diff --git a/ohio/1009788.json b/ohio/1009788.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d4706515325dc354d3ba56a783c6b9eca1022207
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1009788\", \"name\": \"Gregory v. Industrial Commission of Ohio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gregory v. Industrial Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-05-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 25114\", \"first_page\": \"365\", \"last_page\": \"371\", \"citations\": \"129 Ohio St. 365\", \"volume\": \"129\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:56:40.327690+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Williams, Jones, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Gregory v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.\", \"head_matter\": \"Gregory v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.\\n(No. 25114\\nDecided May 1, 1935.)\\nMr. Harry B. Reese and Mr. Charles C. Callahan, for plaintiff in error.\\nMr. John W. Bricher, attorney general, Mr. R. R. Zurmehly and Mr. Herbert Mitchell, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"1332\", \"char_count\": \"7602\", \"text\": \"Stephenson, J.\\nWe quite agree with counsel that the record in this case presents three questions, namely:\\n1. Is the death of an employee from injuries received while proceeding to his work and after reaching the premises of his employer but before arriving at the point where his active duties began, sustained in the course of employment?\\n2. Did the open shop conditions of the mine where Gregory was injured subject him to a hazard greater than that to which the general public in the community was subjected, and thereby establish a causal connection between the employment and the injury?\\n3. Was there causal connection between Gregory's injuries and his death?\\nIf the open shop condition of the mine where Gregory was employed at the time of his injury subjected him to a hazard greater than that to which the general public in the community was subjected, then a causal connection was as a matter of fact established between the employment and his injuries.\\nWe do not regard it as necessary to go back and review the old cases, as that has been taken care of in the recently reported case of Industrial Commission v. Carden, ante, 344.\\nThe case of Industrial Commission v. Nelson, 127 Ohio St., 41, 186 N. E., 735, furnishes the nucleus for the law that we will apply in this case. We quote two paragraphs of the syllabus of that case, as follows:\\n\\\"1. An injury is not compensable, under the workmen's compensation law of this state, unless the employment has some causal connection with the injury, either through its activities, its conditions or its environments.\\n\\\"2. But whenever the conditions attached to the place of employment are factors in causing injury to a workman engaged therein, such injury arises out of the employment and is compensable.\\\"\\nDefendant in error insists that the open shop conditions at the Thompson mine were not sufficient upon which to predicate a hazard greater than that to which the general public in the community was exposed, because no strike at that mine was actually in progress. We do not regard this ground as tenable. This mine was in the Ohio mining district, just a short distance from the Hocking Valley mines that were unionized. The workmen at the Thompson mine had been notified that they would receive a visit from the Hocking Valley miners, and they made their word good. An open shop in a unionized district is not conducive to passivity. The proximity of union and non-union enterprises of itself creates more or less of a hazard. It is a condition in the one sense and an environment in the other. It is our holding that the open shop condition of the Thompson mine did subject Gregory to a hazard greater than that to which the general public in the community was subjected.\\nThere is one other remaining question, namely, was Gregory within the zone of his employment when injured?\\nIt was Gregory's duty to hitch the ponies to the wagon in order to engage in his regular business of hauling coal. He was on the company's property, probably two hundred yards from the barn or stable where the'ponies were kept and two hundred and fifty yards from the mine, when he was intercepted by these men, presumably from the Hocking Valley. His real work, it is true, would not begin until he had arrived at the barn or stable and made some movement toward harnessing the ponies. But was he within the zone of Ms employment as that term has been heretofore defined by this court?\\nIn 49 A. L. R., at page 433, the general proposition is laid down, as follows:\\n\\\"It is generally held that an injury sustained by a miner, while proceeding, on the premises of his employer, to his place of employment, or an injury sustained while preparing to begin his day's work, arises out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the act.\\\"\\nThis is rather a broad statement, but the Ohio authorities are in accord with it in the main. Take the case of Industrial Commission v. Barber, 117 Ohio St., 373, 159 N. E., 363:\\n\\\"An employe, who for the purpose of reaching his place of employment travels a course wMch affords the only unobstructed access thereto, enters upon the course of his employment within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Law when he reaches the zone of such employment that is under the control of his employer, even though such zone be outside the inclosure of his employer.\\\"\\nTo the same effect is the case of Kasari v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ohio St., 410, 181 N. E., 809, 82 A. L. R., 1040. We quote the first and second paragraphs of the syllabus, as follows:\\n\\\"1. An employe, entering the premises of his employer to begin the discharge of the duties of his employment but who has not yet reached the place where his service is to be rendered, is discharging a duty to his employer which is a necessary incident to his day's work.\\n\\\"2. Traversing the zone between the entrance of the employer's premises and the plant where an employe is employed, is one of the hazards of the employment.\\\"\\nNext we find that this theory is followed in the case of Industrial Commission v. Baker, 127 Ohio St., 345, 188 N. E., 560. The second paragraph of the syllabus in that case reads as follows:\\n\\\"An injury sustained by an employe, after reaching the zone of his employment under the control of his employer, even though outside the enclosure constituting his place of work, is compensable.\\\"\\nIt was Gregory's duty to hitch the ponies, and the attacking party probably was aware of that fact. They followed the dictates of common sense and went to the mine property and lay in wait for the employees, one of whom was Gregory. The testimony is overwhelming to the effect that he was kicked and beaten and, leaving out of consideration any declaration or. exclamation of pain that he made to his fellow employees, the physical fact, as detailed by those who saw him at intervals after the injury, that he walked in a stooped-over condition, is sufficient evidence of an injury out of the ordinary. He endeavored to work for a man who had employed him previously. He managed to work one day. The testimony of this employer was to the effect, that before his injury he was a splendid workman; that upon the day in particular he had great difficulty in performing his tasks.\\nThere was certain sufficient testimony to warrant the finding that his injury was at least a contributing cause of death, as different witnesses testified that he vomited clotted blood by the handful. That he died from scarlet fever is little more than an insinuation insofar as the record is concerned.\\nFrom all the facts in this case we find that Gregory was the victim of a continuous condition that existed at the Thompson mine, the place where he was employed at the time of injury; that by reason of such condition he was subjected to a greater hazard than that common to the general public in the community; that he was injured while within the zone of his employment and that there was evidence from which it could be logically and reasonably inferred that his in juries contributed to produce Ms death, maMng Ms case thereby compensable.\\nThe judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Common Pleas Court affirmed.\\nJudgment of Court of Appeals reversed and judgment of Court of Common Pleas affirmed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Williams, Jones, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1013232.json b/ohio/1013232.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..75afd437d5bcda4768fcf9340796cdd60e2edaf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1013232.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1013232\", \"name\": \"City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-07-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 25076\", \"first_page\": \"614\", \"last_page\": \"614\", \"citations\": \"131 Ohio St. 614\", \"volume\": \"131\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:16.811277+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Matthias, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.\", \"head_matter\": \"City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.\\n(No. 25076\\nDecided July 22, 1936.)\\nMr. Ezra Shapiro, director of law, and Mr. Thomas J. Herbert, for plaintiff in error.\\nMr. John W. Bricker, attorney general, and Mr. Donald C. Power, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"95\", \"char_count\": \"591\", \"text\": \"It is ordered and adjudged that the order of the Public Utilities Commission be, and the same hereby is, affirmed on authority of Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ante, 539.\\nOrder affirmed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Stephenson, Williams, Matthias, Day and Zimmerman, JJ., concur.\\nJones, J., not participating.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1037083.json b/ohio/1037083.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..913fd34f285c572f626c6f17712efc8e586a7521
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1037083.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1037083\", \"name\": \"The State, ex rel. Jones Motor Sales, Inc., v. Coffinberry et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Jones Motor Sales, Inc. v. Coffinberry\", \"decision_date\": \"1946-06-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 30647\", \"first_page\": \"683\", \"last_page\": \"686\", \"citations\": \"146 Ohio St. 683\", \"volume\": \"146\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:52:24.205069+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \". Weygandt, C. J., Zimmerman, Bell, Williams, Turner, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State, ex rel. Jones Motor Sales, Inc., v. Coffinberry et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State, ex rel. Jones Motor Sales, Inc., v. Coffinberry et al.\\n(No. 30647\\nDecided June 19, 1946.)\\nMessrs. Meyer, Johnson & Kincaid, for relator.\\nMr. Hugh S. Jenkins, attorney general, Mr. C. G. L. Yearick and Mr. Albertus B. Conn, for respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"416\", \"char_count\": \"2500\", \"text\": \"By the Court.\\nIn the case of Copperweld Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 142 Ohio St., 439, 52 N. E. (2d), 735, the plaintiff, an employer complying with the workmen's compensation law, sought from this court a writ prohibiting the Industrial Commission from making payments under orders awarding compensation and from taking into consideration any payments, which had been made thereunder, in the merit or individual rating of the plaintiff's workmen's compensation risk.\\nIn holding the plaintiff's petition demurrable in that case, this court said at pages 443 and 444:\\n\\\"Counsel for plaintiff do contend that this action is 'in prohibition.' Prohibition is a remedy calculated to keep inferior tribunals from usurping power with which they have not been invested. It must be borne in mind that it is not sought herein to prevent a merit rating of a complying employer as was the case in State, ex rel. Powhatan Mining Co., v. Industrial Commission, 125 Ohio St., 272, 181 N. E., 99, 82 A. L. R., 938, but to control the action of the Industrial Commission with respect to the allowance or disallowance of certain claims. The power to hear claims and award death benefits and compensation for injuries has been expressly conferred upon the commission by Section 1465-90, General Code, and prohibition will not lie to curb the exercise of that power or to prevent the enforcement of a valid award after it has been made upon claims properly before it, as were the claims in the case at bar.\\n' ' The complying employer has no direct financial interest in the distribution of the state insurance fund. His interest lies in basic and merit ratings and the amount he is required to pay in premiums. With respect to the subject matter involved in a proceeding upon a claimant's application for compensation under Section 1465-90, General Code, the complying employer's interest is remote. He is neither a necessary nor a proper party to such a proceeding; not Toeing a party he has no right to appeal or review.\\\"\\nUpon the reasoning and authority of that case, the demurrer in the present proceeding is sustained and a writ of prohibition denied.\\nWrit denied.\\n. Weygandt, C. J., Zimmerman, Bell, Williams, Turner, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1051721.json b/ohio/1051721.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c34d0ea27145e9166597f60de11ce2c8d8b8a233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1051721.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1051721\", \"name\": \"Fawick Airflex Co., Inc., Appellee, v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America et al. ; Schuster, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America\", \"decision_date\": \"1950-06-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 32257\", \"first_page\": \"106\", \"last_page\": \"106\", \"citations\": \"154 Ohio St. 106\", \"volume\": \"154\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:50:05.371465+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Turner and Taft, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Fawick Airflex Co., Inc., Appellee, v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America et al. ; Schuster, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Fawick Airflex Co., Inc., Appellee, v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America et al. ; Schuster, Appellant.\\n(No. 32257\\nDecided June 21, 1950.)\\nMessrs. Marshman, Hollington S Steadman, for appellee.\\nMessrs. Davis, Davis & Handelman, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"78\", \"char_count\": \"527\", \"text\": \"It is ordered and adjudged that this appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved.\\nAppeal dismissed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Turner and Taft, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1071456.json b/ohio/1071456.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f1b70e42e76934ce62fb1df7c2aa7c01be4680d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1071456.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1071456\", \"name\": \"In re Resignation of Cartellone\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Resignation of Cartellone\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-08-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-0336\", \"first_page\": \"1206\", \"last_page\": \"1209\", \"citations\": \"96 Ohio St. 3d 1206\", \"volume\": \"96\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:33:05.652803+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"In re Resignation of Cartellone.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Resignation of Cartellone.\\n[Cite as In re Resignation of Cartellone, 96 Ohio St.3d 1206, 2002-Qhio-4354.]\\n(No. 2002-0336\\nSubmitted July 24, 2002\\nDecided August 15, 2002.)\", \"word_count\": \"1056\", \"char_count\": \"6132\", \"text\": \"{\\u00b6 1} On February 22, 2002, respondent, John Joseph Cartellone, Attorney Registration No. 0017620, last known business address in Cleveland, Ohio, who was admitted to the bar of this state on the 7th day of November, 1980, submitted an Affidavit of Resignation and Authorization and Release pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(G)(1). The affidavit and authorization and release were referred to Disciplinary Counsel pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(G)(2). On July 9, 2002, Disciplinary Counsel filed under seal his report with this court in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(11)(G)(2). Upon consideration thereof,\\n{\\u00b6 2} IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(G)(3), John Joseph Cartellone's resignation as an attorney and counselor at law be accepted as a resignation with disciplinary action pending. It is further ordered that his certificate of admission to the bar of Ohio be, and the same hereby is, ordered cancelled and that the name of John Joseph Cartellone be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this court.\\n{\\u00b6 3} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that from and after this date all rights and privileges extended to John Joseph Cartellone to practice law in the state of Ohio be withdrawn; that henceforth John Joseph Cartellone shall cease to hold himself forth as an attorney authorized to appear in the courts of this state; that he shall not attempt, either directly or indirectly, to render services as an attorney or counselor at law to or for any individuals, corporation, or society, or in any way perform or seek to perform services for anyone, no matter how constituted, that must, by law, be executed by a duly appointed and qualified attorney within the state of Ohio.\\n{\\u00b6 4} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John Joseph Cartellone desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent or clerk or employee of another, and hereby is forbidden to appear in the state of Ohio as an attorney and counselor at law before any court, judge, board, commission, or other public authority, and hereby is forbidden to give another an opinion as to the law or its application or advise with relation thereto.\\n{\\u00b6 5} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, by the court, that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against the respondent by the Clients' Security Fund pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered, sua sponte, by the court that if, after the date of this order, the Clients' Security Fund awards any amount against the respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), the respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Clients' Security Fund within 90 days of the notice of such award.\\n{\\u00b6 6} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent, John Joseph Cartellone, surrender his certificate of admission to practice to the Clerk of this court on or before 30 days from the date of this order.\\n{\\u00b6 7} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall:\\n{\\u00b6 8} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of his resignation and his consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in his place;\\n{\\u00b6 9} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due respondent, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client, or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;\\n{\\u00b6-10} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid, and account for any trust money or property in the possession or control of respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 11} 4. Notify opposing counsel in pending litigation or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties of his disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order, and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;\\n{\\u00b6 12} 5. Send all such notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 13} 6. File with the Clerk of this court and the Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of notices required herein, and setting forth the address where the affiant may receive communications; and\\n{\\u00b6 14} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.\\n{\\u00b6 15} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that until such time as he fully complies with this order, respondent shall keep the Clerk and the Disciplinary Counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.\\n(\\u00b6 16} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings.\\n{\\u00b6 17} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order, and all other orders in this case, by certified mail to the most recent address respondent has given to the Attorney Registration Office.\\n{\\u00b6 18} IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(1), that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(2), and that respondent bear the costs of publication.\\nMoyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/11147866.json b/ohio/11147866.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2c7ddd27548744aa4096ffcd7bcfef9ece1ca5a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/11147866.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11147866\", \"name\": \"WOODLAND AV. SAV. & TR. CO. v. WILLIAMS-MURPHY CO. et al\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Woodland Av. Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Williams-Murphy Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1923-10-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 4657\", \"first_page\": \"190\", \"last_page\": \"190\", \"citations\": \"2 Ohio Law Abs. 190\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:34:11.236256+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WOODLAND AV. SAV. & TR. CO. v. WILLIAMS-MURPHY CO. et al\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 187\\nWOODLAND AV. SAV. & TR. CO. v. WILLIAMS-MURPHY CO. et al\\nOhio Appeals, 8th Dist., Cuyahoga County\\nNo. 4657.\\nDecided Oct. 1, 1923\\n147. BILLS AND NOTES \\u2014 Where A gives note and mortgage to B, who assigns note to C, and C assigns note back to B as collateral for loan, payment of A\\u2019s debt to B discharges note.\\nAttorneys \\u2014 Price, Shepherd & Graves, for Woodland Ave. Savings and Trust; Mooney, Hahn, Loeser & Keough, for Williams-Murphy Co.' and Beckwith; all of Cleveland.\", \"word_count\": \"333\", \"char_count\": \"1956\", \"text\": \"VICKERY, P .J.\\nEpitomized Opinion\\nTrust Co., as executor of Grether estate, sued Beckwith on a $5,000 note, and also Williams-Murphy Co. on two notes signed by the company and placed by Beckwith with Grether as collateral. The evidence disclosed that Grether sold Williams-Murphy Co. a tract of land in payment of which company gave Grether note and mortgage. Company then allotted and sold the land by lots and notes and mortgages, given in payment of lots, were assigned to Grether to the amount of the note and mortgage given by company for the land. Grether assigned to Beckwith two of the original notes given by Murphy Co. to Grether. Later Beckwith borrowed from Grether, giving his own note and assigning his own note and assigning as collateral these Murphy Co. notes, which Grether had assigned to Beckwith. Murphy Co. proved that it had paid its debt to Grether, had the. mortgage cancelled, but had failed to secure these two notes because Grether was sick and had put off ' delivering them. Judgment was rendered against Beckwith by default, but the court ordered a cancellation of the Williams-Murphy notes. In affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeals held:\\n1. \\\"Beckwith either received the payment of these notes as owner of the notes, if he was the owner, or else he received them as a duly authorized and acting agent for his principal, Grether, and Grether, having received the full payment of these notes, could not compel the Murphy Co. to repay them.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/111781.json b/ohio/111781.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dea39426f701cacf884ef704e52db43a7a2585e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/111781.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"111781\", \"name\": \"In re Nentwick\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Nentwick\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-03-20\", \"docket_number\": \"98-199\", \"first_page\": \"1482\", \"last_page\": \"1483\", \"citations\": \"81 Ohio St. 3d 1482\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:58:57.832536+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Nentwick.\", \"head_matter\": \"Friday, March 20, 1998\\nDISCIPLINARY DOCKET\\n98-199.\\nIn re Nentwick.\", \"word_count\": \"990\", \"char_count\": \"5899\", \"text\": \"On January 26, 1998, and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(3), the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court certified to the Supreme Court a certified copy of a judgment entry of a felony conviction against John N. Nentwick, a.k.a. John Norbert Nentwick, an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Ohio.\\nUpon consideration thereof and pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(4), it is ordered and decreed that John N. Nentwick, a.k.a. John Norbert Nentwick, Attorney Registration No. 0061315, last known address in East Liverpool, Ohio, be, and hereby is, suspended from the practice of law for an interim period, effective as of the date of this entry, March 19,1998.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be, and is hereby, referred to the Disciplinary Counsel for investigation and commencement of disciplinary proceedings.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that John N. Nentwick, a.k.a. John Norbert Nentwick, immediately cease and desist from the practice of law in any form and is hereby forbidden to appear on behalf of another before any court, judge, commission, board, administrative agency, or other public authority.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, effective immediately, he be forbidden to counsel or advise, or prepare legal instruments for others or in any manner perform legal services for others.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that he is hereby divested of each, any, and all of the rights, privileges, and prerogatives customarily accorded to a member in good standing of the legal profession of Ohio.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), respondent shall complete one credit hour of continuing legal education for each month, or portion of a month of the suspension. As part of the total credit hours of continuing legal education required by Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), respondent shall complete one credit hour of instruction related to ethics and professional responsibility, including instruction on substance abuse, for each six months, or portion of six months, of the suspension.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall not be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio until (1) respondent complies with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio; (2) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court; (3) respondent complies with the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio; and (4) this court orders respondent reinstated.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, by the court, that within ninety days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded by the Clients' Security Fund pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered, sua sponte, by the court that if, after the date of this order, the Clients' Security Fund awards any amount against the respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), the respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Clients' Security Fund within ninety days of the notice of such award.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before thirty days from the date of this order, respondent shall:\\n1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of his suspension and his consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in his place;\\n2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due him, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client, or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;\\n3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid, and account for any trust money or property in his possession or control;\\n4. Notify opposing counsel in pending litigation or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties of his disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order, and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;\\n5. Send all such notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;\\n6. File with the Clerk of this court and the Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of notices required herein, and setting forth the address where the affiant may receive communications; and\\n7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall keep the Clerk and the Disciplinary Counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte,.that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order, and all other orders in this ease, by certified mail to the most recent address respondent has given to the Attorney Registration Office.\\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(1), that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(2), and that respondent bear the costs of publication.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/11181883.json b/ohio/11181883.json
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+"{\"id\": \"11181883\", \"name\": \"SANZONE v. CINCI. MORRIS PLAN BANK\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sanzone v. Cinci. Morris Plan Bank\", \"decision_date\": \"1924-02-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2325\", \"first_page\": \"775\", \"last_page\": \"775\", \"citations\": \"2 Ohio Law Abs. 775\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:34:11.236256+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SANZONE v. CINCI. MORRIS PLAN BANK\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 814\\nSANZONE v. CINCI. MORRIS PLAN BANK\\nOhio Appeals, 1st Dist., Hamilton County\\nNo. 2325.\\nFeb. 25, 1924\\n147. BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS \\u2014 Trade acceptance held complete and regular on its face, negotiated before due, in good faith for value and properly indorsed.\\n54. BANKS AND BANKING \\u2014 Trad\\u00a9 acceptance not irregular and non-negotiable be-\\n\\u2022 clause maturity date exceeds 90 days of discount unless indorser has negotiated more than 20 per cent bank capital stock.\\n951. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT \\u2014 Evidence of agency by declaration of agent not admissible against principal.\\nAttorneys \\u2014 W. S. Little and M. F. Little, for Sanzone; Wm. R. Collins and Herbert F. Koch, for Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank.\", \"word_count\": \"528\", \"char_count\": \"3157\", \"text\": \"BUCHWALTER, J.\\nEpitomized Opinion\\nPublished Only in Ohio Law Abstract\\nThe Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank brought an action against Sanzone before a justice of the peace. Judgment was for the bank and appealed to the common pleas, and again the bank obtained judgment.\\nAction was brought for $100 and interest due on a trade acceptance as follows:\\n\\\"The Morris Plan Retail Trade Acceptance, Cincinnati, Sept. 30th, 1920. No. 64A429. July 30th, 1921, Pay to the Order of ourselves two hundred dollars ($200.00). The obligation of the acceptor hereof arises out of the purchase of goods from: the drawer.\\n\\\"The drawee may accept this bill payable at any bank, banker, or trust company in the United States which he may designate. To Mrs. Normia Sanzone, Queen City Music Shoppe, 5326 Main Ave. By J. H. Young, Norwood, O.\\\"\\nAcross the face of the trade accaptance is the following:\\n\\\"Accepted. Date, Sept. 30th, 1920. Payable at Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank.Loeation, Cincinnati, Ohio. Mrs. Norma Sanzone (Signature of Customer) '\\nEndorsement on back: \\\"Pay to the order of Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank. J. H. Young.\\\"\\nMrs. Sanzone alleges that the purchase was on open account, that J. H. Young induced her to execute the trade acceptance and also a chattel mortgage with the understanding that payments were to be made to said Young as they fell due and that said papers were to remain in Young's possession. She contended further that her husband had paid Young the full amount of the purchase price. That Young was the bank's agent and payment to him would be payment to the bank. That the trade acceptance was improperly admitted, being endorsed only by said Young, and the bank took it subject to all equities and defenses. That the instrument was not negotiable in that it mlatured more than 90 days after time of discount as provided by 710-124 GC. Affirming judgment of the common pleas, the Court of Appeals held:\\n1. The trade acceptance is complete and regular on its face, and was obtained by the bank before maturity, in good faith, for value and properly indorsed. The bank notified her to make payment to the bank.\\n2. Trade acceptances do not become irregular and non-negotiable by having a maturity date in excess of 90 days if the indorser has not negotiated acceptances or other negotiable paper in excess of 20 per cent of bank capital stock.\\n3. Evidence showing agency to be established by statements of alleged agent not admissible against principal.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/111935.json b/ohio/111935.json
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+"{\"id\": \"111935\", \"name\": \"State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-04-01\", \"docket_number\": \"98-68\", \"first_page\": \"1499\", \"last_page\": \"1499\", \"citations\": \"81 Ohio St. 3d 1499\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:58:57.832536+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., would submit this cause to the court\\u2019s pilot mediation program.\", \"parties\": \"State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland.\", \"head_matter\": \"98-68.\\nState ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland.\", \"word_count\": \"42\", \"char_count\": \"279\", \"text\": \"In Mandamus. On answer of respondents and sua sponte consideration of submission for mediation. Sua sponte, alternative writ granted.\\nPfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., would submit this cause to the court's pilot mediation program.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/12532806.json b/ohio/12532806.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d2da4b1f18775bff7760ca106b5b778603ead0c2
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"12532806\", \"name\": \"State ex rel. Lundeen v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Lundeen v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio\", \"decision_date\": \"2018-06-27\", \"docket_number\": \"2018\\u20130263\", \"first_page\": \"445\", \"last_page\": \"445\", \"citations\": \"100 N.E.3d 445\", \"volume\": \"100\", \"reporter\": \"North Eastern Reporter 3d\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T21:02:22.194526+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State ex rel. Lundeen\\nv.\\nState Med. Bd. of Ohio\", \"head_matter\": \"State ex rel. Lundeen\\nv.\\nState Med. Bd. of Ohio\\n2018-0263\\nSupreme Court of Ohio.\\nJune 27, 2018\\nCASE ANNOUNCEMENTS\\nMOTION AND PROCEDURAL RULINGS\", \"word_count\": \"38\", \"char_count\": \"241\", \"text\": \"In Mandamus and Prohibition. On request for findings of fact/conclusions of law. Request denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/12533894.json b/ohio/12533894.json
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+"{\"id\": \"12533894\", \"name\": \"SUGARCREEK AMISH TOURS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Donald Rodney MARTIN, et al., Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sugarcreek Amish Tours, Inc. v. Martin\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-12-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2017 AP 06 0016\", \"first_page\": \"1075\", \"last_page\": \"1080\", \"citations\": \"102 N.E.3d 1075\", \"volume\": \"102\", \"reporter\": \"North Eastern Reporter 3d\", \"court\": \"Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Tuscarawas County\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-08T21:16:17.237805+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SUGARCREEK AMISH TOURS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant\\nv.\\nDonald Rodney MARTIN, et al., Defendant-Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"SUGARCREEK AMISH TOURS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant\\nv.\\nDonald Rodney MARTIN, et al., Defendant-Appellee\\nNo. 2017 AP 06 0016\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Tuscarawas County.\\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: December 27, 2017\\nROBERT R. STEPHENSON II, Stephenson, Stephenson & Carrothers, 206 West High Avenue, New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663, For Plaintiff-Appellant\\nJ. KEVIN LUNDHOLM, Kyler, Pringle, Lundolm & Durmann, L.P.A., 405 Chanuncey Avenue, N.W., P.O. Box 668, New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663, For Defendant-Appellee Rhonda C. Martin\\nJUDGES: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J., Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J., Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.\", \"word_count\": \"2101\", \"char_count\": \"12717\", \"text\": \"Baldwin, J.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Appellant, Sugarcreek Amish Tours, Inc. appeals the trial court's May 24, 2017 decision to quash a subpoena served upon Huntington National Bank requesting production of the checking account records of Rhonda C. Martin. Appellee is Rhonda C. Martin.\\nSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE\\n{\\u00b6 2} This case began with Appellant's complaint to recover loan proceeds. Appellant filed a complaint on April 2, 2016 alleging Donald Rodney Martin (former spouse of Appellee), Donal Enterprises, Inc. and PRP Railroad Construction & Supply, LLC defaulted on loan obligations, and that the Defendants, including Appellee, were unjustly enriched. On June 4, 2016, Appellee and PRP Railroad Construction & Supply, LLC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). On June 12, 2016 Appellant filed a notice of dismissal of Appellee and PRP Railroad Construction & Supply, LLC without prejudice. After a bench trial on June 28, 2016, the trial court found that defendant Donald Ronald Martin was legally obligated to pay Appellant $4,879,555.46. The pending claim against defendant Donal Enterprises, Inc. was severed for a separate bench trial.\\n{\\u00b6 3} In pursuit of collection of the judgment against Mr. Martin, Appellant obtained and recorded certificates of judgment and filed a motion requesting an order compelling a judgment debtor exam. The request for a judgment debtor exam was granted but the results of the exam are not part of the record. In furtherance of its collection efforts, on April 4, 2017, Appellant issued the following subpoenas:\\n{\\u00b6 4} 1. To J.P. Morgan Chase Bank for checking account records for PRP Rail Construction, LLC from February 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015;\\n{\\u00b6 5} 2. To Huntington Bank for checking account records for Rhonda C. Martin for March 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015;\\n{\\u00b6 6} 3. To Farmers National Bank for checking account records for Donald R. Martin and/or Rhonda C. Martin from September 1, 2014 through December 31, 2015;\\n{\\u00b6 7} 4. To Farmers National Bank for checking account records for Donal Enterprises, Inc. dba DM Enterprises, from December 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015.\\n{\\u00b6 8} On April 19, 2017, Appellee filed a motion to quash the subpoena to Huntington National Bank, claiming that the records sought were personal and private and disclosure should not be permitted. She also claimed that because she was no longer a party and because the statute of limitations had expired for any claims against her, the discovery of these records should not be permitted.\\n{\\u00b6 9} On April 28, 2017, Appellant filed a memorandum opposing the motion to quash, contending that the records were discoverable pursuant to Civ.R. 69 and were a critical part of Appellant's effort to track the funds loaned to Donald R. Martin.\\n{\\u00b6 10} An oral hearing regarding the motion to quash occurred on May 1, 2017, but the record does not contain a transcript of that hearing. On May 2, 2017, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry scheduling the final disposition of the pending motion and granted leave to Appellee to file a Reply Memorandum on or before 4:30 pm on May 19, 2017.\\n{\\u00b6 11} On May 24, 2017, the trial court sustained Appellee's Motion and issued an entry quashing the subpoena to Huntington National Bank. The Court found:\\n.that after thorough consideration of the legal positions of Plaintiff and former party Rhonda C. Martin pertaining to the 4/4/2017 subpoena filed by plaintiff seeking the personal checking account records of former party Rhonda C. Martin at the Huntington National Bank, the 4/19/2017 motion to quash subpoena should be granted.\\n{\\u00b6 12} From this Judgment Entry, Appellant, Sugarcreek Amish Tours, Inc., appeals and submits a single assignment of error:\\nASSIGNMENT OF ERROR\\n{\\u00b6 13} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING APPELLANT'S APRIL 4, 2017, SUBPOENA ISSUED TO HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK FOR RHONDA C. MARTIN'S CHECKING ACCOUNT RECORDS.\\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\\n{\\u00b6 14} This Court's standard of review of a trial court's decision on a motion to quash a subpoena is the abuse of discretion standard. State ex rel. The V. Companies v. Marshall , 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 692 N.E.2d 198 (1998). The Supreme Court of Ohio has held the term abuse of discretion implies the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). When applying this abuse of discretion standard, this court may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Board , 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993).\\n{\\u00b6 15} \\\"Decisions are unreasonable if they are not supported by a sound reasoning process.\\\" AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). \\\"The term \\\"arbitrary,\\\" in this context, means without adequate determining principle and governed by no fixed rules or standard. See Sandusky Properties v. Aveni, 15 Ohio St.3d 273, 275, 15 OBR 408, 409-410, 473 N.E.2d 798, 800-801 (1984).\\\" D.G.M., Inc. v. Cremeans Concrete & Supply Co. , 111 Ohio App.3d 134, 141, 675 N.E.2d 1263 (4th Dist.1996). With these definitions in mind, we review the record to determine if the trial court abused its discretion.\\n{\\u00b6 16} Appellant issued several subpoenas as a part of its effort to collect a judgment of over four million dollars against Donald R. Martin. Civ.R. 69 specifically authorizes the issuance of the subpoenas to discover information in aid of execution. That rule states in relevant part that \\\"[i]n aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or his successor in interest when that interest appears of record, may also obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules.\\\" Appellee does not contend that this rule does not apply to Appellant's efforts.\\n{\\u00b6 17} Appellee argues that because she is no longer a party to the lawsuit and because any claim against her is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Appellant must not be permitted to obtain her checking account records from Huntington National Bank. Appellee cites no authority for her position.\\n{\\u00b6 18} The Civil Rules do not support Appellee's limitations on Appellant's ability to obtain information. \\\"[T]he scope of discovery is broad and includes \\\" any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party .\\\" In re Estate of Geneva , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2016 AP 02 0013, 2016-Ohio-5382, 2016 WL 4362862, \\u00b6 15, appeal not allowed, 148 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2017-Ohio-573, 69 N.E.3d 751, \\u00b6 15. Further, we have addressed a similar situation and found that:\\nThe plain language of Civ.R. 69 clearly permits discovery, from any person, in aid of executing on a judgment and is not limited to the judgment debtor. Therefore, the fact that Whitey's, Inc. and TFS Management, Inc. were not parties to the litigation does not exempt these entities from discovery under Civ.R. 69. Also, the fact that Appellant Schluter was found not personally liable for the acts of Whitey's, Inc. of Shelby is also irrelevant for purposes of discovery under this rule.\\nSchluter v. PSL Motors, Inc., 5th Dist. Richland No. 99 CA 67, 2000 WL 964965, *2 (Jun. 29, 2000).\\n{\\u00b6 19} Further, \\\"This Court has previously held that Civil Rule 45 allows subpoenas to be issued to nonparties.\\\" In re Estate of Geneva, supra , at \\u00b6 16.\\n{\\u00b6 20} Consequently, we find that Appellee's argument regarding the statute of limitations and her status as a non-party are irrelevant and cannot serve as a basis for the trial court to quash the subpoena.\\n{\\u00b6 21} The trial court did not describe its analysis of the facts before it or how it came to its decision to quash the subpoena. For that reason, we have reviewed the record and considered the application of the requirements of Civ.R. 45 to determine if there is any reasonable, non-arbitrary support for the trial court's holding.\\n{\\u00b6 22} The grounds for quashing a subpoena are described in Civ.R. 45(C) :\\n(3) On timely motion, the court from which the subpoena was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena, or order appearance or production only under specified conditions, if the subpoena does any of the following:\\n(a) Fails to allow reasonable time to comply;\\n(b) Requires disclosure of privileged or otherwise protected matter and no exception or waiver applies;\\n(c) Requires disclosure of a fact known or opinion held by an expert not retained or specially employed by any party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial as described by Civ.R. 26(B)(5), if the fact or opinion does not describe specific events or occurrences in dispute and results from study by that expert that was not made at the request of any party;\\n(d) Subjects a person to undue burden.\\n{\\u00b6 23} Appellee cites Civ.R. 45 as grounds for her motion, but she does not argue that she was not allowed reasonable time to comply with the subpoena or that the subpoena is related to facts or opinions held by an expert. She cannot argue that it subjects her to an undue burden because the subpoena was not issued to her, but was directed to Huntington National Bank who would be obligated to collate and provide the records at Appellant's cost ( R.C. 9.02 ). The only possible basis for quashing the subpoena pursuant to Civ.R. 45 is that it seeks production of \\\"privileged or otherwise protected matter and no exception or waiver applies.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 24} Generally, \\\"[t]he burden to show that testimony or documents are confidential or privileged is on the party seeking to exclude the material.\\\" Grace v. Mastruserio , 182 Ohio App.3d 243, 2007-Ohio-3942, 912 N.E.2d 608, \\u00b6 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser , 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983).\\n{\\u00b6 25} Appellee asserts that the information is private and confidential but offered no authority to establish that the information sought by the subpoena was \\\"privileged or otherwise protected.\\\" Neither the Revised Code nor any relevant case law supports a finding that bank records are privileged and nothing within the case record shows that they are otherwise protected. Tisco Trading USA, Inc. v. Cleveland Metal Exchange, Ltd. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97114, 2012-Ohio-493, 2012 WL 425871, \\u00b6 10.\\n{\\u00b6 26} Further, these records are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Appellant holds a judgment in excess of four million dollars against Appellee's former spouse. Appellee signed two checks sent to Appellant in payment of that debt in the amounts of $100,000.00 and $300,000.00 and finally, Appellee has been the subject of litigation by one of the parties in this action in which it was alleged that loan proceeds were transferred to her. (Trial Brief of Defendant, Donal Enterprises, Inc., page 1-2, filed in this case on March 1, 2017). Under the circumstances, it is likely the records will provide some relevant information regarding disposition of loan proceeds or other relevant evidence. The fact that she is no longer a party and may be protected from claims by the statute of limitations is irrelevant and shall not be used as a shield to prevent Appellant from exhausting options to track the funds loaned to Donald R. Martin.\\n{\\u00b6 27} The trial court considered this record and quashed the subpoena without memorializing its reasoning process or citing the rule or determining principle that supported its conclusion. Since the trial court did not give a reason for granting the motion, and we find no support for granting it, we hold that the court abused its discretion. Jamestown Village Condo. Owners Assn. v. Mkt. Media Research, Inc. , 96 Ohio App.3d 678, 695, 645 N.E.2d 1265 (8th Dist.1994).\\n{\\u00b6 28} Consequently, the decision of the Tuscarawas Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.\\n{\\u00b6 29} Costs are assessed to Appellee.\\nJohn Wise, P.J., and Earle Wise, J., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/12548691.json b/ohio/12548691.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f714b9684350d007b2cfd678ec5a1297582be16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/12548691.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12548691\", \"name\": \"CLARKWESTERN DIETRICH BLDG. SYS., L.L.C. v. CERTIFIED STEEL STUD ASSN., INC.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Clarkwestern Dietrich Bldg. Sys., L.L.C. v. Certified Steel Stud Assn., Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2018-01-31\", \"docket_number\": \"2017\\u20130858\", \"first_page\": \"948\", \"last_page\": \"948\", \"citations\": \"90 N.E.3d 948\", \"volume\": \"90\", \"reporter\": \"North Eastern Reporter 3d\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T21:02:56.882594+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CLARKWESTERN DIETRICH BLDG. SYS., L.L.C.\\nv.\\nCERTIFIED STEEL STUD ASSN., INC.\", \"head_matter\": \"CLARKWESTERN DIETRICH BLDG. SYS., L.L.C.\\nv.\\nCERTIFIED STEEL STUD ASSN., INC.\\n2017-0858\\nSupreme Court of Ohio.\\nJanuary 31, 2018\\nCASE ANNOUNCEMENTS\\nAPPEALS NOT ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW\", \"word_count\": \"33\", \"char_count\": \"235\", \"text\": \"O'Donnell, J., dissents.\\nO'Neill, J., not participating.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1368247.json b/ohio/1368247.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01f66a3cb01ae69bf461e666b46fc32485a4bd20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1368247.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1368247\", \"name\": \"The State, ex rel. Bartlett, Pros. Atty., Appellee, v. The Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Bartlett v. Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1940-11-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"334\", \"last_page\": \"349\", \"citations\": \"67 Ohio App. 334\", \"volume\": \"67\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:49:10.927490+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Hornbbck, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State, ex rel. Bartlett, Pros. Atty., Appellee, v. The Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State, ex rel. Bartlett, Pros. Atty., Appellee, v. The Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., Appellant.\\n(Decided November 7, 1940.)\\nMr. Ralph J. Bartlett, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. R. P. Barnhart, for appellee.\\nMessrs. Wilson \\u00e9 Rector, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"4731\", \"char_count\": \"27454\", \"text\": \"Geiger, J.\\nThis case is before this court on an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas against the respondent for the sum of $11,098.50 alleged by the prosecuting attorney to have been illegally paid by the county treasurer to the respondent in repayment of penalties on certain property on which there had been a default in the payment of taxes.\\nThe petition sets out 15 different causes, each claiming a separate sum due the county on account of the refund of the penalty to the respondent on separate parcels of real estate. The payments by the respondent into the county treasury were by the official act of the sheriff who, upon the sale of property upon which the respondent held a mortgage, paid into the county treasury the taxes due, whether delinquent or current and the penalties that had been assessed for the nonpayment of taxes as the same became due. While the respondent did not, as a corporation, pay the penalties into the county, the same were paid by the sheriff out of the money that otherwise would have been distributed to the respondent.\\nThe amended petition sets up the official character of the relator and states that he brings the action under the authority of Section 2921, General Code.\\nIt is alleged that on the 30th day of March 1933, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill No. 42 (115 Ohio Laws, 161), commonly known as- the Whittemore Act, which was approved by the Governor and after-wards was amended at various times as alleged in the petition, the last amendment thereof being Senate Bill No. 359 (116 Ohio Laws, pt. 2, 14).\\nIt is alleged that Senate Bill No. 359, by Section 1 thereof provides, in substance, that any person required by law to pay real property taxes and assessments which have become delinquent prior to the September settlement of 1935, or any person holding a lien on such property may, at any time prior to the 31st day of December 1936, elect to pay the principal sum of such delinquent taxes and assessments except that no such person shall be entitled to make such election unless all taxes and penalties for the year 1935 have been paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 2653, General Code, \\\"provided that in case a penalty and interest has been paid on account of delinquent taxes and/or assessments, for the first or second half of the year 1934, such penalty shall be refunded on order of the county auditor directed to the county treasurer provided the principal sum of such taxes and assessments is paid prior to the thirty-first day of December, 1936.\\\"\\nThe allegations as to the 15 separate causes of action are substantially the same with some variations which we will note. We will epitomize the first cause of action and also state any other additional pertinent matters appearing in the other causes of action. The first cause of action is to the effect that the auditor executed a voucher under Senate Bill No: 42 to the respondent drawn upon the treasurer in the amount named; that th\\u00e9 check issued by the treasurer bore the notation, \\\"refund of taxes overpaid\\\"; that such check was paid by the treasurer; that the amount thereof represented the refund made under color of Senate Bill No. 42 of penalty charges on real property paid through the sheriff's offic'e by the order of the court, for moneys arising from the proceeds of judicial sales; that such refunding whs not provided for in Senate Bill No. 42; and that that bill was not in,force on the date of the refunding check.\\nThe second cause of action relates to a like transac tion, being a penalty refund under Senate Bill No. 359. It is alleged that Senate Bill No. 359, in so far as it attempted to confer upon county auditors tbe authority to make a refund of penalties paid on delinquent taxes, is unconstitutional, and that such refunds were made without authority of law.\\nThe subsequent causes of action are in identical language, but relate to different payments. In the 15th cause of action it is further stated that the Whittemore Acts suspended the operation of Section 5678, General Code, long in force in Ohio, which provided for a charge against the property of certain penalties and interest when taxes were delinquent.\\nIt is further asserted that the Whittemore Acts suspended the operation of Section 2657, General Code, long in force in Ohio, also relating to the charge of taxes and penalties against delinquent property.\\nIt is further asserted in the 15th cause of action that the Whittemore Acts are and were void and discriminatory and in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and were retroactive and in conflict with Section 28, Article II, and that the refunds were unauthorized. It is asserted that the total amount drawn from the treasury by the respondent is $11,-098.50 for which judgment is asked.\\nA demurrer filed to the petition was overruled in part and sustained in part. By an entry the relator was granted leave to amend the amended petition by inserting as the last paragraph in the first cause of action a statement to the effect that if the payment was made by virtue of Senate Bill No. 359, that bill is unconstitutional and void and the refund made without authority of law, and by adding to the 9th and 15th causes of aetion a paragraph to like effect.\\nA demurrer filed to the amended petition as amended was overruled;'\\nThereupon an answer to the amended petition as amended was filed, the first defense of which made certain admissions and alleged that the General Assembly-enacted Senate Bill No. 42, which was later amended and its application extended, and enacted Senate Bill No. 359; and that Senate Bill No. 42 made no provisions for refund of penalty.\\nThe respondent denied that the payment to it represented a refund under the authority of Senate Bill No. 42, and alleged that it was made under authority of Senate Bill No. 359.\\nFor answer to all the other causes of action the respondent denied that the payments or refunds were made without authority of law, and further denied in answer to the 15th cause of action that the Whittemore Acts are void, and that the refunds made to the respondent were unauthorized; or that any part thereof was paid to the respondent without authority.\\nAs a second defense it is alleged that all the payments made to the respondent as alleged in the several causes of action were made by the county auditor upon the advice and direction of the prosecuting attorney with the approval of the Bureau of Inspection and under and by virtue of Senate Bill No. 359, \\\"and before said Senate Bill had been declared to be unconstitutional by the judgment of any court. \\\" It is alleged that the payments were voluntarily made by the officials of Franklin county without any mistake of fact and without any duress or fraud, and are not recoverable by the relator for the benefit of the county. It is further alleged that the relator is estopped to claim that such payments were illegally made or to maintain an action thereon.\\nThe relator demurred to the answer and the court found the demurrer well taken and sustained the same, and, the respondent not desiring to plead further, it was ordered that the relator recover a judgment against the respondent in the sum of $11,098.50.\\nAn appeal was properly taken from the action of the court below to this court.\\nErrors are assigned to the effect that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer of the respondent; in rendering judgment against the respondent, and in holding the payments made to the company were not voluntary; that the court erred in holding these payments were made under a statute which at the time did not authorize the same; and that the court erred in holding these payments were illegally made to the company and the county officials were not justified in making such payments. The court below, in sustaining the demurrer of the relator to the answer, filed an opinion covering the matters in controversy. This opinion is before us, and we have read the same with interest. The respondent takes the position that the refunds alluded to were legally made under a then valid statute, before any court had held the statute to be unconstitutional; that the payments were voluntary, and made without any mistake of fact and without any duress; and that the county had full consideration for the refunds in that the purpose for which the law was enacted, to wit, early payments, had been realized and the county had been benefited. It is pointed out by the respondent that the act, presumed to be constitutional, imposed a duty upon the officials to make the refunds and they were all made in pursuance of the act; that there was no mistake of law and the officers were not under a misapprehension as to the law; that they had the advice of the prosecuting attorney and the approval of the Bureau of Inspection which they followed ; that there was no mistake of fact; and that the purpose of the legislation was to meet the moral obligation to equalize the rights of taxpayers. It is asserted that the officers might have raised the question as to the validity of the act before the refunds were paid, but did not do so. Counsel urge that the statute was valid prior to a judicial determination to the contrary, citing, among other cases, State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St., 24, 42 N. E., 999, 31 L. R. A., 660; City of Mt. Vernon v. State, 71 Ohio St., 428, 73 N. E., 515; and State, ex rel. Cline, v. Vail, 84 Ohio St., 399, 95 N. E., 911. Counsel draw the conclusion that the county officials rightly felt themselves to be bound by the statute commanding them-to make refunds, that, when they made refunds before the validity of the law had been questioned, they were not to be charged with having made an illegal payment, and that, if they did make a mistake in treating the law as constitutional, the payments were made under a then valid section. Counsel quote 31 Ohio Jurisprudence, 212, Section 134, to the effect that the rule is that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with knowledge of the facts; can not be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal, although the payer expressly reserves his-right to litigate his claim.\\nIt is urged that the county auditor could have refused to pay the refund and could have defended on the ground that the act was unconstitutional, and not having done so he was, in his opinion, acting pursuant to the authority of a valid statute. It is asserted that parties may so conduct themselves with respect to the subject of unconstitutional legislation that they are estopped to deny its binding character. It is also asserted that the defense of \\\"voluntary payment\\\" is available against the county. Citing, City of Marietta v. Slocomb, 6 Ohio St., 471.\\nCounsel cite other cases and authorities, among them. 15 Corpus Juris, 662, Section 374, and Blumenthal v. United States, 4 F. (2d), 808, and maintain that under these authorities the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer setting up the defense of voluntary payment.\\nCounsel discuss at length the case of Vindicator Printing Co. v. State, 68 Ohio St., 362, 67 N. E., 733; and State, ex rel. Hunt, v. Fronizer, 8 C. C. (N. S.), 216, 18 C. D., 709, which case was further considered by the Supreme Court in State, ex rel. Hunt, v. Fronizer, 77 Ohio St., 7, 82 N. E., 518. Counsel also cite Thomas v. State, ex rel. Gilbert, 76 Ohio St., 341, 81 N. E., 437, claiming that that case is in perfect analogy to the case at bar. Counsel point out the distinction that they claim can be made between the payment of taxes and of penalties.\\nCounsel for relator file a brief in which they- seek to answer the argument of respondent and to justify the judgment of the court below. \\u2022\\nThe narrow question is whether the prosecuting- attorney may, by virtue of the authority conferred upon him by Section 2921, General Code, recover from the respondent the penalties which were refunded under the provisions of an act of the Legislature which, at.the-time of the refund, had not been declared unconstitutional, but was thereafter so held.\\nSection 2921, General Code, enacted for the protection of public funds, provides, -in substance, so far .as.it relates to the case at bar, that, upon being satisfied that public moneys have been illegally drawn from the treasury, the prosecuting attorney may apply by \\u2022civil-action to recover the public moneys so illegally drawn.\\nThere seems to be no contention between the parties as to the unconstitutionality of that part of Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 359, which provides that in case a. penalty and interest has been paid on account of delinquent taxes such penalty shall be refunded on order of the county auditor directed.to. the county treasurer,provided the principal sum of the taxes and assessment; is paid prior to the 31st day of December 1936. . .\\nIn the case of State, ex rel. Crotty, v. Zangerle, Aud., 133 Ohio St., 532, 14 N. E. (2d), 932, the court had under consideration, the constitutionality .of Section-. 2590-1, General Code, providing that whenever any penalty is paid and is afterwards abrogated by the Legislature, and such penalty paid between June 1930 and January 1937 is remitted and abrogated, and upon application to the \\u00e1uditor before the first of January 1940 such penalty shall be refunded on the order of the county auditor directed to the county treasurer. There are many matters of interest discussed by the court, among them being that penalties and interest, after collection, are to be considered and treated as taxes, the court stating on page 538:\\n\\\"Clearly interest and penalties upon delinquent taxes must be considered as part of the taxes for the purpose of solving the question here presented. Hence the decision in the Rosche case [50 Ohio St., 103, 33 N. E,. 408, 40 Am. St. Rep., 653, 19 L. R. A., 584] requires this court to hold that the statute involved in the instant case is retroactive in its nature and therefore violative of Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution of Ohio.\\n\\\"Likewise this court is of the opinion that this statute is patently repugnant to the equal protection clauses of Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio and Section 1 of Article XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.\\\"\\nIn the case of State, ex rel. Outcalt, Pros. Atty., v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St., 457, 17 N. E. (2d), 743, it is held that the provisions of the Whittemore Acts which authorize the remission of the penalties, interest and other charges on unpaid delinquent taxes, when payment of taxes is made within a prescribed time, are valid and not in contravention of the state and federal Constitutions.\\nThe opinion by Williams, J., states on page 461:\\n\\\"This court is of the opinion that no constitutional rights are contravened by the Whittemore Acts insofar as they undertake to remit penalties, interest and charges. In this respect those acts do not violate Section 26 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution, ; nor Section 2 of Article XII * # * which requires taxation of real estate by uniform rule, for the reason that they concern not taxation or even the collection of taxes but the remission of penalties, interest and charges; nor the equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions for the reason they are not discriminatory but apply to all of one class, namely, delinquent taxpayers who have not paid their taxes, and the classification is not unreasonable nor arbitrary . nor gection 28, Article II which forbids the General Assembly to pass retroactive laws, for the reason that the acts are prospective in character \\u2014 they do not interfere with vested rights acquired under existing laws, impose a new duty, attach a new disability, or create a new obligation with respect to transactions or considerations already past . \\\"\\nWilliams, J., on page 463, states that it is urged that the position taken by the court is inconsistent with State, ex rel. Crotty, v. Zangerle, Aud., supra, in which the court held unconstitutional the amended Ogrin Act which provided for the refund of penalties. Williams, J., points out that in that case it was held that penalties which had been paid in discharging tax obligations became a part of the taxes collected and were distributed to the subdivisions of the state, and that after payment into the public treasury, they could not be refunded through legislative enactment. The judge points out that there is a distinction, in that penalties, interest and charges, when commingled with taxes in a common fund as a result of collection, are taxes so far as the power of the General Assembly to pass legislation for their refund is concerned, but before collection are not.\\nIn speaking of the Whittemore Acts on page 465, it is stated that:\\n\\\"That part of the enactment provides for a refund of a penalty already paid and is therefore invalid and unconstitutional under the pronouncement in State, ex rel. Crotty, v. Zangerle, Aud., supra, but since the part quoted may be separated from the other provisions their validity is not affected thereby.\\n\\\"In our judgment the Whittemore Acts (except insofar as they provide for refund of penalties) constitute a valid exercise of legislative power and are constitutional. ' '\\nA question that may engage our attention is whether an unconstitutional act has validity from the date of its passage until it is declared unconstitutional, or whether it is void ab initio. There seems to be some doubt upon the part of counsel upon this question. While we have not been cited to any case directly passing upon this point, we find it incidentally referred to in several cases.\\nIn the case of State, ex rel. Cline, v. Vail, supra, the opinion is by Shauck, J. We may quote some of his observations:\\nPage 405: \\\"No controversy exists respecting the proposition that an unconstitutional law is in legal contemplation inoperative as though it had not been passed.\\\"\\nPage 406: \\\"The adjudication that the act was unconstitutional only declared that that was its character. Its character had been fixed from the time it was enacted. ' '\\nIn Thomas v. State, ex rel. Gilbert, supra, it is said on page 361, after speaking of the invalidity of an unconstitutional act:\\n\\\"Upon principle this doctrine may be regarded as entirely consistent with the commonly accepted doctrine that an unconstitutional act of the Legislature is not a law but a nullity. It is in accordance with the general rule that all who assume the validity of legislation do so at their peril. As to them, contracts pur porting to be authorized by void legislation have no obligation to be impaired by judicial decisions which apply to them the tests prescribed by the Constitution. ' '\\nThere is, however, a line of cases which are of interest in that they hold that under certain conditions one may not be heard to deny the constitutionality of a law affecting a contract. As touching this matter we cite State, ex rel. Hunt, v. Fronizer, supra, which holds that the statute which authorizes the prosecuting attorney to bring an action to recover back money does not authorize the recovery of money paid on the county commissioners' bridge contract fully executed but rendered void from the inadvertent omission of a proper certificate, there being no claim of unfairness or extortion nor any claim of an effort to put the contractor in statu quo by the return of the bridge, etc.\\nSpeer, J., on page 16, after holding that the money could not be recovered, states:\\n\\\"This court is of the opinion that such recovery is not authorized. The principle applicable to the situation is the equitable one that where one has acquired possession of the property of another through an unauthorized and void contract, and has paid for the same, there can be no recovery back of the money paid without putting, or showing a readiness to put, the other party in statu quo, ,\\\"\\nOn page 17 it is stated:\\n\\\"It does not appear that it was the intention to deprive a party who has dealt with the county honestly, and in good faith, of any legitimate defense or to impose upon the court any duty to ignore the well-established rules of jurisprudence and adjudge in favor of the plaintiff upon his application whether such demand violates fundamental principles of law or not. ' '\\nCity of Mt. Vernon v. State, supra, is to the effect that where a municipal corporation has entered into a contract under a statute which, is unconstitutional and the facts against the corporation are such as would estop an individual from setting up a defense of the unconstitutionality of the statute, the municipal corporation will also be so estopped.\\nIn State, ex rel. Cline, v. Vail, supra, it is held that a party may assert that an unconstitutional act is a nullity, unless his conduct with reference to the subject of the act has been such that to permit the assertion would place his adversary in a less favorable position than he would have occupied had the act not been passed.\\nIn Thomas v. State, ex rel. Gilbert, supra, it is held that the Supreme Court having affirmed the constitutional validity of the legislative act passed to authorize contracts, and such contract having been entered into and services performed towards its execution, the party performing them, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's subsequent decision that the act is constitutionally void, is entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for such services as he has performed before the filing of the petition in the action which challenged the validity of such contract.\\nOn page 362 it is said in substance by Shauck, C. J., that contracts executed under favor of acts which the highest court has declared valid are themselves valid as against subsequent decisions to the contrary, though the acts may not be valid.\\nA party may assert the nullity of the law unless his conduct in reference to the subject of the act would place the other party in a less favorable position than he would have occupied if the act had not been passed.\\nIt is further claimed that the relator is estopped from asserting the unconstitutionality of the act because he received into the. county treasury the taxes which it was the purpose of the unconstitutional portion of the act to promote, and that therefore the county treasury had received a benefit which prevents the recovery on account of its unconstitutionality. But what detriment has inured to the respondent by virtue of the payment of the taxes and the penalty out of a fund received by sheriff in a foreclosure proceeding? Under the statute, the respondent, being a lienholder, could have come forward and paid the back taxes and saved the penalty, but it did not see fit to do so. It waited until it chose to foreclose its lien and then paid the penalty by virtue of the order of the court and the act of the sheriff. It has no moral claim against the county by virtue of any act done by it.\\nIn State, ex rel. Cline, v. Vail, supra, it is said at the bottom of page 406:\\n\\\"Nor can it be governed by the doctrine of estoppel which requires that the party by whom it is asserted shall have sustained some detriment by reason of the conduct or representation of him against whom the estoppel is invoked. ' '\\nUntil the respondent can plead and show that it suffered some detriment, not by reason of the payment by the sheriff to the county treasurer of the penalty, but by the repayment by the county treasurer of the penalty to the respondent, there can be no claim made that the respondent sustained some detriment by reason of the payment by the sheriff, as that has nothing to do with the claimed right to recover now asserted by the prosecuting attorney. The judgment against the respondent is to recover back money wrongfully paid by the treasurer. Certainly it can not be asserted that the respondent sustained any detriment by reason of the fact that the county treasurer paid to it money to which it was not entitled.\\nThe respondent relies upon its second defense which is to the effect that the money was paid voluntarily without duress and in full possession of all the facts but simply through a mistake of law. The court below held that the county treasurer could not he held to make a voluntary illegal payment which would prevent the recovery of the money. The statute itself under which the prosecuting attorney is proceeding is based upon his conviction that public moneys have been illegally drawn from the county treasury. If he is so satisfied he has a right to bring the action, there is no exception depriving him of this right, if the money were voluntarily paid under a mistake of law.\\nLet us visualize the matter as it actually occurred. The respondent had a mortgage lien upon certain real estate upon which there were delinquent taxes which gave rise to the imposition of certain penalties. The respondent then proceeded to foreclose and out of the purchase money the sheriff paid into the county treasury the taxes and penalties. The penalties were commingled with the taxes and distributed to those subdivisions entitled thereto. When money reaches the treasury there is but one key that will unlock the door of the safe and permit its legal distribution. Section 2674, General Code, provides that no money shall be paid from the county treasury except on the warrant of the county auditor, with certain exceptions. Therefore, before the treasurer can legally pay out the money it must be upon the voucher or a warrant of the auditor.\\nSection 2570, General Code, provides that the county auditor shall issue warrants on the treasurer for all moneys paid from such treasury, upon presentation of the proper order or voucher therefor. He shall not issue a warrant for the payment of any claim against the county unless allowed by the county commissioners, except where the amount due is fixed by law or is allowed by an officer or tribunal authorized by law to do so.\\nThe statute now in question provides: \\\"Such penalty shall be refunded on order of the county auditor directed to the county treasurer. ' '\\nBut this provision of the section is unconstitutional and void and had no validity from the beginning; therefore the county auditor could not issue Ms warrant to the county treasurer to pay the money to the respondent. There would then be no way to get the money out of the treasury in view of the unconstitutionality in the provision, except on the allowance by the county commissioners as provided by Section 2570, Q-eneral Code. The county commissioners, of course, took no part in the refund, and the auditor could not issue the warrant because his authority was invalid. It must follow that the money did not legally leave the treasury, and this aside from the fact that the statute permits the prosecuting attorney to bring an action under certain circumstances.\\nWe therefore reach the conclusion that the court below committed no error when it overruled the demurrer to the respondent's answer and rendered judgment in favor of the county.\\nThe judgment is affirmed and the cause remanded.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nHornbbck, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1372949\", \"name\": \"Krisher, Appellant, v. McAllister, Appellee, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Krisher v. McAllister\", \"decision_date\": \"1942-06-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2041\", \"first_page\": \"58\", \"last_page\": \"64\", \"citations\": \"71 Ohio App. 58\", \"volume\": \"71\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:12:14.702034+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Lemert, P. J., and SheriSk, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Krisher, Appellant, v. McAllister, Appellee, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Krisher, Appellant, v. McAllister, Appellee, et al.\\n(No. 2041\\nDecided June 11, 1942.)\\nMr. Franklin L. Maier and Mr. Jas. L. Amerman, for appellant.\\nMessrs. Burt, Carson & Shadrach, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1923\", \"char_count\": \"11128\", \"text\": \"Montgomery, J.\\nThe appellant filed his petition in the Court of Common Pleas against the appellee, Clarence I. McAllister, and one Prank L. Misheff, wherein he sought to recover from the two defendants an .amount claimed to have been suffered by him for expenses, hospital care, medical attention, nursing and doss of services of his minor son, who had been severely injured as the result of the claimed concurrent negli.gence of the two defendants.\\nMcAllister, by his amended answer, admitted certain allegations of the petition, then denied liability, .and as a second defense pleaded contributory negligence of the boy who was injured. By way of' third \\u2022defense, McAllister pleaded the commencement of a .suit in the Court of Common Pleas by Howard Krisher the minor, by Earl Krisher his father and next friend, .against the two defendants in this case; that in that .action a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant McAllister, and judgment rendered thereon; that by reason thereof all questions of the negligence of the defendant McAllister had been determined; and that such matter is now res judicata.\\nAnd for a fourth defense, McAllister pleaded that 'in the former action this plaintiff, Earl Krisher, had .an interest by reason' of his relationship as father of the plaintiff, alleged his active participation in the trial of the former cause, and as the result thereof pleaded estoppel.\\nDemurrers were filed to the third and fourth defenses of the amended answer, which were overruled. \\\"Thereupon, a reply was filed to this pleading. ,\\nThe reply to the third defense admitted that whatever claims the plaintiff Earl Krisher might have for loss of services and expenditures, grew out of the same facts and circumstances as were tried or could have been tried in such former action, and that all questions of the negligence of the defendant McAllister were litigated and determined in such action, but denied that the result was binding upon this plaintiff.\\nFor reply to the fourth defense, plaintiff admitted that he actively participated in the trial of the earlier cause, by employing counsel therein for plaintiff, as next friend; and that he sat at the trial table with the son and counsel throughout the trial, consulted with counsel as to the progress of the case, and authorized an appeal from the judgment. He denied this constituted any estoppel.\\nThereupon, the defendant McAllister moved for judgment upon the pleadings, this motion was sustained and judgment rendered for him, and from that judgment this appeal was perfected to this court.\\nThe cause is still pending in the Court of Common Pleas so far as the defendant Misheff is concerned.\\nThere is, therefore, presented to us the two questions : Did the result' of the former case constitute res judicata so far as this plaintiff is concerned? Is he, by his conduct, estopped from proceeding in the instant case? If these questions, or either of them, be answered in the affirmative the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed, otherwise, there must be' a reversal and a remand for further proceedings.\\nWith reason do counsel for appellee contend that since there was a failure in the original and principal action, its result should be held determinative in the instant case. We might add that there is particular merit in this contention based upon the fact, which was heretofore recited, of the admissions in plaintiff's reply. ' Were this a matter of first impression, we would be inclined to hold with the appellee. There is certainly much reason in the proposition that when an issue has been thoroughly litigated and finally determined, and it has been decided that no cause of action exists for the injuries sustained, it follows that claims incidental to, or growing out of, these injuries should not thereafter be sustainable against one who has been found free from liability in the original action.\\nHowever, as we view it, we are not privileged to do pioneer work in this respect. The law of Ohio, as well as the law generally in the United States, is against the contention. It would be vain and profitless for us to review in detail the Ohio authorities which have been discussed elaborately by counsel in their briefs, and with which they are so entirely familiar. These cases are: Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine, Admr., 77 Ohio St., 395, 83 N. E., 601, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.), 893; May Coal Co. v. Robinette, Admr., 120 Ohio St., 110, 165 N. E., 576, 64 A. L. R., 441; and Gibson v. Solomon, 136 Ohio St., 101, 23 N. E. (2d), 996, 125 A. L. R., 903.\\nCounsel for appellee argue that the effect of these cases is destroyed by the more recent opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Conold v. Stern, 138 Ohio St., 352, 35 N. E. (2d), 133, 137 A. L. R., 1003. However, a reading of that case shows a situation decidedly different from the one at bar, and different from the Ohio cases on which appellant relies. In the Conold v. Stern case it was held that when an insurer had been held not liable in one action by one injured by the insured, that judgment would be conclusive in a subsequent action by another person injured in the same accident against the same insured. In that case the obligation of the insurance company was to its insured, obligating itself to make good the loss sustained by the insured, provided certain requirements were complied with. It had been held in the prior action that there was no compliance with these requirements. The court, in the opinon on page 367, states that since the insurance contract had been held void as between the insurer and insured in the previous case, the injured plaintiff in the Conoid case, \\\"limited to a derivative right from the insured, is barred as her insured is barred from recovery against the insurance company.\\\"\\nIn that case, the right of the injured party to the insurance fund was derivative from the right vested in the insured and depended altogether upon it. In the case presented to us, the right of the plaintiff here is not derivative in the same sense, although it is contingent upon proving liability of the defendant.\\nCounsel for appellant cite many authorities outside the state of Ohio. Most of them are not in point, because in most of them the liability of -the defendant for damages had been established, and it naturally follows that if liable in the original instance to the one injured, he might well be held in turn to respond to those who had suffered incidentally as a result therefrom, and that the amount of liability to those incidentally injured would depend upon the proof of damages which they sustained,\\nHowever, a case directly in point, and apparently similar in every detail to our case, is that of Bamka v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Rd. Co., 61 Minn., 549, 63 N. W., 1116, 52 Am. St. Rep., 618. The syllabus in that case is as follows:\\n\\\"The general rule that the judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, of the parties, and the process, and rendered directly upon the point in question, is conclusive between the same parties, is not applicable when the same person, though a party in both suits, is such in different capacities \\u2014 in the one, occupying a distinctly representative position, such as an administrator, or as a general or an ad litem guardian; in the other, as an individual.\\n\\\"Held, in an action brought by a father, in his individual right, to recover for loss of services, for expenses incurred, and for compensation for care and trouble sustained, by him, growing out of injuries to his minor son, alleged to have been the result of defendant's carelessness and negligence, that a judgment rendered in favor of defendant in a prior action, brought under the provisions of G. S. 1894, Section 5164, by the father, is not a bar to a recovery. ' '\\nAs stated in the opinion of the Minnesota case, on page 552:\\n\\\"For in an action brought by a person as an administrator, or as a guardian, general or special, he is not a party, properly speaking, although he is nominally. The real party is the estate he may represent as administrator, or the minor in whose behalf he as guardian prosecutes the action. In another suit brought to enforce an individual demand or right, he, in contemplation of law, is a distinct person, and a stranger to the prior proceedings and judgment.\\\"\\nWith considerable reluctance, we come to the conclusion that the judgment in the former action of Krisher by his next friend, against McAllister and others, is not res judicata in the present action.\\nComing now to the appellee's claim that the plaintiff is estopped from proceeding with this action, it is to be observed that there is much confusion in attempting to distinguish, in such actions, between res judicata and estoppel.\\nAs stated, in the third paragraph of the syllabus of Clark v. Baranowski, 111 Ohio St., 436, 145 N. E., 760:\\n\\\"The doctrine of res adjudicata is a branch of the law of estoppel # *\\nAnd we note that Bigelow on Estoppel, devotes many, many pages to a discussion of the question of res judicata, and frequently uses that term and the term estoppel as interchangeable.\\nWe take it that counsel will not seriously contend that the plaintiff is estopped, so far as the judgment itself is concerned, if that judgment be not res judicata. Their contention seems to be that there is an additional valid and sufficient estoppel, due to the fact that the plaintiff in the former action appeared as next friend, actively participated in the trial, and directed the institution and perfection of the appeal of the case after final judgment.\\n. In other words, it is contended that he, by his personal conduct, has estopped himself from now proceeding in this action. Frankly, we cannot follow this argument in view of our conclusion on the former proposition. If he is not barred by the result in the former case from now proceeding, we fail to see how it can be contended that his personal participation in that action would bar him. If he has a right to maintain the action in spite of the former adverse judgment, he certainly has a right to pursue it as effectively and forcefully as he can, and in the former action he was certainly bound to pursue it as forcefully and effectively as he could, if for no other ground than upon good faith in having instituted the suit as the next friend of the minor. To hold otherwise on this-claim of estoppel would seem to us to require as a condition that there had been an absence of good faith or an absence of personal interest in the other action, on the result of which counsel seek to rely.\\nIt is our conclusion that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrers to the third and fourth defenses-of the amended answer, and erred in rendering judgment upon the pleadings; and it follows that the judgment of that court will be reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings.\\nJudgment reversed.\\nLemert, P. J., and SheriSk, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1395881\", \"name\": \"Nahas, Admx., Appellant, v. George, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nahas v. George\", \"decision_date\": \"1949-04-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 3976\", \"first_page\": \"328\", \"last_page\": \"330\", \"citations\": \"85 Ohio App. 328\", \"volume\": \"85\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:34:18.972918+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Stevens, P. J., and Doyle, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Nahas, Admx., Appellant, v. George, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Nahas, Admx., Appellant, v. George, Appellee.\\n(No. 3976\\nDecided April 12, 1949.)\\nMessrs. Brouse, McDowell, May, Bierce & W ortman, for appellant.\\nMessrs. Slabaugh, Guinlher & Pfhieger and Mr. Albert F. Schwartz, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"552\", \"char_count\": \"3390\", \"text\": \"Hunsicker, J.\\nLillian Nahas, as administratrix of the estate of Elias Nahas, deceased, commenced an action in Common Pleas Court, praying for an accounting of partnership profits and an undivided one-half interest in a partnership which she claims existed between her deceased husband, Elias Nahas, and Solomon George, the appellee herein. Mr. George denies that any partnership ever existed between Elias Nahas and himself, as claimed by the administratrixappellant.\\nThis appeal from the judgment of the Common Pleas Court is here on law and fact. We have carefully read and considered the transcript of testimony and the exhibits introduced herein, and are unanimously of the opinion that appellant has established the existence of a partnership between Elias Nahas and Solomon George, as claimed in the petition.\\nThis partnership having been dissolved by the death of Elias Nahas on February 22, 1942, the question immediately facing us concerns the application of Section 8085 at seq., General Code, to the facts of this case.\\nWe have considered the case of McShaffrey, Exrx., v. McShaffrey, 10 Ohio Law Abs., 408, decided by the Court of Appeals of this district on June 5, 1931. but find that it has no application to the facts of the instant case.\\nSection 8085, General Code, provides:\\n\\\"When a member of any partnership in this state dies, the surviving partner or partners, upon the appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate of such deceased partner, shall, forthwith, make application to the probate court of the county in which the partnership existed, upon first giving notice of the time of the bearing of such application to the executor or administrator, for the appointment of three judicious disinterested appraisers, who shall make out, under oath, a full and complete inventory and appraisement of the entire assets of the partnership, including any real estate, together with a schedule of the debts and liabilities thereof, and deliver it to the surviving partner or partners, to be by him or them forthwith filed in the probate court of the county in which such appraisers were appointed.\\\"\\nBy the terms of this and the related following sections, the mode of procedure is set out whereby a surviving partner winds up the partnership business. The provisions of these sections are mandatory, and the exclusive jurisdiction lies in the Probate Court to complete the affairs of this partnership.\\nWe believe the reasoning followed in the case of Fissell v. Morris, 9 Ohio Law Abs., 625, is proper and persuasive, and, in that case, the court said, at page 626:\\n\\\"The mode of procedure mapped out by the statute is full and complete to give the plaintiff ample relief and a full opportunity to have his claim adjudicated. The provisions of Sec. 8085 G. C. are mandatory and exclusive. The Probate Court has complete jurisdiction and full authority to adjudicate the rights of the parties in this case.\\\"\\nA decree may be prepared dismissing the petition herein, for the reason that jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action is vested exclusively in the Probate Court.\\nDecree accordingly.\\nStevens, P. J., and Doyle, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1401302\", \"name\": \"Freeman, Appellee, v. The Norwalk Cemetery Assn., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Freeman v. Norwalk Cemetery Ass'n\", \"decision_date\": \"1950-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 598\", \"first_page\": \"446\", \"last_page\": \"454\", \"citations\": \"88 Ohio App. 446\", \"volume\": \"88\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:40:57.667504+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Fess, J., concurs.\", \"parties\": \"Freeman, Appellee, v. The Norwalk Cemetery Assn., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Freeman, Appellee, v. The Norwalk Cemetery Assn., Appellant.\\n(No. 598\\nDecided June 5, 1950.)\\nMessrs. Freeman \\u00a3 Freeman, for appellee.\\nMessrs. Young \\u00a3 Young, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"2084\", \"char_count\": \"12408\", \"text\": \"Conn, J.\\nThis is an action for injunction to restrain defendant from investing, in any investments other than those permitted by the statutes and laws of Ohio, monies held by it as trustee. An appeal has been taken by defendant on questions of law and fact from the Court of Common Pleas, and the cause in this court has been submitted on the original pleadings, copies of docket and journal entries, agreed statement of facts, stipulation and briefs of counsel.\\nIt is admitted in the pleadings or stipulated by the parties that the defendant is a corporation organized and existing- under the laws of Ohio and owning, and operating a cemetery in the city of Norwalk, known as Wo\\u00f3dlawn Cemetery; that the. defendant in its operation has separate funds, called the general fund and the permanent fund; that its general fund is derived from the proceeds of sales of burial lots, money received for services for lot care, maintenance, digging of graves, etc., and interest derived from its permanent fund; and that all operating expenses are paid from its general fund.\\nIt is further stipulated that its permanent fund consists entirely of money paid to defendant by various persons, for care and maintenance of burial lots owned by them in the cemetery, under separate written agree ments, of which the following, with some exceptions, is a copy:\\n\\\"Permanent Fund.\\n\\\"Obligation of the Norwalk Cemetery Association for the perpetual care of a private burial lot:\\n\\\"The Norwalk Cemetery Association of Norwalk, Ohio, hereby acknowledges the receipt of - dollars from -, owner of lot No. \\u2014, which sum has been received and is to be held by said association as a permanent fund.\\n\\\"The said association, in consideration of said payment hereby agrees with said--, heirs and assigns forever, to cause the grass which may grow upon said lot to be cut and removed from same when necessary, and forever kept in proper condition by top dressing and seeding at such times and in such manner as the trustees of said association shall deem expedient for the proper care of said lot and the improvement of the cemetery.\\n\\\"Said association shall not be required to expend any sum on the care of said lot exceeding the net income derived from the investment of the before named sum of-dollars.\\n\\\"Norwalk Cemetery Association\\n\\\"- \\u2014 \\u2014, President.\\n\\\"Norwalk, Ohio,--, 19 \\u2014 .\\\"\\nIt is also admitted that plaintiff has paid into the permanent fund, pursuant to such writing,- the sum of $100 for the care and maintenance of lots in the cemetery; that the total amount paid defendant in consideration of such written agreements up to March 1, 1950, is the sum of $71,819.12, of which amount $57,500 has been invested in United States government bonds, $10,000 deposited in the Home Savings & Loan Company and $4,319.12 in a commercial account with The Huron County Banking Company; that no part of the principal of the permanent fund is ever expended by defendant; that defendant takes care of all lots for which payments have been made into the permanent fund, though the net income from the amount so. paid is less than the actual cost of caring for such lots; and that due to declining interest rates and increased labor costs, the net income received from payments made into the permanent fund is substantially less than the actual cost of the care required for such lots.\\nThe Norwalk Cemetery Association was organized nearly a hundred years ago for the purpose of owning and operating a cemetery in the then village of Nor-walk. The rules and regulations adopted by the cemetery association make provision for the creation of a permanent fund pursuant to the terms of the receipt and agreement hereinbefore referred to, \\\"no part of which can be used for any purpose but- must be loaned out to provide monies with which to care for the lots.''\\nThe statutes of Ohio make provision for the establishment and operation of cemeteries by private companies or associations, townships and municipal'corporations, and also authorize the establishment and maintenance of union cemeteries by two or more townships or municipal corporations. 7 Ohio Jurisprudence, 4, Section 2.\\nThe trustees of townships, municipal corporations and union cemeteries are authorized by statute to receive gifts in trust for the creation of a permanent fund, the income from which shall be used for the upkeep and care of burial lots in the respective cemeteries. In each instance, the statutes prescribe how the permanent funds so created shall be invested. Sections 3457, 4168, 4169 and 4193-1, General Code.\\nThe provisions of the General Code relative to the powers and duties of cemetery associations are found in Chapter 7 of Division VI of Title IX, Corporations Not for Profit. Under the terms of Section 10110 in this chapter, cemetery associations are authorized to receive gifts \\\"for the purpose of maintaining and beautifying therein any particular cemetery lot and appropriate such property, or the proceeds thereof, to any of the foregoing purposes according to the terms of the trust for which it has been given, granted or devised.\\\"\\nSubsequent- sections in the chapter (Sections 10117, 10118 and 10119) provide for the creation of a sinking fund, how such funds may be invested and how expended. The sinking fund thus provided for and the interest thereon is substantially limited to capital improvements in the enlargement and maintenance of the cemetery grounds.\\nThe trust fund for lot care and improvement created under the authority of Section 10110, General Code, and described as a permanent fund in the rules and regulations of the cemetery association, can be differentiated from the sinking fund authorized by other provisions of the Code to which reference has already been made. It is of some significance that the act authorizing the creation of a sinking fund was not passed until 1883 (80 Ohio Laws, 91), many years after the creation of the permanent fund of the association.\\nSection 10109, General Code, provides that all receipts and income should be applied to the payment of lands, etc., and to the general purposes of the association. No debts shall be contracted in anticipation of future receipts, except for the original purchase of the land and the laying out, enclosing and embellishing of the grounds and avenues therein. All its funds must be used exclusively for the purposes of the company, as hereinabove specified, or invested in a fund the income of which shall be so used and appropriated.\\nSection 10110, Genera] Code, to which attention has already been called, authorizes every cemetery association to receive gifts in trust for the uses and purposes therein defined.'\\nSection 10115, General Code, provides that any surplus derived from the sale of a portion of the premises must be invested upon interest, and the income derived therefrom applied to keeping in repair the unsold portion thereof.\\nSection 10117, General Code, provides for the creation of a sinking fund and Section 10118, General Code, prescribes how its funds shall be invested. Section 10119, General Code, provides for the expenditure of the sinking fund for more or less capital improvements. Although it makes no specific provision for paying off bonded indebtedness as is the case ordinarily with a sinking fund, it contemplates something in the nature of an endowment for such purpose.\\nSection 3457, General Code, authorizes township trustees to receive gifts, etc., in trust for a permanent fund to be invested by them, the income to be used in the case of any burial lot designated by the person making the gift. Under Section 3458, General Code, such funds are to be invested in interest-bearing securities, and the trustees may possibly invest the funds in stocks, although a comma is missing between the words \\\"interest\\\" and \\\"dividends.\\\"\\nSections 4168 and 4169, General Code, authorize a city to accept and maintain a permanent fund for the care of a municipal cemetery. Such funds are to be invested in interest-bearing obligations of the city or other authorized interest-bearing securities.\\nThe permanent fund of union cemeteries is to be invested under the same terms and conditions fixed by law for the investment of the funds of a minor by his guardian. Section 4193-1, General Code.\\nIn the absence of statutory provisions or those provided in the trust agreement, a trustee is required to exercise the same degree of diligence and care that a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in the management and investment of his own money. Willis, Admr., v. Braucher, Gdn., 79 Ohio St., 290, 87 N. E., 185, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.), 873; In re Estate of Sedgwick, 74 Ohio App., 444, 59 N. E. (2d), 616.\\nIf the trustee has greater skill than a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill as he has. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 448, Section 174.\\nIn the instant case the rules and regulations of the defendant authorize it to receive deposits from owners of lots in the cemetery \\\"large enough so that the interest upon same will keep the lot in good care perpctually. The'sum so deposited becomes a part of the permanent fund* no part of which can be used for any purpose but must be loaned out to provide means with which to care for the lots.\\\"\\nUnder the terms of the receipt and agreement hereinbefore referred to, given by the cemetery association to each lot OAvner Avho contributes to the fund for perpetual care for his lot, the defendant is under the heavy duty to preserve the amount so donated as a permanent fund for the perpetual care of the respective burial lots of those contributing to such permanent fund.\\nIt appears to \\u00edoIIoav quite conclusively that in view of the absence of any statutory provision, or provision in the charter or in the rules and regulations of the cemetery association or in the agreement with the lot owners, expressly defining how the money in the permanent fund shall be invested, the defendant as trustee is required to exercise the same degree of diligence and care that a man of ordinary prudence Avould exercise in the management and investment of his own money.\\nThe standard of care and good faith required of a trustee is stated in 40 Ohio Jurisprudence, 364, Section 138, as folloAvs:\\n\\\"In the administration of the trust, the trustee owes the beneficiary the duty to exercise that degree of care and skill which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in dealing with his own property. Unusual ability and extraordinary care are not required. This is the minimum standard to which a trustee must be held, and it is an external one. If a trustee does not have this degree of skill or exercise that amount of care, he is not excused. If he has a higher ability or greater skill than that of the ordinarily prudent man, he is under a duty to exercise this higher degree. ' '\\nSee, also, Gilbert v. Sutliff, 3 Ohio St., 129; Willis, Admr., v. Braucher, Gdn., supra; Morris v. Mull, 110 Ohio St., 623, 144 N. E., 436, 39 A. L. R., 323; 54 American Jurisprudence, 286, Section 322; and Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 448, Section 174 (comment [a]).\\nIn the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 645, Section 227, relative to investments which a trustee can properly make, the rule or standard is stated as follows :\\n\\\"In making investments of trust funds the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary (a) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property having primarily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived. ' '\\nThe authorities clearly indicate that if the matter of making investments of trust funds is not regulated by statute, or provided for in the trust agreement, or otherwise limited, the common-law rule of ordinary care and prudence, as applied in the light of the facts of each case, quite uniformly prevails.\\nIn view of these considerations, our conclusion is that the petition and prayer of plaintiff can not be granted and that the petition should be dismissed and the injunction dissolved.\\nPetition dismissed.\\nFess, J., concurs.\\nCarpenter, J., not participating.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1403353\", \"name\": \"The State, ex rel. Freshcorn, v. Board of Education of Blanchester Local School District\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Freshcorn v. Board of Education\", \"decision_date\": \"1951-05-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 166\", \"first_page\": \"196\", \"last_page\": \"202\", \"citations\": \"89 Ohio App. 196\", \"volume\": \"89\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:12:23.847594+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Hildebrant, P. J., Matthews, and Ross, JJ., concur in the syllabus, opinion, and judgment.\", \"parties\": \"The State, ex rel. Freshcorn, v. Board of Education of Blanchester Local School District.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State, ex rel. Freshcorn, v. Board of Education of Blanchester Local School District.\\n(No. 166\\nDecided May 28, 1951.)\\nMessrs. Paxton & Seasongood, Mr. Lester A. Jaffe, and Mr. William, T. Bahlman, Jr., for relator.\\nMr. G. L. Schilling and Messrs. Dargusch, Caren, Greek \\u00e9 King, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"1484\", \"char_count\": \"9003\", \"text\": \"Hildebrant, P. J.\\nRelator, a teacher employed under a continuing contract as local school head, was transferred from his administrative position to that of teacher with classroom duties only, with a consequent reduction in salary, by resolution of the respondent board unanimously adopted at a special meeting on April 22, 1950, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4842-9, General Code, the transfer being effective for the school year beginning September 1950.\\nBy invoking the original jurisdiction of this court in mandamus, relator seeks to compel the respondent to restore him to his former administrative status as local school head, and requests a complete recoupment of salary losses occasioned by the transfer.\\nHis claims are that the minutes of the special meeting of the board held on April 22, 1950, do not disclose that the resolution of transfer was adopted upon the recommendation of the county superintendent of schools, as required by the statute, and that, in any event, under his continuing contract the board had no power to fix his salary schedule below that of the preceding year.\\nThe evidence before the court is in the form of a stipulation between the parties and the depositions of relator and two members of respondent board.\\nSection 4842-9, General Code, reads:\\n\\\"Each board of education shall cause notice to be given annually not later than July 1 to each teacher who holds a contract valid for the succeeding school year, as to the salary to be paid such teacher during such year. Such salary shall not be lower than the salary paid during the preceding school year unless such reduction be a part of a uniform plan affecting the entire district. But nothing herein shall prevent increases of salary after the board's annual notice has been given.\\n\\\"A teacher employed as assistant superintendent, principal, supervisor, or other administrative head may be transferred to a lesser administrative position or to a teaching position upon recommendation of the superintendent of schools and approval of the board of education. A teacher employed as superintendent may be transferred to another position by a majority vote of the board of education. In no event shall the salary of any teacher so transferred be fixed at a rate lower than the highest paid in the district for the type of position to other teachers with similar training and experience. ' '\\nIt is stipulated that no uniform plan of salary reduction affecting the entire district was involved, and that the minutes of the meeting of April 22, 1950, do not disclose any recommendation of transfer by the county superintendent of schools, required by the statute as a condition precedent to action by the board. It Is, however, stipulated that a written recommendation of transfer by the county superintendent is in the files of respondent and remained unopened in the possession of the board at all times during the meeting of April 22, 1950. The depositions show that the county superintendent was present in person at the meeting and made a formal oral recommendation of the transfer, upon which the board unanimously adopted the resolution of transfer. It is obvious that the written recommendation remained unopened because the county superintendent was there in person and orally made the recommendation which is not required by the statute to be in writing. The fact is that the board did have the recommendation required by law, upon which to adopt the resolution of transfer, and the omission of reference thereto in the minutes may be supplied orally to make that record speak the truth.\\n, 35 Ohio Jurisprudence, 26, Section 21, states:\\n\\\"The general rule that records of inferior boards are not conclusive, but are presumptive only, is applicable to records of school boards. Thus, where ihe record of a school board shows that a meeting was held in pursuance of an adjournment, the presumption is, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, that the meeting was so held. The rule as to supplying omissions in the record by parol has been applied to school boards. Thus, where two school directors met at the usual place of holding meetings, at a regularly called meeting, and, acting officially, agreed with a qualified teacher to hire him to teach the school of said subdistrict for a certain time at an agreed compensation, but neither the clerk of the board nor said directors made any entry in the records of said subdistrict of their proceedings, such teacher ought not to and cannot be prejudiced by their omission or ministerial nonfeasance. He may prove, if he can do so, by competent parol testimony, such official action of said board.\\\" See, also, Dixon v. Subdistrict No. 5, 3 C. C., 517, 2 C. D., 298.\\nIt is stated in 35 Ohio Jurisprudence, 27, Section 24:\\n'It is axiomatic that a record must speak the truth. When it does not do so, through inadvertence or mistake, those who have the authority and power may correct the record to make it conform to the truth.\\\"\\nThe burden of proving a clear legal right to the extraordinary relief sought rests upon the relator, and the evidence not only fails to establish that the board passed the transfer resolution without having a prior recommendation from the county superintendent, but, on the contrary, discloses beyond all doubt that both an oral and a written recommendation were made. It is, therefore, clear that relator has failed to meet the burden of proof required to compel restoration to his former position as local school head.\\nRelator contends that even if the transfer was made according to law the salary reduction was contrary to Section 4842-9, General Code, and the terms of his continuing contract. He cites opinions of the Attorney Genera] of Ohio which seemingly sustain that contention. This court is not bound by such opinions and, regardless of factual distinctions which might be pointed out, is not in accord therewith.\\nRelator's continuing contract, the terms of which are stipulated herein, is as follows:\\n\\\"An agreement entered into between the Blanchester Local School Board of Education, Clinton county, Ohio, and L. D. Freshcorn as local school head beginning September , 1947, and continuing in full force and effect until the said local school head resigns, elects to retire, or is retired pursuant to Section 7896-34 of the General Code or until this contract is terminated or suspended as provided by law. Said local school head agrees to remain in the district and further agrees to abide by and maintain the rules and regulations adopted by said board of education for the government of the schools.\\n\\\"In full consideration for such services the Blanchester Local Board of Education agrees to pay the said L. D. Freshcorn the sum of four thousand and .no/100 dollars ($4,000) for the school year 1947-48, and such sums for each subsequent year as may be established by said board in accordance with Section 7690-3.\\n\\\"Entered into at Blanchester, Ohio, this 9th dav of July, 1947.\\n\\\"D. C. Spence President\\n' ' Mary Schnapp Clerk\\n\\\"L. D. Freshcorn Teacher.\\\"\\nIt is a familiar rule that the pertinent statutes in effect at the time a contract is executed are to be read into it. In addition, by its very terms, relator's contract is subject to the provisions of law consisting of all applicable statutes in the Teachers' Tenure Act, which must be construed in pari materia.\\nSection 4842-7, General Code, provides for the assignment of additional duties beyond regular class room duties and supplemental salary therefor and for discontinuance of such salary increase upon relief from the additional duties. This is a general section and must be read into relator's continuing contract.\\nThe first paragraph of Section 4842-9, General Code, in scope, applies to teachers generally and prevents reduction of salary unless in accord with a uniform plan not present hero. The second paragraph applies, not to teachers generally, but specifically to teachers employed as administrative heads and specifically provides for their transfer and contemplates and limits a salary reduction to the highest rate paid by the teaching position to which transfer is made.\\nBy familiar rule of statutory construction, this special provision must control over the general one, which appears to be perfectly consistent with the provisions of Section 4842-7, General Code.\\nIt, therefore, appears that relator has failed to meet the burden of proof required to sustain his contention of an illegal reduction of salary.\\nThe writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby denied, and the costs of this action assessed against the relator.\\nWrit denied.\\nHildebrant, P. J., Matthews, and Ross, JJ., concur in the syllabus, opinion, and judgment.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1441640.json b/ohio/1441640.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1441640\", \"name\": \"Pickering, Appellant, v. Pickering, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pickering v. Pickering\", \"decision_date\": \"1959-12-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 993\", \"first_page\": \"458\", \"last_page\": \"462\", \"citations\": \"111 Ohio App. 458\", \"volume\": \"111\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:19:46.284553+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Younger, P. J., Guernsey and Middleton, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Pickering, Appellant, v. Pickering, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Pickering, Appellant, v. Pickering, Appellee.\\n(No. 993\\nDecided December 23, 1959.)\\nMessrs. Ooslee & Dunlap, for appellant.\\nMessrs. BeeJc, Kelly & Miller, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1614\", \"char_count\": \"9548\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court in a divorce action. The plaintiff, appellant herein, assigns error in a number of particulars but from his oral argument and argument in his brief it is apparent that the only issue to be determined on this appeal is whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in its judgment as to the division of property and alimony.\\nThat part of the judgment particularly complained of roads as follows:\\n\\\"It is further ordered that the Wonder Bar remains as it now stands in the name of Nell Pickering; that Yuba Court and the home at 521 E. Columbus Ave., Beliefontaine, Ohio, both being held in joint survivorship title, be conveyed to Nell Pickering within thirty (30) days, and if plaintiff fails to make the proper conveyances, that he pay in lieu thereof the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500) per month as alimony; and that defendant is awarded the household goods at 521 E. Columbus Ave. ' '\\nThe plaintiff claims that the conveyance of his interest in Yuba Court and in the residence property would result in the defendant ending up with a net worth completely disproportionate to that of the plaintiff, that the alternative alimony of $500 per month would be excessive, and that neither the conveyances nor the monthly installment would meet the requirements of Section 3105.18, Bevised Code, that the \\\"Court of Common Pleas may allow alimony as it deems reasonable to either party, having due regard to property which came to either by their marriage, the earning capacity of either and the value of real and personal estate of either, at the time of the decree.\\\"\\nIn our view of this appeal it is not necessary for this court to determine, and this court does not determine, whether the property division contemplated by the quoted portion of the judgment would bring about such a disproportionate result as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We are more concerned with the basic character of the quoted portion of the judgment. As a general rule alternative judgments have been held void, although under modern practice if a judgment is sufficiently definite and certain this general rule has been relaxed. See State v. Wilson, 216 N. C., 130, 4 S. E. (2d), 440; 49 Corpus Juris Secundum, 193, Judgments, Section 74, and cases therein cited.\\nHowever, without resorting to a determination of whether or not the judgment in question technically conforms to the definition of a judgment in the alternative, we observe and are of the opinion that it has many of the characteristics which have been found objectionable in alternative judgments. The judgment is not self-executing in that it cannot at any time be determined by mere reference to the judgment alone, or even by further reference to the file of the case, whether or not the alter native is applicable, as, by its terms, the alternative is applicable only if plaintiff fails to convey within thirty days. If he conveys the alternative is not applicable. If he elects not to convey he cannot be required to convey. The judgment may not therefore be enforced ministerially by the issuance of execution or otherwise. The judgment for the payment of $500 per month, if a judgment at all, cannot be operative and enforced immediately upon the entry of judgment; at best it can become operative no earlier than thirty days after the entry of judgment, and, if conveyances are made within the time limited, it never becomes operative.\\nWhen an appeal is taken from such a judgment the problems are compounded. Since the plaintiff is complaining that the conveyances mentioned constitute an abuse of discretion we must assume that he has not made such conveyances. The conveyances not having been made, how can the appellate court determine what, in the final analysis, will be the effect of the judgment? If the judgment is binding on this plaintiff what is he going to choose to do \\u2014 convey or pay monthly installments? Not knowing, are we required to determine whether abuse of discretion, if applicable, is applicable to both parts of the judgment, and, if applicable to either part, and not to the other part, does the part of the judgment tainted by the abuse of discretion fail and that part not so tainted stand? Or, if either part of the judgment is so tainted does the entire judgment fail?\\nThe fact that the judgment purports to give the plaintiff his choice of one of two courses indicates that as to him one course is preferable to the other and that the two courses are therefore not equivalents. If they are not equivalent as to the plaintiff they are not necessarily any more equivalent as to the defendant. Since the exercise by the plaintiff of his choice would therefore result in the defendant receiving more or less than the defendant would have received had the choice not been exercised, then does the exercise of choice by the plaintiff constitute a judicial determination, not by a court, but by a private individual?\\nThese rhetorical questions illustrate the problems coexisting with this type of judgment. However, we can arrive at a decision without attempting to answer all these questions. A judgment being a judicial act which settles the issues, fixes the rights and liabilities of the parties, and determines the proceedings, without implementation by any person not possessing judicial powers, then, what do we have here if judicial action alone is considered?\\nThe conveyance part of the judgment becomes operative only if the plaintiff chooses to convey. If the plaintiff does not elect to convey and does nothing then the plaintiff becomes charged, at the expiration of thirty days, with a judgment against him for installment payments of alimony at the rate of $500 per month. This latter then constitutes that part of the judgment of the court unaffected by the act of any individual, and is that part of the judgment in question which we will first consider to determine whether it is tainted by an abuse of judicial discretion.\\nIt is undisputed in evidence that the defendant receives from $80 to $90 per week from pinball and music box concessions, and receives a salary of $100 per week from a corporation of which she is 95% owner, but of which the yearly profits or dividends to defendant are not disclosed. It further appears that no children were born of the union and that defendant's obligations are merely to maintain herself, maintain the properties owned by her, and pay her debts. The defendant has therefore a monthly cash income of at least $720 supplemented annually by her share of the corporate profits. On the other hand, the only evidence as to plaintiff's income discloses that over a three-month period he had personal draws from his business of $250, had paid $3,000 on \\\"bad checks\\\" and personal back accounts, and had a business bank account balance of $284 at the end of the period. Assuming that he had no bank balance at the beginning of the period this evidence would make it appear that plaintiff was making at the most the sum of approximately $1,200 per month. Plaintiff is obligated to pay $100 monthly to a previously divorced wife, maintain himself, his properties, and pay his debts. The evidence shows also that the Hofbrau, owned and operated by plaintiff, was grossing about $1,100 to $1,300 per week, whereas the Wonder Bar, owned by the corporation of which defendant is 95% owner, grossed around $3,000 during the last three weeks in January and $3,800 during the month of February, and in March was running \\\"around $900 to $1,000 a week.\\\" Considering the uncertainty of the evidence as to income but also considering the fact that plaintiff was receiving some additional income from the apartments at Yuba Court ($100 per month), considering defendant's income from her amusement machines, and considering the weekly and monthly grosses of the respective businesses operated by them, it would not be reasonable to conclude that defendant was receiving any less income than the plaintiff. In consideration of the property which each owned at the time of the marriage, in consideration of their respective interests in property at the time of the divorce decree (without further conveyance) and in consideration of their approximately equal annual incomes, this court is of the opinion that that part of the judgment ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony in the amount of $500 per month constitutes an abuse of discretion within the definition of that term in Steiner v. Custer, 137 Ohio St., 448.\\nBeing an abuse of discretion, the judgment as to alimony payments is thereby erroneous and void. By reason of such error there would be no operative judgment of the trial court in the event that the plaintiff chose not to convey the properties mentioned in the decree. The failure of the alimony installment decree is therefore so closely related to the balance of the decree that the entire decree fails.\\nThis court not being authorized to exercise the discretion bestowed upon the trial court and not being able to modify the judgment of the trial court as a matter of law, the judgment as to alimony and division of property must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for a new trial on such issue only and for further proceedings as provided by law.\\nJudgment reversed.\\nYounger, P. J., Guernsey and Middleton, JJ., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1461453\", \"name\": \"PRICKETT, Appellant, v. FOREIGN EXCHANGE, INC., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Prickett v. Foreign Exchange, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-06-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 11802\", \"first_page\": \"236\", \"last_page\": \"240\", \"citations\": \"68 Ohio App. 3d 236\", \"volume\": \"68\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:17:57.701297+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Wolff, P.J., and Grady, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"PRICKETT, Appellant, v. FOREIGN EXCHANGE, INC., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"PRICKETT, Appellant, v. FOREIGN EXCHANGE, INC., Appellee.\\n[Cite as Prickett v. Foreign Exchange, Inc. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 236.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Montgomery County.\\nNo. 11802.\\nDecided June 26, 1990.\\nRobert N. Berger, for appellant.\\nLarry J. Denny and James M. Hill, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1474\", \"char_count\": \"9125\", \"text\": \"Brogan, Judge.\\nDan Prickett brought suit for damages and/or the rescission of an automobile sales contract, alleging that the seller, Foreign Exchange, Inc. had violated the Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act, R.C. 4549.41 et seq. The trial court sustained Foreign Exchange's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Prickett could not show that the dealership knew that the odometer reading was incorrect. Prickett appeals this judgment, asserting as his sole assignment of error that the statutes in question impose strict liability, thus not requiring a demonstration of actual knowledge. For reasons stated more fully below, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.\\nOn June 24, 1985, Foreign Exchange, a car dealership in Dayton, purchased a 1982 Jaguar XJ6 from RAM Financial Corporation (\\\"RAM\\\") at an automobile auction in Louisville, Kentucky. Pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat. 190.300, RAM executed an odometer disclosure statement which it gave to Foreign Exchange along with the title to the Jaguar. On this statement RAM indicated that the odometer read 28,633 miles and certified \\\"to the best of my knowledge that the odometer reading is and reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle.\\\" This reading, however, did not reflect the actual mileage of the car.\\nOn the left inside door frame was a sticker which read: \\\"ODOMETER NOTICE: ODOMETER HAS BEEN REPAIRED OR REPLACED AND SET TO ZERO ON 3-9-83. PRIOR TO REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT MILEAGE WAS 14,800. OWNER OR AGENT UNLAWFUL TO REMOVE OR ALTER.\\\" There is no indication that either RAM or Foreign Exchange noticed this sticker, despite the fact that the laws of both Kentucky (Ky.Rev.Stat 190.290) and Ohio (R.C. 4549.42[C]) require such a sticker to be affixed to the left inside door frame when odometer repairs have taken place.\\nForeign Exchange returned to Ohio with the Jaguar. The car was inspected by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, which certified its mileage to be 28,692, thus also disregarding the additional 14,800 miles that the Jaguar had actually been driven.\\nOn June 27, 1985, Foreign Exchange sold the Jaguar to Prickett for $19,700 plus $1,182 in taxes. Prickett traded in a 1981 Mazda 626, which reduced the purchase price by $3,000. Pursuant to R.C. 4505.06(B)(3) (now R.C. 4505.-07[G][8]), Foreign Exchange listed the Jaguar's mileage as 28,702, whereas the actual mileage was 14,800 greater, or 43,502 miles.\\nA few months after Prickett took delivery of the car, it developed mechanical problems. While the car was being repaired, a mechanic pointed out the odometer repair notice to Prickett, who then contacted Foreign Exchange about the mileage discrepancy.\\nEventually, Prickett filed suit under the Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act, R.C. 4549.41 et seq., requesting, inter alia, rescission of the sales contract and return of both the $15,518 tendered and the 1981 Mazda 626 trade-in. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the matter was referred to a referee. After a hearing, the referee recommended that summary judgment be entered for Prickett. However, the trial court sustained objections to this recommendation and entered summary judgment for Foreign Exchange.\\nAs his sole assignment of error, Prickett asserts that:\\n\\\"The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's complaint on the basis that Section 4549.46 O.R.C. does not impose strict liability on the transferor of a motor vehicle who fails to comply with the odometer disclosure requirements of Section 4549.46 O.R.C.\\\"\\nThe relevant sections of the Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act were amended after this action was filed. Therefore, we must apply the statutes as they existed in their pre-amendment versions. State, ex rel. Slaughter, v. Indus. Comm. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 537, 8 O.O. 531, 9 N.E.2d 505.\\nBoth parties draw the court's attention to R.C. 4549.46(A) which read in its pre-amendment form:\\n\\\"No person shall fail to provide the true odometer disclosure required by 4505.06 of the Revised Code. The transferor of this motor vehicle is not in violation of this section's provisions requiring a true odometer reading if the odometer reading is incorrect due to a previous owner's violation of any of the provisions contained in Sections 4549.42 to 4549.46 of the Revised Code, unless the transferor knows of the violation.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nThe required disclosure referred to is the statement by Foreign Exchange, quoted supra, that the odometer reading reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle. The sole issue of this appeal is whether the Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act requires that the transferor have actual knowledge that the odometer reading is incorrect before the liability provisions of R.C. 4549.46(A) attach. For reasons stated more fully, we find that actual knowledge is required under this version of the statute.\\nThis court has recognized that the first sentence of R.C. 4549.46(A) imposes strict liability. Hammock v. Lozan (Feb. 26, 1987), Montgomery App. No. 9939, unreported, 1987 WL 7048. However, that holding was explicitly limited to instances where \\\"[n]othing in the record suggests that the second sentence of R.C. 4549.46 is implicated.\\\" Id. at 6. It is uncontroverted that the instant case does trigger the second sentence because the rollback of the odometer occurred while the Jaguar was in possession of a previous owner, not Foreign Exchange.\\nThe leading case in this area is universally acknowledged to be Flint v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (1982), 2 Ohio App.3d 136, 2 OBR 150, 440 N.E.2d 1244. Like Hammock, Flint recognized that the first sentence of R.C. 4549.46 imposes strict liability because no culpable mental state is attached to the duty to disclose. Also like Hammock, Flint did not present facts implicating the second sentence since the transferor was the only previous owner of the vehicle in question. Unlike the first sentence, the second sentence clearly attaches a culpable mental state by requiring that a transferor \\\"knows of the violation\\\" when \\\"the odometer reading is incorrect due to a previous owner's violation.\\\" None of the cases cited by Prickett apply to the second sentence of R.C. 4549.46(A) or construe the word \\\"knows\\\" as it appears therein; they merely rely on Flint which is limited by its facts to situations where the odometer discrepancy is not caused by a previous owner.\\nThe plain meaning of the word \\\"knows\\\" in this context is that the transferor must have actual knowledge of odometer discrepancies caused by previous owners before he can be held liable for them. This construction is supported by the fact that the General Assembly saw fit to amend R.C. 4549.46(A) to read that a transferor is not culpable for a previous owner's having rolled back the odometer \\\"unless the transferor knows of or recklessly disregards facts indicating the violation.\\\" (Emphasis added.) If the previous statute had encompassed more than actual knowledge, this amendment would have been unnecessary. An experienced auto dealer's failure to take note of an odometer repair notice placed where it is required to be by statute might constitute reckless disregard under the current statute, but it does not constitute actual knowledge as was required by the relevant version of R.C. 4549.46(A).\\nNothing in the record indicates that Foreign Exchange actually knew that the Jaguar's odometer was incorrect by 14,800 miles. Prickett's own testimony is most enlightening in this matter:\\n\\\"Q. You're not alleging here that the Foreign Exchange had any knowledge of the mileage difference from that registering on the odometer, are you?\\n\\\"A. I'm not alleging that.\\n\\\"Q. Okay. In fact, you are aware through your diligent search and informational gathering that the transaction and the odometer changing or set-back or whatever modification we want to call it, was done by the owner prior to the Foreign Exchange or at least that's where the problem gap was?\\n\\\"A. The record indicates that.\\n(C\\n\\\"Q. Sure. You're not claiming John Higgins or the Foreign Exchange set it back? His signing and saying while in my possession it was not set back, is an accurate statement?\\n\\\"A. No, I'm not alleging that he's misrepresenting his possession of it.\\n\\\"Q. Right. Okay. And the other statement, 'to the best of our knowledge, the odometer reflects the actual reading,' you're not saying that he had any other knowledge, so that statement's also true, to your knowledge?\\n\\\"A. Uh-huh.\\\"\\nThus, Prickett has conceded that Foreign Exchange had no actual knowledge of the odometer discrepancy. There being no dispute as to the relevant facts, summary judgment in favor of Foreign Exchange was appropriate.\\nPrickett's sole assignment of error having been found to be not well taken, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nWolff, P.J., and Grady, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1461537\", \"name\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. JOHNSON, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Johnson\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-06-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 89CA004688, 89CA004689\", \"first_page\": \"272\", \"last_page\": \"278\", \"citations\": \"68 Ohio App. 3d 272\", \"volume\": \"68\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:17:57.701297+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Baird and Cacioppo, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. JOHNSON, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. JOHNSON, Appellant.\\n[Cite as State v. Johnson (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 272.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Lorain County.\\nNos. 89CA004688, 89CA004689.\\nDecided June 27, 1990.\\nGregory A. White, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.\\nJohn Ricotta, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"2280\", \"char_count\": \"14005\", \"text\": \"Reece, Presiding Judge.\\nIn May 1988, Tracy W. reported to police that she had been raped by her former stepfather, Ronald Ray Johnson, Sr., during the period of May 23-26, 1986, at his house in Sheffield Lake, Lorain County, Ohio. The Lorain County Prosecutor subsequently presented evidence to the grand jury, which returned a single-count indictment against Johnson on May 10, 1988, charging him with a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) (case No. 88CRO35880). On October 4, 1988, the grand jury returned a second indictment against Johnson, identical to the May 10, 1988 indictment, and including a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (case No. 88CR036557).\\nThe case proceeded to trial on both indictments on May 15, 1989. During voir dire, the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to proceed only on the second indictment, 88CR036557, and would dismiss 88CRO35880. The court journalized dismissal of this indictment on May 19, 1989. Trial proceeded, and the judge instructed the jury on May 17. At 3:15 p.m. on May 18, the jury informed the court that they could not reach a decision. The court offered further instruction and the jury returned to deliberate, only to report at 4:40 p.m. that they were still dead-locked. At this point the court discharged the jury and reset the case for trial.\\nOn August 8, 1989, the grand jury returned a third indictment against Johnson, charging one count pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), with one specification of a prior felony conviction, and one count pursuant to R.C. 2907.-02(A)(1)(a) and/or 2907.02(A)(2), with one specification of a prior felony conviction (case No. 89CR037616). On October 16, 1989, the court journalized an entry dismissing the indictments in case Nos. 88CRO35880 and 88CR036557, at the state's request.\\nOn October 17,1989, the grand jury returned a fourth indictment essentially identical to the third, but adding a second conviction to each prior felony specification. A third count, pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), having a weapon while under disability, with two specifications thereto, was added, based upon Johnson's trial testimony (case No. 89CR037861).\\nThe case was set for trial on November 1, 1989. On October 31, 1989, Johnson filed motions to sever the third count of the indictment from the other two, and to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds the two remaining counts charging rape. On November 1, 1989, prior to voir dire, the court entertained arguments on Johnson's motions.\\nThe transcript of proceedings indicates that the court granted the motion to sever the counts of the indictment, but did not journalize this decision. Curiously, the record contains two journal entries relating to the double jeopardy issue. The first, time-stamped at 11:37 a.m., November 1, 1989, states:\\n\\\"This matter came to be heard upon defendants [sic ] Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds. For good cause shown, defendants [sic ] Motion to Dismiss is denied.\\\"\\nThis journal entry was signed by the trial judge, and referenced case Nos. 89CR037616 and 89CR037861. The second entry, time-stamped at 11:39 a.m., November 1, 1989, states:\\n\\\"The court having reviewed the record, finds that the defendant's motion to dismiss because of the defendant having been placed in double jeopardy is a frivolous motion, and if the defendant elects to appeal this ruling, that because the motion has been found to be frivolous, this court is not divested by [sic] jurisdiction to proceed to trial on the case.\\\"\\nThis journal entry was also signed by the trial judge, but referenced case Nos. 89CR036557 and 89CR037861.\\nThereafter, the trial court noted its intention to proceed to try the case. Johnson objected, arguing that the court's denial of his motion to dismiss was a final appealable order. When the court ordered Johnson's counsel to proceed, he refused, and requested that the court journalize its denial of the motion to dismiss so that he could file a notice of appeal. Returning after a short recess, the court again ordered Johnson's counsel to proceed, which he again refused to do, stating that he had filed a notice of appeal, and that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to continue. The court disagreed, and upon counsel's continued refusal to go forward, found him in contempt, fined him $500, and sentenced him to ten days in jail. The court suspended the term of incarceration and set bail upon counsel's request. Counsel filed a notice of appeal upon the contempt finding.\\nJohnson appeals, asserting five assignments of error:\\nAssignments of Error\\n\\\"I. The trial court committed prejudicial error by not dismissing the present indictments because proceeding to trial after the First Indictment (88 CRO 35880) had been nolled violated Mr. Johnson's double jeopardy rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.\\n\\\"II. The trial court committed prejudicial error by not dismissing the present indictments because proceeding to trial after the Second Indictment (88 CRO 36557) had been nolled violated Mr. Johnson's double jeopardy rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.\\n\\\"III. The trial court committed prejudicial error by not dismissing the present indictments on the basis of the double jeopardy clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions, in that the prematurely declared mistrial of May, 1989, terminated that case and precludes reprosecution.\\n\\\"IV. In the alternative, the trial court committed prejudicial error by ruling that Mr. Johnson may be prosecuted for additional and greater offenses of rape after he had once been tried for rape under R.C. 2907.02. In other words once the state has tried an individual for an offense, it may not retry him for greater offenses arising from the same set of facts.\\\"\\nBecause these assignments of error are intertwined, they are addressed together. Johnson argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the third and fourth indictments following the court's nolle prosequi of the first and second indictments, and that the trial court erred by prematurely dismissing the jury during trial on the second indictment. We address the latter contention first.\\nThe bar of double jeopardy generally does not attach when a jury fails to agree upon a verdict. United States v. Sanford (1976), 429 U.S. 14, 97 S.Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17; Green v. United States (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199; and United States v. Perez (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165. Thus, when a jury is \\\"hung,\\\" there exists a manifest need to declare a mistrial. Ohio v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425; see, also, Richardson v. United States (1984), 468 U.S. 317, 323-325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3085-3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242, 249-250; Wadsworth v. Gairing (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 126, 534 N.E.2d 917; and State v. Davidson (June 22, 1983), Hamilton App. Nos. C-820647, C-820677 and C-820678, unreported, 1983 WL 8912. The trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine the manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717.\\nPresentation of the case lasted less than two days. The jury deliberated for more than one day before reporting that they could not reach a unanimous verdict. The court instructed the jury further, but they returned in less than an hour, asserting that they were deadlocked. Our review of these proceedings, and the court's discharge of the jury and resetting of the case for trial, reveals no abuse of discretion. Johnson's third error assigned is overruled.\\nJohnson claims error in the trial court's failure to dismiss the third and fourth indictments, on double jeopardy grounds, based upon the prosecutor's request, and the court's acceptance, to nolle prosequi the first two indictments. Reviewing the facts, the prosecutor requested nolle of the first indictment during voir dire, stating: \\\"Before proceeding, I will dismiss the first indictment, the earlier one, and just proceed on the second one. It was a reindictment, your honor.\\\" The court granted leave for the nolle, which was journalized on May 19, 1989. On August 8, the third indictment was issued. On October 16, the state requested nolle of the second indictment; a journal entry of the same date approved this nolle, and restated the nolle of the first indictment. On October 17, the fourth indictment was issued.\\nThe state requested dismissal of the first indictment prior to the jury being sworn, to which Johnson did not object, and which the court approved. Under R.C. 2941.33:\\n\\\"The prosecuting attorney shall not enter a nolle prosequi in any cause without leave of the court, on good cause shown, in open court.\\\"\\nLikewise, Crim.R. 48(A) provides that \\\"the state may by leave of court and in open court file an entry of dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint .\\\" Thus, where a nolle prosequi is entered before a jury is sworn, a defendant has not been placed in jeopardy, and another prosecution for the same offense is permissible. Sander v. Ohio (S.D.Ohio 1973), 365 F.Supp. 1251, 70 O.O.2d 418. In addition, an effective nolle prosequi need only be approved by the court pursuant to R.C. 2941.33 and Crim.R. 48(A), as was done here. Accordingly, the state effectively dismissed the first indictment, with the court's approval, prior to the attachment of jeopardy, and proceeding upon the second indictment was proper.\\nFollowing the mistrial on the second indictment, a third indictment issued, containing two rape counts, with prior felony specifications, arising from the same facts as the first and second indictments. The state then sought leave of the court to dismiss the second indictment, which the court granted. The following day a fourth indictment issued, restating the two rape counts of the third, adding a felony conviction to the prior felony specifications, and adding a third count alleging violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), with two specifications.\\nJohnson argues that the state's dismissal of the second indictment, following mistrial, acts as a bar to further prosecution for the same transaction or occurrence. We disagree.\\nIn Chatfield v. Ricketts (C.A.10, 1982), 673 F.2d 330, certiorari denied (1982), 459 U.S. 843, 103 S.Ct. 96, 74 L.Ed.2d 88, the defendant was tried on five separate counts, the jury could not reach a verdict on two counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the remaining two counts, then later reinstated the charges on the prosecutor's motion. The federal appellate court, considering the period following a mistrial as a pretrial period, determined that \\\"the double jeopardy clause [Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution] does not prohibit the prosecutor from reasserting the same charges [previously dismissed] at a later date.\\\" Id. at 332.\\nIn State v. Brown (Mar. 17, 1989), Erie App. No. E-88-13, unreported, 1989 WL 25542, the state entered a nolle prosequi to the second count of an indictment four months after the court declared a mistrial due to the jury's inability to return a verdict, then later included the same count in a new indictment issued against the defendant. The defendant argued that the state's nolle of the count following mistrial acted as a bar to further prosecution. The appellate court, rejecting this contention, cited Chatfield, supra, for the proposition that a nolle prosequi entered during a pretrial period does not bar the state from prosecuting the defendant upon the same charge, even where that charge is included in a new indictment. The Brown court's reasoning finds its basis in Richardson v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. 317, 325-326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242, 250-251, where the United States Supreme Court stated that the failure of a jury to reach a verdict, and the trial court's declaration of a mistrial thereby, is not an event which terminates the original jeopardy to which a defendant is subjected.\\nThe prior felony specifications charged in the third and fourth indictments are also preserved and permitted with respect to the charges Johnson will face on remand. They were specifically included by the grand jury pursuant to R.C. 2941.142. See State v. Dilley (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 20, 546 N.E.2d 937. Those specifications do not subject Johnson to new or greater charges, as he argues, but rather to an enhanced penalty based upon his prior felony convictions. State v. Allen (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 29 OBR 436, 506 N.E.2d 199.\\nTreating the period following the trial court's declaration of mistrial in the case sub judice as a pretrial period, and embracing the analysis in Richardson, Brown, and Chatfield, supra, we find no error in the court's refusal to dismiss the third and fourth indictments. Johnson's first, second and fourth errors assigned are overruled.\\nAssignment of Error V\\n\\\"The trial court committed prejudicial error by holding Mr. Ricotta in contempt because he would not waive his client's double jeopardy rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.\\\"\\nThe interlocutory nature of this appeal limits the issues to those relating directly to the narrow confines of double jeopardy analysis. See State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 15 O.O.3d 262, 400 N.E.2d 897, paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, the trial court's finding of contempt against Johnson's counsel is not a final appealable order subject to our immediate review. The fifth error assigned is not well taken.\\nBased upon the foregoing, this cause is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nBaird and Cacioppo, JJ., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1465595\", \"name\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BELL, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Bell\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-12-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 57779\", \"first_page\": \"765\", \"last_page\": \"774\", \"citations\": \"70 Ohio App. 3d 765\", \"volume\": \"70\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:25:24.673872+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Ann McManamon and Parrino, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BELL, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BELL, Appellant.\\n[Cite as State v. Bell (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 765.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.\\nNo. 57779.\\nDecided Dec. 24, 1990.\\nJohn T. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.\\nPatricia A. Snyder, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"2896\", \"char_count\": \"17885\", \"text\": \"Patton, Chief Judge.\\nDefendant-appellant Wayne Bell appeals from his conviction of felonious assault with a gun specification. At trial, the following evidence was adduced:\\nLawrence Richey lived in an apartment on the second floor of a six-family dwelling. The defendant lived in the apartment directly above Richey. On the day of the shooting Richey was installing a radio in his car which was parked in a yard next to his driveway. While he was installing the radio, William House, a friend of Richey, arrived to lend a hand.\\nWhen the radio installation was complete, Richey and House walked toward the apartment building. The defendant exited the building and shot Richey after exchanging a few words with him. According to Richey as the defendant approached him, Richey asked defendant, \\\"Did he have something to say to me?\\\" House recalled that as the defendant walked out of the building, he said, \\\"You think that is funny,\\\" and Richey responded that he did.\\nBoth Richey and House testified that the defendant was carrying a gym bag from which he removed a .38 caliber handgun. Richey recalled that as the defendant removed the gun from his bag, he repeated the phrase, \\\"So it is funny.\\\" Richey and House testified that the defendant pulled the trigger twice. The gun failed to fire the first time, but fired the second time, striking Richey. Richey ran upstairs to inform his wife that he had been shot. House observed the defendant walk down the driveway, then up the street. House later took Richey to the hospital.\\nCleveland Police Officer Francis Friedel testified that he and his partner responded to a report of a shooting. Upon arriving at the scene the officers were met by a woman who told them that the victim had been taken to the hospital. The woman also gave the officers a description of the man who had allegedly done the shooting.\\nThe officers toured the area and found the defendant standing on a street corner one block northwest of his apartment. The defendant admitted he had shot someone, but said he had blacked out after the shooting. The officers arrested the defendant, but did not find the gun or bag he had been carrying.\\nThe defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that Richey was a heavy cocaine user who became volatile when under the influence of drugs. The defendant also described three incidents in which Richey threatened the defendant with a gun. The first incident occurred a few months prior to the instant shooting. After arguing, Richey and the defendant returned to their respective apartments. Richey later knocked on the defendant's door. When the defendant looked through his peephole, he saw that Richey was holding a .25 caliber handgun.\\nA few weeks later the defendant, while at his girlfriend's across the street, was approached by Richey. Richey was carrying a gun and allegedly threatened to shoot the defendant for comments the defendant had made about him.\\nFinally, three days prior to the shooting, Richey pulled a gun on the defendant and accused him of \\\"being by his daughter.\\\"\\nOn September 27, 1988, the defendant testified he was leaving his apartment building to go across the street to his girlfriend's. He had seen Richey in the parking lot from his apartment window. The defendant was carrying a gun in his gym bag for his own protection. The defendant testified that Richey called him names and was acting aggressively as he was walking out of the apartment. The defendant stated that he shot Richey because he thought Richey was going to pull a gun and he feared for his life.\\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of felonious assault with a gun specification. The defendant assigns two errors for our review.\\nI.\\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant alleges:\\n\\\"Appellant was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\\\"\\nDefendant sets forth eight instances of ineffective assistance. He contends that defense counsel's failure to raise objections, coupled with the inadequate presentation of the defense case rendered his representation ineffective and denied him his right to a fair trial.\\nThe federal test for determining whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is \\\"whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.\\\" Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-693. The burden is on the defendant to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. A court may dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence or prejudice before examining whether counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 695-697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-2070, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698-699.\\nThe standard in Ohio for determining the effectiveness of counsel is nearly identical to the standard announced in Strickland. The test in Ohio is \\\"whether the accused, under all the circumstances had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.\\\" State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71, 74 O.O.2d 156, 341 N.E.2d 304, paragraph four of the syllabus. In applying this test, the court must determine whether an essential duty owed by defense counsel has been substantially violated and whether such violation prejudiced the defense. State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396-397, 2 O.O.3d 495, 497-498, 358 N.E.2d 623, 626, vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1154; see State v. Cooperrider (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 226, 4 OBR 580, 448 N.E.2d 452. Appellant has the burden of proof since a properly licensed attorney in Ohio is presumed competent. State v. Smith (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 17 OBR 219, 477 N.E.2d 1128.\\nIn addition, this court must accord deference to defense counsel's strategic choices made during trial. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694.\\nDefendant initially suggests he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to bifurcate the aggravated felony specification set forth in the indictment. R.C. 2941.142 provides the defendant \\\"may request that the trial judge, in a case tried by a jury, determine the existence of the specification at the sentencing hearing.\\\" In the instant case, the defendant chose to testify. In light of the fact that the defendant chose to testify, it was not unreasonable to forgo bifurcation since evidence of the defendant's prior convictions would be admissible as to his credibility. As such, the defendant's first claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nSecondly, defendant claims \\\"during his voir dire of the jury, defense counsel informed the jury of details of the appellant's criminal record which otherwise would [sic] have been admissible.\\\" Defense counsel's act of informing the jury of the defendant's admissible criminal record was not unreasonable. The admission constituted reasonable trial strategy. As such, the defendant's second claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nThirdly, defendant contends that defense counsel's opening argument violated his right to counsel due to the fact that \\\"defense counsel said nothing about the facts or evidence in the instant case.\\\" We are unable to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have been different had defense counsel referred to the facts or evidence in his opening statement. Furthermore, the testimony and evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felonious assault with a gun specification. Thus, defendant's third claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nDefendant's fourth claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves the failure of defense counsel to object to certain aspects of the victim's testimony. Specifically, defendant refers to the victim being allowed to testify on direct examination that he had seen the defendant peeking into his apartment a few days prior to the shooting, and defense counsel's further development of the peeking incident on cross-examination of the victim. He also refers to hearsay testimony concerning this incident.\\nThis court cannot conclude that the failure of defense counsel to object to testimony surrounding the insignificant peeking incident so prejudiced the defendant that he was denied a fair trial. Absent testimony about the peeking incident, sufficient evidence and testimony was adduced at trial to support the defendant's conviction for felonious assault with a gun specification. As such, defendant's fourth claim is without merit.\\nDefendant's fifth claim involves the direct examination of defendant in which details of defendant's criminal record and welfare status were elicited. Clearly, the direct examination of the defendant by defense counsel regarding the defendant's admissible criminal record was a strategic choice which cannot now be examined through hindsight. Strickland v. Washington, supra. Also, the fact that it was revealed the defendant was on welfare did not so prejudice the defendant as to deny him a fair trial.\\nTherefore, defendant's fifth claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nIn his sixth claim, defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance by counsel's failure to renew his Crim.R. 29 motion at the conclusion of all evidence.\\nA review of the trial court's entries reveals that defense counsel renewed the Crim.R. 29 motion at the close of defendant's case. The journal entry reveals that prior to closing arguments, the trial court denied the defendant's Crim.R. 29 request. Thus, defendant's sixth claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nDefendant's seventh contention of ineffective assistance involves defense counsel's failure to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault.\\nR.C. 2903.11 defines felonious assault as follows:\\n\\\"(A) No person shall knowingly:\\n\\\"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;\\n\\\"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.\\n\\\"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, an aggravated felony of the second degree.\\\"\\nR.C. 2903.12 defines aggravated assault as follows:\\n\\\"(A) No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly:\\n\\\"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;\\n\\\"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.\\n\\\"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated assault, a felony of the fourth degree.\\\"\\nIn State v. Clark (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 527 N.E.2d 844, the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that an instruction on a lesser included offense should only be given where the evidence warrants such an instruction.\\nWe conclude that a jury charge on aggravated assault was not warranted in the instant case. The record fails to reveal that the defendant was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force. The defendant's own testimony indicates that as he was walking out of the apartment, the victim of the shooting called him names and was acting aggressively. The defendant has failed to allege sufficient facts to warrant an instruction on aggravated assault. Had the defendant requested a jury instruction on aggravated assault, it would have been properly denied by the trial court. Therefore, defense counsel was under no duty to request an instruction on aggravated assault, and the defendant's seventh claim of ineffective assistance is without merit.\\nDefendant's eighth and final contention is that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the limited purpose of evidence of a prior conviction. The trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: \\\"There was some evidence in this case of other convictions. As it relates to evidence of other convictions, they may be considered in determining the credibility of that particular witness.\\\" The trial court did not further instruct the jury that such evidence may not be considered for any other purposes.\\nIn light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, we are not persuaded that the trial court's failure to indicate that evidence of other convictions was to be used for no other purposes so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Therefore, we find the defendant's eighth claim of ineffective assistance to be without merit.\\nHaving found that defendant's eight claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit results in the finding that the defendant's first assignment of error is without merit.\\nII.\\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant alleges:\\n\\\"The trial court erred and violated appellant's right to due process of law by journalizing an entry which increased appellant's sentence on the felonious assault charge to twelve to fifteen years when it had pronounced in open court a sentence of eight to fifteen years for the same offense.\\\"\\nIn the present case, the transcript of proceedings states as follows:\\n\\\"THE COURT: It will be the sentence of this court that you will be sentenced to a term of not less than eight to fifteen years on the felonious assault charge. You will also receive, consecutive to that, a three year sentence on the gun specification charge.\\\"\\nThe journal entry of sentencing, however, indicated that defendant had been sentenced \\\"for a term of twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years on felonious assault charge This entry was filed on April 20, 1989.\\nDefendant argues that the trial court may not increase a sentence until it has vacated its prior sentence. Further, he argues that a defendant must be present when one sentence is vacated and a new sentence is imposed. Defendant's argument has merit.\\nIn order to modify a sentence pronounced in open court, it is necessary for the modification to be formalized in a journal entry, even though the original sentence was not. State v. Sweeney (Apr. 1, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 43810, unreported, 1982 WL 5274; State v. Butler (1974), 44 Ohio App.2d 177, 73 O.O.2d 196, 337 N.E.2d 633. Furthermore, the trial court does not possess statutory authority to increase a lawful sentence after the defendant has served part of that sentence. Brookpark v. Necak (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 118, 30 OBR 218, 506 N.E.2d 936. In the present case the judgment entry filed on April 20, 1989, failed to indicate that a different sentence had previously been imposed in open court and was subsequently vacated. Therefore, the modified sentence as stated in the judgment entry is ineffective and invalid. State v. Sweeney, supra; State v. Butler, supra.\\nFurthermore, Crim.R. 43(A) provides in pertinent part as follows:\\n\\\"The defendant shall be present at the arraignment and every stage of the trial, including the impaneling of the jury, the return of the verdict, and the imposition of sentence. \\\"\\nIt has been held that Crim.R. 43(A) applies when one sentence is vacated and a new sentence is imposed. Columbus v. Rowland (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 144, 145, 2 OBR 158, 159-160, 440 N.E.2d 1365, 1366-1367.\\nWe agree that Crim.R. 43(A) requires the physical presence of a defendant during sentencing. Review of the record fails to reveal that the defendant was present during imposition of the twelve- to fifteen-year sentence. It does, however, reveal that defendant was present during imposition of the eight- to fifteen-year sentence. In this regard the trial court's imposition of the eight-to fifteen-year sentence complied with Crim.R. 43 mandates, while the imposition of the twelve- to fifteen-year sentence did not.\\nAccordingly, under the authority of App.R. 12(B), we hereby reinstate the sentence of eight to fifteen years. The trial court's judgment entry as filed for journalization on April 20, 1989 reads in part as follows:\\n\\\"It is ordered by the Court that defendant Wayne C. Bell be sentenced to the Correctional Reception Center, Orient, Ohio, for a term of twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years on felonious assault charge, twelve (12) years actual time and three (3) years mandatory on the gun specification, to run consecutive.\\\"\\nThis part of the trial court's journal entry is amended and judgment of sentence is modified to read as follows:\\n\\\"It is ordered by the court that defendant Wayne C. Bell be sentenced to the Correctional Reception Center, Orient, Ohio, for a term of eight (8) to fifteen (15) years on felonious assault charge, eight (8) years actual time and three (3) years mandatory on the gun specification, to run consecutive.\\\"\\nThe judgment of the trial court is thus modified and affirmed as modified. This cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to direct the Clerk of Courts to forward a certified copy of this journal Entry to the institution to which defendant is sentenced.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nAnn McManamon and Parrino, JJ., concur.\\nThomas J. Parrino, J., retired, of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1487975\", \"name\": \"The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R'y Co., an Ohio Corporation, v. The Third National Bank, of Urbana, Ohio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R'y Co. v. Third National Bank\", \"decision_date\": \"1885-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"199\", \"last_page\": \"211\", \"citations\": \"1 Ohio C.C. 199\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases argued and determined in the circuit courts of Ohio\", \"court\": \"Ohio Circuit Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:59:22.711812+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Judges Cox, Smith and Swing.\", \"parties\": \"The Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R\\u2019y Co., an Ohio Corporation, v. The Third National Bank, of Urbana, Ohio.\", \"head_matter\": \"(First Circuit \\u2014 Hamilton Co., O., Circuit Court\\nOct. Term, 1885.)\\nBefore Judges Cox, Smith and Swing.\\nThe Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R\\u2019y Co., an Ohio Corporation, v. The Third National Bank, of Urbana, Ohio.\\nA blank certificate of stock in a railroad company, which had been signed by the president of said company, and by G. F. 33., its secretary, was left with the latter to be used in making necessary transfers of the stock of said company, all of which had previously to said time been issued. Gr. F. 13. fraudulently and criminally filled up said certificate as one to himself for 100 shares of said stock, and without the knowledge of said company, or any of its officers, other than the said 33. hypothecated the same to the plaintiff, in this city in which the office of the company was situated, no inquiry having been made by the plaintiff at the office of the company as to its genuineness. There was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the officers of the railroad company in failing to examine the books and papers of the company left with the secretary. The note of 33. not being paid at maturity, it was by the plaintiff presented to defendant, with a request that said stock be transferred to it, as its own, in conformity with the power of attorney of 13. on the back thereof, and on refusal to do so, this suit was brought to recover damages.\\nHeld: , 1. That in so issuing said certificate illegally, 33. was not acting as the agent of the railroad company, but for himself.\\n2. That if there \\\"was negligence on the part of the railroad company in the matter complained of, to entitle the plaintiff to recover on that ground, it must be of such gross character, as to be the equivalent of bad faith or fraud.\\n3. That the plaintiff in taking from 33. the said certificate, without further inquiry of the officers of said company, as to its legality and validity, was guilty of contributory negligence.\\n4. That the loss of the bank, if any, was not the natural and proximate result of the negligence of the directors of the railroad company in failing to examine the books of the company, but that the crime of 33. was the natural and proximate cause thereof.\", \"word_count\": \"4921\", \"char_count\": \"27901\", \"text\": \"Cox, J.\\nThis is a petition in error to reverse a judgment of the Superior Court of Cincinnati.\\nThe action in that court was brought to recover the sum of $7,500, with interest from August 18, 1882, and costs.\\nThe cause of action was set out in two counts :\\nFirst, after reciting that the plaintiff and defendant were corporate bodies, the plaintiff charged that at the time of the transaction referred to, Theodore Cook was the president and Geo. F. Doughty the secretary of the defendant corporation; that the by-laws of the defendant provided, among other things, that the certificates of stock of the defendant should be issued under the corporate seal of the company and signed by the president and secretary, setting forth the number of shares which are owned by the party to whom each certificate should be issued; and, further, that the secretary should keep the office of the company open during business hours, and should be the custodian of the seal of the company, and should affix the same with the attestation thereof whenever the official business of the company should require it, and that he should keep the stock ledger, and make transfers of the stock of the company.\\n. Plaintiff further alleges that a certificate of stock was issued by the company, signed by the president and secretary, bearing the corporate seal.\\nThe certificate is numbered 473, and certifies that Geo. F. Doughty is entitled to one hundred shares of $100 each, of the capital stock of the company. This is signed by Theodore Cook, President, and Geo. F. Doughty, Secretary, and on the back of the certificate was printed a blank assignment, authorizing -to transfer the same on the books of the company.\\nPlaintiff further says that about the 17th of May, 1882, Geo. F. Doughty borrowed of plaintiff $7,500, and executed and delivered to plaintiff his promissory note, payable to himself or order, for that amount at ninety days, and deposited with it said certificate of stock as collateral security, and gave to plaintiff the power in writing to sell or collect, by public or private sale, said stock on the non-payment of said note at maturity; and Doughty then indorsed said certificate of stock, and delivered the same to the plaintiff, who then became the owner of said note and certificate, with the right to have the same transferred on the books of the defendant.\\nThat on the 23d of February, 1883, it presented said certificate with the indorsement to defendant at its office in Cincinnati, and demanded that the stock should be transferred to it on the books of the defendant, and that defendant should pay it the dividend due on said stock; but that defendant wholly refused to so transfer it, and refused to pay the dividends declared on said stock, and refused to recognize plaintiff as a stockholder, or permit it to enjoy any of the rights of a stockholder.\\nThat it made the loan of said money, wholly relying on the representation in said certificate that Doughty was then and there the owner of one hundred shares of the capital stock of defendant, and plaintiff says that defendant, by its acts, has deprived the plaintiff of the ownership of said shares of stock, and converted the same to its use, wherefore plaintiff asks damage for $10,000.\\nThis count proceeds upon the theory that the certificate of stock was the genuine issue of defendant.\\nThe second count, after proceeding with similar allegations to those above stated, then sets out \\\" that said one hundred shares were, as defendant alleges, an excess of the capital stock, which the defendant was, by its charter, authorized to issue, and the same was issued by the president and secretary illegally, and is wholly void; but that plaintiff has no knowledge of the illegal issue or the illegality of the stock, except such as is derived from information from defendant's officer, and that if said certificate was an overissue of the capital stock of defendant, and was thereby illegal and void, it was negligently and fraudulently issued by the defendant corporation and by its president and secretary, and the representations therein contained were falsely and fraudulently made to plaintiff, by which he was induced, in the usual course of business, to purchase and pay for said promissory note and certificate of stock, wherefore plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant for $7,500, with interest.\\\"\\nOn the trial of the c'ase below, defendant filed a motion to require plaintiff to state on which count he would proceed to trial, whether he would rely on the charge that the certificate of stock was a legal issue, or upon that which charges that it was not.\\nThis motion was overruled by the court.\\nA motion was also made to require plaintiff to separately state and number his charges. This was also overruled.\\nA motion was also made to strike out part of plaintiff's petition, which was overruled in part, and granted in part, and leave given defendant to answer the same.\\nA motion was also made by defendant to require plaintiff to definitely state in its second cause of action, whether or not the stock therein described is or is not the valid issue of the capital stock .of the defendant. This motion was overruled.\\nJune 13, 1883, defendant filed its answer in two counts, the first admitting that it is a corporation, and denying all the allegations of the petition. In the second count it states, that it is a corporation, and is a railroad; that its entire capital stock is three million of dollars, divided into shares of one hundred dollars each; that on the 8th day of October, 1881, the entire amount of said stock was subscribed for, fully paid and certificate issued to the respective subscribers therefor; that the pretended certificate for which suit was brought, was not issued by defendant, nor with its knowledge, or consent, or authority; but was issued by Geo. F. Doughty, fraudulently, for his own private purposes solety, and that Doughty did not then, nor has he since, owned said shares of capital stock intended to be represented by said certificate, and that the capital stock intended to be represented by said certificate is in excess of the capital stock of defendant, is an over-issue of said capital stock, void and of no effect, and represents no part of the capital stock of said company, of all which plaintiff had notice at the several times mentioned in the petition.\\nTo this answer, plaintiff replied denying its allegation.\\nThe case proceeded to trial before a jury, who returned a verdict finding for the defendant in the first cause of action, and for the plaintiff in the second cause, in the sum of $8,-473.75.\\nA motion for new trial was made by defendant, and overruled by the court, and judgment entered on the verdict.\\nThis petition in error now assigns these causes of error :\\n1. Error of the court in overruling motion for new trial.\\n2. In refusing to give-charges asked for by plaintiff.\\n3. In giving charges asked for by defendant.\\n4. In overruling demurrer of defendant to petition.\\n5. In admission of evidence offered by defendant in error.\\n6. In ruling out evidence offered by plaintiff in error.\\n7. That judgment was given for defendant in error instead of plaintiff in error.\\n8. Other errors appearing on the record.\\nAt the hearing of the case in this court, considerable argument was made and stress laid upon the inconsistent character of the twocounts of the petition,one suing on the certificate as if it were genuine and legal, and the other as if spurious and void, but issued through the negligence of defendant; and it was claimed that the motion to require plaintiff to specify the count on which he proceeded should have been granted, and also that it should specify in the second count whether it relied on the validity or invalidity of the issue of the certificate.\\nThere should be no inconsistency between the different counts in a petition. The supreme court in Ferguson v. Gilbert & Rust, 16 Ohio State Rep., 91, says, \\\" and as the Code requires pleadings to be verified by affidavit, we must assume that the plaintiff did not claim or intend under the second and general count to set up and prove a state of facts inconsistent with the allegations of the first.\\\" A different rule prevails as to an answer. By our Code a defendant may plead as many defenses as he may have, although they be inconsistent with each other. R. S., 5071; 29 Ohio St., 651, 655.\\nBut we can not see any force in this argument in regard to the first count.\\nThe jury found for the defendant on the first cause of action, and there is no judgment against it on that count, of which it can complain, and no prejudice to plaintiff.\\nIt is also claimed that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the second count.\\nFirst \\u2014 Because plaintiff alleged in that count enough to show that the certificate was valid; and,\\nSecond \\u2014 That it did not allege that it was void, but only that defendant said it was void.\\nIt is said this is hypothetical pleading, which is never allowed either in law or in equity.\\nWhat are the allegations of the petition as to the issuing of the certificates? They are substantially as in the first count:\\n\\\" That the defendant corporation issued the certificate of stock, duly signed by the president and secretary, bearing the corporate seal, and describing it as a genuine certificate; that it was for value received, transferred and assigned to plaintiff, and the plaintiff therefore became the owner of said one hundred shares.\\\"\\nIt nowhere in direct language affirms that the certificate was an overissue or illegal, but asserts that the defendant says it is an overissue, and is illegal and void.\\nThe code requires a petition to contain a statement of facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language.\\nThe statement of fact relied on in the count as the primary cause of action is, that the defendant issued in due form its certificate of stock; that the plaintiff became the owner and was entitled to have it transferred to its name and draw dividends, and that because it was .so refused, it has a cause of action; and the statement that defendant said, it was an over-issue, is but the statement of a reason assigned by the defendant why the transfer was not made, a statement made by defendant by way of defense to the plaintiff's demand.\\nSuppose this were a petition filed to recover as for goods sold and delivered, and the plaintiff, after charging that he sold and delivered the goods to defendant, should aver that he demanded payment, and the defendant said he never purchased the goods nor were they delivered to him, and he refused to pay, what would be the issue to be tried by the court ? Not certainly what the defendant said about it, but the fact which the plaintiff alleged as the ground of action \\u2014 to-wit, that he sold and delivered the goods to .the defendant.\\nSo here, the plaintiff says the stock was issued by the defendant ; that it is the owner, and has a right to the transfer and dividends, and has been refused. These are the facts upon which his action rests. It counts on legally issued and valid stock. All the allegations of what defendant says, as to its illegality, are mere surplusage, and could have been reached by a motion to strike out.\\nBut the petition, after alleging the defense of defendants to the legality of the certificate, without admitting that it was an overissue or illegally issued, goes on to build up a case on what it alleges defendant claims, not in any pleading, but has informed it before any suit was brought, and proceeds to say that \\\" if the stock was an overissue, it was by reason of- defendant's negligence and fraud.\\\"\\nNow here is no positive statement that the certificate was illegally issued. One of the well known rules of pleading is, that the facts must be stated with requisite certainty. This is thus defined in Gould on Pleadings, Chap.'4, Sec. 23: \\\" It consists merely in alleging them so distinctly and explicitly as to exclude ambiguity, and make the meaning of the averments clearly intelligible.\\\" Section 26: \\\" It is sufficient, if the averments are so made that the adverse party, the jury and the judges, can fully understand the subject matter.\\\" Tested by this rule, can it be said that it can be fully understood whether in this count plaintiff relies and intends to maintain that the certificate sued on is a genuine one, or that it intends to admit that it was spurious, and to rely on fraud and negligence of the defendant in permitting it to be issued ?.\\nNow, although our statute is liberal in regard to the construction of pleadings, still I think that what Lord Coke calls \\\" certainty \\\" is still required by us. That is defined in Gould on Pleadings, chapter 3, section 54, as what upon a fair and reasonable construction, may be called certain, without recurring to possible facts which do not appear; that is, without denying or avoiding by anticipation, possible facts which may operate against him, and on the other hand, without the aid' of any supposable facts or circumstances not alleged by him.\\nI do not understand this to be a pleading in the alternative. Such pleading is not favored; a prayer in the alternative may be allowed, and is of frequent practice. But even the use of that must be on facts alleged to exist. A good example of this is given in Cadwallader v. The Granville Society, 11 Ohio Rep., 290, where the court say : \\\" If this bill had been framed in the alternative, demanding of the defendants what property they acquired from Poster, charging that it was under an illegal and void agreement, and asking that it might be set aside, or that if it should be held valid, the residuary interest of Poster might be subjected to the debt, it would afford an example,\\\" etc.\\nThe petition is open to the objection of improperly joining causes of action; as it stands, the defendant is necessarily driven to prepare and try one of two, or two causes of action :\\nFirst, to make such defense as he may have if the certificate were a legal one, and which may not involve any question of negligence in it, or any question of fraud, or illegal issue; and, second, another defense to a wholly different cause of action, involving illegality of issue, fraud and negligence. Each of these causes require different pleadings and different rules of evidence.\\nThe object of pleading is, that the parties be brought to an issue, and that the issue so produced be material, single and certain in its quality. Stephens on Pleading, 155.\\nAnd the rule is thus laid down in Pomeroy on Remedies, 456: \\\" If the facts alleged in the pleading show that the plaintiff is possessed of two or more distinct rights, each of which has been invaded, or that the defendant has committed two or more distinct and separate wrongs, it follows inevitably that the plaintiff has united two or more causes of action; although the remedy applicable to each would be the same, the relief forms no part of the action.\\\"\\nWe are of the opinion, therefore, that the court erred in overruling the motion to require the plaintiff to state definitely in the second cause of action, whether or not the stock therein described is or is not the valid issue of the capital stock of the defendant.\\nThe case proceeded to trial, however, on the second count, as if that where based on the ground that the certificate was illegally issued, and was so treated by the court' and the parties, and we think there was no error to the prejudice of defendant in overruling the motion.\\nIn the course of the trial, numerous exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court.\\nThe first is that the court erred in overruling the motion of plaintiff in error for judgment at the close of plaintiff's testimony.\\nOn examining the record, we find that the court only overruled the motion for the present, with leave to renew it at a later period; but as we do not find the plaintiff renewed it, we think he lost any advantage he might have obtained if he had renewed it.\\nIt is claimed that the court erred in permitting plaintiff below to re-open the case by cross-examination of defendant's witnesses in support of the second count. But the exception only goes to the order of trial.\\n\\\" Allowing evidence out of its order is within the discretion of the court, and if ground of error at all, it is only when it appears that a fair trial was thereby prevented.\\\" Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St., 351.\\nIt is claimed that the court erred in refusing to allow the word \\\" cancelled,\\\" on certain certificates, to go in evidence. We do not think the court erred in so ruling, as the evidence did not show that it had been placed there by Doughty, the secretary.\\nIt is claimed that the court erred in giving charges 13 and 16\\u00a3, as asked by the plaintiff.\\nAs to charge 13, we think as given by the court, it was erroneous ; that the court should have, on the fifth line of said charge, added after the word petition: \\\" after inquiry of the officers of the company as to the genuineness and legality of the certificate.\\\" Board of Education v. Sinton, 41 Ohio St., 513.\\nA certificate of stock is a document signed by the president and secretary of the company, showing the true amount of the stock held by a stockholder in a company. R. S., 3254. The certificate is not the stock, for a stockholder may be the owner of shares without having any certificate to evidence the fact; he may be the equitable owner although the stock appears on the books of the company in the name of another. R. S., 3259.\\nThese certificates are not negotiable under our statutes. Sec. 3171 makes all bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, foreign and inland bills and checks for a sum certain and payable to any person or order, negotiable by endorsement or payable to any person or assigns, negotiable on delivery, and when so negotiated, absolutely transfers and vests the property thereof in each and every endorsee or holder successively. R. S., 3171.\\nAnd he may maintain an action in his own name for the recovery thereof.\\nBut a certificate of stock is not a promise to pay money, and therefore does not come under our statutory definition of a negotiable instrument. Nor is it negotiable under the ordinary significance in mercantile usage. Assignable is the more appropriate term to describe it. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section la.\\nAnd the person who takes it by assignment, takes only what right, if any, the assignor has in stocks which the certificate professes to represent. He takes it subject to all equities which may exist against it. Charter Oak Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 3 Bulletin, 603.\\nA stockholder is only by statute, sec. 3255, entitled to a certificate for such stock as shall have been paid up. He may have the certificate and may have assigned it to another for value received, and yet by section 6255, while the certificate is out, the shares of stock being personal property, may have been levied on and sold upon execution against the owner, and the purchaser at such a sale would acquire an ownership, to the exclusion of the outstanding certificate.\\nAnd hence the necessity of the party who is about to purchase certificates of stock, to exercise care and prudence in making enquiries of the officers of the company as to the legality and genuineness of the stock.\\nOr the certificate may be a . forgery, or issued by persons wholly without authority. And hence the necessity of the party who is about to purchase certificates of stock in a corporation, to exercise care and prudence in making enquiries of the officers of the company as to the legality and genuineness of the certificate and the interest the assignor may have therein, for in all these respects the purchaser would only take the interest the assignor had in the certificate; and especially is this the case when the person claiming to own the certificate is an officer of the company charged with the duty of is suing the certificate, and in his own name he issues it to himself.\\nClaflin v. The Farmers' and Citizens' Bank, 25 N. Y., 293, was a case where the president of a bank, having a general authority to certify checks, certified his own check when he had no funds in bank, and it was transferred to a purchaser for value, and without notice of the want of funds. Held that the bank was not liable to the purchaser. The certificate was beyond the president's authority, and the purchaser could not claim the right of a bona fide holder, because the face of the check showing the president's attempt to use his official character for his private benefit, every one to whom it comes is put upon inquiry, and when the certificate is false, no one can recover against the bank as a bona fide holder.\\nAnd in the case of the Board of Education v. Sinton, 41 O. S. Reports, 504, decided since this case came into this court, where Davis, being one of the Board of Education, which had issued bonds to which his name was signed officially, negotiated them to Sinton for value received. The supreme court decided \\\" that Sinton was not an innocent holder. The bonds disclosed on their face that Davis was one of the directors, and as such might well have possession of the paper without the right to dispose of it on his private account. Under these circumstances the duty of inquiry was put upon Sinton. And, having taken the bonds without inquiry, he was guilty in law of contributory negligence, and is not entitled to the position of an innocent purchaser. He dealt for his own gain with Davis alone, and trusted him at his peril; and we know of no principle of law that now entitles him to look to the tax-payers for re-imbursement.\\\"\\nTo this it was said, it would be of no use to make inquiry of Doughty, for he was guilty of the fraud. But to this answer, the Supreme court i-n Strong v. Strauss, 40 Ohio St., 89, and Board of Education v. Sinton, 41 Ohio St., 513, say : \\\" There is much force in the words of Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in a leading case, Jones v. Williams, 24 Beavan 62. With respect to the argument that it was unnecessary to make any \\u2022inquiry because it must have led to no result, he says 'I think it is impossible to admit of the validity of an excuse.' I concur in the ruling in Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare, 55, that a false answer, or a reasonable answer, given to an inquiry made, may dispense with the necessity of inquiry; but I think it impossible beforehand to come to the conclusion, that a false answer would have been given which would have precluded the necessity of further inquiry.\\\"\\nThe court should have further instructed the jury in said charge, that to entitle the plaintiff to recover on the ground of negligence of the Board, that the negligence must be of such gross character as to be the equivalent of bad faith or fraud, and the loss must result as the natural and proximate consequence of such alleged omission of duty. And that if the loss of the plaintiff was directly occasioned by the criminal act of Doughty in issuing such false certificate, that even if the board was negligent in failing to examine the books of said company, and in discovering the wrong done by Doughty in other matters, that the crime of Doughty, and not such negligence of the board, was the natural and proximate cause of the loss.\\nThis is the doctrine laid down by the supreme court in 41 O. S., 504-513, Board of Education v. Sinton, a cause decided by that court since this case was pending here. We think the principles cover this, and the court erred in not giving the law thus.\\nWe think the court erred in not granting a new trial.\\nThe testimony all tended to show that in issuing the certificate, Doughty did not act as the agent of the board, but was acting directly for himself, and the loss was not the natural or proximate result of the negligence of the board, but of the crime of Doughty.\\nIn issuing the certificate Doughty was not the agent of the company. In the case decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, May, 1885, reported in the November number of the American Law Record, page 393, Santiago Innerarity et al. v. Merchants' National Bank, two or three points involved in this case are decided. The court says: \\\" The proposition that the director of a corporation acting avowedly for himself or in behalf of another, with whom he is interested in any transaction,' cannot be treated as the agent of the corporation therein, is well sustained by authority. Citing 16 N. J. Eq., (1 C. E. Green) 229; 27 N. J. Eq., (12 C. E. Green), 88; 4 Md., 341; 18 Kansas, 480; 5 Denio, 330-337; 10 Fed. Rep., 251; L. R. 7 Ch. App., 170; 26 Mich., 44.\\nUoadly, Johnson & Qolston, and Ramsey, Maxwell & Matthews, for plaintiffs in error.\\nStallo, Kittredge & Wilby, and Paxton & Warrington, for defendant in error.\\nAnd in the same case the court says that: \\\" While the knowledge of an agent is ordinarily to be imputed to the principal, it would now appear to be well established that there is an exception to the construction or imputation of notice from the agent to the principal, in case of such conduct by the agent, as raises a conclusive presumption that he would not communicate the fact in controversy, as wh\\u00e9n the communication of such a fact would necessarily prevent the consummation of a fraudulent scheme the agent was engaged in perpetrating.\\\" 3 Myl. & K., 699; L. R. 15 Ch. D., 639; L. R. 5 Ch. App., 358; 7 Ch. App., 161; 118 Mass., 147; 135 Mass., 453.\\nWithout going seriatim into every charge, we hold that all charges given by the court contrary to these principles, and those refused involving them, were erroneous, and the judgment will be reversed and case remanded to the superior court for a new trial.\\nSmith and Swing, JJ., concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"149484\", \"name\": \"In re Ewanicky\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Ewanicky\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-09-05\", \"docket_number\": \"2003-1427\", \"first_page\": \"1534\", \"last_page\": \"1534\", \"citations\": \"99 Ohio St. 3d 1534\", \"volume\": \"99\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:23:18.641318+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Pfeifer, J., would grant.\", \"parties\": \"In re Ewanicky.\", \"head_matter\": \"2003-1427.\\nIn re Ewanicky.\", \"word_count\": \"69\", \"char_count\": \"421\", \"text\": \"Cuyahoga App. No. 81742, 2003-0hio-3351. This cause is pending before the court as a discretionary appeal and claimed appeal of right. Upon consideration of appellant's motion for stay of the orders and judgments of the probate court,\\nIT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion for stay be, and hereby is, denied.\\nPfeifer, J., would grant.\\nLundberg Stratton, J., would grant and continue bond.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1553899\", \"name\": \"W. B. Wuestefeld v. Ben C. Albert\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wuestefeld v. Albert\", \"decision_date\": \"1916-01-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"601\", \"last_page\": \"604\", \"citations\": \"19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 601\", \"volume\": \"19\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)\", \"court\": \"Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:53:41.010700+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"W. B. Wuestefeld v. Ben C. Albert.\", \"head_matter\": \"PROMISSORY NOTE RECEIVED FOR PRE-EXISTING DEBT IS TAKEN IN DUE COURSE AND FOR VALUE.\\nCommon Pleas Court of Hamilton County.\\nW. B. Wuestefeld v. Ben C. Albert.\\nDecided, January 20, 1916.\\nBills, Notes and Checks \\u2014 Note Received in Due Course and for Value*\\u2014 Where Taken in Payment of a Debt \\u2014 New Note Taken in Part Payment for One Which Had Become Due.\\n1. Where a note is received in payment of a pre-existing debt due from the signer of the note, he parts with nothing and the note is taken in due course and for value.\\n2. The holder of a note, which he surrenders for part payment in cash with the balance evidenced by a new note, is a holder for value.\\nCharles S. Bell and Frederick E. Niederhelman, for plaintiff in error.\\nM. Muller, contra.\", \"word_count\": \"1101\", \"char_count\": \"6151\", \"text\": \"Nippert, J.\\nError to the Municipal Court of Cincinnati.\\nThe defendant in error, Ben C. Albert, recovered a judgment of $203.75, in the court below, against the plaintiff in error, W. B. Wuestefeld, who now prosecutes error' to this court.\\nPlaintiff below based his claim against the defendant below on. a certain promissory note, of which the following is a true- and correct copy:\\n\\\"$200.00 \\u2022 May 28-th, 1914.\\n\\\"Ninety days after date I promise to pay to the order of H. Stem, Two Hundred Dollars.\\n\\\"At the Peoples Bank & Savings Company. Value Received.\\n\\\"W. B. Wuestefeld.\\n' ' Endorsements:\\n\\\"H. Stern,\\n\\\"Ben C. Albert.\\\"\\nThe said note was protested for non-payment and plaintiff paid $1.25 protest fees. Plaintiff claimed that he was the tona fide holder for value, in due course, of said note and recovered judgment in the sum of $203.75 and his costs.\\nThe defendant below, in his answer, admitted that he signed the note and sued upon, but says that he signed said note for the accommodation of said H. Stem, and that he received no consideration whatsoever for signing said note; and denied that Albert is the owner and holder for value of the note sued on or that he. took it in good faith for value and in due course of business; that the plaintiff took the note of said Stern and applied the same as - a credit upon the account of the claim which Albert then had against Stern and which claim was then due and owing by said Stem to plaintiff, and that at the time Albert took said note he gave no value or consideration therefor.\\nThe cause was submitted upon the pleadings and the evidence, and the court below, upon consideration thereof, found that there was due Ben C. Albert from W. B. Wuestefeld the sum of $203.75, to all of which defendant below noted his exceptions, mainly on the ground that said judgment is contrary to law in as far as the court held that Albert received this $200 note in due course of business and for value.\\nThe trial of the cause in the court below developed the following facts, to-wit: Before the giving of the $200 note involved herein, Stern had given Albert a note for $300, which Albert applied upon Stern's account of about $1,200; when this note matured Stern gave Albert $100 in cash and a note of $200, executed by Wuestefeld, in renewal of the $300 note. This $200 note was not paid at maturity and Albert thereupon sued Wuestefeld for the face of the note and recovered judgment, which is now before this court for review.\\nWhere a -party receives a note for a pre-existing debt due from the person who signs the note, he parts with nothing, for a conditional payment by note does not impair the right of the creditor to proceed upon the original indebtedness, and notes so taken are not taken in due course .and for value. This ap plies to the $300 note which Albert received from Stern, endorsed by Wuestefeld. The law regards such payment, under such circumstances, as conditional only, and the right of the creditor, Albert, to proceed upon the original indebtedness after the maturity of the paper is unimpaired unless there is affirmative proof of the intention on part of Albert to receive the SternWuestefeld paper in absolute discharge and satisfaction of the debt at the time of its receipt.\\nBut we are not called upon to fix the respective rights of the parties to this action in as far as the first note of $300 is concerned. Counsel for plaintiff in error would have a good defense if the suit had been brought upon the original $300 note, for under the decisions of our courts no valuable consideration passed when Albert accepted Stern's first note, and the record shows that it was a conditional payment only.\\nThe question raised -in this case is as to the liability of Wuestefeld upon a $200 note, which was given by Stern to Albert when the above-mentioned $300 note matured. The record discloses the fact that upon the maturity of the $300 note, Stern paid Albert $100 cash and gave him the note executed by Wuestefeld for the balance, that is, $200. The $300 note was delivered to Stern and was sufficient consideration for the $100 payment and the $200 note. The consideration was the surrender of the original $300 note.\\nIn the case of Van Norden Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, 62 Misc., 285, the court held that the holder of a note for $2,000, who surrendered it for a payment of $500 cash and a new note for $1,500 executed by the maker and endorsed by the defendant, was a holder for value.\\nIn surrendering the old note; Albert parted with value, and the ease is thus brought expressly within the terms of Section 8131, General Code:\\n\\\"When value at any time has been given for the instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior to that time.\\\"\\nBrannin, Neg. Instr., p. 35, supports this principle.\\nThe fact that the $200 note of Wuestefeld was discounted by Albert at the Peoples Bank does not strengthen the case of the defendant in error. The note became an instrument for value in the hands of Albert the moment he delivered the old note for $300. It is admitted that Albert acted in good faith and without fraud and without notice that the note of Wuestefeld was an accommodation note, so that, the defendant in error having taken the note in good faith and for value must be considered a holder in due course and is entitled to recover.\\nThe judgment below will therefore be affirmed.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1555416.json b/ohio/1555416.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1555416\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of Wm. L. Curry, Deceased, on Exceptions to Account\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Estate of Curry\", \"decision_date\": \"1917-02-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"49\", \"last_page\": \"58\", \"citations\": \"20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 49\", \"volume\": \"20\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)\", \"court\": \"Preble County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:01:50.440556+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of Wm. L. Curry, Deceased, on Exceptions to Account.\", \"head_matter\": \"EXPENSES OF DEFENDING A WILL.\\nCommon Pleas Court of Preble County.\\nIn the Matter of the Estate of Wm. L. Curry, Deceased, on Exceptions to Account.\\nDecided, February 19, 1917.\\nEstates of Decedents \\u2014 Expenses Incurred in Defending a Will \\u2014 May be Charged Against the Estate, When \\u2014 Success of the Defense Not a Determining Fact \\u2014 Executor Must Act from Disinterested Motives and the Estate Must Receive Some Benefit.\\n1. An action to contest a will is a statutory proceeding controlled by the parties, the ultimate object thereof being to determine their rights to the property devised, and wherein the estate is not increased nor diminished nor affected by the result.\\n2. Under ordinary circumstances those claiming under the will are the proper parties to defend it when assailed, and as a general proposition an executrix is not called upon to engage in the contest and charge the estate with the expense thereof. If the beneficiaries make no defense and request or permit her to do so and she is successful, her right to credit in her account for expenses incurred is not absolute but will depend upon the circumstances of such particular case.\\n3. A circumstance of great weight is her interest or lack thereof in the result of the contest. If a devisee under the will, she is interested in sustaining the validity thereof and a presumption arises that she engaged in the contest in defense of her own personal interest, and because thereof she may not, if successful, charge the estate with her proper expenses unless it appear that she assumed the burden from disinterested motives and that her defense inured to the benefit of the whole estate.\\nBisinger & Bisinger and Chas. L. Hopping, for exceptors.\\nElam Fisher, Loivry & King and Gotlschall c& Turner, contra\", \"word_count\": \"3675\", \"char_count\": \"21114\", \"text\": \"Bowman, J.\\nThis case is submitted to the court on exceptions to the account of Irma C. Ricker^ executrix of William L. Curry, deceased.\\nThe exceptions ar\\u00e9 to two items of credit claimed by the executrix in her account for fees and expenses paid attorneys for their services in successfully defending an action to contest the will of said deceased, one item representing the payment to Judge Elam Fisher and Lowry & King, and the other payment to Gottsehall & Turner. They were disallowed by the probate court and executrix appeals.\\nSaid services were performed by said attorneys because employed to do so. The contract with Judge Fisher and Lowry & King is in writing; that with Gottsehall & 'Turner rests wholly in parol. It is established by the evidence, however, that the parties who signed the written contract with said attorneys authorized the employment of Gottsehall & Turner upon the same terms and conditions as Judge Fisher and Lowry & King save only as to amount or rate of compensation.\\nIt is conceded that the payments to said attorneys were a reasonable and proper compensation for their services. The exceptors insist, however, that these payments are not proper items of credit in said account because the contract does not provide for their payment by the executrix, and that it was beyond her power to bind the estate therefor. \\u2022\\nThe contract in writing is signed by said Irma C. Ricker personally and as executrix, and it is conceded that there is no provision therein that said compensation to said attorneys should be allowed and paid out of the estate. The executrix contends, however, that the parties entered into said contract with said attorneys with the distinct, collateral understanding and agreement, that if successful in said contest the amount they obligated themselves to pay said attorneys would be allowed and paid out of the estate.\\nThe contract being in writing, the court is bound by its terms, and upon familiar principles can not, therefore, consider the uncontradicted parol evidence offered by the executrix in support of her claim aforesaid.\\n'This evidence is also in direct conflict with the collateral written contract between the parties employing said counsel, in which it is agreed that if the will is sustained the amount so agreed to be paid said counsel is to be contributed and paid by them in fixed proportions as stipulated therein.\\nBut if proper for the court to consider this evidence and if said counsel were employed by the executrix pursuant to such understanding, she did not bind the estate for their payment, for she may not do so by an executory contract and thus create a liability not founded upon a contract or obligation of the testator. If the services rendered under such employment were important and valuable and for the benefit of the estate, the law contemplates that she will pay the value thereof and be reimbursed by receiving credit for the amount thus paid in the settlement of her account. Thomas v. Moore, 52 O. S., 200, 204, 206.\\nPassing, then, the contract with said attorneys as creating no liability against the estate, the question is, what are the duties and privileges of the executor in case the validity of a will is contested, and under what circumstances may an executor be allowed credit in his account for the services of attorneys employed by him in the contest of a will?\\nSections 12079, et seq., \\u00f3f the General Code, provide for an action to contest a will, and contemplate a suit between' those claiming under the will and those who consider themselves injured by it. Only a person interested in a will may contest it, and all devisees, legatees and heirs of the testator and other interested persons, including the executor or administrator, must be made parties to the action. An issue must be made up \\\"whether or not the writing produced is the last will or codicil of the testate,\\\" which shall be tried by a jury.\\nThe contest, therefore, is a statutory proceeding in which the contestant or plaintiff denies, and the defendants affirm, the validity of the will. The parties control the proceedings and the estate is not affected by the result. As said by Macfarlane, J., in In re Estate of Soulard, 141 Mo., 642, speaking at page 670:\\n\\\"The technical contest in such statutory proceeding is over the validity of the will, but the ultimate object, the real object, is to determine the rights of the parties to the property. The estate is neither increased nor diminished by the result, and the executor is only interested in seeing that the formal proof of the due execution of the will is made. ' '\\nUnder ordinary circumstances, those claiming under the will are the proper parties to defend it when assailed, and the executor is not called upon to do so, and as a general proposition he has no right to espouse the cause of the parties to either side, and, engage in the contest and charge the estate with the expense thereof. Alexander's Estate, 211 Penn., 125.\\nTherefore, it is held in Andrews v. Andrews, 7 O. S., 143:\\n\\\"An executor is not bound to assume the burden of the defense of a contest of the will by the heirs-at-law, but may properly -throw the same upon the legatees or devisees.''\\nAnd, further, that:\\n\\\"The executor is not entitled, when the will is adjudged invalid, to charge the estate, in his settlement account, with the expense of maintaining such defense.\\\"\\nBut, as said by Brinkerhoff, J., speaking for the court in that case at page 151:\\n\\\"Should he do so, and do it successfully, it seems he would, in that case, be entitled to charge his proper expenses against the trust estate; and this for the reason that his expenditure inures to the benefit of the cestui que trust.\\\"\\nThis case was followed and approved by the Supreme Court in the unreported case of In re Estate of Daniel Laws, Dec'd, 17 Bull., 80; 18 Bull., 198 (10th O. Dec., 39).\\nThe facts in these cases are significant and deserve special attention. In both cases the action was brought by the heirs-at-law of the testator whom he had practically disinherited, and the contest therefore was between the heirs-at-law and the devisees and legatees named in the will. If the will was sustained the heirs would get nothing. If set aside, the devisees and legatees would get nothing. The heirs were all therefore interested and would be benefited in a successful contest of the will, and the beneficiaries under the will were all equally interested and would be benefited if the contest failed, and this interest caused all the heirs to array themselves as contestants and all the beneficiaries to band themselves together in the defense of the will. In both cases, the executor assumed the burden of the \\u2022 defense of the will. In the first case the will was set aside; in the latter the will was sustained, and therefore the successful defense of the executor in the latter case inured to the benefit of all the beneficiaries under the will, and if they permitted the executor to make the defense for them, the property devised to them should bear his expense in so doing.\\nTwo facts stand out prominently upon the record in these cases and apparently control the question: (1) the contest was between the heirs as a class and the beneficiaries under the will as a class, arrayed as opposing forces with no middle ground between them; and (2) the beneficiaries made no defense but permitted the executor to make it for them.\\nBut if an executor does assume the burden of a will contest and is successful, it does not follow that he is entitled to credit in his account in all cases for his expenses incurred in so doing. His right thereto depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Weir v. Weir, 7 C.C.(N.S.), 289.\\nThe circumstances or factor controlling his right thereto is his personal interest or lack thereof in the result of the contest. As said by Jelke, J., in Weir v. Weir, supra, speaking at page 290:\\n\\\"Where done in a disinterested effort to maintain the will and preserve the trust therein created and to effectuate the intention of the testator as declared in what is found truly to be his last will and testament, a court of chancery may allow the executor credit in his account for his expenses incurred in defending such'will.\\\"\\nIf he is a devisee under the will and his interest depends largely if not entirely upon its validity, the parties directly interested and not the estate should bear the expense of the litigation, for, as said by Macfarlane, J., in In re Estate of Soulard, 141 Mio., 642, speaking at page 670:\\n\\\"Any other rale might operate ruinously to estates, and is contrary to the manifest policy of our law. If the expense of the contestants is to be paid out of the estate, they would have nothing.to lose and everything to gain by the contest. There would be no limit to the expense the parties might incur short of the value of the estate itself. The entire estate could therefore be swallowed up in the litigation and the contestants, if successful, would reap a barren victory. A premium to contest the will would thus be given to parties who might be displeased with the disposition the testator had niade of his property. But few unsatisfactory wills would escape a contest. ' '\\nLooking then to the facts and circumstances of this particular case, the evidence discloses that the testator never married and died possessed of a large estate. In the second item of his will he devises to his grand-niece, Lois Curry, a minor, \\u2022 certain real estate and $2,000 in money; in the third item thereof he devises to his grand-niece, Irma C. Ricker (nee Curry), certain real estate and appoints her executrix of his will and also trustee of the property devised to her sister in item two aforesaid; in the fifth item he gives to his sister, Mrs. Barr, $10,000 in money; in item six he gives $2,500 to his niece, Jean Curry Lindsey; in item seven he gives $500 to his nephew, Iienry Curry, and in item eight he gives to his grand-nephew and niece, Fern and Lowry Conley, jointly $500.\\nThese legacies do not dispose of his entire estate, and he died intestate as to a considerable residue which descends to his lieirs-at-law. The specific legacies to Lois Curry and Irma C. Ricker are each of the approximate value of $10,000.\\nThe testator died leaving two brothers, John P. and Sylvester Curry; one sister, Mrs. Barr, and John Y. and Elmer Curry, sons of a deceased brother. Irma and Lois Curry, the legatees named in items two and three, are children of said John Y. Curry and grandchildren of said deceased brother. Jean Curry Lindsey, the $2,500 legatee named in item six of said Will, is a daughter of Sylvester Curry, a brother of the testator aforesaid. The $500 legatees named in items seven and eight are children and grandchildren of John P. Curry, the brother of the testator aforesaid.\\nSaid John P. Curry, brother of the testator aforesaid, commenced an action to contest the will, and, having died, his brother, Sylvester Curry, renewed the same.\\nWhile Mrs. Barr survived the testator, she died before the commencement of said action of her brother, John P. Curry, to contest said will.\\nThis action was tried three times before a jury and resulted in a final judgment sustaining the validity of said will.\\nOnly the legatees, Irma C. Ricker and Lois Curry, and two of the sons of Mrs. Barr signed said contract of employment with said attorneys, the husbands of the two daughters of Mrs. Barr evidently representing them and by their authority signed the same for them. While Irma C. Ricker signed the contract as executrix, she bound herself personally only as heretofore shown. The attorneys represented those who employed them and their services were rendered evidently for the benefit of all their employers, and all were interested in having the will sustained.\\nHaving employed counsel to defend said action to contest the will there was no occasion for the executrix to do so. Whether any of the other legatees should aid or assist or take any interest in the defense of said will was entirely personal to them and there is no evidence that they did so, or that they requested the executrix to make said defense.\\nThe contest was not, therefore, between the heirs as a class and the beneficiaries under the will as a class, and the parties to said action were not thus interested and did not divide on those lines.\\nSaid executrix being also a legatee had therefore a \\\"divided duty\\\" to perform, one of which she was not bound to assume, and self-interest would most likely prompt her to perform the other. She was, therefore, vitally interested in having the will sustained. Evidently the legacy to her and those to her sister, Lois Curry, and Mrs. Barr, invited the attack, and the rule is, that when her duty as an executrix is balanced against her private or individual interests the latter must yield, and all doubts and uncertain charges are to be resolved in favor of the estate, for it would be inequitable for an executrix to defend her legacy and receive the same in its entirety with the expense of the defense charged to the heirs at law or residuary legatees under the will. Weir v. Weir, 7 C.C.(N.S.), 289, 291.\\nIn view of the fact that she was a legatee and because thereof directly interested in sustaining the validity of said will, it is quite probable that her assumption of the defense of said will was not entirely a disinterested effort on her part as executrix to maintain the will regardless of any personal interest she may have had in the result of the contest. On the contrary, it is quite natural that in making said defense she was largely, if not entirely, controlled because of her personal interest in sustaining the will. If so, the case would fall within the general rule that an administrator or executor can not be allowed counsel fees incurred for services rendered in defense of his own personal interest, or where the litigation is in reality between beneficiaries, and not for, the benefit or in the interest of the estate as a whole. In re Whitlow's Estate, 184 Mo. App., 229, 246, 247; 2d Woerner's American Law of Administration (2d Ed.), Section 516.\\nThe further claim is made that these legacies are special and that said legatees are entitled to receive the same without deduction or diminution, and it was not the intention of the testator that they should stand any part of the ex\\u00b0pense of defending an unsuccessful attack upon the validity of the will, and that such expense should be justly borne by the residuary estate.\\nBut as heretofore shown, it is a question between the legatees and the heirs-at-law, of whom only one of the latter attacked the will, and in which the estate can have no interest, and the case is not, therefore, unlike the case of Weir v. Weir, 7 C.C.(N.S.), 289, where the credit was disallowed because the attack on the will was chiefly due to the fact that a large special bequest was made to the executor, and although the attack was unsuccessful, it was held that the allowance was not permissible and the hardship cast upon the legatee requiring him to make the defense was \\\"only one of the burdens incident to the acquisition and ownership of property,\\\" and, as said by Jelke, J., speaking at page 291 in that case, this objection would \\\"lie just as well in the mouth of any successful defendant whose property rights had been assailed. ' '\\nIn the ease of In re Account of Ullman, 12 C.C.(N.S.), 340, an executor successfully defended an action to set aside the will and was allowed a reasonable amount for counsel fees in that behalf, and the effect was to place the entire burden upon the residuary legatee. But it appears that the executor was practically a trustee and clothed with some extraordinary powers in addition to the ordinary duties of executor, and that such residuary legatee was the one most vitally interested in sustaining the will and made no defense and permitted the executor to assume the burden thereof and was quite willing to take the full benefits derived from, such successful contest.\\nThe claim is also made that the executrix was appointed because of the confidence reposed in her by the testator; that she represents the testator in carrying out his will; that it is her duty to carry his will into execution; that his wishes should be respected, and that so solicitous was the testator in that respect that he visits his wrath upon those of his kindred who would lay profane hands upon his will or question its validity, and it is urged, therefore, that the executrix had a right to devote his estate to the defense of his will and from the vandal hands of those who would destroy it.\\nThe court was greatly impressed with this claim, and although it gave it much consideration it can not adopt the same. While the executor represents his testator not only in executing the will after its probate, he also represents him in having it probated. It is his duty, therefore, to have it probated, for this is necessary in order to make it effective. In so doing, he acts in the capacity of a representative of his testator, and is entitled to be reimbursed out of the estate for all expenses incurred in good faith in the discharge of this duty, whether the will be established or rejected. In re Estate of Soulard, 141 Mo., 668.\\nBut the will having been admitted to probate, the effect of the commencement of an action to contest the will is, under Section 10633, G-. C., to suspend, or at least greatly limit, the powers and duties of the executor pending said litigation, and, as said by Macfarlane, J., in the case of In re Estate Soulard, 141 Mo., 671:\\n' ' The trusteeship of the executor is suspended during the litigation, and he has no power over the estate and no duty to perform in respect of it other than what he derived from his mere nomination by the testator.\\\"\\nAnd therefore, as said by him at page 672:\\n\\\"While it would have been the duty of the executor to propound the will for probate, and in statutory contests to make formal proof of its due execution and attestation, if no one else undertook that duty, yet the expense of trying the matters contested should be borne by the parties interested in the result.\\\"\\nTrue, it is said by Brinkerhoff, J., in Andrews v. Andrews, 7 O. S., 143, speaking at page 151, that an executor is a trustee and having accepted a trust is bound to defend the trust estate; but he adds that with the exception of an obiter djctum referred to in the same opinion:\\n\\\"We find no authority to sustain the position that a party acting as trustee is bound to defend tire relation of trustee whenever the rightful existence of that relation is assailed or called in question.\\\"\\nThe defense of a trust estate, therefore, presupposes its rightful creation and authority to exist. The defense of the validity of its creation is another matter and quite apart from the control and management of the trust estate.\\nThe executrix, therefore, being a legatee and interested personally in sustaining the will, having joined with the other legatees likewise interested in sustaining the will in the employment of counsel to defend the same, there was no occasion for her, as such executrix, to d\\u00f3 so, and it follows that said amounts so paid to said attorneys are not proper items of credit in her account and should be disallowed, and the exceptions thereto are sustained.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1608837\", \"name\": \"State v. Blogna\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Blogna\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-01-08\", \"docket_number\": \"Case No. CA-7880\", \"first_page\": \"184\", \"last_page\": \"186\", \"citations\": \"1 Ohio App. Unrep. 184\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases:  cases argued and determined in the Ohio courts of appeal\", \"court\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:50:59.322858+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"SMART, J., Concurs.\", \"parties\": \"State v. Blogna\", \"head_matter\": \"State v. Blogna\\nCase No. CA-7880\\nStark County (5th)\\nDecided January 8, 1990\\n[Cite as 1 AOA 184]\\nFor Plaintiff-Appellee, Debra M. Hughes, Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Massillon City Hall, Massillon, Ohio 44646,\\nFor Defendant-Appellant, James B. Lindsey, 424 Citizens Savings Bldg., Canton, Ohio 44702.\", \"word_count\": \"1394\", \"char_count\": \"8680\", \"text\": \"GWIN, J.\\nOn March 26, 1989, defendant-appellant, Matthew D. Blogna (appellant), was involved in an automobile accident and was charged with the offense of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(AX1) and (A) (3). The face of the Uniform Traffic Citation indicated that appellant had a prior DUI offense.\\nOn May 2, 1989, following his pleas of not guilty to the above charges, appellant pled no contest to one count of DUI and was found guilty of the same. However, prior to sentencing, counsel for appellant informed the trial court that appellant's prior charge of DUI occurred on December 22,1987, when appellant was seventeen years old. From that charge, appellant was adjudicated a juvenile traffic offender on February 12, 1988. Therefore, counsel for appellant argued through motion, appellant should be sentenced as a first offender because the adjudication as a juvenile traffic offender is not a conviction as required by R.C. 4511.99.\\nOn May 30, 1989, the trial court, by judgment entry, overruled appellant's motion and found that appellant's adjudication was a conviction of record and therefore appellant was not entitled to be sentenced as first-offender. The trial court then sentenced appellant not entitled to be sentenced as first-offender. The trial court then sentenced appellant accordingly.\\nAppellant now seeks our review of his sentence and raises the following sole assignment of error:\\nASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD BEEN \\\"CONVICTED\\\" OF A PRIOR DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OFFENSE WITHIN THE MEANINGOF OJt.C.4511.99(A)(2)SINCE THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED A JUVENILE TRAFFIC OFFENDER BY WAY OF A DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OFFENSE IN THE STARK COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION, IN 1988. SAID \\\"CONVICTION\\\" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT SINCE SUCH \\\"CONVICTION\\\" IS NOT ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO O.R.C. 2151.358(H). IF THE TRIAL COURT WOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED THE PRIOR JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATION AS A \\\"CONVICTION,\\\" THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WOULD ONLY HAVE BEEN SENTENCED TO A 72-HOUR SENTENCE AS EVIDENCED BY THE COURT'S SENTENCING JUDGMENT ENTRY.\\nI\\nR.C. 4511.99(A) (2) provides in pertinent part:\\nWhoever violates section 4511.19 of the Revised Code, in addition to the license suspension or revocation provided in section 4507.16 of the Revised Code, shall be punished as provided in division (AXD, (2), or (3) of this section.\\n(2) If, within five years of the offense, the offender has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code... the court shall sentence the offender a term of imprisonment of ten consecutives days.... (Emphasis added)\\nAs indicated above, R.C. 4511.99 speaks only of previous DUI convictions and is silent as to juvenile traffic offender (by way of DUI offense) adjudications. Therefore, the initial issue confronting us is whether such adjudications fall within the purview of R.C. 4511.99.\\nR.C. 2151.358(H) provides, in relevant part:\\na judgment entered against a juvenile under R.C. Chapter 2151...shall not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of a crime in that the child is not a criminal by reason of the adjudication, nor shall any child be charged or convicted of a crime in any court except as provided by this chapter.\\nJuvenile proceedings pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2151 are neither \\\"criminal\\\" or \\\"civil\\\" in nature. In re: C. (1975), 43 Ohio Misc. 98, 72 O.O.2d 421, 422. In fact, under the Juvenile Act, a child cannot be found to have committed a crime but can only be found delinquent, unruly, or a traffic offender. In re: Morris (1971), 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 58 O.O.2d 126, 127.\\nThere are numerous distinctions between criminal prosecutions and juvenile adjudications. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has held that a trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental and guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 403 U.S. 528, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 658, citing Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 149. However, States are not required provide jury trials in juvenile proceedings. McKeiver, supra.\\nFor the above reasons, we firmly believe the trial court, in the case sub judice, erred as a matter of law in finding appellant's adjudication as a juvenile traffic offender constituted a conviction of record. Instead, as the State contends, the trial court should have looked to R.C. 2151.358(H), which provides:\\nThe disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in court is not admissible as evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in any other court, except that the judgment rendered and the disposition of the child may be considered by any court only as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation. The disposition or evidence shall not operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examination, appointment or application. (Emphasis added).\\nHence, the trial court may consider, but is not required to consider, a past juvenile adjudication of delinquency, unruliness, and/or traffic offender during the sentencing process.\\nThe trial court, in its judgment entry overruling appellant's motion seeking sentencing as a first offender, stated:\\nIf this had been the defendant's first conviction of a violation of O.R.C. 4511.19, the court would have sentenced the defendant to a first-offender sentence; namely, seventy-two hours in the Stark County United Way Alcohol Treatment Program or the Stark County Jail, and not ten days in the Stark County Jail.\\nAccordingly, we reverse and remand this cause, as to the trial court's sentencing of appellant as a second offender, with instructions that the trial court resentence appellant as a first-offender in accordance with this opinion.\\nSMART, J., Concurs.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1608953\", \"name\": \"Nicholson v. Landis\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nicholson v. Landis\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-02-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Case No. 1404\", \"first_page\": \"146\", \"last_page\": \"154\", \"citations\": \"1 Ohio App. Unrep. 146\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases:  cases argued and determined in the Ohio courts of appeal\", \"court\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:50:59.322858+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"GREY and HARSHA, JJ., Concur\", \"parties\": \"Nicholson v. Landis\", \"head_matter\": \"Nicholson v. Landis\\nCase No. 1404\\nAthens County (4th)\\nDecided February 27, 1990\\n[Cite as 1 AOA 146]\\nGwinn & Wallace, Mr. James A. Wallace and Ms. Susan L. Gwinn, Athens, Ohio, for Appellant,\\nBricker & Eckler, Mr. Michael J. Renner, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee, O'Bleness Memorial Hospital\\nPorter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Mr. William M. Todd, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee, Dr. Phillip D. Kinnard.\", \"word_count\": \"6077\", \"char_count\": \"36808\", \"text\": \"STEPHENSON, J.,\\nThis is an appeal from two judgments entered by the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, one granting a motion for summary judgment whereby O'Bleness MemorialHospital (O'Bleness), defendant below and appellee herein, was dismissed from the case and the other upon a jury verdict finding in favor of Dr. Phillip D. Kinnard (Kinnard), defendant below and appellee herein. Judith A. Nicholson, plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns the following errors:\\n\\\"I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE O'BLENESS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR CHANGE OF VENUE AND IN TRANSFERRING THIS CASE FROM FRANKLIN COUNTY TO ATHENS COUNTY.\\nII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE O'BLENESS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DISMISSING O'BLENESS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AS A PARTY DEFENDANT.\\nIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING FROM EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS C. JACKSON, M.D. ONL [sic] THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY.\\nIV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATION PANEL.\\nV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF DEFENDNAT [sicbAPPELLEE PHILIP D. KINNARD, M.D.\\\"\\nThe following facts are pertinent to this appeal. On March 5, 1983, at the intersection U.S. Route 50 and State Route 329 in Athens County, Ohio, an automobile operated by James E. Landis collided with a motorcycle being operated by Robert H. Nicholson (decedent) and on which appellant was a passenger. Both appellant and decedent incurred serious injuries as a result of the accident and were transported to O'Bleness for treatment.\\nDr. John Ortman was called by one William Cooley, a friend of appellant and decedent, and was asked to go to O'Bleness to treat the Nicholsons. Before proceeding to the hospital, Dr. Ortman telephoned Dr. David Brown, the attending emergency room physician at O'Bleness, and after discussing the case, Dr. Ortman told Dr. Brown to call Kinnard. Dr. Ortman went to the hospital and began treatment of the Nicholsons. However, after Kinnard arrived at O'Bleness, both Dr. Brown and Dr. Ortman believed Kinnard to be ultimately responsible for the care and treatment of decedent.\\nAfter examining decedent, Kinnard decided that decedent should be transferred to Saint Anthony Hospital in Columbus. Kinnard discussed his decision with both Dr. Brown and Dr. Ortman and decedent was subsequently placed in an ambulance for transport to Columbus. Decedent, during transport, became more combative and lost consciousness. Decedent died at Lancaster-Fairfield Community Hospital at 12:45 A.M. on March 6, 1983,\\nAppellant filed suit on her own behalf and as administratrix of decedent's estate against James E. Landis and his parents in Athens, Ohio. She subsequently filed suit, on March 2, 1984, in Franklin County and named as defendants, inter alia, Landis, his parents, Kinnard and O'Bleness. The only reason venue was proper in Franklin County was because Landis and his parents resided in Franklin County. Appellant apparently settled her claim against the Landis's in the Athens County case and, on November 7, 1984, dismissed the Landis's from the Franklin County action.\\nUpon motion of some of the defendants, the trial court dismissed the Franklin County case for lack of venue since the Landis's were no longer parties. In an entry filed on June 13, 1985, the Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed and held that any claim of improper venue was waived for failure to timely raise the issue.\\nO'Bleness filed for summary judgment on June 12,1987. While the motion was pending, the cause was referred to arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.21 and Franklin County Local Rule 61 on June 22, 1987. On November 12, 1987, the arbitration panel filed their decision with the court, which decision reads as follows:\\n\\\"It is a unanimous decision of the Panel after the evidence adduced at the hearing and subsequently reviewing the Deposition testimony, the briefs and other matters that defendant O'Bleness Hospital be absolved from liability.\\n1st Karl H. Schnieder Robert E. Frost Richard M. Huhn\\nFurther it is the majority decision of the Panel that Defendant Philip Kinnard be absolved from liability.\\n/s/ Karl H. Schnieder Robert E. Frost Dissenting /s/ Richard M. Huhn\\\"\\nAppellant rejected the decision of the panel and filed an amended complaint pursuant to R.C. 2711.21(C) on December 11, 1987.\\nOn February 8, 1988, the court sustained another motion for change of venue from Franklin County to Athens County. The new motion was based upon the movant's assertion that new facts had arisen since the previous motion-i.e., neither appellees nor the court was aware that appellant had filed the case against the Landis's in Athens County before she filed the case in Franklin County. In granting the motion, the court stated the following:\\n\\\"[A]s a matter of law that where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action and personal jurisdiction over the Defendant named in that cause of action, the presence of such Defendant named as a named party in the case can not be utilized to satisfy a venue criterion under Civ. R. 3(B).\\nSuccinctly stated, a case is not properly venued in a county solely due to the naming of a Defendant over which the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and also lacks subject matter over the stated cause of action.\\nIt is apparent that the Landises were named as Defendants in this case solely in order to allow Plaintiff to prosecute her malpractice cause of action against the remaining Defendants away from Athens County. In light of this and Plaintiffs failure to fully apprise the Court of Appeals of all relevant facts, this Court holds that extraordinary circumstances exist such that the Court of Appeal's prior ruling should not, in the interest of justice, be deemed to be the 'law of this case.' Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendant's motion for a change of venue pursuant to Civ. R. 3(CX1) has been timely asserted.\\nFurther, this Court finds that this action is not properly venued in Franklin County, and holds that pursuant to Civ. R. 3(BX1), (2), (3), and (6) the County of proper venue is Athens County.\\\"\\nDuring the pendency of the case, all defendants were dismissed except O'Bleness and Kinnard.(fn ) On June 14, 1988, the Athens County Court of Common Pleas filed an entry sustaining O'Bleness's June 12,1987 motion for summary judgment. Thus, when the case went to trial on July 11, 1988, only Kinnard remained a defendant. At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Kinnard was not negligent.\\nIn her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas erred in sustaining the second motion to change venue. Appellant contends that since the Franklin County Court of Appeals had already determined that any error in venue was waived, that decision became the law of the case on the issue of venue, citing Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 1. Therefore, appellant concludes, the court's only option was to deny second motion for change of venue.\\nThe Ohio Supreme Court in Nolan, supra, stated the following with respect to the law of the case:\\n\\\"Briefly, the doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. Gohman v. St. Bernard (1924), 111 Ohio St. 726, 730, reversed on other grounds New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hosbrook (1935), 130 Ohio St. 101 [3 O. O. 138]; Gottfried v. Yocum (App. 1953), 72 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 345.\\nThe doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results. Gohman, supra, at 730-731. However, the rule is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.\\nSee State, ex rel Potain, v. Mathews (1979), 59 Ohio St. 2d 29, 32 [13 O.O. 3d 17].\\nIn pursuit of these goals, the doctrine functions to compel trial courts to follow the mandates of reviewing courts. See, e. g., State, ex rel. Special Prosecutors, v. Judges (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 94 [9 O.O. 3d 88]; Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee (1954), 162 Ohio St. 433 [55 O.O. 247]; Schmelzer v. Farrar (1976), 48 Ohio App. 2d 210, 212 [2 O.O. 3d 178]; Miller v. Miller (1960), 114 Ohio App. 235 [19 O.O.2d 108]. Thus, where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate court's determination of the applicable law. See, generally, Thomas v. Viering (App. 1934), 18 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 344; Loyer v. Kessler (App. 1925), 3 Ohio Law Abs. 396. For additional authorities, see Williams v. Board of Trustees (1924), 210 App. Div. 161, 205 N. Y. Supp. 742; Littmann v. Harris (1913), 157 App. Div. 909, 142 N.Y. Supp. 341. Moreover, the trial court is without authority to extend or vary the mandate given. Briggs v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1948), 334 U.S. 304, 306; United States v. Pink (S.Ct. 1942), 36 N.Y. Supp. 2d 961, 965; Hampton v. Superior Court (1952), 38 Cal. 2d 652, 655, 242 P.2d 1; In re Estate of Baird (1924), 193 Cal. 225, 258, 223 P. 974; Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1977), 76 Cal. App. 3d 140, 147, 142, Cal. Rptr. 676.\\\"\\nAppellant asserts that there were no extraordinary circumstances in the case at bar which would have justified the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in disregarding the Court of Appeals' opinion. We disagree.\\nAs stated by the Court of Common Pleas, there were certain factors present which were not known to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that venue was proper, to wit: (1) appellant had filed another action against the Landis's in Athens, County, (2) because of the action in Athens County, the Franklin County Court had no jurisdiction over the Landis's, and (3) there was never any attempt by appellant to obtain service of process over the Landis's in the Franklin County action.\\nFrom these facts, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas could properly conclude that appellant named the Landis's as defendants in the Franklin County suit merely to obtain venue in that county. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust to allow appellant to reap the fruits of her failure to disclose the pendency of the action in Athens County. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.\\nIn her second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of O'Bleness. Appellant asserts that Kinnard was the hospital's agent and, thus, the hospital was liable for his negligence. O'Bleness asserts, to the contrary, that the only relationship between it and Kinnard was that Kinnard had staff privileges which is insufficient to create an agency relationship.\\nWhere a party moves for summary judgment, a court should grant the motion only where the following criteria set forth in Civ. R. 56(C) are met: (1) no genuine issue of any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such evidence most favorably toward the party against whom such motion is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317. We conclude that the motion was properly granted in the case sub judice.\\nIn the case at bar, there were no allegations of actual negligence against O'Bleness. Thus, the only way liability could be imposed upon O'Bleness is if Kinnard was himself negligent and was, further, an agent of O'Bleness. There are two theories of agency which have possible application in the case sub judice, to wit: (1) actual agency and (2) agency by estoppel.\\nAn actual agency relationship exists if the principal, i.e., O'Bleness, controls or has the right to control the agent, i.e. Kinnard. Councell v. Douglas (1955), 163 Ohio St. 292. Appellant asserts that there was such a relationship for two reasons. First, appellant asserts that at the arbitration hearing Kinnard stated that either Dr. Ortman or Dr. Brown could have overruled his decision to transport decedent to Columbus. Thus, appellant concludes, since O'Bleness's agent, Dr. Brown, as the emergency room physician, could control Kinnard's actions, Kinnard was also O'Blenness's agent.\\nWe first note that Dr. Brown was not an actual agent of O'Bleness. He was not on the payroll nor did he receive any compensation from O'Bleness. He was, in fact, an independent contractor. However, he would probably be considered an agent of O'Bleness through the doctrine of agency by estoppel. See e.g. Hannola v. Lakewood (1980), 68 Ohio App. 2d 61. Hence, appellant urges this court to find that Kinnard was an actual agent of O'Bleness because he was an agent of Dr. Brown, who was an agent of O'Bleness through estoppel.\\nFortunately, we do not need to address the merits of such a theory because we find that the facts do not support appellant's contention that Kinnard was Dr. Brown's agent. A transcript of the arbitration hearing to which appellant refers was never made a part of the record. Appellant attached one page of the transcript to her memorandum contra summary judgment. This is not sufficient to bring that evidence before the court. Further, it is unclear from the portion of the transcript attached to determine whether Kinnard was referring to the specific circumstances in the case at bar or in the abstract.\\nAll of the other evidence before the court indicates that Dr. Brown had no control over Kinnard. Dr. Ortman stated in his deposition that he believed Kinnard was in control of decedent's care after he arrived. Dr. Brown also stated in his deposition that he ceased care of decedent after Kinnard arrived. Further, when questioned about the transport of decedent, Dr. Brown stated that it was not his decision to make. Finally, Dr. Kinnard stated in his deposition that he considered himself the ultimate decision maker in determining whether or not to transport decedent.\\nThere appears to be no question of material fact concerning the control of Dr. Brown over Kinnard. Since Kinnard had the final say in deciding whether to transport decedent, we conclude there is no merit to appellant's first theory of actual agency.\\nAppellant's second argument with respect to actual agency rests upon the fact that Kinnard had staff privileges at O'Bleness. Appellant asserts that since the granting or revoking of staff privileges is analogous to hiring or firing, O'Bleness exercised control over Kinnard.\\nAppellant cites Hannola, supra, for the proposition that extension of staff privileges is sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether agency exists. We are unpersuaded by appellant's argument.\\nWe first note that we are not bound by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals' decision in Hannola. Further, we note that the Franklin County Court of Appeals is apparently in conflict with Hannola. In Stratso v. Song (1984), 17 Ohio App. 3d 39, that court stated that the fact that a doctor has an office in the hospital does not alone make him an agent of the hospital. Instead there must be shown induced reliance under the theory of agency by estoppel.\\nFurther, in Griffin v. Matthews (1987), 36 Ohio App. 3d 228, the Court of Appeals for Butler County held that \\\"[t]he mere practice of medicine in a hospital by a doctor with staff privileges is not of itself sufficient to create an agency by estoppel and hold the hospital liable.\\\" Manifestly, if such evidence is insufficient to show agency by estoppel, it is certainly insufficient to create actual agency.\\nFinally, attached to its motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of one Richard F. Castrop, Executive Director of O'Bleness, wherein he stated that O'Bleness, \\\"does not have the right to control or dictate to physicians the manner and mode by which they make discretionary medical judgments.\\\" Accordingly, since there is no evidence in the record that O'Bleness had any control over Kinnard, we hold as a matter of law that there was no actual agency relationship between O'Bleness and Kinnard.\\nAppellant also argues that even in the absence of an actual agency relationship, the doctrine of agency by estoppel should apply to the case at bar. There have been several cases which have held that a hospital is estopped from denying liability for negligent care administered in its emergency room by emergency room personnel even though the personnel are not employees of the hospital but are instead independent contractors. See e.g. Hannola, supra; Griffin, supra.\\nThe doctrine of agency by estoppel has been explained in Johnson v. The Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584, paragraph four of the syllabus, as follows:\\n\\\"The doctrine of agency by estoppel, as it might be invoked by a plaintiff in a tort action, rests upon the theory that one has been led to rely upon the appearance of agency to his detriment. It is not applicable where there is no showing of induced reliance upon an ostensible agency.\\\"\\nThe reasoning for applying the doctrine in the hospital emergency room setting is set forth in Hannola, as follows:\\n\\\"By calling itself a 'hospital' and by being a full- service hospital including an emergency room as part of its facilities, an institution makes a special statement to the public when it opens its emergency room to provide emergency care for people. In essence, an agency by estoppel is established by creating an effect: that is, the appearance that the hospital's agents, not independent contractors, will provide medical care to those who enter the hospital. The patient relies upon this as a fact and he believes he is entering a full-service hospital.\\nThe agency by estoppel created by the institution purporting to be a hospital is somewhat different than the narrow definition provided by Rubbo [v. The Hughes Provision Co. (1941), 138 Ohio St. 178]. In that case, public advertisements disclaiming agency might have insulated the unwilling principals. The people who relied on the ostensible agency might have acted differently with knowledge that there was no actual agency. Here, we are faced with the situation of injured or ill patients in need of emergency medical treatment. Realistically, a person has no meaningful choice under the circumstances. He needs treatment and will turn to his local hospital to provide it regardless of prior notice that the physicians are independent contractors. The patient thinks of 'Lakewood Hospital' in his time of need, not the West Shore Medical Care Foundation.\\nFurther, sound public policy demands that the full- service hospital not be permitted to contractually insulate itself from liability for acts of medical malpractice committed in its emergency room. First, the emergency room is an integrally related part of the full-service hospital. The hospital may not pretend that this essential element of its public service treatment facilities is a separate entity. Moreover, the nature of the situation when people turn to the hospital and its emergency room facilities for treatment is one fraught with crisis. People are often highly emotional. There is frequently no time to choose. Indeed, time is of the essence. The chances of going elsewhere for treatment are remote.\\nGiven the relationship of the emergency room to the full-service hospital and the crisis circumstances under which people seek emergency treatment, public policy requires that the hospital not be able to artificially screen itself from liability for malpractice in the emergency room.\\\"\\nThe doctrine in Hannola has been expanded to encompass other situations. In Stratso, supra, the Franklin County Court of appeals held that where a hospital provides anesthesiology services, it may be responsible for the negligent acts of the anesthesiologist who is an independent contractor because patients do not choose the anesthesiologist but instead rely upon the hospital to provide competent anesthesiologists. Further, in Funk v. Hancock (1985), 26 Ohio App. 3d 107, the Fayette County Court of Appeals held that agency by estoppel was applicable in a case where the negligent acts were performed not by the emergency room physician but instead by a consulting physician called in by the emergency room physician.\\nAppellant asserts that the case sub judice is very similar to Funk, supra, in that Kinnard was called by Dr. Brown to aid in the treatment of decedent. We disagree. We find Funk, supra, to be distinguishable from the case at bar.\\nWhile Kinnard was actually called by Dr. Brown, it was done at the request of Dr. Ortman. Appellant contends that from a portion of Dr. Brown's deposition, wherein he stated, \\\"we discussed it over the phone and decided that he [decedent] needed surgical intervention and Dr. Kinnard was decided on the one to be called,\\\" that Dr. Brown, in part decided which surgeon to call. We are unpersuaded by appellant's assertion. Dr. Ortman specifically stated in his deposition that \\\"I instructed Dr. Brown to contact him [Kinnard].\\\" Further, Kinnard stated that he was not the on-call physician who would ordinarily be called if a patient needed a surgeon. Kinnard further noted that the only reason he could think of why he was called was at the request of Dr. Ortman who had requested him as a surgeon on a number of occasions. Hence, the facts clearly show that Kinnard was called at the request of Dr. Ortman.\\nAppellant also asserts that Dr. Ortman was not decedent's family physician and, therefore, his actions should be imputed upon O'Bleness. While Dr. Ortman was not in fact decedent's family physician, he was in essence decedent's physician for purposes of this case. Dr. Ortman was called by William Cooley, a friend of appellant and decedent, after the accident occurred. Cooley asked Dr. Ortman to go to the hospital to treat appellant and decedent. In fact, Dr. Ortman's name was put on the emergency room treatment sheet as appellant's and decedent's family physician. Dr. Ortman, therefore, acted as decedent's family physician. Equally important, since Dr. Ortman was not under contract to be at O'Bleness and was not in the emergency room for O'Bleness, he was not an agent of O'Bleness, either actual or through estoppel.\\nWe, therefore, conclude that Kinnard was chosen as surgeon by Dr. Ortman, decedent's acting family physician.\\nA hospital is not liable, as a matter of law, for negligent services rendered by a physician chosen by an injured party or his own physician. See Prince v. Saint Anthony Hospital (October 16, 1985), Franklin App. No. 85 AP-174, unreported.\\nAppellant finally argues that a hospital should be liable for any negligence which occurs in the emergency room regardless of the provider of the care. Again, we disagree. Hannola and its progeny stand for the proposition that a hospital should be held liable for negligence which occurs by personnel which the hospital provides, whether as employees or as independent contractors, in its emergency room. The reasoning is that an injured party does not choose particular doctors, but chooses an emergency room and relies on the hospital to provide adequate personnel.\\nHowever, in the case at bar, the purported negligent acts were performed by a doctor chosen by decedent's acting family physician. Since O'Bleness did not choose Kinnard to perform the services and had no control over the services rendered, it would be inequitable to hold O'Bleness liable in the case at bar.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the court properly granted O'Bleness's motion for summary judgment. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.\\nIn her third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court below erred in refusing to allow her expert witness, Dr. Francis C. Jackson, to testify on the issue of liability. She asserts that Dr. Jackson was competent to testify, and the courts refusal constituted prejudicial error.\\nWhether or not a doctor is competent to testify at trial on the issue of liability is governed by Evid. R. 601(D), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:\\n\\\"Every person is competent to be a witness except:\\n(D) A person giving expert testimony on the issue of liability in any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care or treatment of any person, unless the person testifying is licensed to practice medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery by the state medical board or by the licensing authority of any state, and unless such person devotes three-fourths of his professional time to the active clinical practice in his field of licensure, or to its instruction in an accredited university.\\\"\\nAccordingly, there are two requirements which must be satisfied before a doctor is competent to testify on the issue of liability. First, the doctor must be licensed to practice medicine in Ohio or any other state. Second, the doctor must devote three-fourths of his professional time to active clinical practice, or to its instruction in an accredited university. Since Dr. Jackson was licensed in both Pennsylvania and Texas, he satisfied the first requirement.\\nThe pertinent issue before this court, therefore, is whether Dr. Jackson satisfied the second requirement. There is little case law on Evid. R. 601(D). However, from the cases which have been decided, we find that Dr. Jackson did not satisfy the second requirement of Evid. R. 601(D).\\nThe Ohio Supreme Court in McCrory v. State (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 99, stated that while clinical practice generally describes physicians \\\"who spend three-fourths of their professional time treating patients, it also includes the physician-specialists whose work is so related or adjunctive to patient care as to be necessarily included in that definition...\\\" Under that analysis, the court found that a person who did medical research and supervised research done by a staff of doctors who evaluated and developed new drugs was competent to testify about the use of a drug he studied.\\nIn Goldstein v. Kean (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 255, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that a physician who spent 80 percent of his professional time evaluating workers compensation claims but did not personally examine, diagnose, or treat patients did not satisfy the second requirement of Evid. R. 601(D). From McCrory and Goldstein, it is apparent that the important issue is how closely the purported expert's work is related to patient care.\\nIn the case at bar, Dr. Jackson had performed no surgery at all for three years prior to the trial. He was, at the time of the trial, employed part time as assistant dean for Veteran's Affairs at Texas Tech and was also a professor of surgery. Dr. Jackson stated that he never made rounds anymore except during review conferences and upon an occasional request at the two veterans' hospitals affiliated with the university. Dr. Jackson admitted he rarely had an opportunity to treat patients anymore. It is clear that Dr. Jackson did not satisfy the second requirement of Evid. R. 601(D) through clinical practice.\\nHowever, Dr. Jackson also had some teaching duties as professor of surgery. Appellant urges this court to adopt a very broad definition of what constitutes instruction of clinical practice. We have been unable to find any cases which discuss instruction of clinical practice with respect to Evid R. 601(D), however, we conclude that under any definition of instruction of clinical practice, Dr. Jackson fell short. Dr. Jackson admitted that 50 percent of his time was spent on administrative duties such as interviewing prospective residents and keeping records. He spent little or no time instructing or dealing with residents. His only actual teaching consisted of two two-hour lectures every twelve weeks. While devoting three fourths of one's professional time to instruction of clinical practice does not necessitate being in the classroom every hour, it certainly requires more than four hours of teaching every twelve weeks.\\nBecause Dr. Jackson did not satisfy all of the requirements of Evid. R. 601(D), the court below did not err in preventing him from testifying on the issue of liability. We finally note that we cannot see how Dr. Jackson's testimony would have helped appellant's case. She had two other medical experts who did testify that they believed that Kinnard did not act as a surgeon of ordinary skill, care, and diligence would have acted. Thus, Dr. Jackson's testimony merely would have been cumulative. Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.\\nIn her fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court below erred in admitting into evidence the decision of the arbitration panel. R.C. 2711.21(C) governs the admissibility of an arbitration decision which is rejected and reads as follows:\\n\\\"If the decision of the arbitration board is not accepted by all parties thereto, the pleadings shall be amended to aver both the fact that the controversy was submitted to an arbitration board. The decision of the arbitration board, and any dissenting opinion written by any board member, shall be admitted into evidence at trial upon the offer of any party, if the court conducts a review of the arbitration decision and any other relevant information submittedby the parties and concludes that:\\n(1) The findings of fact by the arbitration board were not clearly erroneous;\\n(2) The decision is in accordance with applicable law;\\n(3) The procedures required for conducting the hearing and rendering the decision were followed fairly and properly without prejudice to either party.\\\"\\nThe arbitration decision in the case at bar contained no findings of fact. Appellant asserts that the court below could not have determined that the first of the three enumerated requirements, supra, was satisfied. Appellant concludes that the only determination the court below could have properly made was that the findings were clearly erroneous, and, thus, the court should not have admitted the arbitration decision into evidence.\\nWe note that nowhere in R.C. 2711.21 is there a requirement that the arbitration panel must prepare findings of fact. We hold, therefore, that the absence of findings of fact does not necessarily render an arbitration decision inadmissible. In fact, while the admissibility of the arbitration decision was not at issue, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Smith v. Mitchell (1988), 35 Ohio St. 3d 237, tacitly approved of the admission into evidence of an arbitration decision virtually identical in content to the one in the case sub judice. See also Herbert v. Young (1984), 23 Ohio Misc. 2d 13.\\nThe court in the case at bar stated that the arbitration decision met the three requirements enumerated in R.C. 2711.21. If appellant believed that any of the requirements were not met, she had the opportunity, pursuant to R.C. 2711.21(C), to submit any information relevant to the requirement in question. There is nothing in the record to indicate that appellant availed herself of that opportunity. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we hold that the court below did not err in determining that the three requirements were satisfied and in then admitting the arbitration decision into evidence. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.\\nIn her final assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court below improperly instructed the jury on the standard of care required by Kinnard. The jury instructions, which covered approximately 20 pages in the transcript of proceedings, read, in pertinent part, as follows:\\n\\\"The physician involved in this action is a specialist. A specialist in this case is a general surgeon who holds himself out as having particular training and experience in general surgery. The standard of care for a general surgeon in the practice of this specialty is that of a reasonable specialist practicing in general surgery, regardless of where he practices. A specialist in any one branch has the same standard of care as all other specialists in that branch. If you find by the greater weight of the evidence the defendant failed to use that standard of care, then you may find that he was negligent. A physician has a duty to make a proper, skillful, careful diagnosis of his patient's illness. However, a mistake in judgment on the part of a physician is not in and of itself, negligence. If you find that Dr. Philip D. Kinnard, M.D. possess [sicj ordinary learning and skill, that in his diagnosis and treatmentofMr. Nicholson he used such care as is ordinarily used in like or similar circumstances of physicians of reasonable and average skill at the time in question, he is not negligent even though the judgment which he arrived at may subsequently have been proved to be incorrect\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nAppellant objects to the underscored portion of the instructions. Even though the \\\"mistake in judgment\\\" instruction is essentially a correct statement of the law, see 61 American Jurisprudence (1981), 341-342, Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers, \\u00a7209; Finley v. United States (N.D. Ohio 1970), 314 F. Supp. 905, appellant argues that it could mislead a jury. To support her contention that a \\\"mistake in judgment\\\" instruction is misleading, appellant cites Rogers v. Meridian Park Hospital (Or. 1989), 772 P. 2d 929, wherein the Oregon Supreme Court determined that such an instruction was misleading and reversed the cause for a new trial.\\nIf this court were bound by the Oregon Supreme Court, we would reverse based upon Rogers. However, Rogers is not controlling. The law in Ohio with respect to errors in jury instructions is set forth in Snyder v. Stanford (1968), 15 Ohio St. 2d 31, paragraph three of the syllabus, as follows:\\n\\\"Reversible error ordinarily can not be predicated upon one paragraph, one sentence or one phrase of the general charge to the jury. Where the court's charge to the jury, considered as a whole, is not prejudicial to the objecting party, no reversible error results from a misstatement or ambiguity in a portion thereof.\\\" (See also Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co. (1983), 19 Ohio App. 3d 7.)\\nThe jury instructions in the case at bar, when considered as a whole, properly state the law. We hold that the two sentences objected to by appellant do not render the entirety of the 20 page instruction misleading, particularly in light of the fact that the portion objected to did correctly state the law. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.\\nIt is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.\\nThe Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.\\nIt is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.\\nAny stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of filing of this Entry.\\nJUDGMENT AFFIRMED\\nGREY and HARSHA, JJ., Concur\\nWe note that one of the defendants, Dr. Richard Roe, whose real name was unknown, was not dismissed from the case. However, since he was never served and made a party to the case, a dismissal was unnecessary with respect to him.\\nIn light of our determination of appellant's third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error, even if summary judgment was improper, the error was harmless because Kinnard was found not negligent and the hospital could only be liable if Kinnard was negligent.\\nR.C. 2711.21 was amended in 1987 and no longer allows an arbitration decision to be admitted into evidence in any circumstances. However, the amendment only applies to \\\"civil actions that are commenced on or after the effective date [of October 20, 1987] and that are based upon claims for relief that arise on or after that date, and only to conduct that occurs on or after that date.\\\" \\u00a73, H.B. 327. Accordingly, amended R.C. 2711.21 is inapplicable to the case at bar.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1614066\", \"name\": \"McNeal v. Bil-Mar Foods of Ohio, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McNeal v. Bil-Mar Foods of Ohio, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-06-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Case No. 89-P-2080\", \"first_page\": \"463\", \"last_page\": \"466\", \"citations\": \"4 Ohio App. Unrep. 463\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases:  cases argued and determined in the Ohio courts of appeal\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:19.944863+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Hon. Judith A. Christley, P.J., Hon. Donald R. Ford Hon. Joseph E. Mahoney\", \"parties\": \"McNeal v. Bil-Mar Foods of Ohio, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ashtabula, Geauga, Lake, Portage and Trumbull Counties\\nHon. Judith A. Christley, P.J., Hon. Donald R. Ford Hon. Joseph E. Mahoney\\nMcNeal v. Bil-Mar Foods of Ohio, Inc.\\n[Cite as 4 AOA 463]\\nCase No. 89-P-2080\\nPortage County, (11th)\\nDecided June 1, 1990\\nN. W. Sandvoss, 228 West Main Street, P. 0. Box 248, Ravenna, Ohio 44266, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.\\nOrville L. Reed, William D. Dowling, SO South Main Street, P. 0. Box 1500, Akron, Ohio 44309, for Defendants-Appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"2571\", \"char_count\": \"16315\", \"text\": \"FORD, J.\\nAppellant, Don C. McNeal Jr., was employed by Manpower, Inc Manpower provided temporary help to individuals and companies by dispatching, upon request, skilled or unskilled personnel to the premises of its clients for whatever services were requested. The dispatched employees received instructionsfrom the customer as to what tasks were to be performed and were supervised solely by the customer's personnel. For its help in providing workers, Manpower was paid a fixed rate by the customer for each work hour provided by Manpower employees. In turn, Manpower paid its employees itself, at a lesser rate than remunerated by the client. A portion of the surplus monies remitted by the clients to Manpower was used to pay all workers' compensation premiums and unemployment compensation premiums for the protections of its employees.\\nOn February 10, 1987, appellant was assigned by Manpower to work for appellee, BilMar Foods of Ohio, Inc Appellant was operating a turkey deboning machine when he injured his right hand. Appellant filed a worker's compensation claim against Manpower which was allowed, in claim number 934906-22. Although the administrative decision is not in the record, apparently, the Industrial Commission found that Manpower was the appellant's employer.\\nOn March 11, 1988, appellant, along with his wife Bernadettq filed on complaint against appellee and Bil-Mar Foods, a Michigan corporation which manufactured the turkey deboner. This complaint alleged that appellant, an employee of Manpower, was injured at appellee's place of employment, in violation of the frequenter statute; R. C. 4101.11. Appellant, Bernadette McNeal, also alleged a loss of consortium based on injuries suffered by her husband. Over the next nine months, appellants amended their complaint twice, to include additional counts and parties, alleging that Bil-Mar, Inc, a Michigan corporation allied with appellee, was strictly liable for the negligent construction of the turkey deboner, and also claiming that appellee committed an intentional tort by failing to place a safety guard on the machine when they knew, to a substantial certainty, that the failure to include such a guard would cause injury.\\nAppellees filed a motion for summary judgment on June 30, 1988, subsequent to appellant's first amended complaint. Appellants responded to appellee's motion for summary judgment on August 22, 1988. After the filing of the second amended complaint, appellants also filed an amended brief in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgments. The trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment on April 27, 1989 and appellants now timely appeal, raising the following assignment of error:\\n\\\"The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.\\\"\\nAppellants' declination of a single assignment of error is somewhat misleading as the assignment posits a number of of sub-issues under the rubric of their contention. The gist of appellants' arguments is that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that appellees were immune from suit under the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court based its decision on the case on Daniels v. MacGregor Co. (1965), 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, which is strikingly on point.\\nIn Daniels, supra, appellant Daniels was also an employee of Manpower, assigned to work for appellee MacGregor Company. As in the case sub judice, MacGregor paid Manpower the correct invoice amount for each employee assigned,from which Manpower would pay the employee's salary, workers' compensation and unemployment compensation premiums, and retain the balance as a fee for its services Both Manpower and MacGregor made semiannual payments to the State Insurance Fund, as required by R.C. 4123.35. Daniels was injured during the course of his employment with MacGregor. \\\"As a result of a claim made on behalf of plaintiff as an employee of Manpower *, (Daniels) was receiving compensation benefits from the State Workmen's Compensation Fund.\\\" Daniels, at 91.\\nIn addition to receiving these funds in compensation, Daniels filed a suit against MacGregor Company, attempting to recover damages for personal injuries suffered while working for MacGregor Company. The Ohio Supreme Court held, however, that Daniels was barred from suing in tort by R.C. 4123.74, stating:\\n\\\"Where an employer employs an employee with the understanding that the employee is to be paid only by the employer and at a certain hourly rate to work for a customer of the employer and where it is understood that the customer is to have the right to control the manner or means of performing the work, such employee in doing that work is an employee of the customer within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, where such customer has complied with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, he will not be liable to respond in damages for any injury received by such employee in the course of or arising out of that work for such customer***\\\" (Citations omitted.) Daniels, at the syllabus.\\nThe Ohio Supreme Court, in determining Daniels, borrowed from the doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.,g. Bobik v. Industrial Commission (1946), 146 Ohio St. 187, cited in Daniels, at 93. As in the respondeat superior context, the court found that the right to control the actions of the employee was the dispositive fact in analysis of which entity employed the employee. (The Daniels court did not expressly examine the question of the res judicata effect, if any, of the Industrial Commission's finding that Daniels was an employee of Manpower for payment of Workers' Compensation benefits.)\\nIn 1978, the court, in Campbell v. Central Terminal Warehouse (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 173, stated, in response to a request that Daniels be overruled, that \\\"[t]he holding [of Daniels] has remained unchanged for approximately 13 years and it is significant that the General Assembly has chosen not to alter the result *.\\\" Campbell, supra, at 175. As Campbell explicated this scenario:\\n\\\"The appellant was clearly 'in the service of Central. He was referred by Hour Man to perform tasks as required by Central. Moreover, there existed an implied contract of hire between Central and appellant, whereby appellant in effect authorized Hour Man to offer his services for hire, and Central, by approving the referral, accepted appellant's offer. Although Central did nor directly pay appellant, Central did pay Hour Man a certain sum which covered the reimbursement of appellant for his services\\\" Id. at 175-176 (Emphasis in the original.)\\nThe Campbell court concluded that, under these facts, appellant was an employee of Central at the time of the injury and, consequently, precluded appellant from bringing suit against the company.\\nIn footnote one of Campbell, the court stated:\\n\\\"It should be noted that although Central did not make any direct payments into the state insurance fund on behalf of appellant, Central was in compliance with the provisions of R.C. 4123.35 requiring every employer to pay into the fund the amount of premium fixed by the Industrial Commission.\\n\\\"Also noteworthy, is the fact that part of the payments made by Central to Hour Man for temporary help took into consideration the contributions Hour Man had made into the Workers' Compensation Fund on behalf of appellant.\\\"\\nSimilarly, the case subjudice, although the trial court made no express findings of fact as to appellee's compliance with R.C. 4123.35, appellee attached to its motion for summary judgment material of evidential quality indicating that the company was indeed in compliance with the relevant statutory provisions.\\nAppellants, in this case, attempt to distinguish this factual scenario from Daniels and Campbell on a number of grounds. First, appellants maintain that the Industrial Commission has already determined that appellant was an employee of Manpower. Appellants assert that this administrative determination must be accepted under the doctrine of res judicata. Scott v. East Cleveland (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 429. Examination of the trial court record indicates that appellants timely raised this issue. While this court grants that administrative agency decisions are entitled to protection under the doctrine of res judicata generally, we note that the Ohio Supreme Court tacitly overruled appellants' argument in cases like Daniels, where the appellant also claimed the benefit of an administrative finding that he was a Manpower employee. Although the court has not propounded a rationale that would account for this apparent legal inconsistency, this court is constrained to follow the precedent set fort in Daniels and Campbell and conclude that as a matter of law, appellant was an employee of appellee at the time of the injury.\\nAppellants next claim that appellant was not on appellee's premises as an employee at all, but rather as a \\\"frequenter.\\\" R.C. 4101.01(E) describes a frequenter as \\\"every person, other than an employee, who may go in or be in a place of employment under circumstances which render him other than a trespasser\\\" (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that appellee had a duty, to appellant as a frequenter, to provide a safe work premises under R.C. 4101.11 (Duty of employer to protect employees and frequenters).\\nAppellants' arguments are flawed on two grounds. First under the Daniels rule, appellant is an employee per se. Secondly, even if there were some debate as to appellant's status examination of the applicable case law would reveal that appellant should not be classified as a frequenter. As Willis v. Eckert Packing Co. (1969), 21 Ohio App. 2d 117 observed, the term frequenter, \\\" by its own definition, alludes to the general public\\\" and specifically, business invitees. Willis, supra, at 121. Examination of the record indicates that appellant was on appellee's premises, not as a member of the general public or even as a business invitee, but instead, as an employee. This argument is without merit.\\nAppellants next contend that the doctrine of promissory estoppel precludes this court from finding that appellant was an employee of appellee. Appellants direct this court's attention to the employee handbook, provided to appellant by appellee, and properly included in the court record as an exhibit to an affidavit assimilated in appellant's brief in opposition to summary judgment. This handbook states in a number of places, that appellant was an employee of Manpower. This handbook, assert appellants, also contained representations that if the Manpower temporaries followed the appellee's rules and regulations, they would increase their chances of becoming employees of appellee. Appellants contend that the appellant relied on these representations in his work performance, and cite Jones v. East Center for Community Mental Health Inc. 1984, 19 Ohio App. 3d 19, paragraph four of the syllabus, for the proposition that:\\n\\\" A promise (or a series of promissory representations) contained in an employment manual which the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by its employees, and which does so induce action or forbearance on their part, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing that which the manual promises.\\\"\\nFor appellant's argument to be cognizable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the court would have to find that appellee promised appellant that he would be an employee of Manpower, and that appellant accepted Manpower's referral to appellee relying on this promise, to his detriment. This argument is fatuous as a matter of common sense. While appellants could conceivably maintain that appellant took the referral to appellee's business on reliance of other factors in the handbook (such as representations that appellant, if he performed well, would have an improved chance at a permanent position with appellee), the record does not support, nor does logic allow the assertion that the reason appellant went to work for appellee was because he was promised that he would remain an employee of the temporary agency throughout his employment. This argument is without merit, particularly given appellants' apparent desire to attain permanent employment with appellee.\\nAppellants' last argument is that the trial court erred in granting appellees' summary judgment motion because of factual issues remaining as to whether appellees committed an intentional tort. Examination of the record reveals that the issue of the intentional tort, pursuant to R.C. 4121.80, was raised in appellants' second amended complaint. Subsequent to the filing of this complaint, appellants filed an amended brief in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. This amended brief contained no reference whatsoever to any question of intentional torts, nor any submissions of evidential quality which would present a factual issue of an intentional tort.\\nAppellants' failure to provide evidence supporting their claim of an intentional tort is particularly harmful, given the high quantum of evidence required, by Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.(1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, to prove the existence of the tort in the courts of this state Van Fossen, supra, requires that the employer possess knowledge of the existence of a dangerous operation, that the employer know to a \\\"substantial certainty\\\" that the dangerous operation will cause an injury, and that the employer requires the employees to continue to perform the dangerous operations in spite of the risk. Id. at the syllabus. The record, as noted, indicates that appellants presented no evidence that demonstrate that appellee knew that the operation of turkey deboner, without the safety guard, was substantially certain to cause injury. Consequently, as a matter of law, appellants cannot set forth a properly cognizable claim of an intentional tort.\\nThe conclusion of our analysis of appellants' claim of an intentional tort brings this court to the end of examination of the arguments raised by appellants in their brief. However, this court's scrutiny of the trial court record indicates that the issue of strict liability was left untreated by the trial court when it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellants have not set forward any arguments on the issue of strict liability before this court, and App. R. 12(A) allows this court to disregard errors not specifically pointed out in the record and separately argued in the briefs. However, appellants' argument is one which merits comment, and we will exercise our discretion to do so in this case\\nAppellants' argument, simply put, is that Bil-Mar, Inc (the Michigan corporation named in the amended complaint) should be held strictly liable for alleged design flaws and faulty constructionof the turkey deboner. This argument is very similar to Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 148. In Schump, supra, the Ohio Supreme court stated:\\n\\\"Where an employer manufactures a product for public sale and for its own use, and an employee is injured while using the product within the scope of his employment, the employee may not maintain a products liability suit against his employer under the dual-capacity doctrine\\\" Id. at the syllabus. See also, Hillman v. McCaughtry (Sept. 15, 1989), Trumbull App. No. 4045, unreported, at 6.\\nThe import of the Schump decision is that it essentially eliminated cases in which the employer was being sued both in his employment capacity and in his capacity as a manufacturer of a company product. Consequently, under the Schump doctrine, appellant's argument is without merit.\\nTherefore, for the reasons delineated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nCHRISTLEY, P.J., and MAHONEY, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1614102\", \"name\": \"Gratsch v. Gilbert\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gratsch v. Gilbert\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-06-12\", \"docket_number\": \"Case No. CA-11865\", \"first_page\": \"59\", \"last_page\": \"63\", \"citations\": \"4 Ohio App. Unrep. 59\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Anderson's Unreported Ohio Appellate Cases:  cases argued and determined in the Ohio courts of appeal\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:19.944863+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WILSON, J., and GRADY, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Gratsch v. Gilbert\", \"head_matter\": \"Gratsch v. Gilbert\\n[Cite as 4 AOA 59]\\nCase No. CA-11865\\nMontgomery County (2nd)\\nDecided June 12, 1990\\nJames T. Borroughs, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Child Support Enforcement Division, 14 W. Fourth Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402, for PlaintiffAppellee.\\nRobert L. Mues, 22 Clay Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402, for Defendant-Appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"2412\", \"char_count\": \"15728\", \"text\": \"WOLFF, P.J.\\nRoger Gilbert appeals the trial court'sdetermination that his gross income, for child support purposes, in 1988 was $42,977.\\nOn November 30, 1987, Carol Gratsch, mother of eight year-old John Gratsch, instituted a paternity action alleging that Roger Gilbert was her son's natural father. Following a trial on January 31, 1989, the jury found Gilbert to be John's father, and the trial court entered judgment on the jury determination. On September 14, 1989, a hearing on the support order was held.\\nRoger Gilbert testified as on cross-examination that he lived in a three-bedroom home on six acres of land that were given to him by his parents. He stated that he, his son, his friends the Bennetts, and his ex-wife owned Gilbert's Party Barn which was a catering business that catered pig roasts He stated that Gilbert's Party Barn was located on his six acres of land and that a small metal building on the property was used as a kitchen area. He stated that he also farmed land owned by another man.\\nGilbert stated that his son drove a 1987 Ford truck, that he drove a 1984 928 Porsche, and that these vehicles were leased by the Gilbert's Party Barn business. He stated that he owned a 1985 GMC van, a rusted out 1981 Chevy van, a 1983 Suzuki motorcycle, a 1965 Triump motorcycle, and a 1978 racing (motor) bike. He stated that his real estate had a mortgage of about $75,000, upon which he made an annual payment of about $8-9,000.\\nGilbert testified that his 1988 tax return indicated that Gilbert's Party Barn grossed almost $80,000 and that his income in 1988 was $2,227. He stated that he had a loss of $4,000 from farming in 1988. He stated that his 1987 tax return shows that he had taxable income of $13,000 and that his taxable income in 1986 was $14,949. He stated that his business had \\\"gone downhill\\\" since he was unable to work as hard as he had worked in previous years. He testified that in 1986, he contracted myasthenia gravis which is a rare nerve disease similar to muscular dystrophy. He stated that he had double vision and could not drive or lift anymore.\\nCarol Ann Gratsch testified that she was John Gratsch's mother and that John was born on April 9, 1982. She stated that since May, 1988, she had her own insurance agency called LPG Benefits. She stated that she earned $12,000 in 1988, and received property worth $5,000 from her parents in 1988.\\nGratsch testified that Roger Gilbert had not helped support John since his birth. She stated that during the school year, day care costs for John were $60 per week and that during the summer, day care costs are $81 per week. She stated that she paid $46 per month for health insurance for John.\\nGratsch stated that she visited Roger Gilbert's home and described it as having three bedrooms, a loft over the living room, a \\\"rec room\\\" in the basement, and an in-ground swimming pool. She stated that Gilbert had a collection of motorcycles. She stated that in July, 1989, she saw Gilbert driving a yellow Porsche in Xenia.\\nAt the close of all of the testimony, the court made no findings from the bench. The court's September 21, 1989, \\\"Judgment Entry and Order\\\" stated, in pertinent part, as follows:\\n\\\"The court finds Defendant Gilbert' gross income from 1988 to be $42,977. The court attains this finding by following Ohio Superintendence Rule 75, which does not allow a self-employed obligor to place depreciation expenses or other non-cash deductible items as ordinary or necessary expenses against the gross income. The court, following Chapter 3111 of the Ohio Revised Code, sets support at $120.00 per week.\\\"\\nGilbert's assignment of error states:\\n\\\"The lower court abused its discretion in failing to follow the Supreme Court Superintendence Rule 75.\\\"\\nGilbert maintains that the trial court misinterpreted Rule 75(111) (A) (3) of the Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas which states:\\n\\\"(3) Income from self-employment or operation of a business, income from rental property, passive income, or potential cash flow from any source. For income from self-employment, proprietorship of a business, joint ownership of a partnership or closely held corporation, or rents, gross income is defined as gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in generating such income.\\n\\\"Specifically excluded from ordinary and necessary expenses for purposes of these Guidelines are amounts for depreciation expenses or other non-cash deductible items allowable by the Internal Revenue Service. In general, income and expenses referenced herein should be carefully reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support obligation. This amount may differ from a determination of business income for tax purposes\\n\\\"Expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent from self-employment, operation of a business or rents should be counted as income if they are significant and reduce personal living expenses. Such payments might include a company car, free housing, reimbursed meals, or any other benefits.\\\"\\nGilbert maintains that the court erred in not deducting all ordinary and necessary expenses except depreciation listed in Schedules C and F of his 1988 tax return. He states that had the court deducted all of the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in generating income, except depreciation, his income from his business and farming operations would have been $9,605. He states that he also had taxable interest of $89 and wages of #323 in 1988, which would have resulted in gross income of $10,017 under C.P. Sup. R. 75(111) (A) (3).\\nGilbert's 1988 tax return was introduced as plaintiffs exhibit 1 at the hearing and was admitted into evidence. Appendix C to Gilbert's brief accurately portrays Schedule C and Schedule F of Gilbert's 1988 tax return, after elimination of depreciation deductions, as follows:\\nEXPENSE FROM GILBERT'S PARTY BARN\\nGross Receipts..............$ 79,370.00\\nCost of Goods Sold............ 39,972.00\\nAdvertising................ 1,825.00\\nCar and Truck Expenses.........4,194.00\\nInsurance.................... 727.00\\nMortgage Interest..............6,089.00\\nOther Interest................... 563.00\\nLegal and Profesional Services................... 235.00\\nRent on Business Property.....1,165.00\\nRepairs.................... 2,738.00\\nTaxes...................... 3,118.00\\nTravel, Meals Entertainment.....1,282.00\\nUtilities and Telephone......... 3,722.00\\nOther Expenses..................403.00\\nGross Income $ 13,337.00\\nEXPENSES FROM FARMING OPERATIONS\\nGross Income...............$ 10,759.00\\nFeed Purchased................ 1,644.00\\nFertilizers and Lime.............. 500.00\\nGas, Fuel, Oil................... 293.00\\nInsurance..................... 123.00\\nMortgage Interest..............3,045.00\\nOther Interest................... 282.00\\nLabor Hired.................... 67.00\\nRent of Farm...................2,712.00\\nRepairs, Maintenance.......... 1,708.00\\nSeeds, Plants Purchased.........1,157.00\\nSupplies Purchased............. 2,538.00\\nUtilities............)........ 398.00\\nVeterinary Fees..................24.00\\nLoss................... $ 3,732.00\\nRULE 75 GROSS INCOME COMPUTATION\\nGross Receipts, Business......$. 79,370.00\\nGross Income, Farming.........10,759.00\\nAllowable Expenses, Business.. . 66,033.00\\nAllowable Expenses, Farming . 14,491.00\\nWages...................... 323.00\\nTaxable Interest and Dividend Income..................89.00\\nRule 75 Gross Income.....$ 10,017.00\\nThe trial court computed Gilbert's gross income under C.P. Sup. R. 75(111) (A) (3) as $42,977. While the court did not explain how it arrived at $42,977, the following calculation, in our estimation, depicts the particular expenses the court probably deducted in computing Gilbert's gross income for 1988. (Although our calculation of $42,905 is $72 less than the trial court's determination of Gilbert's gross income, this discrepancy is of no consequence to our disposition of the appeal.)\\n$ 79,370 gross receipts from business\\n+ 10,759 gross income from farming\\n90,129\\n-39,972 cost of goods sold and/or operations\\n50,157 [business expense]\\n-1,825 advertising [business expense]\\n48,332\\n-1,644 feed purchased [farm expense]\\n46,688\\n- 500 fertilizer [farm expense]\\n46,188\\n-1,157 seeds, plants purchased [farm expense]\\n45,031\\n-2,538 supplies purchased [farm expense]\\n42,493\\n+ 323 wages\\n42,816\\n+ 89 dividend and taxable interest\\n$ 42,905 income\\nGilbert argues that the court's gross income determination amounts to an abuse of discretion since the court failed to deduct other expenses that he claims should have been deducted under C.R Sup. R. 75(111) (A) (3).\\nIn Pruden-Wilgus v. Wilgus (1988), 46 Ohio App. 3d 13, the defendant-appellant, William W. Wilgus, argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making an unconscionable child support award. The court stated:\\n\\\"Appellant is self-employed and claims as his annual income his salary from his realty corporation which he states is $5,200. However, under the Child Support Guidelines, amounts for depreciation and other non-cash deductible items allowable by the Internal Revenue Service are not deducted from the gross revenue of a person who is self-employed, and significant amounts of reimbursements and in-kind payments received by a self-employed parent are to be counted as income. Ohio Child Support Guidelines, C.P. Sup. R. 75(C)(1)(c), now 75(III)(A)(3). See 39 Ohio St. 3d xlv, xlviii.\\nTherefore, the court's taking into consideration amounts on appellant's tax returns which do not affect cash flow and the fact that appellant receives a residence and use of an automobile from his business as additional compensation was not arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. There was ample evidence to support the award.\\\" Id. at 15.\\nThe ultimate issue for our consideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Gilbert's gross income under C.R Sup. R. 75(III)(A)(3)in 1988 was $42,977, a figure Gilbert claims is almost $33,000 too high. The court disallowed the following expenses which Gilbert claimed were \\\"ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in generating...income\\\": car and truck expenses, insurance, mortgage and \\\"other\\\" interest, legal and professional fees, rent, repairs, taxes, meals, travel, and entertainment, licenses, gifts, labor, gasoline, fuel, and oil, utilities, and veterinary fees. C.P. Sup. R. 75(III)(A)(3)states, in pertinent part, that:\\n\\\"Specifically excluded from ordinary and necessary expenses for purposes of these Guidelines are amounts for depreciation expenses or other non-cash deductible items allowable by the Internal Revenue Service. In general, income and expenses referenced herein should be carefully reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support obligation. This amount may differ from a determination of business income for tax. purposes.\\n\\\"Expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent from self-employment, operation of a business or rents should be counted as income if they are significant and reduce personal living expenses. Such payments might include a company car, free housing, reimbursed meals, or any other benefits.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nWe can only assume that the trial court determined that Gilbert derived personal benefit from the above, disallowed items that were expensed on his Schedule C and Schedule F. From our review of the 1988 tax return and Gilbert's testimony, we are well satisfied that the trial court was justified in disallowing at least a part of some of Gilbert's claimed business expenses, e.g. mortgage interest, vehicle expenses, repairs, taxes, entertainment, utilities The evidence certainly supportsa determination that Gilbert's real estate mortgage interest and taxes were charged to the business although he lived on the real estate^ that he drove a company car, and that he charged some of his meals to his expense account.\\nHowever, we do not think that the evidence justified the trial court's disallowing all of the claimed business expenses. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings to determine with greater precision what portion of the almost $33,000 disputed business expenses is not legitimately characterized as \\\"ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in generating .income.\\\" If, notwithstanding a determination that certain of Gilbert'sclaimed business expenses are legitimate, the trial court still determines to establish Gilbert's child support obligation at a level in excess of that suggested by the guidelines, it should provide the parties (and this court)with \\\"a brief statementto substantiate the deviation.\\\" (Rule 75(1).\\nGilbert also argues that the trial court failed to consider R.C. 3109.05(A) factors in establishing child support. The judgment entry states that \\\"[tlhe court, following Chapter 3111 of the Ohio Revised Code, sets support at $120.00 per week.\\\" The judgment entry does not mention R.C. 3109.05(A) factors, and properly so as this case was initiated pursuant to R.C. 3111.01 et seq. The factors pertaining to the determination of child support under Chapter 3111 are located at R.C. 3111.13(E):\\n\\\"In determining the amount to be paid by a parent for support of the child and the period during which the duty of support is owed, a court enforcing the obligation of support shall base the judgment or order of support upon the financial status of the parents and the father's ability to pay support, and shall consider all relevant facts, including, but not limited to, all of the following:\\n\\\"(1) The needs of the child;\\n\\\"(2) The standard of living and circumstances of the parents;\\n\\\"(3) The relative financial means of the parents;\\n\\\"(4) The earning ability of the parents;\\n\\\"(5) The need and capacity of the child for education;\\n\\\"(6) The age of the child;\\n\\\"(7) The financial resources and the earning ability of the child;\\n\\\"(8) The responsibility of the parents for the support of others;\\n\\\"(9) The value of services contributedby the custodial parent.\\\"\\nIn this case the parties had an opportunity to present evidence pertinent to these factors at the support hearing. Ms. Gratsch testified that her income in 1988 was $12,000 and that she received property worth $5,000. She said that her daycare costs were $60 during the school year, and $81 in the summer, and that health insurance per month for John cost $46. Gilbert entered his tax returns into evidence, testified as to his income and expenses, and stated that he had a debilitating nerve disease that effected his work.\\nWhile the trial court's judgment does not discuss the R.C. 3111.13(E) factors, this court presumes the regularity of the trial court's proceedings, and nothing in the record indicates that the court failed to consider these statutory factors in making its child support determination, although, as discussed above, the evidence did not warrant fixing Gilbert's gross income at $42,977. The weight to be given Gilbert's testimony as to his health and declining earning ability was for the trial court to determina\\nBecause the present record convinces us the court erred in fixing Gilbert's 1988 gross income at $42,977, the judgment will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The assignment of error is sustained.\\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded.\\nWILSON, J., and GRADY, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1632286\", \"name\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v. RENTSCHLER et\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Central Community Chautauqua System v. Rentschler\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No 196\", \"first_page\": \"291\", \"last_page\": \"292\", \"citations\": \"7 Ohio Law Abs. 291\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:26.839044+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Judges Hughes, Justice & Crow.\", \"parties\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v RENTSCHLER et\", \"head_matter\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v RENTSCHLER et\\nOhio Appeals, 3rd Dist, Henry Co\\nNo 196.\\nDecided April 5, 1929\\nJames P Ragan, Napoleon, for Chautauqua.\\nFred Gribbell, Deshler, for Rentschaler et.\", \"word_count\": \"508\", \"char_count\": \"3109\", \"text\": \"JUSTICE, J.\\nSeveral errors are assigned. One of them alludes to the overruling of plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts.\\nSection 11601, of the General Code, provides that:\\n\\\"When, upon the statements in the pleadings, one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, judgment shall be so rendered by the court, although a verdict has been found against such party.\\\"\\nThis Section is mandatory, but it authorizes a judgment non obstante verdicto, only when the pleadings require it. Challen v. Cincinnati, 40 O. S. 113. McCoy et al., Trustee, v. Jones, et al., 61 O. S. 119. No such requirement appears in the instant case. To the contrary, however, the pleadings clearly disclose an issuable fact, which the trial court was required to submit to the jury under proper instructions. The motion, therefore, was properly overruled.\\nAnother claimed error pertains to the admission of testimony.\\nCounsel for plaintiff insists that the trial 'court, in admitting testimony, violated the so-called \\\"Parol Evidence Rule.\\\" With this contention we do not agree. Parol contemporaneous evidence, of course, is inadmis sible to contradict, vary, add to or substraet from, the terms of a valid written instrument. 1 Grenl. Ev. Section 275. But the testimony under consideration, as we see it, did not tend to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from, the contract of guaranty. It simply tended to show the inducing and moving cause of said written contract and, in addition thereto, tDnat said contract in law never existed.\\nCommentaries on Evidence, 2nd Edition:\\nClearly the testimony was relevant to the issues as made by the pleadings. It, therefore, was not only competent but obviously of much moment to the defendants. Its reception by the trial court was proper.\\nAnother claimed error refers to the charge.\\nDid the trial court, in so charging, place upon the plaintiff an unwarranted burden? We do not think so.\\nThe pleadings reveal that plaintiff predicated a recovery in this cause upon an alleged present and absolute contract, while the defendants bottomed their defense upon an alleged conditional signing of said contract.\\nIn Leisy & Company v. Zuellig, 7 O. C. C. Reports, 433, the Circuit Court of the Sixth District, held:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nIn the instant case the trial court correctly put the burden upon the plaintiff of proving the material- allegations of its petition. The defense, being based upon a different agreement than that upon which plaintiff sued, was nothing more or less than a general denial. Simmons v. Green, 35 O. S. 104.\\nWe have carefully examined the charge and are of the opinion that, when construed as ,a whole, it is free from prejudicial error. Ohio & Indiana Torpedo Company v. Fishburn, et al., 61 O. S. 608.\\nEntertaining these views, it follows that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.\\nBefore Judges Hughes, Justice & Crow.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1634275.json b/ohio/1634275.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1634275\", \"name\": \"ROWLAND, Admr, etc v. STOUT, Exrx, etc\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rowland v. Stout\", \"decision_date\": \"1930-04-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"376\", \"last_page\": \"378\", \"citations\": \"8 Ohio Law Abs. 376\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:07:10.457150+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Middleton, PJ., and Blosser, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"ROWLAND, Admr, etc v STOUT, Exrx, etc\", \"head_matter\": \"ROWLAND, Admr, etc v STOUT, Exrx, etc\\nOhio Appeals, 4th Dist, Athens Co\\nDecided April 10, 1930\\nWoolley & Rowland, Athens, for Rowland.\\nJones & Jones, Zanesville, for Stout.\", \"word_count\": \"1314\", \"char_count\": \"7452\", \"text\": \"MAUCK, J.\\nThe question actually argued is whether or not the third paragraph of the contract, as above quoted, by its terms avoided the contract when Hayes defaulted in his payments for a period of two months. The claim of the plaintiff in error is that by the paragarph quoted the instrument sued on became absolutely void and of no effect as against either party whenever Hayes was two months in default. The claim of the other party is that the instrument was voidable only at the election of the vendor and that Hayes .and those claiming under him can' not take advantage of his default and avoid his obligation to pay in full, as he is bound to do by the first paragraph of the contract.\\nIt is, of course, quite well understood that the provisions against default in contracts for the sale of real estate are ordinarily provisions against the default of the vendee and are stipulated for the benefit of the vendor, for the reason that the vendor has already fully performed and the executory provisions of the contract await perform anee by the vendee only. The plaintiff in error, however, points out that in Mackenzie v. Stuber, 119 Ohio St. 588, the parties in a land contract may provide by appropriate language for a default on the part of the vendee releasing the vendee himself from further performance. It is true that such a contract may be drawn, and such a contract was before the court in the Mackenzie case.\\nThere is no provision in the instant contract for making all subsequent installments due upon default of an earlier one. There is no provision for the vendee yielding possession of the property on default and ne did not so yield possession, and while in the contract there is a provision that in case the contract becomes void the vendor shall not refund any payments made by the vendee there is no provision that payments actually made shall be full compensation for the use and occupation theretofore enjoyed by the vendee. The Mackenzie case is consequently not controlling.\\nWe are of the opinion, therefore, that there is nothing in this contract that defeats the . general rule that the provision of a forfeiture in this case was made for the benefit of the vendor ,and that the vendee could not take advantage of his own default and avoid the obligation imposed on him by other provisions of the contract.\\nThere is another and more difficult question in the case, however, and that is as to whether or not the vendor can employ the remedy that he invokes in this case. The plaintiff sued at law. He recovered a judgment, the effect of which is that he has a judgment for so much of the contract price as is past due and a finding that the defendant administrator shall allow as a valid claim against the decedent's estate the installments not yet due. So far as the finding relates to the payments not yet due it would seem to be open to the objection that such a claim must be presented to and allowed by the probate court under Section 10748 GC., and that the administrator could not allow such claim nor by his rejection thereof give jurisdiction to the common pleas court to allow such claim at law. ' The difficulty, however, transcends even the section referred to. If this judgment stands Hayes' administrator is required to carry out the contract of his decedent, make all the payments, and when he has done so the vendor will have the money and the legal title to the property, for there is nothing in this judgment which requires conveyance by the vendor and a court of law would be powerless to require it. The petition recites that upon full performance\\n\\\"the plaintiff will be ready and willing to execute to the person or persons entitled thereto a deed for said premises.\\\"\\nIt has made no such deed and only expresses a willingness to do so. Imputing to the parties the best of faith, and having in mind only the possibility of the death of the party now standing in vendor's shoes, it is easily seen that after the property is paid for in accordance with the judgment herein the vendees may be put to great expense to secure the title which would be their due. These facts are recited because they indicate the very apparent fact that by this judgment the vendor is acquiring all the benefits of an .action in specific performance without pleading a performance of those things necessary to obtain specific performance and without affording the vendee the perfect protection that a court of equity would provide in an action to specifically perform. Page on Contracts, Section 3219 says:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nThe difficulties suggested arise thru the attempt of the vendor to collect the purchase price at law. Isolated cases may be found where the vendor has been sustained in his attempt to recover the purchase price, but the rule is to the contrary. In Colson v. Shurman, 197 N. W. 674, 35 A. L. R. 924, the Nebraska Supreme Court says:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nThe Iowa Supreme Court in Prichard v. Mulhall, 127 Iowa 545, 4 Ann. Cas. 789, says: (Here follows quotation)\\nAnd the editor of the Annotated Cases in the note on that case says:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nWhile the identical question has not been passed upon in this state the principle has been recognized. In Dayton, etc. Turnpike Co. v. Coy, 13 Ohio St. 84, the court questions whether an action can be sustained upon an executory contract for the sale of property where title has not passed.\\nWithout multiplying authorities we conclude that while the plaintiff had an action in equity to specifically perform, which in practical effect would be a foreclosure or an action at law in damages, she had no action for the purchase price.\\nThis opinion had proceeded to this point when on April 2, 1930, the opinion of the Supreme Court w.as haded down in Will-O-Way Development Co. v. Mills, in which that court holds that the vendor can not in an action of the kind now under consideration recover from the vendee the full purchase price provided for in a land contract without alleging tender of a deed of conveyance. \\\"The effect of this decision, of course, is to require reversal of the judgment now under review. In the Will-O-Way case the court was required to go no further because a final judgment had been rendered for the vendee in the trial court. In the case at bar, if we should go no further than was gone in the Will-O-Way case, we would only reverse the judgment herein and remand the same to the Court of Common Pleas, where it is possible that the petition might be amended setting up a tender. This would likely require a second review of the case. If, however, we adhere to the veiw already arrived at as expressed above, that with or without a tender of conveyance an action does not lie by the vendor to recover at law the purchase price of his contract, this court must not only reverse the judgment below but dismiss the petition. This we do with even more confidence since the doctrine involved is set forth in Prichard v. Mulhall, supra, and that opinion is given express approval by our Supreme Court in the Will-O-Way oninion.\\n'The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and coming to render the judgment that that court should have rendered the petition of the plaintiff is dismissed.\\nMiddleton, PJ., and Blosser, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1634311\", \"name\": \"BURTON v. SAUNDERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burton v. Saunders\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 10241\", \"first_page\": \"36\", \"last_page\": \"37\", \"citations\": \"8 Ohio Law Abs. 36\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:07:10.457150+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Vickery, PJ., and Levine, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"BURTON v SAUNDERS\", \"head_matter\": \"BURTON v SAUNDERS\\nOhio Appeals, 8th Dist, Cuyahoga Co\\nNo. 10241.\\nDecided November 4, 1929\\nMessrs. Smith, Olds, Smith & Shepard, Cleveland, for Burton.\\nMr. Lawrence M. Rich, Cleveland, for Saunders.\", \"word_count\": \"831\", \"char_count\": \"4895\", \"text\": \"SULLIVAN, J.\\nThe question is raised as to whether under the last amendment of the legislature, the agreement for the commission is in writing or a memorandum equivalent thereto, signed by the party to be charged, as is provided for in the most recent enactment by the legislature, known as the Statute of Frauds. That this stipulation quoted from the provisions of the escrow agreement, .is an agreement in writing, or at least a memorandum signed by the party to be charged therewith, there can be no question.\\nIt is well settled law that the memorandum in writing referred to in the statute of frauds does not apply alone to the existence of the contract, but it is an instrumentality by which a contract may be proven. In other words, it is an enforceable contract composed of mutuality of mind, but not in and of itself a means of proving the contract itself, notwithstanding that it is a valid contract even though unenforceable, excepting as an instrument evidential for the foundation for a cause of action. This memorandum in writing or stipulation in the escrow agreement, was executed by both parties and consequently by ike party to be charged therewith, to-wit, the defendant below. Here we find a consummation of all those elements which are necessary to constitute an agreement of a memorandum in writing for the enforcement of the claim under the statute of frauds. It is argued, however, that the deal did not go through and consequently that the plaintiff is not entitled to her commission under the agreement, but when we come to examine the record we discover that the agreement could not have been cancelled, excepting by breaching the same without the consent of the defendant below, and in searching the record we find that he was the instrumentality by which the escrow agreement was declared null because he mutually joined in the cancellation of the escrow agreement. This act puts the responsibilitv of the party obligated for the commis sion in the position of responsibility for the abrogation of the agreement and therefore, under the weight of authorities, does not release the defendant from the obligation which he assumed for the payment of the commission.\\nIn Rosenthal vs Schwartz, 214 Mass. 371, it is held that a broker is entitled to his compensation as commission, even though the vendor breached his contract, because the stipulation merely fixed the time for the payment of the commission.\\nIn Walker's Real Estate Agency, Sec. 536-A, a broker who produces a purchaser able and willing to buy, and the contract having been executed, was entitled to his commission notwithstanding the agreement to wait for commission until the title passed.\\nSalmon vs Mayer, 164 N. Y. Supp. 166.\\nIn the 10th Ohio App. 454, Jamison vs Harrison Jr., it was held:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nWe think these authorities are applicable to the case at bar because it shows that the plaintiff consummated under her contract according to the provisions of the escrow agreement, all-that was to be done and that the only reason that the deal was halted was because of the part which the defendant took in the cancellation of the same.\\nIn the case of Foldenauer vs Leibold, decided by this court in December, 1928, we find the distinguishing characteristic between that case and the one at bar, in that the record was altogether too ambiguous to determine to whomjdie commission Was to be paid according to the memorandum in writing agreed upon, but in the instant case that question does not arise, and therefore we think that that case is not applicable.\\nWhere a real estate broker, under a contract to procure a purchaser for the sale of land and for which he received a commission, performed his contract, he is entitled to his commission notwithstanding that subsequent to his performance of all his obligations the contract has been breached by the party with whom he contracted, and this status applies even where by reason of a defect in the title the deal is not consummated, if it appears that all that a broker was to do was done, and that through no fault of his the final consummation of the transaction was halted. To hold differently would be violative of the law of contracts which rests upon the foundation that where a party thereto has satisfied the obligation of full performance he is entitled to the consideration for his services named in the agreement.\\nThe principal is elementary that a party to a contract can not discharge himself from his obligations where there has been a full, final and complete performance of the things which he engaged to have done.\\nThus holding, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.\\nVickery, PJ., and Levine, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1676602\", \"name\": \"SMITH et al., Appellants, v. KATZMAN et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. Katzman\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-07-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 62847\", \"first_page\": \"682\", \"last_page\": \"686\", \"citations\": \"81 Ohio App. 3d 682\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:33:37.613854+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Francis E. Sweeney, P.J., Spellacy and Patricia A. Blackmon, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"SMITH et al., Appellants, v. KATZMAN et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"SMITH et al., Appellants, v. KATZMAN et al., Appellees.\\n[Cite as Smith v. Katzman (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 682.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County.\\nNo. 62847.\\nDecided July 6, 1992.\\nChristine Guarnieri, for appellants.\\nStephen J. Charms, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1447\", \"char_count\": \"8998\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThis appeal was filed, briefed and argued as an accelerated appeal pursuant to Local App.R. 25 of this court.\\nBirt Smith and his wife Janet Smith, plaintiffs-appellants, timely appeal the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to Richard A. Katzman, M.D., Inc. and Dr. Richard A. Katzman, defendants-appellees (hereinafter \\\"Dr. Katzman\\\") on the grounds that the one-year malpractice statute of limitation barred the action.\\nThe Smiths argue that the trial court should have applied the two-year negligence statute of limitations pursuant to New York Cent. RR. Co. v. Wiler (1931), 124 Ohio St. 118, 177 N.E. 205. We agree. Therefore, in compliance with App.R. 11.1, it is the opinion of this court that the trial court erred in not applying R.C. 2305.10. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.'\\nThe facts of this case involved an action for negligence and loss of consortium, wherein the Smiths alleged that Dr. Katzman in his individual and corporate capacity was engaged as an independent contractor of the Social Security Administration for the purpose of performing physical examinations. The Social Security Administration notified Mr. Smith that he was required to submit to an examination by Dr. Katzman as a precondition to receiving Social Security benefits; the examination was conducted on November 3, 1988.\\nMr. Smith had a medical history of severe myocardial infarctions and had suffered the last one in June 1987.\\nDuring the examination, Dr. Katzman conducted a \\\"Doppler probe\\\" and then ordered Mr. Smith to take a treadmill test. While on the treadmill, Mr. Smith began to suffer another myocardial infarction. After the examination, Dr. Katzman simply sent him home.\\nThe complaint claimed that the stress of the treadmill test was the direct and proximate cause of the myocardial infarction; that Dr. Katzman negligently failed to conduct a proper medical history, negligently failed to consider the results of the Doppler probe and Mr. Smith's medical history, and thus was negligent when he ordered the treadmill test; and that Dr. Katzman knew or should have known that Mr. Smith was having a cardiac crisis, but negligently failed to take steps to stabilize his condition.\\nIn Count One of the complaint, Mr. Smith sought compensation for medical expenses, pain and suffering; in Count Two of the complaint, Mrs. Smith sought compensation for loss of consortium due to her husband's medical condition.\\nDr. Katzman filed an answer and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the claim was barred by R.C. 2305.11(B)(1); the motion was supported solely by the allegations in the complaint. The Smiths filed a brief in opposition; Dr. Katzman filed a reply brief; the Smiths filed a response brief to his reply. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment and held that the negligent examination action constituted a \\\"medical claim\\\" within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11 and, therefore, the one-year limitation for malpractice applied.\\nThe Smiths present two assignments of error that this court will address together. They state:\\n\\\"The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellants when it granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.\\n\\\"The trial court erred in holding that appellants' cause of action was barred by the one year statute of limitations in O.R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) rather than the two year statute for bodily injury.\\\"\\nThe Smiths' two assignments of error are well taken and sustained.\\nCiv.R. 56, in pertinent part, provides that:\\n\\\"(B) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may at any time, move with or without supportive affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.\\n\\\"(C) Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. \\\"\\nAt the outset, it is important to note that Dr. Katzman's motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B), and the Smiths' brief in opposition were not supported by any evidentiary materials pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E). Thus, the only issue before this court is whether as a matter of law the complaint stated a cause of action for general negligence or one for malpractice arising out of a medical claim. Compare R.C. 2305.10 and 2305.11.\\nR.C. 2305.10, in pertinent part, provides that:\\n\\\"An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.\\\"\\nR.C. 2305.11, in pertinent part, provides that:\\n\\\"(B)(1) Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim shall be commenced within one year after the action accrued ,\\n\\\"(D) As used in this section:\\n\\\"(3) 'Medical claim' means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a registered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. 'Medical claim' includes derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person.\\\"\\nIt is well established that a negligent examination conducted on an employee by an employer's physician and required by the employer is not malpractice for the purpose of the statute of limitations. New York Cent. RR. Co. v. Wiler (1931), 124 Ohio St. 118, 177 N.E. 205. See, also, Pennington v. Timken Co. (May 31, 1988), Stark App. No. CA-7389, unreported, 1988 WL 59526. This court has also concluded that negligent blood-grouping analysis ordered by juvenile court and conducted by a physician and hospital did not constitute a \\\"medical claim\\\" within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11. See Price v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 301, 304, 515 N.E.2d 931, 934-935, citing Wiler, 124 Ohio St. at 122-123, 177 N.E. at 206.\\nIn Wiler, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the requirement that the employee submit to an examination and the purpose of the examination to provide information to the employer are products of the employment relationship and distinguished from the treatment or attempt to cure that creates a physician-patient relationship. Id. at 122-123, 177 N.E.2d at 206. See, also, Pennington at 5.\\nIn Price, this court considered the requirement that a litigant submit to blood-grouping analysis to assist the court in determining paternity and applied the factors considered in Wiler to the definition of a \\\"medical claim\\\" within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11. Id. 33 Ohio App.3d at 304, 515 N.E.2d at 934-935. This court found that negligent blood-grouping analysis is not a claim that arises out of the medical diagnoses, care or treatment of any person. Id. at 304-305, 515 N.E.2d at 934-936. Blood-grouping analysis, like blood-alcohol tests, forensic pathology tests, X-rays and other tests does not involve \\\"diagnosis, care or treatment\\\" simply because a physician can perform it. Id. at 305, 515 N.E.2d at 935.\\nIn the instant case, there are no factual allegations which would suggest that the Doppler probe, the treadmill test, or the entire examination itself involved diagnosis, care or treatment. The fact that Mr. Smith was required to take the examination as a precondition to Social Security benefits and that its purpose was to obtain information for the Social Security Administration is distinguishable from the diagnosis, care or treatment which constitutes a medical claim within the meaning of R.C. 2305.11(D)(3). Therefore, the two-year limitation of actions pursuant to R.C. 2305.10 is applicable to the instant case.\\nFurthermore, because the complaint sub judice was filed within two years of the negligent examination, it is not barred under R.C. 2305.10, and summary judgment was improperly granted.\\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded.\\nFrancis E. Sweeney, P.J., Spellacy and Patricia A. Blackmon, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1693437.json b/ohio/1693437.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1693437\", \"name\": \"NICHOLSON v. RICHTER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nicholson v. Richter\", \"decision_date\": \"1939-03-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No 2964\", \"first_page\": \"413\", \"last_page\": \"416\", \"citations\": \"29 Ohio Law Abs. 413\", \"volume\": \"29\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:22:52.594960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BARNES and GEIGER, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"NICHOLSON v RICHTER\", \"head_matter\": \"NICHOLSON v RICHTER\\nOhio Appeals, 2nd Dist, Franklin Co\\nNo 2964.\\nDecided March 27, 1939\\nCharles B. Cranston, Columbus, and James C. Nicholson, Columbus, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nJ. O. Jones, Columbus, for defendantappellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1311\", \"char_count\": \"7548\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy HORNBECK, PJ.\\nAn appeal on qiiestions of law from a judgment of the trial court for defendant for his costs. Since this cause came into this court on appeal, the death of the defendant was suggested and Flora Brown, Administratrix, was substituted as party defendant.\\nThe action was for money upon quantum meruit for services claimed to have been performed by plaintiff for defendant, Richter, at his special instance and request. The services claimed to have been performed were professional in nature in connection with the claim ol defendant, against the estate of Casper J. Richter, deceased, and consisted ol conferences, legal advice, examination of records and evidence, consultation with attorneys representing said estate.\\nThe answer was a general denial ol the allegations of the petition with further denial. that the plaintiff performed any legal services relative tc the estate of Casper J. Richter either by defendant's request or in his behall and denies that any relationship of the attorney and client ever existed between the parties. Upon issues thus drawn the case came on to trial, jury was waived and the trial judge returned his finding in lieu of verdict in writing and held with the defendant, which finding was filed as of date July 6, 1938, as a paper in the cause and is made a part of the transcript of docket and journal entries. In this decision at the end thereof the trial judge said,\\n\\\"If a motion for new trial is filed it may be considered overruled and an entry furnished accordingly.\\\"\\nAfter the decision plaintiff, on July 8, 1938, filed his motion for new trial, consisting of eight grounds and a separate motion requesting the court to state separately his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court complied with the request and these findings are before us. The motion for new trial was overruled and judgment entered on the finding of the trial judge.\\nThere are twelve assignments of error. The first four of the assignments are directed to the weight of the evidence and the law in respect thereto. These must all be overruled because there is no Bill of Exceptions before this court. The fifth, sixth and seventh are directed to the claimed insufficiency of the findings of ract and the conclusion of law in relation to said finding of fact. The eleventh is to effect that the \\\"findings, conclusions and judgment\\\" in all respect should have been in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.\\nIt will be noted that the motion for new trial and the application for separate findings of law and fact were filed at the same time. Thus the attention of the trial judge was not at any time directed to any insufficiency of his findings of fact and conclusions of law nor was any objection noted thereto, which suggests the advisability of filing the request for separate findings when the case is submitted.\\nIt is elementary that a party cannot predicate error upon a mistake, improper conclusion of law or fact of the trial judge without first giving him an opportunity to pass upon the claimed errors. Nor does the record disclose that counsel proffered any additional findings of fact which he insisted were required to be carried into the findings of fact on the state of the record.\\nFindings of fact are intended to prevent the necessity of an extended Bill of Exceptions but if it is to be urged in a reviewing court that they could not properly have been so determined then the basis of such determination must be presented to the reviewing court.\\nIt is therefore obvious that we are not in position to determine if the findings of fact of the triai judge are incorrect or incomplete.\\nBut it is urged that the findings of fact are not responsive to the pleadings. The findings are brief but in the absence of a record which would clearly disclose that such .findings were so incomplete as to constitute no proper basis for the conclusion of law and judgment thereon we could not .set the judgment aside. An examination of the finding's is convincing that they are a sufficient predicate for' the conclusion of law that the plaintiff has failed to establish his. case by the preponderance of the evidence that an oral contract was made between him and the defendant. The finding of fact upon which the conclusion of law is drawn is to effect that there was a written contract agreement for the professional services of plaintiff with certain heirs of Frank J. Richter but that plaintiff declined to sign said agreement and that the plaintiff signed entries in said estate as counsel for the other heirs but not as counsel for the defendant, Richter.\\nUpon the claim of plaintiff, it might well be true that the trial judge was justified upon the facts set forth in his conclusions in holding tnat the plaintiff failed of his proof.\\nThe briefs of both narties discuss the evidence at considerable length and we find among the papers a statement of a number of. documents, exhibits, letters, contents of folders, etc., which counsel consider as evidence and which we are asked to so consider. This procedure is unknown in our practice. Without some authentication of the testimony before the trial'judge we have no power nor authority to consider it.\\nThe eighth and ninth assignments of error are directed to the overruling of the motion for new trial and it is first claimed that it was error to so overrule it, next and particularly that the court erred in passing upon the motion before it was filed. This latter ground is stressed and argued at considerable length.\\nThe announcement made by the trial judge in the written decision, that if a motion for new trial was filed it might be overruled, is such common practice as might be said to be the rule, especially in cases where the triai judge is acting as a trier of the facts. Why should the judge, if he is satisfied that he has come to the one and onfy conclusion that he can reach upon the controverted issues of fact, burden counsel and take on the added duty of again considering the tacts which he has already resolved against one of the parties. If, however, it oe granted that such procedure was irregular and erroneous, even so, the test would be whether or not it was prejudicial. If, in overruling the motion the trial judge erred to the prejudice of the losing party then the action would be such error as would require a reversal, otherwise it would not.\\nWe find no error to the prejudice of the plaintiff in the action of the trial judge upon the motion for new trial nor in prejudging the motion under the circumstances.\\nThe tenth ground of the motion is that \\\"the trial judge was prejudiced and biased, which is evident upon the record.\\\" There is no support whatever for this claim. Counsel, with knowledge of the judge who was to preside at the trial, waived a jury and elected to submit his cause to the mdge alone. Nothing appears in the record that in the slightest degree indicates any other purpose on the part of the judge than to be impartial and considerate of the plaintiff unless we so construe the fact that he resolved the facts and the law against plaintiff's claim.\\nA fair consideration of the record as it comes to us requires us to-say that no prejudicial error appears to the cause of the plaintiff. The judgment will therefore be affirmed.\\nBARNES and GEIGER, JJ, concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1693553\", \"name\": \"STATE ex PAYNE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Payne v. Industrial Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1939-02-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No 2999\", \"first_page\": \"4\", \"last_page\": \"6\", \"citations\": \"29 Ohio Law Abs. 4\", \"volume\": \"29\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:22:52.594960+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"HORNBECK, PJ, GEIGER & BARNES, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"STATE ex PAYNE v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE ex PAYNE v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION\\nOhio Appeals, 2nd Dist, Franklin Co\\nNo 2999.\\nDecided February 27, 1939\\nFrank A. Dye, Columbus, for relator.\\nThomas J. Herbert, Attorney General, Columbus, and E. P. Felker, Asst. Atty. General, Columbus, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"850\", \"char_count\": \"5066\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBY THE COURT:\\nThis is a suit wherein the relator seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to award nim compensation as upon permanent total disability from September 10, 1935 to September 11, 1936.\\nIt appears that prior to September 11, 1935, the Commission had awarded compensation to the relator for temporary total disability to the maximum sum of $3750, and later awarded the maximum sum of $3750 to him for temporary partial disability.\\nNovember 12, 1935 tne Commission determined that relator was still partially disabled and that he had been paid the maximum amount provided by law for such disability. December 2, 1936, relator applied- for additional compensation beyond the date of the last payment to him, namely, September 11, 1935, upon the claim that he was permanently and totally-disabled. On December 3, 1936, an application to modify previous award was filed by relator in which he sought the same relief as on his application of December 2.' Both of these applications were denied. A sheet from the record of proceedings bearing dates of April 27 and May 20, 1938 shows the dismissal of certain applications with the notation that the decision is based upon medical reports on record following an oral report made to the Commission by members of the medical staff. On May 25, 1938, another application was filed and on June 23, 1938, the Commission again held against the relator.\\nOn July 21, 1938, relator renewed his application to modify previous award which was dismissed on August 16, 1938. In passing upon this last application the Commission referred to a memorandum filed in support of the application in the form of reports of examinations made by the Veterans' Bureau on August 29, 1932 and July 23, 1934, both of which reported the relator to be permanently and totally disabled. The Commission said that no new facts had been added to the file not previously considered, and further stated that the relator was able to drive an- automobile though he was not' engaged in any industrial activities. The Commis: sion dismissed the application. An application of August 25, 1938, for further compensation made oy relator was dismissed. According to the same sheet from which we glean che information of a dismissal of the application to modify previous award, date July 21, 1938, there is a notation that \\\"it is ordered that the recommendation of August 16, 1938 be adopted,\\\" and under date of August 25, 1938 the notation \\\"held for decision\\\". The same sheet also bears date of September 22, 1938 and at the top thereof the notation \\\"Permanent Total Beg. \\u00cdV1/3S.\\\"\\nThe brief of relator states that the Commission placed relator under a permanent total basis on May 4, 1937, and dated his payments back to September 1,1936. We find no order of the Commission dated May 4, 1937, and we might further say that upon the record as it comes to us it is difficult to tell upon what dates the Commission promulgated its orders, and though reference is made to reports of the Veterans' Bureau and of examinations of the medical staff of' the Commission in instances these reports are not to be found.\\nIt is evident upon the whole record that several applications of the relator subsequent to September 1, 1936 were dismissed by the Commission and thereafter it reversed its former holdings and fixed the time when payments for permanent total disability should begin as of date, September 1, 1936.\\nThere are two theories upon which the\\\" action of the Commission may be predicated. First, that though the relator from a medical standpoint might be properly classified as totally disabled during the period of September 11, 1935 to September 1, 1936, he was able to engage in gainful employment? and second, that the Commission acting upon the reports of its own examiners, in conjunction with the reports of the Veterans' Bureau, determined that relator was permanently totally disabled but fixed the date when such disability began as of September 1,1936. As to both of these conclusions. particularly the latter, the Commission had. support. We can not say that it manifestly abused its discretion in Axing the period of total disability to begin September 1, 1936.\\nWe can not take any one statement of doctor, examiner or investigator and bind the Commission thereby, nor was it required to accept in all respects the Andings of the Veterans' Bureau. It has the right to make decision upon composite determination of all of the evidence that was before it.\\nIt is suggested that although the Commission Axed the date of total disability as of September 1, 1936, it did not make payments begin until September 11, 1936. If this is true the Commission should correct this manifest error on its own motion.\\nThe writ will be denied.\\nHORNBECK, PJ, GEIGER & BARNES, JJ, concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"1702261\", \"name\": \"Derrick, d. b. a. Mecklenburg's Garden, Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Derrick v. Board of Liquor Control\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-01-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 34227\", \"first_page\": \"478\", \"last_page\": \"478\", \"citations\": \"162 Ohio St. 478\", \"volume\": \"162\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:13:46.573525+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Bell and Taft, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Derrick, d. b. a. Mecklenburg\\u2019s Garden, Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Derrick, d. b. a. Mecklenburg\\u2019s Garden, Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees.\\n(No. 34227\\nDecided January 12, 1955.)\\nMr. C. G. Yarwood, for appellant.\\nMr. C. William O\\u2019Neill, attorney general, Mr. Robert Krupanshy and Mr. Kiehner Johnson, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"84\", \"char_count\": \"535\", \"text\": \"It is ordered and adjudged that this appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved.\\nAppeal dismissed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Bell and Taft, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1702305.json b/ohio/1702305.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1702305\", \"name\": \"City of Columbus, Appellee, v. Gray, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"City of Columbus v. Gray\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 34285\", \"first_page\": \"592\", \"last_page\": \"592\", \"citations\": \"162 Ohio St. 592\", \"volume\": \"162\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:13:46.573525+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Bell and Taet, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"City of Columbus, Appellee, v. Gray, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"City of Columbus, Appellee, v. Gray, Appellant.\\n(No. 34285\\nDecided February 9, 1955.)\\nMr. Chalmers P. Wylie, city attorney, and Mr. Malcolm M. Prime, for appellee.\\nMr. Isadore L. Margulis, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"77\", \"char_count\": \"490\", \"text\": \"It is ordered and adjudged that this appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved.\\nAppeal dismissed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Hart, Zimmerman, Stewart, Bell and Taet, JJ., concur.\\nMatthias, J., not participating.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1720147.json b/ohio/1720147.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1720147\", \"name\": \"Chucales et al., d. b. a. State Bar and Grill, Appellees, v. Royalty et al., Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Chucales v. Royalty\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-10-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 34214\", \"first_page\": \"214\", \"last_page\": \"227\", \"citations\": \"164 Ohio St. 214\", \"volume\": \"164\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:24:18.262816+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Stewart and Bell, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Chucales et al., d. b. a. State Bar and Grill, Appellees, v. Royalty et al., Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Chucales et al., d. b. a. State Bar and Grill, Appellees, v. Royalty et al., Appellants.\\n(No. 34214\\nDecided October 26, 1955.)\\nMr. H. J. Micklethwaite and Mr. Lee O. Fitch, for appellees.\\nMr. J. W. Brown, Mr. Ben Gettler, Mr. Jonas B. Katz and Mr. Jerome A. Lischlcoff, for appellants.\", \"word_count\": \"3875\", \"char_count\": \"23091\", \"text\": \"Taft, J.\\nDefendants complain that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based upon its finding that the picketing was for the purpose of bringing pressure upon plaintiffs to compel their employees to join the defendant union but that the petition contains no allegation with respect to any such purpose. We believe that the power of this court, with respect to amendments to pleadings (Section 2309.58, Revised Code), and the directions of the General Assembly, with respect to disregarding defects in pleadings not affecting substantial rights of the adverse party (Section 2309.59, Revised Code), are such that we are not justified in setting aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the instant case merely because the petition fails to specify the unlawful purpose of the picketing. The petition does-allege that the picketing was unlawful, no motion to make it definite and certain was filed, no demurrer thereto was filed, and defendants were apparently not misled by such failure to specify the unlawful purpose of the picketing.\\nDefendants also complain because the agreed statement of facts does not include, as one of the agreed \\\"facts upon which\\\" the Court of Appeals \\\"should consider\\\" the appeal, that the picketing was for any such purpose. However, where parties agree that certain facts are \\\"the facts upon which\\\" the \\\"court should consider\\\" a case, the court, in deciding such case, may quite properly base its decision in part upon other facts that may reasonably be inferred from the facts agreed upon.\\nIn view of the facts agreed upon in the instant case, the Court of Appeals could hardly have found that there was any purpose for the picketing except the purpose of pressuring plaintiffs to compel their employees to join the defendant union. Although the wording of the signs used in the picketing tends to show that the only thing defendants were interested in was getting plaintiffs' employees into the union, plaintiffs had not objected to defendants' talking to plaintiffs' employees about joining the union and had even suggested that defendants do so. Especially before defendants had taken advantage of this opportunity to talk with plaintiffs' employees, there would appear to be no apparent reason for defendants to picket in order merely to pressure or to persuade those employees to join the defendant union. It is quite clear from the facts agreed upon that the purpose of the picketing was to conscript plaintiffs, or to pressure plaintiffs into volunteering, as allies of defen dants in pressuring plaintiffs' employees to join defendant union.\\nIn order to compel their employees to join defendant union, it would be necessary for plaintiffs to discharge employees unless they joined that union. In effect, therefore, defendants' purpose of pressuring plaintiffs to compel their employees to join the defendant union amounted to a purpose of pressuring plaintiffs to discharge their employees unless they joined that union.\\nWe have, therefore, in the instant case, peaceful picketing against an employer, conducted on the sidewalk in front of the employer's premises by persons who were never employed by that employer and who do not represent anyone who ever was, and conducted for the purpose of pressuring the employer to discharge his employees unless they join the. union of those who are conducting the picketing.\\nAfter the decision in American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S., 321, 85 L. Ed., 855, 61 S. Ct., 568, there was certainly room for doubt as to whether a state court could enjoin such picketing without conflicting with the right to free speech guaranteed by the federal Constitution. See also Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S., 468, 81 L. Ed., 1229, 57 S. Ct., 857; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S., 88, 84 L. Ed., 1093, 60 S. Ct., 736; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S., 106, 84 L. Ed., 1104, 60 S. Ct., 746. But cf. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U. S., 52, 86 L. Ed., 1262, holding that a state may prohibit use of its streets for distribution of advertising material.\\nSince the decision in the Swing case, the problems, with respect to infringement of the right of free speech by injunctions against picketing, have been considered in numerous decisions by the United States Supreme Court and by state courts of last resort, and have also been the subject of a considerable body of other legal literature. See for example Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S., 287, 85 L. Ed., 836, 61 S. Ct., 552; Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S., 722, 86 L. Ed., 1143, 62 S. Ct., 807; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S., 769, 86 L. Ed., 1178, 62 S. Ct., 816; Cafeteria Employees Un ion v. Angelos, 320 U. S., 293, 88 L. Ed., 58, 64 S. Ct., 126; Giboney v. Empire Storage & lce Co., 336 U. S., 490, 93 L. Ed., 834, 69 S. Ct., 684; Building Service Employers International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S., 532, 94 L. Ed., 1045, 70 S. Ct., 784; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S., 460, 94 L. Ed., 985, 70 S. Ct., 718; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S., 470, 94 L. Ed., 995, 70 S. Ct., 773, 13 A. L. R. (2d), 631; Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U. S., 192, 97 L. Ed., 946, 73 S. Ct., 585; annotations at 11 A. L. R. (2d), 1338; 93 L. Ed., 1151, 1186 et seq.; 94 L. Ed., 973, 975 et seq.; Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harvard Law Review, 180; Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 Harvard Law Review, 513; Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply, 56 Harvard Law Review, 532; Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 Michigan Law Review (1943), 1037.\\nAs a result, it may fairly be said that it is difficult to rescue the principles of law decided from the ocean of words in which they are submerged. For this reason, and because many of these cases were recently reviewed by Judge Hart in his opinion in W. E. Anderson Sons Co. v. Local Union No. 311, 156 Ohio St., 541, 104 N. E. (2d), 22, we will merely state our conclusions as to the principles of law which have in our opinion now been established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the extent that those principles indicate whether or not the injunction against picketing in the instant case conflicts with the right to free speech guaranteed by the federal Constitution; and we will quote briefly some of the reasoning which was used in those decisions and which we believe supports our conclusions.\\nIn our opinion, where the public policy of a state regards picketing of the kind involved in the instant case as unlawful, a state court may enjoin such picketing without infringing the right of free speech guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and the fact, that such public policy has been found by the courts of that state to be a part of its common law instead of being expressed by its Legislature in statutory form, is immaterial.\\nThus in Building Service Employers Intl. Union v. Gazzam, supra (339 U. S., 532), it is said in the court's opinion:\\n\\\"This court has said that picketing is in part an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the federal Constitution. But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey, this court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity.\\n\\u00cd (\\n\\\"The state of Washington has by legislative enactment declared its public policy on the subject of organization of workers for bargaining purposes. Under the so-enunciated public policy of Washington, it is clear that workers shall be free from the coercion, interference, or restraint of employers of labor in the designation of their representatives for collective bargaining. Picketing of an employer to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining representative is an attempt to induce a transgression of this policy, and the state here restrained the advocates of such transgression from further action with like aim. To judge the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is but to determine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on the policy is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected from state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.\\n\\\" An adequate basis for the instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative.\\n\\\"Here, as in Giboney, the union was using its economic power with that of its allies to compel respondent to abide by union policy rather than by the declared policy of the state. * If respondent had complied with petitioners' demands he would have thereby coerced his employees. The employees would have had no free choice as to whether they wished to organize or what union would be their representative.\\\"\\nAlso, in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra (339 U. S., 460), it is said in the court's opinion:\\n\\\" while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and different. Industrial picketing 'is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. ' * # # Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.\\n\\\" A state may constitutionally permit picketing despite the ingredients in it that differentiate it from speech in its ordinary context. And we have found that because of its element of communication picketing under some circumstances finds sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment. However general or loose the language or opinions, the specific situations have controlled decision. It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a state if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance.\\n\\\" The fact that California's policy is expressed by the judicial organ of the state rather than by the Legislature we have repeatedly ruled to be immaterial.\\n\\\" It is not for this court to deny to a state the right, or even to question'the desirability, of fitting its law 'to a concrete situation through the authority given to its courts. ' # It is particularly important to bear this in mind in regard to matters affecting industrial relations which, until recently, have 'been left largely to judicial lawmaking and not to legislation.' \\\"\\nSee also Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, supra (345 U. S., 192); International Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra (339 U. S., 470); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra (336 U. S., 490); and Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, supra (315 U. S., 722).\\nThe question remains whether the public policy of Ohio regards picketing of the kind involved in the instant case as unlawful. It has not been argued and we will not therefore consider whether such picketing is forbidden by the provisions of Section 1331.01 et seq., Revised Code. In our opinion, picketing of the kind involved in the instant case is and will continue to be unlawful in Ohio until legislation making it lawful is adopted.\\nIn the instant case, defendants by their picketing were endeavoring to advance their interests. This effort of defendants necessarily conflicted with the interests of plaintiffs in avoiding interference with their business and with the interests of plaintiffs' employees in avoiding interference with their jobs. Furthermore, it conflicted with the public interest in avoiding industrial strife. There is nothing in the record to show what interests of defendants will be advanced by this picketing other than their interest in getting additional members for their union. For example, there is not even any evidence that, because of such things as payment of low wages or long hours of employment, plaintiffs are enjoying a competitive advantage over others, who are engaged in the same business and are maintaining union standards and employing those whom defendants represent. Under such circumstances, Ohio is certainly reasonable in determining that it is against its public policy to permit the use of its streets and sidewalks (dedicated and opened to facilitate public travel and transportation. Railway Co. v. Telegraph Assn., 48 Ohio St., 390, 27 N. E., 890, 29 Am. St.. Rep., 559, 12 L. R. A., 534; Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio St., 166, 180, 64 N. E., 141, 58 L. R. A., 782) to stir up industrial strife that does not exist and for the existence of which there is no apparent reason.\\nIn our opinion, the holding of this court in Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St., 352, 25 N. E. (2d), 934, requires the conclusion that the picketing involved in the instant case was unlawful and should be enjoined. It is true that the decision in the Crosby case might have been based upon the. fact that the picketing involved in that case had been accompanied by violence. However, the opinion \\\"by the court\\\" does not base the decision upon that ground but upon the ground that picketing is unlawful where there is no dispute between the employer and his employees and where the picketing is conducted against the employer by persons having no connection with his employees and where it is conducted for the purpose of pressuring the employer to discharge his employees unless they become members of a union. Thus, in that case, this court reversed that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which had permitted picketing and boycotting and, in doing so, stated in an opinion \\\"by the court\\\":\\n\\\" it is not even contended that in the instant case there is any dispute whatsoever between the plaintiff and her employees . On the contrary', the only dispute in the instant case is between the plaintiff and the defendants with whom the plaintiff's employees have no connection. The thing upon which the defendants ar\\u00e9 insisting is that the plaintiff discharge her employees unless they become members of one of the defendant unions. There is no reason or convincing a\\u00fathority sustaining the contention of the defendants that they have the right to engage in picketing or boycotting under such circumstances. this must be the law the instant situation is concededly unaffected by statute.\\\"\\nIt is argued that this court in Grimes & Hauer, Inc., v. Pollock, 163 Ohio St., 372, 127 N. E. (2d), 203, not only held that the public policy of Ohio does not oppose union shop agreements, but also questioned the reasons it had given for the Crosby case decision. There are statements in the opinion, but not in the syllabus, which might lend support to such conclusions. Those statements were made in answer to the contention that, because of Section 164(b), Title 29, U. S. Code, and because the common-law public policy of Ohio in effect establishes a \\\"right to work\\\" law, the state court could enjoin the picketing involved in that case. However, even if there had been a statutory \\\"right to work\\\" law in Ohio, the only effect of Section 164(b), Title 29, U. S. Code, would have been to prevent the National Labor Relations Board from acting in disregard of that law, as, for example, in authorizing execution or application of a union shop agreement. As this court recognized in the syllabus of the Grimes & Hauer case, the plaintiff therein was entitled to relief under provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act. Therefore the denial to Ohio of the right to enjoin the picketing in the Grimes & Hauer case (a denial implied by reason of the doctrine of pre-emption announced in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U. S., 485, 98 L. Ed., 228, 74 S. Ct., 161) would not, to use the words of Section 164(b), be \\\"authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment.\\\"\\nHowever, in our opinion, it is not necessary to determine and we do not determine in the instant case whether there is in Ohio, apart from any statutory or constitutional provision therefor, any common-law public policy which in effect establishes a \\\"right to work\\\" law. Assuming that there is no such common-law public policy in Ohio, the common-law public policy of Ohio may still regard peaceful picketing as unlawful where there is no dispute between the employer and his employees and where the picketing is conducted against the employer by persons who were never employed by him and who do not represent anyone that ever was so employed and where it is conducted for the purpose of pressuring the employer to compel his employees to become members of a union. As hereinbefore pointed out, it does; and an injunction against such picketing does not infringe upon the right to free speech guaranteed by the federal Constitution. In our opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution does not require a state to prohibit voluntary acquiescence in the demands of a union in order that such state may prohibit the union from exerting pressure by picketing to secure submission to such demands. Thus, it is said in the court's opinion in International Brotherhood v. Hanke, supra (339 U. S., 470):\\n\\\"Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment require prohibition by Washington also of voluntary acquiescence in the demands of the union in order that it may choose to prohibit the right to secure submission through picketing. In abstaining from interference with such voluntary agreements a state may rely on self-interest. In any event, it is not for this court to question a state's judgment in regulating only where an evil seems to get most conspicuous.\\\"\\nAlso, in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra (339 U. S., 460), it is said in the court's opinion:\\n\\\"If because of the compulsive features inherent in picketing, beyond the aspect of mere communication as an appeal to reason, a state chooses to enjoin picketing to secure submission to a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of his own free will. ' '\\nSince there is no claim that plaintiffs in the instant case were engaged in interstate commerce, the decisions in Grimes & Hauer, Inc., v. Pollock, supra, and Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, supra, are not applicable.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Matthias, Hart, Stewart and Bell, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1722072.json b/ohio/1722072.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1722072\", \"name\": \"POTTS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Potts, Defendant-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Potts v. Potts\", \"decision_date\": \"1943-11-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 153\", \"first_page\": \"54\", \"last_page\": \"56\", \"citations\": \"40 Ohio Law Abs. 54\", \"volume\": \"40\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:39:24.530715+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BARNES, P. J. and HORNBECK, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"POTTS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Potts, Defendant-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"POTTS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Potts, Defendant-Appellee.\\nOhio Appeals, Second District, Madison County.\\nNo. 153.\\nDecided November 13, 1943.\\nH. H. Crabbe, Londo.n, for plaintiff-appellant.\\nD. M. Richmond, London, for defendant-appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"981\", \"char_count\": \"5827\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy GEIGER, J.\\nThis is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Madison County, Ohio, fixing the alimony allowed by it to Ruth Potts, the plaintiff-appellant. The original petition of the divorce asserted that the defendant, Angus Potts, was guilty of gross neglect of duty and adultery. The cause was tried, and plaintiff-appellant asserts that the court before hearing all of the evidence stated that enough had been submitted and proceeded to grant the divorce, and fix the alimony. The court in its order confided the custody of the children, until the further order of the court, to the plaintiff,'exclusively, with the right of visitation of the defendant. The court further ordered that the plaintiff shall have as and for alimony the household goods then in possession of the plaintiff. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff as a reasonable alimony in money, the sum of $2,200.00, payable\\u2014 $400 instante and the balance in monthly payments of $50, beginning on August 15, 1943, and continuing until paid in full. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum of $40 per month for the support of the three children of the parties, the first payment to be made on July 15, 1943; and further, that .the plaintiff remove herself and her chattel property from the defendant's house.\\nNotice of appeal from this order of the court was properly filed, and the plaintiff-appellant filed an assignment of error to the effect that the court erred in its allowance of alimony; that the sum of $2,200 awarded plaintiff-appellant is wholly inadequate and not commensurate with the amount of property owned by the defendant-appellee, and with his ability to pay.\\nThe bill of exceptions discloses that the plaintiff is twenty-seven years of age and defendant twenty-two years of age; parties are farmers, and defendant-appellee is the operator of a farm of four hundred acres, on a fifty-fifty basis. The divorce was granted on the allegation of adultery. The petition in the court below was filed on March 16, 1943, and on March 18th the appellee filed a financial statement with the Ceneral National Bank, showing that the defendant's net worth was $9,110.80, in addition to which he owned a one-half interest in certain cattle which, after the divorce, he sold for between $1,500 and $2,000. The defendant-appellee asserted that his indebtedness had increased from $3,600 to $7,000, between the date of his financial statement to the bank and the date of his trial, a part of his increased indebtedness being caused by the purchase of a new automobile and certain farm equipment.\\nIt is urged by counsel for plaintiff-appellant that this increased indebtedness did not diminish his net worth, in that he was the owner of the property for which the money was expended. The plaintiff-appellant states that there were certain natural increases in the value of the stock held by the defendant. The defendant admitted that his net worth was between $10,000 and $12,000. These parties had been married. for a number of years and together had accumulated property of value.\\nThe court below arrived at the conclusion that the amount allotted was a sufficient measure of the plaintiff's interest in the property of the defendant, accumulated during their married life. The order of the court is that the plaintiff-appellant immediately vacate the premises which would, of course, necessitate her securing new quarters for herself and her three minor children. $40 a month is allowed for the care of the three children. We are of the opinion that this amount would furnish three children but a scanty support, and we are also of the opinion that the plaintiff-appellant should have out of her husband's estate a larger sum in cash than that allowed by the court. The court allowed a total of $2,200, a certain amount to be paid at once and the balance to be paid in monthly installments. No one can predict what may be the future ability of a share farmer to earn money upon the property he operates. This farmer shows ability and skill in the present management of the 400 acres of land, and he has property valued at least in the amount stated by him.\\nWe are of the opinion that the plaintiff-appellant should be awarded as alimony not less than $1,000 more than has already been allowed which would make her alimony allowance at least $3,200. The law would, in probability, be better satisfied if the trial court could allow an additional $2,000. Whatever additional may be allowed, as large a portion as possible should be paid in a short period.\\nAs a reviewing court, we have no authority to fix the amount of alimony, but we will remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceeding, and will state that if additional evidence that may be submitted does not influence us to change our present view, we will not affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas, hereafter to be made, unless the amount of alimony to be paid by defendant-appellee to plaintiff-appellant be increased in the sum of at least $1,000.\\nCounsel for appellant advances the argument that if this court increases the alimony to be paid by him that the defendant-appellee will not be able to continue in the management of the farm and that he will, therefore, become merely a farm hand. We are not impressed with this argument, and besides it should have occurred to him before he began his philandering experience with another woman.\\nCause remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.\\nBARNES, P. J. and HORNBECK, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1724081\", \"name\": \"Cincinnati Insurance Company et al., Appellees, v. Heritage Buffing and Polishing, Inc., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cincinnati Insurance v. Heritage Buffing & Polishing, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-07-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 92-1032\", \"first_page\": \"1202\", \"last_page\": \"1202\", \"citations\": \"67 Ohio St. 3d 1202\", \"volume\": \"67\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:21:47.084776+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright and Resnick, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Cincinnati Insurance Company et al., Appellees, v. Heritage Buffing and Polishing, Inc., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Cincinnati Insurance Company et al., Appellees, v. Heritage Buffing and Polishing, Inc., Appellant.\\n[Cite as Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Heritage Buffing & Polishing, Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 1202.]\\n(No. 92-1032\\nSubmitted June 3, 1993\\nDecided July 28, 1993.)\\nLane, Alton & Horst and Mary McWilliams Dengler, for appellees.\\nR.C. Stoughton, Sr. Co., L.P.A., and R.C. Stoughton, Sr., for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"88\", \"char_count\": \"595\", \"text\": \"This cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently allowed.\\nMoyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright and Resnick, JJ., concur.\\nF.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., dissent and would reverse.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/173081.json b/ohio/173081.json
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+"{\"id\": \"173081\", \"name\": \"BN1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellee, v. CYBERNET COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"BN1 Telecommunications, Inc. v. Cybernet Communications, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-03-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 71342\", \"first_page\": \"851\", \"last_page\": \"857\", \"citations\": \"118 Ohio App. 3d 851\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:32:54.840240+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"James D. Sweeney, C.J., Dyke and Spellacy, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"BN1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellee, v. CYBERNET COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"BN1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellee, v. CYBERNET COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Appellant.\\n[Cite as BN1 Telecommunications, Inc. v. Cybernet Communications, Inc. (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 851.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.\\nNo. 71342.\\nDecided March 31, 1997.\\nJohn B. Wirtz, for appellee.\\nJeffrey A. Stone, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"1776\", \"char_count\": \"10870\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nAn accelerated appeal is authorized pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc. App.R. 25. The purpose of an accelerated docket is to allow an appellate court to render a brief and conclusionary decision. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 11 OBR 240, 463 N.E.2d 655; App.R. 11.1(E).\\nIn the ease sub judice, defendant-appellant Cybernet Communications, Inc. (\\\"Cybernet\\\"), appeals from the denial of its motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4). No evidentiary hearing was conducted by the trial court on this motion for relief from judgment. For the reasons adduced below, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of Cybernet.\\nA review of the record on appeal indicates that plaintiff-appellee BN1 Telecommunications, Inc. (\\\"BN1\\\") provided long-distance telephone services to Cybernet. Thereafter, Cybernet complained about the service provided by BN1. BN1 allegedly agreed to adjust Cybernet's billing account to compensate for the allegedly poor service. These account adjustments never materialized. Thereafter, on May 19, 1995, BN1 filed suit to collect the overdue account, seeking damages in the amount of $11,344.05. Cybernet filed its answer.on July 24, 1995.\\nOn December 28, 1995, the trial court referred the case to arbitration. The arbitration hearing was conducted on April 23, 1996, at which time the arbitration panel made an award in favor of BNl in the amount of $10,238.30 on the overdue account. Defense counsel, but not the defendant-client, attended the arbitration hearing. No objections to the arbitration award were filed by Cybernet. This award was then affirmed by the trial court on May 29, 1996. Cybernet filed its motion for relief from judgment on July 25, 1996. Cybernet filed a brief in opposition to relief on August 5,1996, with no evidentiary support attached. The trial court, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion for relief on September 3, 1996, without opinion, using a half-sheet status form entry. This timely appeal on the accelerated docket from that denial of relief from judgment followed.\\nThe sole assignment of error provides:\\n\\\"The trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(4) because there had been an accord and satisfaction between the parties pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 1303.40, 'accord and satisfaction by use of instrument,' before the trial court entered judgment.\\\"\\nThe basis of the motion for relief from judgment stems from an alleged accord and satisfaction of the disputed debt represented by the overdue account. The statute which governs this issue is R.C. 1303.40 (effective August 19,1994), which provides:\\n\\\"If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that that person in good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, that the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and that the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, all of the following apply:\\n\\\"(A) Unless division (B) of this section, applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.\\n\\\"(B) Subject to division (C) of this section, a claim is not discharged under division (A) of this section if either of the following applies:\\n\\\"(1) The claimant, if an organization, proves both of the following:\\n\\\"(a) Within a reasonable time before the person against whom the claim is asserted tendered the instrument to the claimant, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person that communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place.\\n\\\"(b) The instrument or accompanying communication was not received by that designated person, office, or place.\\n\\\"(2) The claimant, whether or not an organization, proves that within ninety days after payment of the instrument, the claimant tendered repayment of the amount of the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted. Division (B)(2) of this section does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a statement complying with division (B)(1) of this section.\\n\\\"(C) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.\\\"\\nAttached to the motion for relief from judgment was a photocopy, authenticated by an attached affidavit, of a draft, numbered 2079 and dated April 9, 1996, from Cybernet and made payable to BN1 in the amount of $1,105.75. On the face of this draft, in a separate box titled \\\"Description,\\\" is the handwritten phrase \\\"acct paid in full acct #12162341800,\\\" which represents the customer number of Cybernet as used by BN1 on the overdue account. In another separate box on the face of the draft, titled \\\"Explanation,\\\" is the handwritten phrase \\\"Balance paid.\\\" The back of this draft indicates that the instrument was negotiated by BN1 on April 15, 1996, eight days prior to the arbitration hearing. Also attached to this motion was the affidavit of Cybernet's president, Davis Antestenis, who (1) authenticated the photocopy of the draft, (2) detailed the disputed account with BN1, and (3) averred that BN1 did not comply with R.C. 1303.40(B)(1)(a) or (B)(2). Cybernet argues that the negotiation of the draft, without an accompanying reservation of rights by the creditor, BN1, represents an accord and satisfaction of the disputed amount for the amount indicated by the draft.\\nThe standard of review relative to these assignments was recently provided in Caraballo v. Wright (Mar. 2,1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 66971, unreported, at 4-5, 1995 WL 92154, where, citing Acme Music & Vending, Inc. v. Buccaneer Lanes, Inc. (Sept. 30,1994), Trumbull App. No. 93-T-5001, unreported, 1994 WL 587736, and E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Walker (1978), 59 Ohio App.2d 216, 13 O.O.3d 234, 394 N.E.2d 348, the following was stated:\\n\\\"To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate (1) that the party has a meritorious defense, or claim to present if relief is granted, (2) that the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and (3) that the motion is made within a reasonable time. GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 1 O.O.3d 86, 351 N.E.2d 113. The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a ruling on a motion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 514 N.E.2d 1122 [1123-1124], An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of judgment, but rather, indicates an attitude on the part of the court that is unreasonable, unconscionable or arbitrary. Wilmington Steel Products, Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 573 N.E.2d 622 [624-625],\\n\\\"In order to merit a hearing and prevail, a motion under Civ.R. 60(B) must comply with the requirements for all motions as set forth under Civ.R. 7(B); it must be accompanied by a memorandum of facts and law, and evidentiary materials containing operative facts which would warrant relief under the rule must be attached. Angel v. Angel (Feb. 18, 1993), Scioto App. No. 92CA2071, unreported, at 5, 1993 WL 49456; Sykes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Maple Wood Care, Inc. (May 3, 1991), Portage App. No. 90-P-2218, unreported, at 3, 1991 WL 70795; Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 68 O.O.2d 251, 316 N.E.2d 469; 2 Klein, Browne and Murtaugh, Baldwin's Ohio Civil Practice (1988), 106-107, T 53.05(A) and (B).\\\"\\nThe quality of operative facts which must be demonstrated by the movant to warrant relief was defined in E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Walker, supra, 59 Ohio App.2d 216, 13 O.O.3d 234, 394 N.E.2d 348, at syllabus, as follows:\\n\\\"The allegation of operative facts required in order to prevail upon a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) must be of such evidentiary quality as affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, written stipulations, or other sworn testimony. Unsworn allegations of operative facts contained in a motion for relief from judgment filed under Civ.R. 60(B) or in a brief attached to the motion are not sufficient evidence upon which to grant a motion to vacate judgment.\\\"\\nApplying the standard of review to the facts before us, Cybernet's motion met the three basic GTE elements. It is also clear that the draft was conspicuously intended to be payment in full satisfaction of the disputed debt. It is equally clear that BNl negotiated the draft without a reservation of rights and without complying with the protections afforded a creditor by R.C. 1303.40. As a matter of law, the claim was discharged, and the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the trial court order of May 29, 1996, affirming the award of the arbitrators in the amount of $10,238.30, is vacated, and judgment is entered in favor of defendant on the basis of an accord and satisfaction.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nJames D. Sweeney, C.J., Dyke and Spellacy, JJ., concur.\\n. Civ.R. 60(B)(4) provides in pertinent part the following:\\n\\\"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application . The motion shall be made within a reasonable time\\n. Appellee suggests, both in its brief in opposition to relief from judgment and in its appellate brief, that this draft was made known to the arbitration panel. Given that the damages prayed for minus the amount of the draft equals the amount of the arbitration award ($11,344.05 - $1,105.75 = $10,238.30), it would appear that this suggestion has substance.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1742647.json b/ohio/1742647.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1742647\", \"name\": \"Martin v. Hardy\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Martin v. Hardy\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-11-01\", \"docket_number\": \"95-1800\", \"first_page\": \"1442\", \"last_page\": \"1442\", \"citations\": \"74 Ohio St. 3d 1442\", \"volume\": \"74\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:50:55.466061+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Martin v. Hardy.\", \"head_matter\": \"95-1800.\\nMartin v. Hardy.\", \"word_count\": \"28\", \"char_count\": \"191\", \"text\": \"In Mandamus. On motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss sustained. Cause dismissed.\\nMoyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1742723.json b/ohio/1742723.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..97c1bff8dcb57dee6e7e4d5ceab3e559caa5bc41
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1742723\", \"name\": \"State ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Ingraham\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Ingraham\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-11-22\", \"docket_number\": \"95-1941\", \"first_page\": \"1461\", \"last_page\": \"1461\", \"citations\": \"74 Ohio St. 3d 1461\", \"volume\": \"74\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:50:55.466061+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"State ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Ingraham.\", \"head_matter\": \"Wednesday, November 22, 1995\\nMERIT DOCKET\\n95-1941.\\nState ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Ingraham.\", \"word_count\": \"54\", \"char_count\": \"355\", \"text\": \"In Prohibition. On amended complaint and motion for stay. Sua sponte, leave to file the amended complaint is granted, and the amended complaint is dismissed. Motion for stay denied.\\nMoyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1744964.json b/ohio/1744964.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1744964\", \"name\": \"Henry's Cafe, Inc., Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control\", \"decision_date\": \"1959-12-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 36063\", \"first_page\": \"233\", \"last_page\": \"238\", \"citations\": \"170 Ohio St. 233\", \"volume\": \"170\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-21T20:02:18.861595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Harvard\", \"judges\": \"Weygandt, C. J., Zimmerman, Taft, Matthias and Bell, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Henry\\u2019s Cafe, Inc., Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Henry\\u2019s Cafe, Inc., Appellant, v. Board of Liquor Control et al., Appellees.\\n(No. 36063\\nDecided December 30, 1959.)\\nMr. Charles T. Kaps, Mr. Gregory C. Karas and Mr. Richard C. Addison, for appellant.\\nMr. Mark McElroy, attorney general, Mr. John W. Leibold and Mr. John A. Hoskins, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"1626\", \"char_count\": \"9713\", \"text\": \"Peck, J.\\nAt the outset, we quote the pertinent portion of Section 119.12, Revised Code, because the judgment in this case depends upon an interpretation of such provision of the Administrative Procedure Act:\\n\\\"The Court [of Common Pleas on appeal] may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.\\\"\\nThis provision confers the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas in the present case, which jurisdiction is exclusive and limited.\\nNo consequential question of fact is presented by the record. The Court of Common Pleas opinion notes that the president of the appellant corporation was, as such, responsible for the conduct of the business, was present and not only permitted the gambling and fighting but was \\\"an active participant in both.\\\" As has been observed, no serious question concerning the facts is presented, and the only challenge is contained in appellant's contention that the president was in the establishment and participated in the gambling and fighting as a patron rather than as the operator of the permit premises. The Common Pleas Court regarded this as \\\"a rather specious argument,\\\" and we are not disposed to dignify it with extensive comment. Unfortunately, the record does not enlarge upon the appellant corporation's president's managerial control of the permit premises, but it does disclose that he, his wife and his attorney are the sole \\\"members\\\" of the corporation, and the name of the establishment (\\\"Henry's Cafe\\\") contains the president's given name. Lacking the basis for considering this individual as a manager or operator of the place of business, we hold simply that, where an officer of a corporate permittee does acts or engages in conduct on the permit premises which constitute violations of the Liquor Control Act and regulations of the Board of Liquor Control, he is acting as an official of the permittee and not as a customer of the establishment.\\nHeavy reliance is placed by the appellant on the case of Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St., 275, 131 N. E. (2d), 390, but we feel that case to be of little assistance in the present situation, Judge Stewart's consideration there being limited primarily to evidentiary questions. A portion of one of s\\u00e9veral quotations from the Andrews case which the appellant presents in its brief is as follows:\\n' The court must read and consider all the evidence offered by both sides and must appraise all the evidence as to the credibility of the witnesses, the probative character of the evidence and the weight thereof. In other words, the court may reverse, vacate or modify the order of the agency, unless it finds that it 'is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.' \\\" (Appellant's emphasis.)\\nWith that statement of the law, which is merely a rephrasing of the applicable part of Section 119.12, Revised Code, we are in entire accord but point out that its mere quotation begs the question. Unquestionably, the Court of Common Pleas may reverse, vacate or modify an order of an agency unless it finds that the order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, but, where it makes such a finding, it can only affirm and cannot reverse, vacate or modify.\\nWe are thus faced with a question as to the presence or absence of the requisite quantum of evidence. In addition to the expressions in the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas (which we have considered only to the extent permitted by paragraph four of the syllabus of the Andrews case), it was expressly found in the journal entry \\\"that there was gambling and disorderly conduct on the permit premises.\\\" For the present purposes there are no grays in such areas, but only blacks and whites. There are no violations under extenuating circumstances, but only facts which do or do not constitute violations. The Court of Common Pleas found that there were violations, and that gambling and disorderly conduct did exist. That finding was not made in a vacuum, but with full judicial knowledge (and, we do not hesitate to add, with complete actual knowledge) of the statute which would permit reversal, vacation or modification of the board's order, if it lacked reliable, probative and substantial evidentiary support. Patently desiring to modify the admittedly harsh order of the board, the Court of Common Pleas could find no such absence of evidence and, as an alternative route to the same end, found \\\"that the board abused its discretion\\\" and modified its order on that ground.\\nSandwiched between the court's finding that the violations occurred and that the board abused its discretion, this sentence appears in the journal entry: \\\"However, the court also finds that the incidents which formed the basis for the two charges in this matter were the products of a scheme initiated by a third party who entered the premises and invited Henry Zochowski, president of the appellant company, to engage in gambling with him for the purpose of winning money from said Henry Zochowski.\\\" We have neither the inclination to comment upon nor the right to consider the conduct of a nefarious third party, in view of our conclusion that, in such an appeal, the Court of Common Pleas is not empowered to modify an order of the board on the ground of abuse of discretion. The power of the Common Pleas Court to modify an order of an agency as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act (Section 119.01 et seq., Revised Code) is limited to the grounds set forth in Section 119.12, Revised Code, and no jurisdiction exists in that court to make such modification on the ground of abuse of discretion by the agency.\\nWhile not necessary to the determination of this case, some brief additional comment seems proper in connection with the amendment of Section 119.12, Revised Code, effective, November 4, 1959, which was passed and became operative during the pendency of this case. Prior to such effective date all appeals from orders of the Board of Liquor Control under this statute were required to be to the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, and there has naturally been an abundance of such appeals there. Lacking the guidance of Supreme Court decisions on the point primarily at issue here, the judges of that Common Pleas Court have been required to make their own determinations of their power to modify the board's orders, and those determinations have not been entirely in accord with one another. It was partially for that reason that the Attorney General joined in the motion to certify the record to this court. A majority of the unreported decisions of that court, cited in appellees' brief, appear to be in harmony with our conclusion here as well as with the holdings in the following cases: Farrand v. State Medical Board, 151 Ohio St., 222, 85 N. E. (2d), 113; Olin v. Board of Liquor Control, unreported case No. 4927, Court of Appeals for Franklin County; Delmonte Cafe, Inc., v. Department of Liquor Control, 74 Ohio Law Abs., 459, 141 N. E. (2d), 889; and Famous Cafe v. Board of Liquor Control, No. 5893, Court of Appeals for Franklin County. See, also, the distinguishable case of Carpenter v. Sinclair, 106 Ohio App., 211, 149 N. E. (2d), 150.\\nWhile such solace as we may experience at finding that the prevailing trend of the courts below supports our own thinking may be of no importance, it is significant to note that this same trend was available to the observation of the General Assembly when, during the session just past, it had Section 119.12 under consideration. The Franklin County Court of Appeals and Common Pleas Court decisions (i. e., the decisions of the only courts then having jurisdiction), in both reported and unreported cases, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be said to be predominately in support of the appellant's position. They either leave the situation in doubt or support the proposition that the appellate court can reverse, vacate or modify an agency's order, if reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in support of the order is not present. Had the General Assembly been of the persuasion that the first of these alternatives existed it would have removed the doubt. Instead, its amendment concerned chiefly a jurisdictional point (extending the right of appeal to the other 87 Common Pleas Courts), and this we comprehend to be a legislative approval of the interpretation of the statute we here place upon it.\\nThe judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nWeygandt, C. J., Zimmerman, Taft, Matthias and Bell, JJ., concur.\\nHerbert, J., concurs in paragraphs one and two of the syllabus but dissents from paragraph three thereof and from the judgment.\\nThe statement in appellees' brief that \\\"he was in control of the permit premises\\\" is not supported by the record.\\nThere is no claim here that the finding of the Common Pleas Court is not \\\"in accordance with law,\\\" and for purposes of simplification we have therefore eliminated that phrase from consideration.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1745892.json b/ohio/1745892.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff77b3f80def2efb5fa1c9a97e7c1b95e058bfbf
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+"{\"id\": \"1745892\", \"name\": \"STRUBLE, et, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CINCINNATI, (City) et, Defendants-Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Struble v. Cincinnati\", \"decision_date\": \"1948-03-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 6911, 6912, 6913, 6914, 6915, 6916\", \"first_page\": \"566\", \"last_page\": \"569\", \"citations\": \"51 Ohio Law Abs. 566\", \"volume\": \"51\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:58:56.770874+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"MATTHEWS, PJ, and HILDEBRANT, J, concur.\", \"parties\": \"STRUBLE, et, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v CINCINNATI, (City) et, Defendants-Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"STRUBLE, et, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v CINCINNATI, (City) et, Defendants-Appellees.\\nOhio Appeals, First District, Hamilton County.\\nNos. 6911, 6912, 6913, 6914, 6915, 6916.\\nDecided March 1, 1948.\\nDavid L. Shannon, Roy L. Struble, Cincinnati, for plaintiffs-appellants.\\nHenry M. Bruestle, Miss Isabel Guy, Cincinnati, for defendants-appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"866\", \"char_count\": \"5122\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy THE COURT:\\nIn these actions the plaintiffs sought an injunction, restraining the collection of an assessment to pay the cost of a street assessment.\\nThe trial court denied the injunction and made a separate finding of facts and conclusions of law.\\nThe actions are before this court on appeal on questions of law. There is no bill of exceptions, and the only question is whether the finding of facts are sufficient to support the judgment.\\nIt is stated in the syllabus to Jack v Hudnall, 25 Oh St, 255:\\n\\\"Where the finding of facts by the court fairly admits of a construction which will support the judgment, that construction will be adopted rather than a different one which would render the judgment erroneous.\\\"\\nHowever, we do not find it necessary to have recourse to that rule of construction to. support the judgment in this .case.\\nA reading of the finding of facts discloses that the court found that all the procedural requirements of the law for the levying of the assessment were met, that there was no abus\\u00e9 of discretion, and that there was no. suggestion of fraud, and'further that there were benefits conferred upon the plaintiffs' property by the improvement.\\n'The court also found that \\\"the assessment was in excess-of the benefits conferred.\\\" It is urged that this finding requires the granting of an injunction restraining the collection of the excess.\\nAppellants' counsel relies on statements contained in the opinions in Damar Realty Co, v Cleveland, 143 Oh St, 469, Domito v Maumee, 140 Oh St, 229, and Walsh v Barron, 61 Oh St, 15, that special assessments have no legal justification except in special benefits and that an assessment beyond special benefits has no legal justification. That rule may be conceded. However, that is not the question presented by this record.\\nThe question here presented is as to the power of the court to set aside -the finding of the City Council that the plaintiffs' property was benefited to the amount of the assessment. Does a mere finding by the court that the assessment exceeded the special benefits justify the court in granting an injunction against the collection of the assessment in whole or in part? We think not.\\nIn 28 O. Jur, 795, the Ohio cases are summarized as follows:\\n\\\"The statute provides that when an assessment as reported by an equalizing board to the council is confirmed by the council, 'it shall be complete and final.' It is also well established, independently of statutory provision, that where the council of a municipality determines that the amount of an assessment does not exceed the value of the special benefits conferred, its judgment in the premises, in the absence of fraud or an abuse of discretion, is final and conclusive. And where an assessing board has made a finding as to. the amount \\u00a9f benefits and has made an assessment on the basis thereof, there is a prima facie presumption in favor of the correctness of such finding, and it will not lightly be disturbed or inquired into, in the absence of allegations of some of the grounds usually invoking equitable intervention.\\\"\\nThat a judicial conclusion that the amount found by the assessing authority was in excess of the special benefits, does not invalidate the assessment, is generally held. In Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, the Court said at 433:\\n\\\"There is a look of logic when it is said that special assessments are founded on special benefits and that a law which makes it possible to assess beyond the amount of the special benefit attempts to. rise above its source. But that mode of argument assumes an exactness in the premises which does not exist. The foundation of this familiar form of taxation is a question of theory. The amount of benefit which an improvement will confer upon particular land, indeed whether it is a benefit at all, is a matter of forecast and estimate. In its general aspects at least it is peculiarly a thing to be decided by those who make the law.\\\"\\nSee, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v City of Minot, 37 A. L. R. (Minn.) 211, and annotation at 226, et seq.; and Cincinnati v Board of Education, 63 Oh Ap, 549.\\nFor these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.\\nMATTHEWS, PJ, and HILDEBRANT, J, concur.\\nROSS, J, dissents in separate memorandum.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1746549.json b/ohio/1746549.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b51d4e9c01dda9b910463b035cad588bb1f6b631
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1746549\", \"name\": \"State v. Mitchell\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Mitchell\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-03-06\", \"docket_number\": \"96-138\", \"first_page\": \"1408\", \"last_page\": \"1408\", \"citations\": \"75 Ohio St. 3d 1408\", \"volume\": \"75\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:04:25.641801+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Resnick and Cook, JJ., dissent.\", \"parties\": \"State v. Mitchell.\", \"head_matter\": \"96-138.\\nState v. Mitchell.\", \"word_count\": \"25\", \"char_count\": \"159\", \"text\": \"Cuyahoga County, No. 56575. On motion for leave to file delayed appeal. Motion denied.\\nMoyer, C.J., Resnick and Cook, JJ., dissent.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1746781.json b/ohio/1746781.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4db6e83d2d51f5c2293391a9861e60ce06b5817
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/1746781.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1746781\", \"name\": \"State v. Benner\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Benner\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-05-08\", \"docket_number\": \"87-1614\", \"first_page\": \"1474\", \"last_page\": \"1474\", \"citations\": \"75 Ohio St. 3d 1474\", \"volume\": \"75\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:04:25.641801+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State v. Benner.\", \"head_matter\": \"MOTION DOCKET\\n87-1614.\\nState v. Benner.\", \"word_count\": \"25\", \"char_count\": \"162\", \"text\": \"Summit County, No. 12664. On motion for reconsideration under S.CtPrac.R. XI(1)(B). Motion denied and execution date set.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/176279.json b/ohio/176279.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dea58637603972aaa1245310e32353d5b82787b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/176279.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"176279\", \"name\": \"Karr v. Borchardt\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Karr v. Borchardt\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-12-06\", \"docket_number\": \"99-223\", \"first_page\": \"1457\", \"last_page\": \"1457\", \"citations\": \"87 Ohio St. 3d 1457\", \"volume\": \"87\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:14:01.865812+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Karr v. Borchardt.\", \"head_matter\": \"99-223.\\nKarr v. Borchardt.\", \"word_count\": \"53\", \"char_count\": \"315\", \"text\": \"Seneca App. No. 13-98-35. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Seneca County.\\nIT IS ORDERED by the court, sua sponte, effective December 1, 1999, that oral argument scheduled for December 1,1999, be continued until further order of the court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1766592.json b/ohio/1766592.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7affd143bf96b3fe615380530335e9b38f1a29c
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1766592\", \"name\": \"Board of Education of Campbell City School District, Appellant, v. Mahoning County Budget Commission et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Board of Education v. Mahoning County Budget Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-03-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 38021\", \"first_page\": \"294\", \"last_page\": \"295\", \"citations\": \"174 Ohio St. 294\", \"volume\": \"174\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:08:45.501589+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Taft, C. J., Zimmerman, Matthias, O\\u2019Neill, Griffith, Herbert, and Gibson, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Board of Education of Campbell City School District, Appellant, v. Mahoning County Budget Commission et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Board of Education of Campbell City School District, Appellant, v. Mahoning County Budget Commission et al., Appellees.\\n(No. 38021\\nDecided March 13, 1963.)\\nMessrs. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Mr. Henry J. Crawford, Mr. Warren \\u00c9. Hacker and Mr. William H. Luts, Jr., for appellant.\\nMr. Clyde W. Osborne, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Thomas L. Corroto, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"290\", \"char_count\": \"1896\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nAdmittedly, any authority to require the contested reduction is derived from Section 5713.11, Revised Code, which reads so far as pertinent:\\n\\\"When the people of any taxing subdivision have voted additional levies for any purpose in the year of reassessment or any year prior thereto and said additional levies are effective in the year of reassessment or thereafter and the levies are to be calculated on a total valuation of property higher than that of the year before reassessment # the rate of said additional levy shall be reduced in the same proportion in which the total valuation of property in said taxing subdivision is increased by the reassessment over the total valuation of the year preceding the reassessment (Emphasis supplied.)\\nThe Board of Tax Appeals held that the reduction should be affected by all changes in the real, public utility and personal property duplicates excepting, because on the specific provisions of Section 5705.331, new construction on real property. The appellant contends that the reduction should be affected only by the increase caused by the reassessment.\\nIn our opinion, the words of Section 5713.11 plainly indicate that appellant's contention must be sustained. There is nothing in Section 5705.331, Revised Code, which would reasonably support a different conclusion.\\nThe decision of the Board of Tax Appeals being unlawful is reversed.\\nDecision reversed.\\nTaft, C. J., Zimmerman, Matthias, O'Neill, Griffith, Herbert, and Gibson, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1781942.json b/ohio/1781942.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78cf95e43294c572e0a6406bfe1c01b77029a49b
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1781942\", \"name\": \"STATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER et, Defendants-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Alexander\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-12-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2298\", \"first_page\": \"55\", \"last_page\": \"58\", \"citations\": \"71 Ohio Law Abs. 55\", \"volume\": \"71\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:25:05.669517+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WISEMAN, PJ, MILLER and HORNBECK, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"STATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER et, Defendants-Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER et, Defendants-Appellants.\\nOhio Appeals, Second District, Montgomery County.\\nNo. 2298.\\nDecided December 28, 1954.\\nMathias H. Heck, Pros. Atty., Fred M. Kerr, Walter A- Porter, Asst. Pros. Attys., Dayton, for plaintiff-appellee.\\nLloyd H. O\\u2019Hara, Dayton, for defendant-appellant, Curtis Alexander.\\nAlbert H. Scharrer, Dayton, for defendant-appellant, Lawrence Austin Dukes.\", \"word_count\": \"873\", \"char_count\": \"5075\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy THE COURT:\\nThis is a law appeal from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court rendered upon the verdict of a jury finding the defendants guilty on the charge of first degree manslaughter.\\nBriefly, the pertinent facts disclose that on the night of October 16, 1953, at about 10:00 o'clock, the defendant, Curtis Alexander, came to his home and found a person unknown to him on his premises and throwing a flashlight on the house. This person turned out later to be Dr. Charles R. Price, a practicing physician in the City of Dayton, Ohio. No witnesses were present at this time, so we have only the testimony of the defendant, Alexander, as to what occurred when he arrived at his home. He testified that in attempting to learn the identity of the doctor he was attacked by him and that a fight ensued, after which the doctor escaped to his automobile parked at the curb and drove away. Alexander was then joined by the defendant, Dukes, and both pursued Dr. Price in Alexander's automobile. When the doctor parked his car in front of his office the defendants approached him in the street, where the fight was renewed. As a result of the injuries received in these altercations Dr. Price died several days later.\\nThe trial consumed approximately two weeks; hence the record is voluminous, and it would serve no useful purpose to cite in detail all the evidence presented.\\nThe first error assigned is that the judgment is contrary to the weight of the evidence as to the defendant Dukes. The evidence is conclusive that this defendant took no part in the first encounter, but there is a conflict in th\\u00e9 evidence as to whether or not he kicked the doctor while he was lying prostrate on the ground. This was a factual question solely for the determination of the jury. Our review of the testimony discloses that the evidence is quite substantial to the effect that Dukes kicked the doctor numerous times while he was lying helpless on the ground, and called him vulgar names. There was a definite conflict in the evidence on this point; hence it may not be said that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence* as to this defendant.\\nAssignments 2 to 8, inclusive, all relate to alleged errors in the admission and rejection of evidence, most of which pertained to collateral matters. Much of this was immaterial and should not have been admitted, but even so it does not affirmatively appear on the record that it was or may have been prejudicial. Unless it so appears the conviction will not be reversed in any court. Sec. 2945.83 R. C.; State v. Hickman, 77 Oh Ap 479; State v. Farmer, 90 Oh Ap 49; Makley v. State, 49 Oh Ap 359.\\nThe ninth assignment alleges that the court failed to charge on much of the material contained in the 16 special charges which the appellants requested to be given before argument. Counsel admits that special charges in a criminal case need not be given when the law applicable contained in the same is adequately covered in the general charge. We agree with this general proposition of law and our inquiry shall, therefore, be limited to the question of the adequacy and correctness of the general charge. We have carefully examined the special charges submitted and find that the substance of many of them was given. The appellant, Alexander, makes a specific complaint that the court failed to charge on the law as set forth in the eighth special charge, which is as follows;\\n\\\"The court charges you as the law in this case that it is lawfud for a person to follow another.\\\"\\nThis charge was not complete, for it makes no mention of the intent of the pursuer, which is a most vital element in determining the legality of the pursuit.\\nThe court charged fully on all of the facts which may be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the acts complained of were committed in self defense; hence this assignment of error is not well taken.\\nThe court charged adequately on the subject matter contained in special charges 14, 15 and 16, and failure to give them as submitted was not prejudicial error.\\nNo other omissions in the charge were called to the attention of the court after giving the general charge and any further omissions would not constitute prejudicial error. See State v. Tudor, 154 Oh St 249.\\nWe find none of the exceptions to the general charge well taken when consideration is given to the charge in its entirety. The court's charge covered some thirty pages of the bill of exceptions, and correctly explained all of the legal principles applicable to the issues presented. Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.\\nWISEMAN, PJ, MILLER and HORNBECK, JJ, concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1783913.json b/ohio/1783913.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67b01f9d91b68779d66951f221decfc206e6134d
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1783913\", \"name\": \"JUSTICE, Habeas Corpus, In re\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Justice\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-02-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 42525\", \"first_page\": \"323\", \"last_page\": \"329\", \"citations\": \"72 Ohio Law Abs. 323\", \"volume\": \"72\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Licking County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:40.275651+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JUSTICE, Habeas Corpus, In re.\", \"head_matter\": \"JUSTICE, Habeas Corpus, In re.\\nCommon Pleas Court, Licking County.\\nNo. 42525.\\nDecided February 27, 1956.\\nKenneth Little, Columbus, on behalf of petitioner.\\nDonald M. Hamilton, Jr., Columbus, on behalf of respondent, Madelon Boyle.\", \"word_count\": \"2210\", \"char_count\": \"13041\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy HOLTSBERRY, J.\\nJoAnn Justice, now 17 years old, resides with her aunt, Madelon Boyle at Summit Station, Licking County, Ohio. She has been with her aunt the last 12 years. JoAnn has a twin sister, Lee Ann, who lived with her sister and aunt at the Boyle home until June, 1955, when she left the Boyle home and began living with her father, Dane Justice, at Fairborn, Greene County,'Ohio. Dane Justice is a Colonel in the United States Air Force.\\nThe father filed his petition herein asking that a writ of habeas corpus issue discharging JoAnn to his custody. Said petition is grounded upon alleged illegal restraint of liberty and detention without legal authority.\\nSaid aunt answered the writ in writing denying the claim of illegal restraint and detention and raised the issue of the welfare of JoAnn. The petitioner at the commencement of the trial denied the allegations of Mrs. Boyle. The case was tried upon the illegal restraint issue and further upon the issue of the welfare of the child.\\nThe evidence disclosed that shortly after the birth of JoAnn, her mother died. When the twins were five years old, in 1943, Dane Justice and said aunt entered into an oral agreement concerning the possession and rearing of the girls. The aunt refused to take them temporarily, saying that she did not want to become attached and have them taken away after a few years, but that she would raise them as her own. The father agreed to this and further that he would provide partial support. Pursuant to this agreement, Mrs. Boyle and her husband, Earl, took possession of said girls. Over the years the Boyles have displayed an unusual interest in the rearing of these children. To better the environment for the rearing of the children, they even changed neighborhoods. Mrs. Boyle made clothing for the girls, gave them a practical training in home responsibility, kindled an interest in religion and education and generally provided an affirmative climate conducive to future happiness and good citizenship. JoAnn addresses Mrs. Boyle as \\\"Mommy.\\\"\\nHer habits, associations and attachments resulting from her living at the Boyle home the last 12 years are most commendable. She is an unusually good student at the Summit Station High School, where she will graduate in June. She has been active in church work, as well as displaying characteristics of industry and thrift and by working part- time, has saved money to assist her in pursuing higher education when she enters Ohio State University, where she plans to study journalism.\\nThis young lady displayed unusual poise on the witness stand, expressing her love, respect and gratitude for the Boyles. She stated she believed it would be detrimental to her life emotionally and in other ways for her father to force her to go home with him at this time.\\nMrs. Boyle has not, and does not at the present time, refuse to let JoAnn go to her father if this be her wishes. She has not denied reasonable visitations and there is no evidence of illegal restraint.\\nIt was on December 4, 1955, that the father first indicated he wanted JoAnn to live permanently with him. During certain periods the interests of the father left much to be desired, particularly during the period of matrimonial unrest resulting from a second marriage. Petitioner is now married to his third wife, who works at the air force base practically the same hours as that of the Colonel.\\nAbandonment need not be total in scope to reflect upon the best interests and welfare of a child. There can be an abandonment with respect to future welfare in spite of partial payment and support and some visitations, where under the circumstances a father contracts away certain rights, accepts and complies with such contract, and where love, attention and interest has been unreasonably absent.\\nThe record also discloses that at one time the father expressed a desire and even took some steps to have the Boyles legally adopt the girls.\\nPetitioner has utterly failed to prove any illegal restraint of liberty and detention without legal authority. In fact, the evidence clearly establishes the facts to be otherwise.\\nConcerning the question of JoAnn's welfare, this Court is positively of the opinion that it would best be served by possession remaining in the aunt. With respect to the modern trend of legal authorities on such matters this Court has reviewed many cases.\\nPossession is a word which is ambiguous in meaning. It is invariably used to describe actual and constructive possession, which are so often shaded into one another that where one ends and the other begins is often difficult to determine. Possession, where the human element and best interests of a child is concerned must be considered in the light of many things; past, present and future environmental influences upon the individual, the probability of the child's individual characteristics and tendencies being favorably developed or thwarted; and the child's maturity, or lack thereof, to wisely choose, under existing circumstances and those likely to develop, the surroundings and persons which will promote and insure its best interest and welfare. Rules and guides laid down in such matters must ever be flexible because inevitable changes from generation to generation effect the living of the individual. Time changes but fundamentally people do not.\\nSometimes a parent has by act and word transferred custody to another and in such cases, where the custodian is, in every way, a proper person to have the care, training and education of the child, and where the court finds its social, moral and educational interests will be best promoted by not being transferred, the court will treat it as lawful. (Clark v. Boyer, 32 Oh St 299.)\\nA father may delegate or abandon or be deprived of his authority over his child, and the public policy does not forbid this, but in many cases requires it. (Day v. Everett, 7 Mass., 144.)\\nAfter a state of things has arisen which cannot be altered without risking the happiness of a child, where affections have jelled, the better opinion is that a parent is not in a position to have the interference of a court in his favor.\\nQuestions of rightful custody have been made in proceedings in habeas corpus in this country where alleged illegal restraint was the chief question for consideration. The spirit of the law is revealed in several of the following cases:\\nThe Supreme Court of Delaware in the Bratton case, reported in American Law Reg. (N. S.), Volume 15, 359, which was a contest between father and grandmother for custody of children, the court held that the prima facie right of the father is not absolute and unqualified, but may be forfeited or relinquished under certain circumstances.\\nIn State v. Smith, 6 Greenlief, the holding was that circumstances could alter the father's right to claim children as a matter of right.\\nA given state of attending facts could justify a holding that a parent relinquished the right of custody by parol. (See Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Oh St 615.)\\nAn English case was in harmony with our American decisions. In Lyons v. Blenkin, 245, the lord chancellor states: \\\"It is always a delicate thing for a court to interfere against parental authority, yet we know that the courts do it in cases where the parent is capriciously interfering in what is clearly for their benefit.\\\" In reaching his conclusion he placed great weight upon formed habits, associations and attachments.\\nHurd, in his work on Habeas Corpus asks the logical question how a court could pronounce that custody held under a fair agreement with a parent and not adverse to the welfare of the child, could be an illegal restraint.\\nIn Re Tilton, 161 Oh St 571, the court held that an unwed mother by surrendering possession of her child to blood relatives and by executing a written instrument surrendering possession could not regain possession by habeas corpus where the child's best interests required otherwise. And where it was found the mother's acts amounted to abandonment.\\nThe serious question raised in the Tilton case was whether the Ohio statutes permitted the Common Pleas Court to enter an order against petitioner in a habeas corpus proceedings and thus, for practical purposes, deny the mother custody of her child. The Supreme Court said in answering this that it is the law of Ohio that the welfare of a child is first to be considered by a court. The Court further spoke of certain legislative acts of Ohio as commendable which deal with care and custody of children, but said \\\"but in legislating the General Assembly cannot be said to have disregarded the fundamental principle above stated.\\\" (The principle referred to is stated in the preceding paragraph of the Supreme Court opinion as follows: \\\"In all cases of controverted right to custody the welfare of the minor child is first to be considered.\\\")\\nIn those instances where the Legislature of Ohio has acted with reference to custody but limited the section as for example by specifically mentioning children of parties in divorce cases, if the General Assembly had intended the provision to extend to all cases where custody and control of children were involved, it would naturally have said so.\\nI am of the opinion that the opinion and wishes of JoAnn Justice should be given serious consideration and effect under the facts of the instant case. Although her wishes and desires are not mandatory, they reveal that her contentment, emotions and future depend largely upon the compliance therewith. True, the statute giving the child the right to elect between parents under the domestic relations statutes would not be applicable herein, however, a consideration of the election statute, together with a study of the content of other Ohio legislation or legislative acts pertaining to custody and possession of minors reveals an intent on the part of the Legislature like the courts, to give much weight to the wishes and desires of children, particularly in their late teen years, where their interests and welfare are at stake.\\nEven though the statute permitting a minor over 14 years to choose between the parents is not binding in the instant proceedings, where the possession of a child over 14 years has been voluntarily relinquished by a father to a blood relative under an agreement where the possession is not to be taken away or disturbed and where the child has further been properly reared and loved for a number of years, and is content and the evidence further shows the child is well adjusted, the wishes of the child in the opinion of this Court raises a presumption that the child's best interest will be served by not being changed, in the absence of a showing that such change would be beneficial to the child's welfare.\\nIn Sheely v. Sheely, 88 New Hampshire, 223, it was held that a court without jurisdiction to make an order designating a permanent custody for a child may have jurisdiction to make a temporary order of custody as incidental to its power to administer the summary remedy of habeas corpus.\\nOrdinarily the basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is an illegal detention, but in the case of a writ sued out for the detention of a child, the chief concern of the court should be the welfare of the child. (Barlow v. Barlow, 141 Georgia, 535; Bellmore v. McCloud, 189 Wisconsin, 431, State ex rel Jones v. West, 139 Tennessee, 522, Buchanon v. Buchanon, 170 Virginia, 458.)\\nA court is not bound to deliver a child to a parent upon the claim of mere legal right of a parent, but should in the exercise of a sound discretion and after careful consideration of the facts leave it where the welfare of the child at the time appears to require. In short the primary object of habeas corpus, as applied to children, is to determine in whose custody their best interests will probably be advanced. (25 American Jurisprudence [Habeas Corpus] page 205; 20 O. Jur. [Habeas Corpus] page 465.)\\nIn Re Duffy, 78 Oh Ap 16, is not authority on the instant question as careful examination of the court's opinion reveals in paragraph 7, second sentence, \\\"the welfare of the child was not made an issue in this case.\\\"\\nThe instant case must also be distinguished from those cases between parents concerning children where the statute concerns itself with in stances where the court finds \\\"neither parent is a suitable person to have custody.\\\"\\nAfter careful consideration of this case, this Court finds that first, there has been no illegal restraint as alleged, and therefore the application for writ of habeas corpus should be and hereby is denied. Second, that since an issue has been made as to the welfare of JoAnn Justice, this Court can reach no other conclusion than that the best interests of said girl requires that her possession remain with her aunt.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1785630.json b/ohio/1785630.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1785630\", \"name\": \"LAZZARA, Appellant, v. MARC GLASSMAN, INC., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lazzara v. Marc Glassman, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-10-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 68404\", \"first_page\": \"163\", \"last_page\": \"166\", \"citations\": \"107 Ohio App. 3d 163\", \"volume\": \"107\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:07.023855+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Patton, P.J., and Patricia A. Blackmon, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"LAZZARA, Appellant, v. MARC GLASSMAN, INC., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"LAZZARA, Appellant, v. MARC GLASSMAN, INC., Appellee.\\n[Cite as Lazzara v. Marc Glassman, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 163.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.\\nNo. 68404.\\nDecided Oct. 30, 1995.\\nSheldon D. Schecter, for appellant.\\nJack M. Schulman, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1371\", \"char_count\": \"7970\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nPamela Lazzara, plaintiff-appellant, appeals from the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Marc Glassman, Inc., defendant>appellee. Lazzara assigns the following:\\n\\\"The lower court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact.\\\"\\nFor the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\\nOn August 16, 1993, Pamela Lazzara was shopping in the defendant's store, Marc's. She came upon toilet tissue stacked in cardboard boxes one on top of another and against the wall of the store. She described the boxes as being stacked so high they almost reached the ceiling and estimated the stack to be nine boxes high. The front of each box was cut open and contained cellophane packages with four rolls of toilet tissue in each package.\\nLazzara reached into a box at the level of her chin; she is 5'4\\\" in height, and she estimated there were six boxes stacked on top of the one she reached into. The box was half empty and on one side of that same box the packages were stacked from the top to the bottom of the inside of the box. She took a package of toilet tissue facing the front of the box; it was on top of another package, but was not touching the top of the inside of the box.\\nImmediately after she took the package of toilet tissue from the box, someone in the store screamed. Lazzara looked up and saw a box from the top of the stack falling; the whole stack of boxes fell from above. She was struck between ten and twelve times mostly on her right side and the right side of her face, but remained standing.\\nPrior to August 16, 1993, Lazzara observed toilet tissue stacked very high in Marc's and wondered how they stacked it so high. She never thought of the stack of boxes as unstable; \\\"[she] just figured it was okay.\\\"\\nLazzara filed an action for negligence against Marc's. Marc's moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted and this appeal followed.\\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether Marc's had a duty of care to protect or warn Pamela Lazzara of the danger created from the stacked boxes of toilet tissue in view of the \\\"open and obvious\\\" doctrine. The doctrine is premised upon the notion that a property owner is not an insurer of a business invitee's safety. Hurtuk v. Lassiter (July 21, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 66834, unreported, 1994 WL 386004.\\n\\\"The 'open and obvious' doctrine states that an owner or occupier of property owes no duty to warn invitees entering the property of open and obvious dangers on the property. Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 42 O.O.2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 589, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 18 OBR 267, 480 N.E.2d 474. The rationale behind the doctrine is that the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning. Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves. Sidle, supra. \\\" Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504, 506. See, also, Frajt v. Goodwill Industries of Greater Cleveland (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 92, 514 N.E.2d 719 (held display of entangled elastic belts open and obvious danger.)\\nIn this case, Lazzara observed the boxes stacked too high and wondered to herself how employees of Marc's were able to stack them so high. Nonetheless, she pulled a package of toilet tissue from the middle of the stack of boxes. The only evidence presented for or against summary judgment was Lazzara's deposition testimony, and it clearly demonstrates that the danger from the stacked boxes of toilet tissue was open and obvious.\\nAccordingly, Marc's was not the insurer of Lazarra's safety, and had no duty to protect Lazzara from or warn her about the open and obvious danger from the stacked boxes of toilet tissue, and Marc's was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nPatton, P.J., and Patricia A. Blackmon, J., concur.\\nKarpinski, J., dissents.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1785754.json b/ohio/1785754.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1785754\", \"name\": \"UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN LUCAS COUNTY, In re: BAILEY, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Unauthorized Practice of Law\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 4862\", \"first_page\": \"347\", \"last_page\": \"349\", \"citations\": \"73 Ohio Law Abs. 347\", \"volume\": \"73\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:58:43.327613+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CONN, DEEDS and FESS, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN LUCAS COUNTY, In re: BAILEY, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IN LUCAS COUNTY, In re: BAILEY, Appellant.\\nOhio Appeals, Sixth District, Lucas County.\\nNo. 4862.\\nDecided January 30, 1956.\\nMorton Neipp, Robert B. Gosline, John R. Eastman, Robert F. Ebinger, for appellant.\\nA. R. Simmons, Harry Hood, Benjamin B. Durfee, Jr., Merritt W. Green, for committee.\", \"word_count\": \"680\", \"char_count\": \"4082\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBy THE COURT:\\nThis is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, enjoining the appellant, Nelson S. Bailey, from performing certain acts and services as the representative of certain persons or firms as employers, on the ground that such acts and services constituted the unauthorized practice of law.\\nThe case is before this court for a review upon a transcript of the record and proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas, a bill of exceptions, briefs and oral argument of counsel for the parties respectively.\\nThe proceeding was instituted in the Court of Common Pleas following the appointment by that court of a committee, consisting of a number of attorneys, as officers of the court for the purpose of making inquiry into the unauthorized practice of law in Lucas County, Ohio.\\nFollowing their appointment, the committee entered upon an extensive investigation in reference to the acts and services performed by the appellant, as the representative of certain persons and firms in proceedings involving claims being made by persons for state unemployment compensation, before a referee and other acts and services by appellant in connection with such claims before the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation and Board of Review, as a result of which a very voluminous amount of testimony and evidence is presented in the bill of exceptions, now before the court.\\nIt appears in the record that at the conclusion of the hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, the trial judge made a finding as conclusions of fact separately from conclusions of law and found and determined that appellant should be enjoined from the performance of those acts and services as found and stated by the court, for the reason that same constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and appellant was therefore enjoined permanently from performing such acts and services, as the representative of persons or firms, from which judgment the appeal now before this court was taken.\\nThis court finds that the conclusions of fact as found by the trial court are fully supported by competent evidence contained in the record and that the acts and services as found constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore hold that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas should be affirmed.\\nCounsel for the appellant have directed the attention of this court and contended in effect that the law of the State governing proceedings by claimants before the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation has been amended in such a way so that the acts and services performed by the appellant do not now constitute the unauthorized practice of law as defined by the Supreme Court of this State.\\nWe find that \\u00a74141.28 R. C., which provides for and governs the procedure for the presenting and making of claims for-unemployment compensation was amended during the pendency of these proceedings and that certain changes were made respecting the manner in which the claim shall be heard and the record shall be prepared for hearing upon appeal, and it is also noted that no provision is made in the law as amended that same shall have a retroactive effect or that it shall in any wise control the determination of pending cases. We therefore hold, in accord with \\u00a71.20 R. C. (\\u00a726 GO, governing the retroactive effect of legislation, that this court is without jurisdiction and we do not undertake to make an application of the law as amended to the evidence contained in the record now before this court, in a determination of this appeal.\\nTherefore, as indicated above, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings according to law.\\nCONN, DEEDS and FESS, JJ, concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/1830033.json b/ohio/1830033.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1830033\", \"name\": \"The State, ex rel. Lomaz et al., v. Court of Common Pleas of Portage County et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Lomaz v. Court of Common Pleas\", \"decision_date\": \"1988-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 87-783\", \"first_page\": \"209\", \"last_page\": \"213\", \"citations\": \"36 Ohio St. 3d 209\", \"volume\": \"36\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:39:28.134340+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, Douglas, Wright and H. Brown, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State, ex rel. Lomaz et al., v. Court of Common Pleas of Portage County et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State, ex rel. Lomaz et al., v. Court of Common Pleas of Portage County et al.\\n[Cite as State, ex rel. Lomaz, v. Court of Common Pleas of Portage Cty. (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 209.]\\n(No. 87-783\\nDecided May 4, 1988.)\\nCole Co., L.P.A., Leland D. Cole and Mark H. Ludwig, for relators.\\nDavid M. Benjamin, assistant county prosecutor, for respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"1749\", \"char_count\": \"10341\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThis case requires us to answer two questions: (1) does a common pleas court administrative judge in the general division of that court have authority to assign a judge of the domestic relations division of that court to hear an action for injunctive relief involving a civil zoning dispute and (2) if not, does the inter-divisional transfer warrant issuance of a writ of prohibition? For the reasons set forth below, we find that an administrative judge does not have authority to make such a reassignment and that extraordinary relief is appropriate.\\nThe test for prohibition is well-established. For the writ to issue, this court must find that the court or officer against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and that relator has no other adequate remedy at law. State, ex rel. Judson, v. Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 111, 112, 515 N. E. 2d 911, 912, citing State, ex rel. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., v. Guzzo (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 270, 6 OBR 335, 452 N.E. 2d 1314; and State, ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., v. Winter (1970), 23 Ohio St. 2d 6, 52 O.O. 2d 29, 260 N.E. 2d 827.\\nIn support of the premise that Judge Martin was without authority to assign Judge Hayes of the domestic relations division to hear the zoning matter underlying the case at bar, relators rely on Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 33, 22 OBR 27, 488 N.E. 2d 210. Specifically, relators refer to this court's conclusion that:\\n\\\" [O]nly the Chief Justice, Acting Chief Justice of this court, or the presiding judge of a court of common pleas can assign a judge from one division of the same court to another division.\\\" (Footnote omitted.) Id at 37, 22 OBR at 31, 488 N.E. 2d at 214.\\nFrom this, relators argue that Judge Martin, in his capacity as administrative judge, could not transfer case No. 87-CV-0596 to Judge Hayes. We agree.\\nIn Schucker v. Metcalf, a complaint charging trustees of certain inter vivos trusts with self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and the breach of various fiduciary duties was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, General Division. The action, which sought the trustees' removal and monetary damages, was initially assigned to Judge' Clifford Rader. Judge Rader, however, sua sponte transferred the case to the probate division of the court over which Judge Richard Metcalf presided.\\nJudge Metcalf thereafter announced his decision to grant summary judgment for defendants on several of the claims and for plaintiffs on other claims. An action in prohibition was filed in the court of appeals in an effort to prevent Judge Metcalf from proceeding. In response, Judge Gillie, the Administrative Judge of the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, retrieved the action from the probate division and returned it to the general division by ordering the action \\\" 'reassigned to Judge Metcalf, as a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas *.'\\\" Id. at 33, 22 OBR at 28, 488 N.E. 2d at 211. The court of appeals dismissed the action in prohibition.\\nOn appeal, this court allowed the writ after examining, inter alia, C.P. Sup. R. 3(B) and C.P. Sup. R. 2. We held that C.P. Sup. R. 2 is the \\\"sole authority\\\" for transfers of judges from one division to another, other than by assignment of the Chief Justice of this court. Id. at 36-37, 22 OBR at 30-31, 488 N.E. 2d at 213-214. C.P. Sup. R. 2 provides that \\\"[t]he presiding judge shall assign judges from one division of the court to serve another division as the business of the court may require.\\\" Since Judge Gillie in Schucker v. Metcalf was the administrative judge of the general division, we held that he had no authority to assign a case to a judge in another division.\\nRespondents contend that Schucker is distinguishable from this case because it involved an interdivisional transfer to a probate court judge whose jurisdiction is \\\"of a limited nature,\\\" whereas R.C. 2301.03(P) provides that the judge of the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County \\\"shall exercise the same powers and jurisdiction as the other judges of the court of common pleas of Portage county.\\\" Respondents claim that since this language confers general common pleas court jurisdiction on judges elected and designated judges of the Portage County domestic relations division, Sehucker is inapplicable and thus would not preclude the interdivisional transfer at issue herein.\\nWe do not find respondents' reliance on R.C. 2301.03(P) responsive to whether this interdivisional transfer was properly made. Whether R.C. 2301.03(P) conferred such jurisdiction on Judge Hayes does not alter the conclusion in Schucker that requires a valid interdivisional transfer before the power conferred may be exercised.\\nLike Schucker v. Metcalf, this case involves an interdivisional transfer made by an administrative judge instead of a presiding judge. Schucker held that this is an unauthorized means of reassigning a case. We therefore hold that Judge Hayes had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction and that relators have established the exercise of unauthorized judicial power.\\nRelators have also satisfied the first prerequisite to issuance of the writ of prohibition. As was the case in Schucker v. Metcalf, Judge Hayes will undoubtedly proceed with his consideration of the underlying zoning dispute if the writ is refused. Furthermore, this court has determined the issuance of injunctive relief to be an exercise of judicial power sufficient to establish the first element of the prohibition standard. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., v. Winter, supra; State, ex rel. Wolff, v. Donnelly (1986), 24 Ohio St. 3d 1, 24 OBR 1, 492 N. E. 2d 810; and State, ex rel. Dayton, v. Kerns (1977), 49 Ohio St. 2d 295, 3 O.O. 3d 441, 361 N.E. 2d 247.\\nThe third prong of the prohibition standard has also been met. In Schucker v. Metcalf, supra, this court determined that the relators had no right to challenge the assignment of a judge from the probate division to the general division on appeal. The same is true with respect to the assignment of a judge of the domestic relations division. Proper assignment, like jurisdiction over the subject matter, is required for the valid exercise of judicial power. Thus, Judge Hayes cannot proceed in case No. 87-CV-0596, a case to which he has not been lawfully assigned. Accordingly, prohibition is appropriate in this case.\\nThe only question remaining is the extent to which the writ should issue. The Schucker decision is not instructive on this point because, in that case, Judge Metcalf had not entered judgment in connection with the suit before him. Rather, he had only \\\"announced his decision to grant summary judgment.\\\" Id. at 33, 22 OBR at 27-28, 488 N.E. 2d 211.\\nOrdinarily, prohibition is used to prevent the unauthorized exercise of judicial power. However, in State, ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., v. Winter, supra, we allowed the writ not only to prevent further action by a court that was about to exercise unlawful judicial power, but to invalidate an order already made. The authority for applying this remedy in retrospect was described in State, ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 326, 330, 59 O.O. 2d 387, 389, 285 N.E. 2d 22, 24:\\n\\\" [A] court which has jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibition as well as the writs of procedendo and mandamus has plenary power, not only to prevent excesses of lower tribunals, but to correct the results thereof and to restore the parties to the same position they occupied before the excesses occurred.\\\"\\nThus, this court may vacate a lower court's order where a claim in prohibition has been established.\\nGiven respondents' respective judicial positions within the organization of the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County and the reasoning in Schucker v. Metcalf, we conclude that this matter presents no genuine issue as to any material fact and that, pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C), relators are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, relators' motion for summary judgment is granted and the writ is allowed. Respondents' motion is denied. The entry of May 4, 1987 granting a preliminary injunction is vacated and respondents are ordered to proceed with Portage County Common Pleas case No. 87-CV-0596 in a manner consistent with this opinion.\\nWrit allowed.\\nMoyer, C.J., Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, Douglas, Wright and H. Brown, JJ., concur.\\nRelators also argue that Judge Martin had no authority to transfer case No. 87-CV-0596 to Judge Hayes once Judge Martin received notice that an affidavit of prejudice had been filed. Relators rely on Tumbleson v. Noble (1959), 109 Ohio App. 242, 10 O.O. 2d 470, 164 N.E. 2d 808; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Assn. of Cuyahoga Cty. Teachers (1975), 47 Ohio App. 2d 28, 1 O.O. 3d 168, 351 N.E. 2d 777; and Wolf v. Marshall (1929), 120 Ohio St. 216, 165 N.E. 848. Generally, those cases prohibit a judge from determining a cause or hearing any matter that affects the substantive rights of the parties when an affidavit of prejudice has been filed at the earliest possible moment that counsel learns the identity of the trial judge.\\nRelators do not provide any authority that suggests that substantive rights are affected by properly transferring a case to another judge at a preliminary stage of a proceeding. Indeed, the cases cited recognize that a judge whose impartiality has been challenged may nevertheless perform administrative or ministerial acts. See Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation, supra, at 37, 1 O.O. 3d at 174, 351 N.E. 2d at 784, fn. 3, citing Ashland Bank & Savings Co. v. Houseman (1915), 5 Ohio App. 165, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 33; and Tumbleson, supra, at 245, 10 O.O. 2d at 472, 164 N.E. 2d at 811. Thus, we have no reason to preclude a proper transfer in response to the filing of an affidavit of prejudice.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/1848289.json b/ohio/1848289.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1848289\", \"name\": \"Aldrich v. Friedman\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Aldrich v. Friedman\", \"decision_date\": \"1923-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"302\", \"last_page\": \"310\", \"citations\": \"18 Ohio App. 302\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:16:34.621787+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\\u25a0 Chittenden and Kinkade, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Aldrich v. Friedman.\", \"head_matter\": \"Aldrich v. Friedman.\\n(Decided December 3, 1923.)\\nMessrs. Galhms, Storey & Nye, for plaintiff.\\nMessrs. Graves, Stahl $ Duff and Mr. Charles K. Friedman, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"2243\", \"char_count\": \"12874\", \"text\": \"Richards, J.\\nThis is an action brought for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement of a judgment rendered in the court of common pleas of Henry county against the plaintiff and asking that said judgment be declared null and void.\\nSo far as necessary to an understanding of the issues the facts are that one Greorge W. Simmons was the owner of a tract of land in Henry county and executed a mortgage thereon in March, 1916, to one John W. Long for $5,000, Thereafter on October 24, 1916, Simmons conveyed the land to one Emma L. Jenkins, who assumed the payment of the existing mortgage and executed to Simmons a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $2,600. On November 18, 1916, the defendant, Charles K. Friedman, for a valuable consideration, purchased from 'Simmons the second mortgage and the promissory notes secured thereby and the same were duly transferred and delivered to him. In December, 1916, Emma L. Jenkins and her husband, Oliver J. Jenkins, who is the son of the plaintiff, executed a deed of conveyance for the premises to the plaintiff in this action, Bertha M. Aldrich. That deed is in form a regu lar warranty deed and contains the following language, by which the grantee assumed the payment of the incumbrances on the property:\\n\\\"Except a mortgage for the sum of $5,000, a second mortgage for the sum of $2,600, interest on both mortgages, taxes and assessments now against said farm, the grantee assumes, and agrees to pay. ' '\\nOn March 7, 1917, Bertha M. Aldrich and her husband conveyed the premises to Oliver J. Jenkins, who assumed the payment of the mortgages thereon.\\nOn August 3, 1917, John W. Long commenced an action in the common pleas court of Henry county against Bertha M. Aldrich, George W. Simmons, Charles K. Friedman and others, asking for a foreclosure of his mortgage and for a personal judgment against the defendant George W. Simmons and averring that the other defendants had or claimed to have some interest in the premises and asking that they be made parties defendant and required to set up their respective claims or be forever barred. Summons was duly issued and served. On August 7, Charles K. Friedman filed an answer and cross-petition in that action setting up the second mortgage held by him, and the various promissory notes secured thereby, and averring that Bertha M. Aldrich had become the purchaser of the premises, and in the deed to her and as a part of the purchase price had assumed and agreed to pay the notes set forth in the various causes of action in his cross-petition. He asked a personal judgment against her by reason thereof. A summons was issued to the sheriff of Lucas county on the cross-petition thus filed by Friedman in Henry county, and the return of the sheriff shows that he duly served the same on Bertha M. Aldrich by delivering to her a certified copy thereof. Bertha M. Aldrich made default and in due time the cause came on to be heard in the court of common pleas in Henry county, and such proceedings were had that at the January term, 1918, Charles K. Friedman obtained a personal judgment against her on her assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in the amount of $2,792. Thereafter the premises were sold at sheriff's sale, the purchase price not being quite sufficient to pay the first mortgage, and the sale was duly confirmed, thus leaving the claim of Friedman entirely unsatisfied.\\nThe plaintiff in this action contends that the deed made from Emma L. Jenkins to her was without her knowledge and that she never received the same and never had any knowledge of the existence of the deed until the time that she conveyed the premises back to her son Oliver J. Jenkins, and she of course claims that she knew nothing of the fact that by the terms of the deed she assumed the payment of the mortgages existing upon the premises.\\nShe further contends that the copy of the summons issued out of the court of common pleas of Henry county on the cross-petition of Charles K. Friedman, and handed to her by the deputy sheriff of Lucas county, was directed to Bertha M. JenJams, and that such court had no jurisdiction over the person of Bertha M. Aldrich and no power or authority to render a personal judgment against her. She also contends that she was, during all the time, a resident of Lucas county, and was not in Henry county, for which reason she insists that the common pleas court in Henry county had no jurisdiction to render any personal judgment against her on the cross-petition of Charles K. Friedman.\\nThe title of the action pending in Henry county was \\\"John W. Long v. Bertha M. Aldrich et al.,'' and a summons was duly served on Mrs. Aldrich on the petition filed in that case. The summons which was issued on the cross-petition to the sheriff of Lucas county for her was endorsed in the same manner, but appears to have commanded the sheriff to notify \\\"Emma L. JenMns, Oliver J. Jenkins, Bertha M. Jenkins and Ernest J. Ansted\\\" that they had been sued by Charles K. Friedman and were required to answer by a date named in the summons. Mrs. Aldrich testifies that she did not know that this summons was intended for her, and that she delivered the same to her son or daughter-in-law. She did, of course, know that these other persons named in the summons on the cross-petition were the same ones that were involved in the action pending in Henry county and that they had been made parties defendant on the petition filed by John W. Long. She was the only \\\"Bertha M.\\\" named in the summons on the cross-petition, and her name had, in fact, been Bertha M. Jenkins prior to her marriage to Mr. Aldrich, and she must have known that there was no person bearing the name of Bertha M. Jenkins who was. a party to the action. It is difficult for the court to conclude that she was misled by the defect in the copy of the summons on the cross-petition which was served on her, which recited her name as Bertha M. Jenkins instead of Bertha M. Aldrich.\\nThe true rule appears to be stated in 21 Ruling . Case Law, 1324 and 1325. It is there said that all the cases agree that one summoned by a name not his own, and who appears and does not plead misnomer, is bound by the judgment in the wrong name, but that there is some conflict in the authorities as to whether the same result would follow if he did not appear and the judgment was rendered by default. The author then states that the weight of authority is that this makes no difference, and if the writ is served on the party intended to be sued, and such party fails to appear and plead in abatement, and suffers judgment to be rendered by default, the party so in default is concluded by the judgment.\\nCertainly the court had no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against her on the cross-petition without a summons properly served on her, or an entry of appearance by her, but she was already a party to the action and was familial with the names of the defendants which were recited in the copy of the summons on the cross-petition left with her. We conclude that the defect in the service did not mislead her and is not sufficient to invalidate the judgment thereafter rendered against her.\\nDid the Henry county court of common pleas have jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against her in view of the fact that she was at the time a resident of Lucas county and served with summons therein? A solution of this question involves a construction of General Code, Section 11317. That section defines a counterclaim and requires that it must arise out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or be connected with the subject of the action.\\nThe deed executed to Mrs. Aldrich recited that she assumed the payment of both mortgages outstanding on the premises. The plaintiff therefore might, by appropriate averments, have set up that fact and charged her with a personal liability for the payment of the mortgage which he was seek- . ing to foreclose. Her liability thereon was so closely connected with the subject of the plaintiff's action that such an averment would have been entirely appropriate, and the same clause that rendered her liable for the indebtedness due to the plaintiff also created a liability against her in favor of the cross-petitioner, Charles K. Friedman. As the plaintiff would have been entitled to proceed against her on her personal liability by reason of her assumption of the mortgage indebtedness to him, it is difficult to see why the defendant in his cross-petition might not. pursue the same remedy in view of the fact that the mortgages covered the same property and the assumption of payment was in the same clause. Indeed a case might be easily imagined where it would be necessary for the court to adjudicate on the personal liability of those who assume the payment of mortgages in order to determine whether the liability thus incurred was primary, or secondary to the mortgaged property itself. We are satisfied that the claim in the cross-petition to recover a personal judgment against Bertha M. Aldrich is connected with the subject of the action set forth in plaint-, iff's petition, within the language of the section of the G-eneral Code already cited.\\nThe words \\\"subject of the action\\\" have received innumerable definitions, and in order to avoid multiplicity of actions courts have given them a broad construction. 1 Corpus Juris, 946; B. & O. Rd. Co. v. Hollenberger, 76 Ohio St., 177, 181; Mayer v. Klug, 10 Ohio App., 303. We agree with the citation made by Judge Cushing in the latter case where Chief Justice Church is quoted as saying:\\n\\\"This language is very general and very indefinite.\\\"\\nWe do not regard the fact of the residence of Bertha M. Aldrich in Lucas county as important. The original action was properly planted in Henry county, and the power and jurisdiction of the common pleas court of that county over her did not depend upon her residence, but upon the question whether the cause of action set up in the cross-petition against her was, within the language of the code, \\\"connected with the subject of the action.\\\"\\nWe do not find any reported Ohio case where the right of a cross-petitioner on a mortgage to recover a personal judgment against a co-defendant who has assumed its payment has been determined, but the precise question has been decided under a code of practice very similar to ours, in Montpelier Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Arnold, 81 Iowa, 158. After full consideration it was there decided that a cross-petitioner, setting up notes and a mortgage on the same premises that the plaintiff held a mortgage on, and having made appropriate averments, would be entitled to a personal judgment against a codefendant who had assumed the payment of his mortgage, the court holding that the real estate involved and the mortgages thereon constituted the subject of the action. An attentive reading of Giddings, Exr., v. Barney, 31 Ohio St., 80, and Southward v. Jamison, 66 Ohio St., 290, compels the belief that if there had been appropriate averments, and the issuance and serv ioe of summonses on the cross-petitions, the Supreme Court would have found no obstacles in the way of approving personal judgments on the cross-petitions.\\nCounsel for plaintiff rely on Krause v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 13 C. C. (N. S.), 477. The question decided in that case was not precisely identical with the one in the case at bar. The matter there under investigation was the right of a cross-petitioner to a personal judgment against a codefendant on a subsequent mortgage on the same premises, and it was there held that no such right existed. Bertha M. Aldrich had executed no mortgage upon the premises involved in the present action, and no such liability was sought to be enforced against her. The liability which the cross-petitioner sought to enforce was, as has already been stated, upon her written assumption to pay the mortgage indebtedness upon the premises. Whether this distinction between the case of Krause v. Guarantee Title & Trust Company and the case at bar is material is not important for this court to decide. If the holding in that case is broad enough to cover the kind of a case now under consideration we cannot follow it.\\nThe summons which was issued upon the cross-petition of the defendant Friedman was regular in every respect except that the copy which was served upon Bertha M. Aldrich was defective in the respect named. She was, however, sufficiently advised of the claim made against her and therefore had her day in court, a court which had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of her person.\\nDecree for defendant.\\nChittenden and Kinkade, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/2207874.json b/ohio/2207874.json
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/2207874.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2207874\", \"name\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. Beatty\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Beatty\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-06-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2004-0022\", \"first_page\": \"267\", \"last_page\": \"269\", \"citations\": \"102 Ohio St. 3d 267\", \"volume\": \"102\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:15:21.955792+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O\\u2019Connor and O\\u2019Donnell, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. Beatty.\", \"head_matter\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. Beatty.\\n[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Beatty, 102 Ohio St.3d 267, 2004-Ohio-2684.]\\n(No. 2004-0022\\nSubmitted March 15, 2004\\nDecided June 9, 2004.)\", \"word_count\": \"605\", \"char_count\": \"3893\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Respondent, Daniel R. Beatty of Wellsville, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0064901, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1995. On September 19, 2001, we suspended respondent's law license for a period of two years for his neglect of three clients' cases, among other misconduct. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Beatty (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 404, 754 N.E.2d 1264. On August 8, 2002, we cited respondent for contempt for failing to comply with our order requiring the surrender of his certificate of admission and his filing of an affidavit of compliance. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Beatty, 96 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2002-Ohio-4002, 772 N.E.2d 1206.\\n{\\u00b6 2} On November 20, 2002, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent with having committed additional acts of professional misconduct. Respondent was served with the complaint but did not answer, and relator moved for default pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(6)(F). The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline appointed a master commissioner to consider the motion for default and thereafter granted the motion, making findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation.\\n{\\u00b6 3} The board found that respondent, whose license remains under suspension, received but did not respond to relator's repeated inquiries about a grievance filed against him by an attorney for a former client. The board thus found respondent in violation of Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring an attorney to cooperate in an investigation of misconduct) and DR 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct reflecting adversely on an attorney's fitness to practice law). Because respondent did not comply with the administrative requirements of our order, the board also found respondent in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).\\n{\\u00b6 4} In recommending a sanction, the board considered as a mitigating factor that respondent did appear and testify on June 13, 2003, at a deposition that relator scheduled to accommodate respondent's medical condition. At the deposition, respondent expressed remorse for his failure to cooperate in the investigation and comply with our order; however, he also conceded that these failings had aggravated his situation, and the board so found. Respondent further resolved during his deposition to take steps to rectify his situation; however, the board observed that he had not made any apparent efforts toward this goal.\\nLoveland & Brosius and Richard L. Loveland; Stanley D. Ross; Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and Jill M. Snitcher McQuain, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator.\\n{\\u00b6 5} Relator proposed that respondent's law license be indefinitely suspended. The master commissioner recommended permanent disbarment, in part based on unsubstantiated misconduct not charged in relator's complaint. The board accepted relator's proposal and recommended an indefinite suspension.\\n{\\u00b6 6} Upon review, we agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) as found by the board. Moreover, we find an indefinite suspension to be the appropriate sanction. Along with respondent's significant and recent record of disciplinary infractions, he manifests a lack of commitment to his professional duties of cooperation and compliance in disciplinary proceedings. The breach of these duties \\\"ill serve[s] the profession, this court, and the respondent himself.\\\" Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vala (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 57, 59, 693 N.E.2d 1083.\\n{\\u00b6 7} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to respondent.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nMoyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor and O'Donnell, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/3613494.json b/ohio/3613494.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78a792d6f5976fead0dd058127d393cef4bd1ff8
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"3613494\", \"name\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Al'Uqdah\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Al'Uqdah\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-08-09\", \"docket_number\": \"2003-0700\", \"first_page\": \"1491\", \"last_page\": \"1491\", \"citations\": \"114 Ohio St. 3d 1491\", \"volume\": \"114\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:02:06.772278+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Al\\u2019Uqdah.\", \"head_matter\": \"2003-0700.\\nDisciplinary Counsel v. Al\\u2019Uqdah.\", \"word_count\": \"79\", \"char_count\": \"462\", \"text\": \"It is ordered by this court, sua sponte, that William M. Al'Uqdah, Attorney Registration No. 0039809, last known business address in Cincinnati, Ohio, is found in contempt for failure to comply with this court's order of August 6, 2003, to wit: failure to pay board costs in the amount of $184.02 on or before November 4, 2003, and failure to pay publication costs in the amount of $158.16 on or before May 25, 2004.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/4102958.json b/ohio/4102958.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4cc4194dc827b69dbf37ea8976e0682c6f926520
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"4102958\", \"name\": \"State ex rel. Doner v. Logan\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Doner v. Logan\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-03-12\", \"docket_number\": \"2009-1292\", \"first_page\": \"1512\", \"last_page\": \"1512\", \"citations\": \"124 Ohio St. 3d 1512\", \"volume\": \"124\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:00:13.698173+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Cupp, J., not participating.\", \"parties\": \"State ex rel. Doner v. Logan.\", \"head_matter\": \"MISCELLANEOUS DISMISSALS\\n2009-1292.\\nState ex rel. Doner v. Logan.\", \"word_count\": \"68\", \"char_count\": \"422\", \"text\": \"In Mandamus. This cause originated in this court on the filing of a complaint for a writ of mandamus. Upon consideration of relator Kuhn Farms' application for dismissal of its claims,\\nIt is ordered by the court that the application to dismiss is granted, and Kuhn Farms' claims are dismissed. All other claims remain pending.\\nCupp, J., not participating.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/4123875.json b/ohio/4123875.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..995337ac7079c1ef9424d507e14e4807fc5ac8ab
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4123875\", \"name\": \"In re Disqualification of Ruehlman. Pruiett et al. v. The Village of Elmwood Place et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pruiett v. Village of Elmwood Place\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-05-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 13-AP-044\", \"first_page\": \"1217\", \"last_page\": \"1220\", \"citations\": \"136 Ohio St. 3d 1217\", \"volume\": \"136\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:13:03.912578+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Disqualification of Ruehlman. Pruiett et al. v. The Village of Elmwood Place et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Disqualification of Ruehlman. Pruiett et al. v. The Village of Elmwood Place et al.\\n[Cite as In re Disqualification of Ruehlman, 136 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2013-Ohio-2717.]\\n(No. 13-AP-044 \\u2014\\nDecided May 31, 2013.)\", \"word_count\": \"1150\", \"char_count\": \"7309\", \"text\": \"O'Connor, C.J.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Judd R. Uhl, counsel for defendants the village of Elmwood Place and its police chief, has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Robert P. Ruehlman from presiding over any further proceedings in case No. A1209235, now pending on plaintiffs' motion for contempt and motion to file an amended complaint.\\n{\\u00b6 2} Uhl claims that Judge Ruehlman's \\\"words and actions create an overwhelming appearance of bias and prejudice\\\" and \\\"convey the impression that the Judge has developed a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will and that the Judge has reached a fixed anticipatory judgment\\\" preventing him from hearing the balance of the case. Judge Ruehlman has responded in writing to the allegations in Uhl's affidavit, concluding that Uhl has not offered the type of compelling evidence to support his disqualification.\\n{\\u00b6 3} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to order the disqualification of Judge Ruehlman.\\nJudge Ruehlman's March 7, 2013 decision\\n{\\u00b6 4} The gravamen of Uhl's affidavit is his dissatisfaction with Judge Ruehlman's March 7, 2013 decision granting judgment in plaintiffs' favor, invalidating the village ordinance that created the automated speed-enforcement program at issue, and permanently enjoining the village from enforcing the ordinance. An affidavit of disqualification, however, \\\"is not a vehicle to contest matters of substantive or procedural law.\\\" In re Disqualification of Solovan, 100 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-Ohio-5484, 798 N.E.2d 3, \\u00b6 4. Indeed, it is well settled that a party's disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court's legal rulings, even if those rulings may be erroneous, does not constitute bias or prejudice and is not grounds for disqualification. In re Disqualification of Floyd, 101 Ohio St.3d 1217, 2003-Ohio-7351, 803 N.E.2d 818, \\u00b6 4. The remedy for Uhl's legal claims, if any, lies on appeal, not through the filing of an affidavit of disqualification. In re Disqualification of Russo, 110 Ohio St.3d 1208, 2005-Ohio-7146, 850 N.E.2d 713, \\u00b6 6.\\nThe judge's questioning of a hearing witness\\n{\\u00b6 5} Uhl's affidavit also contains excerpts from a January 2013 hearing transcript showing that Judge Ruehlman questioned a witness and then attempted to summarize that witness's testimony. Uhl fails to specifically explain how these transcript excerpts demonstrate bias or prejudice, but presumably Uhl believes that the questions were improper or he disagrees with the judge's summary of the witness's testimony. For his part, Judge Ruehlman provided additional transcript pages to provide context for.his questions. Regardless of the propriety of the judge's questions, \\\"it is not within the scope of this proceeding to evaluate the trial court's compliance with Evid.R. 614, which addresses interrogation of witnesses by the court.\\\" Solovam at \\u00b6 4. Further, according to Judge Ruehlman, Uhl did not object to the judge's questions during the hearing. \\\"A party who fails to object at trial, but then raises an issue in an affidavit of disqualification bears a particularly heavy burden Id. at \\u00b6 8. Uhl has not met that heavy burden here.\\nThe judge's alleged pejorative comments\\n{\\u00b6 6} Finally, Uhl states that Judge Ruehlman's March 7, 2013 decision used \\\"extremely pejorative and unnecessary language\\\" directed at the defendants. The decision states that the village's automated speed-enforcement program hearing is \\\"nothing more than a sham!\\\" and that the village is engaged in \\\"a high-tech game of 3 CARD MONTY [sic, Monte].\\\" (Boldface and capitalization sic.) Judge Ruehlman further wrote that the village's program was a \\\"scam that motorists can't win,\\\" \\\"[t]he entire case against the motorist is stacked,\\\" and the village \\\"has another scheme up its sleeve\\\" if the motorist attempts to argue that he or she was not the driver of the offending vehicle. According to Uhl, Judge Ruehlman also stated at a subsequent hearing that if the village violated the court's decision, \\\"it's going to be a chauffeur service to the Justice Center.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 7} Judge Ruehlman responds by stating that he uses \\\"colorful\\\" language in his decisions; he explains: \\\"when I issue a decision they're easy to understand. They may be a little colorful but they're easy to understand.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 8} Reasonable and objective observers may question whether the language used in Judge Ruehlman's opinion made it easier to understand, and these same observers may question whether the judge's tone and rhetoric were appropriate for a judicial opinion. As the Code of Judicial Conduct directs, judges should be \\\"patient, dignified, and courteous\\\" to litigants, lawyers, and others in an official capacity and should refrain from using words or conduct that might manifest bias or prejudice. Jud.Cond.R. 2.8(B) and 2.3(B). However, in a situation such as this, when an affidavit is filed after commencement of a hearing, after presentation of evidence, and after a decision granting judgment in favor of one of the parties, a judge should be disqualified only if the record clearly and unquestionably demonstrates a fixed anticipatory judgment on the remaining issues that would undermine the absolute confidence of the public in the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. See In re Disqualification of Nicely, 135 Ohio St.3d 1237, 2012-Ohio-6290, 986 N.E.2d 1, \\u00b6 1, 8, 19 (setting forth standard for review ing an affidavit of disqualification after a judge issues a final order and the only matter pending before the judge is a contempt motion); In re Disqualification of Kate, 88 Ohio St.3d 1208,1209, 723 N.E.2d 1098 (1999) (setting forth standard for reviewing an affidavit of disqualification after commencement of a trial and presentation of the evidence has begun).\\n{\\u00b6 9} The judge's comments here support his decision on the dispositive issue in the case \\u2014 i.e., the validity of the village ordinance \\u2014 but the comments alone do not convey the impression that he has reached a fixed anticipatory judgment on plaintiffs' remaining contempt motion or plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. More importantly, Uhl, who has the burden in this affidavit-of-disqualification proceeding, failed to set forth any argument explaining how the judge's comments demonstrate a predisposition on the remaining issues. Accordingly, Uhl has not established that the comments clearly and unquestionably demonstrate a fixed anticipatory judgment on the pending matters, and therefore disqualification based on these comments is not warranted.\\nConclusion\\n{If 10} \\\"The statutory right to seek disqualification of a judge is an extraordinary remedy. A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.\\\" (Citations omitted.) In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, \\u00b6 5. Those presumptions have not been overcome in this case.\\n{\\u00b6 11} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case may proceed before Judge Ruehlman.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/417583.json b/ohio/417583.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88b22c8d27a1f1d31c68f7cca650314382212e54
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"417583\", \"name\": \"JACOB MILLER and JACOB DIEHL, doing business as partners, v. THE TOLEDO GRAIN & MILLING COMPANY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Miller v. Toledo Grain & Milling Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1900-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"325\", \"last_page\": \"333\", \"citations\": \"21 Ohio C.C. 325\", \"volume\": \"21\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases argued and determined in the circuit courts of Ohio\", \"court\": \"Lucas County Circuit Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:45:55.309229+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Haynes, Parker and Hull, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"JACOB MILLER and JACOB DIEHL, doing business as partners, v. THE TOLEDO GRAIN & MILLING COMPANY.\", \"head_matter\": \"(Sixth Circuit\\u2014 Lucas Co., O., Circuit Court\\nOct. Term, 1900.)\\nBefore Haynes, Parker and Hull, JJ.\\nJACOB MILLER and JACOB DIEHL, doing business as partners, v. THE TOLEDO GRAIN & MILLING COMPANY.\\nInjunction \\u2014 Violation by one not party to suit but with knowledge \\u25a0 thereof \\u2014 Contempt of court\\u2014\\n(1). To render a person amenable to an injunction,it is neithor necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in,-. which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have actual notice.\\nContempt of court for violating injunction \\u2014 Sea. 5581 penal\\u2014\\n>(2>. A proceeding for contempt of court for violating an injunction under sec. 5581, R. S., in providing that the party may be fined in any sum not exceeding $200.00 \\u201cfor the use of the county\\u201d, is penal in its nature, and must be strictly construed.\\nContempt of court under sea. 5581, R. S. \\u2014Imprisonment for costs, . not error\\u2014\\n- (3). Under sec. 5581, R. S., a party may be fined in a sum not to exceed $200.00 and imprisonment until such fine is paid. But the statute does not provide that a party can be imprisoned until the costs also are paid; and a judgment in such a proceeding that the party be imprisoned until fine and costs are paid, is erroneous so far as the costs are concerned, and will be modified to that extent.\\nError to the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas county.\", \"word_count\": \"3073\", \"char_count\": \"17007\", \"text\": \"Haynes, J.\\nIn this case a petition in error is filed to reverse the action of the court of common pleas in assessing against Miller & Diehl a fine and costs, and in ordering their imprisonment until the fine and costs were paid, in a proceeding in contempt for the violation of an injunction which had been granted before that time in the case of the Toledo \\u00bfMilling & Grain Co, against Louis M, Friedman, restraining Friedman from using a certain device or design on certain flour bags, indicating that the grade or class of flour was what was called, commonly, \\\"Pansy,\\\" .\\nIn the original case against Friedman, Miller & Diehl were not parties. They had been selling flour as agents of .Friedman, were in court, and testified in the case, and knew of the decree that was rendered; but after the decree was rendered, they ceased to be the agents of Friedman, and \\u2022 then took up the business of selling flour under a design made by themselves, which is the design that is complained \\u2022 of as an infringement or imitation of that of plaintiff below, -and in violation of its rights under the injunction,\\nThe proceedings were heard upon evidence, and the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Pratt, is here given in full, in which he sustains the proceedings. Judge Pratt \\u2022closes his opinion by saying:\\n\\\"I have had in my practice several cases of this kind \\u2014 \\u2022 .one before Justice Swayne when he was sitting in the fed eral court here, and one at Cleveland, in which one of the most prominent attorneys in the city was engaged; and, after holding that the act done as in violation of the injunction, he continued the matter for two weeks, saying that . there would probably be no further necessity for any action on his part; and there was not. The same order was once made in a case in the circuit court here, by Judge Scott, at chambers.\\n\\\"I would punish parties for contempt by imprisonment, however, if that were deemed necessary. But this is the first time this matter has been brought to the attention of the court, and the fact being, so far as this court is concerned, determined that the injunction has been violated, the violation of the injunction should cease at least until there has been an opportunity to re-hear this case on petition in error, and it can be heard,of course, in circuit court.\\n\\\"If there should be a continued violation of the order notwithstanding this finding,then some other judge would have to pass upon the question when it is made; but at present the order of the court is that the defendants be fined in the \\u2022sum of $25 each, and the costs of this proceeding.\\\"\\n\\\"This decision was made on the 8th day of February, 1900. An entry was made on the journal of the court upon that, and an order was issued, on the 16th day of February, eight days afterwards; but it appears that, notwithstanding the \\u2022court said he was not going to commit the accused to imprisonment, the entry upon the journal was as follows:\\n\\\"It is therefore ordered and adjudged, that said Jacob Miller and Jacob Diehl, and each of them, pay a fine of twenty-five dollars and the costs of this proceeding, and that each of them stand committed to imprisonment in the county jail of Lucas county, Ohio, until said fines and costs are paid, nr until they be otherwise discharged, and that execution issue to enforce the foregoing order and judgment. To all of said finding, orders, and judgment both Miller and Diehl excepts.\\\"\\nThis is a transcript of the journal entry, and is the same -as a copy of the final judgment.\\nIn relation to the facts of the case, we are clearly of the \\u2022opinion that the court of common pleas was right in finding \\\"that the design that was used by these parties for the bags of flour which they sold was in violation of this injunction. It seemed to us very marked and very clear in that respect; so that upon the facts we find that the court of common pleas was correct in its finding.\\nTwo questions have been made which are of some importance. They are these: first, whether these parties are-so far parties to the original suit of Grain & Milling Co. v. Friedman that an attachment for contempt can issue against, them, without first instituting an original proceeding for an injunction, and after that, an attachment for a violation of it if they should violate it; the second question is, whether the imprisonment clause is illegal. It is claimed on behalf of the plaintiffs in error that it was an abuse of the discretion of the court. It will be observed that this original injunction is against Friedman and his agents, and it was admitted here and stated in the evidence, that Miller &r JDiehl were agents of Friedman, selling his flour, at the time tha,t the mark upon it was enjoined, and continued to be used until after the judgment of the court in that case;, that immediately thereafter they started out independently to sell flour, and undertook to make a design that should just avoid being a violation of the one in usfa by the defendants in error.\\nWe think the court was correct in holding that these proceedings could be maintained against these parties, although they were not technically parties to the original suit. The-law in regard to injunctions is pretty liberal in that respect. The statute itself (section 5579) provides that \\\"An injunction shall bind the party from the time he has notice thereof, and the undertaking required by the applicant therefor is executed,\\\" We have had a case in this court since I sat on the bench in which it was held that where a party had notice that an injunction was applied for and being issued, but was not served for some time, yet he was liable for a violation of that injunction at any time after he had notice-that an injunction was being issued against him. The law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, is found in ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, The court, Mr. Justice Brown delivering the opinion, say:\\n\\\"The facts that petitioner was not a party to such suit, nor served with process of subpoena, nor had notice of the< application made by the complainant for the mandatory injunction, nor was served by the officers of the court with such injunction, are immaterial, so long as it was made to appear that he had notice of the issuing of an injunction by the court. To render a person amenable to an injunction it is neither necesary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have actual notice. High on Injunctions, section 1444; Mead v. Norris, 21 Wis. 310; Wellsley v. Mornington, 11 Beav. 181.\\nWe think, therefore, that the court of common pleas had authority to pass judgment on these parties, the facts warranting it,\\nNow in regard to the punishment. While this is a proceeding for contempt, it is governed by section 5581 of the code:\\n\\\"An injunction or restraining order granted by a judge' may be enforced as the act of the court, and disobedience thereof may be punished by the court, or any judge who might have granted it in vacation, as a contempt; an attachment may be issued by the court or judge, upon being satisfied, by affidavit, of the breach of the injunction or retraining order, against the party guilty of the same; and such party may be required by the court or judge to pay a fine not exceeding $200, for the use of the county, to make immediate restitution to the party injured, and to give further security to obey the injunction or restraining order, and, in default thereof, he may be committed to close custody until he complies with such requirement ,or is otherwise legally discharged.\\\"\\nHe may be required to pay a fine not exceeding $200, and in default of such payment may be committed to close custody until he complies with such requirement. We have no question but that the court might impose the fine that it did impose, to-wit: a fine of $25,against these parties. The only question is, whether he had a right to impose a .fine and costs, both. We do npt think there was any abuse of discretion in imposing a fine of $25. We think the facts of the case fully warranted the court in making that order; but in regard to the costs of the case we do not agree with the court, that it had a right to impose imprisonment in default of payment of costs. I read from the first case cited by counsel for the plaintiffs in error, from the first circuit, Hamilton county, which was an alimony case \\u2014 Lubbering v. State, 19 Ohio Circuit Court Reports, 688.\\n\\\"A court has power to imprison one who has been ordered to pay alimony in an amount which he could pay, but which he refuses to pay; but where there is added to the amount of alimony a fine and costs of the contempt proceeding, and the defendant is committed until the whole sum is paid, the order of imprisonment is invalid.\\n\\\"A sum ordered to be paid as fine and costs in a contempt proceeding, amounts simply to a judgment for money, and the court has no power to imprison as for contempt on failure to pay it.\\n\\\"Alimony is something more than a debt, and imprisonment for failure to perform is not against the provisions of our constitution or our statutes.\\\"\\nIn that case Rubbering was ordered to pay $1.50 per week, and the arrears amounted to $4.50 at .the time they were proceeding in the case, and he had also refused to pay an attorney fee of $15 to plaintiff's attorney. The court of common pleas took the matter in hand, and ordered that the amount be paid, and in addition to that the sum of $25, to be applied in payment of the expenses of the contempt proceedings, and also the costs of the contempt proceedings, amounting to $16.41, and in default thereof ordered him committed to the county jail, to be confined until said sums of money were paid. The court say:\\n\\\"We think the judgment of the court should beset aside. The court had no power to order the accused to be confined in the jail until the fine and costs were paid.\\n\\\"Section 5645 Revised Statute provides: 'And if it be adjudged that he is guilty he may be fined not exceeding $100, or imprisoned not more than ten days, or both.'\\n\\\"And section 5646 Revised Statute provides: 'When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned until he performs it.'\\n\\\"The only contempt charged against Rubbering, which the court found him guilty of, was in not paying the $4.50 ali mony to the wife, and if Lubbering had been ordered imprisoned until he paid this amount, we would hold the judgment valid, for we are of the opinion that the evidence shows he could have paid this amount; but what the court did was to order him committed until he paid $25'in the-nature of a fine and the costs of the proceedings in contempt. The fine and costs were simply a judgment for money, and there was no power in the court to imprison as for a contempt on the failure to pay it.\\n\\\"The power to imprison as for contempt on failure to pay alimony we think rests on different grounds. Alimony is something more .than a debt, and the best interests of society require that decrees of this nature should have all the power that courts can give for their enforcement, It is a protection to the family and the marriage relation which is-the foundation of our society. We adhere to the ruling made by this court in Effinger v. State of Ohio, 11 Ohio Circuit Court Reports, 389.\\nWe had this question before us in the case of Pancost v. the State of Ohio, three years ago this term, 15 Ohio Circuit Court Reports, 246. And in that case, which was an alimony case, there had been an order that a certain amount of alimony should be paid, including the sum of $25,to the-attorneys. He was ordered to be imprisoned until he paid the amount of alimony, attorney's fees, and costs. The. syllabus of the case is:\\n\\\"Plaintiff in error was imprisoned for contempt in refusing to obey an order granted in a divorce case to pay certain sums to the divorced wife for the support of minor childen.\\n\\\"Held: Under the evidence, it was not within the power of the plaintiff in error to perform the order of the court within the meaning of section 5646, Revised Statutes.\\\"\\nWe say here:\\n\\\"In regard to the attorney's fees we are unable to find any authority for the court directing their payment. But. whether the court was authorized to do that or not, we are clearly of the opinion that he had no authority to order this man to be imprisoned at that time for the payment of those attorney's fees,nor for the payment of the costs made in the contempt proceedings. In support of that we cite a case-from 80 Mo. 447. I read from the syllabus:\\n\\\"'Petitioner was found guilty by the circuit court of Jackson county, of contempt in wilfully violating its restraining order, by removing and refusing to return certain fixtures in controversy in a pending civil suit, and was adjudged to -pay the adversary party therein $150, as costs and expenses incurred by the latter in the contempt proceedings; also to -pay a fine of $500, and that he restore the property mentioned in the order and be committed to jail until he paid \\u2022said sums of money and returned the property. Held, that so much of the judgment of the court as related to the payment of the fine and the $150 was illegal and void.'\\n\\\"The case is a lengthy one,and discusses many questions under their statutes; but where they hold that he might be imprisoned for not returning the property, they say:\\n\\\"Here the court had jurisdiction, and the imprisonment of the petitioner until he should comply with the order of the court, was warranted by law. After he shall have restored the goods the prisoner will be entitled to his discharge, the other requirements of the judgment being nullities.\\n\\\"For these reasons the judgment of the court will be reversed, and the defendant be discharged, and the case be remanded to the court of common pleas.''\\nThere is quite a long discussion in that case in Missouri -of the law in regard to the matter, and the distinctions that are made between the cases that are in the nature of criminal cases, and those that are really civil.\\nThere is a case \\u2014 -which I will not attempt to read from \\u2022 \\u2014 -in 62 Ohio St., 289 \\u2014 second National Bank Sandusky v. Becker \\u2014 in which the court make a distinction in regard to matters that are civil, and hold that there should be a construction of the statute such as would not permit the imprisonment of a party in a matter purely civil, and only civil, for the reason that the constitution provides that there hall be no imprisonment for debt in civil actions,except in -case of fraud. In criminal cases the rule, of course, is -different, and parties are fined, and imprisoned until they pay the costa. This statute provides that he may be fined a certain sum for the use of the county, not for the party. That certainly is a matter penal in its nature; but we think the statute should be construed strictly as against the rights of the party who is bringing the proceeding against him for the purpose of enforcing a fine and imprisonment; and while the statute provides that he may be imprisoned for the nonpayment of the fine, there is no provision in regard to the-non-payment of the costs. -ws\\nT. N. Bierly, for Plaintiff in Error.\\nGr. Harmon and Almon Hall, for Defendant in Error.\\nThe judgment of the court will therefore be modified so-as to provide for the imprisonment for the non-payment of the fine, but not for the costs, As to the matter of costs, it will be reversed. The costs will be divided under tl^ statute, payable one-half by each party.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4185011\", \"name\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Gwinn\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Gwinn\", \"decision_date\": \"2014-01-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2013-1247\", \"first_page\": \"167\", \"last_page\": \"168\", \"citations\": \"138 Ohio St. 3d 167\", \"volume\": \"138\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:50:36.097633+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, O\\u2019Donnell, Lanzinger, Kennedy, French, and O\\u2019Neill, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Gwinn.\", \"head_matter\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Gwinn.\\n[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gwinn, 138 Ohio St.3d 167, 2014-Ohio-101.]\\n(No. 2013-1247\\nSubmitted September 11, 2013\\nDecided January 23, 2014.)\", \"word_count\": \"427\", \"char_count\": \"2837\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Respondent, Susan Louise Gwinn of Athens, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0020836, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1979. On April 19, 2013, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Gwinn with professional misconduct after Gwinn was convicted of violating Ohio election laws by failing to disclose that certain contributions to her unsuccessful campaign for Athens County prosecuting attorney were made from loans that she had received from her brother and a friend.\\n{\\u00b6 2} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline considered the cause on the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement. See BCGD Proe.Reg. 11.\\n{\\u00b6 3} In the consent-to-discipline agreement, Gwinn stipulates to the facts alleged in relator's complaint and agrees that her conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law).\\n{\\u00b6 4} The parties stipulate that mitigating factors include the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, a timely good-faith effort to rectify the consequences of her misconduct by paying her friend back in full and signing a promissory note to her brother, a cooperative attitude in both the criminal matter and the disciplinary investigation, evidence of good character and reputation, and the imposition of other penalties and sanctions as a result of her criminal conviction. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f). The parties agree that there are no aggravating factors. Based upon these factors, the parties stipulate that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for Gwinn's misconduct.\\nJoseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.\\nFrederick Oremus, for respondent.\\n{\\u00b6 5} The panel and board found that the consent-to-discipline agreement conforms to BCGD Proc.Reg. 11 and recommend that we adopt the agreement in its entirety. In support of its recommendation, the panel refers to Disciplinary Counsel v. Taft, 112 Ohio St.3d 155, 2006-Ohio-6525, 858 N.E.2d 414 (a public reprimand was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who violated financial-reporting requirements). We agree that Gwinn violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) and, as stated in the parties' agreement and as indicated by the cited precedent, that this conduct warrants a public reprimand. Therefore, we adopt the parties' consent-to-discipline agreement.\\n{\\u00b6 6} Accordingly, Gwinn is publicly reprimanded. Costs are taxed to Gwinn.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nO'Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Kennedy, French, and O'Neill, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/4201523.json b/ohio/4201523.json
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+"{\"id\": \"4201523\", \"name\": \"In re Resignation of DeLoach\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Resignation of DeLoach\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-05-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2015-0605\", \"first_page\": \"1266\", \"last_page\": \"1269\", \"citations\": \"142 Ohio St. 3d 1266\", \"volume\": \"142\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:52:16.964266+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, O\\u2019Donnell, Lanzinger, Kennedy, French, and O\\u2019Neill, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"In re Resignation of DeLoach.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Resignation of DeLoach.\\n[Cite as In re Resignation of DeLoach, 142 Ohio St.3d 1266, 2015-Ohio-1810.]\\n(No. 2015-0605\\nSubmitted May 6, 2015\\nDecided May 14, 2015.)\", \"word_count\": \"1164\", \"char_count\": \"6872\", \"text\": \"{\\u00b6 1} Jana Bassinger DeLoach, Attorney Registration No. 0071743, last known business address in Akron, Ohio, who was admitted to the bar of this state on November 17, 1999, submitted an application for retirement or resignation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(7). The application was referred to disciplinary counsel pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(7)(B). On April 15, 2015, the Office of Attorney Services filed disciplinary counsel's report, under seal, with this court in accordance with Gov.Bar R. VI(7)(B)(2).\\n{\\u00b6 2} On consideration thereof, it is ordered by the court that pursuant to GovJBar R. VI(7)(C), the resignation as an attorney and counselor at law is accepted as a resignation with disciplinary action pending.\\n{\\u00b6 3} It is further ordered and adjudged that from and after this date all rights and privileges extended to respondent to practice law in the state of Ohio be withdrawn, that henceforth respondent shall cease to hold herself forth as an attorney authorized to appear in the courts of this state, and that respondent shall not attempt, either directly or indirectly, to render services as an attorney or counselor at law to or for any individuals, corporation, or society, nor in any way perform or seek to perform services for anyone, no matter how constituted, that must by law be executed by a duly appointed and qualified attorney within the state of Ohio.\\n{\\u00b6 4} It is further ordered that respondent desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent or clerk or employee of another, and hereby is forbidden to appear in the state of Ohio as an attorney and counselor at law before any court, judge, board, commission, or other public authority, and hereby is forbidden to give another an opinion as to the law or its application or advise with relation thereto.\\n{\\u00b6 5} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(23)(C). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(23) respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(23)(A)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust funds or property.\\n{\\u00b6 6} It is further ordered that respondent shall not enter into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with an attorney or law firm with which respondent was associated as a partner, shareholder, member, or employee at the time respondent engaged in the misconduct that resulted in this acceptance of respondent's resignation with discipline pending.\\n{\\u00b6 7} It is further ordered that respondent shall surrender respondent's certificate of admission to practice to the clerk of the court on or before 30 days from the date of this order and that respondent's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys maintained by this court.\\n{\\u00b6 8} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against respondent by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if after the date of this order the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection awards any amount against respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection within 90 days of the notice of that award.\\n{\\u00b6 9} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall do the following:\\n{\\u00b6 10} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of respondent's resignation and consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in respondent's place;\\n{\\u00b6 11} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;\\n{\\u00b6 12} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in the possession or control of respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 13} 4. Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties in pending litigation of respondent's disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;\\n{\\u00b6 14} 5. Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 15} 6. File with the clerk of this court and disciplinary counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of the notices required herein, and setting forth the address where the affiant may receive communications; and\\n{\\u00b6 16} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.\\n{\\u00b6 17} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall surrender the attorney registration card for the 2013/2015 biennium.\\n{\\u00b6 18} It is further ordered that until such time as respondent fully complies with this order, respondent shall keep the clerk and disciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.\\n{\\u00b6 19} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings. All case documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47, which govern access to court records.\\n{\\u00b6 20} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order, and all other orders in this case, to respondent's last known address.\\n{\\u00b6 21} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2).\\nO'Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Kennedy, French, and O'Neill, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/4284047.json b/ohio/4284047.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c64ef8056760c1925f6acedc44313e2f555729d
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"4284047\", \"name\": \"In re Disqualification of Coss. Buckmaster v. Buckmaster\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Buckmaster v. Buckmaster\", \"decision_date\": \"2014-07-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 14-AP-049\", \"first_page\": \"1210\", \"last_page\": \"1212\", \"citations\": \"140 Ohio St. 3d 1210\", \"volume\": \"140\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:52:50.581108+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Disqualification of Coss. Buckmaster v. Buckmaster.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Disqualification of Coss. Buckmaster v. Buckmaster.\\n[Cite as In re Disqualification of Coss, 140 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2014-Ohio-3435.]\\n(No. 14-AP-049\\n\\u2014 Decided July 9, 2014.)\", \"word_count\": \"741\", \"char_count\": \"4480\", \"text\": \"O'Connor, C.J.\\n{\\u00b6 1} John W. Judkins, counsel for the plaintiff in the underlying case, has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Rocky A. Coss from presiding over any further proceedings in case No. 10 DS 245 in the Highland County Court of Common Pleas. The case is now pending for a rehearing on the plaintiffs motion to terminate spousal support.\\n{\\u00b6 2} Judkins claims that Judge Coss has demonstrated bias toward the plaintiff by prejudging the credibility of the plaintiffs son as a witness, even though the son has not yet testified in the matter. Specifically, in a May 2013 decision, Judge Coss overruled the plaintiffs objection to the magistrate's decision refusing to allow the plaintiff to call his minor son as a witness. In his decision, Judge Coss explained:\\n[T]he Court is of the opinion that in the context of this case, the testimony of the [child] would have received little if any weight because of the circumstances. Children are often manipulated by their parents in divorce proceedings. They may be advancing their own agenda by trying to stay with one parent over another. Their anger toward the other parent would be taken into consideration. Therefore, even allowing the child to testify does not mean that the testimony would have affected the outcome of the case.\\nBuckmaster v. Buckmaster, Highland C.P. No. 10 DS 245, 8 (May 8, 2013).\\n{\\u00b6 3} The court of appeals determined that Judge Coss abused his discretion in excluding the child's testimony and reversed and remanded the matter for another hearing to allow the plaintiff to call his son as a witness. Buckmaster v. Buckmaster, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA13, 2014-Ohio-793, 2014 WL 861508. Judkins claims that Judge Coss should be disqualified from presiding over the rehearing because the above-quoted language indicates that Judge Coss will not give the child's testimony any weight and that Judge Coss has taken a position on the case that is \\\"inconsistent with [the judge's] duty to remain impartial and without bias.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 4} Judge Coss has responded in writing to Judkins's affidavit, denying that he has prejudged the credibility of the child's future testimony. Judge Coss explains that his May 2013 decision was based on the \\\"very general and limited proffer\\\" of the child's testimony, which led the judge to believe that the evidence would have been of limited value and would not have automatically resulted in a different outcome. Judge Coss acknowledges that the appellate court disagreed with his view of the proffered evidence and that the case must now move forward in accordance with the higher court's ruling. Judge Coss vows that on remand, he will fairly and impartially evaluate the testimony of the child \\\"based upon the record before [him] at that time without regard to [his] prior ruling.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 5} In affidavit-of-disqualification proceedings, \\\"[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.\\\" In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, \\u00b6 5. Here, Judge Coss has sufficiently explained that the statements made in his May 2013 decision were based on his view of the proffered evidence at that time. The judge vows that on remand, he will carry out the appellate court's decision and fairly evaluate the child's testimony.\\n{\\u00b6 6} There may be circumstances in which a new judge should preside over a rehearing after remand from an appellate court. See, e.g., Columbus v. Hayes, 68 Ohio App.3d 184, 188-189, 587 N.E.2d 939 (10th Dist.1990) (remanding for further proceedings before a different judge when the original sentencing judge, after being reversed, made it clear that he did not intend to follow the mandate of the appeals court by declaring that he would impose the same sentence as before, even if he were reversed ten times). However, based on Judge Coss's response to the affidavit, the record here does not firmly establish that Judge Coss lacks the ability to impartially preside over further proceedings in this case or to fairly assess the child's testimony.\\n{\\u00b6 7} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case may proceed before Judge Coss.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/430539.json b/ohio/430539.json
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/430539.json
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+"{\"id\": \"430539\", \"name\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Skatzes, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Skatzes\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2003-0487\", \"first_page\": \"195\", \"last_page\": \"242\", \"citations\": \"104 Ohio St. 3d 195\", \"volume\": \"104\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:03:24.076007+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Lundberg Stratton, O\\u2019Connor and O\\u2019Donnell, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Skatzes, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Skatzes, Appellant.\\n[Cite as State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391.]\\n(No. 2003-0487\\nSubmitted September 28, 2004\\nDecided December 8, 2004.)\", \"word_count\": \"21919\", \"char_count\": \"133604\", \"text\": \"Pfeifer, J.\\n{\\u00b6 1} On the afternoon of April 11, 1993, inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (\\\"SOCF\\\") at Lueasville rioted and took control of L Section, one of three main prison cell blocks. On or about April 12, inmates killed inmate Earl Elder. On April 15, inmates killed Robert Vallandingham, one of eight corrections officers taken hostage during the riot. On April 21, while inmates were surrendering and releasing the remaining hostages, inmates killed inmate David Sommers. Defendant-appellant, George Skatzes, was found guilty as one of the inmates responsible for the murders of Elder, Vallandingham, and Sommers and was sentenced to death.\\n{\\u00b6 2} Sometime before April 11, 1993, the Ohio Department of Health mandated that all prison inmates in Ohio's prison system be tested for tuberculosis. The test required an injection. The Muslim inmates at SOCF, led by Carlos \\\"Hasan\\\" Sanders, a leader of the Muslims at SOCF, objected to that form of testing on religious grounds. Word filtered down to the Muslims that a lockdown of SOCF was going to take place on Monday, the day after Easter Sunday, April 12, 1993, to facilitate the tuberculosis testing.\\n{\\u00b6 3} On the evening before the riot, April 10, high-ranking members of the Aryan Brotherhood, including Jason Robb, Dewey Bocook, and Freddie Snyder, and the Muslims, including Sanders and James Were, met in the L block gym. Upon seeing this gathering, inmate Robert Brookover knew \\\"there was something going on.\\\" Robb told fellow Aryan Brotherhood member Roger Snodgrass, \\\"[B]e on [your] toes tomorrow.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 4} On the afternoon of April 11, inmates took control of the entire L section of the prison, including cell blocks 1 through 8. Prison authorities attempted to end the takeover by negotiating over the phone with representatives of the three dominant gangs. The gangs included the Muslims, led by Sanders, who controlled L6; the Aryans, led by Jason Robb and Skatzes, who controlled L2; and the Black Gangster Disciples, led by Anthony Lavelle, who controlled LI. Inmates controlled access'to and from any area of L block.\\n{\\u00b6 5} Several corrections officers (\\\"C.O.s\\\"), including Robert Vallandingham, who was working in LI that day, were taken hostage. As the riot unfolded in its early stages, Vallandingham had locked himself in the corrections officers' LI restroom. Inmates were able to batter open the restroom door and take him hostage. Other inmates saw Sanders and Were escort Vallandingham to L6. Other guards taken hostage were eventually held in L6 as well, except for C.O.s Darrold Clark and Jeff Ratcliff, who were confined for most of the riot in L2.\\n{\\u00b6 6} During the initial stages of the riot, inmates stormed to the back stairwell of L2 where C.O. Ratcliff and inmate Earl Elder had locked themselves. Using a weight bar, inmates punched holes in the wall next to the L2 stairwell door. Ratcliff came out of the stairwell and was beaten. Inmates then brought Elder out of the stairwell and began beating him with baseball bats and stabbing him with shanks. Robb was heard telling Elder, \\\"You want to be police, we will show you what it is to be police.\\\" Elder was then locked in a cell in L6.\\n{\\u00b6 7} Later that night, Lucky Roper, a Muslim inmate, met with Skatzes in the gym. Skatzes then went to Snodgrass and told him, \\\"We got to go to L6.\\\" At L6, Skatzes told Snodgrass: \\\"I want you to take this guy out.\\\" Then Skatzes, Roper, and Snodgrass went to the cell where Elder was being held, and Skatzes told Snodgrass, \\\"Go ahead and take care of your business, son.\\\" Snodgrass went into the cell and stabbed Elder numerous times. When Snodgrass came out of the cell, Skatzes put his arm around him and said, \\\"You did a good job, brother, I am proud of you.\\\" Elder's body was placed in the recreation yard at 10:15 the next morning. He died from multiple stab wounds in his chest and head, as well as skull fractures.\\n{\\u00b6 8} On April 12, prison authorities turned off the electricity and water in L block. Skatzes shouted from a window with a bullhorn, demanding that the authorities turn the power back on. He also had C.O.-hostage Ratcliff identify himself using the bullhorn and demand that power be restored inside L block.\\n{\\u00b6 9} Within two or three days of the takeover, FBI technicians had placed microphones in the tunnels underneath L block to record inmate conversations. By the end of the riot, 591 \\\"tunnel tapes\\\" had been recorded.\\n{\\u00b6 10} The inmate leaders negotiated over the phone with prison authorities. Inmate David Sommers controlled the phones and tape-recorded the inmate leaders during their negotiations with prison authorities. During the first half of the riot, Skatzes was one of the lead inmate negotiators. He told the prison negotiators to stop tear-gassing K block, which they were doing to quell a disturbance, or they were \\\"going to cost an officer's life.\\\" As he continued to argue with authorities over the phone, Skatzes declared, \\\"[Y]ou just cost an officer's life.\\\" At that time, however, the inmates had not killed a guard.\\n{\\u00b6 11} At another time during the siege, Skatzes and Robb ordered a crew of inmates to make a hole in a back wall of L7. They planned to kill a C.O. and dangle his body out of the back of L7, where it could be seen from the front of the SOCF by members of the media. In addition, Skatzes instructed inmates guarding the C.O. hostages to kill them if authorities came into L block.\\n{\\u00b6 12} On April 14, the inmate leaders met in L2 to discuss a solution to the stalemate on their demands. In addition to the gang leaders, including Skatzes, other inmates within the three gangs also attended the meeting. According to Lavelle, a vote was taken to kill a guard if their demands were not met. \\\"No one spoke against doing it, so it was agreed it would happen.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 13} Later that evening on April 14, inmate Miles Hogan overheard a conversation between Skatzes, Sanders, and inmate Stanley Cummings. They talked about the fact that someone who was supposed to kill a C.O. had backed out. Skatzes blurted out: \\\"Fuck the CO, I will kill the CO or fuckin' COs.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 14} Another inmate-leader meeting took place on the morning of April 15. At that time, Skatzes got on the phone and demanded that prison authorities restore water and power within L block or \\\"there would be a guaranteed murder.\\\" He added, \\\"Do your thing. 10:30 or a dead man's out there.\\\" He said that if the water and power were not turned back on by 10:30, \\\"the hardliners were going to step in and take over.\\\" At the inmate meeting of leaders, a vote was taken to kill a C.O., and a member from each inmate gang was chosen to participate in the killing. According to witnesses at the meeting, Skatzes agreed with the decision to kill a C.O.\\n{\\u00b6 15} The deadline set by Skatzes passed without the water or power being restored. Officer Vallandingham was killed in L6 by Muslim inmates. Several masked inmates carried Vallandingham's body out of L6 and down the L corridor to the gym. Skatzes walked behind those who carried the body. At 11:10 a.m., Vallandingham's body was placed in the recreation yard. The coroner later concluded that Vallandingham had died by ligature strangulation.\\n{\\u00b6 16} Negotiations resumed that afternoon, and the inmate leaders agreed to release a C.O. in exchange for allowing Skatzes to make a live radio broadcast to air the concerns and demands of the inmates. The broadcast took place that evening at 7:30 p.m. in the recreation yard. After the broadcast, C.O. Darrold Clark was released. Although he had a transcript, Skatzes's performance was described as \\\"rambling.\\\" Many inmates were not pleased, and Sanders told Robb that he wanted him to make all future decisions on behalf of the Aryans. Skatzes's role as an inmate negotiator diminished thereafter.\\n{\\u00b6 17} The following day, April 16, prison officials agreed to allow inmate Cummings to broadcast inmate grievances on television, in exchange for the release of another C.O. At 1:35 p.m., C.O. Tony Demons was released while Cummings delivered his live television address.\\n{\\u00b6 18} The takeover continued because Sanders and Robb reportedly wanted to break the record for the longest prison takeover in the United States. Finally, on April 20 and 21, Sanders, Robb, and Lavelle met with attorney Niki Schwartz to discuss ending the takeover. They reached an agreement, and the inmates began to surrender on April 21.\\n{\\u00b6 19} Meanwhile, during a meeting in L2 between Robb, Lavelle, and Sanders, the gang leaders decided that inmate David Sommers, who controlled the phones and ran the inmates' tape player throughout the negotiations \\\"had to die, he knew too much.\\\" Sommers had a reputation as a snitch before the riot. Robert Brookover also had a reputation as a snitch, but he was given a choice: kill someone or be killed. Brookover asked Skatzes if he was going to be killed. Skatzes replied, \\\"[J]ust take care of business, be cool.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 20} The surrender was held up for a period of time because, as Skatzes, Robb, Sanders, and Cummings told Lavelle, they had \\\"some things [they had] to take care of.\\\" An inmate called \\\"Kinky\\\" gave Brookover baker's clothes (kitchen whites, which Brookover put on), a shank, and an extension cord. Skatzes, Snodgrass, and Bocook also changed into different clothes. When Robb arrived, the group went to L7 across the corridor from L2. Bocook instructed Brookover to retrieve baseball bats out of a guitar ease in the back of L7. When they arrived in L7, no one was there. Bocook screamed, \\\"Where's that bitch Sommers at.\\\" Robb left to get Sommers from L2 and, moments later, Sommers was seen chasing Robb into L7. Brookover tackled Sommers and stabbed him. Skatzes ran up and kicked Sommers in the head. Brookover followed orders to choke Sommers with the extension cord, and then Skatzes struck Sommers in the head with a baseball bat at least three times. Brookover and the others beat and stabbed Sommers until he was dead. Then the killers cleaned themselves, burned their clothes, and surrendered to authorities.\\n{\\u00b6 21} Prison authorities found Sommers's body in L7. The coroner attributed death to a massive blow to the head leading to skull fracture, laceration of the skull, and other severe brain injuries and bleeding.\\n{\\u00b6 22} The Scioto County Grand Jury indicted Skatzes on six counts of aggravated murder, two counts each for the murders of Vallandingham, Elder, and Sommers. Each murder count carried four death specifications: murder in a detention facility [R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) ], a prior aggravated murder conviction [R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) ], murder as a course of conduct [R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) ], and murder during a kidnapping [R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) ]. Skatzes was also indicted on three counts of kidnapping [R.C. 2905.01].\\n{\\u00b6 23} The trial court changed venue to Montgomery County, and the case was tried before a jury. After the state presented its case, the defense called five witnesses, including former hostage C.O. Ratcliff. Skatzes testified in his own behalf. The defense claimed that Skatzes had been a peacemaker during the prison takeover and had opposed killing a C.O. Skatzes denied involvement in the Elder and Sommers murders. The jury found Skatzes guilty on all counts and specifications. After a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended death for the murders of Elder and Sommers and a life sentence for the murder of Vallandingham. The trial judge sentenced Skatzes accordingly.\\n{\\u00b6 24} In January 2003, the court of appeals affirmed Skatzes's convictions and death sentence but vacated his conviction for the kidnapping of Elder at the state's request. The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.\\n{\\u00b6 25} Appellant Skatzes has raised 60 propositions of law. We have reviewed each and have determined that none justifies reversal of appellant's convictions or his death sentence. We have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstances against the evidence presented in mitigation and have reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and proportionality. For the reasons that follow, we affirm appellant's convictions and death sentence.\\nPRETRIAL/VOIR DIRE ISSUES\\nAlleged Flatus in the Indictment\\n{\\u00b6 26} In his first five propositions of law, Skatzes argues that each count in the indictment and each death-penalty/kidnapping specification was defective because the indictment failed to demonstrate on its face the basis for indicting him, and the indictment or specification failed to provide notice of the allegations against him. Skatzes failed to object to the form of the indictment before trial as required by Crim.R. 12(B)(2), however, and thus has waived all but plain error. State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 332, 652 N.E.2d 1000. In any event, the indictments tracked the language of the definition of kidnapping in R.C. 2905.01(A) and, therefore, properly charged the offenses. State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 583, 605 N.E.2d 884; State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 119, 559 N.E.2d 710; Crim.R. 7(B). In addition, Skatzes obtained a bill of particulars that provided him with the information he sought and identified aggravated riot as the felony underlying the R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) kidnapping charges. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d at 583, 605 N.E.2d 884. Skatzes acknowledged at his arraignment that he understood the charges and waived the reading of the indictment.\\n{\\u00b627} In proposition of law I, Skatzes alleges that the indictment was insufficient to charge aggravated murder involving a kidnapping because it failed to name or identify the kidnapping victims, failed to inform him of the facts and elements of the charge of kidnapping he faced, and failed to identify the applicable Revised Code section of the kidnapping charges. To the contrary, the indictments for kidnapping tracked the language of R.C. 2905.01(A) and properly charged the offenses. The bill of particulars also provided Skatzes with the information he sought. Plain error is lacking. We reject proposition of law I.\\n{\\u00b6 28} In proposition of law II, Skatzes essentially repeats the same argument raised in proposition of law I but directs it toward the kidnapping-based death-penalty specifications. Again, Skatzes does not demonstrate plain error. The indictment tracked the statutory language, and the bill of particulars eliminated any confusion Skatzes may have had about the charges. We reject proposition of law II.\\n{\\u00b6 29} In proposition of law III, Skatzes contends that the indictment was insufficient in naming four of the five purposes of the kidnapping statute [R.C. 2905.01(A)(1), (2), (3) and (5) ] in the disjunctive. Skatzes further asserts that the indictment failed to identify the felony underlying the kidnapping-offense alternatives charged under R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and failed to demonstrate the basis of the grand jury findings. As noted by the court of appeals, it was apparent that the prosecution intended to show that Skatzes had engaged in kidnapping for all of the stated statutory purposes rather than just one of them. Use of the word \\\"or\\\" in the indictment was not vague, since the alleged purposes listed were not mutually exclusive. In addition, the bill of particulars identified aggravated riot as the felony underlying the R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) kidnapping charge.\\n{\\u00b6 30} Moreover, Skatzes's reliance on State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 724 N.E.2d 781, is misplaced. In Childs, we held that an indictment's failure to allege an overt act in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy was a fatal defect. Here, the omission of the underlying felony in the indictment was remedied because the bill of particulars identified the underlying felony, as is permitted where the indictment sufficiently tracked the wording of the kidnapping statute. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d at 583, 605 N.E.2d 884. In addition, there is no requirement that the indictment demonstrate the basis for the grand jury's findings. The bill of particulars serves this function. We reject proposition of law III.\\n{\\u00b6 31} In proposition of law IV, Skatzes contends that the indictment was defective because it failed to identify the underlying felony in the kidnapping charge or the elements of the underlying felony. As discussed under proposition of law III, however, the indictment tracked the language of the kidnapping statute. The bill of particulars identified aggravated riot as the underlying felony and remedied any defect in the indictment. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d at 583, 605 N.E.2d 884. Skatzes's claim regarding the failure to list the elements of aggravated riot was not outcome-determinative plain error since Skatzes was sufficiently informed of the charges against him in both the indictment and bill of particulars. State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d at 332, 652 N.E.2d 1000. We reject proposition of law IV.\\n{\\u00b6 32} Finally, in proposition of law V, Skatzes contends that even though Ohio law does not require complicity or conspiracy to be charged in the indictment in every instance, the failure to charge complicity or conspiracy in his case means that the indictment failed to give notice of the charges. Skatzes again fails to demonstrate plain error. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of the principal offense. R.C. 2923.03(F). See State v. Dotson (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 135, 520 N.E.2d 240, paragraph two of the syllabus. Skatzes was on notice that evidence could be presented that he was a principal offender or complicit in the aggravated murders. The indictment and bill of particulars put Skatzes on notice of the charges he faced. We reject proposition of law V.\\nPrejudicial Joinder\\n{\\u00b6 33} In proposition of law XV, Skatzes contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges against him. Skatzes asserts that joinder was prejudicial because the offenses were separate in time, method, and degree of involvement by Skatzes. \\\"The law favors joining multiple offenses in a single trial under Crim.R. 8(A) if the offenses charged 'are of the same or similar character.'\\\" State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293. Crim.R. 8(A) also allows joinder of two or more offenses that \\\"are based on the same act or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; or are part of a course of criminal conduct.\\\" State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 425, 613 N.E.2d 212. An appellate court will reverse a trial court's denial of severance only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d 293.\\n{\\u00b6 34} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skatzes's motion to sever. First, the charged offenses committed by Skatzes were part of a common scheme to gain concessions from prison authorities for inmate demands and to silence inmate snitches. Crim.R. 8(A). Second, even if Skatzes had been tried separately for his charged offenses, the state would still have been able to introduce evidence of the joined offenses as \\\"other acts\\\" under Evid.R. 404(B). Third, the evidence of each crime joined at trial was \\\"simple and direct,\\\" so that proof of the separate offenses could be readily separated. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at \\u00b6 50-51. Thus, Skatzes was not prejudiced by joinder of offenses. See Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 163, 555 N.E.2d 293. We reject proposition of law XV.\\nLimits on Voir Dire\\n{\\u00b6 35} In proposition of law XVI, Skatzes contends that the trial court unfairly-denied him the right to explore juror attitudes on specific mitigating factors. Skatzes also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of a prospective juror who expressed unwillingness to consider specific items of mitigation evidence.\\n{\\u00b6 36} The trial court acted within its discretion in disallowing specific questions to individual prospective jurors on specific mitigating factors. See State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 N.E.2d 304. Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, does not require judges to allow individual voir dire on separate mitigating factors. See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 386, 659 N.E.2d 292. A review of the entire voir dire indicates that the detailed questioning that occurred over a ten-day period was adequate to expose faults that would render a juror ineligible. See State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus.\\n{\\u00b6 37} The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Skatzes's challenge for cause on prospective juror Hicks. Although Hicks stated initially that the gravity of the offenses might prevent her from considering life sentences, she specifically agreed to follow the court's instructions, even if it involved evidence she hypothetically might be skeptical of considering. We reject proposition of law XVI.\\nAdequacy of Counsel\\n{\\u00b6 38} In proposition of law XXXVI, Skatzes asserts that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry when he requested substitute counsel. The record indicates, however, that Skatzes never requested substitute counsel. Although Skatzes sent a letter to the trial judge addressing some specific problems and concerns about being able to review some audiotapes and other evidence, that letter is not part of the record. Nevertheless, the trial court asked both parties about the allegations in the letter and the status of discovery. The trial judge assured Skatzes that he would have the opportunity to review all the tapes. When asked by the trial judge whether he wanted to fire counsel, Skatzes denied that he was requesting that counsel be removed from the case or substituted. Skatzes opined that he and defense counsel could \\\"iron this thing out.\\\" We reject proposition of law XXXVI.\\nDeath Qualification of Jury\\n{\\u00b6 39} In proposition of law XLVI, Skatzes contends that death qualification of jurors violated his right to a fair and impartial jury. Death qualification of jurors during voir dire has been upheld by both the United States Supreme Court and this court. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree (1986), 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137; State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 26, 689 N.E.2d 1. We summarily reject proposition of law XLVI.\\nFailure to Record Grand Jury Proceedings\\n{\\u00b6 40} In proposition of law LIII, Skatzes argues that he was prejudiced by the state's failure to record grand jury proceedings, contrary to State v. Grewell (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 4, 543 N.E.2d 93, syllabus. Skatzes asserts that he was denied the opportunity \\\"to support his case at trial upon the showing of a particularized need\\\" for the grand jury testimony.\\n{\\u00b6 41} \\\"Grand jury proceedings are secret, and an accused is not entitled to inspect grand jury transcripts either before or during trial unless the ends of justice require it and there is a showing by the defense that a particularized need for disclosure exists which outweighs the need for secrecy.\\\" State v. Greer (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 139, 20 O.O.3d 157, 420 N.E.2d 982, syllabus, citing State v. Patterson (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 181, 57 O.O.2d 422, 277 N.E.2d 201, paragraph three of the syllabus. The trial court, in its discretion, determines whether the defendant has shown a particularized need for the production of grand jury proceedings. Greer at 148, 20 O.O.3d 157, 420 N.E.2d 982. Skatzes filed a motion for disclosure of exculpatory and impeaching information and included a request that the state identify \\\"each occasion on which any witness has testified before any court, grand jury or other tribunal or body.\\\" At a pretrial hearing, the defense stated that it was looking for inconsistencies in the testimony of any witness from one occasion to another. The state responded that no live witnesses had appeared before the grand jury and that the defense had received summaries and transcripts of videotaped depositions that had been played before the grand jury. Defense counsel then conceded that the state's response disposed of the motion, and the trial court opined that the issue was therefore moot.\\n{\\u00b642} Nothing in the record substantiates Skatzes's claim that grand jury proceedings were not recorded. Moreover, defense counsel not only failed to demonstrate any particularized need for the grand jury transcripts, they conceded before trial that the state's response disposed of his motion for the grand jury transcripts. We reject proposition of law LIII.\\nDiscovery\\n{\\u00b6 43} In proposition of law LVII, Skatzes contends that the state failed to provide the defense with timely and complete discovery. Specifically, Skatzes asserts that the state failed to produce \\\"[a]ll statements and evidence inconsistent with the State's theory of guilt\\\" from the State Highway Patrol's 1,395 interviews conducted in connection with his case. Crim.R. 16(B), however, \\\"does not authorize the discovery or inspection of the statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses to state agents.\\\" Crim.R. 16(B)(2).\\n{\\u00b6 44} The highway patrol's 1,395 interviews following the riot constituted statements made by witnesses or prospective witnesses to state agents and were not discoverable unless they were favorable to Skatzes. See Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f). Skatzes asserts that the state used a computer program to help sort information it obtained from these interviews and that it discarded any information considered \\\"false\\\" because that information would be inconsistent with its theory of the case. Skatzes provides no evidence to support this assertion; we will not presume that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from Skatzes.\\n{\\u00b6 45} Skatzes next contends that not all of the 591 tunnel tapes or 17 negotiation tapes were turned over to the defense. Yet, at a pretrial hearing at the outset of voir dire, defense counsel acknowledged that it had received all of the tunnel tapes as well as copies and transcripts of the negotiation tapes.\\n{\\u00b6 46} Skatzes also argues that the state failed to produce plea agreements of inmates whose statements were admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) as co-conspirator testimony, but who did not testify at Skatzes's trial. In Giglio v. United States (1972), 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, the case Skatzes cites as support, the government failed to disclose an alleged promise of leniency made to its key witness in return for his testimony. Id. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104. The statements of Skatzes's co-conspirators are not \\\"witnesses\\\" as that term is normally defined. Thus, Skatzes has no basis to claim that the state was compelled to produce the plea agreements of inmates whose statements were admitted under Evid. R. 801(D)(2)(e).\\n{\\u00b6 47} Skatzes further claims that not all scientific evidence regarding the time of Vallandingham's death was turned over to the defense and that the missing evidence would have shown that Vallandingham died long before the meeting in which Skatzes allegedly voted to kill a guard. This claim involves the coroner's testimony about a vitreous-eye-fluid test that led the coroner to opine that Vallandingham could have died as early as 6:00 a.m. on April 15, 1993. The coroner also testified that the test produced nothing \\\"inconsistent with him having been killed around 10:30 on the morning of the 15th.\\\" Nothing in the record supports Skatzes's claim that he did not receive these test results. Neither does the record suggest that Vallandingham died \\\"long before\\\" the meeting in which inmate gang leaders decided to kill a guard. Finally, Skatzes did not object to the coroner's testimony that Vallandingham died at 7:00 a.m. on April 15, plus or minus one hour, based on the results of the vitreous-fluid test. Even assuming Skatzes did not receive this test, he was not prejudiced because the coroner testified that the time of death could have been 10:30 a.m.\\n{\\u00b6 48} Skatzes also asserts that not all audio- and videotapes were turned over to the defense. Skatzes does not explain or suggest what tapes should have been turned over but were not.\\n{\\u00b6 49} Based on all the foregoing, we reject proposition of law LVII.\\nTRIAL ISSUES\\nJury Instructions\\n{\\u00b6 50} In propositions of law VI through XIII, Skatzes contends that he was prejudiced by several jury instructions at the close of the trial phase.\\n{\\u00b6 51} In propositions of law VI and VII, Skatzes argues that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury to reach a unanimous decision on the following three issues: whether disorderly conduct was committed, which section of the aggravated riot statute was violated, and which of the statutorily enumerated purposes was the basis of each kidnapping charge.\\n{\\u00b6 52} Skatzes's failure to object to the instructions waives all but plain error. State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. Plain error \\\"should be applied with utmost caution and should be invoked only to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice.\\\" Id. at 14, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332. Plain error exists only where it is clear that the verdict would have been otherwise but for the error. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, Plain error is not present in this case.\\n{\\u00b6 53} With regard to Skatzes's complaint about the failure to instruct on which purpose was the basis of each kidnapping charge, Skatzes essentially argues that his right to a unanimous verdict includes a right to a unanimous theory of culpable conduct supporting that verdict. The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Schad v. Arizona (1991), 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555. In Schad, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after the prosecution advanced theories of premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury was not instructed to unanimously find defendant guilty based on one of the proposed theories of guilt. The Schad court found that different mental states of moral and practical equivalence (premeditated and felony murder) may serve as alternative means to satisfy the mens rea element for the single offense of murder, without infringing upon the constitutional rights of the defendant. Id. at 643, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555.\\n{\\u00b6 54} The Schad court noted: 'We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in [eases proposing multiple theories] the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one alone. In these cases, as in litigation generally, 'different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.' \\\" Id. at 631-632, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555, quoting McKoy v. N. Carolina (1990), 494 U.S. 433, 449, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring).\\n{\\u00b6 55} The court of appeals in the instant case stated that the five purposes listed in the kidnapping statute [R.C. 2905.01(A) ] \\\"reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability\\\" that justify treating them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single offense. State v. Avery (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 36, 48, 709 N.E.2d 875, citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 643-644, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555. In our view, the reasoning of Avery is logical and follows the reasoning of Schad v. Arizona. Therefore, we hold that because all the jurors in Skatzes's case agreed on the verdict, they were not required to unanimously agree upon any one purpose for Vallandingham's kidnapping. The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to give such an instruction. See State v. Bell (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 473, 482-483, 679 N.E.2d 44; see, also, State v. Evans (Aug. 18, 1993), Hamilton App. Nos. C-910443 and C-910515, 1993 WL 311681.\\n{\\u00b6 56} For the same reason, plain error is absent in the trial court's failure to require unanimity from the jury on either of the two definitions of aggravated riot on which the jury was instructed. The trial court's instruction on aggravated riot properly set forth that disorderly conduct was an element of that offense. We reject propositions of law VI and VII.\\n{\\u00b6 57} In propositions of law VIII and IX, Skatzes contends that the trial court's instructions on complicity and conspiracy were inadequate. Again, Skatzes's failure to object to either instruction waived all but plain error. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus.\\n{\\u00b6 58} In proposition of law VIII, Skatzes asserts that the complicity instruction was flawed in that the charge was unclear as to whether the culpable mental state required was for murder or kidnapping. The court charged the jury, \\\"Before you can find the defendant guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, acting with the required culpable mental state for the particular offense, conspired with another to commit the offenses.\\\" Plain error is not evident. The language used by the trial court tracked the language of the complicity statute [R.C. 2923.04(A) ] and is not ambiguous. Given the clarity of the instruction, jurors would have understood this instruction to mean that they should apply the culpable mental state for the offense that they found to be the object of the conspiracy.\\n{\\u00b6 59} Here, and in proposition of law IX, Skatzes asserts that the court's instruction on conspiracy was error. The trial transcript indicates that the court stated, \\\"You may not find that the defendant conspired with others to commit an offense unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a substantial overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspires, and that such an act wasn't performed subsequent to the defendant's entrance into the conspiracy.\\\" (Emphasis added.) This instruction is plainly illogical. On its face, it required the jury to find Skatzes culpable only if his overt actions in furtherance of the conspiracy actually occurred before his involvement in the conspiracy.\\n{\\u00b6 60} The record, however, contains copies of the written instructions provided to the jury during deliberations, and these written instructions correctly stated the law, using \\\"was\\\" instead of \\\"wasn't.\\\" In addition, the trial court directed the jurors not to take notes during its charge because they would have a copy of the instructions in the jury room during deliberations.\\n{\\u00b6 61} Even assuming that the court misstated the instruction, we find that any such error did not affect the outcome of Skatzes's trial. Not only did the written instructions correctly state the law on conspiracy, the trial court encouraged the jury to rely upon the written instructions during deliberations. Moreover, given the jury's detection of a conflict between \\\"a\\\" and \\\"the\\\" in the jury instruction and verdict form discussed in proposition of law XIII, infra, the jury likely would have noticed a conflict in logic between the oral and written instructions and would have requested a clarification had they been confused. No outcome-determinative error occurred. We reject propositions of law VIII and IX.\\n{\\u00b6 62} In proposition of law X, Skatzes argues that the instruction on other-acts evidence failed to adequately inform the jury as to what acts are deemed \\\"other acts\\\" of the defendant and what evidence is deemed to be evidence of other acts. He also claims that testimony on other acts from \\\"inmate snitches\\\" is \\\"always highly suspect.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 63} Skatzes's failure to object to the instruction waived all but plain error. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. In fact, no error occurred. The instruction given tracked the language of Evid.R. 404(B), and the trial court prefaced the instruction with language that accomplice testimony may involve special motives and that jurors should \\\"use it with great caution and view it with grave suspicion.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 64} Skatzes suggests that the trial court should have enumerated for the jury the other acts presented by the evidence and the evidence in support of those acts. Trial courts are not required, however, to characterize evidence or to instruct juries as to the category into which certain evidence fits. Moreover, Skatzes's proposal appears to require that the trial court usurp the jury's function as the finder of fact. We reject proposition of law X.\\n{\\u00b6 65} In proposition of law XI, Skatzes complains about the court's reasonable-doubt instruction based on the statutory language of R.C. 2901.05(D). We have repeatedly rejected the same argument. See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph eight of the syllabus; State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 417, 739 N.E.2d 300.\\n{\\u00b6 66} In proposition of law XII, Skatzes raises a number of other alleged errors in the trial-phase jury instructions and asserts that these errors, both individually and cumulatively, warrant a reversal. Skatzes's failure to object to any of the claimed instructional errors waived all but plain error. State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332, syllabus. We find no plain error in any of the 12 instructional errors raised by Skatzes.\\n{\\u00b6 67} Skatzes first contends that the kidnapping instruction was inadequate and failed to identify the underlying felony in the Clark and Elder kidnappings. Trial courts were not required to identify the underlying felony. See 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (2001) 148, Section 501.01(A)(2), applicable to offenses committed before July 1,1996.\\n{\\u00b6 68} Skatzes contends that the complicity instruction contained a misleading definition of the crime of soliciting another to commit an offense because it diminished the character of the request required. Yet, the language of the instruction does not support his contention: \\\"Solicit means to seek, to ask, to influence, to invite, to tempt, to lead on, to bring pressure to bear.\\\" We also note that the instruction is taken from 4 Ohio Jury Instructions (2001) 573, Section 523.03(6), applicable to offenses committed before July 1, 1996. No plain error is evident.\\n{\\u00b6 69} Skatzes contends that the instruction on \\\"purposely\\\" was inadequate. The instruction stated that \\\"[t]o do an act purposely is to do it intentionally and not accidentally.\\\" It is difficult to discern how this language would have left the jurors to simply presume, as Skatzes suggests, that anything more than an accident fit the definition of \\\"purposely.\\\" Moreover, the court also instructed the jury that \\\"[a] person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result,\\\" and that \\\"[pjurpose and intent mean the same thing.\\\" These instructions were not erroneous.\\n{\\u00b6 70} Skatzes next claims error in the instructions defining aggravated riot and disorderly conduct and asserts that the term \\\"felony\\\" was never defined. Skatzes asserts that the jury may have presumed that it knew what conduct constituted a felony and may have convicted him on the basis of nonfelonious behavior. This argument is purely speculative. The trial court identified aggravated riot as an underlying felony to kidnapping.\\n{\\u00b6 71} Skatzes asserts that the instruction on prior calculation and design allowed the jury to convict on the basis of a lesser degree of guilt than is required for prior calculation and design because the instruction did not include language that the \\\"process of reasoning\\\" must be in \\\"advance of the homicide.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 72} The trial court instructed the jury as follows: \\\"A person acts with prior calculation and design when, by engaging in a distinct process of reasoning, he forms a purpose to kill and plans the method he intends to use to cause death. The circumstances surrounding a homicide must show a scheme designed to carry out the calculated decision or cause the death.\\n{\\u00b6 73} \\\"No definite period of time must elapse and no particular amount of consideration must be given, but acting upon the spur of the moment or after momentary consideration of the purpose to cause a death is not sufficient.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 74} This instruction was adequate and did not constitute plain error. A clear reading of the instruction indicates that the \\\"distinct process of reasoning\\\" must take place before the murder because the phrase \\\"plans the method he intends to use\\\" contemplates future action.\\n{\\u00b6 75} Skatzes next argues that the instruction on \\\"cause\\\" was confusing and misleading. We upheld the same instruction in State v. Jalowiec (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 220, 230-231, 744 N.E.2d 163. Moreover, the jury was also charged on specific intent to kill.\\n{\\u00b6 76} Skatzes contends that the court's charge on the kidnapping specifications to the Vallandingham murder counts failed to identify the kidnapping victim. Given the context of the overall charge, it was clear that the victim of the kidnapping was also Vallandingham. See State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus. No plain error occurred.\\n{\\u00b6 77} Skatzes argues that the charge on \\\"unanimity\\\" was deficient because it did not tell jurors that they had to be unanimous on each element of each crime. The court's instruction that the jury \\\"must unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of a particular criminal offense before returning a verdict of guilty on that offense\\\" was adequate and, in any event, did not amount to plain error.\\n{\\u00b6 78} Skatzes asserts that the trial court erred in defining \\\"principal offender\\\" as \\\"one who has hands-on involvement in a homicide.\\\" This court has held that \\\"principal offender\\\" means \\\"actual killer,\\\" State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 371, 513 N.E.2d 744, or \\\"one who personally performs every act constituting the offense\\\" of aggravated murder, State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 197, 702 N.E.2d 866, or \\\"one who directly caused the death.\\\" State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 731 N.E.2d 159. The court of appeals agreed with Skatzes that \\\"hands-on involvement\\\" was not specific enough but held that it did not constitute plain error. We agree. The instruction pertained only to the Sommers murder. Skatzes claimed that he was not present for Sommers's murder and first learned of it after the riot when he was in Mansfield. The state's evidence, however, established that Skatzes was an active participant in the Sommers murder. The error in the instruction was harmless because the evidence at trial showed that Skatzes was an actual killer of Sommers. See State v. Chinn (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 559-560, 709 N.E.2d 1166.\\n{\\u00b6 79} Skatzes contends that the instructions regarding the verdict forms at the conclusion of the jury charge were \\\"too little too late\\\" in instructing the jury to be unanimous as to any alternative presented during jury instructions. The trial court, however, specifically instructed the jury, \\\"Before you can find the defendant guilty of an offense providing alternatives, you must be unanimous in your verdict as to any alternative.\\\" Moreover, all of the verdict forms signed by the jury were unanimous. Given the voluminous number of verdict forms involved, the court did not commit plain error in failing to give the same instruction on every verdict form it reviewed with the jury.\\n{\\u00b6 80} Skatzes asserts that the cumulative effect of the foregoing instructional errors deprived him of a fair trial. None of the claimed instructional errors have merit, and the one that was erroneous was harmless. We reject proposition of law XII.\\n{\\u00b6 81} In proposition of law XIII, Skatzes asserts that the trial court, over defense objection, erroneously instructed the jury in response to a jury question. On the second day of trial-phase deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the court (as read into the record by the. trial judge): \\\"Count 5, Specification 3, difference in words. Instructions say A, underline A, principal offender. Specifications for signature says the, underline the, principal offender.\\\" The court responded, \\\"The principal offender on the verdict forms should read a principal offender .\\\" Skatzes contends that the instruction was erroneous because R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) states \\\"the principal offender\\\" with regard to the specification. We have stated that \\\"principal offender\\\" means the \\\"actual\\\" killer and not the \\\"sole\\\" offender. As there can be more than one actual killer, there can be more than one principal offender. State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 458-459, 705 N.E.2d 329; State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 655, 693 N.E.2d 246. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury as it did. We reject proposition of law XIII.\\nStatements of Co-Conspirators\\n{\\u00b6 82} In proposition of law XIV, Skatzes argues that the trial court erred in allowing inmate Snodgrass to testify that the Aryan Brotherhood had agreed with the Muslims regarding the treatment of white inmates during the riot. Snodgrass was not certain that it was Skatzes from whom he had heard about the alleged agreement.\\n{\\u00b6 83} Snodgrass testified that he had killed inmate Elder under orders from Skatzes and that Muslim inmate Lucky Roper had talked with Skatzes in the gym prior to the Elder murder and had watched the Elder killing along with Skatzes. When the prosecutor asked Snodgrass why he and Skatzes had been involved in this murder with a Muslim, Snodgrass replied that, according to Jason Robb, the Aryan Brotherhood had made a pact with the Muslims. Snodgrass stated that Skatzes had explained the pact to him: \\\"[N]o more white guys were going to be killed in that riot, without sanctions from the AB, that if the [white guys] were to be killed, they were goin' to be killed by their own kind or at least given that opportunity.\\\" Snodgrass then equivocated and said he might have heard this from Robb or another Aryan leader.\\n{\\u00b6 84} Skatzes claims that this testimony about the pact was inadmissible. The testimony was not inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B), because the testimony did not refer to any prior crime, wrong, or act. If the statement was made by Skatzes, the testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) as an admission or statement. If the statement was not made by Skatzes, but instead by Robb or another Aryan leader, as Snodgrass conceded was possible, then the statement was admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e), as a statement made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We reject proposition of law XIV.\\n{\\u00b6 85} In proposition of law XXXIII, Skatzes argues that the trial court erred in admitting, in violation of Evid.R. 404(B), improper other-acts testimony by Snodgrass of an uncharged plot to kill several inmates at the end of the riot. According to Snodgrass, near the end of the riot, he and other Aryans had learned that some inmates were planning a coup to kill Skatzes and take over negotiations to end the riot. Those inmates involved in the alleged coup were locked in a cell in the Muslim block. When the Aryans tried to obtain the inmates from the Muslims in order to kill them, the Muslims told the Aryans they would not release the inmates because they had converted to Islam. That group of Aryans then decided to kill Sommers.\\n{\\u00b6 86} The testimony provided the context in which Sommers was murdered. When Skatzes and other Aryans were thwarted in their plans to kill the inmates who planned the coup, they focused their attention on Sommers. The trial court could have reasonably determined that the plot to kill other inmates was not separate from the murder of Sommers, but part of the same series of events. The testimony was not improper other-acts testimony. We reject proposition of law XXXIII.\\nHearsay\\n{\\u00b6 87} In proposition of law XVII, Skatzes contends that the trial court allowed inadmissible hearsay, over defense objection, when Snodgrass testified concerning a letter he had received from inmate David Snow, a member of the Aryans. Snodgrass testified that Snow wrote in the letter that inmate Brookover was \\\"a maggot\\\" and \\\"a snitch\\\" who had brought down the Aryans somehow in a murder case in Arizona. Skatzes argues that Snow's letter was irrelevant and his objection should have been sustained. We agree. Nevertheless, Skatzes was not prejudiced. Accordingly, the error was harmless. We reject proposition of law XVII.\\n{\\u00b6 88} In proposition of law XVIII, Skatzes asserts that the court erred when it overruled his objection to hearsay testimony from inmate Kenneth Hazlett. Hazlett testified that another inmate, Bobby Bass, had told Hazlett that he had been forced to carry out bodies during the riot, including the body of C.O. Vallandingham. The state contends that Bass was a forced participant in the conspiracy and that his statement was admissible as that of a co-conspirator under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e). The court of appeals rejected this argument but found the statement to be harmless. We agree. Bass's statement did not implicate Skatzes, and there is no dispute that bodies were carried out of L block and onto the recreation yard during the riot. Skatzes was not prejudiced. We reject proposition of law XVIII.\\nDefendant's Prior Conviction\\n{\\u00b6 89} In proposition of law XIX, Skatzes notes that the trial court granted his motion to have the court, rather than the jury, determine the existence of his prior-murder-conviction specification. Skatzes contends that he was prejudiced because the prosecutor, over defense objection, cross-examined Skatzes about his prior murder conviction during his testimony and referred to the conviction, without objection, during mitigation-phase closing argument.\\n{\\u00b6 90} Under R.C. 2929.022(A), Skatzes elected to have the trial judge determine his prior-conviction specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). In State v. Davis (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 364, 528 N.E.2d 925, we observed that when an R.C. 2929.022(A) election is made, evidence concerning a prior murder conviction not otherwise admissible may not be introduced during the trial phase to prove an aggravating circumstance. We further noted, however, that the statute does not \\\"provide a defendant with a blanket statutory right to preclude the introduction of all evidence pertaining to prior purposeful killings which is otherwise admissible.\\\" Id.\\n{\\u00b6 91} During cross-examination of Skatzes, the prosecutor asked him: \\\"[G]oing back to your homicide conviction, someone snitched on you in that homicide , did they not?\\\" The question arose while the prosecutor questioned Skatzes about his attitude toward snitches. Skatzes admitted that the key witness against him in the prior homicide conviction was a person who claimed to be his \\\"partner\\\" in the crime.\\n{\\u00b6 92} The court of appeals determined that Skatzes's feelings about snitches, and specifically the fact that a snitch's testimony led to his prior conviction, were relevant to his motive because the state's theory of the case was that Sommers and Elder had been killed for being snitches. The court of appeals found that R.C. 2929.022(A) does not preclude the introduction of the evidence because evidence of other crimes is admissible to show motive pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). See State v. Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d at 364, 528 N.E.2d 925. The rationale of the court of appeals is sound. We conclude that the state's brief inquiry during cross-examination concerning Skatzes's prior conviction was not improper. Moreover, the defense opened the door to the prosecutor's inquiry when it asked Skatzes during direct examination whether he had been \\\"convicted of aggravated murder and kidnapping.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 93} We also reject Skatzes's claim that it was improper for the prosecutor to briefly mention his prior conviction during mitigation-phase closing argument. When the prosecutor made this reference, Skatzes had already been found guilty and convicted of the prior-murder-conviction specification by the jury. In State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 239, 586 N.E.2d 1042, we found that reference to a prior murder conviction during mitigation closing argument was not error \\\"because the prior murder conviction is an aggravating circumstance.\\\" We reject proposition of law XIX.\\nScope of Cross-Examination\\n{\\u00b6 94} In proposition of law XX, Skatzes argues that the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from impeaching inmate Brookover with specific bad acts during cross-examination. Brookover testified that he had killed only two people in his life. Skatzes contends that he was merely attempting to prove that this was a false statement, Evid.R. 608(B), and that he was not trying to prove with extrinsic evidence other homicides committed by Brookover. Skatzes made a proffer of documents, which the defense claims would have shown that Brookover killed one other person. These documents were sealed at a December 8,1994 hearing by the trial court but were apparently lost and are not part of the record on appeal.\\n{\\u00b6 95} Evid.R. 608(B) provides that whether specific instances of bad conduct of a witness can be questioned during cross-examination is within the discretion of the court. State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 306, 310-311, 12 OBR 378, 466 N.E.2d 860. Evid.R. 608(B) also provides that the privilege against self-incrimination overrides the rule. Thus, Brookover could not be required to admit to any other homicide. With regard to the lost documents, the court of appeals correctly held that Evid.R. 608(B) would have precluded the introduction of general information on Brookover's character. The record demonstrates that Brookover's prior convictions, as well as his criminal activities in Arizona prisons dealing with drugs, were the subject of extensive cross-examination. We reject proposition of law XX.\\nExpert Testimony\\n{\\u00b6 96} In proposition of law XXI, Skatzes contends that the trial court erred in allowing Sgt. Howard Hudson of the Highway Patrol to testify about \\\"Stockholm syndrome.\\\" Skatzes objected several times during Hudson's testimony. Each time, the trial court overruled his objection. Skatzes submits that the state was required to qualify Hudson as an expert on Stockholm syndrome in order to make such testimony admissible under Evid.R. 702 and that it failed to do so.\\n{\\u00b6 97} Sgt. Hudson assisted the Department of Corrections' negotiating team during the riot because he had training in negotiations during hostage situations. Hudson explained the numerous difficulties one encounters in dealing with multiple negotiators in a hostage negotiation. Hudson further testified that the state negotiators in the SOCF riot took Stockholm syndrome into account at several points during the negotiations. Hudson's specialized knowledge of and training in hostage negotiations and Stockholm syndrome establish that he had knowledge of a matter not possessed by the average layperson. Accordingly, he was qualified to testify as an expert on these matters under Evid.R. 702, even though the court did not formally qualify Hudson as an expert on the subject. See State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 709 N.E.2d 128.\\n{\\u00b6 98} Moreover, Hudson's testimony was not hearsay because it did not convey a statement made by another, nor was it offered to prove that the C.O.s who were held hostage suffered from Stockholm syndrome. Hudson's testimony was offered to explain the state's actions in its negotiations with the inmates. Testimony offered to explain the investigative activities of witnesses, and not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, is admissible. State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 232, 15 O.O.3d 234, 400 N.E.2d 401. We reject proposition of law XXI.\\nWitness Speculation Testimony\\n{\\u00b6 99} In proposition of law XXII, Skatzes argues that inmate Lavelle was permitted to speculate, over objection, as to what was said on an audiotape played to the jury. In proposition of law XXIII, Skatzes contends that Lavelle was permitted to speculate, over defense objection, on Skatzes's state of mind with regard to another audiotape. In the first instance, the audiotape was tunnel tape 61, a recording of an April 15 meeting of inmate gang leaders, including Lavelle, where a vote was taken to kill a guard. In the second instance, the audiotape, tunnel tape 67, contained a conversation about negotiations and Skatzes's commitment to the inmates' demands.\\n{\\u00b6 100} Lavelle was present at both of the recorded conversations and possessed firsthand knowledge of what was said. He was competent to testify regarding inaudible portions of the tapes and the meaning he attributed to statements made by the other inmates heard on the tapes. Lavelle's opinion testimony in both instances was admissible under Evid.R. 701 because his opinions as to both tapes were rationally based on his memory and perception and were helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. In both instances, Skatzes had full opportunity to cross-examine Lavelle as to what was said or meant on the tapes. Lavelle's interpretation of what was stated in both tapes was based on his personal knowledge and perceptions of the conversations in both tapes. We reject propositions of law XXII and XXIII. See State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 72, 723 N.E.2d 1019.\\nAdmissibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony\\n{\\u00b6101} In propositions of law XXIV, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII, Skatzes challenges the admissibility of statements made by co-conspirators in the takeover of the SOCF.\\n{\\u00b6 102} In proposition of law XXIV, Skatzes asserts that the state failed to make a prima facie showing of a conspiracy by independent proof, as required by Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e), and failed to make findings that a conspiracy existed or that Skatzes was a part of it. As a result, Skatzes contends that the co-conspirator statements were inadmissible and deprived him of a fair trial. Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it was made by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Statements of co-conspirators are not admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e), however, until the proponent of the statement has made a prima facie showing of the existence of the conspiracy by independent proof. State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 N.E.2d 965, paragraph three of the syllabus; see, also, State v. Lindsey (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 481, 721 N.E.2d 995. There is no requirement that explicit findings be made on the record. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 70, 723 N.E.2d 1019.\\n{\\u00b6 103} As in Robb, supra, at 69-70, 723 N.E.2d 1019, the prosecution established at trial that the entire Lueasville siege involved a major conspiracy by inmate factions. The first three witnesses who testified on behalf of the state, Steven Macko, an inmate, Sgt. Hudson of the Highway Patrol, and C.O. Darrold Clark, established the conspiracy. Macko testified about the takeover of L block, the kidnapping of Vallandingham, the relative strength of the inmate gangs, the gangs' cooperation during the riot, and the identities of the gang leaders. Hudson provided details about the prison factions and their leaders and the tunnel taping conducted during the takeover. He also testified about the events that took place during the takeover, including the compiling of demands by the inmate gangs and their use of prison C.O.s as bargaining chips with the prison authorities. Clark, who was held hostage during the riot, testified about how the gangs cooperated in the handling of the hostages. This testimony provided the required prima facie showing of the conspiracy.\\n{\\u00b6 104} Compelling evidence, independent of co-conspirator hearsay statements, established that inmate leaders conspired to take control of L block at SOCF, held hostages, threatened to kill a hostage, and later killed a hostage. We reject proposition of law XXIV.\\n{\\u00b6 105} In proposition of law XXV, Skatzes contends that co-conspirator testimony is inadmissible when conspiracy is not charged as an independent crime in the indictment. We rejected this argument in Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 68, 723 N.E.2d 1019: \\\"Although the substantive offense of conspiracy was not charged, the state could prove a conspiracy in order to introduce out-of-court statements by conspirators in accordance with Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e).\\\" We reject proposition of law XXV.\\n{\\u00b6 106} In proposition of law XXVI, Skatzes argues that in order for co-conspirator statements to be admitted pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e), the conspiracy must be a crime. Skatzes correctly asserts that Ohio law does not recognize the crime of conspiracy to commit aggravated riot under R.C. 2923.01. That fact does not render co-conspirator statements inadmissible. In Robb, no criminal conspiracy was charged, and we upheld the admissibility of co-conspirator statements under similar facts. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 68, 723 N.E.2d 1019. \\u2022Moreover, the state presented ample prima facie evidence of a conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder, which are recognized as conspiracy crimes under R.C. 2923.01. Even if we were to find error in the state's reliance on aggravated riot as the underlying conspiracy, that error would be harmless in view of the prima facie evidence of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder. We reject proposition of law XXVI.\\n{\\u00b6 107} In proposition of law XXVII, Skatzes argues, pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A), that the probative value of co-conspirator statements offered against him was substantially outweighed by the risks of prejudice and confusion. The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. Just as in Robb, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in admitting relevant, prejudicial co-conspirator evidence against Skatzes. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019. See Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 222, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. Moreover, \\\"Evid.R. 403 speaks in terms of unfair prejudice. Logically, all evidence presented by a prosecutor is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly prejudices a defendant. It is only the latter that Evid.R. 403 prohibits.\\\" State v. Wright (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 5, 8, 548 N.E.2d 923. The relevant co-conspirator statements were not unfairly prejudicial to Skatzes. We reject proposition of law XXVII.\\nOther-Acts Evidence\\n{\\u00b6 108} In proposition of law XXVIII, Skatzes contends that the state's introduction of evidence of other acts he had committed violated Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59. Skatzes's failure to object to the other-acts testimony waives any error on appeal. State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 26-27, 716 N.E.2d 1126. Under Evid.R. 404(B), \\\"[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 109} Most of the evidence Skatzes cites involved uncharged acts during the riot, such as destroying property, disciplining inmates by violence, and involvement in the Aryan Brotherhood. Evidence of Skatzes's involvement in the Aryan Brotherhood was offered to show his leadership role during the takeover, which bore directly upon the crimes with which he was charged. Compare State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 256-257, 750 N.E.2d 90 (evidence of bad acts by other inmates admissible to show defendant's leadership role).\\n{\\u00b6 110} Evidence about Skatzes's involvement in a hunger strike and stopping up toilets at Mansfield Correctional Institution after the takeover had ended should have been excluded under Evid.R. 404(B). Nevertheless, evidence on these relatively minor incidents did not prejudice Skatzes and was harmless. See Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 69, 723 N.E.2d 1019; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 426, 653 N.E.2d 253. We reject proposition of law XXVIII.\\n{\\u00b6 111} In proposition of law XXIX, Skatzes complains that the trial court admitted testimony of bad acts by other inmates in the riot. Skatzes asserts that such evidence should have been excluded under Evid.R. 403 and 404(B). Skatzes lists a number of acts committed by others that he claims should not have been admitted through a conspiracy theory.\\n{\\u00b6 112} \\\"The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.\\\" State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. Arguments similar to those raised by Skatzes were raised and rejected in Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 68-69, 723 N.E.2d 1019, and in Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 256-257, 750 N.E.2d 90. The evidence in this case helped prove that prison gang leaders, including Skatzes, conspired over 11 days to seize and control L-complex, settle old scores, engage in assaults, take hostages, and commit murders.\\n{\\u00b6 113} The prosecutor was entitled to present evidence about the context of the alleged crimes to make the actions of the participants understandable to the jurors. Skatzes did not commit his crimes in a vacuum, and the prosecution was not required to proceed as if he had. The trial court, as in Robb, had wide latitude to permit evidence as to how the riot began and unfolded, the rules and procedures established by the gangs during the riot, how infractions were dealt with, and the ways in which the relationships between the gangs and their members affected the events that occurred.\\n{\\u00b6 114} This information was relevant to the offenses that Skatzes committed, the biases of the various witnesses, and the reasons that they behaved the way they did. Given the prison-inmate culture and the gang loyalty demonstrated by gang members, much of this testimony would not be within the knowledge or experience of the average juror. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of this evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of issues. The evidence was relevant and thus was admissible under Evid.R. 403. We reject proposition of law XXIX.\\n{\\u00b6 115} In proposition of law LI, Skatzes complains that inmate Macko was permitted to testify, over objection, that in order to earn tattoos of lightning bolts, a member of the Aryan Brotherhood had to kill a black person. Skatzes contends that this testimony should have been disallowed under Evid.R. 403. Macko, an L block inmate not affiliated with any prison gang, testified about the symbols of the Aryan Brotherhood and what they are supposed to represent. Macko did not know whether Skatzes had any such lightning-bolt tattoos, and he did not necessarily believe that those who did had killed a black person. Macko also testified that C.O. Ratcliff had such a tattoo and was reputed to have demonstrated racial preferences toward white inmates. Macko's testimony did not directly implicate Skatzes or materially prejudice him. We overrule proposition of law LI.\\nCrime-Scene Photos\\n{\\u00b6 116} In proposition of law XXXI, Skatzes argues that the 275 crime-scene photos admitted during trial had no probative value as to the crimes charged and were prejudicial and inflammatory. Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 264, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. Relevant, nonrepetitive photos in capital cases, even if gruesome, are admissible as long as the probative value of each one outweighs the danger of material prejudice to the accused. Id. at paragraph seven of the syllabus.\\n{\\u00b6 117} The crime-scene photographs were introduced during Sgt. Hudson's testimony and depicted the condition of L-block in the aftermath of the takeover. The photos were probative of the inmates' activities during the takeover and of security measures they had taken to prevent authorities from storming L-block or tear-gassing the inmates. Photos depicted the areas where inmates battered holes in the walls to capture prison guards and to take control of areas of L-block, random destruction of property, and bloody areas where violence had taken place during the siege. Other photos showed graffiti depicting gang activity and a large array of homemade weapons. Skatzes did not object to the admission of any crime-scene photos, and defense counsel specifically stated he had no objection to their admission. Any error is waived except plain error.\\n{\\u00b6 118} The photos were used to present background information about what occurred in L block during the takeover, including the manner in which prison guards had been captured. They helped establish the existence of gang activity and the presence of weapons. They also illustrated the testimony of Sgt. Hudson, who was part of the negotiation team and who had knowledge of many inmate activities during the takeover. It was not plain error for the trial court to admit the 275 crime-scene photos. See State v. Wickline (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 114,119-120, 552 N.E.2d 913. We reject proposition of law XXXI.\\nImpartiality of Trial Judge\\n{\\u00b6 119} In proposition of law XXXII, Skatzes claims he was denied a fair trial by a judge who was not impartial. It is well settled that a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at \\u00b6 34; see Rose v. Clark (1986), 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460.\\n{\\u00b6 120} Skatzes asserts that the trial judge failed to treat the case independently because he frequently ruled in accordance with how similar matters were previously ruled upon in Robb. Skatzes's case was very similar to Jason Robb's case; both were alleged to be leaders of the Aryan Brotherhood during the Lucasville takeover and many of the same witnesses were called to testify in both trials. Given the similarities, it was inevitable that the same legal and evidentiary issues would arise and be disposed of on the same basis in both cases. The fact that the prosecutor and trial judge acknowledged this on the record does not mean that the judge was not impartial.\\n{\\u00b6 121} Skatzes complains that the judge overruled defense objections but sustained state objections. Skatzes cites two instances to support his claim. In neither instance did the judge abuse his discretion in his rulings. The record indicates that the trial judge overruled prosecution objections when appropriate. No evidence of bias is apparent on the record.\\n{\\u00b6 122} Skatzes contends that the trial judge showed bias by failing to reprimand the prosecutor for making a threat. The prosecutor stated that if the defense was allowed to comb through the disciplinary records of inmates testifying on behalf of the state, he would do the same for defense witnesses. This statement was more informative than threatening; no reprimand from the trial judge was warranted.\\n{\\u00b6 123} Skatzes criticizes the trial judge for failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation. Skatzes argues that his competence was questionable because he characterized himself as \\\"paranoid,\\\" was known by the nickname \\\"Crazy George,\\\" and demonstrated his incompetence when he testified and could not remember events during the riot. None of these claims were directly related to Skatzes's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. See R.C. 2945.37(A); State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 603, 734 N.E.2d 345. The factors Skatzes cites do not necessitate a competency evaluation.\\n{\\u00b6 124} Finally, Skatzes asserts that the trial judge failed to control the proceedings by not properly preserving the record or exhibits for appellate review. The problems involving the record will be explored more fully under proposition of law LIV. In any event, the trial judge did not appear to play any role in the disappearance of exhibits from the record, and no bias is apparent.\\n{\\u00b6 125} We reject proposition of law XXXII.\\nEvidentiary Issues\\n{\\u00b6 126} In proposition of law XXXIV, Skatzes argues that the trial court erred in admitting State Exhibits 289 and 290, poster-size chronologies prepared and displayed by the prosecution to aid the testimony of Sgt. Hudson. The posters showed a time-line and highlighted events during the 11-day takeover, such as when the food drops occurred, when the water and power to L-block were turned off, and when certain inmate demands were made. The posters also included notations about the telephone negotiations and the tunnel tapes.\\n{\\u00b6 127} Although Skatzes did not object to their introduction as exhibits, he objected to their admission into evidence for the jury to review. He claimed that some of the facts set forth in the chronology were inaccurate and disputed the identity of voices on the tunnel tapes. The trial court considered the arguments of the parties and then overruled Skatzes's objection. The court acknowledged that in a \\\"normal case,\\\" he would probably sustain defense objections and not admit the posters. He specifically invoked the discretion of the court and stated that \\\"in a very long, very complicated case,\\\" he would allow the jury to use the posters as a reminder of the actual testimony and evidence on that particular subject.\\n{\\u00b6 128} The admission of trial exhibits is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 146, 7 O.O.3d 213, 372 N.E.2d 1324. The court carefully considered the arguments of both sides and decided to admit the exhibits, given the complex nature of the case. The jury was aware that some facts were in dispute, including some of the information on the posters, such as the identity of inmate negotiators on the audio tapes. On balance, the court determined that the posters would be helpful to the jury and that that factor outweighed any prejudice to Skatzes. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these exhibits into evidence. See Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 222, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264. We reject proposition of law XXXIV.\\n{\\u00b6 129} In proposition of law XXXV, Skatzes alleges error in the trial court's admission of State Exhibit 334, a document purporting to be the by-laws of the Aryan Brotherhood. He contends that the state did not lay a proper foundation for the document and, therefore, that the document was hearsay. Skatzes also alleges that the government shifted the burden of proof to him to show that he had no knowledge of the by-laws.\\n{\\u00b6 130} Inmate Snodgrass testified that the by-laws were written by inmate Tramp Johnson and given to inmate Bocook, who then gave them to Snodgrass after the takeover. Among other things, the by-laws defined a \\\"traitor\\\" as one who abandoned a \\\"Brother in the middle of a conflict or potentially violent conflict\\\" and that failure of a member to promptly heed a \\\"Call to Arms\\\" would be considered a \\\"traitorous act.\\\" Snodgrass stated that being \\\"deemed a traitor\\\" meant you would be killed. Snodgrass also stated that the by-laws were in effect during the takeover.\\n{\\u00b6 131} Snodgrass properly identified the by-laws pursuant to Evid.R. 901(B)(1), and his testimony was sufficient to support a finding that the document was what he claimed it to be. Snodgrass also testified that all Aryan Brotherhood members had to learn about and accept the by-laws as part of becoming a member. This testimony supported the inference that Skatzes knew about the by-laws at the time of the riot, and it did not unfairly shift the burden of proof to him to disprove his knowledge of them.\\n{\\u00b6 132} Moreover, the by-laws were not hearsay under Evid.R. 801(B) because the document containing the by-laws was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at \\u00b6 58-60. \\\"Statements offered as evidence of commands or threats or rules directed to the witness, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted therein, are not hearsay.\\\" United States v. Bellomo (C.A.2, 1999), 176 F.3d 580, 586, citing United States v. Stratton (C.A.2, 1985), 779 F.2d 820, 830. We reject propositions of law XXXIV and XXXV.\\nSufficiency and Manifest Weight of Evidence\\n{\\u00b6 133} In propositions of law XXXVIII and XXXIX, Skatzes argues that his convictions for the aggravated murder and kidnapping of Earl Elder and Robert Vallandingham were based on insufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence, respectively. In proposition of law XL, Skatzes asserts that his conviction for the murder of David Sommers was based on insufficient evidence and was against the weight of evidence. In proposition XLI, Skatzes contends that his conviction for the kidnapping of Darrold Clark was based on insufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence.\\n{\\u00b6 134} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.02, this court can overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in a capital case, but only where the crime was committed after January 1, 1995. State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 254, 750 N.E.2d 90. Because the crimes committed here occurred before 1995, we will not decide Skatzes's weight-of-the-evidence arguments. As in Sanders, we will consider these arguments as addressing the sufficiency of the evidence. Id.\\n{\\u00b6 135} In reviewing a record for sufficiency, \\\"[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\" State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. \\\"[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.\\\" State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.\\n{\\u00b6 136} With regard to the murder and kidnapping of Earl Elder, the state's evidence showed that during the initial stages of the takeover, C.O. Jeffrey Ratcliff and inmate Elder fled to the locked rear stairwell in L2. Inmates retrieved Ratcliff and Elder from the stairwell and then beat them. Elder was thereafter locked in a cell in L6.\\n{\\u00b6 137} Inmate Snodgrass testified that on the first night of the takeover, after a meeting with Muslim inmate Lucky Roper, Skatzes told Snodgrass, \\\"We got to go to L6.\\\" At L6, Skatzes told Snodgrass, \\\"I want you to take this guy out,\\\" which Snodgrass understood to mean that he was to kill someone. When Skatzes, Snodgrass and Roper arrived at Elder's cell, Skatzes told Snodgrass, \\\"Go ahead and take care of business, son.\\\" After Snodgrass stabbed Elder a number of times, he left the cell. Skatzes put his arm around Snodgrass and told him, \\\"You did a good job, brother, I am proud of you.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 138} Snodgrass explained that he acted on Skatzes's orders because he believed that he would have been killed if he disobeyed an order from the Aryan Brotherhood. Aryan by-laws were introduced in support of this claim. Roper later told Snodgrass that Elder was not dead. When Snodgrass told Skatzes what Roper had said, Skatzes told Snodgrass that he would \\\"take care of it.\\\" Inmate Tim Williams corroborated most of Snodgrass's testimony.\\n{\\u00b6 139} This evidence was sufficient to support Skatzes's convictions for the kidnapping and aggravated murder of Elder. We reject proposition of law XXXVIII.\\n{\\u00b6 140} With regard to the kidnapping and aggravated murder of Vallandingham, the state's evidence showed that on April 14, inmate gang leaders, including Skatzes, voted to kill a guard. That evening, Skatzes complained to Muslim gang leaders that whoever was supposed to kill a guard had backed out of it. Then Skatzes blurted out, \\\"Fuck the CO, I will kill the CO.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 141} On the morning of April 15 at another inmate-leader meeting, Skatzes got on the phone with prison negotiators and demanded that water and power be restored within L block or \\\"there would be a guaranteed murder. Do your thing. 10:30 or a dead man's out there.\\\" The leadership voted to kill a guard, and a member of each inmate gang was chosen to participate in the killing. Skatzes agreed with the decision to kill a C.O. hostage.\\n{\\u00b6 142} After Vallandingham was killed, Skatzes and other Aryans followed behind when the body was being carried out by masked inmates. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence supported Skatzes's conviction for the murder of Vallandingham.\\n{\\u00b6 143} The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Skatzes actively participated in Vallandingham's kidnapping. Inmate Kenneth Hazlett, who stayed in L6, saw Skatzes and two other Aryans move Vallandingham to a different cell on the third day of the takeover. In our view, Skatzes's leadership role in the Aryan Brotherhood during the takeover and his control over the movement and treatment of C.O. hostages support his conviction for kidnapping Vallandingham. We reject proposition of law XXXIX.\\n{\\u00b6 144} With respect to the murder of Sommers, several inmates testified that Sommers controlled the phones in L2 during negotiations and had made some bombs during the riot. Although Sommers stayed in the Aryan-controlled L2 during the riot, he was not a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. Moreover, Sommers had a reputation as a \\\"snitch,\\\" an inmate who cooperated with prison authorities against other inmates.\\n{\\u00b6 145} As the surrender was taking place at the end of the riot, Skatzes, Robb, Sanders, and Cummings told Lavelle that they had \\\"some things [they had] to take care of.\\\" Skatzes, Snodgrass, and Bocook dressed in other clothes in L2, and when Robb showed up, they went to L7, across the hall from L2. Inmate Brookover also had a reputation as a snitch and was led to believe that he had a choice: kill someone or be killed. When Brookover asked Skatzes if he was going to be killed, Skatzes replied, \\\"Just take care of business, be cool.\\\" Brookover was with the group that went into L7.\\n{\\u00b6 146} When the group entered L7, no one else was there. Bocook yelled out, \\\"Where's that bitch Sommers at.\\\" Robb lured Sommers into L7, and the group proceeded to beat him. Skatzes ran up, kicked Sommers in the head, and hit him in the head with a baseball bat \\u2014 three times, according to Snodgrass. Brookover testified that Skatzes hit Sommers in the head as \\\"[h]ard as you could hit.\\\" Other inmates also beat and stabbed Sommers. The killers, including Skatzes, then cleaned themselves and burned their clothes. The coroner testified that Sommers's skull had been \\\"shattered\\\" and that he died from a massive blow to the head. Based on the foregoing, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Skatzes murdered Sommers. The fact that others also stabbed and beat Sommers does not absolve Skatzes from culpability in his murder. See State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, at \\u00b6 69. We reject proposition of law XL.\\n{\\u00b6 147} With regard to the kidnapping of C.O. Darrold Clark, there is no question that Clark and other corrections officers were held against their will at the direction of the leaders of the takeover. Skatzes was a leader of the Aryans during the takeover, and evidence established that he exercised control over the movement of the guard-hostages and their treatment. Clark testified that Skatzes would check on him and other hostages and that Skatzes got Clark moved out of the Muslim block when Clark requested it. This evidence was sufficient to sustain Skatzes's conviction for kidnapping Clark. We reject proposition of law XLI.\\nCompetency to Stand Trial\\n{\\u00b6 148} In proposition of law XLV, Skatzes contends that he was incompetent to stand trial and essentially argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte. Skatzes submits the following evidence that he was incompetent:\\n{\\u00b6 149} (1) he did not understand that he was waiving constitutional rights by taking the witness stand,\\n{\\u00b6 150} (2) he did not understand the consequences of answering questions with speculative responses,\\n{\\u00b6 151} (3) his use of colloquial phrases, such as \\\"I reckon,\\\" subjected him to ridicule by the prosecutor,\\n{\\u00b6 152} (4) he lost a significant amount of weight pending trial,\\n{\\u00b6 153} (5) his mental state was deteriorating \\u2014 inmates testified that his nickname was \\\"Crazy George\\\" and that he had exhibited paranoia throughout the takeover, and\\n{\\u00b6 154} (6) he had been suffering from stress and confusion at the time of the takeover.\\n{\\u00b6 155} It has long been recognized that \\\"a person [who] lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.\\\" Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103. \\\"Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial.\\\" State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, citing Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815.\\n{\\u00b6 156} The defense didn't request a competency hearing before trial. R.C. 2945.37 provides that \\\"[i]f the issue is raised after trial has begun, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue only for good cause shown.\\\" Thus, \\\"the decision as to whether to hold a competency hearing once trial has commenced is in the court's discretion.\\\" State v. Rahman (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 146, 156, 23 OBR 315, 492 N.E.2d 401. The right to a hearing \\\"rises to the level of a constitutional guarantee where the record contains 'sufficient indicia of incompetence,' such that an inquiry is necessary to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial.\\\" Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d at 359, 650 N.E.2d 433, citing Drope, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, and Pate, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815.\\n{\\u00b6 157} The record in this case does not reflect \\\"sufficient indicia of incompetence\\\" to have required the trial court to conduct a competency hearing. See State v. Smith (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 323, 329, 731 N.E.2d 645. None of the points raised by Skatzes suggest that he did not understand the nature and objective of the proceedings against him or that he was unable to assist in his defense. Skatzes's decision to testify on his own behalf does not provide indicia of incompetence; he attempted to rebut the abundant testimony elicited against him. Nor do we find indicia of incompetence because Skatzes decided to exercise his constitutional rights. Neither his behavior at trial nor his testimony provides \\\"good cause\\\" or \\\"sufficient indicia of incompetence.\\\" Deference on such issues should be granted to those \\\"who see and hear what goes on in the courtroom.\\\" State v. Cowans (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 N.E.2d 298.\\n{\\u00b6 158} Skatzes's alleged paranoia, stress, and confusion during the takeover do not indicate incompetence. Such reactions are understandable in the context of conditions during the takeover and do not appear to have impaired his ability to assist in his defense. See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237. Moreover, at no time did defense counsel suggest that Skatzes lacked competence. See State v. Were (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 176, 761 N.E.2d 591 (counsel continually raised the issue of defendant's competency). Lead counsel represented Skatzes from his appointment in August 1994 through the January 1996 sentencing and thus had ample time to become familiar with Skatzes. If lead counsel had reason to question Skatzes's competence, he surely would have raised the issue. See State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 411, 692 N.E.2d 151.\\n{\\u00b6 159} We reject proposition of law XLV.\\nPreservation of Evidence\\n{\\u00b6 160} In proposition of law LIV, Skatzes contends that the trial court erred when it failed to keep control of the charts used by the prosecutors during voir dire to assist the state in explaining the capital trial process. The whereabouts of the charts are currently unknown. Skatzes does not make any specific argument regarding the contents of the charts; he simply asserts that he was entitled to a full record of the proceedings and that effective appellate review is impossible without the exhibits.\\n{\\u00b6 161} In State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685, syllabus, we held: \\\"The requirement of a complete, full, and unabridged transcript in capital trials does not mean that the trial record must be perfect for purposes of appellate review.\\\" Athough we dealt with bench and in-chambers conferences that were not transcribed in Palmer, the issue of missing exhibits not admitted into evidence is analogous.\\n{\\u00b6 162} Skatzes's counsel made no attempt to make the prosecution's charts part of the record in the trial court, nor did counsel object to the prosecution's using the charts as a visual aid. As we noted in Palmer, if the off-the-record conferences had involved objections and requests considered crucial by the defense, the same objections and requests would certainly have been raised on the record. Id. at 556, 687 N.E.2d 685.\\n{\\u00b6 163} Here, defense counsel made no attempt to recreate the contents of the charts pursuant to App.R. 9(C). As the court of appeals recognized, Skatzes faded to make the required showing of prejudice by identifying an infirmity in the charts. See App.R. 9. As we noted in Palmer, general averments of prejudice cannot substitute for an actual showing of prejudice. Id. at 555, 687 N.E.2d 685. We reject proposition of law LIV.\\nSENTENCING ISSUES\\nJury Instructions\\n{\\u00b6 164} In proposition of law XLII, Skatzes asserts ten instances of error during mitigation-phase jury instructions. Skatzes first contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that their sentencing verdict was a \\\"recommendation.\\\" Use of the term \\\"recommendation\\\" accurately states Ohio law. We have rejected this argument in numerous cases. See, e.g., Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 84, 723 N.E.2d 1019.\\n{\\u00b6 165} Skatzes argues that the trial court failed to count duplicative death specifications only once. Skatzes appears to argue that the trial court should have merged the specifications related to Skatzes's prior murder conviction and the present murder charges as a prisoner in a detention facility. The trial court, however, need not merge these specifications in the manner Skatzes suggests. See, e.g., State v. Carter (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 228, 594 N.E.2d 595; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 149, 538 N.E.2d 373.\\n{\\u00b6 166} Skatzes complains that the trial court failed to merge or elect aggravated murder charges for the same victim before the jury deliberated. The trial court properly merged the counts at sentencing. R.C. 2941.25(A); State v. Osborne (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 135, 144, 3 O.O.3d 79, 359 N.E.2d 78. No merger is required before the jury renders its sentencing verdict, and any error can be cured by our independent review. See State v. Cook (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 526-527, 605 N.E.2d 70.\\n{\\u00b6 167} Skatzes contends that the trial court failed to merge duplicative death specifications before the jury deliberated. This argument is similar to those rejected above. Any error can be remedied by our independent review.\\n{\\u00b6 168} Skatzes argues that the trial court double-counted the death specifications in its instructions to the jury and allowed the jury to weigh eight specifications for each murder victim. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that \\\"[t]he death penalty for each individual count must be assessed separately. Only the aggravating circumstances relating to a given count may be considered in assessing the penalty for that count.\\\" A review of the court's instructions does not support Skatzes's assertion.\\n{\\u00b6 169} Skatzes contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that mitigating factors need not be found unanimously. Skatzes, however, never requested such an instruction. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the jurors acted under such a misapprehension.\\n{\\u00b6 170} Skatzes asserts that the trial court failed to define \\\"principal offender,\\\" leaving the jury to rely on the erroneous \\\"hands-on\\\" killer definition given at the close of the trial phase. As we discussed under proposition of law XII, the evidence established that Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of Sommers.\\n{\\u00b6 171} Skatzes claims error in the court's instruction that the jury \\\"not be influenced by any consideration of sympathy.\\\" Sympathy is not a proper factor for a jury to consider at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 417-418, 613 N.E.2d 212.\\n{\\u00b6 172} Skatzes asserts that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on all mitigating factors raised by the defense. The court did, however, instruct that the jury could consider \\\"any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.\\\" The failure of the trial court to tailor instructions more to the evidence is neither required nor erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 122, 559 N.E.2d 710.\\n{\\u00b6 173} Finally, Skatzes asserts error in the court's reasonable doubt instruction. The court's instruction was proper and did not include the \\\"truth of the charge\\\" language. See State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 37, 689 N.E.2d 1.\\n{\\u00b6 174} Based on the foregoing, we reject proposition of law XLII.\\nSentencing Opinion\\n{\\u00b6 175} In proposition of law LYI, Skatzes alleges that the trial court failed to conduct an appropriate sentencing evaluation. Skatzes contends that the court failed to explain why the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors other than to say that all the evidence in mitigation was rejected.\\n{\\u00b6 176} A trial court is not required to accept or assign weight to mitigating evidence. See State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus. Even if the trial court failed to explain its weighing process, inadequate explanations do not create reversible error. State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 190, 631 N.E.2d 124. Moreover, any error in the trial court's sentencing opinion can be cured by our independent review. See, e.g., State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 257, 699 N.E.2d 482. We reject proposition of law LVI.\\nAlternate Jurors in Deliberation Room\\n{\\u00b6 177} In proposition of law LV, Skatzes argues that the trial court erred in allowing alternate jurors in the deliberation room. He further asserts that defense counsel were ineffective for agreeing that alternates should be in the deliberation room during sentencing-phase deliberations.\\n{\\u00b6 178} The trial court erred in allowing the alternate jurors to sit in on deliberations, even though defense counsel agreed to it and the trial court admonished the alternates to not participate in any way in the deliberations. As we held in State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 531-534, 747 N.E.2d 765, and State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 438-440, 751 N.E.2d 946, Crim.R. 24(F) prohibits the presence of alternate jurors in the jury deliberation room.\\n{\\u00b6 179} Skatzes failed to object, however; therefore, all error is waived save plain error. Murphy at 532, 747 N.E.2d 765; Jackson at 438, 751 N.E.2d 946; United States v. Olano (1993), 507 U.S. 725, 739-741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508. Cf. State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, at \\u00b6 134. Skatzes does not allege, nor does the record reveal, that alternate jurors participated in the deliberations either \\\" 'verbally, or through \\\"body language;\\\" or because alternates' presence exerted a \\\"chilling\\\" effect on the regular jurors.' \\\" Id. at \\u00b6 135, quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508. Skatzes fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the presence of the alternate jurors. See Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 531-533, 747 N.E.2d 765; Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 439-440, 751 N.E.2d 946. This court will not ordinarily presume prejudice. Id. at 439, 751 N.E.2d 946. In addition, defense counsel's decision to agree to allow alternates in the deliberation room did not amount to ineffective assistance because Skatzes did not and cannot demonstrate that he would have prevailed but for the error. We reject proposition of law LV.\\nExecution of a Mentally III Person\\n{\\u00b6 180} In proposition of law LX, Skatzes contends that the record establishes that he may suffer from a serious mental illness. Skatzes asserts that we should extend the decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, prohibiting execution of mentally retarded persons, to those who suffer from serious mental illness. Nothing in the 6,000-plus pages of transcript and record establishes that Skatzes suffers from a serious mental illness. Skatzes has not presented any evidence bearing on his mental health. None of the assertions that Skatzes was \\\"paranoid\\\" or referred to as \\\"Crazy George\\\" create a genuine issue as to whether Skatzes has a mental illness that warrants consideration as part of his sentencing. We reject proposition of law LX.\\nPROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT\\n{\\u00b6 181} In propositions of law XXX and XLIII, Skatzes alleges that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct throughout both phases of his trial. Determining whether remarks constitute prosecutorial misconduct requires analysis as to whether the remarks were improper, and if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights. State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883. The touchstone of analysis \\\"is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.\\\" Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. We will not deem a trial unfair if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without the improper comments. State v. Treesh (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749.\\n{\\u00b6 182} In proposition of law XXX, Skatzes contends that the prosecution impermissibly vouched for the credibility of its witnesses in opening statements and throughout the trial. Skatzes did not object to most of the comments he cites, thereby waiving all but plain error. Although it is improper for an attorney to express his or her opinion or personal belief as to the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may try to ensure that jurors would not be biased against his witness. See State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12, 679 N.E.2d 646; State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 484, 653 N.E.2d 304.\\n{\\u00b6 183} During opening statement at the outset of trial, the prosecutor told the jury that the state had difficulties gathering evidence in this case because of the length of the takeover, the number of inmates involved, the prison culture of not being a \\\"snitch,\\\" and the lack of uncontaminated physical evidence recovered from the crime scene. The prosecutor mentioned that the state had been unable to identify the perpetrators of many of the offenses committed during the siege. The prosecutor then explained that in the investigation, deals were struck with some inmates to help the state piece together what had happened during the takeover. Skatzes contends that the prosecutor created the impression that he was vouching for the credibility of the state's witnesses. The state was entitled to present evidence regarding its methods of investigation following the riot and to refer to that evidence in opening statement. In addition, prosecutors can elicit or disclose information about plea agreements \\\"to blunt or foreclose unfavorable cross-examination revealing that [witnesses] agreed to testify in exchange for favorable treatment by the prosecutor.\\\" State v. Cornwell (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 560, 571, 715 N.E.2d 1144. The prosecutor's comments did not improperly vouch for the credibility of state witnesses.\\n{\\u00b6 184} Skatzes contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of inmate witnesses through the testimony of Sgt. Hudson, who testified that he used a computer database to help \\\"determine who was telling the truth or not.\\\" Hudson explained that the computer database was used to cross-reference information provided by a particular inmate on different occasions. Hudson testified about the need to make deals with some inmates in exchange for their testimony and about the special protection the state gave to cooperating inmates. The trial court sustained Skatzes's objection to Hudson's comment that making deals with inmates was necessary to \\\"get the truth.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 185} Hudson testified as a \\\"summary witness,\\\" who explained the process of the state's investigation of the riot and how it determined what charges to bring against certain inmates. His testimony does not appear to be improper vouching for the conclusions reached by the state's investigators. Given the complexity of investigating crimes committed during the takeover at SOCF, the state was entitled to explain the process that led to the filing of criminal charges against inmate suspects.\\n{\\u00b6 186} Skatzes argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the testimony of inmate David \\\"Doc\\\" Lomache, by making it clear that Lomache had worked with the prosecutor in deciphering conversations on one of the tunnel tapes. The prosecutor elicited from Lomache that he and Lomache had worked together to decipher the tape. Lomache denied that he was coached by the prosecutor as to what was on the tape. Evidence of cooperation does not constitute improper vouching for the witness's credibility.\\n{\\u00b6 187} Finally, Skatzes asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of inmates Brookover and Lavelle \\\"by indicating that their plea bargains were guarantees of truthfulness.\\\" With regard to both of these witnesses, the inmates stated that their plea agreements required them to testify truthfully and that the plea agreements could be withdrawn if they failed to do so. In two instances where it did appear that the prosecutor was trying to bolster Brookover's testimony in this regard, the trial court sustained Skatzes's objections.\\n{\\u00b6 188} As in Cornwell, the prosecutor's questions were not improper and did not prejudicially affect Skatzes's substantial rights. The questions cited were isolated, and when the prosecutor appeared to unduly emphasize truthful testimony by Brookover, the trial court sustained Skatzes's objections. Such questions should not be taken out of context or given their most damaging meaning. Id., 86 Ohio St.3d at 571, 715 N.E.2d 1144, citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431; and State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068. We reject proposition of law XXX.\\n{\\u00b6 189} In proposition of law XLIII, Skatzes asserts misconduct by the prosecutor in arguing nonstatutory aggravating factors during mitigation-phase closing argument. Specifically, Skatzes claims that the prosecutor raised non-statutory aggravating circumstances when the prosecutor stated that Skatzes \\\"was one of the leaders, one of the people who controlled and ran the riot\\\" and when the prosecutor remarked on Skatzes's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. The prosecutor did not state that these were aggravating factors or circumstances, nor did he urge the jury to weigh them as aggravating circumstances. Cf. State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 352-356, 662 N.E.2d 311. We reject proposition of law XLIII.\\nEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL\\n{\\u00b6 190} In propositions XXXVII, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, and L, Skatzes argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Accord Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. Skatzes does not demonstrate prejudice, \\\"a reasonable probability that were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.\\\" Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.\\n{\\u00b6 191} In proposition of law XXXVII, Skatzes contends that defense counsel were deficient in failing to object to the state's repeated references to the Aryan Brotherhood and its beliefs. Skatzes relies on Dawson v. Delaware (1992), 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, for the proposition that membership in the Aryan Brotherhood is not relevant evidence in a capital proceeding. Dawson has no application in this case because gang membership was not relevant to the crimes committed in Dawson. Here, as in Robb, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was relevant because Skatzes used his status as an Aryan Brotherhood leader to commit the crimes he did, either personally or by complicity. See Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 88, 723 N.E.2d 1019. Dawson recognizes that gang membership and beliefs may be admissible when relevant. Id., 503 U.S. at 165, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309.\\n{\\u00b6 192} Skatzes would not have been in a position to negotiate with authorities or to direct the actions of other inmates if not for his leadership role in the Aryan Brotherhood. This evidence was relevant and appropriate to explain Skatzes's actions during the takeover. Counsel were not deficient in failing to object to it. We reject proposition of law XXXVII.\\n{\\u00b6 193} In proposition of law XLVI, Skatzes argues that counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate or present the defense of duress. The facts presented at trial, including Skatzes's own testimony, did not support the defense of duress. Skatzes claims that he was not involved in the deaths of Elder, Vallandingham, or Sommers. Although Skatzes admitted holding Clark as a hostage, he did not testify that he feared being harmed or lolled if he had not done so. In order to assert a defense of duress, one must logically admit involvement in the crimes charged, but Skatzes denied involvement in the crimes he was charged with committing. In addition, this court will not infer a failure to investigate a defense by counsel from a silent record. See Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 542, 747 N.E.2d 765.\\n{\\u00b6 194} Counsel were not deficient for failing to raise duress as a mitigating factor. As set forth above, Skatzes denied involvement in the murders for which he was charged and convicted. In his unsworn statement, he denied involvement in any of the crimes of which he was convicted. Accordingly, raising duress as a mitigating factor would have contradicted Skatzes's own unsworn statement made during the mitigation phase. We reject proposition of law XLVI.\\n{\\u00b6 195} In proposition of law XLVII, Skatzes asserts ineffective assistance in defense counsel's failure to challenge and pursue remedies for the defective indictment. As discussed under Skatzes's first five propositions of law, the information contained in the indictment was sufficient to inform Skatzes of the charges brought against him. Counsel requested and received a bill of particulars that allayed any perceived deficiencies in the indictment. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to challenge the indictment. We reject proposition of law XLVII.\\n{\\u00b6 196} In proposition of law XLYIII, Skatzes claims that counsel were ineffective in permitting Sgt. Hudson to testify on behalf of the state as a \\\"summary witness.\\\" Yet counsel could have reasonably concluded that Skatzes had nothing to gain from having Hudson's testimony presented by several witnesses rather than one. Moreover, counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Hudson and did so. A review of Hudson's testimony indicates that he had firsthand knowledge of most of the matters about which he testified. In addition, Hudson's testimony did not directly implicate Skatzes in any of the crimes with which he was charged. Hudson testified that Skatzes was one of the primary inmate negotiators during the takeover, a fact not in dispute. Skatzes failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice in counsel's determination to permit Hudson's testimony in the manner it was presented. We reject proposition of law XLVIII.\\n{\\u00b6 197} In proposition of law XLIX, Skatzes argues that counsel were ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's comments and to Sgt. Hudson's \\\"vouching\\\" for the state's case. As discussed under proposition of law XXX, the prosecutor's questions and the statements elicited during Hudson's testimony did not constitute improper vouching for the state's witnesses and evidence. Accordingly, counsel were not ineffective in failing to object to these statements. We reject proposition of law XLIX.\\n{\\u00b6 198} In proposition of law L, Skatzes refers to numerous instances where defense counsel failed to object or act effectively throughout trial. We will discuss each in turn.\\nVoir dire\\n{\\u00b6 199} Skatzes asserts six instances of ineffective assistance by counsel during voir dire.\\n{\\u00b6 200} Skatzes claims that counsel failed to object to the trial court's asking each prospective juror if he or she could vote for a death verdict but not mentioning a life verdict. The trial court's initial inquiry to each prospective juror appears to be a fair attempt to ascertain which were capable of sitting on a capital-murder-trial jury. There is no requirement for a trial court to \\\"life qualify\\\" prospective jurors absent a request by defense counsel. State v. Stojetz (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329, syllabus. Failure to do so does not constitute deficient performance.\\n{\\u00b6 201} Skatzes claims that counsel failed to object to the prosecution's \\\"instructing\\\" the jury on the law during voir dire. The prosecution did not improperly instruct the jury when it explained the legal process of capital offenses to prospective jurors. The prosecutor's explanations were balanced and accurate. Skatzes fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by such explanations.\\n{\\u00b6 202} Skatzes claims that counsel failed to ask jurors to state their beliefs about the Aryan Brotherhood, but this did not constitute deficient performance. Trial counsel, who saw and heard the jurors, were in the best position to determine whether such voir dire was needed. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 143-144, 538 N.E.2d 373. Contrary to Skatzes's assertions, jurors who indicated pro-death penalty leanings in their questionnaires were adequately examined about their views during voir dire, including questions concerning the Aryan Brotherhood.\\n{\\u00b6 203} Skatzes claims that counsel failed to challenge prospective juror Brooks. The record indicates that counsel challenged juror Brooks for cause. Moreover, Brooks was later excused when he indicated, before the jury was seated, that he could not sign a verdict.\\n{\\u00b6 204} Skatzes claims that counsel failed to object to the state's example of mitigation using a hypothetical where two men committed multiple murders during a robbery of a store. The prosecution's hypothetical on what constitutes mitigation was not improper, nor were counsel deficient for not continuing to object to it. The statute, R.C. 2929.04(B), requires the jury to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense in mitigation, and the prosecutor's hypothetical example did not falsely characterize mitigation as Skatzes asserts.\\n{\\u00b6 205} Finally, Skatzes claims that counsel failed to object to the prosecution's \\\"instruction\\\" that the jury's verdict had to be unanimous. Skatzes asserts that the prosecutor's response to a juror's question at voir dire violated the decision in State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030. Skatzes's trial, hqwever, was finished approximately five months before Brooks was decided. Moreover, the prosecutor never implied that each mitigating factor had to be agreed upon unanimously to be considered in mitigation. In any event, the jurors were properly instructed on how they could consider factors in mitigation.\\nTrial\\n{\\u00b6 206} Skatzes argues that counsel failed to object to jury instructions and other processes at trial. Skatzes cites nothing specific, however, and he admits that counsel did object to some instructions. Skatzes's bare assertions establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice.\\n{\\u00b6 207} Skatzes claims that counsel were ineffective in failing to object to 49 instances of testimony from various witnesses on the grounds of relevancy. The vast majority of these instances are challenged under other propositions of law, and almost all of the evidence was properly admitted. Otherwise, any error was harmless. Moreover, none of the alleged errors, either individually or collectively, was serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.\\n{\\u00b6 208} Counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to the showing of television commentary during the presentation of State's Exhibit 5. This videotape contained the statement made by prison spokesperson Tess Unwin. Her statement had been cited by several inmate witnesses testifying that the inmates were upset because the statement showed that the state was not taking their demands seriously. Because this videotape was relevant, counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to it.\\nRelevancy\\n{\\u00b6 209} Skatzes next cites four instances where counsel failed to object to testimony and evidence that was irrelevant and should have been rejected under Evid.R. 403(A).\\n{\\u00b6 210} Counsel failed to object to testimony about the selling of marijuana at SOCF and speculation as to who sold it. The failure to object to Brookover's testimony that he sold marijuana at the prison before the takeover did not implicate Skatzes in any way. The testimony likely undercut Brookover's credibility as a prosecution witness. The failure to object to this testimony was not deficient performance.\\n{\\u00b6 211} Counsel failed to object to photographs admitted that were never connected to Skatzes. The \\\"sheer number of photographs\\\" introduced by the state \\u2014 approximately 275 photos of L block after the takeover and over 400 inmate photos \\u2014 did not prejudice Skatzes. Skatzes did not explain how they prejudiced him. See State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 281, 528 N.E.2d 542. Moreover, in Robb, we noted that evidence relating to the \\\"setting of the case\\\" was relevant and admissible. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d at 68, 723 N.E.2d 1019. The inmate photos allowed witnesses to identify participants in the takeover. Counsel were not ineffective in failing to object to the photographs.\\n{\\u00b6 212} Counsel failed to object to the attempt to impeach defense witness Officer Ratcliff. Skatzes's argument that the state improperly explored a variety of objectionable issues (accounts of inmate conduct not attributable to Skatzes, use of a statement Ratcliff did not recall, and implications that Ratcliff suffered from Stockholm syndrome) is unpersuasive. The cross-examination of Ratcliff was not improper, nor was Skatzes prejudiced by it.\\n{\\u00b6 213} Counsel failed to object to the admission of improper victim-impact evidence. Skatzes complains that references to Vallandingham's reputation, Clark's daughter, accounts of non-gang members' hunger, thirst, and fear, and descriptions of murdered inmate Pop Svette were intended to elicit sympathy and bias and that counsel were ineffective in failing to object to such victim-impact testimony. This evidence was offered to establish the context of the takeover, not to show the victim's suffering, the family's grief, or the loss to the community caused by these crimes. See Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720. Counsel were not deficient in failing to object to it, in part, because the victims cannot be separated from the crimes. None of these failures to object constituted ineffective assistance.\\nOther acts\\n{\\u00b6 214} Skatzes argues that counsel were ineffective in failing to object to irrelevant evidence concerning the bad acts of others. Much of this evidence was properly admitted because it was relevant to the roles of the various gangs in the riot, to Skatzes's leadership role, and to the manner in which the gangs wielded their power. This evidence helped prove the conspiracy that occurred over the course of takeover. Moreover, because much of this evidence did not implicate Skatzes in these other crimes, he was not prejudiced by its admission, nor were counsel ineffective in failing to object to it.\\nHearsay\\n{\\u00b6 215} Skatzes complains that counsel were ineffective for not objecting to numerous instances of hearsay testimony by Sgt. Hudson and the inmates' testifying on behalf of the state. As stated earlier, counsel were not ineffective in allowing Hudson to testify as a summary witness. Skatzes claims that it was plain error for the court to admit testimony about the killing or confinement of inmates disfavored by gang leaders, the attack on inmate Fryman, and a poem about the Aryan Brotherhood found in the cell of Aryan leader Freddie Snyder. Skatzes also complains of inmate opinions that Brookover was a snitch and what should be done with him and testimony by inmates Snodgrass, Hazlett, and Lomache that was never tied to Skatzes.\\n{\\u00b6 216} Given the lack of evidence tying Skatzes to some of the incidents in question, defense counsel, in the exercise of their professional judgment, may have decided that the testimony was harmless or even helpful. A decision to object could have drawn undue attention to the testimony. Moreover, objections \\\"tend to disrupt the flow of a trial\\\" and \\\"are considered technical and bothersome.\\\" State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 53, 630 N.E.2d 339. The decisions by defense counsel not to interrupt appear to reflect \\\"an objective standard of reasonable representation.\\\" State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. In any event, the outcome of Skatzes's trial would not have been different even if counsel had objected to the evidence cited by Skatzes. The jury could readily distinguish between evidence that put the takeover in context and evidence that related to the crimes charged against Skatzes.\\nOther alleged failures by counsel\\n{\\u00b6 217} Skatzes claims that counsel were ineffective in failing to object to the admission of audio- and videotapes during trial. Skatzes asserts that the tapes were irrelevant and inflammatory. He further contends that the tunnel tapes were of poor quality and unreliable and were obtained in violation of R.C. 2933.52 et seq. We found the same audiotapes admissible in Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019, and specifically rejected the argument that R.C. 2933.52 et seq. granted any privacy rights to rioting inmates in prison. Id. at 66-67, 723 N.E.2d 1019. Moreover, the audio- and videotapes portrayed important events during the riot as they unfolded at SOCF. Only portions of the tapes were played before the jury, and those portions gave the jury an \\\"appreciation of the nature and circumstances of the crimes.\\\" State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 251, 586 N.E.2d 1042. Skatzes fails to demonstrate how these tapes were \\\"inflammatory.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 218} Although the tunnel tapes were difficult to decipher, Skatzes was free to highlight their shortcomings on cross-examination. Skatzes's argument goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Because the tapes were admissible, counsel were not ineffective in failing to object to them.\\n{\\u00b6 219} Skatzes argues that counsel were ineffective in failing to prepare him to testify on his own behalf. His testimony differed greatly from the state's portrayal of what occurred during the riot and promoted the defense argument that Skatzes was a \\\"peacemaker\\\" during the siege. Even though many of Skatzes's answers to questions were long-winded or rambling, this did not prejudice him. The fact that the jury did not believe his version of what happened during the takeover does not mean that counsel were ineffective in presenting Skatzes's testimony at trial.\\n{\\u00b6 220} Finally, Skatzes claims ineffective assistance in counsel's failure to object to jury instructions, the presence of alternates in the jury deliberation room, and in failing to bring Skatzes's severe mental illness to the attention of the trial court.\\n{\\u00b6 221} With regard to the jury instructions, Skatzes cites Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and contends that counsel failed to take steps to prevent the violation of his right to a sentencing jury \\\"that was fully cognizant of the full weight of its responsibility.\\\" Under R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), the jury determines whether a death specification has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and this requirement does not run afoul of what Ring requires. As we noted in a recent case, Ring is not applicable to Ohio's capital sentencing scheme. See State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, at \\u00b6 69-70.\\n{\\u00b6 222} With regard to the presence of alternates in the deliberation room, as discussed under proposition of law LV, counsel were not ineffective for allowing the alternates to sit in during deliberations nor was Skatzes prejudiced by their presence.\\n{\\u00b6 223} Counsel were not ineffective in not bringing Skatzes's alleged mental illness to the attention of the trial court. As discussed under proposition of law LX, the record does not establish that Skatzes suffers from severe mental illness. Counsel represented Skatzes for many months and became quite familiar with him and most certainly would have raised the issue if any mental illness were present or apparent.\\n{\\u00b6 224} We reject proposition of law L.\\nCONSTITUTIONALITY\\n{\\u00b6 225} In proposition of law LII, Skatzes challenges Ohio's death-penalty statutes on numerous constitutional grounds; as we have before, we summarily reject these claims. See, e.g., Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, syllabus; State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972; State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 529 N.E.2d 192; State v. Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 533 N.E.2d 701; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.\\nCourt of Appeals Issues\\n{\\u00b6 226} In proposition of law LYIII, Skatzes asserts that several issues concerning the record on appeal were not resolved satisfactorily. Most of these issues involve substitute exhibits accepted by the court of appeals in its review of Skatzes's appeal. The court of appeals delayed review of this case for approximately six years in order to obtain a complete record. Exhibits from Skatzes's trial had been removed from the record in this case and used at other trials involving crimes committed during the April 1993 takeover at SOCF. The court of appeals did an admirable job in locating missing exhibits and obtaining duplicate copies of some exhibits. As the court of appeals noted in its opinion: \\\"We are confident that, with the exception of the coroner's sketches, we have been able to supplement the record with true and accurate copies of the exhibits admitted at trial and Skatzes has not advanced a credible argument as to how he was prejudiced by those sketches.\\\" State v. Skatzes, Montgomery App. No. 15848, 2003-Ohio-516, 2003 WL 490549, at \\u00b6 447. Moreover, the trial record need not be \\\"perfect\\\" for purposes of appellate review. State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685, syllabus. We reject proposition of law LVIII.\\n{\\u00b6 227} In proposition of law LIX, Skatzes asserts that the court of appeals erred in allowing the state to supplement the record with written jury instructions that conflicted with the certified transcript and were not properly authenticated. As discussed under proposition of law IX, however, the instruction found in the trial transcript was totally illogical and would have required the jury to find Skatzes culpable only if his acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place before his involvement in the conspiracy. Moreover, the trial court directed the jurors not to take notes during jury instructions because they would have a copy of the instructions in the deliberation room.\\n{\\u00b6 228} The court of appeals obtained the written instructions issued by the trial court that were placed in the jury's deliberation room. It did not err in supplementing the record with the written jury instructions that the trial court essentially encouraged the jury to rely on during deliberations. We reject proposition of law LIX.\\nINDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY\\nAggravating Circumstances\\n{\\u00b6 229} Upon independent assessment, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances in this case:\\n{\\u00b6 230} (1) Skatzes was complicit in the murders of Robert Vallandingham and Earl Elder,\\n{\\u00b6 231} (2) Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of David Sommers while imprisoned in a detention facility [R.C. 2929.04(A)(4) ],\\n{\\u00b6 232} (3) Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of David Sommers as a course of conduct,\\n{\\u00b6 233} (4) Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of David Sommers and had a prior aggravated murder conviction [R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) ], and\\n{\\u00b6 234} (5) Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of David Sommers in connection with aggravated kidnapping [R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) ].\\nMitigating Evidence\\n{\\u00b6 235} At the mitigation hearing, Skatzes presented five witnesses. John Powers, an African-American inmate at SOCF, described Skatzes as a \\\"regular guy, he was like just a straight dude.\\\" He stated that Skatzes was different from other Aryans and was not a racist, and that they respected each other. Powers asserted that Skatzes was \\\"a peacemaker\\\" in prison who had the respect of the prison guards and inmates before the takeover. Powers further testified that during the takeover, Skatzes was helpful to the hostage prison guards and did not want them to die.\\n{\\u00b6 236} Dwayne Johnson, another African-American inmate at SOCF, testified that Skatzes treated him fairly and that Skatzes treated everybody \\\"with utmost respect.\\\" According to Johnson, Skatzes was different from most Aryans. He recalled that Skatzes at one time quelled a potential race war in Ohio Prison Industries. Skatzes was also helpful to injured prison C.O.s during the riot. Johnson described Skatzes as \\\"a pretty likable guy\\\" and feels that Skatzes would be a positive influence on inmates if he were returned to Lucasville.\\n{\\u00b6 237} A third African-American inmate at Lucasville, Wendell Drake, echoed the testimony of the first two mitigation witnesses that Skatzes respected people of all races. Skatzes was at the forefront of the program \\\"Juveniles to Avoid Institutional Lockup,\\\" a \\\"scared straight\\\" type of program to help counsel juvenile delinquents. Drake stated that Skatzes tried to stabilize things during the takeover and would check on the well-being of inmates. Drake felt that Skatzes helped keep the violence to a minimum during the takeover because people respected him. Drake further expressed his belief that Skatzes could do a whole lot of good because there is a lot of good in his heart.\\n{\\u00b6 238} Lucasville inmate Charles Schweingrouber considers Skatzes \\\"a very good friend\\\" of his. He believes that Skatzes could have a positive influence on younger inmates and views Skatzes as a person who always tries to help people and does not lie. According to Schweingrouber, prison guard Jeff Ratcliff would have been in \\\"serious trouble\\\" during the takeover if not for Skatzes's protecting him. During the takeover, Skatzes would walk around, see how everyone was doing, and ensure that everybody had adequate food, water, and medical attention.\\n{\\u00b6 239} SOCF Corrections Officer Jeff Ratcliff testified that Skatzes was an example to younger inmates and helpful to the C.O.s. Ratcliff credits Skatzes with saving his life during the takeover and claims he was helpful in trying to calm down C.O. Darrold Clark during the takeover. He testified that Skatzes was removed from the inmate-negotiating team because he relayed a message to Ratcliffs parents during his radio address.\\n{\\u00b6 240} Skatzes gave a lengthy unsworn statement in which he stated that he disagreed with the jury's guilty verdict but accepted it. He claimed that the witnesses testifying against him were lying and asserted that he would have faced reduced charges for his actions during the takeover if he had snitched on other inmates. Skatzes professed to be \\\"a firm believer in the man upstairs\\\" but that he did not want to \\\"beg somebody else for my life.\\\" He denied being involved in a gang and claimed that he never voted \\\"for that man to be killed, or none of that.\\\" Based on the evidence, Skatzes stated, \\\"I don't see how anybody could justify giving me the death penalty with this kind of evidence coming in here.\\\"\\nSentence Evaluation\\n{\\u00b6 241} The nature and circumstances of the offenses offer nothing in mitigation. Skatzes was a leader in the Aryan Brotherhood during the takeover and exercised his power to help determine who should live and who should die during the takeover. As a member of the inmate-negotiating team, Skatzes repeatedly threatened to kill a prison guard-hostage if certain inmate demands were not met. He threatened that a C.O. would be killed if the water and power were not restored to L block. Robert Vallandingham was murdered when the demand was not met by the deadline Skatzes had mentioned. Skatzes was complicit in the murder of inmate Earl Elder and counseled a younger inmate to \\\"take this guy out.\\\" Skatzes was a principal offender in the murder of inmate David Sommers and kicked Sommers in the head and beat him on the head with a baseball bat.\\n{\\u00b6 242} Skatzes's history, character, and background offer little in mitigation. He was in prison for committing another murder and was firmly immersed in prison culture. Even so, several witnesses opined that Skatzes was a respectful person, a good example to younger inmates, and not a racist.\\n{\\u00b6 243} With respect to the statutory mitigating factors of R.C. 2929.04(B), factor (6) is applicable with regard to the murder of Elder because Skatzes's guilt in that murder was by complicity, not as a principal offender. In view of Skatzes's prominent role in counseling an inmate to kill Elder, this factor is entitled to very little weight in mitigation. See, e.g., State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 71, 752 N.E.2d 904.\\n{\\u00b6 244} As to \\\"other factors,\\\" R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), Skatzes's belief in \\\"the man upstairs\\\" and his work with juvenile offenders in a prison-sponsored program are worthy of some weight in mitigation. Skatzes's role in saving the life of C.O.hostage Jeff Ratcliff is entitled to some weight in mitigation.\\n{\\u00b6 245} Nevertheless, we find that the aggravating circumstances as to the murder of Elder, the murder of Vallandingham, and the murder of Sommers outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Skatzes was a leader in the takeover at SOCF and wielded that power to kill inmate snitches or potential snitches. His claims that he was a peacemaker during the takeover and that he was not involved in the killings of which he is accused lack credibility in light of the evidence.\\n{\\u00b6 246} We further find that the death penalty in this case is both appropriate and proportionate when compared with the death sentences imposed in the other Lucasville cases decided by this court. See Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 750 N.E.2d 90; Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019; and State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166. It is also proportionate to death sentences approved for aggravated murders in detention facilities, see State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585; and for aggravated murder with a prior murder conviction, see State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 570 N.E.2d 229; State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82. It is also proportionate to death sentences approved for aggravated murders during kidnappings, see State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 752 N.E.2d 859; and for aggravated murders as a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons, see State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059, 796 N.E.2d 506; State v. Jordan, 101 Ohio St.3d 216, 2004-Ohio-783, 804 N.E.2d 1; and State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637.\\nMark E. Piepmeier, Special Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, Assistant Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.\\nS. Adele Shank and Gary W. Crim, for appellant.\\n{\\u00b6 247} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nMoyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor and O'Donnell, JJ., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"430945\", \"name\": \"PIRO, Appellee, v. ORANGE VILLAGE, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Piro v. Orange Village\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-07-08\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 69482\", \"first_page\": \"454\", \"last_page\": \"457\", \"citations\": \"112 Ohio App. 3d 454\", \"volume\": \"112\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:18:06.090575+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Patricia Ann Blackmon, P.J., and Patton, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"PIRO, Appellee, v. ORANGE VILLAGE, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"PIRO, Appellee, v. ORANGE VILLAGE, Appellant.\\n[Cite as Piro v. Orange Village (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 454.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.\\nNo. 69482.\\nDecided July 8, 1996.\\nMichael Drain, for appellee.\\nBarry M. Byron, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"1290\", \"char_count\": \"7717\", \"text\": \"Karpinski, Judge.\\nDefendant-appellant, Orange Village, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying Orange's motion to tax costs. In this motion, Orange, as the prevailing party in the administrative appeal, argued that plaintiff-appellee, Sam Piro, should pay all the costs of preparing the transcript for the appeal to common pleas court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court below.\\nSam Piro is a police officer for Orange Village. At the time of the incident which forms the basis for this appeal, Piro held the position of sergeant. On October 8, 1993, Ella Kish and Eleanor Hrezik were driving through Orange Park in Orange Village, where they encountered a group of teenagers playing football in the street. As the women drove past, some of the teenagers harassed the women by yelling obscenities, making obscene gestures, and pounding the car. The women immediately drove to the Orange Police Station and filed a complaint. Piro and two other officers returned with the women to the park to investigate the incident. At the park, Piro was allegedly physically and verbally abusive to some of the youths.\\nThe parents of one of the teenagers made a complaint to Orange Village, whereby Orange brought disciplinary charges against Piro. After a hearing in front of the mayor and police chief, Piro was demoted from sergeant to patrolman and suspended from October 19, 1993, to November 16, 1993. Piro appealed this disciplinary action to the Orange Village Council. After four days of hearing testimony, the council voted to uphold the disciplinary action taken against Piro.\\nPiro filed an administrative appeal to common pleas court pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506. As part of an administrative appeal, Orange had to provide and pay for the transcript from the hearings conducted before the mayor and council. The cost of preparing and filing this transcript was $5,343.90. The common pleas court affirmed the actions Orange Village had taken against Piro. After prevailing, Orange filed a motion to tax costs, arguing that the unsuccessful party who brought the appeal, Piro, should be ordered to pay for the transcript cost initially borne by Orange Village. The trial court denied this motion to tax costs and Orange timely appealed, raising one assignment of error as follows:\\n\\\"The trial court erred by denying appellant's unopposed motion to tax the preparation of transcript as cost.\\\"\\nThe sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by not taxing to Piro the costs of preparing the transcript. Costs are generally covered by Civ.R. 54(D), which states as follows:\\n\\\"Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.\\\"\\nUnder this rule, the first issue is whether there is an express provision in either statute or rule that mandates who pays for the transcript.\\nOrange contends that R.C. 2506.02 directs that the cost of the transcript must be assessed as a cost to the nonprevailing party. R.C. 2506.02 states as follows:\\n\\\"Within forty days after filing the notice of appeal, the officer or body from which the appeal is taken, upon the filing of a praecipe, shall prepare and file in the court to which the appeal is taken, a complete transcript of all original papers, testimony, and evidence offered, heard, and taken into consideration in issuing the final order, adjudication or decision appealed from. The costs of such transcript shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the appeal.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nOrange argues that the last sentence from the Ohio legislature states unequivocally that the transcript cost shall be taxed as a cost to the nonprevailing party.\\nIn furtherance of its argument, Orange cites Smith v. Bd. of Trustees (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 13, 13, 14 O.O.3d 162, 163, 396 N.E.2d 743, 744-745, paragraph two of the syllabus, which states as follows:\\n\\\"Under R.C. 2506.02, the administrative body from which an appeal is taken has the duty, upon the filing of a praecipe, to prepare and file a complete transcript as defined therein, including the duty to initially pay the cost of preparing the same.\\\"\\nOrange asserts that the court's use of the word \\\"initially\\\" implies that the court was of the opinion that while the city pays for the transcript at the time the appeal is made, this cost will be shifted to the nonprevailing party by being taxed as a cost after the case is heard and determined.\\nWe disagree with Orange. Even though R.C. 2506.02 contains the word \\\"shall,\\\" the statute does not mandate that the nonprevailing party must eventually incur the cost of the transcript. Nor is reimbursement to the successful party mandated by Smith, supra, which states only that the successful appellant \\\"could recover the expense,\\\" not \\\"shall.\\\" 60 Ohio St.2d at 14, 14 O.O.3d at 163, 396 N.E.2d at 745. Because nothing in R.C. 2506.02 specifies to whom the cost of the transcript must eventually be taxed, an order splitting the costs, or taxing either one of the sides would not be inconsistent with the statute.\\nThe second issue under Civ.R. 54(D) is whether the trial court erred by not taxing this transcript cost to the losing party. The last portion of Civ.R. 54(D) states that \\\"costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.\\\" On this portion of the rule, the Supreme Court has stated:\\n\\\"Our interpretation of Civ.R. 54(D) is that the phrase 'unless the court otherwise directs' grants the court discretion to order that the prevailing party bear all or part of his or her own costs. We differ from the court of appeals in that we do not believe that such phrase empowers the court to award costs to a non-prevailing party.\\\" (Footnote omitted.) Vance v. Roedersheimer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 555, 597 N.E.2d 153, 156.\\nThe trial court's decision in the case at bar is consistent with the interpretation provided in Vance. The trial court did not award costs to a nonprevailing party. Rather, the court disallowed a cost which the Supreme Court has clarified is to be borne initially by the administrative body.\\nThe Eleventh District Court of Appeals in Horne v. Clemens (1985), 25 Ohio App.3d 44, 45, 25 OBR 118, 495 N.E.2d 441, 442, described the trial court's discretion in disallowing costs as follows:\\n\\\"A trial court's discretion to disallow costs is limited to refusing to tax a litigating expense as a cost only where such expense is an unusual expense in type or amount which because of the prevailing party's conduct it is inequitable to assess against the non-prevailing party.\\\"\\nIn the case at bar, the cost of the transcript was very high ($5,343.90) and could be quite burdensome for an employee to bear. Since the length of the transcript was a result of a seven-day discussion in Orange City Council, the burden of this unusual cost should not fall on the employee. The right of appeal would be made meaningless if the conduct of an administrative body could accelerate, even inadvertently, the costs of an administrative appeal beyond the reach of an employee. Therefore, because the statute does not specifically require the transcript to be taxed to the nonprevailing party and because the decision whether to tax the transcript rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, this assignment of error is overruled.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nPatricia Ann Blackmon, P.J., and Patton, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"501930\", \"name\": \"James Legg v. Samuel Drake\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Legg v. Drake\", \"decision_date\": \"1853-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"246\", \"last_page\": \"252\", \"citations\": \"1 Ohio St. 286\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-21T20:02:18.861595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Harvard\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James Legg v. Samuel Drake.\", \"head_matter\": \"James Legg v. Samuel Drake.\\nIn the argument of a cause before the court or jury, counsel has a right, byway of argument or illustration, either to read from a book a pertinent quotation or extract from a work on science or art, or other publication, adopting it and making it a part of his own address to the jury; but not using, it as evidence in the case.\\nA judgment will not be reversed on error, for the action of the court below, in, regard to a matter resting within its discretion.\\nWhere a party to an action is called upon and introduced as a witness on the trial, by the adverse party, under the act of March, 1850, to improve the law of evidence, the objection to his competency is waived, and he becomes competent as a witness on the trial for all purposes.\\nWhen a witness is produced and examined by a party in an action, even though he be interested to testify against the party calling him, the other party is not limited in his cross-examination to the subject-matter of the examination in chief, but may cross-examine him as to all matters pertinent to the issue on the trial; limited, however, by the rule, that a party can not, be fore the time of opening his own case, introduce his distinct grounds of defense or avoidance, hy the cross-examination of his adversary\\u2019s witnesses-\\nK'VYhen the cross-examination is extended to topics disconnected with the particular facts disclosed in the direct examination, leading questions to the-witness may be proper or improper, according to circumstances, and the-control of this must rest within the discretion of the court.\\nError to the district court of Franklin County.\\nS. W- Andrews, for plaintiff in error.\\nSwayne & Baber for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"2593\", \"char_count\": \"14801\", \"text\": \"Bartley, C. J.\\nThe original suit was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the court of common pleas of Franklin county, wherein the plaintiff below, Samuel Drake, declared against the defendant, James Legg, in case, for a false warranty and deceit in the trade of a horse. It appears that on the trial of the cause at the September term of the common pleas for 1850, on an issue to a jury, on the defendant's plea of not guilty, the plaintiff, after offering evidence tending to prove that he and the defendant, on the 4th day of July, 1849, had traded horses, and that also on the said day, prior to the trade, the parties had held a conversation on the subject of trading horses, at the blacksmith shop of one James Ferguson, called the defendant, James Legg, as a witness, by whom the plaintiff proved the time when and place where the trade took place, the identity of the horses traded, and that the horse traded by the defendant was the same horse that he had talked of trading at the blacksmith shop. On cross-examination, the defendant's counsel asked the witness to state the terms of the trade, also the conversation at the blacksmith shop before mentioned, to which the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection; to which ruling by themourt the defendant excepted.\\nIt further appears that, in the argument of the cause before the court and jury, the defendant's counsel offered to read certain passages from Youatt's work on Veterinary Surgery, the defendant having proven by a witness that the work was a reputable and standard authority on that subject; but not having either exhibited to the witness the particular book *from which he proposed to read, or offered the same in evidence in the cause. The plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection, and refused'to allow the defendant to read from the book in argument; to which ruling,, also, the defendant excepted.\\nYarious other exceptions to the decisions of the court were taken on the trial of the cause; on which, together with the exceptions above mentioned, error is assigned; but it is not deemed necessary to notice any more of them hero.\\nThe trial in the court of common pleas resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff below for sixty dollars and costs, which judgment was on writ of error in the district court of said county of Franklin, at the June term thereof, 1852, affirmed. And the present writ of error is prosecuted in this court to reverse the judgment as affirmed in the district court.\\nThe question presented by the last-mentioned exception, is not whether standard boobs on matters of science and art, when pertinent, can be proven and given in evidence on the trial of the cause; but whether counsel, in their address to the jury, have a right, by way of argument or illustration, to read extracts from works on science not given in evidence. While the right of a party to be heard by his counsel on the trial of his cause is not to be questioned, and is often of great service in the investigation of questions, both of law and of fact; yet, inasmuch as this privilege may be liable to abuse, to the great hindrance and annoyance of courts in the progress of business, the extent and manner of its exercise must in some measure rest in the sound discretion of the court. Although unlimited license in range and extent is not allowed to counsel, in their addresses to the court and jury, yet no pertinent and legitimate process of argumentation within the appropriate time allowed should be restricted or prohibited. And it is not to be denied but that a pertinent quotation or extract from a work on science or art, as well as from a classical, historical, or other publication, may, by way of argument or illustration, be not only admissible, but sometimes highly proper. And it would seem to make no difference whether it was repeated by counsel from recollection or *read from a book. It would be an abuse of this privilege, however, to make it the pretence of getting improper matter before the jury as evidence i,n the cause.\\nIn the case of Rex v. Courvoisier, 9 C. & P. 362, it was adjudged that council had a right to read to the jury the general observations of a learned judge, made in a case tried some years before, on the nature and effect of circumstantial evidence, if he adopted them as his own opinions, and made them part of his address to the jury.\\nBut in the case before us the bill of exceptions does not show 4hat the passage of Youatt's work on veterinary surgery, which the counsel proposed to read, had any relevancy to the cause on trial, or carne within the appropriate and legitimate scope of argument. It is not, therefore, made to appear sufficiently that any right of the party was interfered with, to his injury in this respect; and a judgment will not be reversed on writ of error for the action of the court below, in regard to a matter resting within its discretion.\\nThe error assigned on the other ground of exception to the ruling of the common pleas above mentioned, involves an inquiry as to the extent to which the cross-examination of a party to a suit \\u2022may be carried when made a witness on the trial bjr the adverse party. The act of March, 1850, to improve the law of evidence, authorizes the examination of any party to an action at law, as a witness by the adverse party, \\\" in the same manner, and subject to the same rules of examination, as other witnesses are compelled to testify.\\\" When, therefore, a party in any action avails himself of this provision of the law, and makes his adversary a witness in the cause, he thereby waives the objection to his competency, and places him on the same ground with any other witness in the case, both as to \\u2022competency and as to credibility. So that, when a party to the suit is thus made awitness,hcbecomes competent for all purposes, andmay be subjected to cross-examination as any other witness, with a single qualification that a cross-examination on behalf of the party himself called as a witness, with a view to his own impeachment, would be ^incompatible with his situation as both party and witness; for the reason that he could not allege his own want of credibility.\\nWhat, then, is the legitimate extent of the right to cross-examine .a witness ? It has been held in England, that when a competent witness has been called and sworn on one side, the other party will in strictness bo entitled to cross-examine, although the party calling him has not examined him in chief at all. 2 Phillips' Ev. 397.\\nA different practice, however, has been adopted in this country. Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & R. 72. But when a witness has been examined by one party, whether the right of the other party to cross-examine him is limited to the matters upon which he has already been examined in chief, or extends to the whole ease, does mot appear to be settled by a perfect concurrence of authority.\\nThe case of the Philadelphia and Trenton R. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448, has been understood as limiting the cross-examination of a witness to the facts and circumstances connected with the matter stated in the direct examination.. The question, however, was-not distinctly presented in that case, and the rule on the subject was-only noticed by the court incidentally.\\nBut in the ease of Webster v. Lee, 5 Mass. 334, it is distinctly settled, that where a witness is produced and examined by a party in-an action, even though he be interested to testify against the party calling him, the other party may cross-examine him as to all matters pertinent to the issue on the trial, although the witness could not have been called and examined at his own instance in the first place. And in the case of Merrill et al. v. Berkshire, 11 Pick. 269, it was adjudged that a party calling upon a witness interested against, him, could not confine the cross-examination to matters in which the-witness had no interest. Thus it was ruled in the case of Eden v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238, that where a witness directly interested in favor of the plaintiff in a cause is called and examined by the defendant to prove a particular fact, such as the execution of a bond, the plaintiff *has a right to cross-examine him generally as to the merits of the cause. This decision was subsequently affirmed in the court of errors. 2 Wend. 166. And the case of Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. 483, is to the same effect on this point. In the-case of Morgan v. Bridges, 2 Stark. 279, it was held that where a-party is under the necessity of calling his real adversary to the suit (although n ot a party to the record) for the purpose of formal proof only, he makes him a witness for all purposes, and subject to a crossexaminatiomas to the whole case.\\nThe weight of these authorities is not weakened by the case of Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & R. 72, or Floyd v. Bovard, 6 Watts & S. 75. In the former case, the question was whether a defendant could open his case and introduce the matter of his defense in the cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses; and in the latter, the-question was as to the competency of the witness and the competency of the substance of testimony erroneously rejected.\\nThe term cross-examination would not, perhaps, strictly import any thing more than a leading and searching inquiry of the witness-for further disclosures touching the particular matters detailed -by him in his examination in chief. This, however, is said to be one of the principal and most efficacious tests which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. And inasmuch as it has for its object the disclosure of not merely the extent and degree of accuracy of the witness' knowledge, as well as the means of his knowledge, but also his motives, inclinations, powers of memory, and relative situation in respect to the parties, and the subject-matter of the investigation, it becomes an important test of the credibility of the witness. To limit the cross-examination, therefore, exclusively to the particular facts called out in the direct examination, would often defeat one of its most useful and important objects.\\nIt has been said, it is true, that although the cross-examination generally admits of leading questions, yet if the cross-examination has respect to, and is in reference to new matter *or topics disconnected with the subject-matter of the direct examination, leading questions can not be asked. Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 584. This, however, must rest on the discretion of the court. In the case of Moody v. Rowel, 17 Pick. 490, it was held that, upon the cross-examination of a witness, the court may, in its discretion, permit leading questions to be put, although relating to matters not inquired of upon the direct examination.\\nThe rule, however, that the cross-examination may be extended generally to the merits of the cause, or to any matter embraced in the issue, is limited by the application of another rule, which often becomes important in the trial of a cause, and that is that a party can not, before the time of opening his own case, introduce it to the court or jury by the cross-examination of the witnesses of his adversary. Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & R. 72. The order in which each party may introduce his evidence on the trial of a cause, must, to a great extent, rest in the discretion of the court. But a defendant has no right to go into the distinct matter of his defense, by way of avoidance, before the plaintiff has rested. And to allow a party defendant to do so in the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, would be giving him an undue advantage.\\nIt would appear that the fair conclusion, from all the authorities, is, that the right of cross-examination is not to be limited by the particular facts disclosed in the examination in chief, but may be extended to whatever the party calling, the witness is required to establish to make out and sustain his cause of action or his defense. Thus a witness of the plaintiff may be cross-examined by the defendant touching all matters which it is competent for tbe plaintiff to prove under the issue, in order to entitle him to recover. And, on the other hand, the plaintiff may cross-examine the defendant's \\u2022witnesses to all matters which the defendant may prove under the issue, in order to sustain his defense.\\nIn the case before us, the witness, after having testified as to the time when andthq place where the contract was made, and the identity of the horses tra'ded, was, on cross-examination, tasked to state the terms of the contract, etc., a matter connected somewhat with the subject of the direct examination. It would be toe stringent a practice to thus curtail the right of cross-examination, and would lessen the efficiency of this important test of truth.\\nThe court of common pleas clearly erred in sustaining the objection to the cross-examination; and for this cause the judgment of affirmance in the district court is set set aside, and the judgment of the court of common pleas reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.\\nJudgment reversed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5478461\", \"name\": \"IGNAZIO, Appellant, v. CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING, INC. et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-12-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 04 MA 261\", \"first_page\": \"32\", \"last_page\": \"42\", \"citations\": \"165 Ohio App. 3d 32\", \"volume\": \"165\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:52:31.489441+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Donofrio and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"IGNAZIO, Appellant, v. CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING, INC. et al., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"IGNAZIO, Appellant, v. CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING, INC. et al., Appellees.\\n[Cite as Ignazio v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 165 Ohio App.3d 32, 2005-Ohio-6783.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Mahoning County.\\nNo. 04 MA 261.\\nDecided Dec. 16, 2005.\\nIra Mirkin and Carla Torba, for appellant.\\nThomas Williams and Christine Robek, for appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"4212\", \"char_count\": \"25682\", \"text\": \"Vukovich, Judge.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Diane Ignazio, appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court that granted a stay pending arbitration as sought by defendants-appellees, Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. and others. The issue before us is whether the arbitration agreement provides for a final and binding arbitration award and is enforceable, whether a portion of the arbitration agreement is unenforceable, or whether the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable due to language altering the trial court's standard of review from that set forth in the arbitration statutes. For the following reasons, we hold that the entire agreement is unenforceable. The trial court's stay pending arbitration is reversed, and this case is remanded with instructions that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and appellant can proceed with the lawsuit she filed in the trial court.\\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE\\n{\\u00b6 2} On December 23, 2003, appellant filed an age- and sex-discrimination and wrongful-discharge lawsuit against her employers, Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., and Clear Channel Worldwide, and her supervisors, William Kelly, Robert Hotchkiss, Cornell Bogden, and Brad Marshall. These defendants filed a motion to stay the case pending arbitration, attaching the arbitration agreement signed by appellant in 1999.\\n{\\u00b6 3} Appellant responded in part that the agreement was unenforceable because it provided for an arbitration award that was not final and binding. Her argument was centered on paragraph 10B, entitled \\\"Enforcement,\\\" which provides as follows:\\n{\\u00b6 4} \\\"A party opposing enforcement of an award may bring a separate action in any court of competent jurisdiction to set aside the award, where the standard of review will be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 5} Appellees countered by citing various passages of the arbitration agreement stating that arbitration is final and binding. On November 8, 2004, the trial court found that the agreement clearly states that any dispute submitted for arbitration will be for a \\\"final and binding resolution.\\\" The trial court also stated:\\n{\\u00b6 6} \\\"Although Plaintiff cites language within the arbitration agreement that limits the Court's review of an arbitration award, the Court finds that this does not make the Arbitration agreement unenforceable. The language cited is consistent with the holding in other Ohio cases in that the trial court is precluded from reviewing the merits of the arbitration award except as provided in O.R.C. 2711.10 and O.R.C. 2711.11.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 7} Thus, the trial court stayed the case pending arbitration as provided in R.C. 2711.02(B). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. See R.C. 2711.02(C) (making the granting or denial of a stay pending arbitration a final order).\\nASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR\\n{\\u00b6 8} Appellant sets forth the following three assignments of error:\\n{\\u00b6 9} \\\"The trial court erred in concluding that an award issued pursuant to the agreement in this case is final and binding.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 10} \\\"The trial court erred in concluding that a trial court is precluded from reviewing the merits of an award issued pursuant to the agreement in this case except as provided in O.R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 11} \\\"The trial court erred by staying the proceedings pending arbitration.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 12} These assignments are all based upon the same central premise. Therefore, we shall discuss and analyze them together after setting forth the relevant statutes and case law concerning arbitration agreements.\\nLAW\\n{\\u00b6 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2711.01(A), a written agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable except on grounds existing at law or in equity for revocation of any contract. For instance, an arbitration agreement, like any contract, can be rendered unenforceable if it is found to be unconscionable. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 472, 700 N.E.2d 859.\\n{\\u00b6 14} Once an arbitration award is made, the parties are bound by the decision, absent certain statutory exceptions. Besides invalidation of the agreement to arbitrate, as noted above, there are limited occasions on which a trial court can be asked to review the arbitrator's decision.\\n{\\u00b6 15} Pursuant to R.C. 2711.13, a party to the arbitration may file a motion in the court of common pleas for an order vacating, modifying, or correcting the award as prescribed in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. The standard of review for a request to vacate an arbitration award is set forth in R.C. 2711.10. Vacation of the award is available only if the court finds:\\n{\\u00b6 16} \\\"(A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.\\n{\\u00b6 17} \\\"(B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any of them.\\n{\\u00b6 18} \\\"(C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.\\n{\\u00b6 19} \\\"(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\\\" R.C. 2711.10.\\n{\\u00b6 20} The standard of review for a request to modify or correct an arbitration award is set forth in R.C. 2711.11. Modification or correction of the award is possible only if the court finds:\\n{\\u00b6 21} \\\"(A) There was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award;\\n{\\u00b6 22} \\\"(B) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted;\\n{\\u00b6 23} \\\"(C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.\\n{\\u00b6 24} \\\"The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.\\\" R.C. 2711.11.\\n{\\u00b6 25} As can be seen, the trial court's review of an arbitration award is narrow and limited. The trial court cannot reverse the award merely because it disagrees with findings of fact or with an interpretation of the contract. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union No. 200 (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 516, 520, 71 O.O.2d 509, 330 N.E.2d 703. \\\" 'Courts do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.' \\\" Southwest Ohio Reg. Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 742 N.E.2d 630, quoting United Paperworkers Internatl. Union v. Misco, Inc. (1987), 484 U.S. 29, 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286.\\n{\\u00b6 26} If trial courts acted as appellate courts when reviewing arbitration awards, \\\"arbitration would become only an added proceeding and expense prior to final judicial determination. This would defeat the bargain made by the parties and would defeat as well the strong public policy favoring private settlement of grievance disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements.\\\" Goodyear, 42 Ohio St.2d at 520, 71 O.O.2d 509, 330 N.E.2d 703.\\n{\\u00b6 27} A two-stage process involving arbitration and de novo judicial review destroys the expectation of finality in the arbitration award. See Kelm v. Kelm (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 223, 225-226, 749 N.E.2d 299. \\\" 'The whole purpose of arbitration would be undermined if courts had broad authority to vacate an arbitrator's award.' \\\" Southwest Ohio, 91 Ohio St.3d at 109-110, 742 N.E.2d 630, quoting Mahoning Cty. Bd. of MRDD v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Assn. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 80, 83-84, 22 OBR 95, 488 N.E.2d 872. More specifically, the courts' jurisdiction to review arbitration awards is restricted by R.C. 2711.01 and 2711.11 as set forth above. Miller v. Gunckle, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, 775 N.E.2d 475, \\u00b6 10, citing Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 18 OBR 225, 480 N.E.2d 456.\\n{\\u00b6 28} The question that remains is what happens if the arbitration agreement purports to change the standard of review set forth in the statutes. The Ohio Supreme Court was faced with a case in which an insurer and insured proceeded through arbitration to determine the amount of uninsured-motorist benefits due. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 590 N.E.2d 1242. The arbitration agreement stated that any arbitration award that did not exceed the limits of Ohio's financial-responsibility law was binding on both parties, but if the award exceeded the limits of that law, then either party could demand trial on all issues in court. Id. at 709, 590 N.E.2d 1242.\\n{\\u00b6 29} The arbitration award in that case came out below the legal limits; thus, the agreement categorized the award as binding. Id. Still, the insured filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in the trial court claiming that the aforementioned arbitration clause was unconscionable and against public policy. Id. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question as to whether the clause was unconscionable and reviewed that case as well as another case in which the award was more than the legal limit. Id. at 710, 590 N.E.2d 1242.\\n{\\u00b6 30} There were essentially two plurality positions of the court. One plurality determined that in order for an alternative dispute resolution to be considered actual arbitration, the decision must be \\\"final, binding and without any qualification or condition as to the finality of an award whether or not agreed to by the parties.\\\" Schaefer, 63 Ohio St.3d at 711, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Douglas, J., with A. William Sweeney and Resnick, JJ., concurring). That plurality opined that \\\"binding arbitration\\\" is a redundancy and \\\"nonbinding arbitration\\\" is a contradiction in terms. Id. They concluded that an arbitrator's decision may only be questioned through the procedures in R.C. 2711.13 on the grounds set forth in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11, even if a qualification as to the award's finality is agreed to by the parties. Id. They reasoned that the process is no longer arbitration if the award is appealable. Id. Since the procedure in the parties' agreement did not make any and all awards final and binding, the procedure was not considered to be actual \\\"arbitration.\\\" Id. at 716, 590 N.E.2d 1242.\\n{\\u00b6 31} \\\"By permitting a trial de novo in some instances, the provision unnecessarily subjects the parties to multiple proceedings in a variety of forums, increases costs, extends the time consumed in ultimately resolving a dispute, and eviscerates any advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets. Accordingly, since the provision is not a provision providing for true arbitration, the entire agreement to 'arbitrate' clause is unenforceable.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Id.\\n{\\u00b6 32} Thus, the arbitration agreement reviewed in Schaefer was rendered unenforceable, the arbitration award was invalidated, and the parties were permitted to try their claims in court. This final result was reached due to the concurrence of another plurality of the Supreme Court that opined that the agreement in Schaefer was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and unfair towards the insured. Id. at 721, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only, joined by Moyer, C.J., and H. Brown, J.). The Wright plurality then stated that the other certified case did not involve an unconscionable agreement but the parties could still receive a trial de novo as per the terms of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 722, 590 N.E.2d 1242.\\n{\\u00b6 33} The Wright plurality did not agree with the Douglas plurality's statements that nonbinding arbitration does not exist and that the term \\\"binding arbitration\\\" is a redundancy. Id. at 719, 590 N.E.2d 1242. Their decision opined that Douglas's narrow construction of the word \\\"arbitration\\\" contradicts the existing construction of the word. Id. at 720, 590 N.E.2d 1242. The Wright plurality declared:\\n{\\u00b6 34} \\\"Contrary to the assertions of the plurality, the degree to which parties agree to be bound by an arbitrator's decision flows not from the incantation of the word 'arbitration,' but rather from the parties' intent as expressed through an arbitration agreement. The public policy of this state does not preclude parties from agreeing to bring before an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, prior to the initiation of litigation, a particular set of issues or disputes that may arise between them, or from agreeing further that each party will retain the right to disregard any decision reached through arbitration and seek relief in court in a trial de novo. To the contrary, as evidenced by the passage of R.C. Chapter 179, the promotion of nonbinding arbitration as one of a panoply of alternative dispute resolution techniques is presently favored public policy in our state.\\\" Id.\\n{\\u00b6 35} They concluded that even if the arbitrator's decision in a nonbinding arbitration may not be enforceable under R.C. Chapter 2711, it still may be enforced as a matter of contract law. Id. at 720, 590 N.E.2d 1242. They then stated that an agreement to either binding or nonbinding arbitration gives the trial court authority under R.C. 2711.02 to stay any suit brought pending arbitration. Id. at 721, 590 N.E.2d 1242. Finally, Justice Holmes dissented without an opinion.\\n{\\u00b6 36} Due to the plurality nature of the Douglas opinion in Schaefer, some courts have refused to apply the decision in similar cases. See, e.g., Kolcan v. W. Res. Mut. Cas. Co. (Sept. 15, 1994), 8th Dist Nos. 65582 and 65790, 1994 WL 505275. Other courts have followed Douglas's opinion in Schaefer despite its being a plurality opinion. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Curci (Dec. 8, 1993), 9th Dist. No. 93CA5604, 1993 WL 525855. However, after a more recent Supreme Court case, even the court that previously refused to follow Schaefer now finds that it must follow that precedent. Ghanem v. Am. Greetings Corp., 8th Dist. No. 82316, 2003-Ohio-5935, 2003 WL 22510663 (in a case dealing with the same contractual provision in an insurance contract as in Schaefer).\\n{\\u00b6 37} In this more recent Supreme Court case, the parties agreed to submit their court dispute to arbitration under the local rules of the trial court. Miller v. Gunckle, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, 775 N.E.2d 475, \\u00b64. The arbitrators awarded uninsured-motorist benefits to the insured plus prejudgment interest from the date of the accident. The insurer asked the arbitrators to reconsider on the grounds that prejudgment interest was improper. The arbitrators agreed to defer for the trial court the decision of the date on which prejudgment interest began to run. Id. at If 5. The insured then argued to the court that the arbitrators had no authority to change their first award.\\n{\\u00b6 38} The Supreme Court was eventually faced with three issues: whether the arbitrators were permitted to award prejudgment interest; whether the arbitration panel had authority to reconsider its first award and issue a second award; and whether the insurer is liable for prejudgment interest that causes the total award to exceed the insured's policy limit. Id. at \\u00b6 9. In setting forth the general law on arbitration, a majority of the Supreme Court (including Chief Justice Moyer, who was previously part of the Wright plurality in Schaefer) held:\\n{\\u00b6 39} \\\" 'For a dispute resolution procedure to be classified as \\\"arbitration,\\\" the decision rendered must be final, binding and without any qualification or condition as to the finality of an award.' Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711, 590 N.E.2d 1242. An arbitration award may be challenged only through the procedure set forth in R.C. 2711.13 and on the grounds enumerated in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. Id. 'The jurisdiction of the courts to review arbitration awards is thus statutorily restricted; it is narrow and it is limited.' Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 18 OBR 225, 480 N.E.2d 456.\\\" Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, 775 N.E.2d 475, at \\u00b6 10.\\n{1\\u00cd 40} In determining that the arbitrators were permitted to award prejudgment interest, the Miller court mentioned that the arbitrator is the final judge of both law and fact. Id. at \\u00b6 18, citing Goodyear, 42 Ohio St.2d at 522, 71 O.O.2d 509, 330 N.E.2d 703. Because the arbitrators did not exceed the scope of their power under R.C. 2711.10(D), the Supreme Court stated that the trial court \\\"lacked jurisdiction\\\" to vacate any part of the award. Id. at \\u00b6 21. Then, the Supreme Court determined that the arbitrators had no authority to reconsider or change their own award, stating that R.C. Chapter 2711 confers jurisdiction on the trial court only to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitrator's award under the strict standards set forth in R.C. 2711.10 or 2711.11. Id. at \\u00b6 23.\\n{\\u00b6 41} The Supreme Court was not faced with the issue of whether the arbitration agreement becomes unenforceable where it mentions a de novo trial on issues of fact as in Schaefer or de novo review of questions of law as in this case. Still, the Miller court did set forth law suggesting that a majority of the court believes that a dispute resolution procedure does not encompass arbitration if it is not final and binding due to its allowance of some review different than that set forth in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11.\\nANALYSIS\\n{\\u00b6 42} Here, appellant argues that the arbitration agreement is not final and binding, as it provides for a broader review than that established in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. As previously set forth, the \\\"Enforcement\\\" section of the arbitration agreement, in paragraph 10B on page six, provides:\\n{\\u00b6 43} \\\"A party opposing enforcement of an award may bring a separate action in any court of competent jurisdiction to set aside the award, where the standard of review will be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.\\\"\\n{\\u00b6 44} Appellees note that the agreement contains a severability clause in case any provision is found unenforceable. Appellees also urge that regardless of the above language, the agreement also provides that the award is final and binding various times: twice on page one and once on page two.\\n{\\u00b6 45} Appellant counters, however, by pointing out that another passage in paragraph 9B on page five qualifies the finality by stating, \\\"The arbitration shall be final and binding upon the parties, except as provided in this Agreement.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Later, in paragraph 10A on page six, while detailing a reconsideration procedure, the agreement states that the arbitrator on reconsideration shall \\\"either confirm or change the decision, which (except as provided by this Agreement) shall then be final and conclusive upon the parties.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\n{\\u00b6 46} Appellees insist that appellant is misconstruing the clause in the agreement setting forth the standard of review. They urge that the clause was intended as a limit on the trial court. Although it might be more of a limit than a de novo review of factual issues as existed in Schaefer, it is absolutely no limit compared to the narrow standard of review required in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11 by way of R.C. 2711.13. Notwithstanding appellees' arguments and the trial court's holding to the contrary, the disputed clause in this arbitration agreement clearly attempts to give the parties much greater appellate rights than encompassed in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11.\\n{\\u00b6 47} Specifically, the clause states that the standard of review will be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury. As appellant notes, the standard of review applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court's legal decision is de novo. See, e.g., Lovewell v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 143, 144, 679 N.E.2d 1119 (construction of a contract is a legal decision). Moreover, the appellate court can review certain applications of law to fact under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 658, 635 N.E.2d 331 (review of good-faith effort to settle when awarding prejudgment interest). Additionally, the appellate court can reverse a trial court's decision if it finds that certain factual determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-80, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273; C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280-281, 8 O.O.3d 261, 376 N.E.2d 578.\\n{\\u00b6 48} Although the agreement allows the trial court to apply these various standards on review to any award, none of these standards are permissible under R.C. Chapter 2711. As set forth above, the trial court has no jurisdiction to conduct such a review of an arbitration award.\\n{\\u00b6 49} As appellees note, there is some final and binding language in the case before us. But, see, Schaefer, 63 Ohio St.3d at 715-716, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (in which the Douglas plurality found that any prior language referring to a final and binding decision was amended out of existence when the modified agreement provided for de novo review of all issues). Yet the final and binding language here is qualified (with \\\"except as otherwise provided\\\" language) twice out of the five times cited. That qualification, the altered standard of review, and the general law set forth by the Douglas plurality in Schaefer and adopted by a majority in Miller all compel a holding that any arbitration award issued under the arbitration agreement in this case would not be final and binding.\\n{\\u00b6 50} Even so, there remains debate as to whether we must declare the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable or whether we could merely hold the standard of review clause to be unenforceable, making any arbitration decision subject only to the statutory review standards in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. The Douglas plurality in Schaefer required the entire agreement to be invalidated based upon the altered standard-of-review clause because it described a procedure which was not intended to be actual arbitration.\\n{\\u00b6 51} The agreement here purports to allow de novo review of legal issues and a generally greater standard of review than is permitted under the arbitration statutes. See R.C. 2711.10, 2711.11, or 2711.13. However, it is well established that \\\" '[cjourts do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.' \\\" Southwest Ohio Reg. Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 91 Ohio St.3d at 110, 742 N.E.2d 630, quoting United Paperworkers Internatl. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286.\\n{\\u00b6 52} The Miller court, which was a majority decision, specifically quoted the following passage from Schaefer:\\n{\\u00b6 53} \\\" 'For a dispute resolution procedure to be classified as \\\"arbitration,\\\" the decision rendered must be final, binding and without any qualification or condition as to the finality of an award.' Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711, 590 N.E.2d 1242. An arbitration award may be challenged only through the procedure set forth in R.C. 2711.13 and on the grounds enumerated in R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. Id. 'The jurisdiction of the courts to review arbitration awards is thus statutorily restricted; it is narrow and it is limited.' Warren Edn. Assn. v. Warren City Bd. of Edn. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, 18 OBR 225, 480 N.E.2d 456.\\\" Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, 775 N.E.2d 475, at \\u00b6 10.\\n{\\u00b6 54} Thus, we rely on more than just the Douglas plurality from Schaefer. Applying the Miller holding, we conclude that the agreement herein is not classified as arbitration, because a decision to be rendered under it would not be \\\"final, binding and without any qualification or condition as to the finality of the award.\\\" An award is not final and binding where it provides for review by a trial court greater than that expressly set forth in the arbitration statutes.\\n{\\u00b6 55} When an agreement gives the trial court a standard of review equal to that of an appellate court's typical review power, but where the arbitration statutes do not permit such review, the agreement is not classified as arbitration. In other words, the qualifications on the finality of the award make the agreement unenforceable under R.C. Chapter 2711. Since it is no longer considered an arbitration agreement, the trial court cannot stay the proceedings pending arbitration.\\n{\\u00b6 56} The offending clause is not severable, allowing enforcement of the remainder of the agreement, because that clause rendered the arbitration classification itself a nullity. The disputed-clause goes to whether there is an arbitration agreement, not just whether certain clauses will pertain to arbitration.\\n{\\u00b6 57} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's stay pending arbitration is reversed and this case is remanded with instructions that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable and appellant can proceed with the lawsuit she filed in the trial court.\\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded.\\nDonofrio and DeGenaro, JJ., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5553366\", \"name\": \"Volibar Realty Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Volibar Realty Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-06-08\", \"docket_number\": \"2006-0255\", \"first_page\": \"1498\", \"last_page\": \"1498\", \"citations\": \"109 Ohio St. 3d 1498\", \"volume\": \"109\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:06:38.451546+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Volibar Realty Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision.\", \"head_matter\": \"2006-0255.\\nVolibar Realty Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision.\", \"word_count\": \"82\", \"char_count\": \"475\", \"text\": \"Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2003-T-633, 2003-T-648, and 2003-T-649. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals. Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion to remand this cause to the Board of Tax Appeals,\\nIT IS ORDERED by the court that the motion is granted and this cause is remanded to the Board of Tax Appeals to implement the settlement agreement of the parties.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5589566\", \"name\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-09-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2006-0067\", \"first_page\": \"284\", \"last_page\": \"288\", \"citations\": \"110 Ohio St. 3d 284\", \"volume\": \"110\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:58:54.613949+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Resnick, Pfeifer, O\\u2019Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman.\", \"head_matter\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman.\\n[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman, 110 Ohio St.3d 284, 2006-Ohio-4480.]\\n(No. 2006-0067\\nSubmitted March 15, 2006\\nDecided September 13, 2006.)\", \"word_count\": \"1597\", \"char_count\": \"10186\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Respondent, Howard Joel Freedman of Chagrin Falls, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0016247, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1970.\\n{\\u00b6 2} On December 6, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with having allowed improper notarization of his wife's signature on loan documents and with having thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a hearing at which respondent testified and stipulations and exhibits were submitted. The panel made findings of misconduct, which the board adopted, and a recommendation, which the board modified, recommending a more lenient sanction.\\nMisconduct\\n{\\u00b6 3} Respondent practices in commercial-real-estate and business law. In 2002, respondent obtained a $70,000 loan from JAAL, Inc. The loan was secured by a second mortgage on property in Pepper Pike, Ohio, that respondent co-owned with his wife, Rita Montlack. The loan terms also required respondent to sign a cognovit note and to execute with his wife a quitclaim deed transferring the property to JAAL in case of default.\\n{\\u00b6 4} The mortgage instrument and deed required respondent's and Montlack's notarized signatures, and the jurat on each document applied to authenticate both signatures. On April 21, 2002, respondent asked Loma J. Fried, an associate attorney in his office who routinely acted as a notary for him, to notarize the signatures. Respondent signed the mortgage and deed, but he left blank the signature lines for his wife's name. Fried notarized both documents. Fried filed an affidavit in this case stating that she had trusted that respondent would not ask her to improperly notarize a document, and therefore she did not examine the jurat language and did not realize that she was notarizing Montlack's signature despite the fact that it did not appear on either the mortgage or the deed.\\n{\\u00b6 5} After Fried notarized the mortgage and deed, respondent signed Mont-lack's name on both documents. Respondent and JAAL consummated the loan, and in April 2002, JAAL recorded the mortgage on the Pepper Pike property.\\n{\\u00b6 6} In November 2002, Montlack filed for divorce, and her complaint included JAAL as a defendant. JAAL counterclaimed, attempting to establish that Montlack's \\u00f3ne-half interest in the Pepper Pike property was encumbered by JAAL's lien. In reply, Montlack alleged that she had not authorized respondent to sign the mortgage or the quitclaim deed on her behalf and that her purported signatures were forgeries. In November 2003, however, Montlack signed an affidavit to the effect that she had \\\"authorized and/or ratified\\\" respondent's signing her name on the mortgage and deed and waived all claims and defenses she had concerning the execution of those documents.\\n{\\u00b6 7} Respondent eventually defaulted on the first and second mortgages on the Pepper Pike property, and in March 2003, JAAL obtained a judgment against him for $72,275 plus interest. The property was sold in a foreclosure sale, but the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy any of JAAL's judgment.\\n{\\u00b6 8} At the panel hearing, respondent testified that although he did not have his wife's specific authority to sign the JAAL mortgage and quitclaim deed, she had always allowed him to sign financial documents for her prior to this transaction and he thought he had signed with her consent. Respondent also claimed that his wife did not suffer financially from the transaction because she is not responsible for the debt to JAAL and they would have lost the Pepper Pike property anyway due to financial problems.\\n{\\u00b6 9} The board did not find any misconduct with respect to respondent's signing the documents on Montlack's behalf. Respondent stipulated and the board found, however, that by having the mortgage and deed notarized improperly, respondent had violated DR 1 \\u2014 102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation) and 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice).\\nRecommended Sanction\\n{\\u00b6 10} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel and board weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (\\\"BCGD Proc.Reg.\\\"). Both found an aggravating factor in that respondent had acted with a dishonest motive. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).\\n{\\u00b6 11} In mitigation, the panel and board found that respondent had no prior record of professional discipline and was very cooperative and forthcoming throughout the disciplinary process. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d). Respondent also had expressed genuine remorse, sadness, and embarrassment over his misconduct, especially because he had involved Fried in it. The panel and board further found that respondent is of good character, has a fine professional reputation, and is very active in the community, including serving on the Cleveland Bar Association's real-estate-law committee and the boards of several nonprofit organizations.\\n{\\u00b6 12} The parties jointly recommended a public reprimand, citing precedent that they believed supported that sanction. The panel determined that the cases cited by the parties were distinguishable from this case, observing that those cases had involved technical violations of a notary public's responsibilities, whereas respondent had intentionally had the mortgage and deed notarized improperly. Finding respondent's misconduct to be more egregious than the misconduct in the cited cases, the panel recommended that respondent's license to practice be suspended for six months, but that the suspension be stayed provided that respondent commit no further misconduct and that respondent be placed on probation for one year.\\n{\\u00b6 13} The board recommended that respondent receive a public reprimand for his violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6).\\nReview\\n{\\u00b6 14} We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (6), as found by the board. For the reasons cited by the panel, however, we hold that a stayed six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in this case.\\n{\\u00b6 15} In Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Melnick, 107 Ohio St.3d 240, 2005-Ohio-6265, 837 N.E.2d 1203, and Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty, 105 Ohio St.3d 307, 2005-Ohio-1825, 825 N.E.2d 1094, we publicly reprimanded lawyers who avoided for their convenience the requirements of proper notarization. The lawyer in Dougherty notarized a signature on a liquor-permit application without witnessing the signing. The lawyer in Melnick committed similar misconduct with respect to several signatures.\\n{\\u00b6 16} Respondent did not simply circumvent for convenience the notarization requirements. He took advantage of Fried's carelessness and consciously signed Montlack's name to the documents after they had been notarized. Though respondent had his wife's authority to act on her behalf, his misconduct nevertheless required JAAL to defend against allegations in Montlack's divorce action.\\n{\\u00b6 17} Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months; however, the suspension is stayed on the condition that respondent commit no further misconduct during the six-month stay. If respondent violates the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent shall serve the entire six-month suspension.\\n{\\u00b6 18} Costs are taxed to respondent.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nResnick, Pfeifer, O'Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.\\nMoyer, C.J., Lundberg Stratton and O'Connor, JJ., concur in judgment.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/5759624.json b/ohio/5759624.json
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+"{\"id\": \"5759624\", \"name\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Rayve\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Rayve\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2012-0534\", \"first_page\": \"1226\", \"last_page\": \"1229\", \"citations\": \"132 Ohio St. 3d 1226\", \"volume\": \"132\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:00:01.864428+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O\\u2019Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Rayve.\", \"head_matter\": \"Disciplinary Counsel v. Rayve.\\n[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Rayve, 132 Ohio St.3d 1226, 2012-Ohio-2755.]\\n(No. 2012-0534\\nSubmitted June 1, 2012\\nDecided June 5, 2012.)\", \"word_count\": \"1204\", \"char_count\": \"7088\", \"text\": \"{\\u00b6 1} This cause is pending before the Supreme Court of Ohio in accordance with the reciprocal-discipline provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F).\\n{\\u00b6 2} On March 28, 2012, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed with this court a certified copy of an order of the United States Patent and Trademark Office entered February 6, 2012, in In re Rayve, case No. D2011-19, suspending respondent for three years with two years stayed and placing him on probation for four years. On April 11, 2012, this court ordered respondent to show cause why identical or comparable discipline should not be imposed. Respondent did not respond to the order to show cause.\\n{\\u00b6 3} On consideration thereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this court that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4), respondent, Brian Richard Rayve, Attorney Registration No. 0041708, last known business address in Park City, Utah, is suspended for three years with two years stayed and will not be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio until such time as respondent is reinstated to the practice of law in the United States Patent and Trademark Office.\\n{\\u00b6 4} It is further ordered that respondent immediately cease and desist from the practice of law in any form and that he is forbidden to appear on behalf of another before any court, judge, commission, board, administrative agency, or other public authority.\\n{\\u00b6 5} It is further ordered that respondent is forbidden to counsel or advise or prepare legal instruments for others or in any manner perform such services.\\n{\\u00b6 6} It is further ordered that respondent is divested of each, any, and all of the rights, privileges, and prerogatives customarily accorded to a member in good standing of the legal profession of Ohio.\\n{\\u00b6 7} It is further ordered that before entering into an employment, contractual, or consulting relationship with any attorney or law firm, respondent shall verify that the attorney or law firm has complied with the registration requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(3). If employed pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G), respondent shall refrain from direct client contact except as provided in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(G)(1) and from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling any client trust funds or property.\\n{\\u00b6 8} It is further ordered that pursuant to Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), respondent shall complete one credit hour of continuing legal education for each month, or portion of a month, of the suspension. As part of the total credit hours of continuing legal education required by Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), respondent shall complete one credit hour of instruction related to professional conduct required by Gov.Bar R. X(3)(A)(1) for each six months, or portion of six months, of the suspension.\\n{\\u00b6 9} It is further ordered by the court that within 90 days of the date of this order, respondent shall reimburse any amounts that have been awarded against respondent by the Clients' Security Fund pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F). It is further ordered by the court that if, after the date of this order, the Clients' Security Fund awards any amount against respondent pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VIII(7)(F), respondent shall reimburse that amount to the Clients' Security Fund within 90 days of the notice of such award.\\n{\\u00b6 10} It is further ordered that respondent shall not be reinstated to the practice of law in Ohio until (1) respondent complies with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (2) respondent complies with the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (3) respondent files evidence with the clerk of this court and with disciplinary counsel demonstrating his reinstatement to the practice of law in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, (4) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court, and (5) this court orders respondent reinstated.\\n{\\u00b6 11} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order, respondent shall:\\n{\\u00b6 12} 1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters and any co-counsel of respondent's suspension and consequent disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and, in the absence of co-counsel, also notify the clients to seek legal service elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency in seeking the substitution of another attorney in his place;\\n{\\u00b6 13} 2. Regardless of any fees or expenses due respondent, deliver to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client or notify the clients or co-counsel, if any, of a suitable time and place where the papers or other property may be obtained, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining such papers or other property;\\n{\\u00b6 14} 3. Refund any part of any fees or expenses paid in advance that are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or property in the possession or control of respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 15} 4. Notify opposing counsel or, in the absence of counsel, the adverse parties in pending litigation of respondent's disqualification to act as an attorney after the effective date of this order and file a notice of disqualification of respondent with the court or agency before which the litigation is pending for inclusion in the respective file or files;\\n{\\u00b6 16} 5. Send all notices required by this order by certified mail with a return address where communications may thereafter be directed to respondent;\\n{\\u00b6 17} 6. File with the clerk of this court and the disciplinary counsel of the Supreme Court an affidavit showing compliance with this order, showing proof of service of notices required herein, and setting forth the address where the affiant may receive communications; and\\n{\\u00b6 18} 7. Retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken by respondent pursuant to this order.\\n{\\u00b6 19} It is further ordered that until such time as respondent fully complies with this order, respondent shall keep the clerk and the disciplinary counsel advised of any change of address where respondent may receive communications.\\n{\\u00b6 20} It is further ordered that all documents filed with this court in this case shall meet the filing requirements set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, including requirements as to form, number, and timeliness of filings.\\n{\\u00b6 21} It is further ordered that service shall be deemed made on respondent by sending this order, and all other orders in this case, by certified mail to the most recent address respondent has given to the Office of Attorney Services.\\n{\\u00b6 22} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(1), that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(D)(2), and that respondent bear the costs of publication.\\nO'Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/5760386.json b/ohio/5760386.json
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+"{\"id\": \"5760386\", \"name\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. King\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Columbus Bar Ass'n v. King\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-03-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2011-1418\", \"first_page\": \"501\", \"last_page\": \"505\", \"citations\": \"132 Ohio St. 3d 501\", \"volume\": \"132\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:00:01.864428+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O\\u2019Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. King.\", \"head_matter\": \"Columbus Bar Association v. King.\\n[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. King, 132 Ohio St.3d 501, 2012-Ohio-873.]\\n(No. 2011-1418\\nSubmitted October 5, 2011\\nDecided March 6, 2012.)\", \"word_count\": \"1503\", \"char_count\": \"9521\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Respondent, Ray Jetmore King of Gahanna, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0020733, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1974. Relator, Columbus Bar Association, and respondent stipulated to the facts and misconduct alleged in relator's amended complaint. A three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard testimony in the case, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately recommended that we suspend respondent's license to practice law for two years. The board adopted the panel's report in full.\\n{\\u00b6 2} The parties did not object to the board's report, and we ordered respondent to show cause why we should not adopt the board's report and recommendation. On review, we find that respondent committed the stipulated violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and hereby suspend respondent's license to practice law for two years.\\nMisconduct\\nCounts One through Three\\n{\\u00b6 3} Respondent's stipulated misuse of his client trust account is the basis of these three counts of misconduct. Respondent stipulated that he had deposited into his client trust account money from, or payable to, two clients \\u2014 a corporation and an estate. A short time later, respondent began using both clients' funds to pay his personal and office expenses, and he continued to do so for several months. This frequently resulted in a balance in the client trust account that was less than the amount held in trust for these clients. To remedy this, respondent, on several occasions, deposited personal funds into his client trust account. Three of these deposits exceeded $15,000.\\n{\\u00b6 4} All the debts of the estate in Count Two were eventually paid in full. The $100,000 belonging to the corporate client in Count One was also repaid, but only after the client's unsuccessful efforts to secure a return of its money prompted it to file a grievance against respondent. Respondent initially attempted to justify his failure to promptly return these funds by alleging that the amount owed to the client was in dispute and that he had always been willing and able to remit the amount that was not being contested. Respondent later stipulated, however, that the disputed amount, if any, was minimal. He also stipulated that his professed ability to repay these funds at any time was untrue, because the balance in the client trust account was often insufficient to do so. Finally, respondent admitted that his delay in returning these funds financially harmed his client.\\n{\\u00b6 5} Respondent further stipulated that he did not properly maintain and oversee his client trust account. In addition to the improprieties just discussed, respondent's recordkeeping was haphazard. His admitted failure to keep an individual client ledger for each client made it extremely difficult to determine the clients to which various withdrawals and deposits pertained.\\n{\\u00b6 6} Respondent has stipulated that his misuse of his client trust account constituted violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (failure to maintain complete records of clients' funds), 1.15(c) (failure to keep client funds separate from those of the lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). He has also stipulated that in Counts One and Two, he did not promptly return his clients' money, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (failure to promptly deliver funds that the client is entitled to receive). Respondent lastly concedes that, in Count One, he improperly held funds belonging to his client and attempted to defend his action by fabricating a fee dispute. Respondent has stipulated that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(e) (improperly holding funds in dispute) and 8.4(c).\\n{\\u00b6 7} The board concluded that respondent had engaged in all of the stipulated misconduct and had committed all of the stipulated violations. We agree and accept these findings of misconduct.\\nCount Four\\n{\\u00b6 8} Respondent stipulated that he did not maintain malpractice insurance throughout much of 2009 and 2010 and did not inform many of his clients. Respondent stipulated that these actions violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (failure to notify clients in writing that the attorney does not maintain professional-liability insurance).\\n{\\u00b6 9} The board concluded that respondent had engaged in all of the stipulated misconduct and had committed the stipulated violation. We agree and accept these findings.\\nCount Five\\n{\\u00b6 10} Respondent stipulated that the misconduct set forth in Counts One through Four constituted a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects upon his fitness to practice law).\\n{\\u00b6 11} The board concluded that respondent had engaged in the stipulated misconduct and had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). We agree and accept this finding regarding misconduct.\\nSanction\\n{\\u00b6 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider relevant factors, including the duties violated by the lawyer in question and sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, \\u00b6 16. Before making a final determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10. Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Troy, 121 Ohio St.3d 51, 2009-Ohio-502, 901 N.E.2d 809, \\u00b6 11.\\n{\\u00b6 13} In this case, the board found four aggravating factors. It found that respondent had (1) submitted false statements during the disciplinary investigation, (2) acted with a dishonest and selfish motive, (3) engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and (4) committed multiple offenses. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), and (f). It also found one mitigating factor \\u2014 the absence of any prior disciplinary record. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). The board, however, did not agree with the parties' stipulation that respondent's cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding was an additional mitigating factor. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d). The board felt that respondent's eventual cooperation in the disciplinary process was outweighed by his fabrication of a fee dispute and other misrepresentations that respondent initially made in response to the grievance filed against him in Count One.\\n{\\u00b6 14} The board recommended that respondent's license to practice law be suspended for two years and that reinstatement be premised on the following conditions: (1) respondent's completion of a minimum of 12 hours of continuing legal education related to accounting and law-practice management and (2) monitored probation for one year following reinstatement. The board further recommended that the costs of these proceedings be taxed to respondent.\\n{\\u00b6 15} We accept the board's recommendation. In reviewing sanctions in similar cases regarding misuse of client funds, we find Disciplinary Counsel v. Crosby, 124 Ohio St.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-6763, 921 N.E.2d 225, to be instructive. There, as here, the attorney used his client trust account to pay for personal and business expenses, commingled personal funds with those held in trust for his clients, and did not maintain accurate records for funds deposited into his client trust account. In imposing a two-year sanction, we stressed:\\nEven before the General Assembly authorized the creation of IOLTAs in R.C. 4705.09, we explained that the \\\"mishandling of clients' funds either by way of conversion, commingling or just poor management, encompasses an area of the gravest concern of this court in reviewing claimed attorney misconduct.\\\" Columbus Bar Assn. v. Thompson (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 667, 669, 23 O.O.3d 541, 433 N.E.2d 602. We have also reiterated a number of times that \\\"it is 'of the utmost importance that attorneys maintain their personal and office accounts separate from their clients' accounts' and that any violation of that rule 'warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has been harmed.' \\\" Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 381, 2006-Ohio-1194, 843 N.E.2d 1198, \\u00b6 15, quoting Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Commt. v. Miles (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 574, 577, 669 N.E.2d 831.\\nId. at \\u00b6 15.\\n{\\u00b6 16} In the case at bar, respondent not only committed the same misconduct as that in Crosby, he additionally fabricated a fee dispute in order to justify his failure to promptly return his corporate client's money. For these reasons, we find that a lesser sanction is inappropriate. Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for two years with reinstatement contingent upon his completion of a minimum of 12 hours of continuing legal education related to accounting and law-practice management in addition to the continuing-legal-education requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, followed by a one-year period of monitored probation. Costs are taxed to respondent.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nO'Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.\\nMazanee, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., and Michael S. Loughry; and Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator.\\nRay Jetmore King, pro se.\\n. A failure to keep client funds separate from those of the lawyer falls under Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), not 1.15(e). We consider the error in citation within the record to be inadvertent.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/579826.json b/ohio/579826.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00db588fda74f2108a1c0516bbc20ab4d1fe1ad5
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"579826\", \"name\": \"Moses Eldred v. James H. Sexton\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eldred v. Sexton\", \"decision_date\": \"1831-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"197\", \"last_page\": \"198\", \"citations\": \"5 Ohio 215\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:44:55.441733+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Moses Eldred v. James H. Sexton.\", \"head_matter\": \"Moses Eldred v. James H. Sexton.\\nTax collector justifies as such, proof of acting and general reputation sufficient.\\nThis cause came before the court upon a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Lorain county.\\nThe defendant in error brought an action' of trespass against the plaintiff in error for taking and converting a yoke of oxen; judgment for the defendant by the justice, and appeal. In the common pleas a declaration in trespass was filed, and Eldred, the defendant there, on the plea of the general issue, filed a notice, that at the trial he would prove that before the alleged trespass, he was treasurer of school district No. 3; that a majority of the \\u25a0directors of the school district called a meeting of the householders and others liable to pay a tax for building and repairing .school-houses, at which meeting it was decided to raise money to repair the school-house, etc. Setting forth'a regular assessment *of tax for that purpose, and that a certain amount of tax was assessed upon Sexton, and put in Eldred\\u2019s hands, as treasurer, to collect; that Sexton refused to make payment, and that the seizure and sale was made, according to law, to make the amount.\\nAt the trial, Eldred under his notice offered to prove by parol that at .the time .of taking the property he acted as treasurer of the school district named, and was reputed to be treasurer and \\u2022collector. To this testimony the plaintiff objected, and it was overruled by the court. The defendant took his bill of exceptions. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for fifty-one dollars and five cents and costs, to reverse which this writ of error was brought.\\nNo argument was submitted, for the plaintiff.\\nWilley, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"419\", \"char_count\": \"2389\", \"text\": \"By the Court :\\nThe question raised in the case seems.to have been settled by this court, in the case of Johnson v. Steadman, 3 Ohio, 94. In \\u2022that case it was decided that a person who has justified an act, upon the ground that he was a constable, might establish his official character by general reputation, and proof that he acted as such. We are not disposed to change the principle established in that case. In fact, we are satisfied that it is more consistent with the end of justice, than to establish a contrary rule of evidence. We do not say that such evidence is conclusive; but that, it is prima facie, and, unless contradicted, must be conclusive.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/622888.json b/ohio/622888.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c903453b3eabdc22d81bdd0cb4eabc77a94291f1
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"622888\", \"name\": \"Klovedale, Appellant, v. The Ohio Public Service Co., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Klovedale v. Ohio Public Service Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-09-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"244\", \"last_page\": \"250\", \"citations\": \"54 Ohio Ct. App. 244\", \"volume\": \"54\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:19:21.614722+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Lemert, P. J., and Montgomery, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Klovedale, Appellant, v. The Ohio Public Service Co., Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Klovedale, Appellant, v. The Ohio Public Service Co., Appellee.\\n(Decided September 29, 1936.)\\nMr. Lewis Brucher and Mr. H. M. Bust, for appellant.\\nMessrs. Henhel S Gongwer, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1973\", \"char_count\": \"10976\", \"text\": \"Sherick, J.\\nThis cause comes into this court on the plaintiff's appeal on a question of law arising out of the direction of a verdict by the trial court in defendant's favor, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. Prior thereto, Ethel M. Grump had been dismissed as a party defendant to the action. No complaint is registered as to the court's action in this respect.\\nBefore any statement of the issues as made by the pleading and the evidence is attempted, it seems necessary to epitomize the setting of this accident.\\nLexington avenue, a busy thoroughfare, runs south from the hub of the city of Mansfield, Ohio. At a point thereon, Scholl road on the east and Davis road on the west flow into Lexington avenue. Both roads enter from the south at angles of about thirty degrees with respect to the main artery, so that the streets at this point, were they cut off south of the intersection, are like unto a three-pronged fork. Lexington avenue is a thirty foot street, as is Scholl road. Davis road has an eighteen foot roadway. The point made by the intersection of Lexington avenue and Scholl road is rounded off. On the evening of this accident, the appellee's bus, headed south, had stopped at this point, two feet off of the Lexington avenue roadway. This was a regular stop. The bus had been standing there for two or three minutes. Its only door was at the front right end. This door had then been closed. For the immediate purpose of this action, appellant is found near a tree on the west side of Davis road, about twenty feet below its point of intersection with Lexington avenue. In some manner, not precisely disclosed by the evidence, the appellant, intending to board the bus, crossed the point of intersection made by Davis road and Lexington avenue, on Lexington avenue, and \\u00e1t a point some place between the center line of Lexington avenue and four feet from the bus door, was struck by defendant Gump's car, which was being driven north, with headlights lighted, and seriously injured. It is not claimed that appellee's bus was parked on the left hand side of Lexington avenue.\\nThe appellant asserts that the bus company was negligent in the choice of its stop and in receiving and discharging passengers thereat; that it was not done at a place of safety. It is also maintained that the bus driver, after seeing her in a perilous position, made no effort to warn her, and that it was his duty to do so. The appellee denied all claims of negligence upon its part. It admitted that appellant had placed herself in the way of dangerous traffic. It charged that the direct and proximate cause of appellant's injury was her own negligence. The trial court sustained' the motion for directed verdict upon two theories: First, that no negligence on the part of the bus company was the direct or proximate cause of the accident; second, that the plaintiff's evidence strongly presupposed negligence upon her part, which contributed directly to her injury.\\nWe might hastily conclude in all propriety that the trial court was right in finding from the evidence that the appellant had voluntarily and knowingly placed herself in a position of great danger, when she might have boarded this or another bus at a point or by a way known by her to be safe, and that her known utilization of the dangerous way, as evidenced, clearly established negligence upon her part which contributed directly to her injury; but to so abruptly end the matter would be to disregard the principal questions made, respecting a bus company's duties towards one who intended to become a passenger at a regular stop, when that intention was not communicated to the bus driver. At the risk of a charge that what we shall hereinafter say is purely obiter, we propose to express the views within us on the questions so strenuously argued.\\nUnlike those utilities which operate on their own properties, bus companies more closely resemble street car companies, which operate upon city Streets over which they exercise no control, the principal difference being found in that busses are driven over all portions of streets available for vehicles and not upon a certain fixed track. Our Supreme Court, in Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Crooks, 125 Ohio St., 280, 181 N. E., 102, has so recognized. This was a case of one alighting in the midst of traffic, who had been carried beyond the regular stop at the curb. In view of the court's comment at page 282, that \\\"the safe and sane point for the stoppage of a motor bus, whether the stop be regular or irregular, is at the curb, where there can be no danger to the passenger who is alighting from vehicular traffic,\\\" a rule of reason and conduct is suggested for future guidance. It can be rightfully assumed that the same position be taken upon picking up passengers. There is, however, a further point of difference. A bus can discharge a passenger at a particular place, but a carrier can not control the action of one on a public street where he has a lawful right to be, or require him to approach a waiting bus by a particular course or direction. In this controversy, the bus was parked at the curb without the bounds of the traveled portion of Lexington avenue. One could have entered it without incurring the risk of entering upon the traveled thoroughfare. This being true, it must be conceded as an established fact that the bus was standing in a safe place.\\nThe same court in Reining v. Traction Co., 107 Ohio St., 528, 140 N. E., 84, considered the question if a carrier was bound to warn one alighting from a street car of traffic dangers. The court answered no, which is in accord with the majority holdings. Keeping in mind what we have previously stated, it appeals to us with greater force that a street car company or bus carrier is not bound to warn those seeking transportation of the presence of ordinary street hazards which are well known and apparent to all who will give heed.\\nAs this is not a case of stopping on signal, we think the query may be answered by determination of just when the relationship of passenger and carrier comes into existence. By the appellant's argument, it may be reasoned logically that one becomes a passenger just as soon as the carrier's agent sees one approaching his bus, irrespective of whether or not that person should be starting to cross a busy street, congested with traffic. For if one entertains the thought of becoming a passenger and the agent sees him, the carrier becomes an insurer of his safety. In other words, one's intention and the agent's ability to see are sufficient to create a contract of conveyance with all the encumbent duties of a high degree of care cast upon the carrier, and a relaxation from the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the one intending to become a passenger. And further still, the intending passenger might, upon reaching the conveyance, change his mind and not board the vehicle.\\nIt is our judgment that in cases where busses are involved one intending to become a passenger must do some physical act in respect to boarding the vehicle, like an attempt to enter the vehicle; or that such intention be communicated to the carrier's agent in charge at a time when the physical chance of boarding may be accomplished with safety to both contracting parties'.\\nThe case of Sanchez v. Pacific Auto Stages, 116 Cal. App., 392, 2 P. (2d), 845, is most interesting in that it points out that after one has purchased a ticket, a hiatus may occur in carrier passenger relationship. The court at page 396 held it to be the rule, that:\\n\\\"The relation is in force when one, intending in-good faith to become a passenger, goes to the place designated as the site of departure at the appropriate time and the carrier takes some action indicating acceptance of the passenger as a traveler.\\\"\\nIn Moss v. Mason City & Clear Lake Rd. Co., 217 Iowa, 354, 251 N. W., 627, a woman sought to cross a street and board a street car. It was concluded: \\\"A person while walking in the street toward a street car for the purpose of entering the car for passage thereon cannot be deemed a 'passenger', and the carrier operating the car owes such person that degree of care only, which it owes to all people in the street, to wit, ordinary care.\\\"\\nIt is of interest that the Iowa court in this case adopts with approval its prior reason appearing in Chesley v. Waterloo Rd. Co., found in 188 Iowa, 1004, 176 N. W., 961, 12 A. L. R., 1366, which was likewise employed in Reining v. Traction & Light Co., supra, at page 533.\\nKlingensmith v. West Penn. Rys. Co., 279 Pa., 336, 123 A., 787, states a like tenet. It is held therein, that:\\n\\\"The condition and use of the road is, as a rule, beyond the control of the street railway company, and, consequently, it is not held liable for the safety of persons using the street for the purpose of entering or leaving a trolley car, so long as the acts of its employees do not in any way contribute to the injury.\\\"\\nThe reason advanced by the court in Duchemin v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 186 Mass., 353, 71 N. E., 780, 66 L. R. A., 980, states with precision at page 356 the thought we entertain:\\n\\\"It is apparent that a person in such a situation is not in fact a passenger. He has not entered upon the premises of the carrier, as has a person who has gone upon the grounds of a steam railroad for the purpose of taking a train. He is upon a public highway where he has a clear right to be independently of his intention to become a passenger. He has as yet done nothing which enables the carrier to demand of him a fare, or in any way to control his actions. He is at liberty to advance or recede. He may change his mind and not become a passenger. Certainly the carrier owes him no other duty to keep the pavement smooth or the street clear of obstructions to his progress than it owes to all other travellers on the highway. It is under no obligation to see that he is not assaulted, or run into by vehicles or travellers', or not insulted or otherwise mistreated by other persons present.\\n\\\"Nor do we think that as to such a person, who has not yet reached the car, there is any other duty as to the car itself than that which the carrier owes to all persons lawfully upon the street. There is no sound distinction as to the diligence due from the carrier between the case of a person who has just dismounted from a street car and that of one who is about to take the car but has not yet reached it. ' '\\nThe subject may be further found exhaustively treated in the excellent note appended to report of Villa v. United Electric Ry. Co., 51 R. I., 384, 155 A., 366, 75 A. L. R., 282. See page 285 thereof.\\nFinding no error in the trial court's action, the judgment must be and is affirmed.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nLemert, P. J., and Montgomery, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"625739\", \"name\": \"MASON AND WIFE v. MYER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mason v. Myer\", \"decision_date\": \"1834-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"662\", \"last_page\": \"664\", \"citations\": \"1 Wright 641\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases at law and in chancery, decided by the Supreme court of Ohio, during the years 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834.\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:58:55.892544+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"*MASON AND WIFE v. MYER.\", \"head_matter\": \"*MASON AND WIFE v. MYER.\\nSettlement \\u2014 distribution\\u2014fraud\\u2014advantage by trustees.\\nA settlement made among heirs of their claim on their ancestor\\u2019s estate, under circumstances of unfairness, raising strong presumption of fraud, will not be regarded as conclusive, but be carefully scrutinized.\\nWhere one of several heirs acting for himself and co-heirs, makes an agreement by which he secures to himself an advantage in the distribution of the es- . t\\u00e1te, he will not be permitted to avail himself of the advantage.\\nIn the distribution of a decedent\\u2019s estate among heirs, equality is equity.\\nWhere the probate court has made an order of distribution of the estate, and several years after an order in the form of a writ is issued to the administrator to pay in a different way, on the application of a lawyer of one of them whose share is increased by the new order, that is a circumstance of fraud.\\nIn chancery. The cause is explained in the opinion of the court.\\nAnthony and Mason for the complainants.\\nJ. H. James contra.\", \"word_count\": \"953\", \"char_count\": \"5636\", \"text\": \"WRIGHT, J.\\nThe case made in proof before us is this. Dr. James Myer, in 1819, died intestate in Illinois, leaving a daughter, now Mrs. Mason, then nineteen years old, and the defendant, then fourteen years old, his children and sole heirs-at-law. Before Dr. Myer died, he requested that his children should return to Philadelphia. Administration was taken out on his estate, and the administrators furnished the children with a horse, a small wagon and funds, took the receipt of the girl for the amount, and started them for Philadelphia. The whole money and morej with the proceeds of the horse and wagon, were expended by the sister in their journey and for their expenses in Philadelphia, and in subsisting the brother while getting a trade, of which no particular accounts have been kept.\\nIn 1820, the administrators settled with the probate court in Illinois. They charged the advance to the children as an Ordinary disbursement of assets. A balance was found in their hands for distribution of $677.87, which they were ordered to distribute.\\nAfter the sister had married and the brother had attained to his majority, he went to Illinois to effect a settlement with the administrators. One of them had become insolvent \\u2014 the other made some objections to pay and claimed allowances not admittedby the probate court-A lawyer was employed to effect the settlement. He entered into a project of a settlement and distribution of the estate, allowing to the complainants $186.42 and to the defendant $491.39 in the distribution, and giving the administrators the allowances rejected by the probate court. The brother returned to Ohio with this project \\u2022of a settlement, and submitted it to the complainants to sanction in order to its execution, and induced the complainants to assent to it, under the impression it had been sanctioned by the court in Illinoisand they were bound to do so, the defendant keeping them [642 ignorant of the true state of the case. The lawyer was empowered to execute the agreement and take the obligations of the administrator to each heir separately for his share of the estate. Upon \\u2022this agreement the probate court in Illinois were induced to make \\u2022an order for the distribution of the estate on that basis. There are strong circumstances conducing to the opinion there was collu\\u2022.sion between the defendant and the lawyer to prejudice the complainants. An order in the shape of a writ was Obtained from the probate court for the unequal distribution of the estate as aforesaid, notwithstanding the first order of distribution remains in force unreversed, and without its appearing that any application was made for such order, or any complaint made as to the first order, or any notice given to the parties in interest. A mere gratuitous order, without parties, or notice, or complaint, varying and vacating a former regular decision of the court! It is not made to appear how this order was obtained \\u2014 though it is made the predicate \\u2022of the defendant's claim on his father's est\\u00e1te and of the settlement with his sister. The lawyer when called oil declines acting for the sister, because he was attorney for her brothef ! We cannot believe such an order valid. Certainly not while Unexplained. The defendant sets it,Up \\u00e1s the settlement by the c'outt, and conclusive as to the rights of the parties until reversed. If the Ord'er was obtained by the attorney, he was employed by the brother, acting for himself and as an agent for his sister. In that capacity he will not in this court be permitted to avail himself of any advantage obtained while acting as trustee \\u2014 and the settlement made upon the \\u2022exhibition of papers so obtained will not be held as concluding the parties. Something is wrong in this transaction. The division is? probably unjust \\u2014 the agent having the advantage is obnoxious to-the suspicion of practising a fraud, and his conduct will be scrutinized. The circumstances are of sufficient strength to induce a, chancellor to examine fully in order to do justice. Equality in this-matter is equity. It is not to be tolerated that the brother, who has been reared and assisted by the sister out of her individual earnings through his minority, shall by virtue of the confidence reposed in him, acquire the knowledge and means of appropriating the greater portion of their joint estate to his own use by the aid of this court. We shall send the cause to a master to inquire fully into these matters. The case is very inartificially set forth on the. papers, and the complainants may amend their bill and the defendant his answer. Continued for report.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"639270\", \"name\": \"SCHIRMER et al., Appellants, v. MT. AUBURN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGIC ASSOCIATES, INC. et al., Appellees; Barden et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Associates, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-12-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. C-030034\", \"first_page\": \"640\", \"last_page\": \"652\", \"citations\": \"155 Ohio App. 3d 640\", \"volume\": \"155\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Appellate Reports, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:51:19.394800+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Doan, P.J., and Hildebrandt, J., concur.\", \"parties\": \"SCHIRMER et al., Appellants, v. MT. AUBURN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGIC ASSOCIATES, INC. et al., Appellees; Barden et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"SCHIRMER et al., Appellants, v. MT. AUBURN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGIC ASSOCIATES, INC. et al., Appellees; Barden et al., Defendants.\\n[Cite as Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., 155 Ohio App.3d 640, 2003-Ohio-7150.]\\nCourt of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.\\nNo. C-030034.\\nDecided Dec. 30, 2003.\\nMark B. Smith Co., L.P.A., and Mark B. Smith, for appellants.\\nPatrick K. Adkinson, for appellees Mt. Auburn OB/GYN, Inc., and Kevin R. Fitzgerald, M.D.\\nDinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Frank C. Woodside III, Robert A. Carpenter and Sharon E. Gronotte, for appellees Children\\u2019s Hospital Medical Center and Martha Walker, M.S.\\nRendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., Paul W. McCartney and Megan K. Roach, for appellee Howard M. Saal, M.D.\", \"word_count\": \"4591\", \"char_count\": \"28559\", \"text\": \"Gorman, Judge.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Helen and Richard Schirmer, appeal from the trial court's order dismissing their complaint for damages allegedly caused by the medical negligence of the defendants-appellees, Dr. Kevin R. Fitzgerald, Mrs. Schirmer's obstetrician, his employer, Mt. Auburn Obstetrics and Gynecologic Associates, Inc., Children's Hospital Medical Center (\\\"CHMC\\\"), Martha Walker, M.S., and Howard M. Saal, M.D., who conducted genetic testing during Mrs. Schirmer's pregnancy. The issue is what damages parents of a child born with birth defects are entitled to recover where their reliance on negligent genetic testing and medical advice deprived them of the information necessary to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy. We hold that because of the close causal nexus alleged between the medical negligence and the genetic harm to the Schirmers' child, and because of the absence of the need to calculate the value of nonbeing in determining the amount of damages, the allegations in the Schirmers' complaint state a valid medical claim. The measure of their damages is limited to those consequential, economic damages of raising their disabled child over and above the ordinary child-rearing expenses. But we hold that the Schirmers are not entitled to an award for noneconomic damages. Therefore, the Schirmers' assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.\\nTHE FACTS\\n{\\u00b6 2} In their complaint, the Schirmers alleged that genetic testing, conducted after previous unsuccessful pregnancies, disclosed that Mrs. Schirmer carried a balanced translocation of chromosomes 11 and 22. Although it caused her no harm, there was a one-third chance that she would pass the unbalanced form of the translocation to her child. A child carrying the unbalanced translocation could have a \\\"third\\\" or extra chromosome 22\\u2014a partial trisomy 22. This condition would cause serious birth defects. During Mrs. Schirmer's pregnancy, she instructed the defendants to do all necessary testing to determine whether her fetus carried this genetic defect. The results of the testing would have permitted the Schirmers to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy rather than to bring a severely mentally and physically disabled child into the world.\\n{\\u00b6 3} The defendants ordered and conducted a chorionic villus sampling (\\\"CVS\\\") test that was the recognized and accepted test to determine the genetic makeup of a fetus by sampling fetal cells. The test result indicated that the fetus was probably a female with the same balanced chromosome translocation as the mother. If, however, the test had incorrectly sampled Mrs. Schirmer's own tissue rather than the tissue of the fetus, the results of the CVS would not have accurately determined the genetic makeup of the fetus. The Schirmers alleged that the defendants were negligent in not taking the further steps necessary to validate the CVS test results.\\n{\\u00b6 4} On September 9, 1997, Mrs. Schirmer gave birth to a son, Matthew. Matthew, who is not party to this action, inherited a partial trisomy of chromosome 22 from his mother and is profoundly mentally and physically disabled. He requires round-the-clock care.\\n{\\u00b6 5} The Schirmers brought suit, claiming that because of the negligent medical advice and testing of the defendants, they were precluded from making an informed decision about whether to proceed with the pregnancy and a delivery that would result in a severely disabled child. They sought damages for (1) the costs related to the pregnancy; (2) economic, consequential losses\\u2014the costs of raising and supporting the disabled child; and (3) noneconomic consequential losses'\\u2014the emotional and physical injuries resulting from the added burden of raising and supporting the disabled child.\\nPROCEDURAL POSTURE\\n{\\u00b6 6} In March 2002, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Each argued that Ohio did not recognize the tort of \\\"wrongful birth.\\\" Dr. Fitzgerald also argued that if a wrongful-birth claim existed, the Schirmers' damages were limited to their pregnancy-related costs. The trial court overruled the motions to dismiss, stating that it was unable to determine whether the Ohio Supreme Court would \\\"allow an action for 'wrongful birth.' \\\"\\n{\\u00b6 7} Afterwards, each defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the scope of damages only, seeking a ruling by the trial court that the Schirmers were limited to damages only for pregnancy-related costs.\\n{\\u00b6 8} The Schirmers subsequently urged, pursuant to Civ.R. 56(F), that the trial court should postpone its ruling on factual determinations regarding the damages issue. They argued that although the defendants' motions were styled as motions for partial summary judgment, they had not raised factual disputes, but, instead, had maintained only that Ohio law did not recognize the consequential damages that they were seeking. They argued that the defendants' motions were more properly considered as motions to dismiss made pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The trial court agreed to postpone factual determinations in connection with the pending partial motions for summary judgment, stating that \\\"the Court will rule on the legal question of what element of damages may be sought in a wrongful birth case.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\n{\\u00b6 9} On December 19, 2002, the trial court journalized an entry in which it recorded various stipulations by the parties and entered judgment. First, the Schirmers consented not to seek damages for the pregnancy-related costs. Second, all parties consented to the trial court's \\\"treating the pending motions for partial summary judgment as motions to dismiss the remaining elements of Plaintiffs' case for failure to state a cognizable claim.\\\" Third, the parties stipulated that the trial court's ruling on the pending motions \\\"shall constitute a ruling on questions of law pertaining to^the scope of recoverable damages in a 'wrongful birth' action.\\\" The trial court then held that the Schirmers could bring a wrongful-birth action but that Ohio law permitted recovery only for the pregnancy-related costs and not for either economic or noneconomic consequential damages. Since the Schirmers had voluntarily agreed not to seek pregnancy-related damages, the trial court dismissed the complaint.\\n{\\u00b6 10} A party may move for partial summary judgment. Civ.R. 56(C) and (D) envision a situation where summary judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked, and where a trial may be necessary on the remaining controverted facts. See Holeski v. Lawrence (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 824, 621 N.E.2d 802. An entry of partial summary judgment must specify the uncontroverted material facts upon which the decision is based. See Civ.R. 56(D); see, also, Couto v. Gibson, Inc. (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 407, 587 N.E.2d 336.\\n{\\u00b6 11} But there is no provision in the Civil Rules for converting motions for partial summary judgment into motions to dismiss, even by agreement of the parties. A trial court's ruling on summary judgment must be addressed to the evidence properly before it. See Civ.R. 56(C) and (E).\\n{\\u00b6 12} When, however, a court dismisses a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it makes no factual findings beyond its legal conclusion that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court does not assume the role of fact-finder. See State ex rel. Drake v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 40, 528 N.E.2d 1253. Here, the trial court by its own terms, and with the consent of the parties, ruled, without reviewing the evidence, on whether the Schirmers' complaint stated claims for which relief could be granted under Ohio law. We, therefore, construe the trial court's December 19, 2002 entry to be a ruling on renewed motions for dismissal made in accordance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6).\\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\\n{\\u00b6 13} To affirm a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), an appellate court must conclude that it appears \\\"beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.\\\" O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. Williams Ford Sales, Inc. v. Connor (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 111, 647 N.E.2d 804; York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063. Those facts that may be so significant as to entitle the Schirmers to recovery are determined by the substantive law in Ohio.\\nTHE PRENATAL TORTS\\n{\\u00b6 14} The Schirmers' claim is commonly termed \\\"wrongful birth.\\\" Wrongful-birth claims are brought by the parents of a child born with birth defects. They allege that, due to negligent medical advice or testing, the parents were precluded from making an informed decision about whether to conceive a disabled child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate it. See Johnson v. Univ. Hospitals of Cleveland (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 49, 51, 540 N.E.2d 1370; see, also, Simmerer v. Dabbas (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 586, 587, 733 N.E.2d 1169.\\n{\\u00b6 15} The Schirmers' claim is distinguishable from two other prenatal torts: (1) wrongful life, and (2) wrongful pregnancy. In a wrongful-life claim, the child contends that negligent genetic testing or sterilization resulted in a birth defect or in birth. On grounds of public policy, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim in Hester v. Dwivedi (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 575, 733 N.E.2d 1161, syllabus. In Hester v. Dwivedi, physicians failed to inform the child's mother during pregnancy of test results indicating a possibility of birth defects, thereby depriving the mother of the opportunity to make a fully informed decision whether to terminate her pregnancy by a legal abortion. In rejecting the mother's medical-negligence claim for damages because the child was born with spina bifida rather than aborted, the court responded that it would not weigh the value of life with disabilities against an aborted life. See 89 Ohio St.3d at 580-581, 733 N.E.2d 1161. The court noted that the physicians' negligence was not the cause of the child's birth defects. See id. at 581, 733 N.E.2d 1161.\\n{\\u00b6 16} Ohio has recognized a claim for wrongful pregnancy where parents sue \\\"for proximate damages arising from the birth of a child subsequent to a doctor's failure to properly perform a sterilization procedure.\\\" See Johnson v. Univ. Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St.3d at 51, 540 N.E.2d 1370; see, also, Bowman v. Davis (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 2 O.O.3d 133, 356 N.E.2d 496. In Simmerer v. Dabbas (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 586, 733 N.E.2d 1169, decided the same day as Hester, the court limited the damages available for the tort, holding that medical expenses and emotional-distress damages associated with a child's birth defect were not recoverable in a claim for wrongful pregnancy. In the decision, the court disagreed with the Fourth Appellate District's rationale in Flanagan v. Williams (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 768, 623 N.E.2d 185, that \\\"the extraordinary costs associated with birth defects would be recoverable\\\" in a wrongful-pregnancy action. Simmerer v. Dabbas (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d at 591, 733 N.E.2d 1169. Only three justices joined in the majority opinion and its limitations on those damages recognized and allowed in Flanagan.\\n{\\u00b6 17} In the syllabus paragraph, however, the court again focused on causation, noting that the child's birth defect was not reasonably foreseeable by the physician who had negligently performed the sterilization procedure on the mother, and thus the physician's negligence had not proximately caused the damages associated with the birth defect. See id. at syllabus; see, also, Simmons v. Hertzman (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 453, 457-458, 651 N.E.2d 13 (parents' recovery for wrongful-pregnancy claim was limited to costs associated with pregnancy, particularly because there was no allegation that child's abnormalities were proximately caused by a negligent vasectomy). Justice Pfeifer concurred in the syllabus and judgment only, stating that damages would be recoverable if the parents of the child had sought sterilization to prevent the birth of a child who might have been especially at risk for birth defects. See id. at 592, 733 N.E.2d 1169.\\n{\\u00b6 18} In the more than 20 years since Bowman v. Davis was released, neither the Ohio Supreme Court nor the General Assembly has addressed the viability of the Schirmers' wrongful-birth claim. See Simmerer v. Dabbas, 89 Ohio St.3d at 587, 733 N.E.2d 1169. In Ohio, only the Fourth Appellate District in Flanagan v. Williams, 87 Ohio App.3d 768, 623 N.E.2d 185, has addressed a wrongful-birth claim. More than 20 states and the District of Columbia have recognized a claim of wrongful birth. See Bader v. Johnson (Ind.2000), 732 N.E.2d 1212 (recognizing wrongful-birth claim and listing jurisdictions allowing or disallowing a claim for wrongful birth). At least eight states have judicially barred these claims. See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C. (Ky.2003), 120 S.W.3d 682 (Kentucky Supreme Court noting that the decision is not yet final and is not to be cited as authority in Kentucky).\\n{\\u00b6 19} At least five states have enacted legislation to prohibit recovery in a wrongful-birth negligence suit. See Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts: The Need For Wrongful Birth Legislation (2001), 69 U.CimL.Rev. 1023, 1024; see, e.g., Mo.Stat.Ann. 188.130. Maine, however, has taken action to permit wrongful-birth suits. While declaring that \\\"the birth of a normal, healthy child does not constitute a legally recognizable injury and that it is contrary to public policy to award damages for the birth or rearing of a healthy child\\\" and denying non-economic damages, the Maine legislature permits the recovery of \\\"[djamages for the birth of an unhealthy child born as the result of professional negligence,\\\" including \\\"damages associated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child.\\\" Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Title 24, Section 2931; see, also, Braun & Rabar, Recent Developments In Medicine and Law (2001), 36 Tort & Ins. L.J. 463, 503.\\n{\\u00b6 20} In Flanagan v. Williams, 87 Ohio App.3d at 774-775, 623 N.E.2d 185, the Fourth Appellate District resolved both a wrongful-birth and a wrongful-life claim and recognized a parent's wrongful-birth claim as a legitimate claim for relief in Ohio. While the Supreme Court has questioned the damages available for an injured child under Flanagan, the court has not addressed any other portion of that opinion. The Simmerer court's reference to the damages in Flanagan was not determinative of the wrongful-pregnancy cause it was deciding. It was obiter dicta, agreed to by three justices, and while it provides insight into the three justices' view of the law, it technically has no binding effect on this court's decision in this case. See Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Mgt. Co., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 638 N.E.2d 991; see, also, Suburban Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. Mulvihill (1926), 21 Ohio App. 438, 441, 153 N.E. 204.\\n{\\u00b6 21} Ultimately, labeling the Schirmers' claim as \\\"wrongful birth\\\" adds nothing to the analysis, and it wrongly implies that the courts have created a new tort. In Hester, the Ohio Supreme Court noted, \\\"While these types of cases are commonly labeled 'wrongful life,' 'wrongful pregnancy,' 'wrongful birth,' or 'wrongful living' actions, they are not governed by statutory law as are wrongful death actions. They remain, at their core, medical negligence actions, and are determined by application of common-law tort principles.\\\" Hester, 89 Ohio St.3d 575, 578, 733 N.E.2d 1161. Though the names \\\"wrongful birth,\\\" \\\"wrongful life,\\\" or \\\"wrongful pregnancy\\\" are useful monikers for these cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has been explicit in classifying them as \\\"traditional negligence action[s].\\\" See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d at 45, 2 O.O.3d 133, 356 N.E.2d 496.\\n{\\u00b6 22} As this specific issue has not been addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court, the rule we write today derives from an analysis and synthesis of the language of the Supreme Court in related prenatal-tort cases. Absent guidance by the General Assembly, our effort is to \\\"ensure that the law keeps up with the ever-changing needs of a modern society.\\\" See Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 251, 617 N.E.2d 1052. Full development of the elements of the tort will result through litigation and the resolution of future cases, as it is through this means that the common law develops incrementally. See, e.g., Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 449, 628 N.E.2d 46 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).\\n{\\u00b6 23} As the starting point, the Supreme Court has held that the Schirmers' medical negligence claim, no matter what it is called, must be \\\"decided by applying the same legal analysis employed in any medical negligence claim\\\"; to prevail they must prove the following elements: (1) a duty running from the medical professionals to the Schirmers, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) damages suffered by the Schirmers, and (4) a proximate causal relationship between the breach of duty and the damages. See Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d at 578, 733 N.E.2d 1161; see, also, Simmerer v. Dabbas, 89 Ohio St.3d at 588-590, 733 N.E.2d 1169.\\nTHE SCHIRMERS' ALLEGATIONS OF DUTY AND BREACH\\n{\\u00b6 24} The complaint demonstrates that the Schirmers have stated a claim for relief under traditional medical negligence law. First, the duty of each defendant was to use the degree of care and skill expected of a competent physician or medical practitioner of the same class and under similar circumstances. See Lownsbury v. Van Buren (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 231, 762 N.E.2d 354. The physician is obligated to inform a patient of the diagnosis and the known or inherent risks so that the patient can make an intelligent decision regarding the course of treatment. This duty to disclose arises as a matter of law from the physician-patient relationship. See Bruni v. Tatsumi (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 75 O.O.2d 184, 346 N.E.2d 673.\\n{\\u00b6 25} During oral argument before this court, CHMC attempted to argue that even if the Schirmers could state a claim for relief, the evidence suggested that CHMC had not breached any duty to the Schirmers and was thus not negligent. For purposes of this appeal only, that argument has been waived, as it was not raised below. CHMC's motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment contested solely the damages issue.\\n{\\u00b6 26} The Schirmers' complaint sufficiently alleged that all the defendants breached their duties of care. They alleged that they consulted the defendants to obtain information and medical guidance with a direct bearing on whether Helen Schirmer would carry her pregnancy to term or exercise her constitutionally guaranteed, but limited, right not to procreate and to terminate the pregnancy. See Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510; see, also, Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147. Testing before this pregnancy confirmed that Mrs. Schirmer carried the translocation genetic disorder known to cause severe mental and physical defects in males. For this very reason, she undertook extensive genetic testing under the guidance of the defendants to determine whether the fetus she carried was affected by the Trisomy 22 defect. This was precisely the information the Schirmers had to know to make an informed decision whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry the fetus to term. The failure of one or more of the defendants to conduct followup testing to verify the accuracy of the CVS testing gave rise to a set of facts that would have permitted the Schirmers to allege, and perhaps prove at trial, that their physicians and the laboratory technicians had breached their duty to them.\\nCAUSATION\\n{\\u00b6 27} To survive defendants' motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the Schirmers also had to allege a compensable injury proximately caused by the breach of a duty. An indispensable element of a negligence claim is that the act or omission must be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. See Bruni v. Tatsumi. A negligent act is the proximate cause of an injury if the injury is a natural and probable consequence that, in the light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated. See Mussivand v. David (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 321, 544 N.E.2d 265. According to the Schirmers, because the defendants failed to conduct followup tests, they were not informed of their fetus's condition until it was too late to terminate the pregnancy, which resulted in Mrs. Schirmer's carrying to term and giving birth to a severely disabled child.\\n{\\u00b6 28} This court and the Ohio Supreme Court, in denying recovery to parents and children who have received negligent medical care, have emphasized the tenuous causal link between the negligent act or omission and the resulting harm. Simmerer v. Dabbas, syllabus; Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d at 580-581, 733 N.E.2d 1161; see, also, Simmons v. Hertzman (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 139, 141, 593 N.E.2d 83. Lacking were allegations that the allegedly negligent sterilization procedure, for example, caused the birth defects or increased the probability that any child born after the procedure would suffer from a specific birth defect. See Simmons v. Hertzman, 99 Ohio App.3d at 457-458, 651 N.E.2d 13.\\n{\\u00b6 29} Unlike the parents in Simmerer and Simmons who, after negligently performed sterilizations, gave birth to children with congenital defects not known to be caused by the negligence, and the child in Hester, born with spina bifida after a negligent sterilization, here, the precise defect the Schirmers attempted to discover and avoid by genetic testing\\u2014Trisomy 22\\u2014occurred. After a review of the complaint's allegations, we cannot say that the Schirmers can prove no set of facts entitling them to recovery on the issue of causation.\\nDAMAGES\\n{\\u00b6 30} The final and most problematic element is the measure of damages proximately caused by the defendants' alleged negligence. To prevail, the Schirmers must identify damages permissible under Ohio law. Under traditional tort principles, a physician is responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his negligent acts. See Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979), Section 917, Comment e.\\n{\\u00b6 31} The defendants acknowledge that, under the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court's prenatal-tort cases, the Schirmers would be entitled to pregnancy and birth-related costs directly related to carrying a fetus to full term. See, e.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 89 Ohio St.3d at 588, 733 N.E.2d 1169. But for the allegedly negligent genetic testing and the medical negligence, the Sehirmers must claim that they would have terminated the pregnancy and foregone the medical costs of the pregnancy and delivery. The December 19, 2003 entry, however, states that the Sehirmers have stipulated not to seek the pregnancy-related costs and the costs of the delivery as damages at trial.\\n{\\u00b6 32} The Sehirmers do seek as their measure of damages their economic, consequential damages incurred as medical costs and the costs of raising and supporting their disabled child. The Ohio Supreme Court has disallowed these \\\"reasonable child-rearing costs\\\" in wrongful-pregnancy and wrongful-life cases because of the court's reluctance to adopt a measure of damages that so devalues human life. Simmerer v. Dabbas, 89 Ohio St.3d at 588-589, 733 N.E.2d 1169, citing Williams v. Univ. of Chicago Hosp. (1997), 179 Ill.2d 80, 227 Ill.Dec. 793, 688 N.E.2d 130; see Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d at 580-581, 733 N.E.2d 1161; see, also, Simmons v. Hertzman, 99 Ohio App.3d at 458-459, 651 N.E.2d 13. The Ohio Supreme Court, as matter of public policy, has made it clear that neither a trial court nor a jury may engage in a calculation of damages that includes \\\"comparing the value of being, albeit with handicaps, versus nonbeing.\\\" Hester v. Dwivedi, 89 Ohio St.3d at 582, 733 N.E.2d 1161.\\n{\\u00b6 33} The Supreme Court has not rejected those economic, consequential damages claimed by the Sehirmers in an action for wrongful birth that are over and above the costs directly related to those required to raise a normal, healthy child to adulthood. In Hester, the majority opinion suggested that while a child born with defects after negligent medical tests could not state a claim for damages because the calculation required valuing being and non-being, the proscription would not apply to the child's mother. Albeit in dicta, the majority noted that while the child has no claim, if the medical negligence prevents the mother from acting upon genetic testing information, she \\\"can claim to be injured in that she was deprived of the choice to avoid [the financial obligations associated with parenthood] by terminating the pregnancy.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Id. Justice Pfeifer dissented but approved of permitting parents injured by negligent genetic counseling to recover the financial costs of raising a child. See id. at 585, 733 N.E.2d 1161.\\n{\\u00b6 34} While cognizant of the three-justice majority's reluctance in Simmerer to award extraordinary damages\\u2014the consequential, economic damages of raising a disabled child over and above the ordinary child-rearing expenses for a normal child\\u2014in light of the court's discussion in Hester, we conclude that this is a proper measure of damages because of (1) the causal nexus alleged between the medical negligence and the predictable genetic defect occurring in the Sehirmers' child, and (2) the absence of the need to calculate the value of non-being in determining these economic, consequential damages. This determination is, likewise, consistent with the General Assembly's direction under its tort-reform legislation, which allows an award for economic damages but limits them, as a matter of policy, for emotional injury and pain and suffering. See, generally, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062; see, also, S.B. No. 281, effective April, 11, 2003.\\n{\\u00b6 35} A claim for medical negligence brought by the parents of a child born with birth defects alleging that negligent medical advice or testing precluded them from making an informed decision about whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate it, states a claim for relief where the extraordinary economic, consequential damages of raising a disabled child are proximately caused by the negligence. Calculating and assessing those damages does not involve the Supreme Court's principal concern with the difficulty in weighing life.\\n{\\u00b6 36} Since the calculation of the Schirmers' last claimed measure of non-economic, consequential damages\\u2014the emotional and physical injuries to them resulting from the added burden of raising and supporting a disabled child\\u2014does require the court or jury to weigh the value of being and non-being, the Schirmers cannot, as a matter of law, recover for their noneconomic damages.\\nCONCLUSION\\n{\\u00b6 37} The Schirmers' assignment of error is sustained in part. The dismissal of the Schirmers' complaint for failure to state a claim for relief is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Upon remand, the Schirmers may adduce facts to prove the elements of a medical negligence claim, including the extraordinary consequential, economic costs necessary to treat the birth defect and the additional medical or educational costs attributable to the birth defect during the child's minority.\\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded.\\nDoan, P.J., and Hildebrandt, J., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6704371\", \"name\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Strodes, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Strodes\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-11-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 75-460\", \"first_page\": \"113\", \"last_page\": \"117\", \"citations\": \"48 Ohio St. 2d 113\", \"volume\": \"48\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:55:37.949918+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Neill, C. J., Herbert, Corrigan, Stern, Celebrezze, W. Brown and P. Brown, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Strodes, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Strodes, Appellant.\\n(No. 75-460\\nDecided November 24, 1976.)\\nMr. James A. Berry, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. James P. Hunter, Jr., for appellee.\\nMr. Thomas J. Veshauf, for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"1272\", \"char_count\": \"7966\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nAlthough appellant makes no assertion that the evidence adduced was insufficient in law to support the jury's verdicts, we have reviewed the record since this is a capital case. We have determined that the evidence of all the essential elements of the crimes charged was sufficiently established.\\nAppellant asserts numerous propositions of law, and argues that the trial court, in its rulings on questions of law and in the conduct of trial, prejudiced the rights of the defendant, and thus prevented a fair trial. Upon examination of the record, we find neither error nor prejudice, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.\\nAppellant asserts that the imposition of the death penalty under R. C. 2929.01 through 2929.04 is unconstitutional, as being arbitrary and constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We determined in State v. Bayless (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, that those statutes are in compliance with the United States Constitution and the guidelines of the United States Supreme Court.\\nAppellant asserts further that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his timely objection at trial to the selection of the special venire, allegedly in violation of R. C. 2313.08. A jury commissioner was called to the stand to explain the selection process. Appellant's objection to the venire was general and was overruled.\\nSubsequently, on a motion for a new trial on account of newly-discovered evidence, appellant submitted an article published in a local newspaper which concluded that, in Springfield, a disproportionately small number of women, blacks and young persons were called for jury duty. Appellant also offered the 1970 Census which showed the black population of Springfield to be 15.53 percent. The percentage of blacks called for appellant's venire was one-third of that figure. The trial court properly overruled the motion for new trial.\\nThe American tradition of trial by jury necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community. Smith v. Texas (1940), 311 U. S. 128. The right to trial by an impartial jury means that prospective jurors must be selected by officials without the systematic and intentional exclusion of any cognizable group. State v. Johnson (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 114. No systematic or intentional exclusion was shown by appellant. The trial record indicates that although some formalities were not strictly followed, the selection of the veniremen was made in good faith with no displayed prejudice to appellant. The array of veniremen need not reflect an exact cross section of the community. Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U. S. 202; State v. Wilson (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 199, 201. Such identity would have been pure coincidence, and seldom, if ever, occurs.\\nUnder the United States Constitution, a defendant is entitled not to a perfect cross section of citizens for the jury panel, but only to panels selected by the best method that thoughtful men, who are cognizant of the practicalities of selection and the inherent problems involved, have been able to develop. State v. Johnson, supra. The record demonstrates that all prospective jurors in this case were qualified. The use of voter-registration lists as. the source of names of prospective jurors is not unlawful even though it results in the exclusion of nonvoters. United States v. Kelly (1965), 349 F. 2d 720. Unless prejudice to the defendant or the systematic and intentional exclusion of a group is shown, we will not reverse a judgment because of minor and technical defects in jury-selection procedures.\\nAppellant contends further that one juror had served on a jury during the preceding year in violation of R. C. 2313.07. Again, no prejudice was shown. In fact, appellant neither challenged this juror for cause nor used a remaining peremptory challenge. Such a non-prejudieial oversight is not grounds for reversal.\\nAppellant urges, in another proposition of law, that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting photographs of the victim's body to be admitted in evidence. Appellant contends that the photographs were of no probative value since death by shooting was stipulated. We do not agree. Appellant went to great lengths, in both the trial and appellate levels, to stress that he did not admit, or did not intend to admit, that a robbery occurred. The trial court thus acted within its discretion in ruling that the photographs could be of use to the jury deciding upon this question of fact. Further, under R. C. 2903.01(B), aggravated murder is defined as the purposeful killing of another while committing, or attempting to commit, aggravated robbery. The state must prove, and the jury must find, that the killing was purposely done. The number of shots fired, the places where the bullets entered the body, and the resulting wounds are all probative evidence of a purpose to cause death. The total probative value of these photographs was not outweighed by the danger of prejudicial effect upon the defendant.\\nAppellant asserts that the prosecutor made several statements that were so flagrantly improper that a fair trial was prevented. Some of appellant's objections were properly overruled by the trial court, while others were sustained with appropriate instructions to the jury. Since the accused is provided with counsel, the prosecutor's duty to society requires that he assume the-role of a partisan. HowOver, We will not allow a prosecutor to overstep the bounds of propriety in a manner prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. . We conclude- that no improper.statements by the prosecutor were permitted over exception. Nor does our examination of the record disclose impermissible conduct that necessitates a finding of reversible error.\\nAppellant complains that the prosecutor commented on matters not in evidence, and therefore prejudicial error should be presumed. This proposition is not well taken. Although the prosecutor did state in his closing argument that, after the murder, only coins were found by police in the cash register, an objection by appellant that no direct testimony substantiated this allegation was promptly sustained. We find the trial court's ruling and conduct proper, and therefore no prejudice inured to. appellant.\\nAppellant asserts that the court improperly failed to charge on lesser-ineluded offenses. This argument is wholly without merit. The state's evidence, as we have said, established every essential element of the crimes charged.. A trial court is not permitted to consider lesser-ineluded offenses if the accused presents a complete defense to all substantive elements of the crime charged. State v. Nolton (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 133. Alibi is such a defense.\\nAs a further proposition of law, appellant urges that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the psychiatric report as being inadequate to fulfill the requirements of R.' C. 2929.03. When \\u00e1 death sentence is imposed, tins statute requires a pre-sentence investigation and a psychiatric examination to be made. On review, we conclude the court complied with all statutory requirements, and that the report was adequate for purposes of R. C. 2929.03.\\nReview of cases in which the death penalty has been imposed is not to be taken lightly. The nature of the sentence necessarily mandates that the rights of the accused be safeguarded. All propositions of law have been carefully considered, and our examination of the record reveals no'-reversible error.. Accordingly, the judgment <5f the Court of Appeals is affirmed. :\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nO'Neill, C. J., Herbert, Corrigan, Stern, Celebrezze, W. Brown and P. Brown, JJ., concur.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/6890823.json b/ohio/6890823.json
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+"{\"id\": \"6890823\", \"name\": \"In re Z.H.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Z.H.\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-02-18\", \"docket_number\": \"2015-0065\", \"first_page\": \"1472\", \"last_page\": \"1472\", \"citations\": \"141 Ohio St. 3d 1472\", \"volume\": \"141\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:29:10.813134+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"O\\u2019Neill, J., dissents.\", \"parties\": \"In re Z.H.\", \"head_matter\": \"2015-0065.\\nIn re Z.H.\", \"word_count\": \"25\", \"char_count\": \"163\", \"text\": \"Hamilton App. Nos. C-140636, C-140733, and C-140734. On motion for stay of court of appeals' judgment. Motion denied.\\nO'Neill, J., dissents.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/6891605.json b/ohio/6891605.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46032b46e8449b1e1c5522efd2a25066a387092f
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+"{\"id\": \"6891605\", \"name\": \"Kuhn v. Kuhn\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kuhn v. Kuhn\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"2014-0601\", \"first_page\": \"1481\", \"last_page\": \"1481\", \"citations\": \"141 Ohio St. 3d 1481\", \"volume\": \"141\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:29:10.813134+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Kuhn v. Kuhn.\", \"head_matter\": \"2014-0601.\\nKuhn v. Kuhn.\", \"word_count\": \"53\", \"char_count\": \"321\", \"text\": \"Guernsey App. No. 13-CA-24, 2014-Ohio-126. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County.\\nUpon consideration of appellee's motion for continuance of oral argument scheduled for May 5, 2015, it is ordered by the court that the motion is denied.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/6892916.json b/ohio/6892916.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4265c69ddedf2c1984edc8ef12d891c60e9e68a0
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+"{\"id\": \"6892916\", \"name\": \"State v. Frye\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Frye\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-03-11\", \"docket_number\": \"2015-0103\", \"first_page\": \"1487\", \"last_page\": \"1487\", \"citations\": \"141 Ohio St. 3d 1487\", \"volume\": \"141\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:29:10.813134+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State v. Frye.\", \"head_matter\": \"2015-0103.\\nState v. Frye.\", \"word_count\": \"16\", \"char_count\": \"113\", \"text\": \"Scioto App. No. 14CA3604, 2014-0hio-5016. On motion for delayed appeal. Motion denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/709297.json b/ohio/709297.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8b02d2ce6b1d36b81ae2bc95c55f9efcbe4fad82
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+"{\"id\": \"709297\", \"name\": \"Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-03-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-1776\", \"first_page\": \"317\", \"last_page\": \"320\", \"citations\": \"98 Ohio St. 3d 317\", \"volume\": \"98\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, Third Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:46:28.920372+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Moyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook, Lundberg Stratton and O\\u2019Connor, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity.\", \"head_matter\": \"Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity.\\n[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity, 98 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-740.]\\n(No. 2002-1776\\nSubmitted January 8, 2003\\nDecided March 5, 2003.)\", \"word_count\": \"1168\", \"char_count\": \"7495\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\n{\\u00b6 1} Respondent, Robert J. Garrity of Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0070449, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1999. On October 30, 2001, we suspended his license to practice law for an interim period pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(4) after receiving notice that he had been convicted of five felonies. See In re Garrity (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1467, 757 N.E.2d 378.\\n{\\u00b6 2} On November 28, 2001, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint charging respondent with various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and, on the basis of comprehensive stipulations and other evidence, made the following findings.\\n{\\u00b6 3} In addition to being a licensed attorney, respondent was once a licensed pharmacist in Illinois and Ohio. He eventually became addicted to some of the prescription medications that he dispensed, and his Illinois pharmacy license was suspended for six months for illegal drug possession. He then began law school in Ohio. Respondent's Illinois license was later restored, he obtained his Ohio pharmacy license through reciprocity, and he passed the Ohio bar exam. However, during December 2000, respondent stole a variety of Schedule II controlled substances for his personal use while working for a Lakewood pharmacy. See R.C. 3719.41.\\n{\\u00b6 4} On June 28, 2001, respondent pleaded guilty to five felony counts of prescription drug theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to six months in prison on two counts, with the sentences to be served concurrently. For the remaining counts, the court sentenced respondent to five years' probation to begin upon his release from prison. Respondent was also ordered to pay $800 in restitution to his former employer.\\n{\\u00b6 5} On May 13, 2002, the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy found that respondent was addicted to controlled substances, and his license, which had been on probation since 1998 for prior drug-related infractions, was permanently revoked. Respondent was granted judicial release from prison on December 21, 2001, and was on probation at the time of the hearing.\\n{\\u00b6 6} The parties stipulated that respondent had violated DR 1 \\u2014 102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), (4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and (6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on an attorney's fitness to practice law), and the panel found this misconduct. In recommending a sanction, the panel considered mitigation stipulations that respondent had cooperated fully in investigations conducted by relator, law enforcement authorities, and the Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, had dutifully maintained sobriety since his arrest in January 2001, and had become a dedicated volunteer. Moreover, respondent had already made restitution to his former employer and had not harmed any clients with his misconduct. The panel also considered the overwhelming support shown by respondent's mentors, counselors, and acquaintances, all of whom recounted his impressive efforts toward his recovery and some of whom described respondent's contributions to their own recovery.\\n{\\u00b6 7} However, two panel members had grave concerns about respondent's long history of substance-abuse treatment, his repeated relapses, and what they considered to be his lack of credibility and genuine contrition for his past transgressions. Thus, while one panel member was convinced of respondent's commitment to his treatment plan and recovery, the other two panel members suspected his sincerity. They feared that respondent would be prone to relapse and the temptation to steal again, only this time from clients.\\n{\\u00b6 8} A majority of the panel recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio. The dissenting panel member recommended, consistent with the parties' stipulated suggestion, that respondent's license be suspended indefinitely, with the suspension to have commenced as of October 30, 2001, the date of our earlier interim suspension order. The board adopted the panel's findings of misconduct, but it rejected the majority recommendation to disbar. The board instead recommended that respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law and that he be required to submit to periodic drug screenings during this suspension to ensure compliance with his Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, Inc. (\\\"OLAP\\\") sobriety contract.\\n{\\u00b6 9} We agree with the board's findings that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), and (6) and that an indefinite suspension, conditioned as recommended, is appropriate. Respondent is 43 years old and the victim of a consuming addiction that began while he was working as a young pharmacist in his father's pharmacy in Illinois. He was eventually convicted of illegal possession of prescription medication and permitted to seek medical treatment in lieu of conviction. He did not commit to his recovery, however, and by 1995, his father banished him from the pharmacy.\\n{\\u00b6 10} Jobless and with his second marriage failing, respondent turned to crack cocaine. He was arrested again for possession, convicted, and spent 30 days in a county jail. His Illinois pharmacy license was also suspended for six months. Respondent claims to have remained drug-free after these events. In any case, he subsequently graduated from law school in Ohio. But he eventually returned to pharmacy when his Illinois license was restored and Ohio granted him reciprocity. He also returned to drug abuse for two months before his arrest and convictions in 2001.\\n{\\u00b6 11} By all accounts of record, including a testimonial from the executive director of OLAP, respondent has become since his prison term a model for others attempting to overcome addiction. He has pursued zealously his recovery and has assisted others on their way to sobriety. Moreover, he has promised to continue with this work and to use his legal expertise to further this mission if he is ever permitted to return to the practice of law.\\n{\\u00b6 12} Respondent's misconduct manifests a serious breach of trust and is cause for the concern expressed by the panel majority. However, the sanction we impose is appropriately tempered because respondent has demonstrated a commitment to sobriety, cooperated in investigations leading to and arising out of drug-related convictions, and did not compromise any client's interest as a result of his addiction. See Akron Bar Assn. v. Thomas (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 395, 704 N.E.2d 562. These mitigating considerations, as well as the confidence expressed in respondent's progress and the work he has done for others, convince us that disbarment is too severe and that an indefinite suspension is warranted.\\n{\\u00b6 13} Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in Ohio, with the condition that he submit to periodic drug screening as recommended by the board. Costs are taxed to respondent.\\nJudgment accordingly.\\nMoyer, C.J., Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook, Lundberg Stratton and O'Connor, JJ., concur.\\nJonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kevin L. Williams, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.\\nJohn A. Fatica, for respondent.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8750330.json b/ohio/8750330.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3cc560a93bd766fde8a5ff98c0a6cad4e803f4f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8750330.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8750330\", \"name\": \"LANDRUM v. MIDDAUGH\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Landrum v. Middaugh\", \"decision_date\": \"1927-12-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 20445\", \"first_page\": \"12\", \"last_page\": \"12\", \"citations\": \"6 Ohio Law Abs. 12\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:26.843282+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"(Marshall, CJ., Day, Robinson and Matthias, JJ., concur.)\", \"parties\": \"LANDRUM v. MIDDAUGH.\", \"head_matter\": \"LANDRUM v. MIDDAUGH.\\nOhio Supreme Court.\\nNo. 20445.\\nDecided Dec. 28, 1927.\", \"word_count\": \"95\", \"char_count\": \"591\", \"text\": \"ALLEN, J.\\nAn employe who has applied for and accepted compensation for an injury received in the course of his employment through the negligent act of his foreman, performed in the regular course of such foreman's employment while both the employe and his foreman were working for an employer who had complied with th\\u00b0 pi ovisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, cannot thereafter maintain an action against his foreman to recover damages for his injury.\\n(Marshall, CJ., Day, Robinson and Matthias, JJ., concur.)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8752205.json b/ohio/8752205.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0ad865832280e423e35bf1190d49ab0d2728a87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8752205.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8752205\", \"name\": \"Josephine McCarty v. L. C. Lingham\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McCarty v. Lingham\", \"decision_date\": \"1924-12-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 18493\", \"first_page\": \"9\", \"last_page\": \"9\", \"citations\": \"3 Ohio Law Abs. 9\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:48:59.972986+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Robinson, Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen and Conn, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Josephine McCarty v. L. C. Lingham.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 18493\\nJosephine McCarty v. L. C. Lingham.\\nError to the Court of Appeals of Cuya-hoga county.\\n997. REAL ESTATE\\u20141. Vendee entitled to a marketable title when contract of sale is silent as to\\u2014Such title defined.\\n2. When husband does not join in conveyance and there are liens, vendee not bound to accept deed subject thereto, and without release of dower.\\n3. Measure of damages is the difference between contract price and market value.\", \"word_count\": \"255\", \"char_count\": \"1465\", \"text\": \"MARSHALL, C. J.\\n1. Where a written contract of sale of real estate is silent as to the character of the title to be conveyed, the purchaser is entitled to de.mand a marketable title.\\n2. Where such a contract is executed by a married woman, and her husband does not join therein, and there are liens and incumbrances by way of mortgage thereon, the vendee is not bound to accept a conveyance subject to in-cumbrances and without release of inchoate dower of husband, and upon breach by failure of vendor to obtain release of dower and discharge of incumbrances an action for damages will lie in vendee's favor.\\n3. The measure of damages in such case is the difference between the market value of the property at the time when the conveyance should have been made and the sale price stated in the contract.\\n4. A \\\"marketable title\\\" imports such ownership as insures to the owner the peaceable enjoyment and control of the land as against all others.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nRobinson, Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen and Conn, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8769826.json b/ohio/8769826.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d0ca34344ffa3ce6ae267e23063260ac38b3ddf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8769826.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8769826\", \"name\": \"RED TOP CAB CO. v. WHITFIELD\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Red Top Cab Co. v. Whitfield\", \"decision_date\": \"1927-05-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 7388\", \"first_page\": \"510\", \"last_page\": \"510\", \"citations\": \"5 Ohio Law Abs. 510\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:36:01.353953+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"(Sullivan, P. J. and Levine, J., Concur.)\", \"parties\": \"RED TOP CAB CO. v. WHITFIELD\", \"head_matter\": \"RED TOP CAB CO. v. WHITFIELD\\nOhio Appeals, 8th Dist., Cuyahoga Co.\\nNo. 7388.\\nDecided May 16, 1927\\nAttorneys \\u2014 J. H. McNeal and Henry J. Reed for Company; Bernsteen & Bernsteen and M. S. Fishel for Whitfield; all of Cleveland.\", \"word_count\": \"256\", \"char_count\": \"1459\", \"text\": \"VICKERY, J.\\nThe Red Top Cab Co. was sued by William Whitfield in the Cuyahoga Common Pleas to recover for certain injuries claimed to have been sustained when he was struck by a cab of the company. The Cab Company claimed that there had been a settlement and release of the claim and Whitfield was not entitled to recover. Judgment was rendered in favor of Whitfield, and error was prosecuted and the Court of Appeals held:\\u2014\\n1.We adhere to the doctrine that a release obtained under certain circumstances is a voidable contract and can be avoided by the plaintiff by making a proper tender back of the amount he received for said release and offering to place the other person in statu quo.\\n2. The petition did not set up the release but the answer did. It was flatly denied by Whitfield that there was such a release which was signed by a mark.\\n3. In submitting the interrogatory propounded by the company, \\\"Did the plaintiff knowingly sign this release?\\\", the court did not violate any proprieties but put the question fairly to the jury.\\n4. It was submitted as were the other issues and the jury found generally _ for the plaintiff so that the verdict is unassailable.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\n(Sullivan, P. J. and Levine, J., Concur.)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8770047.json b/ohio/8770047.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6600e6b3e3db47e86ba3450aaec60349caf5aa09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8770047.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8770047\", \"name\": \"COLOMBO v. CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Colombo v. City of Youngstown\", \"decision_date\": \"1928-03-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"475\", \"last_page\": \"476\", \"citations\": \"6 Ohio Law Abs. 475\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:26.843282+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"(Thomas and Williams, JJ., concur.)\", \"parties\": \"COLOMBO v. CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN.\", \"head_matter\": \"COLOMBO v. CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN.\\nOhio Appeals, 7th Dist., Mahoning Co.\\nDecided March 23, 1928.\\nD. F. Rendinell, Youngstown, for Colombo.\\nCarl Armstrong, Youngstown, for City of Youngstown.\", \"word_count\": \"361\", \"char_count\": \"2062\", \"text\": \"PULL TEXT.\\nPARR, J.\\nThis cause is here on error. Colombo was charged in the Municipal Court of the City of Youngstown with possession of property designed for the manufacture of liquor. Upon the trial in that court there was a finding of guilty and it was affirmed in the Court of Common Pleas, and this cause comes here for review upon the issue that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence.\\n_ The record discloses that Colombo lived with his family in a frame dwelling at 1414 Wilson Avenue; that there was a hallway running through the center of the house, upon the opposite side of which hallway there were a number of unoccupied rooms, the doors of some of which were unlocked and accessible to any one. In these rooms and upon a search of the premises there was found a 75 gallon still, 3,-000 gallons of mash, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 100 pounds of yeast, and a large amount of finished product in the way of liquor. The searching officers testify to finding this outfit and these materials in the building, and that Colombo denied all knowledge of the same.\\nIt is said that the odor from the manufacture of liquor was plainly noticeable to anyone entering the building, and it is equally unthinkable that anyone from the outside was going to the building and manufacturing liquor to the extent that it seems to have been carried on in the place. The officers corroborate each other as to the amount and kind of the equipment, materials, etc. Colombo simply denies all. knowledge of the same and likewise his guilt. The trial court found him guilty and this. court could not now well say that this finding is so clearly, so manifestly against the weight of the evidence by the degree required by law as to require a conviction. Clearly the trial court was justified in the conclusion reached, and the judgment is affirmed.\\n(Thomas and Williams, JJ., concur.)\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8772016.json b/ohio/8772016.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1821f9073073cb3221ec65f2d80f4331ef85a109
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8772016.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8772016\", \"name\": \"Sam Brown v. Zanesville Hotel Co. et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brown v. Zanesville Hotel Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-04-21\", \"docket_number\": \"18938\", \"first_page\": \"266\", \"last_page\": \"266\", \"citations\": \"3 Ohio Law Abs. 266\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:48:59.972986+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Sam Brown v. Zanesville Hotel Co. et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"18938\\nSam Brown v. Zanesville Hotel Co. et al.\", \"word_count\": \"21\", \"char_count\": \"122\", \"text\": \"Motion to certify to Muskingum Appeals. Overruled. Dock 2-3-25, 3 Abs. 82.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8796079.json b/ohio/8796079.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a30202c0364b83883b973ef786105ee685237ec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8796079.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8796079\", \"name\": \"Robert W. Ross, et al v. The Adams Mills School District, et.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ross v. Adams Mills School District\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-09-29\", \"docket_number\": \"19096\", \"first_page\": \"598\", \"last_page\": \"598\", \"citations\": \"3 Ohio Law Abs. 598\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:48:59.972986+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Robert W. Ross, et al v. The Adams Mills School District, et.\", \"head_matter\": \"TUESDAY, SEPT. 29, 1925\\n19096.\\nRobert W. Ross, et al v. The Adams Mills School District, et.\\nAttorneys: C. B. Hunt, Coshocton; Frazier & Frazier, Zanesville, for Ross; C. C. Crabbe, W. E. Benoy, Columbus; Clarence J. Crossland, Prosecuting Attorney, Zanesville; C. O. Turner, Prosecuting Attorney, Coshocton, for School District.\", \"word_count\": \"54\", \"char_count\": \"357\", \"text\": \"Dock. 4-24-25, 3 Abs. 278.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/8806459.json b/ohio/8806459.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0b8a00c596adabd8722936bc098e51a9788d816f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/8806459.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8806459\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of Charles M. Wood, Deceased\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Estate of Wood\", \"decision_date\": \"1928-05-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"323\", \"last_page\": \"332\", \"citations\": \"27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 323\", \"volume\": \"27\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)\", \"court\": \"Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:23:46.941515+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of Charles M. Wood, Deceased.\", \"head_matter\": \"Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.\\nIn the Matter of the Estate of Charles M. Wood, Deceased.\\nDecided May 14, 1928.\\nMcMahon, Corwin, Landis & Markham, for Wood estate.\\nWm. H. Middleton, Jr., for the Tax Commission of Ohio.\\nAffirmed by Court of Appeals.\", \"word_count\": \"3588\", \"char_count\": \"20402\", \"text\": \"Snediker, J.\\nThis case is in this court on appeal from a decision of the probate court of this county, which found that certain promissory notes of the estate of Charles Morgan Wood, who in his lifetime was a resident of the city of Ipswich, Massachusetts, which notes were for the amount of $115,-000, and were given as part payment on a land contract on lot 113 of the revised and consecutive numbers of lots on the plat of the city of Dayton, Ohio, and which are held in the state of Ohio by Robert G. Corwin as ancillary administrator of the estate of Charles Morgan Wood, deceased, ought not to be included in a computation of inheritance tax in this state..\\nThe facts of the case are these: Victoria H. Wood, the mother of Charles Morgan Wood, deceased, was in her lifetime the owner of certain property in this city, located at the southwest corner of Second and Ludlow streets. On or about the 1st day of November, 1924, she entered into a contract of sale of that property with Abram. Schachne and Harry I. Schenck. By this contract it was provided that the purchase price thereof was $150,000, payable $15,000 in cash and the balance in notes in different amounts of $10,000, $15,000 and $20,000 each, falling due on the 1st day of November of each year subsequent to the date of the contract to and including the 1st day of November, 1932. There was a further provision that upon the payment of notes Nos. 1, 2 and 3, which aggregated $35,000, Schachne and Schenck would be entitled to and Victoria H. Wood would deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed for the property, taking back a first mortgage upon the real estate conveyed to secure the unpaid notes. Mrs. Wood died before the maturity of the first installment note. R. G. Corwin became her administrator and as such came into possession of all of them. On June 7, 1926, Charles M. Wood, who was the sole beneficiary of the will of his mother, Victoria H. Wood, gave her administrator a receipt for both the contract and the notes. The contract was sent to Boston, Massachusetts, to Mr. Wood's agent and representative. The notes were endorsed by the administrator to the order of Charles M. Wood. At his request all of the notes were retained by the administrator, Mr.. Corwin, in Ohio as a matter of convenience, the makers living here.\\nAfter the payment of the note in November of 1926, Charles Morgan Wood, who was in Arizona, died testate on February 9, 1927, at which time these notes were still in possession of Mr. Corwin under the arrangement heretofore adverted to, with the understanding, however, that had Mr. Wood returned to Massachusetts they, were to be sent to him. Subsequent to the death of Mr. Wood his will was probated in the probate office of Essex county, Massachusetts. By this will, after providing for the payment of his just debts and funeral expenses, he gave to each of his daughters the sum of $100,000, payable in cash or in personal property or real estate in the discretion of his executrix, who was his wife, Annie S. Wood. He further provided \\\"all the rest and residue of my property of gyery nature whatsoever, real, personal or mixed, where soever situate, I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Annie S. Wood, her heirs and assigns forever.\\\" And thereafter he nominated and appointed Annie S. Wood his executrix of his last will and testament and authorized and empowered her to settle and adjust all debts and claims against his estate,- and gave her such other general powers as were necessary to a proper administration thereof.\\nIn the course of the administration of Mr. Wood's estate, ancillary letters of administration of that estate were granted by the probate court of this county to Robert G. Corwin, with authority to administer \\\"all and singular the assets situate within the state of Ohio which were of Charles Morgan Wood late of Ipswich, Essex county, in the state of Massachusetts to administer according to law all the said assets and also the proceeds of the real estate of said decedent situate within the said state of Ohio, which may be sold for the payment of his debts which shall at any time, come into the possession of the said administrator or any person for him,\\\" etc. As a part of the assets which came into Mr. Corwin's hands as such ancillary administrator, and which it became his duty to administer according to law, was the $115,000 notes to which we have already referred. Upon a petition being filed by Mr. Corwin as such administrator with the will annexed for a determination of the amount of inheritance tax which ought to be paid by the estate on the succession to property in the state of Ohio, it was contended by the tax commission of Ohio that the state is entitled to collect inheritance tax on $115,000. When this was resisted by the administrator, Mr. Corwin, the court made the decision adversely to the contention of the tax commission, and the question was thereupon filed in this court on appeal.\\nThe question for decision by this court is whether or not the state of Ohio may tax the succession to the notes owned by Charles Morgan Wood, deceased, who was at the time of his death a non-resident, and whose estate was administered upon in Massachusetts with an ancillary ad ministration in this state, such notes being in the hands of Mr. Corwin, the ancillary administrator, for collection at the time of decedent's death.\\nIt is well for us to keep in mind, as was recently stated by Chief Justice Taft (in the case of Blodgett, Tax Commissioner, v. Silberman, Advance Opinions, United States Supreme Court, May 1, 1928, p. 470), that such a tax \\\"is a tax not upon property but upon the right or privilege of succession to the property of a deceased person.\\\"\\n\\\"Taxes of this general character are universally deemed to relate, not to property eo nomine, but to its passage by will or by descent in cases of intestacy, as distinguished from taxes imposed on property, real or personal as such, because of its ownership and possession. In other words, the public contribution which death duties exact is predicated on the passing of property as the result of death, as distinct from a tax on property disassociated from its transmission or receipt by will, or as the result of intestacy.\\\"\\nIn determining the question which has been propounded to us, it will be necessary for us to examine the inheritance tax law of Ohio, as it is here that this tax is sought to be collected. The foundation of all the enactments found in the Code in this behalf is' laid in Section 7 of Article 12 of the Constitution of the state of Ohio, which, so far as concerns us, reads:\\n\\\"Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of the right to receive or to succeed to estates.\\\"'\\n\\\"As used in this subdivision of this chapter:\\nPursuant to this constitutional provision the Legislature of the state of Ohio passed a law found in Sections 5831 et seq. of the Code relating to the levy and collection of a tax on succession to inheritance. Section 5331, in part, reads as follows:\\n\\\"1. The words 'estate' and 'property' include everything capable of ownership, or any interest therein or income therefrom, whether tangible or intangible, and, except as to real estate, whether within or without- this state, which passes to any one person, institution or corporation, from any one person, whether by a single succession or not.\\n\\\"2. 'Succession' means the passing of property in possession or enjoyment, present or future.\\n\\\"3. 'Within this state,' when predicated of tangible property, means physically located within this state; when predicated of intangible property, that the succession thereto is, for any purpose, subject to, or governed by the law of this state.\\\"\\nSection 5332 reads:\\n\\\"A tax is hereby levied upon the succession to any property passing, in trust or otherwise, to or for the use of a person, institution or corporation, in the following cases:\\n\\\"2. When the succession is by will or by the intestate laws of this state or another state or country, to property within this state, from a person who was not a resident of this state at the time of his death.\\\"\\nThe property in the hands of the ancillary administrator is such as would be included in the general term \\\"intangible property,\\\" and in order to come within the scope of subdivision two of Section 5332 of the General Code, the succession thereto must be \\\"subject to or governed by the law of this state\\\" and when we have determined whether or not it is so \\\"subject to or governed\\\" thereby, it ought not to be difficult to decide the question presented by this record.\\nThe duties of an ancillary administrator under the Ohio Code are, to collect the proceeds and property of the estate, make application of them to the payment of the debts proved against the estate, and this having been done to pay the surplus into the court granting administration for the benefit of the estate of the decedent in the state where he resided at the time of his death. He has no d\\u00faty here as in some states to pay legatees according to the law of the domicile of the decedent. If any such payment is made to a legatee, it ought to be made by the personal representative appointed at the place of domicile.\\nChief Justice Taft in the decision from which we have already quoted says:\\n\\\"At common law the maxim 'mobilia sequuntur per-sonam' applied. There has been discussion and criticism of the application and enforcement of that maxim, but it is so fixed in the common law of this country and of England, in so far as it relates to intangible property, including choses in action, without regard to whether they are evidenced in writing' or otherwise and whether the papers evidencing the same are found in the state of the domicile or elsewhere, and is so fully sustained by cases in this and other courts, that it must be treated as settled in this jurisdiction whether it approve itself to legal philosophic test or not.\\\"\\nThis being a rule of the common law of this country and being universally recognized, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was \\\"that intangible personalty has such a situs at the domicile of its owner that its transfer on his death may be taxed there.\\\"\\nThe Supreme Court of Ohio has long since discussed and decided the question as to what law governs the succession of the personal property of a non-resident of the state. In the 14 O. S., at page 424, and in the case of Swearingen v. Morris, the syllabus is:\\n\\\"Personal property has no fixed situs, but adheres to the person of the owner, and, upon his death, the succession to it is governed by the law of his domicile.\\\"\\nIn the body of the opinion Judge Ranney says:\\n\\\"Personal property has no fixed situs, adheres in contemplation of law to the person of the owner, and is disposed of, in almost every respect, whether of transfers inter vivos, testamentary dispositions, or successions, by the law of his domicile.1 The principle is founded in an enlarged policy, growing out of the transitory nature of personal property, and the general convenience of nations. As remarked by Judge Story (Confl. of Laws, Sec. 379) : 'If the law rei sitae were generally to prevail in regard to movables, it would be utterly impossible for the owner, in many cases, to know in what manner to dispose of them during his life, or to distribute them at his death; not only from the uncertainty of their situation in the transit to and from different places, but from the impracticability of knowing, with minute accuracy, the law of transfers inter vivos, of testamentary dispositions and successions in the different countries in which they might happen to be.' And after enumerating many other 'serious evils/ detrimental to 'the interests of all civilized nations/ which the application of this principle would involve, he very justly concludes that, 'in maritime nations, depending upon commerce for their revenues, their power and their glory, the mischief would be incalculable/\\n\\\"Lord Loughborough, in Sill v. Worswick, 1 Henry Black, 690, states the general doctrine with great force and precision. 'It is a clear proposition/ he said, 'not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world, where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner; both with respect to the disposition of it, and with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession, or by the act of the party. It follows the law of the person. The owner in any country may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate the succession/\\n\\\"Indeed, so universally has it been treated as a part of the jus gentium, and thus incorporated into the municipal law of every country, that C. J. Abbott declared it 'not correct to say, that the law of England gives way to the law of the foreign country; but, that it is part of the law of England that personal property should be distributed according to the just domicili.'\\n\\\"The doctrine has been universally acted upon in this country; and it will be readily seen, that it could nowhere be applied with greater benefit, or less inconvenience, than between the states of the American Union.\\\"\\nIt is unnecessary for us to quote other authorities to the same effect as the Swearingen case, which has not been reversed in this state and is an authority which controls us. Therefore, by the phrase defining \\\"within this state,\\\" viz.: \\\"That the succession thereto is for any purpose subject to or governed by the law of this state,\\\" the legislature must have intended to exclude intangible personal property of a nonresident found in Ohio at his death, unless it could be said that the succession thereto is sub ject to our state law for any purpose. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held (78 O. S., 258) : \\\"As a general rule administration is a prerequisite to the devolution of the personal property .of a decedent.\\\" They say that personal property of a decedent person, upon the appointment of the administrator, is vested in him by relation from the time of the death, and this opinion of the Supreme Court is supported by numerous authorities.\\nIt follows from the foregoing that until full administration is had, succession, as defined by Section 5331 of the General Code, does not take place.\\nThis administrator is an ancillary administrator and in his office and in the performance of his duties, cannot affect the administration in Massachusetts. As between him and the personal represent\\u00e1tive of decedent in Massachusetts, there is no direct connection or dependance.\\n\\\"Each is privy to the testator and would be estopped by a judgment against him, but they have not privity with each other in law or in estate. They receive their authority from different sovereignties and from different property. The authority of each is paramount to the other. Each is accountable to the court from whom he receives his authority; nor does the one come by succession to the other into the trust of the same property encumbered by the same debts as in the case of an administrator de bonis non who may be truly said to have an official privity with his predecessor in the same trust and therefore liable to the same duties.\\\" (5 Howard's Reports, p. 44.)\\nThere could not then be in any sense, in this state, a full administration of the property in Ohio belonging to the Wood estate, unless it was all needed for the payment of local debts. When this ancillary administrator, appointed by the probate court of this county, transmits, in compliance with the provisions of the Code, the surplus of the personal property of the estate to the executor of the decedent in the other state, even then a succession may only occur, if such surplus is not needed for other purposes in the settlement of the estate at the place of domicile; and when and if it does so occur, it is subject to the l\\u00e1w of that place.\\nA leading case is found in the law reports, Chancery-Appeal Cases, at page 1 (Wallace v. Attorney General), in which the Lord Chancellor decided that \\\"Succession duty is not payable on legacies given by the will of a person domiciled in a foreign country.\\\" In discussing the point the Lord Chancellor says:\\n\\\"The question, therefore, is whether, where a person domiciled abroad makes a will giving personal property in this country by way of legacy, the legatee is a person becoming entitled to that property within the true intent and meaning of the second section. I think not. I think that in order to be brought within that section it must be a person who becomes entitled by virtue of the laws of this country. Any wider construction would give rise to questions hardly to be surmounted. In collecting the diities, the officers of the revenue will in general find no difficulty, supposing the duties to be imposed only on persons entitled under our own laws. The officers know, or must be supposed to know, what these laws are with respect to the persons liable by our laws to the duties to be levied. But who the parties entitled under a foreign law are, is a question which no knowledge of our laws will enable them to solve. It can only be ascertained by evidence in every case showing what the foreign law is and who is entitled under it. In some cases this may admit of little or no doubt, but in others it may be a matter of great difficulty, and in no case can the officers safely act until the rights of parties have been ascertained litigiously.\\\".\\nAfter reading these words of the Lord Chancellor, we see the wisdom of that provision of the Code, which requires that the surplus of the estate in the hands of the ancillary administrator, after payment of the debts, shall be transmitted to the original administrator.\\nAnother leading case is that of Thompson v. The Advocate General, found in Clark and Finnelly's Reports, page 1, where the court decided:\\n\\\"Personal property having no situs of its own, follows the domicile of its owner.\\n\\\"The law of the domicile of a testator or intestate decides whether his personal property is liable to legacy duty.\\\"\\nAnd in the case of Enohim v. Wylie, House of Lords Cases, Volume 10, page 1, the Lord Chancellor decided:\\n\\\"The law of the domicile of a testator governs questions of testacy and intestacy, of the construction of the will, and of the rights of those who claim to be his next of kin.\\\"\\nAnd he stated:\\n\\\"I hold it to be now put beyond all possibility of question, that the administration of the personal estate of a deceased person belongs to the court of the country where the deceased was domiciled at his death. All questions of testacy and intestacy belong to the judge of the domicile. It is the right and duty of that judge to constitute the personal representative of the deceased. To the court of the domicile belongs the interpretation and construction of the will of the testator. To determine who are the next of kin or heirs of the personal estate of the testator, is the prerogative of the judge of the domicile. In short, the court of the domicile is the forum concur sus. to which the legatees under the will of a testator, or the parties entitled to the distribution of the estate of an intestate, are required to resort.\\\"\\nFrom the foregoing and from numerous decisions in our own country it may be regarded as settled that the succession in personal estates of every description, wherever situated, is regulated by the law of the domicile.\\nStory in his work on the Conflict of Laws discusses the same question with the same result.\\nIf it is true that the state of Ohio can by enactment govern and make subject the succession to intangible personal property bequeathed by a non-resident testator, we know of no legislation by which it has done so.\\nIn view of the foregoing, we are unable to say that the succession to the notes here in question is \\\"by will to property within the state.\\\" Our finding is in favor of the ancillary administrator.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8807603\", \"name\": \"D. W. Steiner et al v. The City of Lima et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Steiner v. City of Lima\", \"decision_date\": \"1909-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"509\", \"last_page\": \"517\", \"citations\": \"8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 509\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)\", \"court\": \"Allen County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:21:45.838225+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"D. W. Steiner et al v. The City of Lima et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"MAKING GOOD DEFICIENCY IN STREET ASSESSMENT ARISING FROM CORNER LOT EXEMPTIONS.\\nCommon Pleas Court of Allen County.\\nD. W. Steiner et al v. The City of Lima et al.\\nDecided, May, 1909.\\nStreets \\u2014 Assessments for Improvement of \\u2014 Deficiency Arising from Corner Lot Exemptions \\u2014 May be Added to the Remaining Assessable Frontage \\u2014 Jurisdiction and Authority o.f Council.\\nThe burden of bearing that portion of the cost of a street improvement not assessable under the law against corner lots rests upon the abutting owners, notwithstanding in the petition for the improvement they only bound themselves to pay an assessment \\u201cby the front foot for the number of feet set opposite their names, less two per cent, and the cost of the intersections of public alleys and that portion of corner lots exempted by law and not signed for in this petition.\\u201d\\nJames W. Halfhill, for plaintiff.\\nW. L. Rogers, City Solicitor, contra.\", \"word_count\": \"3007\", \"char_count\": \"17811\", \"text\": \"Beoker, J.\\nD. W. Steiner and others, of the number of six, as plaintiffs, file their petition in this court by which they seek to enjoin the collection of special assessments on property of plaintiffs lying along, adjacent to and fronting on North Elizabeth street, in Lima, Ohio, between West Market street and West North street in said city. The plaintiffs enumerate the respective properties that each own, giving the frontage each has on said North Elizabeth street.\\nPlaintiffs set forth in their petition that in the month of June, 1907, some of these plaintiffs and others, residents and owners of lots fronting and abutting on said North Elizabeth street, presented to and filed with the city council of Lima, a petition asking for the improvement of North Elizabeth street from the north line of Market street to the south line of North street in said city, by grading, paving, etc., in short making all such improvements as pertain to a well paved street.\\nThe petition for such improvement is set forth in plaintiffs' petition. The petitioners recited the number of feet frontage each had abutting on said Elizabeth street, and that the city council in accordance with the prayer of the petition passed a resolution for the improvement of said street, three-fourths of the members of council concurring in its passage. A copy of said resolution is set out in plaintiffs' petition. The petition recites that the resolution was approved by the mayor of the city and published as required by law. The petition further recites that on the 18th day of March, 1907, the city council of the city of Lima passed an ordinance for the improvement of said street, under and by virtue of said petition for such improvement and under the jurisdiction taken by said council by virtue of such petition filed by the petitioners requesting such improvement, which ordinance was also approved by the mayor of the city and published according to law; that such proceedings were had that a contract was awarded for the improvement of said street, the improvement completed and accepted by the city, and that thereafter the defendant, the city of Lima, passed an assessing ordinance whereby, in violation of the resolution and ordinance passed by the city council, 286% feet of actual frontage upon Elizabeth street, being that portion of corner lot frontage exempted by, law, was assessed against 'the remaining frontage on said street, whereby each remaining foot frontage on said \\u2022 street was assessed the added sum of $1.1609. The petition claims that by this means there was placed against the property of D. W. Steiner the sum of $162.51, assessable in accordance with the petition for said improvement; against the property of J. IT. Blattenburg, $46.43; against the property of A. C. Baxter, $69.65; against the property of Sol Weisenthal, $58.05; against the property of Francis E. \\u2022 MeComb,'- $58.04, and against the property of Charles IT. Crockett, $58.04. The petition recites that this assessing ordinance was also duly approved by the mayor and was published as required by law.\\nPlaintiffs' petition further recites that all such assessments are void, and that the same are so made by the city council of the' city of Lima in violation of the terms and conditions of the petition for such improvement, in violation of the resolution declaring the necessity for such improvement between these plaintiffs and the defendant, the city of'Lima, and that the city had no jurisdiction to make such added assessments. The petition further recites that the defendant, by its officers, will attempt, unless restrained, to collect such added assessments and invokes the power and authority of this court to restrain defendants from collecting the same.\\nTo this petition the city of Lima, by its solicitor, files a general demurrer and thus raises the legality of such assessments.\\nThere are three purposes that I can see from the filing of the petition with council, asking for improvements: One is to call the attention of council to the necessity for such an improvement, and the other to pave the way for such improvement which could not generally be granted by reason of the conditions which exist and which council could not grant by reason of the hin-derance of some special provision of law, and a petition to council waives the respective rights of petitioners to insist on such protection granted them by law, and which without the waiving of such rights the improvement could not be made. The other is to invoke council to grant such improvement which could not be obtained by reason of not being able to gain the assent of three-fourths of the members of the council.\\nThis distinction, how\\u00e9ver, exists: that where an improvement is made at the request of petitioners, as provided for in Section 1536-223 of the Revised Statutes, that where the owners of a majority of the foot frontage petition therefor, the'majority of the council concurring, may proceed with such improvement. The other section (1536-211) provides, that whenever it is deemed necessary by any city or village to make any public improvement, to be paid for in whole or in part by such assessment, council shall declare by resolution, three-fourths of the whole number elected thereto concurring, the necessity of such improvement.\\nThe plaintiffs presented a petitipn to council as; follows:\\n\\\"Wej the undersigned residents and owners of lots fronting and abutting on North Elizabeth street -from the north line of Market street to the south line of North street, respectively petition'your honorable body to take the necessary steps to improve said portion of said street by curbing, grading and paving the same with good quality .of sheet asphalt, block asphalt or petrified paving bricks upon a concrete, foundation,\\\" etc.\\nMore follows in this petition, but for the present I.may stop there and consider what effect this petition had. It was sufficient to invoke the action of council and give it jurisdiction, but it was not essential that the petition be filed at all to confer jurisdiction on council; council had such jurisdiction. Under the provisions of Section 1536-211 council had such jurisdiction, provided three-fourths of the .members elect, concurred in the resolution declaring the necessity of such improvement, which council did in this case. The petition for an improvement is without significance if it does not give a city the right to do more than act within strict compliance with the letter .of the statute. The sole object of the petition is to avoid and surrender some constitutional or legal limitations. No petition in this case was at all necessary to give council jurisdiction. It probably and possibly served a purpose to call attention to the necessity of such improvement, but when council acted by three-fourths of its members concurring and declaring for such improvement, it had the entire jurisdiction of the subject-matter and could proceed in the way pointed out by the statutes, without any implied reservation on the part of petitioners. It had complete jurisdiction of the subject-matter and all that it was expected to do or could be required to do was to follow the statutes and the laws pertaining thereto. Joseph Jessing v. The City of Columbus et al, 1st Circuit Court, 90.\\nCouncil had not only jurisdiction of the subject-matter by virtue of Section 1536-211, but it had jurisdiction conferred upon it by the petitioners themselves under Section 1536-222.\\n'It is true that the petitioners conclude their petition to council as follows:\\n\\\"And we hereby consent that our property' may be assessed by the- foot front for the number of feet set opposite our names hereto, less two per cent, and the costs of the intersection of public alleys, and that portion of corner lots excepted by law, not signed for in this petition.\\\"\\nSo far as said exceptions pertain to the costs of the intersections and the two per cent, this is already provided for by law and it is wholly surplusage and useless to make -this exception in this petition; such part of the costs of this improvement could not have been taxed against petitioners, had the petition remained silent on the subject; but has their consent any bearing or does it limit the council in the making of just such an assessment as petitioners have signified by their consent they will be satisfied with? Could these petitioners, by withholding their consent, throw an additional burden upon the city itself? ' Certainly they could not. And could these petitioners, if council had jurisdiction by either section of the statute, by reason of the general provisions of law, and by reason of having invoked the authority .and power of council, throw an additional burden upon the city, other than that expressly imposed upon the city by law, by withholding any assent on their part? A council having general jurisdiction and also express jurisdiction conferred upon it by these petitioners, petitioners can only resist such assessments as council are unauthorized to make within the limitations of law.\\nPlaintiffs, in .their petition, seem to resist this assessment on the ground that when this petition was presented and council acted upon it, that it constituted a contract' between petitioners and the city. We do not think so, but think and believe that such petitioners were bound by every act and step council thereafter chose to take in compliance with law governing the question of improvements. Having once invoked the action of council they were bound to take notice of every step taken in furtherance of such improvement, but actual notice is presumed in the absence of a denial of such notice. The law will presume regularity and that every step was complied with as required by law. Having had full knowledge and notice of the resolution adopted, of the ordinance adopted, would they not now be estopped from insisting on what they did not expressly consent to, excepting as to all matters in which council acted beyond its power and authority expressly granted them by law? See Steiner et al v. City of Cincinnati, 4th Circuit Court, 280.\\nOn page 282 the court says:\\n\\\"We think these petitioners who signed this petition and had notice of what council proposed should be assessed against the property, should be estopped.\\n\\\"They are not estopped by reason of the fact that they signed the petition ; they had the right to assume that council would act according to law and that would be that the assessment would not be in excess of 25 per cent, of the value of the property as assessed for taxation; but it further appeared in evidence that these property owners when notified previous to the time that the city had obligated itself by contract to build this improvement, that the assessment was to be by the foot front on the abutting property and was to be nearly $9 per foot, they had the right to enjoin any further proceedings. Council had. exceeded its powers, and no court would have denied them a remedy, but they without objection permitted council to go on and contract to make the improvement, fully knowing that council expected to assess them that amount. It is too late now for them to ask for an injunction.\\\"\\nThis certainly is a strong holding, as applies to the doctrine of estoppel, much stronger than it is necessary to apply, the doctrine in this case to work an estoppel against plaintiffs.\\nIn Fry v. The City of Findlay et al, 7 Circuit Court, 326, the court says:\\n\\\"The plaintiff signed the petition for improvements and both were active in seeing that they were completed; both had knowledge and notice of the mode and manner of the assessment and made no objection; we know of no law, where the improvement is to be assessed by the foot front, that notice is required. ' '\\nTone v. Columbus, 39 O. S., 281, syllabus third:\\n\\\"Active participation in causing the improvement to be made will stop the party engaged therein from denying the validity of the assessment, but to create an estoppel from silence mefely it must be shown that the owners had knowledge, first, that the improvement was being made; second, that it was intended to assess the costs thereof, or some part of it, upon his property; third, that the infirmity or defect in the proceedings existed wliich he is to be estopped from asserting. ' '\\nN'ow, let us see what the resolution of council provided for. In the third paragraph of such resolution it is provided as follows :\\n' ' That the whole costs and expenses of said improvement, except one fiftieth part thereof and except the costs of intersections, shall be assessed by the foot front upon all 'the lots and lands bound and abutting on said street and improvement by the foot front from the north line of Market street to the south line of North street, all of which lots.and lands are hereby determined to be especially benefited by said improvement.\\\"\\nThat was sufficient notice at all events to these petitioners that the costs, except two per cent, and intersections, must be borne by these property owners on this street. The exact assessment was not given it is true, but it does state it to be by the foot front. The foot front has'received a well defined meaning and construction under the statutes of Ohio, and the petitioners were as well bound as to the meaning of these provisions as council. The doctrine as to such assessments for corner lots is well settled. Chamberlin v. Cleveland, 34 O. S., 551; Norwood v. Baker, 172 United States, 269; French v. Barber Asphalt Company, 181 United States, 324; Crawford v. Cincinnati, 26 B., 215, and in the well known Haviland case.\\nThere is a contradiction in the language and meaning of the petition of these petitioners; they ask for this improvement; they except the costs of two per cent, and intersections, and yet they knew or ought to have known then that they could not compel or expect the city to pay any more and have their improvement made. What then was implied? That if an improvement was made they must pay for it. They surrendered nothing and took on themselves no additional burden by having this improvement made other than the law placed upon them. See also Thornton v. City of Cincinnati, 4 C. C.\\u2014N. S., 31.\\nNow, this council having jurisdiction of the matter both by-general provision and by that conferred by petitioners, there were three modes of making assessments under Section 1536-210: first, by percentage of the tax value of the property assessed; second, in proportion to the benefits which may result from the improvement; third, by the foot frontage upon the improvement. This placed the sole power and authority in the council as to the improvement; manner of improvement and assessment.\\nCounsel for plaintiffs say that if council wanted to change the corner lot exemptions against the lot owners or other lot owners on this street, council should have resorted to one or the other of the first two methods of assessment, either in proportion to the benefit or by a percentage of the tax value, but how would either of these methods relieve the situation, if as the petition claims, when council acted on the petition presented by the petitioners, the same became in effect a contract between plaintiffs and the defendant city. In-either event the burden of bearing their portion of the improvement as to these corner lots not assessable under-the law, would fall upon them. If council has jurisdiction they can not be deprived of chosing the method of assessment, and they chose the foot frontage plan. I can not see why this plan is not just as equitable as either of the other two plans, and why should the city be compelled to come to the rescue of these property holders to help them bear their burden; why should any other citizen in any other part of the city be compelled to help them bear this burden. True, we all have an interest in seeing improvements .made and' the city beautified, but when the city bears two per cent, of the costs of the improvement and the costs of intersection, have they not imposed a burden upon ,all the citizens of Lima sufficiently so as far as such interest is concerned ? Only those adjacent property holders have a direct interest in the improvement, and it is not unjust to say that they and they alone shall bear this expense; they can not, even under their petition, dictate the manner of assessment for an improvement .after once having invoked council to act and clothed them with jurisdiction even though council had not otherwise jurisdiction.\\nCouncil then, I think, had full power to adopt this plan of assessment, even though they could not assess certain parts of corner lots exempt from .assessment and have the right to take into consideration and read into the statute these exemptions and consider the foot frontage as actually assessable by law, which they did in this case.\\nThe demurrer to the petition will therefore be sustained.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8842215\", \"name\": \"Falk, Exp.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Falk\", \"decision_date\": \"1885-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"638\", \"last_page\": \"645\", \"citations\": \"42 Ohio St. 638\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:01:28.254739+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Falk, Exp.\", \"head_matter\": \"Falk, Exp.\\n1. The clause of the constitution, art. 2, \\u00a7 26, providing that \\u201c all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform .operation throughout the state,\\u201d is not directory, hut mandatory, and a statute in violation of it is void.\\n2. A statute providing punishment for an act which is malum in se wherever committed, being a law of a general nature, cannot be made local on the ground that the inhibited act is a greater evil in a large city than in other parts of the state.\\n2. Key. Stats. \\u00a7 1924, which provides punishment by fine and imprisonment against any person found in a city of the first grade of the first class, or within four miles thereof, having burglar\\u2019s tools in his possession, is a law of a general nature within the inhibition of the constitution, art. 2, \\u00a7 26, but being local in form and operation, it is void.\\nEi?,ROE to the District Court of Hamilton county.\\nM. F. Wilson, for Falk.\\nE. F. Bradstreet, contra.\", \"word_count\": \"2911\", \"char_count\": \"16577\", \"text\": \"Okey, J.\\nOn May 13, 1884, John Falk was convicted, in the police court of Cincinnati, of the offense of being found, on May 9, 1884, in a city of the first grade of the first class\\u2014 Cincinnati \\u2014 having in his possession burglar's tools, and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the work-house for the space of twelve months, to pay a fine of one hundred dollars and costs, and stand committed until fine and costs were paid. The satutory provision under which he was convicted (Rev. Stats. \\u00a7 1924) is as follows : \\\"Any person found in any such city (of the first grade of the first class) or within- four miles of the corporate limits thereof, having in his possession any burglar's tools, or implements of any kind commonly used by burglars in breaking or entering houses, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof before any police court or other court of such city having competent jurisdiction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than twenty-five nor more than a hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the city work-house for a period not less than ninety days nor more than twelve months, or both.\\\" The statute further provides : \\\" The [police] court shall have jurisdiction of any offense under any ordinance of the city, and of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of the city, or within four miles thereof, to hear and finally determine the same, and impose the prescribed penalty; but cases in which the accused is entitled to a trial by jury, shall be so tried, unless a jury be waived.\\\" Rev. Stats. \\u00a7 1788.\\nOn October 6, 1884, the district court of Hamilton county on application of Ealk, allowed a writ of habeas corpus, upon which he was brought before that court, but on final hearing, he was remanded to the custody of the superintendent of the work-house. Upon leave lie filed a petition in error in this court, and the only question presented is whether section 1924, above set forth, is or is not in conflict with the constitution, art. 2, \\u00a7 26, which provides: \\\" All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation thoughout the state.\\\"\\nThe constitution contains, in the article relating to the legislative department, various provisions as to the forms to be observed in the passage of a bill, as to the structure of a bill, the number of members required to pass it, and the effect and operation of the bill when passed. All of these provisions legislators are morally bound to observe, and in some states it is held that the failure to observe any of them will be fatal to the validity of an act. Cooley's Censt. Lim. 5 ed. 88-98. But in this state it is well settled that the failure of the general assembly to observe some of those provisions will not be attended, in the courts, with the same consequences that will follow the failure to observe other provisions. In other words, the courts of this state hold that some of those provisions are merely directory to the legislature, and an objection that they were not observed will be unavailing in the eojurts ; while other provisions are held to be mandatory, and a failure to observe them will render the statute void. Thus, the provisions as to the number of times a bill shall be read; that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; and that if a law is amended, the old section or sections shall be expressly repealed, are among those which are held to be merely directory. Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; Pim. v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Oshe v. State, 37 Ohio St. 494; State v. Cappeller, 39 Ohio St. 207. On the other hand, the provisions that the general assembly shall, except in certain specified cases, exercise no appointing power; that the legislature shall not authorize a county to become a stockholder in, raise money for, or loan its credit to a corporation; that money shall not be paid out of the treasury, without the consent of two-thirds of the members of each house, on any claim the subject matter of which shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law ; that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state ; that no special act conferring corporate powers shall be passed ; and some other provisions, have been held to be mandatory. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607-617; Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio St. 588; Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. 1; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; Taylor v. Ross Co., 23 Ohio St. 22; State v. Davis, 23 Ohio St. 434; Exp. Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St. 426-431; State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592; State v. Williams, 34 Ohio St. 218; McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 228-238; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54. Hence, the distinction seems to be, that those provisions relating to the structure of a bill, or the forms to be observed in the passage of a bill, are, as a general rule, merely directory; while provisions relating to the number of members required to pass a bill, or the effect and operation of a bill when passed, are usually regarded as mandatory.\\nThe authorities having settled beyond controversy (see opinion of Scott, J., in Kelley v. State, and McIlvaine, J., in State v. Powers), that the constitutional provision requiring all laws of a general nature to have a uniform operation throughout the state is mandatory, and that a failure on the part of the legislature to observe it will be fatal to the validity of a statute, the sole question before us is whether the section quoted (\\u00a7 1924), which is confessedly, indeed palpably, local, is or is not of a general nature within the meaning of the con- stifcutional provision. And in this connection it is proper to refer to the origin of the constitutional provision in question. We find that it was suggested by a provision in the constitution of California, which provision, however, liad not been construed when our constitution was adopted : but the California constitution did not contain the words, \\\" throughout the state they were added to our constitution, on motion, while the provision was under consideration in the convention (2 Debates, 579); and the absence of those words was made the ground of decisions in California which would never have been made if the constitution of that state had contained those words. Looking, however, beyond this, to the evil which led to the adoption of the provision, Thurman, J., in Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607, 617, took occasion to remark: \\\" .The origin of this section is perfectly well known. The legislature had often made it a crime to do in one county, or even township, what it was perfectly lawful to do elsewhere, and had provided that acts, even for the punishment of offenses, should be in force, or not, in certain localities, as the electors thereof, respectively, might decide. It was to remedy this evil, and prevent its recurrence, that this section was framed.\\\" And Boynton, J., in McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 228, 238, used this language: \\\"By reference to the debates upon this clause of the constitution, in the convention that framed that instrument (vol. 2, 225), it will be seen that the legislation complained of, and against which it was sought to guard the future, was of a general character, concerning the general nature of which there could be little doubt. A general law, that land should not be sold upon execution for less than two-thirds of its appraised value, was excluded from operation in several counties by local enactment. There were different laws in different counties respecting the descent and distribution of intestate property. Some statutes defining legal offenses were excluded in their operation from a large part of the state; and different penalties for a violation of the same act were, in some instances, provided for different localities. These are samples of the legislation, to prevent which in the future, and the mischief resulting from it, this provision of the constitution was adopted.\\\"\\nFinding the constitutional provision to bo mandatory, and that one of the principal evils which led to the adoption of the provision was the existence of local penal provisions general in character, it is proper to inquire as to the nature of the statutory provision in question here. And, first, it is to be observed that the provision is not a mere police regulation for the prevention of crime, but it prescribes punishment for an act, namely, being in possession of burglar's tools in Cincinnati, or within four miles thereof, and declares it to be a criminal offense, and the provision is quite analogous to the provisions punishing the act of having possession of instruments for counterfeiting, or having possession of counterfeit money with intent to sell it. Secondly, there can be no conviction for the offense of having burglar's tools in possession, unless it is shown by the state that the prisoner had such possession to aid him or another in the commission, not of any particular contemplated unlawful act, but any unlawful act when it might be thought a favorable opportunity was presented to commit it. Anderson v. State, 7 Ohio, 2 pt. 250; Birney v. State, 8 Ohio, 230; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475; Miller v. State, 5 Ohio St. 275; Crabtree v. State, 30 Ohio St. 382; Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456; Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229; Farrell v. State, 45 Ind. 371; 1 Bishop on Or. \\u00a7 301-310; Bishoja's Stat. Or. \\u00a7 1022. And hence, thirdly, the act inhibited by section 1924, is not merely immoral, but plainly vicious; it is one of a very serious and dangerous character; it is not merely malum prohibitum, but malum in se ; and it is a wrong to society, not merely in Cincinnati, not merely in cities, but in every county, in every township, in fact in each and every part of the state; and no reason can be given why it might not properly be made punishable by statute, throughout the whole state, as a criminal offense. Perhaps it is true that such acts may be a greater evil in large cities, possibly a greater evil in Cincinnati, than in any other part of the state. But the same thing may be truthfully said with respect to many, perhaps a majority of criminal offenses. Take the crime of arson. It is a grievous evil everywhere, and under some circumstances a most atrocious crime. It is an evil alike in town and country, but a far greater evil in a large compact city like Cincinnati than in a small village or bamlet or a sparse rural district. But does this reason, or any other with which it may be supplemented, afford any ground, in view of our constitution, for punishing arson under local law ? So, a person having possession of instruments for counterfeiting, or custody of a large quantity of counterfeit money, may be in a better position to carry on a nefarious business successfully, and therefore more likely to occasion harm, in a crowded city than in the rural portions of the state; but a general law upon the subject, applicable to the whole state, has effected all that can be done by legislation to remedy the evil. Other illustrations, equally pertinent, might be given; but it is sufficient to say, that if we must assume, merely because sect,ion 1924 was enacted, that the legislature had information showing that the necessity for such legislation with respect to Cincinnati was urgent, and therefore must be sustained, we would be compelled, on the same principle, to uphold local legislation on any and every subject, however general the nature and subject matter of such legislation might be. \\\"We are not willing, nor are we permitted, to adopt any such rule of construction; and, indeed, to do so would be in effect to unsay what we have deliberately said as to the mandatory character of the constitutional provision we are considering.\\nTo the end that these statements may not mislead, it is proper to say that the general assembly is clothed in the most general terms with legislative power, and this, unrestrained by other- provisions, would authorize the legislature to pass local penal statutes of every sort, and it will be seen that there is no inhibition against the passage of penal statutes which are local and even special in character. Hence, it may be that a statute punishing even with death any person who should break and enter the state treasury in Columbus, Chio, with intent to steal, or having so broken and entered, rob the treasurer of state, would not be subject to any constitutional objection, however objectionable it might be on the ground of propriety. And other and perhaps more apt illustrations of the principle may be readily suggested. On the other band, a statute, general in form, prohibiting the sale of liquors in the immediate vicinity of any college, would perhaps be regarded as a general and therefore valid enactment, in force thoughout the state, although every county does not contain a college. And this is consistent with everything I have stated.\\nAttention has been called to the fact that in State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653, 658, it was held that the power to classify municipal corporations expressly authorized by the constitution is addressed in a large degree to the conscience and judgment of the legislature, and \\\" that statutory provisions with respect to any such class are, for governmental purposes, general legislation\\\" and not in conflict with the constitution. This we held to be a proper construction of art. 13, \\u00a7 6, which is in no sense in conflict with art. 2, \\u00a7 26. And in this connection it is proper to say, that in Morgan v. Nolte, 37 Ohio St. 23, we sustained the validity of a conviction under an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati, passed by virtue of Rev. Stats. \\u00a7 1692, 2108, prescribing punishment by fine and imprisonment against any person who, being a known thief, should be found in that city; and, there being no general statute punishing the act of having possession of burglar's tools, it is true, perhaps, that the substance of section 1924, if adopted in due form as an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati, under authority of sections 1692 and 2108, would be entirely valid. Nor does this militate against any thing I have said; for the constitutional provision we are considering would not, under such circumstances, have any application.\\nRev. Stats. \\u00a7 1924, is, for the reasons stated, in conflict with the const, art. 2, \\u00a7 26, and therefore void. In saying so, we do not depart in the slightest degree from the rule that no judge should ever concur in holding a statute to be unconstitutional, unless he is satisfied that he is clearly right in so holding. 38 Ohio St. 219. But we do not undertake to lay down any rule, by the application of which it may be determined whether any law is or is not within the inhibition. We content ourselves by holding, that a statute providing punish ment for an act which is malum in se wherever committed, is a law of a general nature, and to be valid under the const, art 2, \\u00a7 26, must have a uniform operation throughout the state ; nor will the fact that the inhibited act maj be a greater evil in a large city than in other parts of the state, warrant a local statute punishing such offense; and that Rev. Stats. \\u00a7 1924 is, therefore, unconstitutional.\\nJudgment reversed and prisoner discharged.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"887167\", \"name\": \"John M. Newcomb et al. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Newcomb v. Cincinnati Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1872-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"382\", \"last_page\": \"388\", \"citations\": \"22 Ohio St. 382\", \"volume\": \"22\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-21T20:02:18.861595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Harvard\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John M. Newcomb et al. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"John M. Newcomb et al. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company.\\nWhere a loss, partially covered by insurance, is occasioned by a wrongdoer, against whom the assured, after payment of the insurance, recovers judgment for such loss in an action, to the prosecution of which the underwriter refuses on request to contribute, the assured, in a subsequent proceeding against him by the underwriter for reimbursement, is answerable for no more, if for anything, than the surplus of the amount recovered from the wrong-doer, which may remain.after full satisfaction of his uncompensated loss, and the expenses of the recovery.\\nError to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.\\nThe facts appear in the opinion of the court.\\nLincoln, Smith \\u00a7 Warnoch, for plaintiffs in error:\\n1. The judgment recovered in the collision suit included items for which the insurance company was not liable, and excluded items of loss which said company was bound to make good. Handyside v. Wilson, 3 Car. & P. 530; Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 Car. & P. 375; Perrin\\u2019s Adm\\u2019r v. Protection Ins. Co., 11 Ohio, 156; Waters v. Mer Louisville Ins. Co., 11 Pet. 222; Walker v. Maitland, 5 Barn. & Aid. 79; Chandler v. W. M. F. Ins. Co., 3 Cush. 330; Halderman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 290; Williamson v. Barrett, 13 How. 110; Cumming v. Spruance, 4 Harr. (Del.) 320; Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 428, 429; Shelbyville L. B. R. R. v. Lew- ark, 4 Port. (Ind.) 473; N. H. St. Bt. & Trans. Co. v. Vanderbilt, 16 Conn. 420; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 378; Reaney v. Culbertson, 21 Penn. 507; The Gazelle, 2 Rob. Wm. Ad. 279.\\n2. The Underwriter can only assert a right of subrogation against the wrong-doer after the insured has been fully paid for his entire loss. Dixon on Subrogation, 155, 157, 175, 177, 179; McCormick\\u2019s Adm\\u2019r v. Irwin, 35 Penn. St. 117; Shotwell v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 5 Bos. 265; Kernochan v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 436-441; Fink v. Mahaffey, 8 Watts, 385; Rittenhouse v. Levering, 6 Watts & S. 197-199; Goswiler\\u2019s Estate, 3 Penrose & Watts, 203; Union Bank of Md. v. Edwards, 1 Gill & J. 365; Woodworth, v. Insurance Co., 5 Wal. 87; Hoover v. Epler, 52 Penn St. 525; Quebec F. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., 22 Eng. L. & E. 89; C. M. Ins. Co. v. N. A. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 278; Rock F. Ins. Co. v. Barton, 39 Maine, 255; Hart et al. v. Union R. R. Corp., 13 Met. 99; Mosher\\u2019s Appeal, 56 Penn. St. 80; 2 Phillips\\u2019 Ins., 5 ed. 240, see. 1512.\\nThe insurer, having settled with the assured for less than was due under the policy, can not claim a right to subrogation. New York Ins. Co. v. Roulet, 24 Wend. 513.\\n3. The insurer, having refused to aid in prosecuting the wrong-doer, can claim nothing from the recovery. Dixon on Subrogation, 175, 177, 178; Rittenhouse v. Levering, 6 Watts & S. 197-199; McCormick\\u2019s Adm\\u2019r v. Irwin, 35 Penn. 117; Goswiler\\u2019s Estate, 3 Penrose & W. 203; Kernochan v. N. Y. B. F. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y 436, 441; Fink v. Mahaffey, 8 Watts, 385; Monticello v. Mollison, 17 How. 155; Quebec Assurance Co. v. St. Louis, 22 E. L. & E. 89; White v. Crisp. 26 E. L. & E. 535; Brown v. Mallett, 5 Man., Gr. & S. 616.\\n4. The right of subrogation only exists where, from all the circumstances of the case, it ought in equity and good conscience to exist. Shotwell v. Jeff. Insurance Co., 5 Bos. 363; Kernochan v. N. Y. B. F. Ins. Co., 17 N. Y. 436-441; Goswiler\\u2019s Estate, 3 Penrose, 203; Mosher\\u2019s Appeal, 56 Penn. 80.\\n5* The verdict and judgment in the collision suit do not estop Newcomb from proving his actual loss. N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Roulet, 24 Wend. 505.\\n6. It is much doubted whether, in any such case, the right of subrogation exists. King v. State M. F. Ins. Co., 7 Cush. 4; Suffolk Fire Ins. Co. v. Boyden, 9 Allen, 127; McCormick's Adm\\u2019r v. Irwin, 85 Penn. 117; Brooks v. McDonald, 1 Y. & Coll. Exch. 530.\\nC. D. Coffin and T. G. Mitchell, for the defendant in error:\\n1. The insured, having been paid as for a total loss by the insurance company, he holds the amount recovered from the wrong-doer in trust for the company. 1 Arnould Ins. 8, 9, sec. 4; 1 Duer, 58, secs. 1, 2; 8 Johns. 247; Randall v. Cochran, 1 Vesey, Sen. 98; Yates v. Whythe, 4 Bing. N. C. 272; S. C., 38 Eng. Com. Law, 349; Hart v. West. R. R. Co., 13 Met. 99; 25 Conn. 277; 39 Maine, 253; Grier, J., in 17 How. 155; 22 L. & Eq. 73; 2 Phillips\\u2019 Ins., sec. 1732; Hall & Long v. R. R., 13 Wal. 367.\\n2. The verdict and judgment of the court in the collision suit judicially settle the amount of all damages sustained by Newcomb by reason of the collision. Boyton v. Williard, 10 Pick. 166, 169.\\n3. The refusal of the insurer to join in the suit does not destroy its right to subrogation.\\nLincoln, Smith \\u00a7 Stephens, in reply:\\n1. The insurance company, taking advantage of Sage v. Mid. Ins. Co., 3 Conn. 243, and Peele et al. v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 7 Pick. 256, paid nothing for permanent injury not repaired. That they were liable for such injury, see Giles v. Eagle Ins. Co., 2 Met. 145; Hagar v. N. E. M. M. Ins. Co., 59 Maine 463: hence they did not settle for a \\u201c total loss.\\u2019\\u2019\", \"word_count\": \"2303\", \"char_count\": \"12973\", \"text\": \"West, J.\\nThe Cincinnati Insurance Company, defendant in error, brought its action against the plaintiffs in error, in the Superior Court of Ciucinnati, to compel the refunding of $1,617.15 paid to them on a policy of insurance. The cause was tried to the court at special term, wherein it was reserved, on the evidence, to, and .was decided at, the general term. The judgment at general term is now sought to be reversed in this proceeding.\\nThe record contains what purports to be all the evidence heard at special term, and to have been certified up with the order of reservation. The court in general term so find, and direct it to be made part of the record.\\nGenerally, the evidence heard on the trial of a cause in an inferior court can be brought here for review on errors assigned, by bill of exception only. This has been repeatedly held by this court. No such bill is discovered in this record. Whether it was competent for the court to attach the evidence as an exhibit to its special finding, and thus make it serve the office of a bill of exceptions, we have not deemed it necessary to determine, but have limited our inquiries to questions arising on the pleadings, and the special findings proper of the court.\\nIn the original petition it is disclosed that the defendant in error seeks reimbursement of moneys, paid to plaintiffs in error, on a policy of insurance, on account of injuries to their steamboat \\\"Wm. Noble,\\\" and for their liability in general average on jettison of cargo, resulting from a collision with the steamer \\\" Fashion,\\\" the whole of which losses, it is alleged, the plaintiffs in error subsequently recovered as damages, in an action against the owners of the latter vessel, as negligent -wrong-doers.\\nIn their answer to this petition the plaintiffs in error admit the collision, the resulting jettison of cargo and injuries to their vessel, the fact and payment of the insurance thereon, and the subsequent action and recovery against the owners of the \\\" Fashion.\\\" But they deny that in said action they recovered the items paid to them on the adjustment of said insurance. On the contrary, they aver that by said collision, they sustained losses, other than and in addition to these items ; that their aggregate losses, for which they sued, exceeded' $15,000, but that they recov ered from the owners of the \\\" Fashion\\\" only $11,086, a sum much less than the excess of their losses, above the items covered by insurance; that the costs of said collision suit exceeded $5,000; that the defendant in error was not a party to said suit; that it expressly declined and refused, on request, to contribute to, or in any manner aid in its prosecution ; and that it released and abandoned its claim to the proceeds of said suit.- The plaintiffs, therefore, controvert their liability to refund.\\nBy the reply, the allegation of the answer, that the defendant in error refused, on request, to aid in or in any manner contribute to the prosecution of the collision suit, is not controverted.\\nThe Superior Court, at general term made a \\\"special finding,\\\" as follows:\\n\\\" The court, being fully advised in the premises, does find that the defendant paid out, in and about th.e prosecution of the collision suit against the owners of the steamboat \\\"Fashion,\\\" the sum of $4,167.40, and is entitled to the further sum of $2,500 for his services in preparing the said suit; and is therefore entitled to have the sum of $6,667.46 first to be credited upon the sum received in the collision suit; which being deducted from the sum so named, leaves the sum of $4,418.60; that the plaintiff's claim, as set out in his petition, with interest to the first of this term, .amounts to $2,538.\\n\\\"The court does further find and hold that the plaintifl in this case is bound by the finding in the collision suit, and can not be permitted to show that his real damages resulting from the collision and involved in the suit, were greater than the amount found by the verdict, or to go into the same in this suit; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to such proportion of said sum of $4,418.60, as the said sum of $2,538 bears to $11,086, the amount recovered in the collision suit \\u2014 to wit, the sum of $1,011.44. The court does, therefor e, assess the plaintiff's damages at the said sum of $1,011.44.\\n\\\"And the said evidence, upon which the case was reserved, was all the evidence in the case, and the same is hereto attached, marked \\\"A,\\\" and made part of the record, in the case.\\n\\\"And the counsel severally excepted to each of the findings and holdings, and- his exceptions were allowed and ordered to be made part of the record.\\\"\\nIn the view we have taken of the case, while we doubt the correctness of the ruling below, which held that -the plaintiffs in error \\\"were bound by the findings in the collision suit,\\\" we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question.\\nThe defendant in error founds its claim on the doctrine of subrogation. This may be stated as follows: Where a loss, covered by insurance, is occasioned by a wrong-doer, the underwriter, after reimbursing.it in specie, or making compensation in money, is, in a proper case, entitled to be subrogated, quoad hoc, to the right of the assured .against the wrong-doer. This is of the highest equity; for whereas the loss is, in the first instance, that of the assured, after reimbursement or compensation, it becomes the loss of the insurer.\\nThe plaintiffs in error insist that the doctrine, if ever recognized, has been doubted by modern decisions. We do not so think. It was fully recognized by Lord Hardwick in the early case of Randall v. Cochran, 1 Ves. Sen. 98, with which the American eases are in nearly universal accord. The loss of mortgaged premises, insured at the instance of the mortgagee, presents a case sui generis, for rejection of the application of the doctrine.\\nThere are two classes of cases for its application, first, where the total loss sustained is covered by insurance, and reimbursed or compensated by the underwriter: Second,\\nwhen the loss sustained is but partially covered by insurance, and is reimbursed or compensated accordingly. These may be respectively denominated full insurance and partial insurance.\\nIn case of partial insurance, of which class is the one at bar, the assured and underwriter have each a substantive interest in the claim against the wrong-doer; whereas, in a case of full insurance and compensation, the interest of the former is but nominal.\\n\\\"Where the assured, as in case of partial insurance, sustains a loss, in excess of the reimbursement or compensation by the underwriter, he has an undoubted right to have it satisfied by action against the wrong-door. But if, by such action, there comes into his hands, any sum for which, in equity and good conscience, he ought to account to the underwriter, reimbursement will, to that extent, be compelled in an action by the latter, based on his right in equity to subrogation. But the assured will not, in the forum of conscience, be required to account for more than the surplus, which may remain in his hands, after satisfying his own excess of loss in full, and his reasonable expenses incurred in its recovery; unless the underwriter shall, on notice and opportunity given, have contributed to, and made common cause with him, in the prosecution.\\nIn this case, the losses of the plaintiffs in error, in excess of insurance, exceeded $9,000; their recovery was $11,086. The costs of prosecuting the action exceeded $6,000. The' amount applicable to their excess of loss, after payment of expenses, was insufficient to satisfy it. It is not unconscionable that they return this: It would be, to award any part of it to the defendant in error, who refused to hazard the costs of its recovery.\\nOn the special findings of the Superior Court, their judgment will be reversed, and the judgment entered here for the plaintiffs in error, which the court below ought to have rendered.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"898625\", \"name\": \"NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO v. CLUTTS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"New York Life Insurance v. Clutts\", \"decision_date\": \"1931-11-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"334\", \"last_page\": \"336\", \"citations\": \"11 Ohio Law Abs. 334\", \"volume\": \"11\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:57:17.506798+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"MIDDLETON and BLOSSER, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO v CLUTTS\", \"head_matter\": \"NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE CO v CLUTTS\\nOhio Appeals, 4th Dist, Lawrence Co\\nDecided Nov 16, 1931\\nLouis H. Cook and Arnold, Wright, Purpus and Harlor, Columbus, for plaintiff in error.\\nH. A. McCown, Ironton, for defendant in error. \\u2022\", \"word_count\": \"848\", \"char_count\": \"4652\", \"text\": \"MAUCK, PJ.\\nWe do not deem it necessary to go into all the questions raised in argument. The insured made no false representations to obtain this insurance. It does not appear that when he made his application he had any reason to suspect that his physical condition was unsdund, and he had no reason to anticipate the collapse that was soon to follow. No question of honesty or good faith is therefore involved in this case. If the defendant is to be- relieved from liability it is because of the provision in the application in these terms:\\n\\\"That the insurance hereby applied for shall not become effective unless and until the policy is delivered to and received by the applicant and the first premium thereon paid in full during his life time, and then only if the applicant has not consulted or been treated by any physician since his medical examination\\\".\\nThe application was signed March 7, 1930, and the policy was issued in New York City on March 12. On the same day that the policy was signed in New York the insured paid the local agent at Ashland, Kentucky, the amount of the first annual premium, the agent taking and discounting the note of the insured for that sum. On the day the policy was signed it was mailed to the defendant's general agent at Louisville, Kentucky, and on March 15 was mailed out of the Louisville office to the local agent at Ashland. It is true that there is no direct evidence of when it was mailed but the date of its receipt at Ashland shows that it must have been mailed from Louisville on the 15. On March 17 the local agent took the policy to the residence of the insured and was then informed that the insured was ill. The policy was left at this time at the residence of the insured. On Sunday, March 16, the day after the poiiey had been mailed from Louisville and the day before it had been left for the insured at his residence and four days after the first premium had been paid, the insured suffered an attack of nose bleed and was treated by two physicians. His illness developed rapidly and resulted in his death on March 21.\\nIf we are to give to the word \\\"delivery\\\" as used in the application an interpretation that is equivalent to the manual passage of the policy from the local agent to \\u2022the insured then it is manifest that the delivery occurred after the insured had consulted with his physicians, and that such defense is open to the insurer unless it was waived by the delivery of the policy by the agent with knowledge of the insured's illness. We do not go into the question of waiver and are therefore not required to examine that question in the light of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Luzio, Ohio Law Bulletin, June 29, 1931 and Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 277 U. S. 311, altho we deem the latter case as strongly inclining to the view that there might have been a waiver in this case. \\u00ab\\nWe are content to give to the term \\\"delivery\\\" a much broader significance than that employed by the manual passage of the document from one person to another. It is not worth while for us to recite the cases that seem to us to justify our position in this behalf. They are to be found in the note appended to Life Insurance Co. v. Otto, 53 A. L. R. 492. They are to the effect that where the premium has been paid delivery may be effected by delivery to the agent, and delivery to the agent is accomplished by placing the policy in the mails, directed to him. There are authorities to the contrary and some of these authorities may be. said to be as impressive in their reasoning as those relied upon by the plaintiff in this case. However, the employment of the word delivery as part of the contract between the parties was due to the defendant. The defendant used that term with full knowledge that while in some instances it had been given the restricted view that it now claims for the word yet in \\u00abother instances it had been given the broader significance now claimed for it by the plaintiff. When an insurance company uses an ambiguous term, knowing that it is capable of more than one construction, it ought to be and is held to that interpretation most unfavorable to it and most favorable to the insured.\\nUpon the authorities referred to we hold that delivery of this policy was made on March 15 and that the defense attempted to be pleaded was hot available to the defendant.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nMIDDLETON and BLOSSER, JJ, concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"898741\", \"name\": \"GARRETSON LUMBER CO v. ZIEMKE et\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Garretson Lumber Co. v. Ziemke\", \"decision_date\": \"1931-10-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No 363\", \"first_page\": \"273\", \"last_page\": \"274\", \"citations\": \"11 Ohio Law Abs. 273\", \"volume\": \"11\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:57:17.506798+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LLOYD, RICHARDS and WILLIAMS, JJ, concur.\", \"parties\": \"GARRETSON LUMBER CO v ZIEMKE et\", \"head_matter\": \"GARRETSON LUMBER CO v ZIEMKE et\\nOhio Appeals, 6th Dist, Erie Co\\nNo 363.\\nDecided Oct 9, 1931\\nA. F. Weichel, Sandusky, for plaintiff in error.\\nHenry Har), Sandusky lor ik-iei'iiki!1 'u error.\", \"word_count\": \"300\", \"char_count\": \"1646\", \"text\": \"BY THE COURT\\nSome claim is made that H. A. Ziemke is entitled to claim the fund as exempt from execution. He can not do so upon the ground that the money is due him as personal earnings for the reason that it is due him on a contract between himself as sub-contractor and Beaver & Morris, Inc. By the terms of this contract H. A. Ziemke, for the sum of $825.00, undertook to do mason work involving the use of labor and materials in connection with the construction of a water softetaing \\u00a1plant. It is therefore apparent that the balance due him under this contract was not due him for work and labor performed or personal services.\\nWe also call attention to the fact that under the authority of Morris Plan Bank vs. Vions, 122 Oh St, 28, a judgment debtor, not the owner of a homestead, can not select property as exempt from levy and sale in lieu of a homestead under the provisions of \\u00a711738 GC, from money, salary or wages due him from any person, partnership or corporation.\\nUpon retrial of the case the court may determine what part of the fund H. A. Ziemke is entitled to and what part of it belongs to laborers working for him in performance of the contract 'between him and Beaver & Morris, Inc., and the laborers may be made parties to the suit in order that the matter may be fully determined.\\nFor these reasons the judgments will \\\\be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\\nJudgment reversed.\\nLLOYD, RICHARDS and WILLIAMS, JJ, concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/899967.json b/ohio/899967.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c6505e20b8a6190190d999fd94494ed99778dddc
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"899967\", \"name\": \"Robert E. Lockhart v. Uella Brown\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lockhart v. Brown\", \"decision_date\": \"1877-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"431\", \"last_page\": \"432\", \"citations\": \"31 Ohio St. 431\", \"volume\": \"31\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:24:25.472240+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Robert E. Lockhart v. Uella Brown.\", \"head_matter\": \"Robert E. Lockhart v. Uella Brown.\\nAn exception to the charge of the court can not be saved, so as to make it reviewable on error, by merely making the charge and exception a part of the journal entry in the case.\\nMotion for leave to file petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Adams county.\\nR. E. Lockhart appealed to the probate court from the final decision of the trustees of Green township as to the location of a ditch, partly through his lands, as prayed for by Della Brown. In the probate court on appeal, the ditch was ordered to be located and constructed. Erom the journal entries in the probate court, it appears that on the trial, Lockhart produced evidence to the jury, tending to shoiv that his adjoining lands would be incidentally injured by the location of the ditch; and that he thereupon requested the court to give to the jury certain instructions which are set out in the entry, and which the court refused to do, to which refusal he excepted. But there was no bill of exceptions taken on the trial, and ordered to be made a part of the record in the case.\\nThe case comes here regularly through the court of common pleas and district court, in which courts, on error, the judgment of the probate court was affirmed.\\nBy this proceeding the reversal of the judgments below is sought, on the ground that the probate court erred in its charge to the jury.\\nJEvans &\\u00a1 Naylor, and John K. Billings, for the motion.\\nWells, Collings, and O. J. Dodds, contra :\\nNone of the errors assigned in the petition appear in a bill of exceptions, and no bill of exceptions is made part of the record.\\nThe only errors assigned in a petition in error which a reviewing court can notice, are those excepted to and set out in a bill of exceptions. Huston v. Huston, 29 Ohio St. 600; 17 Ohio, 495; 6 Ohio St. 182. The bill of exceptions must be a part of the record. 2 S. & C. 1155; 21 Ohio St. 82; 30 Ohio St. 208; 27 Ohio St. 44.\", \"word_count\": \"447\", \"char_count\": \"2410\", \"text\": \"Dv the Court.\\nSection 293 of the code applies only where the decision would properly be entered of record, if no exception was taken to it; and is not intended as a substitute for a bill of exceptions, where the exception relates to matters occurring during the trial. The exception iu this case relates to the charge of the court to the jury, which was improperly made part of the entry, and can not, therefore, be regarded on error.\\nMotion overruled.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/932898.json b/ohio/932898.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2c10d895771a655b711f5cd63125c1a25ce5b849
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"932898\", \"name\": \"Adams v. Meeker\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Adams v. Meeker\", \"decision_date\": \"1894-03-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2644\", \"first_page\": \"591\", \"last_page\": \"592\", \"citations\": \"51 Ohio St. 591\", \"volume\": \"51\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:43:27.444502+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Adams v. Meeker.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 2644.\\nAdams v. Meeker.\\n(Decided March 13, 1894.)\\nError to the Circuit Court of Fairfield county.\\nG. D. Mrn'tin and M. A. Dcvugherty, for plaintiff in error.\\nBarton Griffith, Sha/w c& Cunningham and G. V. Mg Oleery, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"44\", \"char_count\": \"262\", \"text\": \"Judgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/9501623.json b/ohio/9501623.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d681afd6a5459a8ca48634333bddf3413f596b4
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"9501623\", \"name\": \"North Bend (Hamlet) v. Cincinnati, L. & A. Elec. St. Ry. Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"North Bend v. Cincinnati, L. & A. Elec. St. Ry. Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1903\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"268\", \"last_page\": \"270\", \"citations\": \"15 Ohio C.C. Dec. 268\", \"volume\": \"15\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Circuit Court Decisions\", \"court\": \"Hamilton Circuit Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:00:04.385297+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"[Judge Sullivan of the Second Circuit sitting in the First Circuit.)\", \"parties\": \"North Bend (Hamlet) v. Cincinnati, L. & A. Elec. St. Ry. Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS \\u2014 HAMLETS\\u2014STREETS.\\n[Hamilton (1st) Circuit Court,\\n1903.]\\nGiffen and Sullivan, JJ.\\n[Judge Sullivan of the Second Circuit sitting in the First Circuit.)\\nNorth Bend (Hamlet) v. Cincinnati, L. & A. Elec. St. Ry. Co.\\n1. Hamlets Became Villages Under New Municipal Code.\\nWhile the classification of certain villages as hamlets was abolished by the \\u2018 municipal code of 1902, 96 O. L. 20, the legal existence of these corporations continues undisturbed, but subject to reorganization, and it requires no act of the-corporation to effect a transfer from hamlet to village.\\n2. Creation of Additional Hamlets Prohibited \\u2014 Existing Ones not Destroyed.\\nThe repeal of Secs. 1550 and 1552 Rev. Stat. prevents the creation of additional , hamlets, but does not destroy those already in existence.\\n3. Statutes Creating Hamlets not Special Legislation.\\nUnder the statutes in force prior to the municipal code of 1902, many municipal corporations were organized as hamlets, and as these statutes evince no \\u2022 purpose of preventing others from entering that class, they are not within the constitutional inhibition against special legislation.\\n4. Hamlet Trustees Have Control Over Entire Street.\\nThe ownership by a railway company of the land abutting on both sides of a street does not divest the trustees of a hamlet of control over the entire street.\\nStanley Struble and E. J. Dempsey, for plaintiff.\\nPeck, Shaffer & Peck and Shepherd & Shaffer, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1079\", \"char_count\": \"6733\", \"text\": \"GIFFEN, J.\\nThe plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant railroad company from constructing and operating a railroad over and across certain streets within the corporate 'limits without having first obtained the consent of the plaintiff. The court of common pleas allowed a temporary restraining order and afterwards, upon motion of the defendant, dissolved the same, and thereupon the plaintiff appealed from that order dissolving the injunction and now moves for a temporary restraining order, which is resisted by the defendant upon the ground that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue, because:\\nFirst. The municipal code of 1902 abolished hamlets and classified all municipal corporations as cities and villages.\\nSecond. The repeal of Secs. 1550 and 1552 Rev. Stat. left no legislative basis for the existence of a hamlet.\\nThird. The sections of the revised statutes pertaining to' hamlets are unconstitutional and void. -f\\nI. Section 1 of the code provides that, -\\\"All municipal corporations,, which, at the last federal census, had a population of five thousand or more, shall be cities. All other municipal corporations shall be villages.\\\"\\nThe purpose of this provision was not to destroy any existing municipal corporation, but to include all in two classes.\\nThe classification of certain villages as hamlets was abolished, but their legal existence as'municipal corporations, if such they were, contii ued undisturbed, although they were no longer known as hamlets, but as villages.\\nIt required no act of the corporation of North Bend to effect the transfer from one class to the other, although its organization as a village had not been attempted by the electors. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff corporation is improperly designated as a hamlet, since it has by operation of law become a village; but this is a mere misnomer, which does not change substantially the claim of plaintiff, and may be amended under Sec. 5114 Rev. Stat. Sec. 213 of the code provides that \\\"All officers shall remain in their respective offices and employments and continue to perform the severa^ duties thereof under existing laws until their successors are chosen or appointed and qualified or until removed by the proper authority.\\\"\\nWhile this section effectually provides for a continuance of the life of the corporation, we see no reason to apprehend that it may be made perpetual. It contemplates the removal of the officers, and there is ample provision in the statutes to compel a reorganization of the corporation in accordance with the code.\\nTI. The repeal of Secs. 1550 and 1552 Rev. Stat. prevented the creation of additional hamlets, but did not destroy those already in existence except in name.\\nThe classification was changed, but the corporation itself survived, subject, however, to reorganization under the class to which it, according to its population, belonged. The same act by which these sections were repealed provided for, the classification of all municipal corporations under two heads, and it seems clear that the legislature intended to include hamlets as well as all other municipal corporations in such classification.\\nIII. It is contended further that the statutes pertaining to the creation of hamlets are unconstitutional and void, and that, therefore, there was no such municipal corporation as a hamlet when the code was enacted.\\nIn the case of State v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453 [64 N. E. Rep. 424], which is relied on by counsel for defendant, the precise question involved and decided is that an act to confer corporate power upon a single city by such classification as the statutes then provided is repugnant to Sec. 1, Art. 13 of the constitution, which ordains that \\\"The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.\\\"\\nMany corporations other than North Bend are included in the class of harqlets, and the statutes pertaining thereto evince no purpose on the part of the general assembly to prevent others from entering that class.\\nThe court, in the case just cited, does not condemn all classification other than that making the two classes of cities and villages, but, on the contrary, is^careful to state that \\\"Whether the provisions of Sec. 6, Art. 13 ordaining that 'The general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, by general laws/ is an exclusive classification of municipalities into cities and villages we do not determine.\\\"\\nWe are unwilling, therefore, upon this^ preliminary hearing, to hold that hamlets had no constitutional existence, and the motion for a temporary restraining order will be granted.\\nIn case No. 3837 the allegations in the petition of the danger to public travel under the proposed bridge ought to be more definite and certain, but enough is averred to warrant the conclusion that the construction and operation of the railroad over and above the street will probably be dangerous to the use of the street and. become a nuisance unless controlled and regulated by municipal authority. The ownership of the land abutting both sides of the street no more divests the trustees of the hamlet of control over the entire street than the ownership of the land abutting one side deprives them of control over one-half.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/9502854.json b/ohio/9502854.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7fe76dc9824195560c56bc78a1b1f0ec4a872f31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/9502854.json
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+"{\"id\": \"9502854\", \"name\": \"Isaac Kandar v. Aetna Indemnity Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kandar v. Aetna Indemnity Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1907-06-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"260\", \"last_page\": \"270\", \"citations\": \"20 Ohio C.C. Dec. 260\", \"volume\": \"20\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Circuit Court Decisions\", \"court\": \"Lucas Circuit Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:14:51.350167+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Haynes and Parker, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Isaac Kandar v. Aetna Indemnity Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"INSURANCE \\u2014 PLEADING.\\n[Lucas (6th) Circuit Court,\\nJune 15, 1907.]\\nHaynes, Parker and Wildman, JJ.\\nIsaac Kandar v. Aetna Indemnity Co.\\n1. Plaintiff Need not Anticipate Adversary\\u2019s Defense.\\nWhere, in an actibn on an insurance policy, the plaintiff has been released from the performance of any of the conditions in the contract, he should aver such facts in his petition; hut matters \\u00f3f a purely defensive nature need not he met earlier than at the filing of the reply.\\n[For other cases in point, see 6 Cyc. Dig., \\u201cPleadings,\\u201d \\u00a7\\u00a7 342-356. \\u2014 Ed.]\\n2. Insurance Company Estopped to Dispute Acts of Agent in Taking Application for Insurance.\\nWhere the agent of the company, in filling out the application for a policy of insurance against loss hy burglary' or larceny, construes a certain question asked of applicant, to suit the circumstances of the particular case, he acts for the company; and such company cannot escape liability on the policy on the ground of the incorrectness of a statement in the application, based on a contrary construction.\\n[For other cases in point, see 5 Cyc. Dig., \\u201cInsurance,\\u201d \\u00a7\\u00a7 669-703. \\u2014 Ed.]\\n[Syllabus approved by the court.]\\nERROR to Lucas common pleas court.\\nChittenden & Chittenden, for plaintiff in error.\\nSouthard & Southard, for defendant in error;\\nCited and commented upon the following authorities: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Myers, 62 Ohio St. 529 [57 N. E. Rep. 458; 49 L. R. A. 760] ; Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Hook, 62 Ohio St. 256 [56 N. E. Rep. 906] ; Eureka Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 62 Ohio St. 368 [57 N. E. Rep. 57] ; Northern Assur. Co. v. Building, Assn. 183 U. S. 308 [22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133; 46 L. Ed. 213]; Could v. Insurance Co. 90 Mich. 302 [51 N. W. Rep. 455] ; Quinlan v. Insurance Co. 133 N. Y. 356 [31 N. E. Rep. 31; 28 Am. St. Rep. 645] ; Pete v. Woodmen of the World, 26 O. C. C. 653; Hollis v. Insurance Co. 65 Iowa 454 [21 N. W. Rep. 774]; \\u00c9arre v. Insurance Co. 76 Iowa 609 [41 N. W. Rep. 373]; Wadhams v. Insurance Co. 117 Mich. 514 [76 N. W. Rep. 6] ; Kirkman v. Insurance Co. 90 Iowa 457 [57 N. W. Rep. 952; 48 Am. St. Rep. 454] ; Carey v. Insurance Co. 84 Wis. 80 [54 N. W. Rep. 18; 20 L. R. A. 267; 36 Am. St. Rep. 907]; Walsh v. Insurance Co. 73 N. Y. 5; Insurance Co. v. Pyle, 44 Ohio St. 19 [4 N. E. Rep. 465; 58 Am. St. Rep. 781].\\nMateriality of representations. Doming Invest. Co. v. Insurance Co. 16 Okla. 1 [83 Pac. Rep. 918; 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607],\", \"word_count\": \"4920\", \"char_count\": \"27860\", \"text\": \"WILDMAN, J.\\nThis is a proceeding in error to reverse the action of the court of common pleas in sustaining a demurrer to the amended reply of the plaintiff and rendering judgment for the defendant on the pleadings. The ease below was one instituted by the plaintiff in error, Kandar, upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant company to 'indemnify Kandar against loss b\\u00a1y reason of burglary, theft or larceny of property of certain classes described in the policy. Among the claims asserted in the answer is one embodied in what is called the second defense. It is properly the first defense, because the matters treated of in the so-called first defense are merely admissions and denials of the aver-ments in the petition. This so-called second defense asserts, in substance, that a certain misrepresentation was made by the insured in the application for the policy, or, what is equivalent thereto, perhaps,' in,a certain \\\"schedule\\\" containing a number of statements, not signed by the insured but attached to the policy itself. The policy purports to be issued in consideration of $12.50 premium \\\"and of the statements in the schedule hereinafter contained, which statements the assured makes on the acceptance of this policy and warrants to be true.\\\" The particular statement embodied in the schedule and referred to as No. 6, reads:\\n' ' The assured has never suffered loss by burglary, theft or larceny either at the premises above described or elsewhere, nor received indemnity therefor except as herein stated. ' '\\nThere is a clause, No. 16, not in the schedule, but in the body of the policy, reading as follows:\\n\\\"No agent has authority to change this policy or to waive any of its provisions nor shall any notice to the agent or knowledge of his or any other person be held to effect a waiver or change in this contract or in any part of it. ' '\\nRelying upon these provisions in the policy, the defendant in the so-called second defense, alleges that it was not true that the plaintiff had never before had any property stolen from him, but, on the contrary, that some time in the year 1901, he had suffered loss by burglary, theft and larceny at his warehouse at the corner of Short and Huron streets, in the city of Toledo, Ohio, \\\"at which time persons unknown to defendant broke into and entered the said warehouse of plaintiff, and then and there did steal,\\\" certain property mentioned. The property claimed by the plaintiff to have been stolen and for the loss of which he sought this indemnity on the policy, was a certain diamond ring of the value, as claimed by the petition, of $450, which was stolen from some room in the residence of the plaintiff in .the city of Toledo. The amended reply of tbe plaintiff, to which demurrer .was interposed and sustained, is, so far as relates to this inquiry, as follows:\\n\\\"For reply to-the second defense in defendant's answer, plaintiff states that he did not read the questions contained in the application for policy of insurance mentioned in the petition, but that the questions were asked him by the agent of the defendant and that said agent inquired of plaintiff only as to any previous burglary, theft or larceny that plaintiff may have had in his residence, and said agent assured said plaintiff that it was only necessary for defendant to know as to whether or not any burglary, theft or larceny had been suffered by plaintiff in his residence, and plaintiff denies each and every allegation contained in said second defense conflicting with the foregoing allegation.\\\"\\nThe defendant contends that this is no reply; that it does not legally meet the defense asserted; and it is suggested to the court also, by counsel for defendant in error, that this claim in the reply amounts to a waiver of the conditions of the policy and that it should have been asserted, if proper at all, in the petition rather than in the reply. With this latter claim we are not in accord. It is not a waiver of some condition to be performed; not a waiver of some requirement on the part of the plaintiff, but it is a matter rather of claimed estoppel to assert the \\u2022defense which is alleged in the answer. The answer asserts that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief which he seeks because of the incorrectness of a representation made to the company upon which it based its action in issuing this policy; and the plaintiff attempts to meet this claim by saying that the defendant company had knowledge of these facts; that it did not need to rely upon ariy representations made by the plaintiff to it or to its agent; in other words, that the company had this. knowledge and the agent of the company having placed a construction upon what may possibly be an equivocal or ambiguous clause in its schedule attached to the policy, is estopped now to dispute that construction. ' We think it altogether true that when a plaintiff is suing upon a policy and is seeking to avoid the performing of some -condition precedent, or subsequent, obligatory on him, he should assert the facts in his petition which release him from the performance of such obligation. As, for instance, concerning the requirements as to proofs of loss and payment of premium, if for any reason he has been released from such requirements, he should aver such fact in his petition and he could, not meet the obligation resting upon him so to plead by asserting that he had performed all the conditions precedent. A waiver of performance is not the same thing as performance. But he was not bound to anticipate here the assertion of this defense. The claim, asserted by the defendant is purely defensive, and for that reason the plaintiff was not compelled to meet it at any earlier stage of the proceedings than the filing of his reply.\\nBevised Statute 3644 (Lan. 5855), having reference to insurance companies other than life, provides that:\\n\\\"A person who solicits insurance and procures the application therefor, shall be held to be the agent of the party, company or association thereafter issuing it policy upon such application or a renewal thereof, anything in the application or policy to the contrary notwithstanding. ' '\\nIn the policy before us .there is no provision that the solicitor for the insurance shall not be deemed the agent of the company, or that he shall be deemed the agent of the insured; but it is perhaps not necessary to invoke the aid of the statute in behalf of the plaintiff here, in view of the fact that this question arises upon a demurrer which concedes the truth of the allegations properly made in the reply, and the reply nowhere says that the person placing this construction upon the schedule was merely a soliciting agent, but the language is, that the questions were asked him by the agent of the defendant \\\"and that said agent inquired of plaintiff only as to any previous burglary, theft or larceny that plaintiff may have had in his residence, and said agent assured said plaintiff that it was only necessary for defendant to know as to whether or not any burglary, theft or larceny had been suffered by the plaintiff in his residence;\\\" and he further avers that \\\"at the time of writing said application and policy of insurance defendant had full knowledge that plaintiff had suffered loss by theft and larceny at his place of business.\\\" \\u00a5e must then take it for granted that these statements were made by the agent of the company; that he had knowledge of the fact \\u2022of a previous larceny of the plaintiff's property, and, possibly of the further fact that the company itself had such knowledge, as averred in the reply, treating all of these allegations as conceded by the demurrer to be true. But in view of the probability that in the drafting of this pleading,' counsel meant no more than this, that the company had constructive knowledge, or that knowledge which they were bound to have by reason of the communication of facts to their agent, or knowledge possessed by the agent, it is well enough to consider what is the law applicable to such condition.\\nBeliance is placed by counsel for defendant upon two cases, Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hook, 62 Ohio St. 256 [56 N. B. Rep. 906], and Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Myers, 62 Ohio St. 529 [57 N. E. Rep. 458; 49 L. R. A. 760], One of these is a life insurance case and the other an insurance against liability to employes who sustain bodily injury while on the pay roll of the insured. In the case of Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hook, supra, page 256 of this report, it was held, as stated in the first syllabus:\\n\\\"In an action to reeover on a written contract for life insurance- and upon an alleged subsequent verbal modification of the same, statements \\u00bfnd representations made by the agent who solicited the policy,, prior to, and contemporaneous with, the issue of the policy, are inadmissible to vary, in any respect, the terms of the written policy. In the-absence of proof of fraud or mistake, such statements and representations are merged in the written contract. ' '\\nThe verbal representation which was relied upon in the Hook ease-was one which it was claimed extended the policy one year and waived the payment of an annual premium. These were changes which, under the terms of the policy, could not properly be made by an agent of the company nor could they be proven by parol; but Judge Davis, who rendered the opinion in the case, says, on-page 265:\\n\\\"We do not decide that there might not be an estoppel by conduct, notwithstanding such an agreement. But that case does not arise here. ' '\\nThe other case, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Myers, supra, provides, as we read in the third syllabus:\\n\\\"When such policy contains a stipulation that 'No agent has authority to waive or alter anything in this policy contained, ' and the same is accepted by the insured, it is both notice to, and an agreement by, the insured that an agent has no authority to waive or alter anything contained in the policy.\\\"\\nWe take this to mean that the agent has no authority to change the contract, but that is not inconsistent with the view that the company may, under certain circumstances, be estopped by- its own conduct, from asserting some matters of defense. The question is, whether the matter which we have here is one which might be covered by that principle. Counsel for the plaintiff in error urge as a proper construction of the policy that the term \\\"elsewhere\\\" as found in the schedule, is to be construed as meaning other premises on which the insured has resided, or something equivalent to that, and considerable support'is found for this contention in some of the cases, notably State v. Clark, 52 N. J. Law 291 [19 Atl. Rep. 462],\\nIt is insisted that the case falls within the principle wherein the courts have held that when certain articles or certain places are enumerated and then some general wo^d is used following the conjunction \\\"or,\\\" this general term is to be treated as ejusdem generis; that is to-say, of the same kind .or class, as the articles, or places just mentioned. Here the statement is, in substance, that the assured has not suffered loss by burglary, theft or larceny either at the premises above described. or \\\"elsewhere;\\\" and it is very earnestly urged that the word \\\"elsewhere\\\" does not mean anything more than some other premises in their general nature like those already described. Perhaps in the construction of this phrase, however, we should consider the purpose of this stipulation. What was the object of the insurance company in asking for such information? We think it altogether likely that the company designed to ascertain whether the person seeking insurance was careless as to the protection of his property \\u2014 one who would be likely to leave it unguarded or put it in such place or places that it might tempt others to larceny or burglary \\u2014 and perhaps with that thought, it might not make very much difference whether the prior theft was one from the residence or whether it was one from the warehouse.\\nIt may safely be said that the most that can be claimed by either of the parties to the controversy is, that the phrase is somewhat ambiguous ; that it is not free from doubt as to its construction. Now, if that be so, a second inquiry becomes altogether pertinent: What is the effect of the phrase or rather, the construction put upon it by the agent of the company at the time when the question is asked and the answer given? And the further question as a corollary to that: If the agent of the company placed a construction upon it, making the answer given an honest one, is the company bound by it so as to be thereafter estopped from asserting as a defense to an action on the policy that a false representation had been made in this regard? We are not without authorities upon questions somewhat analogous. We have found reference to a mass of litigation along the same lines in Clemans v. Supreme Assembly, 16 L. R. A. 33 [131 N. Y. 485; 30 N. E. Rep. 496] et seq. On page 35 is a reference to a case, Texas Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Davidge, 51 Tex. 244:\\n\\\"The knowledge of the agent of the misrepresentations upon which the insurance was procured must be pleaded in reply if it is intended to rely thereon to defeat the defense based on such misrepresentations. ' '\\nThat is precisely the course that was taken by the plaintiff in error here.\\n\\\"If the insurer's agent after being informed fully as to the facts' incorrectly states them in the application, the insurer is estopped to take advantage of the error to avoid liability on the policy.\\\" North American Fire Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146 [7 Am. Rep. 638].\\nNumerous other cases are cited in a somewhat extensive paragraph,, which include some eases in New York. On the same page is this:\\n\\\"If the statements in the application relied upon as breaches of warranty are inserted by the agent of the insurer, without collusion or fraud on the part of the insured, the insurer is estopped to set up their error or falsity.\\\" Baker v. Insurance Co. 64 N. Y. 648, and other cases.\\nI invite attention 'to these merely because of their treatment of this sort of a claim as a claim of estoppel, which is recognized by Judge Davis as already quoted in Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hook, supra, as not inconsistent with the conclusion arrived at in that case.\\nOn page 37 is cited the case of Key v. Insurance Co. 77 Iowa 174 [41 N. W. Rep. 614]:\\n\\\"An insurance company whose agent himself prepared an application with knowledge of the fact that the 'insured, had only a title bond for his land, which was not paid for, cannot defeat an action on the policy on the ground that the application improperly states that the insured was the sole and undisputed owner of the property, and that it was unincumbered, where this was signed by the insured after making a full statement of the facts, in accordance with the agent's theory of his title.\\\",\\nThere was a case where the agent seems to have put a construction upon the facts which was adopted by both the agent and the insured .and the insured made the application and signed it. And again, on page 38, citation is made of the ease of Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hazlewood, 75 Tex. 338 [12 S. W. Rep. 621; 7 L. R. A. 217; 16 Am. St. Rep. 893]:\\n\\\"A former rejection of the insured on his application to a legion of honor is not a breach of a warranty that he had never applied for insurance in any other company, when the agent told him that a legion of honor was not an insurance company. ' '\\nJust as here, where he claims the agent told him that this clause \\\"elsewhere\\\" had reference only to other residences formerly occupied by him and not to a warehouse. The case of Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlain, 132 U. S. 304 [10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 87; 33 L. Ed. 341], is also mentioned. I have the case before me, but I will not stop to read from it. The annotation in Clemans v. Supreme Assembly, supra, page 38, is as follows:\\n\\\"Where the agent writes in the application that the applicant has no other insurance, although the applicant told him that he had certificates of membership in co-operative companies, which the agent said were not considered insurance by him, the company is bound by the agent's interpretation, and estopped from asserting the contrary.\\\"\\nThat case seems to be pretty close to the case at bar, and, being a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, is, of course, entitled to the highest respect. It was the unanimous expression of that court.\\nIn our own state we have, among other cases, that of Insurance Co. v. Williams, 39 Ohio St. 584 [48 Am. Rep. 474]. This was not a life insurance case, so as to be affected by the express provisions of the section in our statutes as to life insurance companies, but it was embraced in a class of insurance other than life insurance.\\nThe syllabus of the case is as follows:\\n\\\"A soliciting agent, procuring for an insurance company risks and applications on which policies are issued, who fills up the application, is, in so doing, the agent of the company, and not of the insured; and if the agent make a mistake in wrongly stating facts which were correctly given him by the insured in preparing the application, the company is bound by, and responsible for, such mistake.\\\"\\nJudge Follett quotes, on page 588 of his opinion, from the ease of Combs v. Insurance Co. 43 Mo. 148, 149 [97 Am. Dec. 383], which is the language of the supreme court of that state:\\n\\\" 'The authority of the soliciting agent of an insurance company to take applications for insurance carries with it the legal implication of authority to fill up the application, and do all those things which may be needful in perfecting it.' \\\"\\nAnd then Judge Follett adds:\\n' ' That was a case sought to be defeated on the ground of false representations and warranties in the application. Here the agent wrote the application, and was given a correct description and told to write it in the application, and by mistake did not do it. ' '\\nHe refers also to the case of Rowley v. Insurance Co. 36 N. Y. 550, in which the court say, page 589:\\n\\\" 'An agent, authorized to take applications for insurance, should be deemed to be acting within the scope of his authority, where he fills up the blank application of insurance; and if, by his fault or negligence, it contains a material misstatement not authorized by the instructions \\u2022of the party who signs it, the wrong should be imputed to the company, and not to the insured. ' ' '\\nNumerous other authorities are cited from the state of New York showing that the result of the adjudications in that state is not inconsistent with the conclusion of the court in Insurance Co. v. Williams, supra, and the application of the principle of estoppel.\\nJudge Follett also cites Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 223 [20 L. Ed. 617], where the Supreme Court say:\\n\\\" 'Hence, when these agents in soliciting insurance, undertake to prepare the application of the insured, they will be regarded, in doing so, as the agents of the insurance companies, and not of the insured.' \\\"\\nOther cases are cited, including the case of Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Eshelman, 30 Ohio St. 647, in which our own Supreme Court commission held:\\n\\\" 'A subagent of a life insurance company appointed to represent it in a particular branch of its business, becomes, in reference thereto, the direct representative of the company, and notice of a fact to him will operate as notice to the company, and it will be bound by acts done by him in respect to that branch of its business intrusted to him. ' ' '\\nThen Judge Follett concludes with this paragraph:\\n\\\"As showing this to be the policy of our law, we now have a statute going much beyond this case, passed March 5, 1879, and is now See. 3644 [Lan. 5855] Rev. Stat. reading: 'A person who solicits insurance and procures the application therefor, shall be held to be the agent of the party hereafter issuing a policy upon such application or a renewal thereof, anything in the application or policy to the contrary notwithstanding.' \\\"\\nThat section, as cited by Judge Follett, has undergone slight changes in arriving at the condition in which we find it embodied in our present revision. The changes are immaterial so far as this answer is concerned. As suggested by my associate, Judge Parker, the Supreme Court in this case of Insurance Co. v. Williams, supra, is basing its conclusion not upon Rev. Stat. 3644 (Lan. 5855), which was passed after the rights of the parties had accrued, but Judge Follett cites the section merely as showing the tendency of our legislation. In reference to this section of the statute, it is manifest that the legislature had some purpose in enacting that the soliciting agent should be deemed, under such circumstances,, the agent of the company, although so far as the terms of the .legislation go there is nothing further. The purpose of the section is its application as fixing the rights and liabilities of the insured and the insurer. It must be, that the legislature in enacting that the soliciting agent under certain circumstances, shall be deemed the agent of the company, intends that he shall have power to bind the company as its agent to some extent, and we think that the statute was passed in recognition of the general practice of agents of receiving the statements of claimed facts from persons whom they were seeking to insure and embodying them in applications for insurance or in such schedules perhaps as w^ find here, attached to this policy.\\nI find that our own court has had occasion to look somewhat into this question and to pass upon the principle in the case of Phoenix Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowersox, 3 Circ. Dec. 321 (6 R. 1). I read the fifth paragraph of 'the syllabus:\\n\\\"Where the agent of an insurance company, in taking an application for insurance against loss by fire, himself writes out the answers of tbe applicant to interrogatories propounded in behalf of the company, he acts, in that regard, as the agent of the company-; and if any mistake \\u2022occurs in writing out such. answers, such as an excessive estimate of value, based on the truthful statements of the assured, without fault on the part of the assured, the latter is not prejudiced thereby.\\\"\\nThe members of the court at the time this decision was rendered, in 1901, were Judges Haynes, Bentley and Scribner, and the opinion is per curiam, all of the judges indorsing not only the judgment which, was rendered, but the entire phraseology of the opinion. I will not stop to read from this opinion, but will say only that it fully sustains the proposition in the syllabus which I have already read. It is suggested to me, and before leaving the discussion of the subject I will say that the provision in our present revision, Rev. Stat. 3644 (Lan. 5855), has application to all insurance companies other than life. When originally enacted as a part of the Holland law it had reference to fire insurance \\u2022companies only, but it is now embodied in the chapter pertaining to insurance companies other than life, and in another part of the same chapter we find provision for insurance companies of the class represented by the defendant in this suit \\u00a1'that is, insurance against losses by crimes such as burglary, theft, larceny, etc. The case of Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowersox, supra, received consideration by another court higher than the circuit court; it was carried to the Supreme Court and the entry on the docket of the Supreme Court shows that it was dismissed March 21, 1893, so that the last judicial determination of the matter, so far as that case is concerned, is embodied in the decision as quoted. There is an earlier ease in Ohio to which reference might be made: Hartford Protec. Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452 [59 Am. Dec. 684], in which it was held, in the sixth paragraph of the syllabus:\\n' ' If a representation is untrue as to incumbrances, but not fraudulently made, and the agent of the company knows the true state of facts, .and writes the statement as made from his own knowledge, and fails to state it truly, such misrepresentation will not avoid the policy, and this is true, although the statement is signed by the agent of the insured. ' '\\nIn the so-called second defense in this answer there is perhaps a \\u00a1substantial averment of fraud on the part of the plaintiff; that is, an allegation that he knew the statements to be false; but that part of the answer is denied by the reply. The plaintiff does not mention it specifically, but he denies all matters antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, the statements made in the reply including the statement that the defendant's agent and the defendant had full knowledge of all the facts. We think that there is enough in the reply, to carry to the mind of any reader an understanding that the plaintiff is asserting that the defend ant company was not misled by any language in tbis schedule negativing a previous larceny in his residence or elsewhere, and that plaintiff made the statement in good faith.\\nOur judgment is, that the demurrer should have been overruled, and that the court, in sustaining it, committed error; that the court also erred in dismissing plaintiff's case upon-the pleadings. For these errors the judgment of the court will be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer and for such further proceedings as may be required.\\nHaynes and Parker, JJ., concur.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"9504613\", \"name\": \"John C. Uhrlaub v. Cincinnati (City) et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Uhrlaub v. Cincinnati (City)\", \"decision_date\": \"1903-06-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"797\", \"last_page\": \"799\", \"citations\": \"18 Ohio C.C. Dec. 797\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio Circuit Court Decisions\", \"court\": \"Hamilton Circuit Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:20:34.121902+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Swing, J., concurs.\", \"parties\": \"John C. Uhrlaub v. Cincinnati (City) et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"LICENSES.\\n[Hamilton (1st) Circuit Court,\\nJune 12, 1903]\\nSwing and Giffen, JJ.\\nJohn C. Uhrlaub v. Cincinnati (City) et al.\\nLicense on Transient Dealers and Temporary Stores Invalid.\\nA city ordinance imposing a license fee of $300 on all temporary stores and transient dealers is invalid as it is unreasonable, unjust, prohibitive, and in restraint of trade.\\n[For other cases in point, see 5 Cyc. Dig., \\u201cLicenses,\\u201d \\u00a7\\u00a7 69-77. \\u2014 Ed.]\\nKramer & Kramer, for plaintiff:\\nThe ordinance on its face, unjustly discriminates between men in the same business. State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599 [51 N. E. Rep, 136;'41 L. R. A. 689; 65 Am. St. Rep. 785],\\nIn order that an ordinance may be sustained as an exercise of police power the exercise of this power must be reasonable and indiscriminat-ing. Sipe v. Murphy, 49 Ohio St. 536 [31 N. E. Rep. 884; 17 L. R. A. 184] ; 22 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law (2 ed.) 938m; Lacy, Ex parte, 108 ^ Cal. 326 [41 Pac. Rep. 411; 38 L. R. A. 640 ; 49 Am. St. Rep. 93]; Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121; Lien v. Norman Go. (Gomrs.)\\\\ 80 Minn. 58 [82 N. W. Rep. 1094]; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389 [17 N. E. Rep. 343; 4 Am. St. Rep. 465]; \\\"Wheeling Bridge & T. By. v. Gilmore, 4 Circ. Dec. 366 (8 R. 658).\\nIt is agreed by counsel for tbe city and counsel for tbe plaintiff that tbe following additional facts are admitted to be true, and are to betaken as a part of tbe record in this case, to wit:\\nFirst. That tbe plaintiff in tbis case was a temporary and transient dealer within the meaning of the statute and ordinance in question in. this case, and further, that the plaintiff brought his stock of goods from New York to the city of Cincinnati for the express purpose of opening: a temporary store for the sale of the same In the city of Cincinnati, and that he did open said store for the aforesaid purpose.\\nSecond. It is further admitted that the auctioneer engaged by the plaintiff to sell at auction the goods of the plaintiff in the store opened by the plaintiff, had paid the license fee, and had obtained a license from the city of Cincinnati to act as auctioneer, and that the city of Cincinnati required the plaintiff to take out a further license for the privilege of opening a \\u201ctemporary store.\\u201d.\\nThird. That the goods which are described in the petition of the plaintiff, and which were offered for sale by the plaintiff, as described in the petition, were not in the original packag\\u00e9s in which they had been brought from New York to the city of Cincinnati, but that said original packages were broken, and the articles contained in said original packages were taken therefrom, and offered for sale separately.\\nA. H. Morrill, for defendants:\\nAuthority for exacting this license, ordinance No. 248, passed November 14, 1898, entitled \\u201cAn ordinance to license transient dealers and persons who temporarily open stores or places for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise.\\u201d Henderson\\u2019s ordinances, page 138.\\nAuthority for passing such an ordinance, Rev. Stat. 2669b (Lan. 3951).\\nUnless specifically prohibited, the legislature of a state has power to pass any or all laws. Dillon, Munic. Corp. Sec. 357.\\nThis ordinance does not interfere with interstate commerce. Wood-ruff v. Parham, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 123 [19 L. Ed. 382]; Leisy v. Hardin^ 135 U. S. 100 [10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; 34 L. Ed. 128]; Fichlen v. Shelby Co. Tax. Dist. 145 U. S. 1 [12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810; 36 L. Ed. 601].\\nIt does not discriminate against citizens of other states in favor of citizens of Ohio. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 [5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; 29 L. Ed. 257] ; Howe Mach. Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676 [25 L. Ed. 754]; Emert V. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 [15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367;( 39- L. Ed. 430]; Coldwater (City) v. Bussell, 49 Micb. 617 [14 N. W. Rep. 568; 43 Am. Rep. 478]; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 [10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; 34 L. Ed. 128],\\nThe legislature of Ohio has authority to give to a municipality power to pass'such an ordinance. BaJcer v. City, 11 Ohio St. 534; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio 625 [45 Am. Dec. 593]; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63 [12 N. E. Rep. 463],\\nIt is a reasonable police regulation. Baguet v. Ward, 4 Ohio 107; Thomas v. Mt. Vernon, 9 0\\u00bfio 290; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63 [12 N. E. Rep. 463]; Glaser v. Cincinnati, 1 Dec. 398 (31 Bull. 243) ; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Van Hook v. Selma (City), 70 Ala. 361 [45 Am. Rep. 85]; Cooley, Const. Lim. Sec. 704; People v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529 [39 N. E. Rep. 686; 27 L. R. A. 718]; Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464 [19 Atl. Rep. 1044; 8 L. R. A. 551]; Dillon, Munic. Corp. Sec. 357.\\nThe -price exacted is largely a matter for the legislative body to determine. Mirande, Ex parte, 73 Cal. 365 [14 Pac. Rep. 888]; Wolf v. Lansing' (City), 53 Mich. 367 [19 N. W. Rep. 38]; Guerrero, In re, 89 Cal. 88 [10 Pac. Rep. 261]; McNally, Ex parte, 73 Cal. 632 [15 Pac. Rep. 368]; Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio 257.\\nAffirmed, Cincinnati v. Uhrlaub, 72 Ohio St. 667.\", \"word_count\": \"1142\", \"char_count\": \"6162\", \"text\": \"GIFFEN, J.\\nThe ordinance involved in this case is unreasonable, unjust and practically prohibitive in fixing the fee for maintaining a temporary store at the sum of $300, regardless of the amount of goods offered for sale, and of the length of time the business is to be carried on. If the value of the goods is $300 or less, the collection of the prescribed license fee in effect confiscates the goods, and, if the licensee wishes to operate a store for one day only he is charged the same fee as one who desires to maintain it for the period of a week, a month, or a year.\\nThe amount of goods on hand, and the success of the venture are both important factors in determining the length of time that the store would be kept open. A ready sale of all the goods might terminate the enterprise, or on the other hand, induce the proprietor to purchase other goods and continue it indefinitely. A merchant could rarely afford to pay the sum of $300 for the privilege of opening a temporary store, and hence this provision of the ordinance operates in restraint of trade. For these reasons we hold the ordinance to be invalid, and reverse the judgment of the common pleas court.\\nSwing, J., concurs.\"}"
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diff --git a/ohio/969646.json b/ohio/969646.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f6ccdda92e9743c82c21f4d1e335e4e7e8168b6
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"969646\", \"name\": \"The State, ex rel. Coss et al., v. Forney et al., as State Tax Commissioners\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Coss v. Forney\", \"decision_date\": \"1922-12-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 17693\", \"first_page\": \"661\", \"last_page\": \"661\", \"citations\": \"106 Ohio St. 661\", \"volume\": \"106\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:09:55.565684+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Marshall, C. J., Hough, Wanamaker, Bobinson, Jones, Matthias and Clark, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"The State, ex rel. Coss et al., v. Forney et al., as State Tax Commissioners.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State, ex rel. Coss et al., v. Forney et al., as State Tax Commissioners.\\nSupreme court \\u2014 Dismissals\\u2014Moot questions.\\n(No. 17693\\nDecided December 30, 1922.)\\nIn Mandamus.\\nMr. P. M. Smith, for relator.\\nMr. John, G. Price, attorney general, and Mr. Bay Martin, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"94\", \"char_count\": \"568\", \"text\": \"The court finds that the questions involved are moot ones, and it is therefore ordered that the petition be, and it is hereby, dismissed on authority of Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St., 237.\\nPetition dismissed.\\nMarshall, C. J., Hough, Wanamaker, Bobinson, Jones, Matthias and Clark, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/970093.json b/ohio/970093.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..37d97c5fb8fc990ea2f277e77a05f5a0d867f4f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ohio/970093.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"970093\", \"name\": \"Dunnick v. Dunnick, Admx.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dunnick v. Dunnick\", \"decision_date\": \"1906-06-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 9565\", \"first_page\": \"514\", \"last_page\": \"515\", \"citations\": \"74 Ohio St. 514\", \"volume\": \"74\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:50.241869+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Shauck, C. J., Price, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.\", \"parties\": \"Dunnick v. Dunnick, Admx.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 9565.\\nDunnick v. Dunnick, Admx.\\n(Decided June 19, 1906.)\\nError to Circuit Court of Franklin county.\\nMr. M. E. Thrailkill, for plaintiff in error.\\nMr. J. M. Pugh and Mr. W. B. Page, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"50\", \"char_count\": \"289\", \"text\": \"Judgment affirmed.\\nShauck, C. J., Price, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ohio/991204.json b/ohio/991204.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..881fe9718a9774231376dc9c82d455b5a4b6c88b
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"991204\", \"name\": \"Mitchell et al. v. Bailey\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mitchell v. Bailey\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-03-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 14089\", \"first_page\": \"414\", \"last_page\": \"414\", \"citations\": \"90 Ohio St. 414\", \"volume\": \"90\", \"reporter\": \"Ohio State Reports, New Service\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Ohio\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:29:10.813130+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Nichols, C. J., Shauck, Johnson, Donahue, Wanamaker, Newman and Wirkin, JJ-, concur.\", \"parties\": \"Mitchell et al. v. Bailey.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 14089.\\nMitchell et al. v. Bailey.\\nDecided March 31, 1914.\\nError to Circuit Court of Preble county.\\nMessrs. Risinger & Risinger and Messrs: Fisher & Crisler, for plaintiffs in error.\\nMr. W. A. Neal and Mr. E. P. Vaughan, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"56\", \"char_count\": \"352\", \"text\": \"Judgment affirmed.\\nNichols, C. J., Shauck, Johnson, Donahue, Wanamaker, Newman and Wirkin, JJ-, concur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file