diff --git a/navajo_nation/11636697.json b/navajo_nation/11636697.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7cc7be7415d8606ccbc6b5330acf6c13e70f3e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11636697.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11636697\", \"name\": \"Lee and Pearl AUSTIN, Appellants. vs. Margaret A. BEGAY, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Austin v. Begay\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-04-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-01-80\", \"first_page\": 14, \"last_page\": 14, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 14\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lee and Pearl AUSTIN, Appellants. vs. Margaret A. BEGAY, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-01-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nApril 15, 1980\\nLee and Pearl AUSTIN, Appellants. vs. Margaret A. BEGAY, Appellee.\\nAndy G. Smith, Esq., Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellee and Richard George, Esq., Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellants\", \"word_count\": \"121\", \"char_count\": \"736\", \"text\": \"ORDER OF DISMISSAL\\nThe appeal in the above entitled matter, filed the 28th day of January, 1980, having been received and considered by the (Acting) Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7801, the Court finds that no proof of service by personal service or by certified mail as required by Rule 6(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure was certified upon the documents filed with the Court of Appeals.\\nThe above captioned matter is, therefore, HEREBY DISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11637415.json b/navajo_nation/11637415.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac558fe5f696d8823506ae3e61a20e9325507155
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11637415.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11637415\", \"name\": \"In Re: Admission to Practice Before The Courts of the Navajo Nation\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Admission to Practice Before the Courts of the Navajo Nation\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-11-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-29-80\", \"first_page\": 34, \"last_page\": 34, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 34\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In Re: Admission to Practice Before The Courts of the Navajo Nation\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-29-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nNovember 26, 1980\\nIn Re: Admission to Practice Before The Courts of the Navajo Nation\\nTom Tso, Esq., Chairman of the Navajo Bar Admission Committee, Window Rock, Arizona, for Applicants.\", \"word_count\": \"238\", \"char_count\": \"1458\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nReview of Motion by\\nNelson J. McCABE, Chief Justice.\\nOrder entered.\\nThe above-entitled matter having come before the Honorable Court this date on a Petition for Admission to practice law before the Courts of the Navajo Nation, filed by Tom Tso, Chairman, Bar Admissions Committee, Navajo Nation Bar Association, on behalf of the twenty applicants who have successfully passed the appropriate bar examinaton and are qualified to practice law before the Courts of the Navajo Nation; the Court otherwise being fully informed in the premises thereof finds that said petition ought be granted.\\nTHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Admission to Practice before the Courts of the Navajo Nation, filed in this cause be and is granted.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following persons be and are hereby admitted to practice law before the Courts of the Navajo Nation:\\nGeorge J. ADSON, JR.\\nBruce B. BALTAR\\nDavid W. BARROW\\nIrene Feigenoff BARROW\\nMark Glenton BEDEL\\nJ. Tonny BOWMAN\\nVirginia BYRNES Miki DEERWATER\\nSteven A. HARVEY\\nCynthia H. HELLER\\nDave JACKSON\\nSteven LeCUYER\\nJuanita LUMPMOUTH\\nMary Lynne NEWELL\\nJane T. NEZ\\nG. Irene Crawford ROACH\\nAngela SANFORD\\nNona Lou SMITH\\nGuy C. THOMAS\\nCasey WATCHMAN\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/11637605.json b/navajo_nation/11637605.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..115ca8ef5130e3f28e879a45997af4aa3347f91a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11637605.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11637605\", \"name\": \"Leonard WATCHMAN, Appellant, vs. Peter MacDONALD, et al., Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Watchman v. MacDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-02-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-09-80\", \"first_page\": 46, \"last_page\": 46, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 46\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Leonard WATCHMAN, Appellant, vs. Peter MacDONALD, et al., Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-09-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nFebruary 26, 1981\\nLeonard WATCHMAN, Appellant, vs. Peter MacDONALD, et al., Respondents.\\nLeonard Watchman, Esq., Prosecutor, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for Appellant and Michael V. Stuff, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"192\", \"char_count\": \"1160\", \"text\": \"ORDER OF DISMISSAL\\nRule (2c) of the Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of the final judgment.\\nThe final order of dismissal of the entitled matter was entered on March 5, 1980.\\nThe appeal on the entitled matter was filed in the Court of Appeals of the Navajo Nation on April 7, 1980.\\nThe appeal record does not contain proof of personal service or mail service as requird by Rule 6(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure .\\nThe appeal record and the District Court records do not show that the appellant ever complied with Rule 5(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.\\nThe appeal was filed thirty-three (33) days after the final order of the District Court and due to non-compliance with appellate procedure, the appeal shall be dismissed.\\nTHEREFORE, the appeal in the entitled matter is hereby DISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11637761.json b/navajo_nation/11637761.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..380a56a0ce8289967f50bf364803d53982068ee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11637761.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11637761\", \"name\": \"Richard CHISCHILLY, Appellant, vs. Thomas O. and Lenora W. LINCOLN, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Chischilly v. Lincoln\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-04-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-17-80\", \"first_page\": 50, \"last_page\": 50, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 50\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Richard CHISCHILLY, Appellant, vs. Thomas O. and Lenora W. LINCOLN, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-17-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nApril 22, 1981\\nRichard CHISCHILLY, Appellant, vs. Thomas O. and Lenora W. LINCOLN, Appellees.\\nGenevieve Chato, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"99\", \"char_count\": \"616\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nOn December 22, 1980, Richard Chischilly, the Defendant-Appellant, filed his withdrawal of appeal in this case, indicating the matter which was appealed had been resolved by action of the District Court. Since there is now no further action to be taken by the Court of Appeals, the appeal filed July 3, 1980 is dismissed and the judgment of the District Court is final.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11637946.json b/navajo_nation/11637946.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..823b27b5dc6c2d9333de1be1f03437a35c415636
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11637946.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11637946\", \"name\": \"James Woodrow CURTIS, Petitioner, vs. NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION ADMISSION COMMITTEE; its members; chairman; agents; assigns; proctors; and monitors, Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Curtis v. Navajo Nation Bar Ass'n Admission Committee\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-08-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-08-81\", \"first_page\": 53, \"last_page\": 53, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 53\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James Woodrow CURTIS, Petitioner, vs. NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION ADMISSION COMMITTEE; its members; chairman; agents; assigns; proctors; and monitors, Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-08-81\\nAugust 14, 1981\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nJames Woodrow CURTIS, Petitioner, vs. NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION ADMISSION COMMITTEE; its members; chairman; agents; assigns; proctors; and monitors, Respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"172\", \"char_count\": \"1062\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nOrder by the\\nAssociate Justice Homer Bluehouse.\\nThe Honorable Chief Justice Nelson J. McCabe has disqualified himself from acting upon the petition for a writ of mandamus and has appointed the undersigned Associate Justice to make any necessary orders in this matter. The petition was filed upon February 27, 1981 and it appears that James Woodrow Curtis has actually taken the examination for admission to the Bar of the Navajo Nation. That being the case there is no need for this Court to take action on the petition or comment further on its merits or legal sufficiency.\\nThe Court takes no position as to the apparent dispute between Mr. Curtis and the Navajo Nation Bar Association Admissions Committee because that dispute is being taken care of before the committee and the Court will defer to it for the present.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11638678.json b/navajo_nation/11638678.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9dfab1f743adc8021ce5562ee62b7331e6de7009
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11638678.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11638678\", \"name\": \"Tom and Dorothy SHIRLEY, Appellants, vs. Hazel JAMES, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Shirley v. James\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-05-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-39-81\", \"first_page\": 83, \"last_page\": 83, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 83\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Tom and Dorothy SHIRLEY, Appellants, vs. Hazel JAMES, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-39-81\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nMay 27, 1982\\nTom and Dorothy SHIRLEY, Appellants, vs. Hazel JAMES, Appellee.\\nLeonard Watchman, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellant and Albert Hale, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"298\", \"char_count\": \"1754\", \"text\": \"ORDER DENYING APPEAL\\nThe appellant-defendants filed their notice of appeal on July 9, 1981 asking the Court to decide certain questions of law. A review of this case shows there are,three issues, largely hinging on findings of fact.\\nUnder 7 NTC Sec. 801, the Chief Justice has the authority to review the reasons stated in a request for permission to appeal and permit an appeal if those reasons show probable cause for review. This means that if the reasons stated do not demonstrate probable cause to believe there has been an error in the trial court's decision, an appeal may be denied.\\nA review of this file shows no basis for impeaching the findings of fact of the District Court, and this court will not overturn the findings of a trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. In addition, there is no showing the District Court was incorrect with regard to its findings of law. The long period of occupation and land use by the plaintiff's father was found as a finding of fact, and the finding of a \\\"customary adverse possession,\\\" if you will, was reasonable. The record before this court does not disclose any attempt on the part of the defendants to obtain a legal determination of the plaintiff's father's land use during the period he exercised it, and the factual and legal findings of the trial judge are not convincingly demonstrated to be in error.\\nThe appellee's request for attorney's fees for a frivolous appeal are denied.\\nThis appeal is hereby DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11639321.json b/navajo_nation/11639321.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d7787abbfc0091ddda5aa9fe27ac82350c71ead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11639321.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11639321\", \"name\": \"William COLLINS, III, Appellant. vs. Dr. John BEGAY and Mary Ann TYLER, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Collins v. Begay\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-09-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-10-80\", \"first_page\": 137, \"last_page\": 137, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 137\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"William COLLINS, III, Appellant. vs. Dr. John BEGAY and Mary Ann TYLER, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-10-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nSeptember 14, 1982\\nWilliam COLLINS, III, Appellant. vs. Dr. John BEGAY and Mary Ann TYLER, Appellee.\\nLawrence Long, Esq., DNA-People's Legal Service, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellant and Donald Benally, Esq., Shiprock, Navajo Nation (New Mexico), for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"264\", \"char_count\": \"1594\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nOrdinarily the Chief Justice exercises his discretionary powers in reviewing appeal cases on file to determine whether there is probable cause for permitting an appeal and to schedule the matter before the full court. 7 NTC 801(b). This is an automobile wrongful death case, and because of the fact the tape recordings of the trial were lost or misplaced, the court conducted a pretrial hearing before the full Court of Appeals.\\nThe defendant-appellant assigned seventeen grounds of error in his brief in support of his appeal. However, this case was decided by means of a jury trial, and the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of. the plaintiffs. Upon reviewing the file, hearing the arguments of counsel at the time of the pretrial hearing and discussing the matter following arguments, the full court finds that there has been no probable cause shown as to why the jury verdict was in error. The arguments in support of each assignment of error simply do not provide this court with any factual or legal grounds which lead it to conclude that there is probable cause that the jury was in error or that the trial judge erred in his guidance of the case before the jury.\\nTherefore the above-captioned appeal is hereby DISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11639509.json b/navajo_nation/11639509.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..13f38e27e4e124ca4c55e978818213f29131904d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11639509.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11639509\", \"name\": \"Grace YELLOWHAIR, Appellant, vs. Jimmy YELLOWHAIR, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Yellowhair v. Yellowhair\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-10-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-04-80\", \"first_page\": 149, \"last_page\": 149, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 149\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Grace YELLOWHAIR, Appellant, vs. Jimmy YELLOWHAIR, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-04-80\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nOctober 4, 1982\\nGrace YELLOWHAIR, Appellant, vs. Jimmy YELLOWHAIR, Appellee.\\nEleanor Shorty, Esq., Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellant and Lawrence Long, Esq., DNA-People\\u2019s Legal Services, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"63\", \"char_count\": \"456\", \"text\": \"ORDER OF DISMISSAL\\nUpon stipulation of the above-named parties, by and through their respective counsel,\\nThe above-captioned appeal is hereby DISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11639792.json b/navajo_nation/11639792.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c2bf2400a5ad0a31109e53d59b5fc0b6cc85cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11639792.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11639792\", \"name\": \"Ellen K. HUBBARD, Appellant, vs. CHINLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NOS. 24/25, APACHE COUNTY, AZ and ARA FOOD SERVICES, INC. Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hubbard v. Chinle School District Nos. 24/25\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-12-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-19-82\", \"first_page\": 167, \"last_page\": 172, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 167\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Ellen K. HUBBARD, Appellant, vs. CHINLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NOS. 24/25, APACHE COUNTY, AZ and ARA FOOD SERVICES, INC. Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-19-82\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nDecember 22, 1982\\nEllen K. HUBBARD, Appellant, vs. CHINLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NOS. 24/25, APACHE COUNTY, AZ and ARA FOOD SERVICES, INC. Appellees.\\nLawrence A. Ruzow, Esq., and AHen Sloan, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Arizona for appellants and A. Dean Rickett, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona for appeHees.\", \"word_count\": \"2641\", \"char_count\": \"15998\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nI. QUESTION PRESENTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS\\nThis is an action by two former employees of an Arizona state school district against the school district. On July 2, 1982 the Chinle District Court, the Hon. Homer Bluehouse presiding, ruled it had p\\u00e9rsonal and subject matter jurisdiction over the cause but it exercised discretion to decline jurisdiction over it. The sole question on appeal is whether the exercise of such discretion by the trial court was authorized and proper.\\nII. THE FACTUAL SETTING\\nThe facts reviewed here are taken from the pleadings and matters on f\\u00fce in this case, and they are assumed to be true for the sake of this opinion. Chinle School Districts No. 24 and 25 (the school district) are consohdated and they are organized under the school laws of the State of Arizona. The school district is composed of an elementary and a high school district serving the Chinle area. The Chinle Community and its surrounding area are an integral part of the Navajo Nation and its territory, and that area is also organized as the Chinle Agency for the purpose of the governmental business of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and for the purposes of the government of the Navajo Nation. The Chinle area lies in the heart of the Navajo Nation, and of course the school district Hes solely within the territory of the Navajo Nation. The district operates ten schools and district-wide school programs, and most of the approximately 4,000 pupils enroHed are members of the Navajo Tribe. Obviously the parents of these Navajo students are for the most part members of the Navajo Tribe, and those parents exercise their dual tribal-state citizenship by voting for members of the school board. The district's approximately 800 employees live and work within the Navajo Nation, and approximately one-half of that number are members of the Navajo Tribe.\\nThe school district receives a great deal of its operational funding from programs of the United States government designed for Indians ( See A.R.S. Sec. 15205 ), and it has admitted it receives funding under a number federal education laws, e.g. 25 U.S.C. Secs. 293a, 452-457. Aside from funding to the school district which is given solely due to the status of the student population as Indians, it receives governmental and quasi-governmental benefits from the Navajo Nation including police protection, fire department protection, utilities (water, gas, telephone, electricity, etc.) and other services. These benefits and services are provided by the Navajo Nation through its divisions, entities or organizations. There are indirect benefits to the school in the form of shopping centers housing, streets and roads, news dissemination and all the other benefits which are supported, provided or encourage by the government of the Navajo Nation.\\nIn short, the school district and its employees exists in a total Navajo environment within the Navajo Nation, and there are few aspects of the operations of the school district which do not affect or are not affected by the government of the Navajo Nation.\\nThe dispute in this case arises from the refusal of the school district, through its school superintendent and its governing board, to renew the contracts of a Navajo plaintiff by the name of Lucille L. Begay and a Navajo plaintiff by the name of Ellen K. Hubbard. Ms. Begay was the personnel director of the school district from 1974 until her contract for the 1981-1982 school term expired, and Ms. Hubbard was the assistant food service director, serving the district four years prior to the termination of her school year 1981-1982 contract. The plaintiffs complain (summing up very briefly) that the refusal to renew the contracts was in violation of the school's Navajo preference policy, the law of the Navajo Nation guaranteeing Navajo preference in employment (including termination) and the guarantee of freedom of expression under Navajo law.\\nWe do not reach the merits of the claims since this opinion is solely one on whether the trial court properly dismissed the case, but all these facts will be assumed to be true for the purpose of deciding the governmental interest of the Navajo Nation in exercising jurisdiction. The facts are important also for the purpose of deciding the claim of a quasi-governmental body of the State of Arizona to immunity from the exercise of our jurisdiction.\\nIII. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION\\nA. The Navajo Nation as an Independent Sovereign\\nAs far as the Navajo Nation is concerned, the State of Arizona is a foreign government. While the State of Arizona has yet to recognize the Navajo Nation as a separate sovereign. It does grant comity in the enforcement of Navajo decisions and law in a de facto kind of recogni- zation of our sovereignty. Begay v. Miller, 222 P. 2d 624, 628 (Arizona, 1950); Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P. 2d 689, 695 (Ariz. App. 1977). The \\\"comity\\\" granted by the Arizona courts to our statutes and decisions is that they \\\"will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions\\\" of the Navajo Nation \\\"not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect.\\\" Brown, Id., p. 695. Where a decision is made within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Navajo Nation, that decision will be recognized as valid by the Arizona courts. Begay, Id., p. 628.\\nThe fact that the Navajo Nation is an independent sovereign, at least as regards the State of Arizona, is clear. A landmark American constitutional case, Worcester v. Georgia, ruled that Indian nations are \\\"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights,\\\" and that they have ceased to be a state in the international law sense. 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832). In 1978 the status of the Navajo Nation as a self-governing sovereign was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court, and it reaffirmed basic Indian affairs law under the United States Constitution that Indian nations are self-governing under the law of nations-international law. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). See also Higgins, \\\"International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations by the United States,\\\" 3 Arizona L. Rev. 74 (1961); Institute for the Development of Indian Law, \\\"The Indigenous People of Saskatchewan Take Their Rightful Place in the Community of Man,\\\" in Opekokew, The First Nation; Indians Government and the Canadian Confederation, 52 (Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, 1980); Opekokew, The First Nations: Indian Government in the Community of Man, 19-23 (Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, 1982).\\nThe relationship between the State of Arizona and the Navajo Nation is that of two independent sovereigns. As was said in the case Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council:\\n\\\". . . Indian tribes are not states. They have status higher than that of states. They are subordinate and dependent nations possed of all powers as such only to the extent that they have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United States.\\\" 272 F.2d 131,134 (C.A. 10, 1959).\\nTherefore the Navajo Nation stands on the same footing with regard to the state of Arizona when its entities conduct business within the Navajo Nation as a foreign nation which conducts its affairs within the United States. We therefore look to rules of international law to decide whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.\\nB. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over a Foreign Government\\nThere is little by way of domestic American law to guide us in ruling on this matter, and the presentations of counsel here, however, scholarly, provide us with little in the way of concrete guidelines.\\nOne case, involving the state taxation of a Mescalero Apache ski resort outside the boundaries of the tribe's reservation, does provide some guidance. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). There the Supreme Court held that Indians who go beyond their reservation land and their state constitutions, they can regulate activities taking place outside a reservation. Id. at 149-150. The final lesson to be taken from the ruling is that the doctrine of inter-governmental immunity is out of favor and will not be resurrected. Id at 155.\\nWhat was true for the Mescalero Apache Tribe should conversely be true for the school district here, and there would appear to be no bar to applying non discriminatory (i.e. contract, labor and tort) law to it. Because the State of Arizona has disclaimed control over the Navajo Nation, there is no reason that its governmental entities cannot be regulated when operating within the Navajo territorial jurisdiction.\\nOne noted international scholar has said that \\\"Jurisdiction\\\" refers to particular aspects of the general legal competence of states often referred to as sovereignty.1 Jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty and refers to judicial, legislative, and administrative competence.\\\" Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 261 (1966). In discussing jurisdiction the starting point and the presumption is that jurisdiction is territorial . Id. However, in civil cases courts normally look at where the facts in issue took place, as well as questions of allegiance, domicile, submission to the jurisidiction and like matters. Id. at 262.\\nThere are no consistent principles under international law for the exercise of juridiction over the political subdivisions and state agencies of foreign states. Id. at 285. The three approaches are (1) finding immunity in the basis a political subdivision is an organ of a state; (2) finding that sovereignty for the purpose of immunity lies only in the central organs of a state; and (3) looking at the function of the entity in deciding whether it is carrying out political acts (which are immune) or simply administrative acts. Id. The test to be applied would appear to be effective control by the foreign government. Id.\\nUnder federal domestic law it is clear that a foreign government or entity can bring suit in United States courts so long as it is recognized by the United States and at peace with it. Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 320 (1978). The Courts of the Navajo Nation take the same view.\\nAs to allowing suit against a foreign government, there is no command in federal law that the Navajo Nation grant immunity in such suits. \\\"(T)he priviledged position of a foreign state is not in explicit command of the Consititution. It rests on considerations of policy given legal sanction by this Court.\\\" National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 359 (1954). Indeed considering the aspects of a waiver of sovereign immunity by the host sovereign, the ability of the foreign sovereign to be sued in its own courts, a lack of impact upon friendly relations and fair play, there is no reason a foreign sovereign cannot be sued. Id. 362-366.\\nWe have no doubt that our courts do indeed have jurisdiction over such suits, and we have no doubt that the tests of the National City Bank case could be satisfied. The Navajo Nation does relax sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance, a school district can be sued in the State of Arizona, and given the facts recited above,, fair play would support the extension of jurisdiction. A school district is not so important or central an organ of the government of the State of Arizona that it should be exempted from having its conduct reviewed by the Navajo Courts. It is indeed not a central organ of the State of Arizona, and the acts complained of here are iii no way political. They are acts falling under the law of contract, tort and civil rights.\\nHowever there is another important consideration which this court takes into account. That is the doctrine of comity which says that \\\"one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers . . have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.\\\" Darr v. Burford, 399 U.S. 200, 204 (1949).\\nThe trial court found there were matters of comity in the relationship between the courts of Arizona and the District Court for the District of Chinle, and that principles of comity require absentation from hearing the cases. In the National City Bank case it was noted that friendly relations with China were a factor in excercising or declining to grant immunity. Above at 365. Our courts should tread lightly in dealing with affairs of relations with foreign governments in the absence of clear indications from the Executive Branch of the Navajo Nation because of the importance of relations with states and their organs. See Id. at p. 361.\\nTherefore we conclude by holding clearly, with no mistake or misinterpretation to be assumed, that the courts of the Navajo Nation do have jurisdiction over this defendant and that such jurisdiction is fully supported by international and domestic American law. The parties, the events and the operations of the defendant ah he within the Navajo Nation's territory, and since they involve matters of civil rights law, labor policies and the education of children, the subject matter of this suit is clearly within the authority of the Navajo Courts. The entity and the individuals carrying on the work of the entity are within our personal jurisdiction. However, the decision of the trial court to exercise restraint in deference to the courts of te State of Arizona and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona was proper under principles of comity. The District Court had the proper discretion to not exercise jurisdiction in this case, and this court finds no compelling reason to say that the discretion was abused. There may be a case in which considerations of policy and the protection of individual Navajo in and effective forum will require a different outcome, but those matters will be presented on a case by case basis. Further, the courts of the Navajo Nation should not adventure into the field of affairs with state governments without a clear indication from the Chairman of the Navajo Nation, exercising his or her external affairs powers, or the Navajo Tribal Council, exercising its lawmaking authority, that there is a mandate to do so.\\nSince this opinion deals with a major jurisdictional question we make one further point clear; This opinion does not decide whether the State of Arizona his concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suits filed in the Chinle District Court. It may well be that the jurisdiction of our courts is exlusive, given the location and subject matter involved. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). It may also be argued that the parties involved, Indian plaintiffs and a state school district, somehow provide the basis for the extension of State court jurisdiction. We do not decide that question. We simply rule that our courts have jurisdiction over the subject and over all the parties to the suit. Having decide that our courts do have jurisdiction, we have applied principles of public international law, comity in particular, in order to uphold the use of discretion by the Chinle District Court. Due to the fact that comity is a doctrine which relies upon good will from a foreign sovereign and the policies of the executive and legislative bodies of government, the conduct of the State of Arizona in the future and the guidance of the Navajo Government could require us to arrive at a different conclusion.\\nTherefore, the judgment of the District Court for the District of Chine is hereby AFFIRMED in accordance with the reasons stated here, and the reasoning of this case as to the proper exercise of comity and abstention is confined to its facts\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11639984.json b/navajo_nation/11639984.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ecd2e41347d62420989f8db67af47181a27bfe86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11639984.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11639984\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. KAREN HALONA, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Halona\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-11-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CR-6107-81\", \"first_page\": 189, \"last_page\": 190, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 189\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. KAREN HALONA, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nNovember 10, 1981\\nNo. WR-CR-6107-81\\nNAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. KAREN HALONA, Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"898\", \"char_count\": \"5202\", \"text\": \"OPINION AND ORDER\\nHonorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThis matter comes before the Court on the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence, dated October 05, 1981.\\nThe defendant complains that some ground leaves of a green vegetable substance, three roach clips, a matchbook and cigarette papers, a bottle with seeds and a fish bowl should be suppressed as evidence in this case. The basis for the complaint is that Rule 23 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was not followed, items not recited in. the warrant were seized and the warrant was not based upon probable cause.\\nThe affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant shows that a Navajo police officer went to the house which was searched for a proper purpose - to try to locate the place of an incident for which the officer was called. When the officer went to the door she saw a plant on a window shelf. The officer had a right to knock on the door while investigating a case, and she had a right to check the rear of the house while performing her duties. In short, she has a right o be there. This court cannot help but take judicial notice of the fact that our Navajo police officers are given extensive training in drug identification and detection, and certainly officers can make a sufficient identification of plants to report a justified suspicion of the presence of a marijuana plant. If someone happens to have suspicious-looking plants with a leaf pattern which looks like marijuana, they cannot complain later if action is taken to investigate the matter further. The point is that police officers are entitled and indeed have a duty to act when they see what appears to be marijuana while performing their duties.\\nThe affidavit properly showed the court there was probable cause to believe a crime was being committed on the premises, and officers searched the house based upon a warrant valid on its face.\\nTrue, the warrant was limited to the seizure of \\\"marijuana.'' That certainly dispose of the suppression of the vegetable substance and the seeds because those items were within the scope of the warrant itself. As to the roach clips, the matchbook and cigarette papers and the fish bowl, roach clips are certainly associated with marijuana, as are cigarette papers, an they are properly seizable evidence with respect to the scope of the warrant. As to the fish bowl, it is the court's understanding that the bowl is a container for some of the evidence properly seized. Therefore the Court finds all the items seized to be within the scope of a valid search.\\nOf more concern is the fact the police officers conducting the search did not fully comply with the inventory requirements of Rule 23. It appears that the defendant returned to her home while the search was in progress, and while she was present for the purpose of preparation of an inventory and receipt in accordance with the rule, the inventory was not made in her presence and another police officer witnessed it. The inventory requirement is mandatory and it is imposed upon the police for a proper purpose - to protect the rights of a person whose property is seized so that property may not be lost or that property which was not seized during the search may not be introduced into evidence at trial.\\nThe Court is placed in a quandry because this ruling should not constitute a judicial approval of the breach of the rules of court. However the conduct of the officers in failing to properly compile and deliver an inventory does not rise to \\\"constitutional\\\" proportions under the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Exclusionary rules are based upon legal fictions. That is, the courts make a determination that certain kinds of conduct on the part of the police constitute the violation of basic rights. The compilation and delivery of an inventory is not a basic right and indeed many jurisdictions do not have our strict requirements. In the absence of the violation of a fixed right under the Indian Civil Rights Act a defendant must be prepared to come before the court and show how police conduct or misconduct injures him or her or how it prejudices his or her defense. In this case the presence of absence of an inventory made and delivered on the scene in a proper way does not appear to affect the defendant's case. The defendant has access to the inventory which was prepared, and she can challenge the introduction of any item of evidence by testimony a certain item was not taken from her home or by challenging the police chain of evidence.\\nTo summarize: The conduct of the police in this case is condemned, but that failure to fully perform a mandatory duty cannot be the basis for the granting of a motion to suppress because there was no injury and there is no shown prejudice. The warrant was supported by probable cause, the items seized were within the scope of a proper search and the requirements of the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act were met. Therefore it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence should be and is hereby DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11640044.json b/navajo_nation/11640044.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..496d2d61254e0e125157c255f5e68a645907e76a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11640044.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11640044\", \"name\": \"REUBEN MARIANO, Plaintiff, v. BAH MARY ARVISO, et.al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mariano v. Arviso\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-12-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. CP-CV-209-81\", \"first_page\": 196, \"last_page\": 196, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 196\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Crownpoint District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"REUBEN MARIANO, Plaintiff, v. BAH MARY ARVISO, et.al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"CROWNPOINT DISTRICT COURT\\nDecember 29, 1981\\nNo. CP-CV-209-81\\nREUBEN MARIANO, Plaintiff, v. BAH MARY ARVISO, et.al., Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"285\", \"char_count\": \"1639\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nHonorable Marie F. Neswood, Judge presiding.\\nA petition for the removal of this action to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico was filed in this court on December 21, 1981. The removal petition, filed in U.S. District Court by the United States Attorney for New Mexico, alleges that the courts of the United States are vested with jurisdiction over this dispute due to the fact defendants Dodge and Plummer are acting as federal employees in the matters complained of.\\nUnder 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1446(e), where a copy of the removal petition is filed with the clerk of a state court, the clerk is required to \\\"effect\\\" the removal to federal court. The \\\"State court\\\" is also to proceed no further. This court is a \\\"State court\\\" for the purpose of the statute. While there has been no order for the records and proceedings in this court to be brought before the United States District Court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(b), this court's records should be transmitted to the United States District Court for the convenience of that court and the parties to this action.\\nIt is therefore\\nORDERED that there shall be not further proceedings herein except upon any remand of the United States District Court, and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this court shall make a copy of the file herein to be retained with the records of this court and that she shall forward the original court file to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico at Albuquerque.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11640402.json b/navajo_nation/11640402.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dacee2ce02ec60eced4a1f66c29ad109b992347d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11640402.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11640402\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. ROSS BIGMAN, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Bigman\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-04-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CR-7588-81\", \"first_page\": 231, \"last_page\": 232, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 231\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. ROSS BIGMAN, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nApril 26, 1982\\nNo. WR-CR-7588-81\\nNAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff, v. ROSS BIGMAN, Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"982\", \"char_count\": \"5831\", \"text\": \"OPINION AND ORDER\\nHonorable Henry Whitehair, Judge presiding.\\nThis opinion and order is based upon a motion for discovery made by the defendant on February 24, 1982. The motion demands witness statements taken by the Navajo Nation; tests, demonstrations and like matters; and documents and exhibits the prosecution intends to introduce at trial.\\nRule 12 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the court the discretion to grant criminal discovery motions upon a showing the items sought \\\"may be material to the defense\\\" and a showing the request is reasonable. The showing of materiality here was that the prosecution's evidence and testimony needs to be known by the defendant in order to prepare for trial. That showing will have to suffice for the showing of reasonableness, because there was no specific showing which addressed reasonableness.\\nThe questions before the court are 1) The proper scope of a discovery order, and 2) the sufficiency of the motion.\\nThere is no outside precident which will give clear guidance to the court in deciding what the proper scope of discovery will be. Our Rule 12 was apparently based upon Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However there is a large difference in our rule and the Federal rule. Rule 16 F.R.Cr.P. limits the discovery of witness statements to those of the defendant and exempts government materials which are its work product. R. 16(a)(1), (a)(2). Our rule permits the discovery of any books, papers, documents, etc. the prosecution has which are \\\"obtained from the defendant or elsewhere.\\\" Therefore our rule is in reality an \\\"open file\\\" rule. That is, there is a common practice among the various United States Attorneys and state prosecutors to permit the defendant to inspect the prosecution file in order to see what the government's case is. This practice was spurred by the case of Brady v. Maryland, which requires the revelation of evidence favorable to the defendant. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under this rule even a negligent failure to disclose favorable evidence may constitute a denial of due process. See United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478 (CA 5, 1980); Ogden v. Wolf, 522 F.2d 816 (CA 8, 1975); United States v. McCrane, 527 F.2d 906 (CA 3, 1975); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Anderson, 574 F. 2d 1347 (1978).\\nGiven the fact the Judges of the Navajo Nation quite apparently had Rule 16 of the federal criminal rules in mind, and given the fact of the Brady line of cases, the court must conclude the scope of our Rule 12 is broad and can encompass any kind of matter.\\nThe only limitations on the full scope of Rule 12 are the required showings of materiality to the defense and reasonableness. The defendant here simply says he needs these things to prepare for trial. There is no showing of any Brady argument, but that may well not be necessary under our rule. Because we do have an \\\"open file\\\" rule and because the defense counsel has a duty to prepare for trial, the materiality element would appear to be satisfied by a showing, by saying so and by asking for certain things, that the materials are needed for trial preparation. To not do so given our rule would be ineffective assistance of counsel. See, \\\"Modern Status of Rule as to Test in Federal Court of Effective Representation by Counsel,\\\" 26 ALR Fed. 218; \\\"Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,\\\" 5 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, 267.\\nThere was no facial showing of reasonableness in the motion, so the court is left to examine what is asked for. Witness statements are reasonable because obviously the defense would want to examine a prosecution witness on any prior inconsistent statement and would want to know that the essence of the witness' testimony will be. Tests, demonstrations and other reports based on possible demonstrative evidence are reasonable as well because the defendant will want to prepare to rebutt any unfavorable results or matters shown by them. Exhibits and other documentary evidence to be introduced at trial are reasonably discoverable in order to prepare objections and rebuttal evidence.\\nTherefore the court must conclude that the scope of the motion is almost unlimited and there has been skimpy yet proper showing for the court to exercise its discretion and permit a discovery order.\\nOur rule may be extremely liberal one, and the court notes the lack of discovery by the prosecution. This is not to say that the court could not order such discovery because of the fact trial courts have inherent powers to require the production of all relevant facts in a criminal trial, any statutory limitations notwithstanding. United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684 (CA6, 1977).\\nTherefore, in compliance with Rule 12, R.Cr.P., the court enters the following ORDERS:\\n1. The motion of the defendant is hereby GRANTED, and he shall be permitted to inspect and copy all witness statements, reports, tests, demonstrations, documents, exhibits and other matters in the custody and control of the prosecution with respect to the above-captioned matter; and\\n2. The permitted discovery shall take place at the office of the Prosecutor or the office of the individual or agency having custody and control of the sought materials; and\\n3. Counsel of record for the Navajo Nation shall advise counsel for the defendant of the location and custodian of the materials sought; and\\n4. Discovery shall be permitted in accordance with this order no later then ten days from the date of its entry; and\\n5. Reproduction of the sought materials shall be made at the location of the materials or a place reasonably agreed to or accessable to their place of location, and the defendant shall pay any costs of reproduction of such materials.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11640489.json b/navajo_nation/11640489.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c4d3ed42b79cbae8159138bf02531c6f1f0ab2ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11640489.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11640489\", \"name\": \"OREN FREJO, Plaintiff, v. AGNES BARNEY, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Frejo v. Barney\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-52-82\", \"first_page\": 237, \"last_page\": 238, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 237\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"OREN FREJO, Plaintiff, v. AGNES BARNEY, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nMay 24, 1982\\nNo. WR-CV-52-82\\nOREN FREJO, Plaintiff, v. AGNES BARNEY, Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"874\", \"char_count\": \"5198\", \"text\": \"RULING ON MOTION TO TRANSFER JURISDICTION\\nHonorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThis is a child custody and modification of child support action in which the parties were asked to provide the court with affidavits giving factual data upon which to determine both the jurisdiction of this court and the McKinley County, New Mexico District Court. The question of tribal versus state jurisdiction with regard to members of the Navajo Tribe was discussed in detail in the court's May 12th decision.\\nThe parties are in agreement that on September 2, 1976, when Mr. Frejo filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage of the parties in state court, the parties and the children were in the State of New Mexico. Mr. Frejo says he lived at Zuni, and Mrs. Barney says she lived in Gallup. However it is clear that the children lived in GaHup. On November 22, 1976, when the decree of dissolution was granted, all the concerned individuals lived in Gallup. It is agreed that when this action was filed on February 11, 1982, the parents and children lived within the Navajo Nation. Mr. Frejo and Karen Frejo lived in Shiprock, and Mrs. Barney and Kurt and Kim Frejo lived in Tohatchi. Both adults are employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\\nThe court finds that there is no question as to the validity of the New Mexico divorce decree. AH the necessary parties to the decree resided in New Mexico outside the outer boundaries of the Navajo Nation at the time, and indeed the respondent has properly pointed out that suit was filed in state court due to the 90 day residence requirement of the Navajo Tribal Code.\\nHowever the question of whether or not this court should decline to exercise jurisdiction depends upon the current significant contacts of the parties and the children to the Navajo Nation, and the responsibility of this court and the Navajo Nation toward the children. The main interest of the court is the protection of the childrens' interests, and the Navajo Tribal Council's findings as to the duties of the Navajo Nation toward its children with respect to the Juvenile Code are fuHy applicable here:\\n\\\"(E)ach child under the jurisdiction of the Tribal Juvenile Court shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance, and control that is con ductive to his welfare and the best interest of Tribe, the State and the United States; that family ties be preserved and strengthened whenever possible;... and the peace and security of the community and of its individual citizens be safeguarded.\\\" 9 NTC Sec. 1001.\\nThe court concludes that there is concurrent jurisdiction with the State of New Mexico in this matter. While it is true the state court may have concurrent jurisdiction to modify its decree, the modern trend is to litigate child custody at the place of the custody of the child and to litigate child support where a decree can be readily enforced upon the body or resources of the person required to give support. Therefore this court will retain jurisdiction.\\nThe motion is denied because of these factual matters:\\n1. The parties and the children reside within the Navajo Nation;\\n2. The parties and the children are Navajo;\\n3. The children attend school at Shiprock and Tohatchi, making their teachers and counsellors potential witnesses for the child custody issue;\\n4. There are other potential witnesses with regard to child custody, including Navajo Division of Social Welfare social workers, Public Health Service medical doctors and personnel, friends, and neighbors, co-workers, etc.;\\n5. The State of New Mexico has no authority to cause service of subpoenas upon member of the Navajo Tribe residing within the Navajo Nation, and many of the witnesses would fall within this category;\\n6. Social work reports with regard to the parties and children have already been submitted by the Navajo Division of Social Welfare, and it would not be in the best interests of the children to prolong the child custody dispute any further or cause a duplication of effort which has already been undertaken;\\n7. This court can make a speedy determination of the childrens' best interests, in the context and environment of Navajo culture, thereby forwarding the policies of Navajo protection of its children, tribal self-determination with respect to its members and use of a forum closest to the parties in terms of contacts.\\nAs to the effect to be given the New Mexico decree, the respondent was quite correct that this court will honor and enforce that decree. Guardianship of Katherine Denise Chewiwi, 1 Navajo R. 120 (1977). This court wishes to discourage forum-shopping in a jurisdiction which is close to us, and therefore not only will the decree be fully enforced by this court, but it will be modified only upon the same standards set by the law of New Mexico. It was within the expectations of the parties that New Mexico law would govern the divorce, and it should also be their expectation that New Mexico law will govern the questions before this court.\\nBased upon the foregoing considerations, the motion to transfer jurisdiction is hereby DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11640518.json b/navajo_nation/11640518.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a10fec95145562504e5a713fece3155d4ce08c0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11640518.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11640518\", \"name\": \"KEE BROWN, JR., Plaintiff, v. ROSITA BEGAY BROWN, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brown v. Brown\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-C-D-547-75\", \"first_page\": 239, \"last_page\": 240, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 239\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"KEE BROWN, JR., Plaintiff, v. ROSITA BEGAY BROWN, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nMay 17, 1982\\nNo. WR-C-D-547-75\\nKEE BROWN, JR., Plaintiff, v. ROSITA BEGAY BROWN, Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"857\", \"char_count\": \"4872\", \"text\": \"OPINION AND ORDER\\nHonorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThe business before the court in this case is the plaintiff's motion to reopen the judgment which has been entered and vacate it with the exception of the marriage dissolution, which has been granted.\\nOn March 4, 1977 a default judgment on the defendant's counterclaim was entered due to the nonappearance of the plaintiff at a scheduled hearing. Shortly after that, on April 22, 1977 the plaintiff moved the court to set aside the default judgment, and a hearing on that motion was set for May 20, 1977. At the time of the hearing on the motion the plaintiff and his counsel did not appear, so the motion was dismissed for nonprosecution. On April 20, 1982, over five years following the entry of the default judgment and almost five years from the time the last motion to set aside the judgment was heard, the plaintiff wishes a second chance.\\nThe Courts of the Navajo Nation use the common law rule on reopening and vacating judgments. Rule 23 of the Rules of the Civil Procedure states, in pertintent part:\\n\\\"At any time after the final order or judgment, the Court may in the interest of justice reopen a case in order to correct errors or to consider newly-discovered evidence, or for any other reason consistent with justice.\\\"\\nThe vacation or erasure of a judgment is within the sound discretion of the court, but public policy favors the finality of litigation. 46 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments Sec. 682. As to default judgments it has been said that judicial discretion is usually used in favor of granting an application to set them aside so the case can be heard on the merits. Id. Sec. 686.\\nIn balancing the interests of the parties the court must look to two factors which stand out here.\\nThe first factor is that of the time which has passed. The plaintiff complains of the $350.00 per month child support which has been either paid or which is counting up over the years, and yet he did not appear at the hearing on May 20, 1977 and he has sat idle over the past five years with judgment intact. Not only Rosita Begay Brown, the defendant, but Tanya Sharon Brown, the child of the parties, has been relying upon the fixed child support amount all this time. It would hardly be fair to let Mr. Brown sit on his rights over the years and then permit him to now come in and cry that the March, 1977 order was unfair to him. Judges have respect for the finality of judgments, and given a resulting reluctance to interference with them, courts frequently will not give assistance where the applicant did not act with reasonable diligence. Id. Sec. 706. This is certainly the case here.\\nThe second factor to be considered is the fact that the denial of the prior motion to vacate the judgment is the law of the case. Normally strict rules as to the finality of orders on motions are not applicable and subsequent motions may be made on the same ground. 56 Am.Jur. 2d, Motions, Rules, and Orders Sec. 30. While this court may possess the authority to overlook the order of a prior sitting judge for good cause shown, that good cause is not sufficient to overcome the finality of the judgment entered. Perhaps the plaintiff was unjustly treated for the failure of his counsel to appear on March 3, 1977. It may be that the plaintiff's counsel on the case for the May 20, 1977 hearing was in breach of his lawyerly duties. However, given the passage of time and the plaintiff's failure to do anything until now, this court should not penalize the defendant by making her relitigate all the issues that were to be resolved at trial on March 3, 1977.\\nTherefore the court will leave the plaintiff to any remedies he may have against his prior counsel in malpractice actions. That is the only remedy available to him at this point which would be fair to the defendant.\\nAs to the question of child support, since the support of a minor child is a continuing modifiable obligation, the plaintiff will be left to file a proper petition to modify the decree as to child support. He must of course show a substantial change in circumstances from the time of the entry of the initial decree in order to justify a modification of child support. The court makes no decision at this time as to whether child support arrearages may be modified retroactively or whether only present and future child support payments may be modified. That is a matter which would require careful briefing with particular emphasis on the equities of the matter and the modern policy to not permit retroactive modification. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (U.L.A.) Sec. 316(a); and Arizona enactment as construed.\\nGiven the foregoing considerations, the plaintiff's motion to reopen case and vacate order in part is hereby DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/11640557.json b/navajo_nation/11640557.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9d3ba9548dc4e76527473180cddaa5d9c9b17c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/11640557.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11640557\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Petitioner, v. NELSON JESUS, HENRY JESUS, BENNIE LITSON, And any unknown owners, Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Jesus\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-117-82\", \"first_page\": 241, \"last_page\": 245, \"citations\": \"3 Navajo Rptr. 241\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:12.751217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Petitioner, v. NELSON JESUS, HENRY JESUS, BENNIE LITSON, And any unknown owners, Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nMay 24, 1982\\nNo. WR-CV-117-82\\nNAVAJO NATION, Petitioner, v. NELSON JESUS, HENRY JESUS, BENNIE LITSON, And any unknown owners, Respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"1950\", \"char_count\": \"11420\", \"text\": \"FINDINGS OF FACT OPINION AND JUDGMENT\\nHonorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThe above entitled case came before this court for a hearing on the petitioner's petition for hearing to determine livestock ownership on April 21, 1982; Notice requirement under 3 NTC 1304 (b) and 3 NTC 1305 (a) has been properly complied with; Petitioner were represented by the Office of the Prosecutor; Respondent Nelson and Henry Jesus were present and represented by their attorney, William Shepard, Esq.; Respondent Bennie Litson also present and represented by his attorney, Norman Cambridge, Esq.; The court having received testimonies and evidence from the parties, it makes the following findings of fact:\\n1. Petitioner in this case is acting through the Navajo Resources Enforcment Agency, which is vested the authority to enforce Tribal Range and Livestock Laws.\\n2. All the above named respondents are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe of Indians and presently reside upon the Navajo Indian Reservations.\\n3. Respondent Litson claims that he is in the business of buying, selling, and trading livestock including cattles and horses. Said business is conducted without any permit, license or permission from either the Navajo Tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\\n4. Prior to January 12, 1982, Respondents Nelson and Henry Jesus offered to sell to Bennie Litson certain livestocks of which they claimed they are lawful owners:\\n1. One bay gelding with no brand\\n2. One black mare with no brand\\n3. One bay stud colt with no brand\\n4. One jsorrel stud Shetland with State Brand of OnO on LHH\\n5. One sorrel mare with Navajo Tribal brand Y over CL and a -N\\n6. One black filly colt with no brand (colt to sorrel mare with Navajo Tribal brand).\\n5. Respondents Jesus claim that they own the horses since they were born, and they were never branded because they (Jesus) do not have any grazing permit.\\n6. Respondents Jesus testified at trial that approximately two (2) years ago the one sorrel stud Shetland came to their home and since then kept the Shetland pony around their home, and to this day nobody has claimed ownership of that Shetland pony.\\n7. On January 11, 1982 defendant Litson bought said horses from Henry Jesus for a total amount of $300.00.\\n8. The bill of sale dated January 11, 1982 indicated that the seller Henry Jesus sold to buyer Bennie Litson one black mare, one colt, one bay stud, and one stud, and the bill of sale is authenticated by respondent Nelson Jesus.\\n9. The transaction took place in Sawmill, Navajo Nation (Arizona) in District No. 18 without the knowledge of the Sawmill Grazing Committee Member, and the animals were removed to Tsaile, Navajo Nation (Arizona), the residence of respondent Litson, which is located in Ditrict 11. The animals were transported without the knowledge of Tsaile/wheatfields Grazing Committee Member.\\n10. Subsequently defendant Litson attempted to haul said livestock to an auction sale in Aztec, New Mexico while the animals were still unbranded, and in the process of doing so stopped at the Livestock Inspection Station in Shiprock, Navajo Nation (New Mexico) where all the animals were seized.\\n11. After the animals were properly seized by the Range Enforcement Agency Department, the Department held an administrative hearing on January 20, 1982 at the Office of the Prosecutor in Window Rock, Arizona with the presence of all parties involved.\\n12. At the administrative hearing the respondents were given opportunity to prove ownership, and in the process of doing so, a Louise L. Begay, C#55,527 was able to produce sufficient proof and proper legal documentation (a Navajo Tribal Grazing Permit No. 17-1896) to show that two of the impound livestock were hers, to wit: one sorrel mare with Navajo Tribal brand Y over CL, and one black filly colt. These animals were released to her and they are not part of the determination of livestock ownership held on April 21, 1982.\\n13. Pursuant to the testimony and evidence presented, the ownership of the four (4) horses in question are doubtful and therefore should be forfeited to the Navajo Tribe.\\n14. After the hearing the court invited briefs from the parties on several issues, and up to this date no briefs have been submitted. The court will at this time address several issues which it feels needs discussion:\\nOPINION\\n1. DOES THE NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW REQUIRE A BRAND ON ALL LIVESTOCK FOUND WITHIN THE NAVAJO NATION?\\nThere seems to be an assumption that only livestock that are grazing on the Navajo Reservation are required to be branded, and if livestock are kept in a corral, then a brand is not necessary. In this case respondents testified that their animals graze in the immediate area and presents problems because respondents have to go out looking for these animals, in attempt to locate them and return to their home.\\nThose individuals with this assumption are confused on the requirements of a grazing permit and the requirement of a brand.\\nTitle 3 NTC \\u00a7 781(a) states:\\n\\\"All livestock grazed on the Navajo Reservation must be covered by an authorized grazing permit issued by the Superintendent based upon the recommendation of the District Grazing Committee.\\\"\\nClearly this law require all livestock grazing on the Reservation to be covered by a grazing permit. There is an indication that one need not have a grazing permit if his animal is to be impounded at all times, and not grazing. In this manner, perhaps the assumption is proper.\\nThe specific statutes dealing with brands are found at 3 NTC Sec. 2001, et. seq. which state the Navajo Tribe shall require every individual owning range livestock to adopt and record a brand and earmark with which to brand and mark such livestock. A brand can be obtained with a grazing permit or applied for from the state. The point is that all livestock must be branded. If an individual has a grazing permit, chances are that he will also be assigned a brand from the B.I.A., and that is the brand that he has to use on his animal. If an individual does not have a grazing permit but has an animal which he keeps impounded all the time, that particular animal also has to be branded and the brand can be obtained through the state. Clearly these sections state that every animal, whether covered or not by a grazing permit, has to be branded. Paragraph 3 NTC \\u00a7 1301 (1) authorizes the livestock inspectors to seize all livestock not branded as required.\\nTherefore, as a matter of law, all animals either grazing or kept in a corral on the Navajo Reservation has to be branded.\\n2. IS IT LAWFUL TO BE IN POSSESSION OF A HORSE OR CATTLE THAT IS UNBRANDED?\\nBased on the court's discussion in point 1, it seems quite clear that it is unlawful to be in possession of an unbranded animal, in fact under 7 NTC 1301 (1), livestock inspectors are directed and ordered to seized all livestock that are not branded as required.\\nPursuant to 3 NTC Sec. 1251, et. seq. the livestock inspectors are directed not to grant a certificate of inspection of unbranded livestock and further have the charge to prevent any livestock from being shipped, driven or transported unless identification by proof or by bill of sale is signed by the owner of the livestock.\\nTherefore, as the matter of law it is unlawful to be in possession of an animal that is not branded.\\n3. WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO AUTHENTICATE BILLS OF SALE?\\nA bill of sales executed by respondents on January 11, 1982 shows that Henry Jesus was the seller, Bennie Litson was the buyer, and respondent Nelson Jesus was the witness. The question presented here is whether these respondents have the authority to authenticate bill of sales. If not, is that particular bill of sale legal and valid.\\nPursuant to 3 NTC Sec. 1251 (b), livestock Inspectors appointed may authenticate bills of sale of livestock, brands and marks, and deliver certificate of acknowledgement thereto under their hands and seals.\\nThe statute is very clear as to who can authenticate bills of sale - pursuant to the above section livestock inspectors possess and are invested with that ability. Therefore, any bill of sale not authenticated by the livestock inspectors are invalid and are illegal.\\nTherefore, as a matter of law, I conclude that the bill of sale executed by respondents on January 11, 1982 is void and should be held invalid.\\n4. IS IT LAWFUL TO SELL AND TRANSPORT AN ANIMAL FROM ONE DISTRICT INTO ANOTHER DISTRICT?\\nIn this case the animals were bought in Sawmill, Navajo Nation (Arizona), which is located in District 18, and they were taken into District 11, Tsaile, Navajo Nation (Arizona) without the knowledge of the Grazing Committee members either at Sawmill or Tsaile. Pursuant to 3 NTC Sec. 703 (3), one of the purpose of the grazing regulations is to adjust the livestock numbers to the carrying capacity of the range so that the livestock economy of the Navajo Tribe will be preserved.\\nPursuant to 3 NTC Sec. 710 (4), it is a crime to willfully allow livestock to drift from one district to another, and the owner is subject to a trespass action if he permits such drifting.\\nBased on these two provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code, it is clearly implied that it is undesirable to allow livestock to leave one district and to go into another district.\\nThe law does not specifically prohibit selling and transporting animal from one district to another district, however it should be done with knowledge of the grazing committee member from the area from which the animal is sold and also with the knowledge of the grazing committee member from the area to which the animal is being transported .\\n5. WHAT TYPE OF LICENSE, PERMIT, ETC. IS REQUIRED TO ENGAGE IN THE BUSINESS OF BUYING, SELLING AND TRADING ANIMALS ( LIVESTOCK )?\\nNavajo Tribal Code, Title 5, Sec. 2301 (a) authorizes the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council to negotiate and grant leases of, and permits and licenses for the use of tribal lands for all business purposes, now or hereafter authorized by law and upon such terms and conditions as in the discretion of the Advisory Committee are deemed in the best interests of the Navajo Tribe.\\nThe above law clearly indicates that in order to do business on Navajo Tribal land a license is required, and without a license a business is operated illegally.\\nDefendant Litson has been illegally operating a business on the Navajo Reservation by trading, selling and buying livestock without a written license from the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nJUDGMENT\\nBased upon the following findings of facts and the opinion of the court, the following order is hereby entered: 1\\n1. The (1) sorrel stud Shetland with state brand on LHH is not the livestock of Nelson and Henry Jesus, and therefore it was sold to respondent Litson unlawfully, and further since no claim has been made on this animal, the owner is unknown, therefore said (1) sorrel stud Shetland is hereby forfeited to the Navajo Nation.\\n2. Since the Court is in doubt as to the ownership of (1) bay gelding with no brand, (1) black mare with no brand, and (1) bay stud colt with no brand, they are hereby forfeited to the Navajo Nation.\\n3. It is further ordered that the fees incurred in impounding and retaining these animals will be borne by the Navajo Nation.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3549437\", \"name\": \"Nishi GENE, et al. Plaintiffs/Appellees vs. Rufina HALLIFAX Defendant/Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gene v. Hallifax\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-71-98\", \"first_page\": 20, \"last_page\": 28, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 20\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN, and SLOAN (sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Nishi GENE, et al. Plaintiffs/Appellees vs. Rufina HALLIFAX Defendant/Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"Nishi GENE, et al. Plaintiffs/Appellees vs. Rufina HALLIFAX Defendant/Appellant\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-71-98\\nApril 5, 2000\\nAnthony F. Little, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Defendant/Appellant;\\nSamuel Pete, Esq., Shiprock, Navajo Nation (New Mexico), and F.D. Moeller, Esq., Farmington, New Mexico, for the Plaintiffs/Appellees.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN, and SLOAN (sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2846\", \"char_count\": \"17505\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThis is an appeal of a September 5,1998 declaratory judgment and injunction by the Window Rock Family Court which declared interests in life insurance proceeds and directed payment of the proceeds to Nishi Gene for the benefit of the insured's minor children.\\nI\\nThis case is about a dispute between the children of a decedent, acting through their paternal grandmother, Nishi Gene, and the designated beneficiary of a Navajo Nation employee life insurance policy, Rufina Hallifax (\\\"Hallifax\\\"). Hallifax, the defendant in the family court and appellant herein, and Hoskie Gene Jr. (\\\"Gene\\\"), the decedent, began an intimate relationship in late 1986 and started living together in summer 1987, while Gene was a student at the ITT School of Technology in Phoenix, Arizona. Gene was an enrolled Navajo, and Hallifax is a non-Navajo Hispanic woman. Gene and his wife were separated sometime thereafter. In 1990, Gene, accompanied by Hallifax, returned to his traditional home area at Forest Lakes, Navajo Nation (Arizona), where the couple and Gene's children moved into a Navajo Housing Authority rental house. In January 1992, Gene was divorced from his spouse and received custody of the five children of the marriage. After the divorce, Gene, Hallifax, and the children moved to Pinon, Navajo Nation (Arizona) and leased a rental house from the Navajo Housing Authority, qualifying as a \\\"family.\\\"\\nIn 1993, Gene was admitted to the Navajo Nation Police Academy for training as a Navajo Nation police officer. As a police cadet, Gene was considered a Navajo Nation employee. On October 26, T993, he submitted an \\\"Application for Coverage Under the Employer's Health Care Plan\\\" to the Navajo Nation Employee Benefits Program. The application was for health insurance benefits and employee life insurance coverage under an insurance program administered by Fortis Benefits Insurance Company (\\\"Fortis\\\").\\nThe life insurance policy provided death benefits of $60,000 and a double indemnity benefit of $120,000 in the event of accidental death. Gene completed the policy in his own hand. He indicated that he was single and he listed four of his five children as \\\"dependents to be covered.\\\" A fifth child and Hallifax's daughter from a prior marriage were added later. The space for \\\"spouse\\\" under the dependents section was left blank. He checked the box for employee life insurance coverage, indicating he wanted that coverage. One section of the form asked for the given name of the \\\"beneficiary, \\\" and Gene filled in the name \\\"Rufina Hallifax.\\\" The next box asked for the relationship of the beneficiary to the employee, and Gene wrote \\\"FREIND\\\" [sic]. Gene did not change his designation of Hallifax as his beneficiary when he later added the other two children as his dependents.\\nGene graduated from the Navajo Nation Police Academy and became a police officer in February 1994. He continued to live at Pinon with Hallifax and the children until he was assigned to police duties out of Shonto, Navajo Nation (Arizona), which is beyond easy commuting distance from Pinon. Gene leased an apartment in Shonto, while Hallifax and the children continued to live in the Navajo Housing Authority unit in Pinon.\\nDuring this period of time, Hallifax cared for Gene's five children. For purposes of the children's medical treatment at an Indian Health Service facility and enrollment in school, Hallifax was listed as a \\\"stepmother,\\\" \\\"custodian,\\\" \\\"legal guardian,\\\" \\\"mother,\\\" 'parent\\\" or \\\"parent/guardian\\\" of the children. The couple and the children described themselves as a \\\"family\\\" for purposes of occupancy of Navajo Housing Authority units. Hallifax cared for Gene's children and had physical custody of them during his absence from the home to perform duties as a police officer.\\nOn January 5,1996, Gene was killed in the line of duty between Shonto and Inscription House, Navajo Nation (Arizona). When Hallifax and Nishi Gene went to the Navajo Nation Employee Benefits Program office to look into employee benefits, they learned that Gene had designated Hallifax as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. Fortis prepared to pay Hallifax the double indemnity benefit when Nishi Gene began this declaratory judgment and injunction action to prevent payment of the life insurance proceeds to her. Fortis commenced a separate interpleader action to deposit the life insurance proceeds into court and removed itself from the dispute between Nishi Gene and Hallifax.\\nNishi Gene took physical custody of the five children and later sought guardianship of them. She applied for and received $60,000 in death benefits for the children under the Navajo Nation Worker's Compensation Program, and approximately $2,000 per month Supplemental Security Income for the children until they reach the age of majority. She also applied for a $130,000 award from a United States Department of Justice program for survivors of police officers who are killed in the line of duty.\\nAt a trial held on June 2,1998, the Window Rock Family Court placed the burden of proof upon Hallifax to prove that the insurance contract was valid, particularly with respect to the beneficiary designation. The court concluded that Hallifax failed to meet her burden of proof. The court then found that the application for insurance coverage that Gene had filled out was incomplete and ambiguous \\\"only with regard to the designation of a beneficiary.\\\" The court also found that it was \\\"questionable\\\" whether Gene intended that Hallifax should receive the life insurance proceeds. The rest of the application was presumably a valid contract because Gene's dependents had received medical benefits under it. The family court did not make findings of fact to support its legal conclusion that the beneficiary designation was either incomplete or ambiguous or that Gene intended otherwise than what he put in his application.\\nAfter finding the beneficiary designation in the application and the resulting contract vague, the court received extrinsic evidence on the relationship of Gene and Hallifax. The family court found that the couple was not married and that they had \\\"no meaningful relationship\\\" because the intimate relationship had terminated prior to Gene's death. The court then resorted to Navajo common law to distribute the insurance proceeds.\\nThe family court awarded the life insurance proceeds to Nishi Gene for the benefit of the surviving children as heirs of Gene's estate by applying the Navajo common law principles that children are central to Navajo life, that there is preference for their support, and that the children of a decedent \\\"should not be forgotten.\\\" The family court declared that, as a matter of law, Hallifax was not entitled to the insurance proceeds and enjoined her from receipt of the insurance benefits. The court also directed Nishi Gene to pay Gene's funeral expenses of $7,697.35; that order is not disputed on appeal.\\nII\\nUpon a review of the family court's final judgment and the arguments of the parties, this Court finds that the only dispositive issue on appeal is whether the family court was correct, as a matter of law, that the beneficiary designation on the insurance application was \\\"vague\\\" or \\\"ambiguous,\\\" and accordingly that Gene did not intend or could not have intended that Hallifax should be the beneficiary of the employee life insurance proceeds. The family court correctly approached the problem of insurance coverage by first construing the terms of the policy using the application before receiving extrinsic evidence of Gene's intent, to be determined from an analysis of the relationship and the conduct of the couple toward each other. However, the family court erred by placing the burden of proof on intent in the application upon Hallifax, rather than Nishi Gene and the children, and by concluding that the application was in fact vague or ambiguous and that it did not reflect the obvious intent of Gene. Accordingly, the family court erred when it proceeded to receive extrinsic evidence of Gene's intent, measured by his relationship with Hallifax, and when it applied Navajo common law child preference policies after finding that there was no \\\"meaningful relationship\\\" between Gene and Hallifax at the time of Gene's death. It also erred when it failed to make findings of fact to support the legal conclusion that the application was vague or ambiguous. We do not see an \\\"incomplete\\\" portion of the application.\\nA\\nWhile this Court has been invited to apply Navajo common law principles to this domestic relations case, we must first do a standard contract analysis, given the existence of an insurance contract. While the definition of insurance is not settled, and the question of what it may be can differ depending upon the context of a given case, we are comfortable in concluding that \\\"[a]n insurance contract generally involves an agreement by which one party (usually identified as an insurer) is committed to do something which is of value for another party (usually identified as an insured or beneficiary) upon the occurrence of some specified contingency.\\\" R. KEETON 8r A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW \\u00a7 i.i(b) (1988). In the context of this case, Fortis is the \\\"insurer\\\" which was committed to do something of value, Gene was the insured, and Hallifax was the beneficiary named in the application. The parties agree that the only relevant document was the application for insurance that Gene filled out on October 26,1993.\\nInsurance is a contract, Benalli v. First Nat'l. Ins. Co. of America, 7 Nav. R. 239, 334 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1998), and basic contract principles must be used to interpret such a contract. In this particular case, the application for insurance is relevant to find Gene's intentions as an applicant for insurance, and Fortis' understandings when accepting the application. A great deal of contract interpretation involving insurance coverage is governed by insurance industry trade practices, and generally, an insurance application is an offer to make an insurance contract which must be accepted by the insurer before there is a contract. R. KEETON & A, WIDISS 2.1(c). While the insurer's acceptance of the insurance application offer is usually done by delivery of an insurance policy, id. \\u00a7 2.1(c) (3), that is not required here.\\nIn this particular case, there is no dispute that there was an insurance contract; the parties are at issue over what it means. Gene, Hallifax, and the children all received health insurance benefits that flowed from the insurance contract which was the product of the application, so the only dispute is over the meaning and scope of the term \\\"beneficiary\\\" in the contract.\\nThis Court previously handled an insurance claim alleging ambiguity in the terms of the insurance policy. We said that whether or not there is an ambiguity depends upon \\\"what the parties intended the contractual language to mean.\\\" Benalli, 7 Nav. R. 335. In this case, the parties are Gene, as an applicant for insurance coverage, and Fortis, as the insurer which accepted the application. Accordingly, we must first look at the relevant documents which indicate whether the parties had a \\\"meeting of the minds,\\\" Hood v. Bordy, 6 Nav. R. 349 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1991), on the meaning of \\\"beneficiary.\\\" A beneficiary is \\\"[t]he person entitled to take proceeds on death of insured.\\\" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (6th ed. 1990).\\nNishi Gene would have this Court interpret the application using a microscope. She points to the application form's title as one for health care only; she focuses upon the lack of a named spouse; she says that we do not know what Gene meant when he ticked off \\\"dependent life\\\" as separate coverage; and the form does not connect the checkoff box \\\"Employee life\\\" with the term \\\"beneficiary.\\\" Nishi Gene's approach ignores the standard canon of construction that a court must read a document between its four corners, or examine a document as a whole to find the intent of the contracting parties. In an insurance context, a court may need to review several documents, but that is not necessary here.\\nGene was not an unsophisticated insurance applicant. He went to the Navajo Nation Employee Benefits Program office as an employee fairly fresh from Phoenix ITT School of Technology. There is no indication in the record that he had any problems reading or speaking standard English. The term \\\"beneficiary\\\" is not a mysterious one, and the insurance application form makes a clear distinction between the \\\"dependents to be covered (the children)\\\" and the \\\"beneficiary.\\\" It is clear that Gene intended for Hallifax to be the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. He wrote Hallifax's name in the \\\"beneficiary\\\" box of the policy application, and he described their relationship in the adjacent box.\\nThe test for ambiguity in this case is whether the parties to the insurance contract reached a meeting of the minds on what the term beneficiary meant. When Gene reached the space on the form which used that term, he wrote in the name \\\"Rufina Hallifax,\\\" and then he indicated his relationship with her. Gene made an offer to Fortis to form a contract which included life insurance and Fortis clearly accepted the offer with Hallifax as the intended beneficiary. We see the acceptance in an indication under the section, \\\"For Company Use Only,\\\" that the application was processed, and thus accepted, on October 29,1993. Moreover, the fact certain health insurance benefits were paid out is further proof that the application was processed and accepted.\\nB\\nThe family court erred in placing the burden of proof upon Hallifax to prove that she was the intended beneficiary of the life insurance policy when she was clearly indicated as the named beneficiary. \\\"Normally the burdens of proof and persuasion are placed on the party asserting a claim or defense.\\\" R. KEETON 8r A. WIDISS \\u00a7 72 e 2 ii. In this case, the acceptance of Gene's application raised a presumption that there was a valid contract of insurance with Hallifax as the named beneficiary. Fortis accepted Hallifax's claim to the insurance proceeds and was prepared to pay her the benefits when Nishi Gene challenged that determination by filing this action. Therefore, Nishi Gene, as the person asserting a claim to the proceeds, had the burden of proving to the family court that the policy term as to the beneficiary was vague or that Hallifax was otherwise not entitled to the insurance proceeds.\\nNext, the family court found that there was no \\\"meaningful relationship\\\" between Gene and Hallifax at the time of Gene's passing. On that basis, the family court concluded that Hallifax did not have an \\\"insurable interest\\\" in Gene's life or property, and thus, could not claim the insurance proceeds.\\nThe insurable interest doctrine provides that in general, the beneficiary of an insurance policy must have some interest in or relationship to the thing or person being insured. See Mutual Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Noah, 282 So.2d 271 (Ala. 1973). However, the general rule does not apply when a person procures a policy insuring his or her own life and pays the premiums for the policy. See id. In such cases, the insured is said to have an unlimited insurable interest in his or her own life, and, absent statutory restrictions to the contrary, may designate any person as the beneficiary of the policy. See id. The beneficiary need not have any particular relationship to the insured.\\nIn this case, there is no insurable interest problem. Gene procured the life insurance policy for himself and the premiums were paid out of his employment salary. Further, the Navajo Nation Code does not restrict the class of persons who can he named as beneficiaries in life insurance policies. Accordingly, Gene was permitted to name anyone, including Hallifax, as his beneficiary.\\nThe question in insurance cases is the intent of the insured, and Nishi Gene did not affirmatively show that the decedent's intention was other than what he stated in the application for insurance. As a general matter, Navajo Nation employees who name beneficiaries in a wide range of relationships should feel free to make their own free choice, so long as the choice is consistent with law and public policy.\\nUpon the foregoing considerations, the September 5,1998 judgment of the Window Rock Family Court is reversed and this cause remanded to that court for entry of an order awarding the life insurance proceeds to Rufina Hallifax.\\nThe family court exercised its discretion to merge an intestate estate distribution and estate claim with the declaratory judgment and injunction action before it. We do not know if there was a separate intestate probate action.\\nFortis responded in a separate action by depositing the Insurance proceeds Into family court for Nishi Gene and Hallifax to contest.\\nWe note that Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 3 Nav. R. 250 (W. R. Dist. Ct., 1982), is distinguishable from this case, and therefore, does not control our conclusions here.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3549451\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff vs. Jesse BOONE Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Boone\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-03-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. KY-PC-012-03; No. KY-CR-712-02\", \"first_page\": 777, \"last_page\": 779, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 777\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff vs. Jesse BOONE Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff vs. Jesse BOONE Defendant\\nIn the District Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Kayenta Arizona\\nNo. KY-PC-012-03\\nNo. KY-CR-712-02\\nRe:\\nMarch 4, 2002\", \"word_count\": \"549\", \"char_count\": \"3494\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis Matter comes before the court upon the Peacemaking Division's request to incorporate a Peacemaking Agreement into a binding Order. The Court having reviewed the request FINDS that:\\n1. This court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the party and the matter herein.\\n2. On August 28, 2002, the Navajo Nation charged above-named Defendant with the offense of Criminal Nuisance in violation of Title 17, \\u00a7486(A)(2) of the Navajo Nation Code. The complaint alleged that Mr. Boone knowingly maintains his place of residence for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct including openly consuming intoxicating liquor resulting in fights.\\n3. On January 22,2003, Mr. Boone pleaded guilty and the Court transferred the matter to the Peacemaking Division to recommend sentence of n\\u00e1ly\\u00e9\\u00e9h. The court required the attendance of the Criminal Investigations Department, Public Department, and Probation and Parole Services.\\n4. On February 25, 2002, Peacemaker Kent Greymountain facilitated a peacemaking session involving above-named Defendant (In the Matter of Peacemaking of Jesse Boone, Case # KY-PC-012-2003). The departments were all present. The Peacemaker found that:\\na. Mr. Boone has a homesite lease within the Kayenta Township\\nb. Mr. Boone has been known to sell liquor and allow drunks to pass-out and cause disturbance at his house.\\nc. Mr. Boone is in a wheelchair.\\nd. Mr. Boone refuses help from Human Services.\\nThe Peacemaker further recommended that:\\na. Public Safety assist Mr. Boone by providing security checks at Mr. Boone's residence.\\nb. Mr. Boone get assessed and evaluated by Counseling Service\\nc. Mr. Boone attend counseling as recommended by Counseling Service.\\nd. Navajo Nation Social Services provide Mr. Boone transportation to and from counseling.\\ne. Navajo Nation Social Services identify an individual to provide Mr. Boone with homecare.\\nf. Mr. Boone continue with traditional ceremonies.\\ng. A review hearing be held in six (6) months for a status report.\\nh. Mr. Boone's homesite lease remain in effect pending the status review in six (6) months.\\nThe parties agreed that these recommendation should be made into a binding Order.\\n5. The Court finds good cause that the Peacemaker's recommendations should be made into a binding Order.\\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED Peacemaker's request is hereby GRANTED.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jesse Boone shall undergo assessment evaluation by Counseling Services for counseling needed.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Boone shall attend any and all counseling recommended by Counseling Services.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Navajo Division of Social Services shall provide transportation for Mr. Boone to and from counseling.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Navajo Division of Social Services will provide home care for Mr. Boone.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Navajo Nation Police Department shall make daily security checks at Mr. Boone's residence.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall schedule a review status hearing in six (6) month to review Mr. Boone's progress.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Boone's homesite will be kept in effect pending the status review session.\\nIT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Mr. Boone shall continue to utilize traditional healing ceremonies as a part of his rehabilitation treatment.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/3550036.json b/navajo_nation/3550036.json
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+"{\"id\": \"3550036\", \"name\": \"Carole ERIACHO Petitioner vs. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT Respondent and concerning Navajo Nation Real Party in Interest\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eriacho v. Ramah District Court\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-01-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-61-04\", \"first_page\": 617, \"last_page\": 627, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 617\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and BEDONIE, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Carole ERIACHO Petitioner vs. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT Respondent and concerning Navajo Nation Real Party in Interest\", \"head_matter\": \"Carole ERIACHO Petitioner vs. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT Respondent and concerning Navajo Nation Real Party in Interest\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-61-04\\nJanuary 5, 2005\\nBernadine Martin, Esq., Gallup, New Mexico, for Petitioner.\\nPatrick Dooley, Esq., Crownpoint, Navajo Nation, for Respondent.\\nLaVonne Tsosie, Esq., Ramah, Navajo Nation, for Real Party in Interest.\\nBefore FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and BEDONIE, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"2611\", \"char_count\": \"15439\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nFERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice.\\nThis Court previously issued an opinion on a preliminary matter in this case. We now decide the merits by granting the writ of mandamus against the Ramah District Court to require it to grant a jury trial.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are as follows. Petitioner Eriacho (Eriacho) is a defendant in a pending criminal action in Ramah District Court. The court did not arraign Eriacho, but instead Eriacho signed a waiver of arraignment form provided by the Chief Prosecutor (Prosecutor) of the Ramah Office of the Prosecutor. According to the parties, Eriacho went to the Office of the Prosecutor and told the Prosecutor that she did not want to appear at arraignment. The Prosecutor gave her a form apparently used by the Respondent Ramah District Court to record waivers of arraignment. Eriacho signed the form and submitted it to the Ramah District Court, which accepted the waiver.\\nThe form itself lists several rights of the defendant which correspond to the rights required to be read to the defendant at arraignment under Rule 12(c) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (Nav. R. Civ. P.). Among these rights is the right to trial by jury. Nav. R. Civ. P. i2(c)(5)(vi). The form states that a defendant has a \\\"right to a jury trial before the judge.\\\"\\nSeveral months after waiving arraignment, Eriacho requested a jury trial. Eriacho signed her arraignment waiver on February 27, 2004. She first requested a jury trial on June 7, 2004. The Ramah District Court denied her request based on Rule 13(a) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (NRCRP). That rule states that \\\"[t]he defendant may demand a jury trial at the time of the arraignment or within 15 days thereafter or it will be deemed waived.\\\"\\nAfter Eriacho requested and the Ramah District Court denied reconsideration of the original order, she filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. We issued an alternative writ staying the case, and requested briefs from the Ramah District Court and the Navajo Nation as Real Party in Interest. In a previous opinion we held that the Ramah District Court's staff attorney was the appropriate counsel for the Respondent in this case. We then held oral argument, and now issue this opinion.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether Petitioner waived her right to a jury trial by not requesting one within the time required by the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure.\\nIll\\nA\\nWe have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus under our authority to issue \\\"any writs or orders [n]ecessary and proper to the complete exercise of [our] jurisdiction.\\\" 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 303(A). This Court will issue a writ of mandamus against a court to compel a judge to perform a judicial duty required by law, if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Duncan v. Shiprock District Court, 8 Nav. R. 581, 587 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). The petitioner must show that (1) he or she has a legal right to have the particular act performed; (2) the judge has a legal duty to perform that act; and (3) the judge failed or neglected to perform the act. Id. Here the Ramah District Court already rejected Eriacho's motion for reconsideration, and denial of a jury trial is not a \\\"final\\\" order for appeal. Id. Therefore there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The question is whether the court was required to grant a jury trial.\\nB\\nEriacho argues as a threshold issue that NRCRP 13(a) is invalid on its face because it improperly restricts her right to trial by jury recognized by the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act. A jury trial is a fundamental right in the Navajo Nation. A jury is a modern manifestation of the Navajo principle of participatory democracy in which the community talks out disputes and makes a collective decision. See Duncan, 8 Nav. R. at 592. As a deeply-seeded part of Navajo collective identity, we construe restrictions on the right to a jury trial narrowly. Id. at 592-93\\nThe Navajo Nation Council and the United States Congress have limited the right to a trial by jury by requiring a Navajo criminal defendant to affirmatively request one. The Navajo Bill of Rights provision states that \\\"[n]o person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment .shall be denied the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six (6) persons.\\\" 1 N.N.C. \\u00a77 (emphasis added). The Indian Civil Rights Act similarly states that an Indian tribe shall not \\\"deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a71302(10) (emphasis added). Unlike the equivalent federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, there is no automatic right to a trial by jury, as the defendant may waive the right by failing to request it. The initial question is whether Rule 13(a) improperly sets a time limit on the right to request a jury trial, or, at the very least, sets an unreasonably short time period in which to assert the right.\\nA court rule may require a defendant to affirmatively request a jury trial within a specific time period. We have recognized the ability of a defendant to waive a fundamental right. Stanley v. Navajo Nation, 6 Nav. R 284, 289 (1990). As a matter of due process, however, the waiver must be a \\\"knowing, [and] intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.\\\" Id. Rule 13(a) acts as a waiver of the defendant's right to request a jury trial by requiring the defendant to file his or her request within about two weeks after arraignment. The rule interprets the defendant's failure to act within the time period as an affirmative waiver. We see nothing in the Navajo Bill of Rights or the Indian Civil Rights Act that prohibits the courts from interpreting inaction within a specific period of time as a knowing and intelligent decision not to request a jury trial. Failure to act can be a waiver, and interpreting the failure to act after a certain time period to he a waiver is not prohibited.\\nThe time limitation serves important purposes that necessarily impact the right to request a jury trial. Both the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act require an affirmative request based on the realities of tribal court practice. For the smooth and efficient management of the expanding dockets of the Navajo courts, there must be a time limit beyond which the right to a jury trial is deemed waived. The process to select a jury within the Navajo Nation is lengthy and costly for under-funded courts. See NRCRP 34-36. If the right to request a jury trial had no time limit, a defendant conceivably could request a jury in the middle of the trial, causing significant delay in the individual case, and considerable shifts in the court's calendar, pushing other cases back while the court selects and prepares the jury. Unlike civil litigants, criminal defendants have a separate right to a speedy trial that may be violated by such necessary delays. 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 7; 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(6); see Navajo Nation v. McDonald, 7 Nav. R. 1, 11 (1992) (discussing speedy trial right). Also, as with other pre-trial requests, fairness to the other party to the litigation, both in civil and criminal cases, mandates that there be a smooth and predictable process leading up to trial. Under these reasons, the establishment of a time limit to assert a jury trial is not, in itself, improper.\\nThe specific time period, fifteen (15) days from arraignment, is not unreasonably short. While this time period is shorter than the time period provided civil litigants, see Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure 38(b) (allowing request up to time the court issues notice of hearing), it is not too short given the right to a speedy criminal trial and the other considerations discussed above. The rule allows a full two weeks from arraignment (or its functional equivalent) to submit a request, giving the defendant ample time to consider his or her options and inform the court of his or her election of a trial by jury. The only remaining question is whether Eriacho's waiver in this case was otherwise \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\"\\nC\\nAs discussed above, as a matter of due process, a defendant's waiver of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial must be \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" This test comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the equivalent right to due process under the United States Constitution. See Stanley, 6 Nav. R. at 289 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Though we originally adopted that standard without reference to Navajo Common Law, we reiterate that standard as consistent with Navajo principles of due process under the Navajo Bill of Rights.\\nWe expand on our previous statement in Stanley by requiring meaningful notice and explanation of the right to request a jury trial before we will recognize the failure to request the jury trial as \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" In Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez we recently interpreted a similar waiver of fundamental rights under Navajo Common Law. 8 Nav. R. 604, 614-16 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). We adopted the federal Miranda standard as consistent with the Common Law interpretation of the Navajo Bill of Rights to judge the validity of a waiver of the right against self-incrimination and an attorney while in police custody. Id. at 614. However, we broadened the requirements under Navajo law by requiring meaningful notice and explanation of those rights under the Common Law principle of hazho'\\u00f3go. Id. at 615-16.\\nWe interpreted hazho'\\u00f3go as mandating more than the mere provision of an English form stating certain rights. Id. We stated that hazho'\\u00f3go requires a patient, respectful discussion with a suspect explaining his or her rights before a waiver is effective. Id.\\nAs hazho'\\u00f3go requires meaningful notice and explanation of a right before a waiver of that right is effective, it requires, at a bare minimum, that the Nation give notice that the right to a jury trial may be waived by inaction. For notice to be meaningful, and therefore a waiver to be effective, the Navajo government must explain to the defendant that the jury trial right is not absolute, as it may be waived by doing nothing within a certain time. Absent this explanation, the information received by a defendant is incomplete, as it appears the right is automatic and perpetual, like the federal constitutional right. Without this information, the waiver by inaction is not truly knowing and intelligent, and would violate the defendant's right to due process. As the description of the right to jury trial in the waiver of arraignment form does not include a statement that the right must he exercised within fifteen days, Eriacho's failure to request it within that time was not a knowing and intelligent waiver.\\nAt oral argument the Ramah District Court asserted that any requirement of notice of the time period would create a \\\"slippery slope\\\" by forcing a court to give notice to defendants of all procedural requirements in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, according to Respondent, any notice requirement would force a district court to improperly act as the defendant's counsel at arraignment. We do not see our ruling today to apply to all time limits in the rules. Unlike mere procedural requests, the waiver of a trial by jury involves a fundamental right of the defendant requiring knowing and intelligent action to be effective under Navajo due process. Other lesser tactical decisions involve no such right, and, consequently, require no affirmative notice by the court. Further, the additional requirement that the defendant be informed of the time limit involves no improper legal \\\"advice,\\\" but merely accurately states the full scope of the right to a jury trial within the Navajo Nation to make sure any waiver is truly \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" The addition of several more words in an arraignment or its functional equivalent should cause no great burden on the court.\\nIV\\nBased on the above, Eriacho did not waive her right to a jury trial, and the Ramah District Court improperly denied her request. We therefore issue a permanent writ of mandamus requiring the court to grant Eriacho's request and hold a jury trial in this case.\\nThough in certain cases we have discussed due process in light of Navajo Common Law, see Attcity v. District Court for the Judicial District of Window Rock, 7 Nav. R. 227, 229-230 (2996) (discussing cases); In re Estate ofGoldtoothBegayfti, 7 Nav. R. 29, 31 (1992) (\\\"Due process is fundamental fairness in a Navajo cultural context.\\\"), in other cases, such as Stanley, we have adopted federal principles directly. In light of our recent case law interpreting ambiguous statutory language in light of Di yin Nohookaa Din\\u00e9'e Bi Beehaz'aanii (Navajo Common Law), Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, 8 Nav. R. 548, 557 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004), we review the meaning of \\\"due process\\\" in the Navajo Bill of Rights consistent with Navajo Common Law principles. See Fort Defance Housing Corp.v. Lowe, 8 Nav. R. 463, 474 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (interpreting forcible entry and detainer statute consistent with due process as informed by Common Law principle of k'e). This means that we are not bound to follow previous case law that applies federal standards to our Bill of Rights without consideration of Common Law, but may review the question again in light of Navajo principles. However, we still consider federal approaches to the problem, particularly when the use of non-traditional devices such as courts, police, and jails are at issue. Rodriguez, 8 Nav. R. at 614.\\nAt oral argument, the Ramah District Court suggested that an explanation of the right to a jury trial was not necessary due to Ms. Eriacho's income, while the Navajo Nation separately suggested one was not necessary due to Eriacho's apparent education level. We reject any rule that conditions the respectful explanation of rights under Navajo due process on subjective assumptions concerning the defendant. This right exists for all defendants in our system.\\nWe note additional concerns in the process by which Eriacho waived her arraignment. At oral argument both sides discussed how the waiver came about at the Office of the Prosecutor. There was no record created by the Ramah District Court or the Office of the Prosecutor to show what Eriacho was told in addition to the defective form. As an analysis of the appropriateness of the use of arraignment waivers distributed by prosecutors and later approved by the court is not necessary to this case, we reserve comment until properly before this Court. We also reserve any question of whether the information communicated by the Prosecutor was otherwise sufficient under hazho'\\u00f3go, see Rodriguez, 8 Nav. R. at 615-16, because the lack of any written information on the effect of a failure to request a jury trial within the time period itself rendered any waiver ineffective.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/3550240.json b/navajo_nation/3550240.json
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+"{\"id\": \"3550240\", \"name\": \"Ricky SMITH Petitioner-Appellant vs. NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF HEAD START Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. Navajo Nation Department of Head Start\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-09-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-50-04\", \"first_page\": 709, \"last_page\": 716, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 709\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and NESWOOD, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Ricky SMITH Petitioner-Appellant vs. NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF HEAD START Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ricky SMITH Petitioner-Appellant vs. NAVAJO NATION DEPARTMENT OF HEAD START Respondent-Appellee.\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-50-04\\nSeptember 21, 2005\\nDavid Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nDana Bobroff, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and NESWOOD, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1884\", \"char_count\": \"11475\", \"text\": \"An explicit rule in the Navajo Nation Personnel Policies provides that failure to call or report to a supervisor for three days will subject an employee to termination. Is such failure \\\"just cause\\\" for termination under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act? Under the circumstances of this case we affirm the Navajo Nation Labor Commission that the employee violated the rule and uphold the termination.\\nI\\nThe facts are undisputed. Appellant Smith (Smith) was a teacher for the Navajo Nation Department of Head Start in Iyanbito. Smith's wife had gall bladder surgery, requiring Smith to take care of their four children. Smith requested leave from his supervisor for three days after the surgery. His supervisor approved his leave, indicating that he should be with his family. After the three days passed, Smith did not return to work. On two occasions he failed to contact his supervisor for more than three work days to indicate he was not coming to work. The Navajo Nation Personnel Policies (Personnel Manual), which apply to Head Start employees such as Smith, require an employee to call or report to his or her supervisor directly within three consecutive working days. According to the Personnel Manual, failure to do so is grounds for termination. Based on his failure to call or report, Smith's supervisor terminated him.\\nSmith filed a complaint with the Navajo Nation Labor commission alleging he was terminated without \\\"just cause\\\" as required by the Navajo Preference in Employment Act. 25 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(b)(8) (2995). The Labor Commission upheld the termination, concluding that he had violated the rule in the Personnel Manual on two separate occasions by failing to call or report within three days. This appeal followed. The Court held oral argument on August 30,2005 and now issues this decision.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether violation of the rule set out in a personnel manual that an employee must call or report to his or her supervisor within three days is \\\"just cause\\\" for termination under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act when the alleged reasons for failing to call in was that the employee was taking care of his family during his wife's recovery from surgery and that the supervisor initially indicated at the approval of the first request for leave that the employee should be with his family.\\nIII\\nWe review decisions of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission under an \\\"abuse of discretion\\\" standard. Jackson v. BHP World Minerals, 8 Nav. R. at 568. One type of abuse is an error of law. Id. The meaning of \\\"just cause\\\" under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act is a legal conclusion which we review de novo, with no deference given to the Labor Commission. Id.\\nIV\\nAppellant casts this case as an opportunity for this Court to define \\\"just cause\\\" under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA). The NPEA requires that employers terminate employees only for \\\"just cause.\\\" 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(b)(8) (1995). Though the Navajo Nation Council clearly rejected an \\\"at-will\\\" employment system within the Navajo Nation by requiring \\\"just cause\\\" for termination, it did not define \\\"just cause\\\" for this Court to apply. Appellant advocates a definition derived from state case law defining similar phrases in statutes dealing with teachers and unemployment insurance. Appellee rejects these definitions as inapplicable to the NPEA and instead argues that violation of the Personnel Manual's explicit rule is \\\"substantial misconduct\\\" and therefore \\\"just cause.\\\"\\n\\\"Just cause\\\" cannot be defined with any precision for all cases through one test. \\\"Just cause\\\" is a broad concept that involves unique factual circumstances in each situation, and therefore must be applied based on the unique facts of each case. See Smith v. Red Mesa, Unified School District No. 27, 7 Nav. R. 135, 138 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995). The term describes \\\"a wide range of employer justifications for adverse actions.\\\" Dilcon Navajo Westerner/ True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 38 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000). Quoting from a general employment treatise, this Court previously described \\\"just cause\\\" as including only \\\"substantial misconduct,\\\" and not \\\"a minor neglect of duty, an excusable absence, a minor misrepresentation, rudeness, and even filing a defamation action against the employer.\\\" Many goats v. Atkinson Trading Co., 8 Nav. R.321, 337-38 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003) (citation omitted). Rather than attempting to define \\\"just cause\\\" through one test, there are some specific principles that can be applied uniformly to cases with common factual elements, such as, as in this case, when a personnel manual prohibits conduct and sets out termination as a consequence for violation. The Court will consider whether failure to follow a clear rule in a personnel manual that sets out termination as a consequence for failure to comply is \\\"just cause.\\\"\\nA\\nA personnel manual is a contract between employer and employee, with justifiable expectations that both employer and employee follow it to maintain harmony in the workplace. Dilcon Navajo Westerner, 8 Nav. R. at 40. Navajos take contracts very seriously, and this Court will enforce them. Words are sacred and never frivolous in Navajo thinking, Office of Navajo Labor Relations ex rel. Bailon v. Central Consolidated School District No. 22, 8 Nav. R. 501, 506 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004), and promises made must be fulfilled absent some compelling reason otherwise, see Allstate v. Blackgoat, 8 Nav. R. 660, 668 (Nav. Sup Ct. 2005) (prejudgment interest cap in insurance contract unenforceable as violative of Navajo public policy expressed in Common Law concept of n\\u00e1ly\\u00e9\\u00e9h). In Dilcon Navajo Westerner, this Court expected the employer to comply with the procedural requirements set out in the personnel manual, as the employee had justifiable expectations that the procedures be followed before she was terminated. See 8 Nav. R. at 40. Employers also have justifiable expectations that rules they set out in manuals be followed, so that they may maintain a predictable and orderly work environment.\\nBased on these reciprocal expectations, a rule set out clearly in a personnel manual, with notice to the employee, generally is binding, and this Court will enforce it as \\\"just cause\\\" for termination if termination is a stated consequence for non-compliance. However, not all rules in manuals are automatically enforceable. Some rules, though plain on their face, may be impossible for the employee to fulfill under the circumstances of the case, such as when an employee is physically or mentally unable to comply. Absent a stated exception for such impossibility, the Court will not enforce a rule if the employee demonstrates he or she was unable to comply. There may be some rules, though contractually agreed to, that violate the public policy of the Navajo Nation as expressed by the Council in the NPEA, see 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A) (stating purposes of the NPEA) or in Din\\u00e9bi beenahaz'danii. Cf. Blackgoat, 8 Nav. R. at 668 (pre-judgment interest cap in insurance contract unenforceable as violative of Navajo public policy expressed in Common Law concept of n\\u00e1lp\\u00e9\\u00e9h). Further, it may be that the punishment itself is so disproportionate to the offense that it contravenes Navajo public policy though the rule itself does not. Based on these principles, we set out this guidance: ordinarily a violation of a clear rule set out in a personnel manual for which termination is a result of non-compliance is \\\"just cause.\\\" However, an employee may challenge the enforcement of that rule as impossible to fulfill under the circumstances of the case or as violating Navajo public policy. We now apply these principles to this case.\\nB\\nThe relevant rule is that an employee absent from the office must call directly his or her supervisor within three days. If the employee fails to do so, he or she may be terminated. Appellant does not contest that he did not comply with the rule. Instead, Appellant argues that this rule, though reasonable, was unfairly applied in the unique circumstances of this case. His argument appears to be that the rule cannot be enforced if the reason for being absent is that he was taking care of family, a central Navajo obligation.\\nContrary to Appellant's representations, this case is not about an employer terminating an employee for taking care of his family. Appellant was not fired for that reason, but was terminated for not calling in to his supervisor for three days. Had Appellant called in, and then returned to work to find that he was fired for taking leave to care for his family, this might he a different case. Further, Appellant nowhere claims he was unable to call in due to the unavailability of a phone or other physical or mental limitations caused by taking care of his family. Absent a showing of impossibility, the only question is whether, on its face, the rule requiring a call-in within three days violates the public policy of the Navajo Nation. The Court does not think so.\\nUltimately personnel rules, such as the one in this case, seek to balance obligations employees have to their employer and obligations they have to their families and the community. No one in this case questions the obligations Appellant as a Navajo had to his family. However, Appellant failed to balance those obligations with those to his employer. The rule in this case merely requires that the employee let the employer know he or she will not be coming in- a simple requirement easy to perform, but with potentially significant consequences for the employer if not fulfilled. An employer has to find a substitute for the absent employee, whether by adding responsibilities to an existing worker or hiring a temporary new worker to accomplish what the absent employee was supposed to do. In the absence of communication by the absent employee, an employer must guess each day whether substitution is required. In the specific Head Start situation, an employee who teaches children has a greater obligation to make sure his or her employer can make necessary arrangements for a substitute, as ultimately the welfare of Navajo children, and the Head Start program as a federal fund recipient is at stake. As such, we hold that the call-in rule, in the circumstances of this case, does not violate the public policy of the Navajo Nation, and Appellant's failure to comply was \\\"just cause\\\" for termination. That he was caring for his family during the time he failed to call or report to his supervisor, absent facts showing impossibility, does not negate the neutral application of the rule.\\nV\\nBased on the above, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission upholding the termination.\\nThe Court takes judicial notice that \\\"just cause\\\" appeals are increasing in number. Given the twenty years experience of the Navajo Nation in implementing the NPEA, the Court suggests that the government, especially those officials who apply the NPEA provisions, provide recommendations to the Navajo Nation Council for further guidance on its intended meeting of 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(b)(8).\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/3550275.json b/navajo_nation/3550275.json
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+"{\"id\": \"3550275\", \"name\": \"Patrick BENALLY, Sr. Petitioner vs. Berlita BENALLY Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Benally v. Benally\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-12-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. KY-FC-038-03 CV; No. KY-FC-038-03 CV\", \"first_page\": 796, \"last_page\": 807, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 796\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Family Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Patrick BENALLY, Sr. Petitioner vs. Berlita BENALLY Respondent\", \"head_matter\": \"Patrick BENALLY, Sr. Petitioner vs. Berlita BENALLY Respondent\\nIn the Family Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Kayenta Arizona\\nNo. KY-FC-583-02 CV\\nNo. KY-FC-038-03 CV\\nDecember 29, 2003\", \"word_count\": \"4830\", \"char_count\": \"30579\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis matter comes before the court upon a Motion for summary judgment by Ms. Berlita Benally, Respondent. The Court heard oral arguments on March rr, 2003 between Lawrence Ruzow, Counsel for Petitioner, and Dennis Glanzer, Counsel for Respondent. Having reviewed the motion, the counter-motion, the case file, other case files pertinent to this case, and being advised in the premises, the court hereby issues its Order.\\nFINDINGS\\nr. This court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and matter herein.\\n2. This matter is a continuation of previous actions filed in the Family Court and in the Peacemaking Division. On December 15, T999, Ms. Berlita Benally filed a Petition for domestic abuse protection order against Mr. Patrick Benally. On February 15, 2000, the Honorable Leroy Bedonie granted a temporary protection order, issued a garnishment order to Mr. Patrick Benally's employer to collect child support, and transferred the case to the Peacemaking Division for the parties to work out the issues. On April 10,2000, Peacemaker Elwood Sageney facilitated a Peacemaking session in which the parties agreed to dismiss the domestic abuse court case with the following conditions:\\na. Patrick Benally will pay child support,\\nb. Patrick Benally will have open visitation with the children,\\nc. Berlita Benally will have custody of the four children, and\\nd. Patrick Benally will build a house for his children.\\nThe following day, on April ri, 2000, the court issued an order incorporating the Peacemaking agreement. A year later, Ms. Berlita Benally requested the court to clarify the child support provision in the order. The court issued an Amended Order on June 5, 2001.\\n3. Immediately after the court issued the Amended Order, Mr. Patrick Benally requested on June rr, 200T for a Peacemaking session to address the more permanent issue of divorce. (The previous proceedings only addressed domestic abuse and not divorce. Mr. Benally's petition refers to divorce.) Mr. Benally included in his petition the following issues to be addressed by Peacemaking: Restoring Ms. Benally's maiden name, visitation, and child support. On August 29, 20or, Peacemaker Analita Osif facilitated a Peacemaking session pursuant to Mr. Benally's request. The Peacemaking agreement documenting the Peacemaking session contains the following provisions:\\na. The parties' divorce by stipulation,\\nb. Patrick Benally will pay child support,\\nc. Half of the cost of the JUA House will go to Berlita Benally and children,\\nd. Patrick Benally's employment will pay medical insurance,\\nf. Patrick Benally will have open visitation with the children,\\ng. Berlita Benally will have custody of the four children,\\nh. Berlita Benally's maiden name will be restored, and\\ni. The child's name will be changed.\\nThe parties did not attempt to incorporate the Peacemaking agreement into an order.\\n4. Upon attempts to divide the JUA House equally pursuant to the Peacemaking agreement, the Peacemaking Division received a letter from the U.S. Navajo And Hopi Indian Relocation Office on October 3, 2oor. The federal office indicated that it does not have any comment regarding the Peacemaking agreement, however, that it needs a legal divorce or reconciliation to proceed with relocation.\\n5. One year later, on August T5,2002, Mr. Patrick Benally filed a Petition for divorce with the Family Court. The petition identified divorce, custody, visitation, child support, and the JUA House as issues to be resolved. On October 15,2002, Ms. Berlita Benally filed a Motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction along with other requests. Ms. Benally argued that the divorce has already been addressed by the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2oor. Mr. Patrick Benally responded to the motion to dismiss arguing that the Peacemaking agreement was not incorporated into a Court order and that the Peacemaking agreement, alone, cannot be enforced. Mr. Benally further argued that the Peacemaking agreement does not have the force of law and cannot change the legal status of federal benefits. Ms. Benally replied contending that the Peacemaking agreement is valid even without it being incorporated into a court order. The court heard oral arguments on the Motion to dismiss the case on December 5, 2002. The court denied Ms. Benally's motion to dismiss the case.\\n6. Ms. Berlita Benally responded to the original petition for divorce on January 2r, 2003. Ms. Benally contended that the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2001 precludes the court from hearing the issues of divorce, custody, visitation, child support, and the JUA House by virtue of the res judicata doctrine. Ms. Benally stated that the Peacemaking Division has already resolved these issues as evidenced by the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2001.\\n7. On November 15, 2002, Ms. Berlita Benally filed a Petition for an order to show cause against Mr. Patrick Benally for his failure to pay child support in violation of the court's amended Order dated June 5, 2oor, and in violation of the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2001. The Court docketed Ms. Benally's petition under a new docket number separate from Mr. Patrick Benally's Petition for divorce. Later, on January 28, 2003, the Court consolidated this case (the order to show cause case) with the divorce action.\\n8. On January 13, 2003, Mr. Patrick Benally filed a motion to join the State of Utah, and Support Kids, Inc, into the Order to show cause proceeding. Mr. Benally argued that Berlita Benally assigned her right to child support to Utah and Support Kids, Inc. and therefore these entities should he joined.\\n9. On February 6, 2003, Mr. Patrick Benally filed for an order compelling the Navajo Nation Division of Social Services to conduct a home study of Ms. Berlita Benally's home to help determine the issue of custody. Mr. Benally contended that the August 29, 2001 Peacemaking session did not address custody. Ms. Berlita Benally responded on March 3, 2003 to the Motion for homestudy by arguing that a change in circumstances is required to modify the Amended Order dated June 5,2001 (that gives custody of the children to Ms. Benally) and no such change in circumstances has been shown.\\n10. On February 12, 2003, Ms. Berlita Benally filed a Motion for summary judgment since the issues being raised in the divorce petition for the Court to consider have been addressed in the June n, 2001 Peacemaking session as evidenced in the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2001. On February 26, 2003, Mr. Patrick Benally responded to the Motion for summary judgment arguing that the Peacemaking agreement of August 29, 2001 is not valid for enforcement because the Peacemaking Division is not legitimate and needs judges and lawyers to validate Peacemaking decisions. Mr. Benally contends that judges validate a Peacemaking agreement by ensuring that due process is afforded to the parties and that their rights are protected through the process. Mr. Benally further attests that he was coerced into making the Peacemaking agreement, that he was denied \\\"opportunity to think about what he was agreeing to\\\", that he was denied a lawyer, and that he misunderstood the value of the JUA House and the inability to pay half its value to Ms. Benally.\\n11. On March 11,2003, the court heard oral arguments on the Petition for an order to show cause, the Motion for summary judgment, and the Motion for the homestudy. Counsel for Mr. Patrick Benally argued that a genuine issue exists precluding summary judgment, and that there should be a court order accepting or denying the Peacemaking agreement dated August 29, 2001. Mr. Benally's counsel re-emphasized the party's rights. The Court granted Ms. Berlita's Motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Petition for divorce, and denied the Motion for homestudy.\\n12. \\\"A party against whom a claim... is asserted... may... move with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part of the claim\\\" See Rule 56(b), Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure. A party opposing the motion must file affidavits, memoranda or both after the motion is made. See Rule 56(c), Id. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See id.\\n13. The trial court may enter a judgment upon a peacemaking agreement if (1) the court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, (2) all necessary parties have actual knowledge of the proposed judgment and agree to it or agree to submit the case to the peacemaker, (3) the judgment contains the complete agreement of the parties and there is sufficient information regarding the full agreement so future disputes will not arise, and (4) the proposed judgment is otherwise proper and enforceable. A judgment based upon the peacemaking agreement is valid if those conditions have been satisfied. See Rule 4.3, N.P.C.R., See also In re Estate of Kindle (Descheene v. Light), 2 Nav. A.R. 627 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 20or).\\n14. In November 2002, the Navajo Council passed the Fundamental Laws of Dine to start aligning the Navajo government and people with Navajo traditional laws and values since \\\"knowledge and practice of these laws are fading and the tribe is experiencing many forms of negative behavior and occurrences.\\\" 5. The Navajo Nation Council finds that \\\"the Dine Life Way must be protected and assured by incorporating these fundamental laws into the Navajo Nation Code in a manner that will openly acknowledge and recognize their importance and would generate interest to learn among all Dine.\\\" 'The Navajo Nation Council further finds that all elements of the government must learn, practice and educate the Dine on the values and principles of these laws; when the judge adjudicate a dispute using these fundamental laws, they should be thoroughly explained so that we can all learn;...\\\" See Amending Title 1 of the Navajo Nation Code to Recognize the Fundamental Laws of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9. Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CN-69-02 (November 13,2002)(emphasis added).\\nANALYSIS\\nThe summary judgment argument raised by Ms. Berlita Benally is based on the issue of the validity of the Peacemaking agreement. Rule 4.3 of the Navajo Peacemaker Court Rules, the rule of making a peacemaking agreement valid by turning it into a court order, was clear when there was no Fundamental Laws of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9. However, when the Navajo Council enacted the Fundamental Laws of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9, the force of agreements from the Peacemaking Division became an issue. After November 2002, the Navajo Judicial Branch needed to explain the direction of the Peacemaking Division as an institution emphasizing traditional Navajo laws. This is apparent in their motions regarding summary judgment. The parties cite to different rules for Peacemaking: Peacemaker Rules Of The Navajo Nation that is found within the Navajo Practice Book (T SB Publishing, Fourth Edition, 2002), and Navajo Peacemaker Court Manual (source unknown). Additionally, when this court researched rules and policies governing Peacemaking, this court found different policies governing Peacemaking in the various districts. Thus, this court is under the impression that there is no single policy for the Peacemaking Division and that there is a need to further clarify the role of Peacemaking within the Navajo Judicial System. Thus now, based on the foregoing findings, this court must decide whether a Peacemaking agreement that is not incorporated into a court order is valid and can be enforced. This court is also pressed to reconcile the role of due process and individual rights in the Peacemaking Division. If the court finds that the Peacemaking agreement must be incorporated into a court order, then the court must deny the motion for summary judgment since the issues raised by Mr. Patrick Benally (divorce, custody, child support, and visitation) are still issues to be decided by the court. That would necessitate the need for trial and judgment cannot summarily be granted. If the court finds that Peacemaking agreements are enforceable even without converting them into a court order, then the court must grant judgment summarily since the matter has already been decided.\\nIn beginning to determine Peacemaking's role in the Navajo Government, this court begins with the Fundamental Laws of Dine that was passed by the Navajo Council in November 2002. The Navajo Council passed the Fundamental Laws of Dine to start aligning the Navajo government and people with Navajo traditional laws and values since \\\"knowledge and practice of these laws are fading and the tribe is experience many forms of negative behavior and occurrences.\\\" See Amending Title 1 of the Navajo Nation Code to Recognize the Fundamental Laws of the Dine. Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CN-69-02 (November 13,2002). The tribal government was designed mostly by federal officials dictating to tribal members. The Fundamental Laws of Dine reminds us that Navajos need to start developing their own government according to their laws, traditions, and customs. This law is a mark of Navajo autonomy.\\nAnother consideration is the United States' policy regarding Indian nations. Throughout its history, the United States Government has implemented mostly destructive and racist policies against Indian nations, including the Navajo Nation. Although scholars in Indian law purport that the federal policy for Indian nations today is self-determination, this court perceives a different view. In the United States Supreme Court's first federal Indian law case, the Court, while discussing the Doctrine of Discovery and subduing the Indians, made the following remarks:\\nThe title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become subject or citizens of the government with which they are connected. The new and old members of society mingle with each other; the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers.\\nWhen the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes these restraints upon him; and he cannot neglect them without injury to his fame, and hazard to his power. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.), 543 (1823) (emphasis added).\\nThe United States' policy for tribes today is to assimilate its members into mainstream America in accordance with Chief Justice Marshall's policy. This Court is impressed that Navajo People today are incorporating into the American melting pot, and the members of each society are mingling with each other. Today, the Navajo Nation is experiencing a rapid loss of its language due to the subordination by the American dominant society. See Deborah House, Language Shift Among the Navajos: Identity Politics And Cultural Continuity (The University of Arizona Press 2002). Whether the distinction between American society and Navajo society will be lost such that they make one people is to be seen. To this court, Navajo traditional laws and values are what make Navajos distinct from Americans. Maintaining a distinct culture is important to this court for purposes of maintaining Navajo identity, Navajo land, and Navajo resources. Those are the purposes for which the Navajo Government was created. When Navajos are no longer distinct, non-Indians will urge the federal government to dissolve its treaty obligations to the Navajos to open reserved land and resources to the public domain. The American Government today is already beginning to avoid its trust responsibility. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1079, 155 L.Ed.2d 60 (2003) (The U.S. Supreme Court avoided the Tribe's claim that the federal government violated its trust responsibility to the Tribe). In interpreting the Navajo statute emphasizing Navajo laws and values, the Fundamental Laws of Dine, this court brings these concerns regarding the federal assimilationist policy. This court assumes that the Navajo Nation Council had these concerns when the council delegates were drafting the Fundamental Laws of Dine.\\nFrom another angle, the United States Judicial Branch's policy regarding Indians today is terminating tribal governments. The most recent line of cases substantially affecting Indians have diminished tribal jurisdiction, the tribes' power to govern their own territories. For instance, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978)(Indian tribe does not have jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crime on reservation), See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (Tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians unless there is a direct effect on the tribe, or a consensual relationship between the tribe and the non-Indian). In these recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that tribal courts need to mirror federal and state courts to be legitimate. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 2323, 150 L.Ed.2d 398, 423 (2001)(Souter, D., concurring)(Tribal courts need to prioritize individual rights). In the present case, Mr. Patrick Benally's contention, that this court must protect his individual rights in Peacemaking, is not directed at the tribe's governance over nonmembers, but at its self-governance (the Nation governing its own members). The court acknowledges these broader considerations in attempting to define Peacemaking's role in the Navajo government today.\\nThe role of Peacemaking is to preserve and promote the traditional Navajo laws and values of k'\\u00e9 among Navajo people as mandated by the Fundamental Laws of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9. Does this court recognize Peacemaking agreements even without a court order? To answer the pressing question, this court recognizes Peacemaking agreements even without a court order. Peacemaking agreements do not have to be incorporated into court orders to be enforceable. In this case, \\\"enforceable\\\" means being recognized by the District Court for purposes of not visiting he same issues again in a court trial and therefore rending judgment summarily.\\nPeacemakers are experts of the fundamental law of k'\\u00e9 which is central to Navajo philosophy and law. Peacemakers emphasize k'\\u00e9 as the top value in their proceedings: Proceedings center around k'\\u00e9. The law of k'\\u00e9 plays throughout Navajo society, even in the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Government. The Judges' Code of Conduct indicates, \\\"A judge should behave to everybody as if they were his or her relatives.\\\" See Canon 1, Section 3, Navajo Nation Judicial Code of Conduct (1991). Relatives are the epitome of k'\\u00e9. Thus, even judges are subject to learn k'\\u00e9. As experts of the k'\\u00e9 principle, peacemakers are legitimate, contrary to Mr. Patrick Benally's assertions. In fact, the Navajo Nation Peacemaking system is renowned throughout the nation and the world. Some argue that the Peacemaking system may address social problems better than a system based on adversity, punishment and power. SeeE.g., Gross Eric K, Evaluation and Assessment of Navajo Peacemaking (Report to U.S. Department of Justice) (1999) (Contending that upon research, Peacemaking is more effective than family court in reducing conflict within and between families and neighbors).\\nIn his response to summary judgment, Mr. Patrick Benally suggests that lawyers and judges are needed to ensure that the individual rights of parties that go through Peacemaking are not violated. In this court's view, individual rights do not belong in the Peacemaking forum for the following reasons. The Navajo Nation adopted the Navajo Bill of Rights in 1967 right before the Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted. The Navajo Government only adopted its own individual rights protections to mirror the United States Government. The Navajo Government made this move to be acknowledged by the American Government. The United States Supreme Court also indicated that a tribal self-governmental practice that reflects the tribal traditional customs and practices is not barred by rights afforded in the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S. Ct. 1670,56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). However, upon inquiry into individual rights, individual rights do not fit in the Navajo Peacemaking forum according to the following analysis. As a starting point, individual rights are a basic foundation of American government and society. The purpose of individual rights is to protect the individual from governmental intrusions into personal liberties. Historically, personal liberties were created to keep the government from becoming too powerful and abusive. See Glasser, Ira, Visions of Liberty: The Birth of the Bill of Rights (Arcade Publishing, 1991). Before Europeans immigrated to America, the English Crown tended to engage in abusive practices against its own English People. For E.g., See Declaration of Independence para. 2-2r (U.S. i776)(Listing some of the abusive practices committed by the King of England against the colonists). The founding fathers wanted to avoid that type of abusive government. Therefore, the founding fathers identified a set of rules that limited the government's use of power against its own people. The purpose of these rules was to protect individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusions. The founding fathers recognized the Bill of Rights and incorporated it into its governmental foundation, the Constitution. The American Government, being premised upon power, naturally evolved into a coercive government. The American Government, like its English predecessor, forcefully took life, liberty, limb, and property. This is apparent in criminal law today. The government takes away liberty by incarceration, life by capital punishment, and property by fines. (The practice of cutting off limbs is obsolete today.) Thus, the founding fathers indicated that due process shall be afforded to those whose life, liberty, and property was at stake by the government. See e.g., 5th and 14th Amendments of the U. S. Constitution (\\\".. .nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.\\\"). The due process clause became extremely important considering the adversarial and coercive nature of the American legal system. With this background, this Court asks whether individual rights fit within Peacemaking. Unlike the adversarial American legal system, where parties win and lose and the court forces its judgment, Peacemaking is not premised upon adversity nor coercion. Peacemaking is premised upon k'\\u00e9which is opposite to adversity and coercion. Peacemaking is premised upon cooperation, sharing, and helping each other. Peacemaking emphasizes maintaining positive relations by acknowledging and tending to responsibilities toward one another. Peacemaking does not focus on taking away a party's life, property, nor liberty, Even if it did, the Major Crimes Act and Indian Civil Rights Act forbids tribes from exercising capital punishment, imprisoning a person for more than five years, and imposing a fine of more than $5000. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. \\u00a71153 (1885), See also Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1301 -1303 (r968)(amended 1986). Rather, Peacemakers focus on solving the problems brought by parties using the k'\\u00e9 principle. In the American legal system, individual rights, when used properly, protect parties. When abused, lawyers tactically use individual rights against each other to win the case and address the problem by retribution (i.e., revenge). As legal devices engineered for an adversarial coercive system, individual rights do not belong in Peacemaking because Peacemaking encourages making peace and not adversity. Peacemakers want to focus on solving the substance of the problem, rather than focusing on procedural issues for due process as in the American legal system. Because Peacemaking and the legal system are premised on different foundations, and to encourage k'\\u00e9, individual rights do not belong in Peacemaking sessions. Mr. Patrick Benally argues that judges and lawyers are needed to ensure that parties' individual rights are protected. However, since individual rights do not belong in Peacemaking according to the above-reasoning, then there is no need for a judge to check for individual rights in Peacemaking agreements. What replaces due process and individual rights if rights are prohibited in Peacemaking? The concept of k'\\u00e9 fills that void. Due process is fairness in the adversarial system. K'\\u00e9 incorporates fairness, but in the context of cooperation, sharing, and caring for each other. In caring for each other, a person treats each other fairly by giving equal treatment. Rather than favoring one person over another, all persons are treated equally under the k'\\u00e9 principle.\\nMr. Patrick Benally contests that he was pressured into the Peacemaking agreement on August 29,2001. This Court stresses that Mr. Benally requested Peacemaking himself. The Court did not order him to attend Peacemaking for divorce. Mr. Benally voluntarily sought Peacemaking on June 11, 2001. It is impossible for a person who voluntarily participates in an agreement to be coerced. If it is voluntary, then the person can disengage and discontinue participating. To the contrary, to support the child support amount set by the Court following the Navajo Nation Child Support Guidelines, Peacemaking emphasized Mr. Patrick Benally's responsibility to provide for his children as a father. Teaching about responsibility is not coercion. In fact, with the high rate of single parents on the Navajo Reservation, this court supports the encouragement of parental responsibility. This court supports the Peacemakers teaching about parental responsibility. As to the issue of coercion, this court takes judicial notice that Peacemakers operate on the k'\\u00e9 principle. Therefore, it presumes that agreements reached in Peacemaking are fair and without duress and coercion because the parties enter into agreements voluntarily.\\nOne role of Peacemaking is to preserve and promote the traditional Navajo laws and values of k'\\u00e9 among Navajo people as mandated by the Fundamental Laws of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9. When the Navajo government passed the Fundamental Laws of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9, many wondered what its effect would be on the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, particularly when the Fundamental Laws of Dine were placed before the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights in Article x of the Navajo Nation Code. This analysis initiates defining the impact of the Fundamental Laws of Dine on the Navajo Bill of Rights, the rest of the Navajo Code, and court cases. In light of the United States' history and policies with respect to Indian nations, and the Navajo Nation being at the forefront, this court rigorously reinforces the Peacemaking Division. Thus, Peacemakers play a legitimate role in Navajo government comparable to judges. Peacemaking decisions do not have to be incorporated into a court order to be recognized and enforced in the Kayenta Judicial District. Further, individual rights may be appropriate for the adversarial legal system, but individual rights do not belong in the Peacemaking forum. Finally, there is a presumption that agreements reached in Peacemaking sessions are fair and without duress and coercion because parties participate voluntarily.\\nPursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Berlita Benally's pleadings and exhibits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that she is entitled to a recognition of the divorce made in the Peacemaking Division. Further, the Fundamental Laws of Dine recently enacted by the Navajo Council, supercedes Rule 4.3 of the Navajo Peacemaker Court Rules, which is the standard set in In re Estate of Kindle, 8 Nav. R. 150 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2001).\\nCONCLUSIONS\\n1. Peacemaking agreements do not have to be made into a court order for them to be enforceable.\\n2. There is a presumption that agreements reached in the Peacemaking Division are fair and without duress and coercion because the parties enter into the agreements voluntarily.\\n3. Individual rights do not belong in Peacemaking because individual rights are premised upon an adversarial system contrary to Peacemaking.\\nJUDGMENT\\nBased on the foregoing, the court hereby GRANTS Ms. Berlita Benally's Motion for Summary Judgment since this matter has already been determined by the Peacemaking Division on August 29, 2001 pursuant to the analysis above. The court further recognizes the divorce rendered by the Peacemaking Division because Peacemakers are competent with k'\\u00e9principles that make Navajo laws. Thus, the Petition for divorce, along with the motions for res judicata, joinder, and homestudy are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The motion for order to show cause is DISMISSED without prejudice since that motion also relates to the Amended Order that was issued prior to the divorce petition. Any new issues that arise, or may have arisen, related to the Peacemaking agreement may be addressed by making a request to modify their agreement either through this court or through Peacemaking.\\nFor purposes of being consistent with the case caption, the court will refer to Berlita Chief Benally as Berlita Benally.\\nThis Order will treat Mr. Patrick Benally as the petitioner and Ms. Berlita Benally as the respondent according the first of the two consolidated cases.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3550373\", \"name\": \"Dr. Lula Mae STAGO Petitioner-Appellee vs. WIDE RUINS COMMUNITY SCHOOL, Inc. Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Stago v. Wide Ruins Community School, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-63-99\", \"first_page\": 118, \"last_page\": 121, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 118\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN and MORRIS, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Dr. Lula Mae STAGO Petitioner-Appellee vs. WIDE RUINS COMMUNITY SCHOOL, Inc. Respondent-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"Dr. Lula Mae STAGO Petitioner-Appellee vs. WIDE RUINS COMMUNITY SCHOOL, Inc. Respondent-Appellant\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-63-99\\nMay 4, 2001\\nStephen K. Smith, Esq., and Howard Brown, Esq. Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellant.\\nLawrence A. Ruzow, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN and MORRIS, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1090\", \"char_count\": \"6919\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nYazzie, Chief Justice.\\nIn December 1999, the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (\\\"Commission\\\") awarded the Appellee, Dr. Lula Mae Stago, back pay, out-of-pocket expenses, and attorney's fees upon finding that the Appellant, Wide Ruins Community School, Inc. (\\\"Wide Ruins\\\") had violated the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (\\\"NPEA\\\"). The issue before us is whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (\\\"FTCA\\\") precluded the Commission from hearing the case. We hold that under the FTCA, Wide Ruins can only be sued in federal court and thus the Commission lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Stago's claims.\\nI\\nWide Ruins' status as a tribally controlled school (or grant school) pursuant to federal law (Tribally Controlled Schools Act, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2501-2511) and sanctioned as such by the Navajo Nation is not in dispute. Wide Ruins has been a tribally controlled school since February x, 1998. A tribally controlled school is \\\"a school, operated by a tribe or a tribal organization, enrolling students in kindergarten through grade 12, including preschools, which is not a local educational agency and which is not directly administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2511(5).\\nIn January 1998, the school board for Wide Ruins interviewed Dr. Stago and Albert A. Yazzie for the position of executive director of Wide Ruins. According to school board guidelines, a Master's Degree in Educational Administration was required for the position, although the board might allow for such alternatives as it found \\\"appropriate and acceptable.\\\" Commission's Interim Order at 3 (August 20,1999). The board hired Mr. Yazzie for the position, although he lacked the required degree (which Dr. Stago possessed).\\nDr. Stago filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that Wide Ruins had violated the NPEA, 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 601 et seq., by hiring Mr. Yazzie. Specifically, Dr. Stago claimed that the school board failed to hire the best qualified Navajo for the position. The Commission agreed, and after finding that Dr. Stago had no duty to mitigate damages by accepting the higher paying position of principal, awarded her back pay and out-of-pocket expenses in the amount of $27,700, along with attorney's fees in the amount of $8,633.47. The Commission further ordered Wide Ruins to readvertise for the position of executive director. Wide Ruins appealed to this Court, contending inter alia that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Dr. Stago's action and that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This Court first denied the appeal, but later agreed to reconsider the case. Dr. Stago cross appeals on the time period of her back pay award and the hourly rate set by the Commission for her attorney's fees.\\nII\\nA. The Federal Tort Claims Act\\nAccording to 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 45of, Historical and Statutory Notes, \\\"an Indian tribe, tribal organization or Indian contractor\\\" acting under the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988,25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 2501-25^ or the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 450 et. seq., \\\"is deemed hereafter to be part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior or the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services\\\" with respect to civil suits against them. Any civil claim against tribes, organizations, and contractors covered under the two Acts \\\"shall be deemed to be an action against the United States and will be defended by the Attorney General and be afforded the full protection and coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.\\\" Thus, Wide Ruins is part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and it is protected by the FTCA. The United States specifically waived its sovereign immunity regarding claims against grant schools that fall under the two Acts. However, such claims must be litigated in federal district court, as Congress granted these courts \\\"exclusive jurisdiction\\\" over FTCA claims. 28 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1346(b).\\nAccording to 25 U. S.C. \\u00a7 45of, tribal organizations performing functions authorized by the Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988 are considered part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Suits against such organizations must be brought under the FTCA, as this is the only instance in which the United States has waived the sovereign immunity that would usually be accorded the Bureau of Indian Affairs in these cases. Wide Ruins is a tribal organization operating a tribally-controlled school under the Tribally controlled Schools Act. Thus, Wide Ruins can only be sued in federal court, under the FTCA. The commission therefore lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Stago's claims.\\nB. 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 450e(c)\\nDr. Stago wants the Tribally-Controlled Schools Act construed narrowly to support the Navajo Nation's and federal government's goal of enhancing tribal sovereignty, and Congress' express authorization for use of \\\"tribal employment... preference laws.\\\" See 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 45oe(c). This statute says:\\nNotwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section [which deals with wage and labor standards and Indian preference in employment], with respect to any self-determination contract, or portion of a self-determination contract, that is intended to benefit one tribe, the tribal employment or contract preference laws adopted by such tribe shall govern with respect to the administration of the contract or portion of the contract.\\nDr. Stago also wants the FTCA construed to cover only personal injury actions against grant schools.\\nWe are not persuaded by Dr. Stago's arguments. Section 45of, Historical and Statutory Notes, explicitly states that \\\"any civil action\\\" pursuant to the Tribally Controlled Schools Act \\\"shall be deemed an action against the United States . and be afforded the full protection and coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.\\\" The FTCA explicitly states that \\\"any claim\\\" against a tribal organization covered by the Tribally Controlled Schools Act must be brought under the FTCA in federal court. Also, there is no evidence that Congress wanted to limit suits against grant schools to personal injury actions. We find that Dr. Stago's claims belong in federal court.\\nIll\\nBecause tribal organizations running tribally-controlled schools are considered part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the purpose of civil suits against them, suits against such organizations must be brought in federal court under the FTCA.\\nThe Commission's decision is therefore vacated, and Dr. Stago's case is dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3550470\", \"name\": \"Julia BEGAY Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jessie Ray CHIEF Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Begay v. Chief\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-05-18\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-08-03\", \"first_page\": 654, \"last_page\": 660, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 654\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and L. JOHNSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Julia BEGAY Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jessie Ray CHIEF Respondent-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"Julia BEGAY Petitioner-Appellee vs. Jessie Ray CHIEF Respondent-Appellant\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-08-03\\nMay 18, 2005\\nGenevieve K. Chato, Esq., Kayenta, Navajo Nation, for Appellant.\\nSamuel Pete, Esq., Shiprock, Navajo Nation, for Appellee.\\nBefore FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and L. JOHNSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"1882\", \"char_count\": \"11113\", \"text\": \"This case concerns whether a person married through a traditional wedding ceremony must receive a decree by a Navajo Nation court to be validly divorced within the Navajo Nation. We hold that the Navajo Nation Code requires a divorce decree, and therefore vacate the Kayenta Family Court's decision.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are undisputed. Appellant Jessie Ray Chief and Appellee Julia Begay are both enrolled members of the Navajo Nation. Mr. Chief married Dorothy Farland by traditional ceremony in 1978. Some time after 1978, Mr. Chief left Ms. Farland, taking his saddle and blanket from their home. Mr. Chief did not seek or receive a divorce decree from a Navajo Nation court. He subsequently married a second person, Myrtle Dayzie. They received a divorce decree from their marriage in 1985. Neither Ms. Farland nor Ms. Dayzie are parties to the case. Mr. Chief and Ms. Begay began to live together in Phoenix, Arizona in 1985. They moved to Kayenta within the Navajo Nation. They produced one child and operated several businesses together. They never had a traditional, church or civil marriage ceremony performed.\\nAfter they separated, Julia Begay filed a petition for a validation of marriage in the Kayenta Family Court, claiming a \\\"common law\\\" marriage under 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 3(E) (1995). Jessie Ray Chief filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that the court could not validate any alleged marriage, because he had never been divorced legally from Dorothy Farland. According to Mr. Chief, the Navajo Nation Code requires a divorce decree from a Navajo Nation Court for a divorce from a traditional marriage to be legal. Mr. Chief cited a decision of the Navajo Court of Appeals, In re Validation of Marriage of Slowman, 1 Nav. R. 141 (1977), asserting that it was binding precedent for the rule that a Navajo Nation court must issue a divorce decree from a traditional marriage for a court to validate a subsequent marriage.\\nThe Kayenta Family Court denied Mr. Chief's motion to dismiss, ruling that he legally divorced Dorothy Farland by Navajo custom. According to the court, the Navajo Common Law concepts of yo deyah and tse ha maz applied. Under these concepts, the court concluded that a traditional divorce occurred when Mr. Chief left with his saddle and blanket. The court ruled that no binding precedent controlled the case, alleging that Mr. Chief only cited non-binding district courts cases. The court also ruled that the provisions of the Navajo Nation Code concerning marriage and divorce are ambiguous. Therefore, according to the court, the Code did not preclude the recognition of a traditional divorce. The court then considered the merits of the case, ruling that Mr. Chief and Ms. Begay had a valid \\\"common law\\\" marriage. Mr. Chief appealed to this Court.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether a person married through a traditional wedding ceremony must have received a decree by a Navajo Nation court to be legally divorced within the Navajo Nation.\\nIll\\nA\\nThe conclusion of the Kayenta Family Court that a court decree of divorce from a traditional marriage is not required is a legal one which we review de novo. Judy v. White, 8 Nav. R. 510, 528 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). We give no deference to the Family Court, and review the question based on our interpretation of the relevant law.\\nB\\nThe main issue in this case is whether a court must issue a divorce decree from a traditional marriage. Mr. Chief argues that he could not have legally married Ms. Begay because he was never divorced validly from his traditional marriage to Dorothy Farland. Ms. Begay disagrees, arguing that Mr. Chief divorced Ms. Farland by Navajo custom, and therefore was not still married during the relationship at issue in this case.\\nThe question in this case involves two provisions of Title 9 of the Navajo Nation Code, Sections 4(A) and 407. Section 4(A) states that to contract a marriage within the Navajo Nation, both parties must be unmarried. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 4(A) (1995). When, as here, either party has been previously married, that Section requires that \\\"the marriage must have been dissolved by... a valid decree of divorce.\\\" Id. (emphasis added). Section 407, appearing in a separate chapter specifically covering divorce, states that \\\"[n]o person, married by Tribal custom, who claims to have been divorced shall be free to remarry until a certificate of divorce has been issued by the Courts of the Navajo Nation.\\\" 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 407 (1995) (emphasis added). The Kayenta Family Court concluded that Section 4(A), passed by the Navajo Nation Council after Section 407, creates an ambiguity, because Section 407 refers to a decree issued by a court, while Section 4(A) refers only to a \\\"decree.\\\"\\nCuriously, the Kayenta Family Court did not mention our opinion in In re Validation of Marriage ofSlowman, which held that a court decree is necessary for a divorce to be valid. 1 Nav. R. 141,143 (Nav. Ct. App. 1977). In that opinion we concluded that the plain language of Section 407 requires a court decree. Id. We denied a validation of marriage because one party had never received a court decree of divorce from a previous marriage. Id. at 143-44. The Kayenta Family Court omitted Slowman from its analysis, even though Mr. Chief cited it and discussed it in a document submitted in that court. Reply to Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Index Listing No. 55, at 3-4. According to the Kayenta Family Court, Mr. Chief had only cited district court cases, and that \\\"these decisions are merely persuasive.\\\" Order of February 5, 2002, Index Listing No. 75, at 7-8. Whatever the reason for the oversight, the Kayenta Family Court did not consider a potentially binding precedent from this Court. We therefore must consider it ourselves without any guidance from the Family Court.\\nD\\nThe binding effect of Slovenian depends on its reasoning. As we recently stated in Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Blackgoat, our current rules of statutory interpretation require that we interpret ambiguous language consistent with Navajo Common Law. 8 Nav. R. 636 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005); see also Tso v.Navajo Housing Authority, 8 Nav. R. 548, 557 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005). This means that a previous interpretation of statutory language is not binding if the language is unclear and if we did not consider Navajo Common Law in our analysis. See Eriacho v. Ramah District Ct., 8 Nav. R. 617, 625 n. 1 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2005). However, we still apply a statute's plain language when that language is clear. Tso, 8 Nav. R. at 557 n. 1 (collecting cases). This means that case law stating the plain meaning of statutory language still controls the outcome of later cases. See Fort Defiance Housing Corp. v. Allen, 8 Nav. R. 492, 498-99 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004).\\nUnder these rules, we conclude that Slowman controls this case. Here, if there is an ambiguity, the Kayenta Family Court appropriately looked to Navajo Common Law concerning divorce. As we used a plain language analysis in Slowman, however, that holding controls. The language of Section 407 is not ambiguous, as the clear meaning of the statute means that a person must receive a court decree of divorce from a traditional marriage before he or she may marry within the Navajo Nation.\\nThis conclusion was not reached easily in this case. Though we do not condone the activities of Mr. Chief, we are bound to apply the clear and valid policy decisions of the Navajo Nation Council, as we did in Slowman twenty-eight years ago. See Tso, 8 Nav. R. at 557 n.i. This Court ultimately is not the policy-making body for the Navajo Nation. See id. Ms. Begay does not allege that the Section 407 violates a fundamental right under our Navajo Bill of Rights and Indian Civil Rights Act. Absent some suggestion that the statutory requirement for a court decree is somehow invalid, instead of merely ambiguous, we have no choice but to apply it to this case. Ms. Begay and others in her situation may seek a statutory change to allow the courts to recognize other methods of divorce.\\nIV\\nBased on the above, the Kayenta Family Court erred in validating a marriage between Ms. Begay and Mr. Chief. As Mr. Chief was never validly divorced under Navajo Nation statutory law, he cannot be married to Ms. Begay. We therefore VACATE the decision of the Family Court. We do not say that Ms. Begay lacks any valid claim against Mr. Chief. There maybe other claims that do not require a valid marriage. We leave that for the lower court to consider in a new case. This case is closed.\\nA \\\"common law\\\" marriage under the Navajo Nation Code is different than one arising out of a traditional wedding ceremony. See 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 3(D), (E). A \\\"common law\\\" marriage is defined as a marriage, other than through the signing of a marriage license before witnesses or the performing of a church, civil, or Navajo traditional ceremony, that includes four necessary elements: r) a present intention of the parties to be husband and wife, 2) a present consent between the parties to be husband and wife, and 3) actual cohabitation, and 4) an actual holding out of the parties within their community to be married. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 3(E).\\nSlowman was issued by the Navajo Court of Appeals, which the Navajo Nation Council replaced in ^85 with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. As it was the highest appellate body up to the creation of the Supreme Court, and cases pending before that court were transferred to this Court, Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CD-94-85, Resolved Clause 4 (December 4, 1985), we apply decisions of the Court of Appeals as our own. See, e.g., Fort Defiance Housing Corp. v. Allen, 8 Nav. R. 492, 498 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (following Navajo Court of Appeals opinion concerning time for appeal in Forcible Entry and Detainer cases).\\nIn Slowman we did not explicitly refer to the \\\"plain language\\\" of the statute, hut simply said that \\\"[under]... Section [407], a divorce certificate granted by a Navajo court is specifically required even for marriages contractedby customary or traditional ceremony.\\\" r Nav. R. at 143. Absent any reference to other rules of statutory interpretation, we take our discussion in Slowman to be a plain language analysis. However, even assuming Slowman is not a plain language case, and therefore not binding, Section 407 is directly on point, and states clearly that parties who were married through a traditional ceremony must receive a court decree for any alleged divorce to be recognized. Nothing in Section 4(A) contradicts this, the only difference being that the word \\\"court\\\" does not appear before \\\"decree.\\\" The absence of \\\"court,\\\" without more, does not make the word \\\"decree\\\" unclear. When read together, the Council dearly intended that divorces must have a court decree to be valid.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3550583\", \"name\": \"Lavenna GEORGE Appellant vs. Mary TSOSIE and The Navajo Nation Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"George v. Tsosie\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-03-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-30-98\", \"first_page\": 88, \"last_page\": 95, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 88\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN and L. JOHNSON, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Lavenna GEORGE Appellant vs. Mary TSOSIE and The Navajo Nation Appellees\", \"head_matter\": \"Lavenna GEORGE Appellant vs. Mary TSOSIE and The Navajo Nation Appellees\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-30-98\\nMarch 15, 2001\\nScott E. Borg, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nLuke Marik, Esq., Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellees.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN and L. JOHNSON, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1846\", \"char_count\": \"11399\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered\\nAustin, Associate Justice.\\nThe issue on appeal is whether an injured worker who initially filed her claim with the Navajo Nation Workers' Compensation Program, and later withdrew from the administrative process to sue in Navajo Nation district court, should be required to pursue her remedy to completion in the workers' compensation forum. We hold in the affirmative.\\nI\\nOn January ii, 1994, the Appellant, Lavenna George (\\\"George\\\"), a Navajo Nation government employee, was struck and injured by a Navajo Nation vehicle driven by Mary Tsosie, also a Navajo Nation government employee. George was crossing the street between the Ganado Senior Citizen Center, her work site, and the Ganado Chapter House to make a telephone call to her supervisor to relay a message that a co-worker: would be late for work. The center's employees used the chapter house's telephone for sending and receiving office communications because their telephones were not connected. The co-worker had earlier asked George to call in the message to their mutual supervisor. The supervisors of the senior citizen centers encouraged the employees to assist and cover for one another because of the vast distances between the sub-offices.\\nGeorge's supervisor filed a workers' compensation claim for her on January r4,1994. A claims analyst for the Navajo Nation workers' Compensation Program (\\\"Program\\\") denied George's claim on February 4,1994, ruling that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment because she was on a personal errand when she was injured. On February 7,1994, George sent a letter to the Program contesting the denial and requesting a hearing before the Employee Benefits Review Board (\\\"Board\\\"). George also explained in her letter that in addition to the telephone call, she was going to the chapter house to check for the center's messages, which was part of her job. The latter fact was not included in George's original claim that was reviewed by the claims analyst. The Board set George's hearing for April 25,1994.\\nThe Program's attorney reviewed George's file and concluded that the facts supported George's claim for workers' compensation benefits. She sent a memorandum to the Program on April 19,1994, recommending reconsideration of the denial and approval of George's claim for benefits.\\nOn April 21,1994, George sent a letter to L\\u00e1veme Lee, Coordinator of the Workers' Compensation Program, stating that she wanted to \\\"drop [her] appeal\\\" to the Board because she was not prepared for the hearing. The record does not show when the claims analyst on George's case received this letter. The next day, on April 22,1994, the Program notified George by telephone that her claim had been reevaluated and approved for benefits. On April 25,1994, the day of the scheduled hearing, the Board received a letter from the Program's attorney advising that the Program had granted George's claim for benefits. The Board then dismissed George's appeal, but did not give a reason for the dismissal.\\nOn December 12,1995, George brought this negligence action in the Window Rock District Court against the Appellees, Mary Tsosie and the Navajo Nation. The Appellees moved for summary judgment arguing that the workers' compensation program had exclusive jurisdiction over George's claim, and by approving her claim for benefits, George did not have a case. In the alternative, the Appellees' argued that by withdrawing her request for a hearing before the Board, George had not exhausted her administrative remedies. George, this time, argued that she was on a personal errand at the time of the accident, therefore her claim was outside the Program's jurisdiction, and the Program should be held to its initial rejection of her claim. The district court granted summary judgment on the exhaustion issue and ordered George to exhaust her administrative remedies before the workers' compensation forum. The district court retained jurisdiction over the action pending a final decision from the administrative forum. George took an appeal from the summary judgment to this Court.\\nII\\nGeorge relies on Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 123 N.M. 145, 934 P.2d 2074 (N.M. App. 1997), and Humana of Florida, Inc. v. McKaughan, 652 So.2d 852 (Fla. App., 2d Dist. 1995), to support her argument that the district court should have decided the issue of whether she was acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. George claims the district court erred by not deciding the issue and sending her back to the workers' compensation forum to exhaust her remedies.\\nWe find significant differences between George's case and the Eldridge and Humana cases. In Eldridge, the claimant never invoked the jurisdiction of the workers' compensation program, and in fact insisted that the claim did not fall within the program's jurisdiction because it involved an intentional tort. The claimant's decedent had been shot and killed by a customer. The New Mexico court favored the trial court over the workers' compensation program and stressed that while the program was well-suited to make decisions on issues within its expertise, such as employment status, it had no expertise on intentional torts. 123 N.M. at 150, 934 P.2d at 1079.\\nIn the Humana case (which was later certified to the Florida Supreme Court, Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n. v. McKaughan, 668 So.2d 974 (1996)), the plaintiffs initially sued in the trial court on their son's behalf alleging medical malpractice. The defendants raised the exclusivity of the administrative remedy as a defense. At the trial court's urging, the plaintiffs filed a petition for benefits under the plan with the administrative forum, which they later supplemented. Their supplemental petition requested that the case be returned to the court, citing the administrative forum's lack of jurisdiction. The supplementary petition was granted. The issue of which forum would have jurisdiction to decide the matter was certified to the Florida Supreme Court. That court ultimately ruled that plaintiffs who are certain that their claims do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the compensation plan are not compelled to seek a jurisdictional ruling from the administrative agency before filing a civil suit. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n., 668 So.2d at 977.\\nThere is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing in George's case and she initially filed her claim with the Program. She did not allege that she was injured by the willful misconduct of a co- employee, which might have given her the option of filing initially with the district court. See T5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 ror3 (X995). The Eldridge and Humana cases do not support George. Because George's claim is not an intentional tort, she properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Program. A claimant who initially invokes the jurisdiction of the Program should be required to exhaust all remedies before that forum.\\nNavajo Nation government employees are 'presumed to have elected to take workers' compensation\\\" coverage when hired. r5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 roo3(A) (1995). Thus, when a Navajo Nation employee is injured accidentally during the course and scope of his or her employment, and files a workers' compensation claim, the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Program becomes exclusive. T5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 XOT3. Workers fall within this exclusive jurisdiction when their injuries \\\"arise out of and [are] in the course and scope of employment.\\\" r5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 roo2(F) (1995). Section XOX3 of the Workers' Compensation Act states:\\nThe right to receive compensation pursuant to the provisions of this chapter for injuries sustained by a covered member shall be the exclusive remedy against the Navajo Nation and employees thereof, except where the injury is caused by the fellow employee's willful misconduct... in which event, the injured employee may, at his or her option, either claim compensation or maintain an action at law for damage against the fellow employee... before the Navajo Nation Courts. Id.\\nOnce the employee files a claim, the Program must determine the employee's eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. If the Program denies the claim, the employee can request a hearing before the Board on the issue of whether his or her claim can be compensated. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1010(G) (1) (1995). If the Board upholds the denial, the employee may then file an appeal with this Court. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 rorr(B) (1995).\\nGeorge started the process by filing her claim for benefits with the Program. The Program denied her claim on February 4,1994, basing its decision on the facts offered by George at the time. George then sent a letter to the Program requesting a hearing before the Board and offered the following additional information about why she was walking to the Ganado Chapter House:\\n[I]t was part of my routine to check for messages at the Chapter [House] twice each day, this was because the Center which I worked at did not have a phone. I check for messages to keep the lines of communication open with my agency office which is part of my duty____\\nGeorge's Letter dated February 7,1994. The part about checking for messages as part of her job duties was not considered by the claims analyst during the initial review that led to the February 4,1994 denial. Upon advice of its counsel and in light of the additional information George offered, the Program reevaluated George's claim and decided that her claim can be compensated. George was notified of this new decision on April 22,1994 and the Board was notified on April 25,1994 (the date of the scheduled hearing). It appears that the Board may have granted George's request to withdraw her \\\"appeal\\\" because it was satisfied that George had received the relief she wanted. That should have ended the case.\\nHowever, George then obtained counsel and decided to pursue a negligence claim in the district court. She created \\\"material issues of fact\\\" to support her suit by alleging that she was on a personal errand at the time of the accident. Appellant's Complaint dated December 12,1995, allegation No. 5. The record shows that up to the time the complaint was filed, there were no disputed issues of fact as to George's employment status at the time of the accident. In fact, over a year earlier, the Program had determined that she was eligible for workers' compensation benefits. Thus, there was no cause of action for George to sue on in the district court.\\nAccordingly, we hold that the Program's decision of April 22, r994 to award workers' compensation benefits to George is the final and binding decision that precludes her from filing a lawsuit on the same claim in the district court. The district court shall void its summary judgment and dismiss the case before it. The Program shall carry out its decision to compensate George.\\nThis case is remanded to the Window Rock District Court, and from there to the Navajo Nation Workers' Compensation Program, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3550839\", \"name\": \"Dennis WILLIAMS Petitioner vs. The Window Rock District Court Respondent and Ben Wauneka Sr. Respondent and Real Party in Interest\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Williams v. Window Rock District Court\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-09-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-37-98\", \"first_page\": 182, \"last_page\": 191, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 182\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before AUSTIN, Acting Chief Justice, and KING-BEN and GILMORE, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Dennis WILLIAMS Petitioner vs. The Window Rock District Court Respondent and Ben Wauneka Sr. Respondent and Real Party in Interest\", \"head_matter\": \"Dennis WILLIAMS Petitioner vs. The Window Rock District Court Respondent and Ben Wauneka Sr. Respondent and Real Party in Interest\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-37-98\\nSeptember 21, 2001\\nDennis Williams, Fort Defiance, Navajo Nation (Arizona), Petitioner pro se.\\nBefore AUSTIN, Acting Chief Justice, and KING-BEN and GILMORE, Associate Justices.\\nWe amended the caption to show that any writ of prohibition or superintending control would run to the Window Rock District Court, and Ben Wauneka Sr. is properly named as the real party in interest.\", \"word_count\": \"3266\", \"char_count\": \"19296\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Chief Justice.\\nThis case comes before us on a petition for a writ of prohibition, superintending control, and the consolidation of certain land dispute cases. For the purposes of our jurisdiction, it is sufficient to note that on May 8,1998 the Window Rock District Court, sitting in small claims, found the Petitioner, Dennis Williams, to be in \\\"civil contempt of court\\\" arising out of a long-standing land dispute which prompts this case, where he was given a suspended \\\"fine\\\" of $350 for the contempt and placed in jeopardy of incarceration. We also assume jurisdiction because the petition alleges a fraud upon the Court, and this Court has the inherent power to hear and determine such a claim so that public confidence in its decisions will not be undermined.\\nThe appeal file is voluminous. The Petitioner offered many exhibits, and his accusation of a fraud upon the Court, or one committed by someone with the Court, required the retrieval and review of nearly twenty-years of records of separate civil actions of both this Court and the Window Rock District Court. We are sensitive to any claim of fraud, and that required a time-consuming review of the full record of this land dispute. Having reviewed that record, we will establish the standard for reviewing claims of fraud upon a court, discuss the appropriateness of a petition for writ of prohibition to address claims of fraud upon a court, and apply those standards to the record before us.\\nI\\nFraud upon the court is a serious matter, because it places the integrity of a given court into question. It raises the specters of bias, favoritism, corruption, and a lack of basic judicial ethics. While judgments presumed to be regular, they can be attacked for a lack of jurisdiction. In the Interest of Two Minor Children, 4 Nav. R. 57,61 (Nav. Ct. App. 1983). There are two ways of moving a court to vacate a judgment. First, there are motions pursuant to Rule 60(c) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, including motions to vacate a void judgment. In re Adoption of J.L.B., 6 Nav. R. 314,315 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1990). Second courts have the inherent authority to reopen cases or \\\"take another look at a judgment\\\" where justice and equity require them to do so, because of the principle that courts are to be just and must do justice. Navajo Eng'g and Constr. Auth. v. Noble, 5 Nav. R. 1, 2 (Nav. Ct. App. 1984). The federal courts have a similar procedure, where a litigant attack a judgment in an \\\"independent action\\\" by alleging that a judgment should not be enforced in equity and good conscience, or where there was fraud, among other things United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998). That remedy is available only where there has been a \\\"grave miscarriage of justice.\\\" Id. at 47.\\nOne situation where there is a \\\"grave miscarriage of justice\\\" is where there is fraud upon the court. That is what this petition essentially claims. This is the first instance in which such a claim has been brought before this Court. Fraud on the court requires a 'scheme by which the integrity of the judicial process has been fraudulently subverted by a deliberately planned scheme in a manner involving 'far more than an injury to a single litigant. Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mutual Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 1981); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1944). This is another definition:\\nFraud upon the court... should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication, and relief should be denied in the absence of such conduct. 7 Moore's Federal Practice Par. 60.33 (I979)\\nAnother element of fraud upon the court is putting false documents before the court, the kind of conduct alleged here. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238. The standard for proving fraud on the court is high: \\\"Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated, will constitute fraud on the court.\\\" Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir 1978), quoting United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D. Conn. 1972).\\nII\\nWhile we approve of an independent action to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice, including fraud upon the court, the use of a petition for a writ of prohibition is proper. Writs of prohibition are used to prevent a trial court from unlawfully acting within its jurisdiction. Pino v. Bedonie, 7 Nav. R15, 15 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1992). In this particular case, a party obtained a small claims judgment against the Petitioner based upon an original judgment, and the court found the Petitioner in civil contempt of court for failure to pay the prior small claims judgment. The court levied a fine and threatened the Petitioner with incarceration. We find it proper to contest the small claims judgment and the underlying judgment using a petition for writ of prohibition, but we limit such a procedure to the usual circumstance where the jurisdiction of the court and the validity of the judgment are being challenged.\\nIII\\nWe now turn to the petition, and we confine ourselves to the original petition and a supplementary submission we requested of the parties. We will not address the other claims the parties have put before the Court in the many documents they have filed. As we understand the petition and the subsequent submission pursuant to this Court's order, the fraud upon the court alleged here consists of this: The Navajo Nation Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over appeal No. A-CV-46-81, and to \\\"avoid summary dismissal\\\" and to cover up that lack of jurisdiction, someone or someone working for the Court of Appeals switched the case number from A-CV-46-81 to A-CV- 26-81. The irregularities alleged in support of this case number switching theory include the absence in the record of a pretrial order referenced in the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the lack of either a notice of appeal or a motion for reconsideration to the trial court. The Petitioner also attacks factual errors in the Court of Appeals' judgment, a matter we cannot address here because it does not fall within the fraud upon the court standard stated above. As to those matters, the Petitioner had ample opportunity to raise them previously, and the record shows that in fact he did so.\\nBased upon Petitioner's claims, which question the validity of prior judgments, we will now undertake a review of this land dispute. The Petitioner is advised that the Court gathered records from the former Court of Appeals, the Window Rock District Court, and this Court to do this review.\\nThe legal record of this particular phase of dispute begins with a complaint filed against Ben Wauneka Sr. by Dennis Williams (the Petitioner here) on August 1981. No. WR-CV-490-81. On September 23,1981, the Window Rock District Court determined that Williams had exclusive rights to 7.6 acres of a disputed 10.8 acre area Williams calls the \\\"Boh Toh Canyon\\\" land, and Charles Wauneka had exclusive rights to 3.2 acres. Id., Judgment at 3 file of the subsequent appeal in Cause No. A-CV-46-81 in the Navajo Nation Court of Appeals shows that a permanent injunction was issued from the Window Rock District Court on September 23,1981. The file contains the notice appeal that was used to appeal the September 23,1981 judgment. The notice of appeal was filed by Attorney Kee Yazzie Mann on behalf of \\\"Ben Wauneka, and Charlie C. Wauneka,\\\" on October 23,1981. Mr. Mann also requested a trial de novo in his notice of appeal. The appeal was timely under 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7 801 (1978), because it was filed on the thirtieth (30th) day following the date of the judgment on the last day to file for the Court of Appeals to have jurisdiction. Mr. Mann also filed a \\\"motion for correction of errors for a new trial, and for recusal\\\" with Window Rock District Court, which was the equivalent of a motion for reconsideration. It is dated October 2,1981 November T2,1981, Attorney Leonard Watchman, the Petitioner's counsel, filed a response and motion to deny appeal. The issue of appellate jurisdiction was not raised in that motion or in subsequent filings on the Petitioner's behalf. Obviously, all persons associated with this case knew the appeal was timely filed.\\nFrom there, the record of the Court of Appeals is thick with filings, responses and other documents. On August 3,1983, the Acting Chief Justice entered an order finding probable cause to hear the appeal, and he made orders for the preparation of a pretrial order. The record shows that the order was issued by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals \\\"upon the telephonic instruction of the Acting Chief Justice.\\\" The Chief Justice at the time was the Honorable Nelson J. McCabe. He was the permanent head of the Court of Appeals, and trial judges were appointed to sit with him to hear appeals. It appears that Chief Justice McCabe removed himself from the case, and Judge Robert Walters was appointed as the Acting Chief Justice to sit with Judge Marie F. Neswood and Judge Harry Brown. Judge Walters was the presiding judge in the Tuba City District Court, and apparently due to the distance between Window Rock and Tuba City, he directed the issuance of the order by telephone. Such was proper then (and is proper now), because the order was procedural and not a final order.\\nOn September 19,1983, Attorney Lawrence A. Ruzow filed a stipulated order in accordance with the Acting Chief Justice's order. Attorney Leonard Watchman, acting on the Petitioner's (Williams) behalf, filed a response to Ben Wauneka Sr.'s answer and counterclaim on September 16,1983. On October 5,1983, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals received proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment submitted by Mr. Ruzow. That document has the correct docket number A-CV-46-81. The Court of Appeals filed its final judgment on July 24,1984 and it is this judgment that has the incorrect docket number (A-CV- 26-81) The Petitioner uses that error to argue his case number switching theory. The final judgment is obviously written with a typewriter. The writer must have hit the \\\"2\\\" key rather than the \\\"4\\\" key, and that resulted in a typographical error.\\nDespite that error, the record does not support Petitioner's claim that the docket number was \\\"switched\\\" to cover up a lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals clearly had jurisdiction, because the notice of appeal timely filed. In addition, at no time did the Petitioner challenge jurisdiction before the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appeal was not timely filed.\\nThe Petitioner made a motion for rehearing following the Court of Appeals' trial de novo and oral decision from the bench, raising his claims again. On July 24,1984, Court of Appeals entered a ten page order denying the motion for rehearing. This order has the correct docket number of A-CV-46-81.\\nOn the issue of a pretrial conference on the appeal the order denying the motion for rehearing recites that at the time of a scheduled pretrial conference, \\\"the Acting Chief Justice reviewed carefully the pre-trial order submitted to comment and negotiate the terms of the trial order.\\\" He ordered \\\"counsel for Wauneka,\\\" to prepare a final pretrial order, and have it approved by counsel the Petitioner. The final pretrial order was signed by both counsels and submitted to the Court without amendment on September T9,1983.\\nThe Court of Appeals held a trial de novo on September 1983, and at the conclusion, the Court found that neither Ben Wauneka Sr. nor Dennis Williams had met their burden of proof that they had an interest in the land, so it vacated the Window Rock District Court's September 23, judgment. The Court of Appeals found that at the time of his death, Charley Nez Wauneka Sr. had exclusive rights to the land in dispute.\\nTo illuminate the practice of the time, the statutory rule procedure for appeals was as follows: Appellants were required to file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment prior to taking an appeal. That was done. The appeal had to be filed within thirty days of the trial court's judgment, and that was done. After a case was filed, the Chief Justice made a determination of whether there was \\\"probable cause\\\" for an appeal, and appeals were heard \\\"de novo.\\\" That means the old practice (in the absence of trial transcripts) of the appellate court hearing the case anew before a panel of three judges. Specifically, despite the Window Rock District Court's September 23, T98T judgment, the case was heard all over again by the Court of Appeals, under the existing law at that time. The usual procedure was for the Court of Appeals to hear the case, and the judge would then give instructions for someone to write the decision. While Mr. Ruzow may have prepared a draft judgment at the instruction of the Court, it is likely that the solicitor, the Court's attorney, wrote the order denying a rehearing. We base that assumption on the difference in type and writing styles of the judgment and the order denying a rehearing.\\nThe most important part of the Petitioner's challenge is the allegation that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over the appeal of the September 23,1981 judgment. The record does not support that claim. The record consists of a motion for reconsideration made to the district court and a notice of appeal with a date stamp on it. The correct filing date is reflected on the docket sheet which shows the appeal was timely.\\nIn sum, the record does not support the Petitioner's claim. The docket number switching conspiracy theory might be plausible if indeed the notice of appeal was filed late or if no motion for reconsideration was filed. The one defect that does appear is an incorrect docket number on the Court of Appeals' final decision, but it is obviously a typographical error. Moreover, the error had no effect on either the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals or its decision on the merits. Despite the discrepancy between the docket numbers, the names of the parties are correctly listed in the caption of the final decision. We now order that typographical error corrected.\\nWhile that appeal was pending, Charley Nez Wauneka Sr.'s probate was before the Window Rock District Court Based upon the Court of Appeals' decision that the Petitioner had no interest in the land, the administrator of the estate appealed the district court's denial of his claim against the Petitioner for unauthorized use of the land. Matter of the Estate of Wauneka Sr., 5 Nav. R 79 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1986). This Court reversed the district court's judgment (in an appeal on the record, because the Judicial Code was amended in 1985 to provide for them) and there was a slip of the pen in citing the prior Court of Appeals judgment because of the typographical error in it. See Id. at 79, 81, 82. There was another appeal, which was decided on May 31, 1988, and another motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Matter of the Estate of Wauneka, Sr. v. Williams, 6 Nav. R. 63 (Nav. Sup. Ct. r988). We will not elaborate further on the other proceedings before this Court in the interest of time.\\nIn sum, the Petitioner has had many opportunities to assert the claims he attempts to bring before us yet again. We cannot leave this case, however, without commenting upon some problems we find in the entire record that concerns the Petitioner's conduct. The same issues have been litigated again, again, and again. It is time for this \\\"land dispute\\\" to stop. The Petitioner had his day in court many times, and the record shows the many documents filed on the Petitioner's behalf and the hearings he had.\\nWe also note that while the Petitioner filed his papers pro se, he is obviously using law-trained individuals to write his papers. Their style varies, from the poorly-written and bombastic initial petition to the well-written and diplomatic submission. We ignored the essay on contemporary Indian affairs and Navajo Nation politics as mere surplusage. As for ghost-written pleadings by individuals who are not members of our bar, we caution that the practice is a contempt of court and a crime.\\nIn addition, we could assess penalties upon the Petitioner for filing a frivolous petition and wasting the Court's time and limited resources, but we decline to do so with this warning further abuses of the litigation process will not be tolerated. We are aware of the difficulties courts have balancing free speech and process access rights against litigation abuses litigants, but there will come a point, which is within the Petitioner's control, where there will be serious consequences for misconduct. See, Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1993); Busby v. Doe, 231 B.R. (M.D. Fla. 1998) and Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 465 (E.D.N.Y.) (prior review of complaints before filing suits and the authority to end assaults on the judicial process), and compare with Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (a plaintiff cannot be completely foreclosed from any access to court). We also caution that our review of ways challenge judgments is not an invitation to Petitioner to try his claims anew.\\nThe concluding point is that the \\\"Boko Toh Canyon\\\" land does not belong to the Petitioner, and he has no rights to it. Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ is denied.\\nWe note that fines are not proper in civil contempt cases, because civil contempt is used to enforce judgments and it is not a punishment for past conduct which authorizes a fine as a penalty. Incarceration may not be used to enforce a civil money judgment using civil contempt procedure.\\nThe inventory attached to the probate petition of Charley Nez Wauneka Sr.'s estate identifies the land as the \\\"Creek Canyon Farmland (10.8 acre plot).\\\" He was Charles \\\"Charley\\\" Wauneka Jr.'s father, and the land went to the father when an alleged sale of it to the Petitioner was not proven.\\nBen Wauneka Sr. received the land when the estate of Charley Nez Wauneka Sr. was distributed. The Petitioner belatedly questioned the paternity of Ben Wauneka Sr., hut that issue is definitely foreclosed under the principle of res judicata. Charley Nez Wauneka Sr.'s other children did not challenge paternity when the heirs were determined, and we note that the Petitioner was not Charley Nez Wauneka Sr.'s child.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3551095\", \"name\": \"Phildon Ray JACKSON Petitioner-Appellant vs. BHP WORLD MINERALS Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jackson v. BHP World Minerals\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-10-07\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-36-00\", \"first_page\": 560, \"last_page\": 572, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 560\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and J. BENALLY, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Phildon Ray JACKSON Petitioner-Appellant vs. BHP WORLD MINERALS Respondent-Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"Phildon Ray JACKSON Petitioner-Appellant vs. BHP WORLD MINERALS Respondent-Appellee\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-36-00\\nOctober 7, 2004\\nLoretta Danzuka, Esq., and Josephine Foo, Esq., Shiproclc, Navajo Nation, for Appellant.\\nR. Thomas Dailey, Esq., Farmington, New Mexico, for Appellee.\\nBefore FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and J. BENALLY, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"3116\", \"char_count\": \"19647\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nFERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice.\\nThis case concerns the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission and its conclusion that Appellee fired Appellant for just cause. Based on our review, we affirm.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are as follows. Appellee BHP Minerals (Appellee) hired Appellant Phildon Jackson (Appellant) to work as an \\\"Utility C\\\" employee. Appellant submitted his employment application, was informed by Appellee that he had been hired, and participated in a two week training at the Navajo Mine, located on trust land within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. Appellee assigned him to work at the San Juan Mine, located outside the boundaries of the Reservation. Appellee's human resources office and files for San Juan Mine workers are located at the Navajo Mine.\\nBefore Appellant could begin work, Appellee required him to take and pass a physical examination, which included a drug test. According to Appellee's policies, it will not hire an applicant if he or she fails a drug screening. Appellee offered employment in a letter, conditioning Appellant's employment on a preemployment physical examination. Appellant signed the letter indicating he accepted the terms of the employment offer. Appellant was scheduled to take his physical before he began work. For some reason, which is not clear in the record, Appellant did not take his physical on the scheduled date, but took his exam seven days after he began work. According to the drug test results, Appellant tested positive for marijuana. Dr. Robert Rhien, the doctor who administered the examination (hut did not do the actual testing), testified that he has administered hundreds of pre-employment physical exams over the years of his practice. Before informing Appellee of the results, Dr. Rhien discussed them with Appellant. He then informed Appellee.\\nAfter receiving notice of the test results from Dr. Rhien, Appellee took several steps to decide whether to keep Appellant. First, representatives of Appellee's human resources office held a meeting with Appellant to discuss the drug test results, where Appellant attempted to explain how he could have tested positive for marijuana. Appellee then requested that Appellant meet with a substance abuse counselor. The substance abuse counselor reported several other allegedly negative characteristics about Appellant. After that meeting, representatives of Appellee held a final meeting where they informed Appellant that he would be fired. Appellee issued a written termination notice that indicated Appellant was terminated because he had \\\"failed physical.\\\"\\nAppellant filed a charge with the Office of Navajo Labor Relations under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA), 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 201 etseq., and then a complaint with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission. Dr. Rhien testified for Appellee at the Commission hearing. During Dr. Rhien's testimony, Appellant submitted a copy of the laboratory report on his test results, identified in the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Based on the exhibits submitted and the testimony of Dr. Rhien, Appellant, representatives of Appellee's Human Resources Office, and others, the Commission concluded that Appellee fired Appellant for just cause for failing the drug test. This appeal followed.\\nII\\nThe issues in this case are (i) whether the Navajo Nation Labor Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the termination of a Navajo worker when the hiring and training of that worker occurred within the Navajo Nation; and (2) assuming there is jurisdiction, whether Appellant was fired for \\\"just cause\\\" under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.\\nIII\\nAs a threshold matter, Appellee argues that the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (Commission) lacked jurisdiction over this case because Appellant worked at the San Juan Mine. According to Appellee, the Commission's authority is coextensive with the Nation's territorial jurisdiction as defined by the federal \\\"Indian Country\\\" statute, 18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 TT5T. Appellee alleges that the mine is located outside the boundaries of the Navajo Nation under that statute. As the land on which the mine sits is not in trust for the Nation or an allotment, Appellee contends the test is whether the land on which the mine sits fulfills the two-part test defining \\\"Dependent Indian Community\\\" announced in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).\\nAppellant relies on the plain language of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA), as codified in the T995 Navajo Nation Code, which purports to extend the Commission's authority to employers \\\"doing business within the territorial jurisdiction [or near the boundaries] of the Navajo Nation[.]\\\" 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604 (emphasis added). According to Appellant, Venetie is not applicable, and this Court should apply the plain language of the NPEA. Based on that language, Appellant contends that the San Juan mine area is \\\"near\\\" the boundaries of the Navajo Nation, and therefore under the regulatory authority of the Commission.\\nThough both arguments assume that the geographical point of reference for our analysis is the San Juan Mine, the Commission did not make that assumption. In upholding its jurisdiction the Commission cited undisputed facts concerning Appellee's activities at its Navajo Mine, which is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. As found by the Commission, the human resources office and the employment records for the San Juan Mine are located at the Navajo Mine. More importantly, Appellant submitted his employment application, was informed by Appellee that he had been hired, and participated in a two week training at the Navajo Mine. Based on these facts, the question is whether Appellee's hiring and training activities within the Navajo Nation trigger the Commission's NPEA authority regardless of where Appellant actually worked.\\nWe recently announced a jurisdictional test for cases involving activity inside and outside the Navajo Nation. In Pacifcorp v. Mobil Oil, 8 Nav. R. 378 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003), we had to decide whether our courts had subject matter jurisdiction over a contract dispute between two corporations when one party's performance, the provision of electricity, was inside the Navajo Nation, and the other party's performance, payment for the electricity, occurred outside the Nation. We stated that if there is a \\\"sufficient nexus to activity on tribal land within the Navajo Nation, the cause of action arises there for purposes of the Navajo Nation's jurisdiction.\\\" Id. at 385.\\nUnder this test, there is a sufficient nexus to employment activity within the Navajo Nation to assert NPEA jurisdiction over this case. Necessary elements to create an employment relationship, hiring and training, occurred within the Navajo Nation. Even though Appellee ultimately assigned Appellant to a different mine, the Appellee's administration of the employment relationship remained at the human resources and records office within the Nation. Under these facts, there is a sufficient nexus to activity within the Nation, and the regulatory power of the Commission extends to the employment relationship between the parties.\\nLet the parties be clear on our holding. We do not say that the San Juan Mine is or is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. As jurisdiction is premised on the activities at the Navajo Mine, we do not need to resolve the question of whether the San Juan Mine is within a \\\"Dependent Indian Community.\\\" We explicitly reserve this question for a case where it is necessary to make that determination. Under the facts of this case, the Commission had jurisdiction.\\nIV\\nTurning to the merits of the case, Appellant argues several reasons why the Commission erred. First, he contends that Appellee's termination letter did not provide adequate notice of the reason for his termination. Second, he argues that the Commission erred in concluding Appellee fired him for \\\"just cause.\\\" We first discuss the standard of review in NPEA cases.\\nWe review decisions of the Commission under an abuse of discretion standard. Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, 8 Nav. R. 548, 554 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004). Among other things, the Commission abuses its discretion when it makes an erroneous legal conclusion, or if its factual findings are not \\\"supported by substantial evidence.\\\" Id. at 555. We review the legal conclusions de novo, with no deference given to the Commission's interpretation of the law. Id. Our review of the factual findings is more deferential. Id. This Court will find that a decision is \\\"supported by substantial evidence\\\" where, after examining the relevant evidence, a \\\"reasonable mind could accept [the evidence] as adequate to support the conclusion, even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.\\\" Id. Here, the facts underlying the Commission's decision are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. However, whether the notice given was adequate or whether the facts as a matter of law rise to \\\"just cause\\\" are legal questions we review de novo. Id. We now turn to each issue.\\nA\\nAppellant first argues that the termination notice was inadequate under the NPEA. The NPEA requires \\\"a written notification... citing [the] cause\\\" for the termination. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(B)(8). One of the main purposes of written notification is to inform an employee of the basis for the adverse action. By this notice the employee is able to pursue legal remedies with an understanding of what facts the employee must address. Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School District No. 27, 7 Nav. R. 135, 137 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995). Another purpose is to prevent ad hoc justifications for termination by requiring the employer to clearly state why an employee's conduct is unsatisfactory. Id. This stops the employer from avoiding the just cause requirement by merely stating general displeasure with an employee as grounds for firing. To fulfill these purposes, the notification must be in writing, must be meaningful and reasonably clear in its language, must contain facts supporting the termination, and must be provided to the employee contemporaneously with the adverse action. Dilcon Navajo Westerner/ True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 39 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000). Appellant contests the meaningful requirement, contending that the phrase \\\"failed physical\\\" did not clearly alert him of the reason for his termination.\\nWhat constitutes meaningful language in a termination notice depends on the whole context of the employment relationship, in that the language is designed to alert a specific employee at a specific place and time of the reasons for the termination. In reviewing the meaningfulness of the notice, we do not look at the bare language in a vacuum, but consider the full interaction between the employer and employee leading up to the notice. In Red Mesa we considered the meaningfulness of the notice in the context of contemporaneous documents given to the employee discussing her deficiencies. 7 Nav. R. at 137. As the employer had discussed the reasons it was displeased with the employee's work leading up to the termination, we held that the notice was meaningful, as the employee \\\"fully understood the basis for the [employer's] actions and that she received fair notice of the grounds for her eventual termination.\\\" Id. We contrast that situation with the one in Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co., where the employer merely wrote on a scrap of paper that the employer had \\\"violated company policies,\\\" with no previous notice of deficiencies or discussion about what violation of \\\"company policies\\\" occurred. 8 Nav. R. at 38 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003).\\nUnder this approach, when considered in light of the discussions between Appellant and Appellee leading up to his termination, the notification was meaningful. First, the doctor in charge of Appellant's drug test discussed the results with Appellant. Appellee then held a meeting with Appellant, again to discuss the results. Then, at Appellee's request, Appellant met with a substance abuse counselor. After that meeting, Appellee met again with Appellant to discuss his termination. Here, given the multiple discussions between employer, its agents, and employee, Appellant clearly was on notice of the reason for his termination, and therefore the phrase \\\"failed physical\\\" was sufficient to alert him that he had to argue he did not fail his drug test before the Commission.\\nB\\nAppellant makes several arguments why the Commission's conclusion that there was \\\"just cause\\\" is wrong. We focus first on his argument that there was not substantial evidence to find that he tested positive for marijuana. Appellant suggests that this Court adopt a rule used in New Mexico state courts know as the \\\"legal residuum rule.\\\" Under this rule of administrative law, a court will not uphold a factual finding of an agency in a case where a \\\"substantial right\\\" is at stake if based only on evidence that would be inadmissible in a court of law. Trujillo v. Employment Sec. Comm., 610 P.2d 747, 748 (1980). According to Appellant, the Commission's finding that he failed his drug test is only supported by inadmissible hearsay testimony of Dr. Rhien, and therefore, under the legal residuum rule, should be rejected as lacking \\\"substantial evidence.\\\" The Rules of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission do not require that evidence be admissible under formal rules of evidence, but the Commission may exclude any evidence that is \\\"irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.\\\" Amended Rules of Procedures for Proceedings Before the Navajo Nation Labor Commission, Rule 15(E). Despite that, Appellant contends that the legal residuum rule is required as a matter of due process.\\nThough we may adopt a state rule in the absence of Navajo or federal law on the subject, 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 204(C) ^995), it is unnecessary to do so in this case. Even assuming we apply the legal residuum rule, there is admissible evidence of the test results. Curiously, Appellant claims the only evidence submitted to the Commission was \\\"a statement and testimony of Dr. Rhien.\\\" Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 9. Appellant makes this assertion multiple times, at one point in this brief by stating that \\\"[t]he test result itself was never provided to the Commission by the Employer in spite of Appellant's repeated requests that it be provided.\\\" Id. at 8 (emphasis added). While technically true that Appellee did not provide the results, a cursory review of the exhibits submitted at the hearing and the transcript of the proceedings show that Appellant himself submitted a copy of the test results. During his cross-examination of Dr. Rhien, Appellant submitted Petitioner's Exhibit 6, which is a copy of a report by S.E.D. Medical Laboratories showing that Appellant tested positive for marijuana. Transcript at 164. Appellant and the Commission discussed this document at length with Dr. Rhien, and the document became part of the evidentiary record. Transcript at 164-166,189-192.\\nPetitioner's Exhibit 6 would have been admissible in a court of law. First, Appellant himself submitted it, and therefore any objection to its admissibility would have been waived. Second, even assuming Appellee had submitted it, and Appellant had made a timely objection, the report is a \\\"record of regularly conducted activity,\\\" that is a \\\"business record,\\\" under Rule 26(6) of the Navajo Rules of Evidence. Assuming, for the sake of this discussion, that we look to interpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) for guidance, cf. Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez, 8 Nav. R. 417, 424 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) (looking to interpretation of federal rules as guidance in absence of an interpretation of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure), medical records, including test results, are business records. M. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence \\u00a77074 (2000); see also, e.g., Sheldon v. Consumer Products Safety Comm., 277 F.3d 998, roio-n (8th Cir. 2002). Also, Dr. Rhien, who has administered hundreds of physical exams like the one administered to Appellant, would have been competent to give testimony as the necessary foundation for the admissibility of the record as a \\\"custodian or other qualified witness.\\\" FRE 803(6).\\nBased on this analysis, there was substantial evidence that Appellant tested positive for marijuana. As Appellant does not argue that failure of his drug test is somehow not \\\"just cause\\\" we find the Commission did not err on this point.\\nLastly, Appellant makes several other arguments concerning \\\"just cause,\\\" which we consider briefly. Appellant argues that the Commission wrongly used information from Appellee's substance abuse counselor, concerning other alleged negative characteristics of Appellant, as additional justification for the \\\"just cause\\\" firing. Appellant contends it cannot support the \\\"just cause\\\" determination. Appellant also argues that the Commission improperly faulted Appellant for not objecting to the test results prior to his termination. Even if Appellant is correct that the Commission erred, the fact that Appellant failed his drug test is alone enough for \\\"just cause\\\" under Appellee's employment policies. That the Commission added on additional reasons does not take away the separate and independently sustainable reason of failing the drug test. The Commission's purported errors are then harmless.\\nAppellant also contends that Appellee waived its ability to fire Appellant when it put him to work without first completing the physical. However, as found by the Commission, Appellant was on notice by Appellee's offer letter that his employment was conditioned on completing the necessary pre-employment physical. His pre-employment physical was scheduled before he started work. For a reason not revealed in the record, he did not actually go to his screening until after he began working. He did get his screening within seven days of his start date. Under these circumstances, we do not believe there was a waiver.\\nV\\nBased on the above we AFFIRM the decision of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission.\\nWe are aware that de novo review of \\\"just cause\\\" announced in Tso overrules our previous statements that \\\"just cause\\\" is a factual issue for which we defer to the Commission. See Dilcon Navajo Westerner/ True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 38 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000); Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School District No. 27, 7 Nav. R. 135, 238 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995). However, \\\"just cause\\\" is a statutory term created by the Navajo Nation Council, and therefore the interpretation of that term is properly a question of law for which we give no deference to the Commission. Similarly, the written notification requirement arises from the statutory language, and we further have described the requirement in terms of due process. See Smith, 7 Nav. R. at 237. Both elements are legal, not factual, requiring us to review the adequacy of notice as a matter of law.\\nWe apply the version of Section 204 in effect at the time of the filing of this appeal. The Navajo Nation Council amended this section in 2003, changing the placement and language of Subsection (C). Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CO-72-03 (October 24,2003).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3551413\", \"name\": \"Lita MANYGOATS Petitioner-Appellee vs. ATKINSON TRADING COMPANY, Inc. d/b/a Cameron Trading Post Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Manygoats v. Atkinson Trading Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-08-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-62-00\", \"first_page\": 321, \"last_page\": 339, \"citations\": \"8 Navajo Rptr. 321\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:13.248111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Lita MANYGOATS Petitioner-Appellee vs. ATKINSON TRADING COMPANY, Inc. d/b/a Cameron Trading Post Respondent-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"Lita MANYGOATS Petitioner-Appellee vs. ATKINSON TRADING COMPANY, Inc. d/b/a Cameron Trading Post Respondent-Appellant\\nIn the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNo. SC-CV-62-00\\nAugust 12, 2003\\nAnna Marie Johnson, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), C. Benson Hufford, Esq., and Alexandra Shouffe, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellee.\\nJames B. Collins, Esq., Farmington, New Mexico, and William J. Darling, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"4240\", \"char_count\": \"26578\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered by\\nFERGUSON, Associate Justice.\\nThis case involves the termination of employee Lita Manygoats (\\\"Manygoats\\\"), a member of the Navajo Nation, by her employer, Cameron Trading Post (\\\"Cameron\\\"), a non-Indian company located on the Navajo Nation. Cameron appeals from Orders issued by the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (\\\"Labor Commission\\\") on remand from a prior decision of this Court, Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, 8 Nav. R. 3 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000) [hereinafter Manpgoats (I)]. This is Cameron's second appeal. After careful review of the extensive record before us, we affirm the Orders of the Labor Commission.\\nI. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nCameron Trading Post (\\\"Cameron\\\") consists of a hotel, convenience store, curio/ gift shop, restaurant and gas station located near Cameron, Navajo Nation (Arizona), on non-Indian fee land within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Nation. It sells Navajo jewelry, rugs and other arts and crafts to both Navajo and non-Navajo customers.\\nThe vast majority of Cameron's employees - between 70% and 90% depending on the season - are Navajo. Manygoats was hired as a clerk and cashier in March 1995. A few months later, upon arriving to work one day, she found that her shifts for the rest of that week had been crossed out. When she asked her manager about this, he told her that she had been fired, but he did not give her any specific reasons for her termination. After she insisted on proper written notification, the manager wrote on a piece of scrap paper: \\\"Lita George [Manygoats] was terminated on 8-10-95 for violation of company policies.\\\"\\nManygoats filed a Complaint with the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (\\\"ONLR\\\") claiming, among other things, that she was fired without just cause and that she had not been given proper written notification citing reasons for her termination. After the ONLR gave Cameron notice of Manygoats' Complaint, Cameron sent her a letter listing six alleged reasons for her termination.\\nThe case went before the Labor Commission; it held that Cameron did not have just cause to fire Manygoats and that its original notice was improper because it failed to cite the specific reasons for the termination, as required by the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (\\\"NPEA\\\"), T5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(B) (8). It awarded Manygoats back-pay and attorneys' fees, and imposed a civil fine on Cameron for its violations of the NPEA. Cameron appealed the Labor Commission's decision to this Court.\\nIn Manygoats (I), we held that the Navajo Nation has regulatory and adjudicatory civil jurisdiction over Cameron's employment practices, that Cameron does not have standing to assert the equal protection rights of hypothetical non-Navajo employee-claimants and that while the NPEA's allocation of the burden of proof does not violate the right of employer-respondents to due process, the 'clear and convincing' standard of proof does. Accordingly, we lowered the standard of proof to a 'preponderance of the evidence' and vacated the award of hack-pay and attorneys' fees (which we noted were to be calculated with reference to Navajo Nation attorneys' rates). We also vacated the civil fine on the grounds that its imposition was procedurally defective, and remanded the case to the Labor Commission for further proceedings.\\nOn remand, the Labor Commission applied the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard to the record, which included transcripts' of two days of evidentiary hearings. It concluded that Cameron still did not carry its burden of proving that it either had just cause to terminate Manygoats, or had given her proper written notification. The Labor Commission again ordered Cameron to pay Manygoats back-pay, costs, and attorneys' fees, which it adjusted to reflect prevailing Navajo Nation rates. The Labor Commission repealed the civil fine, however, because it had not made a finding that Cameron had violated the NPEA intentionally.\\nCameron then brought the present (and its second) appeal. Cameron repeats its previous claims that (i) the Navajo Nation does not have jurisdiction over Cameron's employment practices; (2) the NPEA violates the right of non-Navajo employees to equal protection; and (3) the NPEA's allocation of the burden of proof violates the right of employers to due process.\\nIn addition, Cameron makes the new claims that on remand, the Labor Commission violated its right to due process by allegedly reviewing the record without the required quorum and by not holding another hearing or accepting more briefs. Cameron also claims that the Labor Commission erred in finding that it had violated the NPEA's termination provision, 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(B)(8), and in awarding Manygoats costs and attorneys' fees.\\nII. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS\\nThe issues before the Court are the following:\\nr. Whether the Navajo Nation has civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over the employment practices of Cameron Trading Post, a non-Indian business employing Navajo workers and operating on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation?\\n2. Whether Cameron has standing to assert an equal protection claim on behalf of hypothetical non-Navajo employee-claimants?\\n3. Whether the NPEA's allocation of the burden of proof violates the right of employer-respondents to due process?\\n4. Whether the Labor Commission violated Cameron\\\"s right to due process on remand by (a) allegedly deciding the case without a quorum, and (b) declining to hold another evidentiary hearing or to accept the submission of additional briefs?\\n5. Whether the Labor Commission erred when it held that Cameron did not prove that it did not violate the NPEA's termination provision, 15 N.N.C \\u00a7 604(B)(8)?\\n6. Whether the Labor Commission erred in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Manygoats?\\nA. JURISDICTION\\nIn Manygoats (I), we noted that the Treaty of r868 between the United States and the Navajo Nation recognized the inherent sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, and, with it, the inherent authority of the Nation to exercise civil jurisdiction on all land within the exterior boundaries of its territory. 8 Nav. R. at 17. In Montana v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, inherent tribal sovereignty does not extend to the exercise of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land within the tribe's territory. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1982). However, the Court recognized two broad exceptions to this general rule:\\nA tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements. [2] A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. (internal citations omitted).\\nThe Navajo Nation's regulation of Cameron's employment practices easily falls within the first exception, for Cameron has clearly entered consensual relationships with members of the Navajo Nation through employment contracts, by employing tribal members to provide services in exchange for mutually agreed upon wages. Its employment practices are, therefore, subject to the Navajo Nation's employment regulations.\\nCameron argues that its employment of Navajo workers is not \\\"consensual\\\" for two reasons: (1) it is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of T964 from discriminating on the basis of race or national origin; since a majority of job applicants are Navajo, it must employ Navajo workers; and (2) even if it were not prohibited by federal law from discriminating against Navajos, it would not be able to avoid hiring them; there are simply not enough non-Navajos in the area to permit Cameron not to employ Navajo workers. Cameron argues that for both of these reasons, it is not voluntarily entering into employment relationships with Navajo Nation members, and the relationships therefore cannot be considered \\\"consensual.\\\" Cameron implies that it would not hire Navajo workers if it could avoid doing so.\\nCameron's argument is disingenuous, for it clearly benefits from the feel of authenticity that Navajo workers bring to the trading post. As we noted in Manygoats (I), Cameron describes itself on its website as \\\"one of the last authentic trading posts... [and] continues to serve as an active trade and cultural center blending modern commerce with traditional Indian trading customs.\\\" 8 Nav. R. at 14. And Joe Atkinson, the President of Atkinson Trading Company, Inc., is quoted as saying:\\nWhat makes Cameron special is not only the fine weavings, baskets and bead work, it's the ambiance. Here you're not just told about the people, their traditions and what trading post life is like. You experience it! This gives the works of art meaning and brings them to life.\\nId. Interacting with the Navajos who work at Cameron is what makes it possible for people who visit the trading post to feel like they are experiencing \\\"the people, their traditions and what trading post life is like.\\\" Cameron's contention that it is somehow forced by law and practical realities to hire Navajos contradicts the fact that it recognizes how important Navajo workers are to the success of its business.\\nMore importantly, from the point of view of the law, Cameron's argument that its employment relationships with its Navajo workers are not consensual is simply wrong. Legal and practical limitations on the employment choices Cameron can make do not, as a matter of law, render those choices involuntary or nonconsensual. All consensual relationships, including those entered into through employment contracts, are formed against the backdrop of particular legal rules (including rules prohibiting discrimination) and market conditions (including the composition of the available labor pool). These rules and conditions may limit the range of choices available to contracting parties, but they do not negate the voluntary or consensual nature of otherwise legal contractual relationships. Since Cameron's employment relationships with its Navajo workers are consensual, the Navajo Nation's regulation of Cameron's employment practices falls within the first Montana exception.\\nMoreover, the Navajo Nation's exercise of regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over Cameron's employment practices satisfies the nexus requirement recently articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). According to Atkinson, \\\"Montana's consensual relationship exception requires that the... regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself\\\" Id. at 656. Such a nexus clearly exists here. The regulation at issue is the NPEA, which governs the terms and conditions of employment of Navajo workers on the Nation's territory. The relevant consensual relationship is an employment contract between Cameron and its Navajo workers; therefore, the nexus requirement is met.\\nSignificantly, this case is distinguishable from Montana Department of Transportation v. King, a recent 9th Circuit Court case in which the court held that absent a state or federal statute or treaty, a tribe does not have jurisdiction to regulate the employment practices of state employees working to maintain a right-of-way through their territory. 191 F.3d 1108 (1999). The issue in King was narrowly limited to whether a tribe has jurisdiction over the employment practices of a state - another sovereign - when the state is engaged in performing one of its sovereign duties, namely the maintenance of the highway. Id. at 1114. King did not deal with whether a tribe may impose employment regulations on private employers doing work on fee land within a Nation's territory and therefore has no bearing on the case before us.\\nFinally, the Navajo Nation's exercise of civil jurisdiction over Cameron's employment practices also falls within the second Montana exception. Montana's second exception provides that a tribe may exercise civil jurisdiction over \\\"the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its territory when that conduct threatens or has some direclt effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.\\\" 450 U.S. 544 at 565. Economic security is very much at issue in this case.\\nWe take judicial notice of the fact that Navajo Nation unemployment rates are very high. The Navajo Nation Council enacted the NPEA to ensure the economic growth of the Nation and the economic well being of the Navajo workforce. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602 (A). Cameron is the major employer in the area surrounding the trading post, with 7% to 13% of the area's Navajo population working for Cameron at any given time. Most families living in the area rely either directly or indirectly on Cameron for their livelihood. Thus, Cameron's employment practices have a great, and potentially devastating, impact upon the welfare of the local community and economy. Therefore, they properly come within the scope of the Navajo Nation's civil authority.\\nB. EQUAL PROTECTION\\nCameron is once again claiming that the NPEA violates: the right of non-Navajo employees to equal protection. We summarily dismissed this claim in our prior decision because Cameron did not have standing to bring an equal protection action on behalf of hypothetical non-Navajo employee-claimants. Cameron continues to lack standing for this claim, and therefore we uphold our previous dismissal.\\nMoreover, non-Navajos are entitled to the NPEA's written notification and just cause for termination protections. In Staff Relief v. Polacca, we held that \\\"under basic principles of equal protection of law, any person who is injured by a violation of [the] NPEA may file a claim with the Commission.\\\" 8 Nav. R. at 65 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000). Cameron's claim is therefore moot.\\nC. THE ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF\\nOur previous holding that the NPEA's allocation of the burden of proof on employers does not violate their right to due process of law is the law of the case. As we explained in Manygoats (I), placing the burden of proof on employer-respondents to show that they had just cause for any adverse action they took against an employee is not only sensible but it is in keeping with the longstanding common law doctrine that the burden of proof ought to rest on the party with peculiar knowledge of the facts and circumstances relevant to determine a disputed element of the case. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted,\\nIt is indeed entirely sensible to burden the party more likely to have information relevant to the facts about [the disputed element, such just cause] with the obligation to demonstrate... the existence or non-existence of the element]. Such was the rule at common law.... \\\"In every case the onus propandi [or burden of proof] lies on the party who wishes to support his case by a particular fact which lies more peculiarly within his knowledge, or of which he is supposed to be cognizant.\\\"\\nConcrete Pipe and Products of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust For Southern California, 508 U.S. 602,626 (1993) (internal citations omitted). Employer-respondents are simply in a better position to know why they took an adverse action against an employee than is that employee. Therefore, placing the burden of proof on the former to show just cause is neither unfair nor a deprivation of their right to due process.\\nD. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S PROCEDURES ON REMAND\\nCameron claims that on remand, the Labor Commission violated its right to due process in two distinct ways: (r) by allegedly deciding the case with less than a quorum of Labor Commission members, and (2), by not allowing another evidentiary hearing or additional briefs.\\nThe first claim is obviously without merit. The Navajo Nation Code explicitly provides for a five-member Commission and a quorum of three. T5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 303 & 305(A). The same three Labor Commission members who initially heard the case reviewed the evidence and decided the case on remand. Therefore, the case was decided by a quorum, and Cameron suffered no deprivation of due process in this regard.\\nThe second claim is also without merit. This Court does not disturb the substantive or procedural decisions of a quasi-judicial administrative agency unless those decisions were the result of an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion by an agency may consist of an action that is:\\nbeyond or outside the power of the agency, based upon a mistake as to the applicable law, a violation of civil rights guarantees, not supported by the evidence, or the [result of] procedures [that] were arbitrary and unreasonable.\\nDilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen, 8 Nav. R. 28, 29 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2000) quoting Navajo Skill Center v. Benally, 5 Nav. R. 93, 96 (Nav. sup. Ct. 1986).\\nThe Labor Commission's decision not to hold another hearing or to accept more briefs was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. We did not give instructions for a new hearing in Manygoats (I), nor was one required given that the original record was extensive and included the transcript of two full days of evidentiary hearings. Moreover, the Navajo Nation Code authorizes and directs the Labor Commission to \\\"[r]eceive, rule on, exclude, and limit evidence, lines of questioning, or testimony which are irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.\\\" 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7304(H). Holding another hearing would have been unduly repetitious because Cameron did not claim to have any new evidence to present.\\nFinally, Cameron had ample incentive to present its strongest case at the initial hearing since it was attempting to meet the 'clear and convincing' standard of proof. Since Cameron had been given a full and fair hearing the first time around, and since Cameron had to meet a lower standard of proof the second time around, the Labor Commission could reasonably have concluded that Cameron would not be disadvantaged by its decision.\\nWe hold that the Labor Commission acted within its discretion in declining to hold additional hearings or to accept additional briefs, and that Cameron suffered no due process violation in this regard.\\nE. THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISION ON THE MERITS\\n1. Just Cause\\nBased on its review of the evidence in the record, the Labor Commission held that Cameron did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it had just cause to fire Manygoats.\\nWe do not disturb findings of fact unless they are unreasonable. Silentman v. Pittsburg and Midway Coal Mining Company, 8 Nav. R. 306, 312 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2003). Findings of fact are unreasonable if they are not supported by \\\"relevant evidence which a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support the [factual] conclusion, even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.\\\" Id.\\nThe Labor Commission found that only two of the six reasons Cameron cited for its termination of Manygoats in the letter it sent her after she filed her Complaint with the ONLR were supported by sufficient credible evidence. The other four were not. Indeed, the evidence submitted to support them seemed to have been fabricated months after Manygoats' termination. We are satisfied that the Commission's findings of fact were not unreasonable.\\nThe Labor Commission also held that although it had found that two reasons of the reasons were supported by the evidence, these did not rise to the level of just cause. At the very least, 'just cause' implies that the employer must have fair reasons for taking adverse actions against an employee and that those reasons are supported by the facts of the case.\\\" Dilcon, 8 Nav. R. at 38. Indeed,\\n[n]ot all employee misconduct will meet the standard for just cause... The misconduct must he substantial. Thus, a minor neglect of duty, an excusable absence, a minor misrepresentation, rudeness, and even filing a defamation action against the employer have been held not to establish just cause.\\nRothstein, et al., 2 Employment Law \\u00a7 8.8 (2d ed., 2003)(emphasis in original; internal citations omitted). We agree with the Labor Commission's legal conclusion that Cameron did not prove that Manygoats' alleged misconduct was substantial.\\nHowever, we note that the Labor Commission was not required even to inquire into whether Cameron proved the six reasons it listed in its belated letter to Manygoats, for \\\"[o]nce the employer has stated reasons for the employment termination, it is bound by them and cannot come forward with new justifications.\\\" Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School District No. 27, 7 Nav. R. 135, 137 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1995). Only the first notification counts, both for purposes of determining whether the employer had just cause for the adverse action taken, and for determining the adequacy of the written notification.\\nCameron's original notification was written on torn scrap paper and stated only that Manygoats was fired for \\\"violating company policies.\\\" Given that Cameron (1) had no formal personnel policies and procedures in place, (2) did not properly document Manygoats' alleged offenses at the time they occurred, and (3) never told Manygloats until after she was fired that she was in violation of company policies, the Labor Commission was reasonable in concluding that Cameron did not show that it had just cause to terminate Manygoats' employment.\\n2. Written Notification\\nWe also affirm the Labor Commission's holding that Cameron did not prove that it gave Manygoats adequate written notification of the reasons for her termination. We previously held that the NPEA's written notification provision includes the requirement that notice be given at the time an employer takes an adverse action against an employee. See Dilcon, 8 Nav. R. at 39. Otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent employers from arbitrarily taking adverse actions against their employees, and then making ad hoc justifications for those actions after an employee files a complaint. Red Mesa, 7 Nav. R. at 137. Therefore, we need only examine Cameron's original notification, which it gave Manygoats on the day of her termination.\\nCameron's original notification did not meet the NPEA's requirement that written notification must in all cases cite the cause or specific reasons for the adverse action taken by an employer against an employee. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(B)(8). One of the main purposes of the written notification provision is to \\\"inform an individual of the basis for adverse action.\\\" Red Mesa, 7 Nav. R. at 137. Thus, we have held that:\\n[i]n order to ensure that the purposes of the written notification requirement are fulfilled, the notification must be meaningful. Therefore, .[it] must be reasonably clear in its language and contain facts that would support the adverse action.\\nDilcon, 8 Nav. R. at 39. This ensures that employees are given the opportunity to decide whether to take appropriate legal action if they feel they have been wronged. In this case, the notice Manygoats received contained no facts that would support her termination. She had to file a complaint with the ONLR to find out why she had been termination.\\nWe affirm the Labor Commission's conclusion that Cameron did not meet its burden of showing either that it had just cause to terminate Manygoats, or that it had given her adequate written notification of the reasons for the termination. Consequently, we also affirm Manygoats' award of back-pay.\\nF. Attorneys' Fees and Costs\\nThe Labor Commission held that Manygoats was entitled to costs and attorneys' fees. The NPEA require that \\\"[i]f, following notice and hearing, the Commission finds that respondent has violated the Act, the Commission shall... award costs and attorneys' fees if the respondent's position was not substantially justified.\\\" r5 N.N.C. 1612(A)(2).\\nWe find that there is ample support in the record for the Labor Commission's determination that Cameron's position was not substantially justified. Cameron's legal arguments were at best misguided, and its evidence ranged from thin to lacking in credibility. Therefore we affirm the Labor Commission's decision to award Manygoats attorneys' fees and costs.\\nThe Labor Commission's Orders are AFFIRMED.\\nIn its first appeal to this Court, Cameron claimed that:\\n1. it did have just cause to terminate Manygoats' employment,\\n2. it had given Manygoats proper written notification,\\n3. that both the award of attorneys' fees and the imposition of the civil fine were unjustified,\\n4. the Navajo Nation lacked regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over its employment practices,\\n5. the NPEA violated the right of non-Navajo employees to equal protection, and\\n6. the NPEA's allocation of the burden of proof, and its 'clear and convincing' standard of proof, violated the right of employer-respondents to due process.\\nWe ruled on the first three issues in Manygoats (I). Our rulings on those issues are the law of the case. However, for the sake of clarity, we restate our reasoning with respect to those issues here, addressing recent developments in the case law where necessary.\\nWe doubt Cameron would have made such an outrageous argument in federal court.\\nCameron also claims that because its employment relationships with Navajos take the form of verbal, rather than written contracts, those relationships do not fall under Montana's consensual relationship exception. This claim is hardly worthy of a response. Montana says nothing whatsoever about the form a contractual relationship must take, and employment contracts need not be written in order to be legally enforceable. The fact that Cameron's employment relationships with its Navajo workers are entered into verbally does not negate their contractual nature.\\nAs we noted in Manygoats (I), the population surrounding the Cameron area is predominantly Navajo. According to Census figures available in 1990, there were 1,on Indians and 24 non-Indians living in the area. 8 Nav. R. at 11.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528749\", \"name\": \"The Navajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter Blake, Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Blake\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-11-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CR-04-95\", \"first_page\": 233, \"last_page\": 236, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 233\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and SLOAN* (*sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"The Navajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter Blake, Defendant-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CR-04-95\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nThe Navajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter Blake, Defendant-Appellant.\\nDecided November 5, 1996\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and SLOAN* (*sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\\nJimmie Dougi, Esq., Office of the District Prosecutor, Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Plaintiff-Appellee; and Phillip O. Multine, Esq., Navajo Public Defender\\u2019s Office, Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Defendant-Appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"1565\", \"char_count\": \"9591\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThe Tuba City District Court sentenced the Appellant, Walter Blake (Blake), to imprisonment and to pay restitution after pleading guilty to the crimes of criminal damage and criminal entry. Blake argues that the district court should have held a hearing to detemine if restitution should be awarded.\\nI\\nBlake was charged with committing seven criminal offenses after he was apprehended for starting a fire that destroyed two businesses in Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona): The Pizza Edge Restaurant and Dahl Chiropractic. Blake pleaded guilty to the offenses of criminal damage and criminal entry, 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 351, 380 (1995), in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The criminal complaints for the two remaining offenses listed $2,000 and $72,000 as the amounts of restitution requested by the business owners for damages. Discovery revealed that the owner of the Pizza Edge Restaurant had insurance to cover his losses. Whether Dahl Chiropractic had insurance to cover its losses is not known.\\nDuring negotiations on a plea agreement, the prosecutor informed Blake that restitution would not be sought; therefore, it was not a point of contention, nor included in the final agreement. The parties dispute whether the court accepted the plea agreement and the record is of little help in this regard. Furthermore, neither the parties nor the court raised the issue of restitution at any time during the proceedings, including sentencing. Moreover, although restitution was requested in the criminal complaints, the Navajo Nation did not actively pursue it at all.\\nThe court did not hear any evidence concerning the businesses nor the alleged damages incurred by the owners, perhaps, because the case did not proceed to trial. Also, restitution was not a recommended sentence either by the plea agreement or the Navajo Nation during sentencing. Nonetheless, the court, on its own, awarded $2,000 and $74,000 as restitution to the two business owners. Blake uses these facts to argue that the district court erred when it awarded restitution without a hearing and considering evidence.\\nII\\nRelying on Navajo Nation v. Bedonie, 2 Nav. R. 131, 135 (1979), the Navajo Nation argues that this Court cannot review the restitution issue because Blake did not object to it during sentencing or raise it as a matter of post-trial relief. Bedonie does not support the Navajo Nation. In that case, the issue of whether the court could consider evidence from a prior hearing involving the defendant's co-defendants was before the court. Id. at 134. The Navajo Nation did not object to the court considering the evidence and, on appeal, the issue was ruled as waived for lack of objection at trial. Id. at 135. In this case, the prosecutor requested restitution on behalf of the business owners in the criminal complaints, but he failed to raise it for the court's decision either prior to or during sentencing. In fact, it is not controverted that the Navajo Nation chose not to pursue it. Thus, Blake did not have a viable restitution issue to contest.\\nThe case of Navajo Nation v. Platero, 6 Nav. R. 422, 428 (1991), also sheds light on the appealability of this issue. In that case, we established the rule that this Court \\\"may . consider errors, whether or not they are raised by the defendant, if any of the following is present: (1) if they are plain and affect substantial rights; (2) if they affect jurisdictional or constitutional rights; (3) if there is lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (4) if review is necessary to avoid grave injustice.\\\" Blake was ordered to pay $74,000 in restitution without being given notice that the court would consider it and without an opportunity to defend. The court's restitution decision plainly affects Blake's due process rights and, undoubtedly, a substantial amount of his property. We see no better case for review, to avoid a grave injustice under the teachings of Platero, than this one.\\nIII\\nOur modem criminal law, as it is found in the Navajo Nation Criminal Code, is foreign to traditional Navajo society. Navajos, traditionally, did not charge offenders with crimes in the name of the state or on behalf of the people. What are charged as offenses today were treated as personal injury or property damage matters, and of practical concern only to the parties, their relatives, and, if necessary, the clan matriarchs and patriarchs. These \\\"offenses\\\" were resolved using the traditional Navajo civil process of \\\"talking things out.\\\" Nalyeeh (restitution) was often the preferred method to foster healing and conciliation among the parties and their relatives. The ultimate goal being to restore the parties and their families to hozho (harmony).\\nThese concepts supported a request for restitution in a juvenile proceeding in a prior district court case. In In the Matter of D.P., 3 Nav. R. 255, 257 (Crownpt. Dist. Ct. 1982), the court discussed the Navajo traditions of putting the victim in the position he or she enjoyed prior to the offense, punishing in a visible way to show a wrong was punished, and giving an offender a means to return to the community by making good for a wrong. Id. The court concluded that \\\"not only is restitution pemitted under Navajo custom law, but indeed it was so central to Navajo tradition in offenses that it should be presumed to be required in any juvenile disposition.\\\" Id. While we agree that restitution is central to Navajo tradition, we do not, at this point, address whether restitution should have presumptive value in criminal cases.\\nRestitution, a time honored American Indian practice, entered the tribal criminal codes through the early Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (often referred to as \\\"Law and Order Regulations\\\"). For example, a provision in the 1938 BIA regulations states as follows:\\nIn addition to any other sentence the Court [CFR Court] may require an offender who has inflicted injury upon the person or property of any individual to make restitution or to compensate the party injured, through the surrender of property, the payment of money damages, or the performance of any other act for the benefit of the injured party.\\nFederal Register, at page 956 (May 18, 1938).\\nIn 1958, the Navajo Nation Council adopted, wholesale, the BIA Law and Order Regulations and made it the Navajo Nation Criminal Code. See Navajo Tribal Council Res. No. CJ-45-58 (passed July 18, 1958). Upon adoption, the restitution provision found in the BIA regulations became a part of Navajo statutory criminal law. Restitution, therefore, is firmly embedded in Navajo common law and in modern Navajo criminal law. With this background, we now turn to the issue raised by Blake.\\nBlake agrees with the Navajo Nation that the district court has the power to award restitution to the business owners upon his guilty plea to criminal damage. Blake, however, takes issue with the court's award of restitution without notice to him and an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Blake believes that the applicable subsection in the criminal statute, 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 380(C) (1985), requires a hearing and the court must be satisfied of certain factors before awarding restitution.\\nSubsection 380(C) states as follows: \\\"Restitution. The court, in addition to or in lieu of the sentence, may require the offender to pay actual damages for the benefit of the injured party.\\\" (italics in original). Blake believes that the words \\\"actual damages\\\" and \\\"injured party\\\" in the subsection mandates an evidentiary hearing, because, without a hearing, it would be impossible to identify the injured party. Blake also argues that on any claim for damages, there must be evidence presented in support of that claim, because our law is damages cannot be speculative. Wilson v. Begay, 6 Nav. R. 1, 5 (1988).\\nWe agree with Blake. Before restitution can be awarded under the criminal code, and specifically subsection 380(C), the court must be satisfied with these minimal factors: 1) Is restitution appropriate in the case; 2) Who is the injured party; 3) What is the extent of the loss or injury; 4) What kind of restitution is appropriate; and 5) If money is to be paid, what amount would satisfy the actual damages requirement. We believe that these factors satisfy the rudiments of traditional Navajo due process apparent in this criminal statute. We trust the district courts will fashion approaches to ensure that the mandates of the statute are fulfilled.\\nFinally, Blake's guilty plea came before the district court on a plea bargain. Under our law, the district court need not accept the exact terms of a plea bargain. The court should warn the defendant that it may disregard the agreement and impose the full sentence allowed by law before accepting the plea. If the defendant still wishes to enter a guilty plea, the court should proceed to sentence. See, Stanley v. Navajo Nation, 6 Nav. R. 284 (1990).\\nThe decision of the Tuba City District Court on restitution is reversed and the issue remanded to that court for a new hearing.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528751\", \"name\": \"Blaze Construction, Inc., a Blackfeet Charter Corporation, and Sun All, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The Navajo Tax Commission, The Navajo Nation, Joe Shirley Jr., Victor Joe, Derrick S. Watchman, Elroy Drake, \\\"Jane/John Doe\\\" and Steven C. Begay, Defendants/Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Blaze Construction, Inc. v. Navajo Tax Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-09-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-26-96\", \"first_page\": 288, \"last_page\": 292, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 288\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, CADMAN and *MORRIS (*sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Blaze Construction, Inc., a Blackfeet Charter Corporation, and Sun All, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The Navajo Tax Commission, The Navajo Nation, Joe Shirley Jr., Victor Joe, Derrick S. Watchman, Elroy Drake, \\u201cJane/John Doe\\u201d and Steven C. Begay, Defendants/Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-26-96\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nBlaze Construction, Inc., a Blackfeet Charter Corporation, and Sun All, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. The Navajo Tax Commission, The Navajo Nation, Joe Shirley Jr., Victor Joe, Derrick S. Watchman, Elroy Drake, \\u201cJane/John Doe\\u201d and Steven C. Begay, Defendants/Appellees.\\nDecided September 3, 1997\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, CADMAN and *MORRIS (*sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\\nLawrence A. Ruzow, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellants; and Herb Yazzie, Esq., and Marcelino Gomez, Esq., Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"2071\", \"char_count\": \"13191\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nThe issue before this Court is whether the Window Rock District Court properly dismissed the Blaze Construction, Inc. and Sun All, Inc. (collectively \\\"Blaze\\\") complaint. Blaze sued the Navajo Tax Commission, the members and executive director of the Navajo Tax Commission, and the Navajo Nation (collectively \\\"Commission\\\") for denial of equal protection and due process rights. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted, and this appeal followed. The issues are: 1) whether the Uniform Tax Administration Statute barred the district court from hearing Appellants' claims; and 2) whether Appellants' claims were exempt from the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. We will not address the issues of whether the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act barred Blaze's claims and whether Blaze had a contractual obligation to resolve its dispute through a Commission hearing officer. We affirm the district court's dismissal.\\nI\\nBlaze built roads on the Navajo Nation between 1986 and 1988. In 1989, the Commission issued Notices of Assessment and Demands for Payment to Blaze for its road construction activities based on the Navajo Business Activity Tax (\\\"BAT\\\"). 24 N.N.C. \\u00a7 401-445 (1995) (partially repealed 1995). In September 1989, Blaze appealed the BAT assessment to the Commission.\\nBefore the Commission made a final decision on Blaze's appeal, Blaze filed suit in district court. In its district court suit and appeal to the Commission, Blaze alleged two instances when the Commission violated its equal protection and due process rights. The first claim stemmed from Blaze's tax settlement offer to the Commission, which was rejected. Blaze alleged the Commission had settled comparable cases with other taxpayers for less favorable terms. Moreover, Blaze argued that the Commission refused to settle the case because of an actual bias and prejudice toward Blaze.\\nWith its second claim, Blaze asserted that the Commission unfairly assessed Blaze a BAT when the Commission exempted the Navajo Engineering and Construction Authority (\\\"NECA\\\") from the tax. NECA is an enterprise of the Navajo Nation engaged in road construction activities comparable to Blaze. 5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1971-1981 (1995). Enterprises of the Navajo Nation are exempt from taxation. 24 N.N.C. \\u00a7 408(A) (1995). Blaze claims discrimination because Blaze and NECA are competitors in road construction bidding and NECA is exempt from the BAT.\\nOn February 14, 1995, a hearing officer issued a decision on Blaze's second claim. The hearing officer held that NECA was properly exempted from the BAT based on the clear language of the Navajo Nation Code. The hearing officer found that \\\"the Navajo Tax Commission is not free to determine that a statutory provision granting an exemption to enterprises owned by the Navajo Nation should not be followed by the [Commission].\\\" Commission Decision at 6 (February 14, 1995).\\nBlaze filed an amended complaint in the district court in April 1996. In the amended complaint, Blaze sought an injunction to force the Commission to accept its settlement offer. Blaze also sought a declaratory judgment on the Commission's practice of assessing Blaze a BAT for road construction activities yet exempting NECA for similar construction activities.\\nIn May 1996, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss based on: 1) the statutory appeal procedure for tax assessments; 2) the exhaustion doctrine; 3) the discretionary clause of the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act (1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 554(F)(4)(a)(1995)); and 4) a contractual agreement requiring Blaze to bring all disputes to the Commission. The district court granted the motion to dismiss ruling that the Commission had the discretion to resolve Blaze's claims. Blaze appeals.\\nThe Commission has since issued a final judgment on Blaze's appeal of its BAT assessment. While Blaze appealed that decision to this Court, that case is independent of the issues we address today.\\nII\\nA. The Uniform Tax Administration Statute\\nIf Blaze's equal protection and due process claims fall within the scope of the Uniform Tax Administration Statute (\\\"UTAS\\\"), then Blaze must follow the procedures outlined in that statute. The Navajo Nation Council enacted the UTAS in 1995. The UTAS replaced the tax sections of the Navajo Nation Code and attempted \\\"to provide statutory rales applicable to all of the taxes imposed by the Navajo Nation.\\\" UTAS \\u00a7 102 (1995). The old BAT appeal procedures listed at 24 N.N.C. \\u00a7 434 (1995) were replaced by the procedures of the UTAS. The language of the two statutes is nearly identical. Because the Navajo Nation Council adopted the UTAS in 1995, before Blaze filed its complaint in 1996, the UTAS is the law that governs this decision.\\nThe UTAS provides a specific procedure for \\\"[ajppeals from assessments, denials of refund, or other adverse action.\\\" UTAS \\u00a7 131 (1995). The UTAS states:\\n(a) Appeals from assessments, denials of refund, or other adverse action shall be made first to the Office of the Navajo Tax Commission according to procedures established in regulations; these procedures shall also apply to any challenges to the validity of the Code....\\n(b) Appeals from final actions of the highest level of administrative review shall be made only to the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation, according to procedures established in regulations, but in no case may an appeal of an assessment be taken to the Supreme Court until payment of the taxes assessed has first been made.\\nId.\\nIn 1989, the Commission assessed Blaze a BAT. In its complaint, Blaze asserted two instances of being discriminated against: 1) when the Commission rejected its assessment settlement offer; and 2) when the Commission did not assess a BAT on NECA. These two claims stem from a BAT assessment dispute and question the fairness of Blaze's BAT assessment. They fall within section 131 of the UTAS. Thus, when Blaze filed suit in district court on its two claims, it essentially appealed the Commission's ruling to the courts and that is not permitted by the tax code. The Navajo Nation Council established a clear procedure for tax appeals and Blaze must follow those statutory procedures. UTAS \\u00a7 131. Those procedures require, first, a final decision from the Commission, and then an appeal to this Court.\\nThe UTAS anti-injunction section further bars Blaze from bringing a suit in the district court that would impede \\\"the assessment or collection of the taxes.\\\" UTAS \\u00a7 128 (1995). The UTAS anti-injunction section states:\\nNo suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of the taxes imposed under the Code shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such taxes were assessed. All actions concerning the application of the Code shall be brought pursuant to \\u00a7 131.\\nId. In its amended complaint, Blaze asked the district court to force the Commission to accept Blaze's BAT settlement offer. Blaze also requested the district court to prevent the Commission from collecting Blaze's BAT until NECA was assessed a BAT. These reliefs, if granted, would restrain the Commission's collection of Blaze's BAT. Section 128 does not permit interference with the Commission's collection of taxes.\\nOur interpretation of the UTAS anti-injunction section is consistent with Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). In that case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the anti-injunction language of the Internal Revenue Code, Section 7421(a) (1954), which was identical to the language of the UTAS. The Supreme Court found that the statute \\\"withdr[e]w jurisdiction from the state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of federal taxes.\\\" Id. at 5. Accordingly, because Blaze's requested relief would restrain the Commission's collection of the BAT, the district court properly dismissed Blaze's claims.\\nB. The Exhaustion Doctrine\\nThe UTAS provides a clear procedure for tax appeals. While the UTAS prevents Blaze from bringing its equal protection and due process claims to district court, this Court recognizes exceptions to exhausting administrative remedies. In Navajo Skill Center v. Penally, 5 Nav. R. 93 (1986), we explained the reasoning behind the exhaustion doctrine and provided four exceptions to the doctrine.\\nExhaustion of administrative remedies is the concept that the agency should complete its procedures before the courts interfere. The exhaustion doctrine is very sound and ultimately serves the interests of judicial efficiency and economy. The exhaustion doctrine prevents the courts from interfering until the administrative process has been concluded. This process has been committed to the administrative body by the legislature and it should be permitted to run its course. This doctrine also requires parties to attempt to redress their grievance without resorting to the courts. Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine helps prevent confusion between the courts and the administrative bodies which would arise if a party were able to seek relief in two different forums.\\nGenerally, exhaustion will not be required:\\n1) When the administrative remedy is inadequate. Inadequacy may include unreasonable delay of agency action, inability of the agency to come to a decision, or lack of authority to grant the relief to which the party is entitled.\\n2) When the complainant will suffer irreparable injury if required to exhaust administrative remedies.\\n3) When the agency is clearly acting or attempting to act in excess of its authority.\\n4) When pursuing the administrative process would be futile such as when an agency indicates that it will not consider a party's challenges to its past policies or decisions, which are of questionable legality.\\nId. at 96-97.\\nIn Navajo Skill Center, we discussed whether the district court had jurisdiction to review the Navajo Skill Center's firing of an employee before she had exhausted her administrative remedies. We held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the employee's due process and civil rights claims because she could still seek relief through the employee grievance process. Id. at 97.\\nBlaze points to the following language in the Commission hearing officer's decision as proof that its equal protection and due process claims fall under the first and fourth Navajo Skill Center exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine:\\nIt is sufficient to say that the [Commission] has followed the C-BAT statute which allowed this exemption. The [Commission] must apply the tax laws as enacted by the Navajo Nation Council; in the absence of some guidance from the Navajo Nation Supreme Court on the interpretation of those laws or some direction from the Navajo Nation Council itself. The Navajo Tax Commission is not free to determine that a statutory provision granting an exemption to enterprises owned by the Navajo Nation should not be followed by the [Commission].\\nCommission Decision at 6 (February 14, 1995). Blaze argues that this statement demonstrates the Commission lacked the authority and willingness to address the discrimination issue and, therefore, the district court was the only appropriate forum.\\nWe conclude that Blaze's equal protection and due process claims do not fall within the Navajo Sl\\u00fall Center exceptions. The hearing officer's decision does not state a lack of authority to address Blaze's claims, but suggests the Commission must follow the law absent direction from this Court or the Navajo Nation Council. Furthermore, the facts in this case are similar to those of Navajo SHU Center. In that case, we held that the employee could not bring her due process and civil rights claims to district court because she failed to exhaust her remedies through the grievance procedure. Similarly, Blaze's equal protection and due process claims stem from an administrative process governed by a statute. Therefore, Blaze must exhaust its remedies through the administrative process.\\nFinally, the UTAS contains an administrative remedy for tax appeals and provides a procedure for judicial review of the final administrative decision. After a final decision is reached, the taxpayer may appeal to this Court. Blaze is not allowed to by-pass the statutory procedure because of an adverse decision.\\nIll\\nWe affirm the decision of the Window Rock District Court dismissing Blaze's equal protection and due process claims.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528760\", \"name\": \"Blanche Raymond, Appellant, v. Navajo Agricultural Products Industry, et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Raymond v. Navajo Agricultural Products Industry\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-07-20\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-26-94\", \"first_page\": 142, \"last_page\": 146, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 142\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, CADMAN and *TOLEDO (*by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Blanche Raymond, Appellant, v. Navajo Agricultural Products Industry, et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-26-94\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nBlanche Raymond, Appellant, v. Navajo Agricultural Products Industry, et al., Appellees.\\nDecided July 20, 1995\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, CADMAN and *TOLEDO (*by designation), Associate Justices.\\nRD. Moeller, Esq., Farmington, New Mexico, for the Appellant; and James J. Mason, Esq., Gallup, New Mexico, for the Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"2143\", \"char_count\": \"13391\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nThis is an appeal of a decision by the Window Rock District Court which granted a summary judgment to Navajo Agricultural Products Industry (NAPI). The District Court held that Raymond's claims were barred under the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act.\\nI\\nRaymond is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation. On November 18, 1992, Raymond was terminated from her position as the Personnel Assistant/EAP Coordinator with NAPI. Upon completing a grievance procedure, NAPI reinstated Raymond in a February 11, 1993 agreement placing her in the same position she held prior to termination. This agreement required a cooperative working relationship toward the best interests of NAPI.\\nIn the period following her reinstatement, Raymond claims that she was sexually harassed and assigned duties inconsistent with the reinstatement agreement. On June 17, 1993, Raymond filed another grievance regarding these complaints but no action was taken by NAPI in respect to it. On June 21, 1993, Raymond was again terminated.\\nOn September 21, 1993, Raymond commenced suit against NAPI in the Window Rock District Court seeking money damages. She claimed that NAPI's actions were breaches of her employment contract and reinstatement agreement, that she was sexually harassed, that she suffered from the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that she was wrongfully terminated. On November 19, 1993, NAPI filed a motion for summary judgment. On June 27,1994, the District Court ruled that the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act barred all of Raymond's claims.\\nOn September 26, 1994, Raymond brought this appeal. On appeal, Raymond presents civil rights arguments that were not before the lower court.\\nII\\nUnder the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act, the Navajo Nation is immune from suit. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(a) (1980). This immunity from suit is an inherent attribute of Navajo sovereignty and not judicially created by any court, including the Navajo courts, and is not bestowed upon the Nation by the United States government, or any other government. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(b) (1988). The Navajo Nation Council, as the governing body of the sovereign Navajo Nation, has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts, especially in suits against the Nation. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(c) (1988). The Act recognizes that the People of the Nation have rights and interests (as enacted in the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights), and that these rights and interests are limitations of the Nation's sovereign powers. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(e) (1986). Thus, the Act provides individuals with specific remedies and redress from governmental actions which are violative of the people's rights. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(e) (1986). There are four exceptions to the Nation's immunity from suit under the Act. This Court finds that none of Raymond's claims fall within the Act's provided exceptions.\\nA\\nFirst, the Navajo Nation may be sued when \\\"explicitly authorized by applicable federal law.\\\" 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(b) (1980) (emphasis supplied). Raymond, citing Nez v. Bradley, 3 Nav. R. 126 (1982), claims that the Navajo Nation Courts will hear \\\"constitutional\\\" claims, as stated in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), and that the Nation cannot \\\"hide behind\\\" its sovereign immunity. Raymond misinterprets Nez. The court in Nez distinguished between laws that expand rights and those which expand jurisdiction. The court denied \\\"that [the ICRA] gives any new jurisdiction to [the] tribal court, because tribal court jurisdiction comes from the sovereignty of the tribe or nation which establishes the court.\\\" Id. at 130-31.\\nThis Court in TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Nation, 6 Nav. R. 57, 60 (1988), agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 59 (1978), in that the ICRA does not waive a tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. See Johnson v. The Navajo Nation, 5 Nav. R. 99 (1987). Since immunity from suit is an inherent attribute of the Nation's sovereignty, a federal law must expressly waive the Nation's immunity from suit to be \\\"applicable federal law.\\\" It is the finding of this Court that the ICRA is not an applicable federal law under the meaning of section 354(b) of the Act. In addition, the ICRA does not explicitly waive the Nation's immunity from suit as required by the Act. TBI Contractors, 6 Nav. R. at 60. This Court reiterates that the Nation's immunity from suit has not been explicitly waived by the ICRA.\\nB\\nThe second exception to the Nation's immunity from suit under the Sovereign Immunity Act is when the Navajo Nation Council explicitly authorizes suit by resolution. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(c) (1980). Raymond has not identified a Council resolution that would allow her claims.\\nC\\nThe third exception is for claims within the express coverage and not excluded by the commercial liability insurance carried by the Nation. 1 N.T. C. \\u00a7 354(f) (1988). To determine whether Raymond's claims are expressly covered and not excluded by commercial liability insurance, it is necessary to examine NAPI's insurance policy with Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. This policy covers damages that NAPI becomes legally obligated to pay for bodily injury, property damage, personal injury, and public officials' errors and omissions. The policy expressly excludes liability for:\\nemployment-related or personnel practices, policies, acts, errors or omissions including but not limited to . termination of employment... [and] coercion, criticism, demotion, promotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination, . or consequential injury as a result of... [the] above. Fireman's Fund Policy sections I.C.2.C. (2), (5) and I.C.2.d.\\nThe policy also expressly excludes public officials' errors and omissions arising out of \\\"failure to perform or breach of a contractual obligation....\\\" Fireman's Fund Policy section I.C.24.e. Therefore, this Court finds that all five of Raymond's original claims are either expressly excluded or not included in the policy's coverage.\\nRaymond asserts that the Nation cannot hide behind its sovereign immunity for suits claiming violations of her civil rights. She is right, but for the wrong reason. In arguing that the Nation cannot enact laws that are violative of U.S. Constitutional guarantees, Raymond is wrong. \\\"Constitutional guarantees... are not applicable to the exercise of governmental powers by an Indian tribe except to the extent that they are made explicitly binding by the Constitution or are imposed by Congress.\\\" Trans-Canada, 634 F.2d 474, 477 (1980); See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra; Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).\\nIndeed, the Nation does not attempt to hide behind sovereign immunity for civil rights claims. The Act itself mandates that commercial liability policies must contain a provision regarding civil rights violations. Under section 354(f)(5) of the Act, the Nation's commercial liability policies must contain a provision covering damages resulting from \\\"wrongful deprivation of civil rights.\\\" The policy contains such a provision at sections III.P. and III.S.:\\nPublic Officials ' Errors and Omissions means any and all Wrongful Acts by an Insured in the discharge of duties for the Named Insured.... Wrongful Act means any actual or alleged error or misstatement, omission, act of neglect or breach of duty including misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance by the Insured. Wrongful Act includes actual or alleged violations of antitrust statutes, negligent ministerial acts, and violations of federal or state civil rights providing coverage is otherwise afforded under this policy (emphasis in original).\\nAlso, the Act provides for prospective mandamus or injunctive relief for these types of claims as discussed below. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(g)(1) (1986).\\nA person seeking redress of civil rights violations must establish that Navajo Nation courts have jurisdiction to hear her claims. If the claimant is suing the Nation, the claimant must, as a jurisdictional predicate, establish that the Nation's immunity from suit has been waived. Since the \\\"jurisdiction and powers of the [cjourts of the Navajo Nation, particularly with regard to suits against the Navajo Nation, are derived from and limited by the Navajo [Nation] Council,\\\" 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 353(c) (1988), the claimant must look to the Council for a waiver of the Nation's immunity from suit. The Council has provided exceptions to the Nation's immunity from suit in the Sovereign Immunity Act. The claimant must apply her claims to the provided exceptions under the Act. It is the duty of the District Court to determine if her claims are civil rights claims and if they are exceptions to immunity under the Act.\\nThis Court agrees with the District Court in that Raymond's claims are not civil rights claims but employment-related claims. The civil rights claims that Raymond raises on appeal were not part of her original complaint and therefore cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Gudac v. Marianito, 1 Nav. R. 385, 394 (1975).\\nD\\nThe final exception to the Nation's immunity from suit under the Act states that \\\"[a]ny officer, employee or agent of the Navajo Nation may be sued in the [cjourts of the Navajo Nation to compel him/her to perform his/her responsibility under the expressly applicable laws of the United States and of the Navajo Nation, which shall include the Bill of Rights of the Navajo Nation....\\\" 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(g) (1986). This is limited to prospective mandamus and injunctive relief. 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(g)(1) (1986). Raymond is not seeking prospective mandamus or injunctive relief, but is specifically seeking an amount equal to \\\"a sum calculated to reimburse her or her damages,\\\" i.e., retrospective monetary relief. Accordingly, this Court holds that Raymond's claims do not constitute a waiver of the Nation's immunity from suit under section 354(g) of the Act.\\nIII\\nRaymond is wrong in her assertion that breach of contract claims against the Nation are exempted from sovereign immunity under the Sovereign Immunity Act. She asserts that this Court, in TBI Contractors, supra, suggested that the Nation's immunity from suit does not apply to breach of contract suits. That is incorrect. In TBI Contractors, this Court suggested that the appellants should have argued that the provisions of the contract contained a waiver of immunity from suit. Id. at 61. The contract in TBI Contractors was approved by the Navajo Nation Council; therefore, if it contained a provision waiving the Nation's immunity from suit, immunity would be waived under section 354(c) of the Act. The Act does not provide for a waiver of immunity in contract disputes per se. A claimant seeking to sue the Nation for breach of contract must, as in any other claim, state a claim that falls under the express exceptions to the Nation's immunity from suit provided in the Act, Again, this Court finds that all of Raymond's claims are barred by the Sovereign Immunity Act.\\nIs Raymond denied an opportunity to obtain a just remedy for the alleged illegal actions of the Nation? The answer to this question is unequivocally \\\"no.\\\" The stated purpose of the Act is to \\\"balance the interests of individual parties in obtaining the benefits and just redress to which they are entitled . while at the same time protecting the legitimate public interest in securing the purposes and benefits of their public funds and assets....\\\" 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354(a) (1985). The exceptions are consistent with this language. If a plaintiff's claims are covered expressly, and not excluded by the Nation's insurance coverage, then a plaintiff may seek retrospective monetary relief. This is the relief that Raymond seeks. Since her claims are not covered by the provisions of the Fireman's Fund Policy, her claims are barred by the Nation's immunity from suit.\\nRaymond should have sought an administrative remedy under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA). According to the NPEA, \\\"[a]ll employers shall not penalize, discipline, discharge nor take any adverse action against any Navajo employee without just cause.\\\" 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 604B(8) (1990). A potential claimant can file a charge with the Office of Navajo Labor Relations, the agency responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of the NPEA. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 610A and B (1990). NPEA provides for full enforcement and remedy in sections 10 through 12 (codified at 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 610-612 (1990)). Remedies available to plaintiffs are both prospective and retrospective. Appeal to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court is available to any party under the NPEA. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 613A (1990). Raymond should have exhausted her administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. Begay v. Board of Election Supervisors, 2 Nav. R. 120, 125 (1979).\\nIV\\nAll of Raymond's claims are barred by the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act, and this Court affirms the decision of the Window Rock District Court.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528778\", \"name\": \"PC&M Construction Company, Inc., Appellant, v. Navajo Nation and Navajo Department of Financial Services, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"PC&M Construction Co. v. Navajo Nation\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-07-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-05-93\", \"first_page\": 96, \"last_page\": 99, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 96\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Yazzie, Chief Justice, and Austin, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"PC&M Construction Company, Inc., Appellant, v. Navajo Nation and Navajo Department of Financial Services, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-05-93\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nPC&M Construction Company, Inc., Appellant, v. Navajo Nation and Navajo Department of Financial Services, Appellees.\\nDecided July 22, 1994\\nBefore Yazzie, Chief Justice, and Austin, Associate Justice.\\nJohn A. Chapela, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant; and Helen E. Avalos, Esq., Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1407\", \"char_count\": \"8378\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nPC&M Construction Company appeals a decision by the Navajo Nation Department of Financial Services to collect a judgment, using an offset provision in the Navajo Business and Procurement Act.\\nI\\nThe Office of Navajo Labor Relations (\\\"ONLR\\\") brought an action on behalf of three Navajo workers against PC&M Construction Company, Inc. (PC&M), the primary contractor on a Navajo Nation funded construction project. The ONLR alleged that PC&M and two of its subcontractors, Ron Prows Construction (\\\"RPC\\\") and Native American Construction and Supply (\\\"NACS\\\"), failed to pay the Navajo workers at the \\\"prevailing wage rate\\\" as required by the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (\\\"NPEA\\\"), 15 N.T.C \\u00a7 607 (1985) (repealed 1990), and the construction contract. The ONLR established the prevailing wage rate for this project using the State of Arizona's minimum wage scale.\\nThe action was filed with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (\\\"Commission\\\"). On April 30,1992, the Commission found the three defendants jointly and severally liable for violating Section 607 of the NPEA and Section 11 .C and 11 .M of Navajo Manpower Utilization Requirements. Office of Navajo Labor Relations v. PC&M Constr. Co., Inc., NNLC No. 91-006 (decided April 30, 1992). The Commission ordered the three defendants to jointly and several ly pay the three workers their lost wages plus interest at 10% per annum. Id. at 5, 6. PC&M, RPC, and NACS appealed the Commission's decision to this Court. We dismissed the appeal because the Appellants did not file a brief as required by our civil appellate rules. Ron Prows Constr., et al. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, No. A-CV-21-92 (Order filed October 22,1992). Our dismissal of the appeal left intact the judgment entered by the Commission against the three construction company defendants.\\nOn December 21, 1992, the controller of the Navajo Nation Department of Financial Services (\\\"NNDFS\\\") notified PC&M by letter that it intended to offset the amount of money PC&M owed under the agency judgment. The amount was to be deducted from other monies the Navajo Nation owed to PC&M on another construction project. PC&M appealed this letter to a hearing officer within the NNDFS and a hearing was held. The hearing officer held that the Navajo Business and Procurement Act (\\\"Procurement Act\\\"), 12 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1507, authorized the NNDFS' intent to offset. In re PC&M Constr. Co., Inc., No. 01-93-F (decided February 2, 1993).\\nPC&M appealed the hearing officer's decision to this Court. Before the appeal could be granted, this Court had to decide whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal. We held that we did. PC&M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Navajo Nation, et al., 7 Nav. R. 58 (1993).\\nOn October 11, 1993, the Nation filed a Motion to Strike because certain exhibits were not made a part of the record. We granted the Motion to Strike.\\nII\\nThe issue on appeal is whether the offset provision of the Navajo Business and Procurement Act, 12 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1507, can be used to enforce the Commission's judgment for the benefit of individual Navajo workers.\\nIII\\nThe ONLR is an administrative agency established by the Navajo Nation Council to implement Navajo Nation labor policies, and monitor and enforce the NPEA. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 10 (1990). The ONLR brings employment disputes between aggrieved workers and their employers to hearings before the Commission. Under the NPEA, the ONLR can abstain from action and permit workers to sue on their own behalf, or it can generate its own charge against an employer. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 10. B.I., H.l. (a), H.2. (a), I (1990). The ONLR uses the latter procedure when it wishes to stop an offensive employment practice which impacts a broad class of Navajo workers and specific workers desire to remain anonymous. A third method allows the ONLR to file a complaint with the Commission on behalf of Navajo workers. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 10.1.1., H.2.(a) (1990). If this option is used, it precludes the worker's right to sue on his or her own behalf. The ONLR frequently uses this method when it detects issues that are of considerable interest, not only to workers, but to protect the interests of the Nation as a whole.\\nWhen the ONLR acts in its official capacity, it has available all Navajo Nation law needed to officially carry out its obligations under the NPEA. The NPEA requires contractors to pay workers the prevailing wage rate as established by the ONLR. PC&M's failure to pay workers at that rate was a violation of the NPEA and a breach of its contract with the Nation. The ONLR had discretion to be directly involved in this suit and represent the aggrieved Navajo workers. We conclude that the ONLR acted properly under authority of the NPEA as a legitimate party to the suit in its representation of the individual Navajo workers.\\nThe Commission's decision against PC&M and the two subcontractors awarded a money judgment in favor of the Navajo workers represented by the Nation through the ONLR. PC&M argues that because the judgment award was specifically for the workers, and not for the Nation, it has no authority to collect that judgment using the offset provision in the Procurement Act. PC&M argues that the workers can collect their judgment as private parties using the remedies available in 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7 701-712 (1985).\\nThe Navajo Nation was the only party in the action before the Commission. It acted in an ex relatione capacity. The three Navajo workers, on whose behalf the ONLR was acting, were not even parties to the action. The Commission's judgment was, therefore, for the Nation; the only party to the action. It is immaterial that the workers will ultimately benefit.\\nThe Procurement Act was created to enforce the Navajo Nation Collection System in the best interests of the Navajo Nation. Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CD-62-86 (December 11, 1986). The relevant part of the Procurement Act provides as follows:\\nIf [a] . business has an outstanding money judgment against it in favor of the Navajo Nation . upon due notice the Navajo Nation may offset its money claim against any amount it owes to or has account payable to the . business .\\n12 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1507(1986).\\nThe Commission entered judgment in favor of the Navajo Nation. The ONLR is entitled to use the offset provision cited above to collect the outstanding money judgment from PC&M, because the ONLR fits under the definition of \\\"Navajo Nation\\\" in the Procurement Act. 12 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1503 a.(6), (8)-(9) (1986). The Procurement Act does not exclude judgments from offset proceedings entered in favor of the Nation acting in an ex relatione capacity. We hold that the offset is proper.\\nThis Court will not create a judicial exception to the offset provision of the Procurement Act for judgments entered in favor of the Nation when it acts in an ex relatione capacity, as PC&M suggests. That is a matter for the Navajo Nation Council to consider. We believe that such an exception would work a substantial injustice to Navajo workers whose claims have been controlled by the ONLR throughout the NPEA enforcement process. It would very likely reduce the leverage the ONLR has to assure compliance with the NPEA.\\nThe decision of the hearing officer is AFFIRMED.\\n. The Navajo Nation filed a Motion to Strike exhibits A through F, and arguments based on those exhibits, because they were not made a part of the record during the administrative hearing. They included the issue of \\\"[wjhether the appellant [PC&M] was justified in its reliance on the assurance of the Executive Director of the Navajo Division of Community Development that the prevailing wage rate for the Whitecone Pre-school project had been waived.\\\" PC&M's Brief at 1.\\n. The Court ordered exhibits A through F, and all arguments based on those exhibits, stricken from the record. PC&M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Navajo Nation Department of Financial Services, 1 Nav. R. 72 (1993).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528789\", \"name\": \"Harry Tome, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Raymond Marshall, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tome v. Marshall\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SR-CV-67-95\", \"first_page\": 569, \"last_page\": 593, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 569\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Harry Tome, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Raymond Marshall, et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SR-CV-67-95\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Shiprock, New Mexico\\nHarry Tome, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Raymond Marshall, et al., Defendants.\\nDecided November 4, 1998\", \"word_count\": \"12614\", \"char_count\": \"74051\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nJudge Lorene Ferguson presiding.\\nTHIS MATTER came before this Court on a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. The Plaintiffs are also seeking sanctions and further injunctive relief. Upon review of the record and upon having conducted a hearing, this Court makes the following findings:\\n1. In SR-INJ-776-72, a default judgment was entered on December 12, 1974 and the Court ordered a permanent injunction in which the only named Defendant was Raymond Marshall and in which the court ordered the following:\\nMr. Marshall be permanently restrained and enjoined horn verbal and physical harassment of Plaintiffs.\\nMr. Marshall be permanently restrained and enjoined from \\\"interfering with or encroaching upon the grazing rights of the Plaintiffs [and Mr. Marshall shall] forever refrain from trespassing onto Plaintiffs' customary grazing use area, and shall cease any and all attempts at constructing any buildings upon Plaintiffs' customary grazing area....\\\"\\nMr. Marshall [shall] remove trailer house and all related structures and any and all equipment from the present disputed site, at the earliest convenience, to any location near his mother's customary grazing area, provided he shall obtain proper permission and consent before relocating.\\nDefendant shall abide by any and all established grazing and homesite regulations and he shall make all necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities, to graze his allowable sheep units of 20 sheep units near his birthplace as allowed pursuant to his father's grazing permit and 10 sheep units at Oak Springs as allowed from that original grazing permit obtained horn his spouse's side, and Defendant shall make any and all necessary arrangements to utilize his dual purpose grazing permit on a yearly rotating basis of six months at or near his birthplace near his mother's customary grazing area and six months at or near the Oak Springs area, and all appropriate authorities shall be notified of the arrangement at the earliest convenience.\\n2. In SR-INJ-776-72, the Defendant Raymond Marshall failed to appear and the Court found that sufficient cause had been shown that the Defendant should utilize the said permit according to customary usage of the original permits, mainly on a yearly rotating basis of six months near the disputed area and six months in the Oak Springs area. Mr. Raymond Marshall is the only named Defendant in SR-INJ-776-72. Plaintiff was represented by Charley John.\\n3. In SR-OSC-181-75, an Order to Show Cause was issued to Mr. Raymond Marshall by Judge Joe Benally on July 25, 1975, which was not served, and by Judge Homer Bluehouse on August 08, 1975, which was served upon Mr. Marshall on the same day.\\n4. In SR-INJ-776-72, an order for summary judgment contempt and for seizure was issued by Judge Charley John, and it is not clear whether he was counsel for the Plaintiffs previously. On October 19, 1978, Mr. Marshall was ordered to jail for 90 days by Judge Charley John.\\n5. Judge Perry Garnenez denied Mr. Marshall's motion to correct error on October 24, 1979, ordering that summary judgment remain.\\n6. In SR-CV-312-84, regarding SR-INJ-776-72, an Order was issued on January 10, 1986 by Judge Harry Brown ordering Raymond Marshall and \\\"all relatives and members of his household\\\" to comply with the permanent injunction issued on December 12, 1974. This is the first time other individuals were named Defendants. Also for the first time, the Court began to specify the area as \\\"all relatives and members of his household who occupy and reside on the customary grazing land of the Plaintiff situated east of Mitten Rock and west of the east wing of the Shiprock peak.\\\" The Court further ordered Raymond Marshall and \\\"all relatives and members of his household\\\" to comply with the permanent injunction issued on December 12, 1974 as follows:\\na. Not to verbally, physically harass plaintiffs.\\nb. Not to encroach or trespass upon grazing areas of plaintiffs.\\nc. Cease any and all construction of buildings or other structures upon the grazing area of plaintiffs.\\nd. Remove, within 20 days, from the date of this Order, mobile home and any and all other structures erected on the said grazing area of the plaintiffs.\\n7. A motion for reconsideration was filed and Shiprock District Court Judge Harry Brown denied the motion on February 14, 1986. Mr. Raymond Marshall filed a motion for stay of execution with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court issued an order on March 19, 1986 denying the motion with the following language:\\na. Order from which the motion is based confirms the validity of an Order issued on December 12, 1974.\\nb. Appellant stipulated on January 08, 1988 that he failed to comply with the December 12, 1974 Order and he had been found in contempt.\\nc. No bond was deposited by Appellant Marshall to protect interest of the Appellees.\\nd. It is not in the best interest of the judicial system to delay a valid order.\\n8. This Order was followed with a memorandum decision issued on May 05, 1986. In this decision, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated:\\nThe Appellant's argument that because the customary use area referred to in the injunction is not described by boundaries, therefore the injunction should be vacated, is without merit. The parties know the area is disputed and the injunction enjoins the appellants from encroaching and constmcting on the disputed area. The appellants are imputed with knowledge of the disputed area, therefore specifying boundaries in the injunction is unnecessary. Should the parties desire further clarification, then the District Court is the proper forum for that purpose only. The District Court has discretion to clarify that issue without invalidating the permanent injunction.\\nFORCIBLE ENTRY and DETAINER and MOTION for INJUNCTIVE RELIEF\\nThis action came to this Court as a Forcible Entry and Detainer Action. This action is based totally upon the Permanent Injunction entered on December 12, 1974. While it is the intent of a Forcible Entry and Detainer action to be swift and immediate, this Court, while reviewing the record in its entirety, finds the case has a history plagued with disparity. In order to do justice, this Court has carefully reviewed the record.\\nIn Malone v. Yazzie, 1 Nav. R. 88 (1994), the Navajo Nation Supreme Court decided a case involving an on-going dispute over a grazing permit and a home-site lease. The Court stated:\\nA review of the record reveals broader issues than what was originally presented to the Court. The dispute over the homesite lease and grazing permit is a part of a bigger dispute between the parties on appeal, and others, concerning use rights to the land. A decision on the issues of the grazing permit and the homesite lease alone, will not settle the entire matter. For that reason, we believe that the bigger dispute concerning the various parties' alleged interests in the land must be decided before the grazing permit and homesite lease issues can be resolved.\\nId. at 89. Such is the case here. The Forcible Entry and Detainer request relies upon the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Shiprock District Court's decisions of December 12, 1974 and January 10, 1986.\\nThis Court will not consider whether the December 12, 1974 and the January 10,1986 decisions are valid. The Supreme Court found them valid and entered a decision based upon their validity. The December 12, 1974 decision does the following:\\nDefendant (Raymond Marshall as of December 12,1974) was restrained horn any verbal, physical harassment including bothering and molesting the Plaintiffs and relatives.\\nDefendant was restrained from interfering with or encroaching upon the grazing rights of the Plaintiffs.\\nDefendant was also restrained forever from trespassing onto Plaintiffs' customary grazing use area, and shall immediately cease any and all attempts at constructing any buildings upon Plaintiffs' customary grazing area.\\nDefendant also was ordered to remove trailer house, any and all related structures, and any and all equipment from the present disputed area, at the earliest convenience to any location near his mother's customary grazing area, provided he shall obtain all proper permission and consents before relocation.\\nFinally, Defendant was ordered to abide by any and all established grazing and homesite regulations, and he shall make all necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities.\\nIn the January 10, 1986 order, the Supreme Court found essentially the same provisions as those set out in the December 12, 1974 order. Upon careful review of the two orders, the injunction issued on January 10, 1986 expanded the parties upon which the December 12, 1974 permanent injunction applies to \\\"all relatives and members of his household.\\\" Also the area which is subject to dispute was narrowed in description as \\\"customary grazing land... situated east of Mitten Rock and west of the east wing of the Shiprock peak,\\\" otherwise referred to as map \\\"O.\\\" The map is not described in detail. The area is excessive, containing about nine townships. Each township is about 36 square miles, each square mile containing 640 acres. Thus, the area referred to in map \\\"O\\\" is excessive, approximately 23,040 acres.\\nThe January 10, 1986 order was the subject of a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 14,1986. At that time, the Shiprock District Court addressed the issue of including other members of the household and relatives by stating that Raymond Marshall and his family have known for many years of the Court's decision. Stated the Court;\\nRule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an injunction is binding on the parties and on those with actual notice by personal service or otherwise.\\nThe general mle is that one is bound by an injunction even though he is not a party to the suit, therefore, if he has notice or knowledge of the injunction and is within the class of persons whose conduct is intended to be restrained, or acts in concert with such a person. 42 Am. Jur. 2d. Injunctions Sec. 320.\\nActual joinder of the family members was not necessary.\\nThe Supreme Court, in its May 5, 1986 order, also responded to the issue of vagueness raised by the Defendants.\\nThe injunction has been in effect for 11 years. This Court is unpersuaded that after 11 years, the appellants have finally become aware that the injunction is vague. Instead we interpret inactivity for 11 years as an acquiesce by the appellants with the terms of the injunction.\\nThe appellants (Defendants herein) argued to the Supreme Court that \\\"because the customary use area referred to in the injunction is not described by boundaries . the injunction should be vacated.\\\" To this the Supreme Court stated:\\nThe parties know the area in dispute and the injunction enjoins the appellants from encroaching and constructing on the disputed area. The appellants are imputed with knowledge of the disputed area, therefore specifying boundaries in the injunction is unnecessary. Should the parties desire further clarification, then the District Court is the proper forum for that purpose only. The District Court has discretion to clarify the issue without invalidating the permanent injunction. May 5, 1986 Order at 3.\\nWith this brief history, this Court will address the charges set out by the Plaintiffs in this case. The parties summoned to the hearing are Raymond Marshall, Lawrence Marshall, Alice Lee and Rose Taliman as respondents. Each of these persons was charged by the Plaintiffs as follows:\\nThat without authority or without the consent of the Plaintiffs, the Defendants have occupied and controlled the established customary grazing use area of the Plaintiffs.\\nThat the Plaintiffs have made repeated demands for the Defendants to comply with the Court Orders to quit and vacate established customary grazing use area set out as Exhibit O and these demands have been totally ignored.\\nDefendants are illegally holding over and they occupy and control the land.\\nDefendants have publicly announced at the District Grazing Committee meeting and at the Red Valley Chapter meetings they do not intend to comply with any Court Orders.\\nDefendants continue to graze their livestock in excess of their permit and build homes.\\nRaymond Marshall was specifically further charged with the following:\\nRaymond Marshall deliberately damaged a well and water supply used by Plaintiffs and other members of the community by breaking off the shut-off valve which is maintained by the Navajo Nation Water Department.\\nRaymond Marshall and all members of his family have repeatedly threatened, harassed and intimidated the Plaintiffs and their family members by \\\"gestures and word of mouth.\\\"\\nThe Plaintiffs are further requesting that this Court enter permanent injunctive relief restraining Defendants from further threatening, harassing, intimidating and making physical contact with the Plaintiffs and members of their families, employees or representatives, and from causing bodily injuries to their persons or to their properties, including livestock.\\nA hearing was held on October 12, 1995, at which time Raymond Marshall, Lawrence Marshall, Rose Taliman and Alice Lee appeared and presented testimony. Also present were Plaintiffs Marshall Tome, Harry Tome and Kenneth Benally who also presented testimony.\\nDECEMBER 12, 1974 PERMANENT INJUNCTION\\nIn order to see if the permanent injunction of December 12, 1974 was violated, this Court had to review the alleged violation in each of the Defendants'cases in light of the testimonies and evidence submitted to this Court.\\nSince this matter was brought to Court on a Forcible Entry and Detainer, this Court must look to 16 N.N.C. Sec. 1803. 16 N.N.C. Sec. 1803 requires that the complaint contain a description of the premises of which possession is claimed in sufficient detail to identify them, and that the complaint shall also state the facts which entitle plaintiffs to possession and authorize the action. It is the December 12,1974 permanent injunction and other subsequent orders which are the basis of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Action. Despite the requirements of section 1803, the Plaintiffs did not describe in sufficient detail the premises. It does not appear that a description was submitted to the Court until the filing of the complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. In fact, the courts previously entered orders without description of the land in dispute. The complaint in this present case alleges that Defendants have been demanded to quit and vacate the established customary grazing use area of the Plaintiffs and as supporting document, the Plaintiffs submitted the map described as \\\"Exhibit O.\\\"\\nAt the hearing, the Plaintiffs testified to the area they claimed. Plaintiffs are claiming an area which appears to overlap with an area claimed by other permit-tees. In addition, the land claimed by Plaintiffs encompasses a settlement from which the Defendants, except Alice Lee, were removed pursuant to the December 12,1974 Order. Ms. Lee testified they were bom and raised at that settlement. It is disputed that this settlement is the area in which Alice Lee's father had a grazing permit and it may be the area described as Defendant's birthplace.\\nThis Court is required to make a decision on whether Defendants' Forcible Entry and Detainer should be granted. The Plaintiffs allege that Raymond Marshall, Lawrence Marshall, Rose Taliman, and Alice Lee occupy and control the established customary grazing use area of the Plaintiffs to the detriment of the Plaintiffs, that the Defendants continually hold over, occupy and control land, that Defendants defy the orders of the court by controlling property to the exclusion of Plaintiffs, that the Defendants have publicly announced at the Grazing Committee meetings and the Red Valley Chapter meetings that they do not intend to comply with any court orders, and that the Defendants continue to graze their livestock in excess of their permits and build homes and other structures without homesite leases. Plaintiffs are further alleging that Raymond Marshall damaged the well and water supply used by the Plaintiffs by breaking the shutoff valve causing water waste. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Raymond Marshall and all his family members repeatedly threatened, harassed and intimidated Plaintiffs by gestures and by \\\"word of mouth.\\\"\\nTESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE COURT\\nMr. Raymond Marshall\\nRaymond Marshall testified as follows: Raymond Marshall has moved off the area alleged as Plaintiffs' customary grazing area about five/six years ago. Mr. Marshall presently lives about three miles off the highway and he has lived there for five years as of March 07, 1995, and he lives there alone with his wife. Mr. Marshall testified that while he obtained approval for a home site lease from the chapter, the homesite lease has not gone through the process to obtain the chairman or Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) approval as it has been held up because of the dispute. Mr. Marshall testified that while he is off the disputed area, the boundary line is close to where he presently lives and that the boundaries are not clear.\\nMr. Marshall also testified that he keeps twenty (20) head of sheep and thirty (30) head of goats and five (5) cows and that he sells them periodically, and the total herd size regularly decreases.\\nMr. Marshall indicated he goes through the disputed area almost daily as there is a road in that area open to the public. He further testified that there is a water well in the disputed area where the livestock drink water and that he keeps his livestock within the area where he presently lives. He stated that there is a windmill in the disputed area which pumps water and that there is no other water in the area and that the water is for use by local people and that the other closest water well is about four miles away.\\nMr. Marshall also testified that he does not harass or threaten any of the Plaintiffs and that he does not see them and that neither Marshall Tome nor Kenneth Benally live in the area. He stated that when he does meet any of the Tomes, they ignore one another.\\nMr. Marshall testified further that while he is limited to twenty (20) sheep units, the sheep units of his livestock periodically reaches a total of seventy (70). However, he keeps the size down by selling his livestock regularly. He also indicated that his children have a grazing permit for ten (10) sheep units and that he has kept his son, Lawrence's livestock, which are two (2) horses. He stated that these livestock graze in the area and that they sometimes go into the disputed area. He was asked that if the boundary was fenced in, would he like it? He stated that he would like it, \\\"... but if I fenced it in, I would get blamed again if I approved it myself and if the people from the area want a fence, its up to them \\u2014 if they say so, it's okay; a lot of people live here, many are related to me, my brothers and sisters (clanwise).\\\"\\nMr. Marshall also testified that his son, Lawrence, lived in Oalcsprings and has lived there since 1990. He also testified that Alice Lee still lives on the disputed land and that she has a few head of sheep which are corralled in, and that she has no cows and no horses. Mr. Marshall also testified that Rose Taliman is his daughter and she resides in Oalcsprings and that she moved to Oalcsprings after their family members were asked to leave.\\nMr. Marshall has cows which are all red except one with a white face. He testified that the earmarks identified by Mr. Harry Tome are not his and that the cows in the photo, submitted to the court as Exhibit Q, are not his cows and that they belong to someone else. He stated, \\\"Mine are fat, these are skinny.\\\"\\nWhen asked specifically about where he was between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock A.M. on August 27, 1995, Mr. Marshall stated he did not remember. When told that he was blamed for shooting a gun in the helium plant area, Mr. Marshall stated he was not there shooting a gun and that he has \\\"not shot a gun in quite a while.\\\" He further stated that he does own a \\\"30-30\\\" and had used it previously to shoot at coyotes. However, he testified that a long time ago he did chase a coyote into the helium plant area, but he stated, \\\"Harry knows that, that it was not recent.\\\"\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall testified that he lives three miles north of the trading post in Oalcsprings and that he has lived there for over four years. Prior to that time, he lived at Mitten Rock where there is the land dispute at subject in this case. He stated that he has a grazing permit for ten (10) sheep units and that he has five (5) horses of which two (2) are kept at his father's present living area and three (3) are at Oalcsprings. He further stated that he has sold all of his sheep. He testified that before he sold his sheep he did keep them at his father's area. He also testified that he has two horses and six cows at his father's area, and that the brands he uses are Q/AC and UDP RQ.\\nHe testified that he did not harass or use abusive language to the Plaintiffs and that he does not visit them and that they do not talk to one another.\\nHe stated he lives at Oalcsprings and would like to live near his father at his present living site. He further testified that Rose Taliman is his older sister and that she does not have any livestock. When asked if Rose Taliman had a horse trailer, Mr. Marshall stated he did not think she had a horse trailer. However, when he was asked if Rose owned a house trailer (mobile home) he testified that she did and that the house trailer (10 x 40) was parked at Mr. Raymond Marshall's present living area, off the disputed area. He also testified that his father has the following vehicles: a 1972 brown and white pick-up, a 1984 silver van, a 1978 or 1976 brown and white car and 1980 white Ford car.\\nMrs. Rose Taliman\\nMrs. Taliman testified as follows: She lives in Oaksprings outside the disputed area and that she moved there in 1970 when they were \\\"chased out.\\\" She stated that her trailer is still parked at her father's living area. Mrs. Taliman stated that all the windows to her trailer have been broken and the door has become loose and the trailer has no wheels. She also stated that she lived in low-rent housing in Shiprock prior to moving to Oaksprings. She stated she does not own any sheep, horses, or cows.\\nShe testified that she did not harass or threaten the Plaintiffs. Rather, in My 1989, she stated that Marshall Tome came at her with a car while she was on the grazing area and that she went to her father's place. No witnesses were presented to support this. She stated that she does not bother the Plaintiffs and allegations of harassment and threats by her are not true. Mrs. Taliman stated she did not do \\\"what I am being blamed for; it's not right.\\\" When asked by Plaintiffs' attorney whether or not she was thinking of moving back to her father's present living area, she stated in Navajo that the area from which she was removed is where her footprints start. She stated that she visited with her parents often and that she would like to live near her parents.\\nMr. Harry Tome\\nPlaintiff Harry Tome testified as follows: That he lives at Mitten Rock and that his parents lived there and that he lives 1/4 mile from the paved highway (M-13 -BIA). Mr. Tome referred to Map O which was introduced into evidence for limited purposes of discussion and not for the truth. Mr. Tome testified that the area described as the disputed area is \\\"our assigned grazing area\\\" belonging to him, Marshall Tome and Kenneth Benally. No testimony was presented to support the assignment.\\nMr. Tome testified that the area was designated by his father and mother and that the area is identified as .0681, based upon a permit which was not introduced as evidence.\\nMr. Tome stated that besides his family, Alice Lee still resides on the disputed area and he sees her and her family everyday. He also testified that she lives in a little house and that her children are constructing another home. Mr. Tome stated that when his cows go into the area where Alice Lee lives, he goes to get his cows and he sees their housing structures.\\nMr. Tome described a small house and another structure being built. He stated that there is also a sheep corral and altogether there are three (3) structures. Mr. Tome further testified that Alice Lee does own livestock, eleven (11) last year and nine (9) at the time of the hearing. Mr. Tome also testified that Alice Lee does not have cows or horses.\\nTo support this testimony, Mr. Tome introduced into evidence pictures his brother, Marshall Tome, took of some livestock he claimed belonged to Alice Lee.\\nMr. Tome does not know why Alice Lee has not moved off and he testified that he wants her to move off the land.\\nMr. Tome further testified that Mr. Raymond Marshall goes north into the area where the Tomes' livestock graze and sometimes he takes his sheep to the water area. Mr. Tome described Mr. Marshall's cows as red, gray (white) and black. When asked about Mr. Marshall's brand, Mr. Tome stated that he was not aware of Mr. Marshall's brand but that Mr. Marshall tells the grazing committee at roundup that he has a brand. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Tome stated he knows which cows belong to Mr. Marshall and that he sees these cows at the water area at least once a week and that Mr. Marshall drives them home.\\nMr. Tome further testified that he is aware of eleven (11) cows which belong to Mr. Marshall. He also introduced pictures which he claims are pictures of cows belonging to Mr. Marshall. Mr. Tome stated he knows these cows belong to Mr. Marshall based upon the cut of the ears. However, when cross-examined regarding the earmarks, Mr. Tome stated he knew the earmarks belong to Mr. Marshall because when they go to get water \\\"I see them, they are like that.\\\" When asked if he knew the Marshall brand, Mr. Tome stated, \\\"No, I don't know that.\\\"\\nMr. Tome also submitted to the Court pictures of houses he claimed belong to Mr. Marshall. Mr. Tome further testified the pictures of the livestock were taken within the disputed area.\\nMr. Tome also testified that he attended a school board meeting in Red Valley and while he was there making a school board report, he was harassed and threatened. He further testified that at chapter and Grazing Committee meetings, since 1990, he was harassed and threatened several times in a row. All in all, he claims he was harassed and threatened a total of (16) sixteen times since 1990, up to a week before his testimony. Mr. Tome did not specify what was said or by whom other than to state, \\\"they talk about us; he is like this and he chased us off our land and up to this day he is not sympathetic.\\\" Mr. Tome indicated that Raymond Marshall and Rose Taliman made such statements. Mr. Tome further stated that at the District Grazing Committee meetings \\\"they say they (Tomes) killed cows and sheep.\\\"\\nMr. Tome testified that \\\"they don't really say how they would harm me, but they call me a liar, a cheat.\\\" Mr. Tome testified that Mr. Marshall does not speak to him with respect and that Mrs. Taliman at school board meeting stated \\\"you are like this, you are not kind to people, you are like that, you are difficult.\\\" The school board had to close the meeting because she created a disturbance. Since 1990, she has done this about (6) six times and these incidents occurred outside the Red Valley Chapter House. While Mr. Tome testified to the above, no witnesses were presented to support this testimony.\\nMr. Tome stated that sometimes when he goes after the sheep, he can hear people yelling at him. He also stated that Rose Taliman has made gestures at him with her fingers. Mr. Tome stated that he knows Rose Taliman is the one who yells because she would be close by in a car. When asked about her vehicle, Mr. Tome stated that Mrs. Taliman would drive different vehicles and he would see her driving the different pick-up trucks.\\nMr. Tome stated that in the most recent occurrence, he recognized Rose Taliman and claimed her children talked awful to Mr. Tome's worker and that they were driving a red and white truck. There was no testimony as to what was actually said.\\nMr. Tome also testified that at the election campaign meetings they said \\\"let's do this to him.\\\" (It is not clear as to what would be done.) Mr. Tome stated he did not hear Mr. Marshall say this and he stated Rose Taliman was there. Mr. Tome stated he was not harmed physically by anyone.\\nHe also testified that on July 18, he became aware of damage to the shut-off valve and stated \\\"his workers (Tome's)\\\" had taken it apart. Mr. Tome stated that the one who damaged the shut-off valve was Raymond Marshall, as \\\"his car tracks were there.\\\" When asked if Mr. Raymond Marshall used the water, too, Mr. Tome stated, \\\"Yes, he's the one who broke it down.\\\"\\nUpon cross examination, however, Mr. Tome did state that people other than Mr. Marshall lived in the area and their livestock also come into the disputed area to water.\\nMr. Marshall Tome\\nMr. Marshall Tome testified as follows: Mr. Tome stated that he took the pictures marked as Exhibits P, Q and R, and that they are pictures taken in the disputed area on October 05, 1995. In Exhibit P, Mr. Tome testified that the picture represented a structure in Alice Lee's living area. In Exhibit Q, Mr. Tome testified that the picture represented Raymond Marshall's cows along side the road. Mr. Tome stated he did not see any brand but \\\"we just know it (sic) is (sic) their cows.\\\" In Exhibit Q, Mr. Tome testified that the picture represents Raymond Marshall's house, outside the disputed area. Mr. Tome also testified that Exhibit S represents another picture of Marshall's houses, again outside the disputed area. Mr. Tome testified that Rose Taliman's trailer is also shown in the picture, also outside the disputed area.\\nMr. Kenneth Benally\\nMr. Kenneth Benally also testified. He is a Plaintiff and a brother to both Harry and Marshall Tome. Mr. Benally testified that on August 26, 1995, his little brother's son, Jeff Tome, called him asking him to help brand calves and that on August 27, 1995, on a Sunday, they agreed to meet at the windmill after \\\"splitting\\\" up to get cattle. Upon splitting up, Mr. Benally testified that he went around the road, staying on the tracks, because it rained on Saturday night. Mr. Benally stated, \\\"I left my truck there and I started to herd cattle on foot and then I was going east toward the helium plant and I saw a pick-up truck parked along the road.\\\" Mr. Benally stated that he heard shooting which sounded like a .22 pistol or a .22 rifle and he stated it didn't bother him as he figured it was someone target practicing. Mr. Benally further testified as he herded the cattle past the pickup truck, he continued to hear the shooting. When asked which way they were shooting, Mr. Benally stated \\\"I don't know which way they were shooting, I know if it was shot at me. I can sense it, but it wasn't.\\\" Mr. Benally stated he then went back to his own car and said, \\\"I'm going to find out who the heck that is shooting around, shooting at what.\\\" At which point, he testified he got back into the car and drove off. He stated he recognized the pick-up truck which was tan and off-white with a little darker color on the side.\\nHaving forgotten the brand, Mr. Benally testified that he went back to Harry's house and on the way back, he saw Raymond Marshall driving the same pick-up truck and that they passed each other, \\\"I was going west and he was coming east on the roadway.\\\" When asked if it was the same pick-up from which he heard shooting, Mr. Benally stated, \\\"I don't know what the motive was - trying to scare me or what. I don't have any idea.\\\" Mr. Benally stated he heard about nine shots. When asked if he was ever harassed or threatened by Mr. Marshall, Mr. Benally stated, \\\"just from what I am told.\\\"\\nWhen asked about the road, Mr. Benally stated there are trails in the area and that the road/trails upon which he was driving led to the helium plant and that one road/trail led right down toward Alice Lee's home. Mr. Benally also testified that he is quite knowledgeable about guns and the sounds of guns, as he served in the military for four and half years (4 V2) years and the shots he heard were from either a .22 pistol or a .22 rifle.\\nMrs. Alice Lee\\nAlice Lee testified that she is married to Paul Lee, Jr. and that she has nine children and that her husband retired from the BIA in April, 1995. Mrs. Lee testified that she lives on the disputed area in a one-bedroom house which she has lived in for a very long time and that it belonged to her mother and father who are deceased. Her father, Marshall Hathalie, died 28 years ago (as of October 1995) and her mother, Lucy Hathalie, died 18 years ago (as of October 1995). Mrs. Lee testified that Raymond Marshall is her older brother. When asked whether her parents lived anywhere else, Mrs. Lee stated, \\\"just right there,\\\" referring to her present site. Mrs. Lee stated she was bom, raised, and nurtured there and that she did not go to school. Mrs. Lee stated in Navajo, \\\"We were raised there. Right there we bonded to the land.\\\"\\nMrs. Lee stated that a house with three bedrooms was built in 1986. However, the house lacks electricity and water because of the problem regarding the dispute. Therefore, no one lives in the house. The Tomes have put a \\\"stop to it\\\" because of the dispute. In addition, there is a third structure on the land where she dwells, a house being built by her children.\\nMrs. Lee stated, in addition to the three dwelling structures, there are two sheds for storage, two old cars, which belong to her son, and a narrow sheep pen, about twenty feet long, in which she keeps nine sheep. Mrs. Lee stated she has a grazing permit for sixty-nine (69) sheep units, which she got from her husband, for an area six to seven miles from where she presently lives. Mrs. Lee stated she does not have any cows, horses or goats.\\nAlice Lee appeared pro se and upon hearing testimonies and receiving photographs, this Court finds that Alice Lee, who is a sister to Raymond Marshall, was not initially named as a party to the ongoing case until the 1995 summons, the subject of this case.\\nMrs. Lee testified in her closing statement that she has a grazing permit for the area she now lives on. She stated she was told to take care of the land and that she is 60 years old as of October 1995 and that, by clan, the Plaintiffs are her older brothers.\\nISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED\\nThe following issues need to be addressed:\\n1. Whether each of the Defendants is out of compliance with permanent injunction and subsequent order as charged by the Tome brothers so as to be guilty of Forcible Entry and Detainer.\\n2. Whether the land upon which Alice Lee presently resides and upon which her siblings and parents resided were ever part of the area subject to claim by the Plaintiffs.\\nCOURT'S FINDINGS\\nRaymond Marshall's Occupation and Control of Area Claimed by Plaintiffs; Harassment; and Water System Damage\\nMr. Raymond Marshall demonstrated to this Court that he does not live on the disputed area claimed by the Plaintiffs. This Court does not find that Mr. Raymond Marshall occupies and controls the established customary grazing area claimed by the Plaintiffs. This Court does not find that Mr. Raymond Marshall continues to illegally hold over, occupy and control land to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs. All of the Plaintiffs testified they have access to the area. Further, there has been no showing that Mr. Marshall has publicly announced that he would not comply with the Court orders.\\nWhile Mr. Harry Tome testified about having been harassed and threatened, he could not say whether Mr. Marshall made any specific statements nor could he pinpoint where these statements were made. He merely stated that \\\"they talk about us, he is like this and he chased us off our land and up to this day he is not sympathetic,\\\" referring to what was said about him. No witnesses to corroborate his statements were brought before the Court. Furthermore, when asked specifically about how the Plaintiffs were harassed and threatened, Mr. Tome stated, \\\"they don't really say how they would harm me, but they call me a liar, a cheat.\\\"\\nAs to Mr. Marshall's role, Mr. Tome made general statements such as he knows that Raymond Marshall and Rose Taliman make statements. Mr. Tome further testified that Mr. Marshall does not speak with respect and that Mrs. Taliman, at school board meetings, says \\\"you are like this, you are not kind to people, you are like that, you are difficult,\\\" and that the school had to close meetings because of the disruption. Again, no witnesses were presented to corroborate these statements.\\nMr. Tome did testify that on an election campaign, \\\"they\\\" said, \\\"lets do this to him.\\\" (It was not clear who \\\"they\\\" were and what would be done.) However, Mr. Tome stated he did not hear Mr. Marshall say this.\\nMr. Kenneth Benally did testify that Mr. Marshall was shooting a gun in the helium plant area on or about August 27, 1995. On one hand, Mr. Benally stated that upon hearing gunshots, he was not bothered as he figured it was someone target shooting. On the other hand, he indicated he was bothered when he saw a truck which he testified belonged to Mr. Marshall and when he realized it was Mr. Marshall driving the truck. When asked if it was the same pick-up from which he heard shooting, he stated \\\"I don't know what the motive was - trying to scare me or what. I don't have any idea.\\\" To this Mr. Marshall stated he does not remember what he was doing on August 27, 1995 between 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock a.m., but that he was not at the helium plant area shooting guns. Stated Mr. Marshall, \\\"I have not shot a gun in quite a while.\\\" Mr. Marshall admitted to owning a 30-30 which he used previously to shoot at coyotes. He also admitted that he did chase a coyote into the helium plant area, but it was a long time ago, and he stated \\\"Harry knows that.\\\" Mr. Benally, on the other hand, claims to be very knowledgeable about guns and the sounds they make. Mr. Benally testified that the shots he heard were from a .22 pistol or rifle. No witnesses were produced to support either Mr. Benally or Mr. Raymond Marshall. This Court is satisfied that Mr. Raymond Marshall was not shown to have harassed or threatened the Plaintiffs as alleged by the Plaintiffs. This Court also finds that Mr. Raymond Marshall has not built any structures in the disputed land area.\\nFurthermore, this Court is not satisfied that Mr. Marshall deliberately caused extensive damage to a well and water supply by breaking the shut-off valve. While Mr. Tome testified that Mr. Raymond Marshall's tire tracks were there, there were no witnesses or evidence submitted to support that allegation.\\nMr. Tome further testified that other people also use the water well. While no evidence was presented regarding the well being private property of the Tomes, it was made clear to the Court that the Navajo Nation maintained the well, contradicting that the well is in the Tome's sole use, exclusive to other users, including Mr. Marshall.\\nMr. Marshall did admit to periodically exceeding the sheep units allowed on his grazing permit. Furthermore, Mr. Marshall also admitted that his livestock roam into the disputed area in order to obtain water from the windmill which he believes is public. No permits were submitted to this Court to either support or to counter either the Plaintiffs' or the Defendants' claim.\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall's Occupation and Control Over Area Claimed by Plaintiffs to the Detriment of Plaintiffs; Harassment; and Water System Damage\\nThis Court is satisfied that Lawrence Marshall has moved from the disputed area and that Lawrence Marshall does not occupy and control the established customary grazing use area to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. This Court is further satisfied that Mr. Lawrence Marshall does not continually hold over, occupy and control land.\\nFurthermore, this Court is satisfied that Lawrence Marshall has not defied the Court order by controlling property to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs. There is no showing that Lawrence Marshall announced publicly at a District Grazing Committee meeting and at a Red Valley Chapter meeting that he does not intend to comply with the Court orders.\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall did testify that he has six (6) cows and two (2) horses which were at his father's house as of the date he testified. Mr. Raymond Marshall testified that he has a grazing permit for twenty (20) sheep units and that his son, Lawrence Marshall, has a grazing permit for ten (10) sheep units.\\nThe Plaintiffs have pointed out that because Mr. Lawrence Marshall's livestock graze and water in the disputed area, they are in violation of the December 12, 1974 order and subsequent Court orders and, therefore, the Court should sanction them. In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the Marshalls are in violation of the orders because the number of sheep units are in excess of the permits. This is included as an item for discussion below.\\nMrs. Rose Taliman's Occupation and Control of Area claimed by Plaintiffs; Harassment and Water System Damage\\nThis Court finds that Rose Taliman has moved off the area claimed by the Plaintiffs and that she does not occupy and control the area to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. Nor does this Court find that Rose Taliman illegally held over, occupied and controlled the claimed area to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs.\\nPlaintiffs' charge that Rose Taliman publicly announced at the District Grazing Committee meetings and the Red Valley Chapter meetings that they (the Marshalls) do not intend to comply with any Court orders. Plaintiffs also charge that she has repeatedly threatened, harassed and intimidated Plaintiffs and family members by gesture and by word of mouth. Rose Taliman denied she has harassed or threatened the Plaintiffs. The only question raised by the Plaintiffs' counsel was \\\"you told us you don't use abusive language\\\" to which Rose Taliman answered \\\"yes.\\\" Rose Taliman was not questioned regarding her alleged role in the harassment, intimidation and threatening charges by the Plaintiffs, which were alleged to have taken place at the chapter meetings, grazing meetings and school board meetings. No other witnesses were produced to support the allegations.\\nLikewise, Ms. Taliman was not asked about her alleged finger gesture, Thus, this Court is not satisfied that Ms. Taliman did harass, intimidate or threaten the Plaintiffs.\\nGRAZING and WATERING LIVESTOCK on DISPUTED AREA\\nThis Court finds that livestock belonging to both Raymond and Lawrence Marshall do periodically graze and water on the disputed area. Alice Lee does live in the area claimed by the Plaintiffs. Mrs. Lee also admitted to having nine head of sheep on her living site, which is located on the area presently disputed.\\nThe December 12,1974 Order recites the following regarding the grazing permits of Mr. Marshall. Stated the Court in its findings at four and six:\\n4. That the Defendant [Mr. Marshall] has a grazing permit for 30 sheep units, 20 sheep units near the disputed area and 10 sheep units from the Oaksprings area and sufficient cause has been shown that the Defendant should utilize the said permit according to customary usage of the original permits. Mainly on a yearly rotating basis of six months on the Oaksprings area.\\n6. That the Defendant should move the trailer house and other structures which are presently located on Plaintiff's customary grazing area to a location near Defendant's mother's customary grazing area, provided he does so with permission.\\nIn the same order, the Court further stated:\\nIt is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Defendant shall abide by any and all established grazing and homesite regulations, and he shall make all necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities, to graze his allowable sheep units of 20 sheep units near his birthplace as allowed pursuant to his father's grazing permit and 10 sheep units at Oaksprings as allowed from that original grazing permit obtained from his spouse's side, and Defendant shall make any and all necessary arrangements to utilize his dual purpose grazing permit on a yearly rotating basis of six months at or near his birthplace near their mother's customary grazing area and six months at or near the Oaksprings area, and all appropriate authorities shall be notified of this arrangement at the earliest convenience.\\nSince this Court Order and the January 10, 1986 Court Order are valid, the present cause of action must be received in light of these Orders. This Court will look first to the December 12, 1974 Order to determine whether there were any violations of the permanent injunction presently in place regarding grazing and use of the water well.\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall did admit to having two (2) horses at his father's present living site. According to testimony given by Mr. Raymond Marshall, the livestock which are under his care do roam onto the disputed area in order to water at the well.\\nThe January 10, 1986 Order and the subsequent Orders exclude the language set out in the December 12, 1974 Order regarding Mr. Marshall's father's and mother's grazing area. The latter altogether refrains Mr. Marshall and relatives from encouraging and/or trespassing upon the grazing area of the Plaintiffs. This Court is charged with reviewing the orders and the testimony given.\\nWhile the Court Order dated December 12, 1974, indicates that Mr. Raymond Marshall does have a permit for 20 sheep units near the disputed area, it does not specify how near. Nor does it specify whether, if indeed Mr. Raymond Marshall has a sheep permit on the disputed area, he would be allowed to graze his livestock in the area, including the area claimed as customary use area by the Plaintiffs. The order also does not specify whether the windmill is for Plaintiffs' exclusive use or whether it is one set up for all people in the area including the Marshalls and the Lees.\\nThe December 12,1974 Order allows Mr. Marshall to graze his 20 sheep units near his \\\"birthplace as allowed pursuant to his father's grazing permit... and to graze (for six months) at or near his birthplace near their mother's customary grazing area.\\\" Review of the records, testimony and evidence taken by the Court do not clarify where Mr. Raymond Marshall's father's grazing permit allows grazing, where Mr. Marshall's mother's customary grazing area is and where Mr. Marshall's birthplace is, other than testimony given by Alice Lee in which she states that she and her siblings (including Raymond Marshall) were bom and raised in the area where she now resides.\\nBecause the record is not clear and the only relevant testimony given was by Mrs. Alice Lee, to the effect that she presently resides on land on which her late parents resided and on which she was bom, it can only be presumed that the land on which Mrs. Lee resides may also be the birthplace of the Defendant, Mr. Raymond Marshall. Given this, Mr. Marshall may have rights to graze a limited head of sheep in the area, if indeed the land off which Mr. Marshall was forced is the same and subject to the grazing permit presently held by Mr. Marshall. The December 12,1974 Order states, \\\"Defendant should utilize the said permit according to customary usage of the original permits.\\\" At Item 4 of the December 12, 1974 Order. At Item 6, it further states, \\\"[Defendant] . shall malee all necessary arrangements . to graze his allowable sheep units of 20 sheep units near his birthplace....\\\" There was no testimony presented in regards to actual grazing permits.\\nIf indeed Mr. Raymond Marshall has a grazing permit in the area and he is one of the permittees in the area having access to the wells established and maintained by the Navajo Nation, then he would not be in violation of the December 12, 1974 Order when his livestock roam onto the area claimed by Plaintiffs as their exclusive grazing right to water.\\nMr. Lawrence Marshall did testify that he has previously kept ten (10) sheep and two (2) horses at his father's residence. Mr. Marshall also stated that he has a permit to graze ten (10) sheep units but it is not clear where the grazing area is located for these ten (10) sheep units. In addition, Mr. Marshall stated that he has five (5) horses, two (2) of which are kept at his father's present living area.\\nA grazing permit gives one the right to use the land for grazing. Grazing permits are issued utilizing sheep units. However, grazing lands are not limited to sheep alone. Horses and cows may also be grazed. For example, one (1) horse is equal to five (5) sheep units. 3 N.N.C. Sec. 708; In Re: Mary Ellis Joe's Customary Use Area, No. SR-CV-949-83. Here, if indeed, Mr. Lawrence Marshall's grazing permit for ten (10) sheep units is within the disputed area, then the two (2) horses kept in the area by his father, Mr. Raymond Marshall, based on the ten (10) sheep units would not be in violation of the December 12,1974 Order. Nor would such grazing be in violation of the subsequent order, since these orders are based on the December 12, 1974 Order. If, however, the ten (10) sheep units are from an area outside the disputed area, then there may be a violation, depending upon where the ten (10) sheep units area is located. Crossing the disputed area to get to the water well may or may not be a violation, depending upon where the ten (10) sheep units area is located and also depending upon whether the water system was intended for all livestock covering an entire area.\\nFinally, the December 12, 1974 Order requires the Defendant \\\"to make arrangements to utilize his dual purpose grazing permit on a yearly rotating basis of six (6) months at or near his birthplace near their mother's customary grazing area and six (6) months at or near the Oaksprings area, and all appropriate authorities shall be notified of this arrangement at the earliest convenience.\\\" It is not immediately clear as to what this means. It may intend to refer to the equivalent of seasonal grazing, as provided for in 3 N.N.C. Sec. 708.\\nThe law of grazing permits is set out in 3 N.N.C. Sec. 701 et. seq. Section 708(c) states, \\\"No person can hold a grazing permit in more than one district on the Navajo reservation.\\\" The December 12, 1974 Order would not be in compliance with this section if Mr. Raymond Marshall's permits are for two districts, unless they are considered seasonal grazing permits, pursuant to 3 N.N.C. Sec. 708.\\nThus, the December 12, 1974 Order must be read in light of the Navajo law. In effect, the December 12,1974 Order requires the Defendant to utilize his permit on a rotating basis of six (6) months at or near his birthplace, near his mother's customary grazing area, and six (6) months at or near Oaksprings area. Such order may be lawful only if pursuant to 3 N.N.C. Sec. 708. Presently, it is unclear to this Court whether the subject permit is seasonal. Even if the permits in question are seasonal grazing permits, they must be used in accordance with the law. Thus, use on a rotating basis is valid only so long as Mr. Marshall's permit allows seasonal grazing.\\nThis Court cannot determine whether Mr. Raymond Marshall and Mr. Lawrence Marshall are violating the December 12, 1974 Order based upon the information submitted. It may be argued that the Marshalls are violating the subsequent orders. However, the subsequent orders build upon the December 12, 1974 Order and, therefore, violation allegations must be read in light of the December 12, 1974 Order.\\nFurthermore, even if we were to assume that Alice Lee was included as a party, as of December 12,1974, the question remains whether the land upon which she resided then and upon which she resides now is subject to claim by the Plaintiffs. Alice Lee, as a named party, is charged with occupying and controlling the established customary grazing use area of the Plaintiffs' since the entry of the Permanent Injunction of December 12, 1974. Plaintiffs allege that she continues to do so illegally and that despite their repeated demands for Mrs. Lee to comply with the Court Order and vacate the \\\"established\\\" customary use area, she has ignored the demands and continues to illegally hold over, occupy and control said land to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs.\\nMrs. Lee testified that she has been living on the land upon which she now resides with her family before and since the death of her parents. Prior to that time her parents resided on the land, as she and her siblings, including Raymond Marshall, were bom and raised there. It is not clear as to the exact area on which this family resided upon and used other than the present living site. If indeed Mrs. Lee was bom and raised where she now resides, then it is possible that the area upon which Mrs. Lee presently resides was never part of the customary use area presently claimed by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, as of December 12, 1974, the area upon which Mrs. Lee presently resides was never part of the land from which Mrs. Lee can be enjoined or from which she can be removed. It follows that if Mr. Raymond Marshall was also bom and raised in the same area, then the area upon which he lived was never part of the customary use area of the Plaintiffs.\\nBased on this, clearly the land upon which Mrs. Lee continues to reside was never part of the customary use area claimed by the Plaintiffs. For this reason, Mrs. Lee is not illegally holding over. There was no testimony offered by the Plaintiffs to the contrary. Thus, this Court does not find Mrs. Lee to be occupying and controlling land she resides upon to the detriment or exclusion of the Plaintiffs.\\nWhile the Plaintiffs' father charged that the Defendants, including Alice Lee, have publicly announced at District Grazing Committee meetings and Red Valley Chapter meetings that they do not intend to comply with the Court Orders, no evidence or testimony was given to show Mrs. Lee was involved. Nor has there been any testimony or evidence given to support the allegation that Mrs. Lee threatened, harassed or intimidated the Plaintiffs.\\nMrs. Lee admitted she was bom and raised in the area upon which she continues to live, within the area in dispute. This Court is aware, based upon the records and testimony, that Mrs. Lee was named a party for the first time in this Forcible Entry and Detainer action. Thus, although Mrs. Lee was never initially given notice, she was later included as a party. This issue was raised and addressed in the February 14, 1986 Order issued by Judge Harry Brown. Judge Brown stated as follows:\\nAlthough Mr. Marshall may not have standing to raise the issue, service upon the family members of Defendant was not required, in order to issue the Writ of Assistance. Raymond Marshall and his family have known for many years of the Court's decision. Furthermore, Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an injunction is binding on the parties and on those with actual notice by personal service or otherwise. At item 6.\\nThe Court then went on to cite 42 Am. Jur. 2d. Injunctions Sec. 320.\\nHowever, it is not clear to this Court whether the parties included as members of Mr. Marshall's family included Alice Lee as of February 14, 1986. Mrs. Lee indicated to this Court that she was never involved in this matter until four (4) weeks ago as of October, 1995 at which time she was told to pay $100.00. A default judgment can be entered against only persons who have been both properly named as parties and properly served. 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Judgments Sec. 277. Even if Alice Lee was a proper party, this Court does not find her in violation of Forcible Entry and Detainer laws.\\nBased on the above findings, this Court is satisfied that the named Defendants are not in violation of the Forcible Entry and Detainer laws, pursuant to 16 N.N.C. Sec. 1801 etseq.\\nNAVAJO NATION GRAZING POLICIES\\nThe facts so far presented must be viewed in light of any Navajo Nation policies regarding grazing rights. Thus, this Court, in order to address this continuing problem, must look to the policies of the Navajo Nation regarding grazing. This Court is also required to look to the grazing policies in order to establish boundaries.\\nIn, In Re: Mary Ellis Joe's Customary Use Area, District 9, Shiprock Agency, Navajo Nation, No. SR-CV-949-83, the Shiprock District Court judge stated:\\n1. A grazing permit gives one the right to use the land for grazing, however, \\\"no person is entitled to more range area than needed to support the number of livestock allowed on his or her grazing permit\\\" as set forth in the 1957 Navajo Reservation Grazing Handbook at page 14. The primary purpose of grazing permits is to control the number of livestock to protect and preserve the land. Mary Ellis Joe testified that she has a grazing permit which allows her to have 83 sheep units. However, according to her testimony, she maintains 150 goats and sheep, 20 cows and 6-7 horses. One cow or one horse is equal to 5 sheep units; therefore, 27 cows and horses would be equivalent to 135 sheep units. May Ellis Joe currently grazes 285 sheep units on a 83 sheep unit permit. Note, under the current poor grazing conditions, she alone needs 17,100 acres to support 285 sheep units on a 83 sheep unit permit. At trial, Mary Ellis Joe alleged that the respondents were responsible for depletion of grass. But, Mary Ellis Joe is also contributing to the poor conditions especially in light of Mr. Randy D. Cornett's testimony that the number of livestock is downplayed by the owners. To exacerbate the situation, there are three other permitters who are allowed 221 sheep units. It is not unreasonable to conclude that these other valid permitters within .0216 are also grazing beyond their limit and thus contributing to the poor grazing conditions in violation of the Navajo land policy.\\n2. Initially, grazing permits were issued to persons who had livestock and could identify customary use to a specified area. Customary use is a Navajo concept that defines one individual Navajo's prescribed boundary for the use and occupancy of land to an area traditionally inhabited by his/her ancestors. In the Matter of the Estate of Charley Nez Wauneka Sr., 5 Nav. R. 79, 81 (1987). Grazing permits were also issued to those people who claimed a specific area of land known as \\\"claimed use area.\\\"\\n3. A grazing permit is one of the most important items of property a Navajo can own. Estate of Navajo Joe, 4 Nav. R. 99 (1983). Grazing permits are extremely valuable property items due to the limited land base and land use rights embodied by the permit.\\n5. Grazing permits, from their inception have been controversial and fraught with conflict.... [T]he court will... adhere to the Navajo land policy adopted by the Navajo Supreme Court. The court recognizes that land is a resource and the increasing pressure on the land threatens its viability. Hence, the primary goal of the Navajo land policy is to keep the land economically viable.\\nThe court is forced [to deal] with the extremely difficult and emotional issue of land disputes. Land to the Navajo people is life which embodies the concept of spiritual, mental, physical and emotional well being. Navajo thinking and values accord land with survival and sustenance. Since the Long Walk, Navajos have maintained a subsistence life-style based on livestock production, which livestock ownership among the Navajo is a symbol of wealth, prestige, and stability.\\nSince the land plays a central and sacred role in the Navajo culture it follows that the Navajo will fight long and hard for their land. Many of the land disputes arising on the Navajo Nation are between common [descendants] and between siblings. The rapid population growth of the Navajos along with a strong cultural tradition of having land with livestock and a home where they grew up inevitably causes land disputes. The Navajo population has increased from approximately 9,000 (upon return from Ft. Sumner) to 169,157 in 1989. See Chapter Images: 1989, General Facts on Navajo Chapters, 1990, Larry Rodgers, Division of Community Development, Window Rock, Arizona.\\nEvidence of the spiritual and mental ties to livestock ownership clearly surfaced when the government forced Navajos to reduce their stock by 64 to 80 percent during the late 1930's and early 1940's. Navajos were devastated by the massive killing and irreverent conduct by government officials. See Navajo Livestock Reduction: A National Disgrace, Navajo Community College Press, 1974. The purported purpose of the stock reduction was to restore the land which had been overgrazed by an over abundance of livestock. This era initiated a reservation-wide grazing policy which gave birth to the Grazing Permit in 1937. The majority ofNavajos reacted strongly against the regulation of grazing and Grazing Permits, but it was eventually accepted. The maximum amount of permissible sheep units an individual Navajo could receive was set at 350 to be authorized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Unfortunately, when dealing with the ancestral use of the land, we must look to the family tree which gets ever wider with more and more people, who all claim to have use rights by virtue of common ancestors. This is exactly what we are faced with in this case. Petitioner Mary Ellis Joe is the daughter of Hosteen Kitseally's old wife and Respondent Grace Oldman is the daughter of Hosteen Kitseally's new wife. When Hosteen Kitseally separated from his old wife and began to live exclusively with his new wife, he gave his old wife the majority of the sheep and the land to her right as she faced east on top of Toh Atin Mesa. Hosteen Kitseally, with his new wife, moved to the North of Toh Atin Mesa and began to build the herd again. When boundaries are delineated by fences, it is possible Mary Ellis Joe may have grazed at one time or another on the land north of Toh Atin Mesa and further south and west of the .0216 area. But, when such a claim is made, we have to look to the rights of the other descendants of common ancestors in light of the Navajo land policy.\\nThe semi-desert and arid region of Navajoland requires livestock control to protect the land from becoming a wasteland. Although the amount of stock owned by individual Navajos is much less than what it was prior to forced stock reduction fifty-five years ago, the Navajo population has almost quadrupled since the issuance of grazing permits in 1940. See Navajo Nation FAX88; A Statistical Abstract, p. 2, September 1988, Division of Community Development, Window Rock, Arizona. Within Shiprock Agency District 9, the population was estimated to be 2,285 in 1940 and 4,994 in 1980 - an 118.56% increase. It is projected to increase to 6,242 by 1988. See Navajo Nation FAX, Id. at p. 7.\\nThe 27,000 acres claimed by Mary Ellis Joe disturbs the court for the following reasons. The estimated land size of Sweetwater Chapter is 152,006,30 acres. Her claim amounts to over one fifth of the Sweetwater Chapter area within District 9. The estimated 1989 Sweetwater population is 1,698. See Chapter Images 198, Id. at 104. To grant Mary Ellis Joe her claim of 27,000 acres would not only deny the rights of descendants who have been bom and raised in the area, but it would grant Mary Ellis Joe a special privilege which is no longer practical or realistic. Almost every middle aged Navajo sheep owner can recall when their families made seasonal herds over great distances and could probably show reminisces of camps upon request. The tremendous increase in population has rendered it inequitable for any one Navajo or family to continue that life-style because in effect, it would force 90 percent of the remaining Navajos to forfeit their identity with the land. It's unlikely that a subsistence life-style entirely based on raising stock is possible because of the massive land base that is required to make it profitable without destroying grazing land.\\nAlthough time has changed the extent of subsistence livestock economy of the Navajo people, stockraising today retains its traditional position. Many young educated Navajos trained in various fields have sources of income other than subsistence stockraising. Contrary to what the officials from the Bureaus of Indian Affairs had hoped for forty years ago, many of these Navajos have inherited the Navajo way of thinking. They maintain ties to the land and value stockraising, even if it is just one sheep, one horse or one cow and return back to where they were raised whenever possible. The BIA believed that the spread of education would de-emphasize stockraising. See The Navajo Year Book, Report No. viii, 1951-1961, A Decade of Progress, Robert Young, Assistant to the General Superintendent; Navajo Agency, Window Rock, Arizona 1961.\\nPetitioner contends that those Navajos who reside and graze in the area she is claiming are responsible for the deterioration of grazing land. Petitioner further contends that given the poor range conditions, the 304 sheep units would require 18,240 acres. This figure is based on the testimony given by Randy D. Cornett, Supervisory Range Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs. Mr. Cornett estimated that the range condition in the lands in dispute is estimated to be poor north of Toh Atin Mesa and poor to fair in the south. Mr. Cornett stated that given poor conditions, it takes 50-60 acres to graze one sheep unit.\\nThe purpose of the Navajo land policy is to keep Navajoland economically viable. The problem of overgrazing is widespread and each individual Navajo should take responsibility to protect our Nation from becoming a wasteland. This can be achieved by controlling the amount of livestock or give them supplemental feeding or both. This court is not in the position to promulgate rules and regulations that may reconcile customary use claims with grazing permits. Nor is this Court responsible for the enforcement of grazing regulations. This Court suggests to the lawmaking body to create a competent administrative agency to hear and determine land disputes. That Navajo Nation administrative agency can promulgate procedures which guarantee due process and rights guaranteed by the Navajo Bill of Rights and Indian Civil Rights Act.\\nJUDGMENT\\nMary Ellis Joe will be not be allowed to claim more land than could have been claimed by her mother Kitseally's old wife. The original 1940 Bureau of Indian Affairs map of the area in dispute shows that Kitseally's old wife had a customary use area designated as .0216 as shown on Petitioner's Exhibit \\\"1.\\\" This will be the land allowed to be claimed by Mary Ellis Joe.\\nThe Navajo Nation policies set out so eloquently in In Re: Mary Ellis Joe remain intact. For this reason, this Court is interested in establishing some boundaries as recommended by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court in the May 5, 1986 Memorandum Decision. In so doing, this Court, in a separate order, shall appoint two (2) fact finders to look into this matter.\\nThis Court is interested in grazing permits held by families within the disputed area. This Court is also interested in the number of sheep units per permit and the customary land use as claimed by the petitioners in light of other permitters in the area, including the Lees and the Marshalls.\\nThe Court is also interested in the following:\\na. How long have the Lees and Marshalls lived in the area prior to the initial petition and how long did Alice Lee's parents live in the area and how did the parents use the land?\\nb. What areas did Mrs. Lee's parents use previously?\\nc. Whether at the time the injunction was issued, what land upon which the Marshalls and Lees lived was occupied and used outside any claim by petitioners?\\nFinally, the Court is also interested in addressing the concerns expressed in In Re: Mary Ellis Joe, that \\\"no person is entitled to more range area than needed to support the number of livestock allowed on his or her grazing permit\\\" and that the rights of other descendants of common ancestors must be reviewed in light of the Navajo land policy.\\nIn summary, the Respondents, Raymond Marshall, Lawrence Marshall and Rose Taliman, are found not to occupy and control any customary grazing use area of the Petitioners. Nor does this Court find Mr. Raymond Marshall, Lawrence Marshall and Rose Taliman to be illegally \\\"holding over.\\\" This Court is not satisfied that any of the Respondents have publicly announced at District Grazing Committee and Red Valley Chapter meetings that they do not intend to comply with any court orders.\\nFurthermore, this Court is not satisfied that Mr. Raymond Marshall deliberately damaged a well and water supply used by Plaintiffs and others. There is no showing to the satisfaction of this Court that Mr. Raymond Marshall damaged the well, much less in a deliberate manner.\\nFinally, this Court is not satisfied that Mr. Raymond Marshall and his family members repeatedly threatened, harassed and intimidated the Petitioners by \\\"gestures and word of mouth.\\\" The Petitioners made some general allegations in their testimony, however, none to the satisfaction of this Court.\\nMrs. Lee appeared for the first time to testify on her own behalf after she was summoned to court in this case. This Court is not satisfied, given Mrs. Lee's testimony, that she occupies, controls, or holds over on land belonging to the Petitioners. Mrs. Lee testified that she was bom and raised upon the land on which she presently lives. This testimony was not challenged by the Petitioners, nor did the Petitioners offer any testimony to the contrary to the satisfaction of this Court. Rather, Mrs. Lee's testimony created a presumption that she's lived on the land claimed by the Petitioners for over 60 years, 40 years prior to the Petitioners' claim. There has been no testimony or evidence to rebut this presumption.\\nThis Court was also not provided evidence or testimony that Mrs. Lee publicly announced at any meetings that she did not intend to comply with court orders, that she damaged any well system or that she threatened, harassed and intimidated the Plaintiffs by gesture or by \\\"word of mouth.\\\"\\nTestimony was submitted to the Court that Mrs. Lee has a grazing permit for another area and that she has nine (9) head of sheep. Mrs. Lee testified that these sheep are corralled. Furthermore, this Court did not receive any testimony that these livestock have been grazing in the disputed grazing area. All testimony submitted indicate that the nine (9) sheep are corralled. Thus, this Court presumes that these sheep are fed by the owners. The Court notes that the corralling of sheep is excluded pursuant to 3 N.N.C. Sec. 937.\\nFinally, testimony was submitted to this Court that various structures were being built in Mrs. Lee's area. However, further testimony indicates that the structures are within the Lees' present residence area and are probably not subject to claim by the Petitioners, so as to preclude such structures.\\nPERMANENT INJUNCTION\\nA permanent injunction restraining Respondents from further threatening, harassing, intimidating and making physical contact with Petitioners is requested by the Petitioners. However, before deciding whether an injunction as requested is needed, this Court finds it necessary to obtain further information regarding permits and customary use areas by both the Petitioners and Respondents and others within the claimed area so as to establish boundaries. The Court also must obtain information regarding grazing by the parties and others, pursuant to 3 N.N.C. Secs. 936 and 942, as well as other provisions that support and further the Navajo Nation grazing policies.\\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that two fact finders be appointed to conduct an investigation and to submit to this Court their findings in forty-five (45) days regarding the permitters, the number of sheep units per permit, land uses by the permitters and other interests set out by this Court so as to clarify boundaries. Each of the fact finders is authorized by this Court as officers of the Court to obtain needed information and each is to be paid a reasonable fee for their services, including mileage and per diem.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pending the gathering and submission of information, that the Petitioners and Respondents are to be mutually enjoined from making contact with one another, harassing, threatening or intimidating one another.\\nIT IS FINALLY ORDERED that neither of the parties are to discuss the pending case, in order to avoid further conflict, until this Court determines what areas constitute the Petitioners' use areas from which Respondents should be enjoined pursuant to the December 12, 1974 Order and the subsequent order of January 10,1986. This Order does not invalidate the December 12,1974 and January 10, 1986 Orders. However, this Court is mindful that upon the submission of the findings by the appointed fact finders, boundaries shall be considered in accordance with and consistent with the Navajo Bill of Rights, Navajo Grazing laws and policies, as well as social goals and this Court is mindful to do substantial justice between the parties.\\nThe appointment of fact finders shall issue in a separate order within fifteen (15) days and the findings shall be submitted to this Court within forty-five (45) days from the day of appointment, unless ordered otherwise.\\n. The record does not reflect how this conclusion was reached. While there are provisions in the Navajo Nation Code, 3 N.N.C. Sec. 708, for seasonal grazing, it is limited to Districts 1 and 12. It is not clear whether \\\"rotating basis\\\" means the same as seasonal grazing.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528791\", \"name\": \"Jane Burbank, Appellant, v. Tommy Clarke Sr., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burbank v. Clarke\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-01-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-36-97\", \"first_page\": 369, \"last_page\": 373, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 369\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Jane Burbank, Appellant, v. Tommy Clarke Sr., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-36-97\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nJane Burbank, Appellant, v. Tommy Clarke Sr., Appellee.\\nDecided January 26, 1999\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nCynthia Thompson, Esq., DNA-People\\u2019s Legal Services, Inc., Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant; and Tommy Clarke Sr., Pro se Appellee, Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona).\", \"word_count\": \"2156\", \"char_count\": \"12935\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nWe are asked to decide the following issues: 1) whether a minor becomes emancipated in fact upon becoming a parent before reaching the age of majority; 2) whether undivided child support payments for multiple children should be automatically reduced pro rata when one of the children becomes emancipated or attains the age of majority; and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it retroactively modified a child support order resulting in cancellation of part of the past due child support amount. We hold as follows on each issue: 1) Under Navajo Nation law, a minor does not become emancipated solely by the fact that he or she becomes a parent; 2) Lump sum child support payments for multiple children may not be reduced without the obligated parent filing a petition for modification and the court affording the parties an opportunity to litigate the alleged changed circumstances; and 3) A Navajo Nation court may not retroactively modify a child support order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\\nI\\nA divorce decree entered on June 17, 1980 ordered Tommy Clarke Sr. (\\\"Appellee\\\") to pay $500 per month to Jane Burbank (\\\"Appellant\\\") for the support of their five minor children \\u2014 four girls and one boy. Clarke v. Clarke, No. CH-CV-142-80 (Chinle Dist. Ct. 1980). The decree was modified on December 29, 1981 after the Appellee failed to make a payment. It reduced his obligation to a monthly lump sum payment of $200 for the support of all the children and ordered him to make a one time payment of $500 to cure the delinquency. The Appellee was further ordered to pay support \\\"for the five (5) minor children of the parties until they become 18 years of age or become emancipated.\\\" Clarke v. Clarke, No. CH-CV-182-81 (Chinle Dist. Ct. 1981). He made only one payment of $200 under this order.\\nThe Appellant filed another action to compel the Appellee to provide support to his children, which produced a written settlement agreement dated August 15, 1983. On August 18,1983, the Window Rock District Court incorporated the settlement agreement into its order, affirmed the Appellee's $200 per month child support obligation that was ordered on December 29, 1981, and added $100 more per month to satisfy $4,100 of unpaid child support. The court further recognized as enforceable all the conditions of the December 29, 1981 order. The Appellee paid nothing pursuant to the 1983 order.\\nOn April 26, 1996, the Appellant filed this case in the Chinle Family Court to collect all of the accumulated, unpaid child support between December of 1981 and the date each female child turned eighteen years of age, and through May of 1996 for the son, whom she claimed would graduate from high school then. She asked for a $34,900 judgment against the Appellee.\\nThe Appellee admitted he did not pay any child support, except for one payment of $200 in 1981. At the final hearing, he asked for a $40 reduction of his obligation, to be applied retroactively, each time one of the children became emancipated. The $40 figure comes from dividing the $200 monthly payment evenly among the five children. The Appellee did not file a petition for modification of his child support payments at any time during the long history of this case.\\nThe Appellee argued that the girls were emancipated on the date they became mothers, at ages fourteen, fifteen, fifteen, and sixteen. He claimed his son was emancipated on the date he dropped out of high school, which was also before he turned eighteen. The record does not disclose whether any child was married, living independently of the parents, or self-supporting at the time of his or her claimed emancipation.\\nThe family court accepted the Appellee's position and retroactively reduced his support obligation \\\"by $40 as each child reached eighteen years of age or was emancipated.\\\" Finding No. 5. The court thereby eliminated from consideration a major portion of the unpaid child support amount that the Appellant sought. Each female was found emancipated upon the birth of her first child and the son upon attaining the age of eighteen. Finding No. 6. The court awarded the Appellant $13,000 for unpaid child support and ordered the Appellee to pay $100 each pay day until the judgment was paid in full. Order Nos. 2-3.\\nII\\nIn 1981, the Chinle District Court ordered the Appellee to pay child support to his five children until they either turned eighteen years of age or became emancipated. In 1997, the Chinle Family Court had to decide the novel issue of whether the sole fact of becoming a parent could emancipate a minor. The court held in the affirmative. We find that the family court's holding on the emancipation issue contradicts Navajo common law.\\nThe law that obligates every parent to support his or her offspring is integral to Navajo culture. This customary law underlies our modem child support jurisprudence. Tom v. Tom, 4 Nav. R. 12, 13 (1983). The rationale for the law is straightforward \\u2014 a parent who brings a child into the world has a duty imposed by natural and spiritual law to provide for the child's needs until the child is capable of self-support. The law also helps to turn the Navajo concept of 'Una (\\\"life \\u2014 past, present and future) into practical experience. Children are viewed as the future, ensuring the existence amd survival of the Navajo people in perpetuity.\\nWhen a young Navajo person no longer needs the support, care, and custody of the parents, he or she is said to be a young adult. At this time, the person becomes self-supporting, independent, and free of parental control. The Navajo term for this is t'aabii ak'inaaldzil and basically means a person is self-supporting. That law applied to the subject of child support determines when a minor becomes emancipated. Navajos became self-supporting earlier in their teens during the first half of this century, because of the Navajo people's minimal reliance on wage income. In contrast, highly developed skills or a post high school education is a must today, if one is to become financially capable of earning a living. For that reason, it takes a minor longer to become independent and self-supporting today. This point may serve as a backdrop for our courts when handling emancipation questions.\\nThe trial court must determine whether emancipation has taken place after examining all the facts and circumstances relevant to that issue. Although what constitutes emancipation is a question of law, the issue of whether a minor has actually become emancipated is a question of fact. Because of our rule that every parent is obligated to support his or her child either to majority or until the child is independent, free of parental control, and self-supporting, we place the burden to prove emancipation on the party asserting it. Nothing short of competent evidence must be used as proof.\\nIn this case, the trial court found that the sole fact of giving birth had emancipated each female minor. The parties did not bring other facts relevant to the emancipation issue to light for the court's consideration. We do not agree that becoming a parent, by itself, is a sufficient ground for emancipation. It is a factor for our trial courts to consider, along with others, but is not alone dispositive of the emancipation issue.\\nThe record before this Court does not disclose whether any of the girls was married, employed, living independently of the parents, or showed an intent to be free of parental control at the time of her purported emancipation. The con trary, however, is apparent from the record. The girls continued to receive the Appellant's full support following the birth of their children. We reverse the trial court's holding that the girls were emancipated, solely by the fact of becoming mothers, and remand for a new evidentiary hearing.\\nThe trial court's order indicates that the son attained the age of eighteen on September 27, 1990. Other than this finding, the court did not make additional findings or legal conclusions establishing the circumstances of the son. We find the trial court's decision on the son impalpable. For example, did the court terminate the son's support as of September 27, 1990? If yes, then for what reasons? Fragmentary evidence seems to indicate the son might have still been attending school after he turned eighteen years of age. Due to the trial court's order lacking findings and legal conclusions, we reverse its decision on the son and remand for a new evidentiary hearing. Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 46, 47 (1983) (Navajo trial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their judgments).\\nIll\\nThe trial court reduced the amount of child support the Appellee had been ordered to pay by $40 each time it found one of the females had become emancipated. The modification was applied retroactively. We now establish the rule that a trial court cannot modify an original child support order in the absence of a petition asking it to do so. See Tom v. Tom, 4 Nav. R. at 14 (\\\"a court order fixing child support can be modified at any time\\\"); see also Brown v. Brown, 3 Nav. R. 239, 240 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982) (a proper petition to modify a decree ordering child support payments must be filed before the court will address the matter). A properly filed petition seeking modification should contain the grounds for the requested relief and the other party should have an opportunity to present evidence in rebuttal. The petition also notifies the payee that the obligated parent intends to seek modification of the child support order. In this case, the Appellee did not file a petition to modify the August 18,1983 order, which set his child support payments at a lump sum of $200 per month for the support of all five children. We find that the trial court erred in modifying the original 1983 order.\\nWhere a court orders a lump sum payment for the support of multiple children, the obligated parent has the burden to modify his or her child support obligation as each child becomes emancipated or reaches the age of majority. Otherwise, the obligated parent must continue to pay the same lump sum support payment originally ordered until the last child is either emancipated or reaches the age of majority.\\nMoreover, a parent who must pay undivided child support for multiple children cannot unilaterally reduce his or her payments each time one of the children becomes emancipated or attains the age of majority, unless permitted by the original child support order. In the case before us, the child support order does not authorize a proportionate reduction in the Appellee's obligation as each child reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated. Therefore, the Appellee was required to pay $200 per month until the youngest child met the conditions in the August 18, 1983 order or until the court modified the support order. On remand, the trial court will determine the Appellee's liability for unpaid child support since December of 1981. The court will give the Appellee credit for the amount of child support he has paid to date, including those made pursuant to the August 18, 1983 order.\\nFinally, the Appellant argues that the trial court should not have canceled part of the past due child support amount. We agree. Court ordered child support payments become vested in the payee as they become due. Thus, our courts should not permit retroactive modification of a child support order, absent a party's showing of compelling circumstances. A party who wants to reduce his or her child support payments always has access to the courtroom. Upon proper application, the court has the discretion to decide whether its previous child support order should be changed to meet current conditions. Any modification should be prospective only and applicable from the date of the written modification order itself.\\nIV\\nThe trial court's award of $13,000 to the Appellant is reversed. This case is remanded to the Chinle Family Court. The family court will hold further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n. This lesson comes to us from a chapter in Navajo history called 'alnaashii jidezdaal (\\\"separation of the sexes\\\"). Due to certain misdeeds of those in authority, the males and females of the tribe separated and took up residence on opposite sides of a wide, swiftly flowing river. After four years of separation, the wise men of the tribe reunited the genders after explaining that without propagation, the tribe would surely become extinct.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528795\", \"name\": \"Jolene Nez, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peabody Western Coal Company, Inc, XYZ Corporations 1-10; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nez v. Peabody Western Coal Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-09-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-28-97\", \"first_page\": 416, \"last_page\": 421, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 416\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, SLOAN* and FERGUSON* Associate Justices (*by special designation).\", \"parties\": \"Jolene Nez, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peabody Western Coal Company, Inc, XYZ Corporations 1-10; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-28-97\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nJolene Nez, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peabody Western Coal Company, Inc, XYZ Corporations 1-10; John and Jane Does 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.\\nDecided September 22, 1999\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, SLOAN* and FERGUSON* Associate Justices (*by special designation).\\nDaniel M. Rosenfelt, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Appellant; and C. Benson Hufford, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for the Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"2459\", \"char_count\": \"15529\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nSLOAN, Associate Justice.\\nThis is an appeal from the Kayenta District Court's dismissal of a personal injury action. The district court held that to allow Plaintiff-Appellant, Jolene Nez (\\\"Nez\\\"), to pursue a personal injury complaint against her employer, DefendantAppellee, Peabody Western Coal Company (\\\"Peabody\\\"), after she had received workers' compensation benefits under the Arizona Workers' Compensation Program for the same injuries, would constitute unjust enrichment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nI\\nOn June 12, 1995, Nez, a member of the Navajo Nation, was injured during her employment at Peabody's Black Mesa Mine near Kayenta, Arizona within the Navajo Nation. Nez suffered permanent facial disfigurement after chemical solvents splattered on her face while she cleaned paint brushes for Peabody. Nez filed a claim for benefits with the Arizona Industrial Commission (\\\"Commission\\\") under the Arizona Workers' Compensation Act (\\\"Act\\\"). On April 5, 1996, the Commission awarded Nez benefits for medical costs and lost wages, and $7,530.77 for permanent disfigurement of her face.\\nIn the spring of 1996, Nez requested that her claim be reopened so she could receive additional medical treatment for areas of pigmentation loss on her skin. Her workers' compensation carrier authorized additional medical care and compensation for time lost from her job. The new medical treatment was unsuccessful. On March 13, 1997, the Commission closed Nez's case. The Commission found no change had occurred in her skin condition since the formal award of April 5, 1996, and therefore her total award for the permanent disfigurement of her face remained at $7,530.77.\\nOn April 19, 1997, Nez brought a personal injury claim against Peabody in the Kayenta District Court. She sought damages for emotional distress, pain and suffering, diminution of the quality of her life, permanent facial disfigurement and any other damages not covered by the Commission's award for her June 1995 injury. Peabody moved to dismiss Nez's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\\nOn July 25, 1997, the district court ruled that \\\"this action is not barred for a lack of jurisdiction,\\\" but dismissed Nez's action finding that this \\\"suit would cause unjust enrichment and violate the legitimate expectations of both the employer and the employee under the workers' compensation scheme which the plaintiff elected to use.\\\" Nez v. Peabody Western Coal Co., Order to Dismiss at 3, No. KY-CV-040-97 (decided July 25, 1997). The district court explained its decision in terms of equity:\\nWhile the state law of the election of the remedy is a statutory matter which does not bind this court, the same equitable principle applies as a matter of Navajo Nation law. Where an applicable statutory scheme under state law is a remedy available to a plaintiff, and that plaintiff selects the remedy, it would be inequitable to allow a separate personal injury action under Navajo Nation law.\\nId.\\nNez appealed, arguing that no Navajo legal principle of equity can deny her action for a personal injury after she previously received workers' compensation benefits. Peabody argues that the Navajo Nation must recognize the exclusive remedy provision of the Arizona Act, and that, even if the Navajo Nation is not required to recognize the Arizona exclusive remedy provision, Nez should be equitably estopped from bringing her personal injury action.\\nII\\nOf the issues raised by the parties, we need only address two.\\n1. Whether the Arizona Industrial Commission's award of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290 precludes the Navajo Nation courts from assuming subject matter jurisdiction over a personal injury claim arising from the same injuries.\\n2. Whether the Kayenta District Court erred in dismissing the action on equity grounds.\\nWe hold that Arizona's application of its workers' compensation laws does not preclude the Navajo Nation courts from assuming jurisdiction over Nez's personal injury claim. We further hold that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Nez's action on equity grounds.\\nIII\\nIn 1936, the United States Congress enacted 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290. Section 290 was passed to \\\"fill a conspicuous gap in the workmen's compensation field.\\\" See, e.g., Swatzell v. Industrial Comm'n of the State of Arizona, 277 P.2d 244, 248 (Ariz. 1954) (quoting S.R. No. 2294, 74th Congress, 2d Session.). Prior to the passage of Section 290, employees working on federal lands for private employers were not covered by any workers' compensation program. They were not covered by the United States Employees' Compensation Act, because it covered only those directly employed by the federal government. Nor were they covered by any state compensation program, since such acts only protected employees on state lands. Id.\\nSection 290 has been interpreted to allow states to extend their workers' compensation coverage to employees of private employers operating on Indian reservations, but not to employees of tribal governments or enterprises. Tibbets v. Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee, 397 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 1986) (holding that \\u00a7 290 does not allow state workers' compensation laws to apply against Indian tribes as employers); Swatzell v. Industrial Commission, 277 P.2d 24 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that \\u00a7 290 does not allow state workers' compensation laws to apply to employees of the federal government working on Indian reservations); and Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that \\u00a7 290 allows state workers' compensation laws to apply to employees of private employers on Indian reservations). We thus acknowledge that 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290 allows the Arizona Industrial Commission to award benefits to employees injured while working for private employers within the territory of the Navajo Nation.\\nIV\\nThe question before us, however, is not whether 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290 extends state jurisdiction into tribal land, but whether it precludes the Navajo Nation courts from exercising jurisdiction over a personal injury claim which has already passed through a state's workers' compensation program. Allowing a state program to compensate victims of workplace injuries on the reservation is vastly different than divesting the Indian nation courts of jurisdiction over an entire area of the law. Indian nation courts are central to tribal sovereignty, and divestiture of tribal jurisdiction is not to be inferred lightly.\\nIn determining the extent of Indian nation court jurisdiction, we assume that Indian tribes retain all those aspects of sovereignty which have not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty or by virtue of their dependent status. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987). Thus, there is a presumption that the Navajo Nation courts retain civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands. Id. To determine if \\u00a7 290 \\\"rebuts\\\" the presumption of Navajo Nation jurisdiction, we follow the test of jurisdiction adopted by the United States Supreme Court in National Farmer's Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985). See Pela v. Peabody Coal Co., 6 Nav. R. 238, 239 (1990) (\\\"We agree with the approach pronounced by the United States Supreme Court [in National Farmer's Union] to determine tribal court jurisdiction.\\\") In National Farmer's Union, the United States Supreme Court noted, \\\"[t]he existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which the sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statute, Executive Branch Policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.\\\" 471 U.S. at 855-56.\\nWe first consider the text and purposes of 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290. Generally a federal law should not be inteipreted as divesting Indian nation courts of jurisdiction absent an express declaration of such an intention by Congress. Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965). We find the text of \\u00a7 290 to be silent as to its intended effect on the jurisdiction of Indian nation courts. Nor does the express purpose of \\u00a7 290 indicate a congressional desire to divest Indian nation courts of jurisdiction; as explained above, the purpose of \\u00a7 290 was to ensure that workers who were previously \\\"slipping-through-the-cracks\\\" between state and federal workers' compensation systems received coverage. Extending the scope of state law does not necessitate a corresponding reduction in the jurisdiction of Indian nation courts. Finally, we find the date of passage of \\u00a7 290 to be partially illustrative of Congress' intentions; Congress passed \\u00a7 290 in 1936, over two decades prior to the establishment of the Navajo Nation Courts in 1959. We find it obvious that Congress could not have intended to divest jurisdiction from a court system that did not yet exist.\\nWe also find the states' treatment of the exclusivity remedy to be illustrative. A workers' compensation award in one state does not preclude a common-law action based on the same facts against the employer in a second state. This is true even if the first state claims that its workers' compensation statute is the exclusive remedy available. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (holding that full faith and credit clause does not compel one state to enforce the exclusive remedy provision of another state's workers' compensation law). See also Garcia v. American Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the forum state had jurisdiction over an employee's common law tort suit even after the employee had received benefits under another state's workers' compensation program). Generally, a state court will enforce another state's exclusive remedy provision, but it will do so for discretionary reasons of comity and not because it is required to do so. Garcia, 12 F.3d at 312.\\nWe thus conclude that 40 U.S.C. \\u00a7 290 does not divest the Navajo Nation courts of jurisdiction over personal injury claims brought on the basis of injuries for which the plaintiff has already recovered under a state workers' compensation statute.\\nV\\nThe fact that the Navajo Nation courts have jurisdiction does not necessarily indicate that that jurisdiction should be exercised. We must consider, as a matter of comity to Arizona, and as a matter of Navajo public policy and Navajo common law, whether the exercise of jurisdiction over personal injury claims based on injuries already heard by the Arizona Industrial Commission undermines the workers' compensation regime. We recognize that workers' compensation systems represent a trade-off on which all parties \\u2014 both workers and employees \\u2014 rely. Workers receive benefits without placing their own contributory fault at issue and employers are protected from protracted litigation and potentially devastating damage awards. We also recognize that economic development is important to the Navajo Nation, and that businesses seeking to operate in the Navajo Nation desire a legal environment that is predictable and fair.\\nWe are thus faced with a delicate balancing test. On one hand, the Navajo Nation courts have jurisdiction over civil disputes on the Navajo Nation and a duty to ensure that parties injured on the Navajo Nation are treated justly and in accordance with Navajo custom and tradition. On the other hand, we recognize that Arizona has a legitimate interest in the integrity of its workers' compensation program, and that private employers have an interest in predictable procedures.\\nIn recognition of this balance, we hold that, while Navajo Nation courts have jurisdiction over claims such as Nez's, such jurisdiction should be exercised with restraint. The Navajo Nation courts should not permit personal injury suits as a \\\"supplement\\\" to state workers' compensation awards unless it is clear that the compensation received under the workers' compensation regime is substantially different from what Navajo common law would consider adequate. We anticipate that the number of instances where a personal injury remedy will be necessary to supplement a state workers' compensation award will be rare; thus, the integrity of the Arizona workers' compensation regime will not be significantly undermined. Whether Nez's award under Arizona's program is substantially different from what would be adequate under Navajo common law is a matter of fact to be determined by the district court.\\nVI\\nWe further hold that before proceeding to the merits of Nez's case, the district court should consider several factual \\\"threshold\\\" issues.\\nA. Waiver\\nUnder Navajo Nation law a party may waive its right to pursue a remedy in court. The district court must consider whether Nez acted in a manner that operated to waive her right to bring this personal injury action in the Navajo Nation courts.\\nWaiver under Navajo common law requires: (1) a distinct waiver of a right; (2) full knowledge of a right which is given up; (3) the fact the person giving the thing up knows his right; (4) a plain appearance that the person intends to give up the rights; and (5) a voluntary and intentional surrender of rights. In re Estate of Tsosie, 4 Nav. R. 198, 200 (W.R. Dist. Ct. 1983).\\nB. Equitable Estoppel\\nThe doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a party from claiming a right against another person who in good faith has relied on the party's prior conduct and has changed his position for the worse. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is recognized by the Navajo Nation courts. Tafoya v. Navajo Nation Bar Association, 6 Nav. R. 141, 142-43 (1989); In re Practice of Battles, 3 Nav. R. 92, 98 (1982) (Neswood, J. concurring).\\nThe district court must consider whether, as a factual matter, Peabody was disadvantaged by Nez's resort to the Arizona workers' compensation system and delay of two years before filing a personal injury action.\\nC. Remedy under Navajo Common Law\\nIf, after consideration of the threshold issues described above, the district court reaches the merits of Nez's claim, it must determine whether, as a factual matter, the remedy Nez received from the Arizona workers' compensation regime is substantially different than the remedy compelled by Navajo common law. Under Navajo common law, damages in personal injury actions are measured by nalyeeh. See Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Nav. R. 206 (1986). Nalyeeh has been interpreted to include a broad range of damages, including claims such as mental anguish and pain and suffering. However, nalyeeh is a flexible concept of distributive justice, and it is possible that Navajo common law prevents plaintiffs from seeking to recover twice for the same injuiy. How nalyeeh should apply in Nez's situation is a matter to be determined by the district court.\\nWe thus reverse the district court and remand this case for disposition consistent with this opinion.\\n. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Ariz. L. R. 225, 230 (1989).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528812\", \"name\": \"Hsaio Li (Mimi) Lee and Yu Te (James) Lin, wife and husband, and Toyo-Cinema Co., Ltd., A Japanese Corporation, Appellants, v. Stanley Tallman and Peabody Coal Company, a Delaware Corporation, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hsaio Li Lee v. Tallman\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-11-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-02-95\", \"first_page\": 246, \"last_page\": 252, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 246\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and *SLOAN, Associate Justices ^sitting by designation).\", \"parties\": \"Hsaio Li (Mimi) Lee and Yu Te (James) Lin, wife and husband, and Toyo-Cinema Co., Ltd., A Japanese Corporation, Appellants, v. Stanley Tallman and Peabody Coal Company, a Delaware Corporation, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-02-95\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nHsaio Li (Mimi) Lee and Yu Te (James) Lin, wife and husband, and Toyo-Cinema Co., Ltd., A Japanese Corporation, Appellants, v. Stanley Tallman and Peabody Coal Company, a Delaware Corporation, Appellees.\\nDecided November 27, 1996\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and *SLOAN, Associate Justices ^sitting by designation).\\nLawrence A. Ruzow, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant; and Frederick Aspey, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellee Tallman, and Richard Woods, Esq., Phoenix, Arizona, for Appellee Peabody.\", \"word_count\": \"3296\", \"char_count\": \"19754\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nToyo-Cinema Co. (\\\"Appellant\\\") claims that the district court erred in dismissing its case against Stanley Tallman and Peabody Coal Company (\\\"Appellees\\\"). The Appellant raises two issues on appeal: 1) May a district court extend the time for a plaintiff to complete service of process beyond the six months provided for in Nav. R. Civ. P. 6(f); and 2) Assuming that a judge has extended the time for completion of service of process beyond the six months provided for in Nav. R. Civ. P. 6(f), may another judge dismiss an action in which service is completed more than six months after filing of the complaint, but within the extended time for completion of service granted by the first judge.\\nI\\nOn November 11, 1990, a motor vehicle collision occurred between Appellant Toyo-Cinema's employees (Lee and Lin) and a vehicle operated by Appellee Stanley Tallman, then an employee of Appellee Peabody Coal Company. Tallman was driving a company vehicle. The incident occurred near Kayenta, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. Tallman is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation. Peabody is a foreign corporation which does busi ness within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.\\nThe Appellant and Lee and Lin filed personal injury suits against the Appellees in both the Navajo Nation and Arizona state court systems. The Navajo Nation complaint was filed on October 15,1992 in the Tuba City District Court. The Arizona state complaint was filed on November 9,1991 (and amended on September 17, 1992) in the Maricopa County Superior Court.\\nDuring September and October of 1992, service of process was made on the Appellees for the Arizona state case. Service was not, however, made for the Navajo Nation case. Instead, the Appellant filed a motion to extend the period of time within which service could be made. A six month extension was granted (first extension) by Judge Evelyne E. Bradley on March 8, 1993. The extension enlarged the time for service to October 15,1993. In August, 1993, the Appellant again filed for an extension and, on August 30, 1993, was granted another six month enlargement of time (second extension) by Judge Wayne Cadman Sr. This extension enlarged the time for service to April 15, 1994.\\nMeanwhile, in the Arizona state case, Appellee Tallman was dismissed by order, on December 23, 1993, due to the state court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On June 22, 1994, the state court granted Appellee Peabody summary judgment due to the Appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.\\nIn the Navajo Nation case, the Appellant filed for a third extension of time within which to serve process. A two year extension was granted (third extension) on April 18, 1994 by Judge Cadman. This extension enlarged the time for service to April 15,1996. Service on the Appellees was finally accomplished on April 7, 1994, within the time period allowed by the second extension.\\nOn June 23, 1994, Judge Cadman recused himself from hearing the case and Judge Manuel Watchman stepped in to hear subsequent proceedings.\\nOn July 21, 1994, Appellee Tallman moved to dismiss the suit for the Appellant's failure to serve process within the time period prescribed by Nav. R. Civ. P. 6(f) (\\\"Rule 6(f)\\\"). Appellee Peabody joined in the motion seven days later. On July 28,1994, the individual plaintiffs, Lee and Lin, were dismissed for failing to appear for their depositions; this left Toyo-Cinema as the sole plaintiff.\\nIn response to the Appellees' motion to dismiss, Judge Watchman entered an Order, on December 28, 1994, granting the dismissal. In the Order, Judge Watchman wrote that \\\"[njotwithstanding the previous ruling of the Court, it appears clear that the action should have been dismissed pursuant to Rule 6(f) on April 16, 1993.\\\"\\nII\\nRule 6(f) states that \\\"[a]n action shall be dismissed without prejudice if the summons is not issued and service completed within six months from the date of the filing of the complaint.\\\" Judge Watchman's dismissal order states that \\\"[t]he language of the Rule is mandatory.\\\" (Order at para. 4). We disagree.\\nRule 6(b), Nav. R. Civ. R, states that an extension of the six-month time limit may be given by the court. Rule 6(b) reads in pertinent part:\\nExtension of Time. When by these Rules or by notice given thereunder or by order of court, an act is required to be done at or within a specified time, the court for good cause may (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order...; but it may not extend the time for any actions under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(e), and 60(c), except under the conditions stated in them, (emphasis added).\\nReading Rules 6(b) and 6(f) in conjunction with one another, we find that our courts may enlarge the time to serve process. Such a reading preserves flexibility in the rules. Flexibility in the time requirement for service may be necessary and appropriate in cases where the defendant cannot be found or where the defendant is evading service. Also, extensions may be necessary in cases that involve numerous defendants or in class actions where difficulties in certifying the class occasionally arise.\\nOur decisions allow for continuances in certain circumstances where flexibility is necessary. Compare Battles v. General Electric Credit Corp., 4 Nav. R. 26, 29 (1983) (holding that the district court should have granted a continuance of a trial where defendant's counsel failed to appear) and Navajo Nation v. Rico, 4 Nav. R. 175, 176 (W.R. Dist. Ct. 1983) (stating that the grant of continuances of trials is within the sound discretion of the trial court and holding that good cause for a continuance did exist where the prosecution's sole material witness was legitimately unavailable to testify) with In re Estate of Plummer, 6 Nav. R. 271, 274 (1990) (holding that good cause for a continuance did not exist where counsel had only one day to prepare for the hearing, although his client had over a month's notice of the hearing). If continuances are allowed for entire trials in certain circumstances, then continuances for lesser components of the litigation process, such as service of process, are also to be allowed. For these reasons, we hold that Rule 6(f) is not mandatory and an extension of the time to serve process may be granted.\\nIll\\nThe trial court has discretion to grant or deny an extension of time to serve process. That discretion must be exercised in a sound and legal manner and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Battles, 4 Nav. R. at 27. The boundaries within which the trial court must exercise its discretion are determined by the facts of the case and established by rules and law. See In re Contempt of Sells, 5 Nav. R. 37, 38 (1985). In light of the strong language of Rule 6(f), the district court must find substantial justification to extend the time period; otherwise, Rule 6(f) would have little effect or force.\\nSpecifically, the requesting party must show two things in order to receive an extension of time for service of process: due diligence and good cause. First, the party must prove that he or she has exercised due diligence in attempting to serve process. Once due diligence is proven, the second level of inquiry arises: whether the requesting party has proven good cause for an extension pursuant to Rule 6(b).\\nA. Due Diligence\\nMore than inadvertence, mistake of counsel, or ignorance of rules is required to receive an extension of time for service of process. Rather, the requesting party must show that he or she exercised due diligence in attempting to serve process. The purpose of the due diligence requirement is to ensure that the plaintiff acts in good faith in seeking a continuance. Further, it is to prevent the plaintiff from sitting on claims and retaining sole control of them, with resulting prejudice to the defendant.\\nThe determination of the requisite diligence rests with the sound discretion of the district court and should be made on a case-by-case basis. Bradley v. Benally, 6 Nav. R. 156, 158 (1989). It should be noted, however, that \\\"[t]he diligence requirement imposes an affirmative obligation on the moving party to keep abreast... of the case.\\\" Id. Where a requesting party has the opportunity or ability to serve process, for instance, the rule requires that he or she do so. See Plummer, 6 Nav. R. at 274 (stating that a litigant should not be able to claim the need for a trial continuance where he or she had ample time to prepare or where the party had the ability to act).\\nOur neighboring jurisdiction of Arizona also imposes a legal duty on the plaintiff to use due diligence in serving process upon the defendant. See, e.g., Grobe v. McBryde, 468 P.2d 936, 938, 939 (1970) (citing Murphy v. Valenzuela, 386 P.2d 78, 80 (Ariz. 1963)); Air Power v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 793, 795 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Riley v. Superior Court, 567 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). In Riley, for instance, the court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate due diligence because it made no attempt to ascertain the defendant's home address even though several means to do so were available to the plaintiff. 567 P.2d at 1220. The court stated that a plaintiff cannot \\\"sit back and say 'it would not have worked' as an excuse . and then be heard to say he exercised diligence.\\\" Id. Instead, the plaintiff must meet the affirmative obligation of attempting to serve process.\\nIn the present case, the Appellant did not meet the affirmative obligation of attempting to serve process. The Appellant made no attempt to serve the Appellees for the Navajo Nation court case during the time permitted by Rule 6(f). The Appellant's lack of due diligence is highlighted by the fact that it had the opportunity and ability to serve process. Instead, the Appellant purposefully delayed service of process for the Navajo Nation court case until the simultaneous state court case was completed. If the due diligence rule were applied to this case, we would hold that the Appellant did not make the requisite showing of due diligence for an extension of time to serve process. The due diligence rule will apply hereafter.\\nB. Good Cause\\nGood cause is not a standardized formula, but is instead a case-specific, fact-based inquiry that is to be conducted within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Battles, 4 Nav. R. at 27-29 (holding that the district court should have granted a continuance of a trial where defendant's counsel failed to appear); Rico, 4 Nav. R. at 176 (stating that the grant of continuances of trials is within the sound discretion of the trial court and holding that good cause for a continuance did exist where the prosecution's sole material witness was legitimately unavailable to testify). In determining whether good cause exists, our courts should consider policies favoring the speedy disposition of cases and the importance of serving timely notice so as to prevent prejudice to the defendant. See In re Certified Questions II, 6 Nav. R. 129, 131 (1989) (stating that unauthorized deviations in the Rules may prejudice parties and impede judicial efficiency); In re Estate of Goldtooth Begay #2, 7 Nav. R. 29, 31 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of notice in Navajo common law by stating \\\"that Navajo due process ensures notice\\\"); Peterson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2 Nav. R. 36, 41 (C. P. Dist. Ct. 1979) ([t]he primary purpose of having rules for service is to ensure the parties are notified and have an opportunity to defend).\\nFailure to serve notice in a timely manner allows the plaintiff to retain sole control of the case and causes great prejudice to the defendant. The Court has addressed the importance of preventing prejudice in the context of granting trial continuances. In Plummer, for instance, the Court stated that a party requesting a continuance must show that prejudice or harm will result if no continuance is granted. 6 Nav. R. at 275. In Battles, we stated that a showing of prejudice is an element common to all of the factors that a court may consider in deciding to grant a continuance. 4 Nav. R. at 28, 29 (holding that requiring the defendant to represent himself on short notice would sufficiently prejudice him). Finally, in Rico, the Court stated that \\\"a showing of prejudice . is most important.\\\" 4 Nav. R. at 176. In light of the importance of preventing prejudice to the defendant, we find that good cause for an extension of time to serve process includes, but is not limited to, a showing by the plaintiff that defendant will not be prejudiced by such an extension.\\nIn this case, the Appellant argues that a pending, simultaneous state court action was sufficient justification for an extension. We disagree. Simultaneous court actions pending in the Navajo Nation and another jurisdictiondo not constitute good cause for an extension of time to serve process. To find otherwise would be to invite forum shopping between state and Navajo Nation courts.\\nForum shopping is particularly damaging in cases such as this one, where a non-Indian litigant attempts to bring, in a state court, an action that is clearly within Navajo jurisdiction. Such action negatively impacts the Navajo govem ment's ability to make its own laws and be governed by them. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). In light of Appellee Tallman's membership in the Navajo Nation, Appellee Peabody's extensive contacts with the Navajo Nation, the location of the accident within Navajo Nation territorial jurisdiction, and the presence of a company vehicle in the accident, Navajo adjudicatory jurisdiction in this case is clear. 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253.B. (1995) (giving Navajo Nation courts civil jurisdiction over \\\"[a]ll civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of Navajo Indian Country, or has caused an action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation); Taylor v. Bradley, 6 Nav. R. 147, 149 (1989) (holding that Navajo Nation courts have civil jurisdiction over all persons who cause an action to occur in Navajo Indian Country); see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that the state may not exercise jurisdiction if doing so would interfere with Indians' right \\\"to make their own laws and be ruled by them\\\"); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (a tribe may regulate the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members); Enriquez v. Super. Ct. In and For County of Pima, 565 P.2d 522, 523 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that the state court's assumption of jurisdiction over a case involving a non-Indian suing an Indian for an accident occurring on a reservation would be an infringement on tribal self government). As such, this case should have proceeded in Navajo Nation courts. By pursuing the state court case, the Appellant made a misplaced attempt at forum shopping.\\nIn cases where litigants feel compelled to pursue their claims in state court and Navajo Nation court, they have valid options on how to proceed. They may serve process for both cases and then ask one of the courts for a trial continuance. Alternatively, they may ask the court for an extension of time to serve process or for a trial continuance. Failing to serve process for the Navajo Nation court case, in the absence of good cause, however, is an error.\\nIV\\nThe final issue deals with \\\"horizontal appeals\\\" or the power of one trial judge to \\\"overrule\\\" another trial judge and such is discussed here for guidance. In this case, Judge Watchman's dismissal order effectively overruled the previous time enlargements granted by Judges Bradley and Cadman. Horizontal appeals are strongly discouraged. Navajo common law disfavors second-guessing a decision maker. The decision of a naat'aanii, when made in good faith, is to be respected and followed. Similarly, the word of a medicine man, in propounding the way of things, is to be respected and followed. Our decisions support this principle. In Rico, the trial judge who granted a motion after it had been denied by another trial judge wrote that he was \\\"extremely reluctant to enter an order different than that entered by the [previous judge]. Normally, judges should respect the prior rulings of a judge....\\\" 4 Nav. R. at 177. Accordingly, we establish a presumption in favor of the rulings of the first judge.\\nThe issue is closely related to the \\\"law of the case\\\" doctrine. According to that doctrine, \\\"a determination of law once made will be treated as correct throughout all subsequent stages of the proceeding except when the issue is raised in a higher court.\\\" Barron's Law Dictionary 269. Accordingly, one trial judge cannot overrule another trial judge of equal authority. This rule helps to preserve precious judicial resources and it discourages \\\"judge shopping,\\\" wherein litigants endlessly search for a judge until they find one that will provide them with a favorable ruling.\\nSound judicial policy also limits our trial judges from overruling one another. Before a judge overrules another, that judge must malee findings sufficient to overcome the presumption favoring the first judge. As such, overrulings will only be allowed in cases where there is a substantial change of circumstances, where a clear error in the first decision makes the decision manifestly erroneous, or where manifest injustice will result if the first ruling is not overturned. Substantial change of circumstances may include the availability of new evidence or previously unavailable evidence that will more likely than not change the outcome of the decision. Also, a litigant may be entitled to a new ruling where a change of law occurs, such as where this Court construes a statute anew. These circumstances seek to prevent unduly harsh and manifestly unjust decisions.\\nWhen one judge overrules another and the issue is presented to this Court, we will examine the merits of the original judge's ruling to determine whether the second judge abused his or her discretion in overruling the original judge.\\nV\\nDespite our conclusion that there was not good cause to enlarge the time within which to serve process, the Appellants actually obtained an extension of time from two prior presiding judges and, in reliance on those orders, faithfully completed service of process. In other words, the Appellants relied upon the validity of the prior orders and, finally, proceeded to serve process. This Court will honor the expectations created by those orders.\\nAccordingly, and without prejudice to our analysis, the decision of the Tuba City District Court dismissing the complaint is REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Tuba City District Court for further proceedings.\\n. Appellant also incorrectly assumed that the service of process for the state court case provided sufficient notice to the Appellees for the Navajo Nation court case. However, serving notice for a separate, pending suit does not permit the plaintiff to fail to serve notice for the suit in question.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528823\", \"name\": \"Ralph Bennett Jr., Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee; and Roy Begay, Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-09-22\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. SC-CV-32-94, SC-CV-36-94\", \"first_page\": 161, \"last_page\": 165, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 161\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and SLOAN* (*by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Ralph Bennett Jr., Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee, and Roy Begay, Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Nos. SC-CV-32-94, SC-CV-36-94\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nRalph Bennett Jr., Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee, and Roy Begay, Appellant, v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Appellee.\\nDecided September 22, 1995\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and SLOAN* (*by designation), Associate Justices.\\nLawrence A. Ruzow, Esq., for Appellant Ralph Bennett Jr., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona); and Roy Begay, Appellant Pro Se, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona); and Claudeen Bates Arthur, Esq., Chief Legislative Counsel, and Ron Haven, Esq., for Appellee Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona).\", \"word_count\": \"1987\", \"char_count\": \"12004\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nI\\nThese appeals involve two separate election cases in which the Navajo Board of Election Supervisors (Board) disqualified Ralph Bennett Jr. (Bennett) and Roy Begay (Begay), both candidates for delegate to the Navajo Nation Council. The Board found that they violated the 1990 Navajo Election Code (Election Code) and the 1984 Navajo Ethics in Government Law (Ethics Law) and disqualified them from running in the November 1994 Navajo Nation General Election. We consolidated the cases on appeal.\\nA\\nOn August 20, 1992, the Ethics and Rules Committee (ERC) of the Navajo Nation Council found Bennett in violation of Section 3754(A) (2) of the Ethics Law because he filed his Economic Disclosure Statement late. The ERC fined Bennett $50.00, payable to the Navajo Nation. On May 9,1994, Bennett filed his declaration of candidacy for Navajo Nation Council delegate for the Red Lake/Sawmill Chapters. The declaration form asks whether the candidate had ever been convicted of any offense listed in Section 8.B.4 of the Election Code within the past five years. Bennett checked \\\"no.\\\"\\nOn June 10, 1994, the Board cleared Bennett to run and he received the most votes in the August 9, 1994 Navajo Nation Primary Election.\\nOn August 29, 1994, the Board decided not to certify Bennett for the general election after being notified by the ERC that he had failed to timely file his 1992 Economic Disclosure Statement. The Board removed Bennett, without notice and hearing, from the general election ballot for violating the Ethics Law and in turn Section 8.B.4 of the Election Code. Bennett appeals the Board's decision to this Court.\\nB\\nBegay was sworn in as a council delegate for the Klagetoh/Wide Ruins Chapter on January 15, 1991. On January 29, 1993, the ERC ruled that Begay had violated Section 3753(1) (1) and (3) of the Ethics Law for receiving unauthorized compensation for official acts.\\nThe ERC recommended that the Navajo Nation Council publicly reprimand Begay pursuant to 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3757(A) (1) (e), and order him to pay $291.28 in restitution to the Navajo Nation. ERC Resolution No. ERC-93-268. The recommendation was debated by the Navajo Nation Council, but it declined to impose any sanctions against Begay.\\nBegay filed his nominating petition on May 10,1994, seeking another term as council delegate for the Klagetoh/Wide Ruins Chapters. On June 17, 1994, the Board certified Begay's candidacy for Navajo Nation Council delegate.\\nOn August 20, 1994, the Ethics and Rules Office notified the Board that Begay had failed to disclose to the ERC his violation of Section 3753 of the Ethics Law and Section 8.B.4 of the Election Code. On August 31, 1994, the Board removed Begay, without notice and hearing, from the general election ballot for violating those laws.\\nII\\nThe Board has discretion to apply election laws, but such discretion is limited and this Court can decide whether the Board acted within its discretion. Pioche v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 6 Nav. R. 360, 364 (1991), citing Johnson v. June, 4 Nav. R. 79, 82 (1989). These limitations are imposed by due process and the statutory language of the Election Code and Ethics Law.\\nA\\nBoth Bennett and Begay claim that the Board removed them from the general election ballot without affording them notice and an opportunity to be heard; thus, raising due process claims.\\nBegay claims that the Board's ex parte decision not to certify him was based solely on the ERC's finding that he violated the Ethics Law. Aside from the Board not giving him notice and an opportunity for hearing, he claims that the ERC has no power to disqualify him from seeking elected office in the first place, because its only job is to recommend sanctions to the Navajo Nation Council.\\nBennett asserts a similar claim that Navajo law requires the Board to notify a candidate of its intent to disqualify him from the general election ballot and then, on request of the candidate, hold a hearing on the issue. He claims that the Board removed him from the ballot without providing the required notice and opportunity for hearing.\\nThe Board contends that it can disqualify any candidate, as a matter of law, that the ERC finds in violation of the Ethics Law without providing notice and hearing. Both Bennett and Begay were found in violation of the Ethics Law by the ERC and the Board claims that is the only justification it needs to disqualify them.\\nNavajo due process requires notice and provides all parties to a dispute an opportunity to be heard. In re removal of Katenay, 6 Nav. R. 81 (1989); Mustache v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 5 Nav. R. 115, 119 (1987). It requires adherence to the principles of justice and fair play, Yazzie v. Jumbo, 5 Nav. R. 75, 76 (1986), and the courts-must interpret it in a way that it protects civil liberties while preserving Navajo culture and self-government. Billie v. Abbott, 6 Nav. R. 66, 74 (1988). The Navajo people have an established custom of notifying all parties involved in a controversy and allowing them, and other interested parties, an opportunity to present and defend their positions. Begay v. Navajo Nation, 6 Nav. R. 20, 24 (1988). This Navajo common law is followed today by the Navajo people in resolving disputes.\\nThe Board is held to these same standards of due process, because, as we said in Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 6 Nav. R. 319, 325 (1990), the right to run for public office is a part of political liberty which makes it a due process right. The Board is thus obligated to provide Bennett and Begay with notice of its intent to remove them from the general election ballot and provide them with an opportunity for hearing on the proposed removal.\\nThe purpose of a hearing before the Board is not to retry issues previously decided by a trial court or an administrative agency such as the ERC, Pioche v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 6 Nav. R. 360 (1991), but to explain to the candidate the precise reason for the proposed action to be taken and to have the candidate respond. This is the nature of traditional Navajo due process and it is carried out with respect. It prevents government agencies, such as the Board, from making important decisions respecting a person's interest in secrecy. It also promotes respect for the decision itself and the decision-making process.\\nThe record shows that the Board did not provide these minimal due process protections to Bennett and Begay. The Board's decision as to both of these candidates must therefore be reversed.\\nB\\nThe final issue is whether the last sentence of Section 8.B.4 is valid and if it can be used to prevent a person who has been found in violation of the Ethics Law from seeking the office of Navajo Nation Council delegate.\\nSection 8.B.4 in its entirety reads as follows:\\nMust not have been convicted of any misdemeanor involving crimes of deceit, untruthfulness and dishonesty, including but not limited to extortion, embezzlement, bribery, perjury, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, false pretense, theft, conversion, or misuse of Tribal funds and property, and crimes involving the welfare of children, child abuse, child neglect, aggravated assault and aggravated battery within the last five (5) years. Mast not have been found in violation by a trial court or the Ethics and Rules Committee of the Navajo Nation Council of the Navajo Ethics in government or Election Laws[.] (Italics added).\\nBennett claims that the language quoted in italics above (language at issue) is not part of the 1990 Election Code as adopted by the Navajo Nation Council and therefore cannot bar him from the general election ballot. Begay claims that the Board exceeded its authority when it removed him from the ballot using the language at issue, because only the Navajo Nation Council, pursuant to 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3756(A) (15) (a), has power to remove and bar a sitting council delegate from seeking reelection for five years. The Board's only argument on the validity of the language at issue is that they \\\"were approved\\\" by the Navajo Nation Council.\\nOur review of the official minutes of the Navajo Nation Council session when the Election Code was adopted shows that the language at issue was not included as part of proposed Section 8.B.4.\\nThe minutes indicate that during the debate, Council Delegate Benjamin Curley requested the delegates who \\\"had the motion\\\" to include \\\"disqualifica tions [of candidates for president, vice-president and council delegate] based on the candidate's filing of various information and pursuant to administrative sanctions of the Ethics in Government Law, because there are provisions which would apply in the Ethics in Government Law that could also be used for disqualification purposes.\\\" Minutes of Navajo Nation Council Session dated April 6, 1990 at 33.\\nCouncil Delegate Daniel Tso (the delegate with the motion) responded that he \\\"will accept [the] request to include references to the Ethics in Government Law as part of the qualifications in the President and other elected officials.\\\" Id. at 42.\\nCouncil Delegate Elmer Milford, who seconded the motion, stated, \\\"I'd like to speak to the issue of Section 8, there was a request made pertaining to 7 on page 18, I'd like to ask the moving party that he also include 'violations of the Ethics and Election Law' on that section right there. With that I will second the motion.\\\" Id. at 43. The proposed Election Code shows that the only section 7 on page 18 is a section dealing with the qualifications for president and vice-president, not council delegate.\\nWe find these comments by various delegates unclear as to what was actually proposed. It is clear that no delegate proposed to enact the actual language at issue, but it was nonetheless published by the Board as part of Section 8.B.4. Since the language at issue was neither in the Election Code as proposed to the Navajo Nation Council nor added during the debate on the Code, as a matter of Navajo law, it simply has no validity. The Board cannot use that language to disqualify candidates from elective office.\\nThe decisions removing Bennett and Begay from the general election ballot are therefore reversed.\\n. Ralph Bennett was among twenty four employees of the Navajo Nation Division of Community Development who were found by the ERC to be in noneompliance with the Ethics Law for filing a late Economic Disclosure Statement for 1992. Ethics and Rules Committee Resolution No. ERC-93-346 (August 20, 1992).\\n. Section 8.B.4 of the Election Code fixes the qualifications for delegates to the Navajo Nation Council and lists as an offense an Ethics Law violation.\\n. Section 3753 (I)(l) and (3) state that:\\n(1) No public official or employee shall accept or receive any benefit, income, favor or other form of compensation for performing the official duties of their office or employment, beyond the amount or value which is authorized and received in their official capacity for performing such duties.\\n(3) No public official or employee, however, shall accept any benefit, income, favor or other form of compensation for the performance of the duties of any other office or employment not actually performed or for which such official or employee is not otherwise properly authorized or entitled to receive.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/528841.json b/navajo_nation/528841.json
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+"{\"id\": \"528841\", \"name\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cynthia Hunter, Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Hunter\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-10-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CR-07-95\", \"first_page\": 166, \"last_page\": 167, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 166\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cynthia Hunter, Defendant-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CR-07-95\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNavajo Nation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cynthia Hunter, Defendant-Appellant.\\nDecided October 3, 1995\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\\nLee R. Belone, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant; and Daryl Junes, Shiproclc, Navajo Nation (New Mexico), for the Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"721\", \"char_count\": \"4116\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThis opinion decides the Navajo Nation's motion to dismiss a criminal appeal for failure to timely file the notice of appeal.\\nI\\nAppellant, Cynthia Hunter, was convicted of four criminal offenses on March 15, 1995. A sentencing hearing was held and the trial judge signed the judgment on June 27, 1995. Hunter filed her notice of appeal and brief on July 31, 1995; which was thirty-four days after the date of judgment. The Supreme Court was closed from July 25-28,1995 due to the Navajo Nation Judicial Branch's Annual Conference. Hunter's thirtieth day for purposes of filing a notice of appeal fell on July 27, 1995, the day the Court was closed.\\nOn August 24, 1995, the Navajo Nation filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing that the failure to file the notice of appeal and brief within thirty days from the date of judgment, as required by Rule 2(c), Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure (NRAP), constituted a lack of jurisdiction. Hunter responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing that NRAP 5(a) permitted an extension of time to July 31, 1995, the date the Court reopened for business.\\nII\\nUnder the NRAP and the Navajo Nation Code, the notice of appeal and brief must be filed with the Supreme Court within thirty calendar days of the date the judge signs the final judgment. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7 801(a) (1985); NRAP 2(c). The rules also provide that \\\"[t]he last day of the period so computed is to be included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or court holiday, in which case the period shall extend to the end of the next business day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or court holiday.\\\" NRAP 5(a). Moreover, 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7 801(a) is a jurisdictional statute and this Court is without jurisdiction unless an appeal is filed within the prescribed time period. Navajo Nation v. Devore, 5 Nav. R. 155 (1987) (citations omitted).\\nThis Court has granted motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to an untimely filing of an appeal. See, e.g., Devore, 5 Nav. R. at 155 (notice of appeal filed 31 days after entry of judgment); The Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Yellowhorse, 5 Nav. R. 133 (1987) (notice of appeal filed 42 days after entry of judgment); Riverview Service Station v. Eddie, 5 Nav. R. 135 (1987) (no enlargement of time for filing by mail); Viva Rancho Motors, Inc. v. Tully, 5 Nav. R. 145 (1987) (the day the judge signs the judgment is the date used to compute appeal time); Whitehorse v. Navajo Nation, 4 Nav. R. 55 (1983) (notice of appeal filed 31 days after entry of judgment); Window Rock Mall, Ltd. v. Day IV, 3 Nav. R. 58 (1981) (no jurisdiction unless timely filing of an appeal).\\nThe question before this Court is whether the filing of the notice of appeal, thirty-four days after the judgment was signed, is untimely because the Supreme Court was not in operation on the thirtieth day. The deadline for filing the notice of appeal in this case was on July 27, 1995, but on that date the Supreme Court office was closed by order of the Chief Justice and the entire Supreme Court staff was attending the Judicial Branch's Annual Conference in Farmington, New Mexico. The Court did not reopen for business until July 31, 1995.\\nWe hold that the closing of the Supreme Court office by order of the Chief Justice, such as for the Judicial Branch Annual Conference, is akin to a court holiday. The delayed filing in this case was not Hunter's fault, but was because the Court staff was not available to attend to the routine, daily business of the Court, as is the case on a court holiday. Accordingly, it was proper for Hunter to file her notice of appeal the next business day the Court was open, which was Monday, July 31, 1995.\\nThe motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528845\", \"name\": \"Singleton's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, Petitioner, v. Bernice Begay Benally, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Singleton's Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Benally\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-01-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SR-CV-12-95\", \"first_page\": 512, \"last_page\": 518, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 512\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Singleton\\u2019s Mobile Home Sales, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, Petitioner, v. Bernice Begay Benally, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SR-CV-12-95\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Shiprock, New Mexico\\nSingleton\\u2019s Mobile Home Sales, Inc., a New Mexico Corporation, Petitioner, v. Bernice Begay Benally, Respondent.\\nDecided January 24, 1997\", \"word_count\": \"2967\", \"char_count\": \"17846\", \"text\": \"JUDGMENT AND ORDER\\nJudge Lorene Ferguson presiding.\\nTHIS MATTER was heard on November 14, 1995 at which time this Court made the following FINDINGS:\\n1. Bernice Begay Benally and Jerome Begay entered into a contract with Singleton's Mobile Home for a 1973 used mobile home in February, 1982.\\n2. The terms of the contract required Ms. Benally and Mr. Begay to make monthly payments in the amount of $295.62 up to January, 1990 for a total of $30,380.00, which included interest at 23% annually.\\n3. Ms. Benally and Mr. Begay separated in 1991 and Ms. Benally was left to pay off the contract.\\n4. Since the contract was entered, Ms. Benally learned that she had a disabiling disease, scleroderma, which impaired her ability to work and she has been receiving Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income checks in the amount of $441.00 a month.\\n5. Ms. Benally was not able to make cash payments each time and found it necessary to deliver personal property to make required payments.\\n6. The Petitioner asserted that the principal balance due was $8,766.14 and the arrears amount was calculated at $10,426.14 which included other costs.\\n7. The Petitioner asserts that since 1990, additional late charges and additional interest have brought the amount owing to $21,732.87.\\n8. Petitioner did not file its petition to repossess until January 25, 1995, five years after the contract was due, allowing the late charges and interest to buildup as it did.\\n9. Respondent did not receive any receipts for the delivery of her personal property although she testified she received receipts for her cash payments.\\n10.Respondent testified that she directed that the amounts credited for the personal property be applied to her mobile home payments.\\n11. While during the course of the contract period, Ms. Benally, Respondent, also took out a loan, she testified that the account was kept separate and the cash payments and property delivered did not apply to that loan which was completely paid back. This was not challenged by the Petitioner.\\n12.Ms. Benally testified that in 1990 she gave personal property which totaled $1,710.00, while petitioner showed credit in the amount of $1,345.00 to which Mr. Singleton was willing to apply a credit of $365.00.\\n13.Also, there was a discrepancy in the total late charges due. While the Petitioner's witness testified Ms. Benally owed $1,840.00 in late charges, she also testified that the figure was based upon a $15.00 per month late charge during the month she was late. However, the contract terms would limit the late charge to $14.78 per month. In addition, the late charges continued to accumulate after the contract year ended. Again, the Petitioner was willing to apply $22.06.\\n14. The contract terms read at 12 of the contract:\\n12. Delinquency and collection charge: Buyer hereby agrees to pay a delinquency and collection charge on each payment in default for a period of more than ten (10) days in the amount of 5% of each payment, or $15.00 which is less.\\n15.Ms. Benally also testified that she gave property for which she did not receive credit in the amount of $3,005.00. The property delivered was:\\nOne camcorder $2,200.00\\nThree shawls (pendelton) $300.00 Three concho belts $150.00\\nThree turquoise beads $150.00\\nThree chokers $65.00\\nOne bead $50.00\\n16.Ms. Benally also testified she paid a total of $1,007.55 since the end of the contract period.\\nDISCUSSION\\nThis being a repossession case, this Court is obligated to review records, testimony, and evidence submitted to this Court to determine whether Singleton Mobile Home should repossess the 1973 Presidential mobile home and whether the Respondent, Bernice Begay Benally, should be required to pay the amount requested by the Plaintiff.\\nWhile there is no dispute regarding Ms. Benally's failure to make payments on the contract, there is a dispute as to the amount owed. In particular, the Respondent asserted that the record keeping practices of the Petitioner have been inadequate and as grounds stated that on several occasions she was not credited for cash payment and delivery of personal property. The Respondent also testified that while she was given receipts for her cash payments, she was not given receipts for her personal property.\\nRespondent also testified she was not properly assessed for late charges and that the lesser amount of $14.78 should have been used in assessing her late charges, rather than the $15.00 amount she was assessed on several occasions.\\nWhile the records are difficult to decipher, due to Plaintiff's lack of accuracy and neatness of the records, this Court is able to ascertain by testimony and supporting documents what was owed on the contract as of the ending date of the contract. The Petitioner has also submitted documents on additional charges since January 25, 1990, which include late charges, interest and taxes.\\nUse of the Rules of Repossession is new to this Court. While these Rules were adopted by the Navajo Nation judges in 1982, all of the judicial districts have not implemented them. A few began to utilize the Rules when Reservation Business Services v. Albert, 7 Nav. R. 123 (1995), was issued by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.\\nThe history of consumer law on the Navajo Nation is brief. In 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council, in Resolution No. CF-26-68, declared the public policy that self-help repossession of secured personal property was illegal. This was codified as 7 N.T.C. Sections 607-609 (Supp. 1985) and requires creditors to either obtain consent from the debtor to repossess or to obtain an Order of Repossession by the Navajo Tribal Court.\\nFearful of Federal Court challenges, the Navajo Nation judges adopted repossession rules to set out the procedure for repossession actions. In Reservation Business, the Supreme Court stated:\\nThe Navajo Nation judges wanted a middle ground between self-help repossession and the delays of normal civil proceedings. They wanted to assure that consumers would be protected from repossession on technical grounds, while offering a prompt and efficient remedy to creditors. The choice reflected in our repossesion rules is that there be a summary proceeding for creditors which allows due process protection for debtors. It modified the common law replevin action in a procedure which permits a petition, an Order to Show Cause to the debtor, and a summary hearing to decide the property of repossession. The rales offer protection for purchasers of personal property on credit while assuring a healthy business climate.\\nId. at 126.\\nUpon the issuance of Reservation Business in 1995, this Court has attempted to implement the Rules of Repossession approved by the judges in 1982.\\nIt appears that the intent of the judges, when they approved the Rules, was to find a balance between protecting the purchasers and providing a prompt and efficient remedy to creditors. However, the Rules as applied here did neither when strictly applied.\\nIn this case, there has been no dispute that the Respondent is behind in her payments. As of the day the contract ended, the Respondent was behind in her payments by $8,766.62.\\nSince then, Plaintiff has added late charges and interest alleging the amount owed was more.\\nThe circumstances involved in this case, however, is that Respondent has been behind in her payment more often than not. Each time, the Plaintiff allowed her to remain in arrears as demonstrated by the late charges, for which Respondent has paid or was assessed either $14.74 or $15.00. In addition, she was allowed to make payments by delivering personal property. Since the contract was entered, Respondent has delivered personal property for which the Petitioner has accepted as payment.\\nIt has been about five years since the end of the contract period and Petitioner did not file its petition until 1995. The Petitioner has been assessing the Respondent late charges and taxes since 1990 and as result the Petitioner requests of this Court to enter a judgment for repossession and for the total amount requested in the amount of $19,613.38 up to January 25, 1995.\\nThe Rules of Repossession would require repossession, where the right to repossess is clear unless the provision of the rule placing limitation on repossession will not be satisfied. Rule (4).\\nWhere the right to repossess personal property is regulated by a contract, the Court is required to apply the terms of the contract unless they are unconscionable or contrary to law. Rule (4).\\nThe Court is required only to consider whether or not the property is a security under an agreement and whether or not there has been a breach of the agreement so as to justify repossession. Furthermore, no counterclaim, setoff or other independent claims in ruling upon the question of repossession is to be considered by the Court. Rule (8)(b).\\nWhen read in light of Rule (9), the Court can set a hearing when the Respondent makes a claim against the Petitioner in the nature of a counterclaim, setoff or otherwise. This Court in applying the Rules has discretion to make a preliminary inquiry as to whether or not there is probable cause to believe the Respondent may have a valid claim for relief and should there appear to the Court that a valid claim exists, the Court has several options as set out in Rule (9)(b)(l), all of which take the property away from the Respondent pending proper Court action with the exception of Rule (9)(b)(3), which allows the Respondent to keep the property upon the posting of a bond equal to the value of the property or the balance due on it. The Court then can make its determination as to whether there is a claim.\\nWhen these sections are applied, here, there doesn't appear to be any protection of the purchaser, nor do these sections provide a prompt or efficient remedy for the creditor, particularly should the Respondent assert a claim. The difficulty in this case is that the records kept by both the seller and the buyer are less than adequate. Finally, the seller attempts to strictly apply the contract terms five (5) years after the payments have stopped. In reality, the contract had been breached time and time again, while the interest and late charges were adding up to a hefty figure.\\nIn A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc., v. Raymond and Alice Becenti, 2 Nav. R. 72 (C.R Dist. Ct. 1979), the Court was presented with an argument that where a creditor accepted late and erratic payments, there was a waiver of \\\"time is of essence\\\" requirement. The Defendant in A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc., by citing Soltis v. Liles, 551 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Ore. 1976), argued that where there was acceptance of late payments or erratic payments, there was a waiver to strictly apply the contract. In so doing, however, the Court did look to Soltis for the proposition that accepting late payments repeatedly may result in a waiver to declare a default in strict compliance with the contract. In Soltis, the contract contained a clause providing that any failure to make timely payment would be deemed a default. The Soltis court took the position that a vendor or creditor, who has repeatedly accepted late payments in the past cannot strictly apply the terms of the contract and cannot declare a default without first giving the debtor reasonable notice of his intention to insist upon strict compliance with the terms of the contract in the future. The terms of the Soltis contract provided that where there is failure to make payments within the grace period, the escrow agent is authorized to surrender to seller, upon demand and without notice to buyer, all of the documents specified in the preceding paragraph, thereby terminating the escrow. Id. at 1301. The Court also stated that the vendor or creditor must allow the debtor a reasonable opportunity to cure any past delinquencies. Id. at 1300. While, in Oregon, there is a state law to this effect, the Court did apply Soltis, by finding that there was sufficient notice to take action and that the history of payments indicated an intention on the part of the defendant to make monthly payments before the date that they became due.\\nIn A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc., the Court focused on whether new notice should be given upon each default. The Court stated:\\nThis behavior on the part of Defendant was not a separate default, but the continuation of his previous one which had not been cured because of the outstanding late charges. Therefore, further notice from GECC of its intention to take legal action was not necessary following the March, 1971, warning. A-1 Mobile Homes. 2 Nav. R. at 74.\\nThere the Court accepted the argument that sufficient notice be given, and decided sufficient notice was given.\\nIn its decision, the Court, while not addressing the specific issue of whether there was a waiver or estoppel so as to preclude strict enforcement of the contract, did respond to the waiver of default argument and in so doing, denied Defendant's request by finding that sufficient notice was given.\\nHere, the terms of the contract require that ninety-six (96) payments be made for the period covering February 25, 1982 to January 25, 1990. The payment amount of $295.62 was to have been made from February 25,1982 to December, 1989 and $296.10 was to have been made in January 25,1990, as a last payment.\\nItem 23 of the contract between the Respondent and the Petitioner requires that should the buyer default in any payments, the seller shall have the right to declare all amounts due immediately, and the buyer would be required to deliver the property to seller at a place designated by the seller and he would have the\\nright to repossess without demand. This did not happen until five (5) years later. Also in Item 24, the contract states that \\\"time is of the essence of this contract.\\\"\\nIn Hale Contracting v. United New Mexico Bank, 799 P.2d 581 (N.M. 1990), it states where \\\"previous conduct of parties is in direct conflict with unequivocal express terms of an agreement, the latter is determinative as to the nature of their agreement.\\\" Id. at 587. Also in Hale, the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed whether the bank was estopped from applying strictly the terms of the contract, which states that when payment is not made and the bank deems itself unsecured, the indebtedness \\\"shall become and be due and payable forthwith without demand.\\\"\\nThe New Mexico Supreme Court stated, \\\"When a party accepts a late payment on a contract without comment, he waives the default that existed. With repetition his actions may suggest an intention to accept late payments generally.\\\" Id. at 588.\\nIn Hale, the Court addressed the issues of waiver, modification and waiver by estoppel. Here, we are concerned with waiver by estoppel. Waiver by estoppel is applied where the party shows that she was misled to her prejudice by the conduct of the other party into the honest and reasonable belief that waiver was intended by the vendor. Waiver by estoppel is further explained as follows:\\nWaiver of estoppel based upon either an actual waiver of certain \\\"expenses or conduct\\\" where the reliance of the opposite party and his change of position justifies the inhibiton to assert the obligation or condition.\\\" Id. at 586.\\nIn.Hale, the case Cowan v. Chalamidas, 98 N.M. 14, 644 P. 2d 528 (1982), was quoted as follows: \\\"When a contract payee accepts late payments without objection as to their timeliness, he impliedly leads the payor to believe that late payments are acceptable.\\\" Furthermore:\\n[A]s a practical matter, one party to a contract will use his past commercial dealing with another party as a basis for the interpretation of the other party's conduct. Hale, 799 P.2d. at 588.\\nHere, the buyer was led to believe she did not have to make timely payments, and she was further led to believe that when she did, she could only malee partial payments, some in personal property. The Respondent was misled to her prejudice into an honest and reasonable belief that Singleton would not assert strictly the contract terms and that Singleton was unconcerned about the past due payments and that she would be allowed to continue making inconsistent and irregular payments.\\nCONCLUSION\\nBased upon the above discussion, the doctrine of waiver by estoppel would prevent Singleton from fully enforcing the contract terms. First, Singleton waived its right to strictly enforce the contract terms regarding timely payments. That in itself is evident.\\nSecondly, Singelton is estopped by claiming any interest after the contract period expired and any late fees after the contract period expired.\\nThis Court has issued a separate Order of Repossession. Any sale of the mobile home shall be in strict compliance with the Navajo Uniform Commercial Code. Any deficiency judgment shall be allowed only upon a showing of strict compliance with the Uniform Commercial Code.\\nThe Court's findings are that the amount owed as of the end of the contract date was $8,766.62. After the contract date, Respondent paid $1,007.55. Also deducted was a $65.00 payment agreed to by the Petitioner, a $22.06 late charge for over-charge fee agreed to by the Petitioner, a $365.00 credit not previously credited and $3,005.00 for property given not previously credited. Thus, the amount owed by the Respondent without interest or late charge since January 25, 1990 is $5,309.39, which is the amount entered as judgment for the Petitioner.\\nFinally, this Court on November 29, 1995 imposed sanctions against the Petitioner in the amount of $400.00 to compensate Respondent's counsel. The Petitioner is hereby Ordered to pay $400.00 to Respondent's counsel within fifteen (15) days.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"528859\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Petition of Jimmie Austin Sr. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Austin\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-07-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-24-98\", \"first_page\": 346, \"last_page\": 348, \"citations\": \"7 Navajo Rptr. 346\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:37.695704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, SLOAN and R. BEGAYE, Associate Justices by designation.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Petition of Jimmie Austin Sr. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SC-CV-24-98\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nIn the Matter of the Petition of Jimmie Austin Sr. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.\\nDecided July 1, 1998\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, SLOAN and R. BEGAYE, Associate Justices by designation.\\nTom Laughter, Esq., Shonto, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Petitioner.\", \"word_count\": \"1053\", \"char_count\": \"6212\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nThis Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus requires us to interpret the provisions of 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663 (1995 ed.). Essentially, we are asked to decide whether the Kayenta Family Court erred when it sent the Petitioner, Jimmie Austin Sr. (\\\"Petitioner\\\"), to jail for a term of 180 days without first finding that he violated a term of its Temporary Protection Order. We hold that the family court erred and invalidate that part of the Domestic Abuse Protection Order incarcerating the Petitioner.\\nI\\nA Petition for a Domestic Abuse Protection Order and motion for immediate Temporary Protection Order were filed against the Petitioner on February 23, 1998. The petition alleged that the Petitioner committed sexual abuse on an elderly lady. On that same day, the family court granted the motion for issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and ordered the Petitioner to appear for a show cause hearing on March 3, 1998. The documents were served on the Petitioner on February 28, 1998.\\nThe Petitioner and the victim appeared at a hearing on the domestic abuse petition on March 3, 1998. The Petitioner admitted all the allegations of the petition at the hearing. The court then entered a Domestic Abuse Protection Order, which ordered as follows: 1) Petitioner shall stay away from the victim's residence and place where the victim conducts daily business; 2) Petitioner is prohibited from abusing, harassing or threatening the victim; 3) Petitioner is prohibited from contacting the victim by any means; 4) Petitioner is prohibited from touching any of the victim's property; and 5) Petitioner shall serve 180 days in jail. The Petitioner was immediately arrested and incarcerated.\\nThe Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a motion to stay execution of the jail sentence with this Court. On March 26, 1998, we granted the stay and ordered the Petitioner's release from confinement after finding a reasonable probability that the family court might have erred in ordering a jail sentence. We left the rest of the family court's orders in the Domestic Abuse Protection Order intact. We now decide the merits of the habeas corpus petition.\\nII\\nThe Petitioner argues that the family court had no basis to give him a jail sentence using either 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663(A) or (B), because no complaint was ever filed with the court alleging that he violated any term of the Temporary Protection Order. The family court's final protection order does not state which law it relied on to incarcerate the Petitioner. Neither does the protection order state the reason for sentencing the Petitioner to a jail term. Without these crucial findings, we are left to guess at what law the court used.\\nA\\nAccording to subsection 1663(A) (1), a person can be charged with the crime of \\\"interfering with judicial proceedings,\\\" if \\\"after receiving notice of a protection order,\\\" the person \\\"disobeys the order.\\\" A Navajo Nation prosecutor must bring the criminal charge against the violator in the district court under this subsection. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663(A)(1) and (2).\\nThe Petitioner is right. There is no evidence in the family court record which would justify jailing the Petitioner for the crime of interfering with judicial proceedings. The family court record is also devoid of evidence that either the court or a police officer referred any alleged violation of the temporary protection order to the prosecutor's office for criminal prosecution. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663(A)(1)-(3). Since a prosecution for the criminal charge of interfering with judicial proceedings was not commenced by a Navajo Nation prosecutor against the Petitioner, the family court could not use subsection 1663(A) to impose a jail term on the Petitioner.\\nB\\nA person can be held in criminal contempt, after the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person violated a term of a Protection order. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663(B)(3). The person may be punished with a jail term of up to 180 days, or a fine of $250.00, or both. Id. The family court very likely used this subsection to put the Petitioner in jail.\\nIf that is the case, the family court erred because, like subsection 1663(A), certain conditions have to exist before the court can impose a jail sentence. There is the initial condition that someone must have reason to believe that a person vio lated a protection order to start the process. The law requires that a written motion for the issuance of an order to show cause naming the violator be filed; a court hearing to ascertain whether the protection order was violated must be held within fifteen days of the issuance of the order to show cause; and the court must find, using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, that the person violated the protection order. One of the sanctions is a sentence of up to 180 days in jail. 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1663(B)(l)-(3). Again, the record does not disclose that anyone filed a complaint alleging that the Petitioner violated a term of the protection order. Since the initial condition was not met, there is no basis to order the Petitioner to jail.\\nThe law requires a finding that a person violated a term of a protection order before jail becomes an option. The courts are prohibited from imposing a jail sentence on a person simply on the basis of the person's admission to an allegation in a domestic abuse protection petition. In this case, the family court imposed a jail sentence on the Petitioner without first finding that the Petitioner violated a term of the protection order and that is error.\\nIll\\nThe Kayenta Family Court's order sentencing the Petitioner, Jimmie Austin Sr., to 180 days incarceration is reversed. We invalidate that part of the Domestic Abuse Protection Order imposing the jail term. The other terms of the protection order are not at issue in this habeas corpus petition and therefore are not affected by this decision.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530235\", \"name\": \"The Navajo Nation; The Navajo Tribal Council; Leonard Haskie, Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council; and Irving Billy, Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, Plaintiffs, v. Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr.; Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. MacDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-99-89\", \"first_page\": 463, \"last_page\": 493, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 463\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Judge Robert Yazzie, Presiding.\", \"parties\": \"The Navajo Nation; The Navajo Tribal Council; Leonard Haskie, Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council; and Irving Billy, Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, Plaintiffs, v. Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr.; Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson, et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. WR-CV-99-89\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Window Rock, Arizona\\nThe Navajo Nation; The Navajo Tribal Council; Leonard Haskie, Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council; and Irving Billy, Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, Plaintiffs, v. Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr.; Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson, et al., Defendants.\\nDecided May 17, 1989\\nStanley Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Violet A. P. Lui, David P. Frank, Attorneys, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, counsels for Plaintiffs.\\nThomas J. Hynes, Hynes, Hale, and Fortner Law Firm, Daniel Deschinny, Sr., counsels for Defendants, and Carol Kirk Retasket, appearing Pro se.\\nJudge Robert Yazzie, Presiding.\", \"word_count\": \"13180\", \"char_count\": \"82404\", \"text\": \"AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, OPINION AND ORDER\\nINTRODUCTION\\nThis matter having come for hearing on May 2-4, 1989, on Plaintiffs' Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, this Court having heard only the Plaintiffs' evidence (Defendants presented no evidence at trial) and the parties' legal arguments on the issue of whether the Navajo Tribal Council's act of placing Chairman Peter MacDonald and Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on Administrative leave with pay is valid, the Court makes the following Findings, Opinion and Order:\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. At trial, Plaintiffs introduced transcripts of hearings held before the United States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs on February 2, 6, and 7,1989. Serious allegations made under oath included:\\n(a) Defendant MacDonald (i) solicited and received bribes and kickbacks from contractors doing business with the Navajo Nation; (ii) realized personal profits from the purchase of the Big Boquillas Ranch by the Navajo Nation; and (iii) conspired with others to cover-up such unlawful actions and encouraged others to commit perjury in investigations concerning payoffs from the Big Boquillas transactions; and\\n(b)The MacDonald-Thompson campaign solicited and received monetary contributions and services of value from non-Navajo and Navajo contractors.\\n2. The campaign expense report for the MacDonald-Thompson campaign, combined with the Senate Select Committee testimony, reveals that Defendants MacDonald and Thompson:\\n(a)failed to report the contributions alleged to have been made by the contractors; (b) failed to report the non-Navajo sources of these contributions; and (c) would have exceeded the $84,192 campaign expense limitation for the 1986 general election for Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council had they reported all expenses, including over $39,000 worth of air transportation services provided by James Paddock.\\n3. The minutes of the 1989 Winter Session of the Navajo Tribal Council and the resolutions adopted by the Council:\\n(a) The Navajo Tribal council convened the Winter Session on February 14, 1989. The Winter Session agenda was adopted by a vote of 53-29-4. The agenda included a resolution adopting procedures for presentation of resolutions and a resolution placing the Chairman and Vice Chairman on administrative leave with pay;\\n(b) At the February 16,1989 session, Chairman MacDonald voluntarily placed himself on administrative leave and left the Council Chambers;\\n(c) On February 17, 1989, the Council adopted:\\n(i) Resolution CF-3-89 estabhshing the Office of Special Prosecutor to conduct investigations into the allegations raised before the Senate Select Committee;\\n(ii) Resolution CF-4-89 placing the Chairman on Administrative leave with pay, by vote of 49-13-5, finding that \\\"a state of emergency exists in the management of the Navajo Tribal Council caused by the unique circumstances and events relating to the office of the Chairman and the serious allegations raised personally against Peter MacDonald, Sr.\\\";\\n(d) On March 1, 1989, the Tribal Council adopted Resolution CMA-6-89 authorizing the Department of Justice to Institute Legal Proceedings Regarding the Big Boquillas Ranch Transaction. The Tribal Council made the following factual finding: \\\"The actions of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council purporting to terminate the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General constitute deliberate use of the Chairman's and Vice Chairman's office powers to interfere with and/or subvert Council action regarding the status of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, as well as legal action concerning possible ethical violations of public officials in connection with Big Boquillas and other matters arising out of the Senate Investigation Hearings.\\\"; and\\n(e) On March 10, 1989, the Navajo Tribal Council adopted Resolution CMA-10-89 placing the Vice Chairman on administrative leave with pay, by a vote of 37-2-6. A quorum of 46 Council delegates were present. Defendants offered no evidence that a quorum did not exist. Pursuant to CMA-10-89, the Council made several determinations including:\\n(i) \\\"Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson is unwilling and has failed to carry out the duties and the obligations of the Office of the Chairman and failed to promote and preserve the interest of the Navajo Nation.\\\"\\n(ii) \\\"Johnny R. Thompson . has indicated that he will be subject to the influence of Peter MacDonald, Sr., in the exercise of authority of the office defeating the purpose of Resolution CF-4-89.\\\"\\n(iii) \\\"Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson himself is implicated by allegations that the MacDonald/Thompson candidacy filed fraudulent campaign contribution and expense reports with the Navajo Election Committee and accepted campaign contributions from non-Navajos, which are grounds for disqualification from office.\\\"\\n4. Defendant Thompson has admitted that at all time relevant to this action, he has acted under the direction and authority of Defendant MacDonald. Subsequent to the Chairman being placed on administrative leave and being divested of all executive and legislative authority on February 17, 1989, Vice Chairman Thompson continued to act under the direction and authority of Chairman MacDonald by:\\n(a) attempting to take the following actions in consort with Defendant MacDonald:\\n(i)firing the Attorney General, (ii) appointing an Executive Secretary, (iii) restraining the Deputy Attorney General from giving legal advice to the Tribal Council, (iv) issuing orders to the Chief of Police, (v) firing the Director of Legislative Affairs, (vi) appointing an Attorney General, and (vii) appointing a Deputy Attorney General; and\\n(b) under his own authority, but subject to the direction of Defendant MacDonald, Defendant Thompson:\\n(i) attempted to fire the Deputy Attorney General on February 17,1989 on the instructions of Chairman MacDonald, after the Deputy Attorney General gave legal advice contrary to the Chairman's wishes, and after the Attorney General had recommended the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate wrongdoing arising from the Big Boquillas purchase;\\n(ii) signed documents after February 17, 1989 under executive authority as delegated by Chairman MacDonald; and\\n(iii) failed to deliver the preliminary Hawkins Report investigating the Big Boquillas transaction to the Navajo Tribal Council after it was presented to a special session of the Advisory Committee and Budget and Finance Committee which Defendant Thompson chaired.\\n5. The foregoing facts demonstrate serious allegations of a breach of trust by Defendants MacDonald and Thompson which threatened, directly and indirectly, the property and resources of the Navajo Nation, and the political integrity, economic security and health, safety and welfare of the Nation.\\n6. The foregoing facts further demonstrate that Resolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 placing Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson on administrative leave do not constitute removal but rather an administrative leave.\\n7. Defendants did not present any evidence that the administrative leave resolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 are invalid or that these resolutions constitute bills of attainder.\\n8. At the conclusion of the trial, Defendants MacDonald and Thompson stipulated with the plaintiffs, on record, that they still do not recognize Resolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 as valid, and as such, they have always exercised full authority of their official capacity despite being placed on administrative leave with pay.\\nOPINION\\nThe Court will address these issues pursuant to the guidelines set out by the Navajo Supreme Court:\\n1.WHETHER THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT CHAIRMAN PETER MACDONALD, SR. OR VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNNY R. THOMPSON SERIOUSLY BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARY TRUST TO THE NAVAJO PEOPLE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NAVAJO PEOPLE.\\n2. WHETHER THE TERMS OF NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CF-4-89 AND CMA-10-89 CONSTITUTE ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE OR REMOVAL.\\n3. WHETHER THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS PLACING CHAIRMAN PETER MACDONALD, SR. AND VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNNY R. THOMPSON ON ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE AFFORD THE BASIC PROTECTIONS REQUIRED BY THE NAVAJO SUPREME COURT.\\n4. WHETHER THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTION CF-4-89 OR CMA-10-89 PLACING CHAIRMAN PETER MACDONALD, SR. AND VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNNY R. THOMPSON ON ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE CONSTITUTE BILL OF ATTAINDER.\\nLegislative acts are presumed valid. This presumption of validity attaches from the moment legislation is passed and remains until rebutted. Benally v. Gorman, 5 Nav. R. 273, 275 (W.R.D.C., 1987); Damon v. MacDonald, 4 Nav. R. 138, 140 (W.R.D.C., 1983); Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). If a legislative act is subjected to judicial review and the court subsequently makes a decision that the act is valid, it does not become valid from the date of that decision but, because of the presumption of validity, the act is valid from the point of passage. In the event a legislative act is declared invalid as a result of judicial review, it is not necessarily a nullity or retroactively invalid. For example, an officer appointed to a public post under a statute subsequently held to be invalid is treated in law as a defacto officer. His acts during the period before the statute was held invalid are binding upon the community. State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 (1871), cited with approval in Norton v. Shelly Country, 118 U.S. 425 (1886).\\nWhen a court is faced with reviewing any legislative action, that review must be conducted under certain principles. The main principle of judicial review is the presumption that the legislative act is proper and legal. The word 'pre sumption' is a legal term which means that a thing is accepted as true or proven unless the presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. One of the factors in determining whether an act is proper or legal is whether the legislative action is rationally related to legitimate governmental purpose. Benally, supra, at 275.\\nThe Navajo Rules of Evidence recognizes the general rule on presumptions: Rule 6, Presumptions, states:\\nIn all cases not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.\\nThe plaintiffs sued Chairman Peter MacDonald, Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson, and other defendants in their individual capacities, seeking declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. A temporary restraining order was sought and granted.\\nThe declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs was:\\n1) This court preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants from attempting to exercise any official powers and duties as officials, employees, or agents of the Navajo Nation; and\\n2) This Court enter a declaratory judgment that any act or action taken by defendants MacDonald and Thompson, after being placed on leave, and by other defendants upon their termination of employment by the Interim Chairman, are null and void.\\nThe defendants requested a Writ of Prohibition from the Navajo Nation Supreme Court on the basis that the action was barred by the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act, 1 N.T.C. \\u00a7 354 (g) (1) and (3).\\nThe plaintiffs asserted that the Chairman and Vice Chairman had been relieved of their executive and legislative powers and put on administrative leave with pay. They therefore had no official capacity and could not invoke the protection of the Sovereign Immunity Act.\\nThe Supreme Court determined that whether the Sovermign Immunity Act was a bar required findings of fact as to the official capacity of the defendants and denied the request for the writ. MacDonald v. Yazzie, 6 Nav. R. 95 (1989).\\nThe next proceeding involved a hearing on the temporary restraining order. At that hearing the District Court certified four questions to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. The fourth question was: Does the Navajo Tribal Council have the authority to relieve the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council and the Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council of their executive and legislative authority and place them on administrative leave with pay? The District Court extended the time period of the TRO pursuant to Rule 18 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure.\\nThe Supreme Court answered certified question Number 4 with a conditional yes. The Chairman and Vice Chairman may be put on administrative leave with pay and relieved of their executive and legislative authority if certain conditions are met.\\nThe first condition is two-pronged: 1) the Tribal Council must have reasonable grounds to believe that the Chairman or Vice Chairman has seriously breached his fiduciary trust to the Navajo people and; 2) administrative leave will be in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\nThe Supreme Court then identified \\\"reasonable grounds to believe that the official seriously breached his fiduciary trust to the Navajo people\\\":\\n1. Serious allegations of breach of fiduciary duty solicited under oath by a properly authorized investigatory body.\\n2. Serious allegations of criminal conduct which would amount to a felony solicited under oath by a properly authorized investigatory body.\\n3. Serious allegations combined with some evidence of any of the grounds for removal set out in 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 211.\\n4. Serious allegations combined with some evidence of violation of tribal law which, if true, could result in removal.\\n5. Actual felony charges in federal or state court.\\n6. Criminal charge or civil suit arising from violation of the public trust in the Navajo courts.\\nThe second condition is that the action in fact be administrative leave and not removal.\\nThe third condition is that certain basic protections be afforded. These protections are:\\n1. The action must occur in a properly convened session of the Navajo Tribal Council at which a quorum is present.\\n2. There must be a properly adopted agenda.\\n3. The resolution by which the official is placed on leave must pass by a majority vote.\\n4. The resolution by which the official is placed on leave must not be a bill of attainder.\\nResolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 are acts of the legislative body and the presumption of validity attached at the moment of passage by the Tribal Council. The presumption is valid until rebutted. The burden of rebuttal is on those contesting the validity of the resolutions, in this case the defendants.\\nThe response to certified question Number 4 by the Supreme Court provides the elements necessary to rebut the presumption of validity.\\nAt trial defendants presented no evidence, either documentary or testamentary, on any issue.\\nAs to the issue of validity of the two resolutions, plaintiffs' burden of evidence consisted of introducing certified copies of the resolutions. At that point the burden of evidence shifted to the defendants to rebut the presumption of validity. In order to rebut a presumption, there must be evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. The test in this case is not whether plaintiffs produced evidence to support the presumption but whether defendants produced evidence to rebut it. The defendants wholly failed to meet their burden. The plaintiffs proceeded, however, to support the presumption of validity through the introduction of evidence relevant to the guidelines established by the Supreme Court.\\nThe Court chooses to identify the evidence which supports the Court's conclusion on each of the elements in the Supreme Court response to certified question 4 and ultimately on the validity of the two resolutions. In addition, the Court will take notice of certain statutes contained in the Navajo Tribal Code.\\nMinutes of Tribal Council meetings from February 14, 1989 through March 10, 1989, were admitted into evidence. These minutes show procedural matters, content of discussion, knowledge of Tribal Council delegates and intent of the legislature. They were not admitted as proof that any allegations against any tribal officials are true.\\nAgain, transcripts of certain portions of the hearings before the Senate Select Committee were admitted into evidence. They were not admitted as to the truth of any allegations but that the allegations had been made.\\nAccording to the Supreme Court's response to certified question Number 4, Tribal Council is not required to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing before putting a Chairman or Vice Chairman on administrative leave. Tribal Council is required only to have reasonable grounds to believe that a breach of fiduciary trust has occurred and that administrative leave is in the best interests of the Navajo people. The Supreme Court said administrative leave is not a deprivation of life, liberty or property and that the due process (notice, hearing, opportunity to be heard, etc.) attendant to those deprivations do not apply. In the Matter of: Certified Questions II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 6 Nav. R. 105, 118-119 (1989). The due process applicable to placing a Chairman or Vice Chairman on administrative leave is found in the conditions the Supreme Court set out for administrative leave. Id.\\nRESOLUTION CF-4-89\\nI. Tribal Council had reasonable grounds to believe that Peter MacDonald, Sr., has seriously breached his fiduciary trust to the Navajo people and that administrative leave was in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\nBREACH OF FIDUCIARY TRUST\\nA. There were serious allegations of breach of fiduciary duty solicited under oath by a properly authorized investigatory body.\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 3, 2/2/89, Hearings before the Special Committee on Investigations, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate at 28-29, 37-42, 52, 69-72, 78-79, 90-93 and Exhibit 3, 2/7/89 hearing, at 44-45, 51-53, 55-61, 66-67, 69,124-125.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 30-31 (Statement of Peter MacDonald, Sr.):\\nI want to first say that I am here before you, as all of you knew, accused of one of the most serious crimes I can think of, betraying the trust that the Navajo people put in me, selling the power of my office for personal gain, enriching myself at the expense of the people who are among the poorest of the poor in America. That's what I have been accused of. I am outraged at these charges, but I know you must be outraged at something else too as we talk here today and yesterday. You must be outraged at the Navajo Tribal Government, not just me, but the whole tribal government has been held up as corrupt, pervaded by kick backs, payoffs and favoritism.\\n3. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether there were serious allegations of breach of fiduciary duty.\\nAlthough the breach of fiduciary trust refers to that which belongs to the people, it is Tribal Council who determines whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the trust has been breached. It is also Tribal Council who determines whether administrative leave is in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\nThe transcript of the hearings before the Senate Select Committee contains allegations that Chairman MacDonald solicited and received bribes and kickbacks from contractors doing business with the Navajo Nation, perpetrated a fraud on the Navajo Nation in the purchase of the Big Boquillas Ranch and realized a personal profit from the Big Boquillas transaction. These are allegations of breach of fiduciary duties.\\nFiduciary duties are those involved in handling the money and affairs of others with diligence, with good faith, and with disclosure of opportunity for private gain or benefit.\\nA review of the Tribal Council minutes from February 14, 1989, through February 17, 1989, show that all Tribal Council delegates who spoke were aware of the allegations made to the Senate Select Committee and that many had listened to audio tapes or seen video tapes of portions of those hearings. Some delegates had been directed by their chapters to take some action in regard to the allegations.\\nThe Tribal Council minutes for those days show that much discussion was devoted to the allegations and what action should be taken in response to those allegations.\\nFinally, the statements of Chairman MacDonald summarize the allegations and, if any member of Tribal Council was unaware of the allegations, the statements of Chairman MacDonald were a source of information.\\nB. There were serious allegations of criminal conduct which would amount to a felony solicited under oath by a properly authorized investigatory body.\\na. Navajo Nation Exhibit 3, 2/2/89, Hearings before the Special Committee on Investigations, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate atpp. 32-33; 2/6/89 Hearing atpp. 99-102,106-107 and 113; 2/7/89 Hearing at pp. 75-79, 93-102 and 124-125.\\nb. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-2/17/89 (Discussion of Tribal Council Delegates).\\nc. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 30-31 (Statement of Peter MacDonald, Sr. set out above).\\nd. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether there were serious allegations of criminal conduct.\\nPlaintiffs' evidence confirmed serious allegations against Chairman MacDonald made under oath by witnesses testifying before the Senate Select Committee which, if the allegations were brought as criminal charges, would constitute subornation of perjury (18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1622); obstruction of congressional proceedings (18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1505); obstruction of criminal investigations (18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1510); and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 371).\\nAs stated above, the Tribal Council minutes show that the delegates were aware of the proceedings before the Senate Select Committee and that Chairman MacDonald acknowledged there were serious allegations.\\nC. There were serious allegations combined with some evidence of violation of tribal law which, if true, could result in removal.\\n1. 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 175. Limitation on expenditures by or on behalf of candidates; radio or television time\\n(a) The following sums shall be the maximum amounts which may be expended by or on behalf of any candidate in any Tribal Election. When anything of value other than money is expended or used by or on behalf of any candidate, it shall be considered as equivalent to money at its fair cash value. Necessary personal, traveling or subsistence expenses of any candidate himself shall not be included in the limitation and need not be reported.\\n(1) For the Office of the Chairman and Vice Chairman (combined sum) one dollar for each registered voter.\\n2. Navajo Nation Ethics in Government Law, 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3751 et seq., one of the penalties for which is removal or suspension from office. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3757, (a) (1), (C).\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-3/10/89 (Tribal Council Delegates' discussion).\\n4. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 30-31 (Statements of Peter MacDonald, Sr. set out above).\\n5. Navajo Nation Exhibit 3, 2/2/89 Hearing at pp. 28-29, 68-72 (The MacDonald-Thompson campaign solicited and received monetary contributions and services of value from non-Navajo and Navajo Contractors) and Exhibit 3 attachments to Hearing transcript (list of payments and gratuities made by John Paddock to Chairman MacDonald).\\n6. Navajo Nation Exhibit 4, Candidate's Campaign Expense Statement for Peter MacDonald, Sr., 11/20/86.\\n7. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether there were serious allegations of violation of tribal law.\\nThe Plaintiffs' evidence confirmed serious allegations made before the Senate Select Committee which suggests a violation of the Navajo election laws for knowingly filing a false report which failed to disclose contributions of a non-Navajo, the penalty for which is removal from office. 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 177. Such testimony also demonstrates alleged violations of the campaign expense ceiling (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 175), with a penalty of removal from office. 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 176.\\nThe Plaintiffs' evidence also confirmed that the testimony contained serious allegations of conduct which is unlawful under the Navajo Nation Ethics in Government Law, 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3751 et seq., one of the penalties for which is removal or suspension from office. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3757 (a) (1) (A), (C). Among the allegations of misconduct under the Ethics Law are: using official authority to realize a personal financial gain (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (b)); using confidential information to further personal economic interests (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753(c)); acquiring a financial interest in a tribal transaction raising a conflict of interest with official responsibilities (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (d)(1)); taking official action in a matter in which there is a personal economic interest (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753(e) (1)); securing a personal economic interest in a tribal contract (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753(f)(1); and acceptance of gratuities and loans from persons doing business with the Navajo Nation (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (m)).\\nThe statements of Chairman MacDonald acknowledged allegations of \\\"betraying the trust that the Navajo people put in me, selling the power of my office for personal gain, enriching myself at the expense of the people . not just me, but the whole tribal government has been held up as corrupt, pervaded by kick backs, payoffs and favoritism.\\\" The Tribal Council minutes show the delegates were aware of these allegations made before the Senate Select Committee. In addition, Chairman MacDonald informed them of the allegations.\\nBEST INTEREST\\nD. Tribal Council found that administrative leave was in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2, Resolution CF-4-89,\\nWhereas Clause 3: The Navajo Tribal Council deems that a state of emergency exists in the management of the Navajo Tribal Council caused by the unique circumstances and events relating to the Office of the Chairman and the serious allegations raised personally against Peter MacDonald, Sr.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-2/17/89 (Tribal Council delegates' discussion).\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/16/89, pp.27-30 (Statements of Peter MacDonald, Sr.).\\na. I also want to thank you for listening to me the day before yesterday when I made my remarks here, for taking my remarks seriously and for avoiding precipitous actions which would have created even worse crises. I want to ask you to give these remarks the same fair-minded consideration. I don't pretend to have all the answers, but I do have some suggestions. Yes, we need to take action and that's exactly what we are going to do now. But the action needs to be based on principles and on concern for the long run implications of what we do. (p. 27)\\nb. Let me conclude by saying I do not want to go on leave without telling you also what an honor it has been to preside over the sessions and to chair these deliberations. I have real confidence in your wisdom, your dedication to the best interests of our people. Your ability to respond to a larger vision of what the future holds is very important and your willingness as has been expressed here to put aside personal grievances and self-interests in order to do what is best, what is fair and what is right, (p. 29)\\n4. Defendants introduced no evidence on the issue of whether Tribal Council found administrative leave to be in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\nIn addition to the presumption of validity, there is another presumption which attaches to legislative acts. That is the presumption that the legislature acted from proper motives.\\nA second presumption guiding the courts is that the legislators acted from proper motives. If the legislative body did a proper and legal act, the court will not examine the motives of the legislators. Motives will be examined only to the extent needed to determine if the legislative action should be invalidated on grounds of fraud and bad faith. Benally, supra, at 275.\\nA proper motive of a legislative body is to act in the best interests of the people. This duty was imposed upon Navajo leaders from the earliest times and was recognized by the Navajo Supreme Court in its response to certified question number 4.\\nThe Tribal Council minutes indicate the best interest of the Navajo Nation was a major consideration of the delegates. The words of Chairman MacDonald are in recognition of the duties of the delegates to act and ascribe proper motives to the actions of Tribal Council.\\nFinally, Resolution CF-4-89 acknowledges an emergency has been created by the allegations. When Tribal Council is faced with an emergency it may not properly decline to act.\\nADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE OR REMOVAL\\nII. Resolution CF-4-89 (Placing Peter MacDonald, Sr., on Administrative Leave with Pay and Removing All Legislative and Executive Authority) placed Peter MacDonald, Sr. on administrative leave with pay and did not remove him from Office.\\nA. Resolution CF-4-89: Placing Peter MacDonald, Sr., on Administrative Leave with Pay and Removing All Legislative and Executive Authority.\\n1. Whereas clause 2: On February 16, 1989, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, Peter MacDonald, Sr., allowed the Vice Chairman to preside over the Navajo Tribal Council session and indicted that he be placed on administrative leave with pay; and\\n2. Whereas clause 3: The Navajo Tribal Council deems that a state of emergency exists in the management of the Navajo Tribal Council caused by the unique circumstances and events relating to the Office of the Chairman and the serious allegations raised personally against Peter MacDonald, Sr.\\n3. Resolved clause 1: The Navajo Tribal Council hereby places Peter MacDonald, Sr., on administrative leave with pay until directed otherwise by the Navajo Tribal Council.\\n4. Resolved clause 2: Furthermore, the Navajo Tribal Council hereby removes all executive and legislative authority delegated by law to the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council from Peter MacDonald, Sr., while on administrative leave and until otherwise directed by the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nB. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-2/17/89 (Tribal Council Delegates' discussion)\\nC. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89 pp. 30-35 (Statements of Peter MacDonald, Sr.):\\n1. I'm trying to talk about what is best for the Navajo people, not what's best for me. What does that mean? It means that there are some things you don't want MacDonald doing right now, based on the allegations, I'm sure that have been stated here, by signing checks or anything that authorized him to commit funds, and you want the tribal government to keep on functioning on a day by day basis. I'm sure you do not prefer a system of government like we see in South America where they have conflicts every couple of months. Don't you want to identify those functions that you think MacDonald shouldn't fulfill and those he can continue to discharge until you can make a determination? (p. 33)\\n2. I want to first say that I am here before you, as all of you know, accused of one of the most serious crimes I can think of, betraying the trust that the Navajo People put in me, selling the power of my office for personal gain, enriching myself at the expense of the people who are among the poorest of the poor in America. That's what I have been accused of. I am outraged at these charges, but I know you must be outraged at something else too as we talk here today and yesterday. You must be outraged at having been held up in ridicule. You must be outraged at the way the Navajo Tribal Government, not just me, but the whole tribal government has been held up as corrupt, pervaded by kickbacks, payoffs and favoritism. All I can tell you is I'm innocent and I'm confident that a court of law will find me innocent of any wrong doing, but I suspect that being innocent won't be enough to stand political avalanche that has been unleashed by the Senate Investigating Committee in Washington, D.C. I know you must be furious at me for anything I did or might have done to give credibility to these attacks from Washington. I know some of you just feel that it really doesn't matter what I did or didn't do, what matters is that the world now thinks that I did, that your Chairman somehow has lost all credibility, that the tribal government has lost all credibility, and that sweeping action is essential to restore some faith in our government and our Council. I know, too, that this council must do something, must do something definitive if you are not to lose face when you return to your chapters. That I know. (pp. 30-31)\\nD. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr, 2/16/89, pp. 27-30 (Statements of Peter MacDonald, Sr.):\\n1. So let me put these suggestions to you:\\n(1) I propose that I go on administrative leave as outlined in the resolution presented by Don Benally as the substitute motion: (2) I propose that the Vice Chairman assume the post of acting Chairman during this period; (3) I request that the Council permit me to retain an office and staff to have access to such tribal records and to have the cooperation of officials so that I might proceed to clear my name and the name of the Navajo Government of the slurs and slanders of which we are accused. In that connection, I ask your leave to retain Counsel to advise me on legal issues and implications of those accusations and to represent me in my dealing with officials of the Federal Government on these matters because effective legal representation can be critical in securing a fair outcome, (p. 29)\\n2. I will now leave the Chair to go on leave and give the Vice Chairman the Chair and hopefully that you will use judgment to make your decision, as I've said earlier, independently with a great deal of soul-searching, remembering the words that we have spoken to each other over the past few days. Thank you very much. (p. 30)\\nE.ll N.T.C. \\u00a7 211\\nThe Chairman, Vice Chairman and all members of the Tribal Council are subject to removal in the following manner:\\n(1) For just cause:\\n(D) Chairman and Vice Chairman absent for three consecutive months without permission of Tribal Council.\\nThe Navajo Nation Supreme Court, in its response to certified question number 4, provided guidelines for distingishing between administrative leave and removal. These guidelines were met in the matter of Peter MacDonald, Sr. Resolution CF-4-89 and the transcript of Tribal Council minutes from February 14, 1989 through February 17, 1989 show that an unusual situation of an emergency nature was facing the Navajo Nation as a result of the content of certain testimony before the Senate Select Committee and that placing Peter MacDonald, Sr. on leave would be in the best interests of the Navajo Nation.\\nResolution CF-4-89 grants leave until further order of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nThe minutes of Tribal Council reveal extensive discussion of whether the Chairman was being put on administrative leave or removed. The Tribal Council delegates who opposed putting the Chairman on leave are the only ones who raised the issues of removal and punishment. The delegates who spoke in favor of administrative leave remained adamant that leave was neither removal nor punishment. The comments of Mr. MacDonald himself show that he understood Tribal Council could limit or modify his powers. Further, he himself proposed that he go on administrative leave and did in fact place himself on administrative leave.\\nFinally, 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 211, 1, (D) makes leave not authorized by Tribal Council a ground for removal. This implies that the Chairman legitimately may be on leave with the consent of the Tribal Council.\\nPROPER LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE\\nIII. The basic protections required by the Supreme Court were afforded to Peter MacDonald.\\nA. Resolution CF-4-89 was passed in a properly convened session of the Navajo Tribal Council at which a quorum was present.\\nQUORUM\\n1. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 162 Number; time; duration\\n(a) There shall be four regular sessions of the Navajo Tribal Council each year.\\n2. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172 Quorum\\n(a) A quomm shall consist of a simple majority of all voting members of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, p. 1\\na. \\\"The meeting was called to order by Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr., at 10:15 A.M., with a quomm of 63 council delegates present.\\\"\\nb. \\\"Chairman: Welcome to the regular Winter Session of the Navajo Tribal Council. The Winter Session of the Navajo Tribal Council will now come to order. We do have a quomm.\\\"\\n4. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/17/89, p. 1\\na. \\\"The council meeting was called to order by Chairman Pro Tempore Marshall Plummer at 2:55 P.M. with (55) Council Members present. INVOCATION: Council Delegate Nelson German.\\\"\\nb. \\\"CHAIRMAN: Members of the Tribal Council, Audience, Officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service, Acting Chairman of the Tribe - Johnny R. Thompson, we appreciate you being here with us to hear us deliberate on this very important agenda. As all of you know, several events have happened since two or three days ago and as of yesterday a bigger event happened, wherein, the Chairman of our Tribe, Mr. Peter MacDonald, announced to the Council and to the public that he was taking administrative leave with pay. He gave a speech which I thought touched the hearts of each one of us, and we were most appreciative of his efforts and his feelings. After that, the Chair was turned over to the Vice Chairman to take over as the chairman of this council. And a vote was taken thereafter, wherein, the substitute motion recognizing the Vice Chairman, Mr. Johnny R. Thompson, to head this Council was defeated, along with other measures that were included in that particular resolution.\\n5. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether Tribal Council was properly convened with a quorum present.\\nWINTER SESSION PROPERLY CONVENED\\nThe winter session of the Navajo Tribal Council was properly convened. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 162 (a) requires Tribal Council to meet in at least four sessions each year. These are commonly referred to as the winter, spring, summer and fall sessions. The winter session was convened with a quorum present. There was also a quorum on February 17,1989, when Resolution CF-4-89 was passed. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172 (a) provides that a quorum of Tribal Council shall consist of a simple majority of the total membership of Tribal Council.\\nThe main motion which cited that myself and Mr. Irving Billy would become Chairman Pro Tern and Vice Chairman Pro Tern was passed, and it is for this reason that we are up here today. I want you as Council Delegates and Tribal leaders to know that our role is to facilitate, to coordinate the meetings and to address all of the items that are on this particular agenda that was approved by this Council. We do not have any authority over the executive branch whatsoever. And I want to make that very clear, not only to you as the Tribal Council Delegates and Tribal Leaders, but also for the Navajo Public. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/17/89, at p. 1.\\nAGENDA PROPERLY ADOPTED\\nB. There was a properly adopted agenda\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/15/89, p. 1. (Statement of Peter MacDonald): \\\"Members of the Tribal Council: The discussion yesterday centered around preparing the Agenda of the Navajo Tribal Council Winter Session. After thorough discussion, we have agreed upon an agenda and that particular agenda that was agreed to by the Council by vote, I'd like to have that handed out to the Members of the Council and read.\\\"\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/15/89, pp. 1-2. (The AGENDA of THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL, February 14, 1989, WINTER SESSION was read into the record. Item 5 is \\\"Placing the Chairman and Vice Chairman on Leave with Pay; Appointing Interim Chairman and Vice Chairman.\\\")\\n4. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of a properly adopted agenda.\\nOn February 14, 1989, the agenda prepared by the Advisory Committe was rejected. A motion was made that Advisory Committee prepare a new agenda. (Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 7-8). A substitute motion was then made to place four items on the agenda (Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 8-9). The main motion subsequently became one to adopt an agenda which included all those items on the initially proposed agenda plus the items contained in the original substitute motion and items subsequently added by request to the substitute motions. (Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp. 56-57). The substitute motion was passed by 53 in favor, 29 opposed, 4 abstaining and 2 not voting. (Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, p. 52). At the time the agenda was adopted, the only dispute was over which agenda should be adopted and not by what procedures the agenda should be prepared. (Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89, pp_).\\nFurther, Chairman MacDonald stated that an agenda had been adopted and that agenda was read into the record at the direction of Chairman MacDonald. That agenda contained an item of placing the Chairman and Vice Chairman on leave with pay.\\nMAJORITY VOTE\\nC. The resolution by which Peter MacDonald, Sr. was placed on leave passed by a majority vote.\\n1. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172. Quorum\\n(b) No resolution or motion of the Navajo Tribal Council shall be passed or otherwise acted upon unless a quorum is present. Where a quorum is present, any motion or resolution shall be passed if it receives a majority of all votes cast, irregardless of how many members actually vote and how many abstain, unless a larger proportion than a simple majority has been properly stipulated in advance.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2: Resolution CF-4-89: Certification showing 49 in favor, 13 opposed, 5 abstaining and 0 not voting.\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/17/89, p. 1:\\n\\\"The Council meeting was called to order by Chairman Pro Tempore Marshall Plummer at 2:55 p.m. with (55) Council Members present. INVOCATION: Council Delegate Nelson German.\\\"\\n4. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/17/89, p. 23 (Showing vote on Resolution CF-4-89)\\n5. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether the resolution passed by a majority vote.\\nThe Tribal Code requires only that resolutions pass by a majority of those delegates voting and not a majority of those present.\\nThe certification to Resolution CF-4-89 and the Tribal Council minutes show that 67 delegates voted and that 49 voted in favor of the resolution.\\nBILL OF ATTAINDER\\nD. Resolution CF-4-89 placing Peter MacDonald, Sr. on administrative leave was not a bill of attainder.\\n1. Resolution CF-4-89 did not legislatively determine guilt.\\na. Whereas Clause 3: The Navajo Tribal Council deems that a state of emergency exists in the management of the Navajo Tribal Council caused by the unique circumstances and events relating to the Office of the Chairman and the serious allegations raised personally against Peter MacDonald, Sr.\\nb. Resolved Clause 1: The Navajo Tribal Council hereby places Peter MacDonald, Sr., on administrative leave with pay until directed otherwise by the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nc. Resolved Clause 2: Furthermore, the Navajo Tribal Council hereby removes all executive and legislative authority delegated by law to the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council from Peter MacDonald, Sr., while on administrative leave and until otherwise directed by the Navajo Tribal Council.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-2/17/89 (Tribal Council delegates discussion)\\n3. Defendants presented no evidence that Resolution CF- 4-89 was a bill of attainder.\\nCASE LAW ON BILL OF ATTAINDER\\nThe Navajo Nation Supreme Court in its response to certified question number 4 defined bill of attainder and provided tests for determining if legislation is in fact a bill of attainder.\\nAlthough defendants presented no evidence on the issue of bill of attainder, Defendant MacDonald did cite to the Court the case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Nixon was also cited by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court in its discussion of bills of attainder.\\nNixon was a challenge to an act passed by Congress. The act provided that the Administrator of General Services take custody of the papers and tape recordings made by Nixon while he was President, and develop regulations for public access. Nixon challenged the act on four grounds, one ground being that the act was a bill of attainder.\\nThe U.S. Supreme Court held the act was not a bill of attainder but rather was nonpunitive legislative policy-making justified by a public need.\\nThe Court in Nixon judged the act by several tests and by none of them found a bill of attainder.\\nHISTORICAL TEST\\nThe first test was historical, what was regarded as legislative punishment in England. Those were generally imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign. In addition, the American experience had added one more to the historical category, that being \\\"a legislative enactment designated individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations.\\\" Nixon, 53 LEd 2d at 910-911.\\nThe Court found none of the above applied. Nixon claimed that the tapes and papers were his personal property. The act provided that Nixon would receive \\\"just compensation.\\\" \\\"This undermines even a colorable contention that the Government has punitively confiscated appellant's property, for the 'owner' [thereby] is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.\\\" Id.\\nFUNCTIONAL TEST\\nThe Court, mindful that \\\"new burdens and deprivations might be legislatively fashioned that are inconsistent with the bill of attainder guarantee\\\" applied the functional test. The functional test examined the law in dispute to determine whether it \\\"reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.\\\" The Court found that there were public interests or purposes served by the act and therefore it was not designed to inflict punishment on Nixon. Nixon, at 912-913.\\nThe functional test reguires an analysis of the public interests which are furthered by the legislation. This analysis is possible without resort to the legislative record or other sources.\\nMOTIVATIONAL TEST\\nThe third test, the motivational one, requires an examination of the legislative record and other evidentiary sources to determine whether there was an intent to punish. The Court examined the legislative record and the evidence and found no intent to punish. The Court did find that the record supported its conclusions under the functional test. Nixon, at 913-914.\\nThe Court stated that it is not necessary that the legislature actually state blameworthiness or punishment. \\\"But the decided absence from the legislative history of any congressional sentiments expressive of this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the mantle of judge - or worse still, lynch mob.\\\" Nixon, at 914.\\nIn furtherance of the motivational test, the Court examined the provisions of the act itself and found no intent to punish. Nixon, at 915. The Court also looked at whether a less burdensome alternative existed by which the legislature could have achieved its purposes. Nixon had suggested that a provision for civil suit by the Attorney General or the Administrator of General Services would be sufficient to accomplish the purposes of the act. The Court did not find this less burdensome:\\nWe have no doubt that Congress might have selected this course. It very well may be, however, that Congress chose not to do so on the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry into appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less punitive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For Congress doubtless was well aware that just three months earlier, appellant had resis ted efforts to subject himself and his records to the scrutiny of the Judicial Branch. Nixon, at p. 916\\nIn the instant case, there was some discussion at various proceedings on whether all tests must be met to find a bill of attainder, or whether one is sufficient. There is absolutely no basis in the instant case to find a bill of attainder under any of the tests. For purposes of this case, it is irrelevant whether the tests are to be applied separately and independently or whether they are cumulative.\\nThis Court is of the opinion that its findings and above conclusions on the conditions and elements of administrative leave satisfy the tests for bill of attainder. The Court will, however, discuss the application of the tests to Resolution CF-4-89.\\nThe Navajo Nation Supreme Court has already stated there is no property interest in public office. In Re Removal of Katenay, 6 Nav. R. 81 (1989); In the Matter of Certified Questions II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 6 Nav. R. 105, 119 (1989). This concept is also recognized in Arizona and New Mexico. Mecham v. Gordon 156 Ariz. 279 (1988); Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157, 163 (1944). Even if some property interests were to be found, the administrative leave is with pay so that monetarily Mr. MacDonald is in the same position he would be in were he not on administrative leave.\\nFurther, Chairman MacDonald is not barred from specified employment or vocations. The Court understands \\\"specified employments\\\" to mean working for a specified employer such as the federal government, the tribal government, General Motors, etc., and \\\"vocations\\\" to mean types of employment or careers such as clergyman, computer programmer, medical doctor, etc. Chairman MacDonald is not barred from tribal employment. It would be a contradiction to being on administrative leave with pay. The Court is not prepared to say that being a Chairman is a vocation, but Chairman MacDonald is certainly not barred from being Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nThere are public purposes and interests which are furthered by the administrative leave. Certainly the need to demonstrate to the public that the Navajo Nation has the ability and the resources to handle governmental crisis is a public purpose.\\nThe minutes of Tribal Council discussion do not reveal any desire or intent to punish on the part of the proponents of administrative leave. Neither is this found in the resolution itself. Although the resolution is addressed to a specific individual, it is not punishment by any test the Court can apply. The U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon most eloquently expresses this Court's views on the matter:\\nBy arguing that an individual or defined group is attained whenever he or it is compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classifications and punishment.... However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a vari ant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some person or groups but not all other plausible individuals. In short, while the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important 'bulwark against tyranny,' United States v Brown, it does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all. Nixon, at p.908-909.\\nRESOLUTION CMA-10-89\\nI.Tribal Council had reasonable grounds to believe that Johnny R. Thompson had seriously breached his fiduciary trust to the Navajo people and that administrative leave was in the best interests of the Navajo people.\\nA. There were serious allegations of breach of fiduciary duty solicited under oath by a properly authorized investigatory body.\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-3/10/89 (Tribal Council delegates' discussion)\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 3, 2/7/89, Senate Select Committee Hearings at pp. 55-61\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-6-89, passed March 1, 1989, Amending the Plan of Operation of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice; Clarifying the Legal Powers, Authority and Status of Persons Occupying the Positions of Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General; Authorizing and Directing the Navajo Nation Department of Justice to Institute Legal Proceedings Regarding the Big Boquillas Ranch Transaction; and Confirming the Authorization and Directive to the Attorney General to Defend the Navajo Tribal Council in Certain Proceedings pending in Tribal Court\\n4. Whereas Clauses 10-11:\\nWhereas 10: On February 17, 1989, the Navajo Tribal Council received (a) the Final Report of the Navajo Tribal Special Counsel Concerning the Big Boquillas Ranch Purchase, authored by Michael D. Hawkins and dated January 27, 1989 (the \\\"Hawkins Report\\\"); (b) a Supplemental Report to the Hawkins Report dated February 17, 1989, appended to which were summaries of sworn testimony of certain witnesses who appeared before the United States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs (the \\\"Select Committee\\\"); and (c) an opinion and recommendation from the Navajo Nation Attorney General concerning legal action by the Navajo Nation with respect to the Big Boquillas Ranch transaction; and\\nWhereas 11: The Hawkins Report, as supplemented, demonstrates good cause to believe the Navajo Nation, and in particular the Navajo Tribal Council, was defrauded by the sellers, Peter MacDonald, Sr., while serving as the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, and others in connection with the Nation's purchase of the Big Boquillas Ranch.\\nThere were allegations made to the Senate Select Committee that the transaction of purchasing the Big Boquillas Ranch had involved a fraud upon the Navajo Nation and the realization of personal profit by some of those involved in the transaction.\\nResolution CMA-6-89 shows that Michael Hawkins' report of his investigation of the Big Boquillas purchase raised sufficient questions regarding the purchase so as to become one basis for directing the Navajo Nation Department of Justice to institute legal proceedings regarding the Big Boquillas transaction.\\nAt trial Defendant Thompson was called by the plaintiffs as a witness. He said that he had been present in the summer of 1988 when Hawkins had made an oral report to a joint committee of the Advisory Committee and the Budget and Finance Committee but that he (Thompson) had never conveyed any information to Tribal Council regarding that report. Thompson also stated that he had signed documents in furtherance of the Big Boquillas purchase but that he did not recall receiving a report from the Navajo Nation Justice Department advising against signing the documents.\\nThere was sufficient opportunity and reasonable grounds for Vice Chairman Thompson, in carrying out his fiduciary duties to the Navajo Nation, to seek to ascertain that the Big Boquillas transaction was free of serious questions as to the good faith and disclosures required in the transaction. There are many indications that Vice Chairman Thompson failed to avail himself of the opportunity. There is no evidence that he took any steps to assure that there were no serious questions regarding the Big Boquillas purchase. Yet the questions were serious enough that soon after the purchase, the Navajo Nation engaged the services of Michael Hawkins to investigate.\\nB. There were serious allegations combined with some evidence of violation of tribal law which, if true, could result in removal.\\n1. Ethics in Government Act.\\na. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (a)\\nb. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (b) (2) (F)\\nc. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (m) (1)\\nd. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3754 (C)\\ne. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3755 (a) (9)\\nf. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3757 (a) (1) (A)\\n2. 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 171-179, Subchapter 9. Campaign Expense; contributions\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 4; and Exhibit 3, 2/2/89, at 28-29, 32-33, 68-72 (see also Exhibit 3 attachment, Paddock list of payment and gratuities to MacDonald), and testimony of Gloria Dennison.\\n4. Navajo Nation Exhibit 5, Memorandum to Attorney General Michael Upshaw dated 2/21/89 from Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr. and Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson terminating Upshaw's services and signed by MacDonald and Thompson.\\n5. Navajo Nation Exhibit 6, Memorandum to Anthony Lincoln dated 3/7/89 from Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson appointing Lincoln, Executive Secretary of the Navajo Nation and signed by MacDonald and Thompson.\\n6. Navajo Nation Exhibit 7, Letter to Eric Dahlstrom dated 3/9/89 from Chairman MacDonald and Johnny R. Thompson barring Dahlstrom from sitting in Tribal Council Chambers and signed by MacDonald and Thompson.\\n7. Navajo Nation Exhibit 10, Memorandum to Eric Dahlstrom dated 2/17/89 from Johnny R. Thompson, Chairman (Acting) terminating Dahlstrom's services and signed by Johnny R. Thompson. The memorandum contains the statement \\\"On February 16, 1989, I assumed the Chairmanship of the Navajo Tribal Council pursuant to 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 284(c).\\\"\\n8. Navajo Nation Exhibit 11, Memorandum to Wilbur Kellogg, Chief of Police, dated 3/10/89, from Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson directing Kellogg to secure the Tribal Council Chambers and Legislative Offices and signed by MacDonald and Thompson.\\n9. Navajo Nation Exhibit 12, Memorandum dated 3/10/89 labeled EXECUTIVE ORDER to Wilbur Kellogg, Chief of Police, from Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson and signed by MacDonald and Thompson. The memorandum reads in full:\\nWe hereby issue this Order for you to protect the Office of the Chairman/Vice Chairman from damage or takeover. You still operate under the direction of the undersigned Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Navajo Nation. The Division of Public Safety is directed and ordered to recognize Peter MacDonald, Sr. as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Navajo Nation and Johnny R. Thompson as Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer when Chairman is out of Window Rock, Arizona.\\n10. Navajo Nation Exhibit 13; Memorandum dated 3/10/89 to Senator James Henderson from Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson terminating Henderson's services and signed by MacDonald and Thompson.\\n11. Navajo Nation Exhibit 14 (Exhibit 14 consists of 58 memoranda and 4 letters written between February 20, 1989, and March 9, 1989 with inside address and signature line indicating they are from Peter MacDonald, Sr., Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, but signed by Johnny R. Thompson. All correspondence is in the nature of conducting tribal business.\\n12. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2\\na. Resolution CF-4-89, Placing Peter MacDonald, Sr., on Administrative Leave with Pay and Removing All Legislative and Executive Authority, passed February 17, 1989\\nb. Resolution CF-5-89, Transferring the Office of Legislative Affairs Completely and Directly under the Navajo Tribal Council, passed February 21, 1989\\nc. Resolution CMA-6-89, Amending the Plan of Operation of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice; Clarifying the Legal Powers, Authority and Status of Persons Occupying the Positions of Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General; Authorizing and Directing the Navajo Nation Department of Justice to Institute Legal Proceedings Regarding the Big Boquillas Ranch Transaction; and Confirming the Authorization and Directive to the Attorney General to Defend the Navajo Tribal Council in Certain Proceeding pending in Tribal Court, passed March 1, 1989\\nd. Resolution CMA-10-89, Placing Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on Administrative Leave with Pay Until He is Cleared of Allegations of Wrong-doing; Appointing an Intertim Chairman and Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council\\n13. Opening statement of counsel for Defendant Thompson.\\n14. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of violation of tribal law.\\nEach candidate whose name appears on a ballot in a Navajo Tribal election is required to file an itemized statement of receipts and expense with the Board of Election Supervisors (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172(a)).\\nThis statement must contain a complete record of receipts and expenditures (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172(b)). 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 175(a)(1) sets a ceiling on campaign expenditures of $1.00 per registered voter. This amount applies to the combined Office of Chairman and Vice Chairman. A candidate who expends more money than allowed is guilty of an offense (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 176). A candidate who knowingly files an incorrect statement is subject to a penalty and may be barred from holding office (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 177). It is unlawful for a corporation or nonmember of the Navajo Tribe to make a contribution (11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 179).\\nThe Candidates' Campaign Expense Statement which is signed by Peter MacDonald shows the total amount of contributions as $69,430.95 and the total amount of expenditures as $75,191.29.\\nThe testimony before the Senate Select Committee contained allegations that campaign contributions had been solicited and obtained from Navajo and non-Navajo contractors. John Paddock, a non-Navajo, testified before the Senate Select Committee that he had contributed air transportation worth $39,000.00 to the MacDonald-Thompson campaign. This contribution was not disclosed and, if true, would cause the MacDonald-Thompson campaign to exceed the expenditures allowed by 11 N.T.C. \\u00a7 175(a) (1).\\nAt trial, Vice Chairman Thompson was called as a witness by plaintiffs. Under oath, he stated that he did not recall filing the required campaign statement. If true, the Vice Chairman could be subject to the penalty provision of subchapter 9 of Title 11 of the Navajo Tribal Code.\\nThe Ethics in Government Act establishes standards of conduct for tribal officials and, if a violation of the Act is proven, one sanction is removal from office. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3757 (a) (1) (A). The standards of conduct include conduct reflecting credit upon the Navajo people and government and complying with \\\"all applicable laws of the Navajo Nation with respect to their conduct in the performance of the duties of their respective office or employment,\\\" (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 753 (a)); refraining from \\\"adversely affecting the confidence of the people in the integrity of the government of the Navajo Nation,\\\" (2 N.T. C. \\u00a7 3753 (b)(2)(F); neither soliciting nor accepting gifts, favors, benefits, etc. in an aggregate amount in excess of $100.00 (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (m)(l); filing by elected officials and employees a Statement of Economic Interests which includes all required information for the previous twelve months (2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3754(c)), such information gift or loans in excess of $100.00.\\nIf the air transportation Paddock alleged he contributed is true, it appears that it should have been reported under the elections laws and/or the Ethics in Government Act.\\nThe memoranda and letters signed by Vice Chairman Thompson between February 17, 1989, and March 10, 1989, raise questions of violation of tribal laws. On February 17, 1989, the Navajo Tribal Council placed Chairman Peter MacDonald on administrative leave and relieved him of his executive and legislative powers until otherwise directed by Tribal Council. In addition, Tribal Council passed Resolution CMA-6-89 relative to the Navajo Nation Department of lustice Plan of Operation, and Resolution CF-5-89 relative to the Office of Legislative Affairs.\\nDespite these resolutions, Defendant Thompson continued to act in concert with Defendant MacDonald contrary to the provision of Resolutions CF-4-89, CF-5-89, and CMA-6-89.\\nThe memoranda and letters contain indications that Vice Chairman Thompson regarded Defendant MacDonald as having full executive and legislative authority. At trial, counsel for Defendant Thompson, in his opening statement, said that Thompson was following the instruction of Chairman MacDonald. When Thompson was called by the plaintiffs he admitted the signature on the documents contained in Exhibits 5-14 was his.\\nTribal Council found reasonable grounds to believe there were serious allegations against Chairman MacDonald of breach of fiduciary trust sufficient to make administrative leave in the best interests of the Navajo people. For Defendant Thompson to act contrary to Resolution CF-4-89 could subject him to the provisions of 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 3753 (a) and (b) (2) (F). Tribal Council had reasonable grounds to believe these were violations of tribal law.\\nADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE OR REMOVAL\\nII. Resolution CMA-10-89 (Placing Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on Administrative-Leave with Pay until he is cleared of Allegations of wrongdoing; Appointing an Interim Chairman and Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council) placed Johnny R. Thompson on administrative leave with pay and did not remove him from office.\\nA. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-10-89: Placing Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on Administrative Leave with Pay\\n1. Whereas Clauses 2-10\\n(2) By resolution CF-4-89, the Navajo Tribal Council placed Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr., on paid administrative leave; and\\n(3) In spite of Resolution CF-4-89, Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson is unwilling and has failed to carry out the duties and obligations of the Office of the Chairman and failed to promote and preserve the interest of the Navajo Nation as expressed by the Navajo Tribal Council; and\\n(4) In spite of offers by the Navajo Tribal Council to Johnny R. Thompson to take command as Acting Chairman, he has indicated that he will be subject to the influence of Peter MacDonald, Sr., in the exercise of the authority of the office defeating the purpose of Resolution CF-4-89; and\\n(5) Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson himself is implicated by. allegations that the MacDonald/Thompson candidacy filed fraudulent campaign contribution and expense reports with the Navajo Election Committee and accepted campaign contributions from non-Navajos, which are grounds for disqualification from office; and\\n(6) The Hawkins Report was delayed from the Navajo Tribal Council by the Vice Chairman and the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council when they were under a duty to forward the position that tribal officials were exonerated; and\\n(7) It is inevitable that Vice Chairman Thompson will have to devote substantial time to defending himself against these allegations; and\\n(8) The allegations made against Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson need to be investigated by appropriate entities of the Navajo Nation; and\\n(9) Loyalty to the Navajo Nation and leadership integrity and credibility are essential to execution of duties and responsibilities of the Office of the Chairman and Vice Chairman; and\\n(10) The Navajo Tribal Council, in the interest of preserving and protecting the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, has inherent authority to declare that the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Navajo Nation is unable to fully and diligently carry out the duties and obligations of-their offices, and to appoint an Interim Chairman and Interim Vice Chairman until the Chairman and Vice Chairman can establish their fitness to lead the Navajo Nation.\\n2. Resolved clauses 1-2:\\n(1) The Navajo Tribal Council hereby declares that Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson is unable to fully and diligently carry out the duties and obligations of his office.\\n(2) The Navajo Tribal Council further places Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on leave with pay until allegations of wrongdoing against him are cleared and the Navajo Tribal Council is satisfied that he has the ability to lead.\\n3. Resolved Clauses 5-6:\\n(5) The Navajo Tribal Council directs that this resolution shall become effective immdiately upon passage, and further, no part of this resolution shall be amended or rescinded except by majority vote of the full membership of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\n(6) The Navajo Tribal Council further withdraws all legislative and executive authority vested by Tribal law in Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson.\\nB. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-3/10/89 (Tribal Council delegates' discussion)\\nC. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether Resolution CMA-10-89 was administrative leave or removal.\\nResolution CMA-10-89 by its terms meets all the requirements for administrative leave as required by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. Unusual circumstances required the leave. Tribal Council found that leave was in the best interest of the Navajo Nation. The leave is to be ended when the allegations against the Vice Chairman are resolved and Tribal Council is satisfied that he can resume his duties. At that time, he may return to his duties. Finally, being on leave with pay is inconsistent with being removed, which would preclude monetary benefits.\\nPROPER LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE.\\nHI. The basic protections required by the Supreme Court were afforded to Johnny R. Thompson.\\nA. Resolution CMA-10-89 was passed in a properly convened session of the Navajo Tribal Council at which a quorum was present.\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 3/10/89, p. 1: The meeting was called to order by Chairman Pro Tem Marshall Plummer at 11:45 A.M., at the Navajo Education Center, Window Rook, Navajo Nation (Arizona) with a quorum of 46 Council Delegates present.\\n2. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of whether Tribal Council was properly convened.\\nThe Court has already addressed whether there was a properly convened session of Tribal Council. There was a quorum present on March 10, 1989.\\nB. There was a properly adopted agenda.\\nThe Court has already addressed this question and found that the session of Tribal Council which convened on February 14, 1989, properly adopted an agenda.\\nC. Resolution CMA-10-89 passed by a majority vote.\\n1. 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172 Quorum\\n(b) No resolution or motion of the Navajo Tribal Council shall be passed or otherwise acted upon unless a quorum is present. When a quorum is present, any motion or resolution shall be passed if it receives a majority of all votes cast, irregardless of how many members actually vote and how many abstain, unless a larger proportion than a simple majority has been properly stipulated in advance.\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 3/10/89, p. 1:\\nThe meeting was called to order by Chairman Pro Tern Marshall Plummer at 11:45 A.M., at the Navajo Education Center, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) with a quorum of 46 Council Delegates present.\\n3. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 3/10/89, p. 17\\n4. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-10-89: Placing Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson on Administrative Leave with Pay until He is Cleared of Allegations of Wrongdoing; Appointing an Interim Chairman and Interim Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council. Certification showing 37 in favor and 2 opposed, and 6 abstaining.\\nResolution CMA-10-89 was passed when a quorum of Tribal Council delegates was present. The resolution passed by 37 in favor and 2 opposed. This was a majority of those voting. At trial, there were some statements by counsel for the defendants that a quorum had not been present. Defendants, however, presented no evidence on the issue of a quorum. The Tribal Council minutes state that a quorum was present. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court finds a quorum was present.\\nBILL OF ATTAINDER\\nD. Resolution CMA-10-89 was not a bill of attainder.\\n1. Navajo Nation Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-10-89\\n2. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Tr. 2/14/89-3/10/89 (Tribal Council delegates' discussion)\\n3. Defendants presented no evidence on the issue of bill of attainder.\\nThe Court has discussed bills of attainder above. Although Resolution CMA-10-89 specifically refers to Johnny R. Thompson, the Court cannot find that there was punishment under the tests, historical, functional, and motivational, as set out in Nixon, supra, adopted by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court.\\nThe same reasoning that applied to Resolution CF-4-89 applies to Resolution CMA-10-89.\\nThere is no indication of an intent to punish Vice Chairman Thompson. There was a three week time period between the passage of Resolution CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89. This fact, coupled with the Tribal Council minutes and Resolution CMA-10-89, convinces the Court that the Vice Chairman was observed and evaluated separate and independent from Chairman MacDonald and that this observation and evaluation led Tribal Council to the conclusion that public interest would be served by placing the Vice Chairman on administrative leave.\\nThe Court has already set out two of the fundamental presumptions to which Tribal Council and any legislative body are entitled: the presumption that legislative acts are valid, and the presumption that the legislature acts from proper motives which include the best interests of the people.\\nIt is clear from the exhibits that the Vice Chairman did not feel bound by the decision of the majority of the governing body. Contrary to the most fundamental right of a legislative body to in fact be the legislative body, the Vice Chairman took actions in conflict with Tribal Council resolutions and the Navajo Tribal Code.\\nWhatever the interpretations and understandings upon which the Vice Chairman acted, his actions between February 17,1989 and March 10,1989, are consistent with a pattern of ignoring Tribal Council and, ultimately, tribal law. The Court is specifically referring to the failure to file campaign and disclosure statements and the failure to convey to Tribal Council the contents of the Hawkins Report.\\nTribal Council, whose duty is to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the Navajo Nation, cannot fulfill its duty when the individual to whom Tribal Council must look to for administration of its laws indicates that he will pick and choose which acts of Tribal Council he will honor. When this happens a non-punitive legislative purpose is clearly served and the public interest is furthered when the situation is resolved.\\nDEFENDANTS OTHER THAN MACDONALD AND THOMPSON\\nThere were 24 defendants other than MacDonald and Thompson named in the original complaint. At the time of trial on May 2, 1989, 15 of those defendants had been dismissed. The defendants remaining in the case are Howard Bitsuie, Erwin \\\"Bo\\\" Bowman, Patricia Damon, Herman Light, William Morgan, Richie Nez, Robert Shorty, Kee Ike Yazzie, and Carol Retasket.\\nThomas J. Hynes filed an answer for MacDonald and the other defendants. Daniel Deschinny filed a separate answer and counterclaim on behalf of Johnny R. Thompson. The counterclaim was dismissed.\\nAt trial, Defendant Carol Retasket indicated she was representing herself but filed no separate answer.\\nAll defendants other than MacDonald and Thompson chose to rely solely on the issue of the validity of resolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 and presented no individual defenses. They are heretofore bound by the Court's decision on the issues regarding MacDonald and Thompson.\\nSOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\\nOn or about March 24, 1989, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction on April 18, 1989, counsel for Defendants, on the record, informed this Court that the Supreme Court had disposed of the question of whether the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act was a bar to suit. Counsel then stipulated to the preliminary injunction and trial was set for May 2, 1989.\\nSince this Court finds the Navajo Tribal Council resolutions CF-43-89 and CMA-10-89 as valid, the Defendants have no Official Capacity or duties protected by the Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act.\\nORDER\\nBased upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Opinion, the Court hereby Orders that:\\n(a) Resolutions CF-4-89 and CMA-10-89 are lawful and enforceable Resolutions of the Navajo Tribal Council which divested Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson of their legislative and executive powers; and\\n(b) The termination of employment of each of the other Defendants was lawful and each Defendant thereafter had no authority related to his/her former position; and\\n(c) Based on the above declaration of the validity of the leave resolutions and employment terminations, and the Court's acceptance of the parties' stipulation on the record that Defendants MacDonald and Thompson do not recognize the validity of the resolutions placing them on leave and have continually exercised purported official authority at all times following the effective dates of their leave resolutions, Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr. and Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson and other Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from attempting to assert official authority which has been declared withdrawn.\\nThe COURT further ORDERS that the Defendants are permanently enjoined as follows:\\nA. Each Defendant is restrained from attempting to exercise any official powers and duties as an official employee, or agent of the Navajo Nation, unless further authorized by this Court; and\\nB. Each Defendant is restrained from entering or remaining in Tribal office for the purposes of conducting business as employee or official of the Navajo Tribal Government except as provided in this order; and\\nC. Each Defendant is restrained from removing or destroying any Tribal records and from using any Tribal property including any credit cards, telephones, airplanes, vehicles, xerox machines, computers, office equipment, offices, and from issuing checks from Tribal accounts; unless further ordered by this Court; and\\nD. Each Defendant is enjoined from issuing or approving any orders, contracts, travel authorizations, requests for payments, purchase order, and travel reimbursements; unless further authorized by this Court; and\\nE. Each Defendant is enjoined from prohibiting or obstructing the duly appointed officials of the Navajo Nation and their employees from entering into Tribal buildings; and\\nF. Each Defendant is restrained from interfering with the duties of duly appointed officials of the Navajo Nation and their employees.\\nFor purposes of this Order, wherever the term \\\"Defendant\\\" is used it shall be deemed to apply to any officer, agent, servant, employee, counsel, or any person acting in concert with them or on his or her behalf. Furthermore, other than Chairman Peter MacDonald, Sr. and Vice Chairman Johnny R. Thompson, nothing in this Order should be construed as prohibiting any Defendant to reapply for his or her former position or to apply for any other Tribal office. Such as, the prohibitions of this Permanent Injunction will not apply to any such bona fide reapplication and rehiring of the Defendant by the Navajo Nation.\\nThe purported official acts of Chairman MacDonald and Vice Chairman Thompson taken after they were placed on administrative leave are declared null and void.\\nThe Navajo Department of Law Enforcement is hereby ordered to enforce and execute the terms of this PERMANENT INJUCTION.\\nA security bond is not required pursuant to Rule 18 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure because the Navajo Nation is a plaintiff in this action.\\nThis Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment is effective at the hour of issuance and shall continue in effect until further order of this Court.\\nThe term of the stipulated Preliminary Injunction entered by the parties on April 19, 1989 shall remain in effect until further order of this Court.\\nOrdered this 17th day of May, 1989, at the hour of 10:25 a.m.\\n. Navajo Nation exhibit 3, transcript of the Senate Select Committee Hearings of February 2, 6 and 7,1989 (hereafter \\\"Exhibit 3\\\"), 2/2/89 at 28-29, 37-42, 52, 69-72, 78-79, 90-93.\\n. Exhibit 3, 2/7/89 at 44-45, 51-53, 55-61, 66-67, 69, 124-125.\\n. Exhibit 3,2/2/89 at 32-33; 2/6/89 at 99-102,106-107,113; and 2/7/89 at 75-79,93-102,124-125.\\n. Exhibit 3, 2/2/89 at 28-29 (including Paddock exhibit list of payments and gratuities to MacDonald), 68-69.\\n. Navajo Nation Exhibit 4, Candidate's Campaign Expense Statement for Peter MacDonald, 11/20/86.\\n. Exhibit 4.\\n. Exhibit 4; and Exhibit 3, 2/2/89 at 28-29 (see also Paddock exhibit list of payments and gratuities to MacDonald, and testimony of Gloria Dennison).\\n. Navajo Nation Exhibit 1, Minutes of the 1989 Winter Session of the Navajo Tribal Council, 1 N.T.C. 2/14/89.\\n. Id. at 57.\\n. Exhibit 1, 2/15/89 at 1-2.\\n. Exhibit 1, 30 N.T.C. 2/16/89.\\n. Exhibit 2, Resolution CF-3-89, 2/17/89.\\n. Exhibit 2, Resolution CF-4-89, 2/17/89; Exhibit 1, 2/17/89 at 33.\\n. Exhibit 1, 2/17/89 at 25; Exhibit 2, CF-4-89 at para. 3.\\n. Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-6-89; Exhibit 1, 2 N.T.C. 3/1/89.\\n. Exhibit 1, 4 N.T.C. 3/1/89; Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-6-89 at para. 15.\\n. Exhibit 1, 17 N.T.C. 3/10/89; Exhibit 2, CMA-10-89.\\n. Exhibit 2, CMA-10-89 at para. 3.\\n. Id. at para. 4.\\n. Id. at para. 5.\\n. Statements made by Daniel Deschinny, Sr., as Counsel for Defendant Thompson in opening remarks and in motion for Directed Verdict; Navajo Nation Exhibit 5, Memorandum to Michael R Upshaw, 2/21/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 5, Memorandum to Anthony P. Lincoln, 3/7/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 7, letter to Eric N. Dahlstrom, 3/9/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 8, Memorandum to Richie Nez, 3/21/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 9, Memorandum to Carol Retasket, 3/21/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 10, Memorandum to Eric N. Dahlstrom, 2/17/89; Navajo Nation on Council Exhibit 11, Memorandum/Executive Order to Wilbur Kellogg, 3/10/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 12, Memorandum/Executive Order to Wilbur Kellogg on Chairman and Vice-Chairman, 3/10/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 13, Memorandum to James Henderson, 3/10/89; Navajo Nation Exhibit 14, Memoranda signed by Defendant MacDonald as Chairman; Adverse inference drawn from Defendant MacDonald's failure to answer question on point.\\n. Exhibit 5, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 6, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 7, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibits 11 and 12, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 13, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 8, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 9, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibit 10, see n. 22.\\n. Exhibits 10, and 14.\\n. Testimony of Defendant Thompson, 5/3/89; Exhibit 2, Resolution CMA-10-89.\\n. All evidence submitted and judicial notice.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530253\", \"name\": \"Johnny R. Thompson, Appellant, v. The Navajo Nation, et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Thompson v. Navajo Nation\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-05-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-19-89\", \"first_page\": 181, \"last_page\": 185, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 181\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Johnny R. Thompson, Appellant, v. The Navajo Nation, et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-19-89\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nJohnny R. Thompson, Appellant, v. The Navajo Nation, et al., Appellees.\\nDecided May 25, 1990\\nBefore TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\\nDaniel Deschinny Sr., Esq., Window Rock, Arizona, for the Appellant; and Stanley M. Pollack, Esq., and David P. Frank, Esq., Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona, for the Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"2343\", \"char_count\": \"14448\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nTso, Chief Justice.\\nAppellant Johnny R. Thompson, Vice Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, appeals the decision of the Window Rock District Court dated May 17, 1989. In its decision the district court held that Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CMA-10-89, which placed appellant on paid administrative leave, was a valid, lawful, and enforceable Resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council. We affirm the district court decision.\\nI\\nOn March 10, 1989, the Navajo Tribal Council passed Resolution CMA-10-89 during its session held at the Navajo Education Center in Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona). The Resolution, as certified, states that the Council met in a properly convened session with a quorum present. The Council passed the Resolution with a majority of the quorum voting for its passage.\\nResolution CMA-10-89 divested appellant of his executive and legislative authorities and it placed him on paid administrative leave for the following reasons: (1) After Chairman Peter MacDonald Sr. was placed on paid administrative leave by the Council, appellant failed to take command as acting chairman. Appellant was unwilling, and failed, to carry out the duties and obligations of the office of chairman; (2) Appellant indicated that he will be subject to the influence of suspended Chairman Peter MacDonald Sr.; (3) Appellant is implicated by allegations that the MacDonald/Thompson candidacy filed fraudulent campaign contribution and expense reports and accepted campaign contributions from non-Navajos; (4) Appellant and the Advisory Committee delayed forward ing the Hawkins Report to the Navajo Tribal Council when they were under a duty to do so; and (5) Appellant will have to devote substantial time to defending himself against allegations of wrongdoing. Despite being placed on paid administrative leave, appellant continued to exercise the powers of the office of vice chairman.\\nOn March 22, 1989, the Navajo Nation Department of Justice, on behalf of the Navajo Nation (Nation), filed this action against Chairman MacDonald, the appellant and others by seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The part of the suit against appellant sought to enforce Resolution CMA-10-89 by enjoining appellant from exercising the powers of the Office of Vice-Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council. The court issued a temporary restraining order. Appellant then applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus to prohibit the district court from exercising its jurisdiction. We denied the application for the writ. MacDonald Sr. v. Honorable Robert Yazzie, 6 Nav. R. 95 (1989).\\nWhile the application for the writ was pending, Chairman MacDonald purported to terminate the district judge sitting on this case and hand picked the judge's successor. This action threw into question the authority of the district judge to sit on this case at trial. Consequently, the district court certified four questions to this Court. We answered all four questions including the one relevant to this appeal: we held that the Navajo Tribal Council has authority to place a chairman and a vice chairman on paid administrative leave if certain conditions are met. In re Certified Questions II, Navajo Nation v. MacDonald Sr., 6 Nav. R. 105 (1989). This Court then instructed the district court to determine whether Resolution CMA-10-89 was properly adopted and whether it violated the prohibition against bills of attainder.\\nOn April 18,1989, the parties agreed to have a preliminary injunction entered. On May 2-4, 1989, the district court held a bifurcated hearing on, among others, two issues relevant to this case: 1) Whether Resolution CMA-10-89 was valid; and 2) Whether the appellant violated the terms of Resolution CMA-10-89.\\nAt trial the Nation introduced the following evidence: 1) A certified copy of Resolution CMA-10-89. The certification stated that it was passed at a duly called meeting with a quorum of the Council present and a majority of the delegates present voted for its passage; 2) Minutes of the March 10, 1989 Navajo Tribal Council session indicating that the session was held at the Navajo Education Center. The minutes also showed that the vote on the Resolution was 37 in favor, 2 opposed and 6 abstaining. The minutes further showed a quorum of 46 council delegates present when the session was called to order by the presiding chairman.\\nAt the close of the Nation's case, appellant moved for a directed verdict which was denied. Appellant then rested his case without presenting any witnesses or evidence. Specifically, appellant offered no evidence that a quorum did not exist. Appellant even stipulated that he did not want to present any evidence on the second phase of the bifurcated hearing concerning the issue of whether appellant violated the terms of Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CMA-10-89.\\nOn May 17, 1989, the district court decided that Resolution CMA-10-89 was valid, and Resolution CMA-10-89 was not a bill of attainder. Consequently, a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment were entered against appellant.\\nAppellant filed this appeal on June 16,1989. On appeal the appellant framed the issues as follows: 1) Whether the lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Navajo Nation's case-in-chief; 2) Whether a bill of attainder is present, adducible from the records of the lower court; 3) Whether the lower court erred in its evidentiary rulings; and 4) Whether the lower court failed to properly ascertain Navajo public policy and applicable federal law.\\nII\\nIn our decision answering the certified questions, we held that the Navajo Tribal Council has authority to place the vice-chairman on administrative leave with pay if certain conditions are met. We directed the district court on remand to decide whether Resolution CMA-10-89, placing appellant on administrative leave with pay, had been properly adopted and whether Resolution CMA-10-89 violated the prohibition against bills of attainder. In re Certified Questions II, id.\\nThe Navajo courts have the power to determine the validity of resolutions passed by the Navajo Tribal Council. Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Nav. R. 189 (1978). The core of this case involves the validity of Resolution CMA-10-89. The Nation filed this suit seeking to enforce the Resolution. In defense, the appellant raised the issue of the validity of the Resolution. We also directed the district court to determine whether the Resolution was valid by looking at the manner in which it was adopted and to test it against the law used to determine whether a legislative act is a bill of attainder. In re Certified Questions II, 6 Nav. R. 105.\\nThis Court has not had an opportunity, previous to this case, to pronounce a standard to be used in determining the validity of a Council resolution. That does not mean that the lower courts were without guidelines. In Benally v. Gorman, 5 Nav. R. 273 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1987), the Window Rock District Court pronounced a standard, which we agree is the proper standard, to be used to test the validity of legislative acts. The court in Benally said as follows: \\\"When a court is faced with reviewing any legislative action, that review must be conducted under certain principles. The main principle of judicial review is the presumption that the legislative act is proper and legal.\\\" 5 Nav. R. at 275. This same standard was first articulated by the same district court in an earlier decision. In Damon v. MacDonald, 4 Nav. R. 138, 140 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983), the court said as follows: \\\"This Court follows the presumption of validity that attaches to official acts, particularly those of the legislature....\\\"\\nThe reason behind this presumption is the belief that public officials normally perform the duties of their offices in a proper manner. Likewise, the Council in exercising its legislative function is presumed to have done its job properly, faithfully, and within the bounds of law. The Council, as the people's servant, is presumed to act in the best interests of the people. For these reasons, we now pronounce that resolutions of the Navajo Tribal Council are presumed to be valid and the party seeking to challenge the validity of any Council resolution has the burden of rebutting that presumption with clear evidence to the contrary.\\nThe presumption that a Council resolution is valid imposes upon the party against whom it is invoked the duty to offer clear evidence to rebut the presumption. The evidence of invalidity must be clear evidence, otherwise Council resolutions could be overturned by our courts based simply upon surmise or speculation. See Damon, 4 Nav. R. at 140. In the absence of such clear evidence, the court will have no choice but to render a ruling consistent with the presumption. In this case appellant alleged that Resolution CMA-10-89 is invalid. Thus, appellant had the burden of presenting clear evidence to the district court to rebut the presumption that the Resolution is valid.\\nThis Court has no difficulty in concluding that the appellant failed to come forward with clear evidence to show the invalidity of Resolution CMA-10-89. The appellant simply offered no evidence whatsoever. The Nation introduced its evidence which included a certified copy of Resolution CMA-10-89 and the minutes of the March 10, 1989 Council session. The Nation then rested. Appellant then moved for a directed verdict, which was denied, and then rested without presenting any evidence. Under these facts the district court had no choice but to rule in accordance with the presumption and hold that Resolution CMA-10-89 is valid.\\nThe appellant made no effort to satisfy his burden and under these circumstances we conclude that the presumption of validity becomes conclusive. Consequently, we need not address any of the issues presented by the appellant. Nonetheless, we will address two points heavily relied upon by appellant which he claims shows \\\"clear evidence of irregularity\\\" in the passage of Resolution CMA-10-89.\\nThe appellant first argues that at the time the council delegates voted on Resolution CMA-10-89, they did not have a quorum. Appellant relies upon the minutes of the March 10, 1989 Council session which show that when the first vote was taken on proposed Resolution CMA-10-89, only 43 delegates voted. Another vote was immediately taken and this time 45 delegates voted on the Resolution. The second vote is the vote that made Resolution CMA-10-89 official; not the first vote.\\nThe appellant's argument has no merit. First, we reviewed the entire minutes of the March 10, 1989 Council session and found that when the session to conduct business was called to order by the presiding chairman, a quorum, comprised of 46 delegates, was present. Second, the resolution that officially became Resolution CMA-10-89, and the one that appellant claims is invalid, shows on its face that 45 delegates voted for it. The first vote did not produce a resolution. We conclude, as did the district court, that the appellant did not present clear evidence by way of witnesses or otherwise to show that a quorum was not present. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a quorum of the Council was present controls.\\nThe appellant also argues that Resolution CMA-10-89 is invalid because the Resolution was passed while the delegates were illegally convened at the Navajo Education Center. The appellant claims that the law requires all Council sessions to be held at the Navajo Tribal Council Chambers. The appellant relies upon 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 161 (1972), which is as follows:\\nAll regularly scheduled or special meetings of the Navajo Tribal Council shall be held at the Navajo Tribal Council Chambers located at Window Rock, Arizona with the following exceptions:\\n(1) If the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council shall declare by written statement that the Chambers at Window Rock are unsuitable for meeting, whether because of fire, physical damage, remodeling or other cause, the Chairman shall designate an alternate meeting place in or near Window Rock, and he shall give reasonable notice to all Council delegates of such fact.\\n(2) A majority of all Council delegates may agree to hold a meeting in some location other than the Chambers at Window Rock. Such agreement may be by written petition or by motion at any regular or special session of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nAgain the presumption of validity controls the decision on appellant's second point. Appellant did not present clear evidence to show that the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council did not designate an alternate meeting place pursuant to section 161(1) above. The appellant further did not present clear evidence to show that a majority of the council delegates did not petition or pass a motion to meet at a place other than the Council Chambers pursuant to section 161(2). The appellant simply relies on speculation.\\nThe appellant had the burden to present clear evidence to rebut the presumption of validity of Resolution CMA-10-89 and he has chosen not to do so. Consequently, we are under no obligation to address any of the issues presented by appellant. The presumption of validity is conclusive as a matter of law. The district court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict. The decision of the district court is affirmed in its entirety.\\n. A quorum of the Council consists \\\"of a simple majority of all voting members of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\\" 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172(a). \\\"When a quorum is present, any motion or resolution shall be passed if it receives a majority of all votes cast, irregardless of how many members actually vote....\\\" (emphasis added). 2 N.T.C. \\u00a7 172(b). There are currently 88 delegates on the Council and 45 dele gates make a quorum. We note that the part of section 172(b) quoted above may be construed to mean that once a quorum has been declared to commence the session, less than 45 delegates can vote on a resolution and the resolution can be valid.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530262\", \"name\": \"In Re: Mary Ellis Joe's Customary Use Area, District 9, Shiprock Agency, Navajo Nation Mary Ellis Joe, C# 20,287, Petitioner, v. Melvin Willie, et al., Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Joe v. Willie\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-09-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SR-CV-949-83\", \"first_page\": 545, \"last_page\": 550, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 545\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Judge Leroy S. Bedonie presiding.\", \"parties\": \"In Re: Mary Ellis Joe\\u2019s Customary Use Area, District 9, Shiprock Agency, Navajo Nation Mary Ellis Joe, C# 20,287, Petitioner, v. Melvin Willie, et al., Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. SR-CV-949-83\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Shiprock, New Mexico\\nIn Re: Mary Ellis Joe\\u2019s Customary Use Area, District 9, Shiprock Agency, Navajo Nation Mary Ellis Joe, C# 20,287, Petitioner, v. Melvin Willie, et al., Respondents.\\nDecided September 26, 1990\\nJudge Leroy S. Bedonie presiding.\", \"word_count\": \"2635\", \"char_count\": \"15764\", \"text\": \"FINDINGS OF FACT; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; AND JUDGMENT\\nDECISION ON REMAND\\nThe Navajo Nation Supreme Court remanded this case to adjudicate and determine the matter de novo. The Court having heard testimony presented, receiving evidence and being sufficiently advised makes its findings as follows:\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. The Court has proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction in this cause of action pursuant to 7 NTC Sec. 253(2).\\n2. On March 9, 1982, Counsel for Mary Ellis Joe, by letter, notified the District Nine (09) Grazing Committee of competing claims to grazing land claimed by Petitioner as her customary use area and requested notice to all parties claiming an interest and that the matter be heard by the committee. On June 29, 1982, the Petitioner was notified that the District Grazing Committee had reviewed Petitioner's claim but no decision was reached.\\n3 On November 10,1983, the Petitioner filed a quiet title suit in the Shiprock District Court citing the grazing committee's failure to reach a decision. Parties (defendants) claiming interests in the disputed land filed an answer to the petition on December 9,1983. On April 4,1984, the Court referred this case to the District #9 Grazing Committee but it decided nothing; therefore, on February 15, 1985, the Court again referred the case to the Resources Committee and on March 27, 1987, this Committee (Resources) entered its decision holding that the Petitioner had \\\"no claim to any area beyond the area authorized by her grazing permit.\\\"\\n4. The Petitioner requested judicial review of the final Resources Committee decision, and on May 29, 1989, the District Court decided not to review a decision of the Resources Committee on grounds it had no jurisdiction. The Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court challenging this Court's decision, and on the 22nd day of March 1990, reversed the decision of the District Court and remanded this case for adjudication and to determine the matter de novo.\\n5. The record shows that the Petitioner, Mary Ellis Joe, is seeking approximately 27,000 acres or 42 square miles. Petitioner currently uses an undisputed area, designated as .0216, within the area claimed by her. The BIA has issued a total of 4 different permits within .0216, for a total of 304 sheep units. Area .0216 is slightly less than one half of the 27,000 acres she is claiming which amounts to roughly 12,000 acres (BIA Land Operations has not conducted a survey on Petitioner's use area .0216). Mary Ellis Joe owns Grazing Permit No. 9-120 for 83 sheep units yearlong within Sweetwater Chapter of Land Management District 9. Mary Ellis Joe testified at trial that she has 80 sheep, 70 goats, 20 cows and 6-7 horses.\\n6. Mary Ellis Joe's claimed use overlaps into other areas claimed by common heirs. While Respondent Grace Oldman and Mary Ellis Joe share a common father, Mary Ellis Joe also shares a grandfather with Hosteen Bluff City's children, who were alleged to be newcomers at trial. That is, Kitseally's old wife was the daughter of Old Wagon and his first wife. Whereas, Hosteen Bluff City, Jack Banana, Jean Morris and Old Wagon's daughter were children of Old Wagon and his second wife. Clearly, if one goes back far enough most of the respondents are related and technically are not outsiders. Mary Ellis Joe wishes to claim property which might have been grazed at any time during the life of Kitseally or his ancestors.\\n7. Respondent Grace Oldman testified that she is a daughter of Kitseally's new wife and that she has a right to use the land north of Toh Atin Mesa. She was born and raised on the land to the north of Toh Atin Mesa and has lived there continuously. Mrs. Oldman and her husband, Jake Oldman, own two separate grazing permits in two areas designated .0203 (41 sheep units) and .0202 (63 sheep units) north and northwest of .0216. Grace and Jake Oldman utilize a third permit owned by their son, Casey Oldman, which allows for 78 sheep units in the .0202 area. The grazing permits combined allow for 182 sheep units. Grace testified at trial that she takes care of 52 sheep, 98 goats, 12 cows and 1 horse. Jim Oldman testified that he has 33 sheep, 3 cows, 2 horses and 10 goats.\\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\n1. A grazing permit gives one the right to use the land for grazing, however, \\\"no person is entitled to more range area than needed to support the number of livestock allowed on his or her grazing permit\\\" as set forth in the 1957 Navajo Reservation Grazing Handbook at page 14. The primary purpose of grazing permits is to control the number of livestock to protect and preserve the land. Mary Ellis Joe testified that she has a grazing permit which allows her to have 83 sheep units. However, according to her testimony, she maintains 150 goats and sheep, 20 cows and 6-7 horses. One cow or one horse is equal to 5 sheep units; therefore, 27 cows and horses would be equivalent to 135 sheep units. Mary Ellis Joe currently grazes 285 sheep units on an 83 sheep unit permit. Note, under the current poor grazing conditions, she alone needs 17,100 acres to support 285 sheep units. At trial, Mary Ellis Joe alleged that the respondents were responsible for depletion of grass. But, Mary Ellis Joe is also contributing to the poor conditions especially in light of Mr. Randy D. Cornett's testimony that the number of livestock is down played by the owners. To exacerbate the situation, there are three other permittees who are allowed 221 sheep units. It is not unreasonable to conclude that these other valid permittees within .0216 are also grazing beyond their limits and thus contributing to the poor grazing conditions in violation of the Navajo land policy.\\n2. Initially, grazing permits were issued to persons who had livestock and could identify customary use to a specified area. Customary use is a Navajo concept that defines an individual Navajo's prescribed boundary for the use and occupancy of land to an area traditionally inhabited by his/her ancestors. In The Matter Of The Estate Of: Charley Nez Wauneka, Sr., 5 Nav. R. 79, 81 (1987). Grazing permits were also issued to those people who claimed a specific area of land known as \\\"claimed use area.\\\"\\n3. A grazing permit is one of the most important items of property a Navajo can own. Estate of Navajo Joe, 4 Nav. R. 99 (1983). Grazing permits are extremely valuable property due to the limited land base, and land use rights are embodied by the permit.\\n4. Grazing permits changed the nature of customary use in some cases, because Navajo people outside the ancestral pool can obtain grazing privilege by gift or purchase. The Navajo Supreme Court held that a grazing permit is the functional equivalent of a deed and is therefore an instrument which transfers real property. In the Matter of the Estate of Joe Dee Nelson, 1 Nav. R. 162 (1977). Characterizing grazing permits as deeds allows for conveyance of grazing permits by gift, purchase or inheritance. Thus, those Navajos who follow the tradition of customary use to a particular area based on ancestral use will necessarily clash with \\\"outsiders\\\" who have bought or received a permit by gift.\\n5. Grazing permits, from inception, have been controversial and fraught with conflict. The Court will not address the issue of whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs and district grazing committees are consistent with each other nor will it concern itself with other administrative problems. The Court will, however, adhere to the Navajo land policy adopted by the Navajo Supreme Court. The Court recognizes that land is a resource and the increasing pressure on the land threatens its viability. Hence, the primary goal of the Navajo land policy is to keep the land economically viable.\\nThe Court is faced with the extremely difficult and emotional issue of land disputes. Land to the Navajo people is life which embodies the concept of spiri tual, mental, physical and emotional well being. Navajo thinking and values accord land with survival and sustenance. Since the Long Walk, Navajos have maintained a subsistence life-style based on livestock production, which livestock ownership among the Navajo is a symbol of wealth, prestige, and stability.\\nSince land plays a central and sacred role in the Navajo culture, it follows that the Navajo will fight long and hard for their land. Many of the land disputes arising on the Navajo Nation are between common relatives and between siblings. The rapid population growth of the Navajos, along with a strong cultural tradition of having land with livestock and a home where they grew up, inevitably causes land disputes. The Navajo population has increased from approximately 9,000 (upon return from Ft. Sumner) to 169,157 in 1989. See Chapter Images: 1989, General Facts on Navajo Chapters, May 1990, Larry Rodgers, Division of Community Development, Window Rock, Arizona.\\nEvidence of the spiritual and mental tie to livestock ownership clearly surfaced when the government forced Navajos to reduce their stock by 64 to 80 percent during the late 1930's and early 1940's. Navajos were devastated by the massive killing and irreverent conduct by government officials. See Navajo Livestock Reduction: A National Disgrace, Navajo Community College Press, 1974. The purported purpose of the stock reduction was to restore the land which had been overgrazed by an over abundance of livestock. This era initiated a reservation-wide grazing policy which gave birth to the grazing permit in 1937. The majority of Navajos reacted strongly against the regulation of grazing and grazing permits, but it was eventually accepted. The maximum amount of permissible sheep units an individual Navajo could receive was set at 350 to be authorized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\\nUnfortunately, when dealing with the ancestral use of the land, we must look to the family tree which gets ever wider with more and more people, who all claim to have use rights by virtue of common ancestors. This is exactly what we are faced with in this case. Petitioner Mary Ellis Joe is the daughter of Hosteen ICitseally's old wife and Respondent Grace Oldman is the daughter of Hosteen Kitseally's new wife. When Hosteen Kitseally separated from his old wife and began to live exclusively with his new wife, he gave his old wife the majority of the sheep and the land to her right as she faced east on top of Toh Atin Mesa. Hosteen Kitseally, with his new wife, moved to the North of Toh Atin Mesa and began to build the herd again. When boundaries are not delineated by fences, it is possible Mary Ellis Joe may have grazed at one time or another on the land north of Toh Atin Mesa and further south and west of the .0216 area. But, when such a claim is made, we have to look to the rights of the other descendants of common ancestors in light of the Navajo land policy.\\nThe semi-desert region of Navajoland requires livestock control to protect the land from becoming a wasteland. Although the amount of stock owned by individual Navajos is much less than what it was prior to forced stock reduction fifty-five years ago, the Navajo population has almost quadrupled since the issuance of grazing permits in 1940. See Navajo Nation FAX 88: A Statistical Abstract p.2, September 1988, Division of Community Development, Window Rock, Arizona. Within Shiprock Agency District 9, the population was estimated to be 2,285 in 1940 and 4,994 in 1980 - a 118.56% increase. It is projected to increase to 6,242 by 1988. See Navajo Nation FAX, id. at p.7.\\nThe 27,000 acres claimed by Mary Ellis Joe disturbs the Court for the following reasons. The estimated land size of Sweetwater Chapter is 152,006.30 acres. Her claim amounts to over one fifth of the Sweetwater Chapter area within District 9. The estimated 1989 Sweetwater population is 1,698. See Chapter Images 1989 at p.104. To grant Mary Ellis Joe her claim of 27,000 acres would not only deny the rights of descendants who have been born and raised in the area, but it would grant Mary Ellis Joe a special privilege which is no longer practical or realistic. Almost every middle aged Navajo sheep owner can recall when their families made seasonal herds over great distances and could probably show reminisces of camps upon request. The tremendous increase in population has rendered it inequitable for any one Navajo or family to continue that lifestyle because in effect, it would force 90 percent of the remaining Navajos to forfeit their identity with the land. It's unlikely that a subsistence life-style entirely based on raising stock is possible because of the massive land base that is required to make it profitable without destroying grazing land.\\nAlthough, time has changed the extent of subsistence livestock economy of the Navajo people, stockraising today retains its traditional position. Many young educated Navajos trained in various fields have sources of income other than subsistence stockraising. Contrary to what the officials from the Bureau of Indian Affairs had hoped for forty years ago, many of these Navajos have inherited the Navajo way of thinking. They maintain ties to the land and value stockraising, even if it is just one sheep, one horse or one cow and return back to where they were raised whenever possible. The BIA believed that the spread of education would de-emphasize stockraising. See The Navajo Year Book, Report No. viii, 1951-1961. A Decade of Progress, Robert Young, Assistant to the General Superintendent; Navajo Agency, Window Rock, Arizona 1961.\\nPetitioner contends that those Navajos who reside and graze in the area she is claiming are responsible for the deterioration of grazing land. Petitioner further contends that given the poor range conditions, the 304 sheep units would require 18,240 acres. This figure is based on the testimony given by Randy D. Cornett, Supervisory Range Conservationist, Branch of Natural Resources, Shiprock Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs. Mr. Cornett estimated that the range condition of the lands in dispute is estimated to be poor north of Toh Atin Mesa and poor to fair in the south. Mr. Cornett stated that given poor conditions, it takes 50 - 60 acres to graze one sheep unit.\\nThe purpose of the Navajo land policy is to keep Navajoland economically viable. The problem of overgrazing is widespread and each individual Navajo should take responsibility to protect our Nation from becoming a wasteland. This can be achieved by controlling the amount of livestock or giving them supplemental feed or both. This Court is not in the position to promulgate rules and regulations that may reconcile customary use claims with grazing permits. Nor is this Court responsible for the enforcement of grazing regulations. This Court suggests to the lawmaking body to create a competent administrative agency to hear and determine land disputes. That Navajo Nation administrative agency can promulgate procedures which guarantee due process and rights guaranteed by the Navajo Bill of Rights and Indian Civil Rights Act.\\nJUDGMENT\\nMary Ellis Joe will not be allowed to claim more land than could have been claimed by her mother, Kitseally's old wife. The original 1940 Bureau of Indian Affairs map of the area in dispute shows that Kitseally's old wife had a customary use area designated as .0216 as shown on Petitioner's Exhibit \\\"1.\\\" This will be the land allowed to be claimed by Mary Ellis Joe.\\nTHUS ORDERED this 24th day of September, 1990.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530266\", \"name\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Patrick Platero, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Platero\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-12-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CR-04-91\", \"first_page\": 422, \"last_page\": 431, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 422\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Patrick Platero, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CR-04-91\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNavajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Patrick Platero, Defendant.\\nDecided December 5, 1991\\nBefore TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\\nVernon J. Roanhorse, Esq., Navajo Legal Aid and Defender Office, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the defendant; and Timothy Joe, Esq., Virgil Brown, Esq., and Victor J. Clyde, Esq., Navajo Nation Prosecutor\\u2019s Office, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the plaintiff.\", \"word_count\": \"4732\", \"char_count\": \"28509\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThe Navajo Nation filed this petition seeking to have this Court reconsider its order filed on October 15, 1991. That order reversed the judgment of conviction of Patrick Platero for the offense of battery. The reversal is based on our finding, after review of the transcript, that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant Platero's motion for acquittal. We have examined the petition, the applicable parts of the transcript and record, and we find no reason to change our ruling of October 15, 1991.\\nI\\nOn March 24, 1989, the Navajo Tribal Council passed a resolution which authorized the termination of Wilbur Kellogg as Chief of the Navajo Police, and recommended the appointment of Major Franklin Morris as the Acting Chief of Police. Leonard Haskie, Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, offered the position to Morris, but he refused it. Chairman Haskie then appointed Major George John as the police chief on April 3,1989. John immediately faced a problem - Kellogg refused to obey his termination orders, and remained in office. On April 5, 1989, John attempted to meet with Kellogg and top command officers (including Platero who was a lieutenant), but Kellogg avoided the meeting. On April 7, 1989, John again unsuccessfully attempted to inform police officers of his appointment. On April 13, 1989, John wrote a memorandum that terminated Platero from his employment as a police officer, for an incident arising from John's April 5, 1989 attempt to inform command officers of his appointment.\\nThe events crucial to this decision happened on April 14, 1989. That morning police officers from around the Navajo Nation assembled in a building called the Old Police Academy, which is at the rear of the Navajo Nation Police and Court Building in Window Rock. Simultaneously, command officers met in the main building. The police officers were preparing for further public demonstrations and a likely confrontation between supporters of suspended Chairman Peter MacDonald Sr. and those in opposition.\\nAt 10:12 a.m., on the morning of April 14, 1989, Lieutenant Daniel Hawkins delivered several employment termination notices, including Platero's, to Major George Waybenais' secretary. Hawkins said that while he usually served termination notices on officers personally, he did not do so then. He and John \\\"felt that it would be safer for myself [Hawkins] not to provoke any type of confrontation, and to leave the packet with the secretary of the Officer in Charge [Waybenais].\\\" Vol. II, Trans, at 74. The prosecution did not present a witness or other evidence during its case-in-chief to show that either the secretary or another person served the termination notice on Platero. In fact, the secretary was not called as a witness at all, and specifically to show what happened to Platero's termination notice after it was placed in her custody.\\nMeanwhile, John met with tribal officials at the Navajo Nation Department of Justice, and there it was decided that he would meet with the police officers, who were assembled at the academy to inform them of his authority.\\nJohn and other tribal officials reached the academy meeting room a little past noon. He went to a podium before the assembled officers, and began to explain his appointment and authority to them. He had spoken only a few minutes when five command officers, including Waybenais, Captain Bobby Edsitty, and Platero entered the room. Waybenais walked up to John, demanded to know his authority for speaking to the officers, and then grabbed him, announcing that he was under arrest. Several witnesses agreed that Waybenais' ground for arrest was that John was impersonating a police officer. Witnesses differed on whether Waybenais directly ordered Platero to complete the arrest, or whether Platero acted spontaneously. Platero put John's left arm behind his back, and pushed him out of the academy entry way. Platero and another officer escorted John into the main police building, and booked him for impersonating a police officer. The charge was later dismissed. When John was asked if he was injured, he replied, \\\"No, I wasn't injured, but I felt a pain. \\\" Vol. IE, Trans, at 18.\\n'On the morning of April 14, 1989, and at the time of the incident, Platero was jnjmiform, and he was with the area and district commanders when they entered the academy meeting room. He and another officer acted as if they were police officers, by marching John into the police station and booking him.\\nPlatero was charged with the offense of battery, 17 N.T.C. \\u00a7 316(a) (1977), when John filed a criminal complaint against him. The case went to trial before a jury on April 11, 1991, and at the close of the prosecution's case, the defense moved the court to enter a judgment of acquittal. The defense argued that the prosecution had failed to prove that Platero acted \\\"unlawfully,\\\" an essential element of the offense of battery. The motion was denied. Platero was convicted and he appealed that judgment of conviction on June 7, 1991. Platero presented a myriad of issues on appeal. This Court, however, decided to dispose of the appeal using the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Platero's motion for acquittal, which was based upon the prosecution's failure to prove an element of the offense of battery; namely \\\"unlawfully\\\" striking or using force on another. Based upon our review of the prosecution's case as laid out in the transcript, we ruled for Platero. Our October 15,1991 order is not based upon Platero's testimony that he did not receive his termination notice or know of his termination until the afternoon following his arrest of John. Further, the order is not influenced by any proceeding in the federal courts. The order is based solely upon an assignment of error that the district court abused its discretion by not granting the motion for acquittal.\\nII\\nSince time immemorial the Navajo people have applied their customs and traditions in dispute resolution. Even with the Navajo Court of Indian Offenses, the Navajo judges of that court, under often adverse circumstances, continued to apply Navajo customs and traditions in cases brought before them. Navajo courts of today are no exception, they apply customs and traditions as the laws of preference. The Navajo Nation Council has legislated that as a requirement. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7 204 (1985).\\nIt should come as no surprise that the customs and traditions of the Navajo people have the force of law. They provide a unique body of law known as Navajo common law. Estate of Belone, 5 Nav. R. 161, 165 (1987); Estate of Apachee, 4 Nav. R. 178, 179-81 (Window Rock D. Ct., 1983). Navajo courts constantly apply Navajo common law in civil cases, and in at least one reported decision, a Navajo trial court applied Navajo common law in a criminal action. In re Interest ofD.P.!, 3 Nav. R. 255 (Crownpoint D. Ct., 1982). The United States Supreme Court has also unanimously confirmed the authority of the Navajo courts to use Navajo common law in criminal cases. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1978). In order to assure Navajo due process, which is fundamental fairness in a Navajo cultural context, we shall apply Navajo common law to this case. The facts of the case require it.\\nA\\nPlatero's defense counsel alluded to Navajo common law during jury selection. He said, \\\"Navajo people believe that it is wrong to hurt a person needlessly,\\\" and he told the prospective jurors that that was the reason the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Vol. I, Trans, at 85. That, restated, means that Platero should not be punished (jailed or fined) unless the prosecution can show a valid reason for doing so. When Navajos say that it is wrong to hurt a person needlessly, that means that a valid reason for inflicting punishment must be clearly present before actual punishment is inflicted. The reason being that actual coercion or punishment were actions of last resort in Navajo common law. While Navajos would shun a repeat offender, or one who committed a particularly heinous crime, they would not do so unless the act was willful or intentional. Individuals also would not be shunned or punished for good faith acts.\\nThe general Navajo common law principle applicable here is one that protects a person clothed with authority in the exercise of that authority until the person actually knows he or she has been relieved of authority. Specifically, as it relates to Platero, he could not be convicted unless he actually knew he did not have a right to act as a police officer, and obey the command of a superior officer. Thus, the prosecution, in proving the element of unlawfulness, had to make it clear that Platero actually knew he had no police authority, and in spite of that knowledge, he acted to arrest John.\\nThere is nothing in the record to show that Platero actually received his termination notice. Hawkins delivered the termination notices, including Platero's, in a sealed envelope to a secretary about two hours before the incident. On cross-examination by a defense counsel, Hawkins admitted that he did not know whether Platero received his. In fact, Hawkins admitted he bypassed the usual procedure for serving termination notices, by delivering them to a secretary, rather than serving them on the affected individuals himself. Most of the prosecution's proof about Platero's lack of authority focused on the termination notice, but glaringly absent was any direct or circumstantial proof of service of the notice on Platero prior to the arrest incident.\\nAt one point on re-cross examination, when defense counsel was repetitiously pounding the point of a lack of proof of service of the termination notice, asking Hawkins about his knowledge of actual delivery, the court interrupted and observed, \\\"that's what he already answered. He said he didn't know if everybody got served.\\\" Vol. II, Trans, at 83. Hawkins was responsible for delivery of the notices, but he did not obtain proof of their service. He could only speculate about service, and offered nothing to show it was made prior to the incident.\\nThe prosecution could have produced the person who delivered the notice to Platero, to testify about when, where, and how it was served. The prosecution did not produce that witness, and that would lead a court to conclude that the testimony of the witness would have been unfavorable to the prosecution. This brings up a point - whether the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence by not producing whoever served the notices - but we will not address that here. It is enough to conclude that given the failure of the prosecution to show Platero received actual notice of his termination, the trial judge should have granted the motion for acquittal. The prosecution did not make it clear that Platero did not act as a police officer, or under color of authority.\\nOne witness made an aside remark that Platero had previously \\\"made the statement he was terminated,\\\" Vol. II, Trans, at 25, but the remark had no foundation, and there was no showing it was based on personal knowledge of an admission actually made by Platero. The prosecution now urges the validity of the \\\"admission,\\\" but at trial it did not follow up on the remark to show the foundation for it. While an admission against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule, Nav. R. Evid. 26, in criminal matters there must be a foundation for testimony about an admission, showing the circumstances under which the purported admission was made, and personal knowledge of it. An admission against interest must have indicators of reliability. The remark carries little weight.\\nWe will continue to examine criminal records and transcripts for fundamental fairness, applying Navajo common law where appropriate, to protect defendants from abuses. The Navajo Nation Council decided, in 1977, to place the element \\\"unlawful\\\" in the battery statute. The prosecution recognized the element, and proceeded on a theory that Platero did not act lawfully because of his termination. It proved there was a termination notice in existence the day before the incident, and proved delivery of a batch of notices to a secretary two hours before the incident. The prosecution did not prove actual notice, when it could have. We cannot uphold this conviction where there is a failure to prove something so elemental as showing that Platero knew he had no right to act as a police officer.\\nB\\nThe Navajo Nation Council did not choose to enact Section 2.12 of the Model Penal Code, which allows a court to dismiss a prosecution for de minimis infractions. However, that power is implicit in 17 N.T.C. \\u00a7 202(1) (1977), because of what it says on its face. If a criminal prosecution violates a purpose of the Criminal Code, that should be a ground for dismissal. We choose, however, not to usurp prosecutorial authority in applying the de minimis rule. Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors have an inherent power \\\"to ignore merely technical violations of law.\\\" 1 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries 389-90 (1985).\\nDuring the time the public refers to as \\\"the turmoil,\\\" the Government of the Navajo Nation was on the brink of collapse. The police command was muddled, because some superior officers chose to be bogged down with politics. Here, the authority of the area commander (Waybenais) was not clear, and the prosecution did not prove Platero was not that person's lawful junior officer. During the defense phase of the trial, John was asked about his three separate attempts to tell his police officers he was in command - on April 5th, 7th, and 14th. When asked, \\\"Were you successful?\\\" John replied, \\\"I was unsuccessful to the point of being arrested.\\\" Vol. Ill, Trans, at 20. That describes the confusion well.\\nThe transcript contains descriptions of the incident as a \\\"near riot,\\\" where \\\"everybody jumped\\\" when the area commander announced \\\"you're under arrest!\\\" It was a \\\"scuffle\\\" and \\\"the tension was high.\\\" Police officers squared off against each other in a policeman's brawl. John and Waybenais were both sub jected to force, and the transcript shows that several officers engaged in an affray. This is not the sort of thing the Navajo courts should have to hear.\\nPolice officers have a certain trust of the people. When they lose sight of their obligations to serve and protect, the safety of the public is compromised, and the public trust is tarnished. The Navajo public definitely expects its police officers to hold themselves to the highest degree of professionalism.\\nIll\\nThe question of whether the Navajo Nation was entitled to oral argument is moot, because it knew the disposition would be on the record, and did not claim one. It waived oral argument. Furthermore, whether oral argument should be scheduled or not is within the discretion of the Court. In this appeal, the evidence (or lack thereof), was clear from the transcript, and oral argument would have added nothing.\\nThe other ground of the petition, a purported conflict of interest by a member of the staff of the Supreme Court, is not relevant to the issue. We decided there was no conflict of interest at the time of initial review of the appeal. We remind the public that the judges of the Navajo Nation, and not their advisors, make judicial decisions.\\nFinally, there is no justification for the attacks on the integrity of either the justices of this Court or on a member of the chief justice's staff, which were made in the petition. The conduct of certain attorneys in making these unwarranted attacks, and in handling matters related to this petition, will be dealt with separately.\\nWe hold that, upon reconsideration, our October 15,1991 order is correct. The conviction of Patrick Platero is reversed and the Window Rock District Court shall enter an order of dismissal, with prejudice.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530293\", \"name\": \"Wesley Begay, Appellant, v. Lena Begay, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Begay v. Begay\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-06-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-20-88\", \"first_page\": 120, \"last_page\": 123, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 120\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Wesley Begay, Appellant, v. Lena Begay, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-20-88\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nWesley Begay, Appellant, v. Lena Begay, Appellee.\\nDecided June 29, 1989\\nBefore TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\\nGary E. LaRance, Esq., Tuba City, Arizona, for the Appellant; Loretta E. Nez, Esq., DNA - People\\u2019s Legal Services, Inc., Tuba City, Arizona, for the Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1541\", \"char_count\": \"9130\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nBluehouse, Associate Justice.\\nThis matter comes before the Court on an appeal of a default divorce decree entered against the appellant by the Tuba City District Court on July 21, 1988. The district court denied appellant's motion to set aside the default divorce decree and he has subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal, citing failure to timely file a brief pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Navaio Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (1987 ed.)(NRCAP). After review, we grant appellee's motion.\\nOn May 20, 1988, appellant, Wesley Begay, was served with a petition and summons informing him that a divorce proceeding had been commenced in Tuba City District Court by appellee, Lena Begay. According to Rule 4 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Begay had until June 20,1988 to file an answer to the petition. Mr. Begay failed to file an answer within the prescribed period, and on July 21, 1988, a default divorce decree was entered in Tuba City District Court. Mr. Begay then moved to set aside the default decree, which was denied on October 10, 1988. Mr. Begay filed an appeal from the denial of the motion to set aside the default decree on November 4, 1988.\\nA notice of docketed appeal was mailed to the parties by the supreme court clerk in accordance with NRCAP 10(b) on December 5, 1988. Pursuant to NRCAP 12(a), Mr. Begay had thirty days from the date the court clerk mailed the notice to file his brief. Mr. Begay filed his brief on January 13, 1989, two days late. On January 26, 1989, Ms. Begay filed this motion to dismiss, pursuant to NRCAP 12(c), alleging that because Mr. Begay's brief was filed late, his appeal should be dismissed. Mr. Begay did not respond to the motion to dismiss, or oth erwise attempt to explain why his brief was filed late. We dismiss the appeal.\\nNRCAP 12(a) is clear in its mandate: \\\"The appellant shall file his brief... within thirty (30) days after the Clerk of the Supreme Court mails the notice [of docketing] required by Rule 10(b).\\\" NRCAP 12(a). The rules allow for an additional seven days if the notice of docketed appeal is served upon the appellant by mail. NRCAP 5(c). If the appellant fails to file his brief in a timely manner, appellee has a remedy under NRCAP 12(c), which allows for dismissal upon appellee's motion. This Court has said that a filing deadline is not a target date, but an integral element of the adversarial process which requires close scrutiny by the litigants involved. Riverview Service Station v. Eddie, 5 Nav. R. 135, 136 (1986).\\nThe appellant had ample time (from November 4, 1988 until January 11, 1989) to outline, prepare arguments, write and file his brief. Nevertheless, appellant, by mail, filed his brief on January 13, 1989; two days late. This Court has recently directed that if papers are filed by mail, \\\"sufficient time for delivery must be allowed so that the [papers] will be in the custody of the clerk and filed before expiration of the time established.\\\" In re Estate of Wauneka Sr., 6 Nav. R. 63, 64 (1988); In re Adoption of Doe, 5 Nav. R. 141, 143 (1987). The additional time granted by NRCAP 5(c) allows a litigant the full thirty days to prepare his brief and still satisfy the filing deadline. It remains the litigant's responsibility, however, to ensure that the filing deadline is met.\\nThe appellant also had a remedy if the deadline became unmanageable: he could have filed for an extension of time, before the expiration of the prescribed time, pursuant to NRCAP 5(b). In re Estate of Wauneka Sr., 6 Nav. R. at 64. NRCAP 5(b) clearly states that \\\"[t]he time for doing any of the acts provided for in these rules, or by order of the Supreme Court, or by any applicable statute, may be shorted or extended . upon written motion for good cause shown....\\\" NRCAP 5(b). The deadline is not dispensed with casually, and a showing of good cause is a prerequisite for an extension. Here, however, there was no attempt at a good cause showing, as no motion for extension was ever filed. The appellate rules set standards for procedural conduct and provide for dispensations under appropriate circumstances. When they are ignored or abandoned, however, this Court is disinclined toward leniency, and will treat the violations as evidence of a lack of good faith. Justice, fairness to all litigants, and judicial efficiency demand no less. As an Arizona court explained: \\\"Although the sanction of dismissal may seem harsh in the context of a particular case, it will have a prophylactic effect in the long run. By enforcing the minimal standards of advocacy set forth in the rules of civil appellate procedure, we necessarily elevate the level of appellate practice to a higher plane. If we ignore a failure to comply with these elementary rules and tolerate unprofessional standards, it will be the clients, the public, the bar and the courts which ultimately suffer.\\\" Adams v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 139 Ariz. 340, 342, 678 P.2d 525, 527 (1984).\\nAppellant has failed to meet the minimal standards which the rules demand. As the Second Circuit has repeatedly held regarding briefs and motions untime ly filed, \\\"[ujnless application for extended time is made... it is evidence of a lack of good faith and, failing extraordinary circumstances, it constitutes neglect which will not be excused.\\\" Gilroy v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 421 F.2d 1321, 1323 (2d Cir. 1970). The appellate rules which the Navajo Supreme Court has promulgated are equally demanding. They provide for the rapid, equitable, and inexpensive disposition of advanced litigation before the Court, and unauthorized deviations may prejudice the adverse party and impede judiciary efficiency. This Court has discretionary authority to accept a brief that is filed late. Absent a showing of good cause for the untimely submission, however, the appeal will be dismissed.\\nFurthermore, it is impossible to ignore the consistent pattern of missed deadlines which has marred the advocatory management of this case from the outset. The deadline for filing an answer to the petition with the district court was missed by appellant because his counsel canceled their initial meeting. The initiation of an attorney-client relationship, at its earliest stages, places a fiduciary obligation upon the attorney. The existence of outside commitments does not excuse an attorney from the performance of present ones owed to his client nor does it excuse the party himself from satisfying rules of court. It is well established that \\\"preoccupation of counsel with other matters does not dispense with the rules that require timely filing.\\\" Moncaida v. Roscoe, 569 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Bowen, 310 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1962).\\nFinally, appellant's failure to file a response in opposition to appellee's motion for dismissal demonstrates a profound indifference to the final disposition of this case. Whether this disregard is attributed to counsel or appellant is irrelevant at this stage of the litigation; it is simply another signpost along a path of indifference which this case has followed from the very beginning.\\nThe Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure operates for the benefit of the litigants, the court, and the public. The rules are also quite clear in their individual mandate: Rule 12(a) requires the appellant to file his brief within thirty days after the clerk serves the notice of docketing; Rule 5(c) allows an additional seven days if the notice of docketed appeal is served on the appellant by mail; and Rule 5(b) provides for an extension of the filing deadline upon motion, with a showing of good cause. The rules, however, also impose a sanction. If appellant flouts the minimal standards imposed and files his brief late, the appellee, pursuant to NRCAP 12(c), can move for dismissal of the appeal. To prevent such dismissal, the appellant must demonstrate good cause why the brief was filed late. Placing blame on the slowness of mail through the postal system is not good cause. See In re Adoption of Doe, 5 Nav. R. at 143.\\nFailure to follow simple appellate procedure \\\"[ijmpedes the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of judicial business,\\\" and will not be tolerated. Community Coalition for Media Change v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 646 F.2d 613, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It is the responsibility of each litigant to ensure the proper and timely filing of all papers, briefs, and motions. Appellant's brief had a January 11,1989 filing deadline. It was not filed with this Court until January 13,1989; two days late. Mr. Begay has failed to show good cause for the untimely filing. Ms. Begay's motion to dismiss the appeal under NRCAP 12(c) is therefore granted.\\nAppeal dismissed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530297\", \"name\": \"Herman Silver, Appellant, v. Marie Keyonnie, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Silver v. Keyonnie\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-02-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-45-90\", \"first_page\": 357, \"last_page\": 359, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 357\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Herman Silver, Appellant, v. Marie Keyonnie, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-45-90\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nHerman Silver, Appellant, v. Marie Keyonnie, Appellee.\\nDecided February 26, 1991\\nBefore TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate Justices.\\nAlbert Hale, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant; and John A. Chapela, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1054\", \"char_count\": \"6422\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThis is an appeal taken by Herman Silver (\\\"appellant\\\") from a final order of the Window Rock District Court, dated October 3,1991, recognizing and enforcing a support decree entered by the 13th Judicial District Court of the State of New Mexico; finding that appellant had failed to comply with the support decree; awarding $7,365.00 in delinquent child support to Marie Keyonnie (\\\"appellee\\\"); and ordering the garnishment of appellant's wages at Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company.\\nAppellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, citing appellant's failure to timely file his opening brief pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (\\\"NRCAP\\\"). Based upon our review of the requisites for perfection of an appeal and of the procedural history of this appeal, we grant appellee's motion to dismiss.\\nI\\nThe pertinent procedural facts are as follows: The Window Rock Family Court filed its order on October 3, 1990. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on November 2,1990. On December 11,1990, pursuant to NRCAP 10(b), a notice of docketed appeal was sent, by certified mail, to each counsel for the parties. Appellant then had thirty-seven days from the date the court clerk mailed the notice, or until January 17, 1991, to file his opening brief. NRCAP 12(a), as adjusted by NRCAP 5(c); Begay v. Begay, 6 Nav. R. 120 (1989).\\nOn January 7,1991, appellant's counsel petitioned this Court for an extension, to January 14,1991, on the time to file appellant's brief, citing the physical inca pacity of his secretary. The extension was granted, and appellant was given until January 16, 1991, to file his brief. On January 14, 1991, counsel for appellant petitioned this Court for a second extension, to January 21,1991, on the time for filing appellant's brief. Once again appellant's counsel cited his secretary's health as \\\"good cause.\\\" The second extension was granted, and appellant was allowed until January 28, 1991, to file his brief.\\nAt approximately 5:15 p.m. on January 28, 1991, counsel for appellant attempted to file appellant's brief with this Court. It being past closing time for the Court, appellant's counsel was informed that the brief would not be accepted for filing that day. Appellant's counsel returned January 29, 1991, and filed the brief.\\nAppellant has responded to appellee's motion to dismiss by asking this Court to permit the late filing and to review the appeal on its merits.\\nII\\nAppellant's plea to ignore his tardiness and to consider his appeal on its merits is not new to this Court. We considered the same problem in Begay v. Begay, id. There, the appellant filed his brief two days late, without explanation for its untimeliness, and the appellee, two weeks later, successfully motioned this Court to dismiss the appeal.\\nIn Begay, we extensively reviewed the reasons for strictly holding the parties to the briefing schedule. There, we found that \\\"a filing deadline is not a target date, but an integral element of the adversarial process which requires close scrutiny by the litigants involved.\\\" Id. at 121, citing Riverside Service Station v. Eddie, 5 Nav. R. 135, 136 (1987). We also found that \\\"[j]ustice, fairness to all litigants, and judicial efficiency demand\\\" that, absent a showing of \\\"good cause,\\\" violations of the procedural rules will be construed as evidence of a lack of good faith and as an adequate basis for dismissal of the appeal. Id. Consequently, we established the following rule: \\\"This Court has discretionary authority to accept a brief that is filed late. Absent a showing of good cause for the untimely submission, however, the appeal will be dismissed.\\\" Id. at 122.\\nIn Begay, the appellant did not even respond to the appellee's motion to dismiss for untimeliness, leaving us with no possibility of finding \\\"good cause\\\" upon which we could exercise discretion to consider the appeal on its merits. Here, that is not the case. Appellant has responded to appellee's motion to dismiss. However, it takes no more than a cursory examination of appellant's response to conclude that the requisite \\\"good cause\\\" to deny appellee's motion has not been shown.\\nAppellant claims that his counsel attempted to file his brief on the day it was due, January 28, 1991, but was rebuffed by Court personnel. In carefully deleting any mention of when \\u2014 what hour of the day \\u2014 his attorney approached the Court, appellant insinuates that the filing would have been timely, save for the absence of key Court personnel. That clearly was not the case. As we have stressed before, this Court accepts filing only during the normal business hours of eight o'clock in the morning to five o'clock of that afternoon, and \\\"no pleading of any sort is accepted for filing after five o'clock in the afternoon.\\\" Viva Rancho Motors, Inc. v. Tully, 5 Nav. R. 145, 146 (1987). Appellant's counsel came to the door of the court fifteen minutes after closing. That being the case, appellant's complaint that his brief was untimely because the doors of the Court were shut to him is without merit.\\nAppellant offers no other explanation for the untimeliness of his brief which we could use to find \\\"good cause\\\" for ignoring his tardiness. Upon appellant's counsel's claim of illness in his office, we exercised our discretion for appellant, not once, but twice, and allowed him extra weeks to prepare his brief. Indeed, our second order extended the timeframe for appellant a full week beyond the date he himself requested. But we have been offered no persuasive, nor even plausible, reason for the type of procrastination which led to the arrival of his counsel at the Court's door fifteen minutes after closing.\\nWe find that appellant's response to appellee's motion to dismiss fails entirely to provide any basis upon which we could find \\\"good cause\\\" for the untimely filing of appellant's brief. Lacking that prerequisite for a favorable exercise of our discretion, we cannot hear his appeal on the merits.\\nAppellant's appeal is DISMISSED.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530302\", \"name\": \"Edison Burnside, Plaintiff, v. Genevieve Burnside, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burnside v. Burnside\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-10-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. TC-CV-073-87, TC-CV-025-84\", \"first_page\": 551, \"last_page\": 559, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 551\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Family Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Judge Wayne Cadman, Sr. presiding.\", \"parties\": \"Edison Burnside, Plaintiff, v. Genevieve Burnside, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Nos. TC-CV-073-87, TC-CV-025-84\\nFamily Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Tuba City, Arizona\\nEdison Burnside, Plaintiff, v. Genevieve Burnside, Defendant.\\nDecided October 19, 1990\\nJudge Wayne Cadman, Sr. presiding.\", \"word_count\": \"4092\", \"char_count\": \"24600\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis matter having come before the Court on June 7, 23 and 24,1988 for final hearings with the plaintiff represented by Gary LaRance, and the defendant represented by Timothy Joe and subsequently Steven Boos of the Mexican Hat D.N.A., the Court upon review of the oral testimony and physical evidence presented, hereby finds:\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. This matter stems from a Petition for Modification of Child Custody, Contempt, and Accounting filed by the plaintiff on February 23, 1987.\\n2. Plaintiff and defendant stipulated to A) the Court's continuing Jurisdiction as it arises from a Divorce Decree issued on February 20,1985, B) that the physical custody of the three minor children were awarded to the defendant, and C) that the plaintiff was granted visitation rights.\\n3. The Court further took Judicial notice of A) the Order for Pendente Lite visitation of December 5, 1984 issued by the Honorable Robert Walters, B) the Marital Settlement Agreement which was incorporated into the February 20,\\n1985 Divorce Decree issued by the Honorable Robert Walters, C) the October 31, 1986 Order issued by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley, D) the December 1,\\n1986 Attachment Order issued by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley, and E) the August 4, 1987 Order issued by the Honorable Wayne Cadman, Sr.\\n4. The minor children at issue in this cause of action are: Shannon Burnside, DOB: 05/28/76, C#619,435; Tom Burnside, DOB: 10/19/79, C#623,282; and Rochelle Burnside, DOB: 09/20/81, C#625,896.\\n5. The Marital Settlement Agreement established a savings account in the amount of $5,000.00 with the Valley National Bank in Page, Arizona under Account # 31337968 for the sole use of the minor children for their education and in case of emergencies with all withdrawals to be consented to by both parties.\\n6. Shannon Burnside is a thirteen year old Navajo child who presently resides with her siblings, natural mother Genevieve (Burnside) Black, and stepfather Roy Lee Black in Shonto, Arizona. She is enrolled with the Kayenta Unified School District and is in the seventh grade.\\n7. Tom Burnside is a ten year old Navajo child who also resides with his siblings, natural mother and stepfather in Shonto, Arizona and is enrolled with the Shonto Boarding School and is in the fourth grade.\\n8. Rochelle Burnside is an eight year old Navajo child who also resides with her siblings, natural mother and stepfather in Shonto, Arizona and is enrolled with the Shonto Boarding School and is in the second grade.\\n9. Genevieve (Burnside) Black is a thirty-three years old Navajo mother who was previously married to Edison Burnside and was divorced on February 20, 1985. Mrs. Black is presently employed with the Shonto Boarding School and has been for the past thirteen years. She has been with Facility Maintenance since February 1988 with an income of $7.50 per hour with forty hour work week and works from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 RM. daily. Mrs. Black presently resides with her three children from her marriage to Edison Burnside, her two children from Roy Lee Black, who are three and two years old, and her husband in a three bedroom government house in Shonto, Arizona. Mrs. Black is a member of the Native American Church and is a member of the Board of Directors from District 8 of the Association.\\n10. Roy Lee Black is a thirty-three years old Navajo male married to Genevieve Black from Long House Valley. Mr. Black presently resides with Genevieve Black, the three Burnside children, and his two children from his present marriage in Shonto, Arizona. Mr. Black is presently employed by Peabody Coal Company and earns an income of $16.65 per hour with an average of thirty-six hour work week. Mr. Burnside met Genevieve Black in September of 1984 and were married on October 20, 1986.\\n11. Edison Burnside is thirty-seven years old and is the natural father of Shannon, Tom, and Rochelle Burnside. Mr. Burnside presently resides in Page, Arizona and is employed by Peabody Coal Company at the Black Mesa Mine as an Electrician and earns an income of $18.17 per hour with an average work week of forty hours. He works from 12:00 midnight to 8:00 A.M. Mr. Burnside presently resides with Grade Bileen at his trailer in Page, Arizona.\\n12. Edison Burnside has an Associate of Arts Degree in Electronics and resides in a two bedroom trailer in Page, Arizona and that photographs of the interior show that the trailer is well furnished with expensive pieces of furniture.\\n13. Grade Bileen is a thirty-six year old Navajo woman with four children, the oldest being twenty-three years and the youngest being six years old. The oldest daughter is presently caring for her three siblings in Teec Nos Pos, Arizona and does not live with her and Edison Burnside. Ms. Bileen met Edison Burnside in 1987 and began cohabitating with him since 1987. She is presently employed by two restaurants in Page, Arizona.\\n14. Kathryn Tsosie of Chinle Navajo Division of Social Welfare Office submitted a written Social Investigation on June 6,1988 listing her interviews, findings and six recommendations to the Court.\\n15. The Social Worker defined the \\\"Alignment Principle\\\" as one parent aligning a child's thoughts and actions to diminish relations with the other parent.\\n16. Edison Burnside, since December 14, 1984 to the most recent attempted visitation on August 14,1988, has made approximately 14 attempted visitations only to be informed by Mrs. Black that the children did not wish to see him, and she would not force them to see him.\\n17. It is apparent that the parties had bitter feelings toward each other during the divorce and that these feelings continued after the divorce. These feelings are evidenced by arguments ensuing between the parties during visitations and at times in front of the children.\\n18. These arguments often stem from the time when the parties separated in July of 1984 when Mr. Burnside had the electricity disconnected and took a washing machine and other household items. At this time, the children were eight, four and two years old respectively. Police officers were sometimes called for assistance when the parties began arguments or disputes over visitation by the plaintiff which often resulted in the plaintiff being advised to take the matter back to Court.\\n19. Since Mrs. Black has two younger daughters by her present marriage, a baby-sitter comes daily when the Blacks are working until she returns after 5:00 P.M. The three Burnside children are normally in school from 8:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. daily.\\n20. The Blacks have stressed the importance of Navajo traditions and culture and presently teach them to the Burnside children and their own children. At times, the children are taken to their grandparents home to visit and herd sheep.\\n21. The Burnside children have accepted Roy Lee Black as their father and refer to him as \\\"father\\\" and \\\"daddy,\\\" and their relationship is good. Mr. Black also provides for the family needs and attends parent meetings held at the school for the Burnside children.\\n22. During the visitations made by Edison Burnside, the children became disturbed and frightened and refused to see their natural father. These fears were often aggravated by the presence of police officers called for assistance by the defendant and by the arguments and verbal confrontations.\\n23. The observations by the relatives of Genevieve Black, the Burnside children's teacher, and the Social Worker in her report all indicated that Mrs. Black was a caring mother and provided for the needs of the children.\\n24. Edison Burnside never hurt the children during their marriage, aside from normal spanking for discipline.\\n25.Edison Burnside indicated that if the children are placed in his home, his working hours would not conflict with being away from the children as they would be asleep from midnight to the early morning hours. Grade Bileen would be available to see them off to school. Mr. Burnside stated that he planned to enroll the children in the Page Public Schools.\\n26. Mrs. Black's criminal history reflects only two convictions for speeding with the most recent offense in May of 1984. Mr. Burnside's criminal history record reflects ten convictions for speeding and one pending with the most recent case being in October 1989.\\n27. On September 13, 1985, Genevieve Black withdrew $5,076.72 from the Valley National Bank in Page, Arizona which was to be used for the education of the children and for emergencies as stipulated in the Marital Settlement Agreement, and without the consent of the plaintiff. Mrs. Black alleges to have deposited the money into the Coconino Federal Credit Union in Flagstaff, Arizona but refuses to specify the amount or account number. Some of the money was also alleged to have been used for clothing purchases for the children, but Mrs. Black failed to produce any receipts or supply an itemized accounting with amounts to the present date, even though an Interim Order of July 27, 1988 ordered Mrs. Black to: A) disclose how the money was used upon withdrawal; and B) show the current balance on deposit at Coconino Credit Union no later than July 8, 1988.\\n28. The first attempts at visitation by the plaintiff were on December 14,1984 and December 21 - 25, 1984, but were denied due to no one being home at the Black's residence even though the defendant had prior knowledge of Court Ordered visitation in accordance with the Pendente Lite Order for Visitation issued by the Honorable Robert Walters on December 4, 1984.\\n29. A third scheduled visitation on February 9, 1985 was also denied due to family members informing plaintiff that the children were afraid of him and did not want to see him, and that defendant had prior knowledge of this visitation by the February 20, 1985 Divorce Decree and the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement.\\n30. A fourth visitation scheduled for the Easter weekend of April 6, 1985 was also denied for reasons of no one being home at the Black residence in Shonto, Arizona.\\n31. A fifth visitation was scheduled for July 5, 1985 in accordance with the Divorce Decree of February 20, 1985 and the Marital Settlement Agreement, but was denied due to no one being home again at the Black residence.\\n32.A sixth visitation was scheduled for October 31, 1986, but was again denied as only the baby-sitter was home, and stated that the Blacks took the Burnside children to the Arizona State Fair in Phoenix, Arizona. This visitation was ordered by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley through her Findings and Order of October 31, 1986.\\n33. A seventh visitation was scheduled for the weekend of December 6-7, 1986 but was denied again, and was scheduled in accordance with the Supplemental Visitation Plan ordered by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley on December 1, 1986.\\n34. An eighth visitation scheduled for the weekend of December 23 - 24,1986 was not made. Although the plaintiff saw the children, no visitation occurred. An officer was summoned due to an argument between the plaintiff and Mrs. Black's mother, Dianna Calamity, and plaintiff further threatened Mrs. Black's father, Trixie Calamity, over ruining his vehicles through witchcraft. The plaintiff took the youngest child, Rochelle, but upon arrival of Police Officer Robert Clitso, the child was returned to the defendant. Officer Clitso refused to permit the children to visit with their father and advised the plaintiff to leave the residence. This scheduled visitation was also ordered by the December 1, 1986 Supplemental Visitation Plan issued by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley.\\n35. A ninth visitation was scheduled for the weekend of January 3 -4, 1987, but was again denied. The plaintiff saw one of the children at the window but no one answered the door. Police Officer Harrison Navajo then came and requested the plaintiff to leave since the children did not want to see him. This scheduled visitation was ordered in the Supplemental Visitation Plan ordered by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley on December 1, 1986.\\n36. A tenth and eleventh visitation were attempted by the plaintiff on February 7 and again on February 8, 1987, but were again denied due to no one being home at the Black residence in Shonto, Arizona. This visitation was also ordered by the December 1,1986 Supplemental Visitation Plan ordered by the Honorable Evelyn Bradley.\\n37. Subsequent scheduled visitations set for the weekends of March 25 - 26, 1987; April 4 - 5, 1987; May 2 - 3, 1987; June 6 - 7, and July 4 - 5, 1987 were not attempted by the plaintiff due to his discouraged and frustrated attempts to visit his children.\\n38. A twelfth visitation was attempted by the plaintiff on August 7, 1987 upon an Order for Visitation issued by the Honorable Wayne Cadman, Sr. on August 4,1987, and by previous agreement by the parties, was to have Mrs. Black bring the children to the Law Office of Gary LaRance for the plaintiff to pick up. But this visitation never occurred and Mrs. Black did not bring the children to the Law Office, and when Mr. Burnside went to the residence of the defendant, no one was home.\\n39. A thirteenth visitation was attempted by the plaintiff on August 14, 1987, but again no one was home and no visitation occurred. This visitation was also ordered by the August 4,1987 order issued by the Honorable Wayne Cadman, Sr.\\n40. A final attempt at visitation by the plaintiff was on December 25,1987, but due to verbal confrontation with the defendant's present husband, Roy Lee Black, the visitation did not occur. The plaintiff tape recorded this conversation and was allowed into evidence.\\n41. Shannon Burnside is afraid of her father because she was told by Genevieve Black he did not take care of them, he had a gun and he always hurt her mother. If she was forced to go with her father, she stated she \\\"would rather go to jail.\\\"\\n42. Tom Burnside really did not know his father and is not afraid of him, and on one occasion went shopping for clothes with his father in Flagstaff, Arizona. He could not read the letter that was sent to the Social Worker but signed it when Shannon asked him to.\\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\nI. WHETHER THE PRESENT CUSTODY OF THE THREE MINOR CHILDREN SHOULD BE CHANGED WHEN THE CHILDREN REFUSE TO VISIT A NONCUSTODIAL PARENT\\nThere is nothing specifically stated in the Navajo Tribal Code to address the issue of a noncustodial parent's visitation right. 9 N.T.C. Sec. 404 does state that a \\\"divorce decree shall provide for a fair and just settlement of property rights between the parties, and also for the custody and proper care of the minor children.\\\" Since there is no Navajo law, then under 7 N.T.C. Sec. 204(c), Navajo courts may apply the laws of the state in which the matter in dispute may lie. Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Nav. R. 108 (1983). The law of the state in this case would be A.R.S. 25-337 which states:\\nA parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights to ensure that the minor child has frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent unless the court finds that visitation would endanger seriously a child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health.\\nThis Court, while not bound by Arizona laws, may use the statute as guidance. Here, Edison Burnside, the noncustodial parent, is entitled to reasonable visitation rights with the minor children. Mr. Burnside has consistently sought to exercise his visitation rights since before the divorce and afterwards.\\nGenerally, the question of whether to limit the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent because visitation would endanger seriously a child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court but the power is to be exercised with caution and restraint. Only under extraordinary circumstances should a parent be denied the right of visitation. Reardon v. Reardon, 3 Ariz. App. 475, 415 P.2d 257 (1966). There is no evidence of misconduct on the part of Mr. Burnside. Neither is there evidence of any deficiency or instability in the father's home. Rather, the father has attempted to increase his time and involvement with the children by asking the Court to increase his visitation rights. See orders of December 1, 1986 and August 4, 1987.\\nHowever, the evidence shows that the children did not wish to see their father and were afraid of him. There is substantial evidence that the mother has consistently and deliberately frustrated, obstructed, and hindered the father's visitation rights, thereby seriously damaging the relationship between the children and their father. The children have rejected their father to the point where one claims that she would \\\"rather go to jail\\\" than be with her father. An Arizona case relied on a Pennsylvania court opinion to address the issue whether minor children should be required to visit the noncustodial parent despite their desire not to do so. That court held that the custodial parent could be directed to exercise parental authority over the minor children so as to require compliance with a visitation order. Sholty v. Sherrill, 129 Ariz. 458, 632 P.2d 268 (1981), citing Fernald v. Fernald, 224 Pa. Super. 93, 302 A.2d 470 (1973); Commonwealth v. Fotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 146 A.2d 362 (1958). In Fotz, the court rejected the argument that the 13 year old child should not be forced to visit her father where the child has a strong fear of her father because it appeared he had struck and kicked the child before. The court held that the best interests of the child would be advanced by effecting a reconciliation with her father. To deny visitation rights could only lead to permanent estrangement between the child and the father. Therefore, the court held that it had the power to require the mother to exercise parental control to compel the child to visit her father.\\nHere, the District Court agrees with this view. Where a mother's attitude toward visitation has been a contributing factor in destroying a relationship between a child and the father, the Court will require the mother to exercise her parental control over her child and take steps to reestablish a relationship between the child and the father. Here, the mother aligned the children, specifically Shannon, against her father. Shannon then influenced her younger siblings. Shannon has the same attitude as her mother, that she won't be forced to see her father and would rather go to jail. The children were too young when the separation occurred and information on the father can only be obtained from their mother.\\nThe children's conflicting emotions stem from the mother's attitudes rather than by any overt mistreatment by the father. There could be a beneficial visitation if the children could be assisted in ridding themselves of the stress and psychological damage. Measures should be taken to attempt to heal the wounds suffered by the children and the parents.\\nHowever, the mother persistently avoids visitation by being away from home. She does recognize the right of visitation, provided the father has \\\"the right attitude.\\\" In her opinion, the right attitude is communicating with her and Roy Lee Black.\\nThe alignment instilled by the mother is damaging to the moral and emotional health of the children and can be overcome by counseling. Counseling needs to include both noncustodial father and mother as well and should be more concerned about the children than their differences resulting in bitter feelings towards each other during and after the divorce. These feelings are evidenced by arguments ensuing between the parents during visitations and at times in front of the children. Children should not be left in this type of environment. Although the children's needs are provided for by the mother and removing them would be detrimental, the future of the children far outweigh the present.\\nIt is in the best interests of the children that they be removed from the residence of the mother and be placed in the care of the Navajo Nation Division of Social Services where they can receive proper guidance and counseling. The children need to reestablish a relationship with their father before it is beyond repair. Because of the history of the mother, this goal cannot be accomplished by leaving the children in her continued custody. This Court has continually issued warnings and orders regarding visitation which have been ignored. The Court has no choice now but to intervene and place the children in the care of the Social Services - until further notice of this Court.\\nII. WHETHER A CUSTODIAL PARENT MAY BE HELD FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR ALLEGEDLY MISUSING THE JOINT TENANCY TRUST ACCOUNT AS ESTABLISHED BY A DIVORCE DECREE AND FOR ALLEGEDLY INTERFERING WITH COURT ORDERED VISITATION SCHEDULES\\nThe Navajo Nation courts have inherent power to punish for contempt. The court must always first determine whether the person's conduct constitutes contempt. A failure to obey an order of the court is contempt. John v. Herrick, 5 Nav. R. 129, 130 (1987). The facts show that the mother deliberately disobeyed the terms of the Marital Settlement Agreement establishing a trust fund at Valley National Bank which was to be used for the education and emergencies of the children. Withdrawals were to be made only upon consent by both parties.\\nOn September 13, 1985, Genevieve Black proceeded to withdraw $5,076.72 from the Valley National Bank in Page, Arizona, without the consent of the plaintiff. Mrs. Black indicated that some of the money was redeposited into the Coconino Federal Credit Union in Flagstaff, Arizona, but refused to specify the amount or account number. The rest of the money was used for clothing purchases for the children but failed to produce any receipts or an itemized accounting with amounts to the present date. An Interim Order of July 27, 1988 ordered Mrs. Black to disclose how the money was used upon withdrawal and show the current balance on deposit at Coconino Credit Union no later than July 8, 1988. Mrs. Black did neither.\\nIn addition, the mother deliberately disobeyed the Pendente Lite Order for visitation (Dec. 4, 1984), Divorce Decree (Feb. 20, 1985), Order of October 31, 1986, Supplemental Visitation Plan (Dec. 1, 1986), and Order of Aug. 4, 1987 granting the father visitation rights. The father attempted 14 scheduled visitations between December, 1984 and 1987.\\nThere is substantial evidence that the mother disobeyed the authority of this Court and interfered with the father's visitation rights as follows: (1) by leaving visitation to the discretion of the children; (2) by refusing to answer the door when the father arrived to pick up the children; (3) by calling the Tribal Police for assistance when their presence was unnecessary and using the police to hinder visitation; (4) by refusing to exercise parental control to compel the children to visit their father; and (5) by contributing to the children's rejection of their father.\\nORDER\\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the said minor children shall immediately be placed in the legal custody, care, and control of the Tuba City Navajo Division of Social Services until further order by the Court.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Navajo Division of Social Services shall commence counseling sessions with both the plaintiff and defendant concerning 1) the alignment of the children against the plaintiff, 2) for visitations, and 3) parenting skills.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant is found to be in indirect contempt for disobeying the Marital Settlement Agreement which was incorporated into the Final Divorce Decree concerning the withdrawal of $5,076.72 on September 13,1985; and is in indirect contempt for violating the provisions of the Interim Order issued on July 27,1988 for failing to disclose to the Court as to how the money was used, and the current amount in the Coconino Credit Union; and that the defendant be immediately taken into custody and detained at the Navajo Division of Public Safety in Tuba City, Arizona and held until a sum of $5,076.72 is deposited into a trust account for the benefit of the three minor children with disbursements to be supervised by the Navajo Division of Social Welfare.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all visitations by both parents with the minor children be supervised by the Navajo Division of Social Welfare.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a review hearing shall be held within 90 days from the date of this order.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530306\", \"name\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Peter MacDonald Sr., Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. MacDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-09-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-31-90\", \"first_page\": 204, \"last_page\": 205, \"citations\": \"6 Navajo Rptr. 204\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:44:15.784960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before TSO, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN (sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Navajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Peter MacDonald Sr., Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-31-90\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNavajo Nation, Plaintiff, v. Peter MacDonald Sr., Defendant.\\nDecided September 6, 1990\\nBefore TSO, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN (sitting by designation), Associate Justices.\\nRichard W. Hughes, Esq., Special Prosecutor for the Navajo Nation, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for the Plaintiff; and Peter Breen, Esq., Navajo Legal Aid and Defender Service, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"728\", \"char_count\": \"4581\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nTSO, Chief Justice.\\nThis is an original proceeding in this Court on a request for acceptance of a certified question from the Window Rock District Court. The issue is whether this Court should accept the question certified by the trial judge.\\nI. Facts\\nOn August 22, 1990, defendant Peter MacDonald Sr. filed a motion with the Window Rock District Court requesting that Judge Robert Yazzie disqualify himself from any proceeding involving the defendant in Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. WR-CR-3682-3740-89 and No. WR-CR-3617-3641-89. As summarized, defendant's ground for the motion is that Judge Yazzie is personally biased against him because he attempted to \\\"fire\\\" the judge in the past.\\nOn August 23, 1990, Judge Yazzie entered an order certifying the following question to this Court: \\\"Is a judge required to disqualify himself for the reasons and under the circumstances set forth in the motions attached to and made a part of this order.\\\" Facts relevant to this question were not stated in the order.\\nOn August 31, 1990, defendant filed with this Court a \\\"motion in opposition to acceptance of jurisdiction\\\" over the certified question. Defendant requests that this Court decline jurisdiction over the certified question. On September 6,1990, plaintiff filed a response to defendant's motion essentially arguing that this Court should accept and decide the question certified by Judge Yazzie.\\nII. Discussion\\nA question can be certified to this Court by a trial court as a special proceeding authorized by decisions of this Court. See Navajo Housing Authority v. Betsoi, 5 Nav. R. 5 (1984); In re Certified Questions I, 6 Nav. R. 97 (1989); In re Certified Questions II, 6 Nav. R. 105 (1989). In Betsoi, the Court permitted trial courts to certify questions to this Court as a special proceeding authorized by Rule 16 of the Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure. In civil actions, the Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure has been superseded by the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. In spite of this, trial courts can continue to certify questions to this Court as a special proceeding authorized by decisions of this Court.\\nWhether to accept a certified question is a matter within the discretion of this Court. Certifying questions, however, should not be a method used by trial courts to avoid deciding issues properly before them. To prevent the remedy of certification of question from becoming meaningless, this Court will examine each question certified against the language in Betsoi to determine whether the question should be accepted.\\nThe initial inquiry on every question certified to this Court is whether the question is one that is proper for this Court to address. For this Court to make that determination, the question certified must be \\\"carefully and precisely framed to present distinctly and clearly the question or proposition of law involved. The certificate should contain the proper statement of the ultimate facts upon which the question arises and should clearly show in what respect the instruction of decision of the appellate court is desired.\\\" Betsoi, 5 Nav. R. at 7\\nThe question certified in this case is not in compliance with the procedural requirements of Betsoi. First, the question certified is not carefully and precisely framed. The question concerns disqualification of the judge, but it further incorporates two motions and an affidavit filed by the defendant's counsels requesting disqualification as part of the certified question. The many pages comprising the motions and affidavit contain numerous factual allegations in support of the motions. The certified question therefore is broad and imprecise. Second, the order certifying the question does not contain facts upon which the question arises. Third, the question of whether a judge should disqualify himself on allegations of bias, we believe, is a proper issue for that trial judge to decide. At least under the circumstances of this case, it is not a proper question for certification.\\nFor the reasons set forth in this opinion, this Court will not accept the question certified.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6755244.json b/navajo_nation/6755244.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8e3d58a2d55a4158aec45d5014da8b24eb75f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6755244.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6755244\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO TRIBE OF INDIANS Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARILYN LITTLEMAN Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Littleman\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-12-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 33, \"last_page\": 36, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 33\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before KIRK, Chief Justice, BECENTt and BENNALLEY, Associate Justices\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO TRIBE OF INDIANS Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARILYN LITTLEMAN Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE NAVAJO TRIBE OF INDIANS Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARILYN LITTLEMAN Defendant-Appellant\\nDecided December 7, 1971\\nMerwin Lynch, Deputy Trial Prosecutor, Office of the Prosecutor, Window Rock, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee\\nNorman Ration, Reynold Harrison, D. N, A., Window Rock, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant\\nBefore KIRK, Chief Justice, BECENTt and BENNALLEY, Associate Justices\", \"word_count\": \"611\", \"char_count\": \"3655\", \"text\": \"KIRK, Chief Justice\\nAppeal from a judgment of the Trial Court for the District of Window Rock, Arizona, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of Title 14, Section 252, Navajo Tribal Code, by failing to use due care while driving a vehicle upon a roadway and from a sentence that the defendant serve 30 days in jail.\\nOn the 29th day of April, 1971, the defendant while driving a pickup truck on Navajo Route #12, a public roadway within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Courts, near Fort Defiance, Arizona, struck and killed a six year old child who was crossing the highway immediately in front of the defendant's truck at the time.\\nA complaint was issued against the defendant charging her with failure to use due care. The case was heard by the Trial Court without a jury, the defendant was found guilty and it comes before this Court for a trial de novo.\\nAfter hearing the evidence on appeal this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Court is not at all satisfied that the defendant used all due care and precautions which she should have used under the circumstances.\\nIn this respect the Court will take judicial notice that highway and traffic conditions on the Navajo Reservation require an extra degree of caution and due care and that Navajo drivers are under a duty to use a higher degree of care because of the general lack of fences and open range conditions on the reservation with horses, sheep and other animals apt to wander onto the highways. There are, in general, no sidewalks or marked pedestrian crossings in the towns on the reservation and many people walk along and cross highways at unexpected points.\\nThe Tribal Council has recognized these conditions in enacting Section 252, Title 14, Navajo Tribal Code, under which Navajos are required to:\\n\\\"... exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.11\\nWe strongly recommend that signs be erected calling for much slower vehicle speeds at all points where there are apt to be children or other people near or upon the highway and that crosswalks be marked on the pavement at points where there are frequent pedestrian crossings, that many of the posted speed limits be lowered and that generally more warnings be posted. In this case the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour. We consider that the defendant may have failed to use due care in this case by driving at 25 miles per hour.\\nCounsel for both parties have presented rather extensive briefs on the application of the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2nd 694, to the present case. It appeared from the evidence that the police officer called to the scene of the accident asked the defendant about the circumstances and she admitted to him that she was driving the vehicle that struck the child. Since the defendant subsequently took the witness stand on her own behalf and admitted she was the driver, we cannot see that the Miranda ruling has application to this case.\\nIt is ORDERED that a judgment of acquittal be entered and that the defendant be immediately discharged.\\nBECENTI, Associate Justice and BENN ALLEY, Associate concur. Justice,\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6755386.json b/navajo_nation/6755386.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81b0d122a31f4f117f17c567e3491db38390943a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6755386.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6755386\", \"name\": \"JOSE PABLO TRUJILLO Plaintiff-Appellee vs. WILBUR MORGAN Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Trujillo v. Morgan\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 55, \"last_page\": 58, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 55\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOSE PABLO TRUJILLO Plaintiff-Appellee vs. WILBUR MORGAN Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"JOSE PABLO TRUJILLO Plaintiff-Appellee vs. WILBUR MORGAN Defendant-Appellant\\nDecided on March 19, 1970\\nLeonard Jimson and Tom Galbraith, D.N.A., Window Rock, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee\\nPerry Allen, Office of the Prosecutor, Window Rock, Arizona, William MacPherson and Warren Bachtel, Office of the General Counsel, Window Rock, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant\", \"word_count\": \"730\", \"char_count\": \"4273\", \"text\": \"KIRK, Chief Justice\\nThe Court of Appeals of the Navajo Tribe, Acting Chief Justice, Virgil L. Kirk, Sr., sitting solely heard ora! argument of both parties on the propriety of the Trial Courtis denial of a motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the Navajo Tribe and Wilbur Morgan.\\nThe motion to dismiss was based on the contention that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits by operation of Resolution CJY-70-69 of the Navajo Tribal Council, Sections 2(5) (F) and 2(5) (D).\\nSection 2(5) (F) provides:\\n\\\"AH cases presently pending before the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council shall be transferred to the Trial Courts of the Navajo Tribe, subject to Subparagraph D of this Section\\\",\\nSubparagraph D of Section 2(5) states in relevant part:\\n\\\"The Navajo Tribe, by the Tribal Prosecutor, or the applicant may appeal any decision of the Screening Committee or its lawful successor, or Trial Court of the Navajo Tribe . within the time provided by law for appeals from judgments of the Trial Courts of the Navajo Tribe .\\\"\\nMr. Trujillo appeared before the Screening Committee in 1956 and was denied admission to membership. In 1969 he requested a rehearing of his case to the Advisory Committee. The Tribal Council by its language in Section 2(5) (F) \\\"transferred\\\" all cases pending before the Advisory Committee to the Trial Courts. The Trujillo case was then pending and was also \\\"transferred\\\" to the Trial Court. No provision was made how the transfer should occur; but Mr. Trujillo initiated his action in the Trial Court at Crownpoint on December 18, 1969, since no other provision had been made for transfer. Appellant argues that the case is an appeal and that it was appealed to late, therefore, being cut off Resolution CJY-70-69, however, transferred all cases then pending before the Advisory Committee to the Trial Courts. Mr. Trujillo's case had previously been cut off from appeal In 1956. When Mr. Trujillo again placed his request for membership in the hands of the Advisory Committee the fact that he was not denied access to the Committee had the effect of giving him another hearing. By transferring the case to the Trial Court, the Council reopened the case. Reconsideration of Trujillo's case could have been denied either by the Council or the Advisory Committee, but it was not. No time limitation was stated in the Resolution for taking a transferred case to the Trial Court, nor was it made clear whether it was an automatic transfer as the language might be taken to apply or the interested party must hand carry it to the Courts. The limitation of thirty days refers only to cases appealed from the Screening Committee to the Trial Court or from the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. If the Council meant something other than this, it was not stated in the Resolution nor in the discussion in Council chambers at the time the Resolution was passed. Only the cases which were pending before the Advisory Committee at the time of the Resolution's passage (July 24, 1969) were transferred to the Trial Court. All other cases must be appealed to the Trial Court as outlined in Section 2(5) (D) from a final order of the Screening Committee. Here there was no final order and could therefore be no appeal. This is so because any appeal from prior Screening Committee or Advisory Committee action had already passed its time limitation.\\nFor the above reasons, denial of the motion to dismiss is therefore denied. This case has been heard on its merits in the Trial Court and an appeal on that case is pending before this Court. Because of the nature of the case it is ORDERED that it be a de novo or new trial.\\nThe Court of Appeals chastises counsel for the appellee for their late appearance and apologizes to counsel for the appellant for Its own late appearance.\\nDONE in open Court on the 12th day of MARCH and SIGNED on the 19th day of MARCH 1970.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6755814.json b/navajo_nation/6755814.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c46e13a8df6f5a257bebf5d84d282c21883678c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6755814.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6755814\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARIE FRANKLIN Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Franklin\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-03-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 145, \"last_page\": 149, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 145\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before KIRK, Chief Justice, BECENTI and BLUEHOUSE, Associate Justices\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARIE FRANKLIN Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MARIE FRANKLIN Defendant-Appellant\\nDecided on March 14, 1977\\nHerman Light, District Prosecutor, Shiprock, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee\\nKenneth Begay, D. N. A., Window Rock, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant\\nBefore KIRK, Chief Justice, BECENTI and BLUEHOUSE, Associate Justices\", \"word_count\": \"1046\", \"char_count\": \"6170\", \"text\": \"KIRK, Chief Justice\\nThis case came on appeal from a conviction of defendant-appellant of the charge of selling liquor in violation of 17 N.T.C. 561.\\nWe are aware that the appellant took the stand in her own behalf at her trial and made statements that tend to support her conviction. However, there are important issues presented, by this case which the Court of Appeals .wishes to discuss and therefore we do not choose to uphold the conviction, on that basis.. . -\\nThe questions presented by this case are:\\n1. Under what conditions may the police conduct warrant-less searches when it is clear that they could have gotten a search warrant in advance?\\n2. What is the scope of the \\\"plain view\\\" doctrine under Navajo law?\\nNeither counsel for the appellant nor counsel for the government focused clearly on these two issues in their briefs and oral argument. The facts, as best we can determine them from the imcomplete record presented to us, are the following:\\n1. Acting on a tip from an informer, on March 7, 1976, the police, dressed in plainclothes, went to the home of Marie Franklin to purchase liquor.\\n2. When they knocked on her door, Marie Franklin opened it and, after some discussion, sold the police officer liquor in violation of 17 N.T.C. 561.\\n3. Upon being sold the liquor, the police arrested Ms. Franklin, entered her home, and conducted an extensive search, seizing an unspecified quantity of liquor, said by counsel for the government to have been in plain view of the opened door at which the purchase was made.\\nIn any situation in which the police have information in advance of a planned operation sufficient to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant, they must obtain such a warrant. To allow any other practice would in effect negate, the substantive protections of Title 1, Section 4 of the Navajo Tribal Code. This is the \\\"search and seizure\\\" section of the Navajo Bill of Rights.\\nThe situation in this case is confused by the fact that apparently the government is claiming that probable cause developed only at the scene and therefore a search warrant was not needed. We are not satisfied, upon examining the District Court record and after hearing oral argument, that such was the case. Even if liquor was in fact in plain view at the time of the arrest, the questions surrounding the search remain.\\nAt the time Marie Franklin was arrested, her entire house was extensively searched. The plain-view doctrine as we apply it only permits the seizure of the thing actually in plain view, the theory being that no \\\"search\\\" was really necessary to reveal the evidence seized. Therefore, once the police gain access to a place to seize something they have seen while outside, they can only seize the object which was already visible and any other materials that then are in plain view of the thing being seized.\\nObviously, then, the plain-view doctrine has limits. It does not authorize the police to open doors, drawers, and cabinets. Nor does this doctrine allow police to enter and search areas not within plain view of the thing being seized. The over-reaching search in this case was indefensible. However, the record is not clear as to what evidence was seized in the illegal portion of the search and whether such evidence was material to the -nviction.\\nTherefore, this case Is remanded to the District Court with instructions to hold a hearing on the following issues*\\n1. Whether the Navajo Division of Law Enforcement had probable cause to obtain a search warrant in advance of the search;\\n2. Whether liquor was in plain view of the officer making the purchase; and\\n3. Whether any evidence seized in the illegal portion of the search was material to the conviction.\\nif it is determined by the District Court that the police could have gotten a search warrant but did not, or that no liquor was in plain view of the arresting officer, or that evidence seized illegally was material to the conviction, then Marie Franklin's conviction shall be reversed.\\nIt is so ordered.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756137.json b/navajo_nation/6756137.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d1a384e71733c9c4769903e8b91fd90e98c0798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756137.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756137\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. RONALD CURLEY, Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Tribe v. Curley\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No.: A-CR-04-77\", \"first_page\": 236, \"last_page\": 237, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 236\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. RONALD CURLEY, Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nTHE NAVAJO TRIBE, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. RONALD CURLEY, Defendant-Appellant\\nNo.: A-CR-04-77\", \"word_count\": \"156\", \"char_count\": \"923\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nThe Appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed the 10th day of August, 197?, having been received and considered by the Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C. Section 451, the Court finds:\\nAppellant has failed to make a motion pursuant to Rule 5(d), Rules of the Court of Appeals, to correct the alleged error. rH\\n2. Title 14, Section 245 of the Navajo Tribal Code allows a judge a impose of sentence of six (6) months or $500.00 or both.\\n3. The remaining sentences are not appealable under 7 N.T.C. Section 172 as the sentence is less than 15 days and/or $26.00 fine.\\nTherefore, the appeal in the above-entitled matter is DISMISSED.\\nDated this 29th day of September, 1977.\\nVirgil L. Kirk, Sr. Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756151.json b/navajo_nation/6756151.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c79ece02c3976e1d6d1c2347b98f8ec4c44827a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756151.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756151\", \"name\": \"In The Matter Of The Appointment Of Tuba City District Prosecutor\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Appointment of Tuba City District Prosecutor\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No.: A-CV-12-77\", \"first_page\": 238, \"last_page\": 238, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 238\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In The Matter Of The Appointment Of Tuba City District Prosecutor\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nIn The Matter Of The Appointment Of Tuba City District Prosecutor\\nNo.: A-CV-12-77\", \"word_count\": \"95\", \"char_count\": \"586\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nAppellee's motion for reconsideration having been considered by th Chief Justice, it is hereby DISMISSED as untimely filed.\\nSince the principal issue is one properly raised only before oral argument, its dismissal for lack of timeliness is dispositive and the tangential matters raised in the motion need not be considered.\\nDated this 25th day of August, 1977.\\nVirgil L. Kirk, Sr. Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756164.json b/navajo_nation/6756164.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5cff6c7b46ba841016ba27de3aa05a3e038b4697
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756164.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756164\", \"name\": \"ROSELYN CHIA, C#104,709 Plaintiff-Appellee vs. CLARENCE BEGAY, C#108,493 Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Chia v. Begay\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No.: A-CV-11-77\", \"first_page\": 239, \"last_page\": 240, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 239\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ROSELYN CHIA, C#104,709 Plaintiff-Appellee vs. CLARENCE BEGAY, C#108,493 Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nROSELYN CHIA, C#104,709 Plaintiff-Appellee vs. CLARENCE BEGAY, C#108,493 Defendant-Appellant\\nNo.: A-CV-11-77\", \"word_count\": \"136\", \"char_count\": \"829\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nThe Notice of Appeal and supporting brief, filed the 9th day of June, 1977, having been received and considered by the Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C, Section 254, the Court finds:\\n1. Appellant has faded to show any error of law by the District Court.\\n2. Any review of the evidence already presented in this case by the Court of Appeals would amount to this Court second-guessing the District Court, Appellant has faded to offer any new evidence.\\nTherefore, the appeal in the above-entitled matter is hereby DISMISSED.\\nDated this 30th day of August, 197?,\\nVirgil L. Kirk, Sr, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756208.json b/navajo_nation/6756208.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ef02fa02a92dc207cdfdfd6d0cbc6b508c9096a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756208.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756208\", \"name\": \"In The Matter Of The Vacancy In The Tuba City District Prosecutor's Office\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Vacancy in the Tuba City District Prosecutor's Office\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No.: A-CV-09-77\", \"first_page\": 244, \"last_page\": 244, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 244\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In The Matter Of The Vacancy In The Tuba City District Prosecutor\\u2019s Office\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nIn The Matter Of The Vacancy In The Tuba City District Prosecutor\\u2019s Office\\nNo.: A-CV-09-77\", \"word_count\": \"125\", \"char_count\": \"735\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nThe Appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed the 23rd day of May, 1977, having been received and considered by the Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C. Section 451, the Court finds:\\n1. The District Court of the Navajo Nation, Judicial District of Tuba City, vacated the contempt order appealed from on June 15th, 1977.\\n2. The case is now moot as there is no appealable order.\\nTherefore, the appeal in the above-entitled matter is hereby DISMISSED.\\nDated this 20th day of June, 1977.\\nVirgil L. Kirk, Sr. Chief Justice Of The Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756272.json b/navajo_nation/6756272.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..682f2ab21b165bb01eff8d4ec6ef7dbc883c02a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756272.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756272\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff vs. KEE BROWNEYES, C#18,676 Dennehotso, Arizona, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Browneyes\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No.: A-CR-0178\", \"first_page\": 252, \"last_page\": 252, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 252\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff vs. KEE BROWNEYES, C#18,676 Dennehotso, Arizona, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nTHE NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff vs. KEE BROWNEYES, C#18,676 Dennehotso, Arizona, Defendant\\nNo.: A-CR-0178\", \"word_count\": \"168\", \"char_count\": \"876\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nThe appeal in the above entitled matter filed the 19th day of June, 1978, having been received and considered by the Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C. Section 451, the Court finds:\\n1. 7 N.T.C. 172 and Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that there shall be no appeal in any criminal case in which the defendant was sentenced to less than fifteen (15) days imprisonment and 60 days probation is less than 15 days and/or $26.00.\\nTherefore, the appeal in the above-entitled matter is DISMISSED.\\nCG tr-en 'C O Ctf +-> H m U fo 0) &\\nPu 53 CO w St S' fa ft> frj a -2 -M ed 525 .o S' > as S5 a) \\u2022H' : <M O: .\\u00ab-t C m -r-t-t->- O n a EN cr> *-\\u00bb\\u00bb > o t\\\"h\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756544.json b/navajo_nation/6756544.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea14c0ae7850cb5c7e4c8740c9c927563c6d4b40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756544.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756544\", \"name\": \"DAVID JOE Plaintiff - Appellant vs. WINONA JOE Defendant - Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Joe v. Joe\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-11-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 320, \"last_page\": 324, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 320\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before NESWOOD, Acting Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and LYNCH Associate Justices\", \"parties\": \"DAVID JOE Plaintiff - Appellant vs. WINONA JOE Defendant - Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"DAVID JOE Plaintiff - Appellant vs. WINONA JOE Defendant - Appellee\\nDecided on November 9, 1978\\nWilbert Tsosie, D.N.A., Shiprock, New Mexico, for Plaintiff - Appellant\\nNo Appearance of Counsel for Defendant - Appellee\\nBefore NESWOOD, Acting Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and LYNCH Associate Justices\", \"word_count\": \"866\", \"char_count\": \"5228\", \"text\": \"NESWOOD, Acting Chief Justice\\nI\\nOn December 8, 1977, the Appellant, David Joe, filed a petition for divorce from the Appellee, Winona Joe, in the Shiprock District Court.\\nAfter a full hearing on the 28th day of June, 1978, the District Judge issued a decree of divorce, divided the property, granted custody of the child to the Appellee, and awarded the Appellee $250.00 a month child support.\\nDavid Joe appealed, alleging that the community property items should have been appraised before the judge attempted distribution and that the distribution of the Native American Church paraphernalia was improper. The Appellant also claimed that the child support payments ordered by the Court are too high because he is permanently disabled.\\nII\\nThe issues for this Court to decide are:\\n1. Should the District Court have ordered the community property appraised before enetering an order of distribution?\\n2. Did the District Judge err in distributing the Native American Church paraphernalia to the Appellee?\\n3. Are the child support payments of $250.00 too high?\\nIII\\nThe Appellant cites this Court to the case of Martin v. Martin, 530 P.2d 1386 (Supreme Court of Alaska) for the proposition that the community property should have been appraised before the judge attempted distribution. A careful reading of that case shows that the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled that while appraisals should be obtained before trial, it was up to the party's counsel:\\n\\\"If in fact the trial judge was unable to divide the property evenly, the fault was not his but must be found in either the failure of preparation or inadequate presentation at time of trial.11\\n530 P,2d at 1389\\nit was the duty of Appellant's counsel, not the District Court, to obtain an appraisal of the community property. If the Appellant felt he had insufficient time to obtain the appraisal before trial, he should have asked for a continuance.\\nAppellant cannot now claim to this Court that the community property was unfairly divided because if there was an error, it was his own fault.\\nIV\\nThe issue of the division of the Native American Church paraphernalia will be examined by this Court separate of the other propety because of the great significance it holds for many Navajos.\\nThe evidence revealed that the paraphernalia was given to the couple jointly, after marriage, and that they both received instruction in its use.\\nThe manner in which the religious paraphernalia given to a man and his wife together should be divided has been a subject of debate at the District Court level several other times. in deciding the division of the paraphernalia the District Courts have attempted to reach two results:\\n1. As fair a monetary division as possible;\\n2. To enable both parties to have sufficient paraphernalia after division to perform ceremonies.\\nThis Court believes that these two objectives must be met, and therefore adopts this criteria for the division of Native American Church paraphernalia in this kind of situation.\\nTherefore, the paraphernalia will be divided as follows:\\nTo the Appellant, David Joe:\\n3 Prayer Feathers\\n1 Eagle Tail Fan\\n1 Ceremonial Whistle\\n1 Peyote (Chief)\\nTo the Appellee, Winona Joe:\\n2 Prayer Feathers\\n1 Prayer Feather (red and blue)\\n1 Water Bird\\n1 Peyote (Chief)\\n1 Ceremonial Fetish\\nV\\nThe final issue before this Court is whether the District Judge's order of $250.00 a month for child support is excessive.\\nThe Court has a duty to protect the child and ensure that there is adequate money for his upbringing. At the same time, the Court cannot order a party to pay more than he makes or order him to pay so much that the payer himself has insufficient money with which to live.\\nThe evidence presented in this case Is that the Appellant has been declared permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration and receives Social Security payments for that reason. In light of this fact, this Court believes that the $250.00 a month child support ordered by the Distrct Court is more than the Appellant can afford. This Court feels that $125.00 a month is a fairer figure. The Appellee is expected to contribute to the support of the child as no evidence has been offered to this Court to show she cannot be gainfully employed. If the circumstances of either party or the child change, the Appellee can institute proceedings in the District Court to have the support payments raised.\\nVI.\\nThe Native American Church religious paraphernalia is to be divided as ordered in part IV of this opinion within thirty (30) days of the date of of this opinion.\\nAppellant shall pay child support of One Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($125.00) every 28th day of each month until the child reaches his eighteenth (18th) birthday.\\nThe Stay of Execution, issued the 25th day of July, 1978, is vacated.\\nThe Judgment of the Shiprock District Court is modified in accordance with this opinion.\\nBLUEHOUSE, Associate Justice and LYNCH, Associate Justice, concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756601.json b/navajo_nation/6756601.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a4a38564eca52092d9992c0436ef3e05ec8bb33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756601.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756601\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of: Goldteeth Deschine a/k/a Deschine, C#70,470 Deceased Gladys Gorman, Petitioner vs. Grace Deschine, Administratrix, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Estate of Deschine v. Deschine\", \"decision_date\": \"1978\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-19-78\", \"first_page\": 338, \"last_page\": 338, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 338\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of: Goldteeth Deschine a/k/a Deschine, C#70,470 Deceased Gladys Gorman, Petitioner vs. Grace Deschine, Administratrix, Respondent\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nIn the Matter of the Estate of: Goldteeth Deschine a/k/a Deschine, C#70,470 Deceased Gladys Gorman, Petitioner vs. Grace Deschine, Administratrix, Respondent\\nNo. A-CV-19-78\", \"word_count\": \"156\", \"char_count\": \"936\", \"text\": \"ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL\\nThe Appeal in the above-entitled matter, having been received and considered by the Acting Chief Justice, the Court finds:\\n1. The Appeal was filed on July 26, 1978.\\n2. The Motion for Correction of Error was filed on July 28, 1978.\\n3. Rule 5(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party file a Motion for Reconsideration before an appeal. Petitioner filed\\nthis motion two (2) days after the appeal and therefore failed to comply with Rule 5(d).\\nTHEREFORE, the Appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed the 26th day of July, 1978, is DISMISSED.\\nDated this 12th day of October, 1978.\\nMarie F. Neswood Acting Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/6756630.json b/navajo_nation/6756630.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4133aec0f3275a150ac6af39cc25f747a2affd3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/6756630.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6756630\", \"name\": \"WILSON HALONA, CECIL LARGO WILLIS H. PETERSON, RAYMOND R. SMITH MARY WALLACE AND JIMMY WOODY vs. PETER MACDONALD, Individually and in his capacity As Chairman of Navajo Tribal Council; and ELDON HANSEN in his capacity as Controller of the Navajo Nation\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Halona v. MacDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-05-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 341, \"last_page\": 351, \"citations\": \"1 Navajo Rptr. 341\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:37:42.549288+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WILSON HALONA, CECIL LARGO WILLIS H. PETERSON, RAYMOND R. SMITH MARY WALLACE AND JIMMY WOODY vs. PETER MACDONALD, Individually and in his capacity As Chairman of Navajo Tribal Council; and ELDON HANSEN in his capacity as Controller of the Navajo Nation\", \"head_matter\": \"WILSON HALONA, CECIL LARGO WILLIS H. PETERSON, RAYMOND R. SMITH MARY WALLACE AND JIMMY WOODY vs. PETER MACDONALD, Individually and in his capacity As Chairman of Navajo Tribal Council; and ELDON HANSEN in his capacity as Controller of the Navajo Nation\\nDecided on May 18, 1978\\nDonald Benally, Shiprock, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appel lees Halona, Largo, Peterson, Smith and Woody\\nRichard Hughes, D. N. A., Window Rock, Arizona, and Wilbert Tsosie, D.N.A., Shiprock, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee Wallace\\nMichael Stuhff, Legal Department of the Navajo Nation, Window Rock, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellants\", \"word_count\": \"2512\", \"char_count\": \"15406\", \"text\": \"JOHN, District Judge\\nNATURE OF THE ACTION\\nThs is an action in which plaintiffs, who are members of the Navajo Tribal Council, are seeking an application for a permanent injunction to enjoin Peter MacDonald, individually and as Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council and Eldon Hansen, in his capacity as Con- trader of the Navajo Nation from expending any monies from the $70,000.00 which was by Tribal Council Resolution appropriated on April 5, 1977 for the defense of defendant MacDonald in a criminal case then pending against him in the United States District Court in Phoenix, Arizona.\\nSUMMARY\\nOn April 4, 1977, a special session of the Navajo Tribal Council was called by defendant MacDonald and the Navajo Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\\nThe agenda prepared for the special session contained five substantive items. What was later enacted as Resolution CAP-32-77, and which gave rise to the controversy, was not one of those items. The Tribal Council approved the agenda by a vote of 54-0.\\nAfter the special session was underway, the Advisory Committee approved an addition to the agenda consisting of three items. One of those items was a resolution amending the budget for fiscal year 1977 to appropriate $70,000.00 for legal fees and expenses for defendant MacDonald's defense in a criminal case then pending against him in United States District Court in Phoenix, Arizona.\\nThe proceedings for which the funds appropriated by CAP-32-77 were sought arose out of an indictment issued February 9, 1977 charging defendant MacDonald with eight felony counts. The indictment alleged that defendant MacDonald, in his position as Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, defrauded an Arizona utility company doing business with the Navajo Tribe by obtaining money from the company for personal gain.\\nThe Advisory Committee never did see the proposed resolution CAP-32-77 but approved its addition to the agenda for the special session; however, the Tribal Council never approved such an addition.\\nOn April 5, 1977, the Council debated the above resolution at considerable length before approving it by a vote of 35 in favor and 19 against. Resolution CAP-32-77 was never presented to the Budget and Finance Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council.\\nDuring the debate on the resolution, the Chairman of the Budget and Finance Committee, Raymond Smith, attempted, without success, to gain the floor to raise a question as to why the Budget and Finance Committee was by-passed, but defendant MacDonald, who was presiding at the session, refused to acknowledge him and the resolution thus passed.\\nThis action was filed on May 3, 1977, and a temporary restraining order was issued on the same day restraining defendant Hansen from paying out any monies pursuant to CAP-32-77, and the Court set May 18, 1977 at 2:00 p.m. for hearing the injunction.\\nDefendants MacDonald and Hansen filed motions for change of Venue and Disqualification of the presiding Judge on the 17th day of May - a day prior to the hearing and the motions were dented. This Court heard arguments of both counsel and adduced testimony from plaintiffs and other witnessess on May 18, 1977.\\nCONTENTION OF THE PARTIES\\nPlaintiffs contend that the appropriation pursuant to Resolution CAP-32-77 by Navajo Tribal Council absent Budget and Finance Committee review and recommendation is contrary to the laws of the Navajo Nation, and although the Navajo Tribal Council is the law making body of the Navajo Nation, they cannot place themselves above the laws they create and cannot act beyond the scope and authority of the laws they create without first duly amending or repealing those laws.\\nPlaintiffs further contend that the above referred to acts of the Council violate the mandate of 2 Navajo Tribal Code 365 and any appropriations such as CAP-32-77 in violation of Council procedures and the substantive law of the Navajo Nation is unlawful and void.\\nDefendants contend that the Navajo Tribal Council, being the only law making body in the Navajo Nation, has the Supreme Authority to do whatever they wish or desire absent any constitutional restriction on their powers, and their legislative actions are above judicial review, that this Court would be dictating legislation to the Council if it decides this case.\\nISSUES\\nThere are a number of minor issues presented to this Court and will be considered in the opinion. The major issue is;\\n1. Absent any constitution, can the Navajo Tribal Council, as the supreme law making authority on the Navajo Nation, pass and enact legislation in violation of its procedural process and/or the mandate of the Navajo Tribal Code without first duly amending or repealing it?\\nThe plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court of Shiprock, Navajo Nation, New Mexico to enjoin the allegedly unlawful expenditure of the Navajo Tribal Trust Funds under CAP-32-77. The complaint alleged that defendant MacDonald, as Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury charging him with felony counts of defrauding an Arizona utility company which was doing business with the Navajo Tribe, and as result of that indictment the Navajo Tribal Council passed and approved Resolution CAP-32-77, which amended fiscal year budget '77, appropriating $70,000.00 of trust funds of the Navajo Nation for the legal defense and expenditures of defendant MacDonald.\\nThis controversial legislation was the subject of a lengthy debate during the second day of a duly convened special session of the Navajo Tribal Council on April 5, 1977. During this lengthy debate, plaintiff Raymond Smith, Chairman of the Budget and Finance Committee, attempted, several times without success to gain the floor to ask why the Budget and Finance Committee was by-passed in this instance as the matter dealt with a interim budget revision. Defendant, MacDonald, who was presiding over the session, refused to acknowledge plaintiff Smith. The resolution was then approved by simply a majority vote of 35 in favor and 19 opposed.\\nOn April 28, 1977, the acting Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs approved the resolution.\\nOn May 3, 1977, this suit was filed and a temporary restraining order was granted the same day enjoining defendant Hansen from paying out any sums pursuant to CAP-32-77; however, the temporary restraining order was not served until May 11, 1977 for reasons not known to this Court.\\nOn May 17, 1977, Defendants moved to dissolve the temporary restraining on the grounds that the temporary restraining order was issued in violation of Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure requiring notice and hearing; the temporary restraining order was issued in violation of Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure requiring the applicants to post a security bond; the full Navajo Tribal Council has the authority to approve the expenditure of Tribal funds to meet \\\"emergent and unusual circumstances.\\\"; the Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs has no power to approve or disapprove the agenda for any session of the Tribal Council; the complaint fails to join as indispensable parties, the real parties in interest, the Navajo Nation, the Navajo Tribal Council and the United States; the provisions of 25 USC \\u00a7 81 are inapplicable to any contract by which Peter MacDonald retains counsel to represent him in a criminal trial and the subject matter is a non-justicable political question. Defendant also filed motions to change venue to Window Rock District Court and to disqualify the Shiprock District Judge.\\nThis Court must first deal with the motions for venue and disqualification. Defendants' motion for change of venue was received by the Court a day prior to the hearing on May 17, 1977. Since a trial date had been scheduled prior to the filing of the motion, and that it was received one day prior to date for hearing, arguments on the motion was held the same day the injunction was heard. Defendants' motion was denied. Defendants' contention that Rule 26 mandates that the action shall be filed in the district in which defendant resides is taken into consideration; however, venue is proper in this Court, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and furthermore it would be inappropriate to require every person seeking redress against tribal officials to travel to Window Rock to prosecute an action.\\nDefendants' motion to disqualify the District Judge, on the grounds that Counsel for plaintiff Donald Benaily is a nephew to the judge, is also denied on the grounds that such a relationship does exist but only in traditional Navajo clan relationship.\\nThe issue of the temporary restraining order being issued in violation of Rute 18 requiring the posting of a bond requires little attention from this Court. The plaintiffs are members of the Navajo Tribal Council with the exception of plaintiff Mary Wallace. Under our rules, the posting of bond is not required of officers of the Navajo Nation. The Court does, however, agree in part with defendants' contention that the temporary restraining order was issued in contra certain requirements in Rule 18; specifically, the requirement of the certification of counsel as to why the temporary restraining order should issue without notice. Since defendants did not move to dissolve within the two day requirement set forth in Rule 18, he has waived his rights to dissolve.\\nDefendants have also advanced the argument that the Navajo Tribal Council, Navajo Nation and the United States are indispensible parties. There is no need for joinder of the United States or of any other members of the Tribal Council, as they will not be adversely affected by the outcome of this suit. The Navajo Tribe has voluntarily appeared and fully participated in this action so that no joinder need be ordered.\\nDuring the course of this suit, all parties found no disagreement as to the supreme law making authority in the Navajo Nation being vested in the Navajo Tribal Council. This Court also vigorously supports that contention. The Power and Authority of constitutionless governments such as the Navajo Tribal Government was compared as similar with the law of England and Australia by defendants' counsel-~law making authority is exclusively that of the governing legislative body. In this case the argument which purports the Navajo Tribal Council, being the supreme law making authority, has unchecked power to enact any legislation it deems fit, even those which violate existing law, makes this Court very uneasy in view of the ancient phrase from 11 Coke, 74 NIHIL ALIUD POTEST REX QUAM QUOD DE JURE POSTEST (The king can do nothing except what he can by law do).\\nIt is well settled that the Navajo Nation is not a lawless Nation. Its governmental powers are limited by laws--laws enacted by the Congress of the United States, by the Navajo Tribal Council (Codified in the Navajo Tribal Code), and the Treaty of 1868.\\nThe Navajo Tribal Council, in an effort for more efficiency, established for itself various procedural mechanism by which proposed resolutions are to be brought before it for consideration--they were subsequently codified in the Navajo Tribal Code. Once the Council passes and approves any resolution binding themselves by that law--they are bound by such law--they are then bound by such law and can only do what by law they themselves established allows them to do. The Navajo Tribal Council cannot violate their laws nor can they place themselves above the laws they create. If such a government were to exist in the Navajo Nation, it would violate all the principles of a democratic government.\\nTribal Council Resolution CAP-32-77 was an interim budget revision as the term is used in 2 Navajo Tribal Code \\u00a7 365. The lan guage of that section of the code is not ambiguous, it clearly mandates that such an interim budget revision shall be reviewed for approval or disapproval by the Budget and Finance Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council before it is submitted for Tribal Council consideration, in this instance, the Budget and Finance Committee did not have an opportunity to exercise their mandate and the budget revision in the form of CAP-32-77 went directly from the Advisory Committee to the Council. It was stipulated by counsel for defendants that the Code \\u00a7 365 clearly is the controlling factor in this matter.\\nThe passage of CAP-32-77 was in violation of 2 Navajo Tribal Code \\u00a7 365 there being no lawful basis existing for any departure therefrom. This Court does not dispute the authority of the Council to expend funds from the Tribal Trust account for \\\"emergent or unusual circumstances.\\\" However, no testimony offered by defendants that the situation giving rise to CAP-32-77 was an emergency or an unusual circumstance. There was testimony that the Council has in the past appropriated monies without review by the Budget and Finance Committee. The consensus is that the Council normally approves community projects grants without Budget and Finance Committee review, or during severe drought or storm conditions such as the 1968 devastating snow storms.\\nThe manner in which the Council approved CAP-32-77 is a radical departu re from that established practice. The appropriation for community projects or drought and other storm relief benefits multitudes of Navajos--not just one individual as in Resolution CAP-32-77. In this regard, Resolution CAP-32-77 constitutes appropriation of public funds for a purely private purpose.\\nIt is a fundamental principle of law that public funds may not be used for private purposes, and that any such use must be declared invalid, and that principle must apply to funds of the Navajo Tribe.\\nThe question of misappropriation of tribal funds by the Tribal Council is not a non-justiciable political question; the Navajo District Courts are fully able to measure the action taken against the existing law, and to determine whether the law has been violated, and when called upon to do so in a proper case, the Courts may not decline the obligation. Thus, as in this case for Navajo District Courts to rule as to the legality of an action of the Tribal Council, it no violation of the principle of separation of powers in the Tribal government.\\nThis case presents appropriate grounds for invoking this Court's equitable powers to prevent any further expenditures of Tribal Funds under CAP-32-77, in that there is no adequate remedy at law to prevent such funds from being disbursed and once they are disbursed the likelihood is that they could not be recovered.\\nResolution CAP-32-77 was unlawfully brought before the Tribal Council, because of the failure to comply with 2 Navajo Tribal Code \\u00a7 365, and it is unlawful on its fact in that it appropriates public monies purely for private purpose; therefore, a permanent injunction is granted.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/685433.json b/navajo_nation/685433.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8944afc63fc745c7e2d5d0c9ea3c6e5de7b4766e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/685433.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"685433\", \"name\": \"Harriet Tracy, Plaintiff, vs. Peterson Yazzie, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tracy v. Yazzie\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-09-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-313-85\", \"first_page\": 223, \"last_page\": 225, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 223\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\", \"parties\": \"Harriet Tracy, Plaintiff, vs. Peterson Yazzie, et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. WR-CV-313-85\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Window Rock\\nHarriet Tracy, Plaintiff, vs. Peterson Yazzie, et al., Defendants.\\nDecided September 16, 1986\\nBefore Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\\nLeonard Tsosie, Esq., Crownpoint, New Mexico for the Plaintiff; Stephen Verkamp, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona for the Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"767\", \"char_count\": \"4730\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYazzie, District Court Judge.\\nThe above-entitled matter coming on defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Elect a Forum with plaintiff responding to said motion; the court having heard the arguments of the counsels, and being fully aware within the premises, enters the following OPINION and ORDER:\\nOpinion\\nPlaintiff filed her petition in this court seeking damages against defendants, who have been sued in their capacity as employees of the State of Arizona, and in their individual capacity. Neither the State of Arizona nor the Arizona Department of Economic Security have been named as party defendants.\\nDefendants argue that there is simply no basis for the Navajo Nation court to assert jurisdiction. This court finds that such is not the case. It is admitted that all parties to this action are members of the Navajo Tribe of Indians, and that the alleged incident(s) complained of happened in Window Rock, Arizona, upon the Navajo Indian Reservation. By authority of 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7253(3), and the resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council, passed on July 25,1985 (Resolution No. CJY-57-85), this court clearly and very plainly has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of this court is further reinforced by the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Ari zona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129, 93 S. Ct. 1257 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S. Ct. 269 (1959). Both, McClanahan and Williams, answer the question that the Navajo Nation court has jurisdiction, and not the Arizona court, whenever causes of action arise on the Navajo Indian Reservation.\\nAs to whether the Navajo Nation court should entertain actions against the state of Arizona; this has been answered in the Navajo Court of Appeals (now Navajo Supreme Court) ruling in Hubbard v. Chinle School District, et. al., 3 Nav. R. 167 (1982). Hubbard involved a suit by Arizona state school district employees against the Chinle school district in Chinle District Court. The district court ruled that it had jurisdiction, but exercised discretion under the doctrine of comity and declined jurisdiction. On appeal, Navajo Nation Court of Appeals ruled that Navajo Nation courts do indeed have jurisdiction over suits against a foreign sovereign, using international law as the basis for its rationale. Accordingly, the appeals court ruled that the State of Arizona is a foreign government and it should be recognized as such. The jurisdiction of Navajo Nation courts is inherent and existed prior to the creation of the State of Arizona.\\nThis court is being asked by plaintiff to keep this matter in this court. The court agrees. The Navajo Nation has laws to compensate injured parties for the loss they have suffered.\\nFinally, defendants provide a lengthy argument that the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution bars suit in federal courts and Indian courts, by private citizens against a state, and that this bar cannot be overcome by naming an individual state official in lieu of the state. The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution states:\\nThe Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States.\\nThe clear reading of the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution says nothing about prohibiting courts of Indian Nations, like Navajo Nation courts, from entertaining lawsuits against states like the State of Arizona.\\nFurther, it is has been held in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 16 S. Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1895); and Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (10th. 1959), that the first and fifth amendment, respectively, do not apply to Indian Nations without a congressional enactment applying the amendments to Indian Nations. Since the United States Congress has never enacted a law to apply the eleventh amendment, and by the reasoning in Talton and Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, Id., this court rules that the eleventh amendment does not apply to prohibit this court from entertaining an action against the State of Arizona or its subdivisions.\\nOrder\\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively Elect a Forum is hereby denied.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/685437.json b/navajo_nation/685437.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe90a57c4edbed3df92f0974a5d9dc257436d9f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/685437.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"685437\", \"name\": \"Vernold Livingston, Appellant, vs. Annie Livingston, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Livingston v. Livingston\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-03-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-01-84\", \"first_page\": 35, \"last_page\": 36, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 35\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McCabe, Chief Justice, Neswood and Hilt, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Vernold Livingston, Appellant, vs. Annie Livingston, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-01-84\\nCourt of Appeals of the Navajo Nation\\nVernold Livingston, Appellant, vs. Annie Livingston, Appellee.\\nDecided March 29, 1985\\nBefore McCabe, Chief Justice, Neswood and Hilt, Associate Justices.\\nGenevieve K. Chato, Esquire, Fort Defiance, Arizona for Appellant and Lawrence Ruzow, Esquire, Window Rock, Arizona for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"629\", \"char_count\": \"3791\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOn December 5,1983, the trial court entered a decree of divorce. The trial court order provided for custody and support of the two minor children and a division of the marital property. The appellee was awarded the parties' two bedroom hogan at Iyanbito. The trial court found that the parties had stipulated the value of the hogan to be $18.50 per square foot. There was no finding as to the number of square feet. The rest of the community property was awarded to the party in possession on the day of hearing.\\nThe appellant filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the trial court's award of the Iyanbito hogan to the appellee. Appellant asked for a determination of the fair market value of the hogan and for a one-half interest in that market value.\\nAn appeal was allowed on the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the hogan to the appellee. The parties were ordered to submit to the Court a written stipulation as to the square footage. The parties stipulated that by external measurements the square footage is 732 square feet and by internal measurements it is 576.13 square feet. Using the value of $18.50 per square foot stipulated by the parties, the value of the hogan ranges from $10,656.00 to $13,542.00.\\n9 N.T.C. \\u00a7404 requires that \\\"each divorce decree shall provide for a fair and just settlement of property rights between the parties. . . .\\\" In Shorty v. Shorty, 3 Nav. R. 151 (1982), [hereafter cited as Shorty], the Court set forth guidelines to assist the trial courts in determining what is fair and just. Eleven factors were listed in Shorty. These factors include the financial circumstances of the parties and the circumstances of the minor children. The District Courts were directed to consider all the circumstances of the parties when making a division of marital property.\\nThe Court considered the relevant facts of this case. Appellant was awarded custody of the two minor children. Appellant's gross salary at the time of hearing was approximately two-thirds of appellee's. The parties received an approximately equal division of household goods and automobiles. The parties were awarded their separate property, the value of appellee's appearing in excess of appellant's. Appellee was ordered to pay approximately $2,000.00 more of the community debts but these debts were generally on his share of the community household goods and his vehicle.\\nA consideration of the factors in Shorty in light of the facts set forth above leads this Court to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to award the entire hogan to the appellee.\\nThe Court agrees that an equal division of marital property is not mandated. This does not mean, however, that there is not to be a balancing of all the circumstances of the parties. In fact, this balancing of circumstances is precisely why an equal division of property is not required in most jurisdictions. Under the flexibility thus allowed a court may, for example, offset one party's lower earning capacity by a larger share of the property. The desired end result is for the parties to start divorced life on some sort of equitable basis.\\nA balancing of the circumstances of the parties in this case requires at the very least that the marital property be divided equally.\\nIt is therefore Ordered that appellee pay to the appellant as and for her interest in the parties' hogan the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) on or before May 1,1986.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"685449\", \"name\": \"Navajo Engineering and Construction Authority, Appellant, vs. Harold Noble, et. al., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Engineering & Construction Authority v. Noble\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-05-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-30-81\", \"first_page\": 1, \"last_page\": 4, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 1\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Review of appeal by Nelson J. McCabe, Chief Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Navajo Engineering and Construction Authority, Appellant, vs. Harold Noble, et. al., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-30-81\\nCourt of Appeals of the Navajo Nation\\nNavajo Engineering and Construction Authority, Appellant, vs. Harold Noble, et. al., Appellee.\\nDecided May 8, 1984\\nReview of appeal by Nelson J. McCabe, Chief Justice.\\nRichard George, Esq., Tuba City, Navajo Nation (AZ), for the Appellant and Albert Hale, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (AZ), for the Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1436\", \"char_count\": \"8640\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS\\nThe issue presented to the Court is an appeal from the Window Rock District Court, the Honorable Tom Tso, over a contract action between the Navajo Engineering and Construction Authority and the Steamboat Chapter and whether the individuals and officials of the Steamboat Chapter enjoy the protections of the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act. The matter was set for argument on November 4,1983 with counsel presenting their points and authorities. For the reasons cited below, the Court herein affirms the order of the Window Rock District Court of June 15, 1981 with the only limitation being the modification of such district court order that had dismissed the action with prejudice to read dismissal without prejudice.\\nI.\\nBecause this matter represents a contract dispute between the above captioned parties and additionally due to the Steamboat Chapter being a \\\"tribal entity\\\" pursuant to Resolution CMY-42-80 of the Navajo Tribal Council, the Court would like to take this opportunity to specify the relevant facts in the instant case.\\nIt appears from reviewing the record below that plaintiffs alleged to have entered into a contract for the improvement in and around the location of the Steamboat Springs Chapter House. While there appears no memoralized contract as to the exact terms and conditions of such performance of labor, petitioner claims as a matter of law that there was substantial performance as to the work conducted. The matter was heard on a Motion to Dismiss on January 21,1981 in the Window Rock District Court with the Honorable Harry Brown denying the Motion to Dismiss.\\nOn May 20,1981 respondents renewed their Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable Tom Tso setting forth legal arguments as to why such a renewed motion should be heard. Counsel for appellant objected to the renewal of such motion but the record appears to be absent of sufficient reasons upon which such objection could have been sustained. Thus, on June 21, 1981, the Window Rock District Court entered a written Judgment and Order granting such Motion to Dismiss and appellant appeals from such order.\\nII.\\nIn reviewing the record below and the pertinent orders entered therein, the Court wishes to examine the procedural elements that appellant raises as to the ability of one district court judge issuing a contrary decision to a prior order entered by another district court judge. Before the Court ventures too far astray from the controllable Rules of Court, Rule 23 of the Navajo Court Rules states as follows:\\n\\\"The Court shall have the power to order any relief required after the determination of the facts, and law, whether such relief be equitable or legal in nature. At anytime after the final order or judgment, the Court may in the interest of justice reopen a case in order to correct errors or to consider newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason consistent with justice.\\\"\\nOur law contains a common rule based upon the principle that courts are to be just and do justice. Because of this principle courts are empowered to correct judgments, reopen cases where new evidence required a new hearing or otherwise take another look at a judgment where justice and equity clearly requires it to do so. Zion's First National Bank v. Joe, 4 Nav. R. 92 (1983).\\nNormally, a judge should not consider modifying or vacating a judgment without very serious reasons for doing so and without a specific writ ten motion asking him or her to do so. Of course, there may be times when the Court discovers a lack of jurisdiction, gross fraud or need to clarify a judgment without an adverse hearing. But those times are rare, and the right of the parties to an action to have notice of the court's action and an opportunity to be heard on it always exists. The due process clause of the Navajo Bill of Rights always requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any right created by a judgment is taken away or modified. Id.\\nIn the instant case, appellee's Motion to Dismiss was originally denied and such action was entered in as an Order on January 21,1981. The matter at hand, therefore, is whether in the subsequent argument made on renewing the same allegations in the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Tso had sufficient grounds which warranted the re-examination of the substantive and procedural grounds in which to rehear the sufficiency of the cause of action. Appellant points the Court to the language of Rule 63, Arizona Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In examining such rule of procedure, the language is at best informative but not conclusive. The reality of the Courts of the Navajo Nation and the fluctuation of our sitting as circuit riding judges reveals that such procedural events may occur, where a subsequent judge may rehear a matter only if such re-hearing is warranted and the subsequent judge is not abusing a discretionary privilege. Such reexamination and subsequent motion re-hearings must be based on sufficient matters of law and facts as to warrant the parties and their counsel to reargue points and authorities before the Court. Id.\\nIn examining the record below, Judge Tso's subsequent ruling does not indicate any abuse of discretion or action which would indicate an arbitrary and or capricious manner in the handling of the re-hearing issues. In examining the Order entered by the Window Rock District Court on June 15,1981, this Court finds that Judge Tso entered findings pursuant to a district court judge demonstrating fairness and discretion in rehearing the matter:\\n\\\"Two grounds for dismissal based on failure to state a claim and sovereign immunity were argued previously and the Honorable Harry D. Brown denied the motion based on an alleged insufficiency of evidence. The motions raised only legal points which did not require presentation of evidence and a denial of defendant's motion on this ground is clearly erroneous and in the interest of justice and fairness, the Court will uses its discretion to allow a rehearing of the motion.\\\"\\n(Judgment and Order, Window Rock District Court, Paragraph 2, June 21,1981)\\nSuch finding as recited above indicates that there existed legal arguments that were to be made before the District Court in essentially a reconsideration of a prior motion that had been argued and denied. This procedure does not appear to be abuse of discretion by the trial judge and this Court will not disturb such ruling. Moreover, it was from such granting of the lat ter Motion to Dismiss that appellee filed this appeal. Judge Brown's denial of appellee's Motion to Dismiss was not discretionary but required a decision based on applicable laws. Judge Tso's findings indicate that the prior motion was not in fact based on applicable laws and properly had the motion reargued. Rule 23 of the Navajo Court Rules authorizes such judicial practice and Judge Tso was within the proper use of discretionary review in allowing such subsequent argument to be made on the Motion to Dismiss.\\nIII.\\nBecause the Court finds that the Order entered by the Window Rock District Court on June 21,1981 is valid and shows no abuse of discretion in law or in fact, the Court will not set aside such order nor find that such order is void for want of jurisdiction. The additional point raised in this appeal is the matter of sovereign immunity as such action relates to the defendant's status as Steamboat Chapter officials. The District Court as a matter of law found that the Steamboat Chapter is a governmental unit of the Navajo Nation and as such entity enjoys the protection of CMY-42-80 Sovereign Immunity. In such dismissal, the district court entered its findings based on the immunity granted to Navajo government functions and found that there existed no cause of action or a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of such finding and further due to the matters of pleading with sufficiency to establish a successful cause of action, the Court herein finds that the Order issued on June 21,1981 is valid and affirms such order with the only modification striking the \\\"dismissal with prejudice\\\" to read \\\"Dismissal without Prejudice.\\\" Such modification allows the appellant to review the facts and law in the instant case and prepare accordingly.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"685451\", \"name\": \"Sandoval, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Tinian, Inc. et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sandoval v. Tinian, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-07-11\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. CP-CV-12-86, CP-CV-15-86; CP-CV-17-86, CP-CV-24-86, CP-CV-31-86\", \"first_page\": 215, \"last_page\": 222, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 215\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\", \"parties\": \"Sandoval, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Tinian, Inc. et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Nos. CP-CV-12-86, CP-CV-15-86\\nCP-CV-17-86, CP-CV-24-86, CP-CV-31-86\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Crownpoint\\nSandoval, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Tinian, Inc. et al., Defendants.\\nDecided July 11, 1986\\nBefore Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\\nPaul Fife, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico for the Plaintiffs; Tim F. O\\u2019Brien, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico for the Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"3068\", \"char_count\": \"19151\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYazzie, District Court Judge.\\nFindings of Fact\\n1. Plaintiffs are Navajo Indians.\\n2. Defendant Tinian, Inc. is a non-Indian corporation; defendant Javen Tanner is a non-Indian.\\n3. These actions concern commercial transactions occurring at the defendants' primary place of business, which is the Torreon Super Mart in Torreon, New Mexico.\\n4. The Torreon Super Mart is located within the boundaries of the Torreon Chapter and within Township 18 North, Range 4 West N.M. P.M.\\n5. The southernmost portion of the Torreon Super Mart building; a strip 8 to 10 feet wide, is located on Navajo Indian Allotment No. 011093.\\n6. Customers of the Torreon Super Mart park in an area south of the building; this area is also located on Allotment 011093.\\n7. The Torreon Super Mart's sewage lagoon is located on Allotment 011093.\\n8. The population within the boundaries of the Torreon Chapter is 81.7 percent Indian.\\n9. Approximately 80 percent of the Torreon Super Mart's customers are Navajo Indians.\\n10. All of the land within Township 18 North, Range 4 West is either owned by Navajo Indians or the Navajo Tribe, or leased to Navajo Indians, except for 3A of a section, which is partially owned and partially leased by Tinian, Inc.; in other words, almost 98 percent of the land within the township is owned or leased by Navajo Indians.\\n11. The Torreon Chapter is a part of the Eastern Navajo Agency and elects a representative to the Navajo Tribal Council.\\n12. Grazing on federal lands in the Torreon Chapter is controlled by the District 15 Land Board, an agency of the Navajo Tribe, through a cooperative agreement between the tribe, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Land Management.\\n13. The Navajo Police Department in Crownpoint provides law enforcement services to the Torreon community.\\n14. Medical services in Torreon are provided by a clinic operated under contract with the Indian Health Service.\\n15. The Bureau of Indian Affairs operates a school in Torreon.\\n16. The water system in Torreon was built by the Indian Health Service and is maintained by the Navajo Tribe; the Torreon Super Mart receives its water from that system and pays no fees for the use of the water or the maintenance of the system.\\n17. The Torreon Super Mart is not located within the boundaries of the Navajo Treaty Reservation or the Executive Order 709 Reservation.\\nOpinion and Order\\nThe facts of this case are as set out in the findings of fact made by this court, supra. The questions which must be answered based on those facts and the applicable law are as follows: (A) Does this court have jurisdiction over the defendants in these cases and over the subject matter of the lawsuits; (B) Does this court have the power to issue declaratory judgments, and if not, is that cause to dismiss these lawsuits?; and (C) Does the fact that the plaintiffs have requested relief based on state law mandate the dismissal of these actions? Each of these questions will be addressed in this opinion.\\nJURISDICTION\\nDefendants have claimed that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over them or subject matter jurisdiction over the transactions which are the basis for the plaintiffs' complaints. Defendants argue that they are a non-Indian corporation and a non-Indian individual doing business outside the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation, and that the transactions occurred outside those boundaries. It is true that the Torreon Super Mart, defendants' principal place of business, is located in the off-reservation portion of what is known as Navajo Indian Country. However, as the findings of fact show, the Torreon Super Mart is located within the Torreon Chapter, which itself is part of the Eastern Navajo Agency. The Super Mart is unconnected to Navajo territory, as would be an enterprise operating in Albuquerque. This court must, then, analyze the facts of these cases and of the situation in Torreon to determine whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction over these cases is proper.\\nA. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION\\nIt should be noted at the outset that if the Navajo Tribal Council has not acted to assert jurisdiction over the Torreon Chapter and transactions occurring therein, this court would have no such jurisdiction. However, the council has done so. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7253 defines the jurisdiction of the trial courts of the Navajo Nation, in pertinent part, as follows: \\\"(2) Civil Causes of Action.... All civil actions in which the defendant is a resident of Navajo Indian Country, or has caused an action to occur in Navajo Indian Country.\\\" This provision covers any defendant, including a non-Indian, and all transactions entered into in Navajo Indian Country. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7254, as amended in 1985 by Tribal Council Resolution CJY-57-85, then delineates the areas that are included in Navajo Indian Country: \\\"all land within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation or of the Eastern Navajo Agency, all land within the limits of dependent Navajo communities, all Navajo Indian allotments. . . .\\\" Since it is undisputed that Torreon is within the Eastern Navajo Agency, it is clearly within the ambit of this definition of Navajo Indian Country. Therefore, the Navajo Nation has granted this court jurisdiction to hear civil cases where the defendant resides in or has caused an act to occur in Torreon. This court must now consider whether that grant of jurisdiction was proper.\\nThe Navajo Tribal Court of Appeals has upheld the validity of a similar jurisdictional resolution which defined the territorial jurisdiction of the tribe to include the Eastern Navajo Agency and Land Management Districts 15, 16 and 19 (excluding Gallup). Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Holyan, 1 Nav. R. 78 (1973). The Holyan court noted that the tribal council had passed its resolution, CMY-28-70, after considering evidence regarding land status and population in the Eastern Navajo Agency. That resolution stated that the entire Eastern Navajo Agency is a dependent Indian community and, thus, is part of Navajo Indian Country. The Holyan court held that the facts cited by the Council were a sufficient basis for that determination. In so holding, the court considered the definition of Indian Country, which is found at 18 U.S.C. \\u00a71151. Indian Country under that statute includes reservations, dependent Indian communities and allotments. In considering whether the Eastern Navajo Agency met the requirements of that definition, the court applied the analysis of \\\"dependent Indian community\\\" found in U.S. v. Martine, 442 F. 2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971), which is the authoritative case on the question. The 10th Circuit in Martine held that three factors should be considered when deciding whether an area is a dependent Indian community: the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and the federal government, and the established practice of governmental agencies toward the area. The Holyan court analyzed each of these factors with regard to the Eastern Navajo Agency and held that the agency is indeed a dependent Indian community. Under Holyan, then, which is binding precedent on this court, Torreon is a dependent Indian community and part of Navajo Indian Country.\\nIn addition, an analysis of the facts presented in this case shows that there could be no question that Torreon is a dependent Indian community under the Martine and Holyan analysis. Torreon is a Navajo community with a population that is 81.7 percent Navajo. Within the township, in which the defendants' place of business is located, almost 98 percent of the land is owned or leased by the Navajo Tribe. The relationship of the inhabitants of Torreon to the tribal and federal governments is the same as the relationship between those governments and reservation dwellers. The tribal and federal governments provide police protection, medical services, water system maintenance, schooling, and other services to Torreon's inhabitants. Finally, federal and tribal agencies have an established practice of treating Torreon as a Navajo community. Torreon sends a representative to the Navajo Tribal Council; the Bureau of Land Management and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have entered into an agreement with the Navajo Tribe so that the tribe's land board controls grazing on federal lands within the Torreon community. Consideration of all of the above factors leads inescapably to the conclusion that Torreon is a dependent Indian community and is part of Navajo Indian Country.\\nDefendants argue that 18 U.S.C. \\u00a71151 is a criminal statute and should not be applied to civil cases. Defendants would limit this court's jurisdiction in civil matters involving non-Indians to cases arising on the reservation. These arguments are without merit. There is no reasonable basis for a holding that this court's territorial jurisdiction is more limited in civil cases than in criminal cases. In addition, the Navajo Tribal Council has mandated that this court's jurisdiction be coextensive with the Indian Country definition found in 18 U.S.C. \\u00a71151. Its power to do so is con firmed by statements made by the United State Supreme Court and other courts. In DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that \\\"While \\u00a71151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.\\\" 420 U.S. at 427, note 2 (citations omitted). The Federal District Court of Utah has stated that it is well settled that the definition applies to questions of civil jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1981).\\nThe Tribal Council's mandate and the statements made in the above cases recognize that the same important policy considerations, which require that tribal courts have jurisdiction on the reservation, apply to situations involving off-reservation dependent Indian communities and allotments. A dependent Navajo community such as Torreon will have a population which is mostly Navajo; the Navajo Tribe will provide many services to that population; and that population will have a voice in the way the tribe is run. It is crucial that the tribal courts have jurisdiction to hear disputes between the members of that Navajo population and businesses, Indian or non-Indian, who would locate within the community and engage in commerce with that population. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), in which non-Indian businesses located within Indian Country were required to sue in tribal courts instead of state courts to resolve disputes with Indians.\\nDefendants argue that this court does not have jurisdiction over these cases because the transactions, which are the subjects of the lawsuits, occurred on fee land and involved a non-Indian entity. It is difficult to determine whether the transactions did occur on fee land because, as defendants have admitted, the south portion of the Torreon Super Mart building and the area where the customers park, are located on a Navajo Indian allotment. This court notes that defendants' claim that the parking area is located on a highway right-of-way running through the allotment; this court also notes, however, that the 18 U.S.C. definition of Indian Country includes all rights-of-way running through allotments.) Plaintiffs would not have had access to defendants' store if the allotment had not been used by defendants; therefore the allotment certainly contributed to the consummation of the transactions. The actual signing of the contracts could have occurred on defendants' fee land or on the allotment; this court cannot say because no evidence was introduced to shed light on that subject. Fortunately, it is not necessary for this court to determine the answer to that question. Defendants' fee land is located in the middle of a dependent Navajo community. Defendants are therefore in the same position as an owner of fee land located within a reservation. The United States Supreme Court has held that a tribe retains inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. \\\"A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.\\\" Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 at 565 (1981). Montana's language applies to reservations because the case involved fee land within a reservation; however, the same analysis applies to land holders in a dependent Indian community. Defendants have located in the midst of a heavily Navajo community to do business with that community; important portions of the store's facilities are located on Navajo land; approximately 80 percent of the store's customers are Navajo. Under those facts this court certainly has jurisdiction to hear disputes between defendants and Navajo plaintiffs who have done business at defendants' place of business.\\nDefendants have cited two cases for the proposition that this court's jurisdiction over non-Indians ends at the reservation border: GMAC v. Chischilly, 96 N.M. 113, 628 P. 2d 683 (1981), and UNC Resources Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981). This court notes that neither of these cases concerned consensual transactions between the parties occurring within Navajo Indian Country; that the language in each directly conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's language in the DeCoteau case; and that both cases contain unnecessarily broad language which is extremely restrictive of tribal court jurisdiction. This court declines to follow those cases.\\nB. PERSONAL JURISDICTION\\nDefendants have argued that this court does not have personal jurisdiction over them because they are non-Indians operating a business on fee land outside the reservation. The discussion of subject matter jurisdiction, however, has shown that defendants' business is located within a dependent Navajo community, deals primarily with Navajos, and avails itself of the use of a portion of a Navajo allotment. These are substantial contacts with members of the Navajo Tribe, and with property lying within the jurisdiction of the tribe; these justify the exertion of this court's jurisdiction over defendants. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Navajo Tribe v. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc., 1 Nav. R. 40 (1972) (holding that when a non-Indian enters Indian land for the purpose of doing business with Indians, he may very well be said to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribal courts); Thompson and Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, 1 Nav. R. 282 (Shiprock D. Ct. 1978). This court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.\\nDeclaratory Judgment Issue\\nDefendants urge this court to dismiss these cases because one remedy which the plaintiffs have requested is a declaratory judgment. However, declaratory judgments are not the only relief the plaintiffs request; they also request money damages. Even if it were true that this court does not have the power to issue declaratory judgments, the proper remedy would be to strike plaintiffs' requests for such judgments, but hear their claims for money damages. The question of this court's power to issue declaratory judgments is not a jurisdictional question, but rather a question of whether plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have certainly done so by stating a claim for money damages.\\nIn any event, this court holds that it does have the power to grant declaratory judgments. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7253, which is the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Navajo Tribe's trial courts, states that this court shall have jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the defendant resides in Navajo Indian Country or causes an action to occur in Navajo Indian Country. An action for a declaratory judgment is a civil action and this court, therefore, has the power to issue such judgments. In addition, under 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7204, this court can apply the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \\u00a72201 and 2202, if there is some question over whether \\\"all civil actions\\\" includes actions for declaratory judgments. Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the fact that one form of relief requested in these cases is a declaratory judgment is denied.\\nApplication of State Law\\nDefendants have also moved to dismiss these lawsuits because plaintiffs are requesting that this court enforce a New Mexico licensing law and a New Mexico consumer protection statute against these non-Indian defendants. Defendants contend that since the relief requested is granted by state law, the state courts are the proper forum to hear these cases. This court cannot accept the proposition for several reasons. First, there is some doubt about whether a New Mexico court would have jurisdiction over these cases; this court's jurisdiction could preclude state court jurisdiction. See e.g., Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 342, 355 (1982 ed.), stating that where a tribe has asserted jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants, that jurisdiction may be exclusive. If this court declined to accept jurisdiction, then, plaintiffs could be left without a forum. Second, this court certainly has the power to apply state law to a case, if the facts warrant it, and the state law has not been preempted by federal or tribal law. 7 N.T.C. \\u00a7204. Therefore, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, and their lawsuits should not be dismissed without affording them an opportunity to present evidence to show why state law should apply to these cases. This court could ultimately decide not to apply such law, but that determination should await a hearing on the merits, because it will depend on the nature of the transactions and the existence of federal or tribal law applicable to those transactions. Finally, this court has decided that it is a proper forum in which to hear disputes between defendants and members of the Navajo Tribe. This decision is proper, because the transactions in which defendants and Navajos such as plaintiffs engage certainly affect the welfare of members of the Navajo Tribe. Cf. Babbitt Ford v. Navajo Tribe, 710 F. 2d 587 (9th Cr. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984). Since this court is the appropriate forum to hear these cases, and it has the power to grant the relief requested by plaintiffs, the motion to dismiss will be denied.\\nOrder\\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss these cases is hereby denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"685455\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of: Joe Thomas\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Estate of Thomas\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-12-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-157-84\", \"first_page\": 232, \"last_page\": 234, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 232\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of: Joe Thomas.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. WR-CV-157-84\\nDistrict Court of the Navajo Nation Judicial District of Window Rock\\nIn the Matter of the Estate of: Joe Thomas.\\nDecided December 12, 1986\\nBefore Robert Yazzie, District Court Judge.\\nWesley Atakai, Esq., Window Rock, Arizona for the PetitionerAdministratrix; Samuel Pete, Esq., Window Rock, Arizona for the Claimants.\", \"word_count\": \"1077\", \"char_count\": \"6286\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nYazzie, District Court Judge.\\nFindings of Fact\\n1. This is a Probate Proceeding.\\n2. Joe Thomas, C#60,179 (hereinafter referred to as decedent), died without a written will on February 26,1984.\\n3. The decedent was married to one Yilnabah Thomas, who predeceased him on April 11,1983.\\n4. The following individuals are heirs of the estate:\\nA. Art Lee Thomas, C#61,730\\nB. MaryT. Silversmith, C# 60,18 2\\nC. Mary Cowboy, C#60,973\\nD. Annie James, C#61,403\\nE. Ray Thomas, C#51,463\\nF. Mary T. Six, C# (not known)\\nG. Dorothy James, C# (not known)\\n5. The decedent and his wife had numerous jewelry, household furniture, and valuable household items; all of which were equally distributed among the seven (7) heirs named above.\\n6. The sole remaining issue is the distribution of one (1) Livestock Grazing Permit, No. #6947, issued to decedent Joe Thomas in District #18 for one-hundred and ninety-three (193) sheep units.\\n7. Dorothy James, Mary T. Silversmith, Mary Cowboy, and Mary T. Six are asking this court to equally divide the grazing permit among all six (6) heirs.\\n8. Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas claim that decedent orally devised his grazing permit to them. This was done in the presence of Ray Thomas. Other heirs were not present when decedent orally devised the permit.\\n9. Annie James agrees that decedent's grazing pemit be awarded to Art Lee Thomas and Ray Thomas in equal shares.\\n10. Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas testified that they actually lived in the same camp or household of the decedent prior to his death. They provided constant care to their deceased father by providing him with firewood, domestic water, livestock feed, and food. Other heirs resided elsewhere and did not live at decedent's home prior to his death.\\n11. Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas filed a claim against the estate asking this court to recognize and approve of decedent's oral will.\\nOpinion\\nISSUE: DID DECEDENT JOE THOMAS SATISFY ALL THE REQUIREMENTS IN MAKING AN ORAL WILL?\\nClaimants, Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas, testified that decedent orally devised his grazing permit to them. This was done in their presence. Other heirs were not present when decedent devised the permit. Was the oral will valid under Navajo law?\\nIn the case of In Re Estate of Chisney Benally, 1 Nav. R. 219 (1978), a Navajo cannot make an oral will unless all of the members of his immediate family are present and agree. In the instant case, all the seven (7) heirs of decedent's estate were not present at the time decedent made his oral will. Is this valid? In Re Estate of Lee, 1 Nav. R. 27 (1971), held that an oral will was invalid, because the surviving wife and children were not present when decedent made the alleged oral will. This requirement, however, was limited in Benally, supra, in that only members of decedent's immediate family are to be present.\\nIn Benally, supra, \\\"immediate family\\\" means those related to decedent by blood ties, adoption or marriage, and they must be living in the same household with decedent at the time he makes an oral will. Blood relation alone does not make one a member of the immediate family. Therefore, \\\"immediate family\\\" is clearly defined in Benally to include members of the same household who are bound by ties of relationship to decedent.\\nIn the instant case, other than Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas, all of the heirs did not live with decedent when he died. For purposes of an oral will, they are not members of the immediate family. On the other hand, claimants, Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas, did live with the decedent when he died. Decedent made the oral will in the presence of his immediate family, namely Ray Thomas and Art Lee Thomas. Both claimants agreed to honor the will after their father's death. The oral will, by which decedent devised his grazing permit to the two claimants, is therefore a valid will. The requirements as set forth in Benally, supra, have been met.\\nIt might be argued that Art Lee Thomas and Ray Thomas, as parties against the estate, cannot be permitted to testify to statements made by decedent regarding his oral will. This was adopted as a general rule in In Re Estate of Lee, supra, that any testimony of a party relating to his claim cannot be considered in a probate proceeding. In a later case of In Re Estate of Benally, supra, the Supreme Court declined to impose that rule. The Court held that the effect of not allowing decedent's immediate family to testify to an existing oral will would invalidate all oral wills. The making of oral wills is a long standing Navajo custom. Oral wills help avoid hardship for the Navajo people, because many Navajos cannot write, cannot afford to have an attorney write a will, and do not understand the concept of a written will. It is important that an alternate method be available by which a person may devise his property. In Re Estate of Benally, supra.\\nThe counsels of record also were directed to address whether a grazing permit could be divided and its use transferred to another grazing district. Since the first issue properly disposes of this case, the second issue need not be addressed.\\nPursuant to the foregoing opinion, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:\\n1. The proposed distribution of the grazing permit, No. 6947 of decedent, Joe Thomas, C#60,179, is hereby granted.\\n2. The Livestock Grazing Permit No. 6947, in Land Management District #18, containing one-hundred and ninety-three (193) sheep units, is hereby awarded to RAY THOMAS and ART LEE THOMAS, on a joint undivided basis.\\n3. The Branch of Land Operations and the District #18 Grazing Committee are hereby required to re-issue said Grazing Permit to RAY THOMAS and ART LEE THOMAS, jointly and on an undivided basis.\\n4. The said Grazing Permit shall not be transferred to another Land Management District; as prohibited by applicable law.\\n5. The Administratrix is hereby relieved of her legal duties and responsibilities in this estate.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/685460.json b/navajo_nation/685460.json
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+"{\"id\": \"685460\", \"name\": \"Ella Mae Tso (Dec.), et al., and Survivors of Harold Tsosie (Dec.), Petitioners, vs. The Workmen's Compensation Employee Benefit Review Board of the Navajo Nation, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tso v. Workmen's Compensation Employee Benefit Review Board\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-07-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-03-85\", \"first_page\": 89, \"last_page\": 92, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 89\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Tso, Chief Justice, Bluehouse and Austin, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Ella Mae Tso (Dec.), et al., and Survivors of Harold Tsosie (Dec.), Petitioners, vs. The Workmen\\u2019s Compensation Employee Benefit Review Board of the Navajo Nation, Respondent\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-03-85\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nElla Mae Tso (Dec.), et al., and Survivors of Harold Tsosie (Dec.), Petitioners, vs. The Workmen\\u2019s Compensation Employee Benefit Review Board of the Navajo Nation, Respondent\\nDecided July 28, 1986\\nBefore Tso, Chief Justice, Bluehouse and Austin, Associate Justices.\\nRaymond Tso, Esq., Crownpoint, New Mexico and Spencer K. Johnston, Esq., Phoenix, Arizona for the Petitioners; William Riordan, Esq., Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona for the Respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"1513\", \"char_count\": \"9251\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nAustin, Associate Justice.\\nClaimants, the dependent survivors of Harold Tsosie, seek review of the denial of their claim for Workmen's Compensation Benefits. They contend that (1) the death of Harold Tsosie arose out of and in the course of his employment, and (2) the Workmen's Compensation Employee Benefit Review Board erred by considering as relevant, events and circumstances, which preceded the emergency causing Harold's death. The Claimants also contend that the deceased Ranger is a public safety officer. We affirm the decision of the Board.\\nHarold Tsosie was employed by the Navajo Nation as Ranger I. These were his duties:\\nExample of duties:\\nAssists in the restocking of fish in reservation lakes; patrols and enforces fishing, hunting, boating regulations; assists in the protection and preservation of reservation wildlife; enforces timber tree cutting regulations; assists forestry with fire prevention; assists in the protection of prehistoric scenic beauty and scientific sites; renders first aid when necessary; assists in emergency, search and rescue operations; provides assistance or information to visitors; maintains records and prepares reports of activities. (Job description for Ranger I).\\nHarold Tsosie was on compensatory leave, therefore he was not on duty nor was he subject to call on the date of his death. Harold and his brother Jeff drowned in Sawmill Lake on the afternoon of June 11,1982. The victims had engaged in substantial drinking the night before and on the day of their deaths. A blood alcohol sample taken from Harold was lost during transmission to the laboratory.\\nHarold's employer issued him a tribal ranger vehicle and equipment consisting of a life jacket, a flotation device, a first aid kit, a spool of rope and a two-way radio. Harold had removed the equipment, radio antenna, and the emblems identifying the tribal vehicle before transporting his brothers and friends to the lake in the ranger vehicle. Beer was consumed by the group on the trip to the lake and at the lake. The male members of the group decided to swim. Immediately thereafter, Harold's brother Pat, began inducing Jeff, the other brother, to swim across the lake. Jeff swam about three-fourths across the lake before he started struggling. Harold, who was taking off his clothes, was alerted to the emergency, and he plunged into the lake to effect a rescue. In attempting rescue, Harold and his brother drowned. Harold was not trained or qualified in water rescue operations as a Ranger I. In its findings the Board concluded that Harold and his friends had gone to the lake to swim and engage in their own personal social activities.\\nAn award under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the Navajo Nation is governed by statute. By law the Claimants must prove (1) that the death was a result of an accident; and (2) that the death arose out of the employment; and (3) that the death arose while in the course of employment. 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1021. Clearly the statute requires that a claimant prove all its elements to effect recovery. Here there is no dispute that Harold Tsosie died as a result of an accident.\\nThe Navajo Workmen's Compensation Act is not founded upon Navajo traditional notions of compensation, although the Navajo practice of reparation to an injured party may parallel compensation pursuant to the Act. Instead the Navajo Workmen's Compensation Laws are based upon their state counterparts. Consequently, non-Navajo sources are ideal for clarification and guidance.\\nUpon proper proof Section 1021 awards benefits for work connected injury or death which \\\"arose out of' the employment and are sustained \\\"in the course of' the employment. Established sources have construed \\\"arose out of' to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and \\\"in the course of' to refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Goodyear Aircraft Corporation v. Gilbert, 65 Ariz. 379, 181 P. 2d 624 (1974); Royall v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 346, 476 P 2d 156 (1970); 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law \\u00a7 610 (rev. ed. 1985). The Navajo Nation adheres to the same construction by statute. At 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1002 (b), course and scope of employment is defined as: \\\"the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred.\\\"\\nThe purpose of Workmen's Compensation is to assist injured workers. With that in mind, each case must be studied on its own set of facts to determine if the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. See Food Products Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 129 Ariz. App. 208, 630 P. 2d 31 (1981); Royall v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 346, 476 P. 2d 156 (1970). The \\\"arising\\\" and \\\"course\\\" tests involve consideration of different factors as mentioned above. However, to effectuate its purpose of assisting injured workers, it is often necessary to consider these factors together to determine sufficient \\\"work connection\\\" to enable a claimant to recover. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law \\u00a7 610 (rev. ed. 1985).\\nIn this case we begin with whether Harold Tsosie died in the course of his employment. If Harold died doing what a person so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time, then we are convinced that Harold died in the course of his employment. See City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 120, 449 P. 2d 291 (1969). In essence the question centers on whether Harold was on duty when he died. It is undisputed that Harold Tsosie was on leave from work and he was not on call for duty at the time of his death. Voluntarily removing all \\\"duty\\\" equipment from the vehicle, including the antenna and emblems identifying the vehicle, shows that Harold considered himself off duty and not subject to call. Harold's presence at the lake was not motivated by his employer nor by his intent to perform any of his enumerated duties. (For example enforcing fishing regulations.) We agree with the Board that Harold and his friends were engaging in personal social activities, outside the course of his employment, when he died.\\nThe Claimants, however, urge us to classify Harold as a public safety officer and apply the emergency rule consistent with Conley v. Industrial Commission, (Colo. App.), 601 P. 2d 648 (1979). There a police officer's death was held compensable, when the officer was killed while directing traffic during a flood, even though the officer was off duty prior to the onset of the emergency. The Court emphasized that the police officer was \\\"on call\\\" twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and the officer died performing duties that a police officer would ordinarily perform in conjunction with such an emergency. Navajo police officers are public safety officers. They complete formal police training at the Navajo Police Academy. In contrast, Harold Tsosie lacked the requisite police training to be classified as a public safety officer. More experienced Navajo Rangers do complete formal police training at the academy but Harold was not among them. Harold Tsosie was a Ranger I and not a public safety officer therefore the reasoning in Conley is inapplicable. Further the facts show that Harold was not \\\"on call\\\" twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and he was not performing his duties at the time of his death like the officer in Conley. The emergency rule would apply if Harold's employment brought him to the lake where he encountered a moral obligation to effect a rescue. That was not the case here.\\nThe final issue concerns consideration of relevant evidence by the Board. The Claimants argue that only events which succeeded the onset of the emergency are relevant since Harold was \\\"pulled\\\" into duty by the emergency. First, we disagree with Claimants in light of 15 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1010 (d), which gives the Board authority \\\"to perform such discovery activity as may be deemed necessary to fully explore all aspects surrounding the occurrence and injury.\\\" (Emphasis supplied). And the Board \\\"may conduct investigations in such a manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out the spirit of this chapter.\\\" 15 N.T.C. \\u00a71010 (e). Clearly the Tribal Council gave the Board broad powers of review to fully explore all aspects surrounding the accident while carrying out the intent of the Navajo Workmen's Compensation Act. Second, we agree with the respondent that the employment does not arise out of the emergency.\\nFor these reasons the award of the Workmen's Compensation Review Board denying compensation is affirmed.\\nTso, Chief Justice and Bluehouse, Associate Justice concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/685464.json b/navajo_nation/685464.json
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+"{\"id\": \"685464\", \"name\": \"Navajo Skill Center, et. al., Appellants, vs. Ellen Benally, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Skill Center v. Benally\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-07-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-08-84\", \"first_page\": 93, \"last_page\": 97, \"citations\": \"5 Navajo Rptr. 93\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:25.804569+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McCabe, Chief Justice, Tso and Bradley, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Navajo Skill Center, et al., Appellants, vs. Ellen Benally, Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-08-84\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation\\nNavajo Skill Center, et al., Appellants, vs. Ellen Benally, Appellee\\nDecided July 14, 1986\\nBefore McCabe, Chief Justice, Tso and Bradley, Associate Justices.\\nRichard W. Hughes, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico for Appellants and Genevieve K. Chato, Esq., Fort Defiance, Arizona for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1858\", \"char_count\": \"11573\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOpinion delivered by\\nTso, Associate Justice.\\nAppellee was employed as an instructor by the Navajo Skill Center in January, 1982. She was later promoted to Manager of Student Services. On February 18, 1983, appellee was terminated effective February 22, 1983. The termination letter was dated February 18,1983, was signed by the Acting Executive Director, and informed appellee that she had five working days to appeal to the Board of Directors of the Navajo Skill Center. During the time appellee was employed the Skill Center established grievance procedures.\\nAppellee appealed and a hearing was scheduled before the Board of Directors on March 8, 1983, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Another employee, Rosemary Benally, who was terminated at the same time also had her hearing scheduled for March 8 in Albuquerque. The appellee was informed of the hearing date on March 2. The pleadings contain statements that appellee who lived next door to Rosemary Benally requested Rosemary to arrange for legal representation. There is no indication that appellee took any other measures on her own behalf during the interval between March 2 and March 8. Appellee did not attend that scheduled hearing nor did she communicate with the Board.\\nOn March 9 appellee was notified that the Board had upheld her termination. On March 10 appellee asked the Board to reconsider.\\nOn April 7,1983, appellee filed a complaint in the Crownpoint District Court against the Navajo Skill Center, and the acting Executive Director and the Board of Directors. Appellee alleged that her due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Navajo Bill of Rights and her right of freedom of association had been violated, that the Navajo Skill Center had failed to follow the grievance procedures, and that the Board should have held their meeting in Crownpoint rather than Albuquerque.\\nA jury trial was held on February 1, 1984. Appellee was awarded reinstatement and back pay. The Navajo Skill Center appealed this verdict.\\nThe appeal was allowed on two general issues: the scope of judicial review of administrative action and whether the Skill Center was immune from suit under the Sovereign Immunity Act. The Court finds that its decision on the scope of judicial review is dispositive and does not decide the issue of whether the Skill Center may assert the defense of sovereign immunity.\\nAt the outset the Court had to determine whether the Navajo Skill Center was a governmental agency subject to the principles of administrative law.\\nThe Navajo Skill Center was incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the laws of New Mexico on September 8, 1982. Its purposes as stated in the Articles of Incorporation were to provide vocational educational and related services to the Navajo Tribe and others and to engage in activities that would alleviate or eliminate poverty among the Navajo people or lessen the burdens of tribal government. The Navajo Tribal Council authorized the Skill Center as a tribal entity (Navajo Tribal Council Resolution ACN-147-81). The Skill Center was established by the Navajo Nation to carry out certain governmental purposes and functions.\\nThe government of the United States has long used corporations as agencies created to facilitiate and execute governmental purposes and functions. In Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that Congress may create corporations as an appropriate means for carrying out the powers of government. In U.S. v. Doherty, 18 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb.), aff'd 94 F. 2d 295 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 303 U.S. 658 (1937), the court said:\\n\\\"[T]he proposition that Congress has power to create a corporation as an agency of the government to fulfill governmental purposes and to endow it with powers of a private corporation is not now open to question.\\\" 18 F. Supp at 794.\\nFinally, the federal government in Title 5 U.S.C. (Government Organiza tion and Employees) recognizes that governmental corporations are administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. \\u00a7 105.\\nThe Court holds that the Navajo Skill Center was a governmental agency subject to administrative laws and procedures.\\nJudicial review of administrative action is reasonable and necessary. There are certain fundamental principles that support such review. Some form of judicial review strengthens rather than weakens the administrative process. Judicial review develops the principles of fairness and due process which are necssary for the administrative body to obtain respect for and obedience of its decisions. Denial of judicial review would be a deprivation of what the courts have to offer. Judges become specialists in civil rights issues, in the interpretation of statutes, in defining and enforcing fair procedures, in determining whether findings are supported by substantial evidence, and in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Finally, judicial review of administrative action is consistent with the principle and desirability of appellate review of trial court proceedings.\\nJudicial review of administrative action may be authorized by statute, implied in the inherent powers of the courts, or mandated by civil rights guarantees of due process and equal protection. Thus it is rare that all agency action is insulated from some form of judicial review. The questions then in each individual case become (1) what action is reviewable (2) when is it reviewable (3) what is the scope of review and (4) which court will do the initial reviewing.\\nAdministrative agencies frequently are both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Certain rule making and judicial type activities are committed to them along with duties of implementing and administering a program. Administrative bodies are designed for the development and application of expertise in the area committed to them.\\nBecause administrative bodies and the courts both have judicial functions it is necessary to sort out the function of both and to distinguish when each may act. This is much like the jurisdictional levels between trial courts and appellate courts.\\nOne of the earliest statements of divisions of functions by the U.S. Supreme Court involved the Interstate Commerce Commission. The ICC was an early administrative body and had the authority to fix rates for carriers of interstate commerce. The rate setting activities were challenged by both the carriers and the users of the carriers. In ICC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 U.S. 541, 32 S. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308 (1912), the railroad challenged the power of the ICC to fix rates and the manner in which the rate was set in this particular instance. The U.S. Supreme Court said:\\n. . it has been settled that the orders of the Commission are final unless (1) beyond the power which it could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law. But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be set aside if it appears that (4) the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law; or (5) if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power.\\\" 56 L. Ed. 308, 311.\\nThe Court finds that the ICC case contains the statement of judicial review which is still valid. Thus, judicial review of administrative action will be whether the act was beyond or outside the power of the agency, based upon a mistake as to the applicable law, a violation of civil rights guarantees, not supported by the evidence, or the procedures were arbitrary and unreasonable.\\nIn determining when agency actions will be reviewed, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies have been developed. Primary jurisdiction refers to the concept that the agency should act first. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is the concept that the agency should complete its procedures before the courts interfere. The exhaustion doctrine is very sound and ultimately serves the interests of judicial efficiency and economy. The exhaustion doctrine prevents the courts from interfering until the administrative process has been concluded. This process has been committed to the administrative body by the legislature and it should be permitted to run its course. The doctrine also requires parties to attempt to redress their grievance without resorting to the courts. Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine helps prevent confusion between the courts and the administrative bodies which would arise if a party were able to seek relief in two different forums.\\nBecause of the court's continuing duty to balance the rights and interests of all parties, however, there are times when exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. Generally, exhaustion will not be required:\\n1. When the administrative remedy is inadequate. Inadequacy may include unreasonable delay of agency action, inability of the agency to come to a decisi\\u00f3n, or lack of authority to grant the relief to which the party is entitled.\\n2. When the complainant will suffer irreparable injury if required to exhaust administrative remedies.\\n3. When the agency is clearly acting or attempting to act in excess of its authority.\\n4. When pursuing the administrative process would be futile such as when an agency indicates that it will not consider a party's challenges to its past policies or decisions, which are of questionable legality.\\nIn the instant case the Court can find no basis upon which the appellee should have been permitted to avoid the requirement of exhausting her administrative remedies. Further, the Court cannot ignore the situation of the co-worker who pursued her remedies and was reinstated in her job. The co-worker upon request was given a change of location and date for her hearing. The Court finds that appellee was inattentive to her own affairs and less than diligent in pursuing her own interests. In the balancing of the rights and interests of the Skill Center and the appellee this Court cannot find it unreasonable to require appellee to assume her responsibilities in protecting her own interests. The Grievance Procedures were established for the use and benefit of both the Skill Center and its employees. Neither party may arbitrarily elect not to follow them and then be allowed to resort to the courts when the results are adverse.\\nThe Court has some questions as to exactly what the grievance procedures are and whether they were followed in the appellee's case. The Court holds, however, that the administrative body must first have the opportunity to make these determinations within the context of its own procedures. The agency was not presented with that opportunity in this case.\\nThe decision of the Crownpoint District Court in this matter is reversed and vacated.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/686611.json b/navajo_nation/686611.json
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+"{\"id\": \"686611\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Practice of Law in the Navajo Tribal Courts by: Melody K. ELKINS, Ronald D. HAVEN, Inja NELSON, Alene DELEGARITO and Donna Carole BRADLEY, Petitioners, vs. THE NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Elkins v. Navajo Nation Bar Ass'n\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-06-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-29-82; A-CV-06-83; A-CV-08-83; A-CV-09-83; A-CV-10-83\", \"first_page\": 63, \"last_page\": 64, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 63\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Appeal heard before Chief Justice Nelson J. McCabe, Associate Justices Robert B. Walters and Tom Tso.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Practice of Law in the Navajo Tribal Courts by: Melody K. ELKINS, Ronald D. HAVEN, Inja NELSON, Alene DELEGARITO and Donna Carole BRADLEY, Petitioners, vs. THE NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-29-82 A-CV-06-83 A-CV-08-83 A-CV-09-83 A-CV-10-83\\nCOURT OF APPEAL OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nJune 24, 1983\\nIn the Matter of the Practice of Law in the Navajo Tribal Courts by: Melody K. ELKINS, Ronald D. HAVEN, Inja NELSON, Alene DELEGARITO and Donna Carole BRADLEY, Petitioners, vs. THE NAVAJO NATION BAR ASSOCIATION, Respondent.\\nAppeal heard before Chief Justice Nelson J. McCabe, Associate Justices Robert B. Walters and Tom Tso.\\nPaul Frye, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona). Richard George, Esq., Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona). Lawrence Long, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona).\", \"word_count\": \"729\", \"char_count\": \"4457\", \"text\": \"The above-captioned matter came before the Court of Appeals on June 23, 1983, and the court is entering its preliminary order on the status of the five petitioners in order to give an immediate disposition of their petitions. The ability to practice law, either as an associate member of the bar or as a regular member of the bar, is a presssing matter in which the rights of the petitioners, and the public, represented by the Navajo Nation Bar Association, should be dealt with immediately in the interests of competent legal representation.\\nTherefore the court makes the following ORDERS:\\n1. As to petitioner Elkins: The court notes that Ms. Elkins is not eligible for associate status in the bar due to the fact she is not Navajo. Therefore she would not normally be eligible to practice law under supervision as an associate member of the bar. However the court notes that Ms. Elkins has lived and worked within the Navajo Nation for a number of years, first as a teacher and then with the Justice Department. Given the fact that the Justice Department has certified her competency and given the fact that the courts must support efforts for the Navajo Nation to obtain and be represented by competent counsel, this court hereby admits the petitioner to associate status under the rules of the bar association pending her bar examination .\\nThe court cautions that this special admission is done in this instance only and it is done only because of Ms. Elkin's period of time working in the Justice Department, and the court urges the Navajo Nation Bar Association to consider the policy factor that the Navajo Nation needs competent counsel and decide whether a special association rule should be adopted for situations such as this.\\n2. As to petitioner Ronald D. Haven: The record of this case and oral argument shows that the Navajo Nation Bar Association has not had an opportunity to review the special circumstances presented by Mr. Haven's petition, and the court remands the matter to the bar association for action.\\n3. As to petitioner Inja Nelson: The record of this case and oral argument shows that the Navajo Nation Bar Association has not had an opportunity to review the special circumstances presented by Ms. Nelson's petition, and the court remands the matter to the bar association for action.\\n4. As to petitioner Delgarito: The court has been advised that Ms. Delgarito's application for associate status was denied by the Admissions Committee and granted by the Board of Governors of the Navajo Nation Bar Association. The court accepts the decision of the Board of Governors and Ms. Delegarito is admitted as an associate member.\\nThe court also notes that the Hopi Tribal Court grants reciprocity to qualified Navajo individuals with respect to practice in that court, and this court accepts Hopi Bar members for admission to our bar upon examination. Therefore the special exception granted Ms. Delegarito to associate . membership is within the policy of reciprocity and mutual respect for the courts of another Indian nation.\\n5. As to petitioner Bradley: Ms. Bradley is admitted to practice as an associate member because of the concession of the Navajo Nation Bar Association that she may be so admitted as an associate member under the supervision of the Attorney General or her designate.\\n6. The court suggests to the Navajo Nation Bar Association that it consider seriously the problem of special exceptions for Navajo Government employees as associate members pending their examination and admission to the bar, and the court suggests that the bar association clarify its appeals procedures with respect to the denial of applications for associate membership.\\n7. The opinion of the court explaining the law supporting the decision of the court will be forthcoming following the next session of the Court of Appeals.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/686615.json b/navajo_nation/686615.json
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+"{\"id\": \"686615\", \"name\": \"MONICA DAMON, EDITH YAZZIE, REBECCA MIKE, and ELEANOR WAUNEKA, PLaintiff, v.1 PETER MacDONALD, FRANK E. PAUL, ROY KEETO, JOHN DOES 2, 3 and 4; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL; and CONTROLLER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Damon v. MacDonald\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-01 -83\", \"first_page\": 138, \"last_page\": 141, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 138\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MONICA DAMON, EDITH YAZZIE, REBECCA MIKE, and ELEANOR WAUNEKA, PLaintiff, v. PETER MacDONALD, FRANK E. PAUL, ROY KEETO, JOHN DOES 2, 3 and 4; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL; and CONTROLLER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nJanuary 21, 1983\\nNo. WR-CV-01 -83\\nMONICA DAMON, EDITH YAZZIE, REBECCA MIKE, and ELEANOR WAUNEKA, PLaintiff, v. PETER MacDONALD, FRANK E. PAUL, ROY KEETO, JOHN DOES 2, 3 and 4; ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL, NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL; and CONTROLLER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE, Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1811\", \"char_count\": \"10599\", \"text\": \"Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nTHE FACTS ON RECORD\\nThis law suit comes to the court as a simple dispute between private individuals over who has the right to use lands owned by the Navajo Nation. It is brought to quiet title to lands which are the subject of separate and conflicting claims. However the suit is more complex because the parties, and one plaintiff who is a member of the Navajo Tribal Council, contend that certain legislative actions of the Advisory Committee were illegal.\\nThe basic facts of the dispute are simple. The plaintiffs claim that in 1967 a gentleman by the name of George Damon established a customary use area in what is now the community of Window Rock, and that the customary use Mr. Damon had was a property interest which he could hold and which his wife and children could inherit. The plaintiffs in this action are the widow and daughters of George Damon, claiming rights to the land through him and the Damon family.\\nThings became complicated when a gentleman by the name of Nakai Nez put his thumb print to an agreement dated November 8, 1935. That agreement says Nakai Nez held for 20 years through \\\"usage, and that Nez would give up \\\"a strip of land lying between the Agency buildings and the Cap Rock of the mesa on the East, and the lands formerly held by Carl Mute, Navajo Indian, on the North, and Charlie Yazzie and John Keto, Navajo Indians, on the South....\\\" In return for these 100 acres, Nez was to receive a farm wagon, a harness set and he could \\\"haul ten cords of wood.\\\"\\nThe Damon family says that Nakai Nez was only living with the Damon family, with the implication he had no right to relinquish the 100 acres. In any event the Damons say that there was never a consent on their part to give up their customary use area. That assertion is somewhat clouded by the inconsistent fact that the decedent and seven of his children have held grazing permits in the area, the children having theirs in the years following 1968.\\nThere is some dispute, as yet unclear, as to exactly what the relevance is of the surrender of the 100 acres by Nakai Nez, including his right to make a surrender and the precise location of the land. The land description contained in the 1935 agreement can by no stretch of the imagination be said to be legally precise.\\nThings began coming to life when the Acting Area Director of the Navajo Area Office (Bureau of Indian Affairs) notified the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council on December 16, 1982 that a certain \\\"administrative reserve\\\" of 100 acres, located in the Window Rock area, was restored to tribal trust land status. Very shortly thereafter defendant MacDonald accepted the return of the land on behalf of the Navajo T ribe.\\nOn December 29, 1982 the Office of Navajo Land Development entered into a compromise of dispute agreement with five individuals regarding the disputed area, but that agreement did not include the plaintiffs.\\nPreviously the Advisory Committee approved the withdrawal of the land in dispute (December 17, 1982), and on December 28, 1982 the day before the compromise agreement was signed - the expenditure of $70,000 to settle the claims of Willie Keeto and others was approved by it.\\nSubsequently defendants MacDonald, Paul and Keeto received Advisory Committee approval for homesite leases in the area. It has appeared to the court that the Advisory Committee resolution with respect to defendant MacDonald's homesite has been approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but that those of defendants Paul and Keeto have not, and the Bureau will withhold action until the rights of all the parties to this case are resolved. Defendant MacDonald has already been removed as a subject of temporary relief by Bureau action.\\nThe plaintiffs ask for a temporary restraining order to stop construction on the land, prevent further decisions on the land until compensation is paid, to halt financial transactions connected with these events, to prevent the use of tribal employees, equipment and materials in developing the land, and to otherwise freeze action until the case is decided. Plaintiff Edith Yazzie asks this relief not only on her own behalf as a claimant, but on behalf of the Navajo public.\\nSTANDARDS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS\\nTemporary restraining orders are meant to be short-lived, and they can be granted only until the court can hear the matter in more detail in a later hearing for relief while the suit is pending. Weintraub v. Hanrahan, 435 F.2d 461 (CA7, 1970). What a plaintiff asks for when requesting a temporary restraining order is something drastic and something the court usually will not grant, unless there is a very strong showing indeed that there will be an injury which cannot be later healed and that it is desirable for such action to be taken. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978 (D.D.C. 1952). Before a court can grant a temporary restraining order, it must be satisfied that:\\n1. There is going to be immediate and irreparable injury;\\n2. There is a probability of success on the merits; and\\n3. There is harm to the moving party which outweighs any harm to the opposing party and to the public. National Prisoners Reform Asso. v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972).\\nTHE LAW IN THIS CASE\\nThese are very high standards, and this court has already turned down the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order for their failure to present compelling facts showing they are entitled to relief.\\nA lengthy hearing was held on the plaintiffs' application, and the court had the opportunity to hear live testimony and receive documents in support of the application. The factual conclusion of this court is that there is something to the plaintiffs' claims but not enough to merit the entry of a temporary restraining order. Very serious questions of fact and law have been raised, but there is not enough at this point to justify drastic action by the court.\\nThe Court is not convinced there will be immediate and irreparable injury because, while the plaintiffs point out that the grazing use of the land will be destroyed, there is no strong showing they actually use it to graze. Their claim for specific relief is also clouded by their claims for monetary payment, and the law for centuries has been that a court will not stop someone from doing something if a money payment to an injured party will resolve his problem. There is also the fact that on January 12, 1983 letters were sent to Frank E. Paul, Willie Keeto and Roy Keeto saying it will not act on resolutions affecting this matter \\\"until all the rights of all the parties have been resolved by the Courts.\\\" Therefore there is in effect administrative hold which resolves some of the need. Further the defendants have already agreed, in their home-site lease application, that they will not build until all approvals are had.\\nThere is not enough evidence before the court to show that the plaintiffs will probably succeed. The court needs clarification of the effect of the 1907 customary use claim, the impact of the 1935 agreement and the actions of the parties affecting their rights to the land. The court must also have a good deal more argument and law presented to it before deciding the validity or invalidity of actions by the Advisory Committee. This Court follows the presumption of validity that attaches to official acts, particularly those of the legislature, and it will not act hastily to invalidate an Advisory Committee resolution. This is not to say that the court will not invalidate an illegal act, but it must be clear that an act is illegal before the staying hand of the court is extended.\\nThere has been no satisfactory showing of a harm to the plaintiffs which outweighs any harm to the opposing parties. If construction is halted, then the defendants could be in breach of building contract commitments, material purchase commitments and other obligations. This court notes that outgoing tribal officials will not have the advantage of tribal housing and that they will have to find other places to live. Defendant Paul has a sufficient risk of losing a great deal of money that the court does not find the wright of hurt to be light for him. Of course all this will depend upon Bureau of Indian Affairs action, and it has indicated it will withhold action until this matter is resolved.\\nThe public concern is great in this case. Allegations of impropriety of public monies being spent and public lands being allocated without following proper procedures are serious, and the court has the public interest very much in mind. However, since the Bureau of Indian Affairs has not approved (and apparently will not approve) the expenditure of public monies, and land illegally vested can be legally divested, the solution is to proceed to a full trial and resolve these questions. The court sees no irreparable injury to the public interest now, given the present state of things.\\nSince these points tell the court it should not issue a temporary restraining order, and since there has been evidence of restraint on the part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it is appropriate for the court to ask the Bureau, as the organ of one sovereign speaking to the organ of another, that it continue with its policy of withholding action on matters before it related to this case until the case here can be resolved. This is a matter falling under Navajo law and one within the jurisdiction of this court, and this court represents to the Bureau of Indian Affairs that this, and not the Bureau, is the more appropriate forum to resolve this dispute.\\nSince the Court is denying temporary relief, it is in the interests of justice that the plaintffs have a rapid opportunity to present their final case. Therefore the Court will enter a separate order for an expedited trial, rapid discovery and appropriate pretrial proceedings. If the case is tried and decided quickly, then many of the problems of possible injury to the plaintiffs will be resolved. Needless to say, the defendants would like to know where they stand as soon as possible.\\nBased on these considerations, the application for a temporary restraining order is DENIED, with leave for reapplication should there be a change in circumstances meriting relief.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/686638.json b/navajo_nation/686638.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd28fa89d61cf9ef77d31b2d8b79bcf7070b407f
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"686638\", \"name\": \"JOANN BECENTI, Plaintiff, v. JOHNNY and SHIRLEY LAUGHLIN, Defendants, and NAVAJO FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Becenti v. Laughlin\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-04-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-C-661-76\", \"first_page\": 147, \"last_page\": 148, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 147\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOANN BECENTI, Plaintiff, v. JOHNNY and SHIRLEY LAUGHLIN, Defendants, and NAVAJO FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nApril 12, 1983\\nNo. WR-C-661-76\\nJOANN BECENTI, Plaintiff, v. JOHNNY and SHIRLEY LAUGHLIN, Defendants, and NAVAJO FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES.\", \"word_count\": \"849\", \"char_count\": \"4888\", \"text\": \"Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThis is a case which involves the construction of a statute, and it appears that a number of interpretations can be made. In this case the plaintiff recovered a money judgment against the defendants in March of 1977. The plaintiff diligently tries to enforce her judgment, and in November of 1982 she made her application to this court for a writ of garnishment to reach the wages of one of the defendants, payable by the Navajo Forest Products Industries (Garnishee). The defendants have moved to quash an issued writ, citing a five-year limitation on executions in 7 NTC, Sec. 705. That statute provides:\\n\\\"The party in whose favor a money judgment is given by the Courts of the Navajo Tribe may at any time within five years after entry thereof have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement. No execution, however, shall issue after the death of the judgment debtor. A judgment creditor may have as many writs of execution as are necessary to effect collection of the entire amount of the judgment.\\\"\\nWhat does this statute mean? There appear to be several readings of it:\\n1. There is an absolute bar to any execution after five years have passed;\\n2. As long as the judgment creditor obtains a writ of execution within five years the judgment can be enforced;\\n3. After five years, writs of execution cannot be used to collect, but other means can;\\n4. There can be waiver of the five year limit by the defendants' actions.\\nThere is an obvious problem in interpreting the intent of the Navajo Tribal Council with respect to the five year limit, and since the reading of the entire resolution which created the statute does not resolved the problem, the court must use other reasonable means of interpretation.\\nIn beginning an analysis of the statute, the court accepts the contention of the defendants that a writ of garnishment is the same sort of remedy as a writ of execution. Reisenfeld, Creditors' Remedies & Debtors' Protection, pp. 2-7 (1967). This is in accordance with the opinion of the court in the case in the Matter of the Interest of Tsosie, (1982) Navajo L.J. 2015. Therefore, any limitation in the statute applies to the remedy sought here.\\nIt is a matter of standard statutory law that statutes must be read on their face to reach a reasonable conclusion which follows from the obvious intent and purpose of the statute. In this case there is an obvious conflict in the intent of the statute when reading it on its face, with a five year limitation to, \\\"have a writ of execution\\\", and a provision that \\\"a judgment creditor may have as many writs of execution as are necessary to effect collection of the entire amount of the judgment.\\\" It is important that the five year limitation is upon the issuance of a writ of execution, and Chapter 5 of Title 7 (Procedure) contains no time limitation on judgments.\\nAs a general rule an execution or part payments on a judgment within the period of the statutory time limitation extends the time in which a judgment may be executed. In Lindsey v. Merrill, executions and payments during the statutory period formed new points for the running of the statute and permitted new executions. 36 Ark. 545 (1880). In Strong v. State, part payment of a judgment was held to postpone the running of the statute and revive a judgment for the purposes of an execution. 57 Ind. 428 (1877). In Neilands v. Wrights, the court interpreted a statute such as ours which did not indicate the effect of part payment, but held that part payment was an acknowledgment of the existence of the demand and a waiver of the statute of limitations. 134 Mich. 77, 95 NW 997 (1903).\\nTwo other cases noted that there is a difference between the running of a limitations upon executions and that upon the judgment itself, and held that partial satisfaction extends the period of time in which one may execute upon a judgment. Hicks v. Brown, 38 Ark. 469 (1882); Kontz v. LaDow, 133 Ark. 523, 202 SW 686, (1918).\\nThe obvious purpose of 7 N.T.C. Sec. 705 is to prevent stale judgments and to require judgment creditors to be diligent in seeking to collect on their judgments. If there is no such diligence, then the judgment debtor is assured peace after the five year period. However, since the judgment creditor is permitted as many writs of execution as he or she needs to collect a valid judgment, this court holds that partial satisfaction of the judgment and, as here, legitimate attempts to collect by execution or otherwise toll the statute.\\nTHEREFORE the limitation of 7 N.T.C. Sec. 705 shall run from the date of the last execution attempt on the part of the plaintiff, and the motion to quash the writ of execution is hereby DENIED.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/686673.json b/navajo_nation/686673.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bdd6e5a799391e7aa260e1a9bf4788a12fee44f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/navajo_nation/686673.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"686673\", \"name\": \"IN THE MATTER OF VALIDATING THE MARRIAGE OF: ROSE M. GARCIA, and ALFRED GARCIA, (Deceased)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Validating the Marriage Of Garcia\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"NO. WR-CV-602-83\", \"first_page\": 197, \"last_page\": 197, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 197\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN THE MATTER OF VALIDATING THE MARRIAGE OF: ROSE M. GARCIA, and ALFRED GARCIA, (Deceased)\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nDecember 8, 1983\\nNO. WR-CV-602-83\\nIN THE MATTER OF VALIDATING THE MARRIAGE OF: ROSE M. GARCIA, and ALFRED GARCIA, (Deceased)\", \"word_count\": \"275\", \"char_count\": \"1661\", \"text\": \"Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nThe above entitled matter having come before this court on the petition for validation of marriage; the question presented by the petition is whether the court can validate a marriage between a member of the Navajo Tribe and a non-member of the Navajo Tribe, who is also now deceased; apparently the parties were married on April 3, 1959, through a Navajo Traditional Wedding Ceremony and as a result of this union four (4) children were born; Petitioner and decedent were recognized as husband and wife in their community of Tsayatoh Chapter on the Navajo Reservation.\\nMarriages between Navajos and non-Navajos may be validly contracted only by the parties' complying with applicable state or foreign law. 9 NTC Section 2, Mixed Marriage, (emphasis added).\\nAll purported marriages of members of the Navajo Tribe not contracted by church, state or Tribal custom ceremony as defined by the resolution of the Tribal Council, wherein such members were or are recognized as man and wife in their community, are validated and recognized as valid Tribal custom marriages from the date of their inception. 9 NTC Section 61, Validation of Marriage, (emphasis added).\\nThe language in 9 NTC Section 2 and 9 NTC Section 61 is very clear that this court is without authority to validate marriage between a member of the Tribe and a non-member of the Tribe.\\nTHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition to validate marriage filed in this cause be and is hereby denied.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/686677.json b/navajo_nation/686677.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..87ad16404486f011733592c6eeafad8a2bbcb76c
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"686677\", \"name\": \"Bessie DESCHENIE, Appellant, vs. Elouise NEZ, Dorothy NEZ and Laura MIKE, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Deschenie v. Nez\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-09-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-04-83\", \"first_page\": 73, \"last_page\": 73, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 73\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Bessie DESCHENIE, Appellant, vs. Elouise NEZ, Dorothy NEZ and Laura MIKE, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-04-83\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nSeptember 27, 1983\\nBessie DESCHENIE, Appellant, vs. Elouise NEZ, Dorothy NEZ and Laura MIKE, Appellees.\\nCasey Watchman, Esq., Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellant. Richard George, Esq., Tuba City, Navajo Nation (Arizona) for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"108\", \"char_count\": \"662\", \"text\": \"The above-captioned appeal is hereby dismissed for the failure to make a motion for reconsideration in District Court, as required by Rule 5(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further, a review of the matters on file in the District Court and this court discloses no probable cause for the granting of an appeal under the provisions of 7 NTC Sec. 801(b).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/686686.json b/navajo_nation/686686.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a22a7900eea092174862b63b5b22780a82111736
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"686686\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION, ex rel. DIVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE, IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF: J.J.S., A Minor\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation ex rel. Division of Social Welfare\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. WR-CV-21-83\", \"first_page\": 192, \"last_page\": 196, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 192\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION, ex rel. DIVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE, IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF: J.J.S., A Minor.\", \"head_matter\": \"WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT\\nNovember 4, 1983\\nNo. WR-CV-21-83\\nTHE NAVAJO NATION, ex rel. DIVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE, IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF: J.J.S., A Minor.\", \"word_count\": \"2120\", \"char_count\": \"12536\", \"text\": \"Honorable Tom Tso, Judge presiding.\\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE\\nThis is a case involving a minor child who is seriously neglected by his mother. The father of the child is unknown. As a result of the mother's severe neglect of the child her parental rights have been terminated pursuant to law. Upon termination of parental rights the natural mother expressed her desire that her child be adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Dan and Helen Chee.\\nA petition for adoption is also pending before this court on the above named minor child filed by Mr. and Mrs. Johnny and Patricia Stephens. Mr. and Mrs. Stephens are not members of the Navajo T ribe.\\nThe social workers submitted an excellent home investigation report and recommendation. They have determined that both families are fit to raise the minor child. Mrs. Chee is a counsin to the child's natural mother and therefore a member of the extended family of the natural mother and resides in Pine Dale, New Mexico within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.\\nThe Court is confronted with the issue as to who should be appointed adoptive parents of this minor child since the two couples petitioning to adopt the child are both fit.\\nAPPLICABLE LAW\\nThe first thing this court must do is find which law applies in this case.\\nThe trial court of the Navajo Nation has original jurisdiction over all cases involving the domestic relation of Indians, such as divorces, or adoption matters. 9 NTC Section 1001, et. seq.\\nThe Navajo Tribal Code gives the Court a choice of law to use in a given case.\\n7 NTC Section 204, Law Applicable In Civil Actions, a. In all civil cases the Courts of the Navajo Tribe shall apply any laws of the United States that may be applicable, any authorized regulations of the Interior Department, and any ordinances or custom of the Tribe not prohibited by such federal laws.\\nThe law is very clear if there is an applicable custom of the Tribe not prohibited by federal laws then the court can apply those customs including any ordinances of the Navajo Tribe.\\nNAVAJO COMMON LAW DEFINED\\nThis Court in its decision in the case of the Estate of Apache, WR-CV-197-82, 1983, Window Rock District Court. Pronounced its preference for the term \\\"Navajo Common Law\\\" rather than \\\"custom\\\" for the reason that it is not widely understood that the customs and tradition of the Navajo people are law, and the English term is used because it more accurately reflects our custom as law. The word \\\"custom\\\" for the purpose of the statute not only includes customs which may be testified to, noticed, proved by expert testimony or otherwise shown by evidence, but it includes recorded opinions and decisions of the Navajo Courts (not dealing with statutory interpretation or the application of principles of state or general Anglo-European Law), and some learned treatises on Navajo ways, Id.\\nAMERICAN LAW ON ADOPTION\\nThere are laws of the United States which this court can use in ruling on this case including the Indian Child Welfare Act, (1978). This court can apply those federal laws in absence of a Navajo Custom which is not prohibited by federal law. Fortunately, there is a Navajo custom that this court is aware of and can apply in deciding the issue in this case.\\nAdoption is a legal process by which the law makes a substitution of parents for a child and terminates the parent and child bond with the natural parents, at least legally speaking. The adoption process requires the termination of the legal bond with the natural parents because of the idea that there can only be one parent- and child relationship at any one time. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in United States, Section 18.1, P. 602, (1968).\\nAn important point about Anglo-European adoption law is that it is a law which is created only by statute, and it did not come to the United States Courts through the English common or customary law. Id. at P. 603. As a result, the current American Law of Adoption is recent and a product of modern American attitudes. There has also been a history of hostility towards the law of adoption in American Courts, possibly due to the fact that it was not created over a long period of time by the courts to fit the needs of those who have come before them. Id.\\nNAVAJO COMMON LAW ON ADOPTION\\nThe American Law of Adoption thinks in terms of duties. Natural parents have duties towards their children, and when those duties are breached, then the law will take the children away from the natural parents and give them to other parents. Navajo concepts are different and the following description has been made of Navajo legal attitudes towards family relationship.\\n\\\"Navajos believe that each person has a right to speak for oneself and to act as one pleases. The mutual rights and duties of kinsmen normally discussed under the concept of the jural relations are best described as mutual expectations, rather than obligations. This distinction is a matter of emphasis and decreeing, but it is very real and worth nothing. Desirable actions on the part of others are hoped for and even expected, but they are not required or demanded. Coercion is always deplored.\\\" Witherspoon Navajo Kinship and Marriage, pages 94-95, (1975).\\nTherefore, the Navajo view of the relationship of children to parents is not one of a simple parent and child relationship, but an entire pattern of expectation and desirable action surrounding children. Opinion of Court Solicitor, 83-10 (1983).\\nA central concept of child rearing in Navajo society should be grasped before there is any discussion of the Navajo Common Law of Adoption. One description of that concept is:\\n\\\"The Navajo people identify themselves as 'Dine, which means the people. The term is simply an expression of native pride or a message that conveys many things which are central in native feelings. One of the most important societal values included in this natural native feeling is the attitude towards children, they are highly valued and wanted. The basis for the Navajo life ethics was that the original parents of the first human infant pronounced a death penalty on any creator or being who mistreated the first child. This act or behavior would devalue or humiliate the supernaturals with whom the first human baby was identified. Therefore, in the Navajo religious context inhumane cruelty to children was prohibited.\\\" Navajo Child Rearing Concept, Child Abuse and Neglect - A Navajo Prospective, Navajo Children's Legal Services, Draft Section Of A Manuel For Use In Child Welfare Services, (1983).\\nThe Navajo Common Law principles of the expectation that children are to be taken care of and that obligation is not simply one of the child's parents. The Navajos have very strong family ties and clan ties.\\nThe term adoption is used by Navajo commentators on Navajo Common Law but it is used in a different sense than that used in Anglo-European adoption statutes:\\n\\\"Orphans of Navajo families or children of large families or broken homes are adopted by other family members or a family member of the same clan as the child.\\\" Carl N. Gorman,\\nThe Navajo Nation Is Made Up Of Many Conference, (1980); Published in Dine' Center For Human Development For Generations To Come, (1982).\\nMany Navajo adoptions have a different focus than Anglo-European law. As such, it is not principally concerned with the exchange of legal parents.\\n\\\"Navajo adoption is based on need, mutual love and help. Children may or may not change the surname. Either way the family is a unit with strong, supportive, extended family and clan ties. It has worked for hundreds of years without adoption agencies and courts of law.\\\" Id.\\nAnother distinctive aspect of Navajo adoption is that it is not necessarily permanent.\\n\\\"Adoption is merely a case of taking the children into the home for a limited time, or permanently, by extending family or parental agreement, depending on the circumstances. The child is raised and treated as ones own. Grandparents are sometimes the ones to take in and raise the young children belonging by birth to their own deceased or unwed children or other related family members. fd. In Navajo Common Law a child is said to be born for his father's clan and a member of his mother's clan. This means that the child is an integeral part of a functioning self-reinforcing and protecting group. Anglo-European law is primarily concerned with immediate parent and child relationship while Navajo Law is concerned with the relationship of a child to a group which shares the expectation that its members will take care of each other's children.\\\" Court Solicitor's Opinion, 83-10, (1983).\\nThe correct statement of the Navajo Common Law of adoption is that there is an obligation in family members, usually aunts or grandparents or a family member, who are best suited to assist the child to support and assist children in need by taking care of them for such periods of time as are necessary under the circumstances, or permanently in the case of a permanent tragedy effecting the parents. The Navajo Common Law is not concerned with the termination of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent and child relationship because those concepts are irrelevent in a system which has obligation to children that extends beyond the parents. Therefore, upon the inability of the parents to assist a child or following the occurence of a family tragedy, children are adopted by family members for care which maybe temporary or permanent, depending upon the circumstances. The mechanism is informal and practical and based upon community expectation founded in religious and cultural belief. Opinion of the Solicitor to the Courts of the Navajo Nation, No. 83-10, September 9, 1983.\\nNAVAJO STATUTES ON ADOPTION\\nThe Navajo Tribal Council is presumed to have had the common law as discussed above in mind when it enacted the following statutes recited in the Opinion and Order of this Court, In the Matter of the Estate of Boyd Apache, Cause No. WR-CV-197-83, October 11, 1983, (Citation omitted.):\\n1. 9 NTC Section 1256, states that after terminating the rights of parents, the court may place the child for adoption under applicable laws and regulations. (Emphasis added).\\n2. .9 NTC Section 1192, states: \\\"In placing the child under the guardianship or legal custody of an individual or of a private agency or institution, the court shall give primary consideration to the welfare of the child but, whenever practical, may take into consideration the religious preferences of the child and of his parent.\\\"\\n3. 9 NTC Section 1001 states that family ties should be preserved and strengthened whenver possible.\\n4. 9 NTC Section 1197 states that the court may make any other reasonable orders which are for the best interests of the child or are required for the protection of the public.\\n5. 9 NTC Section 615 expresses the policy of the Navajo Tribe in regards to the adoption of Navajo children, to wit:\\n(a) The Navajo Tribal Council favors the formal adoption of Navajo children in accordance with the provisions of this chapter in all cases where the parents of such children are dead, or where such children are regularly and continously neglected by their parents, or where the parents have abandoned such children. The Tribal Council looks with disfavor upon informal arrangements for the custody of such children except for temporary periods pending their formal adoption, (b) In the case referred to in subsection (a) of this section the Navajo Tribe neither favors nor disfavors adoption of Navajo children by parents who are not members of the Navajo Tribe but states as its policy that each case shall be considered individually or on its own merits by the Tribal Court of the Navajo Tribe.\\nCONCLUSION\\nIn conclusion, the court rules that an extended family member of the child and the natural mother has stepped forth and recognized and assumed her responsibility and obligation to care for a child who is severely neglected by the natural mother. The Social Services report as well as testimonies at trial also reveal that the home is a fit and appropriate place for the child to be raised and that it is in accordance with the Navajo Common Law and therefore it should grant adoption to that member of the extended family. A Findings of Fact and an Order to this effect will follow forthwith, which is incorporated into this Opinion by reference.\\nSO' ORDERED.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"686713\", \"name\": \"Allen TOM, Appellant, vs. Irene B. TOM a/k/a Irene JOHNSON, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tom v. Tom\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-01-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-26-82\", \"first_page\": 12, \"last_page\": 14, \"citations\": \"4 Navajo Rptr. 12\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:21:24.960305+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Allen TOM, Appellant, vs. Irene B. TOM a/k/a Irene JOHNSON, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. A-CV-26-82\\nCOURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION\\nJanuary 24, 1983\\nAllen TOM, Appellant, vs. Irene B. TOM a/k/a Irene JOHNSON, Appellee.\\nWilbert Tsosie, Esq., of Shiprock, Navajo Nation (New Mexico) for Appellant, and Loretta Morris, Esq., of DNA People's Legal Services, Inc., Crownpoint, Navajo Nation (New Mexico) for Appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1256\", \"char_count\": \"7150\", \"text\": \"ARGUMENT BEFORE THE COURT\\nThe briefs filed by the parties show that the legal question before this court is rather simple. On November 15, 1976 the trial court ruled that appellant Allen Tom was the father of two children and ordered him to \\\"pay in the amount of $50.00 child support to plaintiff. . . .\\\" In November of 1981 the appellee, Irene B. Tom, asked the court to modify its judgment to read \\\"$200.00 per month child support.\\\" Following a hearing, on September 28, 1982 the district court found that there was an oversight in the original order, and that it should have said \\\"$50.00 per month.\\\" The court denied the request to raise the amount of child support and another to order back child support payments. $50.00 per month was ordered.\\nOn appeal the father of the children argues that the original judgment could be read to be a one-time support payment of $50, that the order was defectively vague and that the court could not modify the original order in any way.\\nThe Chief Justice must now decide whether there is probable cause to grant an appeal.\\nTHE VAGUENESS QUESTION\\nIs there a fair dispute of the law applicable to this situation so as to require a hearing by the full court of appeals?\\nThe general principle of certainty in a judgment is that\\n\\\"It is a fundamental rule that a judgment should be complete and certain in itself, and that the form of the judgment should be such as to indicate with reasonable clearness the decision which the court has rendered, so that the parties may be able to ascertain the extent to which their rights and obligations are fixed, and so that the judgment is susceptible of enforcement in the manner provided by law. A failure to comply its this requirement may render a judgment void for uncertainty.\\\" 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments Sec. 67.\\nHowever that does not mean that any judgment which may be vague or uncertain is invalid. Courts are permitted to review their judgments to say what they mean, and that review is not an act of changing the judgment. Id. Sec. 72. Judgments are just like any written document, and the main thing to look for when reviewing a judgment is the intention of the court which made it. Id., Sec. 73. In trying to construe a judgment a court can look at the entire document and read it, along with the entire record of the case, the applicable law and rules of procedure, the kind of proceeding and what it accomplishes and like matters. Id. Sec. 76. The court's review should be such as to give the judgment force and effect, and there is a presumption that the court intended to make a valid judgment, Id., Secs. 73, 74.\\nOne last important principle is that judgments are to be given a practical construction, and not a highly-technical one. Id., Sec. 75.\\nTherefore the situation in this case should be viewed to see if there is a vagueness in the judgment causing a genuine question of law in dispute.\\nAPPLICATION OF A RULE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION\\n- Navajo Custom Law\\nIt is plain under the customary law of the Navajo People that a father of a child owes that child, or at least its mother, the duty of support. It is said that if a man has a child by a woman and fails to pay the woman money to support it, \\\"He has stolen the child.\\\" In other words, the man who receives the benefit and joy of having a child is a thief if he does not share in the worldly burdens of taking care of it. This Navajo custom lays the groundrule of support, and the conclusion to be drawn from the principle given is that a man must pay as much as is necessary for the child, given his abilities and resources at any given time.\\nThe Anglo-European legal rule is the same. See Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, Sec. 6.2 (1968). The foundation for the English and American rule is stated in very basic terms:\\n\\\"The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation . . . laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner injur ious to their issue, if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect right to receiving maintenance from the parents.\\\" I Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 447. (Emphasis in the original).\\nThe Practical Application of the Duty to Support\\nThe appellant father is, in effect, asking the court to let him off completely free of any obligation to his children other than a one-time payment of $50. Courts cannot accept arguments which would make a basic obligation a farce. It is obvious, given the duty to support children in a way which fits the parent's ability and property that there is a continuing a changing obligation. Therefore it is ridiculous to assume that the only obligation the father had was to pay $50.\\nThis practical approach is reinforced by common knowledge of the legal principle that a court order fixing child support can be modified at any time. In this case the mother came into court asking for an arrearage payment and an increase of child support, and the father cannot be said to be injured or prejudiced by the court's order refusing an increase or payment of an arrearage.\\nMODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS\\nRule 23 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court the power to reopen a case to correct errors in the interest of justice. The failure to put the words \\\"per month\\\" in the original judgment was certainly an error that justice required to correct. This is not a situation where the doctrine of res adjudicata applies, since the mother was not asking for relief which had already been ruled upon (as in whether there was paternity in the first place), but she was only asking for an interpretation and clarification of the original judgment.\\nCONCLUSION\\nThis case stands as a good warning to members of the Navajo Bar and the Navajo Judiciary that judgments must be carefully prepared in order to fully and clearly express the intent of the court. Judgments should be carefully prepared by counsel, carefully read by judges and executed only if the court is satisfied the judgment is proper. While there are mechanisms to correct vague or sloppy judgment documents, justice requires that the drafting be done correctly in the first place. This saves litigants the pain and expense of more litigation, and it saves work for the courts.\\nThe appellant's moving documents on appeal show no debatable question of law with respect to the fact situation posed, and therefore there is no probable cause to grant an appeal.\\nAPPEAL DISMISSED.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/687774.json b/navajo_nation/687774.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4028cdf19f49e01003f5620f96a7b937f7c1ca28
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+"{\"id\": \"687774\", \"name\": \"TEE NOS POS CHAPTER, Teec Nos Pos, Arizona, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PERRY GARNENEZ, Judge, District Court of the Navajo Nation, Judicial District of Shiprock, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tee Nos Pos Chapter v. Garnenez\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-CV-04-79\", \"first_page\": 34, \"last_page\": 34, \"citations\": \"2 Navajo Rptr. 34\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.273233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Marie F. Neswood\", \"parties\": \"TEE NOS POS CHAPTER, Teec Nos Pos, Arizona, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PERRY GARNENEZ, Judge, District Court of the Navajo Nation, Judicial District of Shiprock, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nTEE NOS POS CHAPTER, Teec Nos Pos, Arizona, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PERRY GARNENEZ, Judge, District Court of the Navajo Nation, Judicial District of Shiprock, Respondent.\\nNo. A-CV-04-79\\nDated this 16th day of March, 1979.\", \"word_count\": \"120\", \"char_count\": \"725\", \"text\": \"The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, filed the 28th day of February, 1979 and the subsequent Stipulation of both counsel having been received and reviewed by the Acting Chief Justice, the Court finds:\\nThat the Respondent has granted the relief prayed for in the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.\\nTHEREFORE, the Petition for a Writ of Mandamus is DISMISSED.\\nMarie F. Neswood\\nActing Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/687781.json b/navajo_nation/687781.json
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"687781\", \"name\": \"CARLA NOTAH Plaintiff vs. LOUIS NOTAH Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Notah v. Notah\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-10-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 107, \"last_page\": 114, \"citations\": \"2 Navajo Rptr. 107\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Window Rock District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.273233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CARLA NOTAH Plaintiff vs. LOUIS NOTAH Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"CARLA NOTAH Plaintiff vs. LOUIS NOTAH Defendant\\nOpinion of the Window Rock District Court\\nDecided on October 4, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"1913\", \"char_count\": \"11181\", \"text\": \"BROWN, District Judge\\nI.\\nA Motion for Change of Child Custody was filed with the District Court on February 7, 1978. Louis Notah sought custody of his two-and-a-half year old daughter Michelle, whose custody had originally been granted to her mother by a decree of divorce issued September 29, 1976. A hearing was held on May 1, 1978, and temporary custody pending a full investigation was granted to Mr. Notah on May 10, 1978. On June 28th an Order was issued to Bi-State Social Services requesting a social investigation and report and setting the hearing for 10:00 A.M., July 5, 1978.\\nThe report was filed on July 7, 1978, and contained a request that more time be given in which to submit a recommendation. In the meantime, a hearing was held on September 28, 1978, and joint custody of Michelle was granted to both her mother and father by order of the Court dated October 3, 1978. The order stated: \\\"The District Court will await final report and recommendation from the Social Service Branch and/or BIA Welfare Branch as to final custody of minor child involved MICHELLE NOTAH, DOB: 08-15-75.\\\"\\nOn April 17, 1979, the Court ordered BIA Social Services to make an investigation pursuant to 9 N.T.C. 609 and to report at 10:00 A.M. on July 11, 1979. On July 5th, the BIA responded by requesting by letter a postponement of the hearing because the investigation had not been done due to difficulty in contacting the parties to the action. At the hearing, which was held as scheduled, the advocates for both parties to the action moved the Court to hold both the Bi-State Social Services employees and the BIA Social Services employees in contempt of court for failure to comply with the orders of investigation. Orders to Show Cause were issued and the hearing set for August 3, 1979. At the hearing Bi-State submitted a report with a recommendation, but BIA Social Services did not. By order of this Court dated August 9, 1979, Albert Long and Ella Shirley of Bi-State Social Services were reprimanded for the delay in submitting a recommendation and Betty Authur and Wilbur Livingston of BIA Social Services were adjudged in contempt of court and ordered to pay a fine of $50.00\\nNo further action was taken before the Court and the fine was not paid. The Court did receive an ex-parte communication from Donald Dodge, Area Director, stating that it was the BIA's position that Social Services cooperates with the Tribal Courts on a voluntary basis, and requesting a reconsideration of the contempt order.\\nII.\\nThere are two issues before the Court:\\n1. Should an ex-parte communication which calls attention to a conflict between Federal law and Tribal law be considered by a Tribal Court as relevant to the matter before it; and\\n2. Should the contempt order issued in this matter be withdrawn?\\nFor the reasons stated below, I answer both of these questions in the affirmative.\\nIII.\\nThe term \\\"ex-parte\\\" has two meanings. Generally, it is used to refer to the situation in which one party to a proceeding makes application to the Court to hear his side without notice to the other party or an opportunity for the other party to respond before the Court renders a decision. Because the inherent unfairness in hearing only one side before a decision is made is obvious, it is basic to the legal system that such applications to the Court are allowed only in narrow and extreme circumstances. An example would be an application for a restraining order made by a party who alleges and proves to the Court's satisfaction that unless the other party is restrained at once irreparable injury will occur. Even then, the restraining order is only temporary until a hearing can be held at which both parties are pre sent.\\nBut \\\"ex-parte\\\" also means a situation in which an individual who is not a party to the proceeding has an interest in the matter which entitles him to make application to the Court. I believe the second situation applies to Mr. Dodge. His interest was in the clarification of the BIA's position with regard to subpoenas issued by the Tribal Courts and in attempting to resolve a conflict between Federal law and Tribal law. It was because of his instructions to his employees that they were in danger of arrest for failure to obey a Court order holding them in contempt.\\nTherefore, I hold that it is proper for this Court to consider Mr. Dodge's letter regarding this matter. It would have been better for Mr. Dodge to have made a formal motion before the Court and to file the motion with the clerk of the Court as part of this action, and in no way do I mean for this opinion to be interpreted as license for anyone who is concerned with a matter before the Court to communicate with the Court by means of a letter instead of a formal motion. I only hold, very narrowly, that for this particular matter in this particular instance and for this time only, the Court will consider the issues raised in Mr. Dodge's letter because they are important considerations for this case as well as any other case in which BIA employees may be called upon to testify before the Courts of the Navajo Nation.\\nIV.\\nThe issues raised by Mr. Dodge's letter point out the dilemma in which the Courts of the Navajo Nation are placed. It is the contention of the BIA that federal employees cooperate with the Tribal Courts only voluntarily and that the Courts have no power to subpoena a federal employee or to hold that employee in contempt of court for any failure to appear or to testify. Mr. Dodge's letter states: \\\"Whether or not Federal employees testify and present documentary evidence in tribal court is wholly a matter within the realm of Federal, rather than tribal law.\\\"\\nYet, the Tribal Courts are bound by Tribal law. Title 7, Section 206(b) states:\\n(b) Employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, particularly those who are engaged in social service, health and educational work, shall assist the court, upon its request, in the preparation and presentation of the facts in the case and in the proper treatment of individual offenders .\\nThis section of the Code was passed by Tribal Council Resolution CJA-1-59 and was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on February 11, 1959. The language is contained, verbatim, in 25 Code of Federal Regulations Section 11.21. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the Federal government mandates (by the use of the word \\\"shall\\\") that the BIA Social Services do the social investigations for the Tribal Courts when requested to do so.\\nIt is also the opinion of this Court that the Tribal Council interprets the above section in the same way. Otherwise, they would not have required the Courts to request the Agency Branch of Welfare for an investigation in every adoption case. See Title 9, Section 609 which reads:\\n\\u00a7 609. Investigation\\n(a) Upon filing of a petition for adoption the court shall request the Agency Branch of Welfare, with the technical assistance of the state and other government branches of welfare, to make an investigation. Such investigation shall include the history of the child; appropriate inquiry to determine whether the proposed home is a suitable one for the child; and any other circumstances and conditions which may have a bearing on the adoption or custody and of which the court should have knowledge.\\n(b) The report of the investigation shall be a part of the file in the case and shall contain a definite recommendation for or against the proposed adoption stating the reasons therefor.\\nIt was passed by Tribal Council Resolution CN-63-60. In the past, the Navajo Court of Appeals has held that a decree of adoption granted without a BIA Social Services investigation is null and void. In Re Adoption of Tsosie, 1 Nav.R. 112 (1977).\\nThe conflict, thus, becomes clear. In order to avoid a confrontation in federal court to decide this issue, this Court now holds that Title 7, Section 206(b) is directory, not mandatory, and that Title 9, Section 609 does not restrict the Navajo Tribal Courts to the use of BIA Social Services as the only agency from whom a social investigation report and recommendation may be obtained,\\nThis holding is further stregthened by Title 9, Section 1171 of the Tribal Code. 9 N.T.C. 1171 requires that a social investigation be made in all cases wherein the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of 9 N.T.C. 1053 but does not specify by whom. These are most juvenile case situations where the juvenile has been brought to the attention of the Court because he is in some kind of trouble. These two sections read:\\n\\u00a7 1171. Social investigation-Generally\\nWhenever practicable the court shall require that a social investigation be made and a report be submitted to the court in writing in all cases under 9 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1053 in which a petition has been filed.\\n\\u00a7 1053. Jurisdiction of court\\nExcept as otherwise provided by Navajo Tribal Council, the Juvenile Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe:\\n(1) Concerning any child who is alleged to have violated any Federal, Tribal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, regardless of where the violation occurred.\\n(2) Concerning any child:\\n(A) who is neglected or dependent child, as defined in 9 N.T.C. \\u00a7 1002; or\\n(B) who is beyond control of his parent, custodian, or school authorities.\\n(3) To determine the custody of any child or appoint a guardian of the person of any child who comes within the purview of the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this chapter.\\n(4) To determine the legal parent-child relationship, including termination of residual parental rights and duties, as to a child who comes within the purview of the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this chapter.\\n(5) For judicial consent to the marriage, employment or enlistment of a child in the armed forces, and to emergency medical or surgical treatment of a child who comes within the purview of the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this chapter.\\n(6) For the treatment or committment of a mentally defective or mentally ill child who comes within the purview of the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this chapter.\\nThis Court now finds that Title 9, Section 1053(4) includes adoption proceedings. Therefore, the social investigation required by 9 N.T.C. 1171 applies to adoption proceedings and no particular social agency is specified to conduct that investigation.\\nIn light of the above analysis, it is not mandatory that BIA Social Services be the only vehicle in which the Courts of the Navajo Nation receive social investigation information in juvenile cases. Absent federal litigation, the issue of the Navajo Court's subpoena and contempt power over federal employees cannot be decided. At this point, it is, the Court's belief that to wait for federal disposition of this issue would only bring further harm to the little girl whose custody has been in question for over a year and a half. To avoid federal litigation, the Order of this Court issued August 9, 1979, is hereby VACATED.\\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/687785.json b/navajo_nation/687785.json
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+"{\"id\": \"687785\", \"name\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellant vs. DENNIS LEE BEDONIE and LARRY A. ANDERSON Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Bedonie\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-11-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 131, \"last_page\": 143, \"citations\": \"2 Navajo Rptr. 131\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.273233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WALTERS, Acting Chief Justice, BECENTI and NESWOOD, Associate Justices\", \"parties\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellant vs. DENNIS LEE BEDONIE and LARRY A. ANDERSON Defendants-Appellees\", \"head_matter\": \"THE NAVAJO NATION Plaintiff-Appellant vs. DENNIS LEE BEDONIE and LARRY A. ANDERSON Defendants-Appellees\\nDecided On November 5, 1979\\nWilliam E. Perry, III, Special Prosecutor, Window Rock, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant\\nAlbert Hale, Gallup, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees\\nBefore WALTERS, Acting Chief Justice, BECENTI and NESWOOD, Associate Justices\", \"word_count\": \"2720\", \"char_count\": \"16252\", \"text\": \"NESWOOD, Associate Justice\\nI.\\nThe defendant Larry Anderson was charged with criminal entry stemming from an incident at the Window Rock Tribal Park near the Tribal Administration Building. Anderson was arrested on November 28, 1978, and charged with obstructing a police officer. That charge was subsequently dismissed with prejudice by the Chinle District Court upon motion of the Prosecutor. The complaint for criminal entry was then filed on March 12, 1979.\\nOn April 20, 1979, both defendants were charged with several counts of unlawful imprisonment, aggravated assault, burglary and conspiracy based upon an incident which occurred on November 13, 1978. At that time, the defendants were involved in a \\\"take-over\\\" of the Tribal Administration Building. The defendants were initially arrested by Navajo police officers, but were immediately remanded to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation when a decision was made to charge them in federal court.\\nFederal charges were dismissed upon motion of the United States Attorney on November 19, 1979, but the Prosecutor maintains he was not notified of that fact until sometime in December.\\nOn July 2, 1979, the defendants made motions to dismiss all charges on the grounds that they were not afforded a speedy trial.\\nA hearing on the motion was held on July 9, 1979, the Honorable Jerome McCabe presiding. Counsel for the defendants called no witnesses to support his claim that the defendants had been prejudiced by the delay in trial because they had forgotten many of the events due to the passage of time.\\nThe Window Rock District Court dismissed the charges that same day finding no valid reason for the delay in filing charges and that the defendants had forgotten the events on which the charges were filed.\\nIn reaching its decision that the defendants had forgotten events, the Court apparently relied on witnesses called at a prior hearing involving co-defendants of Bedonie and Anderson. At that prior hearing, witnesses had been called to demonstrate a lack of their personal memories about the events occurring on November 13, 1978. Judge McCabe had presided over that hearing as well and had dismissed the charges for failure to afford those defendants a speedy trial and finding prejudice to those defendants due to a loss of memory.\\nThe Prosecutor made no objection to the judge taking this other testimony into account although he was aware that the judge was doing so.\\nThe Prosecutor filed these appeals on August 8, 1979. Appellant argued that speedy trial did not apply and that even if it did, no prejudice to the defendants had been shown because of their failure to call witnesses at their hearing. Appellant maintained that Bedonie and Anderson could not rely on evidence presented at a hearing involving other defendants and that in any event, Anderson had demonstrated a good memory at that time.\\nThe appeals were consolidated for the purpose of the appellate hearing due to the identity of issues.\\nI.\\nTwo issues are raised by this appeal:\\n1. Can the appellant now object to the use of evidence from another hearing when he failed to object at the District Court level?\\n2. Were the defendants denied their right to a speedy trial?\\nIII.\\nAt the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, all parties were aware that the judge was being asked to and was considering evidence from a prior hearing involving co-defendants. Yet the appellant failed to object to this.\\nThe failure to timely object to the admission or rejection of evidence amounts to a waiver of the right to claim error in the future:\\nThus the case was decided not only upon what was alleged in the pleadings but upon other allegations as well, as to which no clear inkling appears in the record. Because the Court of Claims considered these additional allegations, it is urged that we should also consider them. But we cannot consider such allegations in determining the sufficiency of the cause stated. After all, pleadings and the making of a proper record have not been dispensed with. They still have a function to perform. This case points up that function. We will not review questions not clearly raised on the record.\\nStandard-Vacuum Oil Company vs. United States, 339 U.S. 157, 70 S.Ct. 545, 94 L.Ed. 731 at 733 (1950).\\nThe Supreme Court of Arizona has spoken many time on this issue:\\nWe have repeatedly held that matter which were not raised in the lower court will not be considered as grounds for reversal in this Court.\\nState vs. Washington, 103 Ariz. 605, 447 P.2d 863 at 865 (1968)\\nWe need not consider, however, whether the comments were so prejudicial that they constitued reversible error because the defendant's failure to object during or just after the closing arguments consituted a waiver of any right to review on appeal.\\nState vs. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 540 P.2d 695 at 700 (1975)\\nSee also State vs. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586 (1964); Mong Ming Club vs. Tang, 77 Ariz. 63, 266 P.2d 1091 (1954); Bruno vs. San Xavier Rock & Sand Company, 76 Ariz. 250, 263 P.2d 308 (1953).\\nThe Court of Appeals of the Navajo Nation has clearly stated its agreement with the Supreme Court of Arizona in no uncertain terms:\\nIssues not raised at the trial below are not \\\"appealable\\\".\\nGudac vs. Marianito, 1 Nav. R. 385 at 394 (1978)\\nWe hold that failure to object to matters raised in a lower court will constitute a waiver of any right to review on appeal.\\nIn considering the second issue presented to us, we must therefore accept the District Court's finding that Bedonie and Anderson had forgotten many of the events on which the charges were filed.\\nIV.\\nThe Navajo Tribal Code does not specify what is meant by \\\"speedy trial\\\". 1 N.T.C. 6 provides:\\n\\u00a7 6. Rights of accused\\nIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; shall be confronted with the witnesses against him; and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.\\nAdditionally, the Courts of the Navajo Nation are bound by the requirements of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act concerning speedy trial which reads:\\nNo Indian Tribe in exercising powers of self government shall... (6) deny any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial...\\nThe leading case on the right to a speedy trial is United States vs. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). in its applicable portion, Marion states:\\nInordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina [citations omitted]. So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment.\\nInvocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to arrest. Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusations: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer. Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprieve the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself.\\n30 L. Ed. 2d at 478\\nIt is clear from a close reading of Marion that the right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest and need not await a formal charge. Therefore, in regards to the incident at the Window Rock Tribal Park, Anderson's speedy trial right attached on November 28, 1978 - the day he was arrested.\\nThe incident occurring on November 13, 1978, is less clear. The defendants were charged by the federal authorities at the time of the arrest. It is thus arguable that the speedy trial provisions only applied to the United States government and that the defendants had never formally been accused by the Navajo Nation. That would mean that the speedy trial argument of the defendants would not apply.\\nHowever, this Court believes that by having the defendants arrested by Navajo police officers, the defendants were in fact restrained in the manner contemplated by Marion and the provisions of speedy trial attached to the Navajo Nation as well.\\nThis Court notes that the Navajo Nation might have avoided this problem by charging the defendants simultaneously to the federal charges. This procedure is permitted according to United States vs. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). While policy arguments exist that charges by two separate sovereigns for the same incident might be unfair to the defendant, in situations where this is permitted, it seems fairer than leaving the defendant up-in-the-air later on.\\nThe appellants explanation that a delay in filing charges was necessitated by the need to employ a competent attorney to proceed with this matter is unacceptable to this Court. We do not believe that all of the other prosecutors then employed by the Prosecutor's Office of the Navajo Nation were unqualified to proceed with this case. If they were, we must question why they continue to be employed and continue to be allowed to present cases on behalf of the Navajo Nation.\\nWe therefore rule that the arrests of the defendants on November 13th and the arrest of the defendant Anderson on November 28th caused the provisions of speedy trial to attach.\\nV.\\nOnce ascertaining that the provisions of speedy trial apply, it is necessary to examine whether or not the right has actually been violated.\\nThe test for violation of this right is contained in Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and is said to consider:\\n1. Length of delay\\n2. The reason for the delay\\n3. The defendant's assertion of his right\\n4. Prejudice to the defendant\\nVI.\\nThe length of delay in this case was three and a half months for the charge resulting from the Tribal Park incident and five months for the Administration Building incident. While this is not necessarily a lengthy delay in the federal and in some state systems, this length of time is substantial in the Navajo Nation.\\nVII.\\nClosely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such a negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.\\nBarker vs. Wingo, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117\\nThe appellant stated in his arguments to this Court that the matter had been deliberately delayed in order to find a qualified prosecutor. While we do not believe that the delay was made with the express intent to hamper the defense, it is none-the-less of a serious nature.\\nVIII.\\nThe third factor to be considered is the defendants' assertion of their right to a speedy trial.\\nThe defendants were arraigned on May 25, 1979. Their motions to dismiss were filed on July 2, 1979, approximately twenty-eight days before the time set for trial.\\nThis Court notes that Rule 9(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:\\na) The Motion to Dismiss. At any time before trial the defendant may move to dismiss the action on the grounds of insufficiency of the complaint, lack of jurisdiction or failure of the complaint to charge a crime or on any other defense or objection which can be decided without trial of the general issue. The motion shall be in writing unless made in open court at the time o the hearing and shall move for dismissal or for other appropriate relief. The motion shall contain a certificate of service on the prosecutor.\\nThus, the defendants complied with the court rules. This Court believes that the defendants' assertion of their rights were timely and as rapid as one might expect.\\nIX.\\nWe stated earlier in this opinion that the District Court's finding of prejudice to the defendants must be upheld for failure of the appellant to timely object.\\nThe analysis of this factor by the United States Supreme Court in the Barker case is enlightening:\\nPrejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.\\n33 L.Ed.2d at 118\\nThus, the failure to actually call the defendants to testify about loss of memory in and of itself would not be sufficient reason to reverse this decision. Additionally, the lack of memory of witnesses other than the defendants must be considered by the court.\\nX.\\nWe regard none 'of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.\\nBarker vs. Wingo, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118\\nIn considering and balancing these four factors, we find that the delay cause to the defendants was prejudicial. We further find that the delay, while not lengthy by some standards, was considerable and must be weighed against the appellant.\\nWe therefore believe that the defendants right to a speedy trial was denied them and must result in a dismissal of the charges against them.\\nXI.\\nWe have engaged in this lengthy discussion of speedy trial in an attempt to guide our Courts in the future. However, it would be particularly helpful if legislation were passed specifying time periods in criminal proceedings. In that manner, future problems can be curtailed and consistency guaranteed.\\nWe recognize that federal laws and case decisions are not what is always best for our people. But until we are provided with other law, we must turn to*those laws and decisions for guidance. It is our belief that our people deserve no less than that guaranteed to citizens of the various states.\\nXII.\\nThe decision of the Window Rock District Court, dismissing the charges against both defendants, is AFFIRMED.\\nWALTERS, Acting Chief Justice and BECENTI, Associate Justice, concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"687799\", \"name\": \"DONNA BECENTI, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. RONALD ETSITTY, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Becenti v. Etsitty\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-09-27\", \"docket_number\": \"NO. A-CV-16-79\", \"first_page\": 100, \"last_page\": 101, \"citations\": \"2 Navajo Rptr. 100\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.273233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Robert B. Walters\", \"parties\": \"DONNA BECENTI, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. RONALD ETSITTY, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE NAVAJO NATION WINDOW ROCK, NAVAJO NATION (ARIZONA)\\nDONNA BECENTI, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. RONALD ETSITTY, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNO. A-CV-16-79\\nDated this 27th day of September, 1979.\", \"word_count\": \"157\", \"char_count\": \"970\", \"text\": \"The Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed the 21st day of August, 1979, having been received and considered by the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to 7 N.T.C. 801, the Court finds:\\n1. That the final order of the Window Rock District Court, from which this appeal is taken, dated July 17, 1979, was amended nunc pro tunc upon the Court's own motion by order dated September 27, 1979, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.\\n2. That this appeal is, therefore, moot because petitioner-appellant's proper and more expeditous remedy is to refile this acton in the District Court.\\nTherefore, the appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed the 21st day of August, 1979, is DISMISSED.\\nRobert B. Walters\\nActing Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/navajo_nation/687802.json b/navajo_nation/687802.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f5a2871c9a11294a249169b250e725686aa71d4f
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"687802\", \"name\": \"A-1 MOBILE HOMES, INC. Plaintiff vs. RAYMOND and ALICE BECENTI Defendants vs. GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION Third Party Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-03-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": 21, \"last_page\": 26, \"citations\": \"2 Navajo Rptr. 21\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Navajo Reporter\", \"court\": \"Crownpoint District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:29:32.273233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"A-1 MOBILE HOMES, INC. Plaintiff vs. RAYMOND and ALICE BECENTI Defendants vs. GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION Third Party Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"A-1 MOBILE HOMES, INC. Plaintiff vs. RAYMOND and ALICE BECENTI Defendants vs. GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION Third Party Defendant\\nOpinion of the Crownpoint District Court\\nDecided on March 26, 1979\\nThomas J. Hynes, Hynes, Eastburn & Hale, Farmington, New Mexico, for Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant\\nPaul Frye, D.N.A., Crownpoint, New Mexico, for Defendants\", \"word_count\": \"1143\", \"char_count\": \"7080\", \"text\": \"NESWOOD, District Judge\\nA Complaint for Replevin and money damages was filed with this Court against Raymond Becenti, December 5, I977. Plaintiff, A-l Mobile Homes, Inc., sought to repossess a mobile home, the purchase of which was contracted between defendant and the plaintiff on May I8, I973. Plaintiff alleged Defendant's default in payments and sought payment of back payments plus late charges. Plaintiff further sought money damages incurred as a result in having to take legal action.\\nDefendant's Answer and Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint alleged that Plaintiff, A-l Mobile Homes, was not the proper plaintiff in action and named General Electric Credit Corporation as Third-Party Defendant. Defendant's allegation was based upon the fact that A-l Mobile Homes had assigned his contract to General Electric Credit Corporation. By Order of the Court dated August 22, I978, the complaint of A-l Mobile Homes was dismissed on the grounds that A-l Mobile Homes was not the proper plaintiff to the action.\\nIn that same Order, Third-Party Defendant, General Electric Credit Corporation, and Plaintiff, A-l Mobile Homes, were ordered to file answers to Defendant's Counterclaims within 20 days of the date of the Order. A default judgment on those Counterclaims against A-l Mobile Homes was entered by the Court on September 26, I978. For reasons hereinafter set forth, this default judgment is hereby VACATED.\\nPrior to trial Defendant Becenti motioned the Court for Partial Summary Judgment upon his Second and Fourth Claims for Relief. That motion was denied on the grounds that the Second Claim was not timely filed and that the Fourth Claim contained a genuine issue of material fact.\\nDefendant bases his First and Second Claims for Relief upon the alleged violation by General Electric Credit Corporation of I5 U.S.C. I60I et. seq. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Regulation Z promulgated thereunder, I2 C.F.R. 226 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation Z). Section I640 of the Act provides a one-year statue of limitations within which to file an action for violation of this statute. The Navajo Tribal Court of Appeals held in Smoak Chevrolet Company v. Hoskie R. Barton, 1 Nav. R. 153 (Decided June 30, 1977) that \\\"Although Smoak Chevrolet violated the Truth in lending Act and Regulation Z as we interpret it, the counterclaim in this action was barred by the one year statute of limitation of the Act, I5 U.S.C. 1640(e). Smoak at Page 156. That case is dispositive of defendant's First and Second Claims for Relief in the instant case. Those claims are hereby DISMISSED as being barred by the one year stature of limitation of the Act. The claims arose at the time the contract was signed, which was four and a half years prior to the presentation of those claims to this Court.\\nUpon this same authority the Default Judgment against A-l Mobile Homes entered by this Court of September 26, 1978, is hereby vacated with regard to the damages awarded for the violation of the Act.\\nDefendant's Third Claim for relief was based upon the violation of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Sales Act, N.M.S.A. \\u00a7 50-15-7. The violation of this statute was not proven at trial because the defendant admitted having received a copy of the insurance policy upon the mobile home he purchased. Defendant's Third Claim for Relief is, therefore, DENIED. The Default Judgment against A-l Mobile Homes entered September 26, 1978, is hereby VACATED with regards to the preclusion of A-l Mobile Homes collecting any finance charges on the contract at suit.\\nDefendant's Fourth Claim for Relief was based upon an alleged assault upon Defendant by an agent or an employee of either A-l Mobile Homes or General Electric Credit Corporation. After trial upon this issue, the opinion of this Court is that said assault was not proven. Defendant's Fourth Claim for Relief is, therefore, DENIED. The Default Judgment entered against A-l Mobile Homes on September 26, I978, is hereby VACATED with respect to the damages awarded for the alleged assault.\\nAfter trial upon the issue of Defendant's Default upon his contract, it is the opinion of this Court that defendant was in default at the time the suit was filed on December 5, I977. Although it is true that General Electric Credit Corporation regularly accepted late and erratic payments from Defendant, evidence introduced at trial showed that at no time were defendant farther behind in his payments than 66 days. Defendant had been contacted and warned of possible repossession action in March of I977. At the time the suit was filed Defendant had failed to contact Third-Party Defendant with regard to payments for more than 3 months. Under the terms of the contract no notice of legal action or of action upon default was required. The pertinent part of the contract reads as follows:\\n\\\"...Seller may, without notice (except as herein set forth) or demand upon Buyer, declare any part or all of the obligations and indebtedness immediately due and payable, and Seller shall have the following rights and remedies in addition to all the rights and remedies of a secured party under the UCC,...\\\"\\nThe rights and remedies included were that of repossession, and the notice referred in the parenthesis above referred to I0 days notice to the buyer of the sale or other disposition of the mobile home. Therefore, under the terms of the contract itself, no notice of action for repossession was required to be given to the buyer. Although General Electric Credit Corporation's somewhat sudden filing of legal action without notice to Mr. Becenti may not have been the fairest course of action, it was within General Electric Credit Corporation's right as the secured party on the contract at suit.\\nIt is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that General Electric Credit Corporation shall be allowed to repossess Mr. Becenti's mobile home. However, should the parties to this action reach an agreement regarding a refinancing contract which would include the backpayments and interest thereon now due, nothing in this Opinion and Judgment shall preclude the parties from doing so.\\nIn summary, subject to possible negotiations mentioned above, Third Party Defendant General Electric Credit Corporation is entitled to repossession, past installment payments now due and owing, plus late charges.\\nDefendant's Counterclaims based upon violation of Regulation Z are hereby DENIED. Defendant's Counterclaim based upon violation of N.M.S.A. 50-I5-7 if hereby DENIED. Defendant's Counterclaim of assault is hereby DENIED.\\nThe Default Judgment entered against A-l Mobile Homes on September 26, I978, is hereby VACATED in its entirety.\\nEach party is to bear their own costs of suit.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7334976.json b/navajo_nation/7334976.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7334976\", \"name\": \"Aaron JOHN, Appellant, v. The NAVAJO NATION, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"John v. Navajo Nation\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-07-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CR-01-09\", \"first_page\": 40, \"last_page\": 44, \"citations\": \"10 Am. Tribal Law 40\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:15:13.484759+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Aaron JOHN, Appellant, v. The NAVAJO NATION, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Aaron JOHN, Appellant, v. The NAVAJO NATION, Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CR-01-09.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJuly 21, 2011.\\nDavid Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nJane T. Nez, Office of the Prosecutor, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Window Rock, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"2177\", \"char_count\": \"13391\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAppellant Aaron John appeals his conviction in the Window Rock District Court on August 11, 2009 of aggravated battery pursuant to 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 317. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's conviction and order that, under the circumstances, there shall be no new trial.\\nBackground\\nAppellant was convicted of aggravated battery following a bench trial on August 11, 2009. He filed a motion for reconsideration to the district court on September 9, 2009 following which he filed this appeal on September 10, 2009. There is no record that the district court entered a ruling thereafter. On September 30, 2009, the Navajo Nation (Nation) filed a Motion Opposing the Appeal calling for the dismissal of the appeal asserting that Appellant's motion for reconsideration, as required by Rule 5(d) of the Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure (N.R.A.P.), had been untimely. The Supreme Court denied the motion on October 30, 2009. Thereafter, the Nation failed to respond to Appellant's appeal brief and, in fact, filed no further pleadings. On September 19, 2010 Appellant filed a Motion to Adjudicate Appeal on the Record, pursuant to N.R.A.P. Rule 10(d), which we granted on September 24, 2010.\\nStandard of Review\\nThis Court will review evidentia-ry rulings of the district court under the abuse of discretion standard. Chavez v. Tome,, 5 Nav. R. 183, 186 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1987). As we said in Navajo Housing Authority v. Bluffview Resident Management Corp., 8 Nav. R. 402, 412, 4 Am. Tribal Law 700 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003), \\\"a court abuses its discretion by unreasonable conduct that is 'capricious and arbitrary.' \\\" (Internal cite omitted). Pursuant to the Navajo Rules of Evidence (Nav. R. Evid.) Rule 2(a), error may be assigned when an evidentiary ruling which admits or excludes evidence affects a party's substantial right. If evidentiary rulings are \\\"outside the boundaries of the Navajo Rules of Evidence, those rulings are not entitled to deference from this Court.\\\" Rough Rock Community School v. Navajo Nation, 7 Nav. R. 313, 317, 1 Am. Tribal Law 482 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1998).\\nIn this case, the Nation has not filed a brief nor otherwise indicated its interest in participating in the appeal. Previously in Navajo Nation v. Morgan, 8 Nav. R. 732, 6 Am. Tribal Law 697 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005), we addressed a similar situation in which the Nation, as here, did not file a brief. In Morgan, we stressed \\\"to the Office of the Prosecutor and the Attorney General the importance of participation in appeals, as their responsibilities to the Navajo people should mandate them to take an interest in each case before this Court.\\\" hi. at 736, 6 Am. Tribal Law 697. The Court takes judicial notice that underlying the dispute resolution process of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9, there is this expectation: Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 t'\\u00e1\\u00e1 hat'\\u00edshw y\\u00e9ego bik'l hojiz'ahgo doo \\u00e9i t'\\u00f3\\u00f3 bij\\u00fck\\u00e1a'da dooleel, h\\u00e1\\u00e1l\\u00e1 bila'ashcUa'ii \\u00e9i y\\u00edn\\u00ed blighago dilzin d\\u00f3\\u00f3 baaAasti'; doo \\u00e9i t'\\u00f3\\u00f3 naaki nil\\\\igo bil hwiizh dool'aalda. If one brings forth a serious allegation, the aceuser is expected to participate in the resolution of the accusation because the truth of the allegation must be determined out of respect and protection of the individual.\\nPursuant to Cleveland v. Navajo Nation, 3 Nav. R. 113 (Nav.Ct.App.1982), the general rule on the failure of an appellee to file a brief, as applied to our Rule 6(b), Rules of Appellate Procedure, is this:\\nOn the failure of the appellee to file a brief, the appellant is not entitled to a reversal as a matter of right, but the court may, within its discretion, handle the matter in a manner most consonant with justice and its own convenience. It will not search the record to find a theory upon which to affirm the judgment and may confine itself to the objections raised by the appellant or treat the failure to file a brief as a concession of the truth of the facts as stated by appellant, or even as a confession of error, if the appellant's brief appears reasonably to sustain such action.\\nId. at 113-114 citing 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error Sec. 686.\\nThere is no more serious a matter to both the victim and the defendant than a criminal charge involving violence. A person has been accused of egregious conduct in causing physical harm to another person, which if substantiated will bring great shame upon himself and his family and relatives. Furthermore, a charge of aggravated battery carries a potential sentence of one year's incarceration and/or $5,000 fine. The non-participation of the Nation in defendant appeals cannot be excused for reasons of lack of staff or resources because few criminal appeals are filed in our courts. Statistics maintained in the Supreme Court show that of 19 total criminal cases filed by defendants since 2000, the Nation filed a response in only 9 of these cases. In Morgan, supra, we were frustrated with the Nation's non-participation. It is apparent that the Nation continues to treat such matters lightly.\\nFor reasons of setting a clear example in this case where the Prosecutor has indicated no interest in participating in this appeal, this Court will use its discretion pursuant to Cleveland, supra. The Court will confine itself to the objections raised by Appellant and treat the failure to file a brief as a concession of the truth of the facts as stated by Appellant, or as a confession of error, if Appellant's brief appears reasonably to sustain such action.\\nIssues\\nAppellant asserts that the district court made two evidentiary rulings during the bench trial that improperly affected his due process rights: (1) the court prevented him from introducing testimony of his son regarding the previous interactions between the appellant and alleged victim, in order to show that the defendant acted in self-defense; and (2) the court excluded evidence that Appellant had sought a Domestic Abuse Protection Order against the alleged victim on the day after the underlying incident, long before the filing of the criminal charge against him. In so doing, Appellant asserts that he was denied the opportunity to support his claim of self-defense by presenting testimony that the alleged victim had a violent character.\\nAppellant further claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because of the Court's decision herein based on the first evidentiary ruling, there is no need to address this claim, nor will the Court address the second evi-dentiary ruling.\\nAnalysis\\n17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 216(D) permits self-defense as an affirmative defense, setting forth that reasonable force may be justified \\\"when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself or herself or a third person against the use of unlawful force by another person or to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or other trespass upon land or the unlawful carrying away of tangible movable property.\\\" \\\"Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused\\\" is admissible under Nav. R. Evid. Rule 8(a)(2) to prove conformity therewith or to rebut the same.\\nIn reviewing the audio transcript of the bench trial, it is clear that the defendant and alleged victim were involved in a land dispute. At trial, the alleged victim was permitted to testify as to his peaceful character. However, Appellant was not permitted to introduce testimony in rebuttal after the prosecutor argued that the offered testimony related to past events and had nothing to do with the violent incident itself. The exclusion of this evidence, after the prosecution has opened the door by submitting the victim's positive character evidence, is unexplained in the judgment of conviction. The judgment merely contains this finding: \\\"Self-defense was not proven because the Defendant was observed at the hospital without injury and at the time and place of the fight between himself and the victim. Defendant could have retreated from the area to his home which he testified was approximately 30 feet from his front door.\\\" Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment of Conviction, August 11, 2009.\\nThe issue in this case was whether Appellant is guilty of aggravated battery on the alleged victim. As he has claimed self-defense, the character traits Appellant sought to introduce were pertinent to the offense charged, to his claim of self-defense, and in rebuttal. The evidence was admissible for these purposes under Nav. R. Evid. Rule 8. There is no doubt that the impact on a defendant's defense is great when pertinent evidence is excluded. Because of this, fundamental fairness requires that reasons for the exclusion strictly conform to evidentiary rules.\\nParameters for the exclusion of evidence are set by Rule 7, pursuant to which a judge has the discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence, or relevant evidence \\\"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\\\" Because neither the transcript nor the written judgment sheds light on why Appellant's rebuttal testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, confusing, misleading, time-wasting or needless, we find that the trial court erred.\\nUnder the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 principle of n\\u00e1 bin\\u00e1heezl\\u00e1ago bee t'\\u00e1\\u00e1 lahj\\u00ed atgha' deet'\\u00e1, disputes are to be addressed in a comprehensive manner so as to achieve finality. Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis' Aan Community School, Inc., 8 Am. Tribal Law 152, 156 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2009) citing Casaus v. Dine College, 7 Am. Tribal Law 509, 513 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007); Navajo Nation v. Kelly, 6 Am. Tribal Law 772, 777 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006). Here, the trial court stopped a thorough examination of a serious criminal matter and took away Defendant's oppor tunity to be heard without an appropriate reason.\\nWhen a ruling denies a defendant the ability to pursue a line of defense, it undoubtedly affects the defendant's substantial right to his or her defense. Such an impact must be sufficiently reasoned and justified. This Court has continually admonished the lower courts to fully flesh out its findings in written decisions. We have stated that \\\"[tjhrough factual findings the court informs the parties what it relied on to reach its decision, and allows this Court to review the decision on appeal.\\\" Navajo Transport Services, Inc. v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal Law 516, 520 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007). We have emphasized this for twenty-five years. Id, (multiple cites omitted).\\nWhile we have relieved the district courts from reducing to writing the reasons behind a specific class of ruling for reasons of \\\"impracticality,\\\" see Apachito v. Navajo Nailon, 8 Nav. R. 339, 345, 4 Am. Tribal Law 668 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003) (accepting verbal reasons for denial of bail), the record must contain information essential to an understanding of the issues raised, including rulings or decisions showing the trial court's reasoning regarding those issues. Trial courts must ensure that rulings in the course of trial which impact substantial rights, and are therefore prime subjects for appeal, are reduced to writing as part of an order or final judgment. In other words, trial courts must ensure that the record contains all essential information so that it is clear that a defendant's substantial rights have been protected in the proceedings. If this responsibility is not fulfilled, this Court will take appropriate remedial action. See Id,, (stating that this Court has vacated and remanded decisions that lacked the necessary findings of fact).\\nIn this case there is the additional complication of an uncontested criminal appeal. It is time that the Nation shoulders its obligations to pursue a prosecution in all its phases. The Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 principle of bit ch'ii-niya, which means \\\"one has lost an opportunity,\\\" applies to the Nation. See Goldtooth, supra at 158.\\nLacking a response by the Nation and pertinent findings on the matter by the trial court, this Court accepts Appellant's argument that there was an abuse of discretion. With no reason(s) for exclusion provided by the trial court that falls within the Navajo Rules of Evidence, and no challenge to the facts as described by Appellant, there is no doubt that the evidentiary ruling did improperly affect the substantial right of the Appellant to assert a claim of self-defense.\\nCONCLUSION\\nThe Court finds that the district court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's character by denying the Appellant's son to testify to such evidence. That evidence was relevant and admissible under Nav. R. Evid. Rule 8(a)(2). The trial court's judgment of conviction is hereby REVERSED and the Court ORDERS that, under the circumstances, there shall be no new trial. The district court shall VACATE the judgment of August 11, 2009 and immediately dismiss the case against the Appellant.\\n. This is an exception to the general rule under Nav. R. Evid. Rule 8(a), that a victim's character evidence \\\"for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion\\\" is not admissible.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7335160\", \"name\": \"John DOE BF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIOCESE OF GALLUP, et al., Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Doe BF v. Diocese of Gallup\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-09-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-06-10\", \"first_page\": 72, \"last_page\": 85, \"citations\": \"10 Am. Tribal Law 72\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:15:13.484759+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice, and PLATERO, W., Associate Justice by Designation.\", \"parties\": \"John DOE BF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIOCESE OF GALLUP, et al., Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"John DOE BF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIOCESE OF GALLUP, et al., Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-06-10.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nSept. 9, 2011.\\nWilliam R. Keeler, Gallup and Patrick Noaker, St. Paul, Minnesota, for Appellant.\\nThomas Lynn Isaacson, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellee Diocese of Gallup.\\nArthur O. Beach and David W. Peterson, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appel-lee Province of Guadalupe.\\nClifford Graig, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Ap-pellee Province of St. Johns.\\nBrian Nichols, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee Chuck Cichanowiez.\\nBefore YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice, and PLATERO, W., Associate Justice by Designation.\", \"word_count\": \"5528\", \"char_count\": \"34564\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nJohn Doe BF (Appellant) appeals the Shiprock District Court's January 19, 2010 dismissal of his Second Amended Complaint for Personal Injury for damages resulting from injuries arising from sexual abuse that occurred in 1984-85 when Appellant was 14-15 years old. Defendants are non-members of the Navajo Nation. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's order of dismissal and remand the case.\\nI. PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nAppellant filed a Complaint for Personal Injuries against defendant Charles Cieha-nowicz (\\\"Ciehanowicz\\\") on November 6, 2007, shortly thereafter on November 13, 2007 filing a First Amended Complaint, alleging damages resulting from negligence and other misconduct arising from 2 incidents of sexual abuse in 1984-85 when Appellant was a teenager and Ciehanowicz was his parish priest. In addition to Ci-chanowicz, Appellant named as defendants the Diocese of Gallup (\\\"Diocese\\\"), the Franciscan Friars of St. John the Baptist a/k/a the Franciscan Missionary Union of the Province of St. John the Baptist (\\\"Baptist Order\\\") and Franciscan Friars Province of Our Lady of Guadalupe a/k/a the Province of Our Lady of Guadalupe of the Order of Friars Minor, Inc. (\\\"Guadalupe Order\\\"). Appellant alleged that during the dates of the abuse, the above entities directly supervised, employed and controlled Ciehanowicz, and that the abuse occurred on premises within the Diocese that was successively owned and operated by the Baptist Order and Guadalupe Order. All the defendants named in the complaint are collectively Appellees in this appeal.\\nAppellant alleged that as a 14-15 year old child, he had been sexually molested by Ciehanowicz \\\"on the Navajo reservation\\\" after being given alcohol by Ciehanowicz, who was then his priest. Following the incidents, Appellant alleged that Cieha-nowicz threatened him with exposure if he told anyone about the abuse. Appellant asserts that the Diocese, Baptist Order and Guadalupe Order aided and encouraged Ciehanowicz in the abuse by transferring him when he was caught sexually abusing children, continuing to assign him to parishes with unsupervised access to children, failing to report his wrongful conduct to authorities and the public, and in having no system in place to supervise priests, such as Ciehanowicz, to ensure that no minors were abused in their care.\\nAppellant did not file his complaint until more than twenty years had passed after the alleged abuse occurred. Explaining the delay, Appellant claimed that until May 2007, he did not discover that he had been injured by the abuse, the injuries did not manifest themselves in a psychological and objective manner and were not ascertainable to him, and due to the nature of the injuries, it was not possible for him to connect the symptoms and injuries to the acts of abuse before then. Appellant further alleged that he had developed \\\"various psychological coping mechanisms\\\" which prevented him from filing his complaint prior to May 2007. Finally, he asserted that he suffers great pain of mind and body that has affected his enjoyment of life and earning capacity, and incurs expenses for medical and psychological treatment, therapy and counseling.\\nAppellant served interrogatories on the Appellees, none of whom responded. Answers were filed by all Appellees except Ciehanowicz. On March 20, 2008, Cieha-nowicz filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing under Rule 12(b)(1) that the Shi-prock District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case involving him as a nonmember defendant because Appellant had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction under both Navajo Nation law and the test for civil jurisdiction provided under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1980) and its progeny. Alternatively, Ci-chanowicz argued under Rule 12(b)(6) that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(2) which requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years from the date Appellant discovered or should have dis covered the nature, cause, and identity of the person causing the injury. Appellant was permitted to amend his complaint and he filed his Second Amended Complaint on January 21, 2009 to include a statement of Appellant's Navajo Nation enrollment status. Cichanowicz renewed his motion to dismiss on July 13, 2009. On August 24, 2009, both the Baptist Order and the Guadalupe Order joined in the Motion and further moved for a protective order and stay of discovery.\\nOn September 1, 2009, the district court scheduled a Status Hearing for September 22, 2009 and sent a notice advising counsel: \\\"As counsels of record, you and each of you are required to notify your clients and be present at the time set with such evidence and witnesses as may be necessary for the hearing of said cause of action.\\\" Appellant filed an opposition to Cichanow-icz's motion to dismiss on September 10, 2009 and to the motions of the remaining defendants on September 14, 2009. Replies were filed by Guadalupe Order and Baptist Order jointly on September 21, 2009 and by Cichanowicz on September 22, 2009, the day of the status conference. That same day, Appellant filed an affidavit and various journal articles on childhood sexual abuse.\\nAt the status conference, the parties were asked if they were ready to argue the submitted motions and proceeded to do so. Following the hearing, Appellant filed a motion to amend his Second Amended Complaint. Without ruling on this Motion, the district court issued an Order to Dismiss on January 19, 2010. The district court found jurisdiction over the defendants on the basis of the Treaty of 1868, but ordered dismissal upon determining that Appellant had failed to file his action within the required statute of limitations period. The district court stated that it had specifically asked Appellant \\\"to bring in witnesses or psychological professionals to support his assertions concerning the time and significance of his insight of 2007\\\" but Appellant \\\"did not present any testimony or evidence other than what he himself stated\\\" and \\\"did not even appear himself to give the Court an explanation.\\\" Order to Dismiss, \\u00b6 13. The district court then stated that \\\"[a] mental assertion is not sufficient to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the discovery of the nature or cause of an injury, particularly when . the injury asserted is limited to emotional and mental consequences.\\\" Id.\\nAppellant filed a Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2010. Briefs were timely filed by all parties. Oral argument, originally scheduled for October 25, 2010, was held at the Shiprock Chapter House on June 27, 2011.\\nII. ISSUES\\nThe following issues are before this Court:\\n(a) Whether the district court's determination of jurisdiction is based on sufficient findings;\\n(b) Whether the district court erred in ordering dismissal pursuant to a Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b) motion on the basis that, by not presenting witnesses, experts or evidence other than his own sworn affidavit at a status conference, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to toll the statute of limitations for personal injury actions pursuant to 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(4).\\nIII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\nThe Court reviews the trial court's dismissal under Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b) de novo with no deference given to the trial court's conclusion. Begay v. Navajo Engineering & Construction Authority (NECA) et al., 10 Am. Tribal Law 45 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2011) citing In the Matter of A.M.K., 9 Am. Tribal Law 191, 197 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010); Bennett v. Shirley, 7 Am. Tribal Law 595, 597-98 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007).\\nWe assume Appellants' factual allegations to be true for purposes of our review. Bennett, supra citing Secatero v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 6 Nav. R. 385, 389 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1991). Further, the Court reviews legal questions de novo. Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Duncan, 7 Am. Tribal Law 633, 637 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2008) citing Navajo Transport Services v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal Law 516, 519 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007).\\nIV. DISCUSSION\\nA. Jurisdiction\\nIn this case, the district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the non-member defendants on the basis of \\\"the express authority of the Navajo Nation's jurisdiction over non-Indians regarding civil matters\\\" provided by the Treaty of 1868. Other than this conelusory statement, the district court made no factual findings.\\nThis Court previously recognized in Clark v. Allen, 7 Nav. R. 422, 423, 2 Am. Tribal Law 474 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1999) that the proper initial inquiry is whether jurisdiction exists over the parties. Similar to this case, Clark involved a civil proceeding filed by an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation against more than one non-member defendants, in that case it was a bad faith insurance claim filed against a non-member individual and an insurance carrier. We stated: \\\"The Court shall decide the subject matter jurisdiction issue first, and upon finding jurisdiction, try the lawsuit on the merits.\\\" Id. at 425, 2 Am. Tribal Law 474. It is self-evident that lacking jurisdiction as a court for any reason, the court may not proceed. Similar to this case, the trial court in Clark failed to make factual findings in reaching its conclusion that jurisdiction exists. Clark was remanded in order for the trial court to make detailed factual findings and legal conclusions, including whether the bad faith insurance claim arose on or off the Navajo Nation, and whether upon application of relevant Navajo Nation and federal law, an informed decision could be drawn as to whether the Navajo Nation courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the case at hand.\\nNavajo Nation law is clear that the civil authority of our courts to regulate Non-Indian activity within the external territorial boundaries of the Navajo Nation is absolute and stems from inherent authority as recognized in the Treaty of 1868. Dale Nicholson Trust v. Chavez, 8 Nav. R. 417, 5 Am. Tribal Law 365 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004); Ford Motor Co. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct., 7 Am. Tribal Law 652 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2008); EXC, Inc., et al. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct. and concerning Jensen, 9 Am. Tribal Law 176 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010). However, even under Navajo Nation law alone and considering no other laws, a finding that the action arose within our territorial boundaries must be made. In this case, the complaint failed to state the location of the abuse other than \\\"Navajo reservation,\\\" and the defendants have joined in disputing a territorial basis for jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the district court should have made a detailed finding regarding the location of the abuse and erred when it failed to do so.\\nFederal common law bases tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members on different grounds, namely, a test in which exceptions announced by the United States Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), and its progeny must be met. Additionally, the location of the events giving rise to the action is also relevant to the Montana test, which not only asks where the event took place, but who controls and polices that location. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). In this ease, the district court erred in failing to make sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions to meet the federal common law test for jurisdiction.\\nWe must emphasize that establishment of jurisdiction under one set of laws should not end the inquiry where jurisdiction is disputed in a civil matter that concerns a non-member. In the past, we have proceeded to the merits of the case after a cursory review of the district court's finding that jurisdiction existed. See Thinn v. Navajo Generating Station, 7 Am. Tribal Law 558 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007). With the passage of time, it has become clear that tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is under increasing attack in federal common law. In this case, defendants have asserted that Montana applies even when the location is indisputably trust land. As a result of the developments in federal law, an analysis of jurisdictional basis under all relevant laws is proper and shall be required of our district courts regardless of the land status where the action arose.\\nThis Court has long recognized the burden this type of jurisdiction inquiry imposes on the district courts. In Nelson v. Pfizer, 8 Nav. R. 369, 4 Am. Tribal Law 680 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003), this Court refused to impose a Montana inquiry burden on district courts stating that \\\"[jjudicial resources would be stretched if every case brought against a non-Indian required a detailed analysis of the various consensual relationships or direct effects on the Navajo Nation merely to establish jurisdiction.\\\" Id. at 376, 4 Am. Tribal Law 680. We further stated that \\\"our responsibility to protect the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation counsels that we not surrender authority unnecessarily.\\\" Id. In the present climate, this governmental responsibility requires the district courts, however scarce our resources, to make a complete jurisdictional record that will withstand external jurisdictional challenges.\\nWe have stated: \\\"If we have the responsibility to uphold Navajo Nation jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Treaty of 1868 and the inherent powers of the Navajo Nation, it is up to the Nation's attorneys to fully advise the Court of all jurisdictional facts.\\\" See Office of Navajo Labor Relations v. Central Consolidated School District, 8 Nav. R. 234, 241, 4 Am. Tribal Law 599 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2002). Private litigants retaining an advocate may have neither the resources nor sufficient understanding of the interests of the Navajo Nation in asserting its civil authority and protecting its jurisdiction over non-members. Therefore, the Nation's participation on the civil jurisdictional issue involving non-members is both urgent and vital. However, government lawyers normally do not participate until after tribal court proceedings have been exhausted and the jurisdictional issue has reached the federal courts. We exhort the Navajo Nation Council to pass legislation that would require a non-member litigant to provide notice to the Navajo Nation upon initiation of that litigant's challenge to Navajo Nation subject matter and personal jurisdiction; and further require the Navajo Nation to file a brief as amicus on the jurisdictional issue. Such provisions are necessary, especially when jurisdictional challenges involve the interpretation and validity of a Navajo Nation statute, or otherwise may result in a Navajo Nation plaintiff having no recourse to a remedy in any other jurisdiction. Due to the need to establish bases for jurisdiction under both Navajo Nation and federal common law, the Court modifies Nelson v. Pfizer, supra, which made a Montana inquiry discretionary when a civil case involving non-members occurred on trust land. We hold that where jurisdiction is disputed, detailed factual findings and legal conclusions under all relevant laws are required, without exception, in civil proceedings concerning non-member defendants.\\nThis case will be remanded for a full jurisdictional inquiry.\\nB. Status Conference\\nIn this case, Ciehanowiez failed to file an Answer within 30 days as required by Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c). After four months, he pursued dismissal pursuant to Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), joined more than a year later by all Appellees, asserting both that the court lacked jurisdiction and that Appellant filed his complaint too late for the matter to be heard and relief granted. A \\\"status conference\\\" was convened almost two years after the initial complaint was filed and seven months after an amended complaint was filed for the second time. The Notice of Hearing for this status conference directed the parties to bring \\\"evidence and witnesses as may be necessary for the hearing of said cause of action.\\\" Around the time of this status conference, Appellant submitted to the court, but not the Appellees, extrinsic evidence in the form of an affidavit and articles on childhood sexual abuse. The parties argued and defended the Rule 12(b) motions at this status conference, following which the district court issued a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal partly on the basis that Appellant had failed to present witnesses and other evidence at the above proceeding.\\nPursuant to Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 16(c)(9), a status or pretrial conference for \\\"participants\\\" to act on \\\"dispositions of pending motions\\\" is part of the pretrial case management stage of a civil proceeding, whose purposes and limitations are set forth at Rule 16. As Navajo Rule 16 reflects almost identical provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, we will look, for guidance, at Civil Rules Advisory Committee commentary as to how the federal pretrial rules are to be interpreted and applied.\\nOn the Navajo Nation, pretrial conferences are intended specifically for \\\"(1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; and (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.\\\" Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 16(a). Advisory Committee notes explaining identical provisions in the Federal Rules state that the pretrial phase is intended \\\"to improve the quality of justice rendered in the federal courts by sharpening the preparation and presentation of cases, tending to eliminate trial surprise, and improving, as well as facilitating, the settlement process.\\\" Advisory Committee Notes on 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, citing 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil \\u00a7 1522 (1971). It is clear that in both the federal and Navajo Nation rules of civil procedure, the pretrial phase is not intended to be used to try the merits of any portion of the case.\\nNav. R. Civ. P. Rule 16(c)(9) specifically enables \\\"participants\\\" to act on \\\"disposition of pending motions.\\\" This provision is distinguished from amended Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 16(c)(2)(E), which enables the \\\"court\\\" rather than the participants to act on such motions. Notwithstanding this difference, Advisory Committee commentary on the Federal Rules provision explains that \\\"disposition of pending motions\\\" in the pretrial phase in the Federal Rules does not enable the court to act on motions that require further development through argument and other evidence, but only \\\"enables the court to rule on pending motions for summary adjudication that are ripe for decision at the time of the conference.\\\" Advisory Committee Notes, supra. The federal commentary further notes that \\\"the potential use of Rule 56 (summary judgment) is a matter that [often] arises from discussions during a conference. The court may then call for motions to be filed or . enter a show cause order that initiates the process.\\\" Id.\\nIt is clear from the plain wording of both Federal and Navajo Rule 16 that the use of pretrial conferences as a motion hearing is clearly not a use for which the conference is intended, especially where the outcome might be dismissal of the entire action. Additionally, the focus of the Navajo rule on actions of \\\"participants\\\" rather than the court emphasizes horizontal decision-making by the parties in concert with the court. Suitable actions pursuant to Rule 16(c)(9) would include voluntary dispositions of motions for continuance, show cause for non-appearance or non-payment, discovery, stays of discovery, and other case management related matters through \\\"talking things out\\\" between the parties. Settlement in the pretrial phase may include \\\"urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse\\\" and other alternative methods. See id. As time-consuming as horizontal discussions may appear, it is increasingly employed in the federal courts that are apparently developing toward greater empowerment of the parties in the recognition that a vast majority of lawsuits are settled without trial. Navajo Nation judicial rules and policies provide that it is the duty of Navajo Nation judges to use Dine methods of informal discussion \\\"whenever permissible.\\\" Manning v. Abeita, 10 Am. Tribal Law 49, 53-54 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2011). Additionally, the Code of Judicial Conduct imposes an obligation on our judges to \\\"apply Navajo concepts and procedures of justice, including the principles of maintaining harmony, establishing order, respecting freedom, and talking things out in free discussion.\\\" Id., 10 Am. Tribal Law at 53 citing Canon One of the Navajo Nation Code of Judicial Conduct.\\nIt is apparent that the pretrial conference phase is essential in civil proceedings, and its functions are limited to settlement and case management through discussions and actions of the parties in concert with the court. In this case, the parties appeared at a \\\"status conference\\\" and were told to argue and defend Rule 12(b) dismissal motions on jurisdictional and sufficiency grounds. We have held that a court, especially our bicultural courts, must maintain the distinction between pretrial and trial hearings. Manning, 10 Am. Tribal Law at 54. Notwithstanding the acquiescence of the parties, we find the district court erred in converting a status conference into a motion hearing, and in requiring Appellant to appear at such a conference with witnesses and extrinsic evidence.\\nSince additional evidence had been submitted, it should have been clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) sufficiency motion no longer applied. Rule 12(c) provides: \\\"If, in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made relevant to such a motion by Rule 56.\\\" In this case, the district court should have discussed with the parties the scheduling of a summary judgment motion hearing pursuant to Rule 56(c). In failing to do so, the district court erred.\\nWe note that the district court convened the \\\"status conference\\\" more than two years after the complaint was filed without having convened any previous case management conferences. Rule 56(c) requires completion of sufficient discovery, including answers to interrogatories, to show that there is no issue as to any material fact. We have stated that \\\"[t]he development of our court system plainly imposes a duty on our Navajo Nation judges to use Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 methods of informal discussion whenever permissible, primarily to aid horizontal decision-making by the parties themselves.\\\" Manning, supra, 10 Am. Tribal Law at 53. The record shows that the district court never met with the parties for pretrial purposes and Appellant was not allowed any discovery in this matter. Furthermore, Appellant did serve interrogatories on the parties but no ruling was made on the request. Upon remand, the district court shall convene a pretrial conference and ensure that the parties are given reasonable opportunity to present material impacting on the timing of the filing of the complaint and other evidence relevant to the dismissal motions.\\nFinally, in its Order to Dismiss, the district court found \\\"that Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not or should not have discovered the nature and cause of his injury 'by the exercise of reasonable diligence, in light of available knowledge and resources,' earlier than two years pri- or to November 6, 2007, when he filed his first complaint in this matter.\\\" Order to Dismiss, \\u00b6 16. The above standard shall not be applied to the statute of limitations issue upon remand. We have previously stated that, in adjudicating a Rule 56 motion, \\\"[i]t is not the trial judge's function to weigh the evidence and to determine the truth of the material facts before the court, but to decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial,\\\" Jensen v. Giant Industries, 8 Nav. R. 203, 209, 4 Am. Tribal Law 579 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2002) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Upon remand, the district court shall refrain from any weighing of the evidence when considering the Rule 56 motion.\\nC. 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(4)\\n7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(4) provides:\\nNo cause of action accrues for personal injury or wrongful death until the party having the right to sue has discovered the nature of the injury, the cause of the injury, and the identity of the party whose action or inaction caused the injury, or until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, in light of available knowledge and resources, the party should have discovered these facts, whichever is earlier. This Subsection applies to and revives all injured parties' claims, regardless of whether the claim may have been barred in the absence of this Subsection.\\nAppellant submitted a sworn affidavit and articles on childhood sex abuse in support of his assertion that he was unable to discover that the abuse was the cause of his injury, nor the nature of his injury, for over twenty years. The district court gave little weight to this evidence and concluded that Appellant's mere assertion of delayed insight or delayed discovery was not enough to permit the late filing of his complaint under the conditions set forth in Section 602(A)(4). Additionally, the district court stated that \\\"repressed memory\\\" is the only instance of tolling it knew of that was recognized by other courts, and that it knew of no jurisdiction that has accepted Appellant's theory. Order to Dismiss, \\u00b6 5. However, Appellant lists in his brief delayed insight or delayed discovery cases stemming from childhood sex abuse by priests have, in fact, been found credible in other jurisdictions.\\nThe district court stated that Appellant's \\\"mental assertion\\\" is not sufficient without witnesses or psychiatric professionals when there is no physical harm. Id., f 13. The court stated that \\\"in this case we are dealing with only thoughts and the harm caused by thoughts.\\\" Id., f 11. The district court wanted more evidence than Appellant's own belief \\\"that one event and not another set a pattern of thinking in motion.\\\" The court than stated that as the Navajo Supreme Court has not permitted relief on the basis of an individual's own word in cases concerning oral wills and intervivos gifts, therefore a similar objective standard needs to be shown in this case.\\nOur courts have not previously been asked to interpret the meaning of 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 6702(A)(4)'s requirement for \\\"the exercise of reasonable diligence, in light of available knowledge and resources\\\" in relation to a childhood sex abuse case. The legislative history of Section 602(A)(4) shows that it was enacted in order to give uranium radiation victims extra time for their injuries to manifest before filing a personal injury claim. Resolution No. CAP-40-01 (April 20, 2001). Widespread child sex abuse by priests was not yet well-known. No Navajo Nation law specifically addresses child sex abuse victimization as a civil proceeding.\\nThat being said, there is no doubt that our children are in jeopardy from abuse. Appellant's submitted materials include journal articles on the severity of child sex abuse in Indian Country. Appellant's Brief, Exhibits 4-5. The articles suggest that Native American boys, as a \\\"relatively powerless minority\\\" may be expected to have acute effects of withdrawal and loss of contact with community when exposed to such abuse, where healing is traditionally achieved through social integration. Marc H. Irwin and Samuel Roll, The Psychological Impact of Sexual Abuse of Native American Boarding School Children, J. Amer. Acad. Psychoanal. 23:461-473 (1995), Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 4. Pursuant to Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 bi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii at 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 204(E), it is the right of children to be free of abuse. The vital status of tribal children is further recognized under federal law at 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1901(3) (ICWA). This Court notes further that an Amnesty International Report described \\\"cruel and inhuman treatment was the norm and many children experienced physical and sexual violence\\\" when removed from their families and compelled to attend boarding schools. Maze of Injustice: The failure to protect indigenous women from violence in the USA, Amnesty International USA, 2007, at 16. While the Navajo Nation is very tolerant of all religious traditions, it would be a cruel irony if the same authority figures who seek to replace our ancient holistic traditions are also harming our children in such unspeakable ways.\\nTracing psychological and mental injuries over many years primarily to this abuse and not to other causes will not be a simple task. However, we hold that this is a factual issue suitable for a jury to consider at trial, not weighed by a judge in a preliminary motion. Our courts have a duty, in parens patriae, to ensure allegations of harm to our children are fully heard and not dismissed on mere technicalities.\\nAppellant asks that the Court use the \\\"Objective person in Plaintiffs position\\\" standard, taking into account a person's upbringing, culture and circumstances after having been subjected to the abuse. This Court agrees that such a standard is applicable on the Navajo Nation. Under this standard in this case, \\\"reasonable diligence\\\" in 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(4) must be applied to a Navajo person, not a faceless individual whose \\\"reasonable diligence\\\" is measured by an objective standard applied by the dominant culture. We interpret justice through Dine eyes. We do not blindly accept what the phrases have been taken to mean by other societies. To determine what is reasonable for member of the Navajo Nation, it is entirely appropriate to consider factors such as historical trauma and the deference expected of a people by authority figures of a colonizing culture. Citing Martinez-Sandoval v. Kirsch, 118 N.M. 616, 618-620, 884 P.2d 507 (N.M.Ct.App.1994), Appellant further asks that the standard of the \\\"reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct\\\" whose judgment is \\\"altered in some way\\\" be adopted in assessing whether a reasonable person could have discovered the cause or nature of an injury' sooner. The Court finds this standard applicable, given the language of 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 602(A)(4) pertaining to \\\"available knowledge and resources.\\\"\\nV. CONCLUSION\\nThe District Court's Order to Dismiss is VACATED. This matter is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n. The federal courts are a separate jurisdiction with very limited civil authority in Indian Country. Notwithstanding this limitation, federal court rulings profoundly affect tribal civil authority involving non-members in ways that have become \\\"erratic and standard-less.\\\" Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Members, 37 Tulsa L.Rev. 573 (2001-2002). Some federal courts have even crossed jurisdictional lines and have begun treating our tribal courts and administrative agencies like subordinate courts rather than a separate sovereign adjudicative system. See, e.g., Amended Judgment in Red Mesa Unified School District et al. v. Sara Yellowhair, et al., issued by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, No. CY-09-807I-PCT-PGR (D.Ariz. January 6, 2011) (voiding tribal court orders and enjoining tribal court action in a consolidated employment-related matter in which the protections of the Navajo Nation Preference in Employment Act were found to be inapplicable to all employees of Arizona state-funded schools located on the reservation). We are an Indian sovereign judicial system, and as such there is no statutory mandate for our courts to apply the decisions of federal courts within our jurisdiction. However, we do so in the area of our civil jurisdiction over non-members out of the need to participate in, essentially, a political relationship. The jurisdictional barriers created by the federal courts, unilaterally imposed without consulting Congress or the tribes, must be practically resolved through engagement.\\n. Statute of limitations is, specifically, an affirmative defense that must be pled at the time an answer is filed pursuant to Nav. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c).\\n. Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 Judicature 161, 163-64(1986).\\n. Cases cited by Appellant include Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 565 N.E.2d 780, 785-786 (1991) (An injury to the mind could cause a person to be unable to link the misconduct to the damage); Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1990) (abuse victim could not have realized that she had a cause of action against her teacher because of the combination of internal psychological factors and the relationship of the high authority teacher to her self-concept of a low status person who must accede to authority): and Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D.1989) (due to severe emotional trauma, victim was not able to fully understand or discover her cause of action during the applicable statutory time period).\\n. Authority figures of religious institutions have historically imposed their ideas and judgments on North American \\\"heathens,\\\" fully intending to conquer, rework, and redesign our societies. See Steven T. Newcomb, Pagans in the Promised Land: Decoding the Doctrine of Christian Discovery, Fulcrum Publishing (January 29, 2008).\\n. The Court takes note that since Oliphant v. Suquamish. Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), which ruled that tribes have no inherent authority to punish non-Indian criminal offenders, the Navajo Nation people are subject to criminal offenses by non-Indians without a remedy.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7339399\", \"name\": \"Glenyal BAHE, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Adam PLATERO, Respondent/Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bahe v. Platero\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-12-20\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-48-12\", \"first_page\": 104, \"last_page\": 112, \"citations\": \"11 Am. Tribal Law 104\", \"volume\": \"11\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:05:47.253425+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice, and BLACK, L, Associate Justice by designation.\", \"parties\": \"Glenyal BAHE, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Adam PLATERO, Respondent/Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Glenyal BAHE, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Adam PLATERO, Respondent/Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-48-12.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nDec. 20, 2012.\\nNicholas Mattison, Jesse Traugott, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for Appellant.\\nAlain Jackson, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, H., Chief Justice, SHIRLEY, E., Associate Justice, and BLACK, L, Associate Justice by designation.\", \"word_count\": \"4446\", \"char_count\": \"28172\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis matter comes before the Court on Appellant Glenyal Bahe's appeal from an order of the Crownpoint Family Court denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial and to Amend or Alter Judgment. In its order, the family court affirmed its earlier dismissal of Appellant's paternity, child custody and support action in deference to the jurisdiction of a New Mexico state court, where Appellee had previously filed a competing action. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the family court's decision.\\nI\\nThe parties are both enrolled Navajos. They are unmarried. Neither party disputes that Appellee is the father of the parties' two sons, ages three and five. The parties lived together in Torre\\u00f3n, New Mexico on the Navajo Nation between 2006 and 2010, then moved with their sons to Albuquerque, New Mexico. Sometime in 2011, the parties separated. At some point in 2011, their sons, either with Appellant or by themselves, began living in the residence of their maternal grandmother in Torre\\u00f3n. The parties dispute when this move occurred.\\nOn December 2, 2011, Appellee filed a Petition to Establish Parentage, Determine Custody and Time-Sharing, and Assess Child Support in the Second Judicial District Court, Bernalillo County, New Mexico, requesting joint legal custody, with physical custody to the mother and visitation for himself. Appellant was served with the petition on January 18, 2012. On January 31, 2012, Appellant filed a competing Petition to Establish Paternity, Custody and Child Support in the Crownpoint Family Court of the Navajo Nation requesting sole legal and physical custody of the children with limited visitation to the father.\\nOn the basis of her Crownpoint filing, Appellant moved to dismiss the Bernalillo County, New Mexico action. At a hearing on the motion held on May 8, 2012, the state judge took testimony on the children's residence. Shortly thereafter, the judge communicated with the Crownpoint Family Court judge pursuant to the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) at \\u00a7 40-10A-110 NMSA (1978). Following this communication, the Crownpoint court dismissed the Crownpoint action on May 14, 2012, deferring jurisdiction to the state court on the basis that \\\"judicial resources will be preserved, forum shopping will be discouraged, the children will benefit and the matter will [be] resolved in the most convenient forum.\\\" Order of Dismissal, p. 2. On the sole basis of the Crownpoint court's sua sponte dismissal of that action, on May 15, 2012, the state court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss the action in the state court.\\nOn June 4, 2012, Appellant filed her Motion for New Trial and to Amend and Alter Judgment in the Crownpoint Family Court, asserting that the state court lacked proper jurisdiction under the UC-CJEA because the children had moved to the residence of their maternal grandmother in Torreon in February, 2011 and were, therefore, not in the state of New Mexico for the required length of time for the state to acquire \\\"home state\\\" jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The Crownpoint court accepted the post-judgment motion and ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the jurisdictional issue. Both parties submitted briefs. On July 11, 2012, the Crownpoint court denied Appellant's motion on the basis of the court's discretion under PacifiCorp v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 8 Nav. R. 378, 4 Am. Tribal Law 694 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003) to abstain from hearing a case that is properly pending in another jurisdiction unless public policy considerations dictate otherwise.\\nThis appeal followed. The Court granted a Motion for Expedited Ruling filed by Appellant. Briefs were submitted on an expedited schedule. Appellant filed further motions, first for a decision on the record and second, to strike Appellee's brief with fees and sanctions on two bases, namely (1) the brief was submitted a few days past the expedited deadline, and (2) Appellee's counsel had submitted the brief without being duly licensed to practice law on the Navajo Nation. On December 4, 2012, the Court granted Appellant's motion for a decision on the record but denied Appellant's second motion regarding Ap-pellee's counsel's late and unauthorized submission of brief, on several bases, including fundamental fairness and Appellant's failing to raise the matter of unauthorized practice before briefs had been submitted in compliance with court orders that, from the beginning, were addressed to both parties' counsel of record. Meanwhile, the state court action has proceeded forward with the state judge referring the parties' paternity, custody and support matters for evaluation by a court clinic and mediation.\\nWe now issue our opinion.\\nII\\nThe issue in this appeal is whether the Crownpoint Family Court abused its discretion by dismissing a privately-filed child custody matter concerning Navajo parents and Navajo children in deference to a state court in which an earlier petition in the same matter had been filed.\\nIII\\nWe review the nature of state and tribal jurisdiction over privately filed child custody matters de novo as a legal question. In re A.M.K., 9 Am. Tribal Law 191 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010) citing Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Duncan, 7 Am. Tribal Law 633 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2008) and Navajo Transport, Services v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal Law 516 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007). We review the family court's decision on abstention for abuse of discretion. Discretion is limited by legal principles and must be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and adopted rules, to serve the ends of justice. Sheppard v. Dayzie, 8 Nav. R. 430, 484, 5 Am. Tribal Law 374 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004).\\nIV\\nWe take judicial notice that Navajos live both on the Navajo Nation and throughout the United States, where they are raising families in communities outside the land of our forefathers. Navajo individuals and families may move across bor ders for jobs or relationships or to return to their extended families. All these reasons are apparent in this case, where the breakup of one Navajo family living for a time outside the reservation has resulted in state-tribal jurisdictional challenges. While most jurisdictional issues in child custody matters presented to this Court have involved a Navajo and non-Navajo parent, here both parents and their children are all tribal members.\\nWe note that in this case, the record shows no findings to our satisfaction as to the residence of the mother during the pendency of her child custody petition, while the mother insisted that the children resided with her. Therefore, we will assume that not all the parties resided on the Navajo Nation, and that events relevant to the matter appealed may well have occurred outside the Navajo Nation.\\nThe Navajo Nation has codified its extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 2001 Navajo Nation Long-Arm Civil Jurisdiction and Service of Process Act (Long-Arm Statute) at 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253a. Pursuant to Section 253a(B), the Nation has jurisdiction over tribal members based on conduct and status if another tribal member is affected by their activities outside our jurisdiction. Additionally, Section 253a(F) provides that our courts \\\"may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis authorized by law, including the inherent and treaty jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.\\\" We have previously stated that our courts have jurisdiction over our children wherever they may reside. Miles v. Chinle Family Court, 7 Am. Tribal Law 608, 612-13 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2008). Section 253a(F) serves as the statutory foundation for Navajo Nation jurisdiction over our children based on their status as tribal members alone.\\nJurisdiction over matters concerning our children who live outside the reservation is provided by 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253a(F) as arising from our inherent sovereign right to watch over the upbringing of tribal children as a matter of the health, safety and welfare of the Nation as a whole. Congress has expressed that \\\"there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1901(3). The Navajo Nation has a \\\"legitimate and compelling interest\\\" in the welfare of our children within our jurisdiction. Resolution CO-38-11, Section 2(1) (October 26, 2011). Our courts' jurisdiction over matters involving Navajo children wherever they may reside is, furthermore, in keeping with Dine bi beena-haz'\\u00e1anii, which teaches that our children occupy a space in Navajo culture that can best be described as holy or sacred. See EXC v. Kayenta District Court, 9 Am. Tribal Law 176, 187-88 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010). Federal law recognizes that reservation status is not a requirement of tribal jurisdiction because \\\"[a] Tribe's authority over its reservation or Indian country is incidental to its authority over its members.\\\" Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, 344 Fed.Appx. 324 (9th Cir.2009) Otherwise, federal law fully recognizes undiminished inherent tribal sovereignty in matters \\\"involving relations between tribal members.\\\" See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (\\\"Indian tribes retain their inherent power . to regulate domestic relations among members\\\"). New Mexico, in particular, has long acknowledged exclusive tribal jurisdiction over civil matters, where both parties are Indian because those actions are \\\"first and foremost a matter of internal tribal law.\\\" Hinkle v. Abeita, 2012-NMCA-074, 283 P.3d 877, 883, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006, 294 P.3d 1243 (2012) citing Felix S. Cohen, Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law \\u00a7 7.02[1][a], at 599 (Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2005).\\nThe Navajo Nation Council has provided our eourts with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over matters covered by this appeal. The family courts have \\\"original exclusive jurisdiction\\\" over all cases involving domestic relations, paternity, custody and child support. 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253(B) (emphasis added). That the Navajo Nation Council saw fit to term such jurisdiction \\\"exclusive\\\" in a general jurisdiction statute leads this Court to conclude that the Council wished to assert our inherent powers in such matters above all other forums in this or any other jurisdiction, unless the Council adopts a uniform jurisdictional law, enters a jurisdiction sharing agreement with an outside forum, or more specific jurisdictional provisions in the Navajo Nation Code set forth otherwise.\\nJurisdiction over child custody matters in New Mexico is determined under the UCCJEA, NMSA 1978, \\u00a7 40-10A-101 et seq. (2001). According to some commentators, the UCCJEA confers subject matter and personal jurisdiction while also operating substantially like a long arm statute, providing jurisdiction over child custody matters that may not satisfy residency requirements for personal jurisdiction which might otherwise be required in a particular state. The UCCJEA as adopted by New Mexico establishes four bases for initial jurisdiction over child custody matters\\u2014 home state, significant connection, more appropriate forum, and vacuum jurisdiction. \\u00a7 40\\u201410A\\u2014201 (a)( 1)\\u2014(4) NMSA. To be the \\\"home state\\\" the court must find that a child is either present in the state, or was present within six months of the proceedings' commencement and one of the child's parents continues to live in the state even after the child has been removed. \\u00a7 40-10A-201(a)(l). If there is no home state or if the home state has declined jurisdiction, then a court has jurisdiction if the child has \\\"significant connection\\\" to the state and substantial evidence concerning the child is available in the state. \\u00a7 40-10A-201 (a)(2). A court with neither home state or significant connection jurisdiction may exercise \\\"appropriate forum\\\" jurisdiction when a home state or significant connection state have declined on grounds of inconvenient forum or unjustifiable conduct. \\u00a7 40-10A-201(a)(3). If none of the above applies, an alternate court may fill the vacuum and exercise jurisdiction over an initial custody proceeding. \\u00a7 40-10A-201(a)(4). However, the UCCJEA is silent on bases for jurisdiction under tribal laws, including jurisdiction on the basis of tribal member status alone.\\nThe UCCJEA requires a state to \\\"treat a tribe as if it were a state\\\" in applying provisions (Articles 1 and 2) which pertain to jurisdictional determinations, communication and cooperation between courts. \\u00a7 40-10A-104(b). The New Mexico Supreme Court in Garcia v. Gutierrez, 147 N.M. 105, 217 P.3d 591 (2009), grasped that tribal jurisdictional laws over tribal members are not addressed in the UC-CJEA's jurisdictional scheme yet must be acknowledged. In Garcia, a divorce petition had been filed by the non-Indian mother in state court, while the Indian father filed a competing action in tribal court. The parties' children were enrolled members of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Having found that the pueblo lacked \\\"home state\\\" jurisdiction under the UCCJEA's strictly defined scheme, Garcia nevertheless applied a mixture of comity and best interest of the child considerations that take into account \\\"the strong congressional expression in favor of tribal self-determination as to the upbringing of tribal children,\\\" declaring that New Mexico courts \\\"should assume that the tribal court has jurisdiction, as we hope and assume that the tribal court will treat the district court's exercise of jurisdiction as proper.\\\" Garcia, 147 N.M. at 107, 121, 217 P.3d at 593, 607. The Garcia Court described New Mexico's long tradition of comity with tribal courts in child custody matters, noting that this tradition \\\"can survive only where courts actively strive to reach common ground,\\\" in the best interest of the child. Garcia, 147 N.M. at 121, 217 P.3d at 607-608. Such has been the tradition of our own courts. The spirit of mutual respect between courts is a defining characteristic of our relations with the federal and states courts and vice versa. See English/Navajo Glossary of Legal Terms, U.S. District Court, District of New Mexico, vol. 1, definition of COMITY, p. 25 (February, 1985) (Bee \\u00e1nihoot'\\u00e1n\\u00edgi\\u00ed \\u00edl \\u00fcik'ehgo n\\u00e1\\u00e1n\\u00e1lahdi nihwii'aahii h\\u00e1 ya,a n\\u00edd\\u00f3ot'\\\\\\\\lgo bee Iq; ya'at'eehgo ahodooniil il il\\\\ bee (courtesy and respect; a willingness to do or grant something not as a matter of right, but out of goodwill, respect and tradition)). We would note that the Navajo translation of comity in the above glossary is not precisely on point as it merely discusses that there is a judge-to-judge relationship while leaving out reciprocal respect, mutual consideration, and obligation to protect the people, especially children, that are essential in such circumstances under our Navajo principles of law. A better translation, especially in the context of this case, is bilag\\u00e1ana d\\u00f3\\u00f3 dim biw\\u00e1\\u00e1shindoon bit haz'qqdqq ahoolz\\u00e1nigo ahilnidl\\\\igo, alhaants\\u00e9keesgo \\u00e9l b\\u00edla'ashdla'n, 'alchini niliinii tsi'ke', altsq baants'ah\\u00e1kees; alts'qqhjn bibeehaz'\\u00e1anii d\\u00f3\\u00f3 bina'nitin yid\\u00edsin d\\u00f3\\u00f3 ye\\u00edsti', h\\u00e1\\u00e1la iin\\u00e1 d\\u00f3\\u00f3 hoo-ghan haz'qqd\\u00f3\\u00f3 \\u00e9\\u00ed \\u00e1lchin\\u00ed nitsaago b\\u00ed-d\\u00e9\\u00e9t'f. When implementing the decisions of governments and leaders through comity, the implementation must support our paramount obligation to protect human beings, especially our children.\\nGarcia further held that there was concurrent jurisdiction due to the non-Indian status of the mother. The Garcia court found that even though the parties' children were tribal members, because of the non-Indian status of the mother both the state and tribal courts had \\\"considerable interests in adjudicating child-custody matters involving New Mexico citizens and Pojoaque tribal members. Therefore, the exercise of concurrent (but not exclusive) state-court jurisdiction on these facts does not infringe on the Pueblo's ability to make its own laws and be governed by them.\\\" Garcia, 147 N.M. at 117, 217 P.3d at 603. It is clear from the plain wording of the Garcia decision that the state court's assumption of concurrent jurisdiction applies only when one of the parties is a non- Indian. Concurrent jurisdiction is not to be assumed in all cases, especially when all parties are enrolled members of the Navajo Nation.\\nIn the spirit of comity, we will assume that the state court's jurisdiction is proper in this case pursuant to \\u00a7 40-10A-201(a)(3) NMSA (appropriate forum). Pursuant to Section 201(a)(3), New Mexico may acquire jurisdiction after a court with \\\"home state\\\" or \\\"significant connection\\\" jurisdiction has declined. If tribal jurisdiction is taken as the equivalent of \\\"home state\\\" jurisdiction for purposes of jurisdictional review, the record shows Section 201(a)(3) to be the best fit which, furthermore, does not interfere with the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of Navajo Nation courts.\\nWe will next focus discussion on the decision of the Crownpoint court. Namely, whether the Crownpoint court had the authority to defer jurisdiction and whether deferment was proper under the circumstances.\\nAs we have stated, the Navajo Nation Family Court has, generally, \\\"original exclusive jurisdiction\\\" over domestic relations and child custody matters pursuant to 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253(B). However, as we have also stated, the Navajo Nation Long-Arm Statute at Section 253a more specifically applies here, where the residence of the parties and children is in question and jurisdiction is plainly derived from our inherent sovereign powers over tribal children, wherever they may reside, pursuant to Section 253a(F). \\\"Exclusive jurisdiction\\\" by definition means one court has the power to adjud\\u00edcate a case to the exclusion of all other courts. It is the opposite situation from concurrent jurisdiction, in which more than one court may take jurisdiction over the ease. However, \\\"exclusive jurisdiction\\\" does not mean that the adjudicative power may never be relinquished or deferred, especially when foreign jurisdictions must frequently deal with one another in the spirit of comity. We must deal, almost on a daily basis, with federal and state foreign jurisdictions. We take judicial notice that our lands encompass three foreign state jurisdictions which have their own expressed interest in asserting foreign laws in certain instances, while we have the need and sovereign right to have our own laws applied uniformly across all our lands for the protection of our people. We work with these foreign jurisdictions in comity when our people live beyond our borders. Where jurisdiction is obtained under the Long-Arm Statute, 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253a(E) enables the family court to \\\"stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any condition that may be just\\\" upon a finding that, \\\"in the interest of substantial justice, the action should be heard in another forum.\\\" Therefore, we find that the family court had statutory authority to defer adjudication of this case to the state court. Here, New Mexico properly acquired jurisdiction upon the Crownpoint court's dismissal.\\nWe next turn to whether the family court properly exercised its discretion under 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253a(E). In its Order of Dismissal, the court found that the state court is the more convenient forum, distance-wise, for both parents, citing public policy reasons, including preservation of judicial resources, benefit to the children and discouragement of forum shopping, and also stating: \\\"[i]t is not in the best interest of the children that litigation is prolonged and resources that could be devoted to the children be expended in redundant litigation.\\\" Order of Dismissal, p. 1-2. In its Order Denying Motion for New Trial and to Alter or Amend Judgment, the family court expressly stated that the abstention was being made for reasons of judicial economy and out of proper respect to the sister jurisdiction. Order Denying Motion, p. 1. The court also restated its finding from its Order of Dismissal that the state court in Bernalillo County was the most convenient forum due to distance, as well as the need for the children to settle visitation with Appellee quickly in their best interest. Order Denying Motion, p. 3. It is clear to this Court that the family court dismissed the matter for the proper reasons pursuant to 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253a(F).\\nAppellant has challenged the propriety of admonishments made by the family court in its Order to Deny Motion in relation to forum shopping. Appellant states that the court's factual findings giving rise to those statements were in error. While we believe Appellant brought the Crownpoint court's disapproval upon herself by taking inconsistent positions in her pleadings in the different courts that served to obscure the facts regarding the children's residency, we agree that some of the language in relation to forum shopping need not have been so strident, and that the findings in relation to forum shopping were either in error or should have been subject to a hearing. However, we find the errors harmless, as the court could properly dismiss the matter on the basis of inconvenient forum alone.\\nWe note that the family court relied on domicile of the mother to determine the residency of the child, using a provision of the ABBA at 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1005. Additionally, we previously stated that jurisdictional decisions concerning child custody matters arising under the Children's Code (now the ABBA), as set forth in court rules governing Children's Code matters, require a jurisdictional hearing. Zuni v. Chinle Family Court, 7 Am. Tribal Law 495, 497 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006). However, the domicile provision pertains only to ABBA proceedings. Additionally, while the ABBA provides discretion to decline a matter in cases of jurisdictional conflict, the discretion is subject to limitations not found in the Long Arm Statute. Namely, the ABBA further states that it is \\\"the policy of the Navajo Nation that, absent good cause, child custody proceedings involving Navajo children [arising under the ABBA] should be heard in the Navajo Nation Courts.\\\" This policy creates a presumption that ABBA cases be heard in our courts, hence the need for a jurisdictional hearing in ABBA cases.\\nWe must clarify that any reliance on ABBA provisions for statutory authority in private child custody matters is incorrect. The ABBA, which is set forth at 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1001-1504 of the Navajo Nation Code, covers delinquency, children in need of supervision, dependency, and Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) proceedings, not private child custody matters between parents. However, the Council's findings, declarations, and broad policies and principles contained in ABBA regarding the government's responsibilities over the welfare of our Navajo children may be cited as general statements of Navajo Nation policy in other situations.\\nWhere both parents of a child are Navajo, our people living outside the reserva tion must be able to rely on the cooperation of their Navajo courts with state court systems governing activities where they live, without fear that our courts will unduly impede resolution of disputes in such forums and impose undue burdens and delays on far-flung parties absent good cause. However, we caution our courts that ensuring the integrity of our inherent sovereign powers and that our internal laws and customs are available to tribal members, in particular our children, are sacred duties of our Navajo Nation courts. Therefore, our courts need to be extra vigilant that we do not aid in abridgements of our inherent sovereign powers by unnecessarily conceding that concurrent jurisdiction exists when it does not.\\nIt is clear to this Court that children need both parents engaged in their lives without unnecessary delays. This is doubly true in this case, where the record shows visitation concerns have been raised and are being considered in the state court. We note with approval that in order to address these concerns, processes of mediation and evaluation have now been underway in that court for several months. Any forum that places the responsibility on the parents to work out parental responsibilities between themselves is consistent with a fundamental principle of our laws, where finding a solution \\\"is up to him,\\\" t'\\u00e1\\u00e1 Mv\\u00f3 aj\\u00ed t'\\u00e9ego. See, e.g., In re Custody of T.M., 8 Nav. R. 78, 86, 3 Am. Tribal Law 485 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2001) (\\\"The applicable maxim is, 'it's up to him,' meaning that the individual must be consulted before action affecting his interest can be taken.\\\"); and see Watson v. Watson, 8 Am. Tribal Law 361, 373-74 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010) (describing t\\u00e1\\u00e1 hw\\u00f3 aji t'\\u00e9ego as the traditional teaching that each of us is responsible to do what is necessary to make or provide a decent life). In this case, it is not mere consultation that should occur. Parents have a moral and legal obligation to protect their children through their own careful decisions. Parents must coniront the situations involving their children and look to their children's needs above the parents' own personal disagreements. Through \\\"talking things out,\\\" baa y\\u00e1ti', those in disharmony are brought back into h\\u00e9zh\\u00f3. Duncan v. Shiprock Dist. Ct., 8 Nav. R. 581, 592, 5 Am. Tribal Law 458 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004). Through participation in mediation, it is up to both parents, without animosity, to come together for the sake of the children and fully participate in talking out the issues. If properly done, the children can be human beings who are reliable, compassionate, and upright. T'\\u00e1\\u00e1 nih\\u00ed \\u00e1n\\u00f3ht'\\u00e9\\\\go \\u00e9\\u00ed d\\u00ed\\u00ed kqq bee nih\\u00e1 bik'eh '\\u00e1hoolyaa\\u00edg\\u00ed\\u00ed bik'ehgo hazhc>'\\u00f3 atch'\\u00ed' y\\u00e1lti', 'ah/igq, d\\u00f3\\u00f3 ahididl\\u00e1\\u00e1sh t'\\u00e1\\u00e1g'\\u00e9\\u00e9d, d\\u00f3\\u00f3 hazh\\u00f3'\\u00f3 binaho'\\u00e1ago \\u00e9\\u00ed niha' \\u00e1lchin\\u00ed boh\\u00f3n\\u00e9e dz\\u00e1\\u00e1go din\\u00f3oy\\u00e9\\u00e9l. Parents need to heed these fundamental principles on parental duties.\\nV\\nCONCLUSION\\nFor the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the order of the Crownpoint Family Court denying Appellant's motion for a new trial and affirming its dismissal of Appellant's petition. This matter is CLOSED.\\n. Appellant claims the children moved to Tor-re\\u00f3n in February of 2011; Appellee claims the children moved to Torreon in October or November of 20 i 1.\\n. \\\"Exclusive tribal jurisdiction is also acknowledged where an action involves a proprietary interest in Indian land; or when an Indian sues another Indian on a claim for relief recognized only by tribal custom and law; or when an Indian is being sued by a non-Indian over an occurrence or transaction arising in Indian country.\\\" Hinkle at 883 citing Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 134 N.M. 133, 2003-NMSC-019, \\u00b6 14, 74 P.3d 67.\\n. For example, although 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 253(B) also provides exclusive jurisdiction for matters arising under the Children's Code (now the \\u00c1lch\\u00edn\\u00ed Bi Beehaz\\u00e1annii Act (ABBA)), nevertheless 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1004(c) permits our courts to decline jurisdiction in favor of a forum with concurrent jurisdiction. We note that the ABBA at \\u00a7 1001-1504 covers dependency, delinquency, children in need of supervision, and Indian Child Welfare Act proceedings which involve a governmental agency as the filing party.\\n. See, e.g., Ponzini, John Lino, Minimum contacts and jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant under the UCCJEA (Aug. 25, 2011), www.martindale.com/family-law/article_ 1334038.htm.\\n. Appellant informed the state court that the children had lived \\\"their entire life\\\" with her in Torreon. Motion to Dismiss Petition to Establish Parentage for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 1. However, Appellant gave a different version to the Crownpoint court, acknowledging that the children lived in Albuquerque between October 2010 and February 2011. Appellant further claimed that the children resided with her and her mother in Torreon from February, 2011, yet stated that she, herself, did not move to Torreon until October, 2011. Petitioner's Brief in Support of Motion for New Trial or Alter Judgment in Accordance with Nav. R. Civ. P. 59(A)(8) and Navajo Common Law, at 1-2.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7341615\", \"name\": \"Gene SALT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sally MARTINEZ, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Salt v. Martinez\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-03-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-12-08\", \"first_page\": 135, \"last_page\": 135, \"citations\": \"8 Am. Tribal Law 135\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:06.827169+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before, YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Gene SALT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sally MARTINEZ, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Gene SALT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sally MARTINEZ, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-12-08.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nMarch 5, 2009.\\nGene Salt, pro se, for Appellant.\\nAlbert Hale, Window Rock, Navajo Nation for Appellee.\\nBefore, YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"214\", \"char_count\": \"1353\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAppellant petitions this Court to reconsider its January 21, 2009 Opinion. This Court hereby denies the Appellant's request. Appellant attempts to bring in new issues which were not initially raised in the appeal. Rule 19(b), NRCAP, requires that a petition for reconsideration be specific as to \\\"points or matters of law in which it is claimed that the Supreme Court erred.\\\" Appellant's petition alleges new errors on issues not raised in the appeal. The Court will not allow the Appellant to circumvent the specificity required by Rule 19(b). Furthermore, the Appellant's attempt to introduce new issues would contravene the spirit of the general principle that issues not raised at the trial level cannot be brought up at the appellate level. PC & M Construction Company v. Navajo Nation and Navajo Department of Financial Services, 7 N.R. 72, 73-74 (1993); Lee and Lin v. Tallman and Peabody Co., 7 N.R. 191, 192-193 (1996). The principle will also apply to petition for reconsideration at the appellate level. This matter is now CLOSED.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7342265\", \"name\": \"Winifred HALL f/k/a Winifred Watson, Petitioner-Appellee v. Roy WATSON, Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hall v. Watson\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-02-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-52-07\", \"first_page\": 235, \"last_page\": 240, \"citations\": \"8 Am. Tribal Law 235\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:06.827169+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Winifred HALL f/k/a Winifred Watson, Petitioner-Appellee v. Roy WATSON, Respondent-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Winifred HALL f/k/a Winifred Watson, Petitioner-Appellee v. Roy WATSON, Respondent-Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CV-52-07.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nFeb. 24, 2009.\\nDavid R. Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellee.\\nJudy R. Apachee, Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellant.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2143\", \"char_count\": \"12912\", \"text\": \"AMENDING OPINION TO CLARIFY THAT CERTAIN PRECEDENT ARE NOT OVERRULED\\nThis case concerns a divorce matter, initiated by the wife, which resulted in an interlocutory divorce decree prior to the death of the parties but before the distribution of the property. The appeal to this Court, and its opposition, have been brought by the children of the deceased parties. The Family Court in its final order affirmed the interlocutory divorce decree and dismissed the ancillary property distribution matter. We affirm the Family Court's decision.\\nI\\nThe case came before the Family Court with the filing of a divorce petition by Ms. Winifred Hall (f/k/a Watson) on March 28, 2005. On May 27, 2005, Mr. Roy Watson filed a response informing the Family Court that he intended to proceed pro se and that he is not contesting any property accumulated during the marriage. On June 17, 2005, Ms. Hall filed an Emergency Motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate Hearing requesting that a ruling be expedited due to her failing health. This was the first official notification to the Family Court that Ms. Hall's was severely ill, would soon be hospitalized, and was not predicted to live more than one month.\\nOn or about June 30, 2005, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held and the Family Court granted Ms. Hall's petition for dissolution of marriage upon Mr. Watson's verbal consent. On July 5, 2005, the Family Court issued an Interlocutory Divorce Decree, pursuant to 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 405, terminating the marriage between Ms. Hall and Mr. Watson on the grounds of incompatibility to live together in agreement and harmony. The only remaining issue before the Family Court was the distribution of the former couple's community property and debt. Accordingly, Ms. Hall filed her property assessment on July 8, 2005 and Mr. Watson filed his on July 28, 2005.\\nMs. Hall passed away on August 1, 2005. The following day, a Notice of Petitioner's Death was filed informing the Family Court that Ms. Hall had a will and that once a personal representative for the estate was appointed that person would be substituted for the deceased party. However, no substitution was actually made. The final hearing previously scheduled was continued until October 6, 2005.\\nOn September 6, 2005, a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) with a proposed Final Decree was filed with the Family Court by Ms. JoDonna Ward, daughter of Ms. Hall. This document had a signature purported to be that of Mr. Watson. Based on the agreement, the Family Court issued a Final Divorce Decree incorporating the MSA on October 13, 2005. On October 18, 2005, Mr. Watson challenged the MSA alleging that someone had forged his signature and that he did not agree to the division of property and debts specified in the October 13, 2005 Final Divorce Decree. With this challenge, Ms. Ward withdrew the MSA on April 3, 2006 and the Family Court vacated the Final Divorce Decree on May 21, 2006.\\nOn May 22, 2006, the Family Court ordered the parties to submit briefs as to whether the property distribution should proceed under this divorce action or be pursued through probate. Both parties filed briefs in support of the claim that the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage extinguished upon Ms. Hall's death. Neither party disputed the fact that the parties were legally divorced upon the issuance of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree. The only disputed issue was the distribution of the community property and debt. Ms. Ward asserted that the property should be distributed through probate. Mr. Watson, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss the divorce petition and a Motion to Vacate the Final Hearing arguing that the failure of Ms. Ward to file a motion for substitution of party within 90 days violated Rule 25(a) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that \\\"the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.\\\"\\nOn November 2, 2007, Mr. Watson passed away as the result of an auto accident. On November 21, 2007, the Family Court entered an Order Affirming Divorce and Dismissing Property Dispute. The Order affirmed the Interlocutory' Divorce Decree of July 5, 2005 legally terminating the marital relationship between the parties, but dismissed the matter of property distribution as both parties had passed away prior to the issuance of the Order. In dismissing the property issue, the Family Court referred the matter to Ms. Hall's pending probate case. No mention was made of any pending probate case on behalf of the estate of Mr. Watson. Appellant Elroy Watson, acting as personal representative for the estate of Mr. Watson, filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on December 27, 2007. The appeal asks this Court to vacate all orders of the Family Court, particularly the Interlocutory Divorce Decree.\\nII\\nThe issues presented to this Court are (1) whether the marriage between Winifred Hall and Roy Watson ended in divorce upon the Family Court's issuance of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree or whether the marriage dissolved at a later date, upon Ms. Hall's death, and (2) whether this Court can determine the rightful personal representative for the estate of Winifred Hall appointed in a separate probate proceeding before the same Family Court.\\nIII\\nThe issues in this ease are questions of law. The Court reviews such legal questions de novo, with no deference given to the trial court's decision. Navajo Transport Services v. Schroeder, 7 Am. Tribal Law 516, 519 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007).\\nIV\\nWith regard to the first issue, this Court holds that a binding divorce was granted to Ms. Hall, pursuant to 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 405, upon the Family Court's issuance of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree on July 5, 2005. The Family Court's second order, the Order Affirming Divorce and Dismissing Property Dispute, merely affirmed the prior court decree. This holding is also supported by Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 bi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii, Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 Fundamental Law, for the record shows there was never a dispute that the parties viewed themselves as living separate lives and that this dispute continued, and the attendant legal maneuvering was done, solely to gain the upper hand as to the distribution of the property and debt.\\nA\\nAppellant Elroy Watson, personal representative of the estate of Mr. Watson, appeals the Order Affirming Divorce and Dismissing Property Dispute of November 21, 2007 asserting that the Interlocutory Divorce Decree did not constitute a final order legally terminating the marital relationship. The Appellant specifically argues that because Ms. Hall passed away prior to the November 21, 2007 Order, the divorce was not legally finalized and Ms. Hall was still married to Mr. Watson at the time of her death.\\nThis Court has established a general rule against which the finality of an order may be tested. A final order will generally show on its face that the case has been decided on the merits, the substantial rights of the parties have been determined, and there are no further proceedings remaining in the lower court on the merits of the case. Tsosie v. Charlee, 6 Nav. R. 280, 282 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1990).\\nExtensive evidence was presented to the Family Court that Ms. Hall and Mr. Watson had separated on February 8, 2005 and were no longer living together long before the issuance of the Interlocutory Divorce Decree. Provided testimony clarified that Mr. Watson had left the home he shared with Ms. Hall and had begun a now family with another woman. Neither party contested the original petition's claim that the couple could no longer live in agreement or harmony. Hence, the Family Court entered an Interlocutory Divorce Decree that stated \\\"[t]his Order shall serve as a valid certificate of a divorce pursuant to 9 N.N.C. \\u00a7 405.\\\" Hall v. Watson, No. KY-FC-154-05, Interlocutory Divorce Decree (Kay.Fam.Ct. July 5, 2005).\\nThe record shows that at the time the Interlocutory Divorce Decree was issued, the only matter remaining between the parties was the distribution of their community property and debt. This Court holds that the divorce between Ms. Hall and Mr. Watson became effective on July 5, 2005 as the case was decided on the merits, the substantial rights of the parly in regards to their marriage was determined and there were no further proceedings remaining in the Family Court on the question of the marriage. The Interlocutory Divorce Decree was a final order for the purpose of terminating the marriage between the parties; this order was affirmed by a second order in which the issue of the distribution of property was dismissed so that the matter of the marital property and debt could proceed in probate.\\nB\\nDi\\u00f1\\u00e9 bi beenahm'danii, Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 Fundamental Law, also supports the finality of the divorce between Ms. Hall and Mr. Watson. The discussion herein does not overrule this Court's long established precedent that a court decree is necessary for a divorce to be valid. In re Validation of Marriage of Slowman, 1 Nav. R. 141 (Nav.Ct.App.1977); In re Validation of Marriage of Francisco, 6 Nav. R. 134 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1989); Begay v. Chief 8 Nav. R. 654, 6 Am. Tribal Law 655 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005).\\nUnder the Navajo principle of yo de yd, Mr. Watson ended his marriage when he left his wife and home. He openly entered into a new relationship and fathered a child with another woman with whom he resided until his own passing in November of 2007. There can be no greater evidence that Mr. Watson made it known to Ms. Hall and to the general public that he chose to end his marriage. Navajo custom requires that harmony in the community be restored by quickly and finally breaking ties so the community can soon return to normal. To have allowed such a former husband to challenge the fact that there was no longer a marriage would be nonsensical; the former husband cannot have it both ways. The Family Court was correct in not allowing the former husband to lurk \\\"behind the hogan waiting to take a portion of the corn harvest.\\\" Naize v. Naize, 7 Nav. R. 269, 273, 1 Am. Tribal Law 445, 450 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1997) (citing Apache v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 3 Nav. R. 250, 254 (W.R.Dist.Ct.1982)).\\nV\\nWith regard to the second issue, the question of the rightful personal representative of Ms. Watson's estate, that question is pending in the probate proceedings of In re Estate of Winifred Watson, No. KY-FC--018-06, currently before the Family Court. The Family Court has appointed Austin Hall, son of Ms. Watson, as personal representative to the estate. Ms. Ward, now challenges this appointment in her appeal to this Court.\\nBefore this Court may consider the validity of the appointed personal representative, the Court must first decide the threshold question of whether there is an adequate remedy at law for Ms. Ward's request. Only a final court order is ap-pealable to this Court. 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 801(A) (2005). Here, Ms. Ward's request that this Court determine the rightful personal representative of Ms. Hall's estate is best characterized as an improper interlocutory appeal of the probate action, which is prohibited by law. See Johnson v. Tuba City, 7 Am. Tribal Law 566, 570 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2007). In other werds, Ms. Ward's challenge of the personal representative is a matter to be adjudicated first by the Family Court\\u2014that is the remedy still available to her. This Court will not intercede on the issue at this time. Accordingly, this Court will not decide upon the validity of the appointment of Mr. Hall as personal representative to the estate and instead, remands the question to the Family Court.\\nThe Court further reminds the Family Court and the children of the deceased parties that under Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 fundamental law, custom and practice, affairs of the deceased need to be taken care of immediately and with the utmost care. There is a strong principle not to prolong these matters out of respect for the deceased. Burial and property distribution should occur without dispute to protect surviving family members. Furthermore, death is not a proper and lively thing to discuss. In re Estate of Tsosie, 4 Nav. R. 198, 200 (W.R.Fam.Ct.1983). It is therefore troubling that the parties submit pleadings referring to the deceased as if they were alive.\\nVI\\nBased on the above, the Court AFFIRMS the Order Affirming Divorce and Dismissing Property Distribution. The Appellant's Motion to Vacate is DENIED. The Court REMANDS to the Family Court the questions of (1) the debt and distribution of personal and community property, and (2) the determination of the rightful personal representative for the estate of Winifred Hall. The Court recommends that the two probate cases be consolidated.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7342328.json b/navajo_nation/7342328.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7342328\", \"name\": \"Rodriguez A. WOOD, Petitioner, v. WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, The Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wood v. Window Rock District Court\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-07-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-20-09\", \"first_page\": 252, \"last_page\": 260, \"citations\": \"8 Am. Tribal Law 252\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:06.827169+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Rodriguez A. WOOD, Petitioner, v. WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, The Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest.\", \"head_matter\": \"Rodriguez A. WOOD, Petitioner, v. WINDOW ROCK DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, The Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest.\\nNo. SC-CV-20-09.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJuly 1, 2009.\\nKathleen Bowman and Rosa Maria Cortez, for Petitioner.\\nJennifer Balin, for Respondent.\\nLeonard R. Livingston, for Real Party in Interest.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"3743\", \"char_count\": \"22569\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis matter concerns a petition for extraordinary writs filed against the Window Rock District Court in a criminal action. The Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus and granted an alternative writ of superintending control scheduling a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court denied Petitioner's request to make permanent the writ of superintending control. We now issue this opinion to explain our decision.\\nI\\nThe relevant procedural history is as follows. Petitioner Wood was arrested on January 13, 2009. The Navajo Nation filed five criminal complaints against Mr. Wood on January 14, 2009: No. WR-CR-19-09 (battery), No. WR-CR-2\\u00dc-09 (battery), No. WR-CR-21-09 (endangering the welfare of a minor), No. WR-CR-22-09 (endangering the welfare of a minor), and No. WR-CR-23-09 (endangering the welfare of a minor). That same day, Mr. Wood was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to each criminal charge. The District Court, in turn, accepted each plea and set each case for pretrial conference. Judge Johnson ordered that Mr. Wood could be released with conditions, including the condition that he post a cash bond for each charge as follows: No. WR-CR-19-09 ($600), No. WR-CR-20-09 ($250), No. WR-CR-21-09 ($200), No. WR-CR-22-09 ($200), and No. WR-CR-23-09 ($200). Mr. Wood was therefore remanded to jail pending a total cash bond of $1,450.\\nOn January 20, 2008 the District Court received a letter from Mr. Wood's mother requesting that Mr. Wood be released to her custody. On January 21, 2009 Mr. Wood filed a letter of his own in the District Court also asking for third-party release to his mother and grandmother. The following day he filed a request for appointment of legal counsel. On January 23, 2009, Judge Johnson appointed the public defender as legal counsel. On the same day, Judge Johnson also denied both requests for release with notations on each letter that there was no information as to the alleged victim and her children's safety. However, these notations with reasons to deny release were not made at a hearing that included the presence of Mr. Wood.\\nOn February 2, 2009 Mr. Wood filed another request for release, which was routed to his court-appointed legal counsel. According to the District Court, it \\\"did not take any action on this request because it was submitted by Mr. Wood instead of through his legal counsel.\\\" Resp't's Brief at 2. The request was also forwarded to Probation & Parole Services and, on February 3, 2009, the probation officer filed a response recommending against Mr. Wood's third-party release.\\nOn February 20, 2009 Mr. Wood, through his court-appointed legal counsel, filed the following three motions with regard to each complaint: Motion to Dismiss for Defective Complaint, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Discovery, and Motion for Release upon Third-Party Release Agreement. According to the District Court, each motion was set aside for 10 days to provide the Navajo Nation time to file a response by March 2, 2009. On March 3, 2009, Mr. Wood filed a Request for Ruling making note of the Navajo Nation's non-response. The Navajo Nation subsequently filed a late response to each motion on March 5, 2009. On March 6, 2009 Mr. Wood filed a Second Request for Ruling.\\nOn March 13, 2009 Mr. Wood's motions for third-party release came to the attention of a second judge, Judge Holgate, during Judge Johnson's absence. Judge Holgate granted the motions for third-party release in each of the five complaints. Mr. Wood was released on March 13, 2009, 21 days after his legal counsel's request for release. Upon her return, Judge Johnson denied the other two pending motions to dismiss on March 17, 2009. Mr. Wood subsequently filed a petition for writs of mandamus and superintending control with this Court on March 31, 2009 to compel Judge Johnson to rule on motions in a timely manner and to supervise her through a writ to prevent further abuse of discretion.\\nOn April 14, 2009 this Court denied the writ of mandamus explaining that there was no clear violation of any explicit legal mandate requiring the lower court to render a decision on a motion within a certain period and that judges generally have a certain amount of discretion as to when to address motions. Instead, the Court issued an alternative writ reserving its deci sion on the writ of superintending control by setting the matter for a hearing and ordering the District Court to show cause why the writ should not be made permanent. The Court, sua s-ponte, raised an additional issue of whether the inaction by the District Court on the motions for release\\u2014resulting in Mr. Wood's incarceration for 21 days awaiting a response\\u2014 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Navajo Bill of Rights or any other Navajo law. A hearing was held on April 29, 2009 in St. Michaels.\\nII\\nWe address the issues of (1) whether the failure of the District Court to address motions for third-party release while Petitioner remained incarcerated for 21 days is an abuse of discretion in such an egregious way that this Court needs to supervise the processing of this ease through a writ of superintending control and (2) whether the inaction by the District Court for 21 days while Petitioner remained incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Navajo Bill of Rights or any other Navajo law. We also glean a third issue from the briefs and oral argument of whether statutory laws and the rules of criminal procedure support the proposition that there exists a legal presumption of release by recognizance of a defendant pending trial. We address the third issue first.\\nIII\\nThis Court has jurisdiction to issue \\\"any writs . [njeeessary and proper to the complete the exercise of its jurisdiction . or [t]o cause a Court to act where such Court fails or refuses to act within its jurisdiction.\\\" 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 303 (2005). A writ will be issued where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. In re Navajo Nation Election Admin. Determinatin of Insufficiency Regarding Two Initiative Petitions, No. SC-CV-24-09, 8 Am. Tribal Law 240, 243-44, 2009 WL 1789113, *2 (Nav.Sup.Ct. June 22, 2009); Johnson v. Tuba City Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-12-07, 7 Am. Tribal Law 566, 569-70 (Nav.Sup.Ct. November 7, 2007). A writ of superintending control is appropriate when the District Court abuses its discretion in an egregious way that only immediate action by this Court will remedy the damage done to a party. In re A.P., 8 Nav. R. 671, 678, 6 Am. Tribal Law 660 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005); see also Johnson, No. SC-CV-12-07, 7 Am. Tribal Law at 569-70.\\nIV\\nPetitioner makes several arguments in support of a writ of superintending control. Petitioner argues that Judge Johnson abused her discretion in an egregious way by failing to rule for 21 (or more ) days on his motions for release while he remained incarcerated awaiting the District Court's decision. Petitioner requests a writ to compel Judge Johnson to rule on motions without delay and to supervise her through a writ of superintending control in order to prevent further abuse of discretion. Petitioner claims that he has no adequate remedy at law, which ultimately denies him his right to a speedy trial and to a speedy resolution of his cases. Petitioner also contends that there is a legal presumption of release by recognizance unless findings are made to the contrary.\\nWe review the language of Title 17 of the Navajo Nation Code and the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (Criminal Rules) before we address Petitioner's arguments. Section 1807(A) of Title 17 states \\\"[ejvery person arrested for an alleged offense . shall, within a period not to exceed 18 hours from the time of commitment, be given an opportunity to be released on bail.\\\" Bail may be by bail agreement, by cash bond, or by recognizance. 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1807(B). Furthermore, Rule 15(a) of the Criminal Rules, which pertains to the release of a defendant prior to trial, provides that any person \\\"may be ordered released pending trial on personal recognizance unless the judge makes a specific finding that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial.\\\" (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant has a right to be released or admitted to bail \\\"unless certain findings are made to the contrary.\\\" Nav. R. Cr. P. 12(c)(5) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Petitioner argues that there is a legal presumption for release by personal recognizance unless the Navajo Nation objects and a judge makes \\\"certain findings\\\" to the contrary at the defendant's initial appearance. We agree. The Court hereby holds that the plain language of 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1807 and Rule 15(a) of the Criminal Rules do support a \\\"legal presumption\\\" for release of a defendant by personal recognizance unless the government, who has filed the complaint(s) against an individual, objects and a judge makes \\\"certain findings\\\" on the record against release.\\nThe Court takes judicial notice that prosecutors do not routinely appear at arraignments and courts make decisions with regard to release without the prosecutor being present. This practice does not comport with the legal presumption for release. Therefore, wre must specify the procedural requirements at arraignment concerning bail. With a legal presumption for release by recognizance, the burden is upon the Navajo Nation to prove its denial is justified by clear and convincing evidence. See Apachito v. Navajo Nation, 8 Nav. R. 339, 345, 4 Am. Tribal Law 668 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003) (adopting the \\\"clear and convincing evidence\\\" standard for pretrial detention proceedings). For the Navajo Nation to object and for a judge to enter certain findings, the Navajo Nation prosecutor shall be present at arraignment. The non-appearance of a prosecutor shall be understood to mean that the prosecutor has no objections. The District Court shall not delay the necessary decision of whether to release or not because the prosecutor is not present. We recognize the additional responsibility this places upon the government to be available at the arraignment. However, the rights of the individual, protected by the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights and the laws of the Navajo Nation, outweigh any inconvenience this may create where the government accuses an individual of a violation of its laws.\\nThe statute and rules also provide that a judge or officer may refuse to admit a person to bail under certain circumstances, including a reason to believe that the person will fail to appear at subsequent proceedings. See 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1812. Where a \\\"specific finding\\\" is made that a release by personal recognizance will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial, Rule 15(b) of the Criminal Rules provides that a judge may permit release under conditions which will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant for trial. This rule provides that such conditions may include placement of restrictions during the defendant's period of release, or cash bond, or requir ing the return of the defendant to custody after specified hours. Nav. R. Cr. P. 15(b). Furthermore, a judge may deny release or order the defendant to abide by any other conditions where there are reasons, for the record, to believe that the defendant is dangerous to others or will commit a crime. See Nav. R. Cr. P. 15(d) (listing reasons to deny release); Seaton v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-04-06, 6 Am. Tribal Law 737, 741 (Nav.Sup.Ct. March 28, 2006) (examining reasons justifying detention). Furthermore, the mere seriousness of the charge will not justify continued detention. Id. at 742. Overall, denial of such release must be made at arraignment upon a motion by the Navajo Nation. Reasons for denial of release must be stated for the record. Dawes v. Eriacho, No. SC-CV-09-08, 7 Am. Tribal Law 619 (Nav.Sup.Ct. May 5, 2008) (holding that written reasons to deny a criminal defendant's release were not required and that verbal notification was sufficient). This assures the defendant a meaningful appeal of a lower court's order to this Court pursuant to 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1812(C).\\nWe recognize that judges have a certain amount of discretion, but discretion must be exercised within the parameters of the law. Particularly, the discretion given to judges under 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1813 authorizes the imposition of conditions of release that bear a reasonable relationship to insuring defendant's appearance. McCabe v. Walters, 5 Nav. R. 43, 48 (Nav. Ct.App.1985). Here, Mr. Wood was arraigned promptly and Judge Johnson ordered his release by cash bond in the total amount of $1,450 and the imposition of other conditions as to conduct to ensure his appearance at the scheduled pretrial conference. In ordering his release with conditions, Judge Johnson did not state reasons to deny release pursuant to Rule 15(d) and 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1812(B). Mr. Wood, however, was unable to come up with the $1,450 immediately and was remanded to jail, where he subsequently filed a request for third-party release. Judge Johnson unilaterally denied his request with notations that now indicated that Mr. Wood was a danger to the public, information that should have been determined at arraignment pursuant to Rule 15(d) and Section 1812(B). As there were no reasons given at arraignment to deny Mr. Wood's release, the judge may not now use a highly-set bail or unilaterally make findings about a defendant as a substitute for finding facts at arraignment. The purpose of bail, as stated previously, is to ensure a defendant's appearance at trial, and the Court notes that there are alternative methods of securing his appearance such as third-party release. The judge's denial of release under these circumstances is also an abuse of a judge's discretion, contrary to 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1807(A), 1807(B), Rule 15 and the legal presumption for release.\\nPetitioner also argues the District Court's failure to address motions for third-party release while he remained incarcerated for 21 days\\u2014despite his repeated requests\\u2014is an abuse of discretion. Respondent, on the other hand, argues there is no abuse of discretion because Rule 29(h) of the Criminal Rules, which allows motions to be answered in writing within 10 days from service, permits the District Court to set aside motions during that period so the Navajo Nation may file a response. A motion for third-party release is essentially a motion to amend conditions of release as delineated by Rule 15(e) of the Criminal Rules. We therefore review Rule 29(h) in light of Rule 15(e) and provide guidance to the District Court.\\nRule 29, pertaining to pretrial motions, governs the procedure to be followed \\\"between arraignment and trial unless specifically provided by another rule\\\" (emphasis added). Motions for amendment of conditions of release routinely surface between arraignment and trial, but the procedure for such motions is specifically provided by Rule 15(e), wrhich states \\\"[s]uch motions shall be determined promptly.\\\" The plain reading of this rule mandates, with no discretion, that the District Court \\\"promptly\\\" rule on such motions.' We therefore hold the generally applicable Rule 29(h) therefore does not negate the specific Rule 15(e), nor does Rule 29(h) apply to Rule 15(e) motions.\\nJudge Johnson therefore abused her discretion when she failed to \\\"promptly\\\" rule on Mr. Wood's motions for release while he remained incarcerated for 21 days without a response. The abuse of discretion by this particular judge, though egregious, cannot be addressed by a permanent writ of superintending control against the District Court. The fact is that Judge Johnson is no longer at the Window' Rock District Court and all criminal matters in that district have been assigned to another judge.\\nV\\nAs to the additional issue raised by the Court, Petitioner contends an incarceration for 21 days without a response from the District Court on his motions for release constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner further asserts the District Court, w'ho ordered his release upon payment of a cash bond, violated his due process rights by failing to make \\\"certain findings\\\" as to its reasons to deny his release. Respondent, on the other hand, asserts Petitioner's arguments are disingenuous and that he was not incarcerated because of any action or inaction of the District Court, Respondent explains that Mr. Wood waived his right to a speedy trial by requesting that the pretrial conferences be continued twice resulting in the conference being rescheduled from February 17, 2009 to May 12, 2009. Thus, Respondent requests this Court to deny the writ of superintending control directed at the District Court considering that the delay was caused by the prosecutor and the public defender.\\nRespondent also asserts a 21-day period of incarceration pending a pretrial conference, when bail has been properly set, is within the boundaries of the law. An integral part of the District Court's argument is that there is no statute or rule that requires a judge to rule on motions within a certain period of time and that Rule 29(h) of the Criminal Rules authorizes the court to wait for 10 days before ruling on a motion so that the opposing party may respond. Respondent thus submits that the District Court's inaction was appropriate according to the current rules. Based on our analysis in IV, Rule 29(h) does not apply to Rule 15(e) motions to amend conditions of release. The District Court's assertion therefore has no merit.\\nUnder the Dine concepts of justice, on the other hand, Respondent conceded that a lengthy delay in ruling on motions for third-party release may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Navajo Nation also conceded where an individual is incarcerated, a wait of 21 or more days is an awfully long time to wait for a response. We therefore hold that being incarcerated for 21 days without court action on motions for release constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Navajo Bill of Rights. 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 9. Just as the defendant has been accused of violating the law, the counterpart in Navajo thinking is that the government is not above the law. The government must comply with the law in prosecuting a defendant.\\nRespondent suggests that this Court provide guidance by issuing a time-line as to when lower courts need to consider Rule 15(e) motions for amendments of conditions of release. The Respondent suggests that the District Court review7 a request for release, submitted either pro se or through legal counsel, within 48 hours of its filing. The suggestion, however, does not provide a firm deadline in whieh the District Court must enter judgment. In reviewing Respondent's suggestions, we hereby adopt the following guidelines: (1) upon receipt of a Rule 15(e) motion for amendments of conditions of release, the District Court shall conduct a hearing on the motion(s) within 48 hours of its receipt; (2) the Navajo Nation Prosecutor shall be in attendance to raise objections, if any; (3) if the Prosecutor fails to attend the motion hearing, his non-appearance shall denote his non-objection; and (4) at the conclusion of the hearing, if the District Court is to deny the motions, it shall specify the reasons to deny release for the record and immediately enter a decision on the motion.\\nVI\\nBased on the above, we hereby DENY the petition for wNt of superintending control. The criminal complaints, Nos. WR-CR-19/20/21/22/23-09, are hereby dismissed. This case is closed.\\n. The Court takes notice that Cause No. WR-CR-21-09 (as well as WR-CR-22/23-09) was for the offense of endangering the welfare of a minor in violation of 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 456, which specifies no fine or jail time in its sentencing provision. Pursuant to 17 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1809, judges are authorized to set cash bond \\\"provided that in no case shall the bond exceed the maximum fine specified by applicable law for the offense for which the accused has been charged.\\\" Whether or not the bond set by Judge Johnson for this offense exceeded bail is a question that the Court need not address at this time.\\n. The Di.stricl Court considered each letter as a motion for release.\\n. Respondent does not cite a statute or rule that permits the District Court to take no action on a motion simply because it was filed by the defendant instead of through his court-appointed legal counsel.\\n. It is unclear from the record how the motions came to the attention of Judge Holgate.\\n. Although we note that Mr. Wood was released 21 days after his counsel's request of February 20, 2009, this Court takes notice that Mr. Wood had previously filed a pro se request for release on February 2, 2009, which was never acted on by Judge Johnson.\\n. See supra note 3 (noting that a pro se motion for third-party release was filed much earlier but was not acted on).\\n. In setting cash bond, \\\"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,\\\" 1 N.N.G. \\u00a7 9. The Court notes that Judge Johnson set a cash bond for every offense. If the primary purpose of bail, as we say herein, is to ensure the future appearance of the defendant at court proceedings, a legitimate issue is raised whether it was necessary to set a cash bond on every offense. Furthermore, in setting bail for each offense and the defendant cannot post the total cash bail required, the issue of excessive bail also arises. The Court need not address these issues at this time.\\n. Other conditions imposed by the District Court included that Mr. Wood conduct himself as a peaceful and law abiding citizen; that he not possess or use/consume alcoholic beverages or any other illegal drugs; that he not possess deadly weapons; and that he stay away from the victim and her children. Order Accepting Not Guilty Plea, Notice of Pretrial Conference & Agreement for Release, No. WR-CR-19/20/21/22/23-09, January 14, 2009,\\n. Rule 15(e)'s emphasis on promptness is in accordance with 17 N.N.C \\u00a7 1812(C) which emphasizes that the defendant shall 'immediately\\\" be brought before a judge where bail is initially denied and that any order by the judge as to allow bail or not is appealable and this Court shall 'give any such appeal absolute priority.\\\" (emphasis provided).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7342363\", \"name\": \"Ferlin CLARK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DIN\\u00c9 COLLEGE, Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Clark v. Din\\u00e9 College\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-10-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-25-10\", \"first_page\": 348, \"last_page\": 358, \"citations\": \"9 Am. Tribal Law 348\", \"volume\": \"9\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:29:30.374552+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Ferlin CLARK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DIN\\u00c9 COLLEGE, Respondent-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ferlin CLARK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DIN\\u00c9 COLLEGE, Respondent-Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CV-25-10.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nOct. 27, 2010.\\nPatterson Joe, Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellant.\\nDavid R. Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellee.\\nPatricia Salazar Ives, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Amicus Jack Jackson, Sr., Acting President of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, Associate Justice.\\n. The Court is not restricted in issuing a two-justice opinion where \\u201cnecessary and proper\\u201d as long as the Chief Justice or his or her designate presides in the case. Benally v. Mobil Oil Corp., 8 Nav. R. 365, 368 (Nav.Sup. Ct.2003).\", \"word_count\": \"5032\", \"char_count\": \"30603\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nOn September 21, 2010, this Court held a motion hearing on the matter of Appellant Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College's (College) motions to stay execution of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission's April 6, 2010 decision enjoining the College from further extending Appellee Ferlin Clark's (Clark) paid administrative leave and ordering that Clark be reinstated to his full duties as President of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College. We issued our decision on the same day, granting the College's Petition for Stay of Execution and enjoining enforcement of the Commission's decision. In that Order, we also asked for briefs on a matter raised by Amicus Jack C. Jackson, Sr. regarding the legitimacy of this appeal, which was filed after the Government Services Committee's removal of members of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College Board of Regents without duly appointed successors, leaving the Board without a quorum. In addition, we took under advisement the issue of whether there presently exists an employment contract between Clark and the College, which has been fully briefed and argued. We will address both these matters in this opinion.\\nFinally, we stated we would decide at a later date whether oral argument is warranted in the appeal pending before the Court as to possible prerequisites to the Navajo Nation Labor Commission's jurisdiction for injunction purposes. As the disposition of other issues remaining in this appeal renders this issue moot, there will be no need for a hearing on this final issue.\\nI\\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY\\nOn March 5, 2010, Clark filed a petition for preliminary injunction with the Commission, challenging the extension of the College's placement of him on paid administrative leave in order to investigate allegations that he \\\"engaged in certain unprofessional and unacceptable conduct that includes, but is not necessarily limited to, creating a hostile, intimidating working environment for numerous College employees and preferentially treating a select few who [he] deemed to support [his] actions and decisions while treating those [he] deemed not to support [him] with prejudice.\\\" Pet for Stay of Execution, at 8. Clark had been placed on administrative leave by the Board of Regents (Board) since January 25, 2010. The Board had hired an independent investigator to look into his conduct on February 24, 2010.\\nOn March 24, 2010 the Commission held an evidentiary hearing. On April 6, 2010 the Commission granted the injunction on the basis that the College Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual (Manual) limited such leave to 30 days unless formally extended. Although the College finally did extend the leave with the concurrence of the Human Resources Director on March 20-22, 2010, the Commission said that this was not done within the prescribed time period. The Commission enjoined further administrative leave and ordered Clark reinstated to his full duties as college president. That same day on April 6, the College filed a Request for Stay of Preliminary Injunction Order with the Commission. The Commission has never issued any ruling on the College's request.\\nOn April 26, the Government Service Committee (GSC) voted without explanation to immediately remove three Regents from the Board, leaving the Board with three active serving Regents, which is below the number needed for a quorum. On April 27, 2010, following a Board vote that day, the College represented by Patterson Joe, its Legal Counsel of record in the matter before the Commission, filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the Commission's decision.\\nOn May 31, 2010, Clark's existing contract for employment expired on its own terms. Clark continued to occupy and function in the college president's position. Since April 26, the removed Board members had not been replaced, therefore there was no Board enabled to address contract issues with Clark.\\nOn July 27, the independent investigator returned a 172-page single-spaced report substantiating numerous allegations concerning Clark's conduct raised by College employees. However, there was no Board able to receive, review or accept this report. To this day, the removed Board members have not been replaced and there remains no functioning Board.\\nOn August 30, 2010, Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College filed an Emergency Petition for Stay of Execution of the Commission's Order on August 30, 2010, attaching to it the independent investigator's report and raising new and urgent concerns that Clark was now terminating employees who had testified against him in front of the Commission, demonstrated against him, or otherwise questioned his authority by asking him to produce a current employment contract. On September 8, 2010, Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College filed a Request for Immediate Issuance of Stay alleging intimidations and firings of further employees since the filing of the Petition. The College's request was granted. This Court ordered Clark to cease all duties as college president. Jack Jackson, Sr. temporarily assumed the college presidency pursuant to a May 10, 2010 Standard Delegation of Authority.\\nOn September 16, 2010, Jackson asked leave to file an amicus brief or in the alternative, for leave to intervene as a party in his capacity as acting president of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College. On September 20, 2010, Clark filed his Response to Motion for Emergency Stay.\\nOn September 21, 2010, a hearing on the issue of the College's request for stay of execution was held at the Dine College Student Union Auditorium at Tsaile, A number of issues were urged upon the Court. Jackson claimed that, as acting president, he was the rightful representative of the College and should be permitted to intervene as a party. Jackson further claimed that the appeal filed by Joe for the College was unauthorized and should be dismissed. The College as represented by Joe objected, stating that the president lacks the authority to step into the shoes of the Board and pursue litigation. Additionally, Joe informed the Court that there have been more terminations of college employees at the behest of Clark since their petition was filed. Finally, both parties argued at great length the existence or non-existence of a current employment contract between the College and Clark.\\nWe issued a verbal order immediately following the hearing, and the same day issued a written Order permitting Jackson to present an amicus brief but denying his intervention as a party; granting the College's petition for stay; and requesting briefs on the matter of the legality of the GSC's removal of the Board members resulting in reduction of the Board to below quorum, which impacted on the authority of the Board to pursue this appeal.\\nII\\nJURISDICTION\\nAppeals from Commission decisions are prescribed by statute. Decisions of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission are generally appealable to the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation pursuant to IS N.N.C. \\u00a7 613(A). However, petitions for stays of Commission orders must first be filed with the Commission with an opportunity for response by the adverse party unless the Commission has otherwise approved a stipulation by the parties. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 613(B). A petition for a stay may be filed with the Supreme Court if the petition to the Commission is denied, which may grant the stay upon satisfaction of an appeal bond, or otherwise. See N.R.C.A.P. Rule 25(d). In this case, the College petitioned this Court for a stay almost four months after they had filed for a stay to the Commission with no response from the Commission. We deem the inaction by the Commission over such a lengthy period a denial for purposes of N.R.C.A.P. Rule 25(d), and find the College's petition for a stay of execution is properly before this Court.\\nEvents have overtaken this appeal since it commenced, and issues regarding standing and the expiration of an employment contract have shaped the arguments of the parties and now dictate the direction of this Court's opinion. Several issues are raised by Amicus, while the parties themselves have argued other issues. All issues raised are germane to the Commission's order reinstating Clark as college president. However, the legal questions have evolved due to changed circumstances of Clark himself due to the expiration of his employment contract on its own terms and his assertion, contested by the College, that a current contract now exists.\\nWe have stated that issues not raised below are not appealable, Gudac v. Marianito, 1 Nav. R. 385, 394 (Nav.Ct.App. 1978), and failure to object to matters raised in a lower court will constitute a waiver of any right to review on appeal, Navajo Nation v. Bedonie, 2 Nav. R. 131 (Nav.Ct.App.1979) However, we have long reserved the right to raise legal issues not raised by the parties. Brown v. Todacheeney, 7 Nav. R. 37, 42 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1992). In this case, the contract issues could not have been raised to the Commission because they exist as a result of changed circumstances that occurred in the course of this appeal. We will therefore address these issues.\\nFinally, Amicus raises jurisdictional arguments not otherwise raised by the parties. Jurisdictional arguments may be raised on appeal for the first time. Phillips v. NHA, 8 Nav. R. 751, 756 n. 3, 6 Am. Tribal Law 708 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005). The Supreme Court may also take notice of jurisdictional facts for the first time on appeal on its own motion. Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, 8 Nav. R. 3, 13, 2 Am. Tribal Law 492 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2000). Additionally, we recently held that an ami-cus may raise issues not brought up by the parties but may not otherwise function as a party. Nelson v. Initiative Committee, 9 Am. Tribal Law 204 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2010). Therefore, we will address jurisdictional issues raised by Amicus.\\nIll\\nSTANDING\\nAmicus Jack C. Jackson, Sr. has asked this Court to dismiss the appeal in this matter because it was filed on April 27, 2010, the day after the members of the Board of Regents were removed by the Government Services Committee (GSC), which reduced the Board to below quorum. Because Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College is a Navajo Nation entity pursuant to 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 552, and whose stewardship and operations are controlled by statutory provisions at 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2001 et seq., an unauthorized filing by the College goes to standing, which is a jurisdictional issue.\\nA quorum of 5 members must be present for formal action to be taken by the Board. 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2008. Amicus asserts that in the absence of a constituted Board due to the Regents' removal by the GSC, the president has authority to act on behalf of the College. Amicus cites Section IX.3 of the Bylaws of the Board of Regents (\\\"Bylaws\\\") as the authority for this assertion. Section IX.3 of the Bylaws states:\\n\\\"The College President shall serve as the Chief Executive Office of the College; is responsible and accountable to the Board of Regents for the discipline and successful conduct of the College and supervision of each of its campus and departments; and shall take every initiative in A) implementing policies of the Board of Regents and College; and B) promoting the College's development and efficiency.\\\"\\nId.\\nPursuant to 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2001 et seq., authority and control over Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College is delegated to the Board by the Navajo Nation Council. Under the statutory scheme, the Board has the responsibility to \\\"retain qualified and competent attorneys for consultation with the Board and preserving and defending the legal rights and interests of the College.\\\" Section 2016(E). The Board may define \\\"the duties, authority and responsibility of officers of the Board\\\" in the Bylaws pursuant to section 2012. The college president is an officer of the Board whose duties are described in the Bylaws. Section 2010(A). We do not see any delegation of the Board's section 2016(E) responsibilities to the college president in the section of the Bylaws cited by Amicus, nor does the section cited describe any expansion of the college president's authority in the event the Board is incapable of performing its statutory functions. The statutory scheme and the Bylaws cited do not invest in either Clark or Jackson the authority to make decisions concerning the legal interests of the College, including retaining counsel and authorizing or not authorizing the filing of appeals.\\nAmicus further claims that the office of the college president has inherent authority to step into the shoes of a non- functioning Board. This Court finds such a claim absurd. The college president is an officer of the Board whose functions and duties are set by the Board as described in Bylaws established and duly adopted by the Board. In addition, the college president serves at the pleasure of the Board as contracted, pursuant to section 2017 and the Manual. The position is not the equal of the Board, may not override Board decisions, and carries no inherent authority permitting any individual holding its office to expand its functions beyond what is statutorily provided.\\nAccordingly, we find that the college president is not authorized to step into the shoes of the Board and act on behalf of the Board in authorizing or making any decisions concerning the legal interests of the College, including the retaining of counsel on behalf of the College.\\nWe note that the Board, at 6 members, was not fully constituted even before the GSC's removal of the three Regents on April 26, 2010. However, it was one member over quorum and was functional. This functioning Board had retained Patterson Joe as the College Legal Counsel and tasked him with representing the College before the Commission in the matter appealed. On January 25, 2010, this Board had placed Clark on paid administrative leave and on February 24, 2010, had hired an independent investigator to look into Clark's conduct. The removal of the three Regents during the window period during which an appeal of the Commission's April 6 decision must be filed to this Court created a void of leadership in the Board and immediately reduced the Board to non-functioning status.\\nAt the hearing, we had expressed concern as to the motivation behind GSC's removal of the three Regents at a critical juncture in the litigation between the College and Clark. Clark argues that we may not look into the motivation of the GSC in passing the resolution because the GSC is not a party and is unable to defend its action. We agree, and therefore will not look into the GSC's motivation. However, we will examine the legality of the action itself insofar as it bears on the College's standing in this appeal.\\nIn pressing that this appeal should be dismissed because it was filed while the Board was non-functioning, Amicus relies on a May 5, 2010 opinion issued by the Chief Legislative Counsel upholding the authority of the GSC to immediately remove Board members and concluding that \\\"Members of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College Board of Regents who have been removed by the Government Services Committee are no longer members of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College Board of Regents and do not continue to serve until their successors are duly appointed, qualified and seated.\\\" Opinion No. CLC-02-10. The opinion focuses solely on the GSC's removal power under 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2003(B) and \\u00a7 2005, and concludes that this power is absolute, constrained only by the GSC's judgment that removal will serve the College's best interests. However, the opinion fails to consider this power within the entirety of the College's enabling legislation at 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2001 et seq. Section \\u00a7 2003(A) sets conditions for all actions by employees and officials of the Navajo Nation concerning the Board and provides that they \\\"shall not interfere with or interrupt the day-to-day activities of the Board of Regents.\\\" In addition, section 2004(B) permits a Regent to serve until their successor is chosen and seated in order that a quorum of the Board exists,\\nThe Court will read provisions of a statute comprehensively to further the purposes of the law, making sense of all statutory requirements.\\\" Kesoli v. Anderson Security Agency, 8 Nav. R. 724 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005).\\nIn this case, the GSC's actions immediately reduced the Board below a quorum and, therefore, unable to perform its statutory functions. It is beyond dispute that this action interfered with the day-to-day activities of the Board as prohibited by 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2003(A).\\nThe importance of having a duly constituted Board at all times is emphasized in 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2004, which provides for Board members to serve staggered six-year terms. As can be seen in the matter before us, the GSC's reduction of the Board to below quorum has left the College as a governmental entity without decision-makers at several critical junctures. Namely, to authorize this appeal; to address the expiration of Clark's employment contract on May 31, 2010; and to receive, review or take action on the July 27, 2010 report submitted by the independent investigator regarding Clark's conduct.\\nWe note that Patterson Joe, as the duly retained Legal Counsel for the College, had a fiduciary duty to ensure that the Commission matter, to which he was duly assigned, was not lost due to a non-appeal when the Board was incapacitated. As counsel of record in matters concerning Clark, Joe acted in accordance with 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2016(E), supra, and within his fiduciary duty to protect the College's legal interests by filing the appeal during the Board's apparent incapacity. However, this does not fully address the confines of our statutes in regard to standing of a Board incapacitated due solely to unexplained governmental action.\\nWe find that the GSC's reduction of the Board to below quorum by its immediate removal of the Regents on April 26, 2010 was prohibited by law as it violated 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2003(A). Consequently, we HOLD that the Regents were not legally removed and, therefore, continued to serve during the period this appeal was authorized. We further HOLD that the Regents continue to serve in their positions today without interruption.\\nThe appeal is properly before the Court.\\nIV\\nEMPLOYMENT CONTRACT\\nClark claims that although his employment contract expired by its own terms on May 31, 2010, the Board had, in fact, entered into a new contract with him. In the alternative, Clark asserts that he may not be terminated without a proper ceremony because of the medicine bundle entrusted to him when he became college president.\\nAt the time this appeal was filed on April 27, 2010, Clark's employment contract with Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College, effective for three years, was still in force. Pursuant to Title 10 of the Navajo Nation Code, the Board of Regents (Board) was responsible for his hire and supervision. His contract with Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College was from May 17, 2007 and due to expire May 31, 2010. As the contract called for an intent to renew or extend the contract to be communicated in writing 180 days before the expiration date, on November 21, 2009, the Board met and voted to send Clark a written letter of intent to renew and such a letter was sent to Clark by Tah. However, the College Legal Counsel, Patterson Joe, subsequently informed Tah that the November 21 meeting lacked a quorum due to the status of one of the student body representatives. The Board had to re-address the issue at their next meeting on December 18, 2009. At this meeting, the Board again voted, this time with a proper quorum, to send Clark a written letter of intent. Following this meeting, Tah signed a resolution which stated that an aetual employment contract for Clark had been approved by the Board by a 5-0 vote upon motion and second by Board members. Mr. Tah asserts that he signed by mistake, as the vote that did take place concerned the Board's intent to negotiate a contract, not approval of a finished contract. In any case, at the Board's next meeting on January 16, 2010, no employment contract was approved. Instead, on January 25, 2010, the Board placed Clark on administrative leave with pay so that the College could conduct an investigation into allegations of misconduct by Clark from numerous College employees. There does exist a contract signed only by Clark, containing hand-written changes to the year of expiration from \\\"2014\\\" to \\\"2013,\\\" initialed by Clark.\\nClark asserts that Tah's signature on the resolution created a binding contract. However, we have not seen any provision in Title 10 or any Bylaws submitted to this Court that authorizes the Board president to enter into employment contracts without the Board's actual agreement. There is no provision that would bind the College to contracts or promises made by the Board president in the name of the Board when there is no actual Board action. Even if an employee reasonably believes that a contract exists on the Board president's signature without actual assent by the Board itself, a contract is not created. In this case, there is no actual signed contract, only a purported Board approval of contract terms submitted by Clark, whose expiration date appeared to have been changed by Clark himself, therefore muddying what contract term had actually been \\\"approved\\\" by the document signed by Tah. We note that a resolution approving a contract merely permits a contract to be signed and is not the contract itself and does not bind the parties. This Court has not been presented with a signed contract. We note that a functioning Board was in place between December 18, 2009 and April 26, 2010 and no contract was signed throughout this period notwithstanding the December 18, 2009 purported Board approval.\\nOnly the Board has the authority to approve contracts for the College. 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2017(B)(8). Neither the statutes nor Bylaws endow the Board president with apparent authority, or make him an agent of the Board able to bind the College in contracts on his own signature without actual Board authorization. Section 2011 provides that \\\"No individual power or authority to act for or on behalf of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College shall attach to any Regent by virtue of that office, except as may be expressly given by this Chapter, the Bylaws, or resolution of the Board.\\\" 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2011. The limitations of the powers of the Board president is plain, and Clark would be familiar with this provision.\\nClark further asserts that he cannot be considered terminated until a proper ceremony is performed in which the medicine bundle entrusted to him is formally retrieved. We note that the Termination provision of Clark's expired Employment Contract (effective May 17, 2007 through May 31, 2010) provides specifically that the Board may remove the college president upon written notice \\\"without cause and without recourse\\\" and no ceremony is otherwise required. Appellant's Supplemental Filing, Ex. A at 4.\\nAt oral argument, Clark's attorney asserted that since Clark, as college president, had been entrusted with ceremonial items, Clark's employment cannot be terminated without a formal ceremony of passing the ceremonial items to a successor. While a proper ceremony as established by past leaders may take place at the time of transfer of leadership, such a ceremony, or the lack thereof, has no impact on the interpretation of contract terns and duties of officers. No presentation has been made by the parties that the Board's Bylaws and Manual dictate such ceremonial passage. We do not see where the Board has provided that duties and functions of offices either begin or terminate with ceremonies. The sacred items, entrusted with Clark by the College, belong to the College, and not to the individual. These ceremonial items are to be used in a positive way\\u2014to ensure that the College maintain its philosophy of Sa'ah Naagh\\u00e9\\u00ed Bik\\u00e9h H\\u00f3zh\\u00f3\\u00f3n.\\nBased on the foregoing, we find there was no extension of Clark's employment contract which expired on its own term on May 31, 2010. Consequently, Clark has no present legitimate authority as president of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College.\\nWe note that Clark has made use of this forum to contest the existence or nonexistence of a current contract, meaning that his actions as college president following May 31, 2010 and leading up to this holding fall in a grey area of contested litigation. Therefore, we further HOLD that actions taken by Clark as college president following May 31, 2010 through the date of our stay of execution on September 8, 2010 SHALL have legal force if uncontested by persons or entities affected. Otherwise, any exercise of Clark's authority during this period that is contested SHALL first be ratified by the Board in order to have legal force. The Board is left to set the timeframes and form in which such contests are to be brought to their attention.\\nV\\nSTAY OF EXECUTION\\nOn September 21, 2010, we granted the College's motion for a stay of execution of the Commission's preliminary injunction for several reasons. Firstly, Clark's employment status remained contested notwithstanding the expiration of his employment contract on May 31, 2010. For purposes of this litigation, Clark was employed pending resolution of the employment contract issue, and the injunction remained relevant to these proceedings. Secondly, the fact of continued terminations of College employees unsupportive of Clark, under the watch of an acting college president with close ties to Clark, was alarming to this Court.\\nWith the resolution of the employment contract issue, we find that the Commission's injunction no longer has any relevance to the College or Clark. It is resolved that there is no present employment contract between the College and Clark. Therefore, Clark no longer has a protectable interest in his employment, and Commission's preliminary injunction against the College prohibiting the College from placing him on further administrative leave is no longer enforceable.\\nThe order granting Clark's motion for preliminary injunction dissolved by operation of law when Clark's employment contract expired by its own terms. A further stay of execution of that injunction is therefore DENIED as moot.\\nVI\\nPRE-CONDITIONS TO FILING LABOR COMMISSION INJUNCTIONS\\nThis appeal initially concerned an employment matter before the Commission that did not proceed from a charge filed with the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (ONLR), but from a petition for preliminary injunction filed to the Commission without a charge. Initially, the parties contested the legality of the injunction due to the by-passing of the filing of the ONLR charge. The issue is now moot due to the expiration of Clark's employment contract.\\nPreliminary injunctions may be granted by the Commission pursuant to Rule 4 of their Amended Rules of Procedures which provides:\\nREQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: Prior to the initiation of Commission proceedings on a Charge, the ONLR or Petitioner, upon notice to Respondent, may petition the Commission for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief .\\nAmended Rules of Procedures for the Navajo Nation Labor Commission, Rule U\\nThis Court has not previously been presented with appeals of Commission decisions entered under this Rule and would have addressed such a decision as a matter of first impression. The rule suggests that a charge is to be filed at some point, but is unclear as to whether and when a charge must be filed when Rule 4 relief is sought.\\nAs we have stated, the matter is moot with little likelihood of future litigation on the subject in future between the parties, and extending litigation on this issue would incur unnecessary time and expense for the parties. Additionally, the Commission that would be impacted by any decision on the issue is not a party. The Commission should have the opportunity to speak to this issue and, perhaps, clarify their rule.\\nThis Court will not address this issue further in the context of this case.\\nCONCLUSION\\nAmicus Jackson's motion to dismiss this appeal is DENIED on the basis that the GSC's reduction of the Board below a quorum was prohibited by law. The Court DECLARES and ORDERS that the three members of the Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College Board of Regents removed on April 26, 2010 were never lawfully removed from them positions as Regents and continue to serve.\\nClark's employment contract expired by its own terms on May 31, 2010 and was never renewed. Therefore, Clark is not presently under any employment contract as President of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College. The Court ORDERS that Clark shall cease and desist from all functions as President of Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College unless the Regents authorize otherwise.\\nThe Court further ORDERS that actions taken by Clark as college president following May 31, 2010 through the date of our stay of execution on September 8, 2010 SHALL have legal force unless contested by persons or entities affected. Actions of Clark that are contested SHALL first be ratified by the Board in order to have legal force. The Board is left to set the time-frames and form in which such contests are to be brought to their attention and resolved.\\nThe College's petition for stay of execution is DENIED as moot.\\n. According to the Manual,\\nAdministrative Leave is not a disciplinary action; it allows investigation of an infraction of College policies or poor work performance. Upon the completion of the investigation the employee may return to their work place without penalty or being disciplined. Administrative Leave will not exceed 30 calendar days without the ap proval of the Director of Human Resources and the immediate supervisor. An employee's pay and benefits continue during administrative leave. Being placed on Administrative Leave is not subject to the grievance policy.\\nManual, Section 900.03.\\n. Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College is exempt from the appeal bond requirement. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 613(B)(5). Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 College, formerly known as Navajo Community College, is considered \\\"a distinct and semi-independent agency of the Navajo Nation Council,\\\" see 10 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2001, and defined as the Navajo Nation pursuant to 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 552(N).\\nC laik's attorney used the word jish to refer to the ceremonial items. However, the Court is careful not to use that word because it is unknown from the record what exactly was entrusted to Clark.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7342392.json b/navajo_nation/7342392.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7342392\", \"name\": \"Glady JONES, Mildred Reid and Katherine Cornfield, Appellees, v. Irvin CURLEY and Wilbert R. Brown, Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jones v. Curley\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-11-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-52-10\", \"first_page\": 366, \"last_page\": 369, \"citations\": \"9 Am. Tribal Law 366\", \"volume\": \"9\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:29:30.374552+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Glady JONES, Mildred Reid and Katherine Cornfield, Appellees, v. Irvin CURLEY and Wilbert R. Brown, Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Glady JONES, Mildred Reid and Katherine Cornfield, Appellees, v. Irvin CURLEY and Wilbert R. Brown, Appellants.\\nNo. SC-CV-52-10.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nNov. 8, 2010.\\nDavid Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico for Appellant.\\nMichael Venegas, Gallup, New Mexico for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and SHIRLEY, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"1266\", \"char_count\": \"7416\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis matter comes before the Court on Appellees' motion to dismiss appeal. The Court grants the dismissal, and issues this opinion to clarify the appellate rules concerning the requirements for informing the Court that the transcript is not necessary to decide the appeal.\\nI\\nAppellants appealed a decision of the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). Appellants did not file a transcript of the lower administrative agency's proceeding within 30 days of the date of filing the notice of appeal as required by Rule 9(a) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (NRCAP). Appellants, however, filed a pleading informing this Court that they had requested of OHA an extension to file the transcript within 45 days of the date of filing the notice of appeal; to the Court this was Appellants' indication that the transcript was necessary to decide the appeal and, therefore, would be filed. Only after the extension period lapsed with no filing of the transcript, Appellants gave notice to the Court that they are appealing on strictly legal grounds and that a transcript is not necessary to decide the appeal.\\nII\\nThis issue in this case is whether the appellants, within the time frames prescribed by Rule 9, lived up to their affirmative duty to inform the Supreme Court and the other parties in the case that the transcript is not necessary to decide the appeal and will not be filed.\\nIII\\nThe appellate rules are explicit as to when the record on appeal must be transmitted to the Supreme Court. The record on appeal, comprised of the original copy of the lower court record and the transcript of the lower court proceeding or narrative or agreed statement, is due within 30 days from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal. See NRCAP Rule 9(a)(l)-(2). The appellant has an affirmative duty to ensure its timely transmittal from the lower court or administrative agency to the Supreme Court. To ensure compliance, Rule 9(b)(1) provides:\\nNo later than 10 days after filing of the Notice of Appeal, the appellant is explicitly required to order from a reporter or transcriber an original and one copy of a transcript, if any, of such parts of the proceedings necessary for inclusion in the record.\\n(Emphasis added). Within 10 days of the appeal, appellant's determination of whether or not the transcript of the proceedings or a part thereof is explicitly required. Furthermore,\\nUnless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days of the notice of appeal, file a description of the parts of the transcript which he intends to include in the record and a concise statement of the issues he intends to present on appeal, a copy of which shall be served by appellant on appellee. NRCAP 9(b)(2). The concise statement of the issues is required in order to enable the appellee, in turn, to determine whether the transcript of the proceedings or a part thereof is necessary in order to defend the appeal.\\nIn our efforts to clarify Rule 9, we further stated that:\\nWhile a transcript is not necessary in this type of appeal, the Court cannot guess that the appellant is appealing a purely legal question based on the notice of appeal, which usually does not indicate the grounds for the appeal. Therefore, to avoid confusion and to make sure appellants live up to their responsibilities concerning the appellate record, the Court holds that an appellant has an affirmative duty to inform the Court and the other parties in the case that he or she believes that a transcript is not necessary to the appeal, and will not be filed. Absent that notice, the Court will conclude that a transcript simply has not been filed, and, absent a request and grant of an extension, the Court will dismiss the appeal.\\nTso v. NHA 6 Am. Tribal Law 793, 795 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006). In Tso, the appellants did not file the transcript within 80 days of filing the notice of appeal, nor did they seek an extension or file a pleading indicating that they did not intend to file the transcript, and the Court dismissed the appeal. It was not until they filed for reconsideration that they informed the Court that their appeal concerned a question of law and that a transcript was not required. Recognizing its inconsistencies with regard to allowing certain appeals to go forward despite the lack of timely filing of transcripts, the Court in Tso granted appellant's reconsideration and definitively stated the above rule to be applied prospectively.\\nUnlike the appellants in Tso, the Appellants herein filed a notice that they intended to file the transcript, sought an extension to do so, and only after the extension period had lapsed without the filing of the transcript, the Appellants informed the Court of its intention not to file the transcript. Appellants not only failed to live up to their affirmative duty to inform the Court and the other parties that the transcript is not necessary to the appeal, Appellants failed to provide such notifications within the time frames prescribed by Rule 9. Appellants herein did. not give any notice within 10 days of filing the Notice of Appeal that they would not require part or all of the transcript in this appeal, as required by NRCAP 9(b)(2). Further, Appellants did not give a concise statement of the issues they intended to present on appeal as required by NRCAP 9(b)(2).\\nTime frames are set to process litigation in an orderly fashion. Requirements are made to have appellants decide at an early stage in the appeal what issues they are appealing, if they need or do not need the transcript or only a portion of the transcript, and to make satisfactory arrangements to that effect; this provides due process to the appellee who may then request, of the appellant, any additional part\\u00eds) of the transcript pursuant to Rule 9(b)(2). Failure or delay in compliance with these requirements shall be cause for sanctions. See NRCAP Rule 9(b)(3) and 29. Additionally, we have found that \\\"(j]ustice, fairness to all litigants, and judicial efficiency demand\\\" that, absent a showing of \\\"good cause,\\\" violations of the procedural rules will be construed as evidence of a lack of good faith and as an adequate basis for dismissal of the appeal. Silver v. Keyonnie, 6 Nav. R. 357, 358 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1991). We find that not only did Appellants lead this Court to believe that the transcript was necessary to decide the appeal and would be filed, the Appellants also inordinately delayed the appeal with needless extensions\\u2014evidence of a lack of good faith. Dismissal is thus warranted in this appeal.\\nIV\\nBased on the above, the Court hereby DISMISSES the appeal pursuant to NRCAP Rules 10(c) and 29.\\n. From the record it is unclear if the OHA granted Appellant's request for an extension. Nevertheless, the Court treats an inaction of a lower tribunal to a transcript extension request as an automatic grant of a 15 day extension, and the Court will not dismiss an appeal if the transcript is filed within the extended time period. Thompson v. Yazzie, No. SC-CV-21-06, 6 Am. Tribal Law 764, 766-67 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006).\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7342623.json b/navajo_nation/7342623.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7342623\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Aaron JOHN, Defendant/Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. John\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-10-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CR-01-09\", \"first_page\": 334, \"last_page\": 336, \"citations\": \"8 Am. Tribal Law 334\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:06.827169+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Aaron JOHN, Defendant/Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Aaron JOHN, Defendant/Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CR-01-09.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nOct. 30, 2009.\\nDavid Jordan, Gallup, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nJane T. Nez, Office of the Prosecutor, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for Appel-lee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"512\", \"char_count\": \"2964\", \"text\": \"OPINION DENYING MOTION OPPOSING THE APPEAL\\nThis matter comes before the Court on the motion by the Office of the Prosecutor to dismiss the appeal and the response filed by Appellant. Appellee asserts Appellant untimely filed their motion for reconsideration and that Rule 47(a)(2) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the filing of the motion for reconsideration. The Court denies the motion.\\nIt is established law that a criminal appeal must be filed within 30 calendar days of the judgment, 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 801; N.R.A.P. Rule 2(c). This requirement is jurisdictional. N N v. Devore, 5 Nav. R. 155 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1987). In criminal cases, a N.R.A.P. Rule 5(d) motion for reconsideration must either be filed with the district court before the notice of appeal is filed, see Lee v. NN, 6 Nav. R. 124, 125 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1989) (motion for reconsideration is a mandatory prerequisite to appeal), or the motion can be filed on the same day as the notice of appeal, see Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 46, 47 (Nav.Ct.App.1983), Other than the foregoing case law, there is no statute or rule of procedure as to when the motion for reconsideration is t:o be filed after the final judgment. In.other words, there is no time limit on when the motion must be filed after the judgment. However, a motion for reconsideration is deemed automatically denied if the trial court fails to rule on the motion within 5 days of its filing. NN v. Morgan, 8 Nav. R. 732, 737 (citing Help at 47). Furthermore, we glean from the discussion in Help about jurisdiction between the trial court and the appellate court that the notice of appeal can only be considered by this Court after the 5-day period for the district court to act has expired. We therefore hold there are two prerequisites to perfect an appeal: 1) the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the judgment and 2) the 5-day ruling period for a district court to act upon a motion for reconsideration must have expired.\\nIn this case appellant filed a motion for reconsideration 24 days after judgment; the motion was deemed denied 5 days thereafter by the non-action of the District Court. The notice of appeal was filed the day after the reconsideration was deemed denied and within 30 days of the final judgment. The Prosecutor's motion is therefore DENIED. This appeal is properly before the Court.\\n. A motion for a new trial shall be made no later than ten (10) days alter the verdict has been rendered. Nav. R. Cr. P. Rule 47(a)(2). A motion for a new trial per Rule 47(a) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to determining the matter at hand.\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7342989.json b/navajo_nation/7342989.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7342989\", \"name\": \"Bridgette GRASS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Chee Phillip YAZZIE, Respondent-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Grass v. Yazzie\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-05-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-52-09\", \"first_page\": 401, \"last_page\": 407, \"citations\": \"8 Am. Tribal Law 401\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:06.827169+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Bridgette GRASS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Chee Phillip YAZZIE, Respondent-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Bridgette GRASS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Chee Phillip YAZZIE, Respondent-Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CV-52-09.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nMay 12, 2010.\\nJustin Jones, Farmington, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nJohn Chapela, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for the Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and GRANT and SHIRLEY, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2618\", \"char_count\": \"15974\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis case concerns the trial court's use and disclosure of in camera testimony of minor children in the modification of a child custody provision of a prior decree despite the court's conclusion of no or limited evidence of a substantial change in circumstances. The Court remands the case.\\nI\\nOn April 18, 2006 the Appellee (Mother) petitioned the family court to vacate a decree establishing paternity of her children, entered six years earlier, challenging the decree with the assertion that she had not been served with the complaint and summons in that cause of action. On December 8, 2006 the court refused to vacate the paternity decree because the Mother declined to admit or deny that the Appellant (Father) is the father; the court stated that under such circumstance it would not be in the best interest or welfare of the children to vacate the paternity decree. Mother has since abandoned the paternity argument and instead has filed a motion to modify the custody and child support provisions of the paternity decree insisting that she be awarded primary physical custody of the parties' three children and child support. On January 3, 2007 Father filed a counter modification motion requesting that Mother be ordered to pay child support.\\nA hearing was held on March 6, 2007 to determine if primary physical custody should be changed from Father to Mother. On March 22, 2007 the court entered a Minute Entry Order informing the parties that \\\"its decision is under advisement\\\" and that it \\\"was not possible to enter its findings on the Motion to Modify Child Custody.\\\" Furthermore, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to interview the children and file a report. On April 12, 2007 the GAL interviewed the children and filed a report on May 7, 2007 stating that \\\"the children should be maintained in one household to the extent possible\\\" and that \\\"the children appear to be presently situated in a loving and decent environment.\\\" Report of the GAL, R, at 20, p. 5-6. The court further set a final hearing for August 7, 2007 and ordered that the children be brought before the court for an in camera interview. Upon the court's request for an updated report, the GAL filed a second report on August 6, 2007. The GAL stated that unless it is found that the information obtained during his last interview was falsely made, his recommendation would be \\\"to respect the present environment and encourage both parents to work cooperatively.\\\" R. at 29, p. 4. The hearing was held but no decision was issued subsequent to the hearing.\\nTwo years later, the court issued an order for another hearing to be held on August 20, 2009. The order stated that during the last hearing \\\"there was not sufficient evidence to justify a change in physical custody.\\\" Order, May 14, 2009, R. at 33, p. 2 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court informed the parties that it was not ready to order a change in physical custody because a year and nine months had passed since information was last provided to the court. At the hearing, the court conducted a separate in camera interview of each of the minor children. On August 20, 2009 the court issued an order transferring primary physical custody of the children immediately to Mother with a notation that it will explain its decision in a final order. On September 15, 2009 the court entered a final order awarding the parties joint legal custody and sole physical custody in the Mother. The court stated it agreed with Father \\\"that based upon the testimony presented at the hearing, there was limited evidence presented to warrant a change in custody.\\\" R. at 43, p. 3 (emphasis added). However, the judge in disclosing the details of the in camera testimony of the children found from what the children told her \\\"ample evidence\\\" to award Mother primary physical custody. Id. Appellant appeals this final order challenging the court's sole reliance on the in camera testimony to order change in custody despite its two previous legal conclusions of no and then limited evidence of a substantial change of circumstances.\\nThis Court heard oral argument on March 26, 2010. The parties appeared with legal counsel. We learned at this hearing that between the years 2000 and 2006 the parties had resolved custody matters through peacemaking agreements which lasted until Father motioned to have Mother pay child support. Unfortunately, peacemaking has not been used to resolve current differences and the parties now resort to the adversarial system to bring this appeal. The Court's opinion now follows.\\nII\\nThe issues are 1) whether the family court erred in modifying a prior child custody decision based solely on in camera testimony of minor children and without affording the primary custodial parent of ten years an opportunity to respond to the information and preference provided by his children; and 2) whether the family court erred in modifying a prior child custody order without the showing of a substantial change of circumstances.\\nIII\\nThis Court review questions of law fife novo. Hall v. Watson, No. SC-CV-52-07, 8 Am. Tribal Law 235 (Nav. February 24, 2009). The Court gives no deference to the Family or District Court's legal conclusions. Id. Factual conclusions are reviewed for clear error. NHA v. Bluffview Res. Mgt. Corp., 8 Nav. R. 402, 412, 4 Am. Tribal Law 700 (Nav.Sup.2003). Upon such a review, the Court finds clear error where the Family or District Court has abused its discretion. Id. \\\"Discretion\\\" is defined as the discretion to act within certain boundaries of rules, principles and customs applicable to the facts of the case. In the Matter of the Estate of Nat Benally, No. SC-CV-49-08, 8 Am. Tribal Law 246 (Nav.Sup. June 25, 2009). An exercise of discretion will not be overturned unless the record shows the discretion has been abused. Singer v. Nez, 8 Nav. R. 122, 3 Am. Tribal Law 491 (Nav.Sup.2001).\\nIV\\nThis Court has long held that a \\\"substantial change of circumstances\\\" is required in the modification of a prior child custody order. Platero v. Mike, 7 Nav. R. 130, 133 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1995) (party asserting change of custody has burden to show substantial change in circumstances); Yazzie v. Yazzie, 7 Nav. R. 33, 34 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1992) (a non-custodial parent must allege and show a substantial change of circumstances); Pavenyouma v. Goldtooth, 5 Nav. R. 17, 18 (Nav.Ct.App.1984) (the moving party must show a substantial change in circumstances since the last custody order); Barber v. Barber, 5 Nav. R. 9, 12 (Nav.Ct.App.1984) (a substantial change of circumstances must be alleged and shown); Lente v. Notah, 3 Nav. R. 72 (Nav.Ct.App.1982) (as a general principle, a party asking for a change of an original custody must show a substantial change in circumstances which affect the current custody arrangement). Based upon circumstances then existing, the prior custody order is presumed to have been rendered in the best interest of the child. Restated, this means the prior order need not be reexamined unless a substantial change in circumstances indicates a different arrangement would be in the children's best interests. The burden of proof in a custody modification proceeding is on the requesting party to show that there's been a s\\u00fcbstantial change in circumstances since the last custody order.\\nAppellant first argues that the court's conduct of and reliance on the in camera (in private) testimony violated his procedural due process rights when it did not afford him an opportunity to respond to allegations revealed during the interview. The in camera interview was conducted without the presence of legal counsels and the interview was not recorded. Appellant argues that the new allegations, raised for the first time in camera, should have prompted further investigations to substantiate the allegations before the court entered an order changing custody.\\nThe new allegations raised in camera include: children's step mother treated them with indifference; children dreaded chores assigned by step mother; father is absent during the week due to his employment in Las Vegas; father is non-responsive and non-committal; second oldest child (16 years old) supervised his younger brothers for an hour and half each weeknight during step mother's absence; eldest child (an adult) disciplined his siblings with threats and physical abuse; and children expressed a preference to live with their mother. With this new information, the court concluded that while there was \\\"limited evidence\\\" presented at the hearing to warrant a change in custody, there was \\\"ample evidence\\\" from the in camera, interview to \\\"find that their [the children's] current living conditions were a present threat to their health and well-being.\\\" Order, September 15, 2009, R. at 43, p. 3. The court, without further investigation or affording Father an opportunity to respond to these allegations, used the in camera testimony as \\\"findings\\\" to support its decision to change custody.\\nThe court is obligated to review circumstances since the last order. Selective testimonial facts to justify findings of a substantial change in circumstances is not in accordance with the requirement that the court consider \\\"a complete review of the circumstances surrounding the child.\\\" Lente v. Notah, 3 Nav. R. 72, 79 (Nav.Ct.App.1982). We therefore find the court erred when it did not afford Father an opportunity to respond to new allegations revealed during the in camera interview. As a parent, Father has a due process right to respond; the court erred in not according him procedural fairness. A parent should be extended this basic procedural due process because of a parent's fundamental interest and responsibility for the welfare of his or her child.\\nAppellant next argues the court erred in modifying custody despite its previous legal conclusions that no substantial change of circumstances warranted such change. Two hearings on the motion to change custody were held on March 6, 2007 and August 19, 2007. A GAL was appointed after the first motion hearing. At the conclusion of both hearings, the court stated that it did not find a substantial change in circumstances to warrant a change in child custody. Furthermore, the reports of the GAL did not recommend a change in custody. Two years later, the court states again that \\\"based upon the testimony presented at the hearing, there was limited evidence presented to warrant a change in custody.\\\" Order, September 15, 2009, R. at 43, p. 3. For the due process reasons stated above and for the additional reasons stated infra (confidentiality and the weight to be given the testimony of children), the Court finds that the court's use of the in camera testimony of the children as the sole basis for superceding or modifying its previous legal conclusions is an error.\\nWe find that the court's errors are egregious and also note that though in camera interviews may be used by courts, there are no policies, rules or procedures to guide or regulate the conduct and use of such interviews. Therefore, we find it necessary to offer guidance as to the use of in camera interviews in child custody proceedings. An in camera interview by its very definition (in private) is confidential. Unless authorized by statutory law or rule, the judge cannot reveal the details of the conversation in court orders. The purpose is to encourage children to speak frankly during such interviews. Here, the judge revealed the details of the interview in its final order prompting this appeal and, for the first time, instigating a conflict between a father and his children. The in camera interview is limited to the ascertainment of the child's preference as to which parent to live with. A child's preference is but one factor in considering child custody or its modification. See Lente v. Notah, 3 Nav. R. 72 (Nav.Ct.App.1982). Because in camera interviews are confidential and lawyers and parents are not normally present, the court shall not rely on testimony beyond the children's preference as \\\"findings\\\" to warrant an immediate change in custody.\\nAlthough the court has discretion as to how to conduct such interviews, the in camera, interview cannot be used as a substitute for the court's responsibility to investigate and properly declare factual findings. The need to verify newly received information is also supported by our traditional teachings as illustrated by the stories of the warrior twins in their upbringing. In their early years, the twins, while outside their hogan and away from their mother, White Shell Woman, were kidnapped by Y\\u00e9'\\u00edi Tso binaalei'i\\u2014Y\\u00e9'ii Tsoi B\\u00e1h\\u00ed and were eventually returned by Horned Toad. After their return, the twins revealed to their mother that they were taught to lie while in captivity. From this experience comes the principle of caution that while children do normally tell the truth, one must not fully rely on what children say; one should not simply do what the children wish or believe that what they say is always the truth. Children can be told, or given advice, as to what to say or do. It is taught that because of their immaturity (Bini' t'ahdoo hadaniWeehda) one should not simply accept as truth what children say. We know what they say can be loaded with half truths. We therefore need to be careful in taking their information as \\\"fact\\\". The court has an affirmative duty to consider the overall circumstances surrounding the children since the last order.\\nDespite our conclusion that the court erred in modifying a prior child custody order without the showing of a substantial change of circumstances, we are reluctant to simply reverse the court's decision because we are concerned that no further investigations were ordered, the GAL was not involved in the last hearing of August 19, 2009, and the children have now spent more than 8 months with their Mother. The Court, like any relative, parent or guardian is concerned about the well-being of its (and the Nation's) children, see Smith v. Kasper, No. SC-CV-30-07, 8 Am. Tribal Law 347, 352 (Nav.Sup, Ct. December 2, 2009). We will remand the case to the family court so it may properly consider the \\\"overall circumstances\\\" surrounding the children since the last order.\\nV\\nBased on the foregoing, the Court REMANDS the case. For the sake and well being of the children, the Court urges the parents and their counsels to resolve this matter amicably and outside these adversarial proceedings, and present an agree ment to the family court. If no agreement is reached upon remand, the family court should consider its option of referring the matter to the Peacemaking Program prior to exercising other judicial proceedings toward final disposition.\\n. The parties have four children. The eldest child, 19 years old at the time final judgment was entered, is not the subject of this modification action. The 2006 paternity decree awarded \\\"joint legal custody\\\" to the parents with primary physical custody to Father. The decree is silent as to child support from Mother.\\n. Apparently the scheduling order was written, dated and signed earlier than its issuance.\\n. The parties are in disagreement as to the whether they were afforded the opportunity to be present for the in camera interview. The transcript does not provide insight as to whether Father's counsel insisted on being present and was subsequently denied. Nevertheless, the interview was conducted without the presence of both legal counsels.\\n. The Court makes no comment as to whether in camera interviews should or must be recorded. If recorded another question arises, should the recording be sealed or can the parties have access?\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7343335\", \"name\": \"Ed PEARSALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TRIBAL COUNCIL FOR the CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF the GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pearsall v. Tribal Council for the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. A-03-02-002\", \"first_page\": 58, \"last_page\": 66, \"citations\": \"5 Am. Tribal Law 58\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Court of Appeals of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:22:10.458766+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before ROBERT J. MILLER, Chief Justice, and MARK JOHNSON and DAVID B. THOMPSON, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Ed PEARSALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TRIBAL COUNCIL FOR the CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF the GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ed PEARSALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TRIBAL COUNCIL FOR the CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF the GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNo. A-03-02-002.\\nCourt of Appeals of the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community.\\nArgued and Submitted Nov. 24, 2003.\\nDecided Jan. 30, 2004.\\nTerrence Kay, Salem, OR, for Petitioner-Appellant.\\nPer Ramfjord and David Angeli, Portland, OR, for Respondent-Appellee.\\nBefore ROBERT J. MILLER, Chief Justice, and MARK JOHNSON and DAVID B. THOMPSON, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"3329\", \"char_count\": \"20930\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nROBERT J. MILLER, Chief Justice.\\nEd Pearsall (\\\"Petitioner\\\") appeals the decision of the trial court that affirmed the Tribal Council's decision to temporarily suspend him from his position as a Council member for violations of the now-repealed tribal ethics ordinance. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Tribal Code \\u00a7 310(h)(2) and AFFIRM.\\nI. Facts\\nPetitioner was an elected member of the Grand Ronde Tribal Council in 2001 when Jan Michael Reibach (\\\"Reibach Jr.\\\") brought an ethics complaint against him under the Grand Ronde Tribal Ethical Standards Ordinance (TESO), farmer Tribal Code \\u00a7 275. Petitioner was represented by legal counsel and participated in an evidentiary hearing on December 18, 2001, before an ethics hearings officer. The hearings officer, the Yakama Nation chief judge, issued two opinions, dated January 18 and 26, 2002, finding that Petitioner had committed three separate TESO violations. The hearings officer recommended a seven-month suspension from Petitioner's position on the Tribal Council.\\nThe Tribal Council then adopted Resolution 028-02 on January 30, 2002, in which it accepted the findings and recommendations of the hearings officer and imposed a seven-month suspension without pay. Petitioner was present and spoke in his defense at the January 80 meeting, but his attorney was not present, allegedly because notice of the meeting was given too late for her to attend. Petitioner filed for judicial review of the Tribal Council's decision in case number 02-02-004.\\nLater, the Tribal Council reconsidered Petitioner's suspension. On April 10, 2002, the Council called a special meeting, vacated Resolution 028-02, and adopted in its place Resolution 064-02. The new resolution reduced Petitioner's suspension, still without pay, from seven months to five. Petitioner then filed for judicial review in case number 02-04-002.\\nThe trial court consolidated Petitioner's two actions for judicial review, and on February 19, 2003, Judge Sidney Lezak affirmed the Tribal Council's adoption of Resolution 064-02. Petitioner now appeals that decision.\\nII. Standard of Review\\nIn the trial court, Petitioner challenged his suspension from the Tribal Council on procedural grounds the process by which the Council decided to suspend him) and on substantive grounds (i.e., the authority of the Council to discipline him). Both his procedural and substantive challenges were based on the Grand Ronde Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act.\\nUnder TESO, when judicial review of the Council's sanction is sought, \\\"the Tribal Court's jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the sanctions imposed by Tribal Council were imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the Tribe's Constitution or the Indian Civil Rights Act.\\\" Former Tribal Code \\u00a7 275(f)(l)(L). In reviewing Petitioner's case, the trial court therefore was required to determine, under the Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act, whether the Council had the authority to sanction Petitioner and whether it had employed a lawful process in sanctioning Mm. We review the trial court's determination of those legal questions de novo. See Synowski v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. A-01-10-001, at *3, 2003 WL 25756097, 4 Am. Tribal Law 122, 126-27 (Grand Ronde 2003) (where question under review is a question of law, standard of review is de novo), http:// www.grandronde.org/eourt/ PublishedOpinions/SynowskiAppeal.PDF.\\nIII. Discussion\\nTwo preliminary observations are in order. First, Petitioner raises several arguments that turn on the validity of Resolution 028-02, which was vacated when the Council adopted Resolution 064-02 in April 2002. Because the existence of Resolution 028-02 between January and April of that year is pertinent to certain of his arguments, Petitioner argues that Resolution 028-02 was void in its inception. We disagree.\\nPetitioner argues that Resolution 028-02 was void under TESO because, he claims, Council member Reibach Sr. had a conflict of interest and was disqualified from voting. See former Tribal Code \\u00a7 275(e)(2). The penalty for an ethical violation under TESO is a sanction and it is individual to the tribal official or employee involved. Foamier Tribal Code \\u00a7 275(f). Petitioner points to no provision of TESO stating that a Tribal Council action is affected by a single member's conflict of interest, and we are aware of none. Whether or not a court might find such a meaning in TESO, we hold that Resolution 028-02 was valid and effective until it was vacated by the Council or voided by a court.\\nSecond, Petitioner argues for reversal because of certain discovery rulings by the trial court. Although the Tribal Court Ordinance suggests that we may be able to review this and all issues on appeal de novo, see Tribal Code \\u00a7 310(h)(2), as a matter of prudence, we decline to do so here. Discovery decisions are left to the sound and broad discretion of the trial court and we will not ordinarily intervene unless an appellant makes the \\\"clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice.\\\" Sablan v. Dept. of Finance of N. Mariana Islands, 856 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir.1988). Most of Petitioner's arguments about discovery relate to questions of law about which discovery of facts could make no practical difference. The one exception, to be discussed below, does not demonstrate any prejudice that would lead us to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion.\\nPetitioner argues, in essence, that he is entitled to conduct discovery into the process by which the hearings officer and the Tribal Council reached their decisions in this matter. Many federal courts have stated that a court is not authorized to inquire into the thought processes of decision makers, by ordering discovery and going outside an administrative record, merely because an appellant alleges bad faith or some improper conduct. Instead, these courts state that it takes a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before a reviewing court can permit discovery or supplementation of an administrative record. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807-08 (8th Cir.1998); Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.1988) (court cannot inquire into the thought process of decision makers unless an appellant has made a \\\"strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior\\\"). Petitioner does not, and did not at the trial court level, even come close to making the strong showing of bad faith or improper conduct such that we would direct the trial court to allow discovery outside the administrative record.\\nWe now turn to the issues Petitioner raises under the Grand Ronde Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act.\\n1. Whether the April 10, 2002 special . Tribal Council meeting was lawfully convened,\\nPetitioner argues that the special Council meeting of April 10, 2002, in which Resolution 028-02 was vacated and 064-02 was adopted, was not lawfully convened, because he, as a Council member, was not given personal notice of the meeting. We disagree. Although the Constitution requires specific notice for special Tribal Council meetings (\\\"No special meeting shall be called without at least twelve (12) hours' notice to each member G.R. Const, art. Ill, \\u00a7 3(b)), at the time of the April 10 meeting, Petitioner was not a member of the Council, having already been suspended by Resolution 028-02. No personal notice to him was constitutionally required.\\n2. Whether Petitioner's dm process rights were 'violated in the April 10 meeting.\\nPetitioner claims that his due process rights under the Grand Ronde Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act were violated when he and his attorney were not allowed to appear, to present evidence, or to speak at the special Tribal Council meeting on April 10, 2002, when Resolution 064-02 was adopted and he was suspended for five months. We disagree.\\nPetitioner was suspended for seven months from his Tribal Council duties by Resolution 028-02 as of January 30, 2002. He was provided an opportunity to present his case against suspension and against the withholding of his compensation at that Council meeting. Before that, he was fully involved in his tribal ethics hearing. He was represented by an attorney and he presented evidence and argument before the hearings officer found that he had violated the ethics code and recommended his suspension. These procedures comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's statement that due process requires that persons be given \\\"some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.\\\" Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (emphasis in the original). Petitioner, however, argues that due process required that he be afforded the opportunity to be heard again on April 10, 2002, when the Council considered vacating his prior suspension and imposing an amended suspension. His analysis of that issue relies solely on federal case law. The Tribal Council's analysis does the same. Therefore, in this case we will not go beyond the federal analysis in construing the due process clauses of the Grand Ronde Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act.\\nOur trial court has already addressed this issue in an ethics violation setting, stating that a Council member accused of a TESO violation is only entitled to \\\"the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner\\\" and that \\\"due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.\\\" In the Matter of Reyn Lena, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6213, 6215, 2000 WL 35719153, - Am. Tribal Law - (Grand Ronde Tr. Ct.2000) (citing federal cases). We agree with that statement of the law and hold that Petitioner was provided with the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\\nDue process does not require that a person be heard at each and every step of an administrative process, at any particular step in the process, or even more than just once during the process. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 152-53, 312 U.S. 657, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941); Marinangeli v. Lehman, 32 F.Supp.2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C.1998) (a federal agency action to suspend an attorney was proper when the attorney was represented, presented evidence, and testified at one hearing before an Administrative Law Judge; due process did not require that he have another hearing on appeal to the agency commissioner); Hunter v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 951 F.Supp. 1161, 1181 (D.N.J.1996) (accused judge had a hearing, made statements, produced documents, and presented witnesses; due process did not require another hearing before the New Jersey Supreme Court could render a decision on the record). Petitioner has received all the process that is required by the Grand Ronde Constitution.\\n3. Whether Petitioner's ethics hearing was fair and impartial.\\nPetitioner argues that his right to a fair and impartial ethics hearing was violated because the hearings officer was being charged with ethics violations of his own in his position with the Yakama Nation tribal court. Petitioner also alleges that there were improper ex parte contacts between the hearings officer and the officer's employer, the Tribal Council, and that Petitioner was improperly denied discovery by the trial court into these issues.\\nPetitioner's ethics hearing was not rendered unfair or biased based on his speculation about alleged or actual ethics issues the hearings officer was encountering in his home tribe. It is not clear how, even if it were true and established fact, the hearings officer's ethics charge at Yakama would be relevant to his sitting as Petitioner's hearing officer or why that would automatically render the ethics hearing unfair or biased.\\nWe presume the honesty, fairness, and integrity of decision makers until the opposite is clearly demonstrated. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1360 (6th Cir.1991) (\\\"[A]ny alleged prejudice on the part of the decisionmaker must be evident from the record and cannot be based on speculation or inference.\\\"); Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.1988) (courts cannot inquire into the thought process of decisionmakers unless the appellant has made a \\\"strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior\\\"). Below, Petitioner did not make any showing of dishonesty, bad faith, or improper behavior by the hearings officer that would raise an inference of bias or partiality or one that even would justify discovery into this question.\\nPetitioner's arguments about \\\"ex parte \\\" contacts between the hearings officer and the Tribal Council have even less substance to them. The Tribal Council employed the hearings officer to conduct a hearing on its behalf under TESO. The Council was not a party to the matter before the hearings officer and could not engage in an \\\"ex parte \\\" contact.\\nWe have no reason to disapprove of, or interfere with, the trial court's broad discretion to control discovery regarding the hearings officer or the alleged ex parte communications questioned here by Petitioner.\\nJ. Whether the Tribal Council has authority to suspend its own members.\\nPetitioner makes a general separation of powers argument, without citing the Grand Ronde Constitution, that the Tribal Council does not have the authority to suspend elected Council members. We disagree with his argument.\\nThe Constitution clearly grants the General Council of the Tribe\\u2014all enrolled members aged eighteen and over\\u2014several exclusive powers. Among the General Council's powers is the sole authority to elect Tribal Council members and to recall them from office. G.R. Const, art. II, \\u00a7 1(a) & (d). The Constitution then \\\"grants to the Tribal Council all legislative authority, except that vested in the General Council, and all executive authority of the Tribe....\\\" Art. Ill, \\u00a7 1. The Constitution also authorizes the Tribal Council to enact its own rules of procedure as long as they do not conflict with any constitutional provisions. Art. Ill, \\u00a7 3.\\nSince no constitutional provision forbids the Tribal Council from disciplining its own members by temporarily suspending them, we assume that this power is part of the Council's inherent authority to control itself and is implicitly authorized by Article III, section 3. \\\"The [TJribal [CJouncil must have the authority and the freedom to establish standards governing the conduct of its members.\\\" Brandon v. Tribal Council for the Confederated, Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6139, 6140 (Grand Ronde Tr. Ct.1991). Part of that authority is the power to discipline, by suspension and otherwise, Council members who violate the standards of conduct established by the Council.\\n5. Whether the Tribal Council has authority to withhold pay from suspended member's.\\nPetitioner argues that TESO does not expressly grant the Tribal Council authority to withhold the salary of suspended members. Although TESO does not expressly authorize it, we hold that denying Council members compensation while they are suspended is a reasonable interpretation of TESO. The Council's interpretation of TESO is entitled to substantial deference, because it not only drafted the ordinance but also was entrusted with administering it. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc, v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (considerable weight should be accorded to executive department's construction of statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer; court need not conclude that agency's construction of statute that it administers is only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold construction); Providence Health System-Washington v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir.2003) (a reviewing court should give effect to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation so long as it is reasonable, that is, so long as the interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulation). As the Council correctly points out, suspension is a temporary deprivation of the rights and privileges of an office. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1976 (2d ed.1991). The Council could have reasonably interpreted TESO to prohibit Petitioner's receiving compensation for serving as a Council member while he was suspended from that position. The Council reasonably could have concluded that to read TESO otherwise would actually unjustly enrich Petitioner by paying him during the period of suspension. In essence, this would grant him a \\\"paid vacation\\\" and reward a violation of the TESO standards. Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing the Council's construction of TESO.\\n6. Whether the Tribal Council's sanction in this matter ivas excessive or unusual.\\nPetitioner argues that his suspension and the withholding of five months compensation was an excessive fine or un usual punishment under the Indian Civil Rights Act. The provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act that he cites, however, applies only to criminal sanctions. 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(7). This provision is not applicable to a TESO civil proceeding. Moreover, we do not consider a withholding of compensation that matches exactly the length of time Petitioner was suspended from the Council to be excessive or unusual. Indeed, it would have been \\\"unusual\\\" to pay Petitioner for time in which he was suspended from performing duties for the Tribe.\\nIV. Conclusion\\nFor the above stated reasons, we AFFIRM the Trial Court decision, which affirmed the Tribal Council's imposition of a five-month suspension without pay on Petitioner.\\nWE CONCUR: MARK JOHNSON, Associate Justice, DAVID B. THOMPSON, Associate Justice.\\n. It has long been recognized that tribal governments were not created by nor were they constrained by the U.S. Constitution or its Bill of Rights. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Tait\\u00f3n v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896). In 1968, however, Congress exercised its plenary authority over Indian affairs and enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302, which does apply some of the American constitutional principies to Indian governments. Due process is one of them: \\\"No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(8). The Grand Ronde Constitution expressly recognizes this principle and provides that the Tribal Council \\\"shall not . . deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.\\\" Further, \\\"[t]he Tribe shall provide to all persons within its jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.\\\" G.R. Const, art. Ill, \\u00a7 3(k). The tribal court is charged with ensuring that \\\"tribal legislative and executive actions\\\" comply with the Grand Ronde Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act. G.R. Const, art. IV, \\u00a7 3.\\n. Some tribal courts have held that due process can have a different meaning in a tribal court than in a federal or state court. The Hopi Tribe v. Mahkewa et al, No. AP-003-93, \\u00b6 36 (Hopi 1995) (\\\"The Hopi Tribe is not restrained by federal or state interpretations of 'due process.' Federal and Arizona interpretations of 'due process' emanate from the United States and Arizona Constitutions. The Hopi Tribe is guided by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(8), in guaranteeing due process to individuals within its jurisdiction.\\\"), http:// www. tribal resourcecen ter.org/opinionS/opfold-eiV1995.NAHT.0000008.htm. See also Alonzo v. Martine, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6129 (Navajo 1991) (formulating Navajo common law and applying the Navajo statute that authorizes it). Neither Petitioner nor the Tribal Council has departed from analyzing tribal due process under federal case law; thus we leave it for another day to determine whether this Court will develop a Grand Ronde definition of due process that might differ from the federal court interpretation.\\n. TESO authorizes as a possible sanction for Tribal Council members a \\\"temporary sus pension not to exceed three (3) months.\\\" Former Tribal Code \\u00a7 275(f)(l)(I).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7345231\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan BADONIE, Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Badonie\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-07-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CR-01-03\", \"first_page\": 416, \"last_page\": 418, \"citations\": \"5 Am. Tribal Law 416\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:22:10.458766+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before BATES ARTHUR, Chief Justice and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan BADONIE, Defendant-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan BADONIE, Defendant-Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CR-01-03.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJuly 15, 2004.\\nJudy R. Apaehee, Esq., Flagstaff, AZ, for Appellant.\\nDaryl Junes, Esq., Prosecutor, Shiprock, Navajo Nation (NM).\\nBefore BATES ARTHUR, Chief Justice and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"523\", \"char_count\": \"3146\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nFERGUSON, Associate Justice.\\nThis is a criminal appeal. Based on our review of the record we remand this case to the Shiprock District Court. Our reasons are set forth below.\\nI\\nOn August 31, 2002, Appellant was involved in an automobile accident that led to his being charged with the following offenses: Homicide by Vehicle, Driving WTiile Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, and Reckless Driving. The Shi-prock District Court (District Court) found Appellant guilty and issued a Judgment and Mittimus for each offense on October 28, 2003. The District Court did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law on any of the charges. A motion for reconsideration was filed November 13, 2003, and was denied by the District Court on November 19, 2003. Appellant filed an appeal with this Court on November 24, 2003.\\nII\\nThe single issue in this case is whether the District Court erred in not including findings of fact and conclusions of law. In civil cases, this Court has explicitly required the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the district court to facilitate an effective and fair appeals process. Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 46, 47 (Nav.Ct.App.1983) (\\\"[T]rial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law, in opinion form or finding form, in order to support their judgments.\\\"); see also, Burbank v. Clarke, 7 Nav. R. 368, 372 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1999); In re Custody of C.L.M., 7 Nav. R. 130, 133 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1996); Alonzo v. Marline, 6 Nav. R. 395, 397 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1991). These findings provide the Supreme Court with an understanding of the weight that has been given to individual pieces of evidence and the reasons supporting the lower court's decision.. We cannot review a decision for alleged error if we do not know the reasons for the decision. In criminal cases, whei*e personal liberty, and not simply financial penalties, is at stake, there is even a greater need for clear findings to ensure effective appellate review. We therefore hold that a district court must include findings of fact and conclusions of law in a judgment and mittimus issued after a criminal trial. As these were not included in this case, the District Court erred.\\nIll\\nBased on the above, we hereby REMAND this case to the District Court for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For each individual element of the crime, the court shall include the facts, the evidence used to find such facts, and the legal conclusions supporting the verdict. This remand does not call for a retrial or the re-opening of the trial to allow new evidence, but only requires the court to state its reasons for entering the original judgment. After the Court enters a new judgment consistent with this opin ion, the Appellant can appeal the ease to this Court on the merits of that judgment,\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7345378.json b/navajo_nation/7345378.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7345378\", \"name\": \"Beryl LeCOMPTE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ralph REDHAIR, individually and as acting executive director of the Navajo Housing Authority, the Board of Commissioners of the Navajo Housing Authority, and the Navajo Housing Authority, Respondents/Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"LeCompte v. Redhair\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-12-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-47-97\", \"first_page\": 479, \"last_page\": 482, \"citations\": \"1 Am. Tribal Law 479\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:14:00.589869+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Beryl LeCOMPTE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ralph REDHAIR, individually and as acting executive director of the Navajo Housing Authority, the Board of Commissioners of the Navajo Housing Authority, and the Navajo Housing Authority, Respondents/Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Beryl LeCOMPTE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ralph REDHAIR, individually and as acting executive director of the Navajo Housing Authority, the Board of Commissioners of the Navajo Housing Authority, and the Navajo Housing Authority, Respondents/Appellants.\\nNo. SC-CV-47-97.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nDec. 15, 1997.\\nPatterson V. Joe, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for the Respondents/Appellants.\\nClaudeen Bates Arthur, Esq., St. Mi-chaels, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Petitioner/Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1212\", \"char_count\": \"7091\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nWe address two questions on appeal: 1) Was the notice of appeal timely filed; and 2) What is \\\"a certified copy\\\" of the final judgment being appealed under N.R.C.A.P. 7(a). We find that the notice of appeal was filed late and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.\\nI\\nThe Navajo Nation Labor Commission (Commission) rendered its decision in this case on September 10, 1997. The Appellants' counsel received the Commission's decision by certified mail on September 15, 1997. On September 25, 1997, the Appellants mailed their notice of appeal to the supreme court clerk for filing. The notice of appeal was received and stamped \\\"filed\\\" at 1:45 p.m., on September 26, 1997. The parties agree that the deadline for filing this notice of appeal expired on September 25, 1997. The Appellee seeks dismissal of this case for lack of this Court's jurisdiction.\\nII\\nThe statute regulating appeals of Commission decisions states as follows:\\nAny party may appeal a decision of the Commission to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court by lodging a written notice of appeal, in the form prescribed by the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure and within ten (10) days after receipt of the Commission's decision.\\n15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 613.A. (1995). Relying on this section, case law on timeliness of tiling notices of appeal, and N.R.C.A.P. 4(a), the Appellee claims that the time for tiling the notice of appeal in this case expired at the end of business day on September 25, 1997. Conversely, the Appellants claim that pursuant to N.R.C.A.P. 7(d) and 4(b), a notice of appeal is deemed filed with the Court on the date of its mailing when regular mail is used (as opposed to certified mail). The Appellants rely on the following language in this order: Rule 7(d): \\\"The Notice of Appeal and any motions or other papers filed in support of an appeal shall be served in accordance with Rule 4(b)\\\"; and Rule 4(b): \\\"Service by mail is complete on mailing.\\\" Thus, the Appellants argue that their notice of appeal was timely filed because it was mailed to the court clerk for filing within ten days of their receipt of the Commission's decision.\\nThe Appellants present an ingenious argument that is not supportable by any construction of our law. Rules 7(d) and 4(b) are irrelevant to the question of how and when a notice of appeal is filed with this Court. Those rules govern service of papers between parties to an appeal and service of papers by the supreme court clerk upon the parties. The bulk of that service transpires after the notice of appeal is filed with this Court.\\nThe Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure contains statements that papers have to be \\\"filed\\\" with the Court. Rule 7(a) provides that \\\"[a]ll appeals shall originate by filing a written Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.\\\" What events would lead to a binding conclusion that a legal document, including a notice of appeal, whether hand carried or mailed, has been filed with the Supreme Court?\\nThis Court contended with similar facts, issue, and argument in hi re Adoption of Doe, 5 Nav. R. 141 (1987). There the Appellants, using certified mail, deposited their notice of appeal in the U.S. mail at the Tuba City Post Office. The envelope arrived at the Window Rock Post Office on the final day for filing the notice of appeal, but for unknown reasons, the postal officials failed to notify the supreme court clerk of the envelope. Left unclaimed, it was returned to the Appellants several days later. Id. at 142.\\nThe Appellants refiled their notice of appeal which the Court dismissed. Upon reconsideration, the Appellants argued that their initial notice of appeal was timely filed, because they mailed it before the time for filing the notice of appeal had expired. Id. The Court rejected the argument stating, \\\"Deposit of a notice of appeal in the mail is not equivalent to filing the notice of appeal . \\\" (citation omitted). Id. at 143. The Court then held that \\\"an appeal is not considered filed until it is received into the custody and control of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, at the place of business, with all necessary documents stamped by and fees paid to the Clerk.\\\" Id. at 143-44.\\nAlthough Doe interprets the Navajo Rules of Appellate Procedure, the facts of the decision, the Court's reasoning, and the holding apply to this ease unequivocally. Doe and this case address the basic question of when a notice of appeal is considered filed with the Court. Whether the notice of appeal is mailed or not is irrelevant to the inquiry.\\nA notice of appeal, and any legal paper required to be filed with this Court, is filed when it is received by the court clerk at the supreme court office, goes under her control, before the end of business day, and stamps it as \\\"filed.\\\" The final act is the stamping of the document as \\\"filed.\\\" See also Rule 4(a) (\\\"Filing may be accomplished by certified mail addressed to the Clerk, but filing shall not be timely unless the papers are received and stamped by the Clerk within the time fixed for filing\\\"). Of course for appeal purposes, there are the additional requirements of a certified copy of the final judgment and a filing fee. Both must be filed simultaneously with the notice of appeal. We hold that the Appellants' notice of appeal was not timely filed in this case.\\nIll\\nThe final matter concerns the meaning of \\\"certified copy\\\" of the final decision being appealed. Rule 7(a) states as follows: \\\"A certified copy of the [decision] . being appealed . must be attached to the Notice of Appeal.\\\" Certified copy means a copy (normally photocopied) of a document signed by the clerk under whose custody the record is kept attesting to it as a true copy. The clerk's original signature or marking must be on the copy itself. A copy of the clerk's signature and certification (copy of certification) will not suffice.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the notice of appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n. Pioche v. Begay, 6 Nav. R. 403 (1991); In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 5 Nav. R. 141 (1987); Riverview Service Station v, Eddie, 5 Nav. R. 135 (1987); and Viva Rancho Motors v. Tully, 5 Nav. R. 145 (1987).\\n. Rule 4(a) provides in relevant part: \\\"All papers required or permitted to be filed in the Supreme Court shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court_ Filings may be accomplished by certified mail addressed to the Clerk, but filing shall not be timely unless the papers are received and stamped by the Clerk within the time fixed for filing.''\"}"
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diff --git a/navajo_nation/7345419.json b/navajo_nation/7345419.json
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+"{\"id\": \"7345419\", \"name\": \"Eulynda BENALLI, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant/Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Benalli v. First National Insurance Co. of America\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-06-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-45-96\", \"first_page\": 498, \"last_page\": 510, \"citations\": \"1 Am. Tribal Law 498\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:14:00.589869+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and FERGUSON , Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Eulynda BENALLI, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant/Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Eulynda BENALLI, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant/Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CV-45-96.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJune 23, 1998.\\nMichael P. Gross, Esq., Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Theodore W. Barudin, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Plain-tifRAppellee.\\nJames J. Mason, Esq., and Luke A. Macik, Esq., Gallup, New Mexico, for the Defendant/Appellant.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and FERGUSON , Associate Justices.\\nSitting by designation.\", \"word_count\": \"5246\", \"char_count\": \"31883\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nThis appeal is from an October 16, 1996 order of the Window Rock District Court which granted PlaintiffiAppellee Eulynda Benalli's motion for summary judgment. We review the order de novo because in the appeal of a summary judgment, this Court is in the same position as the trial court in reviewing the submitted record to decide whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Both parties assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\nI\\nOn June 10, 1993, between 10:03 and 10:30 a.m., Eulynda Benalli (\\\"Benalli\\\") was driving a 1992 Dodge van to make home visits to the residences of Canoncito youths who would participate in a scheduled \\\"LaLuz Trail Hike.\\\" Canoncito is in the New Mexico portion of the Navajo Nation. She drove north on Navajo Route 56, to approximately a mile and a half south of the Canoncito School. While the van was going down a hill, a 1975 Ford pickup truck driven by Edison Largo Sr. crossed the center line and hit the van head-on. The accident report shows that there were twelve passengers in the van. Largo'was killed and Benalli and five children were injured. Benalli's injuries exceeded the $60,000 uninsured motorist coverage on the van, and she received a pro rata share of that amount with the injured children. Largo and Benalli are Navajos and the accident happened within Navajo Indian Country. Largo and his vehicle were not insured.\\nThe Canoncito Community School Board of Education, Inc. (\\\"Board\\\") is a New Mexico nonprofit corporation which has a contract (\\\"P.L. 93-638\\\" contract) with the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975. The contract permits the Board to lease property from the federal General Services Administration (\\\"GSA\\\"). which requires the Board to carry insurance on its equipment, including the van.\\nOn June 3, 1992, the Board signed a letter agreement with the Center for Indian Youth Program Development of the University of New Mexico Department of Pediatrics to \\\"assist the efforts\\\" of the Center's Canoncito Wilderness Discovery Program. The Board agreed to provide \\\"at cost\\\" a \\\"GSA 12 passenger van\\\" for $180.00 per month plus $0,165 per mile and \\\"$167.42 a month for full insurance coverage.\\\" The Board sent the Center statements that billed for the insurance coverage. In later years, including 1993, the Board and the Center used the letter agreement to continue the Canoncito Wilderness Discovery Program by oral agreement.\\nThe Board wanted certainty that Benal-li, as the driver of the van, had insurance coverage. The letter agreement requires \\\"full\\\" coverage. Although not required by the insurance policy, the insurer required the Board to periodically report the names and driver's license status of its drivers. On July 7, 1992, Cam Pfeiffer, the Board's Operations Manager, asked the insurance agent to \\\"add full coverage\\\" on the GSA van and to \\\"add to our driver list Ms. Eulynda T. Benalli,\\\" giving Benalli's date of birth, license number, and license class.\\nThere is some confusion about Benalli's relationship to the Board. According to Pfeiffer, Benalli was a staff member of the Canoncito Community School (which is separate from the Board) and the director of the \\\"Canoncito Wilderness Challenge [Discovery] Program\\\" sponsored by the University of New Mexico. She was a tenured teacher at the school and carried out the Wilderness Discovery Program during the summer. She implemented the program and transported children home after activities.\\nAccording to Patricia Cormiek, \\\"an insurance person\\\" from Albuquerque, there was no time limit for coverage based upon the names of drivers submitted by the Board, and Cormiek would not \\\"delete a driver\\\" unless \\\"Pfeiffer or someone from Canoncito asked me to delete a driver.\\\" According to Charles Dwyer, of the Insurance Exchange (the insurance agent), \\\"designation as a driver would last . forever.\\\" The insurance agent did not \\\"take names on and off.\\\"\\nWhile the Board did not employ Benalli, she performed functions the Board supported for the benefit of Canoncito school children. This is a joint venture, and the Board clearly desired that Benalli have full insurance coverage under the Board's policy while driving its van. The ultimate issue is what that coverage happened to be.\\nWe set forth the actual terms of the insurance policy and discuss their interpretations below. The insurer, which was the defendant below, is the First National Insurance Company of America (\\\"First National\\\"). Insurance Exchange, the insurance agent, issued a certificate of insurance which shows that insurance coverage is by the Safeco Insurance Company (\\\"Safeco\\\") and Millers Group Insurance Company. We are asked to construe the policy issued by Safeco, which has several standard forms as part of the insurance contract.\\nThe \\\"Business Auto Coverage Form\\\" states as follows: \\\"Throughout this policy the words 'you' and 'your' refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations.\\\" Words in each form are highlighted by quotation marks to refer the reader to specific definitions. Therefore, we know that \\\"you\\\" means the Board. It is a New Mexico nonprofit corporation engaged in the business of education, and it decided to \\\"assist the efforts\\\" of the Ca-noncito Wilderness Discovery Program by providing the van, at cost, and also providing \\\"full insurance coverage\\\" under the Safeco policy.\\nThe coverage in the Business Auto Coverage Form is as follows: \\\"We will pay all sums an 'insured' legally must pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies, caused by an 'accident' and resulting from jjf: the ownership, maintenance or use of a JL covered vehicle.\\\" This is obviously liabili-jpvty coverage and not an uninsured motorist if::'; provision.\\nThe form then tells us \\\"[w]ho is an Insured\\\":\\nThe following are 'insureds':\\nA. You for any covered 'auto.'\\nB. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered 'auto' you own, hire or borrow except:....\\nThe exceptions, or exclusions, are those from whom the insured hires or borrows the \\\"auto,\\\" an employee if that \\\"auto\\\" is owned by the employee or a member of his or her household, someone using the \\\"auto\\\" while working on it, those who are moving property to or from an \\\"auto,\\\" or a partner who owns the \\\"auto.\\\" These ex-elusions do not apply here. The third class of \\\"insured\\\" is \\\"fa]nyone liable for the conduct of an 'insured' described above but only to the extent of that liability.\\\"\\nAmong the exclusions from the policy are \\\"[liability assumed under any contract or agreement, but the exclusion does not apply to liability for damages under an 'insured contract.' \\\" The most closely applicable classification under the \\\"insured contract\\\" definition is as follows:\\nThat part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your business (including an indemnification of a municipality in connection with work performed for a municipality) under which you assume the tort liability of another to pay for 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to a third party or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement.\\nThe parties did not address this category of \\\"insured,\\\" or the \\\"insured contract,\\\" at all; therefore, we are hesitant to apply it to this case. However, it appears that the Board had an \\\"insured contract\\\" with the University of New Mexico program whereby the Board assumed the tort liability of the Canoncito Wilderness Discovery Program.\\nThis is an uninsured motorist coverage case. There is a separate \\\"New Mexico Uninsured Motorists Coverage\\\" endorsement for commercial auto use. It modifies the provisions of the Business Auto Coverage Form discussed above. It indicates that the coverage is to pay all sums the \\\"insured\\\" is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an \\\"uninsured motor vehicle,\\\" because of \\\"bodily injury\\\" sustained by an \\\"insured\\\" and caused by an \\\"accident.\\\"\\nThe key to the disposition of this case lies in the definition of \\\"Who is insured.\\\" According to the endorsement, the following are insured:\\n1. You.\\n2. If you are an individual, any 'family member.'\\n3. Anyone else 'occupying' a covered 'auto' or a temporary substitute for a covered 'auto' .\\n4. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of 'bodily injury' sustained by another 'insured.'\\nThere is no definition of \\\"you\\\" in the endorsement, so it has to be the \\\"you\\\" in the Business Auto Coverage Form, \\\"the Named Insured shown in the Declarations.\\\" The renewal certificate in evidence states that the \\\"named insured\\\" is the Canoncito Community School Board of Education, Inc. A \\\"family member\\\" is someone related to \\\"you\\\" by blood, marriage and adoption who is a resident of the same household. A person is \\\"occupying\\\" by means of being \\\"in, upon, getting in, on, out, or off' [an \\\"auto\\\"]. \\\"Auto\\\" is not defined in the uninsured motorist declaration, so it must be the \\\"Auto\\\" defined in the Business Auto Coverage Form, \\\"a land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads but does not include 'mobile equipment.' \\\"\\nFirst National asks this Court to literally apply the policy's terms when it is hardly a model of clarity. The moving papers, exhibits, briefs, and oral argument in this case raise these issues: 1) Should the Navajo Nation adopt the insurance doctrine of \\\"stacking\\\" coverage; and 2) Is Benalli entitled to stack coverage under the policy's terms.\\nII\\nWe decide the first issue using the following process: 1) define the term \\\"stacking\\\"; 2) discuss the public policy applicable to insurance coverage within the Navajo Nation; and 3) choose the law which will apply in this case.\\nOne definition of stacking is that it \\\"is a term that refers to obtaining for a single loss proceeds from duplicate coverages. If an insured is allowed to stack coverages, the insured is allowed to recover for damages received a sum up to the stated limit of each policy that provides coverage.\\\" E.H. Jerry II, Understanding Insurance I Mir S 136D (2d ed.1996) (hereafter \\\"Jerry\\\"). Another definition says it is a term \\\"used to describe a situation where all available policies are added together to create a larger pool from which the injured party may draw in order to compensate him for his actual loss where a single policy is not sufficient to make him whole.\\\" 12A Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law \\u00a7 45:628 (June 1996 Supp.). As noted by the trial court, \\\"the trend appears to be in favor of stacking.\\\" Id.\\nAn additional consideration is \\\"[t]he problem of stacking and the determination of which policies may be called upon to respond to the loss will be a continuing problem, but the practitioner must be aware of the liberal purpose behind the UM [uninsured motorist] statutes which may serve as rationale for creating whatever fund is necessary to compensate the innocent, injured party.\\\" Id. Some courts and writers prefer to use the terms \\\"pyramiding\\\" or \\\"aggregating\\\" benefits to avoid the impression of a duplication of benefits, but \\\"stacking\\\" is the most common term. Jerry, supra, at \\u00a7 136D[c].\\nActually, stacking is a common sense principle. It says that if you buy insurance for more than one vehicle and pay insurance premiums for uninsured motorist coverage more than once, you should be able to have the benefit of all the coverage you buy. So, if (as here) you have a policy with a limit of $60,000 of coverage on one vehicle, and there are five vehicles with five separate premiums, then there is a total possible coverage of $300,000.\\nThere are two kinds of stacking: \\\"judicial stacking\\\"; and \\\"policy stacking.\\\" Jaramillo v. Providence Washington Ins., 117 N.M. 337, 339 n. 1, 871 P.2d 1343 (1994).\\n'Judicial stacking' is a rule of construction applied by the courts based on public policy. Under judicial stacking, a class-one insured is entitled, as a matter of law, to aggregate all UM [uninsured motorist] coverages purchased with separate premiums. A class-one insured injudicial stacking refers generally to those persons who are 'named insureds' under a UM policy. In contrast, 'policy stacking' refers to a policy which by its own terms expressly grants a right to stack coverages. If the policy is unambiguous, the 'insured' who is entitled to policy stacking is determined by the policy's language and definitions, and the coverage is enforced as written.\\nId. (citation omitted).\\nIt is most curious that while First National continuously reiterates the language of paragraph 2 of the \\\"High-Low\\\" settlement agreement and release of January 23, 1996, item E of the recitals indicates that \\\"there has been a good faith dispute between Releaser Eulynda Benalli and insurer relating to whether she is a Class I or Class II insured.\\\" Given the actual agreement of the parties, this is a \\\"policy stacking\\\" case. That is, whether Benalli may \\\"stack\\\" is governed by unambiguous terms of the policy as written.\\nOnly Navajo Nation law applies to the public policy determination of whether stacking should be permitted in this juris-diction. However, we note that this insurance policy was written to respond to the requirements of New Mexico law. The parties anticipated that the policy would be determined in accordance with the New Mexico insurance law climate. Accordingly, while we will not apply New Mexico precedent construing policies such as the one in this case, we will look closely at New Mexico decisions for guidance to as-sure the legitimate expectations of the par-ties.\\nThe Navajo Nation policy is the same as that of New Mexico. Because large numbers of individuals in this region do not have liability insurance, insurance companies should be required to provide uninsured motorist coverage for their policyholders. The language which provides such coverage will be liberally construed to carry out the purposes of compensating those who are injured to the extent that an insured pays premiums for more than one vehicle. The insurance company bears the additional burden to know the expectations of special classes of policyholders (i.e., fictitious entities and corporations which conduct public business) and to clarify the coverage of a policy where it may appear that the insured has certain expectations about the scope of coverage. A large portion of the Navajo Nation is within the boundaries of New Mexico. That is where First National does business. Everyone in this region, including insurance agents, is aware that there are large numbers of Indians in New Mexico and that they have their own territories, laws, and organizations. Insurance companies cannot escape those facts and they should take into consideration Indian nation public policy.\\nIll\\nAn insurance policy is nothing more than a contract. Therefore, construction of an insurance policy is governed by the law of contracts. JaramiUo v. Providence Washington Ins., Ill N.M. at 340, 871 P.2d 1343. There are special insurance contract rules which apply to identify those who show they are within the class of insureds the policy is intended to benefit. Id. at 339, 871 P.2d 1343. Stacking is also \\\"a rule of construction applied by the courts based on public policy.\\\" Cravens v. Northland Ins. Co., No. 94-1292-M Civ. (D.N.M. May 10, 1995). slip mem. op. at 5 (citing Jaramillo, 117 N.M. at 339 n. 1, 871 P.2d 1343).\\nThe analysis in a policy-stacking case follows these steps: 1) whether stacking can be determined by the unambiguous language of the policy; 2) if \\\"a contract is 'reasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions,' \\\" the court must use extrinsic evidence to decide whether an ambiguity exists; and 3) if the court finds ambiguity, it must resolve it using rules of contract construction, including determining the parties' intentions. Cravens, slip mem. op. at 6-8. The rules of contract construction include the principle that \\\" 'the insurer who drafts the policy must reasonably anticipate the effect of the language used on the untrained mind, or how the language is understood by the ordinary person.' \\\" Cravens, slip mem. op. at 9 (citing Rodriguez v. Windsor Ins. Co., 118 N.M. 127, 131, 879 P.2d 759, 763 (1994)). Where there is ambiguity, \\\" 'the test is not what the insurer intended the words to mean, but what a reasonable person in the insured's position would have understood them to mean.' \\\" Cravens, slip mem. op. at 13 (citing Western Commerce Bank v. Reliance Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 346, 348, 732 P.2d 873, 875 (1987)). One of the reasons New Mexico allows stacking is to fulfill an insured's expectations which arise from paying multiple premiums. Id. (citing Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 170-171, 646 P.2d 1230, 1234-35 (1982)).\\nFirst National faults the trial court for its method of construing the insurance policy and says that the court \\\"reformed\\\" or changed the policy rather than simply apply it. If, however, there is an ambiguity about an \\\"expressly named\\\" insured, then the Court must examine the facts to determine what the parties intended the contractual language to mean. Jaramillo, 117 N.M. at 337, 871 P.2d 1343. Another issue in this case is whether Be-nalli is a third party beneficiary (assuming she is not an \\\"insured\\\"), so this Court must look to the contract or other evidence which shows the intent to benefit a third party, and Benalli must show that she belongs to the class of intended beneficiary. Id. at 343, 871 P.2d 1343. The following factors apply in situations where the claimant is not a \\\"named insured\\\" or the \\\"insured\\\": \\\"1) whether the claimant was named or designated as an insured in the policy or was an insured only because he was a passenger in a covered vehicle (occupancy insured); 2) whether the claimant paid the premium; and 3) whether the insured can be said to have reasonably expected to receive coverage for each vehicle included under the policy.\\\" Lee v. Ins. Co. of North America, 7 Haw.App. 338, 762 P.2d 809, 811 (Hawaii App.1998).\\nWe construe the insurance contract against First National and in favor of Benalli, because First National wrote the contract. Its lawyers or drafters designed a large, standard-form agreement which the Board had to accept on a \\\"take it or leave it\\\" basis. There is an imbalance in the bargaining position of insurance companies and their customers, so courts traditionally correct such imbalances in imposed agreements by construing the agreement in the customers' favor.\\nBenalli is clearly an \\\"insured\\\" under the uninsured motorist endorsement. She was someone who was \\\"occupying\\\" the covered \\\"auto,\\\" the van. However, the limit of insurance clause states that \\\"the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one 'accident' is the limit of Uninsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Declarations.\\\" i.e., $60,000 paid on a pro rata basis among injured claimants. The clause con- Unites that \\\"if there is more than one covered 'auto,' and 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' is sustained by you or any 'family member,' our Limit of Insurance for any one 'accident' is the sum of the limits applicable to each covered 'auto.' \\\" An \\\"insured\\\" other than \\\"you\\\" or a \\\"family member\\\" is limited to a recovery of $60,000.\\nWhile this would appear to decide the issue, given that Benalli is an \\\"insured\\\" but not a \\\"family member,\\\" there remains the question of whether she is a part of \\\"you,\\\" i.e., the Board, or is the equivalent of a \\\"family member,\\\" given the intentions of the parties and the legitimate expect a-tions of the Board and the Canoncito Wil-derness Discovery Program. In the Cra-vens case, the policy was issued to an individual with a \\\"d/b/a [doing business as]\\\" name to operate an auto dealership, The issue there was whether the individu-al's chfldren, who did not fit the \\\"family member\\\" definition, were covered as the dealership's employees. The federal dis-trict court resolved the issue using extrin-sic evidence to determine the ambiguity of the agreement and the parties' intentions. The federal court looked beyond the literal terms of the insurance agreement to determine what the person who bought the insurance really intended.\\nWe find that the policy terms here are ambiguous. While it is true that \\\"you\\\" is a corporation, and not a flesh-and-blood be-\\u215b who can suffer injury from the parties' dealings, we find that \\\"you\\\" is ambiguous as a matter of law. This litigation and the parties' \\\"High-Low\\\" settlement agreement show that the parties agree that there is an ambiguity as to whether Benalli is a \\\"you\\\" or otherwise entitled to stack.\\nHow did the Board understand the policy? The insurer required the Board to submit lists of its drivers, along with their driver's license status. The testimony shows that the insurance agent accepted the lists. We are not told why this was done. Perhaps the insurer wanted to know if those who drove the vehicles had valid licenses or had traffic charges which might affect their risk as drivers. We do know that the Board and the Canoncito Wilderness Discovery Program wanted to make certain there was \\\"full insurance coverage.\\\" Pfeiffer asked for \\\"full coverage\\\" on the GSA van and specifically requested that Benalli be added to \\\"our drivers list.\\\" While the insurance agent may not have known about the arrangement between the Board and the Program, we can clearly see that the Board wanted to be certain that its drivers had \\\"full coverage.\\\" Those expectations were communicated to the insurance agent as the Board periodically informed the insurance agent of the names of its drivers. The Board submitted separate lists of \\\"regular\\\" employees and Be-nalli's name for her Board-sponsored project.\\nThe insurer has a duty to make its policy terms clear. \\\" '[T]he insurer has a duty to make any limitations of or exclusions from coverage both clear and conspicuous: Any limitations should be so written that the insured, by reading the policy, can understand what the exclusions are. when they are given a reasonable and fair interpretation.' \\\" Cravens, slip mem. op. at 14 (citing Rodriguez, 118 N.M. at 133, 879 P.2d 759, and quoting 13 J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice \\u00a7 7403, at 318-20(1976)). The insurance agent knew the Board was a school board. It knew that the Board wanted its drivers covered. It knew that the Board was paying for uninsured motorist coverage for five vehicles and that it would reasonably expect full coverage, including the ability to stack, particularly when the Board sent lists of employees and specifically submitted Benalli's name.\\nBenalli claims to be a beneficiary, so any intent to benefit her as a third party must be gleaned from the term identifying the class of intended beneficiaries, i.e., \\\"You.\\\" It is clear that such was the intent of the Board, because it knew that Benalli would drive the van as a project director and specifically provided that its insurance would cover her. We impute the agent's knowledge to First National, because of the agency relationship.\\nThe third party beneficiary theory applies when the third party gave no consideration. In this situation, the University of New Mexico in fact paid a premium. In addition, the Board, as the \\\"insured,\\\" reasonably expected to have coverage for each vehicle under the policy. It believed its drivers were a \\\"You,\\\" and paid the premiums based on that expectation. First National, through its agent, was in a position to see the Board's (through its representatives) expectation and to eorreet any misconception. In fact. First National had an affirmative obligation to correct any misconceptions in clear exclusions and it did not do so. Instead, it required the Board to supply the names of its drivers (without saying why) and helped reinforce the expectation and understanding that there was \\\"full\\\" coverage on both the van and Benalli as its driver.\\nIV\\nWe take this opportunity to clarify the Navajo common law concept of 'nalyeeh as a separate ground for finding that Benalli was a \\\"You\\\" under the policy. Insurance is nothing more than risk-sharing. People who want help when they get hurt put money into a common money bag and entrust that bag to someone. When one of those people is hurt, they go to the holder and ask for help based on their need. Everyone agrees on how much money needs to be put in the bag. Here, the Board can be likened to a clan group. While there were no corporations or other fictitious entities under Navajo common law, clans have always been recognized as an identifiable group. The Board assumed Benalli into its \\\"clan\\\" membership. It expected that Benalli would be one of its \\\"relatives\\\" if she got hurt.\\nFirst National holds the bag. The Board trusted First National to hold its money, and it paid extra for five vehicles. The Board placed its trust in First National and expected that if the Board's relative was hurt, she would receive benefits in accordance with her injury. Benalli also argues that First National owes her nalyeeh as the uninsured motorist's \\\"relative.\\\" In a sense that is true. When there is an injury'. Navajo common law requires the negotiation of the amount of nalyeeh based upon the effects of the injury and the ability of the tortfeasor and his or her relatives to make things right. The Navajo maxim is that it should be enough \\\"so there will be no hard feelings,\\\"\\nIn this case, First National was prepared to pay based on stacking. Benalli's expert stated that the premiums paid by the Board were similar to those paid by an individual who owned more than one vehicle. Benalli's need exceeded the amount set aside for one vehicle, but in fact First National, as the uninsured motorist's \\\"relative,\\\" had the ability to pay more, based upon the sums the Board put into the money bag.\\nWe observe that while the counsels for the parties made excellent arguments about nalyeeh, the best argument was that made in Navajo by Benalli herself. She introduced herself by clan, and clan relation is the basis of nalyeeh. If a person is hurt, he or she looks to clan relations for help. The tortfeasor and his or her relatives are expected to set things right in accordance with the hurt. That is done on the basis of the ability to help, and in this case, that ability is measured by the amount of money put into the bag and the understanding that there are certain persons who should benefit from the money in the bag.\\nV\\nWe summarily address First National's remaining arguments because they are not essential to this decision. The trial court did not \\\"rewrite,\\\" \\\"reform,\\\" or otherwise tamper with the actual insurance contract. It construed it in accordance with standard contract interpretation principles. The parties' \\\"High-Low\\\" settlement agreement settles this argument. They were engaged in litigation over the insurance policy, and they specifically agreed there was a dispute over whether Benalli was entitled to stack. First National's agreement was an acknowledgment that the contract's terms were vague and required court interpretation. Contract construction is difficult, but this case contains an area of the law which requires a determination of public policy. The public policy is to assure that those who are injured by an uninsured motorist and who are closely associated with an \\\"insured\\\" get the benefit of all premiums paid for coverage. The trial court did not amend, nullify, or rewrite the agreement.\\nWe listened to First National's \\\"parade of horribles\\\" arguments, including the possibility that it would have to pay out large sums of money for a comparatively small premium, and that insurance rates will go up in the Navajo Nation if this Court adopts the stacking doctrine and applies it to this ease. Some courts have rejected stacking because of the possibility of extensive exposure for large numbers of vehicles. That is not the situation here and any potential liability based upon large numbers of vehicles is at this point pure speculation. No one told this Court how premiums are set or the areas for which they are set. We assume that First National complies with discrimination law and that there Is no \\\"red-lining\\\" where Navajos must pay more for insurance than others. Insurance companies hire actuaries to estimate potential liability based upon the incidence and kinds of auto crashes and they take the possibility of stacking decisions into account. There was utterly no factual showing to support the \\\"parade of horribles\\\" argument that a ruling by this Court will drive up the premiums Navajos and Navajo Nation organizations will have to pay.\\nWe avoid the use of the term \\\"designated driver\\\" although the trial court correctly interpreted the contract using that term. This opinion takes another approach.\\nThe worker's compensation argument is irrelevant, because the parties specifically took it into account when signing the \\\"High-Low\\\" settlement agreement. No one told us why Benalli will not recover the full stacking amount, and First National waived or addressed its worker's compensation recovery claims in the agreement.\\nSovereign immunity is irrelevant to this case. It is circular reasoning to say that First National stands in the Board's shoes and that immunity from suit to the extent of insurance coverage protects First National. The extent of insurance coverage is the very issue before the Court and one that First National agreed would be posed to the Court.\\nWe decide the merits of this appeal because there was substantial compliance with the final judgment rule and this litigation has gone on too long already. One of the major policies of law is that courts should discourage multiple litigation by using their inherent authority to control the progress of cases. This was a complex and confusing appeal because of a lack of detailed findings of fact and the need to undertake a de novo review of a large number of documents and exhibits. We do not want to send this case to the trial court and then have to deal with it again. Accordingly, Benalli's motion to strike notice of appeal and the Navajo Nation's motion to appear amicus curiae are denied.\\nThe judgment of the Window Rock District Court is affirmed. This cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings, including those involving costs and fees.\\n. Curiously, while First National complains of the unfairness of not receiving credit for Be-nalli's worker's compensation payments, the parties' \\\"High-Low\\\" settlement agreement of January 23, 1996 says that if Benalli prevails on the stacking issue, she will get an additional $135,000 in addition to the $60,000 already paid to her, or $195,000. That is $105,000 less than the total sum which would be available if stacking is permitted.\\n. The parties failed to clearly distinguish the two stacking doctrines recited above. The class distinctions are essentially between injured individuals who are considered to be \\\"the insured\\\" (Class I) and those who are not (Class II). See the discussion below.\\n. While the term nalyeeh is often used in the sense of an amount of payment, it actually expresses the mode of payment, i.e., the respectful negotiation of the amount an offender should pay based upon the injured person's needs and the offender's ability to pay. including the ability of relatives and clan members.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7345496\", \"name\": \"Eugene KIRK, Gililand Damon, and Reynold R. Lee, Petitioners/Appellants, v. OFFICE OF NAVAJO LABOR RELATIONS, Respondent/Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kirk v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-11-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-21-98\", \"first_page\": 530, \"last_page\": 534, \"citations\": \"1 Am. Tribal Law 530\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:14:00.589869+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Eugene KIRK, Gililand Damon, and Reynold R. Lee, Petitioners/Appellants, v. OFFICE OF NAVAJO LABOR RELATIONS, Respondent/Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Eugene KIRK, Gililand Damon, and Reynold R. Lee, Petitioners/Appellants, v. OFFICE OF NAVAJO LABOR RELATIONS, Respondent/Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-21-98.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nNov. 16, 1998.\\nPatrice M. Horstman, Esq., Flagstaff, Arizona, for the Petitioners/Appellants.\\nMarcelino R. Gomez, Esq., Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Respondent/Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, AUSTIN and CADMAN, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1543\", \"char_count\": \"9859\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nThe Appellants, three compliance officers of the Office of Navajo Labor Relations, filed a complaint with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission alleging violations of the Navajo Preference in Employment Act, 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 601-619 (1995 ed.), in the hiring of the director of the Office. The Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; specifically, for failure to first file the employment charge forms with the Office of Navajo Labor Relations. On appeal, the Appellants seek exemption from this initial step, claiming the remaining compliance officers have conflicts of interests and lack impartiality.\\nI\\nThe Appellants, Eugene Kirk, Gililand Damon, and Reynold Lee, are employed as compliance officers in the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (\\\"ONLR\\\"). When this case began, the ONLR employed five compliance officers to monitor and enforce the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (\\\"NPEA\\\"). On January 31, 1997, the five compliance officers filed a grievance with the Department of Personnel Management disputing the recruitment, selection, and hiring of Timothy Joe as ONLR director. When the grievance proceedings were not resolved to the Appellants' satisfaction, they filed their employment charge forms and a complaint against the ONLR with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (\\\"Commission\\\") on August 21, 1997. The NPEA requires that NPEA matters start with the ONLR.\\nThe complaint and charge forms alleged that the process used to hire Timothy Joe, as director of ONLR, violated the NPEA. The alleged violators are the director of the Division of Human Resources, the director of the Department of Personnel Management, and two compliance officers of the ONLR.\\nBefore filing with the Commission, Appellant Eugene Kirk called the two remaining compliance officers, Irwin Delmar and Harrison Bia, to see if either would file the Appellants' complaint. Both officers stated they would not accept the complaint or investigate the allegations because of their earlier involvement in the grievance process. The Appellants did not attempt to mail or hand-deliver the complaint to any ONLR office for filing. Appellant Kirk knew how to file charges against the ONLR with the ONLR, as he had done so previously.\\nOn February 12, 1998, the ONLR filed a motion asking the Commission to dismiss the Appellants' complaint for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Commission granted the motion on February 28, 1998. The Commission found that Appellant Kirk's telephone calls did not quality as an attempt to file the complaint with the ONLR, and ruled that the Appellants had not exhausted their administrative remedies.\\nII\\nThe NPEA sets forth the statutory requirements for initiating, processing, and resolving charges alleging violations of its provisions. The ONLR is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the NPEA. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 610(A) (1995 ed.). The ONLR becomes involved in NPEA matters when either an individual files a charge (\\\"Individual Charge\\\"), or the ONLR, on its own prerogative, files a charge (\\\"ONLR Charge\\\"). Id. \\u00a7 610(B)(1).\\nProceedings on an Individual Charge begin when the complainant files an employment eharge form containing the alleged NPEA violations with any ONLR office. Id. \\u00a7 610(B)(3). The Appellants contend that their remedies before the ONLR were exhausted when the two remaining compliance officers were called and they refused to accept the complaint. Furthermore, the Appellants argue that no ONLR office was available to file their complaint after officers Delmar and Bia rebuffed them. We agree with the Commission that telephone calls do not qualify as an attempt to file a charge with the ONLR. The Appellants did not physically appear at an ONLR office to file their papers or, alternatively, mail their papers to the ONLR for filing. We affirm the Commission's finding that the Appellants simply did not make any effort to file their complaint with the ONLR.\\nThe Appellants cite internal office practice and procedure to argue that only compliance officers have authority to file employment charge forms and, normally, the officer who files the form must investigate the alleged violations. According to the Appellants, this means that no other compliance officer was available at any ONLR office to file the compliant and investigate after officers Delmar and Bia refused to get involved. We do not agree.\\nThe Appellants' office practice and procedure may promote convenience, but they unduly constrict the law. The receipt of an employment charge form and its subse quent filing are nothing more than ministerial acts, which the law does not restrict to compliance officers. The law is clear on this point: \\\"Date of Filing. Receipt of each Individual Charge shall be acknowledged by the dated signature of an ONLR employee wrhich shall be deemed the date on which the Individual Charge is filed.\\\" Id. \\u00a7 610(A)(4) (emphasis added). Presumably, any ONLR employee may receive and file an employment charge form. These ministerial acts could have been performed by either officer Delmar or Bia without tainting himself with impropriety.\\nThe Appellants acknowledge that the law requires complainants to file their employment charges with the ONLR first. They claim, however, that in this case it would be futile to file with the ONLR for three reasons: 1) due to officers Delmar and Bia's conflicts of interests, the ONLR does not have an independent compliance officer left to investigate their charges; 2) the ONLR, as the agency being challenged in this action, cannot investigate itself; and 3) if the investigation is done by the ONLR, it would not rule against its own interests. We address these concerns and suggest solutions below.\\nThe Appellants correctly state that the Navajo Nation Ethics in Government Law, 2 N.N.C. \\u00a7 3741-3793 (1995 ed.), prohibits officers Delmar and Bia from investigating charges against the ONLR. That law prohibits a government employee from conduct which creates an appearance of:\\n1. Using public office for personal gain;\\n2. Giving preferential treatment to any special interest organization or person;\\n3. Impeding governmental efficiency or economy;\\n4. Losing or compromising complete independence or impartiality of action;\\n5. Making a government decision outside official channels; or\\n6. Adversely affecting the confidence of the people in the integrity of the government of the Navajo Nation.\\nId. \\u00a7 3745(B)(l)-(6). Because officers Delmar and Bia were involved in grievances that also formed the Appellants' complaint, they have conflicts of interests which bars them from investigating the Appellants' charges.\\nWhile the ethics law prevents conflicts of interests, it also provides solutions that the parties can use. Section 3748 of the ethics law addresses the three problems the Appellants have presented and we use it here to set forth guidelines for the parties. After charges are filed with the ONLR, officers Delmar and Bia, or any other ONLR compliance officer who sees a conflict of interest, would explain the potential conflict in writing to their supervisor and to the Ethics and Rules Committee of the Navajo Nation Council. Id. \\u00a7 3748(C). The Committee would then assign the investigative functions to an individual who does not have a conflict of interest. Id. The Committee can provide guidelines to ensure a fair and independent investigation.\\nThe Appellants' final argument is that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over any conflicts of law issues, because it does not have \\\"power or authority to resolve conflicts in existing laws\\\" and it cannot fashion a \\\"proper remedy\\\" for the Appellants. The Appellants contend that only the courts can decide conflicts of law issues. The alleged conflicts are between those NPEA laws that require the ONLR and the Commission to handle employment charges alleging NPEA violations and the Ethics in Government Law which prohibits employee conflicts of interest. The guidelines we have set forth above should eliminate these alleged conflicts The Appel lants are entitled to have their charges investigated by an impartial investigator appointed by the Ethics and Rules Committee. Moreover, we have no reason to suspect that the Commission would handle the Appellants' complaint without comporting with due process standards.\\nThe Appellants do not say what is their \\\"proper remedy,\\\" but clearly, the Commission has the power to issue any of a host of remedial orders, including \\\"injunctive relief' and \\\"mandated corrective action to cure the violation within a reasonable period of time.\\\" Id. \\u00a7 612(A)(1). We are not persuaded that the administrative process would not fashion a proper remedy for the Appellants. We cannot find a justifiable reason to exempt the Appellants from the administrative process.\\nThis Court has recognized and followed the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Navajo Skill Center v. Benally, 5 Nav. R. 93, 96 (1986). These doctrines permit the agency with expertise to act first and to stay the court's hand until the agency has completed its process. In this case, the matters in the Appellants' complaint are within the authority of the ONLR and the Commission. The administrative steps should have been followed.\\nAccordingly, the decision of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7345713\", \"name\": \"Carole ERIACHO, Petitioner, v. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, And concerning, Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eriacho v. Ramah District Court\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-01-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-61-04\", \"first_page\": 624, \"last_page\": 631, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 624\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and BEDONIE, Associate Justice (by designation).\", \"parties\": \"Carole ERIACHO, Petitioner, v. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, And concerning, Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest.\", \"head_matter\": \"Carole ERIACHO, Petitioner, v. RAMAH DISTRICT COURT, Respondent, And concerning, Navajo Nation, Real Party in Interest.\\nNo. SC-CV-61-04.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJan. 5, 2005.\\nBernadine Martin, Esq., Gallup, New Mexico, for Petitioner.\\nPatrick Dooley, Esq., Crownpoint, Navajo Nation, for Respondent.\\nLaVonne Tsosie, Esq., Ramah, Navajo Nation, for Real Party in Interest.\\nBefore FERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice, and BEDONIE, Associate Justice (by designation).\", \"word_count\": \"2660\", \"char_count\": \"15776\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nFERGUSON, Acting Chief Justice.\\nThis Court previously issued an opinion on a preliminary matter in this case. We now decide the merits by granting the writ of mandamus against the Ramah District Court to require it to grant a jury trial.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are as follows. Petitioner Eriacho (Eriacho) is a defendant in a pending criminal action in Ramah District Court. The court did not arraign Eriacho, but instead Eriacho signed a waiver of arraignment form provided by the Chief Prosecutor (Prosecutor) of the Ramah Office of the Prosecutor. According to the parties, Eriacho went to the Office of the Prosecutor and told the Prosecutor that she did not want to appear at arraignment. The Prosecutor gave her a form apparently used by the Respondent Ramah District Court to record waivers of arraignment. Eriacho signed the form and submitted it to the Ramah District Court, which accepted the waiver.\\nThe form itself lists several rights of the defendant which correspond to the rights required to be read to the defendant at arraignment under Rule 12(c) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (NRCP). Among these rights is the right to trial by jury. NRCP 12(e)(5)(vi). The form states that a defendant has a \\\"right to a jury trial before the judge.\\\"\\nSeveral months after waiving arraignment, Eriacho requested a jury trial. Er-iacho signed her arraignment waiver on (February 27, 2004. She first requested a jury trial on June 7, 2004. The Ramah District Court denied her request based on Rule 13(a) of the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (NRCRP). That rule states That \\\"[t]he defendant may demand a jury (trial at the time of the arraignment or within 15 days thereafter or it will be (deemed waived.\\\"\\ny After Eriacho requested and the Ramah (District Court denied reconsideration of (the original order, she filed a petition for a (writ of mandamus. We issued an alterna-. iive writ staying the case, and requested briefs from the Ramah District Court and The Navajo Nation as Real Party in Interest. In a previous opinion we held that the Ramah District Court's staff attorney was the appropriate counsel for the Respondent in this ease. We then held oral argument, and now issue this opinion.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether Petitioner waived her right to a jury trial by not requesting one within the time required by the Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure.\\nIII\\nA\\nWe have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus under our authority to issue \\\"any writs or orders [n]ecessary and proper to the complete exercise of [our] jurisdiction.\\\" 7 N.N.C. \\u00a7 303(A). This Court will issue a writ of mandamus against a court to compel a judge to perform a judicial duty required by law, if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Duncan v. Shiprock District Court, 5 Am. Tribal Law 458, 461, 2004 WL 5658109, *1 (Nav.2004). The petitioner must show that (1) he or she has a legal right to have the particular act performed; (2) the judge has a legal duty to perform that act; and (3) the judge failed or neglected to perform the act. Id. Here the Ramah District Court already rejected Eriacho's motion for reconsideration, and denial of a jury trial is not a \\\"final\\\" order for appeal. Id. Therefore there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The question is whether the court was required to'grant a jury trial\\nB\\nEriacho argues as a threshold, issue that NRCRP 13(a) is invalid on its face because it improperly restricts her right to trial by jury recognized by the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act. A jury trial is a fundamental right in the Navajo Nation. A jury is a modern manifestation of the Navajo principle of participatory democracy in which the community talks out disputes and makes a collective decision. See Duncan, 5 Am. Tribal Law at 4(56, 2004 WL 5658109, *6. As a deeply-seeded part of Navajo collective identity, we construe restrictions on the right to a jury trial narrowly. id.\\nThe Navajo Nation Council and the United States Congress have limited the right to a trial by jury by requiring a Navajo criminal defendant to affirmatively request one. The Navajo Bill of Rights provision states that \\\"[n]o person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment . shall be denied the right, upan request, to a trial by jury of not less than six (6) persons.\\\" 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 7 (emphasis added). The Indian Civil Rights Act similarly states that an Indian tribe shall not \\\"deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(10) (emphasis added). Unlike the equivalent federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, there is no automatic right to a trial by jury, as the defendant may waive the right by failing to request it. The initial question is whether Rule 13(a) improperly sets a time limit on the right to request a jury trial, or, at the very least, sets an unreasonably short time period in which to assert the right.\\nA court rule may require a defendant to affirmatively request a jury trial within a specific time period. We have recognized the ability of a defendant to waive a fundamental right. Stanley v. Navajo Nailon, 6 Nav. R. 284, 289 (1990). As a matter of due process, however, the waiver must be a \\\"knowing, [and] intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.\\\" Id. Rule 13(a) acts as a waiver of the defendant's right to request; a jury trial by requiring the defendant to file his or her request within about two weeks after arraignment. The rule interprets the defendant's failure to act within the time period as an affirmative waiver. We see nothing in the Navajo Bill of Rights or the Indian Civil Rights Act that prohibits the courts from interpreting inaction within a specific period of time as a knowing and intelligent decision not to request a jury trial. Failure to act can be a waiver, and interpreting the failure to act. after a certain time period to be a waiver is not prohibited.\\nThe time limitation serves important purposes that necessarily impact the right to request a jury trial. Both the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act require an affirmative request based on the realities of tribal court practice. For the smooth and efficient management of the expanding dockets of the Navajo courts, there must be a time limit beyond which the right to a jury trial is deemed waived. The process to select a jury within the Navajo Nation is lengthy and costly for under-funded courts. See NRCRP 34-36. If the right to request a jury trial had. no time limit, a defendant conceivably; could request a jury in the middle of the trial, causing significant delay in the individual case, and considerable shifts in the court's calendar, pushing other cases back while the court selects and prepares the. jury. Unlike civil litigants, criminal defendants have a separate right to a speedy; trial that may be violated by such necessary delays. 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 7; 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1302(6); see Navajo Nation v. McDonald, 7 Nav. R. 1, 11 (1992) (discussing speedy trial right). Also, as with other pre-trial requests, fairness to the other party to the litigation, both in civil and criminal cases, mandates that there be a smooth and predictable process leading up to trial. Under these reasons, the establishment of a time limit to assert a jury trial is not, in itself, improper.\\nThe specific time period, fifteen (15) days from arraignment, is not unreasonably short. While this time period is shorter than the time period provided civil (litigants, see Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure 38(b) (allowing request up to time the eourt issues notice of hearing), it is not too short given the right to a speedy criminal trial and the other considerations discussed above. The rule allows a full two weeks from arraignment (or its functional equivalent) to submit a request, giving the defendant ample time to consider his or her options and inform the court of his or her election of a trial by jury. The only remaining question is whether Eriacho's waiver in this case was otherwise \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\"\\nC\\nAs discussed above, as a matter of due process, a defendant's waiver of a (fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial must be \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" This test comes irom the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the equivalent right to due process under the United States Constitution. See Stanley, 6 Nav. R. at 289 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Though we originally adopted that standard without reference to Navajo Common Law, we reiterate that standard as consistent with Navajo principles of due process under the Navajo Bill of Rights.\\nWe expand on our previous statement in Stanley by requiring meaningful notice and explanation of the right to request a jury trial before we will recognize the failure to request the jury trial as \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" In Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez we recently interpreted a similar waiver of fundamental rights under Navajo Common Law. 5 Am. Tribal Law 473, 477-80, 2004 WL 5658107, *3-6 (Nav.2004). We adopted the federal Miranda standard as consistent with the Common Law interpretation of the Navajo Bill of Rights to judge the validity of a waiver of the right against self-inerimination and an attorney while in police custody. Id. at 477-78, 2004 WL 5658107, *3-4. However, we broadened the requirements under Navajo law by requiring meaningful notice and explanation of those rights under the Common Law principle of hozho'go. Id. at 478-80, 2004 WL 5658107, *4-6. We interpreted hozho'go as mandating more than the mere provision of an English form stating certain rights. Id. We stated that Hozho'go requires a patient, respectful discussion with a suspect explaining his or her rights before a waiver is effective. Id. at 479-80, 2004 WL 5658107, *5-6.\\nAs Hozho'go requires meaningful notice and explanation of a right before a waiver of that right is effective, it requires, at a bare minimum, that the Nation give notice that the right to a jury trial may be waived by inaction. For notice to be meaningful, and therefore a waiver to be effective, the Navajo government must explain to the defendant that the jury trial right is not absolute, as it may be waived by doing nothing within a certain time. Absent this explanation, the information received by a defendant is incomplete, as it appears the right is automatic and perpetual, like the federal constitutional right. Without this information, the waiver by inaction is not truly knowing and intelligent, and would violate the defendant's right to due process. As the description of the right to jury trial in the waiver of arraignment form does not include a statement that the right must be exercised within fifteen days, Eriacho's failure to request it within that time was not a knowing and intelligent waiver.\\nAt oral argument the Ramah l)is-trict Court asserted that any requirement ;\\\" of notice of the time period would create ay \\\"slippery slope\\\" by forcing a court to give ; notice to defendants of all procedural requirements in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Further, according to Respondent, any notice requirement would force a district court to improperly act as the defendant's counsel at arraignment. We do ; not see our ruling today to apply to all ; time limits in the rules. Unlike mere pro- ; cedural requests, the waiver of a trial by; jury involves a fundamental right of the defendant requiring knowing and intelli-; gent action to be effective under Navajo;; due process. Other lesser tactical decisions involve no such right, and, consequently, require no affirmative notice by| the court. Further, the additional require-;; ment that the defendant be informed of the time limit involves no improper legal! \\\"advice,\\\" but merely accurately states they full scope of the right to a jury trial within the Navajo Nation to make sure any waiver is truly \\\"knowing and intelligent.\\\" The addition of several more words in an ar-S; raignment or its functional equivalent should cause no great burden on the court.\\nIV\\nBased on the above, Eriacho did not waive her right to a jury trial, and the Ramah District Court improperly denied her request. We therefore issue a permanent writ of mandamus requiring the court to grant Eriacho's request and hold a jury trial in this case.\\n. Though in certain cases we have discussed \\u215b due process in light of Navajo Common Law, \\u215b see Attcity v. District Court for the Judicial District of Window Rock, 7 Nav. R. 227, 229-230 (1996) (discussing cases); In re Estate of Goldtooth Begay #2, 7 Nav. R. 29, 31 (1992) (\\\"Due process is fundamental fairness in a Navajo cultural context.''), in other cases, ( such as Stanley, we have adopted federal principles directly. In light of our recent case law interpreting ambiguous statutory language in light of Diyin Nohook\\u00e1\\u00e1 Dine'\\u00e9 Bi Beehaz'\\u00e1anii (Navajo Common Law), Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, 4 Am. Tribal Law 641, 643, 2003 WL 25794038, *5 (Nav.2004), we review the meaning of \\\"due process\\\" in the Navajo Bill of Rights consistent with Navajo Common Law principles. See Fort Defiance Housing Corp. v, Lowe, 5 Am. Tribal Law 394, 398, 2004 WL 5658062, *2 (Nav.2004) (interpreting forcible entry and detainer statute consistent with due process as informed by Common Law principle of k'e). This means that we are not bound to follow previous case law that applies federal standards to our Bill of Rights without consideration of Common Law, but may review: the question again in light of Navajo principles. However, we still consider federal approaches to the problem, particularly when the use; of nontraditional devices such as courts, police, and jails are at issue. Rodriguez, 5 Am. Tribal Law at 477, 2004 WL 5658107, *3.\\n. At oral argument, the Ramah District Court suggested that an explanation of the right to a jury trial was not necessary due. to Ms. Eria-cho's income, while the Navajo Nation separately suggested one was not necessary due to Eriacho's apparent education level. We reject any rule that conditions the respectful explanation of rights under Navajo due process on subjective assumptions concerning the defendant. This right exists for all defendants in our system.\\n. We note additional concerns in the process by which Eriacho waived her arraignment. At oral argument both sides discussed how the waiver came about at the Office of the Prosecutor. There was no record created by the Ramah District Court or the Office of the:; Prosecutor to show what Eriacho was told in? addition to the defective form. As an analysis of the appropriateness of the use of arraignment waivers distributed by prosecutors andj later approved by the court is not necessary to this case, we reserve comment until properly ; before this Court. We also reserve any question of whether the information communicated by the Prosecutor was otherwise sufficient, under hozho'go, see Rodriguez, 5 Am. Tribal; Law at 479-80, 2004 WL 5658107, *5-6, because the lack of any written infoi mation on the effect of a failure to request a jury ti tal within the time period itself rendered any waiver ineffective.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7346017\", \"name\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Alonzo ARVISO, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Navajo Nation v. Arviso\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-08-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-14-05\", \"first_page\": 675, \"last_page\": 680, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 675\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and SLOAN, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Alonzo ARVISO, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"NAVAJO NATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Alonzo ARVISO, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-14-05.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nAug. 11, 2005.\\nLouis Denetsosie, Jim Fitting, and Danielle Her Many Horses, Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for Petitioner-Appellant.\\nAlonzo Arviso, Crownpoint, Navajo Nation, pro se, for Respondent-Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and SLOAN, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2486\", \"char_count\": \"14803\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis case concerns the dismissal of a forcible detainer action against an occupant of a business site property. We vacate the decision and remand for further proceedings.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are as follows. Bess and Arturo Arviso were the lessees to a twenty-five year business site lease with the Navajo Nation (Nation). The lease authorized the lessees' use of Navajo Nation trust land to operate a gas station in Crownpoint. The lease, which did not include a renewal or renegotiation clause, expired in October of 2001. Bess Arviso died in 1906 and Arturo Arviso died in 2002 shortly after the lease term expired. Alonzo Arviso (Alonzo), son to the former lessees, currently uses the business site without a lease agreement. After the lease expired, Alonzo made some attempt with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to discuss the creation of a lease agreement, but no agreement was ever made.\\nThe Nation filed a forcible detainer action under the forcible entry and detainer statute, 16 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1801 et seq. (1995), to evict Alonzo and his brother from the property and to claim rent and interest. The Nation settled with the brother who is now off the premises. After a hearing, the Crownpoint District court dismissed the Nation's complaint because the court believed the Defendant had rights to the land as a \\\"successor\\\" to the lease as that term is used in section 34 of the expired lease, and that the Nation did not evict him properly based on those rights. This appeal followed.\\nII\\nThe issues are: (1) whether the son of former lessees who continued to operate a business upon a business site after the: death of the lessees is a \\\"successor\\\" under section 34 of a standard lease when the: former lessees did not transfer their lease-; hold interest prior to the expiration of the lease; (2) assuming he is not a successor, whether the Navajo may request eviction; through the forcible entry and detainer,; action; (3) whether the alleged failure u> follow k'\\u00e9 by failing to negotiate a lease renewal is a defense to such eviction; and (4) assuming eviction is proper, whether the Nation may collect unpaid rent from a person who is not a party to the lease.\\nIII\\nEach of the issues before this Court, as stated above, are legal questions. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Judy v. White, No. SC-CV-35-02, 5 Am. Tribal Law 418, 421, 2004 WL 5658577 at *1 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004). We give no deference to the lower court, and review the questions based on our interpretation of the relevant law.\\nIV\\nThis Court notes that both parties based their arguments on the assumption that Alonzo is a successor to the expired business lease between the Nation and Bess and Arturo Arviso. The District Court made the same conclusion, ruling that Alonzo therefore had a contractual right to a renewal that was wrongly denied by the Nation.\\nAlthough all parties involved assumed Alonzo was a successor, we conclude he is not. The procedure for creating a successor interest is outlined in the lease.\\nThe Lessee shall not . . transfer this lease or any right to own an interest in this lease without written approval of the Lessor . No such transfer shall be valid or binding without said approval, and then only upon condition that the sublessee, assignee, or other successor in interest . shall agree in writing to be bound by each and all of the covenants and conditions of the lease.\\nLease, \\u00a7 11. Once a successor is properly established, Section 34 of the lease provides:\\nThis lease and the covenants, conditions and restrictions hereof shall extend to and be binding upon the successors, heirs, assigns, executors, and administrators of the parties hereto.\\nThere is no evidence that the lessor Nation, Bess and Arturo Arviso, or Alonzo ever signed documents during the lease term transferring over \\\"all of the covenants and conditions of the lease\\\" to Alonzo. Because Alonzo did not contract for the full responsibilities of the lease in order to become a successor, as prescribed by the lessor and lessees in the lease terms, he is not a successor party to the lease. The question is then whether the Nation may evict him by a forcible entry and detainer action based on this status.\\nV\\nA\\nThat Alonzo is not a successor means that the Navajo Nation incorrectly filed a forcible detainer action against Ar-viso to remove him from its property. Based on Alonzo's status, he cannot be subject to a forcible detainer action under the forcible entry and detainer statute. 16 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1801(C)(1) (1995). Section 1801 applies detainer actions to tenants \\\"at will or by sufferance.\\\" A \\\"tenancy at will\\\" occurs when land is held by a party with the landlord's consent, but without fixed terms; and a \\\"tenancy by sufferance\\\" occurs when a tenant once had lawful consent to be a tenant, but then unlawfully remains on the property. Blacks Law' Die- tionary 1477 (7th ed.1999). Alonzo is neither, as stated above, because he is not a successor to the lease and occupies the property without the consent of the Nation.\\nAlthough the Nation filed the wrong type of action, a different sub-section of Section 1801 is applicable using a \\\"forcible entry\\\" action. Under Section 1801(B)(1), a \\\"forcible entry\\\" occurs when an entry is made \\\"without the consent of the person having the actual possession.\\\" In this case, the Nation has \\\"actual possession\\\" and the Nation has not consented for Arvi-so to use its land for business purposes. This Court has held that the statute \\\"is designed to address occupancy by trespass or squatting and other wrongful possession of land.\\\" Burnside v. Thriftway Marketing Corp. 7 Nav. R. 152, 155 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1995). The Nation may proceed against Alonzo for eviction from the business site property, and Alonzo will have the burden of establishing some defense that this Court will recognize. For judicial economy and the guidance given herein, this Court will not dismiss the case and considers this matter as a forcible entry action under 16 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1801(B)(1). See Navajo Housing Authority v. Dana, 5 Nav. R. 157, 160 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1987).\\nB\\nThe Crownpoint District Court declined to evict Alonzo because it concluded the Nation waited too long (over twenty-seven years) to demand rent and demand that Alonzo quit the premises. The court also determined that pursuant to the Navajo principle of k'\\u00e9 (which the court eharacter-ized, in application, as a covenant of good faith and fair dealing), the Nation should have not been so \\\"aggressive\\\" in its demands and should have been flexible enough to seek a solution (\\\"The Way Out/' or ch'ih\\u00f3nit'i'), including attempts to^ negotiate a new lease. However, the Nation argues, among other things, that k'\\u00e9 can not create a lease, but that, pursuant to Navajo Nation statutory laws (1) only the Economic Development Committee of the Navajo Nation Council can authorize a business site lease, and (2) that the Navajo Business and Procurement Act prohibits a business site lease to Alonzo because of his indebtedness to the Nation. The Nation also maintains that, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 415 (2000), only the Federal government can create a lease. Because we come to the same outcome under Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 hi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii that Alonzo does not have the right to occupy the property, we are not required to resolve any alleged conflict or establish supremacy between k'\\u00e9, Dim hi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii, federal and Navajo statutory law.\\nDi\\u00f1\\u00e9 hi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii has application to all facets of Navajo life. In Fort Defiance Housing Corporation v. Lowe, No. SC-CV-32-03, 5 Am. Tribal Law 394, 396-99, 2004 WL 5658062 at *1-3 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 2004), this Court applied these laws in the context of the eviction of tenants front their hooghan. Today, we address the application of these laws in an eviction from a business site.\\nOver the years Navajo laws have been enacted to regulate the use of Navajo lands for business purposes. See, e.ti.. 5 N.N.C. \\u00a7 2301 et seq. (1995). The Chapters are now adopting land use plans. The decision of the people through their local and national governments on how to use particular tracts of land is premised upon the \\\"importance of k'e to maintaining social order.\\\" Atcitty v. District Court for the Judicial of Window Rock, 7 Nav. R. 227, 230 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1996). A land use decision by the people through their governments is the balance struck between the individual land user and the needs and desires of the community. As this Court stated in Atcitty, \\\"this is apart of the broader Navajo traditional principle of freedom with responsibility. An individual has much freedom in Navajo society, but that freedom must be exercised with respect for self, family, clan relatives, and the community at large.\\\" 7 Nav. R. at 230 p. 2. The cooperation expected between individuals and the community is also expressed in the Nation's legislative recognition of the place and application of the fundamental laws of the people, where the Navajo Nation Council recognized that Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 hi beenahaz'\\u00e1anii teaches that the rights and freedoms of the individual are not the only considerations. Resolution No. ('N-69-02, Exhibit A \\u00a7 2(A),(B) (November 13, 2002). The rights and free-poms of the people as a whole must also be Recognized. See Tome v. The Navajo Nation, 4 Nav. R. 159, 161 (Nav.Ct.App.1983).\\n\\u215c) The statutory laws of the Nation and the ordinances or resolutions of the Chapters jare thus the regulatory scheme for land use set by Navajo governments. Individuals, such as Alonzo, may not change these laws unilaterally or may not take such actions as will \\\"jeopardize the interests of |he Navajo Nation in the land.\\\" Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Nav. R. 108, 112 (Nav.Ct.App. 1983).\\nBecause the parcel in question is Navajo business site land, Alonzo has no right to occupy this Navajo property for business purposes without being a party to a lease. The lower court erred in holding that k'\\u00e9 can create such a right which culminates in an \\\"equitable lease.\\\" Unlike a residential land situation, in which a home \\\"in the context of Navajo custom and tradition is more than just a dwelling place,\\\" Lowe, No. SC-CV-32-03, support at 3-4 n. 4, there is no comparable interest held by individuals using land owned by the collective Navajo people for commercial purposes. The lowrer court's decision that Alonzo possessed an \\\"equitable lease\\\" is essentially a determination that Alonzo has gained a right of possession comparable to \\\"title\\\" to a tract of land. The concept that an individual can gain an \\\"equitable lease\\\" for business purposes is counter to the long established principle that no individual can gain any prescriptive right in land belonging to the Nation or in land dedicated to a community use. Yazzie v. Jumbo, 5 Nav. R. 75, 77 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1986).\\nMoreover, the collective Navajo people, who have chosen to utilize their common land for economic benefit, should be respected under k'\\u00e9. Alonzo did not operate under k'\\u00e9 when occupying and using Navajo land without invitation or compensation; Therefore, k'\\u00e9 does not mandate an attempted negotiation for a \\\"renewal\\\" when the alleged lessee has no underlying right to the property and has operated without respect for the community. As long as the Nation followed the procedures laid out in the forcible entry and detainer statute, allowing Alonzo to be heard by the court, there is no additional requirement under k'\\u00e9 to perfect eviction. The Nation under the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute is only required to show that the defendant's right of possession terminated, the Nation is entitled to possession and the Nation has made a written demand for possession. Burnside 7 Nav. R. at 164. The Nation has done so, and the Crownpoint District Court therefore erred when it dismissed the Nation's complaint upon the determination that an equitable lease exists.\\nVI\\nThe final question is one the district court did not consider: whether the Nation can collect rent from Alonzo. We must remand the case for the district court to make that determination. However, this Court provides the following guidelines. As Alonzo is not a successor, he is not a party to the lease. It follows that he is not bound by the obligation to pay rent pursuant to the lease terms. If the Nation wishes to pursue unpaid rent accrued during the term of the lese, it must seek it from the actual contracting parties. In this case, because the parties of the lease are deceased, the Nation must bring a separate action against the estate/s of the deceased parties. However, as Alonzo is one of the persons who, as concluded in this opinion, has illegally occupied the property since the expiration of the lease, the Nation must decide whether to seek post-lease rent from him. If the Nation seeks rent, Crownpoint District Court must determine the amount on remand.\\nVII\\nFor the above reasons we VACATE and REMAND this case to the Crownpoint District Court. The district court shall issue a writ of restitution ordering Alonzo Arviso's removal from the property and, if the Nation seeks rent, for a determination of rent.\\n. The lower court also held that because Alonzo is a successor, the lease holdover provision (Section 29) would require the Nation to utilize the default procedures of the lease. The court clearly erred in this interpretation.\\n, Section 29 reads as follows:\\nHolding over by the Lessee after the termination of this lease shall not constitute a renewal or extensions thereof or give the Lessee any rights hereunder or in or to the leased premises. Lessee agrees to remove all property removable under the terms of this lease within sixty (60) days after termination of this lease or pay a daily rental computed at the rate of double the daily rental charged during the year immediately following the termination date of the lease until said property is removed.\\nAlonzo has never been a lessee and therefore Section 29 does not apply to him. Even if he was a successor, Section 29 clearly states that holding over cannot create a right of renewal.\\n. When a lease expires the business site reverts back to the Navajo Nation.\\n. The record also reveals that the Crownpoint Chapter has passed resolutions asking for Alonzo's eviction.\\n.The Nation further argues that because under 7 N.N.G. \\u00a7 204(A) Navajo courts do ' not have the power to alter, rescind, nullify, or contradict Navajo statutory law,\\\" k'\\u00e9 (and generally Di\\u00f1\\u00e9 hi beenahaz' \\u00e1anii) cannot dp the same.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7346301\", \"name\": \"Dorothy PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Phillips v. Navajo Housing Authority\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-13-05\", \"first_page\": 708, \"last_page\": 713, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 708\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and HOLGATE, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Dorothy PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Dorothy PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-13-05.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nDec. 8. 2005.\\nDavid Jordan and Alisha Thompson, Gallup, NM, for Appellant.\\nCalvin Lee Jr., Window Rock, Navajo Nation, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and HOLGATE, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2715\", \"char_count\": \"16622\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\n{ An owner of a mutual help home sued the Navajo Housing Authority for damages arising from NHA's alleged failure to complete renovations to her home. The Shiprock District Court dismissed the ease, apparently ruling that NHA had sovereign immunity based on a Navajo Nation Council resolution passed after the filing of the suit. The Court vacates the district court's decision and remands for further proceedings.\\nI\\n, The relevant facts are taken from the parties' pleadings and the record of the Shiprock District Court. Appellant Dorothy Phillips (Phillips) owns a mutual help home in the Aneth Subdivision in the Utah portion of the Navajo Reservation. Appel-lee Navajo Housing Authority (NHA) began renovating Phillips' home. Phillips moved out of her home temporarily for the renovations to be done. A dispute arose between Phillips and NHA concerning the renovations, and, for reasons still in dispute, Phillips never moved back into her home.\\nPhillips filed a complaint against the Navajo Housing Authority in the Shiprock District Court on August 30, 2004. In her complaint Phillips alleged that NHA never completed the renovations and asserted several claims: (1) property damage, (2) damages based on promissory estoppel, (3) damages for breach of contract, and (4) damages for defamation. While the suit was pending, the Navajo Nation Council passed Resolution No. CO- 55-04 (Resolution) on October 19, 2004, which the President signed on October 29, 2004. The body of the Resolution added the Navajo Nation Legislative Branch and NHA to the list of entities considered the \\\"Navajo Nation\\\" under the Navajo Nation Sovereign Immunity Act (Sovereign Immunity Act). The \\\"Be It Enacted\\\" section of the Resolution states that \\\"[t]he intent of the Navajo Nation Council is to affirm that the Navajo Nation Legislative Branch and Navajo Housing Authority are covered by the sovereign immunity of the Navajo Nation.\\\"\\nBased on the Resolution, NHA moved for dismissal, arguing it was immune from suit. NHA filed the motion on January 6, 2005. Without a response from Phillips, Shiprock District Court granted the motion on January 20, 2005. The order simply states that the motion is \\\"well-taken.\\\" Phillips then filed her appeal. The Court held oral argument on November 16, 2005, and now issues its decision.\\nII\\nThe issues in this case are (1) whether failure of a party to respond to a motion to dismiss within fourteen days of service constitutes a waiver of the right to argue on appeal against an order granting the motion, (2) whether a resolution purporting to include Navajo Housing Authority under the Sovereign Immunity Act is \\\"retroactive legislation\\\" if the Court applied it to a suit filed before the resolution's passage, and (3) if so, whether the Navajo Nation Council clearly intended that the resolution apply retroactively.\\nIll\\nBefore considering the merits of the appeal, the Court disposes of a threshold procedural issue, Phillips argues that the grant of the motion to dismiss without waiting for her response violated her light to Due Process. NHA argues that granting the motion was entirely proper, as she had ample time to respond to it. The Court looks at the issue slightly differently than the parties. The real issue is whether failure to respond to the motion prevents Phillips from arguing on appeal that the order granting the motion was improper.\\nAs the Court has previously ruled, failure to respond to a motion is not an admission the court should grant the motion, and the Court concludes today that such failure, in the context of this case, is not a waiver of the right to argue the merits on appeal. As the parties point out, there is no rule in the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure setting a deadline to respond to a motion. Therefore, the district courts are left to set up their own deadline, consistent with the requirements of Due Process. However, whether or not the time allotted to Phillips was fair, failure to respond to a motion is not an admission that the court should grant the motion. See Navajo Housing Authority v. Bluffview Resident Management Corp., Bd. of Directors, No. SC-CV-35-00, 2003 WL. 25794033 at *4 n. 5, 4 Am. Tribal Law 700, 705 n. 5 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2003). Failure to respond to a motion to dismiss before a deadline clearly established by the district court, however, might be a waiver of a party's right to argue against the order of dismissal on appeal. Regardless, the Court will not deny an appellant's right to argue against an order of dismissal if the district court did not give notice of the deadline for a response. In the absence of a timeline in the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure, the district courts can supply their own deadline, but, at a minimum, the courts must inform the party responding to the motion of the deadline to file his or her response. Due process requires no less. In this case, the Shiprock District Court provided no timeline, and, the Court therefore considers Phillips' arguments against the order of dismissal.\\nIV\\nThe central issue in this appeal is the Shiprock District Court's apparent dismissal of Phillips' complaint due to Nil V' immunity from suit. The appropriateness of the dismissal depends on whether the Resolution is \\\"retroactive legislation,\\\" that is, whether the Resolution changes the legal landscape by applying newly granted sovereign immunity to suits filed before the Resolution's effective date. NHA argues that the Resolution is not \\\"retroactive legislation\\\" because it merely \\\"clarifies\\\" that NHA was always covered under the Sovereign Immunity Act. NHA suggests, without stating explicitly, that the Council merely corrected an erroneous interpretation of this Court, which NHA characterizes tactfully as \\\"confusion\\\" over the last few years over the scope of NHA's immunity. Phillips disagrees, arguing that at the time of her suit, NHA clearly had no immunity, and was not covered by the Sovereign Immunity Act. The Resolution, which purports to include NHA under the \\\"Navajo Nation\\\" for purposes of immunity, according to Phillips, changed NHA's status, and therefore her ability to seek relief. If the Court interprets the Resolution to bar Phillips' claims, she argues, the Resolution would have retroactive effect.\\n' Phillips is correct, as this Court's consistent interpretation of NHA's plan of operation up to the passage of the Resolution had been that it had no sovereign immunity. Beginning in 1987 in Navajo Housing Authority v. Howard Dana, and Associates, 5 Nav. R. 157 (Nav.Sup.Ct.), this Court interpreted a provision of NHA's plan of operation as the Council's waiver of any alleged sovereign immunity:\\nThe Navajo Tribe gives its irrevocable consent to allowing the Authority to sue and be sued in its corporate name, upon any contract, claim or obligation aiising out of its activities, the Authority to agree by contract to waive any immunity from suit which the Navajo Housing Authority might otherwise have.\\n6 N.N.C. \\u00a7 616(b)(1) (1995). Further, the Court did not require the plaintiff to fulfill any of the notice or other procedural requirements of the Sovereign Immunity Act. The Court reiterated that holding in 2003 in Bluffview, and stated explicitly that NHA was not included in Sovereign Immunity Act, but was covered by Section 616 of its plan of operation. No. SC-CV-35-00, 4 Am. Tribal Law 700, 705-06, 2003 WL 25794033 at *4-5. In 2004, the Court again held that NHA had no sovereign immunity from suit due to Section 616. Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, No. SC-CV-10-02, 5 Am. Tribal Law 438, 442, 2004 WL 5658576 at *2 (2004). Far from there being some latter-day \\\"confusion,\\\" the Court has consistently held for seventeen years leading up to the action of the Council that NHA was not covered by the Sovereign Immunity Act, and had no immunity from suit pursuant to the plain language of its plan of operation.\\nBased on this history, it is clear that the Resolution did not merely \\\"clarify\\\" an ambiguity, but altered the legal landscape by purporting to bring NHA under the Sovereign Immunity Act. Before the Resolution, under the Court's precedents, Phillips had a cause of action outside of the Sovereign Immunity Act to seek relief against NHA. The Resolution allegedly changes that, apparently requiring Phillips to follow the procedural and jurisdictional limitations of the Act, which, among things, requires notice of the suit to the Attorney General and the President and allows NHA to transfer the case from the Shiprock District Court to the Window Rock District Court. 1 N.N.C. \\u00a7 555(A); (D) (1995). Were this Court to recognize sovereign immunity in this case pursuant to the Resolution, the Court would be applying the act retroactively. The Resolution alters Phillip's ability to litigate a case filed before the Resolution's effective date, and therefore burdens ap important property right. See In re Certified Questions, No. SC-CV-49-00, slip op. at 5 n. 4 (Nav.Sup. Ct. July 18, 2001) (recognizing right to cause of action as property right under Navajo Due Process); Benally v. Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99, 2 Am. Tribal Law 518, 519, 2000 WL. 35732588 at *1 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2000) (same).\\nIV\\nThe real question in this case is whether the Resolution does apply retroactively. Phillips argues that there is no clear intent in the Resolution to apply sovereign immunity to cases filed before the Resolution's passage. NHA makes no direct argument on this point. A Council resolution will not have retroactive effect unless its language requires that result. Ramah Navajo Community School v. Navajo Nation, No. SC-CV-17-99, 3 Am. Tribal Law 502, 506, 2001 WL 36173241 at *3 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2001). Therefore, before the Court decides whether the retroactive application of a resolution is valid under the Navajo Bill of Rights, the Council must have shown its clear intent that it meant to apply the resolution retroactively at all. This rule, adopted from the United States Supreme Court, see id., is consistent with the Navajo concept of \\u00ed\\u00edshj\\u00e1n\\u00ed \\u00e1doonnl, which mandates that Navajo laws must be clear so that our people may understand them. See Yazzie v. Thompson, No. SC CV-69-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law 672, 671. 2005 WL 6235970 at *2 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005); Rough Rock Community School v. Navajo Nation, 1 Nav. R. 168, 174 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1995). This clarity requirement takes on particular importance in laws affecting homes, as homes hold a central place in Navajo thinking. See Fort Defiance Housing Corp. v. Lowe, No. SC-CV-32-03, 5 Am. Tribal Law 394, 396-99, 2004 WL 5658062 at *1-3 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004) (discussing importance of homes). The Court will not interpret such laws to burden the ability of Navajos to live in safe and secure homes unless clearly stated by the Council. Cf. Duncan v. Shiprock District Court, No. SC-CV-51-04, 5 Am. Tribal Law 458, 465-66, 2004 WL 5658109 at *5-6 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004) (declining to restrict right to jury trial unless clearly stated by Council).\\nThe Resolution lacks the necessary Clarity, and therefore cannot have retroactive effect. The body of the Resolution merely adds \\\"Legislative Branch\\\" and \\\"Navajo Housing Authority\\\" to the list of entities considered the Navajo Nation. There is a sentence in the \\\"Be it Enacted\\\" Section of the Resolution which states that \\\"the intent of the Navajo Nation Council is to affirm that the . Navajo Housing Authority [is] covered by the sovereign immunity of the Navajo Nation.\\\" There is frothing explicitly making the Resolution Retroactive. The only possible reference is the word \\\"affirm.\\\" The word \\\"affirm\\\" Suggests that the Council was merely recognizing that NHA always had immunity. However, as discussed above, NHA's immunity, if any, started on the effective date of the legislation. The word \\\"affirm,\\\" by itself, does not clearly mandate retroactive application, but merely is an attempt to bolster the position that NHA always had immunity, a position rejected by the Court earlier in this opinion. Lacking clear intent by the Council in the Resolution, Phillips is not barred from bringing this suit, and the Shiprock District Court erred.\\nV\\nBased on the above, the Court VACATES the order of dismissal and REMANDS the case for further proceedings in the Shiprock District Court. Sovereign immunity is not a defense in this action, but the Court does not prohibit NHA from asserting other non-immunity based defenses on remand.\\n. At oral argument the parties made numerous allegations concerning the merits of the case. As there have been no factual findings lion any of these allegations, and, as the issues in this case concern sovereign immunity and not the merits of the underlying case, the Court does not consider the allegations as part ofits decision.\\n. A ruling that the motion was improperly granted for failure to allow a response does not help Phillips on the merits of this appeal, as, if the Court agrees, the Court would be required to remand the case to allow her to respond to the motion. Assuming Shiprock District Court again granted the motion, this case would again be up on appeal on the same issue now before it, and Phillips would then be in the exact same position she is in now. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court reframes the issue in terms of a waiver of Phillips' right to argue against the order of dismissal on appeal, which, if there were a waiver, would require dismissal of the entire ease.\\n. The order of dismissal itself states no reasons for the decision, but merely states that the motion is \\\"well-taken.\\\" The Court lias consistently required findings of fact and con-clusions of law so that the parties may understand the decision and so that this Court may effectively review the decision on appeal. See Watson v. Watson, No. SC-CV-45-03, 6 Am. Tribal Law 644, 647, 2005 WL 6235871 at *2 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005) (requiring findings of fact for discretionary decisions that dispose of an issue in the case); Navajo Nation v. Badonie No. SC-CR-01-03, 5 Am. Tribal Law 416, 417, 2004 WL 5658159 at *1 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 2004) (requiring findings of fact in criminal cases when trial occurs); Burbank v. Clarke, 7 Nav. R. 369, 372, 2 Am. Tribal Law 424, 1999 WL 34973499 (Nav.Sup.CU999) (requiring findings of fact in civil cases); Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 46, 47 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1983) (same). The failure to include such findings and conclusions can result in the vacating of the district court's decision and a remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., Watson, No. SC CV-45-03, 6 Am. Tribal Law 644, 647, 2005 WL 6235871 at *2. However, in this case, NHA's motion to dismiss primarily relies on the Resolution, and it reasonable to believe the dismissal was, at least partially, based on sovereign immunity. Further, as sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense, Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 5 Nav. R. 192, 195 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 1987), and therefore may be brought up on appeal for the first time, and as fairness to the parties mandates that the Court avoid unnecessary remands, the Court assumes, as the parties do, that the Shiprock District Court dismissed the case because it believed NHA was immune from suit pursuant to the Resolution.\\n. The Court assumes, without establishing, that NHA is immune from suit alter the effective date of the legislation, except as permitted by the Sovereign Immunity Act. As it is not necessary to decide the question, the Court offers no opinion.\\n. The Court notes that the holding in In re Certified Questions appears to have been ignored by the Council in the new version of the Navajo Code. In that case, the Court ruled that Resolution No. CJA-18-00 was not a \\\"legislative act\\\" and therefore not binding law. No. SC-CV-49-00, at 7-8. However, in the new 2005 Code, the resolution's language appears as 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1013. Further, the language of the resolution has been altered, significantly changing the meaning. Where the language of the resolution had anticipated a comprehensive workers' compensation statute to be passed to address non-Navajo Nation employers, and included a temporary provision recognizing state programs until such passage, see Resolution No. CJA-18 00, \\u00a7 2, the Code states that \\\"the right to receive workers' compensation . shall be the exclusive remedy against employers.\\\" 15 N.N < \\u00a7 1013 (2005).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7347237\", \"name\": \"Ernest TSO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-08-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-20-06\", \"first_page\": 793, \"last_page\": 795, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 793\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Ernest TSO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ernest TSO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAVAJO HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\\nNo. SC-CV-20-06.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nAug. 10, 2006.\\nSampson Martinez, Esq., Gallup, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\\nPatterson V. Joe Esq., Flagstaff, AZ, for Defendants-Appellants.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"802\", \"char_count\": \"4792\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis matter comes before the Court on Appellants' Petition for Reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of their appeal for failure to file a transcript. The Court grants the reconsideration, and issues this opinion to again clarify the appellate rules concerning transcripts.\\nI\\nThe relevant facts are as follows. Appellants appealed a decision of the Crown-point District Court. They did not file a transcript of the lower court proceeding within thirty days of the notice of appeal, as required by Rule 9(a) of the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (NRCAP). They did not seek and extension of the time to file the transcript, and did not file a pleading indicating they intended not to file a transcript. Pursuant to NRCAP 10(c), the Court dismissed the appeal. Appellants filed their Petition for Reconsideration, contending that their appeal concerns purely a question of law, and therefore a transcript is not required.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether an appellant has an affirmative duty to notify the Supreme Court that it intends not to file a transcript because he or she believes a transcript is not necessary to resolve the appeal.\\nIII\\nLike another recent case, Thompson v. Yazzie, No. SC-CV-21-06, 2006 WL 6171160, 6 Am. Tribal Law 764 (Nav.Sup. Ct.2006), the Court is again required to clarify its rules regarding the filing of transcripts. In Thompson, the Court confirmed that a transcript is required in all appeals, and the Court will dismiss appeals if appellants do not file one, unless one of several exceptions exists. Id., at 6 Am. Tribal Law at 765, 2006 WL 6171160 at *1. This opinion concerns the first exception: where an appellant deems no part of the transcript to be necessary to decide the appeal. NRCAP 9(b)(1). Appellants argue that a transcript is not necessary when the appeal concerns a question of law, and therefore it is improper for the Court to dismiss the case for a lack of a transcript in such circumstances. Appellants are correct that in appeals concerning purely legal questions, which do not require the review of factual findings or evidentiary matters, but concern only the interpretation and application of legal principles, a transcript is not required.\\nThe question in this case is whether an appellant can do nothing to inform the Court that he or she believes a transcript is not necessary, and yet still expect the Court to not dismiss the case. While a transcript is not necessary in this type of appeal, the Court cannot guess that the appellant is appealing a purely legal question based on the notice of appeal, which usually does not indicate the grounds for the appeal. Therefore, to avoid confusion and to make sure appellants live up to their responsibilities concerning the appellate record, the Court holds that an appellant has an affirmative duty to inform the Court and the other parties in the case that he or she believes that a transcript is not necessary to the appeal, and will not be filed. Absent that notice, the Court will conclude that a transcript simply has not been filed, and, absent a request and grant of an extension, the Court will dismiss the appeal.\\nThe only remaining question is whether the Court will apply this rule to the present case. As Appellants did not inform the Court of their intention not to file a transcript, application of the duty to file a notice would require the Court to uphold the dismissal of this appeal. However, Appellants correctly point out that the Court has not been consistent over the years, and has allowed some cases to move forward despite the lack of timely filing of a transcript when purely legal questions are involved. See, e.g., Burnside v. Thriftway Marketing Corp., 7 Nav. R. 152, 157 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1995) (noting lack of timely filing of the transcript, but denying motion to dismiss for defect). The Court therefore uses its discretion to apply the rule in this case prospectively to only those cases filed after the date of this opinion. See Fort Defiance Housing Corp. v. Allen, No. SC-CV-01-03, 5 Am. Tribal Law 408, 411, 2004 WL 5658711 at *2-3 n. 4 (Nav.Sup.Ct. 2004) (Court has authority based on k'\\u00e9 to apply rule announced in opinion only to cases filed after date of opinion).\\nIV\\nBased on the above, the Court GRANTS the reconsideration and REINSTATES the appeal. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue a Rule 10(b) notice immediately to allow the parties to file their briefs.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7347289\", \"name\": \"Harrison TOLEDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BASHAS' DINE MARKET, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Toledo v. Bashas' Dine Market\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-08-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-41-05\", \"first_page\": 796, \"last_page\": 801, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 796\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and L. BEDONIE, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Harrison TOLEDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BASHAS\\u2019 DINE MARKET, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Harrison TOLEDO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BASHAS\\u2019 DINE MARKET, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-41-05.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nAug. 17, 2006.\\nDavid R. Jordan, Gallup, NM, for Appellant.\\nDavid W. Barrow and Stephanie J. Quincy, Flagstaff, AZ, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON and L. BEDONIE, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2435\", \"char_count\": \"15370\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThe Navajo Nation Labor Commission (Commission) found that Harrison Toledo (Toledo), a Bashas' employee, sexually harassed a fellow employee in violation of Bashas' Member Handbook, and therefore was terminated for \\\"just cause\\\" under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA). The Commission also:found that Bashas' violated three other provisions of the NPEA, but only issued a remedial order for one of those violations. The Court affirms the Commission.\\nI\\nAppellant Toledo was an Assistant Night Crew Chief at Bashas' Dine Market # 35 located in Window Rock. On April 29, 2004, Toledo was terminated from his employment with Bashas' based on alleged misconduct involving verbal and physical harassment of a fellow Bashas' employee. During an investigation into the incident, Toledo admitted that he had touched the breast of the employee while on duty. The investigation revealed that Toledo had previously had a sexual relationship with the employee, and indicated that he wished to rekindle that relationship.\\nToledo filed a complaint with the Commission alleging, among other things, that he was fired without \\\"just cause,\\\" as required by the NPEA. At the proceeding, Toledo denied he had touched the employee's breast. He also stated that he did not need training on sexual harassment to know that touching a female employee's breast was \\\"wrong.\\\" The Commission upheld the termination, concluding that Toledo had touched the employee's breast, and had sexually harassed that employee in violation of Bashas' Member Handbook. In addition, the Commission found that Bashas' violated three sections of the NPEA: 15 N.N.C. S (504(B)(8), because it stated an \\\"at-will\\\" employment policy in its Handbook, 15 N.N.C. S 604(A)(2), by failing to have an affirmative action plan, and 15 N.N.C \\u00a7 605, by failing to send workforce reports to the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (ONLR). The Commission ordered Bashas' to amend its at-will employment policy within sixty days, but ordered no remedy for the other two violations, stating that they were \\\"harmless\\\" violations because virtually all of Bashas' workers on the Navajo Nation were Navajo tribal members. Bashas' did amend its at-will policy. This appeal followed. The Court held oral argument on July 13, 2006 and now issues this decision.\\nII\\nThe issues in this case are (1) Whether Bashas' had \\\"just cause\\\" to terminate Toledo on the basis that he sexually harassed another employee in violation of Bashas' Member Handbook, when allegedly he received no sexual harassment training; and (2) whether the Commission erred in not granting remedial relief based on its conclusions on Bashas' remaining violations of the NPEA: 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 604(A)(2), lack of an affirmative action plan, and 15 N.N.C \\u00a7 605, failing to send workforce reports to the Office of Navajo Labor Relations.\\nIII\\nThis Court reviews decisions of the Commission under an abuse of discretion standard. Smith v. Navajo Nation Dep't of Head Start, No. SC-CV-50-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law 683, 685, 2005 WL 6235868 at *1 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005). For example, \\\"the Commission abuses its discretion when it makes a mistake as to applicable law, that is, makes an erroneous legal conclusion.\\\" Tso v. Navajo Housing Authority, No. SC-CV-10-02, 4 Am. Tribal Law 641, 642-43, 2003 WL 25794038 at *1-2 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004). The Court's review of factual findings, however, is more deferential. Id., at 4 Am. Tribal Law 641, 642-43, 2003 WL 25794038 at *1-2. This Court will find that a decision is \\\"supported by substantial evidence\\\" when \\\"a 'reasonable mind' could accept [the evidence] as adequate to support the conclusion, even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.\\\" Id. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, \\\"with no deference given to the Commission's interpretation of the law.\\\" Smith, at 6 Am. Tribal Law at 685-86, 2005 WL 6235868, *1-2. Whether there is \\\"just cause\\\" for termination or whether the Commission is required to issue remedial orders for every NPEA violation are legal conclusions.\\nIV\\nToledo argues that he never re-eeived sexual harassment training and therefore Bashas' did not have \\\"just cause\\\" under the NPEA to fire him on sexual harassment grounds. The Commission made no findings on whether Bashas' adequately trained Toledo. Generally, if training were relevant to the question of \\\"just cause,\\\" the Court would be required to remand the case back to the Commission for factual findings on whether Toledo received sexual harassment training, However, though Toledo argues before this Court that he lacked training, he did not assert that point in his charge or complaint. This Court recently ruled in Hood v. Navajo Nation Department of Headstart that the Commission can only make findings of fact and conclusions of law on those claims raised by the employee in his or her charge filed with ONLR and those issues remaining when the employee files a complaint with the Commission. No. SC-CV-11-05, 6 Am. Tribal Law 721, 723-24, 2006 WL 6168349 at *2-3 (Nav.Sup.n. 2006). Toledo argues to this Court that the lack of training is an affirmative violation of the NPEA requiring damages. Hood barred the Commission, and bars this Court from considering that alleged affirmative violation. Toledo also uses the alleged lack of training as a defense to Bashas' assertion that Toledo committed sexual harassment. In this context, the lack of training is not an affirmative claim, but a defense in response to the employer's position that the employee was fired for \\\"just cause.\\\" Hood does not bar review of that defense. The Court therefore considers whether training affects whether Bashas' fired Toledo for \\\"just cause.\\\"\\nIn Smith, the Court ruled that \\\"[j]ust cause is a broad concept that involves unique factual circumstances in each situation and therefore must be applied based on the unique facts of each case.\\\" No. SC-CV-50-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law at 686, 2005 WL 6235868 at *2. In addition, the Court has stated that \\\"just cause\\\" can include \\\"a wide range of employer justifications for adverse actions.\\\" Dilcon Navajo Westerner/True Value Store v. Jensen, No. SC-CV-52-98, 2 Am. Tribal Law 502, 509, 2000 WL 35732586 at *5 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2000). In Smith the Court interpreted \\\"just cause\\\" in the context of a clear rule in a personnel manual defining conduct. The Court ruled that \\\"ordinarily a violation of a clear rule in a personnel manual for which termination is a result of non-compliance is 'just cause.' \\\" No. SC-CV-50-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law at 686, 2005 WL 6235868 at *2.\\nThe Commission relied on Bashas' sexual harassment policy in its Handbook to support Toledo's termination. That policy states that \\\"[i]t is [Bashas'] policy to maintain a work environment free from harassment and/ or intimidation.\\\" Handbook, Respondent's Exhibit C, at 18. The Handbook further defines \\\"sexual harassment\\\" as \\\"[h]arassment that includes any unwanted sexual advance.\\\" Id. The Handbook includes several examples, including \\\"[t]o make unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical contact a condition of continued employment or of any employment decision.\\\" Id. Bashas' did not allege in its termination notice that Toledo attempted to exchange sexual favors for a favorable employment decision. The Handbook further includes among actions constituting sexual harassment, \\\"creat[ing] an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment by such conduct.\\\" Id. The Handbook does not define any of the terms \\\"intimidating,\\\" \\\"hostile,\\\" or \\\"offensive.\\\" Finally, the Handbook states that the specific definitions of sexual harassment are \\\"for clarification purposes only and is not, complete or all inclusive.\\\" Id.\\nGenerally, an ambiguous policy, in the absence of training to inform employees of what that policy means, cannot justify termination. See Smith, No. SC-CV-50-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law at 685-86, 2005 WL 6235868 at *1-2 (requiring violation of a \\\"clear rule\\\" to justify \\\"just cause\\\" termination); cf. Phillips v. Navajo Housing Authority, No. SC-CV-13-05, 6 Am. Tribal Law 708, 711-13, 2005 WL 6236356 at *3-4 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005) (discussing Navajo principle of \\u00ed\\u00edshj\\u00e1n\\u00ed \\u00e1doonifi, mandating that laws be clear). The Court realizes that it is difficult to draft a policy in a personnel manual to clearly and accurately define a broad concept like sexual harassment, particularly when the policy includes terms like \\\"hostile work environment,\\\" which may not be capable of clear defini tion outside the context of specific situations. Cf. Smith, No. SC-CV-50-04, 6 Am. Tribal Law at 685-83, 2005 WL 6235868 at *1-2 (\\\"just cause\\\" can only be defined under facts of each case); Navajo Nation v. Kelly, No. SC-CR-04-05, 6 Am. Tribal Law 772, 774, 2006 WL 6168966 at *1 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006) (same for definition of terms \\\"wanton\\\" and \\\"endanger\\\" in crime of reckless driving). All employers within the Navajo Nation therefore must ensure proper training on their sexual harassment policy if such policies are to be deemed reasonable notice of conduct that may cause an employee's termination.\\nIn the present case, however, the Court finds that the ambiguity of Bashas' sexual harassment policy and alleged lack of training became irrelevant once Toledo admitted during the Commission hearing that he did not need training to know that touching another employee's breast was \\\"wrong.\\\" Importantly, Toledo's counsel at oral argument did not contest that Toledo touched the other employee's breast, but argued that the lack of training on Bashas' ambiguous sexual harassment policy excused such behavior, particularly in the context of the past relationship between Toledo and the employee. The Court finds such behavior so obviously inappropriate, regardless of the past relationship, that Bashas' ambiguous sexual harassment policy is not implicated in this case. Common sense indicates that Toledo's behavior\\u2014of touching another employee's breast while in the workplace\\u2014was so egregious that termination would be a likely consequence, and Toledo himself admitted as much when he stated that he did not need training to know such behavior was wrong. See Kesoli v. Anderson Security Agency, No. SC-CV-01-05, slip op. at 5-6 (Nav. Sup.Ct. October 12, 2005) (supervisor shouting at subordinates was \\\"harassment\\\" and therefore \\\"just cause\\\" in absence of personnel manual). There was therefore \\\"just cause\\\" to terminate Toledo, and the Commission did not err.\\nV\\nThe remaining issue is whether the Commission erred when it declined to issue any remedial order for two out of the three violations of the NPEA it concluded Bashas' committed. The Commission concluded that Bashas' violated three sections of the NPEA independent of the \\\"just cause\\\" issue discussed above. It only ordered Bashas' to remedy one of the three violations, the inclusion of an \\\"at-will\\\" policy in the Handbook, and considered \\\"harmless\\\" the lack of an affirmative action plan and the failure to submit work force reports to the Office of Navajo Labor Relations. Toledo argues that the Commission erred in not ordering a remedy for the two \\\"harmless\\\" violations, and also asserts that it should have remedied the violations by awarding Toledo damages,\\nThe Commission erred, but not for the reason asserted by Toledo. Toledo did not assert Bashas' violated the three provisions in its charge and complaint, and, based on Hood, the Commission therefore was not empowered to make any conclusions on those violations. This does not mean Bashas' may violate the NPEA with impunity if an employee does not raise such violations. ONLR has the authority to file its own charge and investigate violations of the NPEA, 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 610(B)(1) (2005), and may remedy any violation by Bashas' through this process. It is ONLR's duty and responsibility, in the absence of an employee charge that an employer violated the NPEA, to investigate violations of the act, and use its authority to seek a remedy.\\nThe lack of authority to review these violations has several ramifications. Ordinarily the Court would vacate the remedial order to revise Bashas' at-will policy, as it was beyond the Commission's authority. However, Bashas' does not request that the order be vacated, and has already complied with the NPEA by changing its policy within the Navajo Nation. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court will not reverse the Commission's order to amend the at-will policy. However, because Toledo did not assert the statutory violations in his charge and complaint, the Court will not disturb the Commission's decision not to issue remedial orders for the other two violations.\\nEven assuming the Court did review the Commission decision, Toledo would not prevail. The Commission has discretion in determining what type of remedial relief is appropriate for NPEA violations. Section 612 of the NPEA outlines the remedies and sanctions the Commission may implement for violations of the Act. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 612(A)(1) states the Commission, after finding a violation of the Act, shall issue one or more remedial orders, including, \\\"without limitation\\\": directed hiring, reinstatement, displacement of non-Navajo employees, back-pay, front-pay, in-junctive relief, mandated corrective action and/or upon a finding of intentional violation, imposition of civil fines. Based on the plain language of the NPEA, the Commission has no discretion to label a particular violation \\\"harmless\\\" and decline to issue a remedy. The NPEA requires the Commission to deal with all violations of the statute properly before it, and issue an appropriate remedy. However, though the Commission must issue some remedy for all violations, contrary to Toledo's argument, the Commission does not have to compensate the employee for those violations. This Court in Sells v. Rough Rock Community School, No. SC-CV-32-04, 2005 WL 6235867 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2005) found that a NPEA violation that had no bearing on an employee's situation did not require the award of damages to that employee. Id., at 6 Am. Tribal Law at 653-54, 2005 WL 6235807, *4-5. Here, the lack of an affirmative action plan or workforce report does not affect Toledo's wrongful termination claim (which, even if it did, the Court has decided his claim has no merit). Bashas' NPEA violations do not directly relate to Toledo's termination and therefore, even if the Commission appropriately reviewed those violations, the NPEA does not require the Commission to award him damages.\\nVI\\nBased on the above, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission.\\n. Indeed, Bashas' notice of termination to Toledo does not mention its sexual harassment policy, but instead, adopting reasons stated in a separate disciplinary memorandum, cites \\\"unwelcome sexual related conduct and behavior by persistently suggesting of a sexual nature [sic] to start a love affair with a Bashas member Sheila Hardy that ended 4 years ago[,][a]lso by physically touching her breast while on company time,\\\" Member Conference Memorandum, April 29, 2004.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7347407\", \"name\": \"Milton J. YAZZIE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOOH DINEH INDUSTRIES, Respondent-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Yazzie v. Tooh Dineh Industries\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-09-20\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-67-05\", \"first_page\": 806, \"last_page\": 811, \"citations\": \"6 Am. Tribal Law 806\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:38.572494+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Milton J. YAZZIE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOOH DINEH INDUSTRIES, Respondent-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Milton J. YAZZIE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOOH DINEH INDUSTRIES, Respondent-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-67-05.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nSept. 20, 2006.\\nPatterson Joe, Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellant.\\nC. Benson Hufford, Flagstaff, Arizona, for Appellee.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"2240\", \"char_count\": \"13933\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nThis case concerns whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to allow an employee to file a complaint against his employer beyond the time set out in the Navajo Preference in Employment Act. The Court vacates the Navajo Nation Labor Commission's decision that equitable tolling should not apply, and remands for further proceedings.\\nI\\nThis is the second visit by Milton Yazzie (Yazzie) to this Court on his challenge to his termination by Tooh Dine Industries (Tooh Dineh) nearly a decade ago (November 8, 1996). The Navajo Nation Labor Commission (Commission) determined that Yazzie failed to comply with two statutes of limitation set out in the Navajo Prefer ence in Employment Act (NPEA): (1)15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 610(B)(6), allowing 865 days to file a charge with Office of Navajo Labor Relations and (2) 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 610(J)(l)(c), allowing 360 days to file a complaint with the Commission. Based on the untimely filing of his charge and complaint, the Commission dismissed Yazzie's case. On appeal, this Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to have the Commission determine whether or not the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to waive the statutes of limitation. Memorandum Decision, Yazzie v. Took Dineh, SC-CV-12-01 (Nav.Sup.Ct. March 29, 2004).\\nAlter the remand, the Commission held an evidentiary hearing and reaffirmed its dismissal on several grounds. The Commission concluded that Yazzie's testimony that he visited the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (ONLR) several times before 2000, but was rebuffed, was not credible. The Commission instead relied on the testimony of an employee of ONLR, wrho in an affidavit filed with Tooh Dineh's motion to dismiss and in an earlier letter to Yazzie stated Yazzie had not visited ONLR before 2000 and claimed to have searched the sign-in sheets from the time Yazzie allegedly visited and had not located Yazzie's name. That employee's testimony at the hearing was actually different, as he testified that ONLR employees could not locate the sign-in sheets for that time period, and that he did not remember whether Yazzie had visited prior to 2000. Transcript at 19. The employee also testified that he informed Yazzie in March, 2000 that the time to file a charge had expired and that ONLR did not handle workmen's compensation cases, but had Yazzie asked for a charge form, he would have given him one. The Commission also questioned Yazzie's testimony that he went to several different, attorneys before 2000, who allegedly did not inform him of his right to file a wrongful termination claim under the NPEA, but only gave him advice on a potential workmen's compensation claim. In its dismissal order the Commission asked the rhetorical question why the attorneys did not advise him of his rights under the NPEA. Finally, the Commission concluded that allowing Yazzie's late filing would prejudice Tooh Dineh, as Tooh Dineh did not have Yazzie's personnel file, and therefore could not defend against Yazzie's claim of termination without just cause. This second appeal followed.\\nII\\nThe issue in this case is whether the Commission followed this Court's remand instructions when it declined to apply equitable tolling to allow the appellant to file a charge and complaint beyond the time limitations set out in the NPEA.\\nIII\\nThis Court reviews decisions of the Commission under an abuse of discretion standard. Toledo v. Bashas' Din\\u00e9 Market, 2006 WL 6168967, *1-2, 6 Am. Tribal Law 796, 797-98 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006). Under this standard, the Court's review of factual findings is deferential, and those findings will only be reversed if not supported by \\\"substantial evidence.\\\" Id. This Court will find that a decision is \\\"supported by substantial evidence\\\" when \\\"a 'reasonable mind' could accept [the evidence] as adequate to support the conclusion, even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.\\\" Id. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, with no deference given to the Commission's interpretation of the law. Id. Whether the Commission followed the Court's remand instructions is a legal conclusion. In re Estate of Kindle, 6 Am. Tribal 750, 751-52, 2006 WL 6168972, *1-2 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2006).\\nIV\\nThe only question in this case is whether the Commission followed this Court's instructions when it refused to allow Yazzie to file his charge and complaint. The question turns on the concept of \\\"equitable tolling.\\\" The NPEA's statutes of limitation can be tolled by equitable considerations, and the Court and the Commission must look at the circumstances surrounding the late filing to decide whether fairness and substantial justice mandate waiving the time requirements. Harvey v. Kayenta Unified School Dist., 7 Nav. R. 374, 375-76, 1 Am. Tribal Law 707 (Nav.Sup.Ct.1999). In Harvey this Court held that a respondent's conduct that contributes to the petitioner's failure to meet a statute of limitation can toll the time limitation. Id. at 375, 1 Am. Tribal Law 707. In this way, the statutes of limitation in the NPEA are not jurisdictional, but may be waived based on the circumstances surrounding the late filing. Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm'n, 5 Am. Tribal 406, 406-07, 2004 WL 5658111, *1-2 (Nav.Sup.Ct.2004).\\nIn the memorandum decision in this case, the Court expanded the concept of equitable tolling to include instances where extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioners's control make it impossible to file a claim on time. Yazzie, No. SC-CV-12-01, mem. dec. at 3-4. The Court also instructed the Commission to analyze whether the application of equitable tolling would unjustly prejudice Tooh Dineh, due to the loss of evidence or disappearance of witnesses. Id. at 8. Though the Court announced these principles in a memorandum decision, which is not binding precedent, see Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Rule 22(c), the Court reiterates those principles in this opinion as law.\\nThe application of these principles in this case required the Commission to consider the conduct of the Office of Navajo Labor Relations (ONLR). In no uncertain terms, the Court informed the Commission that employees of ONLR are \\\"gate keepers\\\" upon whom the petitioner depends in order to receive the protections of the NPEA. Id. at 5. As observed by the Court, if ONLR employees do not properly perform their responsibilities under the NPEA, the petitioner may, through no fault of his. or .her own, miss the time limitations. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that ONLR employees are to provide information, provide needed assistance and provide necessary forms to people who come to their offices. Id. at 6. The Court further noted that whether equitable tolling is applied can depend upon the conduct of ONLR employees in light of the claimant's situation, especially where the claimant is unaware of time limits, is unschooled in filing procedures or is unable to articulate his or her employment charge. Id. The Court again adopts these principles in this opinion.\\nThough the Commission was required on remand to look at all of these factors, it failed to do so. This Court was very specific in its remand instructions, yet the Commission either misconstrued them or, at worse, chose to ignore them. The record shows that the evidentiary hearing held on remand did not comply with the instructions. Instead, the Commission considered some of the circumstances surrounding Yazzie's late filing, and reached problematic conclusions, but did not fully analyze the situation consistent with the remand instructions.\\nThe Commission avoided a thorough analysis of the equitable tolling factors by interpreting its task on remand to be pvi- marily to clarify whether the Commission rejected Yazzie's testimony concerning his alleged visits to ONLR. In its second dismissal, the Commission specified that it did not believe Yazzie's detailed testimony that he visited ONLR several times before 2000 and that he was denied assistance. On the other hand, NNLC accepted an ONLR employee's questionable statements that Yazzie did not visit ONLR until four years after his termination from employment, However, to reach its conclusion, the Commission ignored significant contradictions in the ONLR employee's testimony, affidavit and letter to Yazzie to conclude that Yazzie did not come to ONLR until 2000. The employee claims in his affidavit and letter, and the Commission so found, that he had checked the sign-in sheets for the relevant period Yazzie claimed he visited, and did not find his name. The Commission applies this evidence to bolster its conclusion that Yazzie fabricated his visits to ONLR. However, the transcript of the hearing shows the employee testified that the sign-in sheets could not be found, and therefore he did not, in fact, review them or know their contents. Transcript at 19. The Commission also found that the employee testified that Yazzie came into the office the first time in 2000, when, in fact, the employee testified he could not remember whether Yazzie came in before 2000. Id.\\nWhile a problematic factual finding on its own, the conclusion that Yazzie did not visit ONLR until 2000 should not have ended the analysis. The Commission cannot end its inquiry merely because it believed Yazzie did not come to ONLR until after the statute of limitation for filing a charge expired. It was required to inquire into the reasons behind why Yazzie supposedly did not seek ONLR's assistance until four years after his alleged wrongful termination.\\nThe Commission failed to seriously consider Yazzie's testimony that he visited several lawyers during the time period in which he had to file a charge, and allegedly received questionable advice on how to proceed with his claim. In its decision the Commission did not take the conduct of the attorneys into account, but merely rhetorically asked why they did not inform him of his right to file a wrongful termination claim under the NPEA. Yazzie's testimony on this point is directly relevant to the larger question of whether circumstances beyond his control contributed to his late filing. The Commission's lack of serious consideration of this point demonstrates its failure to fully analyze the circumstances. Even assuming he did not visit ONLR before 2000, the alleged failure of the attorneys to correctly advise Yazzie should have been taken into account, instead of being brushed off.\\nFinally, the Commission's conclusion that Tooh Dineh would be prejudiced because it no longer had Yazzie's personnel file is not supported by substantial evidence. The Commission also concluded that Tooh Dineh would be unduly prejudiced if equitable tolling were allowed because it no longer possessed Yazzie's personnel records. The record does not show any evidence Tooh Dineh introduced to support such a conclusion. The statement that the records are no longer available appears to come from Tooh Dineh's counsel's dosing statement, and not from any testimony or other evidence submitted at the hearing. See Transcript at 63. In fact, Tooh Dineh submitted documents pertaining to Yazzie's employment in its motions to dismiss in this case, and therefore at least some records are available. Motion to Dismiss, December 14, 2004, Index Listing No. 21, Exhibit B; Motion to Dismiss, February 9, 2001, Index Listing No. II, Exhibits A-C.\\nUpon these findings, and by once again principally relying on the time that had lapsed, the Commission did not thoroughly analyze all of the factors to determine that equitable tolling should not apply. The Commission did not follow the remand instructions, but instead selectively applied several of the Court's factors, bolstering its conclusion with questionable evidence, and ignored other factors altogether. The Court holds that the Commission abused its discretion by not fully analyzing the circumstances under the principles of equitable tolling.\\nV\\nThe Court VACATES the Commission's dismissal of Yazzie's complaint. The Court will not remand the case for the Commission to consider equitable tolling again, but concludes that given the delays and other circumstances beyond Yazzie's control, his case should be heard on the merits. The Court therefore REMANDS the ease and ORDERS the Commission to proceed to a hearing on the merits of Yazzie's complaint.\\n. The Court notes that the ONLR employee's actions in March, 2000 were also inconsistent with ONLR's responsibilities under the NPEA. Though Yazzie indeed was late under the statute, the employee should have done more than simply tell him that fact. The employee testified at the hearing that Yazzie did not ask for a charge form, and that he did not give him one. ONLR's statutory responsibility is to provide assistance to employees seeking the protections of the NPEA. 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 610(B)(2)(g) (2005). If \\\"assistance\\\" is to have meaning, ONLR's responsibility mandates more than simply waiting for the employee to ask for a form that he or she may not even know exists. See, supra, slip op. at 5. Furthermore, assistance must mean more than an ONLR employee telling a person to get a lawyer. ONLR instead has the duty to affirmatively distribute charge forms and explain what they mean. As Yazzie was already beyond the time period, and as the Court does not decide the truth of the Commission's finding that Yazzie first came to ONLR in March, 2000, the Court points out ONLR's responsibilities as guidance for future cases.\\n. The Court is aware of its own contribution to the delays in this case, in that it took two and half years for the Court to decide the first appeal. ;\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7348770\", \"name\": \"Harriette LEUPPE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ambrose WALLACE, Respondent/Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leuppe v. Wallace\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-01-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-21-2001\", \"first_page\": 625, \"last_page\": 627, \"citations\": \"4 Am. Tribal Law 625\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:15:02.988483+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, KING-BEN and FERGUSON, Associate Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Harriette LEUPPE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ambrose WALLACE, Respondent/Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Harriette LEUPPE, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Ambrose WALLACE, Respondent/Appellant.\\nNo. SC-CV-21-2001.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJan. 10, 2003.\\nElsie Redbird, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.\\nJohn A. Chapela, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (AZ), for the Appellee Harriett\\u00ae Leuppe.\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, KING-BEN and FERGUSON, Associate Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1083\", \"char_count\": \"6371\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nKING-BEN, Associate Justice.\\nThe sole issue before us is whether the District Court abused its discretion in holding that a biological parent's support obligations commenced prior to the entry of a Declaration of Paternity.\\nI\\nAppellee Leuppe filed a paternity action against Appellant Wallace, requesting child custody and support in district court on June 21, 2000. On August 2, 2000, Appellant admitted in his answer and counterclaim that he is the biological father of the child. The District Court entered a Declaration of Paternity on September 25, 2000.\\nThe District Court ordered the parties to file a child support worksheet by February 9, 2001. On February 8, 2001, Wallace sent a copy of earnings information to Petitioner. Leuppe prepared a proposed Final Order and faxed it to Wallace on March 14, 2001. In a letter dated March 21, 2001, Wallace sent a copy of his earnings information via fax to Leuppe. A Notice of Filing was finally filed with the Court on April 6, 2001 Leuppe's counsel states that he made corrections requested by opposing counsel and resubmitted the revised proposed Final Order on March 23, 2001. As of April 6, 2001, Respondent had not returned an approved copy of the revised Final Order.\\nOn April 9, 2001, the district court attached a copy of the Monthly Child Support Obligation worksheet showing that Wallace owed $294.27 in child support each month and that the child support order commenced on August 1, 2000. The court also entered a judgment against Wallace in the amount of $1,042.96 for retroactive child support from the time the declaration of paternity was filed. Wallace filed a Notice of Appeal with the Supreme Court on May 8, 2001\\nII\\nAppellant Wallace contends that it would be an abuse of discretion to grant retroactive child support in a paternity action. This court has held that past support cannot be awarded in a paternity action for lack of fair notice. See Descheenie v. Mariano, 6 Nav. R. 26 (1988). In Descheenie, the court acknowledged that it was aware that Mariano, the putative fa ther, knew that the child was his child and that the mother wanted him to pay child support, but due process dictated that the father, Mariano, should not be ordered to make up for something which he had no legal duty to do originally. Id. at 29.\\nLikewise, in the case at hand, the Court finds a birth certificate signed and issued in 1991, indicating Ambrose Wallace as the father. Wallace admitted to be the father as early as 1991, nine years prior to filing of the paternity action. Wallace knew that the child for whom child support is requested is his child and he had provided financial support prior to the entry of the Declaration of Paternity but cannot be ordered to pay retroactive child support. This court has clearly stated that retroactive child support payments will not be awarded in a paternity action and we continue to hold so. See Descheenie v. Mariano, 6 Nav. R. 26, 30 (1988). However, this court has not specifically stated when child support payments commence in a paternity action.\\nTherefore, we need to determine when child support payments commence in a paternity action. Does the support payment commence at the time the action is filed, when an absent parent admits paternity, or when a decree is entered? As stated previously, the court in Descheenie could not award back child support in a paternity case because of lack of fair notice. We hold in this case that a Respondent has fail' notice of the potential to pay child support at the time the paternity action is filed against him. A Navajo District Court may order that child support payments commence anytime after a paternity action is properly filed. In this respect, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in commencing child support on a date after the petition was filed.\\nOur decision is consistent with the best interests of the child as well as customary law of the Navajo people. We have held that the best interests of' the child is always the paramount issue. Barber v. Barber, 5 Nav. R. 9,12 (1984). The family courts, sitting as courts of equity, enjoy wide discretion in balancing the rights and interests of the parents and determination of child support. Joe v. Joe, 1 Nav. R. 320 (1978). The district court did so in the case at hand. We also recognize that under the customary law of the Navajo people, a father owes his child, or at least the mother, the duty of support. See Alonzo v. Martine, 7 Nav. R. 396 (1991). This Court recognizes that the dominant principle in suits involving children is always the best interest of the child. Barber v. Barber, 5 Nav. R. 9, 12 (1984). Our decision today adheres to that principle, as well as the Navajo tradition recognizing the father's absolute obligation to provide support for his children. Notah v. Francis, 5 Nav. R. 147, 148 (1987).\\nIn an attempt to defeat paying child support prior to the entry of a final decree, Wallace claims that the court abused its discretion in executing a \\\"stipulated\\\" judgment over the appellant's objection. A judge does not abuse his discretion simply because he signs a proposed order without making any changes to it. Rather, the standard is that the judge should read, reflect on, consider statements of fact and conclusions of law in a proposed order. We find no evidence that the judge in this case failed to do so. See Mescal c. Mescal, No. SC-CV-43-94, slip op. at 2 (decided May 28, 1996). We find that the commencement of child support on August 1, 2000, was in the child's best interests. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the Window Rock Family Court. (\\n. See the coversheet of a facsimile transmission dated March 14, 2001\\n. See Elsie Redbird's letter to Patricia Joe, the Deputy Court Clerk, dated March 21, 2001, Redbird states that she received a copy of the proposed order on March 14, 2001 and did not agree with some of the language in the Order as it included matters not discussed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7349536\", \"name\": \"Elroy BENALLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, nka ExxonMobil Corporation, Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Benally v. Mobil Oil Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-11-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-05-01\", \"first_page\": 686, \"last_page\": 694, \"citations\": \"4 Am. Tribal Law 686\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:15:02.988483+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Elroy BENALLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, nka ExxonMobil Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Elroy BENALLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, nka ExxonMobil Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-05-01.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nNov. 24, 2003.\\nSee also 2 Am. Tribal Law 518, 2000 WL 35732588.\\nDaniel M. Rosenfelt, Esq., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.\\nJames E. Ledbetter, Esq., Cottonwood, AZ, for Appellee Mobil Oil Corporation, nka ExxonMobil Corporation.\\nBefore YAZZIE Chief Justice, and FERGUSON, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"3020\", \"char_count\": \"18343\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nYAZZIE, Chief Justice.\\nThis ease is before this Court on appeal from the Shiprock District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Mobil Oil Corporation, now known as Exx-onMobil Corporation (Mobil). We reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.\\nI\\nOn June 30, 1998, Appellant Elroy Be-nally (Benally), employed by Big A Well Service Company (Big A), was injured at Mobil's Ratherford unit 09-23, an oil well on land leased from the Navajo Nation. Benally elected to receive benefits under the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, and filed a negligence action against multiple defendants after receiving those benefits. After the Shiprock District Court denied his cause of action against his employer, he appealed to this Court. This Court upheld the district court's decision, stating that it was within that court's discretion to give comity to the Colorado workers' compensation award. Benally v. Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99, 2 Am. Tribal Law 518, 521-22, 2000 WL 35732588 at *3 (2000). The case continued against the other Defendants.\\nMobil filed a motion for summary judgment in the Shiprock District Court claiming that Benally failed to show any genuine issue of material fact as to liability. It applied a rule of \\\"premises liability,\\\" contending that Mobil as lessee on Navajo Nation trust land had no duty to Benally because Benally did not show that Mobil was in control of the workplace. It also applied a rule that Mobil owed no duty to protect Benally against injuries because Benally did not show that Mobil actually controlled his day-to-day work or supplied the equipment that caused his injuries. It also found that Benally was adequately compensated for his injuries under the Navajo common law doctrine of Nalyeeh by his receipt of workers' compensation. This appeal followed.\\nII\\nThe issues presented are (1) whether the Shiprock District Court erred in granting the summary judgment on liability, (2) whether Benally is barred from receiving an award because he was negligent, and (3) whether Benally was precluded. from filing a third-party tort action after receiving workers' compensation benefits.\\nIII\\nBecause summary judgment involves a legal determination based on the allegations in the complaint, we review the district court's decision de novo. Benalli v. First National Insurance Co. of Am., 7 Nav. R. 329, 1 Am. Tribal Law 498, 1998 WL 35278279 (1998). On summary judgment the court must determine whether there is a dispute as to the facts for the case to go to trial. Thomas v. Succo, 7 Nav. R. 63, 64 (1993). The trial judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the material facts, but to decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Begay v. Dennison, 4 Nav. R. 115, 116 (1983). A dispute of fact is genuine if a \\\"reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party\\\" based upon a disputed fact. Jensen v. Giant, SC-CV-51-99, 4 Am. Tribal at 581-84, 2002 WL 34461239 at *1-2 (2002). If a genuine factual dispute is found, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Begay, 4 Nav. R. at 115 Summary judgment is an extreme remedy that should not be employed if there is the slightest doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact. Id.\\nA \\\"material fact\\\" is determined by the substantive law governing the claims or defenses of the parties. Jensen, No. SC-CV-51-99, 4 Am. Tribal Law 579, 581-84, 2002 WL 31461239 at *1-2.\\nIn this case, summary judgment hinges on the law of torts, workers' compensation and nalyeeh. In the law of torts, if defendant owes no duty to plaintiff, the case should not go forward. Material facts in this case that determine Mobil's duty to Benally include the amount of control exerted over the work performed by Benally and the source of the equipment that allegedly caused his injuries.\\nAfter careful consideration of the record, we find that there are indeed genuine issues of material fact pertaining to the length of the extension, selection of the equipment, the method employed to unseat the packer, and whether or not the equipment supplied was the primary cause accident. We find that all these issues are material because they could affect the outcome of Appellant's claim. It therefore was improper for the district court to grant summary judgment.\\nIV\\nIn cases of negligence, to be held liable, a party must owe the injured party a duty of care. Wilson v. Begay, 6 Nav. R. 1, 3 (1988). The extent of the duty depends on the circumstances. Id. at 4. Be-nally claims Mobil had a duty to him under two theories: (1) premises liability, and (2) general contractor liability.\\nA\\nThe district court granted Mobil Oil Corporation summary judgment on the issue of \\\"premises liability,\\\" concluding that \\\"[tjhere was no evidence that Mobil ha[d] created an unsafe work environment as Mobil was not in sufficient control of the workplace.\\\" Order at pg. 5. Is there a duty on the part of a lessee of the Navajo Nation to employees of contractors working on the property? Under \\\"premises liability\\\" a \\\"possessor of land\\\" owes a duty to use reasonable care in providing a safe place to work for employees of a contractor or others that are \\\"business invitees.\\\" Requarth v. Brophy, 111 N.M. 51, 801 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1990); Colorado Revised Statutes \\u00a7 13-21-1153(c)(1); Restatement of Torts 2d \\u00a7 343. A \\\"possessor of land\\\" does not have to be the record ovrner of the land, but can be the lessee when that lessee has control of the property. Jensen, No. SC-CV-51-99, 4 Am. Tribal Law at 585-86, 2002 WL 34461239 at *5\\nTo establish liability of a lessee of the Navajo Nation, we hold that a plaintiff must show that (1) the lessee has at least some specific control over the premises during the performance of the work, or over the instrumentality that caused the employee's injury; (2) the injury was proximately caused by the lessee's failure to exercise that control in a reasonable manner; (3) the lessee knew or by the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the dangerous condition that caused the injury; (4) the hazard involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff; and (5) the lessee should have expected that the employee would not discover or realize the danger, or would fail to protect himself or herself against it. Requarth, 801 P.2d at 124-25.\\nMaterial facts are in dispute concerning the level of control Mobil exercised over the property and the equipment used by Benally that caused his injury. Consequently, it was wrong for the district court to grant summary judgment to Mobil on this theory of liability.\\nB\\nThe district court also granted summary judgment to Mobil because it \\\"did not sufficiently manage the independent contractor's activities or provide the equipment that Mr. Benally used to cause his own injuries!,]\\\" and therefore Mobil owed no duty to Benally. Order at pg. 4. Do general contractors owe a duty to their independent contractor's employees? In Arizona and Utah, the rule is that general contractors have a duty to provide a safe workplace for employees of subcontractors. Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2d 5, 9 (1992); Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 327 (Utah, 1999). Other jurisdictions also assign a duty to general contractors.\\nThe scope of a general contractor's duty is limited by the \\\"retained control doctrine,\\\" extending only so far as the degree of control the general contractor retains over the work of the subcontractor. Lewis, 825 P.2d at 9. The general rule is that principal employers are not subject to liability for injuries arising out of a contractor's work unless the employer \\\"actively participates\\\" in the performance of the work. Thompson, 979 P.2d at 327. In order to \\\"actively participate\\\" a principal employer\\nmust have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendation, which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations or deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail.\\nhi. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \\u00a7 414 cmt. C (1965)). There must be retention of a right of supervision so that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his or her own way. Id. The control that creates a legal duty must involve either the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's activities, or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury. Id.\\nHere we adopt a narrow theory of liability to be applied in circumstances where the general contractor exerts or retains enough control over the independent contractor's -work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not enough control to be considered the employer. In such circumstances the duty owed is reasonable care and is limited in scope to the degree of control asserted and retained.\\n[ 18] In this case, the facts which show whether the requisite control was retained and whether Mobil took reasonable care under the circumstances are disputed. Whether any control was exerted or retained by Mobil over Benally on the day of injury presents a disputed question of material fact, as the parties present conflicting arguments and evidence on this issue. The district court erred when it granted summary judgment on this theory of liability.\\nV\\nHaving found that the disputes of material fact make summary judgment on liability inappropriate in this case, we turn to the issue of whether Benally's negligence bars Ms claims. Mobil did not argue this point in its motion for summary judgment in the lower court, but urges us to use it as an alternative means to uphold the summary judgment. We may uphold the district court's grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds than those stated by the court. Cf. Karl Storz Endoscopy America, Inc. v. Surgical Technologies, Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir.2002) (under federal rules). : However, we generally will not consider arguments against or in defense of a summary judgment not made before the district court. See Raymond v. Navajo Agricultural Products Industry, 7 Nav. R. 142, 145 (1995); cf. Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir.1997) (under federal rule). In some situations we can, in our discretion, consider such arguments, such as when an important issue of public policy is presented, there are sufficient undisputed facts in the existing record to make a decision, and the outcome under the law will dispose of the case. Here, the issue of whether the Navajo Nation applies comparative negligence is an important issue of public policy, there are sufficient undisputed facts on this issue and it may dispose of this case. Therefore, despite the fact that Mobil did not present this argument below, we will consider it.\\nBenally concedes that he operated the power tongs with his foot in an unsafe manner. The parties do not dispute that Benally was at least partially responsible for his own injury. Should Benally's negligence foreclose any recovery? Mobil contends the Navajo common law doctrine of t' \\u00e1\\u00e1 sh shi \\u00e1kwiisdzaa or literally \\\"I take responsibility for my own actions,\\\" controls this case and precludes Benally from collecting anything. Benally, argues that the Navajo Nation recognizes comparative negligence, and that his award should be reduced solely based on his own degree.of fault for the injury.\\nThe Navajo Nation Council has spoken on the issue by recognizing pure comparative negligence as the law to be applied in our courts. 7 N;N.C. \\u00a7 701(d). That provision states \\\"[w]here an injury was inflicted as a result of accident, or where both the plaintiff and the defendant were at fault, the judgment shall compensate the injured party for a reasonable part of the loss he has suffered.\\\" Two district courts, Crownpoint and Window' Rock, have already established that pure comparative negligence is the rule in the Navajo Nation. Begay v. Karty, 5 Nav. R. 267, 270 (Window Rock D. Ct.1987); Cadman v. Hubbard, 5 Nav. R. 226, 229 (Crownpoint D. Ct.1986). This Court therefore holds that the Navajo Nation is a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, and any award to Benally, if Mobil is found liable, should be reduced to reflect only Mobil's portion of responsibility for the injury. The doctrine of t' \\u00e1\\u00e1sh shi \\u00e1ktoiis-dzaa is consistent with comparative negligence, as reduction of the award makes certain Benally takes responsibility for his own actions, but still compensates him for that part of injury caused by Mobil.\\nVI\\nWe now turn to the issue of whether the acceptance of workers' compensation benefits should preclude Benally from bringing a third-party tortfeasor's claim against Mobil. The Shiproek District Court ruled that it did, quoting our previous opinion in this case which stated that \\\"Benally was fully compensated for his injuries under the Colorado Workers' Compensation scheme.\\\" Benally, No. SC-CV-27-99, 2 Am. Tribal Law at 521-22, 2000 WL 35732588 at *3.\\nThe district court failed, however, to distinguish an action by an injured party against his or her employer and an action against a third-party tortfeasor. While it was correct that we ruled that Benally had been compensated under the Colorado workers' compensation program, we did not rule on the issue before us today: W'hether an injured party who received workers' compensation from his or her em ployer nonetheless may sue a third-party tortfeasor for nalyeeh. Here Benally is not requesting additional compensation from his employer, but rather, he seeks compensation from a third-party under the Navajo common law doctrine of nalyeeh for additional injuries not covered by workers' compensation.\\nWe have previously considered this question in the context of the Navajo Nation's workers' compensation program. Largo v. Eaton Corp., No. SC-CV-09-99 (April 11, 2001), concerned an injured tribal employee who sought compensation from a third-party after he received worker's compensation from the Navajo Nation. The exact issue was whether the injured party was barred from seeking damages from a third-party for failure to properly plead the cause of action. We construed 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1032, which in Subsection A recognizes the right of injured workers to bring an action against third-party tortfea-sors:\\nIf a covered person is entitled to compensation under this chapter and is injured . by the negligence or wrongdoing of another in the employment of the Nation . such injured employees . may pursue his or her remedy against such other person while receiving benefits under this chapter.\\nIn Largo we recognized the right of a tribal employee to seek nalyeeh from a third-party under certain procedural requirements set out in 15 N.N.C. \\u00a7 1(332. Largo, No. SC-CV-09-99, slip op. at 9-10. We stated that the injured party's \\\"right to nalyeeh is his [or her] right to recover for additional injuries that were, not covered by the workers' compensation benefits.\\\" Id. at 9 (emphasis added). We recognized that the third-party has a reciprocal obligation \\\"to set things right in accordance with the hurt,\\\" and therefore \\\"a person injured by a tortfeasor is entitled to compensation for his or her injuries and should not be stripped of that right[.J\\\" Id. at 6. Therefore, an injured party could seek nalyeeh from a third-party, and receipt of workers' compensation would not be a bar.\\nWe believe the same right to seek damages from a third-party tortfeasor, notwithstanding receipt of workers' compensation, applies to employees of private corporations operating within the Nation. Assuming liability, the third-party has obligations \\\"to set things right\\\" that have not been fulfilled by the receipt of workers' compensation by the employer. Therefore we hold that an injured employee is not barred from seeking nalyeeh from a third-party tortfeasor merely because he or she has received workers' compensation from his or her employer. Nalyeeh is not satisfied merely by receipt of workers' compensation from the employer when a third party has some responsibility for the accident.\\nWe leave the measure of nalyeeh in this case, if liability is found, to the sound discretion of the district court. We defer the issue of nalyeeh to the district court because it is contingent on a number of factors, such as how much the responsible party can pay, the needs of the injured party, the extent to which the worker was negligent, and other factors.\\nVII\\nLastly, amicus curiae Bituminous Casualty Corporation presents an issue in its brief concerning whether Mobil is a--\\\"statutory employer\\\" under the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act and therefore immune from suit., Mobil did not-argueThis issue in its motion for summary judgment or in its brief in chief. It did assert this point in its response to the amicus brief. Benally contends we should ignore this argument because it was not presented below.\\nAs previously discussed, we generally will not consider arguments-in support of summary'judgment that were not presented to the district court. Here Benally has not had the chance to bring forward facts that may be in dispute concerning this issue. It would then be unfair to consider it in this case. We decline to consider it, and make no comment on the merits.\\nVIII\\nSummary judgment below was granted in error. We remand this case for further fact finding consistent with this opinion and a determination of the issues of negligence in light of the \\\"retained control\\\" doctrine and nalyeeh, and for any other necessary proceedings. The judgment of the district court is VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8163274\", \"name\": \"Jane BURBANK, Appellant, v. Tommy CLARKE Sr., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burbank v. Clarke\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-01-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. SC-CV-36-97\", \"first_page\": 424, \"last_page\": 430, \"citations\": \"2 Am. Tribal Law 424\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"West's American Tribal Law Reporter\", \"court\": \"Navajo Nation Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Navajo Nation\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:12:42.473076+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN, Associate Justice.\", \"parties\": \"Jane BURBANK, Appellant, v. Tommy CLARKE Sr., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jane BURBANK, Appellant, v. Tommy CLARKE Sr., Appellee.\\nNo. SC-CV-36-97.\\nSupreme Court of the Navajo Nation.\\nJan. 26, 1999.\\nCynthia Thompson, Esq., DNA-People\\u2019s Legal Services, Inc., Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona), for the Appellant.\\nTommy Clarke Sr., Pro se, Appellee, Chinle, Navajo Nation (Arizona).\\nBefore YAZZIE, Chief Justice, and AUSTIN, Associate Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"2150\", \"char_count\": \"12906\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nAUSTIN, Associate Justice.\\nWe are asked to decide the following issues; 1) whether a minor becomes emancipated in fact upon becoming a parent before reaching the age of majority; 2) wrhether undivided child support payments for multiple children should be automatically reduced pro rata when one of the children becomes emancipated or attains the age of majority; and 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it retroactively modified a child support order resulting in cancellation of part of the past due child support amount. We hold as follows on each issue: 1) Under Navajo Nation law, a minor does not become emancipated solely by the fact that he or she becomes a parent; 2) Lump sum child support payments for multiple children may not be reduced without the obligated parent filing a petition for modification and the court affording the parties an opportunity to litigate the alleged changed circumstances; and 3) A Navajo Nation court may not retroactively modify a child sup port order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\\nI\\nA divorce decree entered on June 17, 1980 ordered Tommy Clarke Sr. (\\\"Appel-lee\\\") to pay $500 per month to Jane Burbank (\\\"Appellant\\\") for the support of their five minor children\\u2014four girls and one boy. Clarke v. Clarke, No. CH-CV-142-80 (Chinle Dist. Ct.1980). The decree was modified on December 29, 1981 after the Appellee failed to make a payment. It reduced his obligation to a monthly lump sum payment of $200 for the support of all the children and ordered him to make a one time payment of $500 to cure the delinquency. The Appellee was further ordered to pay support \\\"for the five (5) minor children of the parties until they become 18 years of age or become emancipated.\\\" Clarke v. Clarke, No. CH-CV-182-81 (Chinle Dist. Ct.1981). He made only one payment of $200 under this order.\\nThe Appellant filed another action to compel the Appellee to provide support to his children, which produced a written settlement agreement dated August 15, 1983. On August 18, 1983, the Window Rock District Court incorporated the settlement agreement into its order, affirmed the Ap-pellee's $200 per month child support obligation that was ordered on December 29, 1981, and added $100 more per month to satisfy $4,100 of unpaid child support. The court further recognized as enforceable all the conditions of the December 29, 1981 order. The Appellee paid nothing pursuant to the 1983 order.\\nOn April 26, 1996, the Appellant filed this case in the Chinle Family Court to collect all of the accumulated, unpaid child support between December of 1981 and the date each female child turned eighteen years of age, and through May of 1996 for the son, whom she claimed would graduate from high school then. She asked for a $34,900 judgment against the Appellee.\\nThe Appellee admitted he did not pay any child support, except for one payment of S200 in 1981. At the final hearing, he asked for a $40 reduction of his obligation, to be applied retroactively, each time one of the children became emancipated. The $40 figure comes from dividing the S200 monthly payment evenly among the five children. The Appellee did not file a petition for modification of his child support payments at any time during the long history of this case.\\nThe Appellee argued that the girls were emancipated on the date they became mothers, at ages fourteen, fifteen, fifteen, and sixteen. He claimed his son was emancipated on the date he dropped out of high school, which was also before he turned eighteen. The record does not disclose whether any child was mauled, living independently of the parents, or self-supporting at the time of his or her claimed emancipation.\\nThe family court accepted the Appellee's position and retroactively reduced his support obligation \\\"by $40 as each child reached eighteen years of age or was emancipated.\\\" Finding No. 5. The court thereby eliminated from consideration a major portion of the unpaid child support amount that the Appellant sought. Each female was found emancipated upon the birth of her first child and the son upon attaining the age of eighteen. Finding No. 6. The court awarded the Appellant $13,000 for unpaid child support and ordered the Appellee to pay $100 each pay day until the judgment was paid in full. Order Nos. 2-3.\\nII\\nIn 1981, the Chinle District Court ordered the Appellee to pay child support to his five children until they either turned eighteen years of age or became emancipated. In 1997, the Chinle Family Court had to decide the novel issue of whether the sole fact of becoming a parent could emancipate a minor. The court held in the affirmative. We find that the family court's holding on the emancipation issue contradicts Navajo common law.\\nThe law that obligates every parent to support his or her offspring is integral to Navajo culture. This customary law underlies our modern child support jurisprudence. Tom v. Tom, 4 Nav. R. 12, 13 (1983). The rationale for the law is straightforward\\u2014a parent who brings a child into the world has a duty imposed by natural and spiritual law to provide for the child's needs until the child is capable of self-support. The law also helps to turn the Navajo concept of 'Una (\\\"life\\u2014past, present and future\\\") into practical experience. Children are viewed as the future, ensuring the existence and survival of the Navajo people in perpetuity.\\nWhen a young Navajo person no longer needs the support, care, and custody of the parents, he or she is said to be a young adult. At this time, the person becomes self-supporting, independent, and free of parental control. The Navajo term for this is t'aabii ak'inaaldzil and basically means a person is self-supporting. That law applied to the subject of child support determines when a minor becomes emancipated. Navajos became self-supporting earlier in their teens during the first half of this century, because of the Navajo people's minimal reliance on wage income. In contrast, highly developed skills or a post high school education is a must today, if one is to become financially capable of earning a living, For that reason, it takes a minor longer to become independent and self-supporting today. This point may serve as a backdrop for our courts when handling emancipation questions.\\nThe trial court must determine whether emancipation has taken place after examining all the facts and circumstances relevant to that issue. Although what constitutes emancipation is a question of law, the issue of whether a minor has actually become emancipated is a question of fact. Because of our rule that every parent is obligated to support his or her child either to majority or until the child is independent, free of parental control, and self-supporting, we place the burden to prove emancipation on the party asserting it. Nothing short of competent evidence must be used as proof.\\nIn this case, the trial court found that the sole fact of giving birth had emancipated each female minor. The parties did not bring other facts relevant to the emancipation issue to light for the court's consideration. We do not agree that becoming a parent, by itself, is a sufficient ground for emancipation. It is a factor for our trial courts to consider-, along with others, but is not alone dispositive of the emancipation issue.\\nThe record before this Court does not disclose whether any of the girls was married, employed, living independently of the parents, or showed an intent to be free of parental control at the time of her purported emancipation. The contrary, however, is apparent from the record. The girls continued to receive the Appellant's full support following the birth of their children. We reverse the trial court's holding that the girls were emancipated, solely by the fact of becoming mothers, and remand for a new evidentiary hearing.\\nThe trial court's order indicates that the son attained the age of eighteen on September 27, 1990. Other than this finding, the court did not make additional findings or legal conclusions establishing the circumstances of the son. We find the trial court's decision on the son impalpable. For example, did the court terminate the son's support as of September 27, 1990? If yes. then for what reasons? Fragmentary evidence seems to indicate the son might have still been attending school after he turned eighteen years of age. Due to the trial court's order lacking findings and legal conclusions, we reverse its decision on the son and remand for a new evidentiary hearing. Help v. Silvers, 4 Nav. R. 46, 47 (1983) (Navajo trial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their judgments).\\nIll\\nThe trial court reduced the amount of child support the Appellee had been ordered to pay by $40 each time it found one of the females had become emancipated. The modification was applied retroactively. We now establish the rule that a trial court cannot modify an original child support order' in the absence of a petition asking it to do so. See Tom v. Tom, 4 Nav. R. at 14 (\\\"a court order fixing child support can be modified at any time\\\"); see also Brown v. Brown, 3 Nav. R. 239, 240 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.1982) (a proper petition to modify a decree ordering child support payments must be filed before the court will address the matter). A properly filed petition seeking modification should contain the grounds for the requested relief and the other party should have an opportunity to present evidence in rebuttal. The petition also notifies the payee that the obligated parent intends to seek modification of the child support order. In this case, the Appellee did not file a petition to modify the August 18, 1983 order, which set his child support payments at a lump sum of $200 per1 month for the support of all five children. We find that the trial court erred in modifying the original 1983 order.\\nWhere a court orders a lump sum payment for' the support of multiple children, the obligated parent has the burden to modify his or her child support obligation as each child becomes emancipated or reaches the age of majority. Otherwise, the obligated parent must continue to pay the same lump sum support payment originally ordered until the last child is either emancipated or reaches the age of majority.\\nMoreover', a parent who must pay undivided child support for multiple children cannot unilaterally reduce his or her payments each time one of the children becomes emancipated or attains the age of majority, unless permitted by the original child support order. In the case before us, the child support order does not authorize a proportionate reduction in the Appellee's obligation as each child reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated. Therefore, the Appellee was required to pay S200 per month until the youngest child met the conditions in the August 18, 1983 order or until the court modified the support order. On remand, the trial court will determine the Appellee's liability for unpaid child support since December of 1981. The court will give the Appellee credit for the amount of child support he has paid to date, including those made pursuant to the August 18, 1983 order.\\nFinally, the Appellant argues that the trial court should not have canceled part of the past due child support amount. We agree. Court ordered child support payments become vested in the payee as they become due. Thus, our courts should not permit retroactive modification of a child support order, absent a party's showing of compelling circumstances. A party who wants to reduce his org her child support payments always has access to the courtroom. Upon proper application, the court has the discretion to decide whether its previous child support order should be changed to meet current conditions. Any modification should be prospective only and applicable from the date of the written modification order itself.\\nIV\\nThe trial court's award of $13,000 to the Appellant is reversed. This case is remanded to the Chinle Family Court. The family court will hold further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n. This lesson comes to us from a chapter in Navajo history called 'alnaashii jidezdaal (\\\"separation of the sexes\\\"). Due to certain misdeeds of those in authority, the males and females of the tribe separated and took up residence on opposite sides of a wide, swiftly flowing river. After four years of separation, the wise men of the tribe reunited the genders after explaining that without propagation, the tribe would surely become extinct.\"}"
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