diff --git a/delaware/11209835.json b/delaware/11209835.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6226768d45853ee1ee7520212e3fbd6b684324ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11209835.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11209835\", \"name\": \"In re GAYLORD CONTAINER CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litigation\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-01-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Action No. 14616\", \"first_page\": \"462\", \"last_page\": \"488\", \"citations\": \"753 A.2d 462\", \"volume\": \"753\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:48:11.715057+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re GAYLORD CONTAINER CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re GAYLORD CONTAINER CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION.\\nCivil Action No. 14616.\\nCourt of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 10, 2000.\\nDecided: Jan. 26, 2000.\\nJoseph A. Rosenthal, Jeffrey S. Goddess, of Rosenthal, Monhait, Gross & Goddess, Wilmington; of counsel: Steven G. Schulman, Edith M. Kallas, Cary L. Talbot, of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, New York City; Stephen Ramos, of Berger & Montague, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.\\nWilliam O. LaMotte III, Karen Jacobs Louden, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tun-nell, Wilmington; of counsel: Thomas O. Kuhns, Timothy A. Duffy, of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, for Individual Defendants.\\nLewis H. Lazarus, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, for Nominal Defendant Gaylord Container Corporation.\", \"word_count\": \"16127\", \"char_count\": \"100823\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nSTRINE, Vice Chancellor.\\nIn this action, a class of shareholder plaintiffs attacks the decision of the Gay-lord Container Corporation board of directors to adopt a series of defensive measures in July of 1995. These defensive measures included: a shareholder rights plan; the elimination of stockholders' right to act by written consent; bylaws requiring stockholders to submit nominations for directorships in the period sixty to ninety days in advance of the annual meeting; a charter provision bringing the company within the reach of 8 Del. C. \\u00a7 203; and the adoption of a supermajority voting requirement to rescind any of the defensive measures in the charter or amend the company's bylaws by stockholder action. The plaintiffs assert that these measures have unfairly deterred possible acquirors from making an offer for Gaylord and are disproportionate to any threat faced by Gaylord.\\nThe defendants, all members of the Gay-lord board of directors, have moved for summary judgment. In support of that motion, the defendants advance evidence demonstrating that in the middle of 1995 Gaylord's dual class voting structure, which had insulated the company from the threat of a coercive takeover, was going to expire and thereby expose the Gaylord stockholders for the first time to the potential duress of an inadequate and/or coercive acquisition offer. In response to this threat, the Gaylord board, after adequate deliberations and upon advice of counsel, adopted a number of garden-variety defensive measures that gave the board the leverage to negotiate with any potential acquiror and to prevent the acquisition of the company at a price unfair to the stockholders. None of these defensive measures, defendants say, is coercive or preclusive, and many companies that have adopted such measures have been the subject of successful acquisition bids. Furthermore, ten of the eleven members of the Gaylord board of directors were non-management directors with no conflicting affiliations.\\nAfter a careful consideration of the record, I conclude that the Gaylord board of directors, which is dominated by disinterested and independent directors, after a reasonable investigation: i) acted in response to a legitimate threat that the Gay-lord stockholders could be susceptible to an inadequate and/or structurally coercive tender offer (or a rapid proxy contest based on such an offer); and ii) adopted noncoercive and nonpreclusive defensive measures reasonably proportionate to that threat.\\nAlthough there is no doubt that the defensive measures constitute obstacles in the path of a potential acquiror, the measures, even taken together, present no insuperable barrier to a hostile acquisition offer. Indeed, the measures leave a hostile acquiror with the clear option of mounting a proxy fight in advance of the Gaylord annual meeting and/or of structuring and financing an attractive and non-coercive acquisition offer that would place the Gaylord board under severe pressure (because of the threat of a successful injunction action) to redeem the rights plan. In the event of an actual offer, it may well be that the Gaylord board's decision to use the defensive measures to block the stockholders from considering the transaction could be deemed unreasonable under the standard of review articulated in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum. But in the abstract, the Gaylord board's decision to put in place rather ordinary defensive measures in advance of the elimination of the company's dual class voting structure cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed unreasonable.\\nTherefore, I grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment.\\nI. Factual Background\\nA. The Defendants\\nDefendant Gaylord Container Corporation is a Delaware corporation established in 1986. Headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois, Gaylord manufactures brown \\\"kraft\\\" paper and related brown paper products, such as containerboard, corrugated containers, and various types of brown paper bags and sacks.\\nDefendant Marvin Pomerantz was one of the founders of Gaylord and is the company's largest stockholder. At all relevant times, he has served as the company's Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer. Over the years, Pomerantz had made it clear that he does not favor a sale of Gaylord except at an extremely handsome price. Given his managerial position and his statements opposing a sale, I assume for purposes of this motion that there is a triable doubt whether Pomer-antz's support for the defensive measures was influenced or motivated at least in part by his desire to remain as CEO.\\nThe remaining defendants were all members of Gaylord's board at the time the defensive measures were adopted. But none of them was a member of Gay-lord's management at any relevant time., None of them has any financial or personal interests in conflict with Gaylord's public stockholders. There is no evidence that any of them were personally beholden to Pomerantz. Nor is there any evidence that the perquisites of Gaylord board service were so lucrative that the directors had any objective reason to cling to office, other than the human tendency to believe that one has something meaningful to contribute.\\nIn fact, all of the directors owned Gay-lord stock or warrants to obtain company stock. Before July 31, 1995, defendant Pomerantz controlled roughly 62% of the total shareholder vote, defendant Warren Hayford 9%, and the remaining directors and officers 3%. After July 31, 1995, Pom-erantz controlled 12% of the company's outstanding stock, Hayford 5%, and the remaining directors and officers approximately 3%.\\nMoreover, three of the defendant directors \\u2014 Frank E. Babb, Norman H. Brown, Jr., and Harve A. Ferrill \\u2014 were elected to the Gaylord board by a committee of Gaylord bondholders who held warrants giving them a keen interest in increasing the value of Gaylord shares. During the time frame relevant to this dispute, therefore, none of these three directors was subject to removal by Gay-lord's stockholders; all three were therefore independent from Pomerantz.\\nPut simply, ten out of the eleven Gay-lord directors were disinterested and independent at the time the actions complained of by plaintiffs occurred.\\nB. Gaylord's Dual Class Voting Structure\\nWhen Gaylord went public in 1988, it had two classes of common stock. Both the Class A and Class B common stock had equal liquidation and equity rights. But the Class B stock had ten votes per share and the Class A stock only one vote per share on matters requiring the approval of all common stockholders.\\nFrom the beginning, Pomerantz owned or controlled a majority of the Class B common stock. As a result, Pomerantz could dictate the outcome of any vote requiring the approval of a majority of all Gaylord common stockholders.\\nC. Gaylord Restructures And Its Creditors Obtain Substantial Rights\\nIn September 1992, Gaylord restructured itself under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. As part of that restructuring, Gaylord was required to make concessions to the company's bondholders, who negotiated with the company through a committee.\\nIn exchange for agreeing to refinance Gaylord's debt, the bondholders were given warrants to obtain Glass A stock. Those warrants were exchangeable July 31, 1995. In order to protect the bondholders' economic interests, the bondholders' committee demanded a conversion provision that would eliminate the dual class voting structure if Gaylord's stock price did not hit $15.25 a share before the warrants became exchangeable. If Gay-lord hit and maintained that target price for a certain period, the dual structure would persist because the bondholders could sell their warrants at a price the committee deemed adequate to recoup the value of the bondholders' original investment.\\nBut if that eventuality did not occur, the bondholders did not want to be left holding warrants for a second-tier class of stock without equal voting rights. As a result, Gaylord's charter was amended to add the following Article IV, Part 4C:\\nAll outstanding shares of Class B Common will be converted automatically into an equal number of shares of Class A Common [on] . July 31,1995, but only if the Closing Price (as defined herein) of the Class A has not equaled or exceeded $15.25 per share . on a total of twenty or more Trading Days (as defined herein) . during any thirty consecutive Trading Days occurring on or prior to July 31,1995[.]\\nAs part of the restructuring, the bondholders' committee also secured the addition of three directors to the Gaylord board as so-called \\\"Class A directors.\\\" Each of these directors was selected by the bondholders' committee to serve terms expiring July 31, 1996. These terms contrasted with the annual terms served by other Gaylord directors. As noted earlier, defendants Babb, Brown, and Ferrill were elected to the Gaylord board by this method.\\nD. The Gaylord Board Faces The Reality That The Dual Class Voting Structure Will Expire\\nBy the spring of 1995, Gaylord's performance as a company had rebounded, but not to the level where it was likely that the company would avoid the automatic conversion of its Class B stock into Class A. Quite obviously, the elimination of the dual class voting structure made the company more susceptible to the threat of a hostile acquisition offer because Pomerantz would no longer have the votes to dictate the outcome of any stockholder plebiscite.\\nAs a result of the likely termination of Pomerantz's voting control of the company, Gaylord's management sought advice from the company's outside counsel, Kirkland & Ellis, regarding its options. It appears that Kirkland & Ellis explored whether it was possible to stave off the expiration of the dual class structure by a charter amendment enacted through a vote of the Class A and Class B voting together, rather than as separate classes. When it was clear that such an amendment could be accomplished only through separate class votes, Kirkland & Ellis focused on defensive measures that could be presented by Gaylord management to the board for its consideration.\\nOn April 5, 1995, Kirkland & Ellis sent Pomerantz and Gaylord's Chief Financial Officer, Daniel P. Casey, an eighteen-page memorandum reviewing \\\"various mechanisms public companies employ to protect stockholders from raiders.\\\" The memorandum explained various options and the processes by which those options could be implemented. The memorandum preliminarily recommended that Gaylord opt into 8 Del. C. \\u00a7 203 and adopt a shareholder rights plan, a staggered board, limitations on the ability of stockholders to call special meetings and act by written consent, advance notice bylaw provisions for director nominations and shareholder proposals, and a supermajority provision to govern stockholder-initiated bylaw changes and certain charter amendments. On May 22, 1995, Kirkland & Ellis followed up with another memorandum to management that went into further detail about these options and the process and timetable for implementing them.\\nAt the Gaylord board's regularly scheduled meeting on May 25, 1995, the board heard Jack S. Levin of Kirkland & Ellis explain these options for the first time and then discussed them at some length. In this regard, the board minutes state:\\nJack Levin of Kirkland & Ellis reviewed with the Board various mechanisms to deal with an unsolicited or coercive takeover of the Corporation. Mr. Levin explained the operation and features of a shareholder rights plan, a staggered board of directors, the anti-takeover provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law and various amendments to the Corporation's Restated Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws, including provisions relating to shareholder consents, special meetings of shareholders and removal of directors. Mr. Levin emphasized that these mechanisms are designed to maximize shareholder value by requiring persons interested in acquiring the Corporation to negotiate directly with the Board. The Board discussed the benefits of each of the foregoing mechanisms, as well as the timing of their adoption and the advisability of retaining an investment banking firm. Following the discussions, in which all directors participated and a number of questions were raised and answered, the Board decided to meet next month to review proposed documents and agreements.\\nAt the meeting, the board appears to have given preliminary support to several of the options articulated by Levin, all but one of which could be adopted by the board itself or by a stockholder vote controlled by Pomerantz. During the meeting, no serious divisions among the directors emerged. Rather, all the directors, including the directors elected by the bondholders' committee, supported the adoption of defensive measures to ensure that the company was not subject to a coercive takeover bid in the wake of the elimination of the company's dual class voting structure. According to the other ten directors, Pomerantz, who chaired the meeting, limited his active involvement in the discussion of the defenses and was careful to let the other directors speak their pieces before he articulated his views.\\nAlthough the board favored most of the defensive options proposed, the board was not inclined to favor the staggered board proposal. There appear to have been at least three reasons for that. First, the board felt that a staggered board was not particularly necessary, so long as the measures restricting stockholder action by written consent and requiring advance notice of nominations were adopted. Second, Levin advised the board that it was relatively common for boards to adopt rights plans but that in his view it was more out of the mainstream to create a staggered board. Finally, Levin believed that the creation of the staggered board required the assent of the Class A stockholders voting as a separate class and that such approval might not be obtained.\\nAt the end of the meeting, the board decided to give further consideration to a package of defensive measures centering on a rights plan and measures restricting an acquiror's ability to replace the Gaylord board to a proxy fight conducted at the time of the Gaylord annual meeting. The board asked Kirkland & Ellis to provide it with further advice about that package of options and the process for formally adopting it.\\nIn advance of the next meeting scheduled for June 12, 1995, Levin circulated to the board two detailed memoranda outlin ing the recommended options, the process by which they could be adopted, and his advice that the options be implemented through a stockholder vote to occur before the elimination of the dual class voting structure. Such timing would guarantee that there would be no window in which the company would be without protection from a hostile offer. As important, that timing would guarantee adoption of the measures because the votes of Pomerantz would control the outcome \\u2014 which would not be the case after the Class B was converted into Class A.\\nAt the June 12, 1995 meeting, the Gay-lord board unanimously agreed to adopt the following measures:\\n\\u2022 The Rights Plan: Under the terms of the rights plan, if a party acquires 15% of Gaylord's common stock without the approval of the board, all other holders of Gaylord common stock would have the right to purchase $100 worth of common stock for each share of stock they own at the bargain price of $50. The rights plan was adopted by the Gaylord board and did not require stockholder approval.\\n\\u2022 The \\\"Charter And Bylaw Amendments\\\":\\n\\u2666 nominations for election to the board of directors must be made between 60 and 90 days before the annual meeting;\\n\\u2666 stockholder action may only be taken at a stockholders' meeting, and not by written consent;\\n\\u2666 special stockholder meetings may be called only by the board of directors or the Chairman of the Board;\\n\\u2666 the company's bylaws may be amended by a stockholder vote only with the approval of 66 2/3% of the vote;\\n\\u2666 section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law is made applicable to the company; and\\n\\u2666 the charter provisions implementing all the defensive measures can only be amended with the approval of 66 2/3% of the vote.\\nAll of the Charter and Bylaw Amendments (a.k.a. the \\\"Amendments\\\") required approval of the Gaylord common stockholders voting together, rather than as separate classes. Therefore, the board scheduled a special stockholders' meeting to be held on July 21, 1995, ten days before the dual class voting structure automatically expired. In connection with the vote, the company sent out a detailed proxy statement describing the defensive measures and the board's rationale for recommending their adoption. Because of the timing of the vote, however, the board knew that the measures would receive the votes necessary to secure their approval.\\nThe board believed such timing was advisable because it ensured that there would be no time period diming which Gaylord would be defenselessly exposed to a hostile acquisition offer or proxy contest. Moreover, the board knew that it would be easier and cheaper to obtain approval before the conversion, because Pomerantz's votes were sufficient to carry the day. After the conversion, the board would most likely have had to engage a proxy solicitor, and the outcome of the vote could not be guaranteed. As expected, the Charter and Bylaw Amendments were approved on July 21, 1995.\\nE. How The Defensive Measures Work Together\\nThe practical effect of a Rights Plan such as was adopted by the Gaylord board is obvious: so long as it is in place, it acts as an insurmountable barrier to an acquisition offer not supported by the board. Opting into 8 Del. C. \\u00a7 203 is also a hurdle in an acquiror's path. For all practical purposes, invocation of that section of the DGCL gave the Gaylord board the power to block any merger with a shareholder who owns more than 14.9% but less than 85% of the company's stock.\\nBut the flaw in these otherwise formidable defenses is evident: if a potential ac-quiror who owns less than 15% of Gay-lord's stock can win a proxy fight and replace the board, it can quickly redeem the pill and finish its acquisition. Where a company's charter and bylaws allow a majority of stockholders to replace the board by written consent or to call a special stockholders' meeting to replace the board upon short notice, a potential acquiror can initiate a proxy fight premised on its commitment to make an acquisition offer once it acquires board control. In such a scenario, the fact that a company has a poison pill in place is less significant because the proxy fight can operate as a substitute for a tender offer.\\nThe Charter and Bylaw Amendments proposed by the Gaylord board were designed to prevent an acquiror's attempt to bypass dealing with the board in this manner. Taken together, they prevent (e.g., by disabling stockholders from voting to call a special meeting to replace the board) such efforts by, in essence, creating a single, yearly opportunity for a proxy fight for control of the Gaylord board at the company's annual meeting. To start such a fight, the acquiror must make its intentions known sixty to ninety days in advance of the annual meeting. For an ac-quiror who wishes to couple its proxy fight with a tender offer, this means that the stockholders must be given at least fifteen days notice in advance of the forty-five days a tender offer is required to remain open under the federal Williams Act. In practical terms, these limitations could delay an effort to take over the Gaylord board anywhere from sixty days to thirteen months.\\nThe supermajority provision of the Charter and Bylaw Amendments reinforces these limitations by preventing the stockholders from amending the company's bylaws or the defensive measures incorporated into the company's charter by less than a vote of 66 2/3% of the company's outstanding shares.\\nF. The Board's Stated Motivations For Supporting The Defensive Measures\\nThe Gaylord board of directors says that they acted for reasons that are quite common in the public company context. In the absence of the dual class voting structure, the board felt that Gaylord's stockholders were exposed to the threat of a coercive acquisition offer. Without defensive measures, a hostile acquiror could, the board feared, make an inadequate and/or coercive offer for Gaylord at a time when its stock price was depressed and acquire control at an unfair price. This was a real risk, according to them, because the brown paper products industry is a highly cyclical one in which stock prices fluctuate wildly in relation to the prices of raw materials. A self-interested acquiror could therefore choose to make an offer at a premium to market value during a down cycle. In such a situation, a majority of stockholders might, depending on the structure and timing of the deal, be coerced or rushed into accepting an offer that was less than optimal.\\nThe record indicates that the Gaylord board did not act in reaction to \\\"any known effort to acquire the Company's stock.\\\" The plaintiffs have not presented any evidence indicating that the board acted in response to feelers from a potential suitor which was poised to make a hostile (or friendly) acquisition offer in the summer of 1995. Rather, the sole basis for the board's timing was the imminent expiration of the dual class voting structure.\\nFaced with that eventuality, the defendant directors determined that it was in the best interest of Gaylord's stockholders for Gaylord to implement a series of defensive measures that, in the event of an acquisition offer, would serve the following purposes:\\n\\u2022 enable the board to negotiate on behalf of the stockholders with any potential acquiror;\\n\\u2022 secure time for the board to study the offer;\\n\\u2022 give the board breathing room to secure competing offers for the company, if necessary and appropriate; and\\n\\u2022 guarantee that the company's stockholders were fully informed before making a decision on an offer.\\nThe board told the Gaylord stockholders that the adoption of these measures \\\"might have the effect of preventing stockholders from realizing an opportunity to sell their shares of Common Stock at higher than market prices by deterring unfriendly offers or other efforts to secure control of the Company. In addition, the Rights Plan and the [Charter and Bylaw Amendments] may have the practical effect of entrenching the Board of Directors and management.\\\" Nonetheless, the board contended that the advantages of the defensive measures to stockholders outweighed any negative effects:\\nThe effect of the Rights Plan . is to encourage potential acquirors to negotiate with the Board prior to acquiring a large block of the Common Stock and permit the Board to ensure fair treatment for the Company's stockholders in the event of a coercive offer for the Common Stock....\\nThe Board recognizes that certain provisions of the Company's current Restated Certif\\u00edcate of Incorporation and Bylaws, unless amended, could permit the Rights\\nPlan to be circumvented by the taking of corporate action by certain stockholders (including the replacement of the Board of Directors and the redemption of the Rights Plan) without prior notice to all stockholders or the opportunity to participate in the consideration thereof.... The principal purpose of the [Charter and Bylaw Amendments] is to enhance the effectiveness of the Rights Plan such that its provisions cannot be easily circumvented in a coercive takeover situation.\\nThe principal function of the Rights Plan and the Proposed Amendments, as a whole, is to give the Board of Directors an opportunity and sufficient time to evaluate an acquisition offer and determine if it reflects the full value of the Company and is fair to all stockholders, and if not, to reject the offer or to seek an alternative that meets such criteria. Even in the ease of an all cash offer to all stockholders, the Rights Plan and the [Charter and Bylaw Amendments] collectively serve the further function of providing leverage for the Board to facilitate a bidding process and to negotiate for a better price for the stockholders....\\n[T]he board believes that the interests of the Company's stockholders will best be served by a transaction that results from negotiations based upon a careful consideration of the proposed terms, such as the availability of the benefits of the transaction to all stockholders, the price to be paid to stockholders (including minority stockholders), the form of consideration paid and tax effects of the transaction.\\nThe Board of Directors has carefully considered the potential adverse effects of the Proposed Amendments and has concluded that such adverse effects are substantially outweighed by the benefits the Rights Plan and [the Charter and Bylaw Amendments], as a whole, would afford the Company and its stockholders.\\nG. Rumors, Rumors, and More Rumors\\nShortly after the board's public announcement of the defensive measures, the first rumors were published that Gaylord might be the subject of an acquisition' offer. In an article published less than two weeks after the special meeting proxy was sent out, Financial World reported that \\\" '[o]ne money manager believes [Georgia Pacific] is stalking Gaylord Container.' \\\" The report noted the end of Gaylord's dual class voting structure, after which Pomer-antz could no longer \\\" 'nix a deal.' \\\" The report also noted that \\\"Gaylord did recently institute a poison pill\\\" and that \\\"hostile takeover-philes will tell you that such pills are placebos for the right price.\\\"\\nGaylord's earnings in 1995 were apparently quite strong and led analysts to raise their estimates of the company's prospects. Late that same summer, Business Week published an article indicating that \\\" 'a major paper and forest-products company has been doing homework in preparation for making a buyout offer for Gaylord[.]' \\\" According to the article, one large investor stated that \\\"'Gaylord is a pure play in linerboard and containerboard'\\\" and that \\\" 'several paper companies have been filling billion-dollar war chests for acquisitions.' \\\" The article also stated that \\\"Gaylord, despite recent dire straits, is rebounding smartly, with strong earnings growth\\\" but that \\\"[o]n the other hand, Gaylord's stock is selling at 'very cheap price-earnings and price-to-cash flow ratios!.]' \\\" The article did not mention the defensive measures, which by then had been in plate for nearly a month and a half.\\nAnother of the rumors in the record was reported on CNBC by Dan Dorfman on November 30, 1995. In that report, Dorf-man indicated that three industry players were interested in acquiring Gaylord at a price as high as $20 a share - a price 2^ times Gaylord's then extant trading price of $7 % a share. Dorfman's report touted the company's impressive asset values. The defendants note that Dorfman also stated that Pomerantz \\\"may be willing to sell\\\" his block of the company's stock.\\nSporadic rumors of Gaylord's attractiveness as a takeover target were published in 1996 and 1998 as well. The defendants note that Business Week quoted an analyst's April 1998 comments that Gaylord's management \\\" 'appealed] more open . to the idea of selling the company than in the past' \\\" and that another industry player might pay $16 or $17 a share. The article stated that Pomerantz had said the company was not for sale but was \\\" 'aggressively pursuing all options to enhance shareholder value.'\\\" On May 1, 1998, Bloomberg News reported that Gaylord shares had risen 75 percent that year, \\\"as investors and analysts speculate that it's one of several paper companies that are takeover targets in an industry overdue for consolidation.... 'If this company exists in 12 months in its present form, I'd be surprised,' said Mark Wilde, an analyst at BT Alex Brown Inc. who has a 'buy' rating on the stock.\\\"\\nAs of today, none of these rumors has panned out. Although each rumor stimulated a short-term increase in the price of Gaylord shares, no actual acquiror has ever emerged and made a bid.\\nFor this reason, this case has some of the feel of a law school hypothetical rather than a live dispute. There has been no actual contest for corporate control during which the defensive measures have come into play. For example, the notion that any of the timing features of the defensive measures has been a barrier over the four and a half years since the adoption of the defensive measures has a rather surreal quality. But it is in this rather abstract context that I must assess whether the defensive measures were properly adopted.\\nAs a result, this case requires me in large measure to decide the per se validity of a certain combination of defensive measures. It therefore bears heavy emphasis that the fact that certain measures are lawful under the letter of Delaware's corporate law does not mean that those measures can be deployed validly in all circumstances. Where otherwise lawful action is undertaken by directors for inequitable purposes, Delaware courts of course retain the power to protect the corporation and its stockholders.\\nII. Applicable Standards\\nA. Summary Judgment\\nThis matter is before me on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate \\\"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Of course, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. But this does not mean that the non-moving party can safely stand mute in the face of a summary judgment motion. On the contrary, where the moving party supports its motion with admissible evidence and points to the absence of proof bolstering the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party must come forward with admissible evidence creating a triable issue of material fact or suffer an adverse judgment.\\nB. The Relationship Between The Unocal And Business Judgment Rule Standards Of Review\\nIn this case, the plaintiffs allege that the Gaylord board violated its fiduciary duties by adopting defensive measures for the primary purpose of entrenching themselves in their corporate offices and preventing a \\\"fair and open auction of the Company that would maximize sharehold er value.\\\" They contend that no legitimate threat to the interests of Gaylord or its stockholders existed to justify the board's decision to implement, through a hasty vote controlled by Pomerantz, draconian defensive \\u2022 measures constituting \\\"insurmountable obstacles to effective shareholder democracy and insurmountable defenses to an unsolicited takeover.\\\"\\nBecause the plaintiffs attacked the Gaylord board's decision to adopt defensive, anti-takeover measures, Vice Chancellor Baliek held - when denying the defendants' motion to dismiss - that the Unocal test was implicated in this case. That standard of review enables the court to do something that it ordinarily cannot do under Delaware corporate law: examine the substantive reasonableness of the decisions of a board of directors. Not only that, Unocal requires the board of directors to bear the burden of justifying the reasonableness of its actions.\\nThe rationale for this examination was well articulated in Unocal. When a board adopts measures designed to deter or defend against an acquisition offer and thereby also against the possibility that the board and management will lose their positions after the acquisition, there is an \\\"omnipresent specter that [the] board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders[.]\\\"\\nThe Supreme Court later summarized the Unocal test for determining whether a board of directors has met its burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of its actions as follows:\\nFirst, a reasonableness iesi, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and\\nSecond, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors' defensive response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.\\nIn itself, the Unocal test is a straightforward analysis of whether what a board did was reasonable. But Unocal's purpose and application have been cloaked in a larger, rather ill-fitting doctrinal garment. Once the court applies the Unocal test, its job is, as a technical matter, not over. If, upon applying Unocal, the court finds that the defendants have met their burden of demonstrating the substantive reasonableness of their actions, the court must then go on to apply the normal review appropriate in cases that do not implicate Unocal In essence, the court must reimpose on the plaintiffs the burden of showing \\\" 'by a preponderance of the evidence' \\\" that the business judgment rule is inapplicable. Of course, the business judgment rule exists in large measure to prevent the business decisions of a board of directors from being judicially examined for their substantive reasonableness - an eventuality that has, in the Unocal context, already taken place.\\nThus after the defendants have met their burden to show that they acted reasonably \\u2014 -a showing that is materially enhanced by the presence of a majority of outside independent directors \\u2014 in response to a legitimate corporate threat, the plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to show that the board's decision should be overturned because it was the product of a breach of one of the traditional duties of loyalty and care. It is not at all apparent how a plaintiff could meet this burden in a circumstance where the board met its burden under Unocal. To the extent that the plaintiff has persuasive evidence of disloyalty (for example, that the board acted in a self-interested or bad-faith fashion), this would fatally undercut the board's Unocal showing. Similarly, it is hard to see how a plaintiff could rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule by demonstrating that the board acted in a grossly careless manner in a circumstance where the board had demonstrated that it had acted reasonably and proportionately. Least of all could a plaintiff show that the board's actions lacked a rational business purpose in a context where the board had already demonstrated that those actions were reasonable, i.e., were rational.\\nLikewise, it has been held that a board that fails to meet its Unocal burden may still prevail by demonstrating that its actions satisfied the exacting entire fairness test. This back-end window is more plausible, because one could posit a scenario where a board's threat analysis (the first Unocal prong) was deficient (e.g., it simply adopted defensive measures without conducting a threat analysis) but where the defensive measures it adopted were not draconian, were within the range of reasonableness, and were proportionate to market threats that objectively faced the company. In that scenario, there might be a basis for refusing to enjoin the measures. But in a situation where the board failed to demonstrate that the mea sures themselves were reasonable and not draconian, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that those measures could be deemed \\\"fair.\\\"\\nFortunately, in practice, the back end of the Unocal analysis rarely is an issue. Practitioners recognize that the front end largely disposes of all issues and therefore focus nearly all their energies on the Unocal test itself. That is the situation here, and I now turn to an application of that test to the case at hand.\\nIII. Legal Analysis\\nA. Unocal Analysis\\n1. The Evidence Is Insufficient To Support A Finding That The Gaylord Board's Threat Analysis Was Deficient\\nThe first part of the Unocal test, the threat analysis prong, requires the Gaylord board of directors to demonstrate that, after a reasonable investigation, it determined in good faith that the expiration of the dual class voting structure created a threat to the corporation justifying a defensive response. \\\"[T]he presence of a majority of outside independent directors will materially enhance such evidence.\\\"\\nIn this case, there is no triable issue of fact regarding the independence of ten of the eleven Gaylord directors. None of these directors was a member of Gaylord management or had any material financial interests dependent on the current management's continued control. Thus, the composition of the Gaylord board bolsters the reasonableness of its threat analysis.\\nTurning to the substance of the board's investigation, it seems beyond dispute that Gaylord was faced with a situation that directors acting in good faith could determine \\\"warranted a defensive response.\\\" The expiration of the dual class voting structure opened the door for a controlling position in Gaylord to be purchased through, for example, an inadequate and coercive two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer.\\nAlthough there is no record evidence to support a finding that any such offer was imminent, the upcoming expiration of the dual class voting structure was a rational triggering event for an inquiry by the Gaylord board into the adequacy of the company's defenses against coercive and inadequate offers. Delaware law does not require a board to wait until the eve of battle to consider the erection of sound defensive barriers. In fact, our law recognizes that such a requirement would encourage haste rather than due care.\\nThe underlying threats identified by the Gaylord board were ones our law has long recognized as legitimate. In Unocal and Moran, our .Supreme Court recognized that front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers constitute a threat that can justify defensive action. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., the Supreme Court held that a board may even act to protect stockholders from the threat of having their shares purchased at a sub-optimum price through a folly financed, all cash, all shares (i.e., non-structurally coercive) acquisition offer. And recently, in Unitrin, the Supreme Court noted that \\\"the directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine that the market undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long-term value of the corporation under its present management plan.\\\"\\nFurthermore, the Gaylord board engaged in a rational deliberative process to define the threat it faced, meeting on two occasions and receiving detailed legal advice from a distinguished outside law firm. This supports the conclusion that the board acted in an informed manner.\\nIn the face of this evidence, the plaintiffs are left with two primary arguments. First, the plaintiffs argue that the imminent expiration of the dual class voting structure could not constitute a \\\"legitimate threat\\\" because that possibility was a specifically contemplated and bargained-for eventuality that would occur if Gaylord did not get its stock price up to $15.25 a share. The mere fact that the expiration would end Pomerantz's voting control and give more voting power to the Class A stockholders could not, therefore, be a threat.\\nThe problem with this contention is that the threat identified by the Gaylord board was not Pomerantz's loss of voting control in itself, but the effect of that loss of control, which was to subject the company to a threat it did not face before the expiration: exposure to hostile acquisition offers that the Gaylord board could not fend off. Nowhere in the record is there evidence that supports the plaintiffs' argument that the expiration provision was intended to create that exposure to acquisition offers; rather, the record is clear that the purpose of the expiration provision was to equalize the voting power of the bondholders in the event that the stock price did not reach a level sufficient to make them whole. In such a circumstance, the bondholders did not want to remain as second-class citizens in a corporation that Pomerantz could dominate through his voting power.\\nHad the Gaylord board simply identified Pomerantz's own personal loss of control as a threat, I would agree with the plaintiffs' argument that the board did not identify a legitimate threat. But the board did no such thing. Rather, the board focused on the fact that without a controlling stockholder, Gaylord was in a materially different position to fight off acquisition offers and concluded that this change in position generated a vulnerability warranting the erection of defensive barriers. That this decision was in no way intrinsically inconsistent with the expiration provision is demonstrated by the fact that the plaintiffs cannot cite to any language of the expiration provision that the board's actions contravened and the fact that the directors on the board who had been selected by the bondholders unanimously supported the defensive measures.\\nSecond, the plaintiffs argue that the expiration did not pose an immediate threat because no takeover offer was imminent. At best, this argument goes to the proportionate nature of the Gaylord board's reaction to the threats identified. That no takeover threat was imminent does not, however, undercut the fact that the expiration of the dual class voting structure exposed Gaylord to a new threat from inadequate and coercive acquisition offers.\\nOn this motion, Delaware law's longstanding recognition that boards may adopt reasonable defensive measures to deter such offers is dispositive, given the absence of any evidence that the overwhelmingly independent Gaylord board identified the threat as a pretext for then-real fear that they would lose their directorial positions.\\n2. The Evidence Does Not Create A Triable Issue Regarding Whether The Defensive Measures Were Disproportionate To The Identified Threat\\nThe second prong of the Unocal test requires the Gaylord board to demonstrate the proportionality of its defensive measures to the threat it identified. Where, as here, the defensive measures were adopted as an integrated package, \\\"the principles of Unocal require that [they] be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to the perceived threat.\\\"\\nThe key inquiry under this prong of Unocal is whether the defensive measures are \\\"draconian,\\\" in the sense of being preclusive or coercive. A defensive measure is preclusive when its operation precludes an acquisition of the company. A defensive measure is coercive when it operates to force management's preferred alternative upon the stockholders. When defensive measures are neither preclusive or coercive, they will be upheld if they fall within the \\\" 'range of reasonableness.' \\\"\\nThe array of defensive options adopted by the Gaylord board of directors passes muster under these standards. None of the defensive measures precludes an acquisition of the company or coerces the stockholders in some improper manner.\\nThe Rights Plan, for example, is a garden-variety poison p\\u00f1l. Whether or not Delaware law should have authorized the utilization of this extraordinary option in the first instance is water under the M & A bridge. As the Supreme Court has observed, Delaware courts have authorized the adoption of a poison phi in many cases. The primary purpose of a poison pill is to enable the target board of directors to prevent the acquisition of a majority of the company's stock through an inadequate and/or coercive tender offer. The pill gives the target board leverage to negotiate with a would-be acquiror so as to improve the offer as well as the breathing room to explore alternatives to and examine the merits of an unsolicited bid. The adoption of a poison pill is therefore proportionate to the legitimate threats identi-fled by the Gaylord board.\\nWhile it is trae that a poison pill absolutely precludes a hostile acquisition so long as the pill remains in place, the mere adoption of a garden-variety pill is not in itself preclusive under Delaware law. That is because in the event of a concrete battle for corporate control, the board's decision to keep the pill in place in the face of an actual acquisition offer will be scrutinized again under Unocal. In addition, in this case the pill may be redeemed by a new board elected after a successful proxy fight by an acquiror at the Gaylord annual meeting. All an acquiror needs is the necessary votes to elect a new board, which can redeem the pill and allow the offer to go forward. Coupled with the fact that the pill's application in an actual contest for corporate control can be challenged, this option renders the Gay-lord Rights Plan nonpreclusive.\\nAs the reader may have already gleaned, I also conclude that the Charter and Bylaw Amendments ar\\u00e9 not preclusive. The Amendments made it more difficult for an acquiror to obtain control of the Gaylord board. It would, of course, be surprising if defensive measures did not have this effect.\\nThe Amendments were also necessary if the Gaylord board was to address the threats it identified. Market participants are remarkably adaptive. When poison pills became prevalent, would-be acquirors resorted to proxy contests as a method of obtaining indirectly that which they could no longer get through a tender offer. By taking out the target company's board through a proxy fight or a consent solicitation, the acquiror could obtain control of the board room, redeem the pill, and open the way for consummation of its tender offer. The Amendments cut off this shortcut and force an acquiror seeking to obtain control of Gaylord to do so at the annual stockholders' meeting after giving stockholders adequate time to consider the platforms and qualifications of the contending director slates.\\nThese Amendments are therefore not an ineffectual corporate Maginot Line. But nor are they insurmountable or impossible to outflank. What they do is limit Gay-lord's exposure to a proxy fight outside of the company's annual meeting. Although there is no doubt that acquirors would prefer to operate on their own timetables and to take over a board whenever they can muster the necessary votes, the fact that the Amendments force an acquiror to fight its battle at the annual meeting hardly makes them \\\"show stopper[s].\\\" And the fact that an acquiror must make its nomination at least sixty days in advance of the meeting merely lengthens the electoral contest in a way that appears to strike a reasonable balance between the electorate's need to hear out all participants in the debate and the acquiror's need for an adequate opportunity to line up a slate before the meeting. These provisions are far less preclusive than a staggered board provision, which can delay an acquiror's ability to take over a board for several years.\\nThe Amendments also leave it open for an acquiror to ask the Gaylord board to schedule a special meeting to elect directors. As is the case with the Rights Plan, the Gaylord board's decision whether to accede to such a request would be reviewable under the particular circumstances then presented. Put differently, the Amendments do not divest the Gaylord board and its Chairman of their fiduciary duties in exercising their now exclusive power to schedule special stockholder meetings. If the board were to refuse such a request without properly informing itself or for reasons inimical to the interests of the Gaylord stockholders, it could open itself up to a successful application for injunctive relief.\\nLikewise, I fail to see how the superma-jority provision can be considered preclu-sive of an acquisition bid. The most critical fact supporting this conclusion is the reality that an effective fight over board control can occur once a year, rendering the supermajority provision an insubstantial barrier to an acquisition.\\nIn so ruling, I recognize that the super-majority provision makes it very difficult to amend the corporation's bylaws and the other defenses without the support of Gay-lord's board. Although the vote requirement was only lifted to 66 2/3%, this is no trivial hurdle given the likelihood that less than a 100% turnout can be expected. At the same time, I cannot say that the necessary vote is not theoretically achievable. Pomerantz holds only 12% of the vote and is not in a position to block the electorate. It is true that the other directors and Gaylord management hold another 8% of the stock. But the directors' share of that percentage cannot be lumped together with Pomerantz's shares because none of those directors is a manager or has an interest (beyond mere board service) conflicting with the interests of Gaylord's stockholders. In the absence of countervailing evidence, these stockholder-directors \\\"are presumed to act in their own best economic interests when they vote...\\\"\\nAfter Unitrin, it is not clear that the supermajority provision can be deemed preclusive, given this distribution of voting power. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the fact that a repurchase program would place as much as 28% of the stock in directors' hands did not necessarily preclude a successful proxy fight in a vote requiring a majority of the outstanding shares, assuming a 90% turnout.\\nBut I need not and do not reach this question, because the supermajority provision does not subject all charter changes to a 66 2/3% stockholder vote. Only those provisions of the charter that were part of the defensive measures are subject to the supermajority requirement. Moreover, the supermajority requirement for bylaw changes only applies to stockholder-initiated bylaw amendments. Therefore, it is not clear to me why the supermajority provision would hamper the ability of a new board to manage the company with the necessary flexibility. If such a board wished to amend any of the bylaws, it could do so itself without a stockholder vote. And if a new board wished to restore the stockholders' ability to act by written consent, for example, it could propose a charter amendment and solicit proxies in connection with the annual meeting if it wished to do so efficiently.\\nIn sum, because a majority of the stockholders can elect a new insurgent board at the annual meeting without impairment by the supermajority provision and because that board will have the necessary managerial flexibility to run the company efficiently, that provision has little additional defensive bite. It simply reinforces the elimination of the option of removing the board by written consent.\\nNor is there evidence that creates a dispute of fact for trial regarding whether the defensive measures are coercive. In this respect, the plaintiffs' argument becomes a bit confusing. Seizing on the fact that a defensive measure is coercive if it forces management's preferred alternative on the stockholders, the plaintiffs contend that the Charter and Bylaw Amendments were intrinsically coercive because the Gaylord board caused the vote on them to occur while Pomerantz still had voting control and could ensure their passage. This ingenious argument is flawed, however, in several respects.\\nInitially, it seems to me clear that the primary thrust of the coercion prong of Unocal is to enable the court to vitiate measures that foist an alternative strategic transaction (e.g., a repurchase program or merger) on stockholders that prevents them from taking advantage of another acquisition offer. Unocal's coercion prong also permits the court to strike down de fensive measures that coerce stockholders into supporting the continued control of management. The Charter and Bylaw Amendments are not coercive in either of these senses.\\nI also refuse to endorse the proposition that it was inherently wrongful for the Gaylord board to hold the vote on the Amendments at a time when it knew it could easily secure their passage. If the Amendments themselves were neither coercive, preclusive, or unreasonable in their effect, the mere fact that the board chose to put them in place rapidly through a vote it knew would succeed does not render the board's response disproportionate. This type of quibbling with a board's decisions seems inconsistent with the more deferential Unocal analysis articulated in Unitrin.\\nOn this score, the evidence would, I suppose, enable one to conclude that the plaintiffs have the better argument regarding whether there was an exigent need for Gaylord to have all of its defensive measures in place as soon as the expiration occurred. That is, I acknowledge that the adoption of the pill might have offered sufficient protection until a post-expiration vote could be held, given the short period of time an acquiror would have had to launch and win a proxy contest to remove the board. That is, the Charter and Bylaw Amendments may not have been necessary as of that time.\\nBut the fact that one might have decided that question differently than the board did is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial unless one believes that the facts would support a finding that the board's contrary judgment was outside the range of reasonable responses to the circumstances. In my view, the board's decision to put into place seamless defensive coverage efficiently cannot be deemed an unreasonable approach to the situation it faced. Nor was the board bound, if it believed an earlier vote was advisable, effectively to accelerate the expiration of the dual class voting structure by timing any action on the Amendments to occur after the expiration of that structure. The board's decision to take the most expedient and certain route to ensuring the adoption of Charter and Bylaw Amendments it deemed in the best interests of Gaylord and the company's stockholders does not constitute an independent basis for invalidating the board's action.\\nSimilarly, I also reject the plaintiffs' argument that the board's timing decision must be supported by a compelling justification under Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp. because the board knew that it would be more difficult to secure passage of the Amendments after expiration of the dual class voting structure. The defendants concede that it would have been challenging to obtain passage after that event because of the need to mobilize the electorate to cast their ballots. Although the defendants do not concede the point, it seems obvious that the measures might not have obtained electoral support for another reason \\u2014 their nature as defensive barriers.\\nBut it seems to me to be incongruous to hold that the defensive measures were, on the one hand, nonpreclusive and noncoer-cive in the traditional Unocal sense and within the range of reasonable responses but, on the other hand, invalid because the board chose the swiftest and surest method of securing their implementation. Put another way, I have reviewed the evidence and have concluded that the evidence would not support a finding of fact that the board was motivated by improper purposes (e.g., entrenchment) in its adoption of the defensive measures and further that there is no triable question regarding whether the defensive measures the board selected were within the range of reasonable responses. As a result, by securing the speedy enactment of those measures, the board cannot be said to have \\\"acted for the primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of a shareholder vote.\\\"\\nIndeed, it bears emphasizing that the prototypical case implicating so-called Bla-sius review involves a situation where: i) a stockholder vote or action by stockholder consent is imminent or threatened; and ii) the board purposely thwarts the opportunity for that vote or action to take place or takes steps to reverse the likely result (e.g., by reducing the voting power of a particular stockholder). Neither situation is present here.\\nIn fact, the situation in this case is far less compelling than existed in other cases in which Delaware courts have rejected Blasius review. In Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., Inc., for example, Chancellor Allen refused to employ Blasius to review a board's decision to change the company's planned annual meeting date when it appeared likely that the company's largest stockholder would be successful in electing an insurgent slate at that meeting. Because, among other reasons, that decision did not ultimately preclude a fair election in accordance with the company's bylaws, the Chancellor held that the Blasius standard of review was not implicated.\\nNor does the mere fact that the Amendments included a supermajority provision making it difficult for stockholders to undo them in the future \\u2014 as the plaintiffs claim \\u2014 raise an issue distinct from the core Unocal analysis. Supermajority provisions are common and lawful features of corporate charters. And all supermajority provisions, of course, make it more difficult for stockholders to act together to change company policy. Thus a principled basis for invalidating such a provision, unless its primary purpose is disenfranchisement or its effects on stockholder voting power reach a level beyond the pale of Unocal, is not readily apparent.\\nFor all these reasons, I conclude that there is no dispute of fact that requires a trial regarding whether the defendants have met their burden under the Unocal test.\\nB. The Plaintiffs Have Not Produced Evidence Sufficient To Support A Finding That The Presumption Of The Business Judgment Rule Is Rebutted\\nIn the preceding sections of this opinion, I have concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that would support a finding that: 1) the independence or disinterestedness of ten of the eleven Gay-lord directors was compromised; 2) the Gaylord board acted without due care or for improper purposes; or 3) the defensive measures did not have a rational business purpose. Thus the plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the board's actions are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.\\nTV. Conclusion\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and this case is hereby dismissed, IT IS SO ORDERED,\\n. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 946 (1985).\\n. As to this, I note the raging dispute in the briefs about the evidentiary force of May 1995 notes taken by a former Gaylord Vice President, Kathryn Chieger, responsible for the company's communications strategy. In those notes Chieger indicates, among other things, that there is a perception that Pomer-antz \\\"will not sell the company,\\\" that Porner-antz's statements about the price at which he would be willing to sell were so extreme as to generate that perception, that a rights plan might be viewed as an entrenchment tool rather than \\\"a means of delaying a hostile bid,\\\" and that many investors wanted Pomer-antz out of control. Pis. Ex. 43. Although these notes are of course colorful, they have little objective evidentiary force, because they have little bearing on why the rest of Gaylord board acted as it did or how the defensive measures operate in practice.\\n. The only evidence that the plaintiffs have produced on this point to suggest otherwise is inadequate to create a genuine dispute of fact. First, the plaintiffs allege that all of the Class B directors must be considered non-independent because they were elected by that class at a time when Pomerantz controlled the vote. But the mere fact that a controlling stockholder elects a director does not render that director non-independent. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instruments Corp., Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 53, 65-66 (1989).\\nSecond, the plaintiffs allege that director Norman Brown, who was selected by Gay-lord's bondholders' committee and who was not subject to re-election during his tenure, was non-independent because he was a Managing Director of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jen-rette and had offered DLJ's services in connection with the board's consideration of the defensive measures. Yet Brown's offer was declined, and his uncontradicted affidavit states that \\\"[a]t no time while I was on the Gaylord Board or after my tenure ended, did Gaylord engage DLJ to perform any advisory services.\\\" Brown Aff. \\u00b6 6. Brown admits that DLJ did participate \\\"in a financing of Gaylord bonds\\\" after he left the board in 1997. Id. The plaintiffs have had the opportunity for full discovery. The mere fact that Brown offered DLJ's services in connection with advising the board regarding the defensive measures does little to compromise his independence. To the extent that DLJ had been hired, a different finding might be in order. But the plaintiffs have failed to show that Brown feared that a vote against Pomerantz's position on the defensive measures would harm any material financial relationship DLJ had with Gaylord, because the plaintiffs have not produced evidence that any such material financial relationship existed. Moreover, the plaintiffs have ignored the fact that Brown owed his service on the board to the bondholders, a fact weighing in favor of independent status.\\nThird, the plaintiffs challenge the independence of another director selected by Gay-lord's bondholders, defendant Frank Babb. As with Brown, the plaintiffs slight the fact that Babb was selected by the bondholders and free from the threat of removal by the stockholders (including Pomerantz). The only support for their challenge is the fact that Babb admitted in his affidavit that the firm of \\\"McDermott Will & Emery has, over the years, done some work for Gaylord.\\\" Babb Aff. \\u00b6 7. Apparently, this work was actually done for the bondholders' committee. Babb was a partner of the McDermott Will firm until 1990 and has served it in an of counsel position since then. But Babb's affidavit also states that he was \\\"not aware of any significant representation undertaken by the firm [for Gaylord], or any significant fees generated from such work, either during or after Ehis] tenure on the Gaylord board.\\\" Id. The plaintiffs had the opportunity to depose Babb but chose not to do so. They have produced no evidence that the McDermott Will firm had a material financial interest in representing Gaylord or that Babb's personal status as of counsel to that firm was material to him and somehow related to the continuation of that firm's relationship with Gaylord. As a consequence, they have failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact about his independence. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (\\\"Cede II\\\"), Del.Supr., 634 A.2d 345, 363-64 (1993). To the extent the plaintiffs believe that they can wait until trial to generate evidence compromising Babb's independence, they misconceive how Rule 56 operates.\\nFourth, the plaintiffs obliquely question the independence of director Hayford, because he owned approximately 9% of the Class B stock at the time the defensive measures were adopted and was one of the founders of Gay-lord. At the time of the actions challenged by the plaintiffs, Hayford held no managerial position at Gaylord and his status as a major stockholder with no possibility for exercising voting control himself would seem to heighten his incentive to ensure that the company would entertain a favorable acquisition offer, not dampen it.\\nFinally, even if Brown, Babb, and Hayford were not independent, that would still leave an eleven member board controlled by seven independent directors.\\n. The plaintiffs have produced what appears to be an internal Kirkland & Ellis document indicating that elimination of the expiration provision would have required the consent of the Class A stockholders as a class. Pis. Ex. 38. Despite having had the benefit of full discovery, the plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Pomerantz or anyone else at Gay-lord ever saw this analysis or requested it. Most important, there is no evidence that the board gave any consideration to this possibility-\\n. Defs. Ex. 16.\\n. It is not crystal clear whether the board received the May 22, 1995 Kirkland & Ellis memorandum before or at the May 25, 1995 meeting. The clearest evidence in the record seems to indicate that management did in fact share the memorandum with the directors before the meeting, because Levin recalls that the memorandum was in front of the directors during his oral presentation and that the directors all \\\"appeared to be familiar with the memo.\\\" Defs. Ex 28 (Jack S. Levin Dep.), at 307-08. This question is not, in my view, material to the outcome of this motion.\\n. Defs. Ex. 18 (May 25, 1995 Board Minutes), at 1-2.\\n. The board does not claim that the summer of 1995 was a down period in the industry cycle; rather, the industry seemed to be doing well at that point.\\n. In this regard, the defendants have produced evidence that the industry has in fact experienced quite a bit of mergers and acquisitions activity.\\n.Defs. Ex. 23 (Special Meeting Proxy Statement, dated July 7, 1995), at 3.\\n. Id. at 4.\\n. Id. at 3-4.\\n. Compl. \\u00b6 29 (quoting Stephen Taub, Market Watch: Timber! Will Gaylord fall to GP?, FIN. WORLD 16 (July 18, 1995)) (hereinafter \\\"Financial World\\\").\\n. Id.\\n. Defs. Br. at 25 (citing Compl. \\u00b631 and quoting Financial World, at 16).\\n. Compl. 1131 (quoting Gene G. Marcial, Inside Wall Street: Buyers Size Up A Tidy Package, BUS. WEEK 100 (Sept. 4, 1995)) (hereinafter \\\"Business Week\\\").\\n. Compl. \\u00b6 32 (quoting Business Week at 100) (iquoting unnamed investor).\\n. Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Defs. Ex. 37 (Report of Michael A. Marek) \\u00b6 36; Defs. Br. at 25 (citing Compl. II40; Ans. \\u00b6 40).\\n. Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Defs. Ex. 37 (Report of Michael A. Market) \\u00b6 38 (quoting Gene G. Marcial, Inside Wall Street: Gaylord Snaps to attention, BUS. WEEK 110 (Apr. 27, 1998)); see also Compl. \\u00b6 31 (referencing this article).\\n. Id.\\n. Defs. Ex. 37 (Report of Michael A. Marek) \\u00b6 39 (quoting Gaylord Container Shares Gain Steadily on Takeover Speculation, BLOOM-BERG NEWS (May 1, 1998)).\\n. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., Del.Supr., 285 A.2d 437(1971).\\n. Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).\\n. Williams v. Geier, Del.Supr., 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (1996).\\n. See, e.g., In re Liquidation of National Heritage Life Insur. Co., Del. Ch., 728 A.2d 52, 56, aff'd, 723 A.2d 397 (1998); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).\\n. Compl. \\u00b6 48.\\n. Id. \\u00b6 57.\\n. Unocal, 493 A.2d 946. This is law of the case. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. Stockholders Litig., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 14616, mem. op. at 7-8, 1996 WL 752356 at *2-3, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *8-11, Baliek, V.C. (Dec. 19, 1996). In so ruling, Vice Chancellor Baliek decided to review the \\\"combined effect\\\" of Rights Plan and the Amendments to determine whether they were reasonable under Unocal. Id., mem. op. at 7-8, 1996 WL 752356 at *3, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *11. On the other hand, in view of his citation to the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Williams v. Geier, Vice Chancellor Baliek also appears to have recognized that only the Rights Plan, and not the stockholder-approved Amendments, were properly subject to Unocal review. Id., mem. op. at. 8, 1996 WL 752356 at *3, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *9-10 (citing Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368). The Vice Chancellor explained that \\\"the stockholders approved the amendments whose purported purpose was to increase the effectiveness of the shareholder rights plan\\\" and that therefore \\\"the board's unilateral adoption of the shareholder rights plan is subject to enhanced scrutiny,\\\" with that scrutiny considering \\\"the effect of the rights plan in combination with the amendments.\\\" Id. (citation omitted). Because the parties have focused their arguments on this motion solely on the Unocal standard and because Vice Chancellor Balick's opinion contemplated review of the combined effect of the defensive measures, I devote the bulk of my opinion to Unocal. But to the extent Vice Chancellor Balick's opinion leaves this option open to me, I note that Williams v. Geier also supports the result I reach as to the Amendments. See note 80, infra.\\n. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.\\n. Id. at 954.\\n. The use of the term \\\"reasonableness test\\\" to describe the first Unocal prong is a bit confusing, because both prongs hinge on reasonableness. The first prong is essentially an inquiry into whether the board used a reasonable process to identify a legitimate threat to the corporation.\\n. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen'l Corp., Del.Supr., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (1995) (emphases in original) (distilling Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373.\\n. Id. at 1390 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958).\\n. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n. 17 (1993) (where the traditional business judgment rule \\\"is applicable,\\\" the court will not examine the \\\"reasonableness\\\" of the board's decision); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373; R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging The Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1339 (1993) (hereinafter \\\"Rejudging The Business Judgment Rule\\\") (\\\"In its substantive aspect, the rule prohibits a court, absent an abuse of discretion, from substituting its judgment for that of the directors. This substantive aspect is the core of the business judgment rule.\\\"); E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation Of The Business Judgment Rule In Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 512 (1987) (\\\"In the takeover arena, however, not only will the process be scrutinized, but substantive decisions will be examined for 'reasonableness' \\u2014 a concept which implies an objective determination by the court. Such a jurisprudential approach has no rightful place in the application of the defensive business judgment rule.\\\"); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, manuscript at 10 (Nov. 30, 1999) (FORTHCOMING in Business Lawyer) (hereinafter \\\"The Modest Business Judgment Rule\\\") (\\\"The business judgment rule is simply a policy of judicial non-review.\\\") (emphasis in original).\\nIt is true that the business judgment rule leaves it open for a court to conclude that a board decision must be set aside because it cannot be attributed to any rational business puipose. Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, at 12 & 12 n. 32. But properly applied, this standard is extremely deferential and can be satisfied only in the most extreme cases.\\n. Admittedly, some commentators believe that the Unocal standard of review is a \\\"relaxed\\\" one that largely focuses on process rather than the \\\"substantive merits of the [board's] decision,\\\" except in circumstances where directors foresake a pure defense of the status quo and seek to impose a management alternative on the stockholders. See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L\\\" 583, 596, 588, 605-06 (1994); cf. Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 11, 22 (1993) (opining that Delaware has adopted a veiy deferential \\\"modified business judgment\\\" standard that \\\"permit[s] tender offer defenses broadly\\\" and has thereby \\\"narrowed the applicability of the duty of loyalty\\\"). If this interpretation is true, the Unocal standard has failed to live up to the hopes of other commentators who believed that it could be a potent tool to protect stockholders. See generally, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989) (hereinafter \\\"Delaware's Intermediate Standard\\\").\\n. Within which traditional duty would logically rest the subsidiary requirement to act in good, rather than bad, faith toward the company and its stockholders. E.g., Eric A. Chi-appinelli, The Life and Adventures of Unocal \\u2014 Part I: Moore The Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 86 (1998) (hereinafter \\\"Life And Adventures of Unocal\\\") (defining duty of loyalty as \\\"the duty to act in good faith and in the company's best interest\\\").\\nIndeed, the very Supreme Court opinion that refers to a board's \\\"triads [sic] of fiduciary duty [sic] - good faith, loyalty, [and] due care,\\\" Cede II, equates good faith with loyalty. Cede II, 634 A.2d at 361; see also B. Ellen Taylor, New And Unjustified Restrictions On Delaware Directors' Authority, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 837, 881 n. 234 (1996) (hereinafter \\\"New and Unjustified Restrictions\\\") (remarking on the close relationship between good faith and loyalty in Cede II). In the following sentence from Cede II, the Supreme Court quotes its earlier opinion in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., Del.Supr., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (1989), but adds bracketed text to clarify meaning. The sentence, with the bracketed text emphasized, reads as follows:\\n[A] board's actions must be evaluated in light of relevant circumstances to determine if they were undertaken with due diligence [care] and good faith [loyalty]. If no breach of duty is found, the board's actions are entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule.\\nCede II, 634 A.2d at 368 n. 36 (quoting Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286) (emphases added); see also Taylor, New and Unjustified Restrictions, at 881 n. 234). In Barkan itself, it is clear that the Supreme Court used the terms \\\"due diligence\\\" and \\\"good faith\\\" as a fresh way of referring to the \\\"fundamental duties of care and loyalty\\\" it discussed three sentences earlier in the same paragraph. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286. Moreover, Cede II contains two lengthy sections focusing on the duties of loyalty and care but has no comparable section on good faith, despite its putative equality in the triad. 634 A.2d at 361-66 (loyalty), 366-71 (due care); see also id. at 359 (breaking down key issues on appeal into questions of loyalty and due care).\\n. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension In Corporate Governance In America, 52 Bus. Law. 393, 397 (1997) (\\\"Directors are fiduciaries to the corporation and the stockholders, and owe duties of loyalty and care to both.\\\").\\n. Chiappinelli, The Life and Adventures of Unocal, at 100 (\\\"In theory, once Unocal has been satisfied it is open to the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in office or some other breach of fiduciary duty. Practically, how can a plaintiff make such a showing when the board has legitimately found a threat and taken action that , is reasonable in relation to that threat?\\\") (citations omitted).\\n. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1374 (\\\"the business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if, upon review, the court concludes the directors' decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose\\\").\\n. Id. at 1377 n. 18.\\n. But this scenario might be more rationally addressed by not applying the overall Unocal reasonableness test as a rigid, two-question examination, both parts of which must be satisfied to obtain a passing score, but instead as an examination of whether the directors' actions,' taken as a whole, were reasonable. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373, 1375-76 (noting that \\\"Unocal is not intended to lead to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exer cise\\\" but also indicating that, per Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., \\\" 'it is not until both parts of the Unocal inquiry have been satisfied that the business judgment rule attaches to defensive actions of a board of directors' \\\") (quoting Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Del. Supr ., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (1989)).\\nIn this respect, one wonders whether it might also be clearer to reformulate the Unocal test so that it incorporates the concept of due deference to board judgment articulated in Unocal and Unitrin without the confusing burden-shifting required to tie everything to the business judgment and. entire fairness standards of review. Cf. Johnson, The Modest Business ludgment Rule, manuscript at 1 (\\\"The business judgment rule . is better understood as a narrow-gauged policy of non-review than as an overarching framework for affirmatively shaping judicial review of fiduciary performance.\\\") (emphasis in original). That is, if Unocal is the standard of review in a case, perhaps it ought to be the exclusive standard of review.\\nOne tentative approach to such a formulation might be to simply place the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that the directors' defensive actions were a disproportionate and unreasonable or an improperly motivated response to the threats faced by the corporation, based on all of the circumstances (which would include the interests of and care used by the directors who made the decision). Compare AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS \\u00a7 6.02, cmt. a, at 406-08 (1994) (imposing on plaintiff the burden to prove that defensive measures were unreasonable). Such a test could incorporate the requirement that directors' actions be sustained if they are not draconian and are within the range of reasonable defensive responses. This test would give plaintiffs the opportunity to attack the board's decision directly (a chance plaintiffs do not get in the normal case) and yet preserve for boards a realm of reasonable discretion protected from judicial intrusion. A plaintiff meeting its burden under this standard could obtain appropriately tailored injunctive relief. But a plaintiff seeking to hold directors personally liable for monetary damages would have to demonstrate in addition that each of the directors from whom damages are sought breached one of her fiduciary duties and acted with the scienter necessary to sustain a monetary recovery. See id. (advocating a similar approach).\\nRight now, Delaware's doctrinal approach is premised on the assumption that the world can be viewed clearly by simultaneously wearing three pairs of eyeglasses with different prescriptions (Unocal, business judgment, and entire fairness). It is not apparent that this approach works any better in the law than it does in the field of optics.\\n. Indeed, in Moran, the Supreme Court itself collapsed its Unocal and business judgment analyses - a recognition of the substantial, if not complete, overlap between the two inquiries. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., Del. Supr., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355-57 (1985).\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375.\\n. The Gaylord board was reacting to the traditional threats posed by over-the-transom acquisition offers. In its Time and Unitrin decisions, the Supreme Court cited with approval a law review article classifying these threats into three categories: opportunity loss (i.e., the risk that stockholders might be deprived by a hostile offer of the superior benefits of management's strategy or a higher offer); structural coercion (i.e., the risk that disparate treatment of stockholders \\u2014 e.g., through a two-tiered tender offer \\u2014 might coerce stockholders into tendering for an inadequate price); and substantive coercion (i.e., the risk that stockholders might mistakenly disbelieve management's view that an offer is too low and tender at an inadequate price). Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384 (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1153 n. 17) (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard, at 267).\\n. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.\\n. Id. (\\\"pre-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment\\\"); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388 (\\\"When a corporation is not for sale, the board of directors is the defender of the metaphorical medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the corporation's shareholders. The fact that a defensive action must not be coercive or preclusive does not prevent a board from responding defensively before a bidder is at the corporate bastion's gate.'') (emphasis added).\\n. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 & 1357 n. 14; see also Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 48 & 48 n. 18 (two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offers are \\\"coercive\\\" and \\\"inherently problematic and should be expected to receive particularly careful analysis by a target board\\\").\\n. Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-53.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376 (citing Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-53). Reasonable minds can and do differ on whether it is appropriate for a board to consider an all cash, all shares ten der offer as a threat that permits any response greater than that necessary for the target board to be able to negotiate for or otherwise locate a higher bid and to provide stockholders with the opportunity to rationally consider the views of both management and the prospective acquiror before making the decision to sell their personal property. But it is settled law that a board of directors may view such an offer as requiring a far more substantial response that, depending on the particular circumstances, may pass muster under Unocal. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1152-53 (specifically distancing itself from Court of Chancery opinions such as City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., Del. Ch., 551 A.2d 787 (1988), suggesting that all cash, all shares bids posed a limited threat to stockholders and could justify only measured and time-limited uses of poison pills and other defensive options).\\n. The plaintiffs attack the Kirkland & Ellis firm, not on the basis of any errors in the memoranda or legal advice it provided to Gaylord's board, but on the grounds that Kirkland & Ellis was the long-standing outside counsel to Gaylord, had helped Pomer-antz take it public, and must therefore be deemed beholden to him. While I have no doubt that Kirkland & Ellis was appropriately loyal towards Pomerantz as a client, it is not clear why I should infer that Kirkland & Ellis would tilt its advice to help Pomerantz if that meant alienating the other ten directors. After all, once the dual class voting structure expired, Pomerantz would no longer have voting control over board elections. Most important, it would be unusual to require a board dominated by independent directors to retain special counsel simply because company counsel of long-standing had a traditional lawyer-client relationship with the company's CEO. Therefore, although it is hardly the most important factor supporting my decision, I believe that the board's reliance on a reputable law firm to advise it regarding its options supports a conclusion that the board acted on an informed basis.\\nI also reject as inadequate to generate a triable issue of fact the plaintiffs' assertion that the board needed to retain an investment bank in addition to Kirkland & Ellis. In support of this assertion, the plaintiffs twist deposition testimony in an attempt to convince me that the board thought that director Brown, a DLJ managing director, would supply an investment banker's perspective on the defensive measures. What the testimony actually indicates is that the board felt that it was adequately positioned to make a judgment about the defensive measures based on the input of Kirkland & Ellis and company management and using their own business acumen. As to the last point, it is noteworthy that the board was comprised of members with extensive managerial and board experience, as well as one member, Brown, who was an investment banker (and who testified that he discussed the measures during the two board meetings and during one or two conference calls with management), and another, Babb, who was a lawyer.\\nThe plaintiffs point to nothing particularly complex or unusual about the defensive measures that required an explanation from an investment banker. For example, the plaintiffs do not and cannot claim that the terms of the Gaylord Rights Plan (e.g., the 15% trigger) were untraditional.\\nLikewise, the plaintiffs' claim that the board did not understand the way the defensive measures operated or their possible entrenchment effects is unsupported. The Kirkland & Ellis memoranda explain the measures, which are not all that complicated. And the proxy materials in connection with the vote on the Amendments also spell out the possible entrenchment effects of the measures.\\n. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-57.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387.\\n. Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Id. at 1387-88 (quoting Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45-46).\\n. Id. at 1388 n. 38 (\\\"[d]epending upon the circumstances, the board may respond to a reasonably perceived threat by adopting individually or sometimes in combination: advance notice by-laws, supermajority voting provisions, shareholders rights plans, repurchase programs, etc.\\\"); see also Time, 571 A.2d at 1144 n. 5 (noting that Time had in place a \\\"panoply of defensive devices, including a staggered board, a 'poison pill' . triggered by an acquisition of 15% of the company, a fifty-day notice period for shareholder motions, and restrictions on shareholders' ability to call a meeting or act by consent\\\").\\nThe defendants' experts, who are researchers at the proxy solicitation firm of Georgeson & Company, Inc., reviewed the experience of 1502 companies listed in the Corporate Takeover Defenses, 1995 study produced by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (\\\"IRRC\\\"). Defs. Ex. 33 (Georgeson Report). The Georgeson researchers analyzed the defenses in place at 1,228 unregulated companies outside the utility, banking, telecommunications, and insurance industries. Id. at 4-12.\\nOf those companies, 54.4% had in place a rights plan, 42.7% an advance notice requirement for shareholder nominations, 33% a limitation on action by written consent, 31.6% a limitation on the right to call a special meeting, and 15.5% a supermajority requirement to amend the bylaws. Id. at 7. When the 706 Delaware corporations in the sample were analyzed, the percentages generally increased: pill (53.8%), advance notice (44.5%), limited action by written consent (48.4%), limited ability to call special meeting (40 .8%), and supermajority requirement for amending bylaws (18.6%). Id. Moreover, the prevalence of these defenses was even higher among companies in the sample that did not have dual class voting structures. Id. at 9. The report indicates that the sample's reliability as to supermajority provisions is somewhat suspect, however, and the researchers therefore reviewed instead the charters of a random group of 21 unregulated Delaware companies drawn from the sample that did not have dual classes of stock or pills. Eighteen had some type of supermajority provision for charter amendments and/or merger approval. Id. at 11-12.\\nBy contrast, while the plaintiffs argue that the combination of defenses selected by Gay-lord was highly unusual, they cite no evidence to this effect. Moreover, the fact that the combination might be unusual does not make the combination unreasonable.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1378; see also Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354 (\\\"When the Household board of directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer. They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors would be held to in originally approving the Rights Plan.\\\").\\n. The same analysis is true with respect to 8 Del. C. \\u00a7 203. That statute does not prevent an acquisition altogether; it simply precludes (with certain narrow exceptions) an acquiror who wants to enter into a business combination in the next three years from obtaining control of 15% or more of the company's stock.\\n. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354 \\u2014 57 (where decision to redeem pill would be reviewed under Unocal and where shareholders could engage in proxy fight to remove board, challenge to adoption of a pill failed).\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1379 (noting this development).\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1383 (quotations and citation omitted). But it bears re-emphasis that the conclusion that the adoption of this approach by a disinterested board on a clear day was proper does not necessarily validate, for example, similar action by an interested board designed to preclude a particular bidder from mounting a proxy fight or consent solicitation effort under the electoral rules that existed when the bidder made its intentions known.\\n. Put another way, the measures ensure that the stockholders are fully informed before they make a decision, thus reducing the likelihood that they might vote with the acquiror \\\"in ignorance or based upon a mistaken belief, i.e., yield to substantive coercion.\\\" Unit-rin, 651 A.2d at 1384.\\n. Even the plaintiffs' own highly qualified expert. Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk, who is quite familiar with the Unocal lexicon, is unwilling to opine that the Amendments are preclusive. He is only willing to say that they make a takeover attempt \\\"more difficult\\\" and \\\"less attractive\\\" and that the measures significantly raise Gaylord's \\\"contestability index.\\\" Pis. Ex. W (Report of Lucian A. Bebchuk), at 8-9. The last concept is a measure of the strength of takeover defenses articulated in an unpublished paper by one of Bebchuk's academic colleagues. See Pis. Ex. X (John C. Coates IV, The Contestability of Corporate Control: Theory and Evidence, Prel. Draft., Harvard Law School Seminar In Law and Economics (Oct. 13, 1998)), at 9-15.\\nThis opinion evidence does not create a triable issue of fact because Bebchuk does not explain how, as a matter of fact, the Amendments operate to unreasonably preclude a takeover. Because defenses are designed to make it \\\"more difficult\\\" to acquire a company, the operative question is whether the defenses are so formidable as to be outside the range of reasonable defensive responses.\\nIn this respect, the defendants' empirical evidence, in concert with Bebchuk's very careful affidavit in which he eschews the option of opining that the measures are preclu-sive, bolsters the conclusion that the defensive measures are within the range of reason. During the summer of 1998, the authors of the Georgeson report returned to the IRRC data and ascertained whether each of the 1502 companies listed in the Corporate Takeover Defenses, 1995 report was subsequently acquired. Defs. Ex. 33 (Georgeson Report), at 21-22. The researchers then reviewed whether the premiums paid were higher or lower where the target had in place rights plans and certain additional defensive measures. The authors also analyzed whether the companies with defensive measures were more or less likely to be acquired than companies without such defenses in place, with the percentage by which companies are acquired called the \\\"takeout rate .\\\"\\nThe results of that analysis, which the plaintiffs have not challenged as inaccurate, reveal the following. First, there was no statistically significant difference in the premiums paid for companies with poison pills (34.0%) and companies without (34.1%). Second, the takeout rate for companies with poison pills (11.3%) was not different from the takeout rate for companies without pills (14 \\u2014 15%) in a statistically significant way. Third, companies with both a pill and a classified board received higher premiums (38.8%) than companies with just a pill (23.6%). Fourth, the takeout rate for companies with a pill and a staggered board (11.0%) was only slightly lower than the takeout rate of companies with a pill and annual election of directors (11.9%). Fifth, companies with rights plans and advance notice for shareholder nominations received average premiums of 36.4% and had a takeout rate of 11.9%. Finally, combining a pill with a provision limiting the ability to call a special meeting resulted in an average premium of 36.6% (compared to 34.1% for companies without a pill) and a takeout rate of 11.3%. Id. at 21.\\nThis analysis was consistent with other large studies the authors cite in support of their bottom-line conclusion that:\\n[t]he adoption of a shareholder rights plan had a positive effect on the likelihood that a company would receive an offer, as well as a positive effect on the premiums associated with companies that did receive an offer. Moreover, we found no statistically significant data showing that the adoption of advance notice requirements, supermajority vote requirements, limitations on action by written consent, limitations on the ability to call a special meeting or any combination of the allegedly \\\"anti-takeover\\\" or \\\"defensive\\\" measures put in place at Gaylord, in addition to a shareholder rights plan, were associated with any negative effects to shareholders. The results of our research are consistent with earlier studies by Georgeson and others that show that so-called defensive measures do not negatively affect the likelihood that a takeover will occur, but appear to be associated with higher offer rates and higher premiums.\\nId. at 21-22.\\nWhile I hinge my ruling almost entirely on the board's actions and the actual way the defensive measures operate, it is important to note that the record is devoid of empirical evidence that supports the proposition that the array of defenses adopted by Gaylord has been shown, through experience in the marketplace, to present an unreasonable barrier to acquisition offers.\\n. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.\\n. A percentage that neither of the parties has specified.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1380-81.\\n. Id. at 1383.\\n. For example, the adoption of a poison pill that can only be redeemed by continuing directors or their designated successors has been found to coerce stockholders into voting for the continuing directors because otherwise the pill could not be redeemed. Carmody v. Toll Bros. Inc., Del. Ch., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (1998).\\n. Plaintiffs' expert Professor Bebchuk points out that the window of opportunity for an acquiror to replace the Gaylord board before a post-expiration vote on the Amendments could be held was quite narrow, because the pill weis a substantial deterrent. Pis. Ex. W (Report of Lucian A. Bebchuk), at 19-21. While Bebchuk ignores the possibility of removing the board by a proxy fight during that period, such a lightning-strike approach would no doubt have been difficult to pull off.\\n. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386 (holding that it was error for the Chancery Court to substitute its \\\"business judgment\\\" for that of the board by finding a defensive measure unreasonable simply because it was, in the triad court's view, \\\"unnecessary\\\"); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems Inc., Del. Ch., 728 A.2d 25, 40 (\\\"the guiding principle is reasonableness, not perfection\\\"), aff'd sub nom., Del.Supr., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (1998).\\n.Although not argued by the defendants at this stage, see note 32, supra, I note that the Supreme Court has stated that \\\"[a] Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.\\\" Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1377 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). Under the Williams approach, the Charter Amendments are not subject to heightened scrutiny because they were approved by a stockholder vote. Even though Pomerantz controlled the vote, the Charter Amendments did not implicate 8 Del. C. \\u00a7 144 and were authorized by a board dominated by disinterested, independent directors. Thus Williams also supports a grant of summary judgment to the defendants.\\n. Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., Del. Ch., 564 A.2d 651 (1988).\\n. The plaintiffs' expert, Professor Bebchuk, and the defendants' expert, Georgeson & Company, both agree that it is difficult to mobilize the electorate to vote in proxy contests over charter amendments and that a fairly large percentage of shares (anywhere from the low teens to a quarter of the shares) may well not be voted. Pis. Ex. W (Report of Lucian A. Bebchuk Aff.), at 11-12; Defs. Ex. 33 (Georgeson Report), at 23-25 (because of the larger number of Gaylord shares held in street name brokerage accounts, opinion that it would have been difficult to obtain a majority vote and that to do so would have required \\\"an extensive and expensive solicitation effort\\\").\\n. Compare Defs. Ex. 33 (Georgeson Report), at 24-25 (anticipating that stockholders would have supported the Amendments and that the real problem was simply getting enough turnout, but also indicating that only 15% of institutional investors would likely have supported the Amendments) with Pis. Ex. W (Report of Lucian A. Bebchuk), at 15-16 (indicating that a vote after the expiration might not have succeeded because shareholders hold different views on the advisability of defensive measures such as those adopted in this case but also acknowledging that \\\"[mjany companies do have shareholder-approved anti-takeover amendments\\\").\\n.Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660; see also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1376 (rejecting application of Blasius to a recapitalization that created a system of tenure voting because there was no evidence that the defendants' primary purpose for the recapitalization was to \\\"impede the . stockholders' vote\\\").\\nNor can the plaintiffs take comfort in my opinion granting class certification. In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 14616, mem. op., 747 A.2d 71, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, Strine, V.C. (Aug. 10, 1999). In that opinion, I concluded for several reasons that the non-management stockholders of Gaylord had adequately alleged individual injury (separate and apart from harm to Gaylord as an entity or the management stockholders of the company) flowing from the adoption of the defensive measures. That conclusion did not, of course, constitute a finding that any compen-sable or remediable injury in fact took place; instead, it was based solely on the facts pled in the complaint and not on the evidence developed through discovery. For example, I accepted the plaintiffs' premise that the shares held by Gaylord directors would be voted as a block, a premise that cannot be simply accepted at this stage. In re Gaylord, mem. op. at 2, 747 A.2d 71, 73, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127, at *3; Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1380-81. Moreover, I went out of my way to emphasize that my decision on class certification was not a commentary on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. In re Gaylord., mem. op. at 32, 747 A.2d 71, 82, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *41.\\n.See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 75, 91 (1992) (\\\"Almost all of the [Blasi-ws-type] decisions involved situations where boards of directors deliberately employed various legal strategies either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a shareholder vote.\\\"); Blasius, 564 A.2d 651 (board created and filled two new board seats on a seven-member board in specific response to written consent solicitation seeking to expand the board and install a new board majority and thereby absolutely precluded the election of a new majority); Aprahamian v. HBO & Company, Del. Ch., 531 A.2d 1204 (1987) (incumbent board moved annual meeting date when it learned that a dissident stockholder group appeared to have a majority of the proxies); Phillips v. Insituform of North America, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 9173, mem. op., 1987 WL 16285, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 474, Allen, C. (Aug. 27, 1987) (board issued stock to dilute the voting power of certain control shares).\\n. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., Inc., Del. Ch., 579 A.2d 1115 (1990).\\n. Id. at 1123 (Where board changed the date on which it intended, but was not legally obligated, to hold annual meeting so as to enable the board to explore alternatives to a proxy fight initiated by a large stockholder in connection with a tender offer the board considered inadequate, the court held that Blasi-us review was inappropriate. Because the board had no legal obligation to call a meeting in May and had not set a meeting date, because no proxies had been solicited, and because the board's action did not preclude stockholders from \\\"effectively exercising [their] vote[s,]\\\" the board's decision did \\\"not itself constitute an impairment of the exercise of the franchise . sparkfing] . close judicial scrutiny\\\").\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/11253089.json b/delaware/11253089.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9fb88f6a9542cf9c652486ffff3923516a9502ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11253089.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11253089\", \"name\": \"Richard M. LEACH, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the NEW CASTLE COUNTY VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leach v. Board of Education\", \"decision_date\": \"1972-07-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"582\", \"last_page\": \"585\", \"citations\": \"295 A.2d 582\", \"volume\": \"295\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:01:25.107622+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Richard M. LEACH, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the NEW CASTLE COUNTY VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Richard M. LEACH, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the NEW CASTLE COUNTY VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware, New Castle.\\nJuly 25, 1972.\\nJohn P. Sinclair, of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nSheldon N. Sandler, of Bader, Dorsey & Kreshtool, Wilmington, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1580\", \"char_count\": \"9616\", \"text\": \"STIFTEL, President Judge.\\nAppellant's teaching contract was terminated by Appellee after a hearing because of wilful and persistent insubordination and misconduct in office. He appeals to this Court.\\nWas the finding of the Board supported by substantial evidence, as required by 14 Del.C. \\u00a7 1414? If substan tial evidence exists, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Board; and, as a matter of public policy, findings of the Board of Education after a public hearing should not be set aside unless the record clearly contains no substantial evidence supporting the Board's findings. Board of Education, Laurel Special School District v. Shockley, 2 Storey 237, 155 A.2d 323, 327, 328.\\nA review of the record shows no arbitrary or capricious act of the Board. It shows substantial evidence for its action.\\nAppellant was a recalcitrant teacher. He was seldom compliant; had no respect for his immediate superiors and frequently demonstrated this. He wrote caustic and sarcastic letters to his superiors and consistently and persistently tried to embarrass them.\\nThe last incident for which he was \\\"guillotined\\\" is a typical example of his troublesome behavior.\\nOn October 6, 1971, a posted bulletin notified teachers that the place of their meeting had been changed from the cafeteria to two classrooms. Academic teachers were to meet in Room C-109 and Vocational teachers were to meet in C-102-104. Because some separate problems were to he discussed at each meeting, it was decided to hold two separate meetings rather than one. Prior to the meeting, the administrators had met for forty-five minutes to discuss the agenda and the Principal, Mr. Bronson, was to visit each meeting.\\nImmediately before- the meeting, Mr. Leach spread the word that all teachers, Vocational and Academic, were to meet together. Consequently, when Mr. Mozzani arrived for the Academic meeting, only three teachers were in the room. The rest were with Mr. Herr. Mr. Cinaglia, head of the Faculty Policy Committee, and other teachers wanted the meeting together but it was Mr. Leach who took the responsibility of informing Mr. Herr that the faculty should be together, when nobody else spoke up.\\nWhen Mr. Bronson, the Principal, appeared, he was irate and non-plussed at the combined meeting, against the administrative decision. Mr. Leach added a little fuel to the fire by saying to him: \\\"It is ridiculous for me to go down there and listen to Mr. Mozzani telling me one thing while Mr. Herr is up here telling them something else . . .\\\". Mr. Bronson responded: \\\"I will have you know you are not running this school. I am.\\\", and then left the room. Leach, instead of going to the Academic teachers' meeting, went to Bronson's office to further discuss the matter with him because Leach felt Bronson did not understand the teachers' position.\\nMr. Leach's conduct in getting all the teachers to go to one room rather than two was wilful and disruptive. It was a developed pattern of undetermining confidence in his superiors. Although other teachers may have, at times, behaved similarly, nevertheless, it was Leach's conduct that persisted and disunited.\\nA short time before the above incident, Leach took issue with a parking directive. He and Mr. Cinaglia had arrived at their respective meetings thirty-five minutes late and put identical questions to the respective Vice-Principals \\u2014 namely, whether it was a request or an order about parking in a certain area of the parking lot. Even though Mr. Herr and Mr. Mozzani used different words, they clearly meant that the teachers obey the directive in limiting their parking. Leach argued with Mr. Mozzani, his Vice-Principal, that he did not have to comply since Mr. Herr's directive was different from Mozzani's. The order pertaining to parking was changed by the administration soon thereafter, but Mr. Leach's conduct clearly evidenced wilful disrespect.\\nWhen Mr. Leach came to Delaware in 1969, he did not come highly recommended, hut he impressed the Delcastle administrators when he candidly admitted that he formerly had had problems with administrators ; and consequently, he was hired for the 1969-70 school year.\\nIn September, 1970, Principal Bronson prepared and reviewed with Mr. Leach an evaluation letter which, in pertinent part, reads:\\n\\\"Too often during the past year you made selfish decisions that showed irresponsible and unprofessional conduct in the eyes of the administration. . Despite your 'thing' about administrators there is no workable alternative for this year other than to work together harmoniously . . .\\\".\\nThere were other Leach incidents that disturbed the administration. On January 14, 1971, the day before Martin Luther King's birthday, the administration announced at a faculty meeting that January 15 would be a holiday. Previously, teachers had been instructed to come to school. Leach was opposed to the change and after the faculty meeting was adjourned by the Superintendent, Leach attempted to reconvene the meeting to discuss the matter further. Leach, himself, explained what he did as follows:\\n\\\". . . I got up and I said, 'Wait a minute. Do we want to talk about it?\\nOn the holiday, Mr. Leach and a number of other teachers went to school and refused to treat it as a holiday. This was done partly at the instigation of Mr. Leach.\\nIn September, 1971, Mr. Leach, in a supercilious vein, called the Principal to come down and unlock a door for him, saying he was following the administrative orders concerning this particular door, which was to be the door for entering and leaving the building. Actually, there was another door nearby which was open that could have been used. Also, there were custodians at hand with keys. Also, Mr. Leach called Vice Principal Mozzani in the early part of the 1971-72 school year and told him to come to Mr. Leach's classroom and straighten out the chairs, which had been turned around by the night-school class. Mr. Mozzani politely suggested that Mr. Leach contact the custodian instead.\\nThe evaluation letter of September 1, 1971, aptly describes Mr. Leach when it says, in effect, that his potential will only be realized at Delcastle \\\". . . after you have matured enough to stop rebelling for the sake of rebelling, . . .\\\".\\nThere were additional incidents of disrespect for the system. Leach ignored requests to promptly submit attendance records. He summarily dismissed a student from class with a note to the Vice-Principal that the student was never to come to his class again and that, \\\". There will be no punishment that will make me change my mind.\\\" In reality, the student did return to his class and he helped the student immeasurably, for which he was commended. But Mr. Leach continued to rebel for rebellion's sake and the record clearly demonstrates this.\\nThe Board was not limited to consideration of incidents that occurred after his rehiring contract for the 1971-72 season. It had the right to consider appellant's non-cooperation throughout the period of his school employment. Redcay v. Board of Education, 13 N.J.L. 369, 33 A.2d 120 (1943); Pearson v. Board of Education Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 12 Ill.App.2d 44, 138 N.E.2d 326, 331 (1956). His history is one of wilful and persistent insubordination. The Board had a right to do what it did on the evidence before it. It was substantial.\\nDefendant also argues that the Board's findings and conclusions should be reversed because of denial of due process. He claims that no fair hearing could be held when the Board is the judge, jury and prosecutor. In Board of Education, Laurel Special School District v. Shockley, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the same contention by implication. The denial of due process in such situations has been generally rejected. See 2 Davis, On Administrative Law, p. 175; 1 Am.Jur.2d 873, \\u00a7 78. Due process requires a fair hearing. This record shows there was one.\\nThe dismissal is affirmed.\\nIt is so ordered.\\n14 Del.C. \\u00a7 1414 reads as follows :\\n\\\"Judicial Review\\n\\\"A decision of the board shall be final and conclusive unless, within ten days after a copy thereof has been received by the teacher, the teacher appeals to the Superior Court for the county in which the teacher was employed. In case of every such appeal, the cause shall be determined by the Court from the record which shall include a certified copy of the evidence, findings and the decision of the board, without the aid of a jury. The notice of appeal and all other matters regulating the appeal shall be in the form and according to the procedure as shall be provided by the Rules of the Superior Court. The Court shall decide all relevant questions of law and all other matters involved, and shall sustain any board action, findings and conclusions supported by substantial evidence. The Court may reverse, affirm or modify the decision of the board or remand the cause to the board for a rehearing. In case any cause shall be remanded to the board for a rehearing, the procedure and the rights of all parties to such cause shall be the same as in the case of the original hearing before the board. If the decision is in favor of the teacher, he shall be reinstated and shall receive all salary lost as a result of his temporary dismissal or suspension.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/11316179.json b/delaware/11316179.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..15303442161942abe7a14cf5b56ab213703cc469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11316179.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11316179\", \"name\": \"Raymond S. PUSEY, Bertha P. Pusey, Sotiria Pappas, Donald Derrickson, Doris Downs, Margaret Downs, Jeanne A. Booth, C.E. Toppin, Richard Derrickson, Norma Lee Derrickson, Evelyn Thoroughgood, John Salin, Frances Salin, Charles E. Schwartz, Prissilla Smith and Patrick Loughran, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. DELAWARE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL COMMISSION and John J. Corrigan, Watson K. Ayers, George Coyle, Robert Medd and William B. Mitten, in their capacity as Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, and Route 13, Inc., Appellees Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pusey v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-08-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1367\", \"last_page\": \"1372\", \"citations\": \"596 A.2d 1367\", \"volume\": \"596\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:00:10.723062+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CHRISTIE, C.J., MOORE and WALSH, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Raymond S. PUSEY, Bertha P. Pusey, Sotiria Pappas, Donald Derrickson, Doris Downs, Margaret Downs, Jeanne A. Booth, C.E. Toppin, Richard Derrickson, Norma Lee Derrickson, Evelyn Thoroughgood, John Salin, Frances Salin, Charles E. Schwartz, Prissilla Smith and Patrick Loughran, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. DELAWARE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL COMMISSION and John J. Corrigan, Watson K. Ayers, George Coyle, Robert Medd and William B. Mitten, in their capacity as Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, and Route 13, Inc., Appellees Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Raymond S. PUSEY, Bertha P. Pusey, Sotiria Pappas, Donald Derrickson, Doris Downs, Margaret Downs, Jeanne A. Booth, C.E. Toppin, Richard Derrickson, Norma Lee Derrickson, Evelyn Thoroughgood, John Salin, Frances Salin, Charles E. Schwartz, Prissilla Smith and Patrick Loughran, Appellants Below, Appellants, v. DELAWARE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL COMMISSION and John J. Corrigan, Watson K. Ayers, George Coyle, Robert Medd and William B. Mitten, in their capacity as Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, and Route 13, Inc., Appellees Below, Appellees.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: May 14, 1991.\\nDecided: Aug. 5, 1991.\\nJames A. Fuqua, Jr. (argued), Fuqua, Yori & Rogers, Georgetown, for appellants.\\nHenry A. Heiman (argued), and Darrell J. Baker, Heiman, Aber & Goldlust, Wilmington, for appellee Route 13, Inc.\\nBefore CHRISTIE, C.J., MOORE and WALSH, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2904\", \"char_count\": \"18516\", \"text\": \"WALSH, Justice:\\nThis is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court which affirmed the granting of a liquor license by the Delaware Alcohol Beverage Control Commission (the \\\"Commission\\\"). The appellants-protestants contend that it was an abuse of discretion for the Commission to deny them access to certain confidential financial information filed by the applicant and relied upon by the Commission in granting the license. The Superior Court, in affirming the Commission, ruled that the applicant's confidentiality interest outweighed the protestants' entitlement to view the evidence.\\nWe conclude the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in upholding the Commission's order of confidentiality with respect to evidence upon which the Commission relies in a protested application. Accordingly, we reverse.\\nI\\nOn January 13, 1989, Route 13, Inc. t/a The Surfside Restaurant filed an application for a restaurant liquor license for an establishment located in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. Raymond and Bertha Pusey, along with several of their neighbors, filed a written protest with the Commission, and a public hearing was scheduled for March 23, 1989.\\nPrior to the hearing, the protestants, through counsel, sought permission from the Commission to review certain personal financial information submitted by the principals of Route 13, Inc. as part of their application for a liquor license. This information, submitted on forms prescribed by the Commission, is required of every applicant for a liquor license. The Commission informed the protestants that although they could examine the file, the personal financial information of the applicant was confidential. The protestants then requested that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to Route 13, Inc. for production of financial statements. After the subpoena was issued, Route 13, Inc. filed a timely motion to quash the subpoena.\\nBy the date of the hearing on the application, the Commission had not acted on the subpoena and the protestants' attorney requested that the hearing be postponed until he had the opportunity to review the requested financial information. The Commission decided to continue with the hearing and requested that the parties submit memoranda on the disclosure issue. The protestants were thus denied the opportunity to question the applicants on the content of the financial statements submitted to the Commission.\\nThe Commission approved the issuance of a liquor license to Route 13, Inc. by written decision on September 12,1989. In its decision, the Commission noted that it had reviewed the applicant's financial records \\\"and there was no indication of financial irresponsibility.\\\" In rejecting the protestants' request for access to that data, however, the Commission ruled that the protestants \\\"have simply not offered any significant public interest justification to counter-balance the invasion of personal privacy on behalf of the applicants.\\\" In its ruling, the Commission relied upon an opin ion of the Attorney General that an applicant's financial statements may not be disclosed to the general public under the Delaware Freedom of Information Act. 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10001-10005.\\nOn appeal, the Superior Court endorsed the Commission's denial of access to the financial reports. The Superior Court held that disclosure would impair the ability of the Commission to obtain such information in the future and that the Commission has the authority to determine the financial responsibility of applicants without sharing relevant information with those opposing the application. This appeal followed.\\nII\\nThe Delaware Liquor Control Act provides that an individual seeking to sell alcohol to the public must file an application for a license with the Commission. 4 Del. C. \\u00a7 522. If the Commission is inclined to grant the application and at least ten people from the neighborhood where the applicant seeks to sell alcohol file a protest to the issuance of the license within ten days of the filing of the application, then a hearing must be held to consider the application. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 541(b). Thus, \\\"only when the Commission has determined, except for the filing of a protest, to grant an application, is it provided that the Commission must give the persons making the protest an opportunity to present their objections.\\\" Demarie v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, Del.Supr., 143 A.2d 119, 121 (1958).\\nThe Commission must conduct a hearing and keep a record of the proceedings. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 541(b). The record must include the evidence presented, the Commission's findings of fact, and the Commission's decision. Id. Following the hearing, the Commission must issue a written decision which states how it \\\"construed the law and applied it to the facts.\\\" Id.\\nHearings before an administrative agency in Delaware, including the Commission, are governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (the \\\"Act\\\"). 29 Del.C. \\u00a7 10161(1). When the issuance of a license is contested, the Act requires the administrative body to hold a formal evidentiary hearing. 29 Del.C. \\u00a7 10124. The Act affords an array of powers to insure that the evidentiary hearing is conducted fairly and efficiently. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware v. Elliott, Del.Super., 479 A.2d 843, 851 (1984). These include the power to issue subpoenas, administer oaths to witnesses, exclude irrelevant information, limit unduly repetitive proof, cause interrogatories to issue and depositions to be taken or hold prehearing conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues. 29 Del.C. \\u00a7 10125. While the Commission is not required to use these powers in any proceeding, they are designed and available to ensure that each party has a full and fair opportunity to present evidence to the Commission. See Blue Cross, 479 A.2d at 851.\\nAn applicant for a liquor license must submit an assortment of information to the Commission in support of its application. These include general information such as the location of the establishment, nature of the establishment and the applicability of local zoning ordinances. Applicants are also required to submit information relating to the ownership of the establishment and personal data concerning criminal convictions as well as financial background. Although the general information filed by the applicant is deemed public, the Commission has determined that information about an applicant's criminal record or financial background is confidential.\\nThe Commission is authorized by statute to refuse the issuance of a license on various grounds including that \\\"[t]he applicant appears to be financially irresponsible.\\\" 4 Del. C. \\u00a7 543(b)(3). Thus, to grant a liquor license, the Commission must be convinced that the applicant is financially responsible. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers v. Ayers, Del. Supr., 504 A.2d 1077, 1081 (1986). Since the required financial filings by the applicant are directed to this requirement, the Commission is necessarily obligated to examine this data incident to its granting or denial of a license. \\\"The Commission must have a reasonable basis for believing that a statutory ground for refusal exists in order to reject an application on that ground, and such reasonable basis must appear in the record if the rejection is to be sustained on appeal.\\\" Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Contm'n, Del.Super., 58 A.2d 889, 892 (1948). Similarly, where the granting of a license implies the satisfaction of statutory grounds, the record must also reflect consideration of all elements supporting the issuance of a license.\\nHere, the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Commission denying access because the financial information sought by the protestants was confidential and disclosure of the information might impair the Commission's ability to obtain such information in the future. Whatever may have been the level of confidentiality at the time of the filing of the financial data once the matter became a protested application, the Commission's policy goals were required to yield to the due process rights of the parties. As a party, the protestants were entitled to a full and fair hearing on the Commission's decision to grant the applicant a liquor license. See Mitchell v. DABCC, Del.Super., 193 A.2d 294, rev'd on other grounds, Del.Supr., 196 A.2d 410 (1960). An administrative hearing is a quasi-judicial proceeding, in which the parties are entitled to due process. This entitlement includes the right to cross-examine a party on any information which may be considered by the tribunal in reaching an administrative decision. See Blue Cross, 479 A.2d at 843.\\nAn administrative agency may not conduct a hearing in which it withholds information from the parties involved in that hearing on the ground that it is confidential and simultaneously use that information as a basis for its decision. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law \\u00a7 390, at 196 (1962). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of party access to evidence:\\nCertain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show it is untrue.... We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right \\\"to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\\\" This Court has been zealous to protect this right from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny.\\nGreene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413-14, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959) (emphasis added).\\nIn Greene, the Secretary of Defense revoked the security clearance of an employee of a government contractor. At a hearing before the Industrial Employment Review Board, the employee was questioned about his association with several known communists. The government presented no witnesses, but the questions posed during the hearing indicated the Board's reliance on confidential reports which were not made available to the employee. The Supreme Court determined that because the employee had not had the opportunity to review these reports the administrative procedure in this case \\\"failed to comport with . traditional ideas of fair procedure.\\\" Id. at 508, 79 S.Ct. at 1419. Accordingly, it reversed the revocation of the employee's security clearance.\\nA similar issue was addressed in Bonanza Trucking Corp. v. U.S., CIT, 642 F.Supp. 1170 (1986). In Bonanza, the Commissioner of Customs revoked the license of a company authorized to operate a container station after the president was convicted of several felonies. Even though the president resigned following his conviction, the District Director of Customs determined that he had continued to function \\\"as a de facto officer of Bonanza Trucking Corp. after his resignation.\\\" Id. at 1171. Bonanza requested a hearing on the revocation of its license and also asked the District Director to produce any documents supporting its allegations. Bonanza's request for a hearing was granted, but the District Director refused to produce any documentation. At the hearing, Bonanza's counsel discovered that the custom's official who issued the revocation had relied in part upon an internal investigative report. Bonanza's counsel's request to review this report was denied. Following the hearing, the Commissioner of Customs, based on the recommendation of the hearing officer, affirmed the revocation.\\nBonanza appealed to the Court of International Trade which ruled that it was prejudicial for the hearing officer to withhold information upon which it clearly relied upon in affirming the revocation. Bonanza, 642 F.Supp. at 1174-75. The court ruled that the law requires \\\"meaningful cross-examination\\\" in administrative procedures of this nature and that denying Bonanza's counsel access to the internal reports served to deny Bonanza the right to meaningful cross-examination. Id. at 1176.\\nIn the present case, the protestants were denied access to the confidential financial information filed by the applicants. This denial clearly prevented the protestants from engaging in meaningful cross-examination. Since the Commission is required to find as an element of the granting of the license that the applicant is financially responsible (and it did so in this case), it cannot foreclose the examination of the very evidence the Commission considered in reaching that conclusion. The Commission abused its discretion in denying access in this case.\\nFurthermore, we find unpersuasive the argument which suggests that disclosure of confidential financial information might somehow impair the Commission's ability to obtain such information in the future. It is assumed that individuals who submit applications for liquor licenses respond truthfully to all questions. If, however, they do not, the statute provides that the Commission may refuse to grant a license if an applicant makes false statements to the Commission. This is sanction enough and our decision today should in no way impair the Commission's ability to obtain information. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 543(b)(5).\\nThus, we find that while the financial information submitted to the Commission by the applicant is confidential for administrative purposes, that confidentiality must yield to the right of a party in a contested hearing to examine all the evidence upon which the Commission bases its decision.\\nIll\\nAlthough we reverse the Superior Court's ruling, we note that the disputed financial data became available upon the filing of the administrative record in the Superior Court and counsel for the protestants has seen it. Under 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 541(c), the Superior Court has the option of receiving additional evidence to supplement the record, as an alternative to remanding the matter to the Commission for further action. See Caras v. Delaware Liquor Comm'n, Del.Super., 90 A.2d 492, 494 (1952). We leave to the Superior Court the selection of which remedy should be pursued to afford relief to the appellants by reason of the denial of access to the financial information.\\nREVERSED and REMANDED.\\n. 4 DelC. \\u00a7 541(b) provides:\\nIf the Commission has determined to grant an application, but before the issuance of the license applied for and within 10 days of the filing of the application, a protest against the issuance of the license, signed by at least 10 residents of the neighborhood where the license is to operate, has been filed with the Commission, then a hearing shall be held to consider the application and protest. Ten days' notice of the hearing, together with a recital of the protest, shall be sent by registered mail to the address of the applicant, and a notice of the time of the hearing shall be sent to each of the persons who signed the protest; provided, however, that it shall be sufficient to send notice to the attorneys of those who are represented by legal counsel. The hearing shall be conducted by the Commission and a record of the hearing shall be made and kept by the Commission. The record shall include the evidence, the Commission's findings of fact, the Commission's decision, and a brief statement of the reasons therefor. The Commission's decision shall show the manner in which the Commission construed the law and applied it to the facts.\\n. The appellees, as did the Commission, place reliance upon an advisory opinion issued by the Attorney General. See \\\"Public Access to Files of Alcohol Beverage Control Commission,\\\" opinion # 87-1031, November 4, 1987. In this advisory opinion, the Attorney General was asked to determine the extent to which the public is permitted access to files of the Commission. The Attorney General concluded that while the Delaware Freedom of Information Act, 29 DeLC. \\u00a7 10001-10005, provides the public access to the records of State agencies, \\\"financial data has traditionally been considered private and intimate and so this common meaning leads us to conclude that the financial statements required to be submitted are confidential and exempted from public inspection.\\\"\\nThe applicability of this ruling is limited. The Attorney General's opinion governs the access to confidential files by the public at-large, not by parties to a contested proceeding seeking information which the Commission is statutorily required to rely upon in deciding whether to grant or deny a license.\\n. 4 DeLC. \\u00a7 541(c) provides:\\nThe Commission's decision shall be final and conclusive unless within 10 days after notice thereof a party to such hearing shall appeal to the Superior Court of the county in which the license would operate. In every appeal the cause shall be decided by the Court from the record, without the aid of a jury; and the Court may affirm, reverse or modify the Commission's decision. The Commission's findings of fact shall not be set aside unless the Court determines that the record contains no substantial evidence that would reasonably support the findings. If the Court finds that additional evidence should be taken, the Court may take the additional evidence or remand the cause to the Commission for completion of the record. If the Court finds that the Commission has made an error of law, the Court shall reverse or modify the Commission's decision and render an appropriate judgment.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/11350483.json b/delaware/11350483.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..386fbebaedd7768cabf8fdc5e68c88284637bae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11350483.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11350483\", \"name\": \"Anthony ZUPPO, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Zuppo v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-10-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 208,2002\", \"first_page\": \"545\", \"last_page\": \"549\", \"citations\": \"807 A.2d 545\", \"volume\": \"807\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:42:06.655271+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE.\", \"parties\": \"Anthony ZUPPO, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Anthony ZUPPO, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 208,2002.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Sept. 10, 2002.\\nDecided: Oct. 4, 2002.\\nJames A. Bayard, Jr., Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.\\nWilliam M. Kelleher, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appel-lee.\\nBefore VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE.\", \"word_count\": \"1754\", \"char_count\": \"10699\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM.\\nIn February 2002, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant Anthony Zuppo of Second Degree Assault, Offensive Touching, Second Degree Rape, Third Degree Assault, Harassment, five counts of NonCompliance with Bond Conditions, and three counts of Aggravated Act of Intimidation. At trial, Zuppo requested to proceed pro se. Because Zuppo's request came during trial, the judge denied it on the basis that to do so would disrupt the proceedings. Zuppo appeals from that decision.\\nWe conclude that based upon the series of events leading up to Zuppo's request, Zuppo's interest failed to outweigh- the State's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial. Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court.\\nI\\nIn September 2000, Wendy Reynolds and Anthony Zuppo began dating and they moved in together quickly thereafter. According to Reynolds' testimony at trial, Zuppo became violent and controlling. Zuppo would not allow her to leave the house without him, and he often referred to her derogatorily. On one particular occasion, Zuppo pinned her to the couch and beat her. Reynolds considered leaving after the beating but, instead, forgave Zuppo. Shortly thereafter, according to Reynolds, Zuppo raped her. Zuppo maintains that she consented.\\nReynolds attempted to move out the evening following the alleged rape but claimed Zuppo choked her and threatened to shoot her. Reynolds reported these incidents to the police. The police arrested Zuppo for Terroristic Threatening and Offensive Touching. As a condition of Zuppo's release on bond, a Justice of the Peace Court ordered Zuppo to have no contact with Reynolds.\\nDespite the no contact stipulation, Reynolds testified at trial that Zuppo tried contacting her at work a matter of days after his release. Reynolds also testified that Zuppo made a harassing phone call to her place of residence. Zuppo denied making the harassing phone call. A Wilmington Police Officer testified that he traced the call from Reynolds' residence to a gas station near Zuppo's residence.\\nThe day after the phone call to Reynolds' residence, Reynolds and Zuppo aU tempted reconciliation. Reynolds again moved in with Zuppo. The police, however, then arrested Zuppo for violation of bail conditions. For reasons known only to her, Reynolds posted Zuppo's bail and accompanied him to Pennsylvania for one week. In Reynolds' own words, however, \\\"the abuse started right away.\\\" Inexplicably, Reynolds, sporting a clearly visible black eye, married Zuppo while in Pennsylvania.\\nThe marriage failed to resurrect the relationship. One evening, shortly after arriving back in Delaware, Zuppo and Reynolds engaged in an argument that culminated in Zuppo attacking Reynolds. Reynolds claimed she picked up a kitchen knife in self-defense. Zuppo remained undeterred. He pressed on, knocked her backwards and grabbed her wrist. Zuppo then tried to rip the knife from Reynolds and in the process he cut her hand to the bone. Finally, Reynolds called the police and told them about everything Zuppo had done to her. She did so \\\"[b]eeause [she] thought if [she] stayed much longer that he really would k\\u00f1l me.\\\" At the time of trial, Reynolds' hand had been operated on twice, and she appeared to face a serious, long-term disability.\\nOn the second day of trial, Zuppo asked the court to \\\"reassign counsel.\\\" The court denied the request. Zuppo then asked to proceed pro se. The State requested that the trial judge make the proper inquiry before Zuppo would be permitted to proceed pro se. The trial judge informed Zuppo of the risks of proceeding pro se. The State then asked the trial judge to deny the request on the basis that it was untimely \\u2014 coming after one witness already testified and a second was near the end of cross-examination \\u2014 and because the granting of the request would prejudice the State. The trial judge denied Zuppo's request to proceed pro se explaining that because the matter arose mid-trial, the trial judge had greater discretion in making a ruling. Further, the trial judge noted that due to its mid-trial timing, such a request, if granted \\\"does have a tendency to disrupt the proceedings.\\\"\\nII\\nThe right to represent oneself in a criminal proceeding is fundamental. It is protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, \\u00a7 7 of the Delaware Constitution. As an issue of constitutional dimension, we review de novo the trial judge's denial of Zuppo's request to proceed pro se.\\nThe role of the trial judge when entertaining a motion to proceed pro se is to (a) determine if the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and (b) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in going forward without the assistance of legal counsel. Even if the above two steps are taken, however, the right to represent one's self is not absolute. For instance, the right to self-representation is not a license to disrupt the criminal calendar, or a trial in progress. After a trial has begun, the right of self-representation may be curtailed, and the trial judge considering the motion must weigh the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress. The United States Supreme Court has noted that even at the trial level, the government's interest in ensuring integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.\\nIn this case, Zuppo, citing Pitts v. Redman, a case never addressed and applied by this Court but arguably persuasive nonetheless, suggests that the trial judge erred because \\\"[t]he record does not reflect a clear balance by the trial court of the prejudice to the defendant versus the potential disruption of the trial.\\\" In Pitts, a state prisoner sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court of Delaware. The presiding judge held that denying a defendant's request to proceed pro se would not violate his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when the defendant made the request on the third day of trial. The presiding judge also stated that the state court trial judge's failure to mention expressly the timeliness of the request as a reason for denying it did not constitute error because the record adequately revealed the state trial judge's concerns. \\\"Though his reasons were only partially articulated on the record, the basis for the judge's decision was apparent and the denial of Pitts' pro se request was entirely justified.\\\" Thus, assuming that Zuppo contends that the trial judge must detail and reconcile the two competing interests of the defendant and the State, Pitts does not require that kind of detail to demonstrate a \\\"clear balance by the trial court of prejudice to the defendant versus the potential disruption of the trial.\\\" It is sufficient that the record reflect clear findings and logical reasoning underlying the ruling denying the request.\\nThe trial judge here discussed on the record the relevant balancing of the competing interests inherent in Zuppo's mid-trial request to proceed pro se. Specifically, the judge noted that disruption would likely result if he granted the motion. Further, the record suggests that the trial judge implicitly weighed the competing interests with care:\\nTHE PROSECUTOR: I guess I would only ask the Court to address what Judge Roth set out, that it is a discretionary decision at this point, and that not only would he get less-effective representation, which is something the Court should consider, but it would have detrimental impact on the proceedings at this time because it is an untimely request.\\nTHE COURT: I think the Court does have greater discretion . to deny a request when it does come up during a trial, because it does have a tendency to disrupt the proceedings. I think in this case, I don't think you're prepared to examine witnesses, and I'm not inclined, under these circumstances on the second day of trial, measured from when the evidence was introduced, I'm not inclined to grant your request.\\nIn addition, the trial judge also specifically addressed Zuppo's interests in wishing to proceed pro se:\\nTHE DEFENDANT: What is hurting, me, I've got notes with respect to Mr. Bayard, because he's a public defender, but I have, you know, a private attorney that has his own firm that is telling me things that should be brought up to light to help me, and then I have Mr. Bayard saying that's not going to help...\\nTHE COURT: I think you're upset. I think this decision on your part has been one that was only made this morning, or you may have been thinking about after yesterday. You know, you've heard the evidence that's, you know, been coming in from [] witnesses. I think it upset you.\\nBased on a record that we deem to reflect adequately a clear and logical basis for the trial judge's reasoning, we conclude that the trial judge properly determined that Zuppo's interest in proceeding pro se failed to outweigh the State's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial.\\nThe trial judge properly denied Zuppo's motion to proceed pro se and the judgments of conviction in the Superior Court are AFFIRMED.\\n. Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief at 45.\\n. Id. at 52.\\n. Id. at 60.\\n. Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief at 65a-66.\\n. Stigars v. State, Del.Supr., 674 A.2d 477, 479 (1996); Hooks v. State, Del.Supr., 416 A.2d 189, 197 (1980) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975)); Snowden v. State, Del.Supr., 672 A.2d 1017, 1020 (1996).\\n. Stigars, 674 A.2d at 479.\\n. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-582; Briscoe v. State, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 103, 107-108 (1992).\\n. Payne v. State, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 1010, 1015-1017 (1976).\\n. See Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir.2000).\\n. United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir.N.Y.1996).\\n. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 162, 120 S.Ct. 684, 691, 145 L.Ed.2d 597, 607 (2000).\\n. 776 F.Supp. 907, 916 (D.Del.1991).\\n. Appellant's Op. Br. at 11, Zuppo v. State (No. 208,2002).\\n. Pitts, 776 F.Supp. at 916.\\n. Id. at 919.\\n. Id.\\n. Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief at 66.\\n. Id. at 65a-66.\\n. Id. at 65-66.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/11638112.json b/delaware/11638112.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d67323dc0af4a1e20ee048ad3e5508597ca54ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11638112.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11638112\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of a Member of The Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware: Michael P. MAGUIRE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State: Maguire\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 506, 1998\", \"first_page\": \"417\", \"last_page\": \"424\", \"citations\": \"725 A.2d 417\", \"volume\": \"725\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:03:36.848757+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WALSH, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of a Member of The Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware: Michael P. MAGUIRE.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of a Member of The Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware: Michael P. MAGUIRE.\\nNo. 506, 1998.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Feb. 9, 1999.\\nDecided: March 2, 1999.\\nJeffrey M. Weiner, (argued), Wilmington, Delaware, and Michael P. Maguire (allocution), for Michael Maguire, Respondent.\\nMichael McGinniss, (argued) and Mary M. Johnston, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware.\\nBefore WALSH, HOLLAND and HARTNETT, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"4641\", \"char_count\": \"28843\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM:\\nThis Court has before it a report from the Board on Professional Responsibility (\\\"Board\\\") concerning a petition for discipline filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (\\\"ODC\\\") against the Respondent, Michael P. Maguire (\\\"Maguire\\\"). Maguire has been a member of the Delaware Bar since 1968. Most recently, he operated as a solo practitioner. On May 19, 1997, this Court placed Maguire on interim suspension. In re Maguire, Del.Supr., No. 204, 1997, 1997 WL 328588 (May 19, 1997) (ORDER).\\nREPORT OF THE BOARD\\nThe Board held a hearing on August 27, 1998, at which the ODC and counsel for Maguire presented arguments. Maguire ap peared and made a statement on his own behalf. The Board also received supplemental submissions from the parties dated October 13, 1998. After considering the evidence presented, the Board concluded that Maguire had committed various violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the misappropriation of clients' funds.\\nBoard Case No. 8, 1996\\nIn April of 1994, Christopher M. Slaughter retained Maguire to represent him in a personal injury case. Although Maguire and Mr. Slaughter orally agreed to a one-third contingency fee arrangement, Maguire failed to put the agreement into writing. After determining that the driver responsible for the accident was uninsured, Maguire sought a recovery from Mr. Slaughter's insurance company. The insurance company sent Ma-guire a $9,000 settlement check made payable to both Maguire and Mr. Slaughter. On August 30,1995, without obtaining authorization from Mr. Slaughter, Maguire signed Mr. Slaughter's name on the back of the check. Maguire then deposited the full amount of the settlement into his personal checking account. During the next several weeks, Ma-guire spent nearly the entire $6,000 that constituted Mr. Slaughter's portion of the settlement.\\nMr. Slaughter subsequently asked Ma-guire about the status of the settlement. On November 17, 1995, Maguire issued a check to Mr. Slaughter in the amount of $500 with the notation \\\"advance\\\" without disclosing to Mr. Slaughter that he had already received the full settlement amount and deposited it into his own account. In January 1996, Mr. Slaughter filed a complaint with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Maguire distributed the remaining $5,500 in settlement funds to Mr. Slaughter in February 1996. In responding to Mr. Slaughter's disciplinary complaint, Maguire falsely stated that the matter had been resolved when the check from the insurance company arrived and \\\"the funds were distributed the next day.\\\" Maguire subsequently lost Mr. Slaughter's file.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 8.4(e) by \\\"engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation\\\" through his misappropriation of approximately $6,000 of Mr. Slaughter's funds from August 1995 until February 1996. By means of explanation rather than excuse, Maguire also asserts that he was expecting a settlement check in another matter to arrive immediately after the check from Mr. Slaughter's insurance company, so that his use of Mr. Slaughter's funds would have been limited to a short period of time. Maguire also admits that he violated Rule 8.4(e) by misrepresenting to Mr. Slaughter that the $500 check sent to him in November 1995 was an \\\"advance.\\\"\\nMaguire also admits that he violated Rule 8.1(a) by \\\"knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of material fact\\\" by falsely stating to the ODC that he had distributed settlement funds to Mr. Slaughter the day after the check from the insurance company arrived. In addition, Maguire admits that he violated Rule 1.5(c) by failing to put the contingency fee arrangement with Mr. Slaughter in writing. Finally, Maguire admits that he violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to safeguard client property in that he failed to preserve Mr. Slaughter's funds and lost Mr. Slaughter's file.\\nBoard Case No. 11, 1998\\nIn 1995, Antoinette Reason was involved in a car accident in which she ran a red light and hit a vehicle owned by Delmarva Power & Light Company. She was fined for driving without insurance. In addition, Delmarva brought an action against her in Justice of the Peace Court. Ms. Reason retained Ma-guire to represent her in connection with that action. On her behalf, Maguire filed a third-party complaint against Crown Auto Outlet, Inc. alleging that Crown Auto, which had sold Ms. Reason her vehicle, had misled her by persuading her to obtain insurance from someone who issued her a false insurance card. Subsequently, Delmarva and Ms. Reason entered into a settlement pursuant to which Ms. Reason agreed to pay $5,780.84 plus court costs and interest to Delmarva.\\nAfter the trial of Ms. Reason's claims against Crown Auto, the Justice of the Peace Court entered a $9,405.84 judgment in favor of Ms. Reason and against Crown Auto. Crown Auto filed an appeal de novo in the Court 'of Common Pleas and soon thereafter, counsel for Crown Auto called Maguire and offered to settle the case. Maguire alleges that he spoke to a representative of Delmarva and obtained an indication that Delmarva might accept half of the amount due from Ms. Reason in satisfaction of the outstanding debt. Maguire claims that he assured Ms. Reason that he would pay off the Delmarva judgment against her if she accepted Crown Auto's settlement offer and that she agreed to that proposal. Subsequently, counsel for Crown Auto sent a $4,702.92 settlement check to Maguire in satisfaction of the settlement with Ms. Reason. Maguire deposited the settlement check into his attorney's account. During the next few weeks, Maguire depleted the account that held the Reason settlement funds. As of May 16, 1997, the attorney's account held a balance of only $50.80. As discussed above, the Delaware Supreme Court suspended Maguire from the practice of law on May 19,1997.\\nOn May 21, 1997, Maguire called a Delmarva employee to see if Delmarva would accept half of the debt in settlement. In response, the Delmarva employee demanded $4,700 and Maguire accepted this demand. On that same day, Maguire sent a fax to Delmarva memorializing the agreement that the claim would be settled on the terms discussed that day.\\nMaguire failed to pay Delmarva the funds that he had agreed to pay, nor did he deliver such funds to Ms. Reason. Ms. Reason remains liable to Delmarva for the outstanding debt. Maguire asserts in mitigation that Ms. Reason owed him more than $5,000 in unpaid fees and disbursements, and that she had agreed that he could apply the settlement amount to those statements, provided that he also paid off her Delmarva debt.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in \\\"conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation\\\" by failing to pay off the Delmarva judgment, as he asserts he had represented to Ms. Reason that he would.\\nMaguire has also presented to the panel two promissory notes. Pursuant to the first note, Maguire has agreed to make payments totaling $4,700 either directly to Conectiv (Delmarva's successor) or to the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection in the event that the fund pays the claim, which is now under consideration. The second note relates to the fine assessed against Ms. Reason. There is some evidence that the fine is not enforceable due to the state's failure to pursue the matter. In any event, if Ms. Reason is found to have an obligation to pay the fine and the Fund disburses funds to satisfy the fine, Maguire has promised in the second note to reimburse the Fund for the fine. Similarly, if Ms. Reason pays the fine herself, he has agreed to reimburse her directly.\\nBoard Case No. 102, 1997\\nIn 1993, Josephine Lunness filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\\\"EEOC\\\") against her employer. In September 1995, a Pennsylvania attorney referred Ms. Lunness to Maguire to have him handle the EEOC claim. Although the written referral agreement sent by Ma-guire to the Pennsylvania lawyer provided for a consulting fee to be paid to the Pennsylvania lawyer, the agreement did not contemplate that the lawyers would each be compensated in proportion to the respective services performed, nor did Maguire provide Ms. Lunness with a written agreement pursuant to which the two lawyers assumed joint responsibility for the representation. Subsequently, Ms. Lunness was injured in an automobile accident and retained Maguire to represent her in that matter as well.\\nOn July 12, 1996, Ms. Lunness' insurance company sent a check to Maguire which was payable to both Ms. Lunness and Maguire. Maguire endorsed the check with Ms. Lunness' name without indicating in any way that he was signing with her authorization. Maguire asserts that he had authorization to sign Ms. Lunness' name to the check. In addition, he asserts that the funds received were used pay costs associated with a brief filed on Ms. Lunness' behalf and the cost of storing her damaged vehicle at a service station.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in \\\"conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation\\\" by signing Ms. Lunness' name to the check without indicating that he was signing her name for her. He also admits that he violated Rule 1.5(e) in that the division of fees with respect to the referred matter was not going to be made in proportion to the respective services performed by the two lawyers, but he failed to obtain a written agreement with the client to the effect that the two lawyers would be jointly responsible for the representation. Finally, Maguire admits that he violated Rule 8.4(a) by attempting to divide a prospective fee in violation of Rule 1.5(e).\\nBoard Case No. 98, 1997\\nRoland S. Rollins retained Maguire to represent him in connection with claims against his employer. Mr. Rollins filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC on January 27,1995. On the complaint form, Mr. Rollins designated Maguire as his attorney. According to Maguire, although he had represented Mr. Rollins in a previous similar discrimination case, he was not aware that Mr. Rollins had designated him as his attorney in the 1995 complaint. Subsequently, Maguire was contacted and asked about Mr. Rollins' position on the complaint. Without consulting Mr. Rollins, Maguire filed a document withdrawing the complaint and signed the doeument as \\\"attorney for complainant.\\\" Ma-guire subsequently failed to discuss with Mr. Rollins notices he received concerning Mr. Rollins' appeal rights. When Mr. Rollins inquired in February 1997 about the status of his discrimination case, he learned that the complaint had been withdrawn. On March 4, 1997, Maguire filed an appeal seeking to reinstate the complaint stating that he did not have authority to withdraw the complaint on Mr. Rollins' behalf because he did not represent him in the discrimination complaint. Nevertheless, the appeal was dismissed.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to consult with Mr. Rollins prior to agreeing to dismiss the discrimination complaint.\\nBoard Case No. 123, 1997\\nIn 1995, Marie Potts retained Maguire to represent her in a federal employment action against her former employer. On October 28, 1995, Maguire filed a discrimination case on Ms. Potts' behalf. At her deposition in June 1996, Ms. Potts was questioned about documents filed on her behalf that she had not seen. Subsequently, in a series of letters directed to Maguire, Ms. Potts requested that Maguire send her copies of documents that he had filed in court on her behalf as well as copies of documents filed by the opposing party. Maguire failed fully to comply with her requests. Maguire admits that he violated Rule 1.4(a) by failing to keep a client \\\"reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information\\\" by failing to keep Ms. Potts reasonably informed about the status of the matter.\\nBoard Case No. 57, 1997\\nIn May 1995, Bruce Joyner retained Ma-guire to represent him in a pending matter before the Industrial Accident Board. Mr. Joyner's former employer had filed a petition seeking to terminate Mr. Joyner's temporary total disability benefits under a prior agreement. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for June 26, 1995. When Maguire reviewed Mr. Joyner's file, he discovered that no medical witnesses had been subpoenaed by prior counsel and that it was too late to do so. Maguire therefore concluded that Mr. Joyner would not prevail at the hearing. However, Mr. Joyner did not agree to relinquish his claim for temporary total disability benefits. At the end of the day on the last business day before the scheduled hearing, Maguire contacted the employer's attorney and advised her that Mr. Joyner consented to the employer's petition to terminate benefits. Maguire failed to contact Mr. Joyner to inform him of this action. When Mr. Joyner appeared for the hearing on June 26, 1995, he was advised by an IAB employee that the hearing had been canceled because of his consent to the petition. Subsequently, Mr. Joyner wrote to the IAB seeking reconsideration.\\nOn July 18, 1995, Maguire filed a notice to reopen the matter due to a \\\"mistake of fact.\\\" The precise wording of Maguire's statements in support of the motion, while not saying so explicitly, could have given the members of the IAB the impression that he had discussed the consent to the petition to terminate with his client before giving the consent. Attached to the motion to reopen was a letter from Mr. Joyner's doctor, confirming Mr. Joyner's temporary total disability. Both the IAB and the Superior Court refused to reopen the matter because they had the impression that Maguire had represented to them that Mr. Joyner had been aware of the agreement and had approved of it.\\nMaguire admitted that he violated Rule 1.2(a) by agreeing to the employer's petition to terminate total disability benefits without Mr. Joyner's consent. Maguire also admits that he violated Rule 1.7(b) by representing Mr. Joyner in the motion to reopen the matter despite the fact that Mr. Joyner's position on the matter was directly adverse to Ma-guire's interests and by failing to discuss that conflict with Mr. Joyner.\\nBoard Case No. 101, 1997\\nIn connection with the May 19, 1997 order of interim suspension, the Court of Chancery entered an order appointing a receiver for Maguire's law practice. The receivership order provided that the receiver \\\"shall have the power and authority to discharge . any and all debts of the law practice\\\" and that Maguire \\\"shall cooperate fully with the Receiver in the performance of the Receiver's duties.\\\" In connection with performing these duties, the receiver asked Maguire whether he had any blank checks for his attorney's account. On more than one occasion, Maguire advised the receiver that he had no such blank checks.\\nOn May 29, 1997, Maguire issued a cheek from his attorney's account in the amount of $500 to a former client as a partial refund of an unearned $1,500 retainer. Maguire did not inform the receiver of this action. The check was returned for insufficient funds. At the hearing, Maguire's counsel advised the panel that although the preceding facts are true, Maguire had deposited $500 into the attorney's account immediately prior to writing the check and he intended to write the $500 check against those funds.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 3.4(c) by \\\"knowingly disobeying] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal\\\" by failing to cooperate with the receiver's efforts to gain control over the books and records of his practice of law.\\nBoard Case No. 56, 1997\\nIn January 1997, the accountant for the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection notified Maguire of the fact that his books and records would be subjected to a compliance audit. Through counsel, Maguire informed the accountant that \\\"virtually all\\\" of the documents which had been requested had inadvertently been discarded. On February 4, 1997, the accountant issued the report on his compliance audit. In that first report, the accountant concluded that Maguire had incorrectly certified on his annual registration statement that (a) he was properly maintaining cash receipts and cash disbursement journals, (b) he was performing monthly reconciliations for his bank accounts and (c) all tax returns had been timely 'filed and all taxes paid on a timely basis. Maguire was notified of the conclusions reached in the report and given an opportunity to put his records in compliance. On May 16,1997, the accountant conducted a follow-up audit and issued a second report. In the second report, the accountant concluded that several instances of non-compliance had not been corrected.\\nMaguire admits that he violated Rule 1.15(d) by failing to comply with the requirements for keeping books and records set forth in Interpretive Guideline No. 2. Ma-guire also admits that he violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to preserve complete records of attorney account funds for a period of five years after the completion of the events that they recorded and by failing to preserve his financial books and records for the required period.\\nAGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES\\nThe Board determined that the aggravating circumstances which must be considered in connection with this matter are as follows: Maguire's substantial experience in the practice of law; the fact that two of Maguire's violations resulted from his dishonest conduct with respect to client funds; the fact that Maguire has committed multiple violations in the matters under consideration; and Maguire's prior disciplinary history.\\nMaguire has received sanctions in two previous disciplinary proceedings. In In re Ma-guire, Board Case No. 953 (July 2,1986), the Board imposed a two-year public probation for violation of the following disciplinary rules: DR 6-101(A)(2) (lack of adequate preparation), DR 7-101(A)(3) (failure to satisfy government lien out of settlement proceeds), DR 9-102(b)(3) (failure to maintain complete records), DR 9-102(B)(4) (failure to promptly deliver to client funds that the client is entitled to receive) and DR 2-106(A) (excessive fee). In In re Maguire, Del.Supr., No. 562, 1992, Veasey, C.J. (Feb. 9, 1993) (ORDER), the Court approved a one-year public probation for violation of Rules 1.5(a) (unreasonable fee), 1.7(b) (conflict of interest), and 1.8(a) (conflict of interest in business transaction with client). The Board concluded an additional aggravating circumstance is the fact that some of the types of violations which Maguire has admitted in the instant proceeding are of a nature similar to those for which he has previously been sanctioned.\\nThe Board also considered the following mitigating circumstances. Maguire has a history of personal and psychological problems. First, Maguire is a recovering alcoholic who has undergone treatment for his condition since the early 1980's. See In re Clyne, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1118, 1119 (1990). In addition, Maguire was diagnosed in 1986 as having a bi-polar condition. Subsequently, he began to obtain some professional assistance in dealing with that condition. More recently, he has been diagnosed as suffering from a psychological disorder. Finally, Ma-guire suffers from diabetes and the accompanying fluctuations in his blood sugar and medication have had a profound psychological impact on Maguire during the last several years as well. In re Higgins, Del.Supr., 565 A.2d 901, 907 (1989); In re Sullivan, Del. Supr., 530 A.2d 1115, 1119 n. 5 (1987).\\nThe Board has also considered in mitigation the fact that Maguire has cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and has expressed remorse for his wrongdoing. As evidence of his willingness to cooperate, Maguire has offered to make restitution with respect to the Reason matter and has submitted two promissory notes to the Board for its consideration.\\nFinally, at the time of his interim suspension in May 1997, Maguire submitted an irrevocable letter of resignation to the Supreme Court. The Court declined to act upon that letter until after disciplinary proceedings had concluded. At the hearing on August 27, 1998, Maguire submitted another voluntary irrevocable letter of resignation to the Board. As part of the decision concerning the recommended sanction, the Board considered this letter as well. The Board noted that Maguire understands that he will be receiving some form of public discipline and was not seeking to tender his letter of resignation to avoid that result.\\nBoard Recommended Sanction\\nThe Board determined that if Maguire's letter of resignation is accepted by this Court, but accompanied by a serious form of sanction, the interests of the \\\"integrity of the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the protection of the public\\\" will be served. Therefore, the Board recommends that the Court enter an order suspending Maguire from the practice of law for a three-year period. Alternatively, the Board recommends that the Court enter an order accepting Maguire's voluntary irrevocable letter of resignation and strike Maguire's name from the rolls of attorneys of the Court authorized to practice law in the State of Delaware and in the Courts thereof, without Maguire having any opportunity to reapply for membership. Finally, the Board recommends that the Court require Maguire to deliver and honor the promissory notes with respect to restitution in the underlying matters.\\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\\nThis Court has made a careful and independent review of both the factual findings and the conclusions of law that are set forth in the Board's Report. Our scope of review with regard to the Board's factual findings is to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support those findings. In re Higgins, Del.Supr., 582 A.2d 929, 932 (1990). We review the Board's conclusions of law de novo. Id. We are satisfied that the record before us supports the findings of fact and the conclusions of law made by the Board in this ease. Id.\\nSANCTION DETERMINATION\\nThe inherent and exclusive authority for disciplining members of the Delaware Bar is vested in this Court. In re Green, Del.Supr., 464 A.2d 881, 885 (1983). The primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is \\\"to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.\\\" In re Agostini Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 80, 81 (1993), citing In re Brewster, Del.Supr., 587 A.2d 1067, 1070 (1991). The lawyer discipline system is not penal or punitive in nature. See In re Christie, Del.Supr., 574 A.2d 845, 853 (1990); see also In re Rich, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1989); In re Bennethum, Del.Supr., 161 A.2d 229, 236 (1960).\\nThe Court has wide latitude in determining the form of discipline to be imposed. In re Member of the Bar, Del.Supr., 226 A.2d 705, 707 (1967). In imposing sanctions, we are guided by our prior-precedents. See In re Christie, Del.Supr., 574 A.2d 845, 853 (1990). \\\"Those prior precedents reflect, inter alia, that this Court has cited, with approval, the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.\\\" In re Barrett, Del.Supr., 630 A.2d 652, 656 (1993); see, e.g., In re Brewster, Del.Supr., 587 A.2d 1067, 1069-71 (1991). The American Bar Association Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions most relevant in Maguire's case provides:\\n4.1 Failure to Preserve the Client's Property\\nAbsent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:\\n4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.\\nABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 4.1. The four factors to be considered pursuant to ABA Standard 3.0 are: \\\"(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.\\\" ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 3.0. In re Agostini, 632 A.2d at 81 n. 2, citing ABA Standard 3.0.\\nAt the May 1997 hearing on the petition for interim suspension, Maguire tendered his letter of resignation. This Court does not permit members of its Bar to either resign or retire during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, the Court declined to accept Maguire's resignation at that time. The Court noted, however, that it \\\"will consider the letter in resolving the underlying disciplinary proceedings.\\\" In re Maguire, Del.Supr., No. 204, 1997, 1997 WL 328588, *1 (May 19, 1997). Whether a resignation or retirement during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings is ultimately accepted depends on the Court's assessment of the impact that the resignation or retirement will have on public policy interests such as the integrity of the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the protection of the public. In re Lassen, Del.Supr., 672 A.2d 988, 1000 (1996), citing Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Propriety of Attorney's Resignation From Bar in Light of Pending or Potential Disciplinary Action, 54 A.L.R.4th 264, 278 (1987).\\nDefalcations by members of the Delaware Bar are, fortunately, very infrequent events. See Delaware Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Report (1993). This Court has not adopted a per se rule that disbarment is mandatory but has attempted to adopt a policy that is consistent with, and protective of, the public interest whenever a lawyer has converted a client's funds. Sanctions resulting from the misappropriation of a client's property have varied. In re Higgins, Del.Supr., 582 A.2d 929 (1990). See also In re Barrett, Del.Supr., 630 A.2d 652 (1993); In re Frabizzio, Del.Supr., 498 A.2d 1076 (1985); In re Reed, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 686 (1977); In re Green, Del.Supr., 331 A.2d 145 (1975).\\nDISBARMENT APPROPRIATE\\n\\\"The misappropriation of a client's funds is one of the most egregious acts of professional misconduct that any attorney can commit.\\\" In re Higgins, Del.Supr., 582 A.2d 929, 932 (1990). Maguire has a record of repeated professional misconduct. As a result of the present proceedings, this Court was advised during oral argument, that the Lawyer's Fund for Client Protection has paid $39,840 in claims by Maguire's clients that were attributable to either his defalcations or inability to refund unearned fees. Based on our evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors affecting Maguire's pattern of professional misconduct that culminated in his misappropriation of client's funds, we have concluded that disbarment is required to protect the public and to uphold the integrity of the legal profession in Delaware.\\nTherefore, it is adjudged and ordered, pursuant to this Court's exclusive jurisdiction over the Delaware Bar, that Michael P. Ma-guire be disbarred. His name shall be immediately stricken from the Roll of Attorneys entitled to practice before the courts of this State. This Opinion is to be disseminated by Disciplinary Counsel in accordance with Rules 3 and 14 of the Rules of the Board on Professional Responsibility.\\n. The Board acknowledged that an attorney's intention to return the money is irrelevant to the question of whether a disciplinary violation occurred. In re Figliola, Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 1071, 1076 (1995).\\n. The ODC had originally asserted a claim that Maguire had continued to practice law in violation of the interim suspension order by means of his actions on May 21, 1997 with respect to the Reason matter. In response, Maguire asserted that he viewed the Reason debt as a personal debt which he had assumed from the client and did not believe that he was engaging in the practice of law by satisfying that obligation. Thereafter, the ODC elected to dismiss the claim. \\u2022\\n. In investigating the matter, ODC concluded that there was some factual support for Ma-guire's assertion that he had the client's consent to his endorsement of the check.\\n. Maguire asserted in mitigation that after he and Ms. Potts participated in a telephone conference with Judge Longobardi concerning this issue, Ms. Potts copied pleadings in his office. Maguire believed that Ms. Potts was satisfied at that point because she did not thereafter complain to him.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/11940629.json b/delaware/11940629.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2659a8144d9bcde46de459a17f0adb9acec43cee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/11940629.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11940629\", \"name\": \"Tyrone Lee JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Johnson v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-03-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"444\", \"last_page\": \"453\", \"citations\": \"587 A.2d 444\", \"volume\": \"587\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:51:56.312891+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, WALSH, and HOLLAND, JJ\\u201e and ALLEN, Chancellor, constituting the Court en banc.\", \"parties\": \"Tyrone Lee JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Tyrone Lee JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Sept. 9, 1989.\\nRehearing en banc: May 15, 1990.\\nDecided: March 5, 1991.\\nNancy Jane Perillo, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nTimothy H. Barron, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for appellee.\\nBefore CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, WALSH, and HOLLAND, JJ\\u201e and ALLEN, Chancellor, constituting the Court en banc.\", \"word_count\": \"5377\", \"char_count\": \"32909\", \"text\": \"CHRISTIE, Chief Justice.\\nThe opinion in this case dated January 11, 1990, which was released after argument before a panel of three justices and which affirmed Tyrone Johnson's convictions, is withdrawn. The following opinion of the Court en banc is substituted.\\nJohnson appeals his convictions in Superior Court for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and conspiracy in the second degree, in violation of 16 Del.C. \\u00a7 4751(a) and 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 512. He was convicted of these charges following a jury trial on February 11, 1988. He raises three contentions on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial when it became evident that a prosecution witness was not telling the truth during testimony. Secondly, he asserts that testimony regarding his out-of-court identification by an undisclosed informant was inadmissible hear say and that its admission into evidence was reversible error. Finally, he contends that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that a defense under Wharton's Rule, as codified in 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 521(c), existed for the conspiracy charge. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the record and the briefs, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court.\\nThe trial record reveals that on the night of Thursday, June 18, 1987, Delaware State Police Detective Harry Downs, working undercover and based on a tip from a confidential informant, sought to make a purchase of cocaine in Middletown, Delaware. He was introduced by the informant to the appellant who listened to his request and walked over to a parked car occupied by two men. The appellant returned saying that the men indicated that they had no drugs left, but they would go and get some more. The two men left in the car and were gone for approximately one-half hour while Downs waited with the appellant. When the car returned, the appellant approached it alone, paid the occupants $20.00 supplied by Downs, and received a small bag of cocaine. The appellant then returned and gave the cocaine to the police officer. Upon returning from the purchase, Downs gave descriptions of the appellant and the two others who had participated in the transaction to the New Castle County Police in the presence of the confidential informant. As Downs described the participants, the confidential informant provided names of the individuals. New Castle County Police arrested Johnson, Adam Daniels, and Devin Dickerson on August 6, 1987. From their arrest photographs, Downs confirmed that they were the three persons involved in the June 18 drug sale. All three were charged with delivery of a Schedule II narcotic in violation of 16 Del.C. \\u00a7 4751(a) and conspiracy in the second degree in violation of 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 512. Daniels was charged with additional violations. Prior to trial appellant moved for disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant. The Superior Court held an in camera Flowers hearing during which the judge met with and interrogated the confidential informant. The appellant's motion was denied because the court found\\n. that the informant can offer no testimony supporting [Johnson's] contention that he was misidentified as a participant in the drug transaction which is the subject matter of this prosecution.\\nUnder terms of a plea agreement entered on the day of trial, Daniels pleaded guilty to the drug delivery charge, the State dropped several other charges against him, and Daniels agreed to testify against Johnson and Dickerson. In his testimony, Daniels said that Johnson had not been with Dickerson and himself in the car on June 18. Johnson had purchased drugs from Daniels but had not directly indicated that the purchase was for someone else. Daniels had observed the other man (Downs) and testified that he \\\"just figured [Johnson] was coming for someone else.\\\" Daniels also testified that Johnson only approached his car once that evening.\\nDuring his testimony, Daniels stated that he had never participated in a drug sale before or since the June 18, 1987 incident. However, at the end of the State's case, the deputy attorney general read into the record an affidavit which stated that a police detective had purchased cocaine from Adam Daniels on a date prior to June 18, and that Daniels had been indicted for that offense. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the State had knowingly relied on perjured testimony by Daniels. The court denied the motion, holding that while it was clear that the witness had not been truthful about his other drug dealing, there was no proof that his account of the transaction at issue in this trial was false.\\nDetective Bruce Arterbridge of the New Castle County Police testified that after the drug transaction he met with Detective Downs and the confidential informant. As Downs described the events and the individuals involved, the informant assisted by matching the descriptions of the participants to the names of individuals he knew. Over defense objection, Arterbridge testified that the informant identified the three defendants. The trial court ruled that Ar-terbridge's testimony did not constitute hearsay because it was offered only to explain the ensuing activities of the police who arrested the three defendants six weeks later. Additionally, the trial judge noted that the testimony of other eyewitnesses, Downs and Daniels, had established the identity of the defendants as those who took part in the transaction. The jury was given a specific instruction that the confidential informant's naming of the defendants was not to be considered as evidence of their guilt.\\nAt trial the appellant's defense was mistaken identity. The appellant and his wife were the only new witnesses called by the defense. They testified that the appellant's usual habit was to be at home with his family on weekday evenings.\\nCo-appellant Dickerson did not put on a defense. He and Johnson were found guilty of both counts against them. Johnson alone has brought this appeal.\\nI.\\nJohnson's first contention on appeal is that the court erred by failing to grant his motion for a mistrial following the perjured testimony by Daniels. Appellant relies upon Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). The court below held that no proof had been introduced which called into doubt Daniels' testimony concerning the drug transaction on June 18, 1987. We agree with the trial court's holding on this issue. Contrary to the situation in the Napue case, the prosecutor had not knowingly allowed the witness to lie, and he had entered into the record evidence which contradicted the false testimony. The prosecutor also mentioned in his closing remarks the falsehood told by the witness. The jury was fully informed of Daniels' perjury. We hold that the false testimony affected only the credibility of the witness which could be properly weighed and determined by the jury. Tyre v. State, Del.Supr., 412 A.2d 326, 330 (1980).\\nII.\\nJohnson next argues that an out-of-court statement by an unnamed informant which identified the defendants was inadmissible hearsay, and its admission into evidence was reversible error. He also asserts that the admission of Downs' and Arterbridge's testimony concerning identifications made by the confidential informant violated the appellant's right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.\\nA.\\nDelaware Rules of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as \\\"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\\\" If a statement is introduced for a purpose other than its truth, however, it may be admissible under some circumstances. If it is admitted for another purpose, that purpose must be relevant to an issue of the trial. D.R.E. 401. However, while evidence may be relevant, it must also be substantially more probative to an issue than prejudicial to the defendant. D.R.E. 403. It is under these rules that the testimony in question must be analyzed.\\nProblems arise when the statement to be quoted may serve more than one purpose. McCormick states:\\nIn criminal cases, an arresting or investigating officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene; he should be allowed some explanation of his presence and conduct. His testimony that he acted \\\"upon information received,\\\" or words to that effect, should be sufficient. Nevertheless, cases abound in which the officer is allowed to relate historical aspects of the case, replete with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and reports, on the ground that he was entitled to give the information upon which he acted. The need for the evidence is slight, the likelihood of misuse great.\\nMcCormick, Evidence \\u00a7 249 at 734 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984).\\nThis Court has held that testimony regarding statements which explain why the police believed a particular person was a suspect is not hearsay, because the accuracy of the statements is not asserted. Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1258, 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982). In that case, an investigating officer stated during cross-examination by defense counsel that specific information which indicated that the defendant may- have committed the crime was provided by interviews with neighbors. This Court ruled on appeal that:\\n[T]he answer did not contain hearsay because those out-of-court statements were not mentioned \\\"to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\\\" Del.Rule of Evid. 801(c). The reference to out-of-court statements was to show why the detective believed the defendant was a suspect and was not intended to show that those statements were accurate.\\nId. at 1355. In the Whalen case, the neighbors' statements were part of the post-crime investigation, and the neighbors could have been called as witnesses. In contrast, we are confronted with a situation in which the informant was involved throughout the planning, execution, and follow-up of the drug transaction; the testimony was that the informant specifically identified the three defendants; the testimony about the identification was introduced by the prosecution during direct examination; and the informant was unavailable to testify because the court had ruled that his identity would not be disclosed.\\nWhile Delaware courts have not previously ruled on the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of crime suspects by unnamed police informants, courts generally scrutinize out-of-court statements as to the availability of the speaker, the specificity of the information, the need of the statement in relation to other evidence, its relevancy to the question of guilt and the statement's prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g. Whalen at 1355; United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99 (3rd Cir.1983); Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101, 326 S.E.2d 748 (1985); People v. Billingsley, 184 Ill.App.3d 142, 132 Ill.Dec. 496, 539 N.E.2d 1302 (1989); People v. Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819, 501 N.Y.S.2d 641, 492 N.E.2d 769 (1986); People v. Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969, 457 N.Y.S.2d 230, 443 N.E.2d 478 (1982).\\nMany jurisdictions have recognized that out-of-court statements may be admitted to explain why the police took certain actions once their conduct is placed at issue in the trial. United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063-64 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 890 (1986) (evidence admissible to explain police conduct after it was called into question); State v. Cruz, 212 Conn. 351, 562 A.2d 1071 (1989) (evidence admitted not for identification, but to explain police action); Johnston v. State, Ind.Supr., 530 N.E.2d 1179 (1988) (testimony explained why police began surveillance); Stout v. State, Ind. Supr., 479 N.E.2d 563 (1985) (information provided by third party explained police actions); State v. Gray, La.App., 542 So.2d 684 (1989) (fact that a witness had pointed out defendant explained police actions); State v. Parker, La.App., 536 So.2d 459 (1988) (conduct of police leading to arrest of defendant explained); State v. Brooks, Mo.Supr., 618 S.W.2d 22 (1981) (drug informant statement explained police action); State v. Sardeson, Nebr.Supr., 231 Neb. 586, 437 N.W.2d 473 (1989) (eyewitness statement admitted to explain police actions when defendant argued that police manipulated witness). Such testimony has also been admitted in some cases involving the defense of entrapment, where the conduct of the police is at the heart of the defendant's case. Atkins v. State, Del.Supr., 523 A.2d 539 (1987); United States v. Engler, 627 F.Supp. 196 (M.D.Pa.1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir.1986); Morris v. State, Fla.Supr., 487 So.2d 291 (1986).\\nIn several jurisdictions, explicit limitations have been placed on the use of out-of-court statements offered by the police to explain their actions. The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that the prosecution must prove that there is a reasonable level of assurance that testimony is offered not for its truth, but to explain police conduct. Williams v. State, Ind.Supr., 544 N.E.2d 161 (1989). In Connecticut, if an eyewitness is not an informant, his statement identifying a person may be admitted as long as the statement does not refer to anything that the identified person did. State v. Cruz, 212 Conn. 351, 562 A.2d 1071 (1989). In New Jersey, any reference to a statement made by a police informant must be limited to the phrase \\\"information received\\\" or the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant will be violated. State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 307 A.2d 65, 69 (1973). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has ruled that if the statement of an informant has \\\"misleading probative force,\\\" which may explain police conduct, but is also intended to influence the jury on the question of guilt, it is inadmissible hearsay. Purvis v. State, 27 Md.App. 713, 343 A.2d 898, 904 (1975).\\nCourts in Pennsylvania have applied a balancing test between the need for the circumstantial evidence and the danger of hearsay evidence being prejudicial to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Underwood, 347 Pa.Super. 256, 500 A.2d 820 (1985). In a recent case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the statements of a named, but unavailable, informant which contained specific assertions of criminal conduct, to be admitted because they tipped the balance too far toward prejudicing the defendant without a sufficient showing of need for their introduction by the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Paisa, 521 Pa. 113, 555 A.2d 808, 811 (1989) (three justices dissenting on grounds of harmless error). In the Paisa case, a police officer was allowed to testify that a man he had arrested said that he was on his way to the defendant's house to deliver marijuana. The man also told the police officer that he had sold the defendant marijuana the day before and had been given money to buy more for the defendant. The informant had fled the jurisdiction and was unavailable to testify. The trial court instructed the jury to regard these statements as relevant only to explain police conduct. On appeal, the court applied a balancing test \\\"between avoiding the dangers of hearsay testimony and the need for evidence that explains why police pursued a given course of action.\\\" Id. 555 A.2d at 811. The majority held that the questioned testimony contained \\\"specific assertions of criminal conduct by a named accused,\\\" which were likely to be understood by the jury as proof of a necessary element of the crime and that the activities of the police could easily have been explained without the use of the out-of-court statements. Id. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the incriminating nature of the evidence outweighed the asserted need for the evidence's other purposes. The dissent found that the out-of-court statements by the informant were not determinative of the defendant's guilt, concluding that even if the informant's statements were hearsay, they were de minimis and not grounds for reversal. Id. at 812. The majority focused on the prejudicial character of the specific hearsay evidence, while the dissent analyzed the limit ed potential for prejudice in relation to all of the evidence.\\nThe balancing test applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to be similar to the test applied in the holding of Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 97 S.Ct. 29, 50 L.Ed.2d 25 (1976) where the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of out-of-court statements used to explain police conduct. In that case, the Court held that testimony by a police officer that an unidentified informant had told him that Moore and others had heroin at \\\"Moore's apartment\\\" was inadmissible hearsay. Although the defendant was found at the apartment and heroin was also found there, the Court ruled that the trial court had relied expressly on the informant's statement in finding the defendant guilty of possession of heroin. Because the informant was unidentified, he could not be cross-examined as to the basis of his belief that Moore was a tenant or regular resident of the apartment. The Court ruled the statement inadmissible hearsay on the issue of guilt and remanded the case for a determination of whether admission of the hearsay evidence was harmless error. The Court did not address the Sixth Amendment explicitly. To the extent that the Moore case provides guidance in this case, it is on an evidentiary basis. An out-of-court statement of an unidentified informant is inadmissible if it provides the single piece of information relevant to an element of a crime, even though it also explains why the police suspected the defendant in the first place.\\nAppellant argues that the trial court's ruling admitting the statement of the unnamed informant in this case ignores the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and its relation to hearsay, but it has not explicitly disapproved admission of out-of-court statements on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Court's position has been stated: \\\"It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.\\\" Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80, 91 S.Ct. 210, 215, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). In the case of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), which involved an out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator, the Court stated, \\\"While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.\\\" Green, 399 U.S. at 155, 90 S.Ct. at 1933-34, 26 L.Ed.2d 489. Neither Dutton nor Green applies the Sixth Amendment to the eviden-tiary issue present in the case before us today. The Moore case, which clearly addresses the evidentiary issue, refrains from mentioning the Sixth Amendment. In none of these rulings has the United States Supreme Court held that admission of hearsay evidence is an automatic violation of the Sixth Amendment.\\nIn reviewing the facts of the present case, we find that the statement of the unidentified informant was inadmissible hearsay under D.R.E. 403. While the statement was highly incriminating to the defendant, it was merely cumulative in the State's case against him, and it did not have important relevance as an explanation for police conduct. There was little need for the informant's statement to explain why the police arrested Johnson since the primary witness for the State at trial was the undercover police officer who had participated in the drug transaction. There was no further need to explain police actions since the defense did not challenge the procedures used in arresting the defendants, nor did it accuse the police of arbitrary conduct. The facts are clearly distinguishable from our prior ruling in Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 434 A.2d 1346 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1258, 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982), where we found that out-of-court statements were admissible to explain police action. While we find that the confidential informant's statement in this case was inadmissible hearsay under D.R.E. 403, we do not find that the admission of the informant's statement violated the Sixth Amendment since Johnson's accuser was the undercover police officer who had negotiated the drug purchase with Johnson and who identified him both in photographs and in court.\\nB.\\nAlthough we find that the statement of the unidentified informant was inadmissible by application of a standard which balances the dangers of hearsay testimony with the need for evidence in a criminal case, a review of the State's complete case against Johnson shows that the error of admitting the hearsay testimony was harmless. This Court has previously stated a standard for determining whether an error in admitting evidence was harmless. \\\"The well-established rule is that where the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, error in admitting the evidence is harmless.\\\" Collins v. State, Del.Supr., 420 A.2d 170 (1980), citing Outlaw v. State, Del.Supr., 327 A.2d 606 (1974) and Tucker v. State, 55 Del. 342, 187 A.2d 429 (1963). Even if we view the evidence in this case under the stricter standard required for evidentiary errors of constitutional magnitude, we find that the other evidence against Johnson was sufficient to sustain his convictions. The test for constitutional evidentiary error was adopted at the direction of the United States Supreme Court. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). It requires showing that the error was \\\"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\" Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 11 (1987), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).\\nThe case against appellant was not merely circumstantial. Johnson was identified both from photographs and in court by the undercover police officer who witnessed the crime. The police officer's identification was corroborated by a co-conspirator. Neither of these witnesses was a casual observer who was likely to have been mistaken in making the identification.\\nThe defendant presented no credible evidence that he was misidentified by either witness. His only alibi witness was his wife. We find that the jury would have reached the same result without the hearsay testimony identifying Johnson. The appellant has not shown that the erroneous admission of the hearsay statements affected the result of the trial.\\nAn otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Ars- dall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674.\\nIII.\\nAt the end of the testimony, the appellant requested that the jury instructions include the language of 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 521(c), a codification of Wharton's Rule. This request was denied. Appellant argues on appeal that Wharton's Rule does apply to the conspiracy offense in this case and that it was reversible error for the trial judge not to have included a charge on 11 Del. C. \\u00a7 521(c).\\nWharton's Rule provides an exception to the general rule that conspiracy and the substantive offense planned by the conspirators are separate crimes. It provides that \\\"an agreement between two persons to commit an offense does not constitute conspiracy when the target offense is so defined that it can be committed only by the participation of two persons .\\\" 4 Wharton's Criminal Law \\u00a7 731 at 545 (14th ed. 1981). This rule was examined extensively by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). The Court stated that the Rule \\\"has current vitality only as a judicial presumption, to be applied in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary.\\\" 420 U.S. at 782, 95 S.Ct. at 1292, 43 L.Ed.2d 616. The United States Supreme Court held that when a trial court must decide whether or not the Rule applies to a particular offense, the focus should be on \\\"the statutory requirements of the substantive offense rather than the evidence offered to prove those elements at trial.\\\" 420 U.S. at 780, 95 S.Ct. at 1291, 43 L.Ed.2d 616. If it is found that the Rule would apply to a particular offense, both conspiracy and the substantive offense may be charged, but the jury must be instructed that a conviction for the substantive offense necessarily precludes conviction for conspiracy. 420 U.S. at 775, 95 S.Ct. at 1289, 43 L.Ed.2d 616.\\nWharton's Rule applies traditionally to crimes such as adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling. See 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy \\u00a7 6 (1979). In the Iannelli case, the U.S. Supreme Court identified general characteristics of crimes to which the Rule would apply. They included crimes in which the parties to the agreement were the only participants in the offense. The immediate consequences of the crime fell on the parties, not on society, and the agreement did not pose a threat to society that conspiracy laws are designed to avert, such as a more general pattern of criminal activity Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 782-84, 95 S.Ct. at 1292-93, 43 L.Ed.2d 616.\\nThis Court has held that the legislative purpose of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 16 Del.C. \\u00a7 4701-4796 is to control a societal evil by stating \\\"[w]e are well aware that the organized traffic in illegal drugs is a serious problem, causing not only debilitating effects in those who use such substances, but fostering additional crimes.\\\" Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170, 1178 (1983). If the legislature intended to limit 16 Del. C. \\u00a7 4751(a) to one which required a partnership or agreement with suppliers and customers, it could have provided the necessary language. See Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 789, 95 S.Ct. at 1296, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (holding that the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 described \\\"gambling activities\\\" by five or more persons separately from conspiracy to promote gambling activities). We are of the opinion that it is evident, therefore, that 16 Del.C. \\u00a7 4751(a) does not describe an offense to which Wharton's Rule applies. A person could possess narcotics with the intent to deliver them without actually delivering them to another person. This analysis has been adopted by federal courts addressing similar offenses. See United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Schleicher, 862 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Prati, 861 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.1988).\\nIn Delaware, the only reported case testing the application of 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 521(c) held that it did not apply to the offense of receiving stolen goods (11 Del.C. \\u00a7 851). Guyer v. State, Del.Supr., 453 A.2d 462 (1982). The offense described in the statute did not on its face require agreement with another person, because \\\"one may receive property he knows to be stolen from another who is without such knowledge.\\\" Id. at 466. This holding was consistent with the ruling in the Iannelli case in that it applied the Rule to the statute, without regard to the factual situation presented in the particular case before the Court.\\nIf Wharton's Rule was found to be applicable in this case, the court would have been required to include it in the instructions to the jury. 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 303(c). However, since Wharton's Rule does not apply to an offense involving possession with intent to deliver, the trial court did not err in its ruling.\\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\\n. 16 DelC. \\u00a7 4751(a) stated:\\nExcept as authorized by this chapter, any person who manufactures, delivers or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,-000 and imprisoned not more than 25 years unless the defendant is not himself addicted to narcotic drugs in which case, upon conviction, he shall be fined not less than $25,000 nor more than $100,000 and imprisoned for 30 years without eligibility for parole.\\n. 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 512 states:\\nA person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, intending to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony, he:\\n(1) Agrees with another person or persons that they or 1 or more of them will engage in conduct constituting the felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; or\\n(2) Agrees to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of the felony or an attempt or solicitation to commit the felony; and he or another person with whom he conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.\\n. 11 Del. C. \\u00a7 521(c) states:\\nNo person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense when an element of the offense is agreement with the person with whom he is alleged to have conspired, or when the person with whom he is alleged to have conspired is necessarily involved with him in the commission of the offense.\\n. D.R.E. 401 states:\\n\\\"Relevant evidence\\\" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\\n. D.R.E. 403 states:\\nAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\\n. In another case, Atkins v. State, this Court held that tape recorded discussions were relevant to a defense of entrapment and were not hearsay because they showed the effect of the statements on the police officer's state of mind. Atkins v. State, Del.Supr., 523 A.2d 539 (1987).\\n. Other than the Moore case, appellant has referred this Court to only one other U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988). In that case, the Court ruled (with two justices dissenting) that admission of an out-of-court identification by a witness who had lost his memory and could no longer identify the defendant was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment. The specific hearsay rule at issue was F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), not the definition of hearsay itself. Although it appears that we are referred to that case for the contrary proposition, the Court declined to draw a hand-in-glove relationship between hearsay and the Sixth Amendment. \\\"This Court has recognized a partial (and somewhat indeterminate) overlap between the requirements of the traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.\\\" Owens, 484 U.S. at 560, 108 S.Ct. at 843, 98 L.Ed.2d 951. On the point of the reliability of out-of-court identifications in general, the Court stated in the Owens case, \\\"There does not appear in our opinions, and we decline to adopt today, the principle that, because of the mere possibility of suggestive procedures, out-of-court statements of identification are inherently less reliable than other out-of-court statements.\\\" Id.\\n. In the Dutton case, the court also enunciated eight \\\"indicia of reliability\\\" which could be used to analyze the truth seeking value of out-of-court statements as a basis for deciding their admissibility. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89, 91 S.Ct. at 219-20, 27 L.Ed.2d 213. It could be argued that the Flowers hearing with the informant before the trial in this case had some bearing on the reliability of the informant.\\n. Because we find the admission of the confidential informant's identification of the appellant to have been error we do not address the curative instructions provided by the trial court.\\n. 11 Dele. \\u00a7 303(c) states:\\nIf some credible evidence supporting a defense is presented, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that the jury must acquit him if they find that the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/12142201.json b/delaware/12142201.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c43a69c484d2e28f261f29697e1ddbf4cb4d7939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/12142201.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12142201\", \"name\": \"SABREE ENVIRONMENTAL & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. SUMMIT DREDGING, LLC, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sabree Environmental & Construction, Inc. v. Summit Dredging, LLC\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-10-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 21, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"517\", \"last_page\": \"517\", \"citations\": \"149 A.3d 517\", \"volume\": \"149\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:13:09.551584+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SABREE ENVIRONMENTAL & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. SUMMIT DREDGING, LLC, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"SABREE ENVIRONMENTAL & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. SUMMIT DREDGING, LLC, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 21, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: September 28, 2016\\nDecided: October 12, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"40\", \"char_count\": \"304\", \"text\": \"Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, C.A. No. N14C-10-283\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/12257273.json b/delaware/12257273.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..315825627447603c20f9529924244598c56b1a26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/12257273.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12257273\", \"name\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Anthony L. MANISTA\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Manista\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-06-29\", \"docket_number\": \"File No. AN94-0787\", \"first_page\": \"781\", \"last_page\": \"786\", \"citations\": \"651 A.2d 781\", \"volume\": \"651\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Family Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:36:28.148618+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Anthony L. MANISTA.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Anthony L. MANISTA.\\nFile No. AN94-0787.\\nFamily Court of Delaware, New Castle County.\\nSubmitted: June 17, 1994.\\nDecided: June 29, 1994.\\nJohn P. Deckers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Wilmington, for State.\\nSheryl Rush-Milstead, Wilmington, for respondent, Anthony L. Manista.\", \"word_count\": \"3131\", \"char_count\": \"19439\", \"text\": \"JAMES, Judge.\\nPresent before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, Anthony L. Man-ista. The motion seeks dismissal of a criminal charge of harassment which was filed against defendant on March 18, 1994.\\nIn addition to the criminal filing, defendant's spouse, Claire Manista, filed a Petition for Order of Protection from Abuse on that same day. Her petition alleged that: Mr. Manista had threatened her existence in Delaware on March 12, 1994; on March 13, 1994, he came to Mrs. Manista's house and withdrew all of their mutual agreements on separation; on March 17, 1994, he called her at work and harassed her; and on March 18, 1994, he went to her place of employment and stole her vehicle.\\nA hearing on the Protection from Abuse Petition was held before Commissioner Ellen Marie Cooper on April 15, 1994. In her ruling, Commissioner Cooper stated that \\\"[a]fter testimony given by both parties, the Court finds that no act of abuse has been committed.\\\" Manista v. Manista, Del.Fam., File No. CN92-10634, Cooper, Com. (April 15,1994). Therefore, Mrs. Manista's request for a protection from abuse order was denied.\\nDefendant claims that since the allegations which were made in the criminal complaint mirror those which were the basis for the protection from abuse petition, the criminal complaint against him must also be dismissed. He argues that the prosecution would, otherwise, be unconstitutional in light of the federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting the government from placing an individual in double jeopardy. He submits that proceedings under 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 945-952 are criminal or at least quasi-criminal in nature. He bases his assertion on the fact that a violation of a protective order entered by this Court may result in the imposition of criminal contempt.\\nAlternatively, defendant argues that since the issue of harassment has already been litigated at the protection from abuse hearing, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the State from relitigating that issue in a different forum.\\nThe State responds to defendant's motion to dismiss by asserting that the protection from abuse proceeding was civil in nature and, furthermore, that the State may impose both a criminal and a civil penalty for the same act. Since the State argues that the theory of double jeopardy is inapplicable, it further submits that it is not precluded from pursuing a criminal remedy against the defendant.\\nThe State further contends that a judgment of a civil court generally is not binding upon a court in which a criminal case is being tried. Moreover, the State argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is limited to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects to the matter of the first proceeding. Accordingly, since the protection from abuse proceeding is a civil proceeding based upon a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, collateral estoppel is not permitted as a defense specifically because the criminal proceedings are based upon an entirely different standard of proof.\\nOur legislature recently enacted the Protection from Abuse Act. The Act was intended to protect against domestic violence, which is defined by the Act as follows:\\nabuse perpetrated by one member against another member of the following protected classes: (i) Family, as that term is defined in \\u00a7 901(9) of this title, regardless, however, of state of residence of the parties; or (ii) Former spouses, a man and a woman co-habitating together with or without a child or either or both, or a man and a woman living separate and apart with a child in common.\\n10 DelC. \\u00a7 945.\\nAfter consideration of the petition for a protective order, the Court may grant a number of civil remedies as provided in the Act. The order is effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed 1 year, 10 DelC. \\u00a7 949(b), but the Court has the ability to modify the order. The Act further provides that \\\"[a]ll protective orders issued under this part shall state that violations may result in: (1) A finding of contempt; (2) Criminal prosecution; and (3) Imprisonment or fine or both,\\\" 10 DelC. \\u00a7 950(d), and \\\"[i]t shall be unlawful for a respondent to knowingly violate a protective order. Violations shall be punishable as a class A misdemeanor. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the filing of a civil contempt petition by the petitioner for violations of a protective order issued under this part.\\\" 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 950(e).\\nThe United States and Delaware Constitutions both provide that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. U.S. Const., amend. V., Del. Const., art. I, \\u00a7 8. Discussing the theory of double jeopardy, our Supreme Court has stated that\\n[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that the effect of the double jeopardy clause is to afford to criminal defendants several basic protections. Specifically, the Court has held that \\\"[the double jeopardy clause] protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense\\\".\\nTarr v. State, Del.Supr., 486 A.2d 672, 674 (1984) (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-99, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984)).\\nThe United States Supreme Court has ruled that the guarantee against double jeopardy proscribes exposure to criminal prosecutions for the same offense after conviction or acquittal and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 716-17, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Furthermore, the exposure to a subsequent criminal prosecution where double jeopardy may exist is not present in proceedings that are not \\\"essentially criminal.\\\" Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).\\n\\\"The essential nature of a proceeding is not determined by its form or label.... United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1043, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971). A proceeding is criminal for double jeopardy purposes, if it imposes a sanction intended as punishment. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 [L.Ed.] 917 (1938).\\\"\\nState v. Smith, Ct.Supr., 207 Conn. 152, 540 A.2d 679, 692 (1988) (underline supplied) (quoting State ex rel. Flowers v. Department of Health, Supr., 81 Wis.2d 376, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978)).\\nIn a similar Pennsylvania case, the defendant contended that Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act was a criminal proceeding. He based his contention, in part, on his belief that since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ruled that a violation of a protective order constituted criminal contempt, it followed that the original protection from abuse proceeding was itself a criminal proceeding. Moreover, he complained that it was the entry of the protection from abuse order which was the final disposition of a criminal prosecution. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that \\\"[tjhat reading is incorrect.\\\" Commonwealth v. Smith, 380 Pa.Super. 484, 552 A.2d 292, 293 (1988). Rather, the Court explained that the \\\"primary purpose of the act is not retrospective punishment, but rather, advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse.\\\" Id. 552 A.2d at 295 (citing Eichenlaub v. Eichenlaub, 340 Pa.Super. 552, 490 A.2d 918, 922 (1985)). In that regard, the Pennsylvania appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the criminal charges.\\nThis Court, therefore, must decide whether a proceeding under Delaware's Protection from Abuse Act is a civil or criminal proceeding. In a related case, upon reviewing whether a license revocation proceeding is civil or criminal in nature, our Supreme Court stated that the \\\"revocation is essentially civil in nature, having as its goal 'the chastening of the errant motorist' (Barnes [v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690, 694], 261 N.E.2d [617] at 620) (1970) and, more importantly, protection of the public from a dangerous driver.\\\" Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1983). Moreover, the \\\"primary purpose of 21 DelC., Chapter 28 [license revocation for habitual traffic offenders], is to foster public safety on the highways of this State, and not to punish persons who violate traffic regulations.\\\" State v. Kamalski, Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1981).\\nSimilarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has explained that punitive damages arising out of a civil action cannot infringe on a defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy because such a claim \\\"is based upon a private wrong, and is clearly distinguishable from a criminal prosecution, which is brought solely on the behalf of the public.\\\" Tuttle v. Raymond, Me. Supr.Jud.Ct., 494 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1985).\\nThe Protection from Abuse Act, 10 DelC. \\u00a7 945-952, is not targeted at punishing the wrongdoer; rather, its purpose is to help protect the victim against further acts of violence or abuse. The petition is prosecuted by the petitioner , usually the victim. The Attorney General's Office is neither directly nor indirectly involved. Furthermore, the standard of proof at a protection from abuse hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, 10 DelC. \\u00a7 948, which is clearly indic ative that the proceeding is civil in nature. Moreover, the addition of \\u00a7 951, which specifically provides that \\\"[n]othing in this part shall preclude a petitioner or law enforcement officer from filing criminal charges when probable cause exists\\\" is demonstrative of the legislative intent of providing the petitioner with both a civil and criminal remedy.\\nThe United States Supreme Court has concluded that both a criminal and a civil penalty may be imposed for the same act or course of conduct and yet be consistent with the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-36, 93 S.Ct. 489, 492, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972).\\nOur Supreme Court has also stated that \\\"[i]t is well established that double jeopardy 'only prohibits twice punishing a person criminally for the same offense, [and that] the State may impose both a criminal and a civil penalty for the same act.'\\\" Tarr v. State, Del.Supr., 486 A.2d 672, 675 (1984) (quoting State v. Kamalski, Del.Super., 429 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1981)). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). \\\"When the penalty sought to be imposed is a civil penalty, no question of double jeopardy arises.\\\" Kamalski, 429 A.2d at 1318.\\nTherefore, it is the determination of this Court that a proceeding under the Protection from Abuse Act in which the petitioner is seeking an order of protection from abuse is a civil proceeding. Accordingly, a subsequent criminal proceeding based upon the same facts as those which were alleged in the Petition for Order of Protection from Abuse does not infringe upon the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.\\nTurning to defendant's collateral es-toppel argument in support of his Motion to Dismiss, the United States Supreme Court has stated as follows:\\nUnder the judicially developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). Collateral estop-pel, like the related doctrine of res judica-ta, serves to \\\"reheve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage rebanee on adjudication.\\\" Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94,101 S.Ct. [411, 415], 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). In furtherance of those policies, this Court in recent years has broadened the scope of the doctrine of collateral es-toppel beyond its common law-limits. Ibid. It has done so by abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313[,] 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971), and by conditionally approving the \\\"offensive\\\" use of collateral estoppel by a nonparty to a prior lawsuit. Parklane Hosiery [Co. v. Shore], [439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979)].\\nUnited States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 157-59, 104 S.Ct. 568, 571, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984) (footnote omitted).\\nJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Mendoza, stated that when collateral es-toppel issues arise between private litigants, \\\" 'no significant harm flows from enforcing a rule that affords a litigant only one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and [that] there is no sound reason for burdening the courts with repetitive litigation.' \\\" Id. 464 U.S. at 159, 104 S.Ct. at 572 (quoting Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2008, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980)). Thereafter, based upon policy reasons, the Court determined that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel could not be applied against the United States Government in order to preclude litigation of issues. It is important to note, however, that in Mendoza, the Government was a party to prior litigation regarding substantially similar facts. Additionally, the party who was seeking to preclude the Government was not a party to the earlier litigation.\\nOur Supreme Court has also abandoned the requirement of mutuality for purposes of collateral estoppel. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1214, 1217 (1991).\\nThus, many jurisdictions no longer require that a litigant have been a party in the prior litigation or in privity with a party in the prior litigation in order to assert collateral estoppel. It is sufficient that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a previous party. .\\nId. (underline supplied).\\nOur Courts have also recognized that once a party to a prior proceeding has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in the first action, that issue may not be reargued by a party to the first proceeding. In re Asbestos Litigation (Lee), Del.Super., 517 A.2d 288, 293 (1986). In that regard, \\\"[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relit-igation of 'questions distinctly put in issue' and 'directly determined adversely to the party against which the estoppel is asserted.' \\\" Kostelanetz, Ritholz v. Himmelwright, 254 N.J.Super. 249, 603 A.2d 168, 169 (1991) (underline supplied) (quoting Eatough v. Board of Medical Examiners, 191 N.J.Super. 166, 465 A.2d 934 (1983)), aff'd, 264 N.J.Super. 578, 625 A.2d 488 (1993).\\nMutuality of parties need not exist for collateral estoppel to apply, but it must be shown that:\\n(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the subsequent action, (2) the prior action was a judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom it was asserted had been a party or in privity with a party to the earlier adjudication.\\nId. (citations omitted).\\nAccordingly, this Court determines that the State cannot be collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of harassment as described in the criminal complaint. The State was not a party to the protection from abuse hearing and in that regard, did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case against defendant. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.\\n. 10 Dele. \\u00a7 945-952.\\n. 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 949 provides the following forms of relief:\\n(1) Restrain the respondent from committing acts of domestic violence as defined in \\u00a7 945 of this title;\\n(2) Restrain the respondent from contacting or attempting to contact the petitioner;\\n(3) Grant exclusive possession of the residence or household to the petitioner or other resident, regardless of in whose name the residence is titled or leased. Such relief shall not affect title to any real property;\\n(4) Order that the petitioner be given temporary possession of specified personal property solely or jointly owned by respondent or petitioner, including but not limited to, motor vehicles, checkbooks, keys and other personal effects;\\n(5) Grant temporary custody of the children of the parties to the petitioner or to another family member, and provide for visitation with the respondent, if appropriate, including third party supervision of any visitation, if necessary, in accordance with Chapters 7 and 19 of Title 13;\\n(6) Order the respondent to pay support for the petitioner and/or for the parties' children, in accordance with Chapter 5 of Title 13, including temporary housing costs; (7) Order the respondent to pay to the petitioner or any other family member monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of domestic violence committed by the respondent, including medical, dental and counseling expenses, loss of earnings or other support, cost or repair or replacement of real or personal property damaged or taken, moving or other travel expenses and litigation costs, including attorney's fees;\\n(8) Order the respondent to temporarily relinquish to the sheriff, constable or to a police officer the respondent's firearms for the duration of the order;\\n(9) Prohibit the respondent from transferring, encumbering, concealing or in any way disposing of specified property owned or leased by parties;\\n(10) Order the respondent, petitioner and other protected class members, individually and/or as a group, to participate in treatment or counseling programs;\\n(11) Grant any other reasonable relief necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future domestic violence.\\n. 23 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 6101-6117 (original version at 35 P.S. \\u00a7 10181).\\n. Petitioner is defined to mean:\\n(i) A person who is a member of a protected class and files a petition alleging domestic violence against himself or herself or against his or her minor child or an infirm adult; ia) The Division of Child Protective Services acting in the interest of a minor child and files a petition alleging domestic violence; or (iii) The Division of Adult Protective Services acting in the interest of an infirm adult and files a petition alleging domestic violence.\\n10 Del.C. \\u00a7 945(3).\\n. The Court notes that a violation of a protective order which results in criminal contempt, followed by a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct which resulted in the violation, may offend the principles of double jeopardy. See U.S. v. Dixon,-U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993).\\n. By way of explanation, \\\"offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different parly. Defensive use of collateral estop-pel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party.\\\" United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 571-572 n. 4.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/12315925.json b/delaware/12315925.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bbd5750cbe0f3780992071109b0f6c634be155fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/12315925.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12315925\", \"name\": \"Adrian DIECKMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. REGENCY GP LP, Regency GP LLC, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, GP, L.P., Michael J. Bradley, James W. Bryant, Rodney L. Gray, John W. McReynolds, Matthew S. Ramsey and Richard Brannon, Defendants Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Dieckman v. Regency GP LP\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-01-20\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 208, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"358\", \"last_page\": \"369\", \"citations\": \"155 A.3d 358\", \"volume\": \"155\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:41:57.276675+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.\", \"parties\": \"Adrian DIECKMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. REGENCY GP LP, Regency GP LLC, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, GP, L.P., Michael J. Bradley, James W. Bryant, Rodney L. Gray, John W. McReynolds, Matthew S. Ramsey and Richard Brannon, Defendants Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Adrian DIECKMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. REGENCY GP LP, Regency GP LLC, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, GP, L.P., Michael J. Bradley, James W. Bryant, Rodney L. Gray, John W. McReynolds, Matthew S. Ramsey and Richard Brannon, Defendants Below, Appellees.\\nNo. 208, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: November 16, 2016\\nDecided: January 20, 2017\\nStuart M. Grant, Esquire (argued) and James J. Sabella, Esquire, Grant <& Eisen-hofer P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Mark Lebovitch, Esquire, Jeroen van Kwawegen, Esquire and Alla Zayenchik, Esquire, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, New York, New York; Mark C. Gardy, Esquire and James S. Notis, Esquire, Gardy & Notis, LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiff, Appellant, Adrian Dieckman.\\nRolin P. Bissell, Esquire and Tammy L. Mercer, Esquire, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael Holmes, Esquire (argued), Manuel Berrelez, Esquire and Craig Zieminski, Esquire, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Dallas, Texas for Defendants, Appellees, Regency GP LP, Regency GP LLC, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., Energy Transfer Partners, GP, L.P., Michael J. Bradley, Rodney L. Gray, John W. McReynolds and Matthew S. Ramsey.\\nDavid J. Teklits, Esquire and D. McKinley Measley, Esquire, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; M. Scott Barnard, Esquire, Michelle A. Reed, Esquire and Matthew V. Lloyd, Esquire, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Dallas, Texas for Defendants, Appellees, James W. Bryant and Richard Brannon.\\nBefore STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.\", \"word_count\": \"4990\", \"char_count\": \"32214\", \"text\": \"SEITZ, Justice:\\nIn this appeal, we again wade into the details of a master limited partnership agreement to decide whether the complaint's allegations can overcome the general partner's use of conflict resolution safe harbors to dismiss the case. The parties are identified by a host of confusing abbreviations, but the gist of the appeal is as follows.\\nThe plaintiff is a limited partner/unit-holder in the publicly-traded master limited partnership (\\\"MLP\\\"). The general partner proposed that the partnership be acquired through merger with another limited partnership in the MLP family. The seller and buyer were indirectly owned by the same entity, creating a conflict of interest. Because conflicts of interest often arise in MLP transactions, those who create and market MLPs have devised special ways to try to address them. The general partner in this case sought refuge in two of the safe harbor conflict resolution provisions of the partnership agreement \\u2014 \\\"Special Approval\\\" of the transaction by an independent Conflicts Committee, and \\\"Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval.\\\"\\nIn the MLP context, Special Approval typically means that a Conflicts Committee composed of members independent of the sponsor and its affiliates reviewed the transaction and made a recommendation to the partnership board whether to approve the transaction. Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval is typically just that \\u2014 a majority of unitholders unaffiliated with the general partner and its affiliates approve the transaction. Under the partnership agreement, if either safe harbor is satisfied, the transaction is deemed not to be a breach of the agreement.\\nThe partnership agreement required that the Conflicts Committee be independent, meaning that its members could not be serving on affiliate boards and were independent under the audit committee independence rules of the New York Stock Exchange. The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the general partner failed to satisfy the Special Approval safe harbor because the Conflicts Committee was itself conflicted. According to the plaintiff, one of the Committee's two members began evaluating the transaction while still a member of an affiliate's board, and then resigned from the affiliate's board four days after he began his review to then become a member of the Conflicts Committee. On the same day the transaction closed, the committee member was reappointed to the seat left vacant for him on the affiliate's board.\\nThe plaintiff also alleged that the general partner failed to satisfy the Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval safe harbor because the general partner made false and misleading statements in the proxy statement to secure that approval. In the 165-page proxy statement sent to the unitholders, the general partner failed to disclose the conflicts within the Conflicts Committee. Instead, the proxy statement stated that Special Approval had been obtained by an independent Conflicts Committee.\\nThe general partner moved to dismiss the complaint and claimed that, in the absence of express contractual obligations not to mislead investors or to unfairly manipulate the Conflicts Committee process, the general partner need only satisfy what the partnership agreement expressly required \\u2014 to obtain the safe harbor approvals and follow the minimal disclosure requirements. In other words, whatever the general partner said in the proxy statement, and whomever the general partner appointed to the Conflicts Committee, was irrelevant because only the express requirements of the partnership agreement controlled and displaced any implied obligations not to undermine the protections afforded unitholders by the safe harbors.\\nThe Court of Chancery side-stepped the Conflicts Committee safe harbor, but accepted the general partner's argument that the Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval safe harbor required dismissal of the case. The court held that, even though the proxy statement might have contained materially misleading disclosures, fiduciary duty principles could not be used to impose disclosure obligations on the general partner beyond those in the partnership agreement, because the partnership agreement disclaimed fiduciary duties. Further, the court agreed with the defendants that the only express disclosure requirement of the agreement in the event of a merger \\u2014 that the general partner simply provide either a summary of, or a copy of, the merger agreement \\u2014 displaced any implied contractual duty to disclose in the proxy statement material facts about the conflicts within the Conflicts Committee.\\nOn appeal, the plaintiff concedes that if the general partner met the requirements of either safe harbor, his breach of contract claim would fail. The plaintiff also does not argue with the Court of Chancery's ruling that the partnership agreement's express disclosure requirements cannot be supplanted by implied or fiduciary-based disclosure obligations. Instead, he argues that the Court of Chancery erred when it concluded that the general partner satisfied the Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval safe harbor, because he alleged sufficient facts to show that the approval was obtained through false and misleading statements. The plaintiff also claims that, for pleading stage purposes, he has made a sufficient showing that the Special Approval safe harbor was not satisfied, because the Conflicts Committee was not independent.\\nWe view the central issue in the dispute through a different lens than the Court of Chancery. The Court of Chancery was correct that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to supplant the express disclosure requirements of the partnership agreement. But the court focused too narrowly on the partnership agreement's disclosure requirements. Instead, the center of attention should have been on the conflict resolution provision of the partnership agreement.\\nThe partnership agreement's conflict resolution provision is a powerful tool in the general partner's hands because it can be used to shield a conflicted transaction from judicial review. But the conflicts resolution provision also operates for the unit-holders' benefit. It ensures that, before a safe harbor is reached by the general partner, unaffiliated unitholders have a vote, or the conflicted transaction is reviewed and recommended by an independent Conflicts Committee.\\nThe partnership agreement does not address how the general partner must conduct itself when seeking the safe harbors. But where, as here, the express terms of the partnership agreement naturally imply certain corresponding conditions, unithold-ers are entitled to have those terms enforced according to the reasonable expectations of the parties to the agreement. The implied covenant is well-suited to imply contractual terms that are so obvious\\u2014 like a requirement that the general partner not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct to obtain safe harbor approvals\\u2014 that the drafter would not have needed to include the conditions as express terms in the agreement.\\nWe find that the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts, which we must accept as true at this stage of the proceedings, that neither safe harbor was available to the general partner because it allegedly made false and misleading statements to secure Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval, and allegedly used a conflicted Conflicts Com mittee to obtain Special Approval. Thus, we reverse the Court of Chancery's order dismissing Counts I and II of the complaint.\\nI.\\nAs alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff, Adrian Dieckman, is a unitholder of Regency, The business entity defendants, their relationships, and other abbreviations are as follows:\\nRegency Energy Partners LP (\\\"Regency\\\") \\u2014 a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership engaged in the gathering and processing, contract compression, treating and transportation of natural gas and the transportation, fractionation and storage of natural gas liquids.\\nRegency General Partner LP (\\\"General Partner LP\\\") \\u2014 -the general partner of Regency.\\nRegency General Partner LLC (\\\"General Partner LLC\\\") \\u2014 a Delaware LLC and the general partner of General Partner LP.\\nEnergy Transfer Partners L.P. (\\\"ETP\\\") \\u2014 the general partner of Sunoco LP; a 43% owner of limited partnership interests in Sunoco and a 100% owner of Sunoco's distribution rights.\\nEnergy Transfer Partners, GP, L.P. (\\\"EGP\\\") \\u2014 the general partner of ETP. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (\\\"ETE\\\") \\u2014 indirectly owns Regency's general partner and ETP's general partner.\\nConflicts Committee \\u2014 the committee formed by the General Partner under \\u00a7 7.9(a) of the LP Agreement.\\nLP Agreement \\u2014 the Regency limited partnership agreement.\\nThe following is a diagram from the Court of Chancery opinion showing the interconnected relationships among the entities before the merger, and Regency's status after the merger:\\nThe remaining defendants are the six members of General Partner LP's board of directors \\u2014 Michael J. Bradley (also CEO of the General Partner), James W. Bryant, Rodney L. Gray, John W. McReynolds (also CFO and president of ETE), Matthew S. Ramsay, and Richard Brannon. Bryant and Brannon served on the Conflicts Committee of the General Partner's board. Brannon was a Sunoco director until January 20, 2015, and was reappointed to the Sunoco board on May 5, 2015. Bryant was appointed to Sunoco's board on May 5, 2015.\\nA.\\nAccording to the complaint and the proxy statement, distributed to unithold-ers, the ETP and ETE boards met to discuss a merger between ETP and Regency. ETP eventually made a merger proposal to Regency, where Regency would be merged into ETP for a combination of cash and stock using an exchange ratio of 0.4044 ETP common units for one Regency common unit, and a $137 million cash payment. Because of the undisputed conflicts of interest in the proposed merger transaction, the General Partner looked to the conflict resolution provisions of the LP Agreement.\\nUnder \\u00a7 7.9(a) of the LP Agreement, entitled \\\"Resolution of Conflicts of Interest; Standards of Conduct and Modification of Duties,\\\" unless otherwise provided in another agreement, the General Partner can resort to several safe harbors to im-muniz\\u00e9 conflicted transactions from judicial review:\\n[A]ny resolution or course of action by the General Partner or its Affiliates in respect of such conflict of interest shall be permitted and deemed approved by all Partners, and shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement . or of any duty stated or implied by law or equity, if the resolution or course of action in respect of such conflict of interest is (i) approved by Special Approval, (ii) approved by the vote of a majority of the Common Units (excluding Common Units owned by the General Partner and its Affiliates), (iii) on terms no less favorable to the Partnership than those generally being provided to or available from unrelated third parties, or (iv) fair and reasonable to the Partnership, taking into account the totality of the relationships between the parties involved (including other transactions that may be particularly favorable or advantageous to the Partnership).\\nThe General Partner sought the protections of the safe harbors by Special Approval under \\u00a7 7.9(a)(i) and Unaffiliated Unitholder Vote under \\u00a7 7.9(a)(ii). Special Approval is defined in the LPA as \\\"approval by a majority of the members of the Conflicts Committee.\\\" The Conflicts Committee must be:\\n[A] committee of the Board of Directors of the general partner of the General Partner composed entirely of two or more directors who are not (a) security holders, officers or employees of the General Partner, (b) officers, directors or employees of any Affiliate of the General Partner[,] or (c) holders of any ownership interest in the Partnership Group other than Common Units and who also meet the independence standards required of directors who serve on an audit committee of a board of directors established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission thereunder and by the National Securities Exchange on which the Common Units are listed or admitted to trading.\\nFor purposes of subsection (b), \\\"Affiliate\\\" is defined as any person \\\"that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, is controlled by or is under control with, the Person in question.\\\" Sunoco and the General Partner are both controlled by ETE, and are \\\"Affiliates,\\\" under the LP Agreement. Thus, Sunoco board members were not eligible to serve as members of the General Partner's Conflicts Committee. Nor was it clear that they would meet the audit committee independence rules of the New York Stock Exchange.\\nB.\\nThe General Partner appointed Brannon and Bryant to the Conflicts Committee. The complaint alleges that before the proposed transaction, Brannon was a Sunoco director. On January 16, 2015, ETE appointed Brannon to the General Partner's board, while still a director of Sunoco. The plaintiff claims that, from January 16-20, while a member of both boards, Brannon consulted informally on the proposed transaction. According to the complaint, Brannon then temporarily resigned from the Sunoco board on January 20, and on January 22, became an official member of the Conflicts Committee when formal resolutions were passed creating the Commit tee. Brannon and Bryant then negotiated on behalf of Regency with ETP and recommended the merger transaction to the General Partner. On April 30, 2015, the day that the merger closed, Brannon was reappointed to the Sunoco board, and Bryant was also appointed to Sunoco board.\\nThe complaint also alleges that the Conflicts Committee retained a conflicted financial advisor, J.P. Morgan. J.P. Morgan was supposedly chosen by Regency's CFO, Long, and not by the Conflicts Committee. Because it was allegedly known that Long was expected to become the CFO of ETP GP LLC, the plaintiff claims that J.P. Morgan was beholden to Long and would favor its long-term relationship with the Energy Transfer entities.\\nThe plaintiff claims that the negotiations between the Conflicts Committee and ETP were ceremonial and only lasted a few days. According to the complaint, between January 23 and January 25, the Conflicts Committee made a perfunctory and slightly increased counteroffer to ETP's offer, which would have achieved a 15% premium to the closing price of common units. ETP rejected the counteroffer, and the parties settled on ETP's opening bid of a 13.2% premium to the January 23 closing price. The Conflicts Committee recommended that the General Partner pursue the transaction on the original terms proposed by ETP, which the General Partner approved on January 25. The plaintiff alleges that the entire process from start to finish lasted nine days.\\nC.\\nThe LP Agreement only required minimal disclosure when a merger transaction was considered by the unitholders \\u2014 a summary of, or a copy of, the merger agreement. But the General Partner went beyond the minimal requirements in the LP Agreement. To gain Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval and the benefit of the safe harbor, the General Partner filed a 165-page proxy statement and disseminated it and a copy of the merger agreement to the unitholders.\\nThe proxy statement stated that the \\\"Conflicts Committee consists of two independent directors: Richard D. Brannon (Chairman) and James W. Bryant.\\\" It also stated that the Conflicts Committee approved the transaction, and such approval \\\"constituted 'Special Approval' as defined in the Regency partnership agreement.\\\" The proxy statement did not inform unit-holders about the circumstances of Bryant's alleged overlapping and shifting allegiances, including reviewing the proposed transaction while still a member of the Sunoco board, his nearly contemporaneous resignation from the Sunoco board and appointment to the General Partner's board and then the Conflicts Committee, or Brannon's appointment and Bryant's reappointment to the Sunoco board the day the transaction closed. At a special meeting of Regency's unitholders on April 28, 2015, a majority of Regency's unithold-ers, including a majority of its unaffiliated unitholders, approved the merger.\\nD.\\nAfter plaintiff filed his complaint challenging the fairness of the merger transaction, the defendants moved to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), invoking the protections of Special Approval and Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval under the LP Agreement. The Chancellor reached only the Unaffiliated Unitholder Vote safe harbor. After finding that all fiduciary duties were displaced by contractual terms, the court noted that the LP Agreement contained \\\"just a single disclosure requirement\\\" and thus the LP Agreement terms \\\"unambiguously extinguish the duty of disclosure and replace it with a single disclosure requirement.\\\" According to the court, given the express disclosure obligation, the implied covenant of good faith and fan- dealing \\\"has no work to do\\\" because \\\"the express waiver of fiduciary duties and the clearly defined disclosure requirement . prevent the implied covenant from adding any additional disclosure obligations to the agreement.\\\" Once the Unaffiliated Unitholder Vote safe harbor applied, the court dismissed the case because \\\"the Merger is deemed approved by all the limited partners, including plaintiff, and is immune to challenge for contractual breach.\\\"\\nII.\\nThe appeal comes to us from the Court of Chancery's decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. Our review is de novo.\\nA.\\nWe start with the settled principles of law governing Delaware limited partnerships. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (\\\"DRUPLA\\\") gives \\\"maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.\\\" One freedom often exercised in the MLP context is eliminating any fiduciary duties a partner owes to others in the partnership structure. The act allows drafters of Delaware limited partnerships to modify or eliminate fiduciary-based principles of governance, and displace them with contractual terms.\\nWith the contractual freedom accorded partnership agreement drafters, and the typical lack of competitive negotiations over agreement terms, come corresponding responsibilities on the part of investors to read carefully and understand their investment. Investors must appreciate that \\\"with the benefits of investing in alternative entities often comes the limitation of looking to the contract as the exclusive source of protective rights.\\\" In other words, investors can no longer hold the general partner to fiduciary standards of conduct, but instead must rely on the express language of the partnership agreement to sort out the rights and obligations among the general partner, the partnership, and the limited partner investors.\\nEven though the express terms of the agreement govern the relationship when fiduciary duties are waived, investors are not without some protections. For instance, in the case of an ambiguous partnership agreement of a publicly traded limited partnership, ambiguities are resolved as with publicly traded corporations, to give effect to the reading that best fulfills the reasonable expectations an investor would have had from the face of the agreement. The reason for this is simple. When investors buy equity in a public entity, they necessarily rely on the text of the public documents and public disclosures about that entity, and not on parol evidence. And, of course, another protection exists. The DRUPLA provides for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which cannot be eliminated by contract.\\nThe implied covenant is inherent in all contracts and is used to infer contract terms \\\"to handle developments or contractual gaps that the asserting party pleads neither party anticipated.\\\" It applies \\\"when the party asserting the implied covenant proves that the other party has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain that the asserting party reasonably expected.\\\" The reasonable expectations of the contracting parties are assessed at the time of contracting. In a situation like this, involving a publicly traded MLP, the pleading-stage inquiry focuses on whether, based on a reading of the terms of the partnership agreement and consideration of the relationship it creates between the MLP's investors and managers, the express terms of the agreement can be reasonably read to imply certain other conditions, or leave a gap, that would prescribe certain conduct, because it is necessary to vindicate the apparent intentions and reasonable expectations of the parties.\\nB.\\nThe Court of Chancery decided that the implied covenant could not be used to remedy what the plaintiff alleged were faulty safe harbor approvals because the LP Agreement waived fiduciary-based standards of conduct and contained an express contractual term addressing what disclosures were required in merger transactions. According to the court, the implied covenant had \\\"no work to do\\\" because the express disclosure requirement displaced the implied covenant.\\nThe Court of Chancery erred by focusing too narrowly on whether the express disclosure provision displaced the implied covenant. Instead, it should have focused on the language of the safe harbor approval process, and what its terms reasonably mean. Although the terms of the LP Agreement did not compel the General Partner to issue a proxy statement, it chose to undertake the transaction, which the LP Agreement drafters would have known required a pre-unitholder vote proxy statement. Thus, the General Partner voluntarily issued a proxy statement to induce unaffiliated unitholders to vote in favor of the merger transaction. The favorable vote led not only to approval of the transaction, but allowed the General Partner to claim the protections of the safe harbor and immunize the merger transaction from judicial review. Not surprisingly, the express terms of the LP Agreement did not address, one way or another, whether the General Partner could use false or misleading statements to enable it to reach the safe harbors.\\nWe find that implied in the language of the LP Agreement's conflict resolution provision is a requirement that the General Partner not act to undermine the protections afforded unitholders in the safe harbor process. Partnership agreement drafters, whether drafting on their own, or sitting across the table in a competitive negotiation, do not include obvious and provocative conditions in an agreement like \\\"the General Partner will not mislead unitholders when seeking Unaffiliated Un-itholder Approval\\\" or \\\"the General Partner will not subvert the Special Approval process by appointing conflicted members to the Conflicts Committee.\\\" But the terms are easily implied because \\\"the parties must have intended them and have only failed to express them because they are too obvious to need expression.\\\" Stated another way, \\\"some aspects of the deal are so obvious to the participants that they never think, or see no need, to address them.\\\"\\nOur use of the implied covenant is based on the words of the contract and not the disclaimed fiduciary duties. Under the LP Agreement, the General Partner did not have the full range of disclosure obligations that a corporate fiduciary would have had. Yet once it went beyond the minimal disclosure requirements of the LP Agreement, and issued a 165-page proxy statement to induce the unaffiliated unit-holders not only to approve the merger transaction, but also to secure the Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval safe harbor, implied in the language of the LP Agreement's conflict resolution provision was an obligation not to mislead unitholders.\\nFurther, the General Partner was required to form a Conflicts Committee comprised of members who:\\n[A]re not (a) security holders, officers or employees of the General Partner, (b) officers, directors or employees of any Affiliate of the General Partner or (c) holders of any ownership interest in the Partnership Group other than Common Units and who also meet the independence standards required of directors who serve on an audit committee of a board of directors established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission thereunder and by the National Securities Exchange on which the Common units are listed or admitted to trading.\\nAs with the contract language regarding Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval, this language is reasonably read by unitholders to imply a condition that a Committee has been established whose members genuinely qualified as unaffiliated with the General Partner and independent at all relevant times. Implicit in the express terms is that the Special Committee membership be genuinely comprised of qualified members and that deceptive conduct not be used to create the false appearance of an unaffiliated, independent Special Committee.\\nC.\\nThe plaintiff has agreed that the LP Agreement's safe harbor provisions, if satisfied, would preclude judicial review of the transaction. But we find that the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support his claims that those safe harbors were unavailable to the General Partner. Instead of staffing the Conflicts Committee with independent members, the plaintiff alleges that the chair of the two-person Committee started reviewing the transaction while still a member of an Affiliate board. Just a few days before the General Partner created the Conflicts Committee, the same director resigned from the Affiliate board and became a member of the General Partner's board, and then a Conflicts Committee member.\\nFurther, after conducting the negotiations with ETE over the merger terms and recommending the merger transaction to the General Partner, the two members of the Conflicts Committee joined an Affiliate's board the day the transaction closed. The plaintiff also alleges that the Conflicts Committee members failed to satisfy the audit committee independence rules of the New York Stock Exchange, as required by the LP Agreement. In the proxy statement used to solicit Unaffiliated Unitholder Approval of the merger transaction, the plaintiff alleges that the General Partner materially misled the unitholders about the independence of the Conflicts Committee members. In deciding to approve the merger, a reasonable unitholder would have assumed based on the disclosures that the transaction was negotiated and approved by a Conflicts Committee composed of persons who were not \\\"affiliates\\\" of the general partner and who had the independent status dictated by the LP Agreement. This assurance was one a reasonable investor may have considered a material fact weighing in favor of the transaction's fairness.\\nThe plaintiff has therefore pled facts raising sufficient doubt about the General Partner's ability to use the safe harbors to shield the merger transaction from judicial review. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Chancery dismissing Counts I and II of the complaint.\\n. Like the Court of Chancery, for simplicity's sake we collapse General Partner LP and General Partner LLC into one as the \\\"General Partner\\\" of Regency, recognizing that there were two layers of general partners.\\n. The proxy statement incorporated into the complaint and relied on by the parties is properly considered on a motion to dismiss. Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 96 n.2 (Del. 2013).\\n. App. to Opening Br. at 105 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 7.9(a)).\\n. Id. at 70 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 1.1).\\n. The general partner of the General Partner is Regency GP LLC. As noted before, for simplicity salte, \\\"General Partner\\\" in this decision includes both Regency GP LP and Regency GP LLC.\\n. App. to Opening Br. at 62 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 1.1).\\n. Id, at 49 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 1.1).\\n. Id. at 124-35 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 14.3(a)).\\n. Id. at 215.\\n. Id.\\n. Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 2016 WL 1223348, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2016).\\n. Id.\\n. Id. at *10.\\n. Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808, 813 (Del. 2013).\\n. 6 Del. C. \\u00a7 17-1101(c).\\n. 6 Del. C. \\u00a7 L7 \\u2014 1101(d).\\n. The Haynes Family Trust v. Kinder Morgan G.P., Inc., 135 A.3d 76, 2016 WL 912184, at *2 (Del. Mar. 10, 2016).\\n. Bank of New York Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding Trust II, 65 A.3d 539, 551-52 (Del. 2013) (construing an agreement against the drafter to give effect to the \\\"investors' reasonable expectation\\\" using a species of the contra proferentem doctrine); see also Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 365 n. 56 (Del. 2013); SI Mgmt., L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37, 42-43 (Del. 1998).\\n.Stockman v. Heartland Industrial Partners, L.P., 2009 WL 2096213 at *5 (Del. Ch. My 14, 2009) (ambiguities are construed against drafter \\\"to protect the reasonable expectations of people who join a partnership or other entity after it was formed and must rely on the face of the operating agreement to understand their rights and obligations when making the decision to join,\\\").\\n. See 6 Del. C. \\u00a7 17 \\u2014 1101(d).\\n. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Del. 2010) (internal citations omitted).\\n. Id. at 1126 (citing Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005)).\\n. Id. (citing Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Del. Ch. 2000)).\\n. Dutchman, 2016 WL 1223348, at *9.\\n. Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n of Del., 101 A.2d 308, 313-14 (Del. Ch. 1953), aff'd, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954).\\n. In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Deriv. Litig., 2014 WL 2768782, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 12, 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C. v. Brinckerhoff, 152 A.3d 1248, 2016 WL 7380418 (Del. 2016) (citing Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986)); 508 A.2d at 880 (\\\"[P]arties occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about those expectations.\\\") (quoting Corbin on Contracts (Kaufman Supp. 1984), \\u00a7 570)); see also Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 1997 WL 525873, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1997), aff'd, 70S A.2d 989 (Del. 1998) (\\\"Terms are to be implied in a contract not because they are reasonable but because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them and have only failed to express them because they are too obvious to need expression.\\\" (quoting Danby, 101 A.2d at 313-14)).\\n. App. to Opening Br. at 62 (LP Agreement \\u00a7 1.1).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1773695.json b/delaware/1773695.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0fc00ab0114b8c0401fc4b726d74791462838b96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1773695.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1773695\", \"name\": \"LESLIE ANGELINI and ANDREW KOPYLEC, Petitioners, v. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY, and the HONORABLE A. JAMES GALLO and ROBERT WAHL, sitting as Judges of the said Court and the MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF WILMINGTON and the HONORABLE THOMAS HERLIHY, JR., and SIDNEY J. CLARK, sitting as Judges of the said Court, Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Angelini v. Court of Common Pleas\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-11-17\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 76\", \"first_page\": \"84\", \"last_page\": \"88\", \"citations\": \"58 Del. 84\", \"volume\": \"58\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:39:41.520163+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"LESLIE ANGELINI and ANDREW KOPYLEC, Petitioners, v. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY, and the HONORABLE A. JAMES GALLO and ROBERT WAHL, sitting as Judges of the said Court and the MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF WILMINGTON and the HONORABLE THOMAS HERLIHY, JR., and SIDNEY J. CLARK, sitting as Judges of the said Court, Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"LESLIE ANGELINI and ANDREW KOPYLEC, Petitioners, v. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY, and the HONORABLE A. JAMES GALLO and ROBERT WAHL, sitting as Judges of the said Court and the MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF WILMINGTON and the HONORABLE THOMAS HERLIHY, JR., and SIDNEY J. CLARK, sitting as Judges of the said Court, Respondents.\\nNovember 17, 1964.\\nWOLCOTT and CAREY, Justices, and STIFTEL, Judge, sitting.\\nVictor F. Battaglia, of Theisen & Lank, for petitioners.\\nCharles F. Richards Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nNo. 76,\\n1964.\", \"word_count\": \"1113\", \"char_count\": \"6789\", \"text\": \"CAREY, Justice.\\nThe petitioners filed an action in the Superior Court seeking a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent Courts from proceeding further with various criminal charges pending against them. These charges were alleged violations of certain provisions of T. 21 Ch. 41, our traffic regulations or \\\"rules of the road,\\\" committed prior to June 5, 1964. By 54 L. of D. Ch. 160, approved on December 5, 1963, those \\\"rules of the road\\\" were repealed and new ones adopted, although the language of many were in fact unchanged. The new statute became effective six months after approval by the Governor, i. e., June 5,1964. Petitioners maintain that there is no saving clause in the new Act permitting prosecution of violations which occurred before its effective date, and that such violations therefore cannot be further prosecuted.\\nThe Superior Court certified to us the following questions for decision:\\n\\\"1. Did Chapter 160, Vol. 54, Del. Laws repeal the provisions in Title 21, Chapter 41, Del. C. \\u2014Rules of Road \\u2014 so that proceedings pending on the effective day of Chapter 160, Vol. 54 Del. Laws could not be further prosecuted?\\n\\\"2. Is Section 5 of Chapter 160, Vol. 54 Del. Laws to be construed as a 'savings clause' thus keeping effective any criminal prosecution pending at the time that Chapter 160, Vol. 54 Del. Laws became effective in accordance with its provisions?\\\"\\nWe accepted certification because the disposition of a very considerable number of cases pending in various trial Courts has been stayed pending determination of these questions.\\n54 L. of D.Ch. 160 contains a lengthy preamble reciting that our traffic regulations required modernizing and revising so as to make them uniform with those of other states; the purpose of this act is to accomplish that result. Section 1 commences with these words: \\\"Chapter 41 Title 21 of the Delaware Code, is repealed and a new Chapter 41 and a new Chapter 42 are inserted in lieu thereof \\\". Section 5 provides: \\\"This act shall not have a retroactive effect and shall not apply to any traffic accident, to any cause of action arising out of a traffic accident or judgment arising therefrom or to any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State, occurring prior to the effective date of this Act.\\\"\\nRespondents do not dispute the proposition that, where a criminal statute is repealed and there is no express or implied savings clause, all actions which have not attained final judgment are to be terminated. They contend, however, that Section 5 is a savings clause which preserves all pending criminal proceedings. We agree. The section states that the Act shall not apply to \\\"any violation of the motor vehicle laws of this State, occurring prior to the effective date of this Act.\\\" A part of \\\"this Act\\\" was the repealer clause, and Section 5 applies to that repealer as well as to the other parts of the statute. In other words, the repealer itself has no effect upon violations occurring prior to June 5,1964.\\nPetitioners contend, however, that Section 5 does not preserve pending criminal prosecutions because it does not specifically say so; that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of a defendant; and that Section 5 is ambiguous and must be given that interpretation most favorable to petitioners. They suggest that the only purpose of the quoted language is to insure that no prior violation should be prosecuted under the new provision. There are at least two answers to these contentions. First, there is no requirement that a savings clause be couched in any specific language; Crawford on Statutory Construction Sec. 300; any language will suffice which fairly shows a legislative intent not to forgive prior violations. Secondly, if we accept arguendo the suggestion that the clause is capable of two interpretations, we would unhesitatingly construe Section 5 contrary to petitioners' theory.\\nThe object of construction is to ascertain the legislative intent from the language used. Strict construction of a statute is more in the nature of an aid than an end; it cannot be relied upon as a single, precise formula for solving a problem. It does not eliminate from consideration other guides to interpretation. Blaustein v. Standard Oil Co., 4 Terry 449, 49 A.2d 726. It is a fallacy to say that, if the statute can have two meanings, the Court must automatically accept that meaning which is favorable to a defendant. Thus, the rule of strict construction does not prevent consideration of the general purpose of the Legislature and the acceptance of that meaning which best harmonizes with the statutory design; likewise, it does not require an unreasonable construction, or one which results in an injustice which the Legislature should not be presumed to have intended. 50Am.Jur.436 etc.\\nIn the present case, the stated purpose of the Legislature was to make our motor vehicle laws substantially uniform with those of other states in order to promote safety and transportation efficiency. Obviously, that purpose would not be served, but would actually be harmed, by interpreting the clause in the manner suggested by petitioners. Furthermore, such an interpretation would impute to the Legislature an intent to discriminate without a reasonable basis therefor, i.e., an intent, formed six months in advance, to punish those offenders whose cases were concluded within the six-month period, but to forgive those whose cases could not be disposed of during that time. We are unwilling to ascribe to our lawmaking authorities any such discriminatory intent when the language used by them is reasonably capable of a contrary construction.\\nWe neither approve nor disapprove the holding in State v. McGonigal, Del. Super., 189 A.2d 670, but simply note that the statute there involved contained no provision similar to Section 5 of the present act. We likewise refrain from commenting upon a theory advanced by respondents, to the effect that a preservation of pending prosecutions is implied from the reenactment of new regulations simultaneously with repeal of the old ones.\\nQuestion No. 1 will be answered in the negative and question No. 2 will be answered in the affirmative.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1778748.json b/delaware/1778748.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3666ac27a14e84d4b01622b42446d444546c0bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1778748.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1778748\", \"name\": \"Michael W. Audet, a Minor Child, by his father and next friend, Edgar J. Audet, and Edgar J. Audet, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Kathleen Convery, a Minor Child, and Robert J. Convery, father of Kathleen Convery, and Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Delaware, a Delaware corporation, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Audet v. Convery\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-01-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 474\", \"first_page\": \"333\", \"last_page\": \"336\", \"citations\": \"55 Del. 333\", \"volume\": \"55\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:59:10.871698+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Michael W. Audet, a Minor Child, by his father and next friend, Edgar J. Audet, and Edgar J. Audet, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Kathleen Convery, a Minor Child, and Robert J. Convery, father of Kathleen Convery, and Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Delaware, a Delaware corporation, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Michael W. Audet, a Minor Child, by his father and next friend, Edgar J. Audet, and Edgar J. Audet, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Kathleen Convery, a Minor Child, and Robert J. Convery, father of Kathleen Convery, and Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Delaware, a Delaware corporation, Defendants.\\n(January 9, 1963.)\\nStorey, J., sitting.\\nEdmund D. Lyons (of the firm of Morris, James, Hitch-ens and Williams) for the Plaintiffs.\\nDavid Snellenburg, II (of the firm of Killoran and Van Brunt) for the Defendants.\\nSuperior Court for New Castle County,\\nNo. 474,\\nCivil Action, 1962.\", \"word_count\": \"611\", \"char_count\": \"3577\", \"text\": \"Storey, Justice.\\nThis is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Kathleen Convery. The action sounds in tort and is predicated upon the loss of plaintiff's eye allegedly caused by a negligent act of defendant.\\nOn June 29, 1961, defendant, Kathleen Convery, was six years, eleven months and three weeks old. She was playing \\\"house\\\" in a public park when the plaintiff, accompanied by some of his friends, interfered with the activities by sitting on a large rock where she had been playing. She asked them to move so that she could break a bottle against the rock, and even though they refused to move, she nevertheless threw the glass bottle, causing it to break and shatter. It shattered and a piece struck plaintiff, destroying his right eye.\\nDefendant, Kathleen, asserts and urges that she was incapable of negligence as a matter of law.\\nThe Supreme Court of Delaware has already established that a minor may be guilty of contributory negligence. It has further held that a question of this type hinges on the maturity and capacity of the child, the ability and understanding to appreciate the particular dangers involved, as well as other pertinent circumstances. Thus, the question of negligence is one for determination by a jury. Pokoyski v. McDermott, 3 Storey 253, 167 A. 742 (1961).\\nI recognize that the law in this area abounds in conflicts. However, our Supreme Court has clearly defined the law with regard to contributory negligence of a minor and I fail to perceive the necessity of creating other criteria for a minor's primary negligence. They go hand in hand.\\nThis Court recognizes that some jurisdictions follow the rule that a minor, below the age of seven years, cannot be guilty of actionable negligence as a matter of law. I cannot, however, adopt such a rule. On the other hand, there is merit to the theory that a rebuttable presumption exists that a minor below the age of seven years cannot be guilty of actionable negligence. Bush v. New Jersey & N. Y. Transit Co., 30 N. J. 345, 153 A. 2d 28, 77 A. L. R 2d 908 (1959).\\nI do not consider this position to conflict with Pokoyski, supra, since that rule relates to minors in general. Because the minor involved in Pokoyski was ten years of age, it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to express itself on any refinements to the general rule stated therein.\\nI, therefore, hold that a minor below the age of seven years can be guilty of actionable negligence. However, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption that such minors are as a general rule incapable of negligence. It thus follows that such matters are within the province of the jury and I so hold.\\nI assume, however, there is some age under seven at which age it could and would be said as a matter of law that such a minor could not be guilty of either primary or contributory negligence.\\nFor the reasons assigned, the motion of the defendant, Kathleen Convery, for summary judgment, is denied.\\nOn presentation, Order will be entered accordingly.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1861457.json b/delaware/1861457.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6edcb32f4d915dafa6abd371101f13947550bec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1861457.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1861457\", \"name\": \"Daniel Woolman and John W. Sullivan, trading as Woolman & Sullivan, v. Jonathan Zebley and Daniel Morris, trading as Zebley & Morris\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Woolman v. Zebley\", \"decision_date\": \"1857\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"459\", \"last_page\": \"460\", \"citations\": \"1 Houst. 459\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:07:22.298157+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Daniel Woolman and John W. Sullivan, trading as Woolman & Sullivan, v. Jonathan Zebley and Daniel Morris, trading as Zebley & Morris.\", \"head_matter\": \"Daniel Woolman and John W. Sullivan, trading as Woolman & Sullivan, v. Jonathan Zebley and Daniel Morris, trading as Zebley & Morris.\\nLeave to' amend a replication will not be granted after the plaintiff has closed his testimony, and the defendant has proceeded to examine witnesses in support of his plea, to enable the plaintiff to take advantage of such proof, by the amendment asked for.\\nDeclaration in assum/psit. Plea, release. Replication that the release was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. After the jury had been sworn and the plaintiffs had closed their testimony, and the defendants were proceeding with the examination of their witnesses, and had proved the execution of the release from the plaintiffs to the de fendants, and its subsequent loss, but were unable to state from recollection the terms and conditions of it, the counsel for the plaintiffs asked the leave of the Court to withdraw and amend their replication to the plea of release, so as to traverse the plea generally, without replying per fraudem, &c.\\nPatterson, for the plaintiffs.\\nGordon, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"229\", \"char_count\": \"1409\", \"text\": \"By the Court:\\nThe application to amend the replication at this stage of the trial comes too late, after the plaintiffs have closed their testimony and the defendants have proceeded to offer evidence on the very point which the plaintiffs now propose to take advantage of by an amendment of their replication.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1861533.json b/delaware/1861533.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78fc0759c4b8a2f84a4a1f01da3b3d31f9a28b53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1861533.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1861533\", \"name\": \"The Delaware Railroad Company v. Beniah Tharp\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Delaware Railroad v. Tharp\", \"decision_date\": \"1855\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"149\", \"last_page\": \"175\", \"citations\": \"1 Houst. 149\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:07:22.298157+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Delaware Railroad Company v. Beniah Tharp.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Delaware Railroad Company v. Beniah Tharp.\\nThe Delaware Railroad Company was chartered in 1836, with authority to construct a railroad throughout the length of the State, hut no company was organized under the charter at that time. In 1849 the Legislature revived and amended the charter, with authority to the company to construct a railroad on a reduced scale, to extend from Dona River, in Kent, to the Nanticoke River, in Sussex County, under which amendment the company was duly organized, and under the charter as thus amended the defendant subscribed for forty shares in the qapital stock of the company, on which a call of three dollars per share was made by the directors of the company, payable on the first day of December, 1852. In 1853 the company applied to the Legislature for the purpose, and the Legislature amended its charter so as to authorize the abandonment Of the terminus of the railroad at Dona River, and that portion o^ it projected from Dover to that point, and to extend and unite it with the New Castle and Erenchtown Railroad in New Castle County, on which ground the defendant refused to pay for the call or instalment demanded of him. Held that this change in the direction, location and construction of the road, authorized by the Legislature, and adopted by the company Subsequent to the subscription to its stock by the defendant, did not absolve him from his subscription for the stock, but that - he was .still bound to pay for it.\\nThe grsjit of an act of incorporation by the State is professedly for the public good generally, and there is an inherent right in the Legislature to amend, alter and change it with the assent of the corporation, and those who become corporators in it do so with that contingency, and their engagements are therefore subject to it.\\nIf a subscriber to stock enters generally into a corporation, without specific stipulations, he is bound and concluded by the action of a majority of the corporation, and if the Legislature amends and changes the charter with the assent of the company, he will not be thereby discharged from his liability for his subscription for stock made previous to the amendment and change of the charter. But if the subscription for stock is of such a character, and the change in the object of the charter is of such a nature as to increase the amount which he was .originally bound to pay by virtue of his subscription to the stock, it will absolve him from his contract and liability to pay for it.\\nThere is no substantial distinction between the terms subscriber ahd stockholder in the Delaware Bailrpad charter, and a subscriber may be sued for arrears of subscription for stock due from him, without proof that certificates of stock have been issued or tendered to him by the company. '\\nTried before Milligan and Wootten, Justices. Harrington, Ch. J.,-did not sit in the case, as he was at the time the president and a stockholder of the company.\\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought by the Delaware Railroad Company against Beniah Tharp, to recover an instalment of three dollars per share on forty shares subscribed for by him in the capital stock of the company, with interest thereon at two per cent, per month after the expiration of thirty days from the time the instalment be- . came payable. Plea, non assumpsit, with leave of counsel on the other side to give the special matters of defence in evidence under the general issue.\\nThe original charter of the Delaware Railroad Company was enacted by the Legislature in 1836, and authorized the location and construction of a railroad from any point on or near the Wilmington and Susquehanna Railroad, or the Hew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad, to the southern line of the State, in a direction towards Cape Charles, or the southern part of the peninsula, with lateral projections to any other points or places within the limits of the State. In 1849 the charter was re-enacted, and amended so as to authorize the location and construction of a rail road from Dona River, in Kent County, to the Nanticoke River at or near Seaford, in Sussex County, under which the company was organized, and the defendant subscribed for the forty shares of capital stock before mentioned, and was elected one of the board of directors of the company. In August, 1852, the directors, the defendant then being a member of the board, made their first call upon the subscribers to the stock of the company, under which the instalment in question became payable on the first day of December following. At the first annual meeting of the stockholders, in January succeeding, the right of the defendant to vote in the meeting was objected to because of the nonpayment of the instalment due from him, and his vote was rejected, after which he attended no more, meetings of the company. By an act of the Legislature, passed in 1853, the charter of the company was again amended with the consent of the stockholders, to authorize the company to extend and unite their road with the New Castle and Frenchtown Railroad, on such terms and conditions as should be agreed upon between the two companies; and at the same session an act was also passed to authorize the New Castle and Frenchtown Railroad Company and the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, or either of them, to guarantee the bonds of the Delaware Railroad Company to such an amount and on such conditions as should be agreed upon, to hold stock in the latter company, and to contract and agree for the construction, equipment, maintenance and operation of the Delaware Railroad, on such terms and conditions as should be agreed upon by them, provided such terms and conditions should be approved at a meeting of the stockholders of the latter company, to be called for that purpose, by a majority of the stock of said company there represented. By virtue of these two acts of the Legislature, the Delaware Railroad Company, with the consent of a majority of its stockholders, abandoned Dona River as a terminus of their railroad, and renounced the construction of it between Dover and that point, as designed and contemplated at the time when the defendant subscribed for the forty shares in the capital stock of the company, and had agreed with the Philadelphia, \\\"Wilmington and Baltimore \\u00a1Railroad Company for the extension and construction of it to unite with the \\u00a1New Castle and Frenchtown Railroad.\\nOn the part of the defendant it was admitted by his counsel that he had subscribed for forty shares of stock in the Delaware Railroad Company prior to the month of May, 1852, and, after proving the organization of the company by the subscription of the aggregate amount of stock required by the charter, and the election of the necessary officers and the publication of the call, including the instalment in question demanded of the defendant, it was admitted by the counsel for the plaintiff that all the acts of the Legislature relative to the company, passed since 1849, had been accepted by it, and .now constituted portions of its charter; and that, since the defendant had subscribed for his stock in the company, the company had ceased working on that part of the road which extended from Dover to Dona River, and were then constructing ,a railroad from the \\u00a1New Oastle and Frenchtown Railroad to connect with the Delaware Railroad at Dover, which would be much longer, and would consequently cost much more than the road projected from the latter place to Dona River. That the company had leased the whole road to the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, under an agreement of the two companies, with the consent of a majority of the stockholders of the former company, and with the aid of the latter company, it was then engaged in constructing the Delaware Railroad from the New Castle and Frenchtown Railroad, instead of Dona River, to the Nanticoke River, at or near Seaford. The counsel for the plaintiff then rested their case.\\nC. S. Layton, for defendant,\\nmoved for a nonsuit, on the ground that sufficient evidence had not been adduced to prove that the defendant was a stockholder in the company, because there was no proof that any certificate of stock was ever delivered or tendered to him for a share of stock subscribed for by him. But this the president and directors of the company were required to do by the seventh section of the charter of the company, which provided that the president and directors first chosen should procure certificates of stock for all the shares of said company, and should deliver one certificate, signed by the president, and countersigned by the treasurer, and sealed with the seal of the company, to each person, for every share by him subscribed and held, which was made transferable at his pleasure in the mode prescribed, subject, however, to all payments due or to become due thereon. It was manifest, from the peculiar phraseology of this provision of the charter, that the Legislature designed that the certificates of stock should be issued immediately to each subscriber for every share of stock subscribed by him, in order to constitute him and his assignee a stockholder in the company, and to entitle him or his assignee to vote as such, and to exercise all the rights and privileges of a stockholder in it, subject, nevertheless, to all the calls or instalments then due, or thereafter to become due, on every share of stock subscribed or transferred by him. If such was the correct construction of the seventh section of the charter, then it was clearly incumbent on the company to tender the certificates of stock due to the defendant, and to show that they were ready and willing to do all that was required of them by the charter in regard to the defendant, before they could maintain this action against him.\\nJames A. Bayard, for the plaintiff:\\nIn reply to the objection raised, he had first to say that, by the second section of the charter, it was provided that, as soon as twenty thousand shares were subscribed, the stockholders should be incorporated by the name of the \\u201c Delaware Railroad Company,\\u201d and by that name should have power to sue and to exercise the usual rights and franchises of a corporation. It was then, therefore, that every subscriber for stock \\\"became a corporator or stockholder in the company. It was the subscription for stock, not the issuing of certificates of stock, that then constituted the defendant and every other subscriber a stockholder in the company, and to vote and act as such; otherwise there could have been no organization of this company by the election of the required officers, which had to precede the collection of any money on the subscription for stock, as none was required to he paid in at the time of subscribing, or before organizing the company. It was, however, in every ease, the subscription, and not the issuing of certificates of stock, that constituted a subscriber a stockholder in an incorporated company. Ang. and Ames on Corp., secs. 113, 411. The subscription is evidence that he is a stockholder, and enables him to transfer his stock by assignment in the mode prescribed by the charter or by-laws of the company, and that assignment would constitute the assignee a stockholder, although he was not an original subscriber; hut au original subscriber was made a corporator or stockholder by the act itself, and was so with or without a certificate. The remedies between him and the company were mutual and correlative, for he could compel the company to issue the certificate to him, and the company could sue and compel him to pay his subscription. Chester Glass Company v. Demey, 16 Mass. Rep. 100.\\nW. Saulsbury, for the defendant:\\nThe court would find, on examination, that the charter spoke of two classes of persons in this connection. One class was termed subscribers, the other stockholders. The defendant was not sued as a stockholder, and was nowhere denominated a stockholder in any part of the pleadings, but always a subscriber to the stock of the company. There was no provision, however, in the charter for suing a subscriber as such, hut it authorizes the company to sue a stockholder for such a cause of action; and this provision followed the other provision in the charter, which required certificates of stock to he issued to the subscribers as the evidence that they were stockholders in the company. Such was the construction which all the provisions of the charter when taken and considered together required in his opinion. The act seemed to distinguish between a subscriber and a stockholder, and to require that certificates of stock should at once be issued to constitute the latter character, and gave this remedy only against stockholders as such; but the suit was against the defendant as a subscriber merely, without alleging any reason for withholding the certificates due to him under the seventh section of the charter, and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the action. .\\nBy the Court:\\nWe think there is no substantial distinction in the charter between the meaning of the terms subscriber and stockholder as indifferently employed in it, and that a subscriber may be sued even under this charter for arrears due from him on his subscription without proof that certificates of stock had been issued or tendered to him. We do not consider that there is anything in the charter to require or warrant the refined distinction contended for by the counsel for the defendant. We, therefore, refuse the motion for a nonsuit.\\nN. B. Smithers, for the plaintiff:\\nIn the year 1836, the Legislature, believing that such an improvement would be a great public benefit, incorporated the Delaware Railroad Company, to construct a railroad throughout the length of the State. But little more was done under it, however, than to make the preliminary surveys and an estimate of the cost of its construction, until the year 1849, when a supplement was passed to that act, reviving, but reducing the extent of the projected enterprise, by altering the termini of the road from Dona River, in Kent County, to the Nanticoke River, at or near Seaford, in Sussex County, and authorizing subscriptions to the capital stock of the company as thus modified. The commissioners for opening books met, as prescribed in the act, and the defendant subscribed for forty shares in the capital stock of the company ; and at the first meeting of the subscribers or stockholders he was elected one of the directors in the company. A call for an instalment of three dollars on each share of stock subscribed for was made by the board of directors, on the 22d of August, 1852, payable on the first day of December following, which meeting of the board he attended, and pif which call he received due and formal notice. Afterwards, at the ensuing session of the Legislature, which commenced in January, 1853, the directors, with the sanction and consent of a majority of the stock-, holders, applied for a farther amendment and modification of the charter of the company, to authorize the abandonment of the terminus of the road at Dona River, and to project and extend it further up the State, so as to connect and unite it with the Rew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad in Rew Castle County, which amendment and authority was granted by the Legislature, and was adopted by a majority of the stockholders at a meeting afterwards convened for that purpose; and the company has since accordingly abandoned the Dona terminus, and the construction of that part of the road which lies between that point and Dover, and is now engaged in constructing it from the Rew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad to Seaford, on the Ranticoke River. The defendant has since refused to pay the call for the instalment of three dollars a share on the stock subscribed for by him, and insists that by reason of this change in the location and construction of the road, since he subscribed for the stock, he is discharged from the duty and legal liability which he then contracted to pay it.\\nTo determine the question thus presented it was necessary in the first place to consider the status of a corpora-tor, and what constitutes a cbrpovator. Row, what was a corporation ? For a legal definition of the term he, should refer to' a well-known \\u2018authority, Ang. and Ames on Corp. 1. And how did such a body politic or corporate act ? It acted by a majority of the corporators, and when the majority determined, the minority was absolutely lost and absorbed in the majority, and there was then in legal contemplation no minority. Ang. and Ames on Corp., sec. 499; Grindley v. Barker, 1 Bos. and Pul. 235. The act of the majority concludes the minority, and becomes the act of the minority and of the whole body. For the right of a corporation to apply to the Legislature for an amendment of its charter, to authorize alterations and variations in its undertakings, he would refer to a single case, which fully sustained it in its broadest and most comprehensive scope. Ware v. The Grand, Junction Water Company, 2 Russ. and Milnes Ch. Rep. 470. The defendant individually, or simply as Beniah Tharp, had no contract touching this matter with the State, but the contract was between the State and the company, and the contract on which he was sued was not between him and the State, but between him and the company, and there was no contract, either express or implied, between, him and the latter that it should not, if a majority of the stockholders should deem it advisable, apply to the Legislature for an amendment and modification of its charter, to secure in a better and more effectual way the objects of the incorporation. The relation which he bore to the State in the matter was only as a member of the company, and as a member his existence was\\\" merged in the corporation, and he was bound by the act of the majority, Gray v. The Monongahela Navigation Company, 2 Watts and Serg. 156. Whenever a person entered into a corporation as a member of it he did so subject to the right of the State to vary or alter the undertaking with the consent of the corporation, unless it was expressly stipulated at the time that it should not be done, even though the alteration might plunge the company in greater expense than was originally contemplated; because the subscriber is not bound to contribute any more than he subscribed to the original enterprise, and the State does not compel the change, but only consents that the company may make it, and if determined upon, it is the act of the company and binds every member of it. Middle and Great Western Railway Company v. Gor don, 16 Mees, and Wels. 804. He was aware that one case might and probably would be cited against him on this point, the case of The Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company v. Crosswell, 5 Hill, 383. But that case was not sound, and had been since overruled and repudiated, even in Hew York, by the case of White v. The Syracuse and Utica Railroad Company, 14 Barb. 559. In the latter case the Court recognized the principle, that the charter was a contract between the State and the corporation, and that there was no contract involved or implied in it between the State and an individual corporator, and that the company had the power for such a purpose to bind the corporator by its act and consent. The principle was now too well established to be shaken, that the act of incorporation was a contract between its members and the sovereign who granted it, formed by the consent of both parties, and so far as the rights, duties and obligations of an individual corporator, as a corporator, were concerned, he was bound by the acts of a majority of the corporation. The Troy and Rutland Railroad Company v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 582; Revere v. The Boston Copper Company, 15 Pick. 351.\\nW. Saulsbury, for defendant:\\nHe would not dwell long on the facts of the case. His object would simply be to present, for the consideration of the Court, the principles of law on which he relied for a verdict in favor of the defendant in the action. The evidence disclosed this state of facts: The Delaware Railroad Company was chartered in 1836, and was modified in 1849, by which modification the- road was located from Dona River to the Hanticoke, at or near Seaford; and that was the road which he subscribed to the stock of the company, and contracted to pay his money to construct, and not the road which the company was then making from the Hew Castle and French-town Railroad to Seaford, on the Hanticoke. At the time when he subscribed, the company had no design and no authority to locate or construct any such rqad as the latter, or any road beyond the limits of Kent and Sussex Coun ties. The purpose and powers of the company, as well as the termini prescribed and fixed by the charter, restricted and confined the location and construction of the road at that time to the points and within the limits just stated, and the contract of the defendant was to contribute, by the purchase of stock, the amount subscribed by him, to the construction of such a road, and no other. He did not pretend that the defendant personally, or as an individual corporator, had any contract with the State in regard to the matter; but that was his contract with the company, and the only contract entered into by him in relation to the subject. He would not go so far as to contend that any and every variation or change in the location of a railroad from the route originally contemplated or projected, would discharge a subscriber to the stock of a company from his legal obligation to pay for it; but when the alteration adopted by the company involved the total abandonment of the beginning point for the road, and such a radical change in the length and general direction of it as to amount to another and an entirely different road from the one originally projected and commenced by the company, it would absolve him from the obligation, if he saw fit to take advantage of the breach, or rather of the non-performance of the contract by the company. 13 Illinois Rep. 504; 8 Mass. 267. In the case last cited, which was the case of an incorporated turnpike company, which sued a subscriber for an assessment which he refused to pay, because of a change in the location of the road authorized by an act of the Legislature, subsequent to his subscription, the Court remarked that the plaintiff sued on an express - contract of the defendant, and they were bound to prove it as they alleged it, and rested its decision in favor of the defendant, on the ground of the, change in location and .direction of the road. In the case before the Court the declaration was on the contract of the defendant to take and pay for the stock subscribed for by him, as the same should be required and called for, to construct the road from Dona to the Nanticoke River; for that was the only contract entered into by him, and the only one that could have been declared upon against him. It was also an express contract; and, on the authority of the case in Massachusetts, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove it as it was alleged, or he could not recover upon it. In a case like the present, the liability of the subscriber was restricted to the road, as the same was chartered and contemplated at the time he subscribed. 10 Mass. 384; 1 New Hamp. Rep. 44. For the contract between the company and the subscriber in such a case was, that the former would make- the work then chartered, designed, and contemplated, and that the latter would pay for the shares subscribed for that purpose, and the contract could not after-wards be varied without the consent of both parties. In the case of The Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company v. Crosswell, 5 Hill, 383, which the counsel on the other side had said had been overruled (but which he should show had not been overruled), it was held that the charter was the fundamental law of the association or corporation, and to which the corporator subscribed, and it was not competent for the Legislature and the company by consent to introduce new and radical changes in the objects originally contemplated, so as to bind the corporator without his consent; and a contrary doctrine was stated by the Court to be monstrous. It was not true that that case had been overruled by the cases cited on the other side from 14 Barb. 559, and 17 Barb. 607. On the contrary, the Court would find, on examination, that they recognize and sustain the principle ruled in that case. In the case cited from 2 Watts and Serg. 156, the change or variation authorized, was but incidental to the original object contemplated in the charter, and involved no departure from the main object, but was in \\u00bfact subsidiary to it. The object was to improve the navigation of a stream, and the additional power was to authorize the erection of a dam in it, without which the improvement could not be accomplished. It was therefore nothing more than the addition of a necessary power to carry out and complete the original enter prise. The same remark would apply to the case cited on - the other side from 2 Russ. and Milne, 470; for the amendment of the charter in that case also involved no essential change in the original object of the incorporation, but might be fairly considered as merely incidental to it, in which respect both differed widely from the case before the Court.\\nC. S. Layton, on the same side:\\nA corporation was, to a certain extent, a partnership, with this difference, that while private partners were individually liable for the debts of the firm, corporations were created for specific objects, with limited liability as to the corporators.\\nThe chartered road to which the defendant subscribed was the road from Dona to Hanticoke River, and he contracted with the company for no other purpose, and situated as he was, in the forest of Mispilli\\u00f3n Hundred, remote from market and from navigation, it was not only important to him but an actual inducement with him, to have a railroad constructed on the line projected in the act of 1849, with its terminus at Dona River, as a convenient point of shipment of produce, for either Philadelphia or by the Delaware Bay and \\u2019coastwise for Hew York and Boston; and he accordingly subscribed to the stock of the company to make that road. But, by the articles of agreement with the Hew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad Company, the Delaware Railroad Company had engaged to abandon and had abandoned Dona River as a terminus, and was now employed, by means of the changes since introduced in their charter, in constructing their railroad from Seaford, on the Hanticoke, to connect with the Hew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad, which has its eastern terminus at Hew Castle, on the Delaware River. This, it was manifest, was never contemplated by the defendant, for he did not imagine that such a railroad as this was to be constructed by the company when he subscribed for his forty shares of the capital stock in it, and it was equally clear that he never contracted with the company to contribute his sub- scrip ti on for the construction of such a railroad as that which the company was now making.\\nHe would here remark that on the main point of the ease there was no conflict of decisions.\\nHe would, however, in the first place, ask this Court to charge the jury that the defendant was not a stockholder in the company until a certificate for each share of stock subscribed by him was delivered to him; that the certificate of stock was essential to constitute him a stockholder, and that it was necessary that the company should either have delivered or tendered to him the certificates of stock, before they could maintain this action against him.\\nSecondly, that the change in the terminus of the railroad, from Dona River to the junction of the Hew Castle and Frenchtown Railroad, discharged, cancelled and annulled the contract between the defendant and the company to pay for the forty shares of stock subscribed for by him under the charter of 1849.\\nHe did not maintain, however, that a change in the location of the road retaining the termini as originally designed, or that any change of charter by amendment, conferring additional powers upon the company merely to carry out in a more complete and ample manner the original objects of the enterprise would have that effect; but when the deviation or change authorized was in the termini of the road, it was a radical change, and would discharge the subscriber from his contract with the company, unless he had afterwards assented to the change, and the proof of that assent was produced before the Court and jury. The carrying a railroad through a portion of a line marked out by its charter, is a nominal, not a real compliance with its chart\\u00e9r. Wordsworth on Joint Stock Companies, 39 Law Libr. 68. In private articles of association, the articles of association were the fundamental law of the body, and it could not change its articles in their material objects so as to bind its subscribers without their consent; and the same was the law in regard to corporations, particularly if the change should be prejudicial to the interests of the stockholders. Ang. and Ames on Corp. 483. The change or alteration authorized hy the Legislature may he so great an radical in the charter as to absolve the corporator from his contract with the company. Ang. and Ames on Corp. 485; The American Bank v. Baker et al., 4 Metcalf R. 164. On the* authority of that case he should contend, that as there was no proof before the jury that the defendant was present at the meeting which resolved to apply to the Legislature for the change of the charter, or at the meeting which resolved to change the route of the road from Dona River, and as there was no evidence that he subsequently assented to them, that the company could not sustain this action against him. 2 Conn. R. 579; Day\\u2019s Dig. 108; 4 Henn. and Mumf. 315; 5 Hill, 8 Mass. R., and 13 Illinois R., cited by his colleague. On the strength of these eases, which had never been overruled, he would venture to assert that even if it were proved that the defendant was present at these meetings, and assented to all these changes, the plaintiffs still could not recover in this action. The case in 17 Barb. R., tlie strongest against him cited on the other side, recognized and confirmed the decision in 5 Hill, on which they relied. In the case in 17 Barb. R., it was held that the change in the charter was but incidental to the original object of the incorporation, and was consequently an alteration to which the stockholder may be held to have impliedly assented, and therefore he was considered not to be discharged from his contract with the company.\\nMr. Bayard, for the plaintiff,\\ncited Mercer County v. Coovert, 6 Watts and Serg. 70, arid gave the counsel on the other side an opportunity of replying to it if they desired to do so.\\nMr. Layton:\\nA county was a quasi corporation, and as such was as much hound to observe its contracts as a corporation, and he thought, on a critical examination of the report of that case, it would be found to support the position for which he had contended,\\u2014the inviolability of the contract; as it was held in the case cited that the change in the location .of the bridge, after the guarantee given by the defendants, absolved the defendants from any liability on the guarantee.\\nJames A. Bayard, for the plaintiff:\\nIt was proved that the defendant subscribed for forty shares; also, the organization of the company, the call for the instalment of three dollars on each share, and the notice of it to the defendant were proved. The counsel for the defendant who last addressed the jury remarked, that the chief inducement which the defendant had for subscribing to the railroad terminating at Dona River might have been, the outlet which it would afford him, and others residing like him in the interior of the State and remote from navigation, for the shipment of produce and lumber from that river with greater facility and convenience, either by the bay to Philadelphia or coastwise to Dew York or Boston, or other seaports, at their pleasure. But this was a consideration, whatever might have been its influence with the defendant, which could have no weight or importance in the determination of this action, for it was a well-established as well as a wise principle of law, that private considerations, and-expectations of individual benefit and profit, cannot he allowed to have entered at all into the reasons which induced him to subscribe to the proposed enterprise, and that his contract to take and pay for the stock was to he construed and enforced in a court of law, without any regard whatever to such private considerations and expecta- ' tians. On the contrary, before such & forum as this, every Stockholder was to he presumed to have subscribed for his stock from considerations of the public good, from motives of public spirit, and from the expectation of profit which he might hope to derive possibly from the investment of money in the stock, as in the purchase of any other species of property, and without any regard to the incidental advantages and facilities which the work might afford him when made.\\nThe facts relied on by the other side were that, after the subscription of the defendant to the stock of the company, the latter applied to the Legislature to authorize a' change of the terminus of the road from Dona River; that the authority was given, accepted by the company, and that the terminus of the railroad at Dona River has since been changed and abandoned, and by this they contend that the defendant has been absolved from his liability on the contract to pay his subscription. To that he replied, that the application to the Legislature to authorize the change, and the change authorized, and afterwards adopted, were all duly sanctioned and approved by a vote of a majority of the stockholders, in meetings convened according to the rules and regulations of the company for that purpose, and that therefore the defendant had not been discharged thereby from his subscription, but was bound to pay it.\\nThis case, and the cases cited and relied upon on the other side, had all arisen from one case, the ease in 5 Hill Rep., and that had all been the result of the misconception of Judge Nelson, by whom it was decided, of the cases which had been ruled in Massachusetts.\\nHe should ask the Court to charge the jury that the change in the terminus of the road, the 'contract with the New Castle and Frenehtown Railroad Company, and the contract with the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, and the Wilmington and New Castle Railroad Company, have not discharged the defendant from the contract. Because the defendant had not assented to the act of 1853, it was contended that he had been disr charged from his contract. But was not this a singular effect to claim for such an act ? For, if the company had violated its supposed contract with the defendant to make the road to Dona River, it would not discharge the defendant from Ms contract, but he would have a right to go into chancery for an injunction to restrain the company from abandoning that terminus, and to compel it to make the road to that point; while they, on their part, might oblige him to pay his subscription and comply with his contract with them.\\nA corporation was not a partnership. A partner could receive and discharge the debts of the firm, and he could supervise the business of it, and was personally liable for all the legitimate engagements of the firm. A corporator had no such powers, and was subject to no such liability. A partner had a joint but undivided interest and property in everything owned by the firm; but a corporator had no such joint and undivided interest in the property of the corporation, for his only property was in his shares of the capital stock of the company. The corporator, therefore,' had not the interest in the property of the corporation which the partner had in the property of the partnership. In the first case, the property is all vested in the artificial being created by the Legislature, the company; in the other case, the property was all vested in the individual members of the firm. If a corporation owned real estate, that did not make the corporator a land-owner, and he could not vote upon it; he had no estate in the land, that was all vested in the artificial being, the company, and .the corporator had no property in anything but in his shares of stock. Such was not the case of a partner, however; he was a land-owner, and h'ad a joint-estate in the real property of the firm. Corporations were bodies politic and little republics, and a majority of the corporators governed. The right of the corporator is in his share and to vote, and he was bound by the votes of a majority, whether it was under the charter or in an application of the company to the sovereign for a change of the charter. 1 Kidd on Corp. 13; Ang. and Ames on Corp. 1; 1 Bos. and Pul. 235; 15 Pickering, 351. What was the contract of the corporator with the corporation, and what was the contract of the defendant with the corporation in this case ? (Beads the subscription clause in the charter, sec. 1), and asked if this was not an absolute contract to take the shares of stock subscribed, without any condition or stipulation whatever, whether as to any future application to the Legislature for an amend ment of the charter, or that the railroad should be made as then projected in the charter? It was an absolute and 'unconditional contract to take forty shares in the stock of the company, and in consideration of those shares to pay for it. But the idea had somehow or other sprung up that there was involved in this transaction an implied promise by the company to the subscriber that the work should be constructed as contemplated and projected at the time of the subscription. There was no such contract, either express or implied, between the corporation and the corporator. The only contract in such a case was that which he had already stated. By the purchase of the shares the stockholder acquired a property in them, with the rights of property incident to it, and a right to vote upon them; and the very existence of the corporation required that he should be governed by the vote of the majority. The stock which he held, or for which he had subscribed, had no such incident as the implied contract to which he had alluded. His obligation was to pay for the shares; the obligation of the corporation was to convey to him the shares of stock subscribed for, with all the rights of property incident to it, according to the charter. If this was not so, how would you get along in the case of an assignment of the stock, with an assignee refusing to pay the arrears of subscription due on the stock assigned him subsequent to a change authorized in the road? Could he plead such an implied contract ? But there was no soundness in this distinction, and there could be none in such a distinction as were found in some of the books, and recognized and admitted in others cited on the other side, if it be a contract between the corporation and the corporator at the time he subscribes, that the work shall be made as authorized and designed at that time, between large and small changes, or between what are called radical and less important changes in the line or mode of constructing the projected improvement; because, if there was any legal foundation for such an idea as that, it must be on the ground that such a change would impair the obligation of the contract, by attempting to vary or change it without the consent of the corporator. blow, it was manifest, if this was so, it was utterly immaterial whether the change was great or small. The Constitution of the United States made no distinction between such cases, between altering the contract or the impairing of the obligation of it, in a greater or smaller degree, and authorized the Legislature to make no such discrimination. On the contrary, it was evident that, if the exemption of a corporator from his liability to pay for his stock, was based on the idea of a contract between him and the corporation, which could not be changed without his consent, any change whatever from the work as'then chartered and \\u00a1Drojected would discharge him. It was contrary to the practice of the Legislature, and the settled views and received opinions of the profession in this State, in regard to the many and constant changes made by the Legislature in the rechartering of banks, and the modifications made in the charter of almost every corporation existing amongst us. What would he the effect if such a principle had ever been understood to prevail in this State, and that any one dissenting stockholder could have forbidden the renewal of the charter, and compelled the company to wind up, as he could have done if such was the law on the subject?\\nThe idea on the other side drawn from the similitude of a partnership was, that the contract between the corporation and the subscriber was extended by implication, to prevent any radical change in the purposes of the incorporation. This he denied, and had shown that the contract was that he was to pay the amount subscribed for his shares of stock, and the company was to grant him the stock, with all the rights of property incident to it, .which incidents would depend on the nature of the regulations prescribed by the charter on the subject. This was. the contract, and this was the only contract which the corporation, with the sanction of this Legislature, could not change without the consent of the subscriber. All other rights and interests which he had in the corporation were subject to the decision of a majority of-the corporators\\u2014 the great and fundamental law of all corporations. 15 Pickering, 153. The decision in that case was, that the votes and acts of a majority of the corporators, while they may rule the interests of a corporator as a corporator, they could not affect his contracts with the corporation not as a corporator; and this he adinitted. The right of the company to apply to the Legislature for authority to enlarge and change their works, or totally to change their charter, as incident to such a corporation, notwithstanding the objection of a corporator, was clearly and expressly recognized and ruled in the case cited by his' colleague, from 2 Russ. & Milne, 470. It was a necessary incident of a corporation that it should have the right, with the approbation of a majority of the shareholders, to apply to the Legislature for a change of its charter; and every one who came into it was bound by the votes of a majority, unless he had stipulated against it at the time of subscribing; for there was no implied engagement\\\" or contract of the corporation to the contrary. The Pennsylvania cases were with us. The corporation could not do anything to deprive the corporator of his share, or to make him pay more money on or for his share than he originally agreed to pay for it, without his consent, with or without the sanction of the Legislature; because that would be to affect and prejudice him, not as a corporator, but as an individual, outside of the corporation, and would be a violation of his contract. 2 Watts & Serg. 161; 6 Watts & Serg. 71, 72.\\nIn the case cited from 8 Mass. 262, the change authorized by the Legislature increased the amount which the subscriber engaged to pay at the time of subscribing. It had been previously decided in that' State that, where the charter had given only the right of forfeiture for the nonpayment of instalments due upon the shares, an action- at law might be maintained by the company for the amount of the share against the subscriber on his cpntract to pay for the share, as a collateral contract; and that, notwithstanding the charter, gave no action a!t law for it, and the only remedy provided by the statute was by forfeiture; but the Court also decided that the action in that case being on the express contract by the subscriber to take and pay for the shares of stock subscribed, as a collateral promise made by him not as a corporator, but as an individual, it must be declared on as it was actually made, and, it could not be changed by the corporation and the Legislature without his consent. 10 Mass. R. 384. He referred to the case in 5 Hill, 383, and denied that the decision in that case was law, and that it was shaken by the case in 14 Barb. 559, and was in effect overruled by the case in 17 Barb. 607. The Illinois case holds the change to be binding if it was designed to carry out the original undertaking. And if it were necessary to reconcile the present with the ruling in that case, it might be done by showing the first incorporation in 1836 and its objects; its change and reduction of capital in 1849; and its subsequent change to the present, which was more in accordance with the original object of the charter than the amendment of 1849. But, after what he had said on the subject of greater and smaller variations in this respect, he hardly deemed it necessary to notice that case any further, or to say anything more .in regard to it.\", \"word_count\": \"9756\", \"char_count\": \"55709\", \"text\": \"The Court,\\nWootten, J.,\\ncharged the jury: This case, which has been protracted to considerable length by a thorough investigation of the facts, and an elaborate argument of the law on both sides, has now been brought to that stage of it when it becomes necessary for the Court to announce to you their opinion of the law, as applicable to it, and which must mainly govern the decision of it, as there appears to be but little controversy in regard to 'the facts which pertain to it.\\nIt is, as you are already aware, an action i commonly called an action of assumpsit, brought by the Delaware Bailroad Company against Beniah Tharp to recover from him $120, the amount of a call made on him of three dollars per share on his subscription of forty shares of the capital stock of the company, with interest at the rate of two per cent, per month from thirty days after such call, which was on th\\u00e9 1st of December, 1852.\\nTo entitle the plaintiffs to recover it is necessary that they should prove first, the legal existence, of the company as a corporation; and this is done by showing that the Legislature passed the charter, and by showing that the company has been organized according to the terms and stipulations of the charter.\\nSecondly; that Beniah Tharp, the defendant, subscribed to the capital stock of this company to the amount of forty shares, at $25 per share.\\nThirdly, that 5000 shares of stock were subscribed; that the call was made for the amount claimed and notice thereof given as authorized and required by the charter, that is, by publication in two newspapers published in the city of Wilmington, at least thirty days previous to the first day of December, 1852, the time appointed for the payment of that portion or instalment of the stock called for, and that the defendant neglected to pay the same at the time and place appointed for that purpose.\\nIf these facts are all proved to your satisfaction the plaintiffs are entitled to your verdict for the amount claimed by them, unless the defendant has set up and established sdme legal defence which absolves him from his liability.\\nThe defence set up and relied upon by the defendant is, that since the subscription by him to this stock, and since the organization of the company as originally chartered, a change has been made in the charter and in the line and eastern terminus of the road without Ms assent, which, he alleges, releases and absolves him from his liability to pay the amount subscribed by him. That a change has been made by the Legislature, on the application of the company, and has been approved and adopted by the stockholders is true; but whether that change is of such a character as discharges the defendant from his liability to pay the amount of his subscription to the stock is the question upon which this case turns, and which we are now called upon to answer, by the announcement of our opinion to you of the law upon that subject.\\nWe must confess that we have been considerably embarrassed by the contrariety of opinions and seeming conflict of decisions cited, and we are not now entirely free from doubts; but we have given the subject all the attention and the \\\"fullest consideration which our limited time and opportunity would allow, and will announce the conclusion to which it has conducted us.\\nUpon examining the authorities cited on behalf of the defendant, in support of his position, most of them strike us as having and bearing but little analogy to the case now under consideration.\\nThe case of The Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company v. Crosswell, 5 Hill, does go to the extent that such extensive and radical changes may be made in the road, or work of improvement, as will operate as a dissolution of the contract of a subscriber to stock; but it also recognizes the principle that such alterations may be made, in the language of the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the Court, as are clearly enough beneficial, or at least not prejudicial to the interest of the party.\\nSo, too, in the case cited from 13 Illinois R., it is conceded that such changes or amendments may be made to the charter as may be considered by the Legislature useful to the public, and by the company beneficial to them, if they do not divert its property to new and different purposes, and where the work is still designed to accommodate the same line of travel and transportation, and to promote the same general good, without absolving the subseribers from their engagements.\\nThe case in 1 New Hampshire Reports, and those in 8 and 10 Massachusetts Reports, are also relied upon; but those cases are essentially different from the .one we are now considering; and although it is somewhat difficult to determine what they really do decide, they were doubtless cases where the liability'of the subscribers was increased. The case in Hew Hampshire was-a subscription for one share of stock, and the contract was to pay all assessments a majority of the company might think necessary to raise for improving the navigation of a river within certain limits, and for the purchase of six acres of land for the prosecution of the improvement. The assessment on that share was for the purchase of one hundred acres of land, whereby the liability of the subscriber was increased.\\nAnd so in the cases cited from 8 and 10 Massachusetts Reports, the undertaking was in the one case to pay assessments on one share-of stock, to make a turnpike, the cost of which was estimated at $40,000, and that there should be 400 shares, being $100 per share. Two assessments were made, to the amount of $240. A change was made in the charter by the Legislature, on the application of the company, and the direction of the road was altered. The defendant supposed, and very naturally thought, he could not in any possible event be held liable for assessments amounting to more than $100 on each share, for that was the stipulated contract between him and the company when he subscribed, and he was therefore absolved from his liability by such a change as necessarily increased his liability from $200 to $240.\\nThe facts and rulings are the same, or very similar, in the case in 10 Massachusetts.\\nOn the part of the plaintiffs several authorities have been cited in support qf the principle contended for by them; that is to say, that a change made in the charter by the Legislature, without impairing the contract between the subscribers and the company, does not release subscribers to the stock.\\nThe first of these is the case cited from 2 Russell & Mill., Ware v. The Grand Junction Water-works Company. Ware, the defendant, objected first to the expenditure of the money of the corporation for the procurement of an amendment to the charter; and also to the application to Parliament for such amendment.\\nLord Brougham held that one of the incidents of a corporation is to apply to Parliament for an amendment of its charter. And the members of the corporation entered into it with that contingency; and if they intended to enter into it with any reservation, they ought so to have stipulated.\\nThe next of these cases is that cited from 2 Watts & Sergeant. In that case the Court held that the extension or enlargement of the powers or privileges of a corporation, though it may increase the expenses or moneys, does not change the contract of the corporator. His contract was simply to pay to the company his subscription; and to become, in consideration thereof, a holder of stock to that amount; that, as a corporator, he entered into the contract subject to the right of the company to apply to the Legislature to change the charter for the public good, which is the object of all corporations.\\nThe plaintiffs also cited the case of The Middle and Great Western Railroad Company v. Gordon, in 16 Meeson & Welsby; The Troy and Rutland Railroad Company v. Kerr, 17 Barbour's Reports; and the case in 6 Watts & Sergeant.\\nThe grant of acts of incorporation by the State is professedly for the public good generally; and there is an inherent right in the Legislature to amend, change, or alter the charter of any incorporated company with its consent. Those who become corporators do so with that contingency, and their engagements are therefore subject to it. If a subscriber to stock enters into the corporation generally without specific stipulations, he is hound and concluded by the action of a majority of the corporation; and if the Legislature change or amend the charter on the application of the company, and with its assent and approval, without thereby impairing the contract of the corporators, in the mode we have stated, they will not be thereby discharged from their liability as subscribers to stock. Such a change as would not increase the liability of the party to pay more money than he subscribed originally to pay, but merely affects his individual or personal interest, as that the road did not pass by his door, or through his farm, as he may have desired or expected, is not such a change as will absolve the party from his obligation to pay his subscription. The object of corporations being for the public good, and not private interest or advantage.\\nN. P. Smithers and J. A. Bayard, for plaintiffs.\\nW. Saulsbury and C. S. Layton, for defendant.\\nThe contract of the defendant with the Delaware Railroad Company was to pay for forty shares of the capital stock of the Company at $25 per share, in consideration of being the holder of that number of shares. That he agreed and promised to pay the same to the president and directors of the company, in such manner and proportions and at such times as shall be determined and' called for by them. By the terms of his contract he is bound. If he intended to subscribe on the condition that the road should not be changed in its eastern terminus or otherwise, he ought so to have stipulated; not having done so, he cannot now shield himself under the defence set up by him, and upon the ground that the road has since been changed from its terminus at Dona River. Having subscribed' under the general terms of the charter, with an inherent right in the Legislature to change it for the public good, with the consent of the corporation, and the company having applied for and accepted the amendment, he, as a corporator, is concluded by the action of the majority of the company, although he may not as an individual corporator have assented to it.\\nVerdict for plaintiffs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1863529.json b/delaware/1863529.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9a948b11169a1ae2904fa2ba7c2aba1a35d8e2f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1863529.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1863529\", \"name\": \"JAMES JOHNSON vs. AMOS STAYTON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Johnson v. Stayton\", \"decision_date\": \"1852\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"362\", \"last_page\": \"363\", \"citations\": \"5 Harr. 362\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:37:26.435423+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JAMES JOHNSON vs. AMOS STAYTON.\", \"head_matter\": \"JAMES JOHNSON vs. AMOS STAYTON.\\nThe obstructing a public road is not the ground of private action, without special damage.\\nThis was an action of trespass on the case, for obstructing the plaintiff\\u2019s right of way over a public road. Some of the counts laid it as a private road. No special damage was laid. The obstruction was proved in a public highway.\\nMr. Cullen, jr.,\\nmoved a nonsuit; and cited 4 Law Lib., Woolrich on Ways; 3 Blac. Com., 219; 8 Cow. Rep., 146; Clinton's Digest, 1927 ; 7 Cow. Rep , 609; 28 Wend. Rep., 446 ; 1 Esp. Rep., 148; 4 Mau. & Selw., 101; 5 Denio Rep., 213; 2 Bing. Rep., 263; 2 Ib., new series, 281; 9 Com. Law., 407; 29 Ib.)\\nMr. Layton, contra.\\nThe road is laid in two counts as a public road, in others as a private right of way\\u00bb We may go before the jury on either. We are not bound to submit to a nonsuit. (3 U. S. Dig., 68.)\\nLayton, for plaintiff.\\nCullen and Houston, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"332\", \"char_count\": \"1795\", \"text\": \"By the Court.\\nBooth, Chief Justice.\\nThe declaration joins, perhaps property, counts for obstructing a public road, with a count for obstructing a private road, and for obstructing a private right of way. The entire proof offered in reference to the character of this road is, that it is a public road. For obstructions to a public road, the remedy is by indictment. If one individual might maintain a private action for the obstruction of a public road, every person might. Such action cannot be maintained, without the allegation and proof of special damage. There is no such allegation or proof in this case, and the plaintiff must be nonsuited.\\nIt is true that the plaintiff may, as he says, refuse to submit to the nonsuit, and go to the jury; but it will be a mere waste of time, as we shall charge the jury according to this ruling.\\nThe plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1863562.json b/delaware/1863562.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e0d7001bf39a11ac1021725c99767a2d6d45fc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1863562.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1863562\", \"name\": \"JAMES ANDERSON, d. b., p'ff. in error vs. SARAH THOROUGHGOOD, negro, p. b., defendant in error\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Anderson v. Thoroughgood\", \"decision_date\": \"1849-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"199\", \"last_page\": \"201\", \"citations\": \"5 Harr. 199\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Errors and Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:37:26.435423+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JAMES ANDERSON, d. b., p\\u2019ff. in error vs. SARAH THOROUGHGOOD, negro, p. b., defendant in error.\", \"head_matter\": \"JAMES ANDERSON, d. b., p\\u2019ff. in error vs. SARAH THOROUGHGOOD, negro, p. b., defendant in error.\\nOn petitions for freedom, though the proper mode of taking testimony is at bar, if the defendant join in a commission, he waives objection to depositions.\\nUnlawful exportation confers freedom on the slave.\\nThis may he proved, without the conviction of the master for the misdemeanor.\\nAppeal from the Superior Court in and for Sussex county, on a judgment in the case of a petition for freedom, (ante., 95.)\\nHeard at the June term, 1847, before Johns, Chancellor, and Judges Wootten and Milligan.\\nThe Chancellor delivered the opinion in writing, affirming the judgment below.\", \"word_count\": \"764\", \"char_count\": \"4497\", \"text\": \"By the Court:\\u2014\\nJohns, Chancellor:\\nThe appellant has relied on the following causes of appeal, as sufficient to entitle him to a reversal of the judgment of the Superior Court.\\n1. That the testimony was taken under commission, on interrogatories filed, when the witnesses are by the act of assembly required to be produced before the court.\\n2. That the petitioner was not sent out of the State, with the intention that she should be absent permanently, and therefore not exported, contrary to the act of assembly, so as to entitle to freedom.\\n3. That Mcllvaine was an incompetent witness, and his testimony should have been rejected.\\n4. That there must be a conviction of the master for the misdemeanor, before the exportation can give freedom, and until conviction, no other evidence is admissible.\\nThe court having heard the testimony and the parties respectively, by their counsel, are of opinion, that the first cause of appeal relied on is insufficient, as the objection was not taken in the court below, and the assent of the party, by joining in the commission and filing interrogatories, must be considered as a waiver of the right now claimed.\\n2. On the second cause of appeal, the court consider the act of exportation confers freedom, unless the master can bring it within the specific exceptions, or the true intent and spirit thereof, which in this case has not been done.\\n3. The court consider the testimony of Mcllvaine admissible, he being a competent witness; and that the matter relied on as rendering him incompetent, can only be applicable to his credibility.\\n5. The court consider a prior conviction not requisite; because the clauses in the act are distinct and independent; and freedom is not the consequence of conviction, but is by virtue of the act of assembly, and results from the fact of exportation.\\nThe first clause in the act makes the exportation a misdemeanor, for which the master may be convicted, and the consequence thereof to him is the fine. The second clause, or that declaring the effect of exportation, in reference to the condition of the slave exported, makes the freedom of the slave the consequence of exportation, independent of the master's conviction. Therefore, proof of the fact of exportation, contrary to the act, confers freedom.\\nSuppose a conviction had been procured, it could not have availed as proof, since the objection that it was only evidence of the con vie tian and not inter partes, would have caused its rejection. It could not have been admitted as evidence, and the rule that a verdict ought not to effect persons who are no parties, cannot be. disregarded. Besides, it being a well established rule, that a verdict in a criminal case, cannot be given in evidence in a civil proceeding, how can it be possible to put such a strange construction on the law ? The cases put, of convictions which per se are productive of certain legal consequences, are not considered entitled to have any influence in settling the proper construction of our act of assembly. The court, therefore, consider that the freedom of the slave results from the fact of exportation, by virtue of the act of assembly, independent of the master's conviction ; and in no respect can be considered as the consequence of, or dependent on, such conviction.\\nIt is therefore considered and adjudged, that the judgment of the Superior Court be and the same is in all things affirmed, and that the appellant pay the costs of this appeal in three months, or attachment. And it is further ordered by the court, that the record be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the Superior Court in and for Sussex county, to be further proceeded in.\\nJudgment below affirmed.\\nJudge Wootten stated that he declined expressing any opinion in this case; as he had, at one time, been of counsel for the parties.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1864850.json b/delaware/1864850.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f9cd41d11508adbdb66de54b9b1f23d547864ebe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1864850.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1864850\", \"name\": \"JOHN F. MAYBIN, garnishee, def't. b. vs. WILLIAMSON & MILLER, pl'ffs. b.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Maybin v. Williamson\", \"decision_date\": \"1846\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"434\", \"last_page\": \"435\", \"citations\": \"4 Harr. 434\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:46.788079+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN F. MAYBIN, garnishee, def\\u2019t. b. vs. WILLIAMSON & MILLER, pl\\u2019ffs. b.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN F. MAYBIN, garnishee, def\\u2019t. b. vs. WILLIAMSON & MILLER, pl\\u2019ffs. b.\\nThe judgment against a garnishee whose answer admits a specific chattel, must be that he deliver the chattel, and cannot be for the payment of money.\\nCertiorari to Justice Bradley.\\nThe record showed regular proceedings and judgment by attachment against one Bingham ; and that Maybin was summoned as the garnishee of Bingham. He appeared and answered \\u201c that at the time the attachment was served on him, there was in his possession a bay mare of the value of $40, belonging to Elijah W. Bingham, and nothing more. Defendant requested to deliver to constable said mare, who refused to do so.\\u201d Whereupon, judgment having been rendered against the original defendant, the justice gave judgment against the garnishee for $26 78; the amount of the original judgment.\\nThis was the exception; that judgment was erroneously entered for a sum of money, when it should have been for the mare specifically.\", \"word_count\": \"271\", \"char_count\": \"1611\", \"text\": \"The Court\\nreversed the judgment on this ground. No judgment could be regularly given against a garnishee for money, on a declaration by him admitting a specific chattel in his hands, and nothing more. The justice should have ordered him to deliver the chattel to the constable to be inventoried, and would have had the same right to commit him for refusing to obey such an order, as for refusing to answer. Even if the mare were not delivered, no judgment could, be given in this action for the value; but the constable might have appraised her, and maintained an action against the garnishee for her. (Dig. 350.)\\nJanvier, for the garnishee.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1864934.json b/delaware/1864934.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a4b3ae2108d1c1add9e95488d0f92d248887935
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1864934.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1864934\", \"name\": \"THE STATE vs. ALEXANDER PORTER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Porter\", \"decision_date\": \"1845\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"556\", \"last_page\": \"557\", \"citations\": \"4 Harr. 556\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of General Sessions\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:46.788079+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE vs. ALEXANDER PORTER.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE vs. ALEXANDER PORTER.\\nProof of guilty knowledge in an election officer.\\nThe defendant was indicted for refusing a legal vote, the vote of Charles Fawcett, at the general election in 1844, in Wilmington; he being the inspector of the election.\\nThe court charged as in M\\u2019Donald\\u2019s case, ante 555.\\nThe jury, after being out all night, came into court and proposed the following questions, in writing:\\u2014\\nIs it incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence that the defendant acted from a corrupt motive? or what precisely is the nature of the evidence that the prosecution must bring to prove the corrupt motive?\\nIt also appears that some of the jurors argue, and cannot come to a verdict, from the fact that they see proper to connect with the defendant, the judges\\u2019 concurrence, or a majority of them, with the defendant, in his rejection of the vote; what influence on the minds of the jury ought such concurrence to have?\\nAlso, has it been proved before the court and jury, that J. W. Duncan concurred in the rejection of said vote.\\nBradford, dep. att\\u2019y. gen\\u2019l. for the State.\\nRogers, jr., for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"510\", \"char_count\": \"2888\", \"text\": \"By the Court.\\n\\u2014The matters referred to, in the note from the jury, are rather within their own province to decide upon, than that of the court; but we may, perhaps, properly make some suggestions in reply to your communication.\\nWhat we understand the jury to mean by positive proof of corruption, is not possible in a direct sense, for the motives of a man's conduct, and the impulses of his heart, cannot be the subject of direct positive proof; but there must be proof so clear, or positive, as to pi'oduce conviction, of acts; or declarations, or circumstances, from which the jury can, and indeed, have to, draw the inference of corruption. It is difficult to define corruption; but we may say, that it,is the wilfully and corruptly doing an act, or omitting a duty, which a person acting in a public capacity, knoios it to be his duty to do, or omit; in disregard of his official duty, and the obligations of his oath.\\nAs to the connection of other persons in such violations of duty, where the corruption is proved, their participation can be no shelter or excuse for the defendant; but their consent to the act may be regarded in considering the probability of the defendant's corruption.\\nAs to the fact whether all the judges concurred in rejecting this vote; it is for the jury, not for us, to say, whether it was proved. Our note of Mr. Cleland's testimony, is, that he said we, meaning himself and Mr. Duncan, the judges of the election, were satisfied to reject the vote.\\nThe jury came in again at about 8 o'clock, P. M., and stated that they had riot agreed, and probably never would agree, they having been out about twenty-seven hours, and no nearer together than when they first retired. Whereupon, a juror was withdrawn, and they were discharged.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1867893.json b/delaware/1867893.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d7d7e3da8acc469097155a8bfbb583d94b9794d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1867893.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1867893\", \"name\": \"JOHN DOE, lessee of JAMES MARTIN vs. RICHARD ROE, casual ejector, and JAMES ROACH tenant in possession; SAME PLAINTIFF vs. ROE, and ISAAC WHITE tenant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Doe v. Roe\", \"decision_date\": \"1835\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"477\", \"last_page\": \"494\", \"citations\": \"1 Harr. 477\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:04:02.652105+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN DOE, lessee of JAMES MARTIN vs. RICHARD ROE, casual ejector, and JAMES ROACH tenant in possession. SAME PLAINTIFF vs. ROE, and ISAAC WHITE tenant.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN DOE, lessee of JAMES MARTIN vs. RICHARD ROE, casual ejector, and JAMES ROACH tenant in possession. SAME PLAINTIFF vs. ROE, and ISAAC WHITE tenant.\\nA devise \\u201cto A. and her heirs forever, except she should die without an heir born of her own body\\u201d then over to B. is an estate tail in A. with a vested remainder in B and not a contingent fee with an executory devise.\\nThe propriety of an order of the Orphans\\u2019 court directing a sale of lands for the payment of debts cannot be controverted in any collateral proceeding.\\nUnder the old act of assembly the record of a deed was by the settled practice of the courts, permitted to be read in evidence, though such deed had not been recorded\\nwithin a year from itsoexecution.\\nEjectments.\\nThe cases were tried together, depending on the same devise in the will of Mary Fergus. The devise was as follows:\\u2014\\nFourthly. I give and bequeath unto my beloved daughter Eliza Fergus the remainder pari of all my real and personal estate to her and her heirs forever except she should die without an heir born of her own body; then my will and desire is that all the last above real and personal estate goes to James Martin, him and his heirs forever.\\u201d\\nThe plff. began his show by a possession in Hannah Heavilo as far back as the year 1788. She continued in possession until her death, in 1796, and devised the premises in dispute to her three sons, John, Roderick, and Edward Heavilo, in fee, to be divided, two shares to John and one share each to the others. She nominated John and Roderick her executors. John and Edward entered into possession .after the death of their mother: Roderick went off and has not been heard of for many years. Mrs. Heavilo\\u2019s will was duly proved on the fourth January, 1796, and.to prove the grant of letters testamen tory the plff. gave in evidence a testamentary bond of the same date, filled up in the names of John and Roderick Heavilo as principals, and James Elliott as surety, and conditioned, in the usual form, for the faithful administration of Hannah Heavilo\\u2019s estate by John and Roderick Heavilo, her executors. This bond was executed by John Heavilo and James Elliott only. John Heavilo, by his last will and testament, duly proved and allowed, constituted Benjamin Johnson his executor, who .took out letters and gave bond and surety in due form.\\nThe plff. then offered in evidence the petition of Benjamin Johnson, executor of John Heavilo, who was the executor of Hannah Heavilo to the orphans\\u2019 court of Sussex county for an order to sell the land of the said Hannah Heavilo for the payment of her debts, the order thereupon, and the return of the sale made to Mary Fergus. Objected to.\\nBayard. Hannah Heavilo left as her executors John and Roderick Heavilo. Roderick never renounced, and he was entitled at any time to take out letters. The execution of the will survived to him on the death of John Heavilo. Benjamin Johnson as his executor had no right to interfere with the administration of Hannah Heavilo\\u2019s estate, and the proceedings in the orphans\\u2019 court on his petition were altogether irregular and void. 2 vol. D. L. 891. The entire authority survives to the surviving executor, (Toller, 67, 40-41,,) .and even if one renounces he may take out letters after the death of the other. Unless it can be shown that Roderick died before John Heavilo, the execution of the will devolved on him at John\\u2019s \\u2022death. And the grant of letters, if proved at all in this case, is a joint authority to John and Roderick, for the testamentary bond is \\u2022conditioned for the faithful administration of this estate by them both, and styles them both executors.\\nFrame, for plff.\\nNo doubt at common law, where there are joint executors and one dies, the execution survives to the other; but our act of assembly regulates this matter for us by .providing (2 Del. L. 891) that all letters testamentary shall be void without bond and surety. Roderick Heavilo never gave bond; the grant of letters to him was therefore void, and the whole authority went to John, who complied with the law by. giving bond and surety. And I deny that Roderick had the right, afterward, and whilst the estate was in the course of administration, to interfere with that administration, even oh giving bond; much less could he avoid the acts of the other executor. At all events, until he does give bond he can have no legal authority as executor, and the executor who did give bond and those who legally represent him can proceed in the settlement of the estate. John Heavilo first, and, after his death, Benjamin .Johnson, his executor, were the only legal representatives of Mrs. Heavilo\\u2019s estate, and as such were authorized to apply to the orphans\\u2019 court for an order to sell her lands for the payment of debts. Again. I submit that at this time it is not competent for the court in this way to inquire into and reverse the proceedings of the orphans\\u2019 court. That court had jurisdiction of the subject; it was competent for i.t. to decide the questions now raised, whether John Heavilo was the sole executor of his mother; whether Roderick was excluded, either from not having given bond, or from his subsequent death, which may have appeared to that court; and whether Benjamin Johnson, as the executor of John Heavilo, was not the proper representative of Hannah Heavilo. And its decision of these questions ought not to be controverted in this collateral way.\\nClayton, for deft.\\nThe act of assembly (1 Del. L. 281) only authorizes the orphans\\u2019 court to order a sale on the application of the executor. In terms the act does not give the same power to the executor of an executor. The counsel then is driven to the common law for the principle that an executor of an executor represents the first testator, and the moment he gets there for this principle he is .governed by the other, to wit, that on a joint administration the execution of the will goes to the survivor and not to the executor of a deceased executor. We come then to the question, was John Heavilo the legally constituted executor of Hannah Heavilo? I deny it, and I say that the letters granted to him were absolutely void. The bond is drawn up in the name of John and Roderick Heavilo, and the condition is to secure the faithful administration of the estate by both, jointly. It was signed by John only, and by the surety. The grant of letters upon it either conferred a joint power or none. It could not confer a several power to John, for such was not the condition of the bond. The truth is, it conferred no power to any one: the bond was void, and the grant of letters void. But there is no evidence that letters were ever granted even to John Heavilo. The letters themselves are not exhibited, nor is any register of the grant produced. All rests on this irregular and void bond. We do not controvert any matter judicially decided by the orphans\\u2019 court. These orders of sale are made ex parte, on the application of.the executor or the person presenting himself as the executor. That court, never decided the questions now raised.\\nFrame. The bond we offer is a record. It comes from the register\\u2019s office. No registry of the grant of letters can be found so. far back as 1796; indeed there is no law now requiring such registry, and the practice to this day is different in the different counties on this subject. As to the letters themselves, they are never retained in the office, but given out to the executor. The testamentary bond therefore is in this case the best and the only evidence which can be had of the grant of letters. It states the fact that letters had been granted to John and Roderick Heavilo, and it appears from the face of the bond that Roderick did not execute it. The grant to him was therefore void: was it void also as to the other? The object of taking these bonds is to secure the public; they should be construed so as to attain this end and not to defeat it. Is not the meaning of the act of assembly that the grant of letters shall be void as to those who do not give bond, but good for those who do? Could John Heavilo ever set up the defence to an action on this bond, that he was jointly an executor with another, and therefore not liable?\", \"word_count\": \"7375\", \"char_count\": \"40561\", \"text\": \"By the Court.\\nHarrington, Justice.\\nThe question now submitted to the court is of more consequence in its general bearing than in its operation on the present case. Regarding either the policy of the law or the known rules of evidence, applicable to the question, we are perfectly clear that, on principle, the objection to the evidence now offered ought not to be sustained.\\nIn developing his title the plff. has set out with the proof of a possession many years ago in Hannah Heavilo. To show the transfer of title from her to Mary Fergus, under whom he claims, he offers in evidence an order of the orphans' court, made on the application, of Benjamin Johnson, the executor of John Heavilo, who was executor of Hannah Heavilo, for the sale of these lands for the payment of debts, and the proceedings upon that order under which Mary Fergus became the purchaser. It is objected to this evidence that Benjamin Johnson was not the representative of the estate of Hannah Heavilo, and had no authority to sell these lands; in short, that the order of the orphans' court directing the sale was irregular and void, because made on the petition of a person who was not legally constituted the executor of Mrs. Heavilo. By her will she constituted her two sons, John and Roderick, to be her executors; whether letters were in fact granted to one or both of them is not clearly shown, the only evidence of the grant of letters being a testamentary bond, filled up in the name of both, and conditioned for the faithful administration of the estate by both, but signed only by John Heavilo and by his surety. Roderick Heavilo, it is proved, left the state shortly after the death of his mother, and has never returned. John Heavilo died, having appointed Benjamin Johnson his executor, who took out letters, and as the executor of John Heavilo, who was executor of Hannah Heavilo, obtained the order which is now objected to.\\nIt is conceded that the entering into bond and giving surety is necessary to the appointment of an executor, and that the grant of letters without such bond is void. Roderick Heavilo was therefore never actually the executor of liis mother. Whether the bond given by John Heavilo in the name of both will sustain the grant of letters to Mm alone, and whether the administration passed to his executor or survived to Roderick, or was void as to both, are questions not necessary now to be decided, as we rest our opinion on other considerations. Though it may be remarked that after this lapse of time much would be presumed by a court and jury to supply defects in procedings, and sustain titles acquired under the orders and decrees of a court of competent jurisdiction.\\nThe orphans' court is a court of peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of this order; and, of course, over the incidents to the proper exercise of this jurisdiction. The act of assembly (1 vol. 281) authorizes it to call executors to an account of their administration, and if the personal estate shall be found insufficient for the payment of debts, and the heirs or devisees of the decedent shall refuse or neglect to pay them, to make an order for the sale of the decedent's lands, all which sales \\\"shall be deemed as available as if the decedents had sold and conveyed the same lands in their life time.\\\" With such authority to proceed in the premises and to decree a sale of the lands, would any irregularity in the proceedings vitiate the title under the court, and could such irregularity be inquired into in 'a collateral way? The proceeding in the orphans' court was said to be ex-parte; it is nevertheless a proceeding in remf which by the act of assembly passes all the title of the decedent in the land, and concludes every body. Roscoe Ev. 103; 1 Levinz. 236. 1 Stark. Ev. 229; \\\"It is evidently essential to the existence of a jurisdiction of this nature that its adjudications upon' the subject matter should be final, not only in the courts in which they are pronounced but in all other courts where the same question arises. It would not only be inconsistent that the decision in rem should not be final in the court in which it is pronounced, but, from the nature of the subject matter, mischievous and inconvenient. Although the parties who are in a greater or less degree affected by the consequenquences of the judgment may change, the subject matter is immutable, and therefore the decision upon it ought not to be liable to be disturbed. And it ought to be binding in other courts, in order to prevent inconsistency, and to support the jurisdiction of the court in which that sentence has been pronounced, for it would be in vain for a court of exclusive jurisdiction to decide, if its decisions upon the subject matter were to be wholly disregarded.\\\" It is doubtful whether any but the heir at law or a creditor could object to the decree, even in the orphans' court or by way of appeal, and it must be regarded as conclusive upon them until vacated or reversed in a regular manner. As a judgment of the court, the propriety of the order of sale of Mrs. Heavilo's land for the payment of her debts is as uncontrovertible in any collateral proceeding as a judgment at law binding on the land and rendering it liable to sale. Suppose the case of a judgment recovered at law against an executor and a sale on such judgment. Could a title derived under such a judgment be invalidated by showing an informality in the executor's bond? And if the objection here made be considered available, you had as well require proof that the executor filed before the orphans' court the accounts of his administration required by the act of assembly, or that the heirs at law or devisees refused or neglected to pay the deficiency, which are pre-requisites to the order for a sale. There is no stopping place if you once get behind the order of the orphans' court and open the door for objection to its proceedings. The principle is immensely important in its general bearings. Many of the titles to land in this state are derived immediately or remotely under a sale by order of the orphans' court, and if these titles are liable to be overturned by any defect in the mode of proceeding, however slight, which may be discovered after a lapse of even thirty-five years, the consequences to the community would be alarming. A defect in the executor's bond, it is here insisted, shall have this operation. A stronger example could not be presented of the danger of looking beyond the decree of the court. What purchaser under a sale in the orphans' court ever examines into the validity of the executor's appointment? And can he reasonably be expected to do so? It is conceded that the existence of a legally constituted executor is necessary to the order of sale, but no more essential than the filing an account of his administration of the personal assets; the establishing of a deficiency; the refusal or neglect of the devisees or heirs at law to pay the debt; or, (under the present law) the giving a new bond by the executor. All these are matters for the orphans' court to examine into and decide upon; and any matter necessarily decided by that court in making its decree cannot ever afterwards be questioned in any collateral proceeding. The representative relation of Benjamin Johnson to the estate of Hannah Heavilo was a matter necessary to be decided by the orphans' court in this proceeding; for the order of sale could have been made only on the application of the representative of the estate.\\nOn this general ground we are of opinion that the record and proceedings of the orphans' court may be given in evidence; but perhaps this case might also be decided on another fact appearing from the record. It is clear that at the time of making the order of sale no one could have objected to it on the ground now taken, but the two other devisees Roderick and Edward Heavilo; and the record shows that they were notified and consented to the order.\\nEvidence admitted. Exception prayed and granted.\\nThe record showed a sale under the order of the Orphans' court of the premises now in possession of the deft. Roach to James Martin as the agent of Mary Fergus on the 14th June, 1800. Sale approved and confirmed.\\nPlif. then offered in evidence the record of the deed of Benjamin Johnson, executor of John Heavilo, who was executor of Hannah Heavilo to Mary Fergus, dated ;22d November, 1800\\u2014proved 21st April, 1802, and recorded, but there was no date of the time of recording. Objected to.\\nBayard. No paper entered on the records of the recorder's office thereby becomes evidence unless such entry be made by the authority of law. The law requires deeds to be recorded within a year after their execution, 1 vol. D. L. 220, and this deed not having been recorded within that time is not evidence without the formal proof of its execution. The deed is not invalidated by not being recorded in due time, but the record of it after the year is not authorized and is therefore not evidence. The deed itself must be produced and proved as at common law.\\nFrame. The language of the old act is that deeds may be recorded within one year after the execution, and not after they bear date. This deed, though dated in Nov. 1800, was not proved or entitled to record until 1802. The time therefore of its execution within the meaning of the law and for the purpose of recording is not so apparent from the face of the deed; and much would be presumed after such a length of time. But the point has always been considered as settled by the practice in the late courts which always permitted these old records to be read in evidence though not made within a year from the date of the deeds. We offer this deed also as an antient paper whose execution would be presumed after such a lapse of time.\\nThe Chief Justice said he had made the objection many years ago before the late supreme court in this county and that court would not permit him to argue it. They considered it then to be well settled. It was afterwards decided in Kent in the case of Stout vs. Pollen (or Nickerson vs. Stout) about twenty years ago.\\nBlack Justice said he had often heard it spoken of in Newcastle county but had not known the point made. The bar considered the question doubtful on the act, but settled by the practice and by decisions which were understood to have been made in the other counties. These decisions had probably induced the strong exclusive expressions in the revised act to which it has been found necessary to add so many supplements extending the time. Objection overruled.\\nBy agreement the further examination of testimony was suspended on the following arrangement. In the case of Martin's Lessee vs. Isaac White, verdict to be rendered for deft. In the case of Martin's Lessee vs. James Roach, verdict to be rendered for the plff. subject to the opinion of the court on the devise in Mary Fergus' will; and subject also to any benefit of exception to the opinion of the court on the preceding questions of evidence.\\nFrame, for plff. \\u2014The question arises on the fourth clause of the will of Mary Fergus. What is the estate which Eliza Fergus took? We say that it is an estate tail, and the devise over is a vested remainder in fee in James Martin. On the part of the deft, it will probably be contended that it is an estate in fee in Eliza Fergus with an executory devise over to James Martin. There is no doubt that the first clause is a direct devise of a fee to Eliza Fergus; yet it is well settled that, even in such a devise, if there be any words added which qualify the word \\\"heirs\\\" and show an intention of limiting it to the heirs of the body of the devisee, it will only create an estate tail.\\u20146 Cruise 202; Devise ch. 12 sec. 7. The question then is, what superaded words will have this effect? and we lay it down with confidence that the expression in this will \\\"except she should die without an heir born of her own body\\\" is of all others the most apt for this purpose.\\nThe whole clause is; \\\"Fourthly. I give and bequeath unto my beloved daughter Eliza Fergus the remainder part of all my real and personal estate to her and her heirs forever, except she should die without an heir born of her own body, then my will and desire is that all the last above real and personal estate goes to James Martin him and his heirs forever.\\\"\\nThe words \\\"if he die without issue\\\" if there be nothing to restrict them to issue living at the death will always reduce a fee simple to an estate tail (sec. 9): yet they are not so strong as this. Heir is a more technical term than issue. Suppose it were \\\"except she should die without issue born of her body\\\" could there he a doubt that it would be but an estate tail? yet the expression here is even stronger. If this is to be construed an executory devise it cannot be after a general failure of issue or heirs of the body, but must be restricted to heirs of the body of Eliza Fergus living at the time of her death. Is there any thing in this will so to restrict it? can it arise from the use of the word \\\"heir\\\" in the singular number? Not so. Here was the devisee an illegitimate daughter of the testatrix. She could have no collateral heirs, and the testatrix saw the propriety of confining it. to the issue of the body, or lineal descendants. It cannot be confined to the immediate issue of the devisee's body, or children; because technically speaking, Eliza Fergus could have no \\\"heir\\\" during her life, as nemo est hceres viventis, but chiefly because it would violate the principal intent of the testator and give the property over to James Martin, a stranger, to the exclusion of grand children. For if Eliza Fergus had had issue or children which had died leaving children these could not take on the death of their grandmother and the whole line of lineal heirs would be cut off. Nothing shall be construed an executory devise which can take effect as a remainder, and a vested remainder is preferred to a contingent. 6 Cruise 319. If there be a devise of both real and personal property the terms may be rendered each to each. The same words may give a fee simple or the entire property in the personal estate, and but an estate tail in the realty. 1 P. Wms. 667; Fearne 476.\\nBayard. The intention of the testatrix in this case cannot be effectuated without giving to her daughter Eliza Fergus a fee simple, dependent, not on her dying without leaving issue at the time of her death, but on the contingency of her having had no heir, or child, born of her own body. The will is evidently drawn by a person unskilled in the use of legal terms\\u2014it was in fact drawn by James Martin, the devisee over\\u2014want of technical knowledge is evident on the face of it. Our business is from such a will; regarding the condition of the testatrix and her family; and her main purposes as appearing from the will itself; to elicit and carry out her designs; without so much regarding the precise legal meaning of the words used. Plain common sense would interpret this will thus:\\u2014\\\"I give to Eliza Fergus my daughter and to her heirs forever all the remainder part of my property.\\\" This is the general intent; to benefit in the fullest extent this first and greatest object of her bounty, her child. And thus far it is a plain fee; but there is a limitation, the common sense meaning of which is equally plain; \\\"except she should die without having had an heir (i. e. a child) born of her body\\\" in that case, and in that case only shall the property go over to a stranger. The word heir may be construed as a word either of limitation or of purchase to meet the intent of the testatrix. 2 Atkyns 582; 3 Chitty Dig. 1365. I agree that \\\"heir\\\" is nomen coilectivum and is the same as heirs, but the use of it here shows that it was intended to mean the same as child; and that it is to be taken as a word of purchase. 1 Croke Rep. 66; Archer's case. The use of the word heir in the singular is the reason why in that case it was construed a word of purchase, and not because there is a limitation over to the heirs of that heir. Fearne 102 (150.) I agree that technically there caqnot be an heir to a living person but the ordinary acceptation and use of the word is the same with child, or heir apparent. Croke Eliz. 453, another report of Archer's case in which it is said that this is the vulgar meaning of heir. \\\"Except she should die without an heir born of her own body;\\\" a very strong expression; the word own is added to show that the design was to confine it to her immediate issue, and not to the issue of such issue. What common person would say that an heir born of her pion body could mean an heir horn of her child's body.\\\" \\\"In case he should depart this life and hear no issue\\\" construed to confine it to issue living at the death of the devisee. Roe vs. Jeffry, 7 T. Rep. 585. \\\"Except she should die without an heir born o\\u00ed her own body is much stronger to show that she meant to confine it to the issue or children born of the body of Eliza Fergus\\u2014to a failure of issue at her death.\\nWhen words applied to real estate would give an estate tail they give an absolute estate in personal property, 1 Mad. 264; Tollel vs. Chatham. The limitation of an estate tail in personal property is void. 3 Vezey Jr. 99 Chandler vs. Price. Is it not certain that Mary Fergus meant to give her personal estate over to Martin on the same event that she gave the real estate. The plff.'s construction undoubtedly defeats this intention as to the personalty, and gives to Eliza Fergus the whole of it without the possibility of its going over to Martin. On our construction that it is a contingent fee dependent on the birth of a child, all the devises both of personal and real may take effect; and the rules of construction require that no part of the instrument shall be defeated if all can take effect. Forth vs. Chapman, 1 P. Wms. 663 is not law.\\nClayton. \\\"Heirs\\\" is a word of peculiar meaning. Heirs of the body of A. are his issue and their issue forever. Powel on devises 361-2. But there is a manifest distinction between heirs of the body of A. and \\\"an heir born of her own body\\\" the former is an estate tail because it plainly embraces all the lineal descendants of the first taker; the latter expression shows an equally plain intention to confine it to the immediate descendants or children of the first taker. It has been said that cases on a will are of very little importance as precedents unless in the same words, for they depend on the intent. No case can be found in which such an expression as this has been construed as restricting a previous plain devise in fee to an estate tail, or giving to the heir born of a person's own body the extended signification of issue or of lineal descendants generally. This case then is not to be governed by authority. It must depend on the meaning which the testatrix herself attached to the words. What was her meaning and intention? Did she use the word heir in its legal signification, extending to the thousandth generation, or did she mean such an heir as should spring immediately from her daughter's body; a child born, in the strong language of the will, of her own body. It is impossible to construe this into an indefinite failure of issue without rejecting the word \\\"own\\\" which is too important as manifesting intent to be rejected. If the words used here force us to the conclusion that the event upon which Mrs. Fergus intended this limitation over to Martin should take effect must happen within the compass of a life or lives in being and twenty one years after, the limitation over is an executory devise and the devise to Eliza Fergus is a contingent fee. And the event necessarily happened within that time. Eliza Fergus was in being, and the heir to be born of her own body had necessarily to be born during her life; if it was not so born the limitation over would take effect; and on the birth of such an heir it was defeated, and the contingent fee became absolute. Cites 1 Chitty, Dig. 345; 9 Vezey 197; 7 T. Rep. 589; Roe vs. Jeffry, Fearne 445; 431; (316) Gore vs. Gore.\\nFrame, in reply.\\u2014The counsel on the other side have taken somewhat different views of this will but they both seem to have settled down on this, that the expression \\\"heir of her own body\\\" means child or children and not issue generally. The great question is, at what time and upon what event was the limitation over to James Martin designed to take effect. Shall it take effect in default of issue living at the death of Eliza Fergus or after a general failure of issue. The law has fixed a meaning to such forms of expression as \\\"dying without issue\\\", \\\"without heir of the body,\\\" \\\"heirs of the body,\\\" &c. &c. and the legal import of all such expressions is a general or indefinte failure of issue. It devolves then on the other side, if this is to be construed an executory devise which it cannot be after a general failure of issue, to show us something indicating the intention of the testatrix to have these terms understood differently from their usual and legal meaning. Doubtless this may and must yield to clear intention, but such intention must be plain and not doubtful. How do they attempt to show this intention? By resorting to the expression itself and rely upon words which have a legal definite meaning to prove a different meaning. Much stress has been laid on the word own. It is not denied that \\\"dying without heirs of her body\\\" would make an estate tail; but \\\"dying without heirs of her own body\\\" is supposed to be a very different thing, as if her body could be other than her own body!! And Powell was cited as supporting some such distinction; which is denied. (Powell on Devises 361-2.) The words first\\u2014next\\u2014eldest child, &c. do not vary the construction, because they express no more than heir; neither can it be varied by heir born of her own body for this is nothing more than heir born of her body. 4 T. Rep. 605; 8 Term Rep. 211; 26 Johns Rep. 396; n. a. Chr. Kent's opinion.\\nThe general intention of the testator in the use of these words is in accordance with the legal meaning attached to them, though the Vulgar meaning may be different; for when a man leaves his property to his child and the lawful issue of that child's body, his intention is that not only children shall take but grandchildren, and the whole line of lineal descendants; though in common acceptation 'issue of his child's body\\\" would mean only children.\\nTo what result will Mr. Clayton's construction lead? If \\\"heir born of her own body\\\" means a child or children living at the death Eliza Fergus, then in case she had had a child and that child had died in the life time of her mother leaving numerous children, the estate would \\\"go over to James Martin to the exclusion of all these grandchildren, for the event would have happened of Eliza Fergus dying \\\"without leaving a child born of her own body.\\\" Such a construction is too monstrous to be entertained for a moment on the ground of the intention of Mrs. Fergus.\\nMr. Bayard's construction is still less plausible. He will have it that the event upon which the estate was to go over to Martin was the dying of Eliza Fergus without \\\"having had a child born of her own body.\\\" How much of a will does he have to make for Mrs. Fergus to get at this!! But establish this construction and it makes it a contingent and conditional fee, and Eliza Fergus having once had a child, the estate could not go to Martin even though at the time of her death there was an entire extinction of her race. Now can it be doubted that the testatrix meant James Martin should have the property if Eliza Fergus died without leaving either children, grandchildren or any issue or descendants? One other thing is absolutely certain from the will; the question whether 'Martin should in fact ever become-entitled to this land was to be determined at the period and on the event of Eliza Fergus' death. But Mr. Bayard's construction makes it dependent on a previous event; the birth of a child. It cannot therefore be correct.\\nOn the question whether the bequest of the personal property in the same words affects the construction as to the reality. I care not whether the same words have the same meaning when applied to different kinds of property, or not. Suppose the law does prevent an entailpient of the personalty, it does not necessarily prevent an entailment of realty; on the contrary the law adjudges such an estate from the very words which fail as to the personal property. A devise of \\\"all my property both real and personal to my son A\\\" gives him the absolute estate in the personalty, and only a life estate in the realty. And see Forth vs. Chapman, 1 P. Wm's. 663 Porter vs. Bradley, et. al. 3 Term, R. 143; 7 T. Rep. 589; Roe vs. Jeffry, &c. 6 Term Rep. 307; Daintry vs. Daintry, 17 Vesey 479; 16 Johns 413.\\nThe Court directed the following entry of judgment.\\nAnd now, to wit, this twentieth day of April,- A. D. 1835, this cause having been argued by counsel on both sides, learned in the law, upon the case stated and agreed upon on both sides and filed in the cause, and the court having heard the same upon the said case stated, it is therefore considered and adjudged by the court, and the court are of the opinion, that the said Eliza Fergus took an estate in tail in the said lands and premises in the said case stated mentioned, by and under the said devise contained in the said last will and testament of the said Mary Fergus in the said case stated also mentioned; and that the limitation or devise of the said lands and premises made in and by said will to the said James Martin was a vested remainder in fee simple; and it is further considered and adjudg ed by the court that the plff. do recover against the deft, seven equal undivided eighth parts of the said lands and premises in the said case stated mentioned; and that judgment be rendered, and the court do hereby render judgment for the plff. against the deft, for the said seven equal undivided eighth parts of the said lands and premises, together with the costs of suit.\\nWhere there is a devise to one and his heirs forever if there be a limitation over and any expression from which it can be collected that the testator intended to restrain the first devise to any particular class of heirs it will be so restricted. As where the limitation over is on a failure of issue; dying without issue of the body, or heirs of the body, &c. the previous g\\u00bb neral devise is restrained to this description of heirs and reduced to an estate tail with a remainder over.\\nThe terms \\\"failing issue\\\"\\u2014\\\"dying without issue\\\" and other expressions of similar import have a fixed legal signification, and mean a general or indefinite failure of issue, unless there be something to show that the testator meant to restrict it to a failure of issue at the time of the death of the first taker. For it is reasonably supposed, when nothing appears to the contrary, that the whole line of lineal descendants of the first taker are the objects of the testutors' bounty as much as the children or immediate issue; and that a construction which would cut oil grandchildren and give the estate to the devisee over on the death of the first taker without children cannot in the general be in accordance with a testators intention. And, though there has been a constant struggle in the cases to apply the first devise to children, and limit the event on which the devise over shall take effect to a dying without issue living at the time, the whole current of authorities has established, that whether the form of expression be \\\"dying without issue\\\"\\u2014\\\"without issue of his body\\\"\\u2014\\\"lawfully begotten of his body\\\"\\u2014\\\"leaving no issue of their respective bodies\\\"\\u2014\\\"dying without an heir of his body\\\"\\u2014&c. &c. the meaning is still the same, an indefinite failure of issue.\\nThe first case in which this form of expression was construed to mean a definite and not a general failure of issue was the case of Pells vs. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590. But that case was decided on the particular form of the devise and was not designed to controvert the general rule. It has moreover been much questioned. See Anderson vs. Jackson, 16 Johns, Rep. 407. Yet it was followed in Porter vs. Bradley, 3 Term. Rep. 143, and Roe vs. Jeffery both of which cases chancellor Kent designates as \\\"blind guides.\\\" In the first, Lord Kenyon thought the words \\\"if he should die leaving no issue behind him\\\" sufficient to restrict it to issue living at his death; and though he placed much stress on the words \\\"behind him\\\" he intimated that the expression leaving no issue would be sufficient. Yet in Daintry vs. Daintry, 6 Term. Rep. 307, it was decided that \\\"if he should happen to die without leaving issue of his body\\\" meant a general failure of issue.\\nIt is observable that in all the cases giving a restricted construction to \\\"issue\\\" they profess not to violate the general rule, but to establish exceptions on the particular words of the will; yet most of them have been regarded as .infringing on the established construction, and have always been more or less controverted. In the principal case the defendant's counsel admitted the general rule; they agreed that if the expression had been \\\"except she should die without issue born of her body\\\" it would have been an estate tail; but they distinguished between \\\"heir\\\" and issue, and laid much stress on the word \\\"own\\\" as indicating an intentian to restrict the meaning. The reason which induced the enlarged meaning applied in legal construction to the word issue, .equally applies to this form of expression, namely, that the testatrix did not intend the estate to go over while there were lineal descendants of her daughter to take it. It applied to this will with peculiar force. The first devise was to the testatrix's only child; the remainderman was a stranger in blood. Without strong evidence of that intention it would not be supposed that she intended he should take to the exclusion of the grandchildren or other lineal descendants of her daughter. There is nothing in the word \\\"heir\\\" either in the singular, or \\\"heirs\\\" in the plural, that should give it a more restricted signification than issue. Heirs is a technical word of greater latitude than issue, comprehending all the blood relatives either lineal or collateral. Heirs of the body or \\\"heirs born of the body\\\" is precisely the same as issue, being restricted to lineal heirs and extending to all the lineal descendants. And \\\"heir\\\" is nomen collectivum, and the same with \\\"heirs.\\\" 3 Bin. Rep. 374. In one of the earliest cases on the stat. de donis a grant to B. and his heirs forever, provided B. had issue of his body begotten; and if he died without heir of his body the land was to revert, was construed an estate tail. In Denn vs. Slater, 5 Term. Rep. 355, on a devise to B. and if he died without male heir then to C. and his heirs; Lord Kenyon said it was clearly an estate tail in B. A devise to a son, and, in case he died without heir of his body lawfully begotten, then over, is an estate tail. Royal vs. Eppes, 2 Munfa. 479. Has the word \\\"own\\\" in this connection, the force attributed to it by the defendant's counsel? It is difficult to distinguish between the heirs of a man's body, and the heirs of his own body; and such a distinction would seem to be too refined to overturn an established rule of construction. It has been sought to apply a like stress on the words \\\"first,\\\" \\\"next,\\\" \\\"eldest heir,\\\" &c. but they have been held not to vary the construction. Powell 361. Lessee of James vs. Avis. 4 Term Rep. 605: under a devise \\\"to A. and B. and their heirs\\\" and in case they agree to sell the estate that they should have their equal share of the money arising therefrom, but if they agreed to keep the estate whole together then that the rents should be equally paid and divided between them and the several and respective heirs of them on their bodies lawfully begotten. \\\" A. and B. took only estates tail. Lessee of Gregory vs. Whichelo, 8 Term Rep. 211. A devise to \\\"A and B. and their heirs forever, provided that if both have issue, then both their dividends to go to the issue of their own bodies\\\" was held an estate tail. Here the word pion actually occurs, and is applied to the issue generally, the nail natonm, et ep\\u00e1 nascentur ab illis.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/1872105.json b/delaware/1872105.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b67399d58a960092c4226dbf6117aee75569904d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/1872105.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1872105\", \"name\": \"Equitable Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Administrator cum testamento annexo of the Estate of Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased, and Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of the said Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased. vs. Jean Kane Foulke, Elizabeth Kane Rhein, Jean Kane Foulke and Jean Kane Foulke duPont, Executrices of the Will of Florence Bayard Kane, deceased, Sarah Williams Kane and Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, Trustees of the residuary estate under the Will of James A. Bayard Kane, Margaret Paul Kane, residuary legatee under the Will of John Kent Kane, Mabel Kane Fox, Florence Kane Foskett, John Kent Kane, Jr., Frank Paul Kane and Braden Bayard Kane\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Equitable Trust Co. v. Foulke\", \"decision_date\": \"1945-01-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"238\", \"last_page\": \"250\", \"citations\": \"28 Del. Ch. 238\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:43:23.054630+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Equitable Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Administrator cum testamento annexo of the Estate of Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased, and Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of the said Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased. vs. Jean Kane Foulke, Elizabeth Kane Rhein, Jean Kane Foulke and Jean Kane Foulke duPont, Executrices of the Will of Florence Bayard Kane, deceased, Sarah Williams Kane and Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, Trustees of the residuary estate under the Will of James A. Bayard Kane, Margaret Paul Kane, residuary legatee under the Will of John Kent Kane, Mabel Kane Fox, Florence Kane Foskett, John Kent Kane, Jr., Frank Paul Kane and Braden Bayard Kane.\", \"head_matter\": \"Equitable Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Administrator cum testamento annexo of the Estate of Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased, and Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of the said Mabel Bayard Bird, deceased. vs. Jean Kane Foulke, Elizabeth Kane Rhein, Jean Kane Foulke and Jean Kane Foulke duPont, Executrices of the Will of Florence Bayard Kane, deceased, Sarah Williams Kane and Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, Trustees of the residuary estate under the Will of James A. Bayard Kane, Margaret Paul Kane, residuary legatee under the Will of John Kent Kane, Mabel Kane Fox, Florence Kane Foskett, John Kent Kane, Jr., Frank Paul Kane and Braden Bayard Kane.\\nNew Castle,\\nJanuary 10, 1945.\\nCaleb S. Layton, of the firm of Richards, Layton & Finger, for complainant.\\nJames R. Morford of the firm of Marvel & Morford, and Thomas Cooch for Mabel Kane Fox, Florence Kane Foskett, John Kent Kane, Jr., Frank Paul Kane, and Braden Bayard Kane.\\nLighton S. Dorsey and John Hemphill, of Philadelphia, Pa., for Jean Kane Foulke, and Jean Kane Foulke duPont, executrices of the will of Florence Bayard Kane, deceased.\", \"word_count\": \"3375\", \"char_count\": \"19507\", \"text\": \"Harrington, Chancellor:\\nThe question to be determined is the validity and effect of the exercise of the power of appointment by Mabel Bayard Bird, given her by the will of her father, James Ashton Bayard.\\nJames Ashton Bayard died in 1880, and by his will dated April 14th, 1871, and.a codicil thereto, dated May \\u2014, 1874, he gave and devised to his son, Thomas F. Bayard, a one-third part of the residue of his real and personal estate, in trust, for the sole and separate use of Mabel Bayard Kane, who later became the wife of Levi C. Bird, for her natural life. By the Third Item of that instrument, the testator also provided:\\n\\\" at her decease I give and bequeath the said property so mentioned in this Item to and among her children in such shares as she may by any last Will appoint\\nThe codicil is unimportant, and its provisions will not be set out.\\nMabel Bayard Bird died November 28th, 1897, and by her will expressly assumed to exercise the power of appointment given her by her father's will. She left to survive her five children, Jean Kane Foulke, Florence Bay ard Kane, James A. Bayard Kane, John Kent Kane and Elizabeth Kane, who first married one Norris, and later became the wife of Dr. John H. W. Rhein.\\nBy the will of Mabel Bayard Bird, dated July 3rd, 1889, and a codicil thereto dated April 10th, 1895, she bequeathed and devised all of her own individual property, and appointed the property over which she had the power, to her brother, Thomas F. Bayard, in trust. In that instrument, she first recited that, though she wished to provide equitably for each of her children, she especially desired that her two unmarried daughters, Florence Bayard Kane and Elizabeth Kane, \\\"while they continue unmarried, should receive an income from my (her) estate sufficient to provide and keep for them a home, and in the event of the marriage of either that the daughter remaining unmarried should receive sufficient income to secure her independence.\\\" She then directed her trustee (1) to- pay from the income arising from the trust fund to her two daughters, \\\"Florence Bayard Kane and Elizabeth Kane, each the sum of One Thousand Dollars yearly, so long as they continue to live together and both remain unmarried\\u2014:and the residue of all the income from my estate shall be divided by the said Trustee equally among my other three children\\u2014viz\\u2014Jean Kane Foulke (wife of George Foulke) James Ashton Bayard Kane, and John Kent Kane\\u2014the issue of any deceased child to take the same share their or its parent would have taken if living\\u2014\\\"; (2) \\\"in the event of the marriage or death of either of my said daughters Florence Bayard Kane or Elizabeth Kane the sum of Twelve Hundred Dollars income shall then be annually paid by the said Trustee unto the daughter who shall remain unmarried\\u2014and the residue of the income of my estate shall be equally divided among all my other children, the issue of any deceased Child to take the same share their or its parent would have taken if living\\u2014\\\" (3) \\\" in the event of the marriage or death of both of my said daughters Florence Bayard Kane and Elizabeth Kane, or of their ceasing to live together while both remain unmarried, then I direct that the entire income of my estate shall be equally divided among all my children share and share alike, and in the event of the death of any one or more of my children leaving a child or children or the issue then living of said child or children, such child or children shall receive such portion of the income and share of my estate as his, her or their parent would have received if living\\\"; and (4) \\\" in the event of the Marriage or death of my said daughters, Florence Bayard Kane and Elizabeth Kane, after the death of both Levi C. Bird and Susan Faussett, then the trust hereby created shall terminote and the said Trustee shall divide the whole corpus of my Estate equally among all my Children then living, or the issue then living of such of my children as may then be dead, 'per stirpes' and not 'per capita'.\\\"\\nLevi C. Bird, the husband of Mabel Bayard Bird, the testatrix, and Susan Faussett were to receive certain bequests during their lives, the former on his birthday, and the latter at Christmas, both predeceased Florence Bayard Kane.\\nThe bill alleges, and the answer filed admits, that Florence Bayard Kane and Elizabeth Kane Rhein were both living .at the death of James Ashton Bayard. While not alleged in the bill, it is conceded that the other children of Mabel Bayard Bird were also in being at the death of their grandfather.\\nFlorence Bayard Kane died May 14th, 1943, unmarried and without issue, and Jean Kane Foulke and Jean Kane Foulke duPont are the executrices of her will.\\nJames A. Bayard Kane died August 31st, 1931 and left to survive him one daughter, Mabel Kane Fox. His estate has been closed, and Sarah Williams Kane and Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia are the trustees of the residue.\\nJohn Kent Kane died November 14th, 1937, leaving to survive him four children, Florence Kane Foskett, John Kent Kane, Jr., Frank Paul Kane and Braden Bayard Kane. His estate has also been closed, and Margaret Paul Kane is the residuary legatee under his will.\\nThomas F. Bayard, the executor and trustee under the will of Mabel Bayard Bird, renounced the appointment in both capacities, and Equitable Trust Company, the complainant, was appointed administrator c.t.a. of her estate by the Register of Wills for New Castle County. The complainant also became successor trustee by designation of the children of the said Mabel Bayard Bird, pursuant to the provisions of the codicil to her will.\\nThe marriage of Elizabeth Kane Rhein and the subsequent death of Florence Bayard Kane on May 14th, 1943 terminated the trust; and the rights of the various parties must be determined as of that date. That is conceded by all parties who appeared and argued the case. The complainant, as trustee, at that time had in hand $118,429.73, of which $33,834.91 was received from Thomas F. Bayard, as trustee of Mabel Bayard Bird under the will of James Ashton Bayard, deceased; and, as administrator c.t.a. and trustee, it seeks instructions with respect to the proper distribution of the funds in hand.\\nThe intent of James Ashton Bayard, as shown by his will, is the controlling factor in determining the scope of the power given Mabel Bayard Bird. Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 21 Del.Ch. 102, 180 A. 597; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 25 Del.Ch. 121, 15 A.2d 153; 49 C.J. 1266. In effect, the appointment was in trust during the life of her daughter, Florence Bayard Kane, or so long as she remained unmarried, during which time she was to receive a specified income from the entire trust fund; the excess income, if any, was to be paid to the donee's other children and to the issue of deceased children. The major life provision for Elizabeth Kane Rhein never took effect because of her marriage prior to the death of her mother.\\nIn exercising the power, the donee could have given absolute and unqualified rights to her children \\\"in such shares\\\" as she might appoint, but the right to appoint lesser interests to objects of the power was neither expressly nor impliedly prohibited, and was lawful. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra; 1 Sugden on Powers, * p. 491. The power was special only as to the persons among whom the fund could be appointed, and not as to the quantum of their interests; and the unrestricted power to appoint absolute interests includes the right to appoint lesser interests. Id.; Jebb v. Tugwell, 44 Eng. Repr. 258; Thompson on Wills, (2d Ed.) 493. When the exercise of a power is merely restricted to certain persons, the reasonable inference is that the nature of the interest to be appointed is left to the donee's discretion. The testator's use of the words \\\"in such shares\\\" does not mean that only absolute and immediate rights could be appointed among the objects of the power. Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. 354, 20 A. 521, 11 L.R.A. 85, 20 Am.St.Rep. 925; 41 Amer.Jur. 854. In Wilmington Trust Company v. Wilmington Trust Company, supra, this court reached the same conclusion when the authorized appointment was \\\"in such proportions\\\" as the donee might designate. In Matter of Kennedy's Will, 279 N.Y. 255, 18 N.E.2d 146, the power was couched in somewhat different language, and was regarded as wholly special; and in so far as the broad general statements of the court might be inconsistent with the conclusion in this case, they were not followed in the Wilmington Trust Company cases. Nor was the donee compelled to appoint equal rights in the income to her children; but the attempted appointment of a portion of it, and ultimately of a portion of the capital to the issue of deceased children, was void.\\nIn the absence of something to show1 a contrary intent, the word \\\"children\\\" in the donor's will creating the power, must be given its usual and ordinary meaning, and, under such circumstances, a power to appoint to children does not include the right to appoint to their issue. 2 Sugden on Powers, *p. 253; Jarnagin v. Conway. 21 Tenn. 50.\\nIt does not appear how the excess income from the Bayard fund, if any, was distributed during the life of Florence Bayard Kane, and no possible relief, with respect thereto, is involved in this proceeding.\\nThe next contention relates to the distribution of the corpus of the Bayard fund in the hands of the trustee. Mabel Bayard Bird directed in her will, that at the termination of the trust, the corpus should be equally divided \\\"among all my (her) children then living or the issue then living of such of my children as may then be dead 'per stirpes' and not 'per capita'.\\\" Of her five children, only Jean Kane Foulke and Elizabeth Kane Rhein survived Florence Bayard Kane. The important question, therefore, is whether the appointment was valid as to them, though it was clearly invalid as to the children of deceased children.\\nUnder the old general rule, when the donee of a power of appointment includes persons who are not objects of the donor's bounty, the excess appointment is alone invalid. Sadler v. Pratt, 5 Sim. 632, 58 Eng.Repr. 476; In re Perkins, [1893] 1 Ch. 283; 2 Sug. on Powers, 56, *p. 62; 1 Simes Fut. Int., \\u00a7 274; 41 Amer. Jur. 861; 49 C.J. 1300; see also Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 21 Del.Ch. 188, 186 A. 903. In other words, \\\" ordinarily, if the appointment is in part within the terms of the power and in part in excess of them, it will be void only for the excess.\\\" 1 Simes Fut. Int., \\u00a7 274; Sadler v. Pratt, supra. In such cases, the boundaries between the excess and the proper execution of the power are regarded as precise and apparent, so that the shares of the legitimate objects can be readily ascertained. In re Perkins, supra; Alexander v. Alexander, 28 Eng.Repr. 408; 121 A.L.R. 1227. Moreover, when there is a complete execution of a power and some unauthorized con dition or limitation, primarily for the benefit of non objects, is added by the donee, that part is void, but the appointment is otherwise good. In re Holland, [1914] 2 Ch. 595; Alexander v. Alexander, Supra; In re Perkins, supra; 21 R.C.L. 431.\\nUnder the old rule, when \\\" a part of the fund is ill appointed, it goes according to its original destination in the event of there being no appointment. And consequently a person to whom a specific share is well appointed shall not be excluded from taking any of the unappointed shares.\\\" Sugden on Powers, 202, *p. 220.\\nIf these general principles be applied, the two surviving daughters of Mabel Bayard Bird would together be entitled to more than one-half of the entire appointive fund. Each of them would get not only their shares under the appointment, but under the default provision of James AshBayard's will, would also take one-fifth of the part illegally appointed. It is contended that the application of this rule would cause an inequitable result; that if the appointment of the corpus of the fund is void in part, the donee's real intent would be more nearly carried out by holding it entirely void, and by distributing the whole fund under the \\\"default provision of James Ashton Bayard's will.\\nThe rule adopted by the Restatement of the Law of Property (Future Interests) is largely relied on. Section 362, in part, states:\\n\\\"Where one part of an appointment is ineffective but another part would, if standing alone, be effective, such other part is given effect unless\\n\\\"(a) the two parts are so mingled that it is impossible to fix the line of division between them, or\\n\\\"(b) the donee's scheme of disposition is more closely approximated by allowing both parts to pass in default of appointment than by treating as valid the latter part of the appointment and allowing only the property covered by the former part to pass in default.\\n\\n\\\"b. Rationale. Whenever part of a dispositive scheme fails, and it is possible to separate that part from the balance of the disposition, there always arises the question whether that part was so essential to the whole that its failure causes the failure of the remaining parts, of themselves valid. The answer to this question depends upon whether the general dispositive scheme disclosed in the instrument is more nearly approximated by treating as effective the remaining part or by allowing the property to pass to those persons who would receive it if no disposition had been attempted; for it is inferred that the person making the disposition desires the remaining part to stand only if thereby the purposes of the original disposition are advanced. When the partial invalidity so distorts the dispositive scheme that it is inferable that the person making the disposition would not prefer the balance to stand alone, then the entire disposition fails. -\\n\\\"This general rule is applicable in cases where the donee of a power has made an appointment which is partially ineffective. If the general scheme of appointment shown in 'the donee's instrument would be better carried out by allowing the property to pass in default of appointment, the entire appointment fails and the property passes in default.\\\"\\nAs we have seen, there is little, if any, authority for that rule in England, but it was recognized by some courts and text books in this country before the Restatement was published. While less specific, Simes recognizes it in principle by the statement that \\\"a case may arise where to strike out the void portion of the appointment so completely defeats the donee's intent as to render the entire appointment void.\\\" 1 Simes Fut. Int., \\u00a7 274. See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mass. 147, 7 N.E.2d 432, 121 A.L.R. 1218; Varrell v. Wendell. 20 N.H. 431; Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 428, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36, 66 L.R.A. 408; Parker v. MacBryde, (4 Cir.) 132 F.2d 932; Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Sch. & Lef. 315; 121 A.L.R. 1227; 49 C.J. 1300.\\nThe will of James Ashton Bayard provided that if Mabel Bayard Bird failed to exercise the power given her, the corpus of the fund shall be held \\\"for all and every her child and children if more than one in equal shares and the issue of any child who may have died in her lifetime to take the same as its parent would have taken if living That provision would include all of the donee's children living at her death, and the issue of any who might have died in her lifetime, the latter to take the same shares their parents would have taken if living. All of her children survived her, but the attempted appointment was quite similar in its real intent. It provided that at the termination of the trust, the corpus should be divided equally among all of the donee's children, then living, or the issue then living of such as might be dead, \\\"per stirpes\\\" and not \\\"per capita\\\". It, therefore, seems proper to apply the Restatement rule to this case.\\nNeither Wilmington Trust Company v. Wilmington Trust Company, 21 Del.Ch. 188, 186 A. 903, nor Equitable Trust Company v. Snader, 17 Del.Ch. 203, 151 A. 712; Id., 17 Del.Ch. 308, 154 A. 15, is inconsistent with this conclusion. There might be some general statements in the first case that may be relied on in support of the old English rule, but the facts were very different.\\nThe equitable interests appointed during the life of Florence Bayard Kane were also void in part, but the Restatement rule is not applicable.\\nThe donee, in attempting to exercise the power given her, recited that, while she wished to provide for all of her children equitably, she especially desired to provide for her unmarried daughters so long as they should remain single. Apparently that was her primary intent. Moreover, the ultimate annual income of $1200 provided for was to be paid from the entire trust fund, and not from the Bayard fund ($33,834.91) alone. Under the circumstances, the.inference is not justified that the donee of the power would not have exercised it in favor of any of her children had she known that no part of the excess annual income from the Bayard fund, if any, could be appointed to the issue of deceased children. The probable total income from that fund during the life of Florence Bayard Kane, and the portion she re ceived therefrom, is emphasized; but, in view of the clear intent of the donee of the power, that is unimportant.\\nApplying the above principles, the corpus of the Bayard fund should be equally divided among Jean Kane Foulke, Elizabeth Kane Rhein, the executrices of Florence Bayard Kane, the estate of James A. Bayard Kane, deceased, and the estate of John Kent Kane, deceased.\\nOrdinarily, moneys due the estates of deceased persons should be paid to their personal representatives, but when their estates have been closed and balances turned over to the proper parties, there is usually no good reason why the payment should not be made directly to them. Huxley v. Security Trust Co., 27 Del.Ch. 206, 33 A.2d 679. The amount due the estate of James A. Bayard Kane can, therefore, be paid to Sarah Williams Kane and Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, the trustees of his residuary estate, and the amount due the estate of John Kent Kane can likewise be paid to Margaret Paul Kane, his residuary legatee.\\nA decree will be entered in accordance with this opinion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/418161.json b/delaware/418161.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..758730772acf78abc54e984040ba10c5618df031
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/418161.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"418161\", \"name\": \"Charles W. Cullen, Trustee in Bankruptcy of The Delmar Lumber Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Mary A. Veasey\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cullen v. Veasey\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-02-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"537\", \"last_page\": \"539\", \"citations\": \"4 Boyce 537\", \"volume\": \"27\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:59.699372+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Charles W. Cullen, Trustee in Bankruptcy of The Delmar Lumber Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Mary A. Veasey.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles W. Cullen, Trustee in Bankruptcy of The Delmar Lumber Manufacturing Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware, vs. Mary A. Veasey.\\n1. Pleading\\u2014Demurrer\\u2014Admissions.\\nA general demurrer admits all of the material facts well pleaded.\\n2. Sales\\u2014Action for Price\\u2014Replication.\\nIn assumpsit for goods sold, defendant pleaded payment, and the replication alleged that defendant's husband was formerly the president of a bankrupt corporation of which plaintiE was trustee, and that the corporation was formally adjudged bankrupt, and that defendant, with the influence of her husband, fraudulently and with the intent of defrauding the company\\u2019s creditors, and creating an illegal preference in favor of her husband, four months before the filing of the petition of bankruptcy, transferred her indebtedness to the corporation to her husband, an alleged creditor of it, and that defendant\\u2019s husband thereupon, wrongfully and without the consent of the company\\u2019s board of directors, credited defendant with payment of her indebtedness to the company, and also set oE defendant\\u2019s debt to the company, to the amount so pleaded by her, against the indebtedness of the company to defendant\\u2019s husband, thereby creating in her husband an illegal preference in violation of the federal Bankrupt Act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]). Held, that the replication was good on demurrer.\\n(February 4, 1914.)\\nJudges Boyce and Conrad sitting.\\nAlbert Worth and John W. Huxley, Jr., for the plaintiff.\\nRobert C. White for defendant.\\nSuperior Court, Sussex County,\\nFebruary Term, 1914.\\nAction (No. 14, April Term, 1913) by Charles W. Cullen, trustee in bankruptcy of the Delmar Lumber Manufacturing Company, against Mary A. Veasey. (Trial, post).\\nDeclaration in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. General demjurrer to the replication of the plaintiff to the third plea of the defendant, being a plea of payment. It was averred in the replication, in substance, that Theodore A. Veasey, husband of the defendant, was on the twenty-second day of June, 1912, president of the said the Delmar Lumber Manufacturing Company, and that on the twentieth day of the same month Willard F. Deputy, one of the officers of the said company, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, in which it was alleged that the company was insolvent, to which bill answer was filed by the said company, admitting all the allegations therein,- under oath of the said Theodore A. Veasey as to the truth of the matters contained in said answer, as well as that the execution and filing thereof were done in pursuance with directions and authority of a resolution of the board of directors of said company, passed on the nineteenth day of June, 1912; that the Chancellor did on the twenty-fourth day of June, 1912, decree the said company to be insolvent and appointed receivers therefor; that on the eleventh day of July, 1912, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in the United States Court for the District of Delaware, upon which petition the said company was duly adjudged bankrupt; that the defendant, with the influence of her husband, wrongfully, fraudulently and illegally, with the purpose and intent of defrauding the creditors of the said company and creating an illegal preference in favor of the husband of the said defendant, then four months before the filing of the said involuntary petition of bankruptcy, transferred her indebtedness to the said company to her husband, an alleged creditor of the said company; that the defendant\\u2019s husband thereupon wrongfully, illegally and without the consent of the board of directors of the said company, credited the defendant with the payment of her said indebtedness to the said company and also set off the debt of the said defendant to the said company to the amount so pleaded by her against the indebtedness of the said company to the husband of the defendant as set forth in her said plea, thereby creating in her said husband an illegal preference in violation of , Section 68 of the Act of Congress entitled \\u201cAn act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States.\\u201d\", \"word_count\": \"728\", \"char_count\": \"4409\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nIt is a rule of pleading that a general demurrer admits all material facts well pleaded. It is the opinion of the court that the replication is good and the demurrer should not be sustained. It is overruled.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/419667.json b/delaware/419667.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a106a8f4b4fa05be78a02a3abc5fdf5e505ee9da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/419667.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"419667\", \"name\": \"William M. Hope and Henry Ridgely vs. George Burton\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hope v. Burton\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"22\", \"last_page\": \"24\", \"citations\": \"5 Boyce 22\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:19:27.484826+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"William M. Hope and Henry Ridgely vs. George Burton.\", \"head_matter\": \"William M. Hope and Henry Ridgely vs. George Burton.\\n1. Attorney and Client\\u2014Compensation of Attorney\\u2014Reasonable Compensation.\\nAn attorney at law is entitled to a reasonable compensation for professional services rendered to another, and in determining what is the reasonable value of the services, which varies with the magnitude and the importance of the particular case, the degree of responsibility attaching to its management, the difficulty of the questions involved, the ability and reputation of counsel engaged, and the amount of labor bestowed may be considered.\\n2. Attorney and Client\\u2014Actions for Attorneys\\u2019 Compensation\\u2014 Evidence\\u2014Opinion of Client.\\nIn an action by attorneys for their compensation, testimony by the defendant that he regarded the amount of plaintiffs\\u2019 claim as a joke and as unreasonable, and that he thought he had been overcharged, has no probative force or value.\\n3. Trial\\u2014Verdict\\u2014Determination.\\nIn all civil actions the verdict of the jury should be in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence.\\n(May 4, 1914.)\\nJudges Boyce and Conrad sitting.\\nJohn B. Hutton for plaintiffs.\\nJames H. Hughes, attorney for pleading to issue; the defendant preferring to conduct his own defense thereafter.\\nSuperior Court, Kent County,\\nApril Term, 1914.\\nAssumpsit (No. 45, February Term, 1914) by William M. -Hope and another against George Burton to recover fees for services as attorneys at law, rendered to defendant.\\nThe defendant had counsel for pleading to issue, but preferred to conduct his own defense thereafter.\\nThe case is stated in the charge of the court.\", \"word_count\": \"886\", \"char_count\": \"5293\", \"text\": \"Boyce, J.,\\ncharging the jury:\\nGentlemen of the jury:\\u2014This is an action of assumpsit on the common counts brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant to recover the value of services rendered for him as attorneys at law in the defense of a will contest and in connection with certain other matters testified to by the plaintiffs.\\nThe defendant, a layman, employed counsel to plead this case to issue only and then on his own volition he assumed personal charge thereof, which he has undertaken to conduct here at the trial. The defense relied upon is the general issue of non assumpsit. The defendant concedes that he retained the plaintiffs in defense of the will contest which resulted in his favor and in connection with the other matters detailed by the plaintiffs. There is no suggestion that the services were rendered gratuitously, but it is admitted by the defendant that he did make inquiry of his attorneys at or about the time of their engagement, and perhaps one or more times thereafter, respecting the compensation which they would expect for their services and that no amount was agreed upon.\\nThe plaintiffs gave testimony at much length as to the kind and character of the services rendered and also as to the time consumed by them.\\nAn attorney at law when retained by another is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for professional services rendered, and he may maintain an action therefor. In the absence of an express agreement, there is no fixed standard by which the value of the services of an attorney can be determined. Their value and reasonable price may vary with the magnitude and importance of the particular case, the degree of responsibility attaching to its management, the difficulty of the questions in- valved, the ability and reputation of counsel engaged, the labor bestowed, and other matters which will readily occur, especially to members of the profession. Lawson, Exp. Ev. rule 21.\\nThe plaintiffs have testified as to the nature and importance of the matters relative to which they rendered services for the defendant; likewise as to the character of the issues and the amount involved, labor bestowed, and time required; and also that their services are reasonably worth the sum of three thousand dollars, the amount which they claim in this action. Testimony of other members of the bar of skill and experience has been introduced to the effect that the claim of the plaintiffs is fair and reasonable. The defendant does not deny or attempt to disprove that the plaintiffs were retained by him as his counsel or that the services for which this action was brought were not rendered. He does not even suggest that the plaintiffs did not exercise reasonable diligence and skill, and he has not offered any legal evidence in depreciation of the value of the services upon a quantum meruit.\\nIt was competent for the defendant, under the pleadings in this case, to disprove the plaintiffs' claim in whole or part, if he could do so. It is true, the defendant testified to the effect that when the plaintiffs made known to him the amount of their claim, he regarded it as a joke, and he considers the amount claimed unreasonable. He has merely expressed an opinion claiming that he has been overcharged. This has no probative force or value\\u2014that is, it proves nothing.\\nCounsel for the plaintiffs has withdrawn his motion for binding instructions, and the case goes to you upon the evidence before you and you are to decide the case in accordance with the evidence as given.\\nIn all civil actions, the verdict of the jury should be in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence, and that is our charge to you in this case.\\nVerdict for plaintiffs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/422918.json b/delaware/422918.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d15c911a9725d8d7470dbfa936d8a8b51d85c1c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/422918.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"422918\", \"name\": \"James H. Thomas, d. b. a., vs. Frederick P. Ruhl, p. b. r.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Thomas v. Ruhl\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-10-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 1\", \"first_page\": \"437\", \"last_page\": \"438\", \"citations\": \"7 Boyce 437\", \"volume\": \"30\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:01.645923+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James H. Thomas, d. b. a., vs. Frederick P. Ruhl, p. b. r.\", \"head_matter\": \"James H. Thomas, d. b. a., vs. Frederick P. Ruhl, p. b. r.\\nWitnesses\\u2014Fees of Expert Testifying Before Justice.\\nThe law and rule of court authorizing payment of five dollars a day to a witness testifying as-an expert does not apply to witnesses giving testimony before a justice of the peace, and any agreement to pay witnesses more than the legal fees for testifying before a justice is unenforceable by action.\\n(October 27, 1919.)\\nPbnnewill, C. J., and Boyce, J., sitting.\\nJohn D. Hawkins for the appellant.\\nJ. Hall Anderson for the respondent.\\nSuperior Court for Kent County,\\nOctober Term, 1919.\\nAppeal No. 1,\\nApril Term, 1919.\\nAction by Frederick P. Ruhl before a justice of the peace against James H. Thomas. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings appeal. Trial before jury. Verdict for appellant.\", \"word_count\": \"362\", \"char_count\": \"2084\", \"text\": \"Pennewill, C. J.,\\ncharging the jury:\\nThis is an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover an amount which the plaintiff claims is due and owing to him for services rendered the defendant as an expert witness in a trial before, a justice of the peace in which the defendant was plaintiff.\\nThe plaintiff contends that the defendant requested him to attend said trial and give testimony as an expert witness, and agreed to pay him the sum of five dollars for each day's attendance and mileage.\\nThe defendant denies that he made any agreement to pay the plaintiff more than the usual and legal witness fees and mileage, all of which he contends he has paid.\\nThe court instruct you that the plaintiff cannot recover in this case a greater amount than the difference between the amount the testimony shows the defendant has paid, and the legal fees and mileage. Any agreement to pay more than such fees would be against public policy and void. The law and rule of court, which authorize the payment of five dollars to a witness testifying in a case as an expert, does not apply to witnesses giving testimony before a justice of the peace, and any agreement to pay more than the legal fees is unenforceable in an action at law.\\nVerdict for appellant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/422953.json b/delaware/422953.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e47d0767de79204a1611e1536f59f0eeb7bc2002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/422953.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"422953\", \"name\": \"Sadie G. Lemmon, widow of Walter J. Lemmon, vs. Luke H. Broadwater\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lemmon v. Broadwater\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"Summons Case, No. 46\", \"first_page\": \"472\", \"last_page\": \"478\", \"citations\": \"7 Boyce 472\", \"volume\": \"30\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:01.645923+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Sadie G. Lemmon, widow of Walter J. Lemmon, vs. Luke H. Broadwater.\", \"head_matter\": \"Sadie G. Lemmon, widow of Walter J. Lemmon, vs. Luke H. Broadwater.\\n1. Negligence\\u2014Burden of proof.\\nNegligence is never presumed, and plaintiff must affirmatively show that defendant neglected some duty he owed to deceased.\\n2. Negligence\\u2014Definition.\\nNegligence is want of ordinary care, or the want of such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise in similar circumstances.\\n3. Highways\\u2014Rights of automobile driver and motorcyclist.\\nAn automobile driver and motorcyclist have equal rights to lawfully use public highways, and each may assume the other will exercise ordinary care, and not carelessly expose to danger or negligently injure the other.\\n4. Highways\\u2014Collision Due to Traveler on Wrong Side of Road.\\nTraveler on public highway should proceed on the right hand side, and upon meeting a person traveling on the wrong side may assume that such person will do everything reasonably possible to avoid a collision, andisnothimself responsible for any collision if he does all that a reasonably careful person would have done to prevent it.\\n5. Highways\\u2014Duty of Persons Operating Motor Vehicles Upon Meeting.\\nPersons operating motor vehicles on a public highway upon meeting should turn to the right side of the highway, so that the other vehicle may pass with safety.\\n6. Highways\\u2014Violation of Speed Statute as Negligence per se.\\nExceeding the speed limits prescribed by Rev. Code 1915, \\u00a7 246, for motor vehicles on highways constitutes negligence per se.\\n7. Highways\\u2014Exceeding Statutory Speed Must Proximately cause Injury.\\nA defendant is not hable for violating Rev. Code 1915, \\u00a7 246, prescribing speed limits for motor vehicles on highways, unless the violation of the statute caused the accident of which plaintiff complains.\\n8. Highways\\u2014Collision Between Motor Vehicles Does Not Create Presumption of Negligence.\\nThe fact that a motorcyclist was killed in a collision with an automobile on a public highway does not create a presumption of negligence either on the part of the deceased or defendant automobile driver.\\n9. Highways\\u2014Contributory Negligence Bars Recovery.\\nIf deceased motorcyclist was negligent in colliding with an automobile, no recovery could be had for his death, even if defendant automobile driver was also negligent.\\n10. Highways\\u2014No Recovery For \\u201cUnavoidable Accident.\\\"\\nNo recovery can be had for death caused in a collision between motor vehicles if the collision was an \\u201cunavoidable accident\\\" or one which could not be prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence.\\n11. Evidence\\u2014Matters Considered in Determining Weight.\\nIn weighing testimony the jury may consider the appearance and manner of witnesses, their apparent fairness or bias, their intelligence and opportunities for observing, and other elements which may fairly test their truthfulness and accuracy.\\n12. Death\\u2014Damages For Death of Husband.\\nA wife may recover for her husband\\u2019s negligent killing such damages as will reasonably compensate her for all damages which she has sustained, or may sustain, based upon deceased\\u2019s probable length of life, and governed by the portion of his income that plaintiff would have probably received if he had lived..\\n(December 8, 1919.)\\nBoyce and Rice, J. J., sitting.\\nW.W. Knowles for the plaintiff.\\nRobert H. Richards and Aaron-Finger for the defendant.\\nSuperior Court, New Castle County,\\nNovember Term, 1919.\\nSummons Case, No. 46,\\nMarch Term, 1919.\\nAction by Sadie G. Lemmon against Luke H. Broadwater to recover damages for the death of her husband, Walter J. Lemmon. Verdict for the plaintiff.\\nThe facts sufficiently appear in the charge of the court.\", \"word_count\": \"2301\", \"char_count\": \"13464\", \"text\": \"Rice, J.,\\ncharging the jury:\\nThis action was brought by Sadie G. Lemmon, the plaintiff, against Luke H. Broadwater, the defendant, to recover damages for the death of Walter J. Lemmon, her husband, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligent operation of defendant's automobile on a public highway in this county.\\nThe plaintiff claims that the defendant on the nineteenth day of August was running his automobile in a southerly direction on a part of the State Road, leading from Summit Bridge to Mt. Pleasant, a public highway in this county, and in attempting to pass a wagon going in the same direction ran his automobile to the left of the wagon and on the left hand side of the roads thereby colliding with the motorcycle on which Walter J. Lemmon was riding in a northerly direction. As a result of the collision between the automobile and the motorcycle, Walter J. Lemmon was injured and died from his injuries a few minutes later.\\nThis action is based on the alleged negligence of the defendant and the particular acts with which the plaintiff charges the defendant are: (1) That the defendant negligently ran his automobile at the place of the accident, at an unlawful and dangerous rate of speed, to wit, at the rate of thirty-five miles per hour; (2) that he attempted to pass Walter J. Lemmon, the rider of the motorcycle, at a dangerous rate of speed without stopping or attempting to stop his automobile, after he saw or could have seen Lemmon approaching in an opposite direction; (3) that he attempted to pass Lemmon, without giving \\u00a1a warning of his approach; (4) that the defendant ran his automobile at a rapid rate of speed on the left hand side of the road; (5) that contrary to the statute law of the state of Delaware, the defendant ran his automobile to the left of the center of the highway.\\nThe defendant denies that he was guilty of any of the acts of negligence as charged by the plaintiff. He denies at the time of the collision, between his automobile and the motorcycle on which Lemmon was riding, that he was in the act of passing a wagon going in the same direction. The defendant contends that at the time of the collision and immediately prior thereto he was operating his automobile at a reasonable and lawful rate of speed on the right hand side of the road, in the direction he was proceeding, and while so proceeding, Lemmon approached him on a motorcycle at an unreasonable and dangerous rate of speed, with a noticeable lack of control of the motorcycle on the part of the rider, and when the motorcycle reached a point in the road opposite the automobile, the motorcycle, either by reason of the negligence of the person operating it, or for some reason beyond the operator's control, suddenly swerved to the left and ran into the side of defendant's automobile.\\nIt is admitted that the accident occurred in August, 1918, on the State Road, a public highway in New Castle county, leading from Summit Bridge to Mt. Pleasant, that the plaintiff's husband was operating a motorcycle at the time of the accident, that the defendant owned and operated the automobile which collided with the motorcycle, and that the plaintiff is the widow of the deceased.\\nIt is not denied that Walter J. Lemmon died shortly after the accident as a result of injuries received in the collision.\\nThe basis and gist of this action is negligence. Negligence is never presumed; it must be proved, and it is a burden on the plaintiff to affirmatively show that the defendant neglected some duty which he owed to the deceased. Negligence has often been defined by this court to be the want of ordinary care; that is, the want of such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise under similar circumstances.\\nAn operator of an automobile and a traveller on a motorcycle have equal right to lawfully use public highways, and each has the right to assume and act upon the assumption that the other will exercise ordinary care and caution according to the cir cumstances, and will not negligently and carelessly expose himself to danger or negligently do injury to the other.\\nIt is the law of this state that a traveller on a public highway proceed on the right hand side of the highway and if he should meet a person travelling on the wrong side of the road, the traveller on the right side of the road has the right to assume that the other on the wrong side will do all that a reasonably prudent person, under all the circumstances, would do to avoid a collision, and if they should collide with each other, the traveller on the right side of the road would not be held responsible if he did all that a reasonably careful and prudent person would have done to prevent the accident.\\nIt is the duty of a person operating a motor vehicle on a public highway upon meeting another vehicle to reasonably turn to the right of the center of the highway so that such vehicle may pass with safety and without interference.\\nWe will call to your attention the following provisions of the statute law of this state: Section 209 [246], Rev. Code 1915, in part, provides:\\n\\\"The following rates of speed may be maintained but not exceeded: Upon any public street or highway where the buildings are of greater distance apart than one hundred feet, a rate of speed of one mile in two minutes and twenty-four seconds shall be permitted, but not exceeded, but this rate shall be reduced to one mile in five minutes in passing other vehicles; provided that nothing in this section shall permit any person to drive a motor vehicle at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable, having regard to the traffic, or so as to endanger the safety of any person or injure the property of any person.\\nIt has been held in this state that a violation of the provisions of a statute amounts to negligence in law, whether any positive or active negligence be proved or not. It is what is commonly known in law as negligence per se.\\nHowever, the defendant would not be liable for injury resulting from such negligence, unless you are satisfied from the evidence that the violation of the statute, if any, caused the accident complained of.\\nIf you should find from the evidence that the defendant at the time of the accident was operating his automobile in a manner in violation of the provisions of the statute law of this state, he would be guilty of negligence per se, and if such negligence on the part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision between the automobile operated by the defendant and the motorcycle operated by Walter J. Lemmon, the deceased, the defendant would be liable.\\nIf, on the other hand, you should find that the operator of the motorcycle was at the time of the accident operating his motorcycle in a manner in violation of the provisions of the law, he would be guilty of negligence per se and if such negligence on his part was operating at the time of the accident and caused or contributed thereto, his widow, the plaintiff, would not be entitled to a recovery in this action.\\nOne of the defenses relied upon by the defendant is that the collision was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff's deceased husband. As we have before stated, negligence is never presumed [it must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury by the party alleging it. There is no presumption of negligence either on the part of the deceased or on the part of the defendant, from the fact that the death of the deceased resulted from the collision between the automobile and the motorcycle. Whether negligence exists in a particular case, and whose, is a question to be determined by the jury from the evidence.\\nIf the accident was caused solely by the negligence of Walter J. Lemmon, there can be no recovery by the plaintiff, or, if the deceased was guilty of negligence which was operating at the time of the accident and contributed thereto, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a recovery even though the jury should believe that the defendant was also guilty of negligence, as the law will not measure the proportion of blame or negligence to attributed to either party.\\nAnother defense urged is that the collision between the automobile and the motorcycle, resulting in the fatal injuries to Walter J. Lemmon, was an accident, without fault of either party to the collision.\\nAn accident which could not be prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence is termed an unavoidable accident, and, if you should find from the evidence that the collision in question was of such a character, the plaintiff could not recover.\\nWhen the testimony is conflicting, the jury should reconcile it, if they can; if they cannot, they should give credit to the testimony of those witnesses who, under all the circumstances, appear to the jury to be most entitled to credit, and reject such testimony as they may deem unworthy of credit. In weighing testimony, the jury may consider the appearance and manner of the witnesses, their apparent fairness or bias, degree of intelligence and their opportunities for seeing and otherwise knowing the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction concerning which they testify, and any other element which may fairly test their truthfulness \\u00e1nd the accuracy of their testimony.\\nIf you find for the plaintiff, it sfiould be for such a stun of money as will reasonably compensate her for any and all damages that she has sustained, or may sustain by reason of the death of her husband, basing your verdict upon the number of years the deceased would probably have lived had he not been killed, and governed by what portion of the gross earnings or income the plaintiff would probably have received from the deceased if he had lived. Your verdict should be for that party in whose favor you find the preponderance or great weight of the testimony.\\nVerdict for the plaintiff.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/425505.json b/delaware/425505.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..14727c120be6964b7c5822aa5431d8890fe61faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/425505.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"425505\", \"name\": \"Joseph L. Marshall and James O. Marshall, trading as J. L. Marshall and J. O. Marshall vs. Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marshall v. Maryland, Delaware, & Virginia Railway Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1921-02-22\", \"docket_number\": \"Case No. 9\", \"first_page\": \"170\", \"last_page\": \"173\", \"citations\": \"31 Del. 170\", \"volume\": \"31\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:45:38.733307+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Joseph L. Marshall and James O. Marshall, trading as J. L. Marshall and J. O. Marshall vs. Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph L. Marshall and James O. Marshall, trading as J. L. Marshall and J. O. Marshall vs. Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\\n1. Landlord and Tenant \\u2014 Exemption of Landlord Prom Liability for Negligence in Operation of Adjacent Railroad is Valid.\\nAn exemption of a railroad company from liability for damages from negligence in the operation of the railroad, as part of the consideration for a lease by it of buildings and structures owned by it adjacent to the railroad, is valid.\\n2. Landlord and Tenant \\u2014 Lease by Railroad Company of Buildings Adjoining Land held Insufficient, to Exempt From Liability for Fire Caused by Negligence.\\nA lease by a railroad company of buildings and structures adjoining its railroad, providing that the lessee would indemnify it from all claims and damages arising through the exercise of any right thereby granted or conferred, was ambiguous, and did not exempt it from liability for fire due to its negligence, and which destroyed the lessee\\u2019s property, as such immunity cannot rest on a presumption or strained construction.\\n(February 22, 1921.)\\nBoyce and Conrad, J. J., sitting.\\nDaniel J. Layton and James'M. Tunnell for plaintiffs.\\nCharles S. Richards for defendant.\\nSuperior Court for Sussex County,\\nOctober Term, 1920.\\nCase No. 9,\\nFebruary Term, 1920.\\nAction brought by Joseph L. Marshall and James 0. Marshall, partners, against the Maryland, Delaware & Virginia Railway Company, to recover damages for loss by fire of certain buildings and personal property therein of the plaintiffs. On demurrer to special plea to declaration. Demurrer sustained.\\nThe declaration contains three counts, and alleges substantially that, the plaintiffs at the time of the loss by fire were the owners of certain buildings, structures and personal property located contiguous or adjacent to the right of way of the defendant's railroad; that the defendant company was under duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care in the equipment and operation of its locomitives to prevent damage being caused to the plaintiffs through sparks or cinders emitted from its locomotives passing the buildings, structures and personal property of the plaintiffs; that on or about, etc., the defendant, in violation of this duty, while engaged in the operation of its railroad was negligent and careless in running one of its locomotives upon and along its railroad by and past said buildings and structures without suitable, proper and sufficient spark catchers, etc., to prevent sparks, etc., negligently set fire to the buildings and personal property therein of the plaintiffs and destroyed the same.\\nThe defendant filed a special plea to the declaration, alleging in substance that the buildings and structures which were burned, were, on, etc., and prior thereto, the property of the defendant company; that the defendant company theretofore, on, etc., entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs by which it granted to the plaintiffs the permission to maintain and'use said buildings and structures in connection with the canning business of the plaintiffs, at their own cost and expense; that in consideration of this permission the plaintiffs agreed as follows:\\n\\u201cThat in consideration of the issuance of this permit they shall and will save and keep harmless and indemnify the party of the first part from and against all claims for damages of whatsoever kind or nature arising in any manner or under any circumstances through the exercise of any right granted or conferred hereby, whether such damages be sustained by the parties of the second part or by other person or persons, corporation or corporations which seek to hold the party of the first part liable.\\u201d\\nThe plea closes with the statement that the plaintiffs were,at the time the fire occurred, occupying and in possession of the buildings and structures, under the agreement, and prays judgment, etc.\\nTo the plea the plaintiffs filed a general demurrer. Joinder in demurrer was entered.\\nThe contention of the defendant was that the buildings which were destroyed were let to the plaintiffs under the agreement between the parties which exonerated the defendant company from any liability for loss by fire through its own negligence or that of its employees, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to have or maintain their action. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Saulsbury, 115 Tenn. 402, 90 S. W. 624, 5 Ann. Cas. 744. The plaintiffs conceded that it is competent for a railroad company to let its buildings to persons who are to occupy the same at a point adjacent to its railroad, under an agreement that the railroad company shall not be liable for damage to the same by fire from its locomotive engines although owing to the negligence of the railroad company or its employees. 33 Cyc. 1330; Griswold v. III. Central R. R. Co., 90 Iowa, 265, 57 N. W. 843 , 24 L.R. A. 647. Yet it was urged that in seeking to relieve itself from liability for acts of its own negligence, the railroad company must exercise its right to obtain such an exemption by language which clearly expresses the fact that at the time the parties entered into the contract such was the understanding in the minds of both of them. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chic., Mil. & St. Paul R. Co., 175 U. S. 91, 20 Sup. Ct. 33, 44 L. Ed. 84. It was claimed that the right of exemption secured by the provision relied on in the plea was limited to some such damages as might result to the plaintiffs, or others, in the use of the buildings and structures from possible defects therein, or from some duty to maintain the same in repair, or from some acts on the part of the plaintiffs, or others than the defendant, arising in any manner, or under any circumstances through the exercise of any right granted or conferred by the agreement between the parties.\", \"word_count\": \"1204\", \"char_count\": \"7270\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe substantial question raised by the pleadings is whether the defendant company entered into an agree ment with the plaintiffs by which the company should be exempt from any liability for damage to the buildings and property which it let to the plaintiffs, although the damage should be occasioned by the negligence of the company, or its employees. An exemption from liability for damages in consequence of negligence as part of the consideration for such an agreement is valid in a case like this. The language of the provision set out in the plea, exempting the defendant company from claims for damages is obviously ambiguous. Clearly exemption from liability for negligence or from fire is not expressed in the provision. If it was the intention of the parties that the provision should secure to the defendant company the exemption claimed for it in this action, it should appear from the language of the provision fairly interpreted; for such immunity cannot rest upon a presumption or strained construction of the provision.\\nIt is the opinion of the court that the language of the provision is not sufficiently specific to relieve the defendant company from liability for damages to the said buildings and personal property therein of the plaintiffs, if occasioned by the defendant company in the manner as alleged in the declaration of the plaintiffs.\\nThe demurrer is sustained.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/427807.json b/delaware/427807.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..386e8cdfbb0ff70338a2105a7c5dd6c758c139a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/427807.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"427807\", \"name\": \"Laurel Produce Growers Association, a corporation created by and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, d. b. a., vs. Reese O. Gordy, p. b. r.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Laurel Produce Growers Ass'n v. Gordy\", \"decision_date\": \"1924-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 57,\", \"first_page\": \"405\", \"last_page\": \"406\", \"citations\": \"32 Del. 405\", \"volume\": \"32\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:23:34.925620+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Laurel Produce Growers Association, a corporation created by and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, d. b. a., vs. Reese O. Gordy, p. b. r.\", \"head_matter\": \"Laurel Produce Growers Association, a corporation created by and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, d. b. a., vs. Reese O. Gordy, p. b. r.\\n(February 11, 1924.)\\nHarrington and Richards, J. J., sitting.\\nJames M. Tumtell for plaintiff.\\nJohn M. Richardson for defendant.\\nSuperior Court for Sussex County,\\nFebruary Term, 1924.\\nNo. 57,\\nFebruary term, 1923.\", \"word_count\": \"132\", \"char_count\": \"763\", \"text\": \"Richards, J.\\nWe think that the book in question has been sufficiently identified as being the account book of the defendant in its transactions with the plaintiff. We, therefore, think that it is admissible against the defendant on the ground that it is an admission against interest. 2 Ency. of Ev., pp. 664, 666; Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co., 31 N. H. 209; Allen v. Coitt, 6 Hill. (N. Y.) 318.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/427928.json b/delaware/427928.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f74f4fe05083c37893deaa3b8bff928e7de60247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/427928.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"427928\", \"name\": \"State vs. Walter L. Long\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Long\", \"decision_date\": \"1923-07-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 18\", \"first_page\": \"380\", \"last_page\": \"386\", \"citations\": \"32 Del. 380\", \"volume\": \"32\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Oyer and Terminer\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:23:34.925620+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State vs. Walter L. Long.\", \"head_matter\": \"State vs. Walter L. Long.\\n(July 2, 1923.)\\nRice, Harrington and Richards, J. J., sitting.\\nSylvester D. Townsend, Jr., Attorney-General, Robert G. Houston and Clarence A. Southerland, Deputy Attomeys-General, for the State.\\nJames M. Tunnell for defendant.\\nCourt of Oyer and Terminer, Sussex County,\\nJune Term, 1923\\nNo. 18,\\nApril Term, 1923.\", \"word_count\": \"1150\", \"char_count\": \"6299\", \"text\": \"Rice, J.:\\nThe evident purpose of the question is to show that the deceased and the defendant were together at a time when the murder could have been committed. It is not claimed that the deceased was starting or about to start to meet the defendant when the declaration sought to be proved was made by him. The statement of the deceased, therefore, neither accompanied nor characterized any act relevant to the issue. While an examination of the authorities above cited will show that declarations of a deceased person under such circumstances are some times admitted on the ground of being a part of the res gestae, as we view it, they are not admissible on that ground, (opinion of Start, C. J., in State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N. W. 63); and we do not understand that the State contends that they are. Such declarations are also admitted in some cases on the ground that they are verbal acts. {State v. Hayward, Supra). If, however, the doing of an act is material, then the existence of a design or plan to do that specific act is relevant to show that the act was probably done as planned (1 Wigmore on Ev., Sec. 192; Greenleaf on Ev., Sec. 126a); and, considering the plan or design as a condition of mind, a person's own statements of a present existing state of mind when made in a natural manner, under circumstances dispelling suspicion, and containing no suggestion of sinister motives, only reflect the mental state, and are, therefore, competent to prove the condition of the mind when made; or, in other words, what such person's purpose or intention then was. A similar principle has been applied in this state in a suit for alienation of affections, to show the wife's feeling toward her husband by her declarations. Rash v. Pratt, 1 W. W. Harr. (31 Del.) 18, 111 Atl. 225. The purpose of the question is not to show that the deceased was at some time, at a particular place with a particular person because he said he was going there, \\u2014 and it clearly would not be admissible on that ground, \\u2014 but to show his purpose or intention at the time he made such statement as a circumstance tending to show that he did as he planned or intended to do. In a trial on an indictment for murder, where the defendant relies on self-defense, evidence that threats were made by the deceased person against the defendant, though not communicated to him, are admissible to show that the deceased began the affray. State v. Powell, 5 Penn. 24 (32-34). While there are certain limitations on this rule, including the limitation that in order to make such evidence admissible it must be uncertain as to which was the agressor, the principle involved would seem to be similar. For the reasons above stated our conclusion is that the declarations in this case are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. (Wigmore on Ev., vol. 3, Sec. 1725, 1726, 1727; Greenleaf on Ev., Sec. 126a. Supra; State v. Farnam, 82 Or. 211, 161 Pac. 417, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 318; State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562, 569 (633); See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillam, 145 U. S. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. 909, 36 L. Ed. 706, and Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 185, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. A. 235. We, therefore, overrule the objection, reserving to defendant's attorney the right to move to strike out the reply of the witness, if it should not prove to be material.\\nThe witness answered the question as follows:\\n\\\"Well, he told me that she (Mrs. Ella Baull) asked him to come around to see her, and he told, her that he cquldn't come, that he was going away soon, and he told her that he had a date that night to meet a girl and a fellow on the duPont Road at about eight o'clock, and I am afraid to say whether he said the boy was from Wilmington and the girl was from Philadelphia, because I wouldn't like to say\\\".\\nHouston, Deputy Attorney-General, in endeavoring to prove that it was the habit of Elisha W. Hudson to carry a considerable some of money on his person, asked the following question:\\n\\\"Do you know his habit in relation to his money?\\\"\\nThe attorney for the defendant objected to the question, unless the State proposed to follow it up by proving that the deceased had money on him at the time of his death.\\nRice, J.:\\nOn the authority of the Supreme Court in Roberts v. State, 2 Boyce 385 (391), 79 Atl. 396, Ann. Cas. 1914 D, 1266, the Court overrules the objection.\\nA witness for the State, after testifying that the deceased had a considerable sum of money on his person in the shape of notes about three weeks before his death was asked:\\nQ. Did you see any of the denominations of those notes?\\nA. Yes, sir; I saw some one hundred dollar bills.\\nThe attorney for the defendant moved to strike out the answer to the question on the ground that proof of what money Elisha W. Hudson had on his person three weeks before he was murdered was too remote, and, therefore, not material to show how much money he had on his person at the time of the murder. On the promise of the State to show that Hudson was a sawyer in a mill, and that it was not his habit to spend much money, the motion of the defendant was overruled.\\nRice, J., in ruling on the defendant's motion, said, that it was perfectly proper for the State to prove that the deceased had money in his possession shortly before his death, and that how far back the inquiry would be permitted to go, depended upon the character and business habits of the deceased, as well as on all other circumstances which rendered it more or less probable that if he had money on his person prior to the time of his death, that he still had it at the time of his death (Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245; Commonwealth v. William, 170 Mass. 461, 50 N. E. R. 1035; Commonwealth v. Richmond, 207 Mass. 249, 93 N. E. R. 816); and that, if the State produced the additional proof promised, evidence as to the money that he had three weeks before his murder was entirely proper.\\nState vs. Lynch, 2 W. W. Harr., (32 Del.) 597.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/429366.json b/delaware/429366.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..643ce358c4c09da5f28f9735fac569c6d1cbd7e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/429366.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"429366\", \"name\": \"Frank Kupis vs. Wilmington Provision Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kupis v. Wilmington Provision Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1927-03-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 125\", \"first_page\": \"317\", \"last_page\": \"323\", \"citations\": \"33 Del. 317\", \"volume\": \"33\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:51.790414+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Frank Kupis vs. Wilmington Provision Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Frank Kupis vs. Wilmington Provision Company.\\n(March 23, 1927.)\\nRice and Harrington, J. J., sitting.\\nWilliam Prickett for appellant.\\nH. H. Ward, Jr., (of Ward, Gray and Ward) for appellee.\\nSuperior Court for New Castle County,\\nNovember Term, 1926.\\nNo. 125,\\nMarch Term, 1926.\", \"word_count\": \"1807\", \"char_count\": \"10637\", \"text\": \"Rice, J.,\\ndeivering the opinion of the court:\\nThe appellant claims (1) that when a specific permanent injury follows a period of total disability, there should be no deduction from the' period of compensation specified under Section 103, subsec. (c), for compensation paid under Section 103, subsec. (a), for total disability; (2) That under Paragraph 20 of Subsection (c) it is the amount of compensation which varies, and not the period; (3) that all compensation under Subsection (c) is subject to the maximum and minimum prescribed in the last paragraph of this subsection.\\nCode 1915, \\u00a7 3193j, at Section 103, as amended (30 Del. Laws, c. 203, \\u00a7 3; 32 Del. Laws, c. 186, \\u00a7 2), in so far as applicable to the consideration of the instant case, provides:\\n\\\"(a) For the first four hundred and seventy-five weeks of total disability, fifty per centum of the wages of the injured employee as defined by this act as amended; but the compensation shall not be more than fifteen dollars per week nor less than five dollars per week, and shall not exceed in the aggregate the sum of four thousand dollars; provided, that if at the time of injury, the employee receives wages of less than five dollars per week, then he shall receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation. Nothing in this paragraph (a) shall require the payment of compensation after disability shall cease. Should partial disability be followed by total disability, the period of four hundred and seventy-five weeks mentioned in this paragraph (a) of this section shall be reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid for such partial disability.\\n\\\"(b) For disability for work partial in character (except the particular cases mentioned in the next succeeding subsection [c] of this section), fifty per centum of the difference between the wages received by the injured employee before the injury and the earning power of the employee thereafter, but such compensation shall not be more than fifteen dollars per week. This compensation shall be paid during the period of such partial disability for work; not, however, beyond two hundred and eighty-five weeks. Should total disability for work be followed by partial disability for work, the period for two hundred and eighty-five weeks mentioned in this subsection (b) shall be reduced by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid for such total disability _\\n\\\"(c) For all permanent injuries of the following classes, the compensation, regardless of the earning power of such injured employee after such injury, shall be as follows:\\n\\\"For the loss of a leg, fifty per centum of wages during one hundred and ninety-four weeks.\\n\\\"In all other cases in this class, or when the usefulness of a member or any physical function is permanently impaired, the compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the above schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule.\\n\\\"This compensation shall not be more than fifteen dollars per week, nor less than five dollars per week; provided, that, if at the time of injury the employee receives wages of less than five dollars per week, then he shall receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation.\\\"\\nWe believe that the award of the Industrial Accident Board allowing a deduction from the period of compensation specified under Section 103, Subsec. (c), for compensation paid under Subsection (a) for temporary total disability, is not within the provisions or intendment of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Law. The language of Subsection (c) does not specifically provide for such a reduction in cases coming within the schedule set forth in this section, neither is there any general or special provision for a reduction in such cases, in the statute. The employer, the appellee, argues that subsections (a), (b), and (d) all contain provisions for reducing the period of compensation payable for an injury under one'subsection by the number of weeks of compensation paid for the same injury under another subsection, and, there fore, the general policy of the Workmen's Compensation Law providing for such a reduction is established, and should apply to cases coming under the provisions of Subsection (c). This argument ordinarily would be entitled to great consideration in determining the general policy of the law and the intendment of the Legislature, but we believe it to be without much force under the present circumstances. We believe greater weight should be attached to the fact that while the deduction provision appears in all subsections dealing with disability for work, either total or partial, it is omitted from subsection (c), the only section dealing with compensation for the loss or impairment of an organ or member of the body. It is reasonable to believe, if it was the intention of the Legislature that deduction should be made in the cases coming within Subsection (c), the same or like provisions appearing in Subsections (a), (b), and (d) would have been written into Subsection (c).\\nThe Industrial Accident Board, in deciding the case, relied largely upon the decision of the board in the case of Pullman Co. v. Riley, 1 W. W. Harr. (31 Del.) 440, 114 A. 920, which decision, when the case was appealed to the court, was approved. Pullman Car Lines v. Riley, 1 W. W. Harr. 440, 114 A. 920. The facts in the Riley Case differ so greatly from the facts in the present case that we believe it is not necessary to approve or disapprove that decision. The board, in that case, found as a fact that the employee suffered an injury resulting in the loss of a leg, and at the same time suffered other injuries resulting in probable permanent total disability for work. In the present case the employee suffered only one injury causing temporary total disability for work, and eventually resulting in permanent impairment of the use of his leg.\\nThe second cause of appeal is from the action of the board in proportioning the period of compensation to the injury, and not proportioning the amount of compensation. The board found that the usefulness of the leg of the employee had been permanently impaired to the extent of 35 per cent., and awarded compensation at 50 per cent, of wages for 68 weeks (35 per cent, of 194 weeks.).\\nParagraph 20 of Subsection (c) provides:\\n' 'In all other cases in this class, or when the usefulness of a member or any physical function is permanently impaired, the compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the above schedule as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule.\\\"\\nThe cases decided in other jurisdictions under statutes containing language somewhat similar to that found in the Delaware statute appear to be somewhat in conflict on the question now before us. In some jurisdictions, it is argued by the employer, it is held that the statute provides for an apportionment of the period of compensation. Spurgeon, Appellee, v. Iowa & Missouri Granite Works, et al., Appellants, 196 Iowa 1268, 194 N. W. 286; Casey-Hedges v. Lynch, 147 Tenn. 173, 245 S. W. 522.\\nThe appellant cites the following cases from other jurisdictions which it is claimed decide the opposite: Banister v. Kriger, 84 N. J. Law 30, 85 A. 1027; De Zeng v. Pressey, 86 N. J. Law 469, 92 A. 278; Maziarski v. Ohl & Co., 86 N. J. Law 692, 93 A. 110.\\nHowever, we do not find the decisions from other states of very much assistance upon this question, for the reason that while the general provisions of the statutes are the same,' yet in many features and details they differ. We are of the opinion that when the Legislature used the word \\\"amount\\\" in Subsection (c), Para-. graph 20, amount of compensation was meant, and we see no reason to believe that period of compensation was intended. The Legislature seemed to have exercised great care in using the expression \\\"the period\\\" or \\\"number of weeks\\\" when it wished to denote length of time, as in Subsection (a), Subsection (b), Subsection (c), Paragraphs 7, 13, 19, and Subsection (d); and to denote money to be paid as compensation by the use of the word \\\"amount,\\\" as in Subsection {c), Paragraphs 14 and 20. We are of the opinion that the board was in error when it proportioned the period of compensation, and are of the opinion that it should have proportioned the amount of compensation.\\nIt is contended by the employer that if the amount of compensation is to be proportioned, and not the period of compensation, then the compensation should be $4.55 per week, which is 35 per cent. {Subsection [c] Par. 20) of 50 per cent, of wages {Sub section [c] par. 5), the weekly wage being $26. We are of the opinion that this contention cannot be sustained under the provisions of the last paragraph of Subsection (c), and that the minimum of compensation is $5 per week, unless the employee received weekly wages less than that sum per week.\\nThe last paragraph of Subsection (c) provides:\\n\\\"This compensation shall not be more than fifteen dollars per week, nor less than five dollars per week; provided, that, if at the time of injury, the employee receives wages of less than five dollars per week, then he shall receive the full amount of such wages per week as compensation.\\\"\\nThe proviso in this paragraph has reference only to compensation where the wages are less than $5 per week, and qualifies the minimum mentioned in such cases only, and does not otherwise qualify the minimum compensation of $5 per week.\\nWe are of the opinion that we are not in possession of sufficierit facts in the case to make an award for compensation in conformity with our conclusions on the questions of law raised, as it . does not appear from the findings of the board the date of determination of the temporary total disability, from which date, of course, under our holding, the compensation became payable for the permanent impairment of the use of one leg.\\nFor the reasons stated, it is ordered that the case be remanded to the Industrial Accident Board for additional findings of fact, and an award by the board in conformity with our determination of the law. It is further ordered and decreed that a certified copy of this order be sent to the Industrial Accident Board. The costs of the proceeding in this court are taxed against the appellee.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/432359.json b/delaware/432359.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f814495c031f188c54ded74ddd105a925f584dc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/432359.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"432359\", \"name\": \"Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, d. b. a., v. Milton Landsman, p. b. r\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Landsman\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-02-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 313\", \"first_page\": \"384\", \"last_page\": \"394\", \"citations\": \"35 Del. 384\", \"volume\": \"35\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:15:37.960226+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, d. b. a., v. Milton Landsman, p. b. r.\", \"head_matter\": \"Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, d. b. a., v. Milton Landsman, p. b. r.\\n(February 10, 1933.)\\nPennewill, C. J., Harrington and Richards, J. J., sitting.\\nPaul Leahy for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.\\nCharles F. Curley and James Malloy for Milton Landsman.\\nSuperior Court for New Castle County,\\nNo. 313,\\nSep- \\u25a0 tember Term, 1932.\", \"word_count\": \"3615\", \"char_count\": \"20577\", \"text\": \"Pennewill, C. J.,\\ndelivering the opinion of the Court:\\nObviously, under the pleadings, the only question the Court must determine is whether the injury complained of was caused by violent and accidental means.\\nThe defendant correctly states' in his brief that the clause contained in the policy \\\"caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means\\\" has received two distinct and opposed interpretations from the courts of this country.\\nOne line of decisions hold that any injury that is accidental is covered by the clause. The other draws a distinction between an accidental injury and an injury caused by accidental means. Under the former holdings the injury here complained of would be covered by the policy; under the latter it would not.\\nThe plaintiff contends, however, that the weight of authority and the better reasoned cases support his contention that the policy in issue indemnified him against the injury he received.\\nOn the other hand, the defendant claims that the weight of well considered cases, as well as of reason, supports its contention that there is a distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means.\\nThe distinction has been expressed by some courts in general language, as follows:\\nAn injury is caused by accident when the result is accidental and by accidental means when the means that caused the injury are accidental. It must be admitted that such distinction does not clarify the law very much and some courts have frankly said there is no distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means. But no matter how technical the distinction may seem' to be, many courts have recognized and acted upon it. Perhaps the difference in judicial decisions may be shown by a case similar in principle to the present one, where the plaintiff in voluntarily attempting to perform an act in the usual course of his occupation over- . taxed his strength and imposed upon the vital organs a burden greater than they could bear. Such was a leading . case cited by the defendant. Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462, 156 P. 1029, 1030, L. R. A. 1916E, 1197.\\nIn that case the plaintiff undertook to carry a heavy casket down a flight of stairs. The entire operation was carried out precisely in the manner intended and designed by the plaintiff, but the exertion he assumed was beyond \\u2022 his strength and the result was a dilation of the heart and death. On these facts, the Court held, it could not be said the death was caused by bodily injuries affected through accidental means. In that case the Court said:\\n\\\"A differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result. It is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen, but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act or occurrence which leads to the injury or death. 'The question, in the sense of this policy, is not whether death was the result of accident in the sense that it was a death which was not foreseen or anticipated. That is not the question. The question is, in the words of this policy, whether the means by which the injury was caused were accidental means. The death being accidental in the sense in which I have mentioned, and the means which led to the death as accidental, are, to my mind, two quite different things. A person may do certain acts, the result of which acts may produce unforeseen consequences, and may produce what is commonly called accidental death, but the means are exactly what the man intended to use, and did use, and was prepared to use. The means were not accidental, but the result might be accidental.' \\\"\\nThe distinction the Court sought to make in that case, between accident and accidental means, is made clearer by the following words in the opinion:\\n\\\"In carrying it [the casket] down he did not slip or stumble, nor did the casket fall against him.\\\"\\nThe necessary inference from these words is, that if the injury had been caused by the plaintiff's slipping or stumbling, there would have been a cause preceding the injury which the plaintiff could neither anticipate or control, and in such case the injury would have been caused by accidental means. And this is conceded by the defendant to be the law, because it is said in its brief:\\n\\\"For example, if the insured slipped, if the bag he was carrying fell from his shoulder, and he attempted to catch it, if he wrenched or strained his body and then fell \\u2014 any or all of these events would, under this particular policy, be acts which were beyond his control, and the injury would, of course, be the result of accidental means.\\\"\\nThe defendant has cited many cases and quoted at considerable length from some of them but they are all to the same effect as the Rock Case to which we have particularly referred.\\nSome of the other cases cited by the defendant are: Bennetts v. Occidental L. I. Co., 39 Cal. App. 384, 178 P. 964; Schmid v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 42 Ind. App. 483, 85 N. E. 1032, 1036; Feder, et al., v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N. W. 252, 253, 43 L. R. A. 693, 70 Am. St. Rep. 212; Shanberg v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. (C. C. A.), 158 F. 1, 5, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206; Fane v. Nat. Ass'n Ry. Mail Clerks, 197 App. Div. 145, 188 N. Y. S. 222, 223; Seipel v. Eq. Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A.), 59 F. (2d) 544.\\nIn order to make the distinction which many courts have'made between accident and accidental means, as clear as possible, we will quote from a few of the cases cited above.\\nIn the Schmid Case, it was said:\\n\\\"As to what constitutes an accident, the reported cases are not all in accord. But our own decisions, with the weight of the decisions of other courts, we think hold that, where an injury occurs as the direct result of intentional acts, it is not produced by accidental means.\\\"\\nIn the case of Feder, et al., v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, the Court said:\\n\\\"Although a result may not be designed, foreseen, or expected, yet, if it be the natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done, or of conditions voluntarily assumed, it cannot be said to be accidental. The evidence shows that the cause was the ruptured artery; but that was not accidental, if it was the natural result of an act voluntarily done by Feder. That he did anything but what he intended to do, in attempting to close the shutters, is not shown nor claimed. It is not even shown that he made any unusual exertion in what he did.\\\"\\nIn the Shanberg Case, it was said:\\n\\\"It would not help the matter to call. the injury itself \\u2014 that is, the rupture of the heart \\u2014 an accident. That was the result and not the means through which it was effected. Carrying the door, or, after putting it down, the act of filling his lungs with air by drawing a long breath, was the means by which the injury was caused. Both were done by the assured voluntarily and in an ordinary way with no unforeseen, accidental, or involuntary movement of the body whatever. There was no stumbling, slipping, or falling; there was nothing accidental in his movements any more than there would be in walking on the street, or passing down the steps of his house. Had the assured, while assisting in carrying the door, lost his balance and fallen and struck upon some unforeseen object, or slipped on the ice, his death might be said to have resulted from violent or accidental means.\\\"\\nIn the Fane Case, the Court said:\\n\\\"It is undoubtedly true that the act of lifting the mail bag produced an unforeseen consequence, and the consequence might commonly be called an accidental injury, and the result of lifting the bag might be accidental; but the wording of the policy is, 'through accidental means.' The means which the plaintiff used to place the bag were exactly those which he intended to use, and precisely those he had used on many other occasions. It cannot be said that the means were accidental. The most that can be said is that the result was accidental. He was doing what he meant to do, and doing it in the way he meant to do it. An unexpected result followed, but that result did not follow through accidental means. He was injured from doing what he intended to do and doing it in exactly the way he intended to do it, and the rupture was not the result of accidental means. This conclusion is sustained by many decisions.\\\"\\nPerhaps the latest case on the subject is the Seipel Case in which the plaintiff was injured in lifting a very heavy wheel. The Court in that case held that the injury received was not the result of external, violent and accidental means.\\nIt would be unprofitable to quote from other cases, which are very numerous but to the same effect.\\nThere are, however, cases, and well considered ones, which recognize no distinction between accident and accidental means.\\nThe plaintiff cites a leading case on the subject and one that is often mentioned, United States Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 S. Ct. 755, 762, 33 L. Ed. 60. The plaintiff claims that this case is an authority that strongly supports his contention, but when the case is carefully considered, it does not seem to differ much in principle from those relied on by the defendant. .\\n!' We quote at some length from the opinion of the . Appellate Court:\\n\\u2022 \\\"It is further urged that\\\" there was no evidence to support the verdict, because no accident was showrt!' We do not concur in this view. The two companions of the deceased jumped from the same platform, at the' same time' and place, and alighted safely. It must be presumed', not only that the deceased intended to alight safely, but thought that he would. The jury were, on all the evidence, at liberty to say that it was an accident that he did not.\\\"\\nContinuing the Court said:\\n\\\"The court properly instructed them [the jury] that the jumping off .the platform was the means by which the injury, if any was sustained, was caused; that the question was whether there was anything accidental, unforeseen, involuntary, unexpected, in the act of jumping, from the time the deceased left the platform until he alighted on the ground; that the term 'accidental' was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular sense, as meaning 'happening- by chance,- unexpectedly taking place, not according to the. usual course of things, or not as expected'; that if a result is. such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way,. it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes- the injury, something unforeseen, _ unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, \\u2022then the injury has resulted through accidental means.\\\"\\nIt appears, therefore, that the Court distinctly recog- . nized the distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means, as expressed in the cases cited by the defendant, the only difference being in the application of the principle, which was left to the jury.\\nAnother leading case relied on by the plaintiff is Horsfall v. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 32 Wash. 132, 72 P. 1028, 1029, 63 L. R. A. 425, 98 Am. St. Rep. 846.\\nIn that case the insurance was against the effect of. bodily injuries \\\"caused solely by external, violent and accidental means.\\\"\\nAfter defining an injury by accident in the usual terms, the Court said:\\n\\\"So a strain of.the muscles of the back, caused by lifting heavy weights in the course of business, is injury by accident or violence 'occasioned by external or material causes operating on the person of the insured.' The evidence shows conclusively that the deceased was a strong and apparently healthy man of 58 years, who had never been sick, and who was accustomed to lift from 200 to 250 pounds without difficulty; that immediately after he had made the lift of one end of the bar, weighing from 350 to 400 pounds, he became sick and 'deathly pale.' The exertion had caused a violent dilation of the heart. The result certainly was unexpected. It did. not take place according to the usual course, of things. If, instead of a sprain of the muscles, of the heart, the deceased had sprained the muscles of his back, or arm, or ankle, it certainly could not .have been reasonably claimed that the result was not due to accident, r We. think the evidence shows an accident within the meaning of the policy.\\\"\\nEven this case is not .wholly inconsistent with the defendant's cases which hold that the result may be accidental when the means that caused the result were not accidental.\\nAnother cas\\u00e9, the importance and pertinency of which is stressed by the plaintiff is Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 126 Mo. App. 325, 103 S. W. 557, 562, in which the Court used the following language:\\n\\\"Accident assurance companies do business mostly with the .common people, and the term 'accident,' as used in these policies, should be construed most strongly against the companies, and be defined according to the ordinary and usual understanding of its signification. 'Any unusual and unexpected event attending the performance of a usual and necessary act,' whether the act be performed by the party injured or by another, is ordinarily and usually understood to be an event which happened by accident: In the foregoing cases it seems to us a too strict and illiberal'definition of the term was adhered to. At any rate, they are not reconcilable with the general trend of the best considered American cases, which hold that accidental means are those which produce effects which are not the natural and probable consequence of the act. 'An effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of such means, an effect which the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged with the design of producing, is produced by accidental means.' \\\"\\nIn that case the injury was received when the insured was assisting in lifting or pulling a sack of mail into the car.\\nThe Court concluded that the question, whether or not the plaintiff's injury was caused by \\\"external, violent and accidental means\\\" was for the jury.\\nThe Court in the ease of Lickleider v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 423, 166 N. W. 363, 366, 168 N. W. 884, 3 A. L. R. 1295, comments as follows on the rule the defendant contends for:\\n\\\"There is, however, another alleged definition which has had a degree of judicial sanction which ought not to be passed without notice. According to this definition, if correctly interpreted by counsel for the defense, an injury happening to the insured through his own voluntary act is not an accident, nor is his hurt to be attributed to accidental means \\u2014 a proposition which is wholly at variance with every statement of the true rule as illustrated in the numerous authorities above cited. It may be, and it is true, that if the insured does a voluntary act, the natural, usual, and to be expected result of which is to bring injury upon himself, then a death so occurring is not an accident in any sense of the word, legal or colloquial, and it is only when thus limited that the rule so stated has any proper application. To say that the deceased in the case at bar did just what he attempted and intended to do, that is, he attempted to remove and did remove the tire from the wheel, and therefore there was no accident or accidental means producing his injury, is to beg the whole question and to ignore the well-established meaning of words.\\\"\\nOther cases cited by plaintiff below include: Pervangher v. Union Cas. & Sur. Co., 85 Miss. 31, 37 So. 461; Budde v. Nat. Trav. Ben. Ass'n, 184 Iowa 1219, 169 N. W. 767; Pledger v. Bus. Men's Ass'n (Tex. Com. App.), 228 S. W. 110; Patterson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 25 App. D. C. 46; Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S. W. 49, 74 Am. St. Rep. 112; Summers v. Mutual Aid Ass'n, 84 Mo. App. 605; Martin v. Trav. Ins. Co., 1 Fort. & F. 505, 175 Eng. Rep. 828.\\nThere are' very many other cases that might be cited on either side of the question here involved, and it is impossible to say on which side is the greater number. We have quoted at length from a few- on each side that seem to have been well considered, for the purpose of assisting the Court in determining whether the injury received by the plaintiff was caused by accidental means. This has been a perplexing question for many Courts and given rise to much refined and technical reasoning. Perhaps the difficulty has been as much in the application of the rule as in its recognition.\\nCourts that find no distinction between an injury caused by accident and one caused by accidental means, concede that if the insured does a voluntary act, the natural and usual result of which is to bring injury upon himself, it is not an accident because it might have been expected. But Courts that recognize the distinction go a step further and say that although a result may not be foreseen or expected, yet if it be the direct effect of an act voluntarily done, or of conditions voluntarily assumed, it cannot be said to be accidental. These cases make a difference between the result and the means that cause the result or injury. The injury, they say, may be unexpected, and in that sense accidental, but the means that caused it are not accidental because they were the voluntary and usual means employed by the insured to accomplish the act he wished and intended to accomplish. In the language of the Court in the Barry Case, supra:\\n\\\" If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.\\\"\\nThis is taken from one of the plaintiff's cases. And the distinction recognized in the Barry Case is illustrated in some other cases in this way: If the person who is lifting or carrying a load falls, in the effort to carry it, and the injury is produced by the fall, it is caused by accidental means, it being an unexpected occurrence preceding the injury.\\nApplying the rules we have mentioned, and attempted to describe to the case in hand, what should be the result? The plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was voluntarily carrying, or attempting to carry, a sack of potatoes on his shoulder, in the usual way, no doubt in the way he had often carried such a load before and in the way he wanted to carry it. The injury he received was unexpected and un foreseen. It was, therefore, accidental in a way. But while the injury or result was accidental because unexpected, can it be said that the means which caused the injury were accidental? We must distinguish, if there is a difference, between the result and the means that produced it. What were the means in the case before us? Nothing more nor less than carrying, or attempting to carry, the sack of potatoes on the shoulder. Surely then, there was nothing' accidental in the means which the plaintiff employed, as there would have been if he had unexpectedly fallen with his burden and the fall had been the means of his injury.\\nWhile we agree with the language used by the Court in the Young Case, supra, that these policies should be construed strongly against the companies that issue them, and the terms employed therein be defined according to the ordinary and usual understanding of their signification ; and while we realize that some of such terms, including \\\"accidental means,\\\" are impossible of understanding by the persons with whom the companies deal, still the policy and its acceptance, constitute a contract which the Courts must construe in accordance with established rules of law.\\nThe conclusion of the Court is that the injury received by the plaintiff was not caused by violent and accidental means within the meaning of the policy sued on. No cause of action, therefore, is shown and defendant's demurrer must be sustained.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/443457.json b/delaware/443457.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3574d82a06ae13f14a679f00f0adb2af69f546e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/443457.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"443457\", \"name\": \"Hyland P. George and Richard M. Appleby, trading as George & Lynch, plaintiffs, v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Delaware, defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"George v. Unemployment Compensation Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1945-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"558\", \"last_page\": \"566\", \"citations\": \"42 Del. 558\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:26:55.588544+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Hyland P. George and Richard M. Appleby, trading as George & Lynch, plaintiffs, v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Delaware, defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Hyland P. George and Richard M. Appleby, trading as George & Lynch, plaintiffs, v. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Delaware, defendant.\\n(January 30, 1945.)\\nLayton, C. J., Rodney and Speakman, J. J., sitting.\\nWilliam S. Potter and Collins J. Seitz (of Southerland, Berl and Potter) for the plaintiffs.\\nCaleb B. Layton, 3d, for the' defendant.\\nSuperior Court for New Castle County, 149,\\nMay Term, 1944.\", \"word_count\": \"2527\", \"char_count\": \"15116\", \"text\": \"Layton, Chief Justice.\\nThis case is before the Court under the provisions of Sec. 6 (i) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. The facts are not in dispute.\\nThe sole question is whether the plaintiffs, as employers, in making contributions to the Unemployment Compensation fund, were entitled after January 1, 1942 to a percentage rate lower than the standard rate of 2.7 per annum with respect to employment, under Sec. 7 (c) (1) (A) of the law.\\nThe Act became effective on April 30,1937. In a prefatory declaration of state public policy it was declared that social security \\\"can be accomplished by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance.\\\"\\nBy Sec. 2(g) \\\" 'Employing unit' means any individual or type of organization, including any partnership, association, trust estate, joint stock company, insurance company, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee or successor thereof, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which has or subsquent to January 1, 1936, had in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it within this State.\\\" 43 Del. Laws, c. 281, \\u00a7 2.\\nBy Sec. 2(h) (1) \\\"employer\\\" means \\\"Any employing unit which in each of twenty different weeks within either . the current or the preceding calendar year (whether or not such weeks are or were consecutive) has or had in employment, one or more individuals (irrespective of whether the same individuals are or were employed in each such week).\\\"\\nBy Sec. 8 (b) an \\\"employing unit\\\" shall cease to be an \\\"employer\\\" subject to the Act \\\"only as of the 1st day of January of any calendar year, only if it files with the commission, prior to the 5th day of January of such year, a written application for termination of coverage, and the commission finds that there were no twenty (20) different days, each day being in a different week within the preceding calendar year, within which such employing unit employed one (1) or more individuals in employment subject to this Act.\\\"\\nBy Sec. 2(d) \\\"Contributions\\\" means the money payments to the State Unemployment Compensation fund required by the Act; and the provisions which are of immediate concern are found under the general heading of \\\"contributions,\\\" as follows:\\nSec. 7 (a) (1) \\\"On and after January 1, 1937, contributions shall accrue and become payable by each employer for each calendar year in which he is subject to this act, with respect to wages for employment. Such contributions shall become due and be paid by each employer to the commission for the fund in accordance with such regulations as the commission may prescribe, and shall not be deducted, in whole or in part, from the wages of individuals in such employer's employ.\\\"\\n\\\"(b) (1) Each employer shall pay contributions equal to the following percentages of wages payable by him with respect to employment.\\\"\\n\\\" (A) 1.8 per centum with respect to employment occurring during the calendar year 1937.\\\"\\n\\\"(B) 2.7 per centum with respect to employment occurring during the calendar years 1938, 1939, and 1940.\\\"\\n\\\"(2) Each employer shall pay contributions equal to 2.7 per centum of wages paid by him during the calendar year 1941, and during each calendar year thereafter, with respect to employment occurring after December 31, 1940, except as may be otherwise prescribed in subsection (c) of this section.\\\"\\n\\\"Future Bates Based on Benefit Experience.\\\"\\n\\\"(c) (1) (A) The' Standard rate of contributions payable by each employer shall be 2.7 per centum.\\n\\\"(B) No employer's rate shall be reduced below the standard rate for any calendar year unless and until his account could have been chargeable with benefit wages throughout the thirty-six consecutive calendar months ending on December 31 of the preceding calendar year.\\\"\\nWhen the Act went into effect Hyland P. George and John P. Lynch, trading under the firm name of George & Lynch, were engaged in a general contracting business, became subject to its provisions, and began making contributions to the compensation fund at the standard rate of 2.7 per centum of the wages paid to its employees. On February 22, 1940, John P. Lynch died. The surviving partner purchased from his deceased partner's executor all of the interest of the decedent in the firm's assets, and continued in the same business, under the same trade name, using the same equipment, office, executives and substantially the same labor personnel. In the office of the Commission one folder, or jacket, contains all of the \\\"George & Lynch\\\" reports. In the folder was a letter dated April 15, 1940, by which the Commission was advised of the death of Mr. Lynch, and that the surviving partner, Hyland P. George, was continuing the business temporarily as an individual under the trade name of George & Lynch. No application in writing for termination of coverage under Sec. 8 (b) was made.\\nSubsequent to the death, the Commission, on March 31, 1940, that being the end of the calendar quarter year, caused a blue line to be drawn under the \\\"George & Lynch\\\" record to indicate that, owing to the dissolution of the firm by the death, the account was terminated for experience rating purposes, in result that the account of the survivor although continuing to operate the business under the same trade name would not become entitled -to apply for, a reduction of the rate of 2.7 per centum except upon a showing of wages paid in respect of employment for thirty-six consecutive months subsequent to the death, that is, not until January 1, 1944, rather than on January 1, 1942.\\nThe Commission, after formal hearing, ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a lower rate for contributions paid during the years 1942 and 1943, on the ground that the firm of George & Lynch ceased to exist as a legal entity on the death of Mr. Lynch, and it was no longer possible for the firm's account to be chargeable with benefit wages; wherefore, the account could not have been chargeable with benefit wages throughout the thirty-six consecutive calendar months ending on December 31 of the preceding year, under the provisions of Sec. 7 (c) (1) (B) of the Act.\\nThe plaintiffs contend that th,e Commission's interpretation of the language of the paragraph is discriminatory, and highly penal as against partnerships and in favor .of corporations, and leads to the unjust result that the account of George & Lynch, chargeable as it was for upwards of two years at 2.7 per centum of the wages paid by the firm, is denied a lower rate because of the involuntary change in the type of organization occasioned by the death of the partner although the business was continued in precisely the same way. It is insisted that, having regard for the language of the declaration of state policy, and the statutory definitions of \\\"employing unit\\\" and \\\"employer,\\\" the Legislature manifested no particular interest in the type of legal entity assumed by an employing unit, and that the statute is not concerned with legal niceties with respect to the type or form of organization assumed by an employer so long as there is a substantial continuity of interest and identification in the employer; and attention is called to the fact that no application in writing for termination of coverage was made under Sec. 8 (b), so that \\\"George & Lynch\\\" continued to be an employer under the law.\\nThe argument is found unacceptable for the reason that, upon the death of the partner, the firm of George & Lynch ceased to exist, and there remained no real continuity of interest and identification with respect to the individual carrying on the business.\\nApart from the conception of a partnership as a legal entity distinct from and independent of the persons composing it, a partnership is a relation or status resulting from an agreement between persons whereby they unite their money, effects, credit, labor, skill and experience, or some or all of them, in the prosecution of a lawful business. The success of a business partnership is, in general, dependent upon the attributes of the partners; and its' ability to maintain employment of labor is largely dependent upon its success in business. What contribution the deceased partner made to the success of the firm of George & Lynch by way of skill and experience and credit and reputation in the business and financial world does not appear, but we do not know and cannot assume that he was not a material factor in the successful prosecution of the enterprise and in the maintenance of employment by the firm. These considera tians serve to show that upon the death of the partner, notwithstanding the continued use of the trade name, which amounts to nothing, and the employment of the same office, executives, equipment and personnel, the successor was another and different employer with a distinct individuality and distinguishable characteristics, whose ability to maintain employment was for the future to determine. There was a complete change of identity and interest. All that remained of uninterrupted sequence was continuity of business, not of ownership or liability. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 54 S. Ct. 788, 78 L. Ed. 1348. If, for example, the firm of George & Lynch had sold the entire business to a stranger who, without break in operation, continued to carry on the enterprise with the same equipment and personnel, it would hardly be arguable that the benefit experience built up by the partnership was in the nature of an asset transferable to a successor whose ability to maintain a satisfactory employment record was undemonstrated. Again, let it be supposed that the firm had a poor experience record of employment with a rate of three per centum or more, which is possible under the law, and upon the death of, the partner, the survivor continued to operate as before, it would be a harsh ruling to fasten the penalty on the successor.\\nThere is no discrimination in a legal sense against partnerships and in favor of corporations. A partnership as a form of business association, has its advantages and disadvantages. If persons choose to associate themselves as partners it does not follow that a law is discriminatory because of disadvantages inherent in the form of association.\\nThe language of . the paragraph is plain and its meaning is clear. The words \\\"his account\\\" refer necessarily to a definite employer and his experience in maintaining employment. The general language of the preamble to the Act and the statutory definitions of \\\"employing unit\\\" and \\\"employer\\\" cast no doubt upon the legislative intent. The provisions of Section 8 (b) with relation to termination of coverage are entirely unrelated to the question. The word \\\"successor,\\\" as used in Sec. 2(g) of the Act, imports a devolution of property by statutory succession. Claim of Turano, 260 App. Div. 971, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 213, affirmed Turano v. Wightman, 286 N. Y. 574, 35 N. E. 2d 925.\\nIt may be supposed that the establishment of the standard rate of 2.7 per centum of wages paid with respect to employment and the precise limitation placed on future rates based on benefit experience were the results of careful study to the end that the unemployment compensation fund would be adequate in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances, and that any alteration of the law which may operate to decrease the rate and, in consequence, the fund will have like careful consideration. The hard and unescapable fact is. that the Legislature has made no provision for a transfer of benefit experience with respect to employment from a predecessor to a successor employer except as suggested by Sec. 7(c) (5) which has relation to mergers, consolidations or other forms of reorganization. Sec. 11, Ch. 207, Vol. 44, Del. Laws, approved March 12, 1943. With this provision we are not here concerned. Hardship in some degree may be admitted, but the Act is a taxing act, and under such statutes cases of individual hardship abound. What the plaintiffs ask is that they be relieved from the application of the 2.7 per centum rate and allowed to come within a lower rate. The analogy of exemption from taxation is suggested. The burden is always on the claimant to establish his right to an exemption by bringing himself clearly within the terms of the grant. As said in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, supra [292 U. S. 435, 54 S. Ct. 790], \\\"Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.\\\" There is no ambiguity in the language of the Act, and no reason to indulge in construction. The Court may not speak when the Legislature has declared its will. Benefit experience in respect of employment acquired by a partnership is not transferable to a successor to the enterprise.\\nThe authorities are few. The plaintiffs cite as their only authority a ruling by the Unemployment Compensation Commission of New Jersey in 1942; and it is stated in their brief that the Commission in that State ruled in 1943 that the present firm of George & Lynch was entitled under the New Jersey law to the experience rating of its predecessor.\\nTo the contrary, and in accord with the ruling of the Commission in this State, is a ruling of the Idaho Commission through the Attorney General of the State. Com. Clearing House, U C I S Idaho, 1800.05. The Court of Appeals in Georgia and the Supreme Court in Florida, in decisions more sweeping than is necessary here, have likewise interpreted substantially similar provisions. In Schwob Manufacturing Co. v. Huiet, 69 Ga. App. 285, 25 S. E. 2d 149, and in Florida Industrial Commission v. Schwob Co., 153 Fla. 356, 14 So. 2d 666, 667, a corporation acquired from an individual his entire business organization, trade and assets, the individual through stock control, eighty-five per centum in one case and practically one hundred per centum in the other, continuing to exercise domination and control over the business. In each case it was held that the corporation could not claim the benefit experience with respect to employment of the individual.\\nWe are of opinion that the Unemployment Compensation Commission correctly construed the law in denying the plaintiff's demand.\\nAn order will be signed in accordance with this opinion.\\nCh. 258, Vol. 41, Del. Laws, as amended by Chs. 196, 197, 198, Vol. 42, Del. Laws, Chs. 278, 279. 280, 281, 282, 283, Vol. 43, Del. Laws, Chs. 207, 208, Vol. 44, Del. Laws.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/451603.json b/delaware/451603.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7ae0c28470c733b1031c20208abdc42ac409bbbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/451603.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"451603\", \"name\": \"E. Earle Downing v. John Gasser, Sr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Downing v. Gasser\", \"decision_date\": \"1952-07-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 292\", \"first_page\": \"273\", \"last_page\": \"275\", \"citations\": \"47 Del. 273\", \"volume\": \"47\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:01:01.331916+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"E. Earle Downing v. John Gasser, Sr.\", \"head_matter\": \"E. Earle Downing v. John Gasser, Sr.\\n(July 21, 1952.)\\nCaret, J., sitting.\\nHenry M. Canby (of Richards, Layton and Finger) for plaintiff.\\nWilliam H. Benrieihum, (of Morford, Bennethnm, Marvel \\u2022 and Cooch) for defendant.\\nSuperior Court for New Castle County,\\nNo. 292,\\nCivil Action, 1949.\", \"word_count\": \"627\", \"char_count\": \"3783\", \"text\": \"Caret, J.:\\nThe action is one in negligence, the plaintiff claiming to have been injured by falling over a piece of wire lying on defendant's premises. The defendant took plaintiff's oral deposition, counsel waiving both the reading and signing thereof. At least three times during the taking of the deposition, plaintiff definitely and clearly stated that the wire over which he tripped was on a step or platform leading out of defendant's store. This statement was in direct contrast to an allegation in his complaint to the effect that the wire was on the sidewalk adjoining the store.\\nSome three months later, the plaintiff filed the present motion asking that the deposition be reopened to permit him to change his answers by stating that the wire was on the sidewalk. He does not allege any mistake on the part of the reporter in taking the testimony, nor does he present any excuse for having given incorrect statements. He simply says that they are not in conformity with his present recollection. His counsel explained the delay in fifing this motion by the fact that the plaintiff went to Florida shortly after testifying and, the reading and signing having been waived, he did not realize his mistake until he returned and discussed the case with his attorney.\\nThe situation closely resembles that in DeSeversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., D. C., 2 F. D. R. 113, the principal difference, being that in the DeSeversky case the reading was not waived and the alleged errors were discovered before signing. The sole purpose of such waiver is to avoid trouble and inconvenience. In re Samuels, 2 Cir., 213 F. 447. It should not be allowed to interfere with the true purposes of pretrial discovery. Any action otherwise permissible under the present motion will not be barred by the waiver.\\nThe DeSeversky case points out that Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 30(e), 28 U. S. C. A., contemplates an examination which is finished, except for errors and mistakes on immaterial matters. When a witness desires to directly contradict his previous answers on material matters, the examination is not \\\"finished\\\". The distinction is important because the cited rule includes no express right of further examination upon the basis of the changed answers, and, certainly, no such change as the one requested here ought to be permitted without opportunity for such further examination.\\nBoth parties agree that the present application is addressed to the Court's discretion. Undoubtedly, the exercise of that discretion may be conditioned upon such terms as will prevent injustice to either party.\\nThe testimony which plaintiff desires to alter is regarded by both parties as having a significant hearing upon the trial. An important function of the deposition is to enable the defendant to learn the facts plaintiff proposes to prove in Court. This purpose can better be carried out, in my opinion, by reopening the deposition than by waiting until the trial itself. The plan suggested in the DeSeversky case seems a feasible and practicable way to handle the situation and works no injustice to either party. The original answers must, of course, remain in the record. 4 Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 30, 20. Moreover, defendant must have the opportunity to examine the plaintiff further in the light of the new answers. If any unforeseen difficulty should arise during the taking of the further testimony, the parties may come back to the Court under Rule 30 for any proper relief.\\nIt will be so ordered.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/451648.json b/delaware/451648.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7b993cdeaa581508d2f3652c924cbd68ca83bef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/451648.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"451648\", \"name\": \"James W. Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth M. Hill, John P. Joseph and Ralph S. Karl, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marshall v. Hill\", \"decision_date\": \"1952-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 89\", \"first_page\": \"478\", \"last_page\": \"483\", \"citations\": \"47 Del. 478\", \"volume\": \"47\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:01:01.331916+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James W. Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth M. Hill, John P. Joseph and Ralph S. Karl, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"James W. Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Elizabeth M. Hill, John P. Joseph and Ralph S. Karl, Defendants.\\n(December 3, 1952.)\\nHerrmann, J., sitting.\\nSamuel R. Russell (of Tunnell and Tunnell) for Plaintiff.\\nHerbert L. Cobin for Defendants.\\nSuperior Court for Sussex County,\\nNo. 89,\\nCivil Action, 1952.\", \"word_count\": \"1399\", \"char_count\": \"8144\", \"text\": \"Herrmann, J.:\\nThe plaintiff brings this action for declaratory judgment as a citizen-taxpayer and as a member of the Board of Education of the Lewes Special School District. In his complaint, the plaintiff asserts that each of the defendants is usurping the office of member of the said Board of Education and that each of them is exercising such office without legal right. The defendants deny the assertion and, by counterclaim filed by them as citizen-taxpayers and members of the said Board of Education, they in turn charge the plaintiff with usurpation and unlawful exercise of office on the Board. Each side seeks a declaratory judgment which would have the effect of ouster as to the other. None of the parties claims the office which he or she alleges to be usurped.\\nThe Board of Education of the Lewes Special School District is composed of four members. A vacancy was created when one of the four members of the Board moved out of the District. The controlling Statute provides that such vacancy \\\"shall be filled by the remaining members of the Board of Education for the unexpired term.\\\" 45 Delaware Laws, Chapter 195. The plaintiff and the defendants Hill and Joseph were the three remaining members of the Board and they were unable to agree upon a replacement to fill the vacancy. Hill and Joseph nominated and voted for the defendant Karl and, over the plaintiff's objections, Karl was declared elected to fill the vacancy and he assumed office.\\nThe plaintiff alleges that Karl holds the office without right because, under a proper construction of the Statute, the affirmative vote of all the remaining members of the Board was required to fill the vacancy and Karl did not have that vote. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants Hill and Joseph hold office without right because they did not take the oath of office required by Article XIV of the Delaware Constitution. By their counterclaim, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff holds office without right for the same reason.\\nThe Court, upon its own motion, rais\\u00e9s the issue of jurisdiction and the standing of the parties to seek a declaratory judgment.\\nAn \\\"actual controversy\\\" is a jurisdictional prerequisite in any action brought under our Declaratory Judgments Act and, therefore, the Court is obliged to ascertain the existence of such controversy before it may properly proceed. Jurisdiction may not be conferred upon the Court by the agreement or consent of the parties if the cause does not involve an \\\"actual controversy\\\" within the meaning of that term as it is used in the Statute. The Declaratory Judgments Act may not be invoked merely to seek legal advice. Stabler v. Ramsay, Del. 88 A. 2d 546.\\nI think that the prerequisites of a controversy, such as will warrant consideration of a declaratory judgment action under our Statute, may be summarized as follows: (1) It must he a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) it must be a controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. See Stabler v. Ramsay, supra; 16 Am. Jur., pp. 284, 298; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, pp. 26-57; Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, pp. 27-42; State ex rel. LaFolletle v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 264 N. W. 627,103 A. L. R. 1089. Applying those prerequisites, it would follow that a mere difference of opinion between public officers, not involving the assertion of adverse interests, is not suEcient to support an action for a declaratory judgment. 16 Am. Jur. p. 319.\\nNo case directly in point has come to my attention. I have found helpful, however, the case of McGee v. Dunnigan, 138 Conn. 263, 83 A. 2d 491. There, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment which would authorize a Board of Education to expend certain funds. The plaintiffs'brought the action as citizens-taxpayers and as the three minority members of the Board of Education. The defendants were the four majority members of the Board of Education and other oEcials who were opposed to the expenditure of the funds. As in the instant case, the Court was requested to construe a statute. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the plaintiffs had no standing to raise the question because their personal rights would not be affected and, therefore, there was no justiciable issue as to them.\\nIn this State, when public oEce is usurped and ouster is sought, the controversy always has been deemed to he between the public and the usurper. In such case, the proceeding for determination of right to office has always been instituted and prosecuted by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State, by way of the common-law remedy of information in the nature of a writ of quo warranta. Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 A. 790, 51 L. R. A., N. S., 1126; Ake v. Bookhammer, 13 Del. Ch. 320, 119 A. 238; State ex rel. Wolcott, Atty. Gen. v. Kuhns, 4 Boyce 416, 89 A. 1; State ex rel. Southerland, Atty. Gen. v. Hart, 3 W. W. Harr. 15, 129 A. 691; State ex rel. Green, Atty. Gen. v. Collison, 9 W. W. Harr. 245, 197 A. 836; Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, Atty. Gen., 3 Terry 405, 35 A. 2d 903; State ex rel. James, Atty. Gen. v. Schorr, 5 Terry 232, 58 A. 2d 421. I find nothing in the Declaratory Judgments Act which would change the time-honored thesis that usurpation of public office is an offense against the sovereignty of the people and that the proceeding for ousting the offender must be brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the State. See Jones v. Talley, 190 Tenn. 471, 230 S. W. 2d 968; McCarthy v. Hoan, 221 Wis. 344, 266 N. W. 916; Brush v. City of Mount Vernon, Sup., 20 N. Y. S. 2d 455, affirmed 260 App. Div. 1048, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 355; Manlove v. Johnson, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P.2d 397; Weaver v. Maxwell, 189 Tenn. 183, 224 S. W. 2d 832.\\nAccordingly, it is held that the Court does not have the jurisdiction to grant, and the parties do not have the standing to seek, a declaratory judgment in this case.\\nThe plaintiff contends that Reese v. Hartnett, 6 Terry 339, 73 A. 2d 782, reversed, Del., 75 A. 2d 266, is authority for his right to maintain this declaratory judgment action to try title to \\\" public office. I consider this contention to be without merit. The Reese case did not involve the charge of usurpation of office and a request for ouster. In that case, the plaintiffs, asserting that they constituted the Bureau of Registration, sought to oblige the defendants, constituting the Levy Court, to pay salaries to the plaintiffs. After the institution of the action, the\\nplaintiffs added as parties defendant another group of persons who likewise claimed to constitute the Bureau of Registration and to be entitled to the salaries. The Court was then asked to U \\\"enter a judgment declaring who constitutes the Bureau of Registration\\\". I find nothing in the opinions in the Reese case, expressed or implied, which would be in conflict with the conclusions reached herein.\\nThe complaint and the counterclaim will be dismissed.\\n46 Delaware Laws, Chapter 269 provides in part as follows: \\\"In cases of actual controversy the Superior Court shall have power, to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.\\\"\\nIt is unnecessary to decide whether or not, in a proper case, the Attorney General may invoke the Declaratory Judgments Act in lieu of the common-law remedy of information in the nature of a writ of quo warranta.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/452874.json b/delaware/452874.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f1cae959dc17f0a92f015ad9ffd84f4037eef98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/452874.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"452874\", \"name\": \"Charles Carey, Claimant-Appellee, v. Bryan & Rollins, Employer-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carey v. Bryan & Rollins\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-05-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 115\", \"first_page\": \"395\", \"last_page\": \"402\", \"citations\": \"48 Del. 395\", \"volume\": \"48\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:27:59.430046+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Charles Carey, Claimant-Appellee, v. Bryan & Rollins, Employer-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles Carey, Claimant-Appellee, v. Bryan & Rollins, Employer-Appellant.\\n(May 6, 1954.)\\nHerrmann, J., sitting.\\nRobert W. Tunnell and Arthur D. Betts (of Tunnell and Tunnell) for the Claimant-Appellee.\\nHouston Wilson for the Employer-Appellant.\\nSuperior Court for Sussex County,\\nNo. 115, Civil Action, 1953.\", \"word_count\": \"1595\", \"char_count\": \"9425\", \"text\": \"Herrmann, J.:\\nThe claimant seeks workmen's compensation for injuries sustained when a motor vehicle, which he was driving, ran off the road and struck a telephone pole.\\nDuring the hearing before the Industrial Accident Board, the claimant testified upon direct examination regarding details of the accident in which he sustained the injuries for which he now claims compensation. The following exchange took place during cross-examination of the claimant:\\n\\\"Q. Now during the course of that evening did you have anything to drink that had alcohol in it?\\n\\\"Mr. TunneH: I object to that unless Mr. Wilson can produce evidence. Why, that question is just one conceived to em barrass and insult the witness. I don't believe he has any testimony to that effect and, if so, he should state it to this Court.\\n\\\"Mr. Wilson: It so happens that the testimony did. But nevertheless,\\u2014\\n\\\"Mr. Tunnell: (interrupting) You don't have it.\\n\\\"Mr. Wilson: Nevertheless, I can still ask this man and he can give me the answer.\\n\\\"Mr. Tunnell: You can't ask a man if he has been in jail, unless you think he has and can prove it. You can't ask him if he was drunk unless you have evidence that he was drunk.\\n\\\"Mr. Wilson: I insist upon my right to ask this witness whether or not he had anything to drink that evening with alcohol in it.\\n\\\"The Chairman: The Board rules that Mr. Carey, at his own discretion, may answer the question.\\n\\\"Mr. Tunnell: Do you understand what the Board tells you? They say you may in your own discretion answer that question or not answer, as you see fit. You may say 'I refuse to answer,' or you may answer in your own discretion.\\n\\\"The Witness: I just refuse- to answer.\\n\\\"Q. What was the position? A. I refuse to answer.\\n\\\"Q. You refuse to answer whether or not you had anything to drink during the course of that evening with alcohol in it, is that my understanding ? A. Yes, sir.\\\"\\nI am of the opinion that the Board erred in permitting the claimant to refuse to answer the question regarding alcoholic beverage. It is not entirely clear that Carey was claiming his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. It appears that his attorney was claiming for him something akin to a privilege against self-degradation. It is generally recognized that a witness must answer a question, even though to do so will disgrace him, where his testimony on the point is material to the issue. See 58 Am. Jur. \\\"Witnesses\\\" \\u00a7 35. The question was proper cross-examination and the claimant should have been compelled to give his answer.\\nEven if we assume that the privilege against self-incrimination was properly claimed by Carey, personally and clearly, there was error in allowing the privilege. It is well established that when a witness testifies as to a fact or incident without invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, he thereby waives that privilege with respect to the details and particulars of the fact or incident. See U. S. v. St. Pierre, 2 Cir., 132 F. 2d 837, 147 A. L. R. p. 255, et seq.\\nThere are two reasons usually given to support this theory of waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. First, in the interest of justice, the trier of fact is entitled to a full statement of the witness' knowledge of matters concerning which he testifies. Thus, when a witness has sworn to tell the whole truth and has commenced to testify as to a fact or incident within his knowledge, he cannot be permitted to withhold particulars thereof under a claim of privilege made for the first time upon cross-examination. Secondly, when a witness commences to testify as to a fact or incident without asserting his privilege, he must be deemed to have done so with knowledge that a full disclosure of the particulars thereof would tend to incriminate him. Thus, he must be considered to have waived his privilege when he commences to testify and will not be permitted to defeat the right of full and complete cross-examination by invoking the privilege.\\nIn Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490, the prevailing view was well expressed as follows:\\n\\\"The witness ordinarily has the privilege of declining to answer a question that might subject him to criminal prosecution; but this he can waive. It is the privilege of the party. Where he is both party and witness for himself, he must be held on his cross-examination as waiving the privilege, as to any matter about which he has given testimony in chief. Having testified to a part of the transaction in which he was concerned, he is bound to state the whole.\\nThe rule as to waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is stated at 58 Am,. Jur. \\\"Witnesses\\\" \\u00a7 95 as follows:\\n\\\" according to the weight of American authority, a witness who, in his direct examination, voluntarily opens an account of a transaction will, on his cross-examination, be compelled to complete the narrative notwithstanding his claim of privilege from testifying; he will not be allowed to state a fact and afterward refuse to give the details. The objection that an answer to a question asked would tend to incriminate the witness must, therefore, be made at the threshold of the examination. He may not wait and answer a part and then refuse to answer other questions legitimate to a cross-examination. A contrary rule, it has been said, would sanction the obvious injustice of permitting a person to waive his privilege under the constitutional provisions and give testimony to his advantage, or the advantage of his friends, and at the same time and in the same proceeding assert his privilege and refuse to answer questions that are to his disadvant\\u00e1ge or the disadvantage of his friends.\\\"\\nBy the explicit terms of the Statute, the claimant is not entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law if his injuries resulted from intoxication. 19 Del. C. \\u00a7 2353. Thus, the question, which the claimant was permitted to avoid, is of extreme importance and the Employer should have been permitted full and complete cross-examination upon this phase of the case.\\nAccordingly, it is held that there was error in permitting the claimant to refuse to answer the question regarding alcoholic beverage and, for that reason, the award must be reversed and the cause remanded for further hearing.\\nIf, upon rehearing, the claimant persists in his refusal to answer material questions regarding the issue of intoxication, the Board may strike all of the claimant's testimony regarding the accident, with the result that his claim for compensation would be unsupported and, therefore, would be denied. See 58 Am. Jur. \\\"Witnesses\\\" p. 56; 147 A. L. R. pp. 270-273.\\nOne of the contentions urged by the Employer, both before the Board and upon this appeal, was based upon the following provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law, 19 Del. C. \\u00a7 2353(b):\\n\\\"If any employee be injured because of his wilful failure or refusal to perform a duty required by statute, he shall not he entitled to \\\" compensation or service under the compensatory provisions of this chapter.\\\"\\nThe Employer contends that the claimant wilfully violated State penal laws governing speeding and reckless driving and that, therefore, the claimant is barred by the Statute from recovery of compensation.\\nThe Board failed to make findings or to announce conclusions upon this issue.\\nIn view of the clear prohibition of the Statute, it is held that the claimant is not entitled to compensation if he wilfully violated the Motor Vehicle Law governing speed or reckless driving and if such violation was the proximate cause of the accident. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333, 150 S. E. 208; cf., King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 139 S. E. 478, 58 A. L. R. 193; cf., Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nations, 236 Ala. 571, 183 So. 871, 119 A. L. R. 1403; 1 Larson on Workmen's Compensation Law \\u00a7 35.10, et seq.; 6 Schneider on Workmen's Compensation \\u00a7 1598, et seq.\\nIn this connection, there are four possible questions to be decided:\\n1) Did Carey violate the speed Statute?\\n2) Did Carey violate the Statute governing reckless driving?\\n3) If he violated either or both of such Statutes, was the violation \\\"wilful\\\"?\\n4) If there was a wilful violation, was it the proximate cause of the accident?\\nSince the case must be remanded for the reason heretofore stated, and since some or all of the above questions must be decided in order to dispose of the Employer's contentions, the remand is for the further purpose of enabling the Board, as the trier of fact, to complete the record by deciding the foregoing questions and by announcing conclusions in accordance with its findings.\\nI find no merit in the Employer's contentions that the accident did not arise out of the employment or during the course of the employment. I find that there is evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the claimant's injury was not the result of \\\"deliberate and reckless indifference to danger\\\". See 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2353(b).\\nA certified copy of this Opinion will be filed forthwith by the Prothonotary with the Industrial Accident Board.\\nSee Mumford v. Croft, 8 Terry 464, 93 A. 2d 506.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/452910.json b/delaware/452910.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3ed90d79d65a4466ecafc63519839732d030804f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/452910.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"452910\", \"name\": \"T. Fletcher Williamson, Plaintiff, v. Elsie Lee Correll Williamson, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Williamson v. Williamson\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-01-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 219\", \"first_page\": \"277\", \"last_page\": \"282\", \"citations\": \"48 Del. 277\", \"volume\": \"48\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:27:59.430046+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"T. Fletcher Williamson, Plaintiff, v. Elsie Lee Correll Williamson, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"T. Fletcher Williamson, Plaintiff, v. Elsie Lee Correll Williamson, Defendant.\\n(January 5, 1954.)\\nHerrmann, J., sitting.\\nDaniel J. Layton, Jr., for the plaintiff.\\nEverett F. Warrington for the defendant.\\nSuperior Court for Sussex County,\\nNo. 219, Civil Action, 1953.\", \"word_count\": \"1336\", \"char_count\": \"7673\", \"text\": \"Herrmann, J.:\\nThe plaintiff seeks annulment of his marriage to the defendant on the ground that she had a husband living at the time the marriage was contracted. See 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1551.\\nAt the trial of the case, the plaintiff proved a ceremonial marriage between the parties on March 19, 1946, in Miami, Florida. He then offered in evidence a final decree of divorce, granted on July 3, 1946 by the Circuit Court of Manatee County, Florida, by which Theodore William Correll, as plaintiff, was divorced from Elsie W. Correll. It is admitted that the defendant here was the defendant in the Florida action. The plaintiff offered no other evidence in support of the ground of his petition, contending that it is manifest from the face of the Florida divorce decree that the defendant had a husband living on March 19, 1946 when she married the plaintiff. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof imposed upon him in a case of this kind.\\nThe Florida decree contained the following:\\n\\\"This cause coming on to be heard on this day upon the Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint, the decree pro confesso which has been duly and regularly entered against the Defendant, and it appearing to the court and the court finding from the said Bill of Complaint and decree pro confesso that it has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and parties to this cause, that the relation of husband and wife now exists between the parties hereto, and that the defendant is guilty of willful, obstinate, and continued desertion of the plaintiff for a period of more than one year prior to the filing of the Bill of Complaint herein, and the court being advised in the premises, it is upon consideration,\\n\\\"Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the marriage between the plaintiff, Theodore William Correll and Elsie W. Correll be and the same hereby is dissolved, and the said parties and each of them are hereby forever freed from the obligations arising therefrom.\\\"\\nThe plaintiff contends that the finding of the Florida Court, as to the husband-wife relationship of the parties to the Florida action, is not only proof adequate to support the petition here, but, further, is proof binding upon this Court by virtue of 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1511. I am unable to agree.\\nDelaware public policy forbids the annulment of a consummated marriage except upon the most convincing proof. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 7 Terry 458, 85 A. 2d 706. The law indulges a presumption in favor of the validity of an existing marriage when it is attacked upon the basis of a prior subsisting marriage. State v. Collins, 6 Boyce 260, 99 A. 87. The presumption of the validity of an existing marriage is the strongest of the several presumptions applicable in annulment actions. 3 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, \\u00a7 31.61. The strength of this presumption, and the special weight generally accorded to it in a case of this kind, is demonstrated by the oft-quoted statement of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Smith v. Smith, 32 Idaho 478, 185 P. 67, 69:\\n\\\"The authorities all agree upon the following broadly stated rule: Where it is sought to invalidate a present existing marriage on the ground that one of the parties thereto was incapable of consummating a lawful marriage by reason of a former subsisting marriage, the proof of the latter, the burden of showing which is upon the party attacking the validity of the former, must be clear, convincing, and satisfactory. Or, in other words, an existing marriage being shown, the presumption of its validity is so strong that proof of a former subsisting marriage in order to be sufficient to overcome this presumption, must be so cogent and conclusive as to fairly preclude any other result.\\\" See also 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, \\u00a7 956.\\nIn the instant case, in order to overcome the presumption of the legality of his marriage to the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by clear and conclusive evidence, the validity of the alleged prior marriage of the defendant and that it subsisted at the time when the plaintiff's marriage to the defendant was contracted. See Schaffer v. Krestovnikow, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 A. 246. This burden of proof includes the burden of proving conclusively that the defendant and Correll were free from disabilities and eligible to contract a legal marriage. Routledge v. Githens, 118 Or. 70, 245 P. 1072, 45 A. L. R. 922; Sparks v. Ross, 72 N. J. Eq. 762, 65 A. 977. The proof in this case falls far short of that standard.\\nI am of the opinion that the Florida divorce decree, the only evidence offered to establish the prior marriage of the defendant, is not sufficiently conclusive to overcome the potent presumption of the validity of the existing marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. A decree of divorce does not conclusively establish the validity of the marriage which it purports to dissolve. It is apparent that the Florida action was undefended and that the decree of divorce was taken by default. The issue of the validity of a marriage between Correll and this defendant was not litigated and determined in the Florida action. The plaintiff may not rely upon the doctrine of res judicata nor may he claim estoppel. Routledge v. Githens, supra. Adopting the rule generally prevailing in the United States, it is held that the Florida divorce decree does not conclusively establish that a valid marriage existed between Correll and this defendant. See Chirelstein v. Chirelstein, 12 N. J. Super. 468, 79 A. 2d 884, 890; Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N. W. 110; Smith v. Foto, 285 Mich. 361, 280 N. W. 790, 120 A. L. R. 801; Ex parte Soucek, 7 Cir., 101 F. 2d 405; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A., N. S., 966.\\nI find no merit in the plaintiff's contention that, by reason of the full faith and credit provisions of 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1511, this Court is bound by the finding of the Florida Court as to the husband-wife relationship between the parties to the Florida action. The validity of the Florida divorce decree is not under attack here. There is presented here only the question of the conclusiveness of a finding recited in the decree relating to an issue which was not tried or determined by the Florida Court. Since that Court did not adjudicate the issue of the validity of a marriage between Correll and this defendant, it is obvious that the divorce decree is not-deprived of full faith and credit by a declination to accept it as conclusive as to that issue.\\nAccordingly, it is held that the plaintiff has failed to prove, by the requisite quantum of proof, a valid marriage between the defendant and Correll and that, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant had a husband living at the time of her marriage to the plaintiff.\\nA decree of annulment will be denied.\\nThis Statute provides:\\n\\\"Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this State to a decree of annulment of marriage or divorce by a court of competent jurisdic tion in another State, territory, or possession of the United States. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the power of any court of this State to give such effect to a decree of annulment or divorce by a court of a foreign country as may be justified by the rules of international comity.\\\"\\nIn this case, the parties cohabited for about seven years and there was a child of the union.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/454324.json b/delaware/454324.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dee1b0b679e1ee60af340ce51ead01197cdae272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/454324.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"454324\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth Veronica Dougherty, Deceased\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Last Will & Testament of Dougherty\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-06-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"273\", \"last_page\": \"277\", \"citations\": \"49 Del. 273\", \"volume\": \"49\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Orphans' Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:29:38.319738+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth Veronica Dougherty, Deceased.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth Veronica Dougherty, Deceased.\\n(June 6, 1955.)\\nHerrmann, J., sitting.\\nStewart Lynch (of Hastings, Lynch and Taylor) for Catherine Rita Maloney, Proponent of the Will.\\nJohn Merwin Bader for Ruth M. Connor, Contestant of the Will.\\nOrphans\\u2019 Court for New Castle County.\", \"word_count\": \"1055\", \"char_count\": \"5896\", \"text\": \"Herrmann, J.:\\nThis appeal arises from a proceeding before the Register of Wills in which Ruth M. Connor petitioned for review of the probate of the will of Elizabeth Veronica Dougherty. After the contestant posted the cost bond required by 12 Del. C. \\u00a7 1310 and after a hearing in which the executrix of the will was proponent, the Register of Wills found that the contestant \\\"failed to make out a prima facie case\\\" and the petition for review was dismissed.\\nThe proponent then petitioned the Register to tax her counsel fees against the contestant, as part of the costs of the proceeding, and to hold the contestant's cost bond chargeable for the payment of such fees. The Register denied that application and the proponent appeals.\\nThe question for decision is this: May the word \\\"costs\\\", as it is used in 12 Del. C. \\u00a7 1310 and 10 Del. C. \\u00a7 5106, be construed to include the proponent's counsel fees?\\nAs a general rule, in the absence of statute or contract, a litigant must pay his own counsel fees. In re Equitable Trust Co., Del. Ch., 30 A. 2d 271; Maurer v. International Re Insurance Corp., Del., 95 A. 2d 827. It is settled that a court may not order the payment of attorneys' fees as a part of the costs to be paid by the losing party unless the payment of such fees is specifically authorized by statute or contract. See Great American Indemnity Co. v. State, 32 Del. Ch. 562, 88 A. 2d 426. In its common usage and according to its usual and ordinary meaning in this jurisdiction, the word \\\"costs\\\" does not include counsel fees of the successful litigant. See 10 Del. C. Ch. 51 \\\"Costs\\\"; Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corporation, 23 Del. Ch. 365, 8 A. 2d 89; Muhleman & Kayhoe, Inc., v. Brown, 4 Terry 481, 50 A. 2d 92; J. J. White, Inc., v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, 9 Terry 526, 107 A. 2d 892.\\nThe proponent contends, however, that legal fees and expenses have been considered by the court as costs in certain will contest cases and that, since the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of such practice when it enacted 12 Del. C. \\u00a7 1310, the word \\\"costs\\\" as used in that Statute must be read to include the proponent's counsel fees. The proponent cites In re Warrington's Will, 2 Boyce 595, 81 A. 501; Rodney v. Burton, 4 Boyce 171, 86 A. 826; In re Gordon's Will, 1 W. W. Harr. 108, 111 A. 610; Conner v. Brown, 9 W. W. Harr. 529, 3 A. 2d 64.\\nThe proponent's argument is unacceptable for several reasons. It is sufficient to state that the cited cases do not support the proponent's contention. In those cases, the Court dealt with the question of the propriety of an allowance of legal fees and expenses to an unsuccessful contestant as a charge against the estate. Compare Di lorio v. Cantone, 49 R. I. 452, 144 A. 148. The cited cases did not involve the taxing of proponent's counsel fees as costs against an unsuccessful contestant. While the word \\\"costs\\\" appears in certain of the cited cases, it is not used in the sense urged by the proponent. The word is used in those cases in the sense of a proper \\\"cost\\\" of, or charge against, the estate and not in the sense of a taxable \\\"cost\\\" against a losing contestant. Indeed, if the cited cases stand for the proposition that the Register may tax the proponent's counsel fees as costs against an unsuccessful contestant, those cases would seem to be in irreconcilable conflict with the recent statement of the Supreme Court in Great American Indemnity Co. v. State, supra.\\nSince, by common usage and ordinary meaning, the word \\\"costs\\\" does not include counsel fees of a successful liti gant and since there appears to be no acceptable reason for according to the word any meaning broader than that ordinarily given it, it is held that the word \\\"costs\\\", as used in 12 Del. C. \\u00a7 1310 and 10 Del. C. \\u00a7 5106, may not be construed to include counsel fees of the proponent.\\nIn the absence of specific statutory authority, the Register of Wills does not have the power to order the payment of the proponent's attorneys' fees as part of the costs to be paid by the losing contestant..\\nAccordingly, no error is found in the order of the Register of Wills and it will be affirmed.\\n12 Del. C. \\u00a7 1310 provides, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"(a) Any person interested who shall not voluntarily appear at the time of taking the proof of a will, shall at any time within one year after such proof have a right of review which shall on his petition be ordered by the Register; but unless the petitioner or petitioners shall, within ten days after such review shall have been ordered by the Register, give bond to the State, jointly, and severally if more than one petitioner, with such sureties and in such penal sum not less than $500 and not more than $5,000 as the Register determines, conditioned for the payment of any and all costs occasioned by such review which may he decreed against such petitioner, or petitioners, such petition shall he considered as abandoned and shall be dismissed and proceedings may be had in all respects as though no such review had been ordered.\\n\\\"(b) The Register may determine the costs occasioned by such review and decree the payment of such costs by the petitioner or petitioners.\\\"\\n10 Del. C. \\u00a7 5106 provides as follows:\\n\\\"The Court of Chancery, the Orphans' Court, and the Register's Court shall make such order concerning costs in every case as is agreeable to equity.\\\"\\nIt is noteworthy that in the most recent of the cited cases, Conner v. Brown, supra [9 W. W. Harr. 529, 3 A. 2d 73], the Court carefully distinguished \\\"costs, counsel fees, and expenses of counsel\\\".\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/455422.json b/delaware/455422.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1a74f787e6801df18e65daa960720134f514dcb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/455422.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"455422\", \"name\": \"E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, a corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. I. D. Griffith, Inc., a corporation, Defendant below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. I. D. Griffith, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1957-03-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 50\", \"first_page\": \"348\", \"last_page\": \"354\", \"citations\": \"50 Del. 348\", \"volume\": \"50\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:56:26.360348+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, a corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. I. D. Griffith, Inc., a corporation, Defendant below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, a corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. I. D. Griffith, Inc., a corporation, Defendant below, Appellee.\\n(March 29, 1957.)\\nWolcott and Bramhall, Justices, and Marvel, Vice-Chancellor, sitting.\\nCarl E. Geuther for appellant.\\nHenry R. Horsey for appellee.\\nSupreme Court of the State of Delaware,\\nNo. 50,\\n1956.\", \"word_count\": \"1756\", \"char_count\": \"10376\", \"text\": \"Wolcott, J.:\\nAn action was commenced by duPont Company to recover damages resulting from the forceful moving by a high wind of a piece of metal duct work left on the roof of a building being constructed at its Chestnut Run Plant. The cause was tried before the Court without a jury and resulted in the entry of a judgment for the defendant, Griffith.\\nDuPont Company entered into a contract with Griffith for the erection of metal duct work on the roof of its Polychemical Laboratory. At the same time, duPont Company was engaged either with its own employees or through other contractors with the construction of a roof for that laboratory. To give access to the roofers to that part of the roof on which they were then working, a piece of metal duct work previously installed by Griffith's employees was unfastened and placed out of the way of the workmen but in a position exposed to the winds.\\nAs a normal routine, duPont Company obtained weather forecasts daily and advised the responsible persons supervising any work on its premises of these forecasts. On July 14, 1954 thunderstorms were predicted for that night and the following day. This forecast was passed on to the various responsible persons. Notwithstanding this warning, the piece of metal duct work, which had been unfastened, was not secured at the end of the day's work, nor placed in a safe position. During the night it was forced by high winds across the roof of the laboratory, occasioning damage to the extent of approximately $2,100.\\nThe action seeks to hold Griffith responsible on the theory that it was an independent contractor and that the duct work was left exposed by the negligence of Griffith's employees for which it is responsive in damages.\\nThe fundamental issue is whether Griffith was in fact an independent contractor, or whether duPont Company exercised such control over Griffith's employees that, in effect, Griffith had been made the agent of duPont Company, thus placing the responsibility for damage resulting from the negligence of Griffith's employees upon duPont Company itself.\\nThe trial Judge held that Griffith was not an independent contractor but was an agent of duPont Company which had retained a large measure of control over the operation Griffith had contracted to perform. The trial Judge found that duPont Company's control was asserted through its employee, Harrington.\\nThere is no dispute as to the rule of law applicable. Admittedly, if Griffith was operating as an independent contractor it is liable for the damage resulting from negligent failure to secure from high winds the piece of metal duct work in question. The problem resolves itself, therefore, to a determination of the status of Griffith. Generally speaking, there is no absolute rule to be applied in determining whether or not a purported contractor is in fact independent, or is in fact an agent or employee of the owner. Each case stands or falls on its own facts. The test of independency consists of the amount of control retained or exercised by the owner, particularly with respect to the absolute right to direct the manner and method of proceeding with the work rather than with respect to the end result only. A requirement that the work be performed according to standards and specifications imposed by the owner is not sufficient to establish the degree of control necessary to make a presumably independent contractor the agent of the owner. But retention of the right not only to insure conformity with specifications but the retention or exercise of the right to direct the manner in or means by which the work shall be performed will destroy the independent status of the contractor. 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractors, \\u00a7 5, 6, 7; 1 Thompson on Negligence 547; 56 C. J. S., Master and Servant, \\u00a7 3(2); Restatement of Agency, \\u00a7 2(3).\\nThe question, therefore, decided below was almost entirely one of fact. Upon appeal, by way of Writ of Certiorari from such a ruling the function of this Court is to determine whether or not the judgment rendered is supported by any competent evidence in the record, and if that be the fact, to issue a mandate of affirmance. This result would follow even though an independent evaluation of the record by us might lead to an opposite conclusion. We are required to treat the judgment of a Superior Court Judge sitting without a jury as though it had been entered following the rendering of a jury's verdict. Mulco Products v. Black, 11 Terry 246, 127 A. 2d 851; Turner v. Vineyard, 7 Terry 138, 80 A. 2d 177.\\nWe think the trial Judge accepted at its face value the testimony of Harrington, the admitted employee of duPont Company, who was called as one of its principal witnesses. If this testimony is accepted, as we believe it was by the trial Judge, it appears that he was the man placed by duPont Company in charge of all of the roofing activity and related matters; that it was his job to co-ordinate the activities of the various subcontractors working on the roof, including the activities of Griffith's men installing the metal duct work; that part of his job was to approve or disapprove all the work done on the roof; that he had over-all control of all work done on the roof; and that any work done must be done in accordance with duPont Company's safety standards.\\nHarrington testified that the particular piece of duct work, the moving of which by high winds caused the damage, had at one time been installed by Griffith and had been removed later to permit access for workmen and materials to other parts of the roof. He testified that if the duct work had not been removed at his specific direction, nevertheless it had been moved with his approval. He testified that it was his duty to see that material lying around on the job was secured against movement by high winds at the close of the day's work. He further testified that while he knew the particular piece of metal duct work was, on July 14, 1954, placed in an exposed and vulnerable position, and that he gave orders to secure all loose material at the close of work on that day, nevertheless he did not make certain that this particular piece of duct work was securely fastened.\\nPrimarily, upon the basis of Harrington's testimony, the trial Judge concluded that duPont Company, through one of its employees, exercised absolute control over the means and manner of performing the roofing and related activities involved in the construction project. We think his conclusion in this respect is supported by competent evidence if Harrington's testimony is accepted fully. The conclusion thus reached gains some additional support from the anomalous position of one Wofford, who was carried on Griffith's payroll as its foreman in charge of its employees working on the job. Actually, Wofford had been a duPont Company employee engaged in supervising sheet metal work for a number of years prior to the execution of the contract between Griffith and duPont Company. He was in fact so employed at a duPont Company plant in the South when he received orders from duPont Company to report to the Chestnut Run Plant in Wilmington. When he reported there he found that he had been placed upon Griffith's payroll and put in charge of Griffith's men performing its contract with duPont. This contract was let to Griffith on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. Wofford was in complete charge of Griffith's men. He testified that it was common practice for the duPont Company to enter into an arrangement of this nature when the job to be done was such that certain crafts would not work for duPont Company directly. It further appears that upon the completion of the job, Wofford expected to return to the employ of duPont Company.\\nThe trial Judge expressly stated that he did not find it necessary to decide whether Wofford's equivocal status on Griffith's payroll was decisive on the question of control over the operation by duPont Company, but that his position, considered with the position of Harrington as outlined in his uncontradicted testimony, compelled the conclusion that Griffith was not an independent contractor.\\nWe think that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion without the necessity of deciding the question of whether or not Wofford came under the category of a duPont Company employee loaned to Griffith which, under some circumstances, would support the conclusion that the loaning employer retained such a measure of control over the operation as to destroy the independent nature of the contract. Cf. Restatement of Agency, \\u00a7 227.\\nThis record presents one curious aspect. Neither party has seen fit to offer in evidence the contract between duPont Company and Griffith. The failure to do so is unexplained, and we think the lack of explanation by one side or the other is, in it self, inexplicable, since the contract is always an important factor in determining whether the owner has retained such a right of control over the operation as to destroy the existence of an independent contract.\\nFinally, duPont Company argues that irrespective of the fact of whether or not Griffith was an independent contractor, the failure to secure the piece of duct work was the direct responsibility of one Draco, an employee of Griffith, after orders to secure everything had been issued, and that an agent or servant is liable to his principal for the negligent performance of his duties. Assuming that to be the rule, it does not help duPont Company's case, for it also was the responsibility of Harrington, not only to order the material to be made secure, but also to insure that his orders were carried out. He did not do the latter. His negligence accordingly was a contributing cause of the damage and, as such, is imputed to his employer, duPont Company. 65 C. J. S., Negligence, \\u00a7 162.\\nWe hold, therefore, that there is competent evidence in the record to support the factual conclusions of the trial Judge upon which judgment was entered for Griffith.\\nThe judgment below is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/457794.json b/delaware/457794.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..120beef870eb2280049ee71b8c7cbd1c2a64ee0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/457794.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"457794\", \"name\": \"Robert S. Kirkwood, vs. John Mitchell, administrator de bonis non of John Mitchell, dec'd\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kirkwood v. Mitchell\", \"decision_date\": \"1821-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"130\", \"last_page\": \"132\", \"citations\": \"1 Del. Ch. 130\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:00:12.346752+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Robert S. Kirkwood, vs. John Mitchell, administrator de bonis non of John Mitchell, dec\\u2019d.\", \"head_matter\": \"Robert S. Kirkwood, vs. John Mitchell, administrator de bonis non of John Mitchell, dec\\u2019d.\\nSussex,\\nMarch T. 1821.\\nA legatee may file a bill for his legacy against the personal representative of the deceased executor of the testator (the executor having received assets to pay the legacy) without making the administrater c. t. a., d. b. n. of the testator a party.\\nThe deceased executor having left a will and appointed an executrix thereof, who, after taking letters testamentary, died : Held, that her personal representative was a necessary party to a bill filed for the legacy against the administrator c. t. a.,d. b. n. of the deceased executor of the testator under whose will the legacy was claimed.\\nBill in Equity to recover a legacy.\\u2014Alexander Smith, by his will, bequeathed a legacy to Robert S. Kirk-wood. The bill was filed by the legatee against the defendant as the administrator de bonis non of John Mitchell, dec\\u2019d, who in his lifetime was the surviving executor of Alexander Smith, the testator. At the July Term, 1819, a demurrer to the bill was filed, and the following causes of demurrer assigned, viz : 1. That the complainant, did not in his bill set'forth that he, the complainant, had sued out administration on the estate of Alexander Smith, the testator; and, therefore, he hath not entitled himself to receive said legacy. 2. That the complainant could not discharge the defendant of said money if the defendant should pay it, the complainant not being entitled to receive it. 3. That Alexander Smith is dead, and his executor or administrator is not a party to the bill. 4. That the complainant hath a remedy at law.\\nRobinson, for the complainant.\\nCooper and Wells, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"602\", \"char_count\": \"3543\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor\\nwas of opinion that the legatee might sue in this Court the personal representative of the executor who had received assets of the testator sufficient to pay the legacy.\\nThe demurrer was overruled, and the defendant ordered to answer.\\nThe Chancellor's order was afterwards, at the June Term, 1820, affirmed by the High Court of Errors and Appeals.\\nAfterwards, at March Term, 1821, this cause came again before the Chancellor, for a hearing upon the bill, answer and exhibits. Pending the hearing it appeared that John Mitchell, deceased, who in his lifetime was the surviving executor of Alexander Smith, had made a will appointing his wife, Rhoda Mitchell, the executor thereof; that Rhoda Mitchell had, after taking letters testamentary, died, having made her will and appointed James Windsor and James Wiley her executorsthat they had renounced, and upon their renunciation Haney Wiley had taken out administration c. t. a., d. b. n. of the said Rhoda. Haney Wiley was not a party to this bill.\\nRidgely, Chancellor.\\nThe administratrix of Rhoda Mitchell is a necessary party. Rhoda may have paid the debt, which her representatives alone can show ; but it is particularly necessary in this case that her representative should be a party, because John Mitchell devised land to be sold by his executrix, Rhoda, for payment of his debts. She sold the land and ought to account for the proceeds of such sale, to be applied to the payment of this debt, if any thing shall be found due to complainant, unless it should appear that she applied the proceeds to other debts.\\nLet the cause stand over, with leave to amend the bill by making Haney Wiley, administratrix,c. t. a.,d. b. n. of Rhoda Mitchell, deceased, a party.\\nThis opinion is not drawn out, nor are the arguments of counsel given in the Chancellor's notes.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/457844.json b/delaware/457844.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4df5e3b7eea22308ccf6b2977d8c5073ffb3ced1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/457844.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"457844\", \"name\": \"John Conner, vs. Otho Pennington and Timothy Cummins\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Conner v. Pennington\", \"decision_date\": \"1821-10-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"177\", \"last_page\": \"184\", \"citations\": \"1 Del. Ch. 177\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:00:12.346752+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John Conner, vs. Otho Pennington and Timothy Cummins.\", \"head_matter\": \"John Conner, vs. Otho Pennington and Timothy Cummins.\\nNew Castle,\\nOct. 8, 1821.\\n(In vacation.)\\nThe defendant in a scire facias at law on a judgment, which had been entered under a warrant of attorney for the confession of judgment upon a bond, claimed to be allowed certain credits against the bond, which were disputed. By an entry on the docket of the scire facias, it was agreed between the parties that judgment should be confessed, ' with stay of execution for three months, the confession not to preclude any equitable relief the defendant might be entitled to in chancery. The present bill was filed by the defendant in the scire facias in order to obtain the benefit of the credits claimed by him against the judgment at law, the credits being for certain payments which he had made for the obligee in the bond in the course of settling the affairs of a former partnership between them. Held, That the defence against the bond being one which could have been eff dually made at law, a court of equity will not interfere.\\nNotwithstanding the judgment at law was entered under a warrant of attorney, relief could have been had at law against the judgment for payments and matters of discount. For, as to payments made upon the bond jp nor to the entry of judgment, the court of law was competent, to that extent, to vacate the judgment, on motion ; while payments and matters of discount accruing after judgment entered might have been pleaded in the scire facias.\\nThe Statute of 4 Anne, Ch. 16, Sec. 12, enabling a defendant in an action of debt or scire facias on a judgment to plead payment, in bar of such action, is in force in this State ; and such has been the practice.\\nIn the present case, in addition to the complainant\\u2019s right to discount or set off against the bond his alleged payments for the defendant, the complainant had his action for money paid, and in that view there was an adequate remedy without the aid of a court of equity.\\nBill eor an Injunction.\\u2014The case made by this bill was as follows :\\nThe complainant and the defendant, Pennington, hav ing been partners in the business of retailing goods, at Staunton, prior to the year 1816, under the firm of Otho Pennington & Co., dissolved the partnership by mutual consent in April of that year, and undertook to make a final settlement of the partnership transactions. Owing to the condition of some outstanding debts, including both debts due from and debts due to the firm, they were unable then to make a complete settlement. So, they made an adjustment exclusive of the debts. As the result of this adjustment, the complainant purchased Pennington\\u2019s share of the stock, for which he gave his judgment bond in the sum of $324.00, dated Dec. 25th, 1816. With respect to the outstanding debts it was agreed that the complainant should proceed to collect such as were due to the firm and to discharge its liabilities. He was to account to Pennington for one moiety of all the debts due to the firm which he should collect, subject to the usual commissions ; and for Pennington\\u2019s share of all debts from the firm, which should be paid by the complainant, the latter was to be credited on his judgment bond before mentioned. The bond contained an express stipulation to the effect that if the complainant (the obligor) \\u201cshould be compelled \\u201c to pay any portion of the debts due from the concern he \\u201c should be allowed a credit on his said bond for the proper \\u201c share of the said Pennington.\\u201d\\nThe judgment bond was afterwards assigned (though not in the form prescribed by the Statute in that behalf) to the other defendant, Timothy Cummins, for whose use a judgment was entered in the Court of Common Pleas for New; Castle County, in May, 1817. A scire fqcias upon the judgment was issued to the Dec. Term, 1819, to which the complainant, Conner, being the defendant in the scire facias, appeared and pleaded, giving notice that he should claim to be credited, against the judgment, the amount of Pennington\\u2019s share of certain debts of the partnership, which he, Conner, had paid. At the May Term of the Court of Common Pleas, 1821, the scire facias being called for trial, it was agreed, by an entry made upon the docket, that the pleas should be withdrawn and judgment entered for the plaintiff, with stay of execution for three months ; and it was expressly stipulated, in the entry on the docket, that the confession of judgment should not preclude the defendant in the scire facias (Conner) from any equitable relief he might be entitled to in chancery, and that the costs at law should abide the event of the cause in chancery, if the defendant should file his bill in chancery before the expiration of the three months stay, giving, security in the usual form, and should prosecute his suit in chancery with effect.\\nThe credits claimed by the complainant against the judgment were, $172.25, for Pennington\\u2019s share of certain debts of the partnership paid by the complainant, and $50.22, for sundry private debts of Pennington paid by the complainant at his request and for merchandise furnished to Pennington after the bond was given,\\u2014the whole of the credits amounting to $223.47. The bill alleged that Pennington\\u2019s share of the debts due to the firm, and collected by the complainant was the sum of $99.45 ;\\u2014that the amount of the bond, with interest to May 15th, 1818, was $331.55; which together with Pennington\\u2019s share of the debts collected ($99.45) made the gross sum of $431.00 ; that deducting therefrom the credits before stated ($223.47),and $10 claimed by the complainant for commissions, there would remain due upon the bond a balance of $197.53, which the complainant submitted himself as ready to pay.\\nThe complainant insisted, that he was entitled to the credits claimed by him, notwithstanding the assignment of the bond to the defendant, Cummins, because, as he believed and alleged, the payments for which he claimed the credit had been made by him prior to the date of the assignment; but at all events, he insisted that such pay ments had been made without notice of any assignment and upon the supposition that the bond was still held by Pennington; that subsequent to the making of the payments he had conversed with Pennington about the bond, and had received from him no intimation of his having .made any disposal of it.\\nThe bill further alleged, that the term of three months limited in the agreement entered upon the record of the scire facias for a stay of execution had been subsequently extended by consent of parties ; that such limitation was intended to apply only to the issuing of execution upon the judgment, and not to limit or affect any remedy the complainant might have in equity; \\u201c it being always understood that the matters of defence should be heard somewhere, and that it would conduce to the mutual interest of both parties that the subject should be fully investigated in the Court of Chancery.\\u201d The bill further alleged that on the 19th of September, 1821, a fieri facias had been issued upon the said judgment, which waspending at the filing of this bill, (October 8th, 1821.) The prayer was, that the defendants should be decreed to come to an account with the complainant with respect both to the monies paid and the monies collected by the complainant on account of the defendant, Pennington, and to allow as credits upon the said judgment all payments made by the complainant on account of said Pennington previous to his receiving notice of said assignment; and that the defendants should be compelled to accept, in satisfaction of the judgment and execution, whatsoever balance should be found due after crediting the complainant with such payments as aforesaid; and that upon the payment of such balance the judgment and execution should be decreed to be satisfied and a perpetual injunction awarded ; and for general relief, &e.\\nThe cause came before the Chancellor upon a motion for a preliminary injunction.\\nMcLane, for the complainant.\", \"word_count\": \"2684\", \"char_count\": \"15033\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor\\nrefused to order the writ of injunction, and assigned the following reasons :\\nThe ground upon which a writ of injunction issues is, that the party is making use of the jurisdiction of a court of law, contrary to equity and good conscience; and it is commonly suggested in the bill, that the complainant, for some reasons therein stated, is not able to make his defence in such court, though he has a good discharge in equity; or that the court refuses some rightful advantage, or does injustice to him in the proceeding, or has not power to do him right. 1 Atk. 515, Hill vs. Turner : 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 109 : Wyatt's, Pr. Regr. 232. In this case, it is not even pretended that the complainant could not make a defence at law, but only that when the scire facias was called up for trial, it was considered to be the mutual interest of both parties that the matters of defence in the said cause should be heard and investigated in this Court. What advantage either party could have by proceeding in equity, which he could not have at law according to the practice in this State, is not to be conceived. It appears by the bill, that the bond is dated December 25th, 1816, and that judgment was entered by warrant of attorney in the Court of Common Pleas for Hew Castle county, on the 15th of May, 1818. Between the date of the bond and the date of the judgment all the payments of money by Conner, claimed by him as credits upon the bond, and also the sale of the merchandise to Pennington, had been made; and the defendant had no notice of the assignment of the bond to Timothy Cummins until the service of the writ of scire facias in the winter of 1819. The judgment was entered for the use of Timothy Cummins, and consequently the bond was not assigned according to the form of the Act of Assembly. There could then be no objection to pleading any discount on account of the assignment, because the complainant had no notice of the assignment. So it was understood by the complainant's counsel; for he pleaded to the scire facias and gave notice of the discount.\\nBut it may be said that this was ajudgment entered by a warrant of attorney and that the defendant could, at law, plead nothing in bar which might be pleaded to an original action; that this being a judgment without writ, nothing could be pleaded in bar at law, and that the party could have a remedy in equity only. As to all payments and matters of discount which accrued before the 15th of May, 1815, the date of the judgment, the Court, according to Cooke vs. Jones, Cowper 727, would have interposed on a motion to vacate the judgment, and would have afforded a relief which the party could not otherwise have had. 2 Str. 1043 : Cas. temp. Hard. 233 : Cro. El. 588 . 1 Sid. 182. The only difficulty which this part of the case offers is whether the payments and discounts which accrued after the date of the judgment could be pleaded in bar to this scire facias. In Hartzell vs. Reiss, 1 Binney, 289, the Court doubted whether, in England, the party in such a case could have any relief in a court of law. He certainly might, it was said, in equity. But there is no good reason why the Court might not.interpose in the one case as in the other. In Cooke vs. Jones, where the defence arose before the judgment, Lord Mansfield said, the party had no opportunity of pleading unless the Court interposed. If, then, the party could not plead, and the Court was compelled to interpose for the sake of justice, why should not the Court in this case afford the party relief by allowing him to plead according to the state of the transaction ? By the Stat. 4 Ann. c. 16, sec. 12, it is enacted that \\\" where \\\" any action of debt shall be brought upon any single bill, \\\" or where an action of debt or scire facias shall be brought \\\" upon any judgment, if the defendant hath paid the money \\\" due upon such bill or judgment, such payment shall and \\\" may be pleaded in bar of such action or suit.\\\" By this Statute, which is the Act for the amendment of the law, and the better government of justice, and is in force in this State, the defendant at law, might well plead payment of this judgment. Before this Statute payment was no plea to a debt upon record, because a payment being against matter of record cannot be a discharge unless by matter of record. Cro. Car. 328 : 5 Com. Dig. 782, Pleader (3 L. 12.) It is, I believe, the constant practice, in the courts of law in .this State, to plead to a scire facias payment, or any other plea which goes to show that the debt is satisfied, or that the party should not have execution. However this may be, it is not pretended that the complainant could not make a defence at law ; and no ground is laid in the bill to show that this Court ought to interpose, as that the complainant is deprived of some rightful advantage at law, or that injustice will be done him, or that the court at law has not power to do him right.\\nThere is, though, a stronger objection. This bill is not brought for the settlement of a partnership concern. Every thing seems to have been adjusted (debts due to and from the partners excepted) and Conner fell in debt to Pennington, including Pennington's share of the goods and stock in trade, in the sum of $324, for which he gave his judgment bond. Conner was to pay and collect the debts. Then, as to all money received, Conner was liable to Pennington for a moiety '; and for debts paid,Pennington was liable to Conner in the same proportion. Conner also claims commissions. Conner alleges that he paid, at the request of Pennington, debts of Pennington to several persons, and sold him goods before the assignment of the bond, amounting in all to $50.22. These make a fair claim, against Pennington, for which Conner, either by way of set off or in an action for money paid, &c., for the use of Pennington and for goods sold, may have a remedy at law. Conner collected debts, but paid away more than he collected, so that for a moiety of the excess of payments, Pennington would be liable to him. For this sum, then, Conner can have no difficulty. He has the proof all in his own hand, and has no necessity of applying to chancery for relief. And so, as to the commissions, if he is entitled to any, all which could be settled in a court of law. How there is not an allegation made of any fact as to which Conner is not in possession of the proof., The whole may be settled at law. If this Court were to sustain the present bill, all cases of payment, set off,release and discharge of all kinds, might with equal propriety be brought here for adjustment. This is not a bill for an account between- partners; but merely to obtain a credit by way of set off for matters entirely within the knowledge of the complainant, the proof of which is also in his power. The party might, on the issue joined in the court of law, have had a complete remedy at law, and therefore the writ of injunction should not be awarded. See l Mad. Ch. Pr. 69, 70 : 6 Vesey Jr., 136, Dinwiddie vs. B ailey.\\nThe injunction is refused.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/472650.json b/delaware/472650.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4be0e458e289e28f8f223d76ea06da57db71eeb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/472650.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"472650\", \"name\": \"John A. Green and Joseph Green by their next friend Margaret S. Green. vs. Vincent O. Hill\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Green v. Hill\", \"decision_date\": \"1866-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"92\", \"last_page\": \"93\", \"citations\": \"3 Del. Ch. 92\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:22:19.871547+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John A. Green and Joseph Green by their next friend Margaret S. Green. vs. Vincent O. Hill.\", \"head_matter\": \"John A. Green and Joseph Green by their next friend Margaret S. Green. vs. Vincent O. Hill.\\nNew Castle, At Chambers,\\nJune 1866.\\nAttachment for contempt at Chambers and defendant imprisoned for refusal to produce an indentured servant, at the hearing of a petition to discharge the indentures.\", \"word_count\": \"415\", \"char_count\": \"2528\", \"text\": \"Petition to discharge indentures of apprenticeship. ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT. \\u2014 This was a petition for the discharge of the indentures of apprenticeship under which the petitioners were bound to the respondent. On the 30th day of June the process being returnable to the Chancellor, at Chambers, the respondent was present and John A. Green one of the petitioners was also present, but the other petitioner Joseph Green was not produced by the respondent. After a hearing npon petition, exhibits and oral examination of witnesses, upon application of the respondent, the further hearing was adjourned until Wednesday the 5th of July then next, and it was ordered that the respondent should produce the said Joseph Green before the Chancellor at that time. On the 5th of July the respondent failed to appear and said Joseph Green was not produced,whereupon, on application of T. F. Bayard, for the petitioners, an attachment for contempt was issued against the respondent for not obeying the order of the Chancellor for the production of the said Joseph Green, said attachment being made returnable on the 14th of July at Chambers. At that time the respondent appeared in custody of the sheriff, having been arrested under the attachment, and declined to make any further defense, whereupon the Chancellor further heard the complaint and made an order annulling the indentures and discharging the petitioners therefrom, the respondent to pay the costs. The Chancellor also made an order, reciting the refusal of the respondent to produce the said Joseph Green, adjudging him guilty of a contempt of the authority of the Chancellor in the cause and committing him to the custody of the sheriff for fifteen days.\\nNote. The Statute Revised Code, Ch. yg. Sec. 16 enumerates the orders which may be made by the Chancellor or Judge in such cases, and adds that \\\" any such order,\\\" may be enforced by attachment and imprisonment. The precise order, to produce the servant, made in this case is not among those enumerated. The case is therefore one of the enforcement, by attachment, of an order, not mentioned in the statute, but only incidental to a purely statutory jurisdiction, and the punishment of the disobedience of it by imprisonment.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/474544.json b/delaware/474544.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0356619dce43f5bf6434bd34e65099be096a5631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/474544.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"474544\", \"name\": \"Mercantile Trading Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois, vs. Rosenbaum Grain Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1931-08-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"167\", \"last_page\": \"170\", \"citations\": \"18 Del. Ch. 167\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:38:59.834363+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Mercantile Trading Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois, vs. Rosenbaum Grain Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mercantile Trading Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois, vs. Rosenbaum Grain Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\\nNew Castle,\\nAug. 8, 1931.\\nGeorge N. Davis, for complainant.\\nHugh M. Morris, for defendant.\\nAaron Finger, of the firm of Richards, Layton & Finger, for intervenors.\", \"word_count\": \"942\", \"char_count\": \"5329\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor:\\nReference is made to an opinion handed down on last April 28 for the facts necessary to an understanding of the case. In that opinion I declined to pass upon the pending motion to dismiss, because of doubts upon a question of procedure. The parties have since agreed that the motion might be heard and disposed of on the affidavits already on file and it was stated by each party that no further evidence was desired to be submitted.\\nThe procedural question is thus removed from the case and I accordingly proceed to dispose of the motion.\\nThe bill seeks to enjoin the defendant from allowing the intervenors to enjoy a right of inspection which they say they are entitled to enjoy and which in fact the defendant through its board of directors has signified its assent to. The complaining stockholder is a corporation. The uncontradicted evidence now. before the court is that Emanuel F. Rosenbaum is president, Edwin S. Rosenbaum, vice-president, S. J. Spain, secretary, L. T. Sayre, assistant secretary, and L. Nairn, treasurer, of the defendant corporation, and that the same persons hold similar offices in the complainant corporation. All of the persons just named, except Spain, are members of the board of directors of the defendant. They compose four of the seven directors of the defendant. The complainant owns all the common stock of the defendant. All the stock of the complainant corporation is owned by the two Rosenbaums above mentioned and their wives, except a few shares which are owned by other close relatives of the Rosenbaums and a few more that are held by employees of the defendant corporation for the purpose of qualifying them as officers and directors of the complainant. The officers of the complainant corporation are as already stated the officers of the defendant, and the directors of the complainant corporation are the two Rosenbaums and salaried employees of the defendant corporation.\\nI think there can be no doubt but that the same persons who control the complainant control also the defendant.\\nWe have therefore a case where the management of the complainant has instituted a suit to restrain the carrying out of a proposed action by the defendant, when the management of the defendant which has resolved to take it is in substance the same in personnel as that of the complainant which seeks to stop it. The proposed action consists in the opening of books to inspection by stockholders of the defendant who are not parties to the suit. The rights of strangers to the litigation are thus sought to be affected by a suit to which they are not parties. The parties to the suit who, if it proceeds, will litigate the rights of the third persons, are really not adversary parties in the true sense of the word. The identity of the controlling interests and management in the complainant and defendant is not seriously questioned. Stripping the case of the formal appearances which the fiction of corporate personality creates, a case is revealed in which a set of men in one role sue to restrain themselves in another role from recognizing certain rights of third parties which in that other role they were free to contest. It is much as if a man were to sue to enjoin himself from doing something with respect to the rights of others which he had resolved to do and which he need not have resolved to do.\\nWhere the rights of a third party are alone involved in the outcome of a suit in which the adversaries are such only in form and where they are manifestly in harmony in opposition to the third, it can hardly be said that a genuinely litigious controversy is pending. In the opinion heretofore filed by me in this cause (17 Del. Ch. 325, 331, 154 A. 457, 460) I used the following language:\\n\\\"There seems to be no doubt upon the general proposition that a person who is not a party to a cause but who may be affected by its determination,\\\" is entitled to an opportunity to present to the court a motion to dismiss on the ground that the formal parties to it are not in fact adversary litigants, and that they are acting in concert to secure a result injurious to him.\\\"\\nThe case cited by me in support of this right of the third party to move for a dismissal sustains also his right to obtain it in such a case.\\nI conclude that the movers in this case have shown enough to warrant the granting of their motion to dismiss.\\nThe complainant cites cases to the effect that the fact that two corporations have directors or other officers in common does not of itself prevent one from maintaining an action at law against the other and that a judgment rendered in such an action is valid if free from fraudulent conduct on the part of the officers who procured the judgment. If this principle be conceded, I do not see how it is applicable here, for in the instant case the decree sought is one that is aimed at the rights of a third person who is not only not present as a party but who is not even named as one.\\nThe motion to dismiss will be granted. Decree accordingly.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/476796.json b/delaware/476796.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acf16a4c3a2827a2739fd91d78e72ef328ae8192
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/476796.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"476796\", \"name\": \"Samuel B. Field, Edward W. Pyle and Allan Sauerwein, vs. Layton & Layton, Incorporated, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Charles L. Horsey, Solomon S. Kenney, Albert H. Phillips, Victor I. Records, Administrator of the estate of William T. Records, deceased, George W. Ward, T. J. Waller, Orlando V. Wooten, The Selbyville Bank, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Thomas F. Cottinham, William J. Highfield and Industrial Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Field v. Layton & Layton, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1928-05-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"135\", \"last_page\": \"146\", \"citations\": \"16 Del. Ch. 135\", \"volume\": \"16\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:56:07.653283+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Samuel B. Field, Edward W. Pyle and Allan Sauerwein, vs. Layton & Layton, Incorporated, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Charles L. Horsey, Solomon S. Kenney, Albert H. Phillips, Victor I. Records, Administrator of the estate of William T. Records, deceased, George W. Ward, T. J. Waller, Orlando V. Wooten, The Selbyville Bank, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Thomas F. Cottinham, William J. Highfield and Industrial Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\", \"head_matter\": \"Samuel B. Field, Edward W. Pyle and Allan Sauerwein, vs. Layton & Layton, Incorporated, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Charles L. Horsey, Solomon S. Kenney, Albert H. Phillips, Victor I. Records, Administrator of the estate of William T. Records, deceased, George W. Ward, T. J. Waller, Orlando V. Wooten, The Selbyville Bank, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Thomas F. Cottinham, William J. Highfield and Industrial Trust Company, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\\nNew Castle,\\nMay 2, 1928.\\nRobert H. Richards and Aaron Finger and George W. Lindsey, of Baltimore, Md., for complainants.\\nHenry R. Isaacs and Charles C. Keedy, for Industrial Trust Company.\", \"word_count\": \"3818\", \"char_count\": \"21817\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor.\\nThe demands of the complainants are purely legal demands, two of them being upon promissory notes held by Field and Pyle respectively and the third being Upon a claim for legal services rendered by Sauerwein. Certainly a court of law is the ordinarily appropriate forum in which to seek satisfaction of such demands.\\nA court of equity has no jurisdiction to entertain suits for the enforcement of purely legal claims unless their' attempted assertion can be brought under some one of the recognized heads of equitable cognizance. Our statute provides that the Court of Chancery \\\"shall not have power to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other Court, or jurisdiction, of this State.\\\" Revised Code 1915, \\u00a7 3844. The only particular in which the complainants contend the law courts are incapable of affording to them a sufficient remedy consists, not in the inability of those courts to grant a remedy, but in their inability to do so without resort to a great multiplicity of suits. This being so, they contend, the Court of Chancery may with perfect propriety assume jurisdiction over the matters in controversy notwithstanding the typically legal character of the claims.\\nThe jurisdictional ground upon which the complainants rely therefore in support of their bill is the familiar and much discussed one of the power of equity to entertain bills in order to save litigants from the burden or vexatious annoyance of a multiplicity of suits.\\nThe jurisdiction of equity in proper cases to entertain bills whose sole purpose is to settle controversies which, but for equity's intervention, would result in a great multiplicity of suits at law-is -unquestioned. This court has recognized the jurisdiction,though in the case cited its exercise was denied under the particular facts shown. Equitable G. & T. Co. v. Donahoe, 8 Del. Ch. 422, 45 A. 583. In P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Neary, 5 Del. Ch. 600, 8 A. 363, the jurisdiction rested on an avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. The Court of Errors and Appeals in Murphy, et al., v. Wilmington, 6 Houst. 108, 22 Am. St. Rep. 345, said that \\\"equity will interpose, in a proper case, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, excessive litigation, or circuity of action.\\\"\\nThe jurisdiction is therefore well settled in this State as well as elsewhere. But when is the case a \\\"proper\\\" one for the exercise of the jurisdiction? The answer to that question, if thorough, would lead to a laborious examination of the authorities and a lengthy discussion of' their rulings, and, in the end, conflict upon some phases of the question would be left in hopeless irreconcilability. Pomeroy in Section IV of his first volume of Equity Jurisprudence, (4th Ed.) has discussed the whole subject in his characteristically learned manner and his treatment of it demonstrates the confusion found in the cases dealing with it. He has succeeded, however, in deducing from the mass of authorities certain general principles upon which no substantial disagreement in judicial opinion exists. He mentions four classes of cases in which bills to prevent a multiplicity of suits fall. 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, (4th Ed.) \\u00a7 245. The first two classes are where two individual parties are concerned and they are as follows: 1. Where the same individual, in order to secure full relief at law, would be obliged to bring a number of actions against the same wrongdoer all growing out of the same wrongful act and involving similar questions of law and fact. Cases of nuisance, waste and continued trespass illustrate this class. 2. Where B. institutes, or is about to institute, a number of suits either successively or simultaneously against A., all depending upon the same legal questions and similar issues of fact, and A. by a single equitable action seeks to bring them all within the scope and effect of one judicial determination. Cases of repeated actions of ejectment fall within this class.\\nPomeroy's next two,- the third and fourth, classes embrace cases where numerous parties are present on one side of the suit either as complainants or defendants. They are:\\n\\\"3. Where a number of persons have separate and individual claims and rights against the same party, A., but all arise from some common cause, are governed by the same legal rule, and involve similar facts, and the whole matter might be settled in a single suit by all these persons uniting as co-plaintiffs, or one of the persons suing on behalf of the others, or even by one suing alone. Th.e case of several owners of distinct parcels of land upon which the same illegal assessment or tax has been laid is an example of this class.\\n4. Where the same party, A., has or claims to have some common right against a number of persons, the establishment of which would regularly require a separate action brought by him against each of these persons, or brought by each of them against him, and instead thereof he might procure the whole to be determined in one suit brought by himself against all the adverse claimants as codefendants.\\\"\\nInto the classifications thus arranged by Mr. Pomeroy all the reported cases sustaining the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits may be fitted and his language descriptive of each class contains about as accurate a definition of the general features of each class as one may hope to be able to formulate. Of course such general language needs to be greatly amplified in order to convey a more intimate view of the whole subject with its various refinements and specific applications.\\nLooking at the case in hand, it is apparent that it lies entirely outside the first two classes. If the case is maintainable at all as one to prevent a multiplicity of suits, it falls within the third and the fourth classes named by Mr. Pomeroy, though it is not precisely like either of them, for here there is neither a number of persons suing an individual nor an individual suing a number. This is a case where a number are suing a number.\\nBut the circumstance of a number suing a number cannot of itself alone, I conceive, render inapplicable the doctrine upon which the jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits rests, if otherwise all the essentials of the jurisdictional requirements are present.\\nAre all the essentials present in this case? In answering this question I shall turn first to the complainants' side of the case and having examined it from that angle turn next to the side of the defendants to see how the matter appears from that angle.\\nFirst then are all the essential requirements present on the side of the complainants? With respect to them, we have three complainants, each of two of them holding a promissory note and one of them possessing a claim for legal services. The three claims have nothing in common, unless indeed the fact that the debtor in each case is the same person or group of persons can be said to constitute a thing common to all of them within the meaning of the phrase as used in connection with the doctrine of multiplicity of suits, a point of view which no court has ever advanced. Certainly if a number of persons have separate and distinct legal claims against the same debtor, the fact that the debtor is common to all the creditors cannot alone justify equity in drawing the one debtor within its domain in order that his several creditors may all sue him at the same time. The individual claims of the complainants must, in the language of Mr. Pomeroy's description of the third class, all arise from some common cause, be governed by the same legal rules and involve similar facts. The three claims represented by the complainants neither arise from a common cause, nor are they governed by the same legal rules, nor do they involve similar facts. Even if the cause of action in the case of each complainant were clearly equitable in nature instead of purely legal, a joining of them in one bill would offend against the rule against multifariousness in pleading, so diverse and unrelated are they. What is here being sought is to consolidate in equity three causes of action at law and in one piece of equitable litigation, carry on three separate, distinct and entirely unrelated lawsuits, which means the drawing of three separate issues to be tried at once, upon evidence separately applicable to each and eventuating in three separate decrees put in the form of one, granting or denying to each complainant relief on his particular claim. I should be greatly surprised if any case were found anywhere justifying such a procedure.\\nLooking at the case from the side of the complainants, therefore, the demurrer must be sustained. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. v. Barnes, 94 Miss. 484, 48 So. 823; Hamilton v. Alabama Power Co., 195 Ala. 438, 70 So. 737; Marselis, et al., v. Morris Canal, etc., Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 31; Van Auken v. Dammeier, 27 Or. 150, 40 P. 89; International Paper Co. v. Bellows Falls Canal Co., 88 Vt. 93, 90 A. 943; Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins; 174 Ala. 465, 57 So. 11, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 464, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 692; Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, et al., 173 Ala. 347, 56 So. 198, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 491; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McKnight, 244 U. S. 368, 37 S. Ct. 611, 61 L. Ed. 1200; Newton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Sessum, et al., 102 Miss. 181; 59 So. 9.\\nIt would be proper to conclude this opinion at this point. But inasmuch as the question has been argued and will in all probability arise later on, whether one of these complainants can maintain a bill against all of the defendants on the theory that he is entitled to do so in order that a multiplicity of suits may be avoided, I may as well proceed to consider whether, if there were no objection to the bill on the score of the inability of the complainants as a group to sue, the bill might be sustained as against the defendants by one alone of the complainants.\\nSecond, then, are the requirements essential for an assertion of the jurisdiction present by reason of anything peculiar to the liability and the situation of the defendants?\\nThe complainants assert in their bill that the defendants are jointly and severally liable. They assert that one hundred and forty-four law suits will be necessary for them to collect their debts. Why this is so is not made clear. The bare assertion is made. It certainly cannot be true if each complainant is required, as above indicated, to sue separately. If so, taking the complainants' assertion at full value, it would mean at the outside not one hundred and forty-four law suits, but rather one-third as many, or forty-eight for each party whether he sues in law or equity. But no such number of suits as that would be necessary unless the individual creditor elected to sue each defendant severally. Here in Delaware where only twelve of the bondholders are located, even separate suits based on a liability in severalty could not number over twelve. Of course in so far as the trouble to each of the complainants in bringing numerous suits may be due to the residence in different states of the debtors and to the consequent necessity of resort to different jurisdictions, multiplicity of suits cannot be avoided regardless of what tribunal is appealed to, whether one of law or of equity. In considering this aspect of the demurrer, therefore, I think of the case in terms only of the defendants located in the jursidiction of Delaware who are within the reach of its courts, for no court in Delaware could by any possibility do anything by way of preventing a multiplicity of suits in so far as the necessity for such multiplicity is occasioned by the residence of parties beyond the jurisdiction.\\nLooking at the matter then as though the numerous actions at law which it is sought by this bill to prevent are actions against Delaware defendants it appears that, if one of the complainants desired to assert his claim in a law action on the ground of a several liability, twelve actions at law would be the outside limit instead of one hundred and forty-four as claimed.\\nThis to be sure is a number large enough to impose trouble on the suing creditor. It cannot be said that twelve can be called a multitude. Even if it could, the jurisdiction of equity to bring all twelve of them within its processes for adjudication would not by reason of multitude alone be made out, for as observed by Wales, J., in Murphy, et al., v. Wilmington, supra, speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals, \\\"multiplicity does not mean multitude, and equity will not interfere where the object is to obtain a consolidation of actions, or to save the expense of separate actions.\\\" Mr. Pomeroy in section 251\\u00bd of volume 1 of the Fourth Edition of his work on Equity Jurisprudence expresses and elaborates the same principle. His text is full and abundant reference to the cases in support thereof is to be found in his notes. I quote the following from the section referred to as particularly apt:\\n\\\" There must be some common relation, some common interest, or some common question in order that the one proceeding in equity may really avail to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The equity suit must result in a simplification or consolidation of the issues; if, after the numerous parties are joined, there still remain separate issues to be tried between each of them and the single defendant or plaintiff, nothing has been gained by the court of equity's assuming jurisdiction. In such a case, 'while the bill has only one number upon the docket and calls itself a single proceeding, it is in reality a bundle of separate suits, each of which is no doubt similar in character to the others, but rests nevertheless upon the separate and distinct liability of one defendant' in cases resembling those of the fourth class, or upon the separate and distinct liability of one plaintiff in cases resembling those of the third class. In refusing to entertain these spurious bills of peace, courts of equity impose no real limitation upon their jurisdiction, which, by its very definition, exists not because of multiplicity of suits, but to avoid them, when their rules of procedure can avail to that purpose; indeed, they merely apply to bills of this character the ordinary rules of equity pleading relating to multifariousness.\\\"\\nFrom the nature of the causes of action held by each of these complainants it would seem obvious that there must be as many issues as there are defendants and a \\\"simplification or consolidation of the issues\\\" presented by them all would be impossible. See the cases cited by Pomeroy in section 251\\u00bd and particularly those cited by him in the note on page 416.\\nWhat has just been said is predicated on the theory that an individual complainant if he sued at law would be required to bring twelve separate suits against these defendants. If he did so, it would be because he chose to do so on the theory that their liability is several. But if as his bill alleges the liability is not only several but joint, the claimant would not be required to proceed at law in twelve separate actions. He could sue in one action. Cunningham v. Dixon, 1 Marv. 163, 41 A. 519; Jackson v. Hedges, 4 Har. 96; Reybold v. Parker, 6 Houst. 544. The last case, though reversed, was reversed on other grounds. If this be so, it is apparent that one action at law, not many, is available to each of the complainants to secure ample relief against all the defendants, and therefore in this aspect of the matter no occasion whatever exists for a resort to equity because of a possible multiplicity of suits.\\nIt \\u00abmight be suggested that if a complainant should proceed on the theory of a joint liability and bring one action at law against all the bondholders, taking judgment however against only the twelve Delaware defendants who were served in accordance with the rule laid down in the cases supra from 1 Marvel, 4 Harrington and 6 Houston, he would be confronted by the result that if he thus took judgment, his right of action against the absent co-contractor defendants would be merged in the judgment and gone forever, as indicated by the Chancellor, speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals in Reybold v. Parker, 7 Houst. 526, 32 A. 981; and that in the light of such a result the complainant's right to remain in equity ought not to be tested by the circumstance that he could proceed in one suit at law to obtain judgment against some of the joint debtors.\\nTo this, the following is to be said: The case in which the doctrine of merger of the cause of action into the judgment was applied by the Chancellor speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals was. one where the absent defendant was so far as appears not a non-resident and the sole question was whether the statute of limitations was interrupted in its running until such time as the absent defendant came within the jurisdiction. Where a Cause of action is joint, and the parties liable under it are residents of different states, it is obvious that it would be impossible in many of such cases for the creditor to find a jurisdiction in which all of his joint debtors could be found and served with process. If the common law doctrine of merger should be held to apply with all of its rigidity in every such case, it would necessarily follow that a joint claim against several debtors, some resident in the jurisdiction and others non-resident, would often be turned by the doctrine into a claim against only one or a few of them. If such be the law, an illustration is found where the substantial merits of justice are made to yield to the law's slavish devotion to theory. I cannot believe that the Court of Errors and Appeals meant, in the case referred to, to give to the common law doctrine any such application. Courts elsewhere have refused to allow the doctrine to work an injustice of the kind referred to and have- accordingly found exceptions to its application. One of the most familiar of these exceptions is that \\\"where a creditor bringing suit upon a joint obligation is unable to get service .upon some of the obligors because they are beyond the jurisdiction in which he is acting, his judgment there recovered will not be regarded as a bar against the obligors not served, where he is able.to obtain jurisdiction over them in some other forum.\\\" Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296, citing in support of its language, Brown v. Birdsall, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 549; Third Nat. Bank v. Graham, 174 App. Div. 503, 161 N. Y. S. 159; Campbell v. Steele, 11 Pa. 394; Nat. Bank v. Peabody, 55 Vt. 492, 45 Am. Rep. 632: Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500, 44 Am. Dec. 562; Merriman v. Barker, 121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. 992; Rand v. Nutter, 56 Me. 339; Tibbetts v. Shapleigh, 60 N. H. 487; Yoho v. McGovern, 42 Ohio St. 11; Bradley Eng., etc., Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 P. 170, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1127; Beck & Pauli Lith. Co. v. Wacker, etc., Co. (C. C. A.) 76 F. 10. See, also, Larison v. Hager (C. C.) 44 F. 49; Cox v. Maddux, 72 Ind. 206; West v. Furbish, 67 Me. 17; Dennett v. Chick, 2 Greene. (Me.) 191, 11 Am. Dec. 59.\\nIf an exception to the common law rule lies, as the cases cited hold, it therefore follows that each of these complainants, even though they proceed on the theory of a joint debt, need bring only one suit in the law courts of this State in order to obtain judgment against all the defendants resident here, without incurring the consequences of having to forego their rights of action against the non-residents.\\nIf, as suggested by the solicitor for the complainants, one action should thus be brought at law against all of the defendants on the theory of a joint liability, and any judgment obtained should be paid by one of the defendants, the one paying would be driven to suits to collect from his co-defendants their proper proportions of the joint debt and a multiplicity of suits would thus be entailed upon the defendants, it does not follow that this bill should be retained in order to avoid that result. I say this for the following reasons: It would seem that the multiplicity of suits thus sought to be avoided could hardly be of. any concern to the complainants, for such multiplication of litigation could in no wise be annoying or burdensome or vexatious to the complainants. It would be a matter of concern solely to the defendants. That sort of thing is what any joint debtor assumes the risk of being bothered with when he assumes a joint obligation. In such cases, furthermore, the law courts are provided with ample machinery to afford adequate relief by requiring an assignment by the plaintiff of the joint judgment to the paying defendant who may have execution against his co-defendants for their proportionable part of the debt. Revised Code 1915, \\u00a7 2905.\\nWhether, therefore, the defendants are to be regarded as severally liable to the complainants or jointly so, the same result follows, that no case is presented falling within the recognized principles which justify a court of equity in taking cognizance of purely legal demands in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits\\nThe demurrer will be sustained.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/477587.json b/delaware/477587.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c2eabb706f23d102ac9f28b4b9bf6dda5f092b5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/477587.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"477587\", \"name\": \"Helen G. Wilson, Guardian of Margaret Gregg Wilson, vs. Wilmington Trust Company, Trustee by appointment of the Chancellor of Delaware, under the will of James Wilson, deceased\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wilson v. Wilmington Trust Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-05-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"389\", \"last_page\": \"391\", \"citations\": \"14 Del. Ch. 389\", \"volume\": \"14\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:11:09.601306+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Helen G. Wilson, Guardian of Margaret Gregg Wilson, vs. Wilmington Trust Company, Trustee by appointment of the Chancellor of Delaware, under the will of James Wilson, deceased.\", \"head_matter\": \"Helen G. Wilson, Guardian of Margaret Gregg Wilson, vs. Wilmington Trust Company, Trustee by appointment of the Chancellor of Delaware, under the will of James Wilson, deceased.\\nNew Castle,\\nMay 22, 1925.\\nWilliam F. Kurtz, for the complainant.\\nWilliam S. Hilles, for the defendant;\", \"word_count\": \"558\", \"char_count\": \"3294\", \"text\": \"The Chancellor.\\nThis case is dissimilar to the case of Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., decided by this court and reported ante p. 348, not only in the language of its bequest, but in these two important particulars, viz., first, in that case the relation between the testator and the legatee was that of parent and child, whereas here the relationship is that of uncle and niece; and second, in that case the legatee was totally without any means of support other than what the parent had bequeathed, whereas here the legatee has other property which is immediately available for her needs.\\nIt is not necessary for me to turn the decision in this case upon the first consideration, for what follows in the next paragraph is sufficient in itself to dispose of the matter. This, however, is to be said, that very considerable and highly respectable authorities hold that a direction for the accumulation of income will not be diregarded unless the relationship between the testator and the beneficiary is that of parent and child or of persons standing in loco parentis towards the legatee. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. Jr. 10; Mole v. Mole, 1 Dick. 310; Green v. Belchier, 1 Atk. 505; Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Wms. 21; Lowndes v. Lowndes, 15 Ves. Jr. 301; Perry on Trusts, Vol. 2, par. 616 (6th Ed.).\\nThe consideration here, however, which is conclusive of the matter is that the minor's situation is not such as to make it necessary, in order to save the beneficiary from ignorance and want, to disregard the testator's direction that the income be accumulated. No present need is shown, because it appears from the facts that the guardian now has available about thirty-six hundred dollars in cash or securities. If the income from this is not sufficient for the ward's maintenance and education, I entertain no doubt that the Orphans' Court would authorize an encroachment upon the principal. It may be true that it would make no great difference to the minor whether money for her maintenance and support comes out of her present funds or out of the legacy which will eventually come to her from her uncle's estate. That is not the point. It will make a difference in the faithfulness with which the testator's wishes are carried out. Courts have gone far enough in cases of this kind in disregarding the apparent, at least the literal, language of testators who have left behind them instructions concerning the disposition of their property. Finding nothing in the facts here presented which, so far as I am advised, no authority would suggest \\\"as warranting the immediate expenditure of the income, it follows that the bill must be dismissed.\\nIn view of the foregoing it is not necessary to discuss the significance of that portion of the bequest which refers to the possibility of the legatee's becoming \\\"crippled or helpless\\\" as the only possibility upon which the testator desired the direction for accumulation to be disregarded.\\nLet a decree be submitted in accordance herewith.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/488243.json b/delaware/488243.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d01fecc9fef6414dbd0d67a03dc38bce73b77c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/488243.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"488243\", \"name\": \"George E. Gronemeyer, vs. Hunter Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gronemeyer v. Hunter Manufacturing Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-10-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1\", \"last_page\": \"4\", \"citations\": \"35 Del. Ch. 1\", \"volume\": \"35\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:16:40.232695+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"George E. Gronemeyer, vs. Hunter Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\", \"head_matter\": \"George E. Gronemeyer, vs. Hunter Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware.\\nNew Castle,\\nOctober 28, 1954.\\nJohn M. Bader, Joseph A. L. Errigo, Wilmington, for plaintiff.\\nJames R. Morford, Ernest S. Wilson, Jr., of Morford & Bennethum, Wilmington, and Robert R. Thornton, of Dorr & Hand, New York City, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1073\", \"char_count\": \"6463\", \"text\": \"Seitz, Chancellor:\\nSince the court filed its opinion in this case, Gronemeyer v. Hunter Mfg. Corp., 34 Del.Ch. 515, 106 A.2d 519, the parties have been engaged in prolonged private argument as to the form of order to be entered thereon. The matter has finally been submitted to the court for decision. The difficulty arises from the nature of the case, as is best demonstrated by a reading of the previous opinion. It was there held, in substance, that plaintiff was entitled to protection of the \\\"know-how\\\" taught by certain patterns and drawings which were revealed to defendant under an agreement and then returned to plaintiff.\\nPlaintiff seeks one of two types of injunction:\\n1. Enjoin defendant perpetually from using or disclosing any of the processes, methods or techniques exemplified by the patterns and drawings, or,\\n2. Enjoin defendant, for a limited period of time, from making any reflective insulation which embodies or employs methods or techniques that are substantially identical with those taught by the drawings.\\nDefendant says that plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction and that even if he is, it is necessary to limit it so that it will not embrace matters taught by the patent owned by defendant, or information already in the public domain or know-how secured from plaintiff while he was employed by defendant. Alternatively, defendant contends that the court should grant plaintiff monetary relief in lieu of an injunction because of the practical difficulties in formulating an injunction which would be both fair and workable.\\nI do not hesitate to say that this problem is a particularly difficult one for this court. As the arguments of counsel have demon-stated, it is a challenge to the ingenuity of a court of equity. The conclusions hereinafter reached are not entirely satisfactory. I believe that such a result is inevitable where, as here, there must be an accommodation of the rights of both sides. The subject matter\\u2014 know-how \\u2014 is such that language is inadequate to delineate the respective rights of the parties in a manner which will be fully meaningful to defendant when it proceeds with its operation. And, more important, language of the kind sought by plaintiff would make a fairly objective evaluation of defendant's subsequent conduct almost impossible.\\nIn my discretion I determine that the relief should take the form of the grant of an election to plaintiff to choose between two alternatives. In this way, plaintiff may have a choice of fair alternatives and defendant will not benefit by its legal wrong. I do not believe that these facts present a situation when plaintiff is being forced to take something less or something different than he is entitled to under the decision. The reversing aspects of Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 33 Del.Ch. 113, 91 A.2d 49, are therefore not in point.\\nI believe equity has jurisdiction to give a plaintiff such a choice in a case such as is irevealed by my previous opinion, viz., where the equitable right has been established and the difficulties arise from the formulation of the relief.\\nThe first alternative will be an injunction directing the destruction, as of a fixed future date, of all drawings and patterns in the defendant's possession or control. I exclude those which plaintiff admits are taught by the patent. I recognize that this will impinge on the so-called \\\"improvements\\\" made on plaintiff's drawings while plaintiff was employed by defendant. However, as I view the evidence, there is no practical way to separate the two and defendant must suffer the consequence under my findings.\\nThis order will not be entirely satisfactory to plaintiff. But plaintiff conceded that the \\\"know-how\\\" reflected in his drawings and patterns could be reproduced by competent persons in what I calculate to be about two years. I believe it is fair to infer from the evidence that one owning the patent and having the benefit of plaintiff's employment for the time involved, plus the other materials here involved, could do it in substantially less time. Thus, I conclude that defendant could have done it in less time.\\nIt is true that defendant's employees will continue to have the benefit of some of the know-how disclosed by the drawings since they have been working with them. However it is not feasible to \\\"brain wash\\\" the employees. Moreover, the court is reluctant here to enter an order which, in effect, would shut down the business, particularly where, as here, the plaintiff sold the assets and the patent to defendant for a substantial consideration. Also, defendant paid plaintiff a substantial salary while it employed him. This is not to say that plaintiff's relief should be arbitrarily reduced. But I do say that defendant has substantial rights and is entitled to have them considered by a court of equity in formulating its relief.\\nI will also consider a possible provision which would enjoin the disclosure of this know-how to third parties.\\nThe order should direct the defendant to file an account covering the work properly allocable to the period from the date when the drawings should have been returned until a date to be fixed in the order. Counsel will be heard as to the latter date. The order should also fix a date for plaintiff to file exceptions.\\nIt seems to me that the form of injunction suggested plus the accounting will give plaintiff all the relief to which he is fairly entitled under the facts.\\nThe second alternative available to plaintiff will be a money judgment for the fair value of the know-how retained, in effect, by defendant. This will be in lieu of an injunction and an accounting. It is premised on the theory that the ethereal quality of the subject matter plus the conditions necessarily created thereby render it impossible to issue a completely workable and fair injunction. Counsel will also be heard as to the monetary yardstick to be applied to this alternative.\\nThe judgment should incorporate the alternatives and should provide that plaintiff will be given a fixed number of days to indicate an election at the foot of the judgment.\\nOrder on notice.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/503203.json b/delaware/503203.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d9490a0c8785acae795181f4b49539f7a43cd32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/503203.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"503203\", \"name\": \"STATE v. ABRAM EMORY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Emory\", \"decision_date\": \"1796-12-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"67\", \"last_page\": \"68\", \"citations\": \"2 Del. Cas. 67\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Cases\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Quarter Sessions\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:29:20.726548+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. ABRAM EMORY.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. ABRAM EMORY.\\n[Court of Quarter Sessions.] Kent.\\nDecember 1, 1796.\\nRodney\\u2019s Notes.\\nBayard [for the State]. Miller [for defendant].\\nJoshua Beauchamp. On a Sunday I saw Abram at Maxwell\\u2019s, talked to him and rode off. He called to me and asked me who told me he had threatened him. He gave me the lie and drew his fist. I jumped down and we closed. This was the last of September.\\nBedwell Maxwell surrenders up Abram, and John Anderson recognizes for him.\\nMaxwell, sworn on the voir dire, says he expected to have the fine and fees to pay in first instance but should look to Abram for repayment.\\nBayard objects to Maxwell\\u2019s examination on the ground that he is interested.\\nMiTler.\\nHe is not interested, and if he was, it appears in testimony no other person was present but black people.\\nIn the account of this case in Bayard, the name is spelled \\u201cEmery.\\u201d\\nThis case is also reported in Bayard\\u2019s Notebook, 166.\", \"word_count\": \"301\", \"char_count\": \"1669\", \"text\": \"The Court do not consider him as an incompetent witness: first, from the necessity of the case; second, his interest being remote or very small.\\nMaxwell. On Monday morning after this happened, Beau-champ rode up and said the evening before he took his negro man to see Abram. He was going to leave him, and Abram called after him. They disputed and Abram called him a liar. He then said that he struck him, Abram, with his whip and got off his horse and dragged him towards some brush etc.\\nWilliam Berry, Esq. On Sunday evening Beauchamp complained on oath that he was afraid Abram would bum his house or do .him some other injury. I issued a warrant or warrants against [Abram].\\nVerdict: guilty of an assault only, not guilty of the battery. Fined \\u00a35.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/503597.json b/delaware/503597.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f6a51b3ed9e4e7445285fefb1f9a7c2996c5577e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/503597.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"503597\", \"name\": \"ELSEY SPICER'S LESSEE v. JOHN CONAWAY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Spicer's Lessee v. Conaway\", \"decision_date\": \"1803-11-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"195\", \"last_page\": \"196\", \"citations\": \"2 Del. Cas. 195\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Cases\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:29:20.726548+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ELSEY SPICER\\u2019S LESSEE v. JOHN CONAWAY.\", \"head_matter\": \"ELSEY SPICER\\u2019S LESSEE v. JOHN CONAWAY.\\nCourt of Common Pleas.\\nNovember 25, 1803.\\nRodney\\u2019s Notes.\\nBayard, Wilson [for plaintiff]. Bidgely [for defendant].\\nBayard, plaintiff\\u2019s counsel,\\ncontended that there was only error in the proceedings and that defendant should have made his objection at the return of the writ or at least of the sale by [the] sheriff.\\nRidgely.\\nIf such a practice as the counsel contends for obtains, a man may lie still for years, and when the party is sued and likely to be turned out of possession by ejectment under improper proceedings, is to be told that though his opponent\\u2019s title is not good, yet he is now too late to object. This is an ejectment, and the same rules will not apply that would on motion to set aside execution etc.\", \"word_count\": \"159\", \"char_count\": \"893\", \"text\": \"November 25, 1803. The Court were of opinion that the rule to show cause in the above case be discharged and new trial not granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/510246.json b/delaware/510246.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ccad26be709c998eafad15a359da6cb214b3713d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/510246.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"510246\", \"name\": \"Arthur Hoffman, Erwin H. Ezzes, Herman Koenigsberg and Virginia S. Hudson et al., Appellants, vs. Sol A. Dann et al. and Mary L. Gallo et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, and Chrysler Corporation et al. and Paul C. Ackerman et al., Defendants Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hoffman v. Dann\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-11-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"123\", \"last_page\": \"144\", \"citations\": \"42 Del. Ch. 123\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:16:40.928172+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Arthur Hoffman, Erwin H. Ezzes, Herman Koenigsberg and Virginia S. Hudson et al., Appellants, vs. Sol A. Dann et al. and Mary L. Gallo et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, and Chrysler Corporation et al. and Paul C. Ackerman et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Arthur Hoffman, Erwin H. Ezzes, Herman Koenigsberg and Virginia S. Hudson et al., Appellants, vs. Sol A. Dann et al. and Mary L. Gallo et al., Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, and Chrysler Corporation et al. and Paul C. Ackerman et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.\\nSupreme Court on Appeal,\\nNovember 17, 1964.\\nHoward M. Handelman, Wilmington, and Norman Annenberg, New York City, for appellant objector Ezzes.\\nFrank J. Miller, of Foulk, Walker, Miller & Wakefield, Wilmington, for appellant objector Koenigsberg.\\nIrving Morris and J. A. Rosenthal, of Cohen, Morris & Rosenthal, Wilmington, for appellant objector Judson et al.\\nSotiere S. Kapsglis, Wilmington, and Bader & Bader, New York City, for appellant Hoffman.\\nWilliam E. Taylor, Jr., Wilmington, Norman S. Nemser and Stanley Nemser, and Irving Steinman, New York City, for plaintiffs appellees Mary L. Gallo and James A. Gallo.\\nDaniel 0. Hastings, Clarence W. Taylor and Russell J. Willard, Jr., of Hastings, Taylor & Willard, Wilmington, Lewis M. Dabney, Jr., Liebman, Eulau & Robinson, New York City, and Dann, Rosenbaum Bloom & Kaufman, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs appellees in the Dann action except Sol A. Dann.\\nRichard F. Corroon of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Daniel L. Herrmann, of Herrmann, Bayard, Brill & Russell, Y. Samuel Arsht, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Robert H. Richards, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, John J. Morris, Jr., and Albert W. James, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, and Clyde M. England, Jr., Wilmington, Francis S. Bensel and Robert Ehrenbard of Kelley, Drye, Newhall, Maginnes & Warren, David W. Peck and Howard T. Milman, of Sullivan & Cromwell, and Milton Pollack, New York City, for certain defendant appellees.\\nSol A. Dann, Detroit, Mich., plaintiff appellee, in pro. per.\\nWolcott, C.J. and Carey, J., and Stiftel, Judge, sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"6577\", \"char_count\": \"40461\", \"text\": \"Wolcott, Chief Justice:\\nThese are appeals from a judgment of approval of the settlement of a stockholders' derivative action brought in behalf of Chrysler Corporation. The settlement approved disposed of two stockholders' derivative actions which had been consolidated for the purpose of.settlement. In the two actions 17 separate causes of action, involving in all 70 separate claims, were asserted against 97 individual and corporate defendants.\\nThe causes of action may be divided into three classifications: (1) charges that certain officers of Chrysler had personally profited from transactions between Chrysler and suppliers in which they had a financial interest; (2) charges that some of the defendants as officers and directors had mismanaged Chrysler from 1956 to 1961, and (3) charges that the Incentive Compensation Plan of Chrysler and its Stock Option Plans were not soundly devised, and were unfair to Chrysler's stockholders.\\nPrior to the agreement of settlement the plaintiffs had conducted fairly extensive discovery proceedings, and agreed to the terms of the settlement only on the condition that they be permitted further discovery in order to determine whether or not the claims asserted in the complaints had sufficient merit to demonstrate the unfairness of the proposed settlement. Additional discovery was allowed which thereafter proved to be elaborate. The final result was that plaintiffs concluded that, except for the cause of action based upon the unfairness of the Incentive Compensation Plan, no cause of action set forth in the complaints could be successfully prosecuted to recovery because of the lack of probative evidence.\\nAccordingly, plaintiffs represented to the stockholders in the notice calling a stockholders meeting to approve the proposed settlement that, with the exception of the cause of action based upon the Incentive Compensation Plan, there was no possibility of recovery in any substantial amount for the benefit of Chrysler and its stockholders.\\nThereafter, the stockholders, at the special meeting called for the purpose, overwhelmingly approved the proposed settlement and a modification of the Incentive Compensation Plan which was part of the proposed settlement.\\nIn addition, following the stockholders meeting the Chancellor appointed an amicus curiae to report to him on the relevant issues to be tendered at the hearing on the proposed settlement, and as to proof which would be of assistance to him in passing on the fairness of the settlement. The amicus filed an elaborate report with the Chancellor analyzing the evidence of record and suggesting other areas in which additional proof might be desirable.\\nSubsequently, an extensive hearing upon the fairness of the proposed settlement was held before the Chancellor. He ultimately approved the settlement. From his judgment of approval these appeals are taken by various objecting stockholders who had appeared at the hearing before the Chancellor to oppose the settlement.\\nFundamentally, the settlement agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Chancellor provides that the actions herein be dis missed with prejudice and releases be delivered to the defendants, with the exception of the defendant Newberg, and, in return, that the Chrysler Incentive Compensation Plan be amended by stockholder action to accomplish what both plaintiffs and defendants say is a better Incentive Compensation Plan than that formerly in effect.\\nThese appeals were taken only by certain stockholder objectors appearing at the hearing upon the settlement. None of the plaintiffs have appealed but appear in this Court as appellees along with the defendants. Only one of the objectors, viz., Ezzes, attacks the approval of the settlement on the ground that some of the causes of action asserted in the complaints are not in fact worthless but, to the contrary, offer hope of substantial recovery for the benefit of Chrysler.\\nWe first consider the arguments made by the appellant Ezzes that certain of the causes of action offer hope of substantial recovery for the benefit of Chrysler. In doing so, however, we consider only those specific causes of action brought to our attention by Ezzes in his brief and at the argument.\\nFirst, Ezzes argues that the incentive compensation computations for the years 1955, 1957, 1960 and 1962 were made in violation of the Incentive Compensation Stockholders' Resolution of 1956. The argument is that nonoperating income was improperly included in consolidated net earnings of Chrysler for those years in order to compute the total amount payable as incentive compensation.\\nFor the years in question the payment of incentive compensation was governed by the Stockholders' Resolution of 1956 authorizing the payment of incentive compensation not to exceed 5 \\u00b0fa \\\"of the consolidated net earnings for that fiscal year (as reported in the Annual Report to the stockholders).\\\"\\nIn the computations in question all income of Chrysler resulting from its automobile business as well as from its investments, interest on loans, and profits from other sources were included in consolidated net earnings for the purpose of computing incentive compensation. Ezzes argues that the phrase \\\"consolidated net earnings\\\" used in the Resolution of 1956 necessarily excluded earnings from any source not connected with its main business venture, i. e., the making and sale of automobiles. It is argued that the improper inclusion of the so-called nonoperating income for the years in question resulted in an increase in incentive compensation of slightly over $2,000,000 which may readily be recovered from the defendants.\\nThe Resolution of the Stockholders of 1956 does not exclude in terms so-called nonoperating income, but refers generally to \\\"consolidated net earnings.\\\" Chrysler is actually a diversified business and has earnings arising from other than the manufacture and sale of automobiles. It has earnings derived from its Air-Temp, Missile, Defense and Space Divisions which are nonautomobile sources, and from some other diversified sources such as catering service, vending machines in its plants, etc.\\nIf the stockholders intended to exclude income from sources other than the manufacture and sale of automobiles from the Incentive Compensation Plan, that should have been made specific in the Resolution authorizing such payments. This follows from the provision in the Resolution that incentive compensation was to be based on the Annual Report to stockholders, which included earnings from all sources as consolidated earnings.\\nEzzes, however, cites in this connection three cases which he argues control the question.\\nHe cites Schwartz v. Miner, 37 Del.Ch. 575, 146 A.2d 810. This case was a derivative action on behalf of a corporation which had a Profit-Sharing Trust Plan providing for contribution by the corporation of a percentage of its consolidated net profits. The corporation made an investment in the stock of a supplying company which it later sold at a loss. In determining later the amount to be distributed under the Profit-Sharing Plan, the loss thus occasioned was not deducted from the net profits. The Chancellor held that the corporation under the Plan was not required to deduct the net loss from the sale of capital assets in determining the amount to be distributed.\\nThe case, however, does not stand for the proposition for which Ezzes cites it. The Plan involved in the Schwartz case provided for the contribution by the corporation to the Profit-Sharing Trust of a percentage of \\\"consolidated net profits exclusive of capital gains or losses.\\\" We think the Chancellor approved the exclusion of the capital loss from the computation of consolidated net profits of the corporation by reason of the precise exclusion in the Plan, itself, and not upon any theory that consolidated net earnings of necessity must be exclusive of so-called nonoperating income.\\nEzzes also cites Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del.Ch. 540, 155 A.2d 596. We think, however, this case has nothing to do with the problem. It dealt with an attack upon a Deferred Compensation Unit Plan ultimately upheld by this Court. That Plan, however, was tied directly to the market price and dividends upon the corporation's stock. We see no connection between the rule announced in the Lieberman case and the cause of action now under consideration.\\nFinally, on this point, Ezzes cites Heller v. Boylan, Sup., 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, aff'd. 263 App.Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131. This case, we think, is equally inapposite to the one before us. In it the Court construed the term \\\"net profits\\\" used in a bylaw providing for the payment of incentive bonus. The bylaw in question defined \\\"net profits\\\" as the \\\"net earnings made by the company in its business as a manufacturer and seller of tobacco and its products.\\\" The Court in Heller clearly reached its decision upon the conclusion that if non-tobacco earnings of the company had been intended to be included, the bylaw would have been worded differently.\\nThus it is, we think, that with respect to this particular cause of action the contention of Ezzes that substantial recovery could be made on it is erroneous. To the contrary, we think no recovery could be obtained as a result of trial.\\nThe next cause of action said by Ezzes to have the probability of ultimate substantial recovery is that in 1962 the sum of $884,000, made up of state and local taxes, was included in net earnings. It is argued that this was illegal because this item was not reported in the 1962 Annual Report to stockholders as required by the Resolution governing Incentive Compensation Plans.\\nThe figure $884,000 is arrived at as the difference between $60,700,000 reported as \\\"Taxes on Income\\\" in the 1962 Annual Report to Stockholders, and $61,584,000 included as \\\"Taxes on Income\\\" in the computing of incentive compensation for 1962.\\nIt is therefore argued that since only those amounts reported in the Annual Report to stockholders could be included in the computation of incentive compensation, and since the $884,000 was not reported in the Annual Report, it was clearly improperly included in the incentive computation and the directors are accordingly liable.\\nInitially, it is to be observed that the sum of $884,000 included in the 1962 computation is in fact the total of state and local income taxes paid by Chrysler. Prior to 1942 these figures were included by Chrysler's accountants with Federal income taxes but, thereafter, were not so included because the amounts did not again become significant until 1962 after the decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 79 S.Ct. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421, upholding the right of states to levy income taxes on companies engaged in interstate commerce.\\nFollowing this decision, Chrysler's auditors sought the advice of counsel as to whether or not to take such taxes into account in computing incentive compensation. This action was taken in accordance with the 1956 Resolution which authorized the auditors in the computation of incentive compensation to rely upon the opinion of counsel as to any matter of law.\\nThe question therefore as to the propriety of including $884,000 in the computation of incentive compensation for the year 1962 depends solely on whether or not these figures were contained in the Annual Report to stockholders for that year. As a matter of fact, the Annual Report to stockholders of 1962 does in fact contain the figures making up this sum, although they are included under different headings in the Annual Report. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Chancellor was correct in holding as he did that this asserted cause of action had no probability of substantial recovery.\\nNext, Ezzes argues that the cause of action based upon an alleged violation of the 1929 Incentive Compensation Resolution of Stockholders for the years 1953 and 1955 has substantial probability of recovery.\\nThe 1929 Resolution of Stockholders providing for incentive compensation, later superseded by the 1956 Resolution, provided that incentive compensation may be paid not in excess of 5% \\\"of the net earnings of the corporation for that year.\\\" It is argued, citing Heller v. Boylan, supra, that the clear and unambiguous terms of this Resolution prevented the payment of incentive compensation for the years in question out of \\\"consolidated earnings\\\" of the corporation, but that this in fact was done in 1953 and 1955.\\nHowever, from 1929 on, the earnings of the corporation were always reported to stockholders as consolidated earnings. We think this continued practice clearly indicates that the intention of all concerned was that the 1929 Resolution referring to \\\"net earnings\\\" in fact meant \\\"consolidated net earnings.\\\" Under the circumstances, it is proper to define the phrase \\\"net earnings\\\" as \\\"consolidated net earnings.\\\" Meyers v. Cowdin, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 471, aff'd. 270 App.Div. 827, 60 N.Y.S.2d 129, aff'd. 296 N.Y. 755, 70 N.E.2d 555, and Diamond v. Davis, Sup., 62 N.Y.S.2d 181.\\nWe think this cause of action is at best of doubtful merit.\\nEzzes next argues that the cause of action charging invalidity of stock options issued after 1956 in violation of the 1956 Incentive Compensation Resolution is meritorious and has promise of substantial recovery against the defendants on behalf of the corporation.\\nThe argument in this respect is that since the Stockholders' Resolution of 1956 limited all Incentive Plans to 5% of consolidated net earnings, necessarily no stock options could have been issued if the full 5 % had been paid out as incentive compensation. It is argued that the granting of stock options falls within the meaning of the words \\\"Incentive Plans\\\" as used in the Stockholders' Resolution of 1956.\\nWithout laboring the issue, however, we are of the opinion that the limitation of a percentage of consolidated net earnings under the Stockholders' Resolution of 1956 has no bearing on the issuance of stock options. This is made clear by a comparison of the Stockholders' Resolution of 1929 with that of 1956. The 1929 Resolution authorized the Board to establish Profit-Sharing Plans and to provide for Bonus Plans. In 1956 the 1929 Resolution was amended to permit the Board to provide plans for officers and executives of the corporation \\\"to share in the profits of the corporation (hereinafter in this Resolution called Incentive Plans).\\\" It seems plain therefore that the 1956 Resolution substituted the phrase \\\"Incentive Plans\\\" for the former phrases of \\\"Profit-Sharing Plans\\\" and \\\"Bonus Plans.\\\" This being so, it is apparent that the amendment was not intended to include Stock Option Plans which, ordinarily at least, are not Profit-Sharing or Bonus Plans but are plans designed to permit the optionees an opportunity to acquire a share in the corporation, itself.\\nFurthermore, the Stock Option Plan of the corporation was approved by the stockholders in 1952 and had at that time no relation to the Incentive Plan of 1929, nor did it acquire any by the subsequent amendment of that Plan in 1956.\\nAccordingly, we are of the opinion that this cause of action is without merit.\\nNext, Ezzes argues that the cause of action charging the directors with the wasting of corporate assets by causing the stockholders to cancel stock options previously granted and granting new options at a lower option price is meritorious and has the probability of substantial recovery.\\nIn 1958 the Stock Option Committee of non-eligible directors granted, subject to stockholder approval, new options to purchase stock at around $50 per share on condition the holders of options previously issued at $61 to $77 per share were surrendered for cancellation. The Board recommended the proposal to the stockholders. It is argued that this action constitutes a waste of corporate assets.\\nIt appears to us that the provisions of the Plan authorizing the issuance of options in 1959 comply with the requirements laid down by Delaware Law for the validity of Stock Option Plans. Indeed, no serious contention is made to the contrary.\\nThe argument of Ezzes under this heading seems to be that a corporation should not permit the cancellation of old options and the issuance of new stock options at lower prices since that, in effect, excuses poor performance by management. Certain magazine and Law Review articles are cited to this effect and, indeed, we may assume that, as an ordinary business practice, such action is undesirable. This does not alter the fact, however, that under the law of this State a Stock Option Plan may not be successfully attacked when the options are granted by a disinterested committee with the approval of the directors and stockholders, and where the optionee is required to remain in the employ of the corporation. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57; Beard v. Elster, 39 Del.Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731. The new Option Plan meets these tests.\\nWe are of the opinion that this cause of action has no merit.\\nFinally, Ezzes argues that the cause of action based upon the cost to Chrysler of a revolving credit commitment is meritorious and has probable recovery of in excess of $2,000,000.\\nThe facts underlying this alleged cause of action are that in 1958 Chrysler obtained a revolving credit commitment for $150,000,000 which was continued until 1961. Chrysler never used the revolving credit but its existence cost Chrysler $2,157,533 from 1959 to 1961.\\nThe credit commitment was recommended by the Finance Committee in 1958 of which there were nine members, seven of whom were directors of banks later participating in the credit commitment. Prior to this action Chrysler's Administrative Committee, the members of which were all full-time employees of Chrysler, approved the establishment of the credit commitment. On the same day, the Board of Directors \\u2014 18 of the total of 21 being present \\u2014 approved the credit commitment arrangement. Of the 18 directors voting, eight were officers or directors of banks later participating in the revolving credit commitment.\\nEzzes argues that the action of the Finance Committee and the Board of Directors was illegal as a violation of Article II, Section 6 of Chrysler's bylaws requiring a majority of directors in office to constitute a quorum, and Article II, Section 9 providing that no director shall vote upon a matter in which he is interested.\\nIt appears that the reasons leading to the arrangement of the revolving credit commitment are that in 1958 it was clear to the directors that Chrysler faced heavy cash demands due to the requirements to be caused by major model changes in 1959 and 1961; the entry into the compact car field; increased emphasis on international operations and a slowdown in Government payments for defense products, all of which would probably require additional cash. In addition, in 1958 it had become obvious that Chrysler's financial fortunes had begun to deteriorate and that its sales were severely contracting.\\nAccordingly, on the basis of this estimate of Chrysler's prospects the revolving credit arrangement was approved. The agreement was between Chrysler and the Hanover Bank as agent, of which McNeill, one of Chrysler's directors, was president. However, it appears that the Hanover Bank had been selected by two independent officers of Chrysler as agent, and that it had agreed to serve without compensation.\\nFurthermore, at the time the revolving credit agreement was authorized, no bank other than the 'Hanover Bank had been selected as a participant in the agreement. As a matter of fact, Simons, Chrysler's treasurer, selected the banks to participate, allocated their shares of the participation, and later reported that fact to the directors.\\nThereafter, from 1958 to 1961 the advisability of terminating the credit agreement was reviewed frequently and, in the unanimous opinion of the Board of Directors until 1961, it was continued as advisable for the good interests of Chrysler.\\nThe Chancellor found that the evidence of record discharged the burden of proof lodged upon the directors of proving that the commitment was reasonably necessary as a matter of business judgment for the purpose it was intended to serve, and that, accordingly, the technical bylaw violation, if indeed there was one, imposed no liability upon the directors since there was no showing at all of any loss to Chrysler or of any pecuniary benefit to the allegedly interested directors.\\nWe agree with the Chancellor that this cause of action is essentially an attack upon a decision involving the exercise of business judgment on the part of the directors. In the absence of a showing of bad faith or fraud, of which there is none in this record, recovery on this claim is at best of extremely doubtful probability. Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904, 120 A.L.R. 227; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660; Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 38 A.L.R.2d 425.\\nThere were other causes of action argued by Ezzes to the Chancellor below, all of which were held by the Chancellor to be of extremely doubtful merit. Ezzes has not in this Court renewed his argument with respect to these other causes of action. We therefore are not required to consider them.\\nWith respect to the causes of action urged upon us as containing probability of substantial recovery and, thus, a reason for disapproval of the settlement, we agree with the appraisal of them made by the Chancellor to the effect that the evidence produced in the record in support of these claims is wholly inadequate to afford any hope of substantial recovery upon them. Therefore, they may properly be described as devoid of merit or, possibly as some of the parties label them, worthless.\\nOf all of the claims asserted against these defendants, the only one considered to have any possibility of ultimate recovery was the one based upon the alleged unfairness of the 1956 Incentive Compensation Arrangement. All of the parties before us agree that this is the fact with the exception of the appellant Ezzes and the plaintiffappellee Dann, whose position will be referred to later.\\nUnder the 1956 Plan, incentive compensation awards were permitted to be made for years when the consolidated net earnings of Chrysler and its subsidiaries, computed before the payment of taxes on income and before the payment of incentive compensation and interest on long-term debt of the corporation, exceeded 7% of the shareholder's investment \\u2014 that is, capital, surplus and retained earnings of Chrysler and its subsidiaries and the long-term debt of Chrysler. The total award for any one year was limited to 5% of such excess. There was no provision limiting the fund to be paid as incen tive compensation in any one year to the amount of dividends declared in that year.\\nThe charge of unfairness with respect to the 1956 Plan is that it was wasteful in that it permitted the payment of more in the way of incentive compensation than do comparable Plans of Chrysler's competitors ; that the Plan does not limit the payment of incentive compensation only to years when corporate income exceeds a reasonable return on the stockholder's investment, and that the Plan requires a so-called \\\"set-aside\\\" for the benefit of stockholders of only 7% of the stockholder's investment before taxes which, after the payment of taxes, is the equivalent of about 3^2%. All of this means, it is argued, that the Plan is unfair because the stockholder's return on his investment is too small in comparison with the incentive compensation permitted to be paid.\\nThe Chancellor concluded that the attack on the Plan as outlined above raised an issue of fairness upon comparison of the return on the stockholder's investment with the amount of incentive compensation thatcould be paid. He therefore concluded that an issue as to the fairness of the 1956 Plan remained in the case, even though his appraisal of the other causes of action in effect was that they were worthless.\\nAccordingly, the parties agreed upon a settlement as to the only remaining issue, that of fairness of the Plan. As a part of that settlement they proposed the adoption of a new Incentive Compensation Plan to be submitted to the stockholders for their approval upon the understanding that a vote for its approval was a vote in favor of the agreed-upon settlement. As we have pointed out, the stockholders overwhelmingly approved both the new Compensation Plan and the settlement.\\nThe new Plan of 1963 briefly is as follows: The period within which it is to operate is 1963 through 1969. It provides that incentive compensation may be paid only when the consolidated net income after taxes, as reported in the Annual Report to stockholders, plus provision for incentive compensation plus interest on the long-term debt of the corporation, is greater than 5j4% of the stockholder's investment \\u2014 that is, capital, surplus and retained earnings plus the corporation's long-term debt. The total amount that may be awarded as incentive compensation is limited to the lower of 12% of the excess or the aggregate amount of all dividends paid upon the common stock for the year in question.\\nThe adoption of the new Plan resulted in changing the Incentive Compensation Plan of Chrysler from a before-tax to an after-tax basis. It increased the after-tax set-aside from 3^% under the old Plan to under the new Plan, thus increasing the benefit to the stockholder's investment. The new Plan increases the percentage rate of incentive compensation computed after the increased set-aside for the benefit of stockholders. The result is that the Plan requires higher earnings before any award of incentive compensation may be made.\\nUntil the earnings for a particular year reach the so-called \\\"cross-over\\\" point \\u2014 that is, the amount of earnings which would make the fund for incentive compensation the same under both the old and new Plans \\u2014 the result would be a smaller amount available under the new Plan to be awarded as incentive compensation. After the cross-over point is reached, however, a larger amount would be available for such purposes under the new Plan than would have been under the old. In addition, an increase in earnings in each succeeding year increases the amount of the set-aside so that higher earnings are required in each succeeding year to continue an increase in the amount awarded as incentive compensation.\\nIt is obvious that the settlement with respect to the Compensation Plan has resulted in the increase of the set-aside for the benefit of stockholders before the payment of incentive compensation. This automatically increases the total amount of earnings required before incentive compensation can be paid.\\nThe defendants argue it is really immaterial whether the change in the Compensation Plan is a benefit to Chrysler Corporation. They argue that the settlement should be approved for the reason that the necessity of defending the worthless claims asserted against the defendants would prove an expensive and unreasonable burden upon Chrysler Corporation by reason of the cost of the defense and the wastage of time which would be required of Chrysler's officers and executives. Indeed, this seems to us to be an apparent fact.\\nThe Chancellor concluded that his function was to determine whether or not the terms of the settlement are fair to Chrysler Corporation when set against the probability of recovery on the asserted claims against the other defendants. These are, of course, theoretically asserted for the benefit of Chrysler Corporation.\\nHe concluded that while both the old Plan and the new Plan were probably fair and would be upheld against attack, he could not and should not determine which of the two was the better from the point of view of Chrysler. He pointed out that the new Plan does in fact require higher earnings, up to a certain point at least, in order for the same amount to be paid as incentive compensation as would have been permitted under the old Plan. Recognizing that no one could predict the future of Chrysler accurately, he reached the conclusion that in the long run the new Plan would probably result in increased benefits to the stockholders of Chrysler.\\nAccordingly, under all the circumstances, he approved the settlement subject to the limitation that no director of Chrysler should receive benefits under the Plan for the year 1963. This limitation was imposed because of the greatly increased earnings of Chrysler for the year 1963 which probably were known or could have been forecast by the Chrysler directors entitled to benefit under the Plan.\\nIt is this determination of the Chancellor we are to review in these appeals. Our function in the review of such matters is not to determine for ourselves the intrinsic fairness of the settlement in the light of our business judgment. Our function is solely to determine whether or not the Chancellor in the approval of the settlement has abused his business judgment to an extent amounting to an abuse of judicial discretion. Rome v. Archer, 41 Del.Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49; Kleinman v. Saminsky, 41 Del.Ch. 572, 200 A.2d 572.\\nInitially it is obvious that the settlement approved in this litigation does not take the traditional form of the payment of a quid pro quo by the defendants. The reason for this is obvious. Such a payment would be nothing more than a buying-off of the plaintiffs for the dis missal of worthless claims. It is, we think, generally conceded that such a practice is an undesirable one to ask a court to approve. In fact, Rule 23(c) of the Court of Chancery, Del.C.Ann. under which this settlement was approved was, we think, specifically designed to end a practice prevalent theretofore to this effect. See 3 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.), \\u00b6 23.24[2],\\nNevertheless, on the record before us the Chancellor concluded, and we agree with his conclusion, that the causes of action, with one possible exception, were, if not worthless, at least incapable of sufficient proof to hold out much hope of recovery. With respect to the one cause of action about which there could be some argument, the parties have agreed upon, and the Chrysler stockholders have approved, an adjustment which probably will result in a long-term benefit to Chrysler.\\nAccordingly, we think it was proper for the Chancellor to conclude, in view of the desirability of terminating litigation which, at best, was an harassment of Chrysler, to approve a settlement which departs from the traditional form. Each case, of necessity, must be decided upon its peculiar facts. Under the peculiar facts of this case this settlement is fair and results in the ending of this prolonged and harassing litigation. We think it should be approved.\\nThe appellant Koenigsberg, an objector, argues that the settlement should be disapproved because in effect the stockholders, themselves, are making the payment of settlement through the media of increased incentive compensation payments. We think the argument confuses the facts of the result. Certainly, it is to the benefit of Chrysler stockholders to end this litigation. There is no hope of substantial recovery for their benefit by the continuance of the litigation, but there is assurance of cost to them in the event it is prolonged. Furthermore, it is at least arguable that the new Incentive Compensation Plan in the long run will benefit the stockholders of Chrysler by reason of the increased requirements of the so-called set-aside.\\nIt seems to us to make little difference under the circumstances of this litigation that the individual defendants who receive releases as a part of this settlement have in fact made no monetary payment in settlement. This, we think, necessarily follows from the fact that the claims asserted against the individual defendants have been found to be devoid of merit. Despite this, they cannot end the litigation. The claims are pleaded with technically legal sufficiency and, thus, are not subject to a motion to dismiss.\\nNevertheless, if the claims are prosecuted the expense of defense will fall upon Chrysler Corporation which, in the last analysis, is the Chrysler stockholders. We think, therefore, that while on its face plausible, the argument of Koenigsberg is not sufficient to cause us to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the Chancellor.\\nThe appellants, Sandler objectors, argue that the settlement should be disapproved because it confers no benefit upon Chrysler and because, for the year 1963, the amount which may be awarded as incentive compensation under the new Plan is some $1,500,000 in excess of that which could have been awarded under the old Plan. The argument is, of course, primarily based upon the fortuitous circumstance that Chrysler's earnings for 1963 were greatly larger than for 1962. While the directors and officers of Chrysler may have realized the potentially greater earnings for that year, that fact has been taken care of by the Chancellor in the condition he imposed upon his approval of the settlement, that such persons not share in the incentive compensation award for 1963.\\nA further answer to these objectors' argument is that, in all probability, over the long span of the future, the Plan in its operation will result in benefit to Chrysler's stockholders. Admittedly, no one can predict Chrysler's future earnings but, certainly, in a business such as the automobile industry, profits take their ups and downs and may well equalize themselves over a course of years.\\nThe objector Ezzes makes a final point to the effect that approval of the 1963 Incentive Compensation Plan by the directors and stockholders was invalidly obtained.\\nHe points out that of the directors present at the meetings of February 7, 1963 and March 21, 1963, which resulted in the recommendation of the Plan to the stockholders, all hut two on February 7, and all but four on March 21, were either recipients of incen live compensation or defendants in these actions, or both. Upon this fact, it is argued that the Board's action in approving the settlement, including the amendment to the Plan, was invalid as a violation of Article II, Section 6 of Chrysler's bylaws requiring a majority of directors in office to constitute a quorum, and as a violation of Article II, Section 9 of the bylaws providing that no director shall vote upon a matter in which he is interested, or be present when the vote is taken.\\nEzzes overlooks the fact that the action of the directors did not bind Chrysler to the amendment in the Compensation Plan since, under the then-existing Plan, the sole method of change was by stockholder action. The most the directors could do in this respect was to submit to the stockholders the proposed change. This is what was done. Whether or not, therefore, there was some legal defect in the directors' action, that defect could be cured by informed stockholder action. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airlines, 33 Del.Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652, 34 A.L.R.2d 839.\\nEzzes says, however, that there was no effective stockholder action because a fair disclosure of the facts was not made to the stockholders in that they were not informed of the future profit potentials of Chrysler and the resulting possibility of payment of greatly increased incentive compensation under the amended Plan. He charges that before April 16, 1963, the date of the stockholders meeting, the directors knew that the new Plan would produce a substantially greater fund for incentive compensation for 1963 than would the old Plan; that there had been general public acceptance of Chrysler's 1963 model; that sales and earnings figures pointed to an outstanding year for Chrysler, and that general conditions known to the automobile industry indicated that the industry would have an outstanding year in 1963. The failure to include this information in the proxy material and the notice of settlement hearing, it is asserted, constituted a breach by the directors of their duty to make a full and frank disclosure to stockholders.\\nIt appears, however, that these matters were largely disclosed to the stockholders in the Annual Report for 1962 which was sent to them at or prior to the starting of solicitation of proxies. Indeed, it would seem as though a large part of the information Ezzes says was withheld was a matter of general public knowledge.\\nIn any event, we are satisfied that the stockholders were fully informed and acted in the light of that information except, possibly, with respect to the charge that the directors knew that the new Plan would produce substantially greater compensation for 1963 than would the old Plan. The Chancellor, however, imposed as a condition upon his approval of the settlement the requirement that no director-defendant shall receive greater benefits under the Plan in 1963. We think this condition adequately takes care of Ezzes' objection.\\nAll of the plaintiffs, with the exception of the plaintiff Dann, named as appellees in these proceedings, argue for the approval of the settlement. They advance two reasons in support of their position, one of which we have followed for our approval of the settlement. Their second reason is that the main benefit of the litigation now settled was to effect a change in management in Chrysler Corporation which has resulted in its greatly improved financial position.\\nWe are of the opinion that the second reason, if it is entitled to any consideration \\u2014 a question upon which we refuse to express an opinion \\u2014 is entitled to consideration only in connection with the application for fees, as to which the Chancellor has reserved decision.\\nFinally, the plaintiff Dann, an appellee before us, has filed a brief and was permitted to argue orally in opposition to the approval of the settlement.\\nSome of the other appellees filed a motion to strike the brief of Dann on the ground that he had no standing before us to argue in opposition to the Chancellor's judgment since he had not taken an appeal therefrom. We think the position taken by these appellees is correct and that the plaintiff Dann, appellee here, has no standing to argue in opposition to the judgment below. Cf. Cleaver v. Roberts, Del., 203 A.2d 63; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Por terie, Del., 183 A.2d 174; Casey v. Southern Corp., 26 Del.Ch. 447, 29 A.2d 174. The brief of the appellee, Sol A. Dann, is accordingly ordered struck from the record.\\nBy reason of all of the foregoing, the judgment of the Chancellor approving the settlement of this litigation is hereby affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/63053.json b/delaware/63053.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27169e6acc38b80d43be2e566312370fa88ab7b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/63053.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"63053\", \"name\": \"Henry W. Stewart v. George S. Grier\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Stewart v. Grier\", \"decision_date\": \"1886-10-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"378\", \"last_page\": \"386\", \"citations\": \"7 Houst. 378\", \"volume\": \"12\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:50:52.812955+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Henry W. Stewart v. George S. Grier.\", \"head_matter\": \"Henry W. Stewart v. George S. Grier.\\nArbitration by Submission\\u2014Award\\u2014Avoidance\\u2014Costs.\\nWhen by consent of parties their controversies, including all matters of account, claims, debts, or demands which they may have against each other and then in dispute, are submitted to arbitrators selected and agreed upon by them without a rule of reference out of court, the arbitrators thus appointed are the judges of all items in controversy whether legal or equitable, and both parties are bound in law by the award, unless there be good grounds shown for avoiding the same.\\nI; 1 such an arbitration any matter in question in the nature of a partnership account between the parties is subject to the determination of the arbitrators.\\nThe award of arbitrators in such a case, when by the terms of the articles of submission, if it was made within the time limited it should be final and conclusive, will be confirmed by the court, unless good cause be shown for avoidance.\\nAjny material error or defect apparent on the face of such an award as misconduct or mistake of the arbitrators in making their award in such a case may not be shown in bar of an action at law for nonperformance of the award, but the remedy must be pursued in equity.\\nT ie failure of the arbitrators to be duly sworn or affirmed before proceeding in the arbitration will vitiate the award.\\nT. le parties to arbitration having bound themselves in a certain sum to abide the award, said sum is in the nature of a penalty and no greater amount can be collected than the amount specified in the award with interest from the date of the award.\\nThe power of awarding the costs of the arbitration was necessarily incident to the authority conferred on the arbitrators, though not mentioned in the articles of submission. Comegys, C. J., dissents. '\\n(Sussex,\\nOctober 12, 1886.)\\nAction of Debt on an arbitration bond.\\nn After the plaintiff rested counsel for the defendant moved a m-suit on the following grounds: First, because by the terms of the agreement to submit their differences to the said arbitration, the plaintiff agreed to discontinue the suit he had already instituted in this Court against the defendant which he has not done. Second, that the arbitrators were within twenty days after the hearing to report in writing. Third, that it was not proved that Mr. Evans was appointed by the other two arbitrators to act as an arbitrator with him. Fourth, there was no proof that the arbitrators were sworn.\\nThe Court refused the motion for a non-suit.\\nJames R. Lofland and Charles M. Cullen, for the plaintiff:\\nCharles F. Richards and Jacob Moore, for the defendant:\", \"word_count\": \"3556\", \"char_count\": \"20018\", \"text\": \"Houston, J.,\\ncharged the jury:\\nThat the law was favorable to the arbitration and this method of determining legal controversies and disputes out of Court by the mutual consent of the parties to submit them to the arbitration of persons agreed upon between them, and when it is done without a rule of reference out of Court, or any intervention by the Court, as in this case, the arbitrators become the judges and the tribunal of their own selection and creation for this purpose, and for that reason, unless there be good grounds shown for refusing to abide by their decision, both parties are bound in law to comply with it, and when, as in this case, the submission to arbitration is of all matters in difference between the parties, it includes all matters of account, claims, debts, or demands, which they may have against each other, and then in dispute and unsettled between them; and as some question was started on this point in the argument by the council for the defendant, we will say that we know of no reason why it should not include any equitable, as well as legal claims or demand then in dispute and unsettled between the parties, since in its nature it is no more a legal than an equitable tribunal created and established by the act and consent of the parties, and not under the constitution or any statutory provision of the State, and, therefore, we think, if under the terms of the submission in this case, there was any matter in question in the nature of a partnership account between the parties submitted with other claims or demands by them, or either of them, to the consideration and determination of the arbitrators, it was as competent for them to entertain and pass upon it, as upon any other matter of account, claim or demand then subsisting between the parties and submitted to them for their consideration and determination, for the authority and jurisdiction conferred upon them for that purpose, was solely by the will and consent of the parties, and without the intervention of any Court of law or equity in the-State in which such distinctions are observable and constitute an important line of division between this respective jurisdiction, as a general principle.\\nNot only by the express terms of the submission the award if made within the time limited in it, was to be final and conclusive; tut the tendency of modern jurisprudence is to give force, conclusiveness and effect to all awards where there is no corruption or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, and where no deception has been practiced upon them; such has long been .the practice in the Courts of this State. In defence, however, of an action on the award, or for not performing the award, or in defence of an action 0:1 a bond conditioned for the performance of the award, and for not performing it, as in this case, the defendant may avail himself of any material error or defect apparent on the face of the award; such as excess of power by the arbitrators; as by omitting to consider a matter submitted, and it is material to the award : or want of certainty to a common intent; or a plain mistake of law, as for instance, as allowing a claim for freight when the ship had' never broken ground, and the like. In regard to corruption or other misconduct or mistake of the arbitrators in making their award, the common law seems not to have permitted them to be shown in bar of an action at law for non-performance of the award; but the remedy must be pursued in equity. But in this country, in those States where the jurisdiction in equity is not general, and does not afford complete relief in such cases, it has been held that if arbitrators act corruptly, or commit gross errors or mistakes in making tleir award, or take into consideration matter not submitted to them, or omit to consider matters which were submitted, or the award be obtained by any fraudulent practices, or suppression of evidence by the prevailing party, the defendant may plead and prove any of these matters in bar of an action at law to enforce \\u2022 the award. In practice where no suit is pending arbitrations are now generally entered into under the statutes enacted for the purpose of making the submission a rule of court; and in all cases where the submission is made a rule of Court, the Court will generally administer relief whenever it could be administered in equity. Such is the doctrine on the subject announced by Mr. Greenleaf in the second volume of his work on evidence, section seventy-eight, on the authority of the numerous cases cited in his notes to the section in support of it. But the arbitration in this case was not made a rule of Court, and was not intended to be returned to any other tribunal whatever for examination, approval or confirmation of the award made by the arbitrators; while at the same time it should be observed that we have a Court of Chancery wherein the the jurisdiction in equity is general, and which can afford complete relief in such cases as he refers to. But it is not necessary to pursue this principle or inquiry any further in this case for the submission and the award of the arbitrators are in evidence before the Court and jury, and as there is no material error or defect apparent on the face of the award, such as we have before mentioned and there is no proof of corruption or other misconduct or mistake of the arbitrators in making it; and we must therefore say to you that no such ground appears or has been shown for impeaching or denying the validity and conclusiveness of it.\\nThere is however, another matter on which the counsel for the defendant has asked the Court to charge the jury that if the plaintiff in the progress of the trial failed to prove by the testimony of any witness in the case, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the arbitrators before proceeding in the arbitration, were duly sworn, or affirmed, if they had conscientious scruples against taking an oath, as such to try the case, he could not recover in the action. In response to which the Court would say to them that if in the recollection of the jury there was not sufficient testimony before them to satify them of the fact that before proceeding to the hearing of the case the arbitrators had been so duly sworn or affirmed, the plaintiff could not recover, and their verdict should be for the defendant; but if on the contrary, the jury should be satisfied from any testimony in the case they were so sworn or affirmed to try the case, then their verdict should be for the plaintiff. And this brings us to the question presented by the counsel for the plaintiff ijn the argument, if for the plaintiff for what amount the verdict shall be. The agreement to submit the matters in difference between them to arbitration is under the hands and seals of the parties respectively and contains an express stipulation by which each bound himself to the other in the penal sum of six hundred dollars to abide by and perform the award of the arbitrators; and although upon the face of the instrument and in view of the facts proved in this case before us, it is not free from doubt whether the parties intended that the sum of six hundred dollars stated in it should constitute what is termed in law as strictly a penalty, or on the contrary, what are termed liquidated damages. The counsel for the plaintiff have contended for the latter construction, and that the words used must in this case be construed to mean stipulated damages and nota penalty; and yet among the rules of law which h,ave been established on the subject, it has been generally held that where it is doubtful by the language of the instrument whether the stipulation was intended as a penalty or as liquidated damages, the stipulation is to be considered a penalty merely. Besides we dp not think there has been anything disclosed in this case to bring it within the principle ruled on this question in the case cited by the counsel for the plaintiff, for we apprehend there could have been nothing in the character of the counter claims, debts and demands subsisting between the parties to this arbitration which could have prevented or seriously embarrassed the arbitrators in fixing the measure by which they were to ascertain and determine the amount of 'damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, or the actual amount due to him from the defendant on a full and final adjust-m ent and settlement of the mutual accounts and demands of the parties according to the evidence before them. We therefore instruct the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover the six hundred dollars demanded by him as liquidated damages, or more than the sijm awarded him by the arbitrators, with interest thereon from the d\\u00e1te of the award. Upon the question raised by the counsel for the defendant in the argument whether the arbitrators without any authority conferred upon them for that purpose by the terms of the submission had any power or discretion with respect to the costs of th,e arbitration or to award among other things, as was done by them in this case, that the costs of the arbitration amounting to twenty-two dollars and twenty-four cents, should be paid by the defendant, it is proper for me to say that after consultation the members of the Court offer in opinion a majority, however, holding that the power of awarding the costs of the arbitration was necessarily incident to the authority conferred on the arbitrators of determining the cause; and also such a trial by arbitration as this was is not in the matter of the legal costs properly incident to it, is not in terms provided for in our general statute in regard to costs in civil actions, it is certainly embraced in the long established and reasonable rule and policy of it, that \\\" generally a party for whom final judgment is given, in any civil action, or on a writ of error upon a judgment in such action, shall recover against the adverse party costs of suit, to be awarded by the court.\\\" According to the broad and comprehensive language of the act. But notwithstanding there is some contrariety in the rulings upon this question both in England and in this country, the better opinion, and the weight of the decisions, especially in this country, the majority of the Court think are in accordance with the principle which I have just announced. Kyd. on Awards, 100; Watt. on Arbitrat., 11 Law Libi., 89; 1 Steph., N. P., 151; Atchison v. Corgey, 9 E. C. L., 380; Roe I. Wood v. Doe, 2 T. R., 644; Alling v. Munson, 2 Conn., 691; Strang v. Ferguson, 14 Johns, 161; Dew v. Exton, 1 South, 173; Joy v. Simpson, 2 N. H., 179; Cox v. Jager, 2 Cow., 638; Lewis v. England, 4 Binn., 5 ; Buckley v. Ellmaker, 13 Serg. & R., 78; Young v. Shock, 4 Raudu., 299 ; Nicholas v. Ins. Co., 22 Wend., 125; Wood v. O'Kelly, 9 East, 426. We have therefore only to say to you in conclusion that if you find a verdict for plaintiff it should be for the amount of the award with interest thereon from the date of it and the costs of the arbitration, twenty-two dollars and forty-two cents.\\nComegys, C. J..\\nThe defence to this action is put upon two grounds\\u2014First, That no proof was made of any notice to the defendant of the making of the report by the arbitrators; nor that it was made within the time (twenty days) after the hearing, fixed by the articles of submission. Second, That there was no sufficient proof that the arbitrators were sworn, as provided by the articles, before entering upon the discharge of their duties. With respect to these respective grounds, we say to the jury that the articles of agreement contain no provisions for notice to either party. In the absence of such, no notice was required by law to be given by Stewart to Grier; for in cases of arbitration mutually agreed upon by the parties, each of them is in legal contemplation cognizant of all that takes place; in other words, has notice of the proceedings, or is bound to take notice of them from the beginning to the end. And we further say, in relation to the second ground, that while the statement in the report of the arbitrators that they were sworn (in pursuance of the requirements of the submission), is not in itself sufficient proof of that fact, yet when supplemented by the testimony of a witness who swears to their qualification, there is ample evidence that the arbitrators were sworn. The defendant confidently contends that there was no such supplementary proof; while the plaintiff is equally sure that there,was, and that it was made by the arbitrator, Robert H. Davis.\\nIn case of such contention, the question is usually settled by the notes of the Judge trying the case; but we have no notes upon the subject, neither is our recollection clear about it. Therefore, the question must necessarily be submitted to your recollection ; and if such recollection be that Mr. Davis said the arbitrators were sworn, there is an end to the controversy, and the second ground of defence to the action fails. Should your minds be satisfied, upon the subject of proof that the arbitrators were sworn, and you find that they were sworn, then your sole duty is to decide upon the amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, for there is no other defence to the action relied on. The plaintiff contends that he has a right to a verdict at your hands for six hundred; while the defendant denies this, insisting that he can recover nothing. If you think he should have a verdict, but the sum of two hundred and two dollars and ninety-four cents found to be due him by the arbitrators. A settlement of .this dispute depends upon the nature of this case. Ordinarily a party in whose favor an award is made (I am not speaking of awards on submissions in Court or by statute), is entitled to this amount of it, and also the costs he has incurred. But this is not a case of such award, but that of one made in pursuance of articles of agreement; and as they contain no provision for the payment of expenses, the decision with re spect to them is a nullity. If, therefore, you should adopt the defendant's view and confine the recovery to the award and not extend it to the provision in the articles for stipulated damages, the plaintiff can recover nothing but the sum of two hundred and two dollars and ninety-four cents, but by way of damages for the detention of his debt, you may give him and he is entitled to have interest from the making of the award till this day. But the plaintiff insists that he is entitled to recover from the defendant the sum of six hundred dollars, upon the ground that such sum is fixed and agreed upon between the parties in their submission to arbitration, and as for the damages to be recovered each from the other, for a breach of the mutual covenant or agreement in the articles, to pay the sum awarded to be due by the arbitrators. This contention is opposed by the defendant, in whose behalf it is claimed that the verdict in this case (if any be given for the plaintiff) must be limited to the debt, or indebtedness, of the defendant to the plaintiff, as found and reported by the arbitrators. This difference between the parties makes it necessary that we should charge you upon the subject of agreements for fixed, or stipulated damages. It is not a very uncommon thing for parties entering into a contract, especially where the measure of damages for the breach of it would be difficult to ascertain, to stipulate, as they may lawfully do for a certain sum as such measure. When this is done, if suit be brought upon the instrument to recover the damages agreed upon (which are known as stipulated or ascertained damages), and breach of the stipulation be shown, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to a verdict for the amount, provided he has brought proper action therefore, and in the statement of his case, have unequivocally shown that he bases his claim absolutely upon such stipulation. In this case there appears to be two grounds upon which the verdict in his recovery (if you give him a verdict) should not be benefitted by the stipulation for fixed damages. The first is, that it is not in our opinion absolutely certain, as it should be, that the parties intended in this case that the one should recover against the other the full sum of six hundred dollars for the breach of the agreement; for the reason that the sum is characterized in the instrument as well as \\\" penal sum,\\\" as \\\" ascertained and liquidated damages.\\\" While this in itself, might not be sufficient to fix the sum as a penalty; yet the form of action adopted is debt, and not covenant, the former not being a fit action for the recovery of damages, however resulting, but the latter the appropriate one where, as in this case, the action is upon a sealed instrument. Besides all this, the form of the breach in the declaration, taking it in its entirety is the same as that used in suits to recover for damages sustained by reason of breaches of the condition of bonds with collateral conditions brought under our statute, the judgment in such cases being for the penalty on account of the forfeiture of the bond. We can not, consistently, instruct you that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of six hundred dollars, in view of the considerations, but sum only of two hundred and two dollars and ninety-four cents, with interest from the date of the award.\\nVerdict for the plaintiff.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/6777478.json b/delaware/6777478.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7cd2bdad0a3cfdaf76bf01d573185980c99a8a3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/6777478.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6777478\", \"name\": \"Andre OWENS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Owens v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-08-09\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 364, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"968\", \"last_page\": \"968\", \"citations\": \"145 A.3d 968\", \"volume\": \"145\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:11:01.698766+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Andre OWENS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Andre OWENS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 364, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: July 29, 2016\\nDecided: August 9, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"41\", \"char_count\": \"268\", \"text\": \"Court Below \\u2014 Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Cr. ID No. 0201010358\\nDISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/6795703.json b/delaware/6795703.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a36950578dda69722d01f10ed5d186f9084522cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/6795703.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6795703\", \"name\": \"John M. FRANKLIN, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Franklin v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-05-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 206, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"1018\", \"last_page\": \"1018\", \"citations\": \"141 A.3d 1018\", \"volume\": \"141\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:08:38.085220+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John M. FRANKLIN, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"John M. FRANKLIN, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.\\nNo. 206, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted:'May 6, 2016\\nDecided: May 23, 2016\\nRehearing En Banc Denied June 13, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"47\", \"char_count\": \"306\", \"text\": \"Court Below \\u2014 Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Cr. ID No. 0304010407C\\nAFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/6806284.json b/delaware/6806284.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f15819884ef85df96ec1b2c3b8d912695bd4a698
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/6806284.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6806284\", \"name\": \"Anthony L. GILMORE, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gilmore v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-03-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 35, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"77\", \"last_page\": \"77\", \"citations\": \"135 A.3d 77\", \"volume\": \"135\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:53:01.148853+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anthony L. GILMORE, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Anthony L. GILMORE, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.\\nNo. 35, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: January 27, 2016\\nDecided: March 10, 2016\\nRehearing En Banc Denied March 29, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"34\", \"char_count\": \"237\", \"text\": \"AFFIRMED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/6810116.json b/delaware/6810116.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..02b22b57858cfbd67445a6ca26003ba3fdfda65d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/6810116.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6810116\", \"name\": \"Augustus H. EVANS, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Evans v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-04-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 121, 2016\", \"first_page\": \"762\", \"last_page\": \"763\", \"citations\": \"135 A.3d 762\", \"volume\": \"135\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:53:01.148853+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Augustus H. EVANS, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Augustus H. EVANS, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 121, 2016\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: March 29, 2016\\nDecided: April 1, 2016\\nReargument Denied April 21, 2016\\nRehearing En Banc Denied April 21, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"42\", \"char_count\": \"275\", \"text\": \"DISMISSED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/6917305.json b/delaware/6917305.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1973d3e48cbb540c2b97d6abdcf32f19a2fe081f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/6917305.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6917305\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: Fred BARAKAT, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: Barakat\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-12-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 397, 2013\", \"first_page\": \"639\", \"last_page\": \"649\", \"citations\": \"99 A.3d 639\", \"volume\": \"99\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:49:04.884032+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: Fred BARAKAT, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware: Fred BARAKAT, Respondent.\\nNo. 397, 2013.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Sept. 18, 2013.\\nDecided: Dec. 11, 2013.\\nPatricia Bartley Schwartz, Esquire, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware.\\nFred Barakat, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware.\\nBefore HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"4831\", \"char_count\": \"29696\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM:\\nPending before us is an attorney disciplinary proceeding. Fred Barakat, Esquire, was found to have failed to maintain a bona fide office for the practice of law in Delaware, and to maintain adequate books and records as required by the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (the \\\"Rules\\\"). In a Report dated July 25, 2013, the Board on Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Delaware (the \\\"Board\\\") found that Barakat's course of conduct violated Rules 1.5(f), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Barakat maintains that his conduct has not violated the Rules, and objects to the Board's findings on both factual and legal grounds. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (\\\"ODC\\\") does not object to the Board's Report, which recommends that Barakat be suspended for two years.\\nWe find that, with respect to Counts I through Y, and VII through XII of the ODC Petition, Barakat's objections lack merit. Regarding Count VI, we find the record not sufficiently developed to support the Board's finding of a violation, and thus dismiss that Count. We, therefore, adopt the Board's findings on Counts I through V and VII through XII. Lastly, we independently determine that Barakat should be suspended from the practice of law for two years, as the Board recommended.\\nFacts\\nBarakat has been a member of the Delaware Bar since 1992. Since January 2005, Barakat's address of record with this Court has been 901 North Market Street, Suite 460, in Wilmington, Delaware. Bar-akat also works from his home in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania.\\nBarakat's 901 North Market Street office is not an \\\"office\\\" in the traditional sense. Barakat's lease does not include any designated office space that is exclusively his. Rather, the employees of the landlord collect Barakat's mail and greet any visitors Barakat may have. The building security guards direct visitors to the fourth floor, where a receptionist is stationed during normal business hours. Under this arrangement, Barakat is enti- tied, for additional fees, to rent a conference room or office space, and utilize secretarial, reproduction, facsimile, word processing, and shipping services.\\nThe landlord's billing records (the \\\"Occupant Ledger\\\"), and the testimony of two employees who work on the fourth floor, evidence that Barakat's presence at 901 North Market Street is \\\"sporadic and unscheduled.\\\" The Occupant Ledger reflects that in 2010, Barakat rented conference space approximately three times in April, four times iii May, twice in June, once in both September and October, and twice in November. This pattern of use continued through August 2012. In October 2011, Barakat informed the United States Internal Revenue Service (\\\"IRS\\\") that \\\"all of [his] work aside from meeting clients, court room appearances and depositions are conducted at [his] home [in Pennsylvania],\\\" and that he has no employees at his Wilmington office.\\nIn 2005, the ODC inquired about Bara-kat's compliance with Supreme Court Rule 12, which requires Delaware attorneys to maintain a \\\"bona fide\\\" office for the practice of law in Delaware. By letter dated May 5, 2005, the ODC informed Barakat of the requirements of Rule 12. Barakat responded to that letter on May 6, 2005. There is no evidence, however, that he responded to the ODC's later (May 17, 2005) request for additional information.\\nIn 2010, the ODC renewed its inquiry into Barakat's Rule 12 compliance. Bara-kat responded by letter dated December 19, 2010, asserting that advances in technology enabled him to handle client matters effectively, despite his lack of presence in the Wilmington office. The ODC again reminded Barakat that Rule 12 requires, at a minimum, a \\\" 'responsible person acting on [your] behalf \\u2014 i.e., accountable and answerable to you, by employment or by contract.\\\" On July 2, 2011, Bara-kat sent the ODC a letter, asserting, inter alia, that he had four employees in his Wilmington office and that he would be present in the Wilmington office \\\"some portion of . 3 days per week, most weeks.\\\" Based on that representation, the ODC dismissed the investigation with a formal warning, stating that its purpose was \\\"to directly inform and educate [Bara-kat] as to conduct which . has raised professional concerns.\\\"\\nBarakat's books and records were first reviewed in 2008 by the firm of Master, Sidlow, the auditors for the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (the \\\"LFCP\\\"). That compliance audit, which covered the six month period ending December 31, 2007, revealed that Barakat's \\\"books and records were deficient based upon his failure to prepare bank reconciliations or client subsidiary ledgers and the inability to prove cash receipt entries to deposit totals.\\\" In a letter dated July 7, 2008, Barakat assured the LFCP that the \\\"deficiencies noted in the report have been corrected and the books are now and will continue to be properly maintained.\\\"\\nIn February 2012, after a judicial referral alerting the ODC to possible professional misconduct, Bryan Morgan, a senior Master, Sidlow accountant, performed a second compliance audit covering the six month period ending December 31, 2011. Mr. Morgan's 2011 Audit Report concluded that Barakat's books and records practices were irregular.\\nAfter the February 2012 audit, the ODC requested an in-depth, forensic audit of Barakat's books and records for the period January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2011. Mr. Joseph McCullough, who conducted that audit, found similar deficiencies in Barakat's bookkeeping practices, including not reporting or improperly recording fees received in cash, depositing most retainer fees directly into his operating account, commingling personal funds into the operating account, and failing to prepare monthly bank reconciliations or client subsidiary ledgers. Indeed, Bara-kat's accounts and records were in such disarray that McCullough was unable to complete the audit. During the Board proceedings, Barakat admitted that he \\\"pockets\\\" cash retainers, rarely deposits retainers he receives into his escrow account, commingles personal funds in his operating account, and does not maintain bank reconciliations.\\nProcedural Background\\nThe ODC filed a Petition for Discipline with the Board on October 10, 2012. The Petition alleged twelve Counts of Rules violations \\\"arising out of (1) a failure by Respondent to meet the requirements of a bona fide office for the practice of law in Delaware, (2) misrepresentations by Respondent regarding whether he maintains a bona fide office, (3) books and records deficiencies, (4) mishandling of client funds, and (5) misrepresentations by Respondent on his Supreme Court Certificates of Compliance from 2008 to 2012.\\\" The Petition alleged that this conduct violated Rules 1.5(f), 1.15(a), 1.15(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).\\nBarakat filed a Response to Petition for Discipline on October 25, 2012, and an Amended Response on October 31, 2012. The Board held a hearing on February 12, 2018, at which Ms. Patricia Fry Cox and Ms. April Yanacek, as well as Messrs. Bryan Morgan and Joseph McCullough, the auditors, testified. Barakat also testified.\\nAfter the hearing, the Board granted two motions by Barakat to supplement the record. The ODC and Barakat both submitted written closing submissions on March 22, 2013, and on April 4, 2013 both parties submitted written replies. The Board issued its findings and recommendations in a report dated July 25, 2013 (the \\\"Board Report\\\"). The Board concluded that the ODC had established by clear and convincing evidence all twelve Counts of the Petition, and recommended that a two-year suspension be imposed.\\nANALYSIS\\nThis Court has the \\\"inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware Bar.\\\" Although Board recommendations are instructive, we are not bound by them. We review the record independently to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's factual findings. We review the Board's conclusions of law de novo.\\nI. Bona Fide Office\\nUnder Count I, the Board concluded that Barakat violated Rule 3.4(c) by \\\"knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal to maintain a bona fide office in Delaware.\\\" Barakat advances several weak objections to that finding.\\nFirst, he argues that that finding is barred by res judicata and collateral es-toppel because of the May 5, 2005 and May 17, 2005 letters he received from the ODC that (he alleges) acquiesced in his office arrangements. Addressing Barakat's Motion in Limine, the Board correctly concluded that the bona fide office issue had not yet been adjudicated, and that the \\\"Supreme Court's final order will be the first adjudication of the bona fide office issue to which the principles of res judica-ta and/or collateral estoppel may apply.\\\"\\nSecond, Barakat argues that he meets the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 12, because he is reachable by phone, and, therefore, has complied with the Rule. The Rule requires that the office \\\"be a place where the attorney or a responsible person acting on the attorney's behalf can be reached in person or by telephone,\\\" and have \\\"the customary facilities for engaging in the practice of law.\\\" Barakat's July 2, 2011 letter to the ODC undermines his claim that being reachable by phone is sufficient under Rule 12. Were (remote) phone access sufficient, Barakat would have had no reason to represent that he was present three days per week and that a paralegal was present two days per week.\\nFinally, Barakat appears to suggest that Supreme Court Rule 12, as interpreted by the ODC, imposes an unconstitutional residency requirement, and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. That claim is unsupported. Barakat cites Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., a case that involved a challenge of New Jersey's bona fide office requirement. In Tolchin, the Third Circuit held that the requirement violated neither the commerce clause, nor the privileges and immunities clause, nor the equal protection clause.\\nWith respect to Counts II and III, the Board found that Barakat violated Rule 8.1(a) \\\"by knowingly making a false statement in connection with a disciplinary matter,\\\" and also Rule 8.4(c), \\\"by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he informed the ODC he was meeting the requirement to maintain a bona fide office for the practice of law in Delaware.\\\" Barakat claims that his July 2, 2011 letter was neither knowingly false nor dishonest or fraudulent, because when he wrote the letter, his court schedule and record of bank deposits showed that he was in Delaware approximately 12-15 days per month. Even if Barakat was in his \\\"office\\\" three days per week, that does not cure his misrepresentations about his staff in the Wilmington office and their activities managing his practice.\\nRegarding Count IV, the Board found that Barakat violated Rule 8.4(d) by \\\"engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice by failing to maintain a bona fide office for the practice of law in Delaware.\\\" Although Barakat objects generally to all of the Counts, he advances no specific argument regarding this particular one. Therefore, the finding is conceded.\\nIt is clear from the record that the Board's findings on Counts I-IV are supported by substantial evidence.\\nII. Accounting Misconduct\\nCounts V through X are based on Bara-kat's books and records practices, including the safeguarding of client funds. V and VI are based on Barakat's dealings with a particular client (Giles). VII through X charge general violations.\\nAs for Counts VII through X, the Board concluded, based on the findings of the audits conducted by Messrs. Morgan and McCullough, that Barakat had violated Rules 1.5(f) (Count VII), 1.15(a) (Count VIII), 1.15(d)(3) (Count IX), and 1.15(d) (Count X). Barakat objects to the admission of the 2011 Audit Report, Mr. McCullough's Audit Report, and the testimony of both Mr. Morgan and Mr. McCullough. Barakat claims that the testimony and reports lack scientific validity under both Delaware Rule of Evidence 705 and the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Messrs. Morgan and McCullough are both experienced auditors who are very familiar with the auditing procedures of the LFCP. Morgan has performed \\\"approximately one hundred Rule 1.15 and 1.5(f) compliance audits for the LFCP using the standard procedure and following the outline developed by LFCP....\\\" Morgan testified that when conducting his compliance audit of Barakat, he followed LFCP's standard procedure. McCullough is an experienced accounting professional who spent thirty years as a special agent in the criminal division of the IRS specializing in white collar crime and financial record-keeping. He has also performed approximately two hundred forensic audits, and between fifty and sixty audits for the LFCP.\\nBarakat also contends that he has maintained his records and accounts in compliance with the Rules. Barakat's primary argument is that he complied with the Comments to Rule 1.5 and that the auditors erroneously failed to account for those Comments in their audits. Barakat specifically relies on Comments 10 and 12. Comment 10 provides in relevant part that:\\nSome smaller fees \\u2014 such as those less than $2500.00 \\u2014 may be considered earned in whole upon some identified event, such as upon commencement of the attorney's work on that matter.... Nevertheless, all fees must be reasonable such that even a smaller fee might be refundable, in whole or in part, if it is not reasonable under the circumstances .\\nComment 12 is substantially similar. It provides that in certain contexts, such as bankruptcy representation, fees greater than $2500 may be deemed earned upon the occurrence of a particular event.\\nFirst, these Comments do not mean what Barakat claims they do. By their plain language, the Comments do not authorize an attorney to deposit any fee under $2500 automatically into his operating account (which Barakat admitted is his practice). By the Comments' own terms, if an attorney receives an advance fee of less than $2500, of which he earns a portion upon commencing work, the unearned portion of the advance fee must still be placed in a fiduciary account. Even if (counterfactually) the Comments could be read to condone Barakat's accounting practices, the Preamble to the Rules clearly states that the Comments are not authoritative and are meant only for interpretive guidance.\\nRegarding his retainer agreements (at issue in Count VII), Barakat argues that he satisfied Rule 1.5(f) because his agreements state that a portion of the retainer is \\\"non-refundable\\\" at a certain point. Although one might infer from this that the balance of the retainer is refundable, Rule 1.5(f) requires an explanation that unearned fees are refundable. Barakat's retainer agreement does not explain that unearned fees are refundable.\\nThe audit reports and the testimony of Morgan and McCullough establish that the Board's findings on Counts VII-X are supported by substantial evidence.\\nCount VI charges Barakat with failing to deposit an advance fee from his client, Giles, into his trust account. Barakat objects to this Count. The record on Count VI is unclear and undeveloped. Barakat claims that Giles paid him $800 upon the signing of a bankruptcy fee agreement (dated April 16, 2008), which \\\"basically covered the work [he] had done that day.\\\" The Board Report does not adequately address Barakat's claim that he earned the fee that same day. We therefore conclude that the Board's findings on this Count are not supported by substantial evidence.\\nIII. Certification Statements\\nCounts XI and XII charge false statements made by Barakat on his 2008-2012 Certificates of Compliance. Barakat certified that (i) \\\"[a]ny and all fiduciary funds held are maintained in an attorney trust/escrow account;\\\" (ii) \\\"[cjheck register balances are reconciled monthly to bank statement balances;\\\" (iii) \\\"[w]ith respect to attorney trust/escrow account(s), there is a client subsidiary ledger maintained with monthly listings;\\\" and (iv) \\\"[w]ith respect to attorney trust/escrow account(s), the reconciled end-of-month cash balance agrees with the total of the client balance listing of the client subsidiary ledger.\\\" The Board concluded that Barakat did not follow any of these procedures, should have so reported, and therefore violated Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). We agree.\\nIn his objection to the Board Report, Barakat points to (allegedly) exonerating statements made by the auditors during cross-examination. This objection lacks merit. The testimony to which Barakat points is either in response to hypothetical questions that assume the Comments to Rule 1.5 (as interpreted by Barakat) govern, or is cited out of context Moreover, Messrs. Morgan and McCullough were called to testify about their respective audits, not to offer legal opinions.\\nIV. Sanctions\\nThis Court follows the ABA standards for imposing lawyer sanctions. \\\"The ABA framework consists of four key factors to be considered by the Court: (a) the ethical duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) aggravating and mitigating factors.\\\"\\nRegarding the first three factors, the Board found that Barakat had violated duties owed to clients, the legal system and the legal profession. The Board also concluded, that based on the history of interactions with the ODC, Barakat was aware of his obligations to maintain a bona fide office in Delaware and to maintain his books and records in accordance with the Rules. Although no actual harm to clients was demonstrated, the Board concluded that Barakat's failure to maintain adequate books and record presented a serious risk of harm to clients.\\nIn determining the appropriate sanctions for Barakat, the Board identified six aggravating factors \\u2014 dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, the submission of false and/or misleading statements, an unwillingness to admit the wrongful nature of his conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law \\u2014 and only two mitigating factors\\u2014 absence of a prior disciplinary record, and Barakat's cooperative attitude.\\nBarakat argues that the two year suspension recommended by the Board is disproportionate to the adjudicated violations. He points to In re Doughty, as support for a more lenient punishment. Although that case involved similar violations, this Court found that Mr. Doughty had \\\"negligently\\\" engaged in the misconduct, had no dishonest motive, and had engaged in \\\"timely, good faith remedial efforts.\\\" The factors supporting relative leniency in Doughty's case are simply not present in Barakat's case.\\nCONCLUSION\\nFor the reasons stated above, we adopt the terms of the Board's recommendation with respect to Counts I-V, and Counts VII-XII, and dismiss Count VI. It is hereby ordered that Barakat be disciplined as follows:\\n1. Barakat hereby is immediately suspended from the practice of law in this State for a period of two years;\\n2. During the period of suspension, Barakat must fully cooperate with the ODC in its efforts to monitor his compli-anee with the suspension order and shall not: (a) have any contact directly or indirectly constituting the practice of law, including the sharing or receipt of legal fees, except that Barakat is entitled to any legal fees earned prior to the date of this order; (b) share in any legal fees earned for services by others during such period of suspension. Barakat also shall be prohibited from having any contact with clients or prospective clients or witnesses or prospective witnesses when acting as a paralegal, legal assistant, or law clerk under the supervision of a member of the Delaware Bar;\\n3. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) shall file a petition in the Court of Chancery for the appointment of a Receiver for Barakat's law practice pursuant to Rule 24 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure; the Receiver shall provide notice to clients, adverse parties, and others as required by Rule 23 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure; and the Receiver shall make such arrangements as may be necessary to protect the interests of any of Barakat's clients and the public;\\n4. Barakat shall cooperate in all respects with the Receiver, including providing him/her with all law office books and records;\\n5. Barakat shall promptly pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure when presented with a statement of costs by the ODC;\\n6. As reinstatement is not automatic, should Barakat apply for reinstatement, any such application must be made pursuant to Rule 22 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure following the suspension period; and\\n7. This Order shall be disseminated by the ODC as provided in Rule 14 of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.\\n. The Board addressed Count VI in only a conclusory manner that, because of the lack of analysis, gives us nothing of substance to review.\\n. Barakat's objections to the facts, if any, are addressed in the Analysis, infra.\\n. Report of the Board on Professional Responsibility, Board Case No. 2012-0019-B (July 25, 2013), at 3 (Bd. Rep.); Amended Resp. to Petition, para. 1 (Am. Resp.).\\n. Bd. Rep. at 4; Am. Resp., paras. 1, 6.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 4; Tr. at 32, 43-44, 60.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 4; Tr. at 43-44.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 5; ODC Ex. 8.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 9; ODC Ex. 10; Tr. at 49-50, 56-57.\\n. Barakat also incurred charges for other, undated use of a conference room. Bd. Rep. at 9; ODC Ex. 10.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 9-10; ODC Ex. 10.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 7-8; ODC Ex. 17.\\n. Supr. Ct. R. 12(d) defines a \\\"bona fide\\\" office as an office where the \\\"attorney practices by being there a substantial and scheduled portion of time during ordinary business hours in the traditional work week. An attorney is deemed to be in an office even if temporarily absent from it if the duties of the law practice are actively conducted by the attorney from that office. An office must be a place where the attorney or a responsible person acting on the attorney's behalf can be reached in person or by telephone during normal business hours and which has the customary facilities for engaging in the practice of law. A bona fide office is more than a mail drop, a summer home which is unattended during a substantial portion of the year or an answering, telephone forwarding, secretarial or similar service.\\\"\\n. Bd. Rep. at 5; ODC Ex. 1.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 6.\\n. Id.; ODC Ex. 4.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 6; ODC Ex. 5.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 7; ODC Ex. 6.\\n. ODC Ex. 7.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 10-11; ODC Ex. 26.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 11; ODC Ex. 27.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 11-13; ODC Ex. 28. The 2011 Audit Report noted that Barakat did not maintain monthly bank reconciliations; cash receipt entries could not be proved to deposit totals; Barakat's retainer agreements did not state that the \\\"fee is refundable if not earned;\\\" and that Barakat deposited retainers directly into the operating account, or personally retained cash retainers. In addition, Bar-akat incorrectly answered four questions in his 2011 Certificate of Compliance (to this Court) regarding his books and records practices.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 14; ODC Ex. 29.\\n. Id.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 15; Tr. at 319, 338, 347, 365.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 3; Petition for Discipline.\\n. Id.\\n. A supplement to the original response was received by the Board on November 5, 2012, and a supplement to the amended response was received on February 11, 2013.\\n. Ms. Fry Cox is a property manager for 901 N. Market Street, and Ms. Yanacek is an assistant to Ms. Fry Cox. Both work on the fourth floor of the building and Ms. Yanacek sits in the center of the fourth floor lobby. Tr. at 24-25, 54.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 1-3.\\n. Id. at 20-29, 37.\\n. In re Martin, 2011 WL 2473325, at *3 (Del. June 22, 2011) (citing In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 484 (Del.2007)).\\n. Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 21; Supr. Ct. R. 12(d); Prof. Cond. R. 3.4(c).\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 9-10. Barakat filed a Motion in Limine prior to the hearing to bar the testimony of April Yanacek and Patty Fry Cox based on the same theory. Bd. Rep. at 2.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 20. Barakat's reliance on Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531 (Del. 2000), and City of Newark v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 802 A.2d 318 (Del.Super.Ct.2002) is misplaced. Both cases dealt with administrative bodies that had adjudicated claims. Moreover, in both cases the court held that the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not apply.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 33.\\n. Supr. Ct. R. 12(d).\\n. Bd. Rep. at 7; ODC Ex. 6.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 30-31, 34-35. Bara-kat also argues that the days that he is in court in Delaware should be counted toward his presence in the office. However, it is unclear how presence in court constitutes presence in the office. Barakat has admitted that \\\"aside from stopping at the office prior to court, or to pick up mail,\\\" he goes to the office only \\\"to meet clients by appointment.\\\" ODC Ex. 16.\\n. Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099 (3d Cir.1997).\\n. The Board Report refers to Rule 8.3(c). However, the language following the rule is that of 8.4(c).\\n. Bd. Rep. at 21.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 38-39. He claims that a change in fortune \\u2014 a failure to sign new Delaware clients \\u2014 caused him to be absent from the office for the remainder of 2011.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 7, 23; ODC Ex. 6.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 21-22.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 26-28.\\n. As for Count VII, the Board found that by \\\"depositing unearned advance fees into his operating account, and by providing written retainer agreements that fail to state the advance 'fee is refundable if [it] is not earned,' [Barakat] violated Rule 1.5(f).\\\" Id. at 27.\\n. As for Count VIII, the Board found that by \\\"depositing unearned advance fees into his operating account, [Barakat] failed to safeguard client funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a).\\\" Id.\\n. As for Count IX, the Board found that by \\\"commingling personal funds into his attorney operating account, [Barakat] violated Rule 1.15(d)(3).\\\" Id.\\n. As for Count X, the Board found that by \\\"(1) retaining advance fees for personal use and not depositing them into any account, (2) not proving cash receipt entries to deposit totals, (3) depositing unearned advance fees directly into his operating account, (4) not preparing monthly bank reconciliations, and (5) not preparing reconciled client subsidiary ledgers, [Barakat] failed to abide by the requirements for maintaining his books and records in violation of Rule 1.15(d).\\\" Id. at 28.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 5-7.\\n. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).\\n. Bd. Rep. at 26.\\n. Id.; Tr. at 110.\\n. Tr. at 110.\\n. Tr. at 180-81.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 26; Tr. at 182.\\n. A difficulty in evaluating Barakat's objections arises from the general disarray of Bara-kat's accounts and records. Both auditors testified that the lack of standard records made it difficult to get a clear sense of exactly what was happening with Barakat's accounts. In fact, McCullough could not finish the audit. Tr. at 115-123, 191.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 7, 20.\\n. Prof. Cond. R. 1.5, Comment 10, (emphasis added).\\n. Id., Comment 12.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 27; Respondent's Obj. at 20.\\n. Although Barakat asserted at certain points that his retainer fee in bankruptcy cases is earned at his initial consultation with a client, he also stated that a portion of his bankruptcy retainer is not refundable once the bankruptcy petition is substantially prepared, and that the remainder of the retainer is not refundable upon the petition's filing. That explanation of his bankruptcy fees, and his bankruptcy retainer agreement, undermine Barakat's claim that the bankruptcy retainer fee is fully earned at the initial consultation. Respondent's Obj. at 16-17.\\n. Prof. Cond., preamble, para. 21.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 17.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 25.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 23.\\n. Tr. at 314.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 17. The Board relies on the language in the fee agreement that states that \\\"the full fee must be paid prior to filing.\\\" Id.\\n. In his 2008 and 2012 Certificates of Compliance, Barakat responded \\\"N/A\\\" to this question.\\n. Bd. Rep. at 18-19; ODC Exs. 39-43.\\n. Id. at 18-19, 28-29.\\n. Respondent's Obj. at 21-22, 26-27.\\n. See, e.g., Tr. at 230-31, 239, 245, 252-54.\\n. In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 866 (Del.2003) reinstatement granted, 842 A.2d 1244 (Del. 2004) (citing In re Lassen, 672 A.2d 988, 998 (Del.1996)).\\n. See In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258, 262 (Del. 2001) (\\\"[Ejven though Benson's violations did not result in any injury to her clients, her careless record keeping certainly had the potential to cause injury because of the difficulty in ascertaining that all client funds in fact were being properly maintained.\\\").\\n.Bd. Rep. at 33-35. The Board noted that the two mitigating factors were partially negated by the years-long span of Barakat's wrongful conduct, and by Barakat's false and misleading statements to the ODC.\\n. In re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724 (Del.2003). Doughty was publicly sanctioned and placed on probation for two years.\\n. Id. at 736.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/710317.json b/delaware/710317.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5fa4f2f893295889ad1afa687c160c2b0afbc360
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/710317.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"710317\", \"name\": \"Joseph Shanik, suing on behalf of himself and all other Stockholders of White Sewing Machine Corporation similarly situated, Complainant Below, and Norman Johnson, Intervening Complainant Below, Appellants, vs. White Sewing Machine Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1941-04-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"371\", \"last_page\": \"387\", \"citations\": \"25 Del. Ch. 371\", \"volume\": \"25\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:35:09.508578+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Joseph Shanik, suing on behalf of himself and all other Stockholders of White Sewing Machine Corporation similarly situated, Complainant Below, and Norman Johnson, Intervening Complainant Below, Appellants, vs. White Sewing Machine Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph Shanik, suing on behalf of himself and all other Stockholders of White Sewing Machine Corporation similarly situated, Complainant Below, and Norman Johnson, Intervening Complainant Below, Appellants, vs. White Sewing Machine Corporation, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court, On Appeal,\\nApril 18, 1941.\\nLayton, C. J., and Richards, Rodney, Speakman, and Terry, JJ., sitting.\\nHering, Morris, James & Hitchens, and H. Paul Shanik, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for Joseph Shanik.\\nWilliam H. Foulk, and Arthur Garfield Hays, of New York City, for intervener, Norman Johnson.\\nHugh M. Morris and S. Samuel Arsht, for White Sewing Machine Corporation.\", \"word_count\": \"4561\", \"char_count\": \"27521\", \"text\": \"Statement op the Case. This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of Chancery dismissing the bill of complaint originally filed in that court. See ante p. 154,15 A. 2d 169. The case involves the legality and propriety of certain changes in the capital structure of the appellee, made under the following circumstances:\\nIn 1926, the appellee had two classes of capital stock, preference stock of 100,000 shares authorized and outstanding, and of common stock 400,000 shares were authorized and 200,000 outstanding. Under the charter each share of the preference stock entitled the holder to cumulative dividens of $4 per annum, before any dividends were paid on the common stock; each share of preference stock had a liquidation value of $50 in addition to unpaid cumulative dividends, and a redemption value, at the option of the corporation, of $55, together with accumulated dividends, and each share was convertible at the option of the holder, into one share of common stock. The common stock was entitled to distribution of dividends and of corporate assets upon dissolution, after satisfaction of the priority of the prefer ence stock. During the years 1930 to 1934 the corporation suffered substantial losses from operation. The corporation made a small profit in 1935, and larger profits in 1936 and 1937.\\nAt the end of 1937 the corporation had a consolidated deficit- from operations of $3,167,228.26, after deducting capital surplus. Cumulative dividends were due and unpaid on the preference stock to the extent of $31 per share, or a total of $3,100,000. In 1938 the defendant put forward a plan of recapitalization which was subsequently approved and adopted by a very large majority of stock of both classes. The plan proposed an amendment of the charter, to authorize three classes of stock, briefly described as follows:\\nThat prior preference stock (100,000 shares) be preferred over the other two classes, each share having a par value of $20; entitled to dividends of $2 per annum, cumulative after January 31, 1941; with a liquidation value of $25 plus accumulated dividends, and redeemable at the corporation's option, after January 1, 1942, at $35, plus accumulated dividends.\\nPreference stock (100,000 shares) with the stated rights and preferences as set out in the charter.\\nCommon stock (500,000 shares) having a par value of $1 per share, entitled to distributions after satisfaction of the priorities of the prior preference and of the preference stock. By the amendment each share of the old common stock was converted into 2/5 of a share of the new common stock.\\n' Under the plan each share of preference stock may be exchanged by the holder for one share of prior preference stock and three shares of new common stock.\\nThe amount of capital represented on the corporation's books by the preference stock had been $5,000,000 and by the old common stock $750,000. The plan proposed a re duction of the defendant's capital from $5,750,000 to $2,-380,000; and an allocation of capital to each share of the three classes of stock created by the amendment, as follows:\\nPrior preference stock, $20; preference stock $23 (instead of $50 before the reduction in capital); common stock $1 (instead of $3.75 for each share of old common). It was intended that the reduction of capital should eliminate the consolidated deficit and give rise to a surplus in excess of $200,000.\\nPursuant to the suggested plan of reorganization the directors, on November 14, 1938, adopted certain resolutions to carry it into effect, and on December 12, 1938, the stockholders, by a large majority of each class of stock, approved the plan. On June 28, 1939, the plan of reorganization was declared operative by the directors and the certificate of incorporation amended on August 5, 1939, in the manner provided by law. On August 7, 1939, the (new) prior preference stock, and the reclassified common stock, were admitted to trade on the New York Stock Exchange. Approximately 90 per cent of the old preference stock was duly exchanged according to the plan.\\nOn December 18, 1939, the directors met and declared a dividend of fifty cents per share on the prior preference stock, such dividend to be payable February 1, 1940, to stockholders of record on January 30, 1940. It was stipulated in the case that the resolution declaring said dividend expressly stated that the dividend was paid out of net profits of the corporation since the filing of the amended certificate of incorporation on August 5, 1939.\\nOn January 26,1940, the appellant, Joseph Shanik, filed a bill, and a restraining order withheld the payment of the dividend. The defendant filed a demurrer to the bill, and on August 14,1940, the demurrer was sustained, and on August 30th the restraining order was dissolved and the bill dismissed.\\nOn January 8, 1941, Norman Johnson, the intervenor, filed his petition to intervene in order that an appeal from the decree of the Chancellor might be taken, and stated in such petition that the intervenor was informed and advised that the original complainant did not contemplate an appeal. The petition for intervention stated that the petitioner had bought his stock in March, 1940, and copies of his stock certificates in the record bear special reference to the amendment of August 5, 1939. The petition for intervention was garnted by the court below.\\nThe errors assigned were eight in number. Seven of these assignments alleged, by varying language, the invalidity or illegality of the proposed method of recapitalization. The first assignment was that the \\\"court erred in failing to find that the appellee's plan of recapitalization and reduction of capital was unfair.\\\"\\nRodney, Judge,\\ndelivering the opinion of the court:\\nFrom the foregoing facts three questions are presented. First, a consideration of the claim of unfairness as to the plan of recapitalization; second, a consideration of the validity or legality of the plan, and third, the effect of loches on the part of the original complainant and of the intervenor.\\nWe shall but briefly consider the question of fairness of the plan of recapitalization. The first assignment of error states that the \\\"court erred in failing to find that the appellee's plan of recapitalization and reduction of capital was unfair.\\\" The appellee insists that no question of fairness of the plan is properly before this court, because such question was never raised in the court below, and cites Trout v. Farmers' Trust Co., 19 Del. Ch. 437, 168 A. 208, and Stephenson v. Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 211. Those cases held that questions not raised and preserved for review in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. The learned Vice-Chancellor in his opinion in the court below, states \\\"The changes under the plan are not charged to be unfair,\\\" and a critical examination of the bill fails to disclose that any issue of fairness, as such, was before that court. In the reply brief the appellant disclaims any reliance upon unfairness \\\"in its colloquial sense,\\\" and adhering to the cited decisions we shall not consider the question of fairness of the plan except insofar as it is inextricably interwoven with the issue of legality.\\nIt is, of course, a trite expression to remark that a purchaser of stock takes it subject to the provisions of the charter and of the constitution and statutes of the state of corporate origin. No objection is taken to the execution of the formalities of the amendatory action of the recapitalization, either in the reclassification of stock by charter amendment or in the reduction of capital, so that we may pass at once to the question of legality of the proposed plan.\\nThe statute, See. 26 of the Corporation Law, See. 2058, Revised Code of Delaware 1935, gives power to a corporation, after obtaining the required vote of stockholders, to amend its charter \\\"by increasing or decreasing its authorized capital stock or reclassifying the same, by changing the number, par value, designations, preferences, or relative, participating, optional, or other special rights of the shares # 99\\nThe charter here involved, as it existed prior to the changes objected to, provided that the then preference stock, should be entitled to fixed cumulative dividends of $4 per share per annum \\\"before any dividends shall be paid or declared upon and/or set apart for the common stock.\\\" That in substance, insofar as this case is concerned, was the preference, and the only preference, to which the stock was entitled.\\nThe difficulties of the present case seem to grow out of the circumstance that attached to the preference stock was the right to accumulated and unpaid dividends, which in 1938 amounted to $31 per share. To ascertain the legality of the plan of recapitalization we shall consider first the validity of the plan as if there had been no accumulated dividends in arrear on the preference stock, and then consider what change, if any, is brought about by reason of such arrearage.\\nIf there had been no accumulated dividends in arrear at the time of the proposed voluntary plan of recapitalization we are at a loss to know on what grounds any objection could have been made. The relative priority of the old preference stock over the common stock would have been preserved, and the only effect would have been the creation of a prior preference stock having priority to the preference stock retained by the non-assenters to the voluntary change. This was the precise situation in Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696. There, under the same statute as in force when the corporation now discussed was formed, and under substantially the same facts, the court held valid the creation of prior preference stock. The Morris case was decided in 1923, and during the intervening years has been understood and acted upon by the bar, cited in many other jurisdictions, and approved by this court. Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co., 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155 A. 514, 75 A. L. R. 1136, and Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391,190 A. 115.\\nAnd now we must consider what effect, if any, the existence of accumulated and unpaid dividends upon the preference stock has to the legality or validity of the proposed plan of recapitalization.\\nThe courts of this state have had several occasions to consider the nature and effect of cumulative dividends in arrear, which have become due and accumulated through passage of time. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., supra; Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co., supra; Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra; Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 262, 197 A. 489.\\nThe Morris case, we think, is distinguishable from the present case in only one particular. In that case, under identical statutory authority and analogous corporate power as here involved, the court upheld, as we have shown, the right to create a prior preference stock where the only charter priority of the preference stock was over common stock. The right to change the preference and create the prior preferred stock was held in strict conformity with the terms of the contract which the members of the corporation had themselves adopted. The court refused to restrain the payment of dividends on the newly created prior preferred stock before payment on what had theretofore been the preference stock, holding that the only charter preference of dividends was a priority of payment before any payment of dividends should be made upon common stock. The court was explicit in its treatment, as a severable question, of the right to disturb accumulated dividends in arrear, which had accumulated on cumulative preferred stock. The court held the existence of accumulated dividends as a present property interest in the person entitled and that such person as against the common stockholder was, in substance, a creditor, and that as against the consent of the holder the right to accumulated dividends could not be destroyed. It was this attempt, in the Morris case, to destroy the right to accumulated dividends in arrear, that furnishes the only discernible distinction between that case and the present. In the present case there is no attempt to destroy the accumulated dividends in arrear, but the right to such dividends is maintained and retained by the holders of the former preference stock who are non-assenters to the plan of recapitalization.\\nIn Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co., supra, this court considered accumulated dividends in arrear in connection with the dissolution of the company. The court held accumulated dividends in arrear as a property right of the holder, which from the time of their accrual were fixed and merely awaited the creation or existence of a legal fund for their payment.\\nThe question of accumulated dividends in arrear was again considered in Keller v. Wilson & Co. and Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, supra. The substantial distinction between the two cited cases existed in the fact that the former dealt with a charter created prior to a statutory amendment of 1927, and the latter considered corporate powers subsequent to such amendment. Both cases, however, involved an attempt either to wipe out accumulated dividends in arrear or to compel their transmutation, in part at least, into common stock. In the Keller case in particular there is an elaborate discussion of the rights incident to accumulated dividends on preferred stock, and this court held that such accumulation could not be destroyed without the consent of the holder, nor the holder compelled to exchange such accumulation of arrearage into common stock. With this holding we are now in accord, and nothing herein can reasonably be construed to be otherwise. Federal United Corporation v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318,11 A. 2d 331, when properly understood, was in no way in conflict with the foregoing cases. In that case the court merely declined to extend the legal principles arising under Sec. 26 of the Corporation Law to an entirely different statutory proceeding providing for merger of corporations in which any dissenting stockholder had a statutory right to have an appraisement of the value \\u00f3f his stock and accumulated dividends in arrear, and the value thereof paid to him in cash.\\nIn the present case none of these situations exist. Here the transfer, if made, is purely voluntary, and any dissentient to the plan may keep his original preference stock with all accumulated and unpaid dividends thereon, and his relative position with reference to the common stock (the only preference to which he was ever entitled) remains precisely the same as if no change had been made. His accumulated dividends in arrear are not, in any sense, wiped out, but remain awaiting a legal fund for their payment, and they must be paid before dividends are paid upon the common stock. We think there was no conflict between the Morris case and the Keller case, and the present case being substantially similar to the Morris case, we think there is no conflict between the Keller case and the present.\\nCourts in other jurisdictions have considered identical or strongly analogous situations to those here involved. Reference to the cases without copious extracts must be sufficient.\\nJohnson v. Fuller, et al., (D. C.) 36 F. Supp. 744, is strongly in point and seems impossible to distinguish. There the plan of recapitalization was substantially the same as the present and holders of old preferred stock had the same rights, either to keep his preferred stock with accumulated dividends retaining priority over common stock, or to exchange it into newly created debenture and prior preference stock together with some common stock. There the court reached the same conclusion as herein reached, and its reasoning loses none of its pertinency because it cites, with approval, the opinion of the court below in the present case.\\nAttention should also be specifically directed to Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567,15 N. E. 2d 127; Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N. E. 2d 502; Blumenthal v. DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App. 2d 11, 85 P. 2d 580; Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., (D. C.) 34 F. 2d 533; Ainsworth v. Southwestern Drug Co., (5 Girl) 95 F. 2d 172.\\nIt is somewhat difficult to determine whether the appellants' objection to the plan of recapitalization arises by reason of the creation of prior preferred stock having priority to the former preference stock, or whether it arises from a consideration of the supposed enhancement of the value of the common stock. It is argued that plans of re capitalization affecting accumulated dividends in arrear originate in the holders of junior securities. In this case there were no junior securities but common stock, and the inference is suggested that the plan is in the interest of common stock and therefore not fair.' It is quite doubtful whether this matter should be at all considered, since questions of fairness were never suggested -in the court below, and this question seems clearly separable from questions of legality. At the expense of brevity the matter will be briefly considered.\\nThe company or its predecessors are stated to have been in existence since 1876. The company was not insolvent in either the equity or bankruptcy sense and could not have been forced into involuntary liquidation. It is true that during the depression years of 1930-1934 an operating deficit occurred, consisting largely of unpaid dividends, and in 1938 there were accumulated dividends in arrear of some $3,000,000. In 1935 there was a profit of over $35,000 and in 1936 the profit reached $280,000 and in 1937 about $300,-000. The common stock had considerable potential value but the time of realization, especially as to dividends, must normally, without recapitalization, have been deferred while current profits paid the accumulated preferred dividends in arrear, but no plan of reorganization or recapitalization could be effected without the concurrence of common stock.\\nThe facts of the present case concerning the common stock, the status of the company or the nature of the proceeding do not fall within the category of Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 1, 84 L. Ed. 110, or similar cases cited. There the court considered solely the question of \\\"fairness\\\" as required by the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A. \\u00a7 1 et seq., as applied in a mandatory proceeding and affecting a corporation insolvent in both an equity and bankruptcy sense. There must also be distinguished those cases like Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co., 211 Mass. 424, 97 N. E. 1006, where it was held that in partial liquidation, common stock must be resorted to, even to the point o\\u00ed extinction, before preferred stock, having liquidation preference, could be called on to contribute. Here the preference stock contributed to no loss whatever.\\nThe common stock gave up three-fifths of its value and one share of old common stock was transferable into two-fifths of a share of new common stock, and a common stock ownership of 200,000 shares is reduced to 80,000 shares. If this reduced interest is subsequently enhanced in value as a direct result of the recapitalization it is difficult to understand the complaint of any preferred stockholder. If a holder of old preference stock exchanges such stock for prior preference stock he is still, by the prior preference stock, entitled to priority over the common stock both as to dividends and in liquidation, and, in addition he has three shares of common stock for each share of old preference stock; if a holder of old preference stock does not desire to exchange his stock he retains his priority oyer the common stock both in liquidation and as to dividends in the future, and his dividends in arrear must be paid in full before any dividends can be paid on the common stock. Success of the company and the consequent enhancement of the value of the common stock must result to the benefit of all holders of preferred stock whether they have agreed to the new plan or not; failure of the company and the consequent depreciation of the value of the common stock would not change the relative status existing between the old preference stock and the common stock.\\nWe shall pause but briefly to consider the question raised by the appellant that the prior preference stock and the new common stock issued in accordance with the recapitalization were invalid as being issued without consideration. The Delaware law provides that stock may be issued', for \\\"cash, by labor done, by personal property, or by real' property or leases thereof.\\\" Rev. Code 1935, \\u00a7 2046. The new prior preference stock and new common stock were issued under the plan in consideration of the surrender of the old preference stock or common stock, as the case might be. The old stock was personal property within the meaning of the statute. Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E. 2d 127; Mitchell v. Mitchell, Woodbury & Co., 263 Mass. 160,160 N. E. 539. .No authorities are brought to our attention which hold to the contrary.\\nWe must now briefly consider the question of loches, and this consideration will separately deal with the conduct of the original complainant and of the intervener.\\nThe following seem to be the material facts and dates:\\nMarch 7, 1938, copies of the proposed charter amendment and capital reduction mailed to all stockholders, including complainant.\\nDec. 12, 1938, stockholders meeting approved plan of recapitalization.\\nJune 28, 1939. Plan declared operative by board of directors.\\nAug. 5, 1939. Amendment to charter and certificate of reduction of capital filed.\\nAug. 7, 1939. New prior preference stock and new common stock admitted to trading on New York Stock Exchange.\\nDec. 18, 1939. Dividend of 500 per share on new prior preference stock declared by directors, payable Feb. 1, 1940.\\nJan. 22, 1940. Some 87,879 shares of old preference stock had been exchanged for new preference stock and 263,637 shares of new common stock.\\nJan. 26, 1940. Bill of complaint filed.\\nAug. 9, 1940. Opinion of court below filed, followed by decree of Aug. 31, 1940, dismissing the bill.\\nJan. 8, 1941. Petition of Norman Johnson, praying leave to intervene, filed, he having bought his stock in March, 1940.\\nThis court has had recent occasion to consider the action of dissenting stockholders with reference to a charge of loches. In Federal United Corporation v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331, 343, this court reviewed the pertinent authorities where periods of delay had covered from one to ten months. In the cited case the court said:\\n\\\"What constitutes unreasonable delay is a question of fact dependent largely upon the particular circumstances. No rigid rule has ever been laid down. Change of position on the part of those affected by non-action, and the intervention of rights are factors of supreme importance. The promptness of action demanded of a stockholder objecting to the accomplishment of a proposed corporate act is dependent in a large degree upon the effect of his delay on others; and where many persons will be affected by an act that involves a change of capital structure and a material alteration of rights attached to stock ownership, the stockholder, having knowledge of the contemplated action, owes a duty both to the corporation and to the stockholders to act with the promptness demanded by the particular circumstances.\\\"\\nAgain the court said:\\n\\\"Sitting by inactive and in what amounts to silence, when every consideration for the rights of others demanded prompt and vigorous action, and until affairs had become so complicated that a restoration of former status was difficult, if not impossible, is conduct amounting to loches.\\\"\\nIt remains to apply the law to the present facts.\\nThe complainant knew of the contemplated plan from March 7, 1938; he knew of the approval of the plan by the stockholders on December 12, 1938, and that the plan would, become effective. He knew that on June 28, 1939, the directors declared the plan operative, and that the formal corporate action in filing the requisite papers was taken on August 5, 1939. More particularly he knew that after Au gust 7, 1939, the new prior preferred stock and the new common stock were freely admitted to trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Notwithstanding all this knowledge, he took no action until January 26, 1940. At that time more than 87 per cent, of the holders of old preference stock had changed their position and exchanged their old preference stock for new securities in accordance with the plan of recapitalization and their old status cannot be restored; at that time the new securities had been freely traded in on the New York Stock Exchange for almost six months, and the rights of new stockholders have intervened. The complainant cannot say his action was not required until a dividend was declared and payable on the new prior preference stock. He knew certainly from August 5, 1939, when the amended charter was filed, that whatever dividends were to be paid in the future must first be paid on the new prior preference stock, and that such stock had priority over the old preference stock. We have no hesitation in saying that the action and course of conduct of the complainant constituted loches which prevented affirmative action on his bill of complaint.\\nIf established rules of law would have prevented the granting of relief to the original complainant then these same rules operated much more strongly against the intervenor. Indeed, the equities of the intervenor are so indistinct as to make questionable any right to intervene at all if the petition to intervene had been opposed. The intervenor bases his right upon purchases of stock by him in March, 1940, some nine months after the plan of recapitalization had been declared to be effective, and some seven months after the stock had been freely subject to trading on the New York Stock Exchange. It nowhere appears in the record that the stock held by the intervenor was voted against the plan of recapitalization and, for all that appears, such stock may have been voted in favor of the plan. The law is quite clear that it is only non-assenting stockholders who have not been guilty of loches who can be heard upon such matters as here involved. The measure of protection afforded to non-assenting stockholders in any prospective plan of reorganization is applicable only to those stockholders whose rights are, in some way, affected by the plan. It does not include those persons who voluntarily and with knowledge become stockholders. long after the plan has become effective.\\nThe decree of the Chancellor will be affirmed, with costs against the intervener.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/716048.json b/delaware/716048.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..db7b4c98acec5c7541f9dcae36835aac23853fe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/716048.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"716048\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of Petition for Adoption\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Petition for Adoption\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-07-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"433\", \"last_page\": \"435\", \"citations\": \"21 Del. Ch. 433\", \"volume\": \"21\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Orphans' Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:50:00.799776+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of Petition for Adoption.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of Petition for Adoption.\\nNew Castle,\\nJuly 5, 1935.\\nWolcott, Presiding Judge, sitting.\\nWilliam Prickett, for petitioner.\", \"word_count\": \"623\", \"char_count\": \"3624\", \"text\": \"The memorandum is as follows:\\nWolcott, Presiding Judge:\\nThe petition is proposed to be presented under the Adoption Statute, 38 Del. Laws, Chap. 162 (Page 613). If the petitioner cannot bring herself within that statute, she cannot of course maintain an adoption proceeding.\\nThe petitioner was and continues to be a married woman. In March of this year, however, she secured a decree nisi in divorce against her husband. The decree nisi cannot become absolute until after the expiration of one year from the entry thereof. Revised Code 1915, \\u00a7 3026. Until the entry of an absolute decree the status of the petitioner as a married woman remains unaltered.\\nThe statue permits a petition for adoption to be filed by \\\"a resident of this State who is over twenty-one years of age and not married, or a husband and wife residents of this State (if not legally separated) jointly.\\\"\\nThe petition is the sole petition of a married woman. But, it is contended, the effect of the decree nisi is to adjudicate a legal separation of herself and husband, and that if husband and wife are thus legally separated either spouse may file a separate petition for adoption.\\nThe statute does not say so. I take it to be clear that no adoption proceedings can be maintained unless the case falls plainly within the provisions of the statute. The statute is express in so providing.\\nThere are two classes of petitioners named in the statute. They are (1) a person who is not married, and (2) a husband and wife who must petition jointly (if not legally separated).\\nThe petitioner is not in the category just designated as (1). How can she bring herself within the category-designated as (2) ?\\nThe petitioner's attorney argues that if there is a legal separation, either spouse may file a sole petition. The argument introduces a third category of possible petitioners, viz., a married person who is legally separated from his or her spouse, in which case a sole petition may be presented. If there be such a third class it is derivable only by argumentative inference. But what, I ask, is the justification for such an inference? It is to be remembered that the statute is a creative one, by which I mean it gives birth to rights and specifies those who may enjoy them. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is especially applicable in the interpretation of such a statute. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (2d Ed.) \\u00a7 491. As to married persons, the statute allows them to file a joint petition if they are not legally separated. Plainly they cannot file a joint petition if they are legally separated. The case of a married person legally separated from his or her spouse is not covered by the statute. It is not permissible to say that the Legislature meant such a case to be included, because it is entirely conceivable that considerations of policy might well have suggested that in such a case neither spouse should be permitted to assume the relationship of parent to a child of alien blood as long as the marital bond remained unbroken.\\nAssuming then, without deciding that the petitioner is in a state of legal separation .from her husband, as it is argued she is, she is nevertheless not within the permissive scope of the statute's provisions.\\nI accordingly advise the attorney for the petitioner that the petition if formally presented will be dismissed. If it is desired to lay the basis for an appeal, the petition may be filed and an order will be entered denying its prayer.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/720301.json b/delaware/720301.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bfeb30b6b9fc32782cea5b25ac5fffffbc7d00b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/720301.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"720301\", \"name\": \"Leonce P. Durand, Jr., and Florence A. Durand, Plaintiffs, vs. Henry E. Snedeker, Vera E. Snedeker, Thomas C. Snedeker, Elizabeth S. Foraker and Charles H. Foraker, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Durand v. Snedeker\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"166\", \"last_page\": \"173\", \"citations\": \"40 Del. Ch. 166\", \"volume\": \"40\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:22:24.480891+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Leonce P. Durand, Jr., and Florence A. Durand, Plaintiffs, vs. Henry E. Snedeker, Vera E. Snedeker, Thomas C. Snedeker, Elizabeth S. Foraker and Charles H. Foraker, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Leonce P. Durand, Jr., and Florence A. Durand, Plaintiffs, vs. Henry E. Snedeker, Vera E. Snedeker, Thomas C. Snedeker, Elizabeth S. Foraker and Charles H. Foraker, Defendants.\\nNew Castle,\\nFebruary 9, 1962.\\nJohn P. Sinclair, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.\\nWilfred J. Smith and Frank J. Gentile, Jr., of Smith & Gentile, Wilmington, for defendants Henry E. Snedeker and Vera E. Snedeker.\\nBruce M. Stargatt, of Morford, Young & Conaway, Wilmington, for defendants Elizabeth S. Foraicer and Charles H. Foraicer.\", \"word_count\": \"2535\", \"char_count\": \"15015\", \"text\": \"Marvel, Vice Chancellor:\\nAccording to the complaint in this case, on or about April 20, 1961 plaintiffs contracted to buy and defendants contracted to sell some 290 acres of farm land in Red Lion Hundred together with the buildings thereon located, namely, a barn, storage shed and a large dwelling. Defendants Henry E. Snedeker, Thomas C. Snedeker and their sister Elizabeth S. Foraker are the actual owners of undivided interests in the lands in question, Vera E. Snedeker having merely a dower interest as Henry's wife and Charles H. Foraker a curtesy interest in the share of his wife, Elizabeth. The complaint alleges that the defendants Henry E. Snedeker, Vera E. Snedeker and Thomas C. Snedeker agreed in writing to such sale on or about April 20, while the defendant Elizabeth S. Foraker, being in Florida at the time \\\" orally contracted, by telephone, to sell her interest in the 'Snedeker Farm' to the plaintiffs, agreed to execute the contract signed by her two brothers when it was mailed to her, and agreed that the plaintiffs could take immediate possession of the farm (but not of the mansion house and other improvements) . . .\\\" It is further alleged in the complaint that \\\" On or about the following day, April 21, 1961, the defendant Charles H. Foraker orally agreed to sell his interest in said premises and agreed to execute said contract of sale as soon as the defendant, Elizabeth S. Foraker, had executed said contract.\\\"\\nThe complaint goes on to state that acting in reliance upon the oral contract of the defendants Elizabeth S. Foraker and Charles H. Foraker and the written contract of the defendants Henry E. Snedeker, Vera E. Snedeker and Thomas C. Snedeker and in the belief that a firm and binding contract existed, the plaintiffs partially performed the contract by making a down payment of $500, and in further reliance upon said oral and written contracts, plaintiffs \\\" with the permission and acquiescence of all the defendants and with the active assistance and cooperation of defendant, Henry E. Snedeker, entered into possession of the farm (but not of the mansion house) and performed \\\" a number of possessory acts, including the building of a road, the performance of certain acts of excavation, the installation of eight machines, each weighing several tons, designed to prepare peas for marketing, the planting of some thirty-\\u00f1ve acres in garden peas, and the making of other planting arrangements with tenants then engaged in farming operations on the property.\\nThe complaint concedes that during the time plaintiffs were engaged in the possessory acts outlined in the complaint the defendants Henry E. Snedeker and his wife Vera continued to reside in the mansion house but that neither of said defendants nor any of the other defendants at any time prior to the filing of the complaint made any objection to plaintiffs' possession of parts of the lands in dispute.\\nThe complaint concludes with an allegation that defendants after agreeing to sell the lands in question, later repudiated their contract by indicating that they would not perform it on June 15, 1961, the proposed date of settlement, thereby committing an anticipatory breach. Plaintiffs pray that inasmuch as they are willing and able to perform the undertakings agreed to by them in said contract of sale, that defendants be forthwith ordered specifically to perform their part of the contract according to its terms. Alternatively, in the event specific performance should not be granted, plaintiffs ask that damages be awarded them in the amount of $50,000. In an amendment to the complaint an additional prayer is added to the effect that if specific performance not be granted against the non-signing defendant Charles H. Foraker, that such decree be granted against the other defendants without abatement of the purchase price because of the contingent curtesy interest of the said Charles H. Foraker.\\nThe defendants Henry E. Snedeker and Vera E. Snedeker deny the existence of an enforceable contract for the sale of land, contending that during the negotiations up to and including April 20, 1961 it was understood between the parties that a contract of sale would come into being only if all of the defendants were to agree upon the terms of such contract and thereafter execute a contract in writing, and that such was not done. Said defendants contend that even assuming that an oral contract was made by Mrs. Foraker, there was no effective partial performance by plaintiffs. They further claim that if a contract ever existed, it was thereafter rescinded by mutual agreement. Finally, they say that in any event specific performance may not be had against less than all the defendants because the agreement sued upon contemplated a conveyance of land by all defendants, including Charles H. Foraker.\\nIn their amended answer the defendants Elizabeth Foraker and Charles H. Foraker deny the existence of an enforceable contract for the sale of the Snedeker farm, specifically denying that Mrs. Foraker made an oral agreement for such sale and contending that in any event should such oral agreement be found to exist, that it may not be enforced because of the provisions of the Delaware statute of frauds, \\u00a7 2714, Title 6 Del.C. By counterclaim these defendants also seek damages against plaintiffs for their alleged improper occupation and use of parts of the Snedeker lands.\\nThe defendant Thomas C. Snedeker failed to appear in response to substituted service, and a default judgment was entered against him on September 11, 1961, said judgment being subject to being reopened upon his answering or moving in response to the complaint within thirty days thereafter. No responsive pleading was thereafter filed by such defendant although he did appear and testify at the trial. In any event, Thomas's failure to comply with the rules and order of the Court presents no problem of substantive law in the case in view of the fact that the two Snedeker brothers and their sister, Mrs. Foraker own undivided interests in the lands in controversy and that any effective relief for plaintiffs in the form of specific performance would have to run against all of these defendants.\\nSection 2714 of Title 6 Del.C. provides in part:\\n\\\"(a) No action shall be brought to charge any person upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements, or heredita-ments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the contract is reduced to writing, or some memorandum, or notes thereof, are signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing \\u00bb\\nThe purpose of the statute is explained by its title, namely to afford protection against fraud not only in the type of transaction described in the language above recited but also in a number of other listed transactions omitted from the above quotation. Nonetheless, actual part performance of an oral contract is recognized as a substitute for the statute of frauds on the theory that acts of performance constitute substantial evidence of a contract, Hamilton v. Traub, 29 Del.Ch. 475, 51 A.2d 581. By the same token, it is well established that specific performance will not be decreed unless \\\" the existence and terms of the contract sought to be enforced are established by that high degree of proof which has been variously characterized by the terms 'clear/ 'clear and convincing/ 'clear and satisfactory' or other equivalent expressions.\\\" 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance \\u00a7 143, p. 727, citing inter alia Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del.Ch. 126, 7 A.2d 753. See also Godwin v. Collins, 3 Del.Ch. 189, 4 Houst. 28, Connaway v. Wright's Administrator, 5 Del.Ch. 472, Hindes v. Wilmington Poetry Society, 37 Del.Ch. 80, 138 A.2d 501, and M. F. v. F., ante, p. 17, 172 A.2d 274. And the rule for obvious reasons has been held to have especial application to a paroi contract, Motor Parts Co. v. Bendix Home Appliances, D.C.Del., 36 F.Supp. 649, and 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance \\u00a7 143, p. 727.\\nThe exigencies of time militate against a detailed analysis of the evidence. A new planting season is approaching and the parties here in dispute as well as those having rights in the lands here in dispute as tenants or share croppers are entitled to have this Court's opinion as to their respective rights in the lands in controversy.\\nIn brief, I am of the opinion that the evidence bearing directly on the issue of whether or not an unequivocal oral contract was made by Mrs. Foraker on the night of April 20 does not clearly establish such a contract. The lady in question was aroused from a sound sleep by a telephone call placed at the Snedeker farm some time after 11 p.m. She was at the time at home in Florida while her husband was in Delaware for the alleged purpose of attempting to buy the farm for himself. Mrs. Foraker denies speaking to Mr. Young, an agent, in the words of the written contract, \\\"for the parties\\\", or that she agreed to sell, and her brothers and sister-in-law agree. On the other hand, Mr. Young, whose recollection and that of the Durands differs with that of the Snedekers as to such alleged conversation, held other telephone conversations with Mrs. Foraker both before and after the night of April 20. His version as to exactly what transpired on the night in question is perhaps explained by these other conversations and by his enthusiasm for the proposed sale, a transaction which, if consummated, would benefit him to the extent of a 6% commission on a sale having a total dollar value of $157,500. I have no doubt but that Mrs. Foraker, in response to the enthusiasm of her brothers for the revised draft of contract presented to them that evening, evidenced interest in Mr. Durand's latest proposal, particularly because of the fact that the agent, Mr. Young, had agreed to take his commission as the purchase price was paid over a period of ten years rather than all at once. I have grave doubts, however, that she agreed unequivocally on that occasion to the terms of a proposed written contract which was not before her. On the other hand, I am satisfied that after the phone call to Florida both brothers were convinced that their sister would almost certainly agree to the sale because of her approval of its theory. Such approval, however, was hardly unequivocal assent to all the terms of a written contract. Furthermore, while they did not sign the contract until after talking to their sister, the brothers had already virtually made up their minds to sell, if she agreed, and they knew, of course, that the contract could not be executed by her until it was sent to Florida for that purpose. Finally, and most significantly, they were aware of the fact that their brother-in-law who was then in Delaware was not only a prospective purchaser of the farm but was also in the anomalous position of being at the same time a prospective party to the contract before them.\\nMr. Durand claims that his precipitate action in moving into a part of the Snedeker farm was taken in reliance on what was said in a telephone conversation to which he was not a party. However, the possessory steps taken by him were as consistent with a later plan on his part to which Henry Snedeker, the owner in residence, was not adverse, namely, to negotiate an alternative, salvaging arrangement whereby he would take over a portion of the farm as owner and lessee in lieu of his original offer to buy the entire property.\\nIn Houston v. Townsend, 1 Del.Ch. 416, aff'd, 1 Harr. 532, an action on an oral contract for the sale of land, Chancellor ICensey Johns, Jr., stated:\\n\\\"The act relied on as part performance should be such as would not have been done independent of some contract or agreement relative to land; because as you are from the act performed to infer a contract, it must therefore be an act of that description, which will not admit any other inference.\\\"\\nIn Shepherd v. Niles, 14 Del.Ch. 316, 125 A. 669, however, Chancellor Josiah O. Wolcott stated in declining to grant specific performance of a contract for the sale of land:\\n\\\"There are two questions presented by this cause. These are, first, was a paroi contract entered into between the parties as alleged in the bill, and second, if so, was there such part performance of it as to take the case out of the statute of frauds?\\n\\\"The view I take of the second question makes it unnecessary for me to consider the first one. Conceding that the oral agreement was entered into as alleged in the bill, yet it seems clear to me that the complainant is not entitled to have it specifically enforced for the reason that the facts fail to disclose such part performance as removes the obstacle of the statute of frauds set up by way of defense in the answer.\\\"\\nBecause of the factual situation in the case at bar I have necessarily considered both questions posed in the case last cited, judging plaintiffs' claims as to part performance primarily as they throw light on what was actually said over the telephone by Mrs. Foraker on the night of April 20, 1961. Having found that plaintiffs did not clearly establish by direct evidence an unequivocal oral commitment on the part of Mrs. Foraker to sell her interest in the farm, the alleged acts of part performance relied on by plaintiffs as further evidence of such a contract are to say the least ambiguous. Not only, as earlier noted, were the possessory act of plaintiffs partial and consistent with later negotiations for lesser rights in the Snedeker farm than those originally bargained for but such acts were also not clearly authorized by Mrs. Foraker. Finally, without considering whether or not a down payment was actually made to her brothers, there is no evidence which could conceivably establish an unambiguous acceptance of a down payment by or on behalf of Mrs. Foraker. Compare contra Ross v. Cannon, 36 Del.Ch. 63, 125 A.2d 266.\\nOn notice, an order may be presented denying plaintiffs' prayers for specific performance and dismissing the complaint.\\n. Under their mother's will a half interest in the farm was left to Henry and a quarter share each to Thomas and Elizabeth.\\n. Mr. Young testified on cross-examination, T204.\\n\\\"Q. Did you tell her that there was a $500 deposit?\\nA. I am sure I must have.\\nQ. Did you tell her that the deposit was in the form of a check which you were instructed not to negotiate without notifying Durand ?\\nA. I don't remember specifically.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/722198.json b/delaware/722198.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0a956aefc857439b0bff44a8a4650fd3b4f4644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/722198.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"722198\", \"name\": \"Jan A. Bata, Defendant Below, Appellant, vs. Thomas J. Bata, Thomas J. Bata and David Graham, as Executors of the Estate of Mary T. Bata, and Western Investment and Trading Company, Limited, a Bermuda corporation, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bata v. Bata\", \"decision_date\": \"1961-04-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"548\", \"last_page\": \"562\", \"citations\": \"39 Del. Ch. 548\", \"volume\": \"39\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Chancery Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:56:06.572056+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Jan A. Bata, Defendant Below, Appellant, vs. Thomas J. Bata, Thomas J. Bata and David Graham, as Executors of the Estate of Mary T. Bata, and Western Investment and Trading Company, Limited, a Bermuda corporation, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jan A. Bata, Defendant Below, Appellant, vs. Thomas J. Bata, Thomas J. Bata and David Graham, as Executors of the Estate of Mary T. Bata, and Western Investment and Trading Company, Limited, a Bermuda corporation, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees.\\nSupreme Court, On Appeal,\\nApril 25, 1961.\\nGeorge T. Coulson, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Harold E. Stassen, of Stassen, Kephart, Sarkis & Scullin,\\nPhiladelphia, Pa., and Amos J. Peaslee, Jr., of Peaslee, Brigham, Albrecht & McMahon, New York City, for appellant.\\nRobert H. Richards, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, and Inzer B. Wyatt, John W. Dickey and Edward C. Stebbins, Jr., of Sullivan & Cromwell, New York City, for appellees.\\nSoutherland, C. J., and Wolcott and Bramhall, JJ., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"4893\", \"char_count\": \"28500\", \"text\": \"Southerland, Chief Justice:\\nThe defendant-appellant, Jan Bata, has filed a petition for reargument on seven grounds. The seventh ground embodies a motion to remand the case to the court below in order that the defendant may move the Chancellor to reopen the case and receive newly discovered evidence. Since the motion to remand presents a question not heretofore raised in this proceeding, we consider it first.\\nPetition to Remand.\\nThe petition advances a new theory of the case, radically different from the issues made by the parties, tried below, and reviewed here. Those issues were as follows:\\n1. Whether the sale memorandum of May 10, 1931, and the will of May 19, 1931, considered either separately or together, creates a sales legacy in favor of Jan Bata.\\n2. Whether the Czech doctrine of constitutive recognition is effective to vest title to the Leader shares in Jan.\\n3. Whether the Czech doctrine of tacit waiver is effective to vest such title in Jan.\\nBoth in the court below and in this Court these issues have been resolved against Jan on the present record. See Bata v. Hill, 37 Del.Ch. 96, 139 A.2d 159; Bata v. Bata, ante p. 258, 163 A.2d 493.\\nIn dealing with these questions it was agreed by all parties that the property in dispute, under Czech law, \\\"passed to plaintiffs [Tom and Marie] as the intestate heirs subject to debts and legacies\\\". Appellant's Brief, p. 8.\\nThe new theory of the case on alleged newly discovered evidence is that the May 10th document was a valid offer of a contract effectively accepted after Thomas' death, and that title to the property in dispute \\u2014 the Leader shares \\u2014 passed directly to Jan and never vested in the heirs.\\nWe quote from the petition:\\n\\\"The newly discovered evidence is as follows:\\n\\\"It was the law in Czechoslovakia in 1931, 1932, 1933 and until 1938, that a unilateral declaration of sale addressed to an intended purchaser holographic and signed by the declarer and placed in a position where it would be received by the intended purchaser after the death of the seller was a valid offer.\\n\\\"It was further the law in Czechoslovakia in 1931, 1932, 1933 and until 1938 that an offer did not terminate upon the death of the offeror unless the offeror had expressed a contrary intention, or such intent was to be inferred from the circumstances. Such an offer could be accepted validly within a reasonable time after death.\\n\\\"It was further the law in Czechoslovakia in 1931, 1932, 1933 and until 1938 that when such an offer was accepted after death, the probate court had the jurisdiction and duty to supervise the fulfillment of the contract and to supervise and confirm the provision of the substitute estate or payments for distribution through the deed of delivery. The title to the property sold passed directly to the purchaser and did not vest in the other heirs.\\n\\\"It was the law in Czechoslovakia in 1931, 1932, 1933 and until 1938 that the May 10th and May 19th documents in the instant case, upon the acceptance of the May 10th document by Jan A. Bata, did constitute a valid contract consummated after the death of Thomas Bata.\\\"\\nThe petition is supported by affidavits of six experts in Czech law. Taken at their face value, these affidavits, confirm the existence in Czechoslovakia, or at least in Bohemia and Moravia, of the rules of law set forth in the petition.\\nThese affidavits also set forth the following:\\nThese rules constituted a unique feature of Moravian and Bohemian law and a departure or variant from the rules of the Civil Law prevailing in Germany and other areas of Austria-Hungary. They had their origin in a Bohemian and Moravian tradition that peasant farms should descend to a single owner, in order that the farm might not be split up into uneconomic units. This custom, deeply rooted, developed into the rules of law above quoted. A common and accepted method of insuring the transfer from an owner to his successor was the use of such a sales contract as the May 10th document, i. e., an owner's declaration of sale delivered to and accepted by the offeree after the death of the offeror. This was a special method of giving effect to an owner's wishes, standing between an inter vivas contract and a testamentary sales legacy.\\nThis practice was not limited to peasant farms. It was frequently applied in commercial and industrial circles where the owner wished to preserve economic unity.\\nTherefore, in the opinion of the experts, the May 10th document constituted a valid offer under Czech law, and Jan's acceptance completed a binding contract of sale.\\nThe experts are also of the opinion that the Probate Court at Zlin duly supervised the performance of this contract, and that thereby the property of Thomas listed in the May 10th document became vested in Jan. The deed of delivery of June 28, 1933, vested in the heirs only the remaining property of Thomas Bata, and hence did not give the heirs title to the Leader shares.\\nThe petition thus presents a theory of the case completely new to this proceeding. We shall refer to it as \\\"the tacit-offer\\\" theory, recognizing the inadequacy of this label to express the concept of Czech law.\\nThe petition and affidavits also' aver that this evidence of Czech law has never been presented in any of the courts in which this dispute has been litigated, because unknown to Jan and his counsel. In explanation or excuse for such lack of knowledge, the petition avers\\n\\\"6. Nor is this surprising, nor is it evidence of neglect, since in the first instance the law and tradition and custom is unique to the area, and the area has been closed throughout the years of this litigation as a result of the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. This law and custom and tradition does not apply with the same force throughout Austria, Germany, Switzerland and France. The Civil Law is usually looked upon as a unified whole, and thus this regional variant, grounded in local tradition and custom, was not ascertained previously.\\n\\\"7. Furthermore, Defendant-Appellant Jan A. Bata was himself a generation removed from the peasant side, had no training in the law, had become deeply engrossed in the Bata shoemaking business at a very early age, and has been completely cut off from Czechoslovakian lawyers and from any opportunity to visit Czechoslovakia since this litigation arose. Unlike his much older brother Thomas, who spanned the transition from Moravian peasant farm owner and shoemaker to industrial urbanite, Jan began as an urban industrial employee and spent much of his youth in the United States. His limited means in the face of the multiplicity of legal attacks, and his remote location in Brazil have combined to make it understandable and excusable that he had not previously obtained this evidence of Czechoslovakian law and custom and tradition.\\\"\\nThe plaintiffs oppose the granting of the petition on the following grounds:\\n1. That the theory of the case now advanced is not newly discovered, but on the contrary was developed and rejected in the prior lawsuits; and with reasonable diligence Jan could have obtained expert testimony in time to present it to the court below in this case.\\n2. That the Czech Probate Court in this case did not supervise the performance of a contract consummated after Thomas' death, but on the contrary dealt only with a supposed and fictitious inter vivas sale.\\n3. That the new theory requires a rejection of an express admission by Jan's former counsel in this case that title to the Leader shares passed to Tom and Marie as intestate heirs, and hence a new trial of the entire case.\\n4. That the present claim of the tacit-offer theory is res judicata by reason of the findings in the New York lawsuit.\\nReasons 2, 3 and 4 we find it unnecessary to consider. We think that the first ground of opposition is well-taken.\\nTo succeed upon a petition such as this the applicant must show, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial, and that it could not, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered for use at the trial. In re Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 23 Del.Ch. 215, 2 A.2d 273.\\nThe proffered evidence, consisting of opinions upon rules of Czech law, is advanced in support of the tacit-offer theory, i. e., that the May 10th sale memorandum embodied an offer, and, though it was not communicated to Jan, its valadity was unimpaired by Thomas' death, and Jan's acceptance converted it into a valid contract of sale. This theory, although new to this case, is not new to the Bata litigation. It was developed in the prior lawsuits.\\nIn the trial court in New York Jan's then counsel did not advance it, but in rebuttal the heirs' expert testified that the document was invalid under Czech law as an offer because not communicated. The trial court so found. Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., Sup., 99 N.Y.S.2d 535. On appeal, however, new counsel for Jan made the same argument as Jan now makes before us, i. e., he advanced the tacit-offer theory. It was further developed at length in his reply brief. The Appellate Division, however, affirmed Justice Schreiber's findings concerning Czech law and \\\"the absence of any enforcible oral or written contract. Bata v. Bata, 279 App.Div. 182, 108 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660.\\nThe argument was reiterated in the brief for Jan in the Court of Appeals. That Court affirmed, saying: \\\"Both lower courts have found that neither the May 10th writing nor the will constituted a valid enforcible contract under Czech law.\\\" 306 N.Y. 96, 115 N.E.2d 672, 677.\\nIn the litigation in Holland, the same argument was developed at length before the District Court and again pressed in the Court of Appeal. In the Swiss litigation it was again advanced.\\nEnough has been said to show conclusively that the theory of the case now advanced as ground for reopening it is not newly discovered. It was known to Jan's counsel for years before the institution of the Delaware litigation.\\nObviously, it was the deliberate decision of Jan's trial counsel here to abandon the contention. In his brief on the law on appeal, he says that Jan \\\"does not challenge the New York determination that there was no enforcible contract\\\". From a subsequent comment, it appears that he regarded the New York determination as res judicata. On that point we do not pass. What we do say is that the new theory was well known and was deliberately abandoned in this case.\\nIn effect, what Jan is contending here is that the legal experts he has heretofore had did not know the Czech law. But, once the theory of tacit-offer had been evolved, why did he not seek to obtain from a Czech lawyer expert advice in support of it? In all probability, reasonable diligence would have borne fruit, since it is clear from the moving papers that some at least of the six affiants were available for consultation before 1954. In any event the effort should have been made if, as is contended, the question was still open for consideration in Delaware. Nothing appears to have been done.\\nThe allegations of paragraph 7 of the petition in excuse of Jan's inaction do not impress us.\\nThe argument upon the supposed difference in background between Thomas and Jan is unconvincing. Thomas' family was centuries removed from the peasant farm. If Thomas was familiar with the legal effect of a \\\"tacit offer\\\", and relied upon it, as Jan must argue, why was Jan himself not familiar with it? When the sale memorandum was found in Thomas' safe, Jan was advised by the notary to sign it, in order presumably to make a binding contract. As to financial stringency, Jan was in a position to retain able counsel to try this case and an expert to testify.\\nHis location in Brazil is within 55 miles of Sao Paulo, a very-large commercial city in which he has an office.\\nIt is true that since the Russian seizure of Czechoslovakia he, like others, has been cut off from his native country; but, again, assistance was available in this country and probably elsewhere.\\nJan's real difficulty now stems from the decision to abandon in this case the tacit-offer theory. But that decision was made, and was made at a time when it was still possible (as he contends) for him to press it.\\nIt is true that the affidavits, on their face, make in some respects a rather impressive case. As Jan's counsel says, they tend to throw light upon some of the puzzling features of this matter. But the application comes too late.\\nThe Bata litigation has gone on for thirteen years. The suit in Delaware has lasted seven years. Now, at the last moment, Jan asks us, in effect, to open the door to a re-trial of the case on a theory known to him and his counsel for at least nine years, and expressly abandoned in the Delaware litigation. He has in our opinion failed to show reasonable diligence in obtaining and adducing the new evidence, and hence has failed to comply with one of the fundamental requirements for the granting of the relief he seeks.\\nThe petition to remand to permit a motion to reopen the case is denied.\\nWe turn now to the six other questions raised by the petition for reargument.\\nI. It is said that our decision in this case is based upon a collateral attack upon the probate proceedings in Czechoslovakia. These proceedings, it is said, were proceedings in rem; they administered and disposed of the estate of Thomas Bata in accordance with the will and sale memorandum left by him, and are conclusive against the World. Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch 423, 432, 11 U.S. 423, 432, 3 L.Ed. 392; Hapai v. Brown, 239 U.S. 502, 36 S.Ct. 201, 60 L.Ed. 407. Hence the title of Jan to the Leader shares, as part of Thomas' estate, was definitely determined in these probate proceedings, and their findings cannot be collaterally attacked.\\nThis contention is new to the Delaware case, but it is not a new idea. It was explicitly presented in the New York litigation, was vigorously pressed, and was rejected by the Supreme Court. On appeal in New York it was abandoned.\\nThere are three answers to this contention.\\n1. The contention is apparently based upon the same theory advanced in the New York case, i. e., that the Probate Court supervised the fulfillment of an unperformed contract of sale from Thomas to Jan, and delivered to the heirs, by way of the deed of delivery of June 28,1933, only the \\\"substitute estate\\\" consisting of a claim against Bata a. s.\\nThe first difficulty about this theory is that the probate proceedings were not based upon an unperformed contract of sale, but upon a supposed sale completed in Thomas' lifetime \\u2014 since determined to be a fiction. It was upon this theory that Jan added to his acceptance of the sale memorandum the phrase: \\\"that is to say, I agreed and purchased as per oral agreement\\\". There is nothing in the probate proceedings about an \\\"unperformed contract\\\". Hence the scope of the deed of delivery was not a recognition of the performance after death of the sale contract, and cannot be res judicata with respect to such performance. \\\"As the proceedings were conducted, there was no obligation of the estate to Jan whose satisfaction the Probate Court was obliged to supervise or determine.\\\" Per Mr. Justice Schreiber, 99 N.Y.S.2d 535, 575.\\n2. Whether Jan's alleged claim to Thomas' industrial property was based on a contract unperformed during Thomas' lifetime, or, alternatively, upon a sale consummated during Thomas' lifetime, is immaterial. In either case the District Court at Zlin had no jurisdiction to determine it, because it involved a sum exceeding 5,000 crowns. For a full discussion of this matter see the opinion of Mr. Justice Schreiber in the New York case. Bata v. Chase Safe Deposit Co., Sup., 99 N.Y.S. 2d 535, 570-576. We are in accord with his opinion for the reasons therein stated.\\n3. In the New York case, Jan made the express contention \\\"that the Deed of Delivery, executed by the Czech District Court on June 28,1933, is 'res ad judicata as to plaintiffs and estops them from asserting their present claim of ownership of the property formerly of Thomas Bata, including the shares of Leader.' \\\" 99 N.Y.S. 2d 570. After a thorough consideration of the contention Mr. Justice Schreiber concluded as follows (99 N.Y.S.2d 574) :\\n\\\"Since the District Court of Zlin, which functioned as the Probate Court in connection with the administration of the estate of Thomas Bata, was thus clearly without jurisdiction to determine the merits either of Jan's present claim of a contract unperformed at Thomas' death, or of his claim in the estate proceedings of a contract performed prior to Thomas' death, and since the court was obliged to accept as true and could not question the truth of plaintiffs' declaration in lieu of oath, it is evident that the decree or judgment of the Czech court, though in rem, is not res ad judie ata either as to the validity of Jan's claims or as to the composition, extent or nature of Thomas Bata's estate. Cases cited by Jan's counsel for the proposition that a decree in rem is binding are not applicable here, for in those cases the determinations relied upon as conclusive were made by courts which possessed jurisdiction to make said determinations.\\\"\\nThis finding is basic to the New York judgment and necessary to the determination of the heirs' title, because the Czech probate proceedings were invoked in that case, as they are now invoked here, as a final determination that title to the Leader shares passed to Jan. The New York finding in effect determined the \\\"ultimate fact\\\" that the heirs took title to the Leader shares under the deed of delivery. Hence it is a determination binding in this proceeding under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See the comments on this rule in our opinion on the merits. Bata v. Bata, ante p. 258, 163 A.2d 493.\\nFor all of the reasons above stated we think that the first ground for reargument is without merit.\\nAs a part of the discussion of this first ground, petitioner adds a contention which seems to have no connection with the effect of the probate proceedings. It is a contention relating to Westhold Corporation and North River Securities Corporation. These Delaware corporations are merely holding companies for certain of the Leader shares. The contention seems to be that because they were organized after Thomas' death and for a period were controlled by Jan, their shares are his property.\\nApparently counsel have overlooked that the only function of these corporations has been to hold title to the Leader shares for the benefit of the real owners. See the Chancellor's opinion on the merits. He says:\\n\\\"The Delaware corporations were created long after Thomas' death. It is agreed, however, that the ownership will follow, derivatively, the determination of ownership with respect to the Leader shares.\\\" Bata v. Hill, 37 Del.Ch. 96, 139 A.2d 159, 162.\\nFor the proceedings whereby the shares of these holding companies and the Leader certificates came to be deposited in the Court of Chancery, see the opinion of the Chancellor of March 8, 1955, prior to his opinion on the merits:\\n\\\"Those controlling North River concede that they hold the certificates [of Leader] for the party \\u2014 as between Jan versus Tom and his mother's estate \\u2014 who is determined to be the rightful owner. 35 Del.Ch. 154, 112 A.2d 519, 521.\\nFor a discussion of the status of Westhold, see the opinion of May 6, 1955. 35 Del.Ch. 184, 113 A.2d 740.\\nIt is entirely clear that the separate corporate existence of these two corporations ceased to have any significance by the time the case came on for trial.\\nJan's belated assertion of ownership of these corporations is wholly without merit.\\nII. Jan next invokes, as a citizen of Brazil, the protection of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of March 18, 1829, and of the Status of Aliens Treaty of June 6, 1930. By the former treaty each nation guarantees to the nationals of the other free access to judicial tribunals. By the latter, it is provided that states should extend to foreigners individual guarantees extended to their own nationals and the enjoyment of essential civil rights.\\nTo find in these provisions any pertinency to this litigation requires some ingenuity. Certainly Jan has been afforded access to the courts of this country to the same extent as a citizen. What counsel says is that the rights guaranteed by these treaties \\\"include the right to respect for the in rem Czechoslovakian Probate Proceedings\\\", and a \\\"right to proper recognition for the Dutch Decision\\\", and a \\\"right to an independent final determination by the Federal Courts\\\". The contention therefore reduces to a reiteration of the res judicata arguments based upon the prior proceedings. These arguments have been fully dealt with and rejected. It is now sought to reintroduce them in the guise of a federal question.\\nWe see no merit in this contention.\\nIII. Petitioner builds an argument upon one of the items listed in the May 10th sale memorandum. This item reads:\\n\\\"Bata Matschapai Amsterdam 51,000 Hol.fl.\\\"\\nThis, he says, refers to 51% of the shares of Bata Best. The Dutch Court of Appeals held, he says, that these shares belonged to him. Bata Best subscribed to 890 shares of Leader. Therefore, says petitioner, all the shares of Bata Best, and hence the 890 shares of Leader, have been adjudicated as his.\\nThere are several errors and fallacies in this reasoning.\\nFirst, Jan had 225 shares in Bata Best. These were the minority shares. The majority shares \\u2014 275\\u2014were owned by Leader. This is clear, not only from the New York record, but from the case in the Restitution Court, in which Jan complained that the cancellation of the shares issued under the German control would leave control of Bata Best with Leader.\\nSecond, although Bata Best subscribed to 890 shares of Leader, the certificates were deposited in a Zurich bank in the custody of Muska, as we have heretofore pointed out.\\nThird, the whole contention rests upon the assumption that the Dutch Court of Appeal finding of sales legacy is binding here. This question has been disposed of adversely to Jan.\\nWe find nothing of substance in this contention.\\nWith respect to all three of these contentions we note that none of them was made below, nor was any of them made on appeal. They are brought forward for the first time on reargument. We might have summarily refused to consider them because of the rule forbidding a change of legal theory at such a late stage of the proceeding. See Stephenson v. Commonwealth & Southern Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 211; cf. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del.Ch. 174, 91 A.2d 62, 34 A.L.R.2d 839.\\nBut petitioner has been required to bring new counsel into the case, because of the death of his former counsel. We have accordingly thought it desirable in this c\\u00e1se to deal with these matters on the merits.\\nIV. The next ground assigned concerned the Parry visit to Jan in Brazil in 1942. This resulted in an agreement for the control by a committee for the duration of the war of certain of the operating companies. This action was the outcome of the placing of Jan Bata on the British blacklist. It was a temporary expedient, devised to meet the difficult situation arising from Jan's refusal to state definitely who were the ultimate owners of the Bata enterprises. This is touched upon in our opinion on the merits. 163 A.2d 500.\\nThe agreement made no attempt to settle the matter of ownership of the Leader shares. It does deal with control, but there has never been any doubt about the fact that after the death of Thomas Jan succeeded to control of the enterprise.\\nThe Parry mission is one of those happenings during the war years which, as the Chancellor said, confuse, rather than assist the trial judge in reaching the basic issue.\\nV. Under the heading of \\\"Other Grounds\\\" the petitioner assails as erroneous the four principal questions dealt with in our opinion of August 3, 1960. No adequate reason is put forward as ground for changing our opinion or granting reargument on any of these points.\\nVI. Upon the hypothesis that reargument on the merits may be denied, Jan raises again the question of compensation. He cites Williams v. Gibbes, 20 How. 535, 61 U.S. 535, 15 L.Ed. 1013, for the proposition that if A renders service to B in recovering property under the belief that he is the owner of such property, A is entitled, upon the award of the property to B, to compensation out of the fund as a trustee. We have no quarrel with this general proposition. The difficulty is to apply it to the situation in this case. Although Jan filed his claim as a trustee, he was unwilling to give up his claim as owner of the minority shares. We gather that he is still unwilling to do so.\\nIn these circumstances, we are still unable to see how a proper award of compensation can be made until the disputed question of the ownership of those minority shares shall have been determined. See our opinion on this point, 163 A.2d 524. We are not unsympathetic with Jan's position, but we find no reason to change our opinion upon this matter.\\nJan contends that the requirement that he abandon his claim to the minority shares as a prerequisite to compensation is an unconstitutional attempt by the Delaware courts to reach property beyond their jurisdiction. On the contrary, the deposit is permissive, and the Chancellor's order, as modified by this Court, will be without prejudice to any future claim of Jan, both as to the minority shares and to compensation.\\nIt is suggested, alternatively, that the Leader shares should be retained in the custody of the court \\\"until the amount of his compensation is determined, \\\". We cannot follow this suggestion. As we have held, the amount of compensation depends somewhat upon Jan's ownership or nonownership of the minority shares. That question cannot be litigated in this proceeding, for the issue is not before the Court of Chancery. Is Jan suggesting that delivery of the Leader shares to the plaintiffs should be withheld indefinitely pending determination, in some proceeding not yet even begun, of the title to the minority shares ? Such an order, in our opinion, would be wholly unwarranted.\\nFor the reasons above set forth, the petition for reargument, including the petition to remand the cause to the lower court to permit petitioner to move to reopen it, is denied.\\nThere remains for consideration only a question of costs.\\nOn August 15, 1960, the appellees filed a certification of the costs of printing their appendix.\\nOn August 17, 1960, the appellant filed an application for a special order taxing the costs in this Court against appellees. Appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to this application.\\nIn the court below the Chancellor, citing Kennedy v. Emerald Coal & Coke Co., 27 Del.Ch. 55, 30 A.2d 269, held that the circumstances of this case justified the assessment of costs against the property in the court \\u2014 or against the successful plaintiffs if they preferred. Bata v. Hill, 37 Del.Ch. 363, 143 A.2d 728, 738.\\nWe are of the same opinion with respect to the costs in this Court. The circumstances of the case are highly unusual. It is unnecessary to set forth all the facts which make the case somewhat analogous to a case in which a fund is before the court for distribution.\\nAccordingly, the application of appellees that the certified costs be taxed against the appellant is denied.\\nAll of the costs in this Court will be taxed against the appellees.\\nIn accordance with the order of the Chief Justice of January 13, 1961, the issuance of the mandate of this Court is stayed for a period of ten days from the date of filing this opinion, in order to permit petitioner to make the application referred to in that order.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7291873.json b/delaware/7291873.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6e3f3e58d5f33a50a8b40a0ccff947c0a55bee96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7291873.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7291873\", \"name\": \"The Estate of Lucille OSBORN, by and through its Co-Executor/Executrix Lawrence Osborn and Sharon Gillespie, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Michael J. KEMP, Defendant Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Estate of Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-03-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 545, 2009\", \"first_page\": \"1153\", \"last_page\": \"1163\", \"citations\": \"991 A.2d 1153\", \"volume\": \"991\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:42:11.476201+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"The Estate of Lucille OSBORN, by and through its Co-Executor/Executrix Lawrence Osborn and Sharon Gillespie, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Michael J. KEMP, Defendant Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Estate of Lucille OSBORN, by and through its Co-Executor/Executrix Lawrence Osborn and Sharon Gillespie, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Michael J. KEMP, Defendant Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 545, 2009.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: March 3, 2010.\\nDecided: March 25, 2010.\\nDean A. Campbell, Law Office of Dean A. Campbell, LLC, Georgetown, Delaware for appellant.\\nBradley S. Eaby (argued) and Robert D. Cecil, Jr., The Eaby Firm, LLC, Dover, Delaware for appellee.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"4313\", \"char_count\": \"26537\", \"text\": \"STEELE, Chief Justice.\\nMichael Kemp signed a holographic real property sales contract with Lucille Osborn, and made monthly payments while living in her beach house for over 20 years. Osborn's estate asserts that Kemp signed a document for a leasehold interest, and appeals the Vice Chancellor's order to sell the house to him. Because the contract unambiguously expresses a purchase agreement; Kemp was ready, willing, and able to perform; and the balance of the equities tips toward specific performance, we AFFIRM.\\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURE POSTURE\\nOsborn lived in Wilmington and had a beach house in Slaughter Beach, Sussex County. Lucille and her husband bought the beach house back in 1968. The beach house had two floors which were divided into two separate apartments. In 1984, Osborn decided to rent out the top floor, but wanted to keep the bottom floor for herself, so she could enjoy the beach from time to time. Osborn found a lessee in Kemp and on November 9, 1984, Kemp began leasing the upper apartment at a rate of $275 a month, plus utilities. Later that year, Kemp's friend, Roxanne Dan-burg also moved in and both took to living in the upper apartment and have lived there ever since.\\nFrom the start Kemp wanted to buy the beach house and on April 16, 1985, Osborn and Kemp entered into an agreement which is the subject of this litigation. That day Osborn allegedly agreed to sell the beach house to Kemp. Kemp drafted the holographic document which provided, in its entirety,\\nI, Michael Kemp agree to pay Lucille Menicucci $275.00 per month plus utilities for twenty years for the purchase of property at 292 S. Delaware and Bay Ave. Slaughter Beach for $50,000.\\nKemp signed his name on the bottom right of the document and Osborn signed under Kemp's name. Osborn and Kemp decided to get the document notarized that very same day and, eventually, arrived at Cedar Creek Bait and Tackle Shop.\\nAt the bait shop, Joyce M. Macklin, a public notary, notarized the agreement and placed an embossed seal on the document. Macklin signed at the bottom, to the left of the signatures of both Osborn and Kemp. Macklin testified at trial that she remembered signing this document because she did not see many handwritten documents for the sale of real property. Macklin, however, could not recollect who brought her the document or how many people saw her notarize the document. Macklin testified that before she notarized a document, she customarily requested photo identification from the signatories.\\nAfter Macklin notarized the document, Osborn left with the original. She later photocopied the document and sent it to Kemp for his records. Soon after, Osborn remarried and signed an antenuptial agreement with her husband. The ante-nuptial agreement stated that Osborn owned the property in fee simple without mentioning the contract with Kemp.\\nBy the document's express terms, Kemp would pay $275 per month for twenty years. For those next twenty years, Kemp and Danburg lived together in the beach house. Kemp made $11,000 worth of improvements to the house. Kemp and Danburg made their scheduled payments lackadaisically, paying several months at once and frequently late, but, in the end, no dispute with Osborn arose over any missed payments. Kemp or Danburg would send payment to Osborn and she would send them a copy of the receipt. These receipts refer to the payments only as \\\"rent.\\\" Also, Osborn listed on a 2004 tax return that the payments made by Kemp and Danburg were \\\"rent\\\" and did not indicate Kemp's ownership stake.\\nBecause Osborn and Kemp consummated the deal in April of 1985, the installment payments were set to end in April of 2005. April, 2005 came and passed with little moment and more payments. In July, 2005, Kemp and Danburg sent Osborn a check for past \\\"rent\\\" for the months of May, June, and July. Kemp claims that he realized his error in August 2005 and stopped making payments. Kemp did not inquire about the overpay-ments because he assumed that Osborn would put them towards his utility bills. Kemp still did not have the deed and testified that sometime in August he spoke with Osborn about the deed transfer, but they did not set a firm date for the transfer.\\nAs of May 2006, Osborn still owned the property of record when tragedy struck. Osborn's neighbors in Wilmington found her unconscious on the floor of her home. Osborn never recovered and began to suffer from dementia. Fortunately for Osborn, her adoring niece, Sharon Gillespie, took care of her needs and soon assumed all of Osborn's affairs under a previously executed power of attorney. While going over Osborn's records, Gillespie noticed that Kemp had stopped making payments on the beach house. Osborn never told Gillespie, nor did Gillespie have any reason to know, about the holographic contract. Gillespie assumed that Kemp merely leased the beach house.\\nIn August 2006, Gillespie traveled to Slaughter Beach to inquire about the missed rent payments. According to Gillespie, Kemp apologized profusely and agreed to pay the back rent. Gillespie claims, and Kemp does not dispute, that Kemp did not mention anything about the contract, nor did Kemp assert any legal ownership interest in the beach house. Gillespie left that day with the understanding that Kemp would resume paying rent.\\nFrom that point on Kemp and Gillespie's relationship deteriorated. Kemp did not provide any funds and in January 2007, Gillespie hired a lawyer and served Kemp with a \\\"5-Day Notice\\\" to obtain past due rent and utilities payments. Kemp responded by sending Gillespie a copy of the copy of the installment contract and asserted that he had a property interest in the beach house. Gillespie was taken aback because this was the first time she knew about any claim of right on the property.\\nOn August 17, 2007, Gillespie filed suit on behalf of Osborn seeking a permanent injunction, declaratory judgment, and restitution against Kemp. Kemp answered and on August 8, 2008, Kemp amended his complaint to include a counterclaim for specific performance. The parties went to trial in the Court of Chancery on October 29, 2008. Osborn could not testify at trial because her mental faculties declined. She died on December 15, 2008. At the conclusion of the trial, the Vice Chancellor ordered specific performance and dismissed Osborn's complaint with prejudice.\\nThe Vice Chancellor issued a memorandum opinion in which, first, he found that the photocopy of the holographic installment contract is authentic and then held (1) the parties entered into a valid contract, (2) Kemp was ready, willing, and able to perform, and (3) the balance of the equities tipped in favor of specifically enforcing the contract. The Vice Chancellor also rejected Osborn's argument that the doctrine of laches barred Kemp's claim.\\nThe Vice Chancellor set the terms of specific performance as (1) Kemp must pay the Estate of Osborn $50,000 within 90 days, (2) Kemp must pay interest, compounded quarterly, accruing from April 16, 2005, (2) Kemp must remit to the Estate payment for utilities up until the present time, (3) Kemp must pay for the deed preparation and closing costs, (4) and the Estate would pay the transfer tax pursuant to 30 Del. C. \\u00a7 5412. Gillespie, as co-executrix of Osborn's estate, appeals the Vice Chancellor's decision.\\nII. ANALYSIS\\nWe review questions of law and interpret contracts de novo We review a trial judge's factual findings for clear error. We review the grant of specific performance for abuse of discretion.\\n1. Specific Performance\\nSpecific performance for the transfer of real property is an extraordinary remedy and we will not award it lightly. A party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to specific performance and that he or she has no adequate legal remedy. A party seeking specific performance must establish that (1) a valid contract exists, (2) he is ready, willing, and able to perform, and (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the party seeking performance. We will examine each element separately.\\n(a) Validity of the Contract\\nFirst, a valid contract exists when (1) the parties intended that the contract would bind them, (2) the terms of the contract are sufficiently definite, and (3) the parties exchange legal consideration. Gillespie does not seriously dispute that the parties intended to be bound nor does she dispute that consideration passed hands. We will only briefly examine these elements.\\nThe face of this contract manifests the parties' intent to bind one another contractually. Both parties signed the contract and had the contract notarized. The parties also exchanged consideration for the beach house. The Vice Chancellor could not have more correctly held that we limit our inquiry into consideration to its existence and \\\"not whether it is fair or adequate. Mere inadequacy of consideration, in the absence of any unfairness or overreaching, does not justify a denial of . specific performance where in other respects the contract conforms with the rules and principles of equity.\\\" Here, Kemp paid Osborn an uninterrupted stream of income for twenty years, plus, an additional $50,000 due at settlement. These payments indisputably constitute consideration.\\nGillespie does argue that the contract fails for indefiniteness and, thus, the Vice Chancellor erred by granting specific performance. Gillespie contends that we may reasonably interpret the price term in ways, which create an indefinite ambiguity, and obviates specific performance. Gillespie points to the \\\"$50,000\\\" term and asserts that when the contract is read in toto the term could mean that Kemp has the option of paying $50,000 after making all monthly payments to fully consummate the transaction, or that Kemp would make installment payments of $275 per month for twenty years, on a $50,000 base price with the overage consisting of an amalgamation of interest, fees, and carrying costs for which the parties did not expressly provide.\\nThe Vice Chancellor held that Kemp must pay $50,000 in order to obtain the property because (1) courts must read the contract in its entirety and give effect to all of its terms and provisions, and (2) the contract was ambiguous and applied the doctrine of contra proferentem to interpret the terms against the drafting party. The Vice Chancellor did not err when he held that he must read the contract in its entirety and give effect to all of its terms and provisions, however, the Vice Chancellor incorrectly found that the contract is ambiguous.\\n\\\"Delaware adheres to the 'objective' theory of contracts, i.e. a contract's construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.\\\" \\\"We will read a contract as a whole and we will give each provision and term effect, so as not to render any part of the contract mere surplusage.\\\" We will not read a contract to render a provision or term \\\"meaningless or illusory.\\\" \\\"[A] contract must contain all material terms in order to be enforceable, and specific performance will only be granted when an agreement is clear and definite and a court does not need to supply essential contract terms.\\\"\\nWhen the contract is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain-meaning of the contract's terms and provisions. On the contrary, when we may reasonably ascribe multiple and different interpretations to a contract, we will find that the contract is ambiguous. An unreasonable interpretation produces an absurd result or one that no reasonable person would have accepted when entering the contract.\\nIf a contract is ambiguous, we will apply the doctrine of contra proferentem against the drafting party and interpret the contract in favor of the non-drafting party. The parties' steadfast disagreement over interpretation will not, alone, render the contract ambiguous. The determination of ambiguity lies within the sole province of the court.\\nThis contract's only reasonable interpretation creates an installment contract with an option to purchase at the end of the term. The parties do not dispute the import of the $275 per month for twenty years. Under these terms, Kemp agreed to pay Osborn $275 a month for twenty years.\\nAs for the language \\\"purchase of property . for $50,000\\\", we let the plain-meaning of this term guide us. The contract includes a price term of $50,000 which clearly indicates that Kemp must remit $50,000 in additional proceeds to \\\"purchase\\\" the property. This prototypical condition commonly precedes the offeror's performance. Therefore, the ordinary, plain meaning of this term establishes installment payments with an option to purchase at the end of the term and obtain title.\\nAlternatively, if we read the $50,000 as the base price and the $16,000 as some arbitrary, unexplained interest or carry, calculated pursuant to a formula not found within the four corners of the contract, we would render the' explicit $50,000 purchase term meaningless or mere surplusage. The parties ask us to interpret the contract, contrary to both the plain meaning of the document and logic, and to reach an absurd, unfounded result. It stretches the bounds of reason to conclude that Osborn, a college graduate and professional tax preparer, would sell her property for a mere pittance based on an undefined, un specified, implicit term. We cannot countenance such an absurd interpretation of the contract.\\nWe hold that the unambiguous contract states a definite price term.\\n(b) Ready, Willing, and Able to Perform\\nWe will order specific performance only if a party is ready, willing, and able to perform under the terms of the agreement. Unless the contract provides that time is of the essence, we will permit the parties a reasonable time to obtain financing and conclude the transaction.\\nGillespie argues that Kemp is not ready, willing, and able to perform because he did not have the necessary financing at the time of trial. The Vice Chancellor found that Kemp could put the property up as collateral to obtain the funding and he held that Kemp had 90 days to exercise the option. We find no fault in the Vice Chancellor's reasoning. Kemp may put the property up as collateral and obtain financing. We hold that 90 days is a reasonable time period when a contract does not in-elude a \\\"time is of the essence\\\" clause to exercise an option to buy real property.\\n(c) Balance of Equities Tips in Favor of Kemp\\nLastly, we will only order specific performance where the balance of equities tips in favor of specific performance. When balancing the equities \\\"[we] must be convinced that 'specific enforcement of a validly formed contract would [not] cause even greater harm than it would prevent.' \\\"\\nGillespie argues that, when looking at the \\\"big picture,\\\" the balance of the equities tips against Kemp and specific performance. First, Gillespie introduced evidence that a one-story home in Slaughter Beach cost $106,000 in 1986 and that Kemp will only pay $116,000 for a far superior house, twenty years later. Second, Osborn did not increase the rent over the course of twenty years and Kemp received ample benefit from this cheap rental rate. Third, Kemp and Danburg started out living only on the second floor, but eventually occupied the entire house and, even when they occupied both floors, they did not pay increased rent. Fourth, Osborn paid all, and Kemp did not pay any, of the property taxes for twenty years. Finally, the Vice Chancellor erred by not taking into account the appreciation value of the property and the interest that would have accumulated when he held that the balance of equities tipped in favor of awarding specific performance.\\nWhile Gillespie has made a robust argument, the balance of the equities tips in favor of Kemp and specific performance. We recognize that real property is unique and often the law cannot adequately remedy a party's refusal to honor a real property contract. We also take note of the improvements that Kemp made to the property that cost him approximately $11,000. If we add this to the Vice Chancellor's $116,000 purchase price, then the $127,000 total amount further tips the scales against Gillespie's proffered property that sold for $106,000 in 1986. Osborn not only received an income stream for twenty years, but she also used the first floor of the property for her personal use over the course of the contract. Osborn indisputably benefited from this arrangement.\\nWe do not discount that beach front property has appreciated over the span of twenty years, however, the \\\"mere increase in land values, unaccompanied by other circumstances showing inequity, is not such hardship as justifies a court of equity in denying specific performance.\\\"\\nFinally, and most importantly, Kemp and Danburg lived in this property for twenty years. They made it their home. Equity would not be served by ousting Kemp and Danburg from their long-time residence.\\nIn sum, we affirm the order for specific performance because the parties validly executed a contract; the party seeking specific performance is ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract; and the balance of equities tips in favor of specific performance.\\n2. The Doctrine of Laches\\nGillespie next contends that the Vice Chancellor erred when he held that the doctrine of laches did not bar Kemp's petition for specific performance. \\\"[L]aches generally requires the establishment of three things: first, knowledge by the claimant; second, unreasonable delay in bringing the claim, and third, resulting prejudice to the defendant.\\\" While the doctrine of laches does not prescribe a specific time bar to determine reasonableness, we traditionally have taken into account the legal statute of limitations when assessing whether the party unreasonably delayed bringing suit. The analogous statute of limitations in this action is three years.\\nWe hold that Kemp did not unreasonably delay bringing this suit. Under the terms of the agreement, Kemp completed performance on April 16, 2005. Kemp testified that he informed Osborn in August 2005 that he had completed performance and asked her to transfer title to the property. Osborn never transferred title, but because of their close personal relationship and course of dealing over twenty years, Kemp had no reason to believe that he would not receive the deed at some point. When Gillespie assumed Osborn's affairs, in August 2006, she requested that Kemp renew paying rents. Kemp responded in January 2007 by asserting his ownership interest in the property.\\nThese facts indicate a continued, albeit lethargic, series of actions taken by Kemp to assert his ownership interest in the property. Kemp twice asserted his ownership interest in the property and eventually furnished a copy of the installment contract. Therefore, Gillespie has failed to show that Kemp unreasonably delayed bringing this action.\\nIII. CONCLUSION\\nFor the aforementioned reasons we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Chancery. The parties shall follow the Vice Chancellor's order of specific performance as outlined in his opinion of August 20, 2009.\\n. Sharon Gillespie, who brought this suit on behalf of the Estate of Lucille Osborn, also contended in the Court of Chancery that Osborn's signature was a forgery and presented an expert witness to dispute the authenticity of the signature. The expert witness could not determine whether the signature was a forgery. Gillespie has not raised this as an issue on appeal.\\n. Gillespie contends that Osborn reimbursed Kemp for these improvements and produced receipts which Gillespie claims showed that Osborn repaid Kemp for his expenditures. But these receipts to do not explicitly state that they were receipts reimbursing Kemp for improvements.\\n. The Vice Chancellor devoted a significant portion of his opinion establishing the documents' authenticity, however, Gillespie does not challenge the Vice Chancellor's ruling on that issue on appeal.\\n. The Vice Chancellor offset these payments by requiring the parties to take into account Kemp's payments made after April 2005.\\n. Kuhn Construction, Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp., 2010 WL 779992, *2 (Del. Mar. 8, 2010).\\n. Olson v. Halvorsen, 986 A.2d 1150, 1157 (Del.2009).\\n. U.S. Dimension Products, Inc. v. Tassette, Inc., 290 A.2d 634, 635 (Del.1972).\\n. Szambelak v. Tsipouras, 2007 WL 4179315, at *1 (Del.Ch. Nov. 19, 2007) (\\\"[Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy....\\\") (Letter Opinion); see also Morabito v. Harris, 2002 WL 550117, at *1 (Del.Ch. Mar. 26, 2002) (\\\"Specific performance is a remedy predicated upon the exercise of equitable discretion....\\\") (Letter Opinion).\\n. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 834 n. 112 (Del.Ch.2007); see also Deene v. Peterman, 2007 WL 2162570, at *5 (Del.Ch. July 12, 2007); (\\\"In other words, the court must be certain of the essential elements of the contractual obligation it is asked to enforce.\\\").\\n. West Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, 2007 WL 3317551, at *12 (Del.Ch. Nov. 2, 2007) (\\\"The party seeking specific performance must show that there is no adequate remedy at law.\\\").\\n. Morabito, 2002 WL 550117, at *2.\\n. Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 524 (Del.Ch.2006) (\\\"Three elements are necessary to prove the existence of an enforceable contract: 1) the intent of the parties to be bound by it, 2) sufficiently definite terms and 3) consideration.\\\").\\n. Osborn v. Kemp, 2009 WL 2586783, at *8 (Del.Ch. Aug. 20, 2009) (citing Glenn v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 101 A.2d 339, 344 (Del.Ch.1953)).\\n. Walton v. Beale, 2006 WL 265489, at *5 (Del.Ch. Jan. 30, 2006) (holding that essential terms are \\\"price, date of settlement, and the property to be sold\\\").\\n. NBC Universal v. Paxson Commons, 2005 WL 1038997, at *5 (Del.Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).\\n. Kuhn Construction, Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp., 2010 WL 779992, *2 (Del. Mar. 8, 2010).\\n. Sonitrol Holding Co. v. Marceau Investissements, 607 A.2d 1177, 1183 (Del.1992) (\\\"Under general principles of contract law, a contract should be interpreted in such a way as to not render any of its provisions illusory or meaningless.\\\").\\n. Ramone v. Lang, 2006 WL 905347, at *10 (Del.Ch. Apr. 3, 2006).\\n. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Del.1992) (\\\"Clear and unambiguous language . should be given its ordinary and usual meaning.\\\").\\n. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Delaware Racing Ass'n, 840 A.2d 624, 628 (Del.2003); see also Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co., 616 A.2d at 1195 (\\\"[A] contract is ambiguous only when the provisions in controversy are reasonably v or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.\\\").\\n. Gore v. Beren, 254 Kan. 418, 867 P.2d 330, 337 (1994) (\\\"In placing a construction on a written instrument, reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations are favored by law. Results which vitiate the purpose or reduce terms of the contract to an absurdity should be avoided.\\\"); Born v. Hammond, 218 Md. 184, 146 A.2d 44, 47 (1958) (\\\"[I]f a contract was susceptible of two constructions, one of which would produce an absurd result and the other of which would carry out the purpose of the agreement, the latter construction should be adopted.\\\"); Huntington on the Green Condo. v. Lemon Tree I-Condo. 874 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (\\\"[I]f one interpretation would lead to an absurd conclusion, then such interpretation should be abandoned and the one adopted which would accord with reason and probability.\\\") (citation omitted).\\n. In re Appraisal of Metromedia Intern. Group, Inc., 2009 WL 1509182, at *2 n. 10 (Del.Ch. May 28, 2009) (Letter Opinion).\\n. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co., 616 A.2d at 1195 (\\\"A contract is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree upon its proper construction.\\\").\\n. Morabito v. Harris, 2002 WL 550117, at *2 (Del.Ch. Mar.26, 2002).\\n. Bryan v. Moore, 863 A.2d 258, 260 (Del.Ch.2004) (\\\" 'Generally time is not of the essence in suits to specifically enforce a contract for the sale of land' and will not be of the essence unless it is specifically stated in the contract.\\\") (quoting Butzke v. Beach Homes, Inc., 1984 WL 159380, at *2 (Del.Ch. Apr. 2, 1984)).\\n. See Williston on Contracts \\u00a7 67:15 (2009) (\\\"A prospective purchaser is not able to perform . for purposes of obtaining specific performance, when funds from third parties are needed to make the purchase, and those parties are not bound to furnish the money. A purchaser will be deemed ready and able to perform, by contrast, and the contract will be specifically enforced, where the agreement is subject to financing, and the purchaser is able to obtain it.\\\").\\n. Morabito, 2002 WL 550117, at *2.\\n. Szambelak v. Tsipouras, 2007 WL 4179315, at *7 (Del.Ch. Nov. 19, 2007) (quoting Walton v. Beale, 2006 WL 265489, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2006)); see also Morabito, 2002 WL 550117, at *2 (\\\"The balance of equities issue 'reflects] the traditional concern of a court of equity that its special processes not be used in a way that unjustifiably increases human suffering.' \\\") (quoting Bernard Pers. Consultants, Inc. v. Mazarella, 1990 WL 124969, at *3 (Del.Ch. Aug. 28, 1990)).\\n. If you add the $50,000 payment ordered by the Vice Chancellor and the $66,000 which was the total payment of $275 a month for twenty years this equals the $116,000.\\n. Szambelak, 2007 WL 4179315, at *7 (\\\"Real property is unique; thus, specific performance of a real estate sale contract is often the only adequate remedy for a breach by the seller, except in rare circumstances.\\\").\\n. Cunningham v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 118 A.2d 611, 614 (Del.1955).\\n. Morabito, 2002 WL 550117, at *3 (holding that a family would experience significant hardship because an order of specific performance cast the family out of their home and render them homeless).\\n. Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182-83 (Del.2009) (quoting Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 210 (Del.2005)).\\n. Id. at 183.\\n. 10 Del. C. \\u00a7 8106.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7294510.json b/delaware/7294510.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1528aaddede98f25d526671064504b62c605ed82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7294510.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7294510\", \"name\": \"Paul J. MCLAUGHLIN and Lisa C. McLaughlin, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY, Ronald Fuller and Kristine Fuller, Jeffrey Martin and Valerie Martin, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McLaughlin v. Board of Adjustment\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-12-07\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 15,2009\", \"first_page\": \"1190\", \"last_page\": \"1194\", \"citations\": \"984 A.2d 1190\", \"volume\": \"984\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:50:27.621729+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Paul J. MCLAUGHLIN and Lisa C. McLaughlin, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY, Ronald Fuller and Kristine Fuller, Jeffrey Martin and Valerie Martin, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Paul J. MCLAUGHLIN and Lisa C. McLaughlin, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY, Ronald Fuller and Kristine Fuller, Jeffrey Martin and Valerie Martin, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees.\\nNo. 15,2009.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Oct. 14, 2009.\\nDecided: Dec. 7, 2009.\\nLisa C. McLaughlin, Phillips Goldman & Spence, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for appellants.\\nJeffrey K. Martin, Martin & Associates, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for appellees.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1584\", \"char_count\": \"10295\", \"text\": \"STEELE, Chief Justice:\\nPaul and Lisa McLaughlin appeal from a Superior Court judgment affirming two decisions of the New Castle County Board of Adjustment granting area variances for two property owners. The McLaughlins contend the Board incorrectly applied the analysis we established in Board of Adjustment of New Castle County v. KwikCheck Realty, Inc and failed to consider the degree of and the need for the variances and the impact of the subdivisions. Because we find no error in the Board's application of the Kwikr-Check factors or the Superior Court's judgment, we also AFFIRM.\\nFactual Background and Procedural Background\\nFuller Application\\nOn July 14, 2006, the Fullers requested a dimensional/area variance to support a three-lot subdivision of their 1.85-acre parcel, located in Sedgely Farms, Wilmington, Delaware. Because of the unusual location of the property, two of the three proposed lots required variances. During the Board's hearing on August 24, 2006, the Fullers stated their intent to subdivide the property because Mrs. Fuller's multiple sclerosis had caused financial hardship. The Board considered a Recommendation Report by the Department of Land Use, reviewing and discussing the legal standards governing a Board's decision to grant a variance pursuant to 9 Del. C. \\u00a7 1352 and Kwih-Check.\\nThe Department concluded that the variances would neither seriously affect the neighboring properties nor adversely affect the area, and that \\\"the hardship as a result of a denial will outweigh the minimal likely effect on neighboring properties if the variance is granted.\\\" Despite opposition from neighbors, the Board granted the variances, subject to three conditions: (1) no further subdivision of the lot retained by the Fullers, (2) that the Fullers submit a comprehensive stormwater management plan for review by New Castle County, and (3) that the Fullers provide landscaping between the newly created lots and the adjoining property.\\nMartin Application\\nOn January 31, 2007, the Martins requested a dimensional/area variance to support the subdivision of their 2.35 acre-parcel, located at Sedgely Farms. At the Board's hearing on April 12, 2007, Valerie Martin testified about the disrepair of her home and her intent to subdivide the property to help finance a new home. The Board considered the Recommendation Report by the Department, which favored granting the variances. On June 22, 2007, the Board granted the variances.\\nClaims on Appeal\\nThe McLaughlins petitioned the Superi- or Court for a writ of certiorari for both variances. The Superior Court issued a consolidated Opinion and Order affirming the Board's decisions in both cases. This appeal followed.\\nThe gist of the McLaughlins' three assignments of error is that the Board misapplied the Kwik-Check factors. Particularly, they contend that under the Kwik-Check analysis, the Board may grant an area variance solely for economic reasons only if it finds that the variance is minimal and that the Board errs when it fails to consider and determine the extent of the requested variances.\\nSecond, the McLaughlins claim Kwik-Check required the Board to consider the effects of the subdivisions on the community resulting from the variances, and that the Board misapplied Kwik-Check by considering only the variances' effect, and not the subdivisions' effects. Finally, the McLaughlins contend that because Fuller and Martin created the difficulties underlying their request for variances, the Board erred by finding simply that the Fullers and the Martins demonstrated \\\"exceptional practical difficulties.\\\"\\nStandard of Review\\nUpon review of a Zoning Board decision, we apply the same standard as applied by the Superior Court. We limit our review to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's findings of fact. When sufficient evidence exists, we will not reweigh it and substitute our own judgment for that of the Board.\\nDiscussion\\nWe agree with the Superior Court's well-reasoned discussion of the McLaugh-lins' claims in McLaughlin v. Board of Adjustment of New Castle County, C.A. No. 07A-07-003, and find no error. Accordingly, while we affirm on the basis of the opinion below, we make these additional observations.\\nIn their briefs, the McLaughlins contend that the Board may grant an area variance solely for economic reasons only if it finds that the variance is minimal. In Kwik-Check, we rejected a similar position advanced by the Board and observed that under the exceptional practical difficulty test \\\"[a] practical difficulty is present where the requested dimensional change is minimal and the harm to the applicant if the variance is denied will be greater than the probable effect on neighboring properties if the variance is granted.\\\"\\nOur statement, on which the McLaugh-lins rely, does not mandate that the Board make a separate analytic step when considering an \\\"economically motivated\\\" application for an area variance. Rather, our observation was a specific example of how the Board should consider the four factors, weighing the potential harm to the neighboring properties by granting the variance against the potential harm to the property owner by denying it. Because the McLaughlins' first claim of error rests on an incorrect premise, it must fail.\\nThe McLaughlins' next assignment of error\\u2014that the Board erred by failing to evaluate the effects of the subdivisions on the neighboring properties\\u2014raises a factual issue without regard to the record. Several concerns raised by opposing residents included adverse effect on property values, stormwater management, private nature of lots, and lot size in keeping with the community. For the Fuller variance, the record shows that the Board placed three conditions on its grant \\\"to satisfy concerns voiced by Sedgely Farms residents.\\\"\\nSimilarly, in its decision on the Martin application, the Board discussed the opposing neighbors' concerns and stated that the Martins would address the stormwa-ter, drainage, and landscaping issues raised by the subdivisions. The record sufficiently demonstrates that the Board considered the effects of subdividing and recommended mechanisms to minimize any potential negative effects the variances had, and that these ultimate subdivisions might cause, to the community.\\nThe McLaughlins third claim of legal error is that the Board misapplied the law because it could not properly find that the Fullers and the Martins showed \\\"exceptional practical difficulties\\\" because the Fullers and the Martins created those very difficulties. The McLaughlins rely on the principle that \\\"[a] self-imposed condition or violation which gives rise to a form of self-imposed hardship is generally not such hardship as is sufficient to sustain a variance.\\\" They contend that the Fullers and the Martins \\\"self-created\\\" their need for the variances. Granting the variances would therefore \\\"sanction[ ] or reward[ ] code violations, and thus, stimulate[e] their occurrence.\\\"\\nThis claim of error must fail because the variances remedied difficulties that were not self-created; rather, the Fullers' and the Martins' respective difficulties resulted from inherent and pre-existing characteristics of their properties that operate to preclude subdivisions that would otherwise be permitted. Particularly, the variances remedy the idiosyncratic location of the Fuller property at the end of a private driveway and the smaller lot width of the Martin property.\\nAssuming arguendo that the Fullers and the Martins created the difficulties that generated the need for variances, that alone would not suffice to deny the variances. \\\"In Delaware, there is no per se bar against a variance for a self-imposed hardship.\\\" The question is whether an applicant has adequately demonstrated that his difficulty justifies the grant of a variance.\\n9 Del. C. \\u00a7 1352(a)(3) empowers the Board to grant variances \\\"where, owing to special conditions or exceptional situation[s], a literal interpretation of the provisions of any zoning ordinance, code or regulation will result in . exceptional practical difficulties to the owner of property so that the spirit of the ordinance, code, or regulation shall be observed and substantial justice done.\\\" The special characteristics of the two subject properties were properly found to constitute \\\"special conditions or exceptional situation[s]\\\" creating the Fullers' and the Martins' difficulties.\\nConclusion\\nBecause the Board did not err in its application of the Kwik-Check factors and its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.\\n. Ronald and Kristine Fuller and Jeffrey and Valerie Martin, respectively.\\n. 389 A.2d 1289 (Del.1978).\\n. The Fuller property is zoned NC-15, a classification requiring a minimum lot size of 15,000 square feet, frontage on a public street, 100 feet of lot width, 40 feet front and rear yard setbacks, and 12 feet side yard setback.\\n. 389 A.2d 1289 (Del.1978).\\n. The Martin property is also zoned NC-15, but does not have 100 feet of lot width.\\n. Janaman v. New Castle County Bd. Of Adjustment, 364 A.2d 1241, 1241 (Del.Super.1976), aff'd, 379 A.2d 1118 (Del. 1977) (TABLE); Cooch's Bridge Civic Ass'n v. Pencader Corp., 254 A.2d 608, 609-10 (Del. 1969). See also Sawers v. New Castle County Bd. Of Adjustment, 550 A.2d 35 (TABLE), 1988 WL 117514 at *2 (Del. Oct. 26, 1988).\\n. Groves v. Bd. Of Adjustment of Sussex County, 1987 WL 25469, at *1 (Del.Super.Nov. 10, 1987) (citing Searles v. Darling, 83 A.2d 96 (Del.1951)).\\n. Kwik-Check, 389 A.2d at 1291. (emphasis added).\\n. Janaman, 364 A.2d at 1243.\\n. Id.\\n. CCS Investors LLC v. Brown, 977 A.2d 301, 314 (Del.2009) (reviewing the grant of a use variance).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7313588.json b/delaware/7313588.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f44527c3c8600440a39ac7d1bc5bac6970ff4e37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7313588.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7313588\", \"name\": \"Sheldon H. SOLOW, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ASPECT RESOURCES, LLC, Aspect Energy, LLC, Aspect Management Corp., and Alex M. Cranberg, Defendants Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Solow v. Aspect Resources, LLC\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 484, 2011\", \"first_page\": \"1074\", \"last_page\": \"1076\", \"citations\": \"46 A.3d 1074\", \"volume\": \"46\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:20:45.230271+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Sheldon H. SOLOW, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ASPECT RESOURCES, LLC, Aspect Energy, LLC, Aspect Management Corp., and Alex M. Cranberg, Defendants Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Sheldon H. SOLOW, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ASPECT RESOURCES, LLC, Aspect Energy, LLC, Aspect Management Corp., and Alex M. Cranberg, Defendants Below, Appellees.\\nNo. 484, 2011.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 25, 2012.\\nDecided: March 16, 2012.\\nCorrected: March 19, 2012.\\nReargument and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 5, 2012.\\nR. Karl Hill, Esquire and Patricia P. McGonigle, Esquire, Seitz, Van Ogtrop & Green, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. Of Counsel: Ira Lee Sorkin, Esquire, Donald A. Corbett, Esquire (argued) and Daniel K. Roque, Esquire, Lowenstein Sandler PC, New York, New York for Appellants.\\nJon E. Abramczyk, Esquire (argued) and Matthew R. Clark, Esquire, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellees.\\nBefore BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"974\", \"char_count\": \"6018\", \"text\": \"BERGER, Justice:\\nIn this appeal we consider whether the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's amended complaint for failure to prosecute. Appellant contends that, notwithstanding more than two years of inactivity, it established good cause for its failure to prosecute \\u2014 change of counsel and settlement negotiations. The trial court found that Appellant's showing was insufficient to overcome the long delay. We find no abuse of discretion, and affirm.\\nFactual and Procedural Background\\nIn June 2008, Sheldon H. Solow filed this action against Aspect Resources, LLC and related parties. Solow claims that Aspect breached a limited partnership agreement under which another limited partnership was formed to seek out, acquire and develop oil and gas producing properties through the use of three-dimensional seismic technology. After the trial court dismissed several of Solow's claims, he amended his complaint in February 2004. Aspect again moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. In October 2004, the court granted the motion to dismiss but denied the motion for summary judgment.\\nSolow filed document requests in December 2004, but took no further action for the next 21 months. He resumed litigation in October 2006. During the period from October 2006 through July 2008, So-low filed requests for discovery, took and defended a few depositions, and filed a second amended complaint. Thereafter, Solow took no action to pursue his claims. During this period of inactivity, Solow's New York and local counsel withdrew from representing him. By letter dated March 13, 2009, Solow advised the court that he was appearing pro se until he retained new counsel. There were no docket entries in this case from April 2009 until January 2011.\\nOn January 11, 2011, the trial court sent a- status letter to former counsel advising that there was no activity for more than one year, and that the court might dismiss the ease without further notice under Chancery Court Rule 41(e). No party responded to the court's status letter, and the case was dismissed on March 9, 2011. Four months later, Solow's former counsel advised the court that Solow did not receive the January status letter until recently. Former counsel requested that the order of dismissal be vacated and that Solow be given 20 days to submit a case management order to govern future proceedings.\\nThe court gave Solow until August 1, 2011, to move to vacate the order. Shortly before the due date, new counsel appeared on behalf of Solow, and his motion to vacate was timely filed. In it, Solow argued that the \\\"good reason\\\" for his inaction was that he was actively seeking new counsel and that he was engaged in substantive settlement negotiations. Opposing counsel described the settlement discussions as \\\"wholly conceptual,\\\" and added that the parties never discussed a stay. The trial court decided that Solow did not establish good cause for his inaction. By letter dated August 11, 2011, the court dismissed this case for failure to prosecute. This appeal followed.\\nDiscussion\\nDelaware trial courts have inherent power to control their dockets. Consistent with that power, Court of Chancery Rule 41(e) provides for involuntary dismissal of cases where there has been no action for one year:\\nRule 41(e) Inaction for 1 year; dismissal. [I]n each cause pending wherein no action has been taken for a period of 1 year, the Court may upon application of any party, or on its own motion, and after reasonable notice, enter an order dismissing such cause unless good reason for the inaction is given....\\nIn deciding what constitutes \\\"good reason\\\" the court should balance the reasons for, and length of the delay, against the policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits. This Court reviews the trial court's decision for abuse- of discretion, which has been explained as follows:\\nJudicial discretion is the exercise of judgment directed by conscience and reason, and when a court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused.\\nIn this case, Solow took no action for more than two years. His explanation for the delay is that he was looking for new counsel and engaged in settlement negotiations. In his affidavit, Solow's General Counsel acknowledged that he and Solow were looking for new counsel for more than a year. But there is nothing to suggest why such a long search was necessary. As for the settlement discussions, Aspect describes them as \\\"conceptual\\\" and makes the point that there were never any discussions about staying the litigation. In sum, it has been almost 9 years since Solow filed suit, and for the past 2 years he allowed his claims to languish. The Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.\\nConclusion\\nBased on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED.\\n. Coleman v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC, 902 A.2d 1102, 1107 (Del.2006).\\n. Draper v. Medical Center of Delaware, 767 A.2d 796, 798 (Del.2001).\\n. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del.1988).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7331851.json b/delaware/7331851.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..520c2a8dc673258589155079e3c0680c5acfa1b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7331851.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7331851\", \"name\": \"Dennis VINCENT, Claimant Below-Appellant, v. EASTERN SHORE MARKETS, Employer Below-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vincent v. Eastern Shore Markets\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-04-07\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 561, 2008\", \"first_page\": \"160\", \"last_page\": \"165\", \"citations\": \"970 A.2d 160\", \"volume\": \"970\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:39:45.711459+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Dennis VINCENT, Claimant Below-Appellant, v. EASTERN SHORE MARKETS, Employer Below-Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Dennis VINCENT, Claimant Below-Appellant, v. EASTERN SHORE MARKETS, Employer Below-Appellee.\\nNo. 561, 2008.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: March 10, 2009.\\nDecided: April 7, 2009.\\nWalt F. Schmittinger, Esquire and Kristi N. Vitola, Esquire of Schmittinger and Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware, for appellant.\\nJohn J. Klusman, Esquire and Leroy A. Tice, Esquire of Tybout Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2129\", \"char_count\": \"12985\", \"text\": \"RIDGELY, Justice.\\nClaimant-Appellant Dennis Vincent appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the Industrial Accident Board's (the \\\"IAB\\\" or the \\\"Board\\\") dismissal of Vincent's petition to determine compensation due. Vincent raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that in dismissing the petition, the Board violated his due process rights and the notice requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (the \\\"APA\\\"). Second, he contends that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We find merit to Vincent's first argument and reverse.\\nI. Facts and Procedural History\\nVincent sustained an injury to his lumbar spine while working for Employer-Appellee Eastern Shore Markets (\\\"ESM\\\") in July 2000. ESM accepted his injury as a compensable work injury and paid Vincent disability benefits, permanency, and medical expenses arising out of his injury. On December 6, 2007, Vincent filed a petition for compensation due with the IAB, seeking payment of additional medical expenses. An evidentiary hearing was set for May 15, 2008.\\nESM sent a letter to Vincent's counsel requesting production of several items in connection with the petition, including copies of all medical bills claimed due and owing, as well as documentation regarding the relationship between the bills and the work accident and indicating the bills had been forwarded to the worker's compensation carrier for payment. Two days later, ESM sent a second letter to Vincent's counsel requesting that he \\\"specifically identify the medical treatment which is the subject of this Petition.\\\" Vincent responded to ESM's requests through counsel, stating that it was his \\\"understanding that the doctor feels he needs to see the patient more often than three or four visits per year.\\\" However, Vincent's response did not include any bills or notes from his treating physician.\\nESM requested that the IAB schedule a legal hearing because Vincent had allegedly \\\"failed and refused to respond to the Employer's Request for Production which was served on [his] counsel.\\\" A hearing was scheduled for February 6, 2008. Before the hearing, Vincent produced a copy of the medical records and office notes of his treating physician to ESM. ESM replied:\\nWe have received your recent correspondence forwarding the medical bills of Dr. Balu/Pain Management and Rehabilitation/Professional Anesthesia Services. First and foremost, the worker's compensation carrier will not pay your bill for copies of medical records so I am returning that herewith. Second, as to the statement of Professional Anesthesia Services, that bill has a zero balance. Finally, as to the bill of Dr. Balu, please be advised that the carrier will not voluntarily pay for this medical expense. Please accept this correspondence as notice of denial pursuant to Board Rule 4. Please also confirm that this is the only medical bill at issue in connection with your client's petition as previously requested by Mr. Klusman. If there are other bills at issue, please confirm the same in writing, noting specifically what treatment is at issue. Until such time as we receive this confirmation, we will be unable to cancel the legal hearing now scheduled to occur on February 6, 2008.\\nI look forward to hearing from you.\\nVincent did not so confirm and the hearing was not cancelled. The IAB heard arguments from both parties at the February 6th hearing. Vincent stated that all bills were sent to ESM in response to the request for production and that there were no additional outstanding bills at that time. ESM argued that the bill submitted had been settled in a prior agreement and, therefore, the petition should be dismissed. Vincent objected because there was no notice of a motion to dismiss and the only issue at the motion hearing was a request for production regarding a written confirmation that there were no other bills.\\nThe Board then asked ESM what it was seeking and ESM responded that it was requesting that the case be dismissed. The Board granted the dismissal because \\\"[i]t seems like it's the same bill\\\" and signed a form of order dismissing Vincent's petition.\\nVincent appealed the dismissal of his petition to the Superior Court. The court affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Vincent was not denied due process because he was aware of why the hearing was scheduled and that the IAB's decision to dismiss the petition was supported by substantial evidence.\\nII. Discussion.\\nOur review of IAB decisions is limited. We review the record to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. \\\"Where the issue raised on appeal from a Board decision involves exclusively a question of the proper application of the law, our review is de novo.\\\" Absent any errors of law, we review for abuse of discretion.\\nVincent contends that the Board violated due process and the notice requirements of the APA when it dismissed his petition to determine additional compensation due. Vincent argues that he had no notice that the Board would be considering a motion to dismiss the petition at the February 6th hearing.\\nThe proceedings of the IAB are governed by both the requirements of due process and the APA. \\\"In the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory administrative power, administrative hearings, like judicial proceedings, are governed by fun damental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process, including fair notice of the scope of the proceedings and adherence of the agency to the stated scope of the proceedings.\\\"\\nDue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical notion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; rather it is a flexible concept which calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands. As it relates to the requisite characteristics of the proceeding, due process entails providing the parties with the opportunity to be heard, by presenting testimony or otherwise, and the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved in an orderly proceeding appropriate to the nature of the hearing and adapted to meet its ends. Further, due process requires that the notice inform the party of the time, place, and date of the hearing and the subject matter of the proceedings.\\nAdditionally, under the APA, whenever the IAB proposes to proceed with a case decision, it must provide notice to all parties. The parties agree that the Board's dismissal of Vincent's petition is a \\\"case decision\\\" within the meaning of the APA. Whenever the Board proposes to proceed with a case decision, it must give twenty days prior notice that includes:\\n(1) The notice shall describe the subject matter of the proceedings;\\n(2) The notice shall inform the parties of the opportunity, if permitted by law, to elect to proceed by informal fact finding and of the date by which such election must be made;\\n(3) The notice shall give the date, time and place the formal hearing will be held if informal fact-finding is not elected;\\n(4) The notice shall cite the law or regulation giving the agency authority to act;\\n(5) The notice shall inform the party of the right to present evidence, to be represented by counsel and to appear personally or by other representative; and\\n(6) The notice shall inform the parties of the agency's obligation to reach its decision based upon the evidence received.\\nIn this case, the Board provided the following notice:\\nYOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT, in accordance with the rules, your appearance at the offices of the Board is requested in the above captioned matter:\\nDATE: February 6, 2008\\nTIME: 09:00 A.M.\\nLOCATION: 24 N.W. Front Street, Suite 100, Milford, DE 19968\\nOFFICE OF WORKERS COMPENSATION\\nWhile the notice given stated the date, time and place of the formal hearing as required by due process and paragraph (3) of Section 10122, it failed to comply with Section 10122 in every other respect, including a description of the subject matter of the proceedings.\\nThe purpose of the February 6th hearing related to a request for production. Nothing in the record suggests Vincent knew or should have known that the hearing could lead to the dismissal of his petition on the merits. Both parties agree that the Board's decision was a \\\"case decision\\\" within the meaning of 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10102(3). Therefore, Section 10122 requires that the Board provide notice to the parties in a proceeding before it containing certain elements prior to proceeding to a case decision. Similarly, while due process is flexible, its fundamental requirement in agency proceedings is fairness, including fair notice of the scope of the proceedings and adherence of the agency to the stated scope. The Board's decision to dismiss Vincent's petition on its merits exceeded the scope of the notice provided to the parties and did not comport with either due process or the APA.\\nIII. Conclusion\\nWe reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\\n. See 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10101-10161.\\n. Because we remand for an evidentiary hearing on the merits, Vincent's second argument is not ripe for review.\\n. See Vincent v. Eastern Shore Markets, I.A.B., No. 1171932 (Feb. 8, 2008) [IAB Decision].\\n. See Vincent v. Eastern Shore Markets, Del.Super., No. 08A-03-001 (Oct. 29, 2008). [Superior Court Decision ].\\n. See Histed v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del.1993); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del.1965); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del.1960); see also 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10142(d).\\n. Baughan v. Wal-Mart Stores, 947 A.2d 1120, 2008 WL 1930576, at *2 (Del.2008) (Table); see also Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132 (Del.1989).\\n. Baughan, 2008 WL 1930576, at *2; see also Digiacomo v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. in Wilmington, 507 A.2d 542, 546 (Del.1986); Histed, 621 A.2d at 342.\\n. See Pusey v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 596 A.2d 1367, 1369, 1370 (Del.1991); Phillips v. Delhaize America, Inc., 2007 WL 2122139, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. July 20, 2007) (citing 19 Del. C. \\u00a7 2301A(d) and 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10161).\\n. Phillips, 2007 WL 2122139, at *2. (citing Carousel Studio v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1990 WL 91108, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. June 26, 1990)); cf. Pusey, 596 A.2d at 1370 (finding parties at administrative hearing entitled to due process, including right of cross-examination).\\n. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); see also Cook v. Oberly, 459 A.2d 535, 538 (Del.Ch.1983); Phillips, 2007 WL 2122139, at *2; Playtex Products, Inc. v. Harris, 2002 WL 31167581, at *5 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 30, 2002).\\n. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893; see also Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Wilson, 504 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Del.1986); Phillips, 2007 WL 2122139, at *2.\\n. See id. (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Phillips, 2007 WL 2122139, at *2.\\n. See 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10122.\\n. A \\\"case decision\\\" is \\\"any agency proceeding or determination that a named party as a matter of past or present fact, or of threatened or contemplated private action, is or is not in violation of a law or regulation, or is or is not in compliance with any existing requirement for obtaining a license or other right or benefit.\\\" 29 Del. C. \\u00a7 10102(3).\\n. (A16.)\\n. The Board's order is a dismissal on the merits. It provides: \\\"ORDERED, that it being determined after a legal hearing that there are not outstanding medical expenses at issue other than that which was previously the subject of a prior settlement agreement, that the claimant's petition to determine compensation due is hereby dismissed.\\\" IAB Decision, supra note 14.\\n. See Carousel Studio, 1990 WL 91108, at * 1.\\n. Accord Phillips v. Delhaize America, Inc., 2007 WL 2122139 (Del.Super.Ct. July 20, 2007). We do not preclude the dismissal of a petition as a remedy of last resort when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery and no other sanction is more appropriate. See Marcelin v. Layton, 2009 WL 595580 (Del. Mar. 9, 2009); Hoag v. Amex Assurance Co., 953 A.2d 713, 716-17 (Del.2008). See generally Super Ct. Civil R. 37(b)(2)(C). However, in this case, the Board's dismissal of Vincent's petition was on the merits and not a sanction for a discovery violation. Even if it had been phrased as a discovery sanction, the Board failed to explain why no other sanction was more appropriate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7331935.json b/delaware/7331935.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..302d3d6b12e117702bea0b69e29643e9e3f897d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7331935.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7331935\", \"name\": \"AT&T CORP., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles LILLIS, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O'Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees; AT&T Corp., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O'Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees; Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O'Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees/Cross Appellants, v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., f/k/a AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Defendant Below, Cross Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"AT&T Corp. v. Lillis\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-03-09\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 490,2007, 459,2007\", \"first_page\": \"166\", \"last_page\": \"175\", \"citations\": \"970 A.2d 166\", \"volume\": \"970\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:39:45.711459+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.\", \"parties\": \"AT&T CORP., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles LILLIS, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. AT&T Corp., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees/Cross Appellants, v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., f/k/a AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Defendant Below, Cross Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"AT&T CORP., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles LILLIS, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. AT&T Corp., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. Charles Lillis, Gary Ames, Richard Post, Frank Eichler, Robert Crandall, Lou Simpson, Pierson Grieve, Richard McCormick, Janice Peters, Pearre Williams, Roger Christense, Doug Holmes, Steven Boyd, Patti Klinge, Connie Campbell, Sharon O\\u2019Leary, Jim Taucher, Bud Wonsiewicz and Daniel Yohannes, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees/Cross Appellants, v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., f/k/a AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Defendant Below, Cross Appellee.\\nNos. 490,2007, 459,2007.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Nov. 5, 2008.\\nDecided: March 9, 2009.\\nReargument Denied: April 13, 2009.\\nA. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Esquire (argued) and John P. DiTomo, Esquire, Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Of Counsel: Todd C. Schiltz, Esquire, Wolf Block Schorr and Solis-Cohen LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael L. Banks, Esquire and Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; David W. Carpenter, Esquire and Kevin C. Pecoraro, Esquire, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for defendant below appellant AT & T Corp.\\nKevin G. Abrams, Esquire and Nathan A. Cook, Esquire, Abrams & Laster LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Of Counsel: Miranda S. Schiller, Esquire (argued), Joshua S. Amsel, Esquire, Stefania D. Venezia, Esquire and Lauren B. Hoelzer, Esquire, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, New York for cross appellees.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.\\n. Lillis v. AT & T Corp., 2008 WL 2811153 at *8 (Del.Ch.).\", \"word_count\": \"4812\", \"char_count\": \"30195\", \"text\": \"BERGER, Justice for the majority.\\nThis is our decision, after remand, in an action by former officers and directors of MediaOne Corp. (the \\\"Option Holders\\\") seeking compensation from AT & T Corp. for the full value of their options. The Court of Chancery originally decided that the applicable contract provision is ambiguous, and that the Option Holders' interpretation is correct. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court relied \\\"heavily\\\" on AT & T's admissions in its original answer and its briefs, and on AT & T's failure to explain the basis for withdrawing those admissions. On appeal, this Court agreed that the contract language is ambiguous, but remanded with instructions that the trial court reconsider its decision without giving any weight to the admissions. The Court of Chancery followed our instructions, and issued a second decision reversing itself. We now realize, however, that our instruction to disregard the admissions was based on a factual mistake. Thus, we defer to the trial court's original findings and affirm its decision granting relief to the Option Holders.\\nFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\nBecause the relevant facts are fully set forth in prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Chancery , we summarize only those facts necessary to an understanding of the present issues. The Option Holders acquired stock options from MediaOne pursuant to a 1994 stock option plan (the 1994 Plan), which provided in Section XVIII.A:\\nIn the event there is any change in the Common Stock by reason of any consolidation, combination, liquidation, reorganization . or other like change in the capital structure of [MediaOne], the number or kind of shares or interests subject to an Award and the per share price or value thereof shall be appropriately adjusted by the Committee at the time of such event, provided that each Participant's economic position with respect to the Award shall not, as a result of such adjustment, be worse than it had been immediately prior to such event....\\nIn 1999, when AT & T acquired MediaOne, the Option Holders' options were converted into AT & T options. In 2001, when AT & T spun off AT & T Wireless, the Option Holders' options were converted into adjusted AT & T and new Wireless options. The Option Holders' converted options continued to be governed by the 1994 Plan. In 2004, when Cingular Wireless acquired Wireless, all in-the-money options were cancelled and exchanged for the difference between the $15 per share merger price and the option exercise price. All out-of-the-money options, although not cancelled, became worthless.\\nIn 2004, the Option Holders filed suit against AT & T and Wireless, alleging that the Cingular merger deprived them of the full economic value of their options, in violation of Section XVIII.A of the 1994 Plan. In its original answer to the Option Holders' complaint, AT & T admitted many of the substantive allegations. In light of AT & T's answer, the Option Holders filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Although AT & T opposed the motion, its answering brief agreed with the Option Holders' claim that the Cingular merger did not preserve the value of their options. AT & T argued that Wireless was responsible for the Option Holders' losses, and pointed out that it was arbitrating a claim against Wireless, seeking the same relief for all option holders as the plaintiffs are seeking for themselves in this action.\\nAs it turned out, AT & T's timing could not have been worse. A few days before the Option Holders' motion was to be argued, AT & T learned that it had lost the arbitration. Thus, if the Option Holders were to prevail in this action, AT & T, not Wireless, would be liable. AT & T moved for leave to amend its answer so as to withdraw its earlier admissions. The trial court granted the motion, but imposed a condition:\\nWhile the court concludes that it should grant AT & T's motion to amend, it will not do so unconditionally. In its answer and its brief in opposition to the Rule 12(c) motion, AT & T made an irrefutably deliberate choice to admit the substance of the plaintiffs' claim (including adopting the plaintiffs' interpretation of the 1994 Plan) but pointed the finger at Wireless as the party obligated to make the plaintiffs whole. Based on AT & T's numerous admissions, the plaintiffs made a good faith decision that they were entitled to judgment on the pleadings and move for such under Rule 12(c). They, undoubtedly, incurred sub stantial expense in briefing and arguing that motion.\\n\\n[T]he court concludes that the plaintiffs should not be forced to bear the cost of AT & T's procedural maneuvering. Therefore, the proper outcome is to grant AT & T leave to amend its answer, conditioned upon AT & T paying the reasonable legal fees and costs that plaintiffs incurred in bringing them Rule 12(c) motion.\\nIn July 2007, after a four day trial and post-trial briefing, the Court of Chancery held that the term \\\"economic position\\\" in Section XVIII.A of the 1994 Plan is ambiguous. The trial court considered the extrinsic evidence, and concluded that \\\"economic position\\\" means the full economic value of the options, including their \\\"intrinsic value\\\" and them \\\"time value.\\\" In reaching that decision, the trial court relied heavily on AT & T's withdrawn admissions in its original answer. The trial court also evaluated the experts' valuations, and concluded that the Option Holders were entitled to $11,303,986 in damages, together with prejudgment interest at the legal rate.\\nOn appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the operative provision in the 1994 Plan is ambiguous. But the trial court did not address two facts that might bear on the intended meaning of \\\"economic position\\\": 1) the difference between a cash out merger and a stock for stock merger; and 2) the significance of the $85 cash election in the MediaOne/AT & T merger. In addition, we decided that the trial court should not have considered the AT & T admissions:\\n[T]he Vice Chancellor correctly decided that AT & T's admissions were conclusions of law and as such not binding. More importantly AT & T's factual admissions, if any, related only to the Employee Benefits Agreement and the Wireless Adjustment Plan, but not to the 1994 MediaOne plan. Therefore, the Vice Chancellor should afford no weight to AT & T's supposed admissions when interpreting Section XVIII.A on remand.\\nOn remand, the Court of Chancery reversed itself:\\nThis court's conclusion in the Trial Opinion concerning the interpretation of Section XVIII.A hinged primarily on AT & T's admissions. Without that evidence, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that, in the case of the all cash Cingu-lar/Wireless merger, Section XVIII.A required an adjustment to preserve both the intrinsic value and the time value of their options.\\nThis court retained jurisdiction when it remanded the case to the Court of Chancery. The matter is now before the Court for consideration of all issues on appeal, including those generated by the remand.\\nDISCUSSION\\nIn our first opinion, this Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the governing contractual provision, Section XVIII.A of the 1994 Plan, is ambiguous. As a result, \\\"consideration of extrinsic evidence is required to determine the meanings the parties intended.\\\" We defer to the trial court's findings as to the significance of the extrinsic evidence:\\n[T]o the extent the trial court's interpretation of the contract rests upon findings extrinsic to the contract, or upon inferences drawn from those findings, our review requires us to defer to the trial court's findings, unless the findings are not supported by the record or unless the inferences drawn from those findings are not the product of an orderly or logical deductive process.\\nIn its original opinion, the trial court made findings based on its evaluation of the meaning and import of AT & T's withdrawn admissions. In its decision after remand, the trial court noted that those findings were critical to its first decision. Thus, the question of whether the admissions could properly be considered is outcome determinative.\\nIn our first opinion, this Court instructed the Court of Chancery to disregard AT & T's admissions because we concluded that those admissions did not relate to the 1994 Plan. We were mistaken. The relevant allegations and admissions do relate to the 1994 Plan, as AT & T acknowledges. Nonetheless, AT & T argues that the remand instruction was appropriate because the admissions are irrelevant to determining the meaning of \\\"economic position.\\\" We disagree. Several of AT & T's answers, and statements in its brief in opposition to the Option Holders' motion for judgment on the pleadings, support a conclusion that AT & T agreed with the Option Holders' interpretation of Section XVIII.A.\\nParagraph 3 of the complaint and the original AT & T answer state:\\nComplaint:\\nThe 1994 Plan clearly and unambiguously provides that, in the event of \\\"any consolidation, combination, . recapitalization . split-off, spin-off, combination of shares, exchange of shares or other like change in capital structure, the number or kind of shares or interests subject to an Award and the per share price or value thereof shall be appropriately adjusted . at the time of such event, provided that each Participant's economic position with respect to the Award shall not, as a result of such adjustment, be worse than it had been immediately prior to such event.\\\" Ex. A at \\u00b6 XVIII(A). Wireless' announcement that the out-of-the-money Options will be cancelled and that the in-the-money Options will be cashed out at a discount places Plaintiff in an economically worse off position.\\nAnswer:\\nThe allegations in the first sentence of paragraph 3 purport to characterize a document which speaks for itself and no response is required. AT & T denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in the second sentence except to admit that cancellation of the options would leave the option holder in a worse off position.\\nIf AT & T did not agree with the Option Holders' interpretation of \\\"economic position,\\\" it would not have admitted that the cancellation of the options would leave them \\\"worse off.\\\" The only options being cancelled were the out-of-the-money options. If those options had no time value, then they were worthless at the time of the merger, and the Option Holders could not have been made \\\"worse off' by their cancellation. Therefore, AT & T must have believed that \\\"economic position\\\" included value in addition to intrinsic value.\\nAT & T's original answer to paragraph 34 of the complaint likewise supports the Option Holders' interpretation of \\\"economic position\\\":\\nComplaint:\\nAT & T agreed to permit Wireless to retain $200.6 million of value in order to insure that Wireless would honor the outstanding stock option plans. This demonstrates that Defendants believed that Plaintiffs' \\u2014 Options even Plaintiffs' out-of-the-money Options \\u2014 had significant value. In response to Plaintiffs' recent demand that AT & T and Wireless make good on their contractual obligations to preserve the value of Plaintiffs' Options, AT & T's counsel reminded Wireless' counsel that Wireless more than $200 million of value for precisely this purpose.\\nAnswer:\\nAdmitted.\\nAgain, the out-of-the-money options would have value only if they had time value in addition to their intrinsic value.\\nApart from AT & T's admissions in its original answer, AT & T's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings eliminates any doubt as to what it was admitting. AT & T stated:\\nAT & T demanded [in its arbitration against Wireless] that if Wireless's merger with Cingular were consummated, Wireless must compensate the holders of the Adjusted Wireless Options for the value of their options immediately prior to the announcement of the merger. In the alternative, AT & T requested that if such compensation were not provided, it should receive an award of damages to restore it to the value of the consideration it gave to Wireless to provide a performance (the granting of the Adjusted Wireless Options and honoring them during the entirety of their scheduled term) that Wireless did not render. In the arbitration proceeding, AT & T is seeking to secure for the holders of the Adjusted Wireless options, including Plaintiffs, the same relief Plaintiffs are seeking in this action. AT & T sought an award declaring that Wireless must compensate the holders of Adjusted Wireless Options, including Plaintiffs, for the value of their Adjusted Wireless Options which had been rendered worthless as a result of Wireless's agreement to merger with Cingular.\\nThe Court of Chancery considered AT & T's admissions of primary importance in construing the term \\\"economic position.\\\" The trial court also noted AT & T's failure to explain its changed position, which coincided with the adverse arbitration decision. AT & T's conduct in that regard is relevant because it is strong evidence that AT & T believed it had admitted the Option Holders' interpretation of \\\"economic position\\\" in its original answer. If not, there would be no need for AT & T to seek permission to amend its answer, and moreover, agree to pay the Option Holders' attorneys' fees as a condition for being granted leave to amend. In sum, we conclude that our remand instruction was improvidently ordered, and that the trial court could properly consider AT & T's admissions, along with all other extrinsic evidence, in deciding the meaning of \\\"economic position\\\".\\nIn their separate opinion, the dissenting Justices acknowledge that AT & T's original answer contained admissions that relate to the 1994 Plan. Their position, however, is that those admissions in AT & T's original answer were legal, rather than factual. Based upon that distinction, the dissent concludes that the admissions are not binding and, regardless, that a party's legal theory does not reveal a party's intention when the agreement was drafted. We disagree with this analysis for several reasons.\\nFirst, the analysis in the dissenting opinion is limited to the admissions in AT & T's original answer. It does not confront the fact that similar admissions also were made in AT & T's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Second, although the admissions, once withdrawn, were no longer legally binding as admissions, them withdrawal did not eliminate or alter then-probative value as evidence of a disputed material fact \\u2014 the parties' intended meaning of the ambiguous term \\\"economic position.\\\" It is hornbook law that the contracting parties' course of conduct may be considered as evidence of their intended meaning of an ambiguous contractual term. In this case, that course of conduct included the undisputed fact that AT & T made certain admissions in its original answer, which it later withdrew.\\nAT & T's decisions to make and later to withdraw those admissions, without explanation and at a time when it was strategically advantageous to do so, are themselves facts that are probative of the intended meaning of the ambiguous term \\\"economic position.\\\" They are probative because they support a reasonable inference that AT & T believed it had initially agreed with the Option Holders' argued-for meaning of \\\"economic position.\\\" Otherwise, why would AT & T have gone to the considerable effort \\u2014 and financial cost \\u2014 of withdrawing those admissions? This is not to suggest that that is the only permissible inference, but only that it is a reasonable inference that the trial court could properly weigh against any contrary inferences permitted by the record. We therefore cannot agree with the dissent's suggestion that the Vice Chancellor was legally required to ignore that aspect of the parties' course of conduct.\\nHaving thus concluded that the AT & T admissions are proper matters to consider, we defer to the trial court's evaluation of the extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning of the term \\\"economic position.\\\" There was record support for its conclusions and they are clearly the product of a logical reasoning process. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's damages award, and affirm on the basis of the trial court's original decision.\\nCONCLUSION\\nBased on the foregoing, the original judgment of the Court of Chancery, granting relief to the Option Holders based on the conclusion that \\\"economic position\\\" in Section XVHI.A of the 1994 Plan means intrinsic value and time value, is AFFIRMED.\\n. See, e.g.: AT&T Corp. v. Lillis, 953 A.2d 241 (Del.2008); Lillis v. AT&T Corp., 2007 WL 2110587 (Del.Ch.).\\n. A-22 (Emphasis added).\\n. Lillis V. AT&T Corp., 896 A.2d 871, 879 (Del.Ch.2005).\\n. AT&T Corp. v. Lillis, 953 A.2d 241, 257 (Del.2008) (Lillis I).\\n. Lillis I at 253 (Quotation omitted.)\\n. Lillis I at 252 (Quotation omitted.)\\n. \\\"The implications of this conclusion [that the court must ignore the admissions] to the plaintiffs' case are severe.\\\"; \\\"[T]his extrinsic evidence was by far the most compelling support for the plaintiffs' position.\\\"; \\\"The Supreme Court's instructions drastically change the landscape of the extrinsic evidence I can now consider.\\\" Lillis v. AT & T Corp., 2008 WL 2811153, at *4 & *6.\\n. We also noted that some of AT & T's \\\"admissions\\\" were conclusions of law, which are non-binding.\\n. AT & T also argues that we must adhere to our remand instruction under the \\\"law of the case\\\" doctrine. \\\"[T]he law of the case doctrine is not a legal bar to a court's reconsideration of its own decision on a motion for reargument and before entry of a final judgment.\\\" Mellow v. Bd. of Adjustment of New Castle County, 1989 WL 114626 at *2 (Del.Supr.). While this is not a motion for reargument, there has been no final judgment and the same principle applies. Moreover, \\\"[f]he law of the case doctrine does not preclude this Court . from reexamining the prior rulings in this case when the factual premises of those prior rulings are demonstrated to have been mistaken.\\\" Hamilton v. State, 831 A.2d 881, 887 (Del.2003).\\n. A243 (Emphasis added.)\\n. A267 (Emphasis added.)\\n. A254 (Emphasis added.)\\n. A270.\\n. A283 (Emphasis added.)\\n. See pp. 12-13, supra.\\n. Bruce E.M. v. Dorothea A.M., 455 A.2d 866, 869 (Del.1983) (pleadings which have been superceded by amendment, withdrawn, or dismissed, may be taken as admissions against interest of the pleading party with respect to the facts alleged therein.)\\n. See, e.g., 11 Williston on Contracts \\u00a7 32.14 (4th ed.).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7346037.json b/delaware/7346037.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4312ae6c28048505bb039cb0b1efa70d5e3be2c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7346037.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7346037\", \"name\": \"Janet V. TORRES, Claimant Below, Appellant, v. ALLEN FAMILY FOODS, Employer Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Torres v. Allen Family Foods\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-12-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 125, 1995\", \"first_page\": \"26\", \"last_page\": \"33\", \"citations\": \"672 A.2d 26\", \"volume\": \"672\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:01:56.042284+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, and BERGER, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Janet V. TORRES, Claimant Below, Appellant, v. ALLEN FAMILY FOODS, Employer Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Janet V. TORRES, Claimant Below, Appellant, v. ALLEN FAMILY FOODS, Employer Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 125, 1995.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Oct. 26, 1995.\\nDecided: Dec. 29, 1995.\\nRehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1996.\\nJohn J. Sullivan, Jr., Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, for Appellant.\\nNancy E. Chrissinger, Tybout, Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, for Appellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, and BERGER, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"3039\", \"char_count\": \"18655\", \"text\": \"WALSH, Justice:\\nThis is an appeal from a Superior Court affirmance of termination of workers' compensation by the Industrial Accident Board (\\\"Board\\\"). Appellee, Allen Family Foods (\\\"Allen\\\"), sought the termination of the permanent partial disability benefits of the appellant, Janet V. Torres (\\\"Torres\\\"), which resulted from a carpal tunnel condition sustained in the course of her employment with Allen. Before the Board, Torres contended that she was a displaced worker \\u2014 a contention disputed by Allen. The Board determined that Torres was not, prima facie, a displaced worker and that she had failed to demonstrate that she had made a reasonable job search which was unsuccessful because of her injury. The Superior Court correctly found that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Torres had failed to meet her burden of proof. Accordingly, we affirm that ruling.\\nIn addition to reviewing the merits of Torres' claim for compensation, the Superior Court considered Torres' allegation that she was deprived of due process of law in the course of her hearing before the Board. The Superior Court found that the Board was within its discretion in refusing to issue subpoenas to all of the employers in a labor market survey. Because the proposed testimony would have been irrelevant to the issues before the Board and because of the importance of allowing the Board flexibility to administer its cases, we affirm that ruling. However, we add the cautionary note that the Industrial Accident Board's discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas on the behalf of parties before it is limited by the requirements of due process and fairness.\\nI.\\nTorres, who is bilingual and a high school graduate, was employed processing chickens by appellee Allen Family Foods. In 1991 she began experiencing pain in her left wrist and was diagnosed in May with left carpal tunnel syndrome and underwent surgery for that condition. Shortly after her return to work in June of 1991, she fell and aggravated the condition of her left wrist. Her doctor diagnosed her as having reflex sympathetic dystrophy. In September of that year, Torres again returned to work but left permanently in March of 1992. It is undisputed that environmental factors aggravated her condition, including the cold temperatures and high humidity at Allen. Although she would be capable of doing some work, physicians for both parties agree that Torres' activity should be restricted to lifting objects weighing less than five pounds with her left hand and avoiding damp and cold workplace climates similar to that at Allen's facility.\\nAllen retained a vocational rehabilitation specialist to assist Torres in the summer of 1992. After unsuccessfully providing Torres with a number of job leads, the specialist ceased providing leads and commenced a labor market survey, the results of which were testified to before the Board. Torres continued to seek work primarily by utilizing old labor market survey results retained by her attorney on behalf of other clients. In pursuit of these leads, Torres would send a resume and cover letter to employers appearing on these lists for whom she believed she was qualified to work. In the vast majority of her application attempts, Torres did not ascertain whether the employers to which she was applying had current openings, nor did she notify them of her injury.\\nOn September 30, 1992, Allen filed a petition to terminate Torres' total disability benefits on the ground that Torres was physically able to return to work. In order to challenge the findings of the market survey conducted by Allen's vocational rehabilitation specialist, Torres requested that the Board issue subpoenas to all employers identified in that survey. The Board denied this request, citing its discretion under Uniform Rule of Evidence 403, which allows the exclusion of evidence that is needlessly cumulative or to prevent undue delay.\\nThe Board granted Allen's petition to terminate, finding that Torres had not made a prima facie showing that she was a displaced worker. According to the Board, Torres did not carry \\\"her burden to demonstrate that she has made a reasonable job search that has not been successful because of her injury.\\\" The Board based this conclusion on several facts. First, it noted that Torres was employable within the physical limitations noted above. The Board then turned to the fact that Torres had sent letters of inquiry to firms identified in the labor market survey, which had openings in the past, but not necessarily in the present. This lack of job openings combined with the fact that Torres identified her disability in only two of the letters that she sent led the Board to find that she had not established that she had conducted a reasonable job search which was without success due to her injury.\\nOn appeal to the Superior Court, Torres' claim was consolidated with another appeal from the Industrial Accident Board, Stauffer v. Kent General Hospital. Torres argued, inter alia, that the Board's failure to issue subpoenas on her behalf abrogated her due process rights, contending that the Board's ruling compromised her ability to present her case before the Board. The Superior Court denied her appeal and affirmed the decision of the Board. Torres v. Allen Family Foods, Del.Super., C.A. No. 93A-12-005, 1995 WL 269481 Ridgely, P.J., (Mar. 15, 1995). Because the Superior Court had reversed and remanded the Stauffer claim to the Industrial Accident Board, this Court remanded the Torres case to verify that the judgment of the Superior Court appealed from was indeed final. This case is now before us after the Superior Court's entry of final judgment.\\nII.\\nOn appeal to this Court, Torres reasserts three claims of error made below. First, she argues that the Board violated her due process rights by failing to issue subpoenas on her behalf. In- addition, she argues that the Board erred in not according sufficient weight to Allen's refusal to allow her to return to work in a manner within her physical restrictions. Lastly, she argues that the evidence does not support the finding that she did not carry her burden of proof to show that she was a displaced worker. We first address her substantive claims.\\nA.\\nAfter filing a petition to terminate an employee's total disability benefits, a former employer bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the employee is no longer totally incapacitated for the purpose of working. Governor Bacon Health Center v. Noll, Del.Super., 315 A.2d 601, 603 (1974). If the employer satisfies that burden, the employee must show that she is a \\\"displaced worker.\\\" A worker is displaced if she \\\"is so handicapped by a compensable injury that [s]he will no longer be employed regularly in any well known branch of the competitive labor market and will require a specially-created job if [s]he is to be steadily employed.\\\" Ham v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Supr., 231 A.2d 258, 261 (1967). The employee's \\\"physical impairment, coupled with other factors such as the injured employee's mental capacity, education, training, or age\\\" may constitute a prima facie showing that the employee is displaced. Franklin Fabricators v. Irwin, Del.Supr., 306 A.2d 734, 737 (1973). However, even if there is insufficient evidence for the employee to show that she is prima facie displaced, she is a displaced worker and deemed \\\"totally disabled\\\" for the purposes of the Delaware Workers' Compensation Law, 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2101-2397, if she \\\"has made reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment which have been unsuccessful because of the injury.\\\" Franklin Fabricators, 306 A.2d at 737. Assuming that the employee can demonstrate that she is displaced, the burden shifts back to the employer to show the availability of work within the employee's capabilities. Id.\\nB.\\nTorres contends that the Board should have been persuaded that she met the criteria for \\\"displaced workers\\\" because Allen would not hire her back for different work within her capabilities. While the refusal to rehire is a factor which may \\\"weigh heavily\\\" in the analysis, it is not dispositive. Chrysler Corporation v. Duff, Del.Supr., 314 A.2d 915, 917-18 (1973). Furthermore, \\\"given the great variety of factual situations, it is unwise to focus solely on one factor as necessarily decisive_\\\" Id. at 918.\\nAppropriately, the Board decided that this factor was not conclusive. The refusal of Allen to rehire Torres was not indicative of a general lack of jobs. It simply did not make sense for Allen to rehire her given that the cold and damp working conditions at Allen exacerbated her physical condition and contributed to her departure from Allen's employment the second time. The Board's decision not to accord great weight to this factor is justified by the law and by the facts of this ease.\\nC.\\nTorres next contends that the Board erred in its determination that she had not satisfied her burden of showing that she was a displaced worker, i.e., that through her job search she demonstrated that she made reasonable efforts to secure employment which were unsuccessful because of her injury. Indeed, Torres did contact at least 20 employers between the end of 1992 and the first half of 1993. However, the names of those potential employers were obtained from her attorney and were from market surveys used in other cases.\\nWhile noting that contacting the employers whose names were provided by her attorney is more effective \\\"than looking in the phone book,\\\" the Board was not persuaded that this search established that Torres was a displaced worker. The labor market surveys used by Torres were not current, and only indicated the availability of a job at sometime in the past. In addition, the claimant only mentioned her physical disability on two of her cover letters. Thus, most of the employers she contacted could not have refused to hire her because of her injury since they knew nothing about it.\\nThe Board found that Torres could have better demonstrated that she made \\\"reasonable efforts to secure employment which were unsuccessful because of her injury\\\" if she had contacted employers who actually had openings. See Franklin Fabricators, 306 A.2d at 737. Consequently, the Board was not persuaded that Torres had satisfied the requirements to defeat the petition to terminate benefits under the Franklin Fabricators standard. After reviewing the record below it is apparent that the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence and we agree with the Superior Court that it should not be disturbed. See Histed v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Del.Supr., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (1993).\\nIII.\\nA.\\nTorres argues that the Board denied her due process of law when it refused to issue 29 ordinary subpoenas and 29 subpoenas duces tecum. Torres apparently requested these subpoenas in an attempt to undermine the survey conducted by Allen's vocational rehabilitation specialist, since the subpoenas were to issue to the employers contacted by the specialist.\\nAs a starting point, we note that the Board is not bound by the formal rules of evidence. 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2121. In order to ensure the efficient adjudication of claims, the Board has the power to make its own rules. Pursuant to that power, the Board may relax the rules of evidence and allow the proceedings to be less formal than a trial. For example, the Board may allow hearsay evidence to be admitted into the record. This allowance is consistent with the purpose of the rule against hearsay, which is to keep from an untrained trier of fact material whose reliability is untrustworthy. See 1 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence \\u00a7 4b, at 110 (1983). Presumably the Board, with its background and expertise, is able to evaluate evidence without the restrictions and safeguards imparted by the formal rules of evidence.\\nThe Board may not, however, relax rules which are designed to ensure the fairness of the procedure. \\\"While the nature of the proceedings and the spirit of the Compensation Law justify some relaxation of the technical rules of evidence, nevertheless, it is fundamental that the right to confront witnesses, to cross-examine them, to refute them, and to have a record of their testimony must be accorded unless waived.\\\" General Chemical Div., Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Fasano, 47 Del. 546, 94 A.2d 600, 601 (1953); accord Air Mod Corp. v. Newton, 59 Del. 148, 215 A.2d 434, 439 (1965); Paco v. Am. Leather Mfg. Co., N.J.Super.App.Div., 516 A.2d 623, 625 (1986). These rules, such as the right to cross-examine, are designed to guarantee the substantial rights of the parties and are based on fundamental notions of fairness. 3 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \\u00a7 79.83(a) (1995). \\\"Nothing is more repugnant to our traditions of justice than to be at the mercy of witnesses one cannot see or challenge, or to have one's rights stand or fall on the basis of unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted.\\\" Id.\\nThe exclusion of relevant, material, and competent evidence by an administrative agency will be grounds for reversal if that refusal is prejudicial. John Strong, et al, McCormick on Evidence \\u00a7 352, at 513 (4th ed. 1992). However, as the Superior Court noted, no prejudice resulted from not having the surveyed employers testify. Since hearsay was admissible, live testimony by the employers was not necessary to challenge the report of the employer's vocational expert. More importantly, refuting this testimony would not have assisted Torres in carrying her burden. See supra part II A. In order to prevail at this stage, Torres would need to show that she made a reasonable job search which was unsuccessful because of her disability. Rebutting Allen's vocational expert would at most cast doubt on Allen's assertion that some jobs were available and would not establish the required elements necessary for Torres to prevail. Inquiry into the availability of jobs was irrelevant at that point since the Board had concluded that she had not established that she was a displaced worker. Consequently, the Board's consideration of this information was harmless error, and Torres' inability to cross-examine surveyed employers was similarly irrelevant.\\nB.\\nWhile in this case it was unnecessary for the Board to issue the requested subpoenas, we note that the Board has a basic responsibility to comply with reasonable requests for the issuance of subpoenas to the extent the witnesses' proposed testimony may implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. See Cross v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 201, 607 S.W.2d 680, 681 (1980). Although the Superior Court noted, and we agree, that \\\"due process can require procedures less rigorous than those in a trial-type hearing,\\\" Feliciano v. Chater, D.P.R., 901 F.Supp. 50, 52 (1995); see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the power to issue subpoenas is an integral part of the administrative process. The Board must respect the decision of a party to use the subpoena process provided for in the statute if the claimant or her counsel, after an informal investigation, has established the need for a witness. See Moore v. Fulton Paper Co., Del.Supr., No. 14, 1995, 663 A.2d 488 Berger, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER) (finding that no prejudice and therefore no error resulted from Board's refusal to issue subpoena for records which would not have aided claimants' ease). Since the judgment is not one for the Board to make, when counsel is satisfied that a witness is needed, the Board cannot refuse. See O'Blenis v. Florida Dept. Of Labor and Employment Security, Fla.App., 388 So.2d 1099, 1100 (1980) (noting that \\\"minimal due process requires the right to subpoena witnesses,\\\" and rejecting requirement of \\\"good cause\\\" for the issuance of requested subpoenas).\\nWe do not encourage the issuance of unnecessary or irrelevant subpoenas. See Fernandes v. Commonwealth, Pa.Cmwlth., 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 79, 416 A.2d 644, 646 (1980). Whether or not the issuance of a subpoena is necessary for the Board to fulfill its role in the adjudication of claims resulting from industrial accidents is a determination that must be made on a case by case and witness by witness basis. The Board has at its disposal, and should use, its power to prevent an abuse of process. For example, it may grant a motion to quash the subpoena if the subpoenas are sought unnecessarily or for harassment. In addition, counsel in administrative proceedings are expected to obtain the required testimony or information more economically and informally through informal interviews and depositions.\\nWe conclude in this ease that Torres received a fair hearing before the Board. In addition, we find that the Board's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court and uphold the Board's termination of Torres' disability benefits.\\n. Uniform Rule of Evidence 403:\\nAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\\n. \\\"The Board may make its own rules of procedure for carrying out Part II of this title to the same extent as the Superior Court pursuant to \\u00a7 561(a) of Title 10.\\\" 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2121(a); see also 2B Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \\u00a7 77A.60 (1995). Pursuant to \\u00a7 2121(a) the Industrial Accident Board has promulgated Rule 14(B):\\nThe rules of evidence applicable to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware shall be followed insofar as practicable; however, that evidence will be considered by the Board which, in its opinion, possesses any probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The Board may, in its discretion, disregard any customary rules of evidence and legal procedures so long as such a disregard does not amount to an abuse of its discretion.\\n. See also Smith v. Sampson, Alaska Supr., 816 P.2d 902, 907 (1991) (finding no error in refusal to issue subpoena in administrative hearing when claimant offered no explanation of why evidence was relevant).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7356991.json b/delaware/7356991.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99deb19f66ec062fc91b6abc9f4766b6513e04cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7356991.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7356991\", \"name\": \"Arnold D. SAMSON, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Dale Robert SMITH, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. BOWL-A-RAMA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Third Party Defendant Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Samson v. Smith\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-05-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1024\", \"last_page\": \"1028\", \"citations\": \"560 A.2d 1024\", \"volume\": \"560\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:23:28.892397+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.\", \"parties\": \"Arnold D. SAMSON, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Dale Robert SMITH, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. BOWL-A-RAMA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Third Party Defendant Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Arnold D. SAMSON, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Dale Robert SMITH, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. BOWL-A-RAMA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Third Party Defendant Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 18, 1989.\\nDecided: May 26, 1989.\\nJeffrey M. Weiner, Wilmington, for appellant Arnold D. Samson.\\nStephen P. Casarino, Tybout, Redfearn, Casarino & Pell, Wilmington, for appellee Bowl-A-Rama, Inc.\\nBefore CHRISTIE, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.\", \"word_count\": \"2518\", \"char_count\": \"15166\", \"text\": \"WALSH, Justice:\\nThis is an interlocutory appeal accepted on certification from the Superior Court, which granted one of the defendants' motion to dismiss a complaint for personal injuries. The issue presented, is whether a third party injured by the actions of an intoxicated driver has a cause of action against a tavern operator for dispensing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated patron. The Superior Court ruled that the liability of the tavern owner, Bowl-A-Rama, Inc. (\\\"Bowl-A-Rama\\\"), does not extend to the off-premises conduct of an intoxicated patron. We agree with this conclusion and hold that no cause of action against a tavern operator for injuries to third parties, caused by an intoxicated patron, exists in Delaware under either the common law or statutes regulating the dispensing of alcoholic beverages. The judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the complaint is, therefore, affirmed.\\nI\\nWe view appellant's claim, as did the Superior Court, in the context of a motion to dismiss, accepting the well pleaded allegations of the complaint and assuming the presentation of evidence sufficient to support those allegations. Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., Del.Supr., 441 A.2d 226, 227 (1982). Bowl-A-Rama operates a bowling establishment and, in addition, is licensed to sell alcoholic beverages to patrons on its premises. On October 21, 1986, Dale Robert Smith (\\\"Smith\\\"), while on the premises as a member of a bowling team was served a number of alcoholic drinks by employees of Bowl-A-Rama. Smith admitted that he drank seven or eight twelve-ounce draft beers within three and one-half hours. Shortly after leaving Bowl-A-Rama, while driving his automobile south on U.S. Route 13, Smith failed to stop at a red light. His vehicle struck the rear of appellant's, Arnold D. Samson, (\\\"Samson\\\"), vehicle which had already stopped. As a result Samson sustained serious bodily injury. According to the police report, Smith registered a .23% blood alcohol reading on the evening of the accident \\u2014 more than two times the statutory standard for driving under the influence of alcohol in Delaware. See 21 Del.C. \\u00a7 4177.\\nInitially, Samson only filed suit against Smith, but Samson later joined Bowl-A-Rama as a defendant, on the theory that the conduct of Bowl-A-Rama's employees, in permitting Smith to drink in excess, was a proximate cause of the accident.\\nII\\nSamson argues that this Court should enforce his claim against Bowl-A-Rama on both common law and statutory grounds. We first address the common law claim. Whether there is a valid cause of action, sounding in negligence or in willful and wanton conduct, against a commercial vendor of alcohol by a third party, injured by the actions of an intoxicated driver who was served by the vendor, is an issue of first impression in this Court. Samson concedes that recognition of such a claim requires that we extend our recent decision in Diossi v. Maroney, Del.Supr., 548 A.2d 1361 (1988), to include recognition of a common law cause of action against a tavern owner under Delaware law. Such a holding would, inferentially at least, serve to overrule our prior holding in Wright v. Moffitt, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 554 (1981).\\nWe begin with an historical analysis. At common law purveyors of alcoholic beverages could not be held liable for damages sustained by third persons resulting from a patron's intoxication. See e.g., State v. Hatfield, Md.Ct.App., 78 A.2d 754 (1951); 48A C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquor \\u00a7 428 (1981); Annotation, Common-Law Right of Action for Damage Sustained By Plaintiff in Consequence of Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-Forming Drug To Another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528 (1980). The rationale for the rejection of liability was that the consumption of the alcohol, not the sale of the beverage, was the proximate cause of the injury. In State v. Hatfield the court articulated the rule:\\nApart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against a seller of intoxicating liquors, as such, for \\\"causing\\\" intoxication of the person whose negligent or wilful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts. The law (apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate cause between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor.\\n78 A.2d at 756.\\nIn 1981, the Maryland Court of Appeals revisited the same issue in Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981). Once again, the court found that there is no liability, independent of a statute, upon sellers of alcoholic beverages for damages caused to others by intoxicated tavern patrons. Id. at 499. The court in Felder acknowledged, as do we, that numerous jurisdictions have departed from the early common law rule and have imposed civil liability independent of statute. Id. at 496, 497 (Citations omitted).\\nSamson urges us to adopt the modern trend and to recognize a common law cause of action against an alcoholic beverage purveyor for injuries caused by an intoxicated customer. Samson's position is not without strong decisional support in other jurisdictions. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, petition denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983); Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973), Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).\\nIn Wright v. Moffitt, this Court refused to recognize a common law cause of action against a tavern owner and indicated that the creation of such a claim must be left to the General Assembly. The injured plaintiff, Wright, was also the patron who purchased alcoholic liquor from the tavern operator where he became intoxicated. Wright was injured shortly after leaving the tavern, when he attempted to walk across Route 13 and was struck by an automobile. As a result of the accident, Wright sustained serious and permanent bodily injury for which he sued the tavern. Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d at 554-555. On appeal this Court denied relief, holding that a cause of action for personal injuries against a vendor does not exist when the injuries result from a patron's voluntary intoxication. Id. at 554. The Court ruled that \\\"the creation of a cause of action against one who is licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, under the circumstances alleged here, involves public policy considerations which can best be considered by the General Assembly.\\\" Id. at 556.\\nSamson argues that the status of the plaintiff in Wright is significant and notes that this Court did not address the issue of the liability of a tavern owner to an innocent third party. The concerns expressed in Wright, however, had broader application than the identity of the plaintiff.\\n[S]hould any such liability extend to a hotel dining room or restaurant owner (or to a social host) as well as to a \\\"tavern\\\" owner? should it extend to assaults or other torts by an inebriated patron? to whom should such a cause of action accrue? should there be a special rule for minors? And inevitably, if a cause of action were recognized under any of these circumstances, a commercial dispenser of alcoholic beverages (and, probably, a social host) would be a party to every suit in which an intoxicated person is alleged to have committed a tor-tious act.\\nId. at 556.\\nThe policy question regarding the propriety of judicial creation of a cause of action in an area subject to specific statutory regulation, is the same today as it was when Wright was decided eight years ago. The answer given then continues to have validity, and bears repeating:\\nWe do not suggest that Dram Shop liability, or a responsibility akin to it, is undesirable public policy or that adoption in Delaware would lend to illogical or unfair results. On the contrary, we think that a law which imposes some such responsibility on a licensee who willfully or carelessly serves alcohol to an intoxicated patron has much to commend it. But, in our view, the General Assembly is in a far better position than this Court to gather the empirical data and to make the fact finding necessary to determine what the public policy should be as to a Dram Shop law, and the scope of any such law.\\nId.\\nSamson contends that we have recently circumscribed our holding in Wright by recognizing a common law claim for damages arising out of the improper dispensing of alcoholic beverages in Diossi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361. Although we found liability in Diossi, a case involving the social dispensing of alcohol to minors, we did not create a cause of action directed against the activities of commercial sellers of alcoholic beverages. Moreover, in Dios-si we posited liability upon common law premises principles as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 1365-68. In particular, we addressed a social host's liability to a business invitee under sections 332 and 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and fashioned our holding on a safe work place rationale. Id.\\nConsistent with our adherence to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in Diossi, Samson claims that any one of four separate sections of the Restatement could be applicable to establish a cause of action against Bowl-A-Rama based upon negligence. In particular, Samson asserts that the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury to others may be reflected in any of the following: Section 302. Risk of Direct or Indirect Harm; Section 302A. Risk of Negligence or Recklessness of Others; Section 302B. Risk of Intentional or Criminal Conduct; Section 303. Acts Intended or Likely so to Affect the Conduct of the Other, a Third Person or an Animal as to Involve Unreasonable Risk; and Section 315. General Principle (Duty to Control Conduct of Third Persons). The Restatement is merely a formulation of well estab lished common law principles. Wright affirms the proposition that there is no common law liability against a tavern operator based on dram shop principles. This absence of liability exists whether the patron, through abuse of alcohol, harms himself, as in Wright or a third party, as here. The Restatement cannot supply what the common law lacks. We decline to apply Restatement principles to the facts of this case to establish a cause of action against Bowl-A-Rama.\\nIll\\nSamson alternatively requests that we hold that 4 Del. C. \\u00a7 711 and 713 create a statutory standard of care, the violation of which may form the basis for a private cause of action against a tavern operator. In Wright this Court rejected the same argument and concluded that \\\"\\u00a7\\u00a7 711 and 713 do not create a legislative standard of care that may be used by a patron as the basis of recovery against a liquor licensee.\\\" Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d at 559. Samson attempts to distinguish Wright, on the basis that the plaintiff in Wright alleged that violation of Sections 711 and 713 was negligence per se. We believe, however, that this attempted distinction begs the question of whether the absence of a statutory standard may be remedied through judicial creation of an alternative basis for recovery. Wright has clearly answered that question and the rule of stare decisis requires adherence to that precedent in the absence of a clear manifestation of error. Oscar George, Inc. v. Potts, 49 Del. 295, 115 A.2d 479, 481 (1955).\\nMoreover, this Court, in Wright addressed the holding of Taylor v. Ruiz, Del. Super., 394 A.2d 765 (1978), which viewed section 711 as supporting a negligence claim against a tavern owner brought by a third party injured by an intoxicated patron. The Court in Wright noted that the facts of Taylor were more persuasive than those in Wright because the plaintiff was an innocent third person. Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d at 559. Nonetheless, this Court nullified the holding in Taylor and declined to find a cause of action under either section 711 or section 713. Id.\\nWe conclude that there is no cause of action against a tavern operator, by a third party who is injured off the premises of the tavern by a patron, who became intoxicated at the tavern. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court, dismissing the complaint as to Bowl-A-Rama is affirmed.\\n. Smith is not a party to the present appeal.\\n. An earlier Superior Court decision recognized a cause of action in a similar factual setting. See Taylor v. Ruiz, Del.Super., 394 A.2d 765 (1978). That holding was later disapproved by this Court in Wright v. Moffitt, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 554 (1981).\\n. Section 302 addresses a negligent act or omission involving an unreasonable risk of direct or indirect harm; Section 302A addresses an act or omission based upon an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other or a third person; Section 302B addresses an act or omission based upon the unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal; Section 303 addresses a negligent act where the actor intends, realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect the conduct of another to create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other; Section 315 acknowledges a duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent the third person from causing physical harm to another where a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.\\n. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 711 and 713 are part of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, the basic legislation controlling the sale of alcoholic beverages. Section 711 provides in pertinent part:\\n\\u00a7 711. Sale or service of alcoholic liquors to intoxicated person.\\nAny licensee, or employee of a licensee, or person in charge of a licensed premises1 shall refuse to sell or serve alcoholic liquors to any individual if such individual is intoxicated or appears to be intoxicated. Such licensee, employee of a licensee or person in charge of the licensed premises shall not be liable to any individual for damages claimed to arise from the refusal to sell alcoholic liquors if such refusal is based upon this section.\\nSection 713 provides in pertinent part:\\n\\u00a7 713. Prohibition of sales to certain persons.\\n(a) No person shall sell any alcoholic liquor to any:\\n(1) Individual who has not reached the age of 21 years, .\\n(2) Person to whom such sale is prohibited;\\n(3) Individual who is mentally ill or mentally deficient;\\n(4) Individual who habitually drinks alcoholic liquor to excess....\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7357903.json b/delaware/7357903.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0dbba1296b7010aead30c46384eba3ace6513310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7357903.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7357903\", \"name\": \"Philip ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Robinson v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-07-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1184\", \"last_page\": \"1186\", \"citations\": \"562 A.2d 1184\", \"volume\": \"562\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:28:37.045302+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before HORSEY, MOORE, and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Philip ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Philip ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: June 6, 1989.\\nDecided: July 18, 1989.\\nPhilip Robinson, Georgetown, pro se.\\nRichard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Chief of Appeals Div., Dept, of Justice, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.\\nBefore HORSEY, MOORE, and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"720\", \"char_count\": \"4623\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM:\\nPhilip Robinson (\\\"Robinson\\\") appeals from a Superior Court order dated January 12, 1989, which summarily denied his application for postconviction relief. In September 1980, following jury trial in Superior Court, Robinson was convicted of first degree robbery and second degree conspiracy. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. Robinson v. State, Del.Supr., No. 42, 1981, Quillen, J. (Dec. 14, 1981) (Order). Following the affirmance, Robinson filed a motion for new trial in Superior Court based on newly discovered evidence. Superior Court denied this motion and, on appeal, this Court affirmed the denial. Robinson v. State, Del.Supr., No. 316, 1982, Horsey, J. (April 19, 1983) (Order).\\nIn October 1988, Robinson filed a nonconforming document styled motion for new trial, grounded on the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning defendant's failure to testify. Superior Court, by order dated October 25, 1988, summarily denied defendant's motion. Without agreeing with the merits of defendant's claim, the court found defendant's motion barred on multiple grounds of waiver: waiver at trial for failure to request an instruction; failure to raise the issue on direct appeal; and failure to raise the issue on first motion for new trial.\\nWithout appealing that order, Robinson filed the current postconviction relief application in December 1988. He now asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, attributable (a) to counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on Robinson's failure to testify, and (b) to an evidentiary ruling. Superior Court summarily dismissed defendant's application under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(4) for defendant's procedural default. The court stated:\\nAll of the matters that you presently raise in your Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief could have been, if they were not, handled or presented during those prior appeals and motions.\\nWe agree with the Superior Court that the appellant was procedurally barred from making the claims in this case. Robinson's filing in October 1988 constituted an application for postconviction relief for which his exclusive remedy lay under Rule 61. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(a). Therefore, Robinson was required to include in his application filed in October 1988 all grounds for relief that were available to him. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(b)(2). His present claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was available and was known, or should have been known, to Robinson at the time of his filing in October 1988. In order to raise the issues in his present petition, Robinson was required to show that consideration of the claim was warranted in the interests of justice. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(2). Robinson failed to make this showing. Robinson also made no showing of cause for relief from his procedural default and prejudice from any claimed violation of his rights. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(3). Hence, Superior Court was correct in ruling that his present claim was barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2).\\nEven if Robinson's claim were not procedurally barred, his claim fails on the merits to meet the two-pronged standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): (1) that defense counsel's conduct fell below \\\"an objective standard of reasonableness\\\"; and (2) that counsel's action was prejudicial in that, but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Robinson failed to respond to the trial court's request that he be more specific in his claim with respect to the failed jury instruction. Robinson's sole response was directed to the evidentiary claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of two shotguns into evidence for lack of adequate authentication under D.R.E. 901. Assuming the claim were valid, it would not have affected the robbery charge. Whitfield v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 13, 16 (1987). The link between the weapons, Robinson, and the crime was established by other evidence, as set forth in this Court's decision on Robinson's direct appeal. Robinson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is clearly insufficient as a matter of law under Strickland.\\n\\nAffirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7371124.json b/delaware/7371124.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..229f485d015b92edd403a36fae2e984ad540d04d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7371124.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7371124\", \"name\": \"NATIONWIDE MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Adrian McCollough Balmer, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Christine PEEBLES and Horace Peebles, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees; NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. David C. MAYO and Carol J. Mayo, Defendants Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Peebles\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-02-18\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 155, 1996, 242, 1996\", \"first_page\": \"1374\", \"last_page\": \"1380\", \"citations\": \"688 A.2d 1374\", \"volume\": \"688\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:24:21.878487+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT, and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc).\", \"parties\": \"NATIONWIDE MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Adrian McCollough Balmer, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Christine PEEBLES and Horace Peebles, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. David C. MAYO and Carol J. Mayo, Defendants Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"NATIONWIDE MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, and Adrian McCollough Balmer, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Christine PEEBLES and Horace Peebles, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. David C. MAYO and Carol J. Mayo, Defendants Below, Appellees.\\nNos. 155, 1996, 242, 1996.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 7, 1997.\\nDecided: Feb. 18, 1997.\\nGilbert F. Shelsby of Mason, Ketterman & Morgan, Newark, and Angus R. Everton (argued), of Mason, Ketterman & Morgan, Baltimore, MD, for appellant.\\nKenneth M. Roseman (argued), of Ciconte, Roseman & Wasserman, Wilmington, for ap-pellees, Christine Peebles and Horace Pee-bles.\\nMichael Weiss (argued), and Yvonne Takvorian Saville, of Michael Weiss, P.A., Wilmington, for appellees, David C. Mayo and Carol J. Mayo.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT, and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc).\", \"word_count\": \"3926\", \"char_count\": \"25225\", \"text\": \"HOLLAND, Justice, for the majority:\\nThis is a consolidated appeal from two Superior Court judgments. The defendant-appellant in each proceeding is Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (\\\"Nationwide\\\"). The plaintiffs-appellees in one case'are Christine Peebles and Horace Peebles. The other plaintiffs-appellees are David C. Mayo and Carol J. Mayo.\\nThe single common legal issue in both cases relates to the underinsurance policy issued by Nationwide to each of the plaintiffs. The Superior Court was required to construe the deduction of other policies \\\"available to the insured\\\" that is required by 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b)(3). In each ease, the Superior Court held that reduction must be set off against the claimant's total damages for bodily injury, rather than being set off against the limits of the claimant's underin- surance policy. The Superior Court concluded that holding was compelled by this Court's construction of Section 3902(b)(3) in the context of an uninsured claim. Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 10 (1995). We agree. The Superior Court's judgment in each ease is affirmed.\\nFACTS\\nMayo v. Nationwide\\nOn May 5,1992, Carol J. Mayo was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of a third party tortfeasor. The liability insurance carrier for the third party tortfeasor paid the liability policy limits of $25,000 to Carol Mayo in settlement of her claims against the tortfeasor. At the time of the accident, Carol Mayo had $100,000 in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with Nationwide.\\nBecause she sustained damages in excess of $25,000, Carol Mayo asserted an underin-sured claim against Nationwide. At a binding arbitration hearing, the arbitration panel determined $135,000 to be the total value of Carol Mayo's damages. Nationwide paid Mayo $75,000, pursuant to the terms of its underinsurance policy. It arrived at the figure by deducting the $25,000 paid to Mayo by the tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier from the $100,000 per accident maximum of her underinsured policy limits.\\nNationwide then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court. That action sought a determination of whether the liability limits paid by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier were to be subtracted from the limits of Mayo's underinsured motorist policy with Nationwide or the amount of Carol Mayo's total damages. The Mayos filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the policy provision relied upon by Nationwide was void as a matter of law.\\nPeebles v. Nationwide\\nChristine Peebles was injured in three different motor vehicle accidents. The first accident occurred on March 20, 1992. The third accident occurred on October 11,1992. In each of those accidents, the motor vehicle being operated by Christine Peebles was struck by an uninsured motorist. The second accident occurred on May 27,1992, when Christine Peebles's automobile was struck by an insured vehicle, being driven by David Truszcienski (\\\"tortfeasor\\\"). At all times relevant to the three accidents, Christine Pee-bles was insured under the same Nationwide automobile policy. That policy included uninsured and underinsured benefits of $50, 000/$100,000.\\nIn October 1998, the Peebles filed a suit for negligence against the drivers of the other vehicles in each of the three accidents. The Peebles also sued Nationwide for uninsured and underinsured benefits. On March 10,1995, the Peebles and Nationwide entered into a stipulation to resolve the uninsured and underinsured claims through binding arbitration.\\nThat binding arbitration was subject to several stipulated provisions. The parties agreed that the claims regarding the accidents with uninsured motorists in March 1992 and October 1992 \\\"shall be subject to a maximum award of $50,000 for each accident.\\\" The third paragraph of the stipulation provided, with regard to the May 1992 accident involving the tortfeasor, that the claim \\\"shall be subject to the maximum of $50,000. However, any amount awarded over $35,000 shall not be binding\\\" and \\\"either party may litigate in court the entitlement of the plaintiff to receive any amount awarded in excess of $35,000.\\\" This provision was added because Christine Peebles received the tortfeasor's policy limit of $15,000, as a result of the second accident. The parties also agreed that \\\"if the arbitrator's [sic] are unable to apportion damages between the three accidents, then N\\u00e1tionwide shall satisfy the arbitrator's award by making three equal payments within the coverage limits of the three respective claims subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph three of the stipulation to arbitration.\\\"\\nOn August 24, 1995, the arbitration panel entered an award in favor of Christine Pee-bles in the amount of $165,000 for all three accidents. The panel concluded that her injuries were not apportionable. Nationwide paid Christine Peebles the $50,000 of maximum coverage per accident for each of the two collisions with uninsured drivers and $35,000 for the collision caused by the under-insured tortfeasor, i.e., $135,000 in total. Nationwide arrived at the $35,000 figure by deducting the $15,000 paid to Christine Pee-bles by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier from the $50,000 maximum per accident of her underinsured policy limits.\\nAfter the arbitration, the Peebles filed an amended complaint which added a seventh claim against Nationwide. That claim sought an additional $15,000 payment of underinsurance to Christine Peebles.\\nParties' Contentions Superior Court Holding\\nThe Superior Court held that the amount of underinsured liability coverage to be paid is determined by setting off the money received from the tortfeasor against Carol Mayo's and Christine Peebles's respective total bodily injury damages and not against the limits of each applicable underinsured motorist policy. Accordingly, the parties agree that the sole and common legal issue on appeal is whether 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b) requires the money received from a tortfeasor's liability policy to be deducted from the arbitration panel's total award of damages or from the limits of the claimant's underinsurance policy. The applicable standard of appellate review is de novo or plenary.\\nIn both cases on appeal, Nationwide's policy provision for underinsured coverage provides that the underinsured motorist limit \\\"will be reduced by any sums paid by or for any liable parties.\\\" Accordingly, Nationwide contends it is entitled to a credit against the underinsurance policy limits for the money paid on behalf of the tortfeasor. The plaintiffs argue that underinsured claims and the reduction permitted by Section 3902(b)(3) are controlled by this Court's holding in Hurst v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Del. Supr., 652 A.2d 10 (1995). Thus, the plaintiffs submit that a tortfeasor's payment is to be set off against the claimant's total damages for bodily injury and that any provision in the underinsurance policy to the contrary is unenforceable. In response to that argument, Nationwide contends that this Court's holding in Hurst is distinguishable, because it related to the validity of a reducing clause for uninsured coverage rather than underin-sured coverage.\\nKenner/Hurst Section 3902 Construed\\nThis Court has closely examined the statutory intent and public policy of Section 3902(b) in two prior opinions. The first opinion to construe the statutory issue of set-offs in uninsured and underinsured coverage (\\\"UM/UIM coverage\\\") was Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kenner, Del.Supr., 570 A.2d 1172 (1990), an underinsured motorist case. In Kenner, the tortfeasor's liability limits totaled $100,000 and the plaintiffs' UM/UIM coverage equaled $300,000. Id. at 1173. The majority opinion in Kenner concluded that Section 3902(b) established both a floor and a ceiling for an insured's recovery when an accident involves an underinsured motorist. Therefore, the Kenner majority opinion held that Nationwide was permitted to deduct the $100,000 paid by the tortfeasor from the $300,000 limits of its UM/UIM coverage. Id. at 1176-77.\\nThe operation of uninsured motorist coverage was decided in Hurst v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 10 (1995). This Court noted, however, that \\\"[t]he issue in the present case, whether payments 'by or for any liable parties' may be deducted from the Nationwide Policy limits, is the same issue that divided this Court in Kenner.\\\" Id. at 13. Accordingly, in deciding the issue of uninsured coverage in Hurst, this Court re-examined its underin-sured coverage holding in Kenner.\\nThis Court concluded that the majority's decision in Kenner was \\\"contrary to the express terms of Section 3902 and inconsistent with the other decisions of this Court.\\\" Id. at 15. Accordingly, this Court stated that a \\\"careful re-examination of Section 3902 and other decisions of this Court leads us now to adopt the construction of Section 3902 taken by the dissent in Kenner, even in the face of unambiguous policy language to the contrary.\\\" Id. at 13 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Washington, Del.Supr., 641 A.2d 449 (1994); Adams v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1103 (1990); Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., Del.Supr., 553 A.2d 1199 (1989)). Therefore, the Court in Hurst held that Section 3902(b) mandates that any reduction provided for by Section 3902(b)(3) must be deducted from the total amount of the insured claimant's bodily injuries and not from the limits of the insured claimant's uninsured coverage. Id. at 13-14. Consequently, to the extent Kenner was inconsistent with the majority opinion in Hurst, Kenner was overruled. Id. at 11, 15.\\nSection 3902\\nUnderinsurance Coverage\\nThe Superior Court correctly concluded that this Court's construction of Section 3902(b) in Hurst controlled the disposition of Mayo's and Peebles's underinsurance claims against Nationwide. The ratio decidendi of the majority opinion in Hurst concerning uninsured coverage is clearly applicable to underinsured coverage. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary in Hurst to overrule the construction of Section 3902 in Kenner, which was an underinsurance case.\\nThe logical operation of Section 3902(b) with regard to uninsurance, as described by this Court in Hurst, applies a fortiori to underinsurance coverage as that term is defined in subsection 3902(b)(2). See Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 10 (1995). Once again, we begin our construction of the statute with the mandate in Section 3902(b) to extend an offer of uninsured motorist coverage to each insured in an amount not to exceed the limits of the insured's basic liability policy. That introductory statutory mandate is followed by a sentence which states that the offer of \\\"[s]uch additional insurance shall include un-derinsured bodily injury liability coverage.\\\" 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b) (emphasis added).\\nSection 3902(b)(1) then provides that, if the offer of additional coverage is accepted, it shall \\\"pay for bodily injury damage that the insured . [is] legally entitled to recover from the driver of an underinsured motor vehicle.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Section 3902(b)(2) defines an underinsured vehicle as one which has total insurance \\\"applicable at the time of the accident . less than the limits provided by the [insured's] uninsured motorist coverage.\\\" Finally, Section 3902(b)(3) provides that the underinsured motorist coverage insurer does not have to make any payment until' the limits of all bodily injury insurance policies or bonds available to the insured have been exhausted. Nevertheless, when the underinsured policy is activated, it must respond in an amount up to its policy limits \\\"for bodily injury damage that the insured or his legal representative are legally entitled to recover from the driver of an underinsured motor vehicle.\\\" 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b)(1) (emphasis added).\\nNationwide contends that Section 3902(b)(2) not only defines underinsurance but also sets a maximum ceiling on recovery at the limits of the underinsurance policy. Thus, Nationwide argues that it does not have to pay the limits of the underinsurance policies to Mayo and Peebles even though an underinsured driver caused each of them bodily injuries in excess of the limits in the underinsurance policies they purchased from Nationwide. That argument is completely contrary to the statutory mandate in Section 3902(b)(1) that requires underinsurance coverage for the purpose of paying \\\"bodily injury damage that the insured or his legal representative are legally entitled to recover from the driver of an underinsured motor vehicle.\\\"\\nNationwide's argument was adopted in Kenner but overruled in Hurst, when this Court concluded that Kenner had misconstrued Section 3902. The majority opinion in Kenner equated the limits of underinsurance which must be offered with the operation of those limits as a ceiling on underinsurance recovery. The majority opinion in Hurst concluded that such a construction defeated the General Assembly's avowed purpose of providing innocent Delaware motorists with an opportunity to protect themselves from impecunious tortfeasors. Hurst v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d at 12.\\nKenner's construction of Section 3902 permitted the insurance carrier to use the definition of underinsurance in Section 3902(b)(2) as more than a predicate for activating coverage. By construing Section 3902(b) to require Section 3902(b)(3)'s deductions to be made from the underinsurance policy limits rather than the insured's total bodily injuries, the otherwise innocuous definition of underinsurance in Section 3902(b)(2) becomes a sword to pierce the shield of mandatory insurance coverage in Section 3902(b)(1). Instead, Section 3902(b)(1) was intended to pay the claimant for bodily injury damage that the insured driver was entitled to recover from the driver of an underinsured vehicle, if full compensation for those injuries had not been received after the deductions required by Section 3902(b)(3).\\nThe introductory section of Section 3902(b) correlates the offer of underinsurance with the limits of the insured's basic liability policy. Section 3902(b)(1), however, correlates the operation of that underinsurance coverage to the amount the insured is legally entitled to receive from the underinsured driver, after maMng the deductions for other coverage as required by Section 3902(b)(3). Section 3902(b)(2) simply defines underinsurance for the purpose of triggering that form of coverage. Accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gillaspie, Del.Super., 668 A.2d 757 (1995), aff'd, Del.Supr., No. 327, 1995, Hartnett, J., 1996 WL 21056 (Jan. 10, 1996) (ORDER). Accordingly, we hold that Section 3902(b) mandates that any reduction provided for by Section 3902(b)(3) must be deducted from the total amount of the insured claimant's bodily injuries and not from the limits of the insured claimant's underinsurance coverage. The contrary provisions in the Nationwide policies issued to Mayo and Peebles are vio-lative of the statutory mandate and unenforceable.\\nConclusion\\nThe judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.\\n. Christine Peebles was accompanied during the third accident by the other plaintiff, her husband, Horace Peebles. Compensation for his injuries from that accident are not an issue in this appeal.\\n. Although Gillaspie is factually distinguishable from the cases sub judice and from Hurst, its holding is consistent with this opinion. The statute defines an underinsured driver as a tortfeasor with liability policy limits that are less than the insured's uninsured motorist coverage. 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b)(2). Unlike Hurst, Mayo, and Peebles, the limits of Gillaspie's uninsured coverage were equal to the tortfeasor's liability limits. In Gillaspie, the Superior Court held that because the tortfeasor's liability coverage was not less than Gillaspie's uninsured motorist cover-, age, Gillaspie did not meet the unambiguous statutory definition of being injured by an \\\"un-derinsured'' driver. Gillaspie, 668 A.2d at 762-63. Therefore, the Superior Court concluded that it was not required to apply this Court's holding in Hurst to Gillaspie's underinsurance claim. Id. This Court affirmed that judgment. In this opinion, we again hold that the presentation of record evidence which comports with the unambiguous definition in Section 3902(b)(2) is a condition precedent to pursuing an underinsurance claim. See id.\\n. The Peebles case on appeal was decided by the same Superior Court jurist who decided Gillas-pie. In Peebles, however, the limits of the tortfea-sor's liability coverage are less than \\\"the limits provided by [Peebles's] uninsured motorist coverage.\\\" 18 Del.C. \\u00a7 3902(b)(2). Accordingly, the Superior Court held that disparity between Pee-bles's coverage and the tortfeasor's limits triggered the statutory definition of underinsurance in Section 3902(b)(2). The Superior Court further held that this Court's construction of Section 3902(b)(1) and (b)(3) in Hurst, with regard to uninsurance coverage, was applicable to Pee-bles's proper claim for underinsurance coverage. This opinion affirms that judgment.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7383429.json b/delaware/7383429.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..95505590544c221c1c23177163c01a39b03b4096
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7383429.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7383429\", \"name\": \"CABLE ADVERTISING NETWORKS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Michael DeWOODY and Paul DeWoody, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cable Advertising Networks, Inc. v. DeWoody\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-03-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1383\", \"last_page\": \"1387\", \"citations\": \"632 A.2d 1383\", \"volume\": \"632\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:39:01.455966+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CABLE ADVERTISING NETWORKS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Michael DeWOODY and Paul DeWoody, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"CABLE ADVERTISING NETWORKS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Michael DeWOODY and Paul DeWoody, Defendants.\\nCourt of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County.\\nSubmitted: March 3, 1993.\\nDecided: March 10, 1993.\\nLawrence C. Ashby, Stephen E. Jenkins and Richard D. Heins, of Ashby & Geddes, Wilmington, Scott R. Erikson, of Hopkins & Sutter, Dallas, TX, for plaintiff.\", \"word_count\": \"2417\", \"char_count\": \"14897\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nALLEN, Chancellor.\\nCable Advertising Networks, Inc., (\\\"Cable\\\") is a Delaware corporation with its prin cipal place of business in the State of Texas. Having just filed a complaint in this court, Cable now moves for the ex parte sequestration of certain property of the named defendants, Michael and Paul DeWoody, in order to compel the DeWoodys to appear in this action. These individuals are, according to the allegations of the complaint, residents of Texas and former stockholders of Cable. The complaint alleges that through a reverse stock split and a board resolution' under 8 Del.C. \\u00a7 155 (1991), the shares of Cable owned by the DeWoodys have been converted into a right to receive a stated amount of cash. It is this right to receive cash from plaintiff that plaintiff requests the court to \\\"seize\\\" in order to force a personal appearance of defendants. Substantively, Cable seeks a declaratory judgment determining that the amount that the DeWoodys are entitled to receive from it under the Section 155 board resolution is fair. It is alleged that there is an actual controversy with respect to this question.\\nThe sequestration statute, 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 366 (1991), on its face, authorizes the seizure of non-resident defendants' property within the State of Delaware, for purposes of compelling a non-resident to appear in the Court of Chancery. The statute provides that the property sequestered \\\"may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults.\\\" 10 Del. C. \\u00a7 366(a). Application of this statute, at least since the well known decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), carries a Delaware court onto thin constitutional ice. Shaffer v. Heitner, of course, did not declare Section 366 unconstitutional per se. Id. 433 U.S. at 207-09, 97 S.Ct. at 2582. There remain situations in which seizure of property may form a proper basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Grynberg v. Burke, Del.Ch., 388 A.2d 443, 445 (1978); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. GAC Properties Credit, Inc., Del.Ch., 389 A.2d 1304, 1308 (1978).\\nThe present application, involving self-attachment (in equity) of a debt owed to a nonresident, raises a host of issues. Only two of those issues, however, need to be addressed. Those questions are, first, whether the Court of Chancery has in any case the power to deny an ex parte motion for sequestration? and, second, whether sequestration is authorized in an action in which plaintiff does not seek an award of money from the owner of the property seized?\\nAs explained below, I find that the Court of Chancery'has the power and indeed the responsibility to determine whether plaintiff has shown, prima facie by affidavit or verified pleading, that the circumstances render an ex parte seizure of property consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. I also conclude that on the face of the pleadings, sequestration is not authorized by statute in this action because plaintiff is not seeking monetary damages. Therefore, the motion for sequestration must be denied on this ground alone.\\nI.\\nAt a time when the constitutionality of the sequestration of the property of non-residents in order to compel their appearance was unquestioned, the Delaware courts viewed the issuance of a sequestration order as the procedural equivalent of the issuance of a summons. Under the pre-Heitner regime, our Supreme Court rejected the claim that since 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 366 provided that the court \\\"may\\\" order sequestration under given circumstances, the court therefore had discretion to refuse to do so. The Supreme Court stated:\\nIt has never been suggested, so' far as we know, that the use of this process [seques tration] by a litigant is controllable by the court's discretion. We think that [plaintiff] is entitled to it as a matter of right, just as he is entitled to a writ of summons.\\nBreech v. Hughes Tool Co., Del.Supr., 189 A.2d 428, 431-32 (1963). In a second case from that era, the Supreme Court rejected a defendant's claim that, sequestration should only be ordered \\\"upon proof satisfactory to the Court . that plaintiff has a good cause of action against defendant_\\\" The Supreme Court stated:\\nThe sequestration statute contains [no such] requirement. If non-residence is alleged, and a monetary claim, in any amount, is asserted, the defendant's property may be seized.\\nHughes v. Trans World Airlines, Del.Supr., 186 A.2d 886, 889 (1962). Thus, under Breech and Hughes the sequestration process was seen as a matter of right of plaintiffs. The Court of Chancery was accorded essentially no role in the question whether the process should issue in the first instance. The Court, of course, was recognized as having the power to quash the writ on motion once the process was issued and defendant appeared.\\nSince the 1963 Breech decision, the law regarding sequestration has changed substantially. First, the concept of procedural due process has developed to require that, except in extraordinary circumstances, parties whose property is to be seized under color of law must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before such seizure is effectuated. E.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). Second, the circumstances in which a state court may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over non-residents through sequestration or other remedies have been sharply reduced by Shaffer v. Heitner. Under Heitner, the exercise of jurisdiction by a state court over a non-resident defendant violates defendant's right to due process unless \\\"minimum contacts\\\" with the forum state exist and \\\"maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\\\" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Heitner, 433 U.S. at 216, 97 S.Ct. at 2586.\\nFuentes v. Shevin and its progeny, constituted judicial recognition that sequestration was a state interference with property that can violate the constitution unless adequate procedural protections are provided; Shaffer commanded that any such process be limited to persons who have some minimal relationship with the forum state. Thus it is, after these cases, clear that the Constitution mandates some minimal protections against wrongful seizures when an attachment or sequestration process is employed.\\nIn Gordon v. Michel, Del.Ch., 297 A.2d 420 (1972), this court rejected the argument that developments in procedural due process, as of that time, required that defendants whose property is ordered sequestered be given pre-seizure notice and a hearing. The court reasoned that the emergency exception to the notice and hearing requirements was applicable because, if defendants were supplied with prior notice of the sequestration, they could avoid the court's jurisdiction by removing their property from the state or transferring it to third parties. Id. at 423, (citing, Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n. 23, 92 S.Ct. at 1999 n. 23).\\nAccepting arguendo that Gordon v. Michel is still good law, it is nevertheless the fact that intervening Supreme Court opinions have made it clear that even where an emergency justifies pre-notice seizure, due process does require that property not be seized under the authority of a court, without the procedural safeguard of authorization by a judicial officer. Indeed, that authorization must follow a review of the circumstances to determine if the seizure is legally permissible. See North Georgia Finishing v. DiChem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1976); Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 187-88, 96 S.Ct. 473, 487, 46 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 1904, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3rd Cir.1976) (an official exercising some discretion and possessing the necessary professional competence required to satisfy due process).\\nOur Supreme Court recognized this requirement of pre-seizure review in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, Del.Supr., 361 A.2d 225 (1976); rev'd on other grounds, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), where, in holding that Section 366 of title 10 authorized a process that was consistent with due process, the Court stated:\\nAs to safeguards or protection of a defendant's interest, the following appear significant to us:\\n(1) An order of Court is required to initiate the \\u00a7 366 process and beyond doubt, that requires an order of a Judge of the Court of Chancery who has control of the process at all times.\\nGreyhound at 232 (emphasis added). Thus, in Greyhound, the Delaware Supreme Court implicitly recognized the constitutional infirmity of a sequestration procedure that failed to provide judicial supervision of any ex parte seizure process. The Court thus implicitly amended its position in Breech to allow for the constitutionally mandated judicial control of the sequestration process.\\nThus, I conclude that the issuance of an ex parte order seizing a defendant's property in this state is not a matter of right, in the sense that only ministerial acts are necessary in order to effectuate it. Rather, when seizure is employed to effectuate jurisdiction, in order to satisfy the requirements of due process, it is necessary, at a minimum, for a judicial officer to evaluate the exigency that is said to justify the deviation from the procedures normally mandated, before a court may constitutionally interfere with the exercise of property rights.\\nII.\\nAmong the subjects appropriate for judicial review prior to an ex parte seizure of property is the question whether plaintiff has shown prima facie that the statutory seizure procedure has been validly invoked. In this instance plaintiff has not done so.\\nUnder the Breech procedure, when seizure orders were entered automatically, the Court of Chancery would grant motions to quash the writ if it determined that the complaint did not seek a money judgment from the defendants whose property had been seized. See Steinberg v. Shields, Del.Ch., 152 A.2d 113 (1959); Wightman v. San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 142 A. 783, 785 (1928). Indeed, it has been long recognized that sequestration is only available in cases in which the plaintiff is seeking a money judgment. Greyhound at 233, n. 7. See also Widder v. Leeds, Del.Ch., 317 A.2d 32 (1974); Hughes v. Trans World Airlines, Del.Supr., 185 A.2d 886, 889 (1962) (\\\"the complaint must contain a claim for monetary damage\\\").\\nSteinberg v. Shields is an example. That was an action for waste against directors of a Delaware corporation and a Mr. Shields,'who was allegedly the recipient of a gift of stock. In quashing the sequestration of stock owned by the directors, the Court stated:\\nThe specific relief prayed for in the complaint is the cancellation of or imposition of a constructive trust on the shares allegedly given Shields_ It is therefore pertinent to note that had the moving defendant [directors] defaulted, under the prayers of the present complaint the court could not have entered a money judgment against them. Thus, it could not have sold the seized shares.... I conclude that the allegations of the present complaint are not sufficient to support the seizure of the moving defendants' stocks under 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 366.\\nId. at 115.\\nIn the pending case, Cable does not seek a money judgment against defendants. Rather, it seeks a judicial determination that its liability to defendants is exactly the amount its board determined it to be. Thus, in no event would defendants have a money judgment entered against them in this action, and their property, if seized, could not be sold to satisfy any judgment. Therefore, under the old learning governing this now atrophied process, it would be error for the court to order defendant's property sequestered to compel their appearance.\\nIt is therefore not necessary for me to express an opinion on the question whether it would satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to require former shareholders who appear to have no substantial connection to this jurisdiction other than their relationship to this Delaware corporation, to litigate a claim of this type in the corporate domicile, although I might add that this seems like an especially weak case to try to apply such a principle. The motion for sequestration of plaintiffs obligation to defendants must therefore be denied. It is so Ordered.\\n. There are at least three other important issues raised by this application. (1) Does defendants' property, which consists not of stock, which has a legal situs in Delaware under 8 Del.C. \\u00a7 169 (1991), but of the right to receive cash in lieu of fractional shares, have a situs in Delaware such that it can be sequestered under the statute? See Weinress v. Bland, Del.Ch., 71 A.2d 59 (1950). (2) Would haling defendants before a Delaware tribunal through sequestration offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and thus violate the Due Process Clause? (3) Could a seizure be ordered ex parte, on the present record, without violating the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due process?\\n. See, e.g., Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Wilson, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1083 (1986) (pre-hearing revocation of environmental permits by administrative agency held constitutional in light of imminent threat to public health and safety).\\n. In Gordon this Court premised its opinion, in part at least on the view that \\\"Ownbey [v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921)] is very much alive_\\\" 297 A.2d at 423. In the 1977 Heitner opinion, however, the Supreme Court cast grave doubt upon the continuing vitality of that once formidable precedent. See 433 U.S. at 194 n. 10, 212, 97 S.Ct. at 2574 n. 10, 2584.\\n. A stronger case would be presented where the class of plaintiffs reside in a large number of states; it is necessary to determine the amount of a corporate obligation arising from stockholder status; and that obligation legally would be precisely the same for each defendant. Compare Hynson v. Drummond Coal Co., Del.Ch., 601 A.2d 570, (1991). This speculation, however, does not bear on the question of process which is the subject of this motion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/73891.json b/delaware/73891.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b2145629841c6c756ade6091109fd9d7be2d1912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/73891.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"73891\", \"name\": \"In re a certain paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Matthew Spiegelhalter\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re certain paper writing purporting to be the last will & testament of Spiegelhalter\", \"decision_date\": \"1897-09-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"5\", \"last_page\": \"7\", \"citations\": \"1 Penne. 5\", \"volume\": \"17\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:34:28.879825+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re a certain paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Matthew Spiegelhalter.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re a certain paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Matthew Spiegelhalter.\\nIssue from Register of Wills\\u2014Evidence.\\nAn executor named in a v/ill is a competent witness for the purpose of probating the will.\\n(September 29, 1897.)\\nRore, C. J., and Grubb and Pennewiee, J. J., sitting.\\nP. L. Cooper, fr., for the will.\\nSuperior Court, New Castle County,\\nSeptember Term, 1897.\\nThe following petition and issue were sent to the Superior Court by the Register of Wills for New Castle County:\\n\\u201cThat on the sixth day of July, A. D., 1897, the instrument in writing hereto attached, purporting to be the last will and testament of Matthew Spiegelhalter, deceased, having been presented to me as Register as aforesaid, by Thomas A. Brown, the executor named therein, for probate, the said Thomas A. Brown being one of the two witnesses only to said paper writing, the said Register did not know whether he should receive the said Thomas A. Brown as a witness in probating said paper writing purporting to be a will, he, the said Thomas A. Brown, being the person named therein as executor. It was therefore ordered by the Register that an issue of fact touching the said instrument in writing, purporting to be a will as aforesaid, be sent to the Superior Court, there to be tried by a jury. The said issue of fact being:\\n\\u2018 \\u2018Is the paper writing hereto attached the last will and testament of Matthew Spiegelhalter, deceased?\\u201d\\nMr. Cooper, at the trial of the above issue, offered Dr. Thomas A. Brown, the executor named in the will as a witness to the execution of the same, and argued that he was a competent witness for the purpose of probating the will as follows:\\nThe statute allowing parties in interest in civil actions to testify, passed in 1881, (Rev. Code p. 798) is as follows:\\n\\u201cNo person shall be incompetent to testify in any civil action or proceeding whether at law or in equity, because he is a party to the record or interested in the event of the suit or matter to be determined: Provided, that in actions or proceedings by or against, Executors, Administrators, or Guardians in which judgment or decree may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the oth'er as to any transaction with or statement by the testator, intestate or ward unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party. \\u2019 \\u2019\\nBefore the passage of the above quoted statute, it may be questioned whether an Executor under the will was a competent testamentary witness, yet it has never been directly decided to the contrary.\\nDavis vs. Rogers, 1 Hous. 58-65; Sutton vs. Sutton, 5 Har. 459.\\nIt will thus be seen that if the executor was incompetent at all as a testamentary witness prior to the passage of the foregoing statute, it was on the sole ground that he was a party in interest, which objection the above quoted statute expressly removes unless he comes within one of the exceptions to the statute. What are those exceptions ?\\nIn none of the States except Alabama and Delaware was an Executor ever incompetent.\\n1 Williams on Executors, 403 note; Cornstock vs. Hodlyme, 8 Conn. 254, 262; Peralto vs. Costro, 6 Col. 354; Snyder vs. Bull, 17 Pa. St. 54; Stewart vs. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25.\\nDhe statute permitting parties in interest to testify removes the disqualification of Executors in probating wills.\\nMartin vs. McAdims, 27 S. W. 255; In re Fotts Will, 71 Hun. 492 (24 N. Y. S. 1052); In re will of John Nulson, 103 N. Y. 374; Manley vs. Staples, 65 Vt. 370; Hays vs. Ernest, 13 So. 451; Denning vs. Butcher, 59 N. W. 69; In re Gogaris Will, 2 N. Y. S. 426; Foster's Ex. vs. Dickinson, 64 Vt. 233; In re Buckman's will, 64 Vt. 331; Richardson vs. Richardson, 35 Vt. 238; Snyder vs. Burks, 4 So. 225; Stewart vs. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25; Children\\u2019s Aid Soc. vs. Loveridge, 70 N. Y. 387; Rugg vs. Rugg, 83 N. Y. 592; Loder vs. Whelply, 111 N. Y. 239; Sawyer vs. Bennett, 8 Mich. 411; Wiltson\\u2019s Will, 103 N. Y. 374; Reeve vs. Crosby, 3 Redf. (N. Y.) 74; McDonough vs. Laughlin, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 238.\\nTo exclude a witness under any of the enabling statutes it should be made to appear that there is a direct immediate conflict between his rights and those of the estate of the deceased person with whom it is proposed to prove a transaction.\\nAla. Gold. L. Ins. Co. vs. Sledge, 62 Ala. 566; Hill vs. Hilton, 80 Ala. 532; Snell vs. Fervell, 64 Miss. 655.\", \"word_count\": \"984\", \"char_count\": \"5453\", \"text\": \"EorE, C. J:\\u2014\\nThe probate of a will is a civil proceeding as contradistinguished from criminal proceedings. The executor, therefore, would be a competent attesting witness under the express terms of the statute (Section 1, Chapter 337, Rev. C. 798), unless shut out by the proviso.\\nCan it be. said, in any proper sense, that the probate of a will is an action or proceeding by or against an executor and in which judgment or degree may be rendered for or against him as such executor ? There are no parties to the action. In contemplation of law it is solely an inquiry as to the validity of a certain paper writing, whether it is or is not the last will and testament of the decedent; and the judgment or decree in such case is either that it is or is not such will. The costs are uniformly taxed upon the estate inquired about, and an executor is in no wise liable to have judgment or decree rendered for or against him, as .such, for costs, charges or otherwise.\\nWe think, therefore, the statute makes an executor a competent attesting witness t\\u00f3 a will.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/75531.json b/delaware/75531.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..493bdc37e6d2e7ddf48bb75f36307715f4cb6781
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/75531.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"75531\", \"name\": \"Henry W. Pusey vs. James M. Webb\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pusey v. Webb\", \"decision_date\": \"1900-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"490\", \"last_page\": \"495\", \"citations\": \"2 Penne. 490\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:32:52.576976+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Henry W. Pusey vs. James M. Webb.\", \"head_matter\": \"Henry W. Pusey vs. James M. Webb.\\nCase\\u2014Bailment\\u2014Negligence\\u2014Caire Required\\u2014Damages.\\n1. When a person holds himself out to the public in any particular employment or trade, there is an implied engagement with those who employ him that he and his employees possess and will use that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and used by others engaged in the same business.\\n2. The delivery by the plaintiff to the defendant of a horse for the purpose of being shod constitutes in law a bailment, and in such case the skill, care and prudence required on the part of the defendant is such as a reasonably careful and prudent man would exercise under like circumstances.\\n3- If a person receives property as bailee, and such property is injured while in his possession, and while in the exercise of ordinary care, he is not liable for such injury; but if it be occasioned by the negligence or carelessness of the bailee, his servant or agent, he is liable for such injury.\\n4. Ordinarily negligence is never to be presumed, but must be proved like any other substantive fact; and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. But where the property is injured whilst in the exclusive custody of a bailee, his servant or agent, it is incumbent on the bailee to show that the injury was not occasioned by the negligence of himself, his servant or agents.\\n5. If a horse which was left with defendant for the purpose of being shod was restless and would not stand quietly, and the injury complained of resulted from an unavoidable accident caused by the horse jumping suddenly at the time of the trimming of his hoofs, and while the defendant was using reasonable care, the plaintiff cannot recover.\\n(May 4, 1900.)\\nJudges Spruance, Grubb and Boyce, sitting.\\nArley B. Magee and Alexander M. Daly for plaintiff.\\nRobert C. White for defendant.\\nSuperior Court, Kent County,\\nApril Term, 1900.\\nAction on the case for damages for the loss of a gray mare owned by the plaintiff. It was claimed by the plaintiff that the defendant negligently permitted the foot of the mare to be cut while shoeing her at his blacksmith shop in the town of Milford, and that from the wound caused thereby blood poison set in, resulting in the death of the mare. The plea was not guilty. The narr consisted of three counts. The first count was for money laid out and expended by the plaintiff in the cure and healing of the mare.\\nThe second, for damages for the loss of labor of the mare. The third count was for the value of the mare.\\nThe plaintiff testified that he took the mare to the blacksmith shop of the defendant in the town of Milford on or about the twenty-third of February, 1899, and delivered her into the custody of the defendant for the purpose of having her shod. That either Mr. Webb shod the mare or someone else in his shop, in the absence of the plaintiff who went up town after taking the mare to the shop of the defendant, and that the work had been done when he came back to the shop. That he paid Mr. Webb for the shoeing of the mare. That when he took the animal to the shop there were no cuts or bruises on her feet and there were no signs of lameness. That after he took her back home he noticed some soreness or lameness and upon examination of the hoofs found a hole cut through the wall or bottom of the foot into the quick, and that the wound looked white after he had cleaned the dirt out of it. That about ten or eleven days after the animal was shod he asked Mr. Webb, the defendant, about this cut and the latter said, \\u201cJohn, my brother, cut it, but he did not think it would amount to anything.\\u201d The witness further testified that the mare rapidly grew worse and finally died. The veterinarian who attended the horse during its sickness testified that it died from blood poisoning super-induced by the cut in the foot.\\nThe plaintiff further testified that John, a brother of the defendant, who the latter said cut the mare, was employed in a wheelwright shop adjoining the blacksmith shop, and that he did not think he was considered an experienced horse-shoer, but that he was put on to shoe horses.\\nThe plaintiff rested, and Mr. White, counsel for defendant, moved for a nonsuit on the ground that there was no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant.\\nLouth vs. Thompson, 1 Pennewill, 149.\\nCounsel for plaintiff contended that while in an ordinary case for damages the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the negligence of the defendant, yet from the nature of the transaction in this case, the plaintiff not being present at the time of the injury to the mare and the mare having been left in his possession as bailee, the burden was upon the defendant to show that the injury did not result from his negligence.\\nWeber vs. Vernon, 2 Pennewill, 359.\", \"word_count\": \"2010\", \"char_count\": \"11142\", \"text\": \"Boyce, J.:\\nWe have considered this question as fully as we could in the short time afforded us, and we decline to grant a non-suit.\\nBoyce, J., charging the jury:\\nGentlemen of the jury:\\u2014This action was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of damages from the defendant for the death of a mare belonging to the plaintiff, and for money laid out and expended by him for medicine and medical services procured for her.\\nThe plaintiff charges that on, or about, the twenty-third day of February, 1899, he delivered his mare into the custody of the defendant, at the blacksmith shop of the latter, in the town of Milford, for the purpose of having her shod; that he left the shop for a time; that upon returning, finding that the mare had been shod, he paid the defendant therefor, and took her away; that within a few days thereafter he discovered that the mare was lame, and, upon an examination, he found that the inner part of her left forefoot, near the hoof, had been cut into the quick. The plaintiff avers in his declaration that the defendant did undertake to and did shoe his mare, and that by his negligence and carelessness in so doing, did cut, bruise, wound, and injure the left forefoot of the mare, by reason of which she did become sick, sore, lame and disordered, and did continue so until the twenty-third day of March, A. D. 1899, when by reason of such cuts, wounds, bruises and injuries, she died.\\nThe defendant admits that one of the forefeet of the mare was cut very slightly, as he thought at the time, in the act of trimming the hoof which he found necessary to do before shoeing; but he denies that the cut, thus admitted, was the result of negligence or carelessness. He contends that he used reasonable care, prudence and skill in the work which the plaintiff had engaged him to do; and that the injury complained of was an unavoidable accident due to the fact that the mare was very restless, and would not stand quietly and gently while her hoofs were being trimmed and shod; and that while trimming the hoof of the foot which was injured, she gave a sudden jump, causing the cut or accident at that instant.\\nWe have thus briefly stated the contentions of the respective parties, and it is for you to apply the evidence, adduced in your hearing, to the law as we shall declare it to you.\\nIt is a general rule of law that when a person holds himself out to the public in any particular employment, work or trade, there is an implied engagement with those who may employ him that he and his employees in that trade or business possess that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill which is ordinarily possessed by others engaged in the same business or trade. And that he and they will perform the services which he may be engaged to do, diligently and faithfully, and with that skill and prudence ordinarily possessed and observed by others engaged in the same or like employment.\\nThe delivery of the mare to the defendant by the plaintiff for the purpose of shoeing her, constituted what is known in the law to be a bailment; and in such a case where the engagement or undertaking requires skill it is understood to mean ordinary skill in the particular employment or trade in which the party is engaged; and the measure of his undertaking and responsibility is reasonable skill coupled with that care and prudence which a reasonably careful and prudent man would exercise under like circumstances.\\nIf a person receives property as a bailee, and such property is damaged or injured while in his possession, and while in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, he is not liable for such damage or injury; but if it be occasioned by the negligent conduct or carelessness of the bailee, his servant or agent, he is liable for such damage or injury.\\nOrdinarily negligence is never to be presumed, but must be proved like any other substantive fact, and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. But where the property is damaged or injured whilst in the exclusive custody of a bailee, his servant or agent, it is incumbent upon the bailee to satisfy the jury that the injury was not occasioned by the negligence of himself or his servants or agents.\\nIf you find from the evidence that the alleged injury to the mare was produced by reason of incompetency or unskillfulness on the part of the defendant, or any other person whom he may have employed, either to trim her hoofs, or to shoe her, or to assist him in doing so; or that the defendant, or his servant, or agent, did not use that degree of care in and about the work for which he was employed by the plaintiff which a reasonably skillful and careful man would have exercised; and also that the death of the mare was due to the effects of the injury complained of, then the plaintiff will be entitled to recover such a sum as you may find from the evidence to be the value of the mare, at or about the time of her injury and death, and for such further or additional sum as you may find from the evidence that the plaintiff reasonably and necessarily laid out and expended in his endeavor to heal and cure the mare. If, however, you should find from the evidence that the defendant, or the person whom he may have employed to assist him, was reasonably skillful in the work which was undertaken by either of them\\u2014 that is, that they each possessed that reasonable degree of knowledge and skill possessed by persons engaged in the same business or trade, and that reasonable care was exercised in and about the un dertaking such as a prudent, careful man would exercise under like employment and circumstances, your verdict should be for the defendant. Or if you find at the time of the shoeing that the mare was restless and would not stand quietly, and that the injury resulted from an unavoidable accident, caused by her jumping suddenly at the time of the trimming of the hoof, and while the defendant was in the exercise of reasonable care and caution under the circumstances, your verdict should be for the defendant.\\nYou are the sole judges of the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case, and it is your duty carefully to weigh and consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, and to render your verdict for the plaintiff, or the defendant, according to the preponderance and weight of the testimony adduced before you.\\nVerdict for defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/77404.json b/delaware/77404.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b714f4f3147a1c038101404da5a600f13ae1bea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/77404.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"77404\", \"name\": \"William Craig, plaintiff below, plaintiff in error, vs. Benjamin F. Ginn, defendant below, defendant in error\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Craig v. Ginn\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-01-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"117\", \"last_page\": \"128\", \"citations\": \"3 Penne. 117\", \"volume\": \"19\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:03:45.551548+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"William Craig, plaintiff below, plaintiff in error, vs. Benjamin F. Ginn, defendant below, defendant in error.\", \"head_matter\": \"William Craig, plaintiff below, plaintiff in error, vs. Benjamin F. Ginn, defendant below, defendant in error.\\nWrit of Error\\u2014Malicious Prosecution; Termination of; When Action for Will Lie\\u2014Duress\\u2014Party Impeaching Evidence He Introduced.\\n1. It is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution that the plaintiff shall prove, among other things, that the prosecution was not only terminated, but terminated in his favor, but it is not necessary that it should have terminated in a verdict of acquittal. It may be by nolle prosequi or in some other way. A voluntary abandonment of the case by the complainant is such a termination as will sustain an action.\\n2. But the rule is well settled that where the termination of the prosecution has been brought about by the procurement of the party prosecuted, or by compromise or agreement of the parties, an action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained.\\n3. When the prisoner is discharged because of an agreement made and accepted for his accommodation, whereby he and his surety bind themselves to pay whatever sum is found to he due at a conference to be had between the parties, or in the event of their failure to agree, whatever judgment might be obtained against him in an action at law for that purpose, (and he also pays a part of the costs of prosecution) ; it presents a case of the termination of the prosecution by the procurement and consent of the defendant therein, or by a compromise and settlement of the matters in dispute, and will not sustain an action for malicious prosecution.\\n4. When such agreement has been put in evidence by the plaintiff, as a material part of his case, he will not be permitted to contend that it was obtained by duress or fraud.\\n(January 16, 1901.)\\nNicholson, Ch., and Pennewill and Boyce, J. J., sitting.\\nFranklin Brockson for. plaintiff in error.\\nMartin B Burris for defendant in error.\\nSupreme Court,\\nJune Term, 1900.\\nWrit op Error to the Superior Court for New Castle County.\\nThe facts, contentions of counsel and authorities cited, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court.\", \"word_count\": \"3814\", \"char_count\": \"22156\", \"text\": \"Pennewill, J.,\\ndelivering the opinion of the Court .-\\nThis was an action in the Superior Court for New Castle County brought by William Craig, the plaintiff, against Benjamin F. Ginn, the defendant, for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant.\\nUnder the instruction of the Court the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff having declined to accept a nonsuit. The plaintiff excepted to said instructions and took his writ of error, upon which the case has come to this Court.\\nThe declaration filed by the plaintiff contained three counts; the first of which, after setting forth the charge contained in the warrant filed before the Justice of the Peace, the arrest and bringing of the plaintiff before the Justice, alleged \\\"that the said defendant was then and there present, but wilfully neglected to offer any evidence whatever to support the said false and malicious charge against the said plaintiff, which said plaintiff* was then and there ready and anxious to establish his innocence in that behalf, and the said defendant did then and there voluntarily desert and abandon his said complaint and prosecution without the consent of the said plaintiff*, and thereupon, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, at New Castle County aforesaid, the said John W. Naudain, Esquire, so being such Justice as aforesaid, adjudged and determined-that the said plaintiff was not guilty of the said supposed offense, and then and there caused the said plaintiff to be discharged out of the custody fully acquitted and discharged of the said supposed offense, and the said defendant hath not further prosecuted his said complaint, and the said complaint and prosecution is wholly ended and determined, to wit, at New Castle County aforesaid, by means of which said several premises,\\\" etc.\\nIn the second count It was alleged that \\\"the said defendant not having any evidence to support the said false and malicious charge, and well knowing the innocence of the said plaintiff in that behalf, then and there voluntarily neglected to bring the same on to a hearing or trial, and thereupon, to wit, on etc., at etc., the said John W. Naudain, Esquire, so being such Justice of the Peace as aforesaid, adjudged and determined that the said plaintiff was not guilty of the said supposed offense, and then and there ordered the said plaintiff to be discharged out of the custody, and the said plaintiff was then and there discharged, fully released,\\\" etc.\\nThe third count contained the following allegation: \\\"And\\nthereupon the said defendant not having any ground or evidence to support the said false and malicious charge, then and there voluntarily withdrew his said complaint and prosecution, and abandoned the same, and then and there, to wit, on etc., at etc., the said John W. Naudain, Esquire, discontinued the said prosecution and dismissed the said case, and ordered the said plaintiff to be discharged out of custody, and the said plaintiff was then and there discharged and fully released of the said supposed offense; and the said complaint and prosecution is wholly ended and determined in favor of the said plaintiff as aforesaid,\\\" etc.\\nIt is upon the third count that the plaintiff mainly relies.\\nIn the Court below the motion for a nonsuit was based upon two grounds, viz.: 1. That there was material and fatal variance between the averments in the declaration and the proof in respect to the termination of the prosecution for which the action was brought. 2. That the mode of termination of the alleged malicious prosecution, as disclosed by the evidence produced by the plaintiff was not such a termination as the law requires for the maintenance of such an action.\\nOn both of these grounds the Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff should not be permitted to recover, and accordingly directed the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant.\\nSuch direction of the Court is assigned as error, and it therefore becomes necessary for us to determine whether the Court below was justified in disposing of the case as it did, without submitting the same to the jury.\\nUpon a careful examination of the record, we find that the evidence produced by the plaintiff, so far as the same is material to the question before us, consisted of the record of the Justice of the Peace before whom the alleged malicious prosecution was instituted, and a written agreement and endorsements thereon, together with the oral testimony of the plaintiff, and a party named Atwell, who seems to have been acting, if not as the agent, at least as the friend of the plaintiff.\\nThe said record is as follows: \\\"Action on the oath of Benjamin F. Ginn this tenth day of March, A. D. 1898, charging William Craig of obtaining under false pretense from George M. D. Hart two hundred and twenty-four and ninety-two one-hundredths dollars belonging to the said Benjamin F. Ginn, on the sixteenth day of February, A. D. 1898. Warrant issued to George W. Skeggs, Constable, this tenth day of March, A. D. 1898, for the arrest of William Craig forthwith.\\u2014George W. Skeggs, constable return\\u2014summons same day 10th of March, 1898, with prisoner in charge. After Benjamin F. Ginn's attorney and William Craig consulting together agreed to abandon the warrant and settle by mutual consent or by referee trial. The prisoner released from said charge. Before John W. Kactoain, J. P.\\\"\\nThere was written across the face of the record this entry, which is admitted by the plaintiff to be a part of the record: \\\" Costs paid and settled by mutual consent. Case discharged.\\\"\\nThe warrant on which the plaintiff was arrested was also admitted in evidence, and is substantially set forth in the record above given.\\n\\u2022 The written agreement and endorsements thereon were as follows : \\\" Whereas, Benjamin F. Ginn and William Craig, both of Appoquinimink Hundred, are in dispute as to the amount of money due the said Ginn, as proceeds of sale of wheat and corn to George M. D. Hart on the 16th day of February, A. D. 1898, and it is desired to postpone a settlement until Saturday, the 26th day of March next, at 9.30 A. M., at the office of John W. Naudain, Esq., J. P., in order that the said Craig shall have an ample opportunity to produce his accounts. Now therefore, we hereby agree to pay to the said Ginn whatever sum shall be ascertained to be due on said accounts at the conference aforesaid, or in failure of their being able to agree, to pay whatever judgment that shall be obtained against said Craig in action at law thereon. Witness our hands and seals this tenth day of March, A. D. 1898. Wm. Craig [Seal]. J. W. Atwell [Seal.] Witness at signing, George W. Skeggs.\\\"\\nEndorsements :\\n\\\"March 26th, 1898.\\n\\\"The amount ascertained to be due from William Craig to Benjamin F. Ginn is one hundred and seventy dollars, and we hereby agree to pay the said Benjamin F. Ginn the said sum of one hundred and seventy dollars six months from the date hereof, with legal interest till paid; said sum above mentioned is agreed upon as a settlement of outstanding accounts between the said Ginn and Craig in full.\\n\\\" Wm. Craig.\\n\\\" John W. Atwell.\\\"\\n\\\" I hereby accept the above obligation in settlement as therein stated.\\n\\\"B. F. Ginn.\\\"\\n\\\" September 28th, 1898.\\u2014Received of Mr. John W. Atwell one hundred and seventy-five dollars and ten cents in full of the above obligation.\\n' Martin B. Burris,\\n\\\" Plaintiff's Attorney.\\\"\\nIt appears from the oral testimony presented by the plaintiff that about the middle of February, 1898, he received from George M. D. Hart, for a part of the grain crop of 1897, the sum of $224.92; that he was the tenant of the defendant at the time, but had made up his mind to leave the farm the first of the next month; that he then owed the defendant $150. It also appears that when the plaintiff was arrested and taken before the Justice of the Peace, he asked for a postponement of the case, stating \\\" that it did not suit him to attend to the case right on that day.\\\" Defendant's counsel replied, \\\" No, he would not. That has got to be settled to-day, and right here, or you go up the road.\\\" The agreement above mentioned was then signed by the plaintiff and Atwell, and plaintiff was thereupon discharged by the Justice. It was also shown by the testimony that the costs of the case, which amounted to $2.50, were paid by the plaintiff and the defendant in equal amounts.\\nUpon this state of facts, shown and admitted by the plaintiff, we shall consider and determine whether there was such a termination of the prosecution as would enable the plaintiff to maintain his action for malicious prosecution.\\nIt is essential to the maintenance of such an action that the plaintiff shall prove, among other things, that the prosecution was not only terminated, but terminated in his favor.\\nRhodes vs. Silvers, 1 Harr., 127; Wells vs. Parsons, 3 Harr., 505.\\nCertainly it is not necessary to the maintenance of such an action that the criminal proceedings should have terminated in a verdict of acquittal. Such termination may be caused by the entry of a nolle prosequi, or in some other way; and it is unquestionably the Jaw that a voluntary abandonment of the case by the party who made the complaint is such a termination.\\nBut the rule seems to be well settled that where the termination of the prosecution has been brought about by the procurement of the party prosecuted, or by compromise and agreement of the parties, an action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained.\\nMcCormick vs. Sisson, 7 Cowan, 715; Welch vs. Cheek, 115 N. C., 311; Langford vs. R. R. Co., 144 Mass., 431; Marcus vs. Brunstein, 117 N. C., 31; Atwood vs. Bevine, 73 Hun., 547; Clark vs. Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344; Gallagher vs. Stoddard, 47 Hun., 101; Wilkinson vs. Howell, 1 Moody and Malkim, 495; Brown vs. Randall, 36 Conn., 56; Sartwell vs. Parker, 141 Mass., 405; Fadner vs. Liler, 27 Ill. Ap., 506.\\nWe think it is not all necessary to refer at much length to the authorities cited in support of the rule, because we imagine there is not so much doubt about the correctness of the rule as there is respecting its application to the facts in the present case.\\nIn the case of McCormick vs. Sisson, before the Justice had finished the examination of the witnesses, the parties decided they would settle all matters of difficulty between them, and on that account he proceeded no further. It was held to be not such a termination as would sustain an action. This case was approved in Clark vs. Cleveland. In the case of Gallagher vs. Stoddard, after the plaintiff was arrested he gave the officer making the arrest nine dollars in settlement of all claims against him by the complainant, officer and Justice. The Court held that the action could not be maintained on these facts, and that the nonsuit granted should be sustained.\\nIn the case of Langford vs. R. R. Company, the Court said, \\\" But our cases uniformly hold that, where nolle prosequi is entered by the procurement of the party prosecuted, or by his consent, or by way of compromise, such party cannot have an action for malicious prosecution.\\\" It appeared from the evidence that after the complaint against the plaintiff was entered in the Superior Court upon his appeal, a nolle prosequi was entered by the District Attorney by the procurement of the attorney of the plaintiff.\\nIn the recent cases cited from North Carolina, the rule laid down in the Langford case was quoted and approved. In the case in 115 North Carolina the important facts were that after the plaintiff had been arrested on a charge of embezzlement and brought before the Justice, a party appeared who claimed to be a friend of all concerned, and asked for a private interview with the parties interested, whereupon they retired to a private room. After a while the Justice was called in, and the mutual friend drew up and signed a paper. The plaintiff paid a part of the costs. The case was dismissed. The Superior Court on appeal said: \\\" Where, however, the proceeding is dismissed by virtue of an agreement between the parties, the principle (that is the general rule as to the termination of the prosecution) does not apply. There was testimony in this case tending to show some agreement between the parties, under which the plaintiff paid a part of the costs, and was discharged.\\\" This case seems strikingly similar to the one before us.\\nIn the case in 125 North Carolina, it was shown that the plaintiff compromised with the defendant, and agreed and consented to the ending of the action before the Justice. The Court said: \\\" It is a settled rule that before an action like the present to recover damages can be maintained, the criminal action must have terminated in some way, either by nol. pros, verdict or quashing, etc. Where, however, the termination has been induced and brought about by the defendant, he cannot maintain an action for damages.\\\"\\nThe case of Atwood vs. Bevins, 73 Hun., 547, was another in which the Appellate Court reversed a judgment against the defendant, declaring the plaintiff's case must fail because there was not such a termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff's favor as would afford the proper foundation for an action for malicious prosecution. In that case it appears there had been two cross complaints of assault and battery, and one complaint of larceny. After trying one of the assault and battery cases, it was arranged by counsel that the complainants should respectively be absent from court upon the days to which the proceedings in the other cases were adjourned, and each complaint thus fell for want of prosecution. The Court said the \\\"disposition of the matter was judicious and creditable to all concerned, but it was not such a termination of the prosecution as would sustain an action. In principle it was a compromise of abandonment of the proceeding by mutual consent, and no real determination has been had. On that ground the plaintiff's case fails.\\\" We have not been able to examine the ease of Fadner vs. Filer, but from references made thereto, which we have seen in different digests, it distinctly appears the Court held that \\\" the compromise of a criminal prosecution does not constitute such a termination as will justify an action for malicious prosecution.\\\"\\nWe have made a very careful examination of all the authorities cited in the argument, as well as others bearing on the question we are considering, and find no substantial conflict between them, and no dissent from the rule above stated; unless the case of Robbins vs. Robbins, 133 N. Y., 597, be considered as an authority to the contrary. That decision, however, seems to stand alone, and is not only unsupported by any authority that we have been able to find, but appears to be in conflict with other rulings in the same State.\\nIn the case of Morton vs. Young, 55 Me., 24, which was cited by the plaintiff, it was held that where a person was arrested, and subsequently, for the purpose of procuring his discharge, pays under protest a portion of the sum claimed, he is not thereby estopped from showing the want of probable cause. The Court said; \\\"if he (the plaintiff) settled the demand understandingly, and voluntarily, he is estopped from denying that the defendant had probable cause for bringing the suit.\\\" This case is not at all inconsistent with those we have given in support of the position taken by the defendant. The case of Marcus, vs. Bernstein above mentioned, may at first appear to be somewhat in conflict with the other cases we have cited. And although a different conclusion was reached therein, yet the Court said, that while inclined to agree to the proposition recognized in the Langford case, they thought the facts would not admit of its application. And those facts were (1) that the plaintiff protested all the time that his arrest was malicious and without just cause; and (2) that the defendant paid the costs of the prosecution.\\nFrom an examination of the testimony which we have above given it is perfectly clear; (1) that the defendant Ginn, at the time the plaintiff was arrested and brought before the Justice, was present, ready and anxious to proceed with the hearing, and was unwilling to consent to any postponement or delay; (2) that the plaintiff Craig was not ready or willing to proceed, but insisted strongly on a postponement; (3) that the agreement was then signed by the plaintiff and his friend Atwell, which terminated the prosecution; (4) that the plaintiff paid one-half of the costs of the prosecution; (5) that the said agreement, as appears by its terms, was made and accepted for the accomodation of Craig, and at his instance.\\nCan there be the slightest doubt, therefore, that the criminal prosecution was terminated not only with the consent, but by the procurement of the defendant therein?\\nIt is perfectly clear that the prisoner was discharged because of said agreement whereby he and his surety bound themselves to pay whatever sum was ascertained to be due at the conference to be had between the parties, or in the event of their failure to agree, whatever judgment might be obtained against the plaintiff in an action at law for that purpose. This is manifest not only from the fact that the defendant had been insisting up to the time of the execution of the agreement upon an immediate hearing of the case, but also from the record of the Justice which recites that \\\"After Benjamin F. Ginn's attorney and William Craig consulting together agreed to abandon the warrant and settle by mutual consent, or by referee trial; the prisoner released from said charge.\\\"\\nThe evidence adduced by the plaintiff presents as strong a case as can well be imagined, of the termination of the prosecution by the procurement and consent of the defendant therein, or by a compromise or settlement of the matters in dispute. We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, not only that the rule of law is as we have above stated, but we are equally clear that the case now before us comes fairly within its application; unless the agreement which caused the termination of the prosecution was obtained by duress, as is contended by the plaintiff. But such contention made by the plaintiff seems to us inconsistent, and untenable for the reason that the agreement which he now seeks to have disregarded on the ground of duress was put in evidence by himself as a material part of his case. As appears by the record, he declared, in reply to a question asked by the Court, that the paper (meaning the agreement) \\\" was material\\u2014everything on it.\\\" It would be quite extraordinary for us to hold that the plaintiff may be permitted to impeach the evidence which he insisted upon making a part of his case, and which he stated was material thereto. And it would be in effect impeaching the record of the Justice, which the plaintiff introduced and upon which he relied, because it states that the prisoner was discharged by virtue of an agreement made by the parties. And manifestly this is the same agreement which it is now insisted was obtained by duress, and should be disregarded by this Court. We think such position cannot be successfully maintained.\\nMoreover, we are of the opinion that there was no evidence that should have been submitted to the jury, which tended to show that the agreement in question was obtained by duress. To say that it might have been so obtained, would be, we think, but speculative, in the absence of some pertinent testimony to that effect. The question is not what might have induced the plaintiff to make the agreement, but rather what the evidence shows or tends to show, did induce him to make it.\\nOur conclusion being that the termination of the prosecution before the Justice was not such a termination as the law requires to sustain an action for malicious prosecution, we deem it unnecessary to consider the question of variance, which was also ably and elaborately argued by counsel.\\nThe assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment below affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7870320.json b/delaware/7870320.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c30a3b27f091c1a92a77c07cf0b101641fc99eb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7870320.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7870320\", \"name\": \"SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., a New York Corporation, and Otis Elevator Co., a New Jersey Corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Hsu-Nan HUANG, Guardian ad Litem for Stephanie Huang, a minor, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hsu-Nan Huang\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-01-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 83, 1994, 89, 1994\", \"first_page\": \"568\", \"last_page\": \"574\", \"citations\": \"652 A.2d 568\", \"volume\": \"652\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:28:48.821834+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc).\", \"parties\": \"SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., a New York Corporation, and Otis Elevator Co., a New Jersey Corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Hsu-Nan HUANG, Guardian ad Litem for Stephanie Huang, a minor, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., a New York Corporation, and Otis Elevator Co., a New Jersey Corporation, jointly and severally, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. Hsu-Nan HUANG, Guardian ad Litem for Stephanie Huang, a minor, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNos. 83, 1994, 89, 1994.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Dec. 15, 1994.\\nDecided: Jan. 26, 1995.\\nStephen F. Dryden of Heckler & Cattie, Wilmington, for appellant Sears, Roebuck & Co.\\nJames W. Semple of Morris, James, Hitch-ens & Williams, Wilmington, for appellant Otis Elevator Co.\\nBernard A. Van Ogtrop (argued), and R. Karl Hill of Cooch & Taylor, Wilmington, for appellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and BERGER, JJ. (constituting the Court en Banc).\", \"word_count\": \"3453\", \"char_count\": \"21630\", \"text\": \"HOLLAND, Justice:\\nThis is an interlocutory appeal from the Superior Court. The plaintiff-appellee, Hsu-Nan Huang, guardian ad litem for Stephanie Huang (\\\"Huang\\\"), a minor, seeks damages from the defendants-appellants, Sears, Roebuck & Co. (\\\"Sears\\\") and Otis Elevator Co. (\\\"Otis\\\"). Huang's suit is based on the alleged negligence of Sears and Otis, with regard to an incident in which Huang's hand became caught in an escalator.\\nThis appeal arises from the Superior Court's ruling, which granted Huang's motion in limine, to preclude reference at trial to the alleged negligent conduct of Huang's mother. The Superior Court certified that ruling to this Court for two reasons: first, it concluded that this Court's recent decision in Beattie v. Beattie, Del.Supr., 630 A.2d 1096 (1993), placed the continued viability of Delaware's limited parental immunity doctrine in question; and second, it recognized that its pre-trial ruling may be deemed to conflict with this Court's decision in McKeon v. Goldstein, Del.Supr., 53 Del. 24, 164 A.2d 260 (1960). This Court accepted the interlocutory appeal. Supr.Ct. R. 42.\\nThe defendants, Sears and Otis, have raised two arguments. First, according to the defendants, the parental immunity doctrine should now be abrogated entirely for reasons similar to those that recently persuaded this Court to abrogate completely the interspousal immunity doctrine. See Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096. Second, the defendants argue alternatively that the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that Delaware's limited parental immunity doctrine precludes the presentation of evidence or argument regarding its allegation of negligent supervision by Huang's mother as a supervening cause of Huang's injury. See McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d 260.\\nThis Court has decided to retain the current Delaware law which recognizes a limited parental immunity doctrine. Schneider v. Coe, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 682 (1979) (\\\"Schneider I \\\"). This Court has also decided to adhere to its prior holding in McKeon that evidence of a parent's negligent supervision may be presented to establish that such negligence was a supervening cause of a minor child's personal injury. McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d at 262-63. Because we find the Superior Court's ruling is inconsistent with McKeon, the interlocutory judgment of the Superior Court must be reversed.\\nSubstantive Facts\\nOn October 5, 1991, Huang, then four years old, along with her younger brother, accompanied their mother, Cheung-Hua Mei (hereinafter \\\"Mother\\\"), while she shopped in the Sears retail outlet at Price's Corner. After hearing an announcement on the store's public address system, the Mother and her children took the ascending escalator from the first floor to the second floor to see a presentation on jewelry. The presentation took place on the second floor within a few feet of the escalator.\\nThe jewelry presentation was given before more than twenty people by Valerie Carroll (\\\"Carroll\\\") on behalf of her employer, Classic Contemporary Designs. During the presentation, Huang's brother was in a stroller. Huang stood next to her Mother. The Huang family was somewhere in the middle of the crowd.\\nThe Mother stood watching the jewelry presentation approximately six feet from the escalator. At times, Huang either held her Mother's hand or held the stroller next to her Mother. Carroll stated that as she:\\ngot into the beginning of the demonstration, about 5 minutes into it, the little girl went towards the escalator. The very first time she did that I stopped and asked the mother to get the child; that was the only time I asked her.\\nAccording to Carroll, Huang went to the escalator and had to be brought back by her Mother more than two or three times.\\nAt the conclusion of the presentation, Carroll was handing out free pendants to those in attendance when she heard Huang scream. Carroll rushed over and stopped the escalator. She then called for a security guard who came and removed Huang's hand and arm from the nippoint between the escalator handguard and handrail.\\nThe Mother does not remember her daughter walking away from her and toward the escalator several times during the fifteen minute jewelry presentation. The Mother recalls Huang standing next to her, holding the stroller, as she approached Carroll to accept a pendant. As she went around the display table to receive the gift, she heard Huang's scream. The Mother believes the time lapse was approximately thirty seconds between the time when she last remembered Huang holding onto the stroller and when she heard Huang's scream.\\nProcedural Facts\\nHuang sued Sears and Otis for damages relating to her injury from the escalator. Huang filed a complaint in the Superior Court on February 16, 1993, against Sears. On April 8,1993, Huang was granted leave to amend the complaint to add Otis as a party defendant.\\nThe amended complaint alleges negligence in the construction, maintenance, and operation of the Otis manufactured escalator system in place in the Sears retail location in Price's Corner. This negligence allegedly resulted in the injury to Huang. The complaint, as amended, states that the:\\n[mjinor plaintiff was at all times reasonably supervised by her mother who kept a proper lookout for minor plaintiffs safety.\\nSears and Otis seek to assert the defense of supervening cause based on the Mother's negligent supervision of her child, Huang. On April 8, 1993, Sears filed its answer to Huang's amended complaint, alleging as part of its Fifth Affirmative Defense that:\\nif the plaintiff was damaged in any manner whatsoever, that said damage was a direct and proximate result of the intervening and superseding actions on the part of other persons and not of this defendant, and that such intervening and superseding action on the part of the other person or persons bars recovery herein on behalf of the plaintiff due to the doctrine of intervening, superseding causation.\\nSears and Otis have not asserted third party claims for contribution. They seek to introduce evidence regarding the Mother's conduct in order to show that her negligence, not theirs, was the sole (supervening) proximate cause of Huang's injury. The Superior Court ruled that no reference or argument could be made at trial to the negligence of Huang's mother. This decision was based on the doctrine of parental immunity which bars children from suing their parents, and third parties from suing parents for contribution, in cases in which an unemancipated child is negligently injured.\\nHistory in Delaware\\nParental Immunity Doctrine\\nThe doctrine of parental immunity was first recognized in Delaware by the Superior Court in the case of Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Del.Super., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956). The facts of Strahom are similar to the facts in the case sub judice. A little boy evaded his father's grasp, ran to an escalator, fell, and injured his fingers in the escalator apparatus. In Strahom, the Superior Court noted, \\\"the majority rule is that an unemancipated minor cannot sue a parent in tort in a case of ordinary negligence.\\\" Id. 123 A.2d at 108 (citations omitted). The Superior Court adopted the majority rule, relying in part on the public policy of \\\"preserving] the peace and harmony of the home.\\\" Id. Accordingly, the Superior Court held the action was barred by the doctrine of parental immunity, notwithstanding the fact that the action was for contribution from the minor child's parent, as opposed to a direct action against the parents for damages by the minor child. Id. 123 A.2d at 109-10.\\nThis Court first addressed the doctrine of parental immunity in the case of Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976). In Williams, a father, as next friend of the child, brought a direct action against the minor child's mother for injuries the child sustained in an automobile accident. This Court held that \\\"an absolute rule of parental immunity in tort has no rational basis under modern day conditions and circumstances\\\" and allowed the minor's suit to stand. Id. at 673.\\nThis Court did not completely abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity in Williams and was careful to point out that Strahom had not been overruled. The holding in Williams was limited. It only permitted an unemancipated minor child to sue an insured parent for negligence arising from an automobile accident. In Williams, we stated, \\\"[w]hether this Court will adopt the doctrine of parental immunity when . issues of parental authority and discretion are presented must await another case.\\\" Id.\\nThree years later, in Schneider v. Coe, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 682 (1979) (\\\"Schneider /\\\"), this Court decided the question that Williams left unresolved. In Schneider I, a minor child ventured into a neighbor's yard and was kicked by a pony. The issue presented was whether a \\\"parent who negligently supervises his unemancipated child can be liable for the resulting injury to his child.\\\" Id. at 682. This Court ruled that evidence regarding the parent's negligence was inadmissible. Williams was distinguished because \\\"[u]nlike driving an automobile, supervision of one's children involves issues of parental control, authority, and discretion that are uniquely matters of a very personal type of judgment.\\\" Id. at 684.\\nReciprocal rights and duties inhere in the parent-child relationship. Anything creating conflict between parent and child, or interfering with the authority, discretion, or control that a parent has the right to exercise in supervising his child is repugnant to the institution of the family, and therefore is against public policy. Paren tal immunity will not be abrogated where the duty arises from the family relationship, for to do so would manifestly tend to disturb domestic tranquility.\\nId.\\nIn Schneider I, this Court explicitly declined to extend the holding in Williams to abrogate entirely the doctrine of parental immunity. After recognizing the exception to the parental immunity doctrine in Williams, this Court held that \\\"where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule of parental immunity must be preserved.\\\" Id. (citing Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Liability of a Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence, 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 976-80 (1972)).\\nLimited Parental Immunity.\\nDelaware Retains Doctrine\\nOtis and Sears contend that this Court should no longer retain the doctrine of parental immunity. That argument is based, by analogy, on this Court's recent decision to abrogate the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. Beattie v. Beattie, Del.Supr., 630 A.2d 1096 (1993). While the national trend has been toward eroding the doctrine of parental immunity, only ten states have completely abrogated the doctrine for all torts. Caroline E. Johnson, Comment, A Cry for Help: An Argument for Abrogation of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse Cases, 21 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 617, 638 (1993).\\nThe majority of states, thirty-three, have not abrogated the parental immunity doctrine altogether, but have only recognized certain exceptions and still provide partial immunity. Id. at 630 n. 88. Twenty-nine states, for example, have abandoned the doctrine in the instance of automobile accidents, such as in the Williams decision. Id. at 632 n. 100. Twenty-six states have abrogated the doctrine for negligent torts. Id. at 631. Many states, however, have not abrogated the doctrine or have reserved judgment when the facts before them involve parental discretion, control and authority. We have decided to adhere to all of our prior precedents with regard to the issue of parental immunity. See Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669; Schneider I, 405 A.2d 682. Therefore, \\\"where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule of parental immunity [is] preserved\\\" in Delaware. Schneider I, 405 A.2d at 684.\\nIf Parent's Negligence Relevant\\nAdmissible As Supervening Cause\\nOtis and Sears' second argument is that, even if the Mother is immune from direct liability or liability for contribution, they should be allowed to present evidence to establish that the Mother's negligent supervision (control) was a supervening cause of her minor child's injuries. This Court responded affirmatively to a similar argument in McKeon v. Goldstein, Del.Supr., 53 Del. 24, 164 A.2d 260 (1960). In McKeon, this Court stated that \\\"the determination of proximate cause is a question of fact for the trier of facts.\\\" Id. 164 A.2d at 263.\\nThus, in McKeon, we held that even when the parent was not (and could not be) a named defendant, the trier of fact must decide whether the parent's negligent supervision was the sole proximate cause, i.e., supervening cause, of her minor child's injury. If the parent's negligence was a supervening cause of the child's injury, the named defendants' negligence would be a remote cause, rather than a proximate cause, and the defendants would not be liable as tortfeasors. We adhere to that holding in this case.\\nHuang contends that the holding in McKeon was modified in 1980, when the Schneider litigation came before this Court a second time in Coe v. Schneider, Del.Supr., 424 A.2d 1 (1980) (\\\"Schneider II\\\"). The question presented in Schneider II was whether evidence of the parent's negligent supervision of a child was admissible in a suit based on the \\\"attractive nuisance\\\" doctrine. This Court held that any reference to the parent's negligent conduct was inadmissible, even with regard to the issue of proximate cause.\\nIn Schneider II, this Court held that \\\"[g]iven Delaware's adherence to the rule of Restatement [of Torts] (2d) \\u00a7 339, under the facts of this case, parental supervision is immaterial to the question of the defendants' liability.\\\" Id. at 2. See Cox v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., D.Del., 823 F.Supp. 241, 247-48 (1993) (holding that under facts of case, evidence of employer's negligence was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible to demonstrate intervening/superseding causation). \\\"Notably, \\u00a7 339 and the official comments thereto do not make the possessor's liability contingent upon a showing that the child's trespass was not due to parental negligence in failing to properly supervise the child.\\\" Schneider II, 424 A.2d at 2. Thus, our holding in Schneider II, regarding the immateriality of the parent's negligent control, was explicitly based on the attractive nuisance doctrine theory of liability.\\nOur holding in McKeon was not cited in Schneider II because the issue of parental control was irrelevant. McKeon has not been overruled but has, in fact, been cited with approval in other contexts. Moffitt v. Carroll, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 169 (1994); Culver v. Bennett, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1094 (1991); Naidu v. Laird, Del.Supr., 639 A.2d 1064 (1988); Chudnofsky v. Edwards, Del.Supr., 58 Del. 280, 208 A.2d 516 (1965); Sweetman v. Strescon Indus., Inc., Del.Super., 389 A.2d 1319 (1978). Delaware's recognition of a limited parental immunity doctrine in Schneider I is completely consistent with the recognition that, when parental negligence is relevant but not actionable, a defendant may introduce evidence to establish that parental negligence was the supervening cause of a minor child's injury. See McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d at 262-63. Cf. Schneider II, 424 A.2d 1.\\nThis Case\\nDelaware Jurisprudence\\nLimited Parental Immunity\\nThis Court has held that Delaware's enactment of a comparative negligence statute did not change the common law doctrine of proximate cause. Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d at 1098. Multiple defendants may be liable as joint tortfeasors if each defendant's negligence is found to be a proximate cause of a plaintiffs injury. Id. If one defendant's negligence is found to be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, it is a supervening cause which shields the other defendants from liability. McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d at 263.\\nIn cases where the parental immunity doctrine applies, defendants who decide to assert the parent's negligence as a supervening cause adopt essentially an \\\"all or nothing\\\" legal strategy. The trier of fact may decide that the parent's negligence and the negligence of one or more defendants were all proximate causes of the child's injury. In such an event, since the parent is immune from direct liability or liability for contribution, by definition the parent cannot be a joint tortfeasor. 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 6301 and 6302. See Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc. v. Mullins, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 6 (1994). Therefore, the non-parent tortfeasors will be held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the minor child's damages.\\nBecause this case is in the pre-trial stage and will be remanded for further proceedings, we will summarize our holdings seria-tim. First, where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, e.g., in potential actions against parents for negligent supervision of their children, the rule of parental immunity is preserved in Delaware and precludes direct claims by a minor child, as well as third-party claims for contribution. Accord Schneider I, 405 A.2d 682; Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Del.Super., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956). Cf. Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976). Second, if the parent's negligence is relevant to the minor child's theory of liability, but not actionable, a defendant may introduce evidence to establish that the parent's negligence was a supervening cause of the minor child's injury. McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d 260. Third, if the parent's negligence was a proximate cause but not a supervening cause, the parent's negligence does not provide a basis for reducing full payment to the minor child or the basis for a claim of contribution by any defendant determined to be a tortfeasor, since by definition the parent cannot be a joint tortfeasor. See Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc. v. Mullins, 637 A.2d 6; Schneider I, 405 A.2d 682.\\nConclusion\\nThe interlocutory judgment of the Superi- or Court, which granted the plaintiffs motion in limine, is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\\n. Ms. Carroll was employed by Classic Contemporary Designs as of October 1991. She had been working as a subcontractor at the Sears Price's Comer store performing jewelry demonstrations for three years. Sears earned a twenty or twenty-five percent commission on her total sales.\\n. After quoting the same passage from Williams as quoted in the preceding paragraph, the Court stated, \\\"[t]he instant appeal seems to be that other case.\\\" Id. at 683.\\n. See Coe v. Schneider, Del.Supr., 424 A.2d 1 (1980) (''Schneider II''); Schneider I, 405 A.2d 682; Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976); Strahom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Del.Supr., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956).\\n. In McKeon, this Court allowed a jury to hear evidence of parental conduct for the issue of proximate causation. The case involved a mother who left her child on a bed adjacent to a hot steam pipe from the heating system. The mother placed the child on her bed after noticing a bulge in the ceiling over the child's crib which appeared to be from a water leak. The child was subsequently discovered severely burned lying on the floor near the pipe.\\n. Section 339 provides:\\nArtificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children\\nA possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if\\n(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and\\n(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and\\n(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and\\n(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and\\n(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.\\n. \\\"The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Statute comes into play only when the proposed contributor shares with the defendant a 'common liability' to the plaintiff. Absent such liability, no contribution may be enforced.\\\" Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., Del.Supr., 59 Del. 135, 215 A.2d 427, 430 (1965).\\n. See Schneider II, 424 A.2d 1.\\n. See Schneider I, 405 A.2d 682.\\n. The parent's negligence cannot be imputed to the minor child. McKeon v. Goldstein, 164 A.2d at 262. This Court recently addressed the minor child's own capacity for contributory negligence. See Moffitt v. Carroll, Del.Supr., 640 A.2d 169 (1994).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7874101.json b/delaware/7874101.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fa1324c68892d8192b89eeffb9d5b1011f1ad4fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7874101.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7874101\", \"name\": \"John M. SMITH, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-09-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 237, 1993\", \"first_page\": \"1083\", \"last_page\": \"1091\", \"citations\": \"647 A.2d 1083\", \"volume\": \"647\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:52:09.144349+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"John M. SMITH, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"John M. SMITH, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 237, 1993.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Aug. 31, 1994.\\nDecided: Sept. 23, 1994.\\nDavid W. Jones, Blades, Pryor & Benson, P.A., Dover, for appellant.\\nGary A. Myers, Dept, of Justice, Georgetown, for appellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4160\", \"char_count\": \"26573\", \"text\": \"VEASEY, Chief Justice:\\nIn this appeal we consider whether the Superior Court erred in admitting against defendant below-appellant John M. Smith (\\\"Smith\\\") testimony of Jeanine Weedon (\\\"Mrs. Weedon\\\"), the wife of codefendant below William Weedon, Jr. ('Weedon\\\"). In relevant part, the testimony recounted a conversation Weedon had with Mrs. Weedon on October 10, 1992, that implicated Smith in the subject offenses. For the reasons below, we hold that the Superior Court committed plain error by admitting the pertinent testimony and therefore REVERSE Smith's convictions and REMAND the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.\\nI. FACTS\\nIn the early morning hours of October 10, 1992, Ronald Ward (\\\"Ward\\\") was attacked while sleeping in his house in Lewes, Delaware. Ward did not see who attacked him. As a result of the attack, Ward received severe injuries to his face, skull, arm and fingers.\\nLater that morning, Officer Gilbert Clam-pitt (\\\"Clampitt\\\"), of the Lewes police, stopped a blue Chevrolet Nova for a speeding violation. Smith and Weedon identified themselves, respectively, as the driver and passenger/owner of the vehicle. Located inside the vehicle were two baseball bats. Clampitt ticketed Smith for speeding and allowed the two to proceed.\\nThe police learned of Weedon's and Smith's involvement in Ward's assault primarily through a phone call Mrs. Weedon placed to the Delaware State Police. In that call, she recounted certain events which occurred in early October, 1992, which events are summarized as follows: between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. on October 9, Weedon arrived at the Weedon residence; Mrs. Weedon apprised Weedon of unfortunate developments relating to the sexual molestation of their children; upon learning from Mrs. Weedon of an accusation by his son Billy that Ward molested him, Weedon declared that he would kill Ward and stormed off; Weedon returned to the Weedon residence between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m., October 10, where he told Mrs. Weedon that he and \\\"John\\\" (later identified as Smith) had gone to Ward's house and beaten Ward with two baseball bats; he continued that \\\"John [Smith] hit him in the head like he was hitting a baseball.\\\"\\nUpon Mrs. Weedon's recitation of the above events, the police pieced together what had occurred in the early hours of October 10, eventually leading to a five-count indictment of Weedon and Smith on January 11, 1993. A joint jury trial commenced on April 26, 1993, in which Smith testified on his own behalf and presented an alibi defense. Wee-don did not take the stand. Mrs. Weedon testified as to the events of October 9 and 10, including a recounting of her October 10 conversation with Weedon. The trial ended on May 4, 1993, with the jury finding Wee-don and Smith guilty of Attempted Murder First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony and Conspiracy First Degree. Smith was sentenced on June 18, 1993, to a total incarceration period of 17 years. He filed a timely appeal.\\nSmith originally raised two contentions on appeal. First, he argued that admission as to Smith of Mrs. Weedon's testimony regarding Weedon's October 10 statement to her violated Bruton and the Confrontation Clause. Second, Smith contended that the Superior Court erred in denying his timely motion for judgment of acquittal. This Court subsequently ordered supplemental briefing on whether Delaware should adopt the standard enunciated in Williamson v. United States, \\u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), in defining the scope of D.R.E. 804(b)(3).\\nII. ANALYSIS UNDER D.R.E. 804(b)(3)\\nThough conceding that he failed to object to the introduction of this evidence in the Superior Court, Smith argues that the court committed plain error in admitting portions of the October 10 conversation between Weedon and Mrs. Weedon that implicated him. He asserts that Williamson provides the more analytically sound approach to D.R.E. 804(b)(3) issues. The State initially notes that Williamson is only marginally involved because only those portions of Wee-don's statement that used a plural, first-person pronoun and the component that directly inculpated Smith are at issue. The State contends that because Williamson was based on federal statutory analysis, this Court is not bound by that decision and, further, that policy considerations favor rejection of Williamson. Premised on such rejection, the State concludes that Weedon's October 10 statement was admissible against Smith under D.R.E. 804(b)(3).\\nD.R.E. 804(b)(3) only allows admission of truly self-inculpatory statements. That provision, which codifies the declaration-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule, allows admission of the following:\\nA statement which was, at the time of its making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.\\nD.R.E. 804(b)(3). In Williamson v. United States, \\u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (O'Connor, J., majority), the United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of statements admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) (\\\"F.R.E. 804(b)(3)\\\"), \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2433-37, the federal counterpart to D.R.E. 804(b)(3). In that case, a declarant (\\\"Harris\\\") during a custodial interrogation made a confession that incriminated himself as well as the defendant ('Williamson\\\"). Subsequently, Harris recanted parts of his confession as fabricated but made a second confession. The second confession still incriminated himself and Williamson, though under a different set of circumstances. At William son's trial, because Harris (who was called as a witness under use immunity) refused to testify, the court allowed the interrogating officer to recount Harris' second confession which inculpated both Harris (the declarant) and Williamson (the defendant). Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2433-34.\\nThe issue before the Court was whether the confession should be dissected to its self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory components. Relying on the denotative meaning of \\\"statement\\\" in F.R.E. 804(b)(3) and the underlying basis for admissibility of such statements \\u2014 trustworthiness attributable to declarations against interest \\u2014 the Court explicated that F.R.E. 804(b)(3) renders admissible only those components of a declarant's confession that are truly self-inculpatory as to the declarant in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2436-37.\\nThe policy behind the declaration-against-interest exception is that self-inculpa-tory statements are inherently reliable and trustworthy. Williamson, \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2435 (\\\"reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-incriminatory statements unless they believe them to be true\\\"); United States v. Matthews, 2d Cir., 20 F.3d 538, 545 (1994) (\\\"people do not ordinarily make statements damaging to themselves unless they are true\\\") (quotation omitted). There is no clear policy basis, however, for attributing equal guarantees of trustworthiness to declarations appurtenant to the self-incriminatoiy ones, particularly those that are self-serving. Williamson, \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2435; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986); Matthews, 20 F.3d at 545. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court in Williamson, analyzed the rule as follows:\\nRule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true. This notion simply does not extend to the broader definition of \\\"statement.\\\" The fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-in-culpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.\\n\\nSelf-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements.\\n\\nNothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or the general theory of the hearsay Rules suggests that admissibility should turn on whether a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement. The fact that a statement is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's reliability. We see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are neutral as to interest . should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded.\\n\\nIn our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else.\\nWilliamson, \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2435.\\nAlthough not bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) in construing our identical D.R.E. 804(b)(3), we have repeatedly noted that construction of identical rules by the federal judiciary is accorded \\\"great persuasive weight\\\" in our interpretation of the Delaware counterparts. See Hoffman v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 1096, 1098 (1988) (quoting Canaday v. Superior Court, Supr., 49 Del. 456, 119 A.2d 347, 352 (1956)). We find Justice O'Connor's reasoning to be persuasive and we therefore adopt it in construing the Delaware rule.\\nAs the Court in Williamson held, there is no theoretical basis for the admission of neutral, collateral statements. Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. D.R.E. 802. A hearsay declaration is admissible, usually under a specific exception, only where the declaration has some theoretical basis making it inherently trustworthy. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); D.R.E. 803 (listing hearsay exceptions where availability of declarant is immaterial); D.R.E. 804 (listing hearsay exceptions requiring unavailability of declarant). Thus, absent some special indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, hearsay statements are inadmissible. Neutral, collateral statements enjoy no such guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. Williamson, \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2435. Non-self-incriminatory components of a declaration purportedly falling within D.R.E. 804(b)(3) are presumptively inadmissible hearsay because they cannot claim any special guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. This result is consistent with Delaware's traditional approach of viewing constitutional protection of confrontation accorded the accused by the United States Constitution as a floor rather than a ceiling. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, Del.Supr., 571 A.2d 170, 176-77 (1990); Hammond v. State, Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 81, 86-87 (1989).\\nIn the instant case, the Superior Court allowed Mrs. Weedon to testify to the entire conversation she had with Weedon on October 10, 1992. In that conversation, Weedon described his assault on Ward, inculpated himself and also inculpated Smith. Under the D.R.E. 804(b)(3) analysis set forth above, only those portions of Weedon's October 10 communication to Mrs. Weedon that were truly self-inculpatory as to Weedon under all the circumstances were admissible. The Superior Court committed plain error in not analyzing the October 10 communication to distill those portions that were truly self-inculpatory and admissible from those that were not.\\nIII. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION\\nThe State's rebanee on D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) is misplaced. That provision states in relevant part: \\\"A statement is not hearsay if . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . a statement made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspira- ey[.]\\\" D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). To fall within the co-conspirator statement exclusion, the admitted statement must have been made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Lloyd v. State, Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 1262, 1264 (1987); see also Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617, 73 S.Ct. 481, 489, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953) (applying federal counterpart); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43, 69 S.Ct. 716, 717-18, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (same). Duration of a conspiracy depends on the fact-specific scope of the original agreement, but generally a conspiracy terminates upon accomplishment of the principal objective unless specific evidence is introduced indicating that the scope of the original agreement included acts taken to conceal the criminal activity. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 616, 73 S.Ct. at 488; Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 442-43, 69 S.Ct. at 717-18. A declaration made by a co-conspirator after termination of the conspiracy is inadmissible under the co-conspirator hearsay exclusion against any co-conspirator other than the declarant. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 617-18, 73 S.Ct. at 489-90; Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 443, 69 S.Ct. at 718 (reversing conviction where post-conspiracy declaration improperly admitted under exception).\\nIn the instant case, the State does not specify when the conspiracy to assault Ward ended. There is nothing in the record requiring departure from the general rule that a conspiracy terminates upon the accomplishment (successfully or unsuccessfully) of the primary object, here the assault on Ward. Thus, the October 10 conversation does not fall within the ambit of the co-conspirator hearsay exclusion. See D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E); Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 617-18, 73 S.Ct. at 489-90; Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 443, 69 S.Ct. at 718.\\nIV. ANALYSIS UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE\\nSmith contends that the Superior Court erred in admitting Mrs. Weedon's testimony regarding Weedon's October 10 statement because such admission ran afoul of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause. The State retorts that Bruton is unavailing because its rule is predicated on inadmissibility of the subject statement against Smith. The State continues that the precondition is not met here because the October 10 statement was admissible under D.R.E. 804(b)(3) or D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). This begs the question and is incorrect as a matter of law.\\nIn a joint trial, admission of a eode-fendant's confession that also incriminates the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1622, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), unless the confession is sufficiently redacted to exclude the possibility that a jury will use it against the defendant, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Blodgett v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 628, 629 (1973) (analysis under federal Confrontation Clause). The instant case implicates Bru-ton because it involves a joint trial of code-fendants where the inculpatory statement of one defendant (Weedon) was used against both Weedon and the codefendant (Smith). We have held that those statements of Wee-don within the October 10 conversation with Mrs. Weedon that were not truly self-incul- patory did not fall within the ambit of D.R.E. 804(b)(3). See Part II, supra.\\nThe majority in Williamson predicated its decision solely on its interpretation of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) and did not base its decision under the Confrontation Clause. That clause states in relevant part: \\\"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\\\" U.S. Const., amend. VI. Hearsay statements, however, may be admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause if (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify and (2) the statement \\\"bears adequate indicia of reliability.\\\" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972)). A declarant who invokes the Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege against self-incrimination is \\\"unavailable\\\" for Confrontation Clause purposes. See D.R.E. 804(a)(1) & (2); see also United States v. Bakhtiar, 2d Cir., 994 F.2d 970, 977, cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 554, 126 L.Ed.2d 455 (1993); State v. Payne, Conn.Supr., 219 Conn. 93, 591 A.2d 1246, 1258 (1991); State v. Smith, Me.Supr., 415 A.2d 553, 559 (1980); State v. Grossi, R.I.Supr., 588 A.2d 607, 608 (1991). A statement may be sufficiently reliable if it falls either within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or if it otherwise has \\\"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.\\\" Lee, 476 U.S. at 543, 106 S.Ct. at 2063; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (footnote omitted).\\nThe United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the deelaration-against-interest exception is \\\"firmly rooted.\\\" See Williamson, \\u2014 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. The lower federal circuits have split on the issue. Compare United States v. York, 7th Cir., 933 F.2d 1343, 1363-64, cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262 (1991) (firmly rooted); United States v. Seeley, 1st Cir., 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1989) (same) with United States v. Flores, 5th Cir., 985 F.2d 770, 783 (1993) (not firmly rooted); Olson v. Green, 8th Cir., 668 F.2d 421, 428, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009, 102 S.Ct. 2303, 73 L.Ed.2d 1305 (1982) (same). This Court need not reach the issue, however, because as earlier discussed, see Part II, supra, we hold that portions of the larger October 10 narrative that were not truly self-inculpatory lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness irrespective of whether D.R.E. 804(b)(3) is a firmly rooted exception.\\nGiven that Weedon's October 10 narrative does not fall within the declaration-against-interest hearsay exception, co-conspirator exclusion, or any other hearsay exception or exclusion, the Superior Court's admission of that statement against Smith constituted plain error under the Delaware Rules of Evidence. To permit the introduction of the evidence as to Smith squarely implicates the Confrontation Clause. See Fuson v. Jago, 6th Cir., 773 F.2d 55, 60-61 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3334, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986) (interpreting Ohio Rule of Evidence 804(B)(3)). Accordingly, the interpretation of D.R.E. 804(b)(3) which we adopt today saves the constitutionality of the Rule since to construe D.R.E. 804(b)(3) to permit the introduction of the Weedon statement as to Smith would have violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, \\u00a7 7, of the Delaware Constitution.\\nFurthermore, the Superior Court's error was not harmless. Upon a finding that a defendant's constitutional rights were violated, a reviewing court must \\\"weigh the significance of the error against the strength of the untainted evidence of guilt to determine whether the error may have affected the judgment.\\\" Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 11 (1987) (reversal based on Confrontation Clause violation). Constitutional errors are of such magnitude that \\\"reversal is required whenever the reviewing court 'cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' \\\" Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In the instant case, there was no untainted direct evidence linking Smith to commission of the subject offenses. The only circumstantial evidence allowing for an inference of culpability was Clampitt's testimony that he stopped a car driven by Smith for speeding in the early morning hours of October 10 and saw two baseball bats in the car's compartment. Given the paucity of untainted evidence against Smith, the gravity of Mrs. Weedon's testimony relating to portions of the October 10 conversation that inculpated Smith is palpable. Thus, the Court cannot say that the improper, wholesale admission of that conversation constituted error that was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\\nWe therefore REVERSE Smith's convictions and REMAND the case to the Superior Court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\\n. 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 636(a)(1).\\n. Id. \\u00a7 826(1).\\n. Id. \\u00a7 1447(a).\\n. Id. \\u00a7 513(1). The fifth count, Criminal Mischief, id. \\u00a7 811(a)(1), was nolle prossed by the State prior to trial.\\n. In Weedon's companion appeal, this Court, in an opinion issued contemporaneously herewith, affirmed Weedon's conviction. Weedon v. State, Del.Supr., Veasey, C.J. (1994) (OPINION), 647 A.2d 1078.\\n. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).\\n. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Del. Const., art. I, \\u00a7 7 (1897).\\n. As an initial matter, this Court is empowered to review Smith's argument even though he failed to object to admission against him of the October 10 conversation. Where a party fails to object to introduction of evidence in the Superior Court, the issue is whether plain error mandates review in the interests of justice. Supr.Ct.R. 8; Robertson v. State, Del.Supr. 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (1991); Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 674, 680 n. 7 (1983). The Court finds that the Superi- or Court committed plain error, requiring review in the interests of justice.\\n. Cf. Hooks v. State, Del.Supr., 416 A.2d 189, 201 (1980) (excluding collateral, self-serving statement that was purportedly part of more general, admitted confession); but cf. United States v. Matthews, 2d Cir., 20 F.3d 538, 546 (1994) (those portions of a declaration against interest that have \\\"sufficient 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' \\\" do not violate the Confrontation Clause and are therefore admissible) (quotation omitted).\\n. See also State v. Riviera, Del.Super., 515 A.2d 182, 184 (1986) (where Delaware has not ruled on the scope of a term in an evidentiary rule, deference to interpretation accorded the term by federal and other states' case law is appropriate, though not binding).\\n. As noted infra the Supreme Court did not predicate its opinion on the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Hence, we are not bound by any federal constitutional mandate emanating from Williamson.\\n. That rule states: \\\"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these Rules.\\\" D.R.E. 802. Note that under D.R.E. 801(d)(2) a party defendant's own statement is not hearsay. Thus Weedon's statement to his wife implicating himself is not hearsay as to him. Accordingly, it is admissible as to Weedon unless protected by the marital privilege. In Weedon's companion case decided today, we have held that the marital privilege was waived, the statement was admissible as to Weedon and his conviction was affirmed. Weedon v. State, Del.Supr., Veasey, C.J. (1994) (OPINION), 647 A.2d 1078.\\n.Also, the State's argument that the Court's Special Advisory Committee's failure to adopt a sentence that codified the Bruton rule into D.R.E. 804(b)(3), D.R.E. 804(b)(3) cmt., proves too much. Though analysis under Bruton and D.R.E. 804(b)(3) can be coextensive, the Bruton sentence, had it been adopted, would not have been determinative here; its rejection provides even less guidance.\\n. The Court has earlier noted the parallel between D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) and its federal counterpart. Lloyd, 534 A.2d at 1264.\\n. Even if the State had produced evidence expanding the conspiracy to include concealment of the Ward assault, the subject statement involved disclosing the crime and thus would not be in furtherance of this collateral sub-conspiracy-\\n. See also United States v. Enriquez-Estrada, 9th Cir., 999 F.2d 1355, 1359 (1993) (redaction sufficient protection); United States v. Macko, 11th Cir., 994 F.2d 1526, 1536 (1993) (same); United States v. Chatman, 10th Cir., 994 F.2d 1510, 1513, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 230, 126 L.Ed.2d 185 (1993) (same); United States v. Strickland, 7th Cir., 935 F.2d 822, 826 (1991), cert. denied, \\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 884, 116 L.Ed.2d 787 (1992) (same); United States v. Benitez, 2d Cir., 920 F.2d 1080, 1087 (1990) (same); United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 5th Cir., 862 F.2d 526, 534 (1988) (same); but see United States v. Payne, 8th Cir., 923 F.2d 595, 597, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1219, 111 S.Ct. 2830, 115 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1991) (redaction not sufficient to protect defendant's confrontation clause rights); United States v. Pickett, 6th Cir., 746 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 1222, 84 L.Ed.2d 362 (1985) (same).\\n. We have also held that the entire October 10 narrative was inadmissible under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). See Part III, supra.\\n. Justices O'Connor and Scalia expressly stated that Confrontation Clause analysis was not necessary in light of the Court's holding. Id. - U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2437.\\n. Delaware's Confrontation Clause states in relevant part: \\\"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall hath a right . to meet the witnesses in their examination face to face[.]\\\" Del. Const., art. I \\u00a7 7 (1897). Although it is unnecessary for us to decide whether Smith's constitutional claim under the Delaware Confrontation Clause differs from his claim under the United States Constitution, the Court notes that the protection accorded an accused by that clause may be greater than its federal counterpart. See Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 7 n. 5 (1987).\\n. Also, Smith offered an alibi defense in which he essentially claimed he was not in Lewes, Delaware (where Ward was attacked) on October 10. His testimony, however, was contradicted by other witnesses.\\n. The Court finds Smith's primary claim dispos-itive and thus need not decide Smith's second claim \\u2014 that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7929169.json b/delaware/7929169.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..93534a0c8a2817fbb713c657e1bb9452eee7360d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7929169.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7929169\", \"name\": \"Charles W. TULLOCH, II, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Kathleen FLICKINGER, Petitioner Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tulloch v. Flickinger\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-11-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"315\", \"last_page\": \"320\", \"citations\": \"616 A.2d 315\", \"volume\": \"616\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:22:36.130397+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., HORSEY and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Charles W. TULLOCH, II, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Kathleen FLICKINGER, Petitioner Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles W. TULLOCH, II, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Kathleen FLICKINGER, Petitioner Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Oct. 14, 1992.\\nDecided: Nov. 16, 1992.\\nH. Alfred Tarrant, Jr. (argued), and Thomas D. Shellenberger, Cooch and Taylor, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nRobert A. Penza (argued), Heiman, Aber & Goldlust, Wilmington, for appellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., HORSEY and HOLLAND, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2577\", \"char_count\": \"16109\", \"text\": \"HORSEY, Justice:\\nThis appeal in a child support action contests an order of the Family Court sustaining a master's wage attachment of periodic annuity payments received by obligor from an insurance company. The periodic amounts payable to the child support obli-gor, respondent, resulted from a medical malpractice settlement of a pre-marital personal injury claim of respondent for damages for disability, including pain and suffering.\\nThe proceedings had their origin in a petition by the child's mother, Kathleen Flickinger (\\\"petitioner\\\"), for attachment of the \\\"income\\\" of the father, Charles W. Tulloch II (\\\"respondent\\\"), for his failure to comply with a master's Interim Consent Order for periodic support filed pursuant to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513. Respondent had stipulated to an attachment of his income under section 513 in the event of his default in his support undertaking. Respondent had also listed two sources of income: wages from his employer, the State of Delaware, and a disability annuity from an insurance company. The record is unclear whether the petitioner, in seeking attachment under section 513, sought a discretionary attachment of \\\"property\\\" under subsection 513(a) or a mandatory attachment of \\\"income\\\" under subsection 513(b), or both. Regardless, Family Court, in its review de novo, framed the issue solely as whether a wage or income attachment lay under subsection 513(b); and the court failed to consider or address its discretionary authority to attach respondent's annuity income as \\\"property,\\\" if not wages, under subsection 513(a). Family Court then held the monthly annuity payments received by respondent to be tantamount to wages, even though the payor was not his employer, and subject to wage attachment under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(5) and (6). We reverse.\\nWe conclude that the payments do not constitute income from an employer, subject to mandatory attachment, under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(1), (5) and (6). The record on appeal is unclear, in part perhaps due to the unavailability of appropriate court forms, whether petitioner may also have sought a discretionary attachment of respondent's property under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(a)(6). Therefore, we remand the matter for determination of that issue, if originally fairly raised below, with jurisdiction reserved.\\nI\\nIn May 1991, following mediation in Family Court by the parties of their obligation to support their daughter, the parties entered into an Interim Consent Order for child support, which was approved by a Family Court master. The May 6 master's order required Tulloch to pay support in the amount of $315 per month. The order also provided for an \\\"Income Attachment\\\" of Tulloch's income, pursuant to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513, with the attachment stayed until the filing of a notice of default by father in his undertakings for more than seven days. The consent order was based in part upon Tulloch's Financial Report Form 16(a), under which he identified his employer as \\\"State of Delaware, Legislative Hall, Dover,\\\" stated his monthly gross wage, and then listed as \\\"income from other sources\\\" a monthly income of $750 from a workmen's compensation disability. Additionally, Tulloch listed on his Form 16(a) \\\"periodic loss of work with consequent reduction of income resulting from . amputation of leg.\\\"\\nThereafter petitioner initiated contempt proceedings against Tulloch by seeking an attachment of his \\\"monthly insurance proceeds\\\" through an \\\"income attachment,\\\" pursuant to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513. Petitioner also modified the Family Court form for her listing of respondent's employer by striking the words \\\"employed by\\\" and inserting, \\\"Respondent is: Receiving Insurance Benefits from: Safeco Life Insurance Company . Seattle, Washington.\\\"\\nRespondent contested the attachment of the payments, again amending the Family Court printed form by stating in part, \\\"The payments sought to be attached are payments by an insurance company resulting from a personal injury settlement. They do not constitute 'income' as defined under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(5) in that they are not payments made by Respondent's 'employer.' \\\"\\nOn September 24, 1991, a Family Court master issued an order attaching Tulloch's income from the insurance proceeds. Tul-loch sought a review de novo and Family Court affirmed. The court held that the monthly annuity payments were subject to attachment under section 513(b)(5) and (6) and directed that the income attachment issued by the Family Court master continue in force. Tulloch appeals the decision.\\nOn appeal, Tulloch reiterates his contention below that Family Court committed legal error in attaching the insurance payments, arguing that such payments do not constitute \\\"income\\\" under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(1) and (5); and he further contends that the court erred in finding Safeco to be his \\\"employer\\\" under section 513(b)(6).\\nII\\nThe question presented is a question of law; and there are no disputed issues of fact, except as previously noted with respect to the record below. The issue on appeal is whether Family Court may, pursuant to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(5) and (6), attach monthly insurance payments due an obligor annuitant and received in settlement of a personal injury claim exclusively attributable to disability and pain and suffering. This Court will review, de novo, questions of law decided by the trial court. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927 (1982).\\nIII\\nIn 1974, the U.S. Congress determined that a more uniform, nationwide child support system was necessary, primarily to recoup from absent parents payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (\\\"AFDC\\\"). 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 602. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act was created to implement a state run, federally over seen, system built upon cooperation and compliance incentives.\\nTitle IV-D required states to implement statutes and procedures to collect efficiently child support payments or risk losing some federal welfare funding. States experimented with various programs to collect support payments. Eventually, wage withholding became the dominant and most effective method of collecting child support payments.\\nIn July 1983, the Delaware General Assembly enacted amendments to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513 requiring mandatory wage attachment. 64 Del. Laws, c. 139. Most notably, paragraph (b) was added, stating in part, \\\"Where a duty to support has been determined to exist, the Court shall attach the Defendant's wages if any....\\\" Id.\\nAs a result of the success of wage assignment in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1974, Congress passed the Child Support Amendments of 1984. Specifically, the Act requires states to implement mandatory procedures to improve the collection of child support.\\nSection 666(b)(1) of the Act requires that wages of a delinquent parent against whom a support order has been issued or modified be withheld. 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 666(b)(1). Section 666(b)(8) allows a state to extend its system of withholding to include withholding from forms of income other than \\\"wages\\\" in order to assure that child support owed by absent parents will be collected without regard to the type of income or the nature of the income producing activity. 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 666(b)(8); see also 45 C.F.R. 100(f).\\nIn apparent response to these amendments, the Delaware General Assembly passed the 1986 amendments to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513. See 65 Del.Laws, c. 228. Among the changes was the specific substitution of the word \\\"income\\\" for \\\"wages\\\" in those sections where the court is mandated to attach where a duty to support has been found.\\n\\\"Income\\\" is defined in 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(5) as\\nany form of payment made by the obli-gor's employer to an individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to, wages, salary, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, compensation as an independent contractor, workers' compensation, disability, sick pay, SUB benefits, unemployment compensation, railroad retirement, pensions, annuity and retirement benefits....\\n\\\"Employer\\\" is defined as \\\"an individual, partnership, association, corporation, trust, federal agency, state agency, or political subdivision paying or obligated to pay income\\\". 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)(6).\\nIV\\nThe 1986 amendments to 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b) clearly evidence an intent of the General Assembly to extend Delaware's system of mandatory attachment to include attachment of any payment of \\\"income\\\" by an employer to an employee-obligor, regardless of form of payment or type of employer, consistent with 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 666(b)(8) and C.F.R. \\u00a7 303.100(f). Additionally, 65 Del.Laws, c. 228, \\u00a7 11, relating to the 1986 amendments, provides, \\\"This act shall be liberally construed to effectively carry out the purpose of the act.\\\"\\nWhile the Legislature has substituted a far broader definition of \\\"income\\\" subject to attachment, the source of the payments subject to attachment has remained the obligor's employer. Thus, the sine qua non for invoking the mandatory attachment provisions of section 513(b) is that the payments sought to be attached be received from the obligor's employer. The legislative history of 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513, in concert with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, compels us to conclude that the provisions of section 513(b) are employer focused and driven. Employment income remains the lodestar for mandatory attachment. See 64 Del. Laws, c. 139 (enacting 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(b)); 65 Del.Laws, c. 228; see also Pub.L. No. 93-647, \\u00a7 101, 88 Stat. 2351.\\nSubsection (5) of section 513(b) defines the character of an obligor's income which is subject to mandatory attachment and requires that it be a payment from an obligor's employer. Subsection (6) is not meant to define what entities are deemed to be an \\\"employer,\\\" but simply to illustrate in all-inclusive language the variety of employers against whom an income attachment will lie. The plain meaning of subsections (5) and (6), when read in conjunction, is that mandatory attachment is limited to income payments due an obligor from an entity who is in an employer-employee relationship with the obligor.\\nHere, since no employer-employee relationship existed between the obligor Safeco Insurance Company and Tulloch, Family Court was without authority under section 513(b) to attach Safeco's payments to Tul-loch. The payments attached were not income from employment by respondent or income for lost employment benefits. While the Legislature intended section 513(b) to be liberally construed, the legislative mandate that income to be attached originate with the obligor's employer may not be disregarded. The payments made by Safeco to respondent also cannot be construed as a recovery of lost income or lost earning capacity.\\nIn reaching the contrary conclusion, the trial court interpreted the illustrative examples of \\\"an employer\\\" under section 513(b)(6) as a \\\"statutory definition of employer [that] is not exclusive.\\\" Seizing upon the term \\\"trust\\\" within the examples of an \\\"employer,\\\" the court concluded that because \\\"passive trust income\\\" of an unemployed obligor who is independently wealthy has been held subject to attachment for child support, the annuity payments received by respondent should be treated no differently.\\\" The court then concluded that its reading of subsection (b)(6) was sufficient to overcome any presumption created by section 513(b)(1) and (5) that income subject to attachment under section 513(b) is confined to payments attributable to or resulting from an employer-employee relationship.\\nThe court has thereby confused its mandatory authority under section 513(b) to attach income payments of an employer due a child support obligor with its discretionary authority under section 513(a)(6) to attach or sequester property interests of an obligor in discharge of a child support obligation, and supporting decisional law of this court. Examples of case law recognizing the discretionary authority of the property attachment authority of the Family Court include Patricia M.D. v. Alexis I.D., Del.Supr., 442 A.2d 952, 954-55 (1982), and Mark T. v. Judith T., Del.Supr., 430 A.2d 792 (1981). None of these cases involves the construction and application of section 513(b), which was first enacted in 1983. See supra n. 4.\\nWhile we find the attachment of respondent's property to be impermissible under section 513(b), as previously noted, the question remains whether respondent's property was not subject to attachment by the trial court pursuant to the authority conferred upon it under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 513(a)(6). Since such an attachment involves a discretionary exercise of authority by Family Court, we decline to address the issue in the first instance. Therefore, we remand the case to Family Court for clarification of the record and for such further proceedings as are consistent herewith and with the record below.\\n\\nThe judgment of the Family Court is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion, with jurisdiction RESERVED under Rule 19(c) and for return from remand within 30 days.\\n. The reason for lack of clarity of the record may in part be attributed to the inappropriateness of the Family Court forms available for use of a party seeking attachment of income or property other than wages paid by an employer.\\n. Pub.L.No. 93-647, \\u00a7 101, 88 Stat. 2351 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 651-660); see also, Ball, The Income Withholders Role in Child Support Cases, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement (1991).\\n. Ball, The Income Withholder's Role in Child Support Cases, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Enforcement (1991).\\n. Under the Child Support Amendments of 1984 and its regulations, every state was required to have:\\na) Income withholding language in all of its new or modified orders, IV-D and non-IV-D;\\nb) Provisions for mandatory implementation of income withholding in existing IV-D cases when triggered, whether or not the order contains income withholding language;\\nc)A trigger for income withholding to begin no later than the earliest date:\\ni) on which one month's amount of support becomes past due;\\nii) on which the absent parent requests withholding; or\\niii) an earlier date that a state selects;\\n*\\ni) laws that command an employer to withhold from the obligor's wages the amount specified by the notice, and forward the withheld amount to the designated payee; employers are permitted to deduct an optional handling fee for themselves that do not exceed the Consumer Credit Protection Act limits when combined with the amount of support withheld;\\n*\\nk) laws that hold the employer liable for amounts that should have been withheld but were not, after the employer received proper notice of the withholding....\\nPub.L.No. 98-378,98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 666, 667).\\n.Chapter 228 designates subsection (b) of section 513 as paragraph (b)(1); substitutes \\\"income\\\" for \\\"wage(s)\\\" in new paragraph (b)(1); and adds new paragraph (b)(5), which originally stated in part, 'Tor purposes of Chapter 4, 5 and 6 of this Title, 'income' is defined as any form of payment made by the obligor's employer to an individual_\\\"\\n. This law. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1974, and the regulations adopted thereunder, in particular subparagraphs (i) and (k), are discussed above. See supra n. 4.\\n. The court cited no authorities in support of this conclusion.\\n. Section 513(a)(6) provides:\\nWhere the duty of support has been determined to exist, the Court may:\\n*\\n(6) Enforce its order by attachment of the defendant or by sequestration of property; and....\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7939208.json b/delaware/7939208.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3febd66eafbde15398b96bcf4342d7cd0cbbf3e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7939208.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7939208\", \"name\": \"Ben LOLLY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lolly v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-07-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"956\", \"last_page\": \"962\", \"citations\": \"611 A.2d 956\", \"volume\": \"611\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:27:11.865240+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.\", \"parties\": \"Ben LOLLY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ben LOLLY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: May 19, 1992.\\nDecided: July 27, 1992.\\nRehearing Denied Aug. 27, 1992.\\nNancy Jane Perillo (argued), Asst. Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nGary A. Myers (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Wilmington, for ap-pellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en banc.\", \"word_count\": \"3564\", \"char_count\": \"21830\", \"text\": \"WALSH, Justice:\\nIn this appeal from the Superior Court we again confront the question of the evi-dentiary effect of the State's failure to collect and/or retain allegedly exculpatory evidence. The State argues that we should abandon the analysis crafted by our rulings in Deberry v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 744 (1983) and Hammond v. State, Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 81 (1989) in favor of a standard which turns on the good faith of the police, as exemplified in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). We reaffirm our adherence to the more exacting standard based on Delaware constitutional norms and conclude that the Superior Court erred in instructing the jury on the effect to be accorded missing evidence in this case. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial.\\nI\\nThe appellant, Ben Lolly (\\\"Lolly\\\"), was convicted following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Burglary Second Degree, Misdemeanor Theft and Criminal Mischief. The charges arose out of an incident which occurred at the apartment of Lolly's former girlfriend on November 10, 1989. The evidence presented at trial depicted the following events. On the night in question Fulton Hutchinson (\\\"Hutchinson\\\") was watching television in the apartment of his girlfriend, Karen Butler (\\\"Butler\\\"). Hutchinson was scheduled to pick up Butler after she finished work at 9:30 p.m.\\nAt approximately 8:00 p.m. the appellant Lolly knocked on the door of the apartment, asking for Butler. Lolly had been Butler's previous boyfriend but had broken up with her five months earlier. Hutchinson told Lolly that Butler was not at home. Lolly left but returned a short while later, again asking for Butler. Hutchinson again informed him Butler was not there.\\nWhen Hutchinson left the apartment at 9:30 p.m. to retrieve Butler, Lolly approached him on the street and once more asked if Butler was home. Hutchinson responded that she was not and left to pick up Butler. Although he had encountered Lolly three times that evening, Hutchinson testified at trial that Lolly seemed \\\"normal.\\\"\\nButler and Hutchinson returned together approximately ten minutes later. While Hutchinson was parking the car, Butler walked to the apartment but was approached by Lolly before entering the building. She noticed that Lolly's hand was wrapped in a blood soaked towel. After a brief exchange regarding their prior relationship, Butler was rejoined by Hutchinson, and the two of them entered the apartment.\\nOnce inside, the couple found that the apartment had been ransacked. However, the only items missing were Butler's high school diploma and a picture of her aunt.\\nThe burglar's point of entry was a back window. In the previous few months, Butler's apartment had been broken into a number of times. Each time, the burglar came through the back window by breaking it. To prevent this from happening again, Butler had booby-trapped the window with a razor-knife and sharpened sticks. The intruder on November 10 had evidently been caught in the trap as there was a small pool of blood near the window. The trap also explained the blood splattered throughout the apartment. Butler immediately suspected Lolly of the crime and requested Hutchinson to call the police from a neighbor's phone.\\nOfficer Cynthia Dodson (\\\"Dodson\\\") arrived at the apartment within a few minutes of the call. As she was interviewing the couple in the apartment, a loud crash was heard. From the window, Dodson saw a brick bounce off Butler's car and a man running down the street. Butler also saw the man and identified him as Lolly. Dodson immediately radioed for assistance and broadcasted a description of the fleeing man. A few minutes later Lolly was stopped five blocks away by a police unit because he fit the description broadcast by Dodson. Lolly was holding a rag to a bleeding wound on his hand. When he was taken back to the crime scene, he was identified by both Dodson and Butler as the man they saw running down the street. He was then arrested for the break-in of Butler's apartment.\\nAs noted above, blood splattering was found throughout the apartment, including a small pool near the broken window. Blood was also found on the fire escape outside the window and in the alley below. The trail of blood in the alley led around the building to the spot where Lolly had approached Butler. From there, the trail led to Butler's car, which was also found to have blood smeared on it.\\nBlood was also found in the back of the patrol car which had transported Lolly back to the crime scene. At trial, the officer who stopped Lolly testified that Lolly's hand was dripping blood when the officer apprehended him. Dodson also testified that when Lolly had been brought back to the scene she specifically looked at his hands and noted that they were so covered in blood that she could not tell where the wound was.\\nDespite the significance of the.blood as evidence of the crime, the police failed to collect any sample for use at trial, even after Lolly told the police he had cut his hand earlier in the day.\\nLolly testified in his own defense at trial and denied breaking into Butler's apartment. He also denied that the blood found in the apartment was his. He claimed he had cut his hand earlier that morning while laying carpet at his mother's house and his mother corroborated that claim. He contended that the identification of him as the fleeing man was simply mistaken and suggested that the description fit a great number of people who live in the area of Butler's apartment.\\nAt the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for Lolly requested that the jury be given a special instruction that \\\"because of the failure of the police to take and preserve evidence the jury must assume that the evidence, if available, would have been exculpatory or pointed towards the defendant's innocence.\\\" After hearing argument by counsel, the trial judge concluded:\\nIn this case we have the police either making a judgment or acting negligently not to gather evidence. In my view the blood samples were important evidence in this case because that is the issue of evidence that connects this defendant to the burglary.\\\"\\nThe court ruled, however, that it would not instruct the jury in the language proposed by Lolly but opted in favor of the following instruction which it subsequently gave:\\nIf you find that the State negligently failed to carry and gather and preserved blood samples from Karen Butler's apartment, photographs of the apartment, and no other evidence that (sic) a substantial probative value exists with regard to the identity of the person who entered her apartment, or the condition of the apartment, you may infer that such blood samples and photographs would be exculpatory, and therefore, favorable to the defendant.\\nCounsel for Lolly objected to the court's instruction on the ground that the preliminary determination of negligence was one to be made by the court, not the jury, and that the instruction permitted the jury to find an exculpatory inference only in the absence of other substantial probative evidence of identity.\\nII\\nLolly contends that the instruction given by the trial court in this case failed to comply with the standards for measuring the evidentiary impact of lost or unavailable evidence articulated by this Court in Deberry. The State does not take issue with the Superior Court's determination that the police acted negligently in failing to secure blood samples but argues that the Superior Court applied a practical evi-dentiary analysis, implicitly sanctioned by this Court, to determine the effect of the missing evidence. In any event, the State contends this Court should abandon the Deberry/Hammond analysis in favor of a police bad faith test as the prerequisite for a finding of lack of due process. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988).\\nIn Deberry, this Court ruled that the State, including its police agencies, is obligated to preserve evidence which is material to a defendant's guilt or innocence as a matter of federal and state due process. In fashioning the relief to be afforded a defendant who claims to have been prejudiced by the State's omission, the Deberry court fashioned a multi-faceted analysis which, in effect, examines the type of evidence, the conduct of the police, and the significance of the evidence in the context of the total quantum of evidence available at trial. In Deberry, and later in Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 521 A.2d 1069, 1090 (1987), we emphasized the need for the State and law enforcement agencies to adopt procedures for the gathering and preserving of evidence that could be favorable to the defendant.\\nIn Hammond, we again considered the duty of the State to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, applying a six part paradigm gleaned from Deberry and Bailey and specifically focused upon the failure of the trial judge to give a jury instruction concerning the significance of missing evidence consistent with Deberry. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86. Although this Court in Hammond found the failure to give a Deberry-based jury instruction harmless error, we expressly \\\"reaffirmed our prior holdings, pursuant to the 'due process' requirements of the Delaware constitution.\\\" Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87. Compare Arizona v. Youngblood. In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police in order to succeed on a denial of due process claim founded upon the failure of police to preserve potentially useful evidence. In Hammond we declined to adopt the federal bright line due process test of police bad faith but adhered to the State constitutional underpinnings of Deberry where \\\"the conduct of the State's agent is a relevant consideration, but is not determinative.\\\" Id.\\nIn the present appeal, the State again urges adoption of the federal bad faith standard as the sole test for determining the consequences which flow from the State's failure to gather or preserve evidence. The State's approach to the problem is quite simplistic. If the police deliberately fail to gather or preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, a due process violation is deemed to have occurred and the prosecution is dismissed. Under the State's thesis the focus is on the conduct of the police not the nature of the evidence. This \\\"bright line\\\" test suffers from at least two deficiencies. First, under a bad faith standard the defendant is required to prove that the police were: (1) aware of the significance of the evidence in question (2) under an acknowledged duty to gather or preserve such evidence and (3) deliberately refused to perform their duty. The practical difficulty in proving these elements is obvious. Short of an admission by the police, it is unlikely that a defendant would ever be able to make the necessary showing to establish the required elements for proving bad faith.\\nSecond, where the defendant can make a showing of police behavior which approaches bad faith, the State's bright line test would place the trial court in a difficult position. The court must either find bad faith and dismiss the charges, despite facts which support only a finding of gross negligence, or find no bad faith and deny the defendant the benefit of a favorable inference, despite the loss of material evidence due to the State's negligence. In such a situation the court is left with an all or nothing proposition leading to two equally unsatisfactory results. The Deber-ry/Hammond approach, on the other hand, allows the court more flexibility in addressing these borderline situations by basing the remedy on a number of factors, including police conduct, taking into consideration the significance of the missing evidence and its relationship to other evidence in the case. The Deberry/Hammond due process \\\"totality of the circumstances\\\" approach might actually preserve convictions for the State where the evidence of bad faith presents a close question and the trial judge would have otherwise dismissed the charge.\\nAlthough both Deberry and Hammond involved situations in which evidence once in the possession of the police was not preserved, we believe those holdings are equally applicable to claims involving the alleged failure to gather evidence ab initio. Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1049 (1985) (citing Deberry). After consideration of the State's position we continue to adhere to the view that the Deber-ry/Hammond rationale, premised upon State constitutional standards of due process, should continue to control claims of prejudice arising from failure of police to gather or preserve evidence. Under that standard the emphasis, properly we believe, continues to be upon the significance of such evidence in the trial setting with appropriate guidance by the trial judge through jury instruction. We thus turn our attention to the claim in this case that the jury was not properly instructed.\\nIll\\nThis case differs from both Deberry and Hammond in two significant respects. First, the trial judge made a specific finding that the police had a duty to collect blood samples and negligently failed to do so. Second, the jury was instructed con cerning the legal significance of the State's failure to collect evidence. Since the State does not here contest the trial judge's determination of police negligence, or the materiality of the missing evidence, those steps of the Deberry analysis need not be pursued. We focus therefore on whether the court's instruction served to advise the jury on the probative value of the missing evidence and its relationship to other evidence produced at trial on the identity issue.\\nOnce it has been established that the State must bear responsibility for the loss of material evidence, an appropriate jury instruction is required as a matter of due process under the Delaware Constitution. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 90. In this case the trial judge determined, as the premise for the granting of a jury instruction, and presumably as a matter of law, both the responsibility of the State and the materiality of the evidence. The instruction drafted by the court, however, permitted the jury to redetermine the factual basis for the court's legal ruling. In instructing the jury that \\\"If you find that the State negligently failed to carry and gather and preserve blood samples .\\\" the trial judge posed a factual issue for the jury where, under his prior ruling, none existed. In our view this was error.\\nWhile situations may arise in which the issue of police responsibility may be the subject of conflicting evidence at trial, thus requiring jury resolution of that dispute, such is not the case here. Although no witness directly testified concerning the usual police practice for collecting blood samples, the State did not take issue with the trial court's determination that there was negligence in the failure to collect samples, nor does it dispute that determination on appeal. Since the trial judge made a legal determination of negligence, it was error to permit the jury to determine whether a factual predicate for that ruling existed.\\nThe instruction was also deficient in making the significance of the missing evidence conditional on the presence or absence of other identity evidence of \\\"substantial probative value.\\\" If, as Deberry teaches, 457 A.2d at 754, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of an inference that the missing evidence would have been exculpatory, that inference, once established by the trial judge's legal ruling of materiality, may not be further conditioned on the existence or non-existence of other facts in evidence. The inference, however, may be rebutted and it is in that connection that the other evidence has significance. Thus, while the defendant is entitled to an inference that is beneficial on the-issue of identity such inference may be dispelled by the other evidence which outweighs the effect of the inference and establishes identity beyond a reasonable doubt. By conditioning the existence of the inference on the absence of other substantial evidence of identity, the instruction deprived the defendant of any inference and thus foreclosed the jury's duty to weigh the evidence. In this respect as well it was erroneous.\\nWe recognize that there was significant evidence, apart from the missing blood samples, which linked the defendant to the burglary of Butler's apartment. But, given the trial court's determination of police negligence and materiality, the defendant was entitled to an instruction which accords him a favorable inference based on the missing evidence. The instruction given in this case was clearly deficient and thus deprived the defendant of the process due him under Delaware law. Since the erroneous instruction went to the key issue of identity there is no basis for determining, and the State has not argued, that such error was harmless. Accordingly, the convictions must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.\\nIn view of our reversal and remand for a new trial, it is unnecessary to consider Lolly's claim of plain error in the admission of testimony by Butler that she believed Lolly had ransacked her apartment on previous occasions. The witness' testimony was not solicited by the State and was given in violation of the trial court's in limine ruling barring such testimony. In the event of a retrial we assume that the ruling of the trial court will continue to be in force and complied with.\\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\\n. The same window was also used for egress since the doors to the apartment required a key to open from either side.\\n. Officer Dodson requested an evidence detection officer to photograph the blood stains and to attempt to lift fingerprints. The photographs were not taken and the fingerprint lifts proved of no value.\\n. As part of her discovery effort pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, counsel for defendant had specifically requested information concerning any blood samples collected at the Butler's apartment. The State responded orally that no such evidence existed.\\n. The trial judge made the following ruling incident to his granting the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the significance of the missing blood samples:\\nIn this case we have the police either making a judgment or acting negligently not to gather evidence. In my view the blood samples were important evidence in this case be cause that is the kind of evidence that connects this defendant to the burglary.\\nIn another case the situation might be different, but I would be surprised if Mr. Rho-dunda, in his closing argument, didn't talk about the bloodstains in the apartment and the bleeding hand of the defendant.\\nSo in that sense I think that the standard enunciated in DeBury (sic) and Hammond has been violated and the police have acted negligently in failing to gather evidence which is material to the case, and I say that recognizing that the police investigate hundreds, thousands of crimes and the burden of collecting every last bit of evidence on every crime might be significant.\\nIndeed, as the Trial Judge predicted, the prosecutor, in his summation to the jury emphasized the significance of the blood stains.\\nWell, ladies and gentlemen, you've heard about the bloodstains, and the bloodstains are very important. There were no examinations done of the blood to determine if, in fact, it was Mr. Lolly or if it wasn't Mr. Lolly. What we have is Mr. Lolly with a bleeding hand. Karen Butler saw it. She saw the blood-soaked towel. Officer Moser picked him up. He had the towel around his hand. He bled all over the police car.\\n. In our view the determination of negligence is a matter for threshold determination by the Court, unless there is a genuine factual dispute concerning police procedure. Materiality questions are subject to the Court's plenary power over admissibility of evidence which is relevant, i.e., \\\"of consequence.\\\" D.R.E. 401; Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 731 (1988)\\n. Because the issue of the significance of missing evidence is a recurring problem, we recommend that the trial courts, where appropriate, instruct the jury in accordance with the following suggested instruction.\\nIn this case the court has determined that the State failed to collect/preserve certain evidence which is material to the defense. The failure of the State to collect/preserve such evidence entitles the defendant to an inference that if such evidence were available at trial it would be exculpatory. This means that, for purposes of deciding this case, you are to assume that the missing evidence, had it been collected/preserved, would not have incriminated the defendant and would have tended to prove the defendant not guilty. The inference does not necessarily establish the defendant's innocence, however. If there is other evidence presented which establishes the fact or resolves the issue to which the missing evidence was material, you must weigh that evidence along with the inference. Nevertheless, despite the inference concerning missing evidence, if you conclude after examining all the evidence that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the offenses(s) charged, you would be justified in returning a verdict of guilty.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7960724.json b/delaware/7960724.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..980ac3e9b64b8f8bb0130003afc85df9e72a5671
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7960724.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7960724\", \"name\": \"John ROPER and Tommie Lou Roper, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Royce F. STAFFORD, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Roper v. Stafford\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-03-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"289\", \"last_page\": \"291\", \"citations\": \"444 A.2d 289\", \"volume\": \"444\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:22:32.815400+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"John ROPER and Tommie Lou Roper, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Royce F. STAFFORD, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"John ROPER and Tommie Lou Roper, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. Royce F. STAFFORD, Defendant.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware, Kent County.\\nSubmitted Dec. 30, 1981.\\nDecided March 11, 1982.\\nHarold Schmittinger, Douglas W. Lund-blad, Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P. A., Dover, for plaintiffs.\\nGary F. Dalton, John Williams, Prickett, Jones, Elliott, Kristol & Schnee, Dover, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1238\", \"char_count\": \"7528\", \"text\": \"BUSH, Judge.\\nThis is a decision on defendant's motion for summary judgment.\\nPlaintiff, Tommie Lou Roper, was a passenger in a motorboat owned and piloted by defendant, Royce Stafford. Stafford had taken plaintiff for a ride across Rehoboth Bay. The boat crossed the wake of another motorboat and Mrs. Roper was thrown, or slid, from her seat in the bow to the deck, injuring her back.\\nThe central issue is whether state or federal law applies to the facts of this case. This issue is crucial because state and federal law require the operator of a boat to observe different standards of care.\\nStafford argues that the Delaware Guest Statute, 21 Del.C. \\u00a7 6101(a), applies. That statute would preclude recovery by Roper unless she proves intentional, wilful or wanton conduct by Stafford.\\nRoper contends that federal maritime and admiralty law applies and that the standard of care is ordinary negligence. If federal law does apply, it preempts the substantive law of the state. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628, 79 S.Ct. 406, 408, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959).\\nJurisdiction in admiralty cases is controlled by 28 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1333, which states in pertinent part:\\nThe District courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:\\n(1) Any civil case-of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.\\nThe \\\"saving to suitors\\\" clause permits a suitor with an in personam claim in admiralty to seek his remedy in the state courts. Smith v. Allstate Yacht Rentals, Ltd., Del. Super., 293 A.2d 805, 807 (1972). The state courts must apply federal substantive law to assure uniformity in maritime decisions. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra; Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410, 74 S.Ct. 202, 205, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953).\\nA more complex question is whether under federal maritime law the federal courts would take jurisdiction of this particular case. The traditional yardstick used by the federal courts was the \\\"locality\\\" test. If the situs of the tort was the high seas or a navigable waterway, jurisdiction existed. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 421, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971).\\nThe United States Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972), which involved an airplane crashing into a navigable waterway, stated in dictum:\\nIn sum, there has existed over the years a judicial, legislative, and scholarly recognition that, in determining whether there is admiralty jurisdiction over a particular tort or class of torts, reliance on the relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity is often more sensible and more consonant with the purposes of maritime law than is a purely mechanical application of the locality test, (at 261, 93 S.Ct. at 501)\\nThe majority of federal Courts of Appeal have read the Executive Jet decision as an abrogation of the locality test in all maritime tort claims, and have adopted the \\\"locality plus\\\" test by which both situs and significant relationship to maritime activity are considered. Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 5th Cir., 644 F.2d 1132, 1135 (1981), cert. denied sub nom. Valero Energy Corp. v. Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co.,-U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 635, 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981).\\nThe Third Circuit has been reluctant to adopt the locality plus test. In Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc., 3rd Cir., 562 F.2d 215 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978), the court indicated that it believed the locality test had not been explicitly abandoned by the Supreme Court, but it adopted provisionally the locality plus test because the outcome in Edynak would be the same under either test. The District Court for the District of Delaware followed suit, applying the locality plus test only to show that the outcome in the case before it would also be the same. Otto v. Alper, D.Del., 489 F.Supp. 953, 955 (1980).\\nThe court in Edynak endorsed the Fifth Circuit's articulation of the factors to be considered under the locality plus test. The Fifth Circuit identified four factors relevant to the existence of a \\\"significant relationship to maritime activity.\\\" 1) the func tions and roles of the parties; 2) the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; 3) causation and type of injury; and 4) traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. See Kelly v. Smith, 5th Cir., 485 F.2d 520, 525 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974).\\nThe first three factors present no difficulty in this case because maritime activity was certainly involved: 1) the parties were the passenger and pilot on a boat; 2) the accident occurred entirely in a boat without involvement of land vehicles or instrumen-talities; 3) the injury was allegedly caused by the pilot's negligent operation of the vessel. Cf. Otto v. Alper, supra, at 955.\\nThe fourth factor, traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law, has been the subject of much dispute among the federal courts where, as in this case, the vessel involved is a pleasure boat with no connection to commercial maritime activity. The United States Supreme Court only recently granted review of this question. Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Co., 5th Cir., 641 F.2d 314 (1981), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 88, 70 L.Ed.2d 81 (1981).\\nHowever, as noted in Otto v. Alper, supra at 955, in the main, the courts that have considered the question after Executive Jet have found pleasure boating accidents to be within the admiralty jurisdiction.\\nTraditional concepts of the role of admiralty law are not violated by this Court taking jurisdiction over this claim. Federal maritime jurisdiction lies under the locality plus test.\\nThere is little question that federal maritime jurisdiction also exists under the locality test. The District Court specifically ruled in Otto v. Alper, supra at 955 that the Rehoboth Bay is a navigable waterway.\\nThe requirements of both the locality and the locality plus tests having been satisfied, federal maritime law will apply in this case. Stafford's conduct is therefore to be judged by the standard set forth in the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1461(d);\\nNo person may use a vessel . in a negligent manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.. .\\nUnder Rule 56(c) of both Delaware and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Questions of negligence are rarely decided by motion for summary judgment. Barron v. Honeywell, Inc., Micro Switch Div., E.D. Pa., 69 F.R.D. 390 (1975); Caine v. New Castle County, Del.Supr., 379 A.2d 1112, 1116 (1977). This case is no exception. There are genuine issues of material fact involving questions of foreseeability, causation, and breach of the duty to operate the boat safely.\\nTherefore, summary judgment as to the issue of Stafford's negligence is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7978007.json b/delaware/7978007.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a4e774edfca7f53493d00df1040465624b7c2d1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7978007.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7978007\", \"name\": \"E. C. W., Petitioner, Appellant, v. M. A. W., Respondent, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"E. C. W. v. M. A. W.\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-08-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"934\", \"last_page\": \"938\", \"citations\": \"419 A.2d 934\", \"volume\": \"419\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:19:10.382500+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DUFFY, McNEILLY and HORSEY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"E. C. W., Petitioner, Appellant, v. M. A. W., Respondent, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"E. C. W., Petitioner, Appellant, v. M. A. W., Respondent, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted March 14, 1980.\\nDecided Aug. 19, 1980.\\nH. Alfred Tarrant, Jr., Wilmington (argued) of Cooch & Taylor, Wilmington, for petitioner-appellant.\\nAlene S. Berkowitz, Wilmington (argued) of Knecht, Greenstein, Schagrin & Berkow-itz, Wilmington, for respondent-appellee.\\nBefore DUFFY, McNEILLY and HORSEY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1855\", \"char_count\": \"11586\", \"text\": \"HORSEY, Justice:\\nThe sole question raised by this appeal is whether stock dividends paid during marriage to one spouse on shares of stock acquired before marriage are marital property under 13 Del.C. Chapter 15, the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act. Husband appeals Family Court's ancillary ruling, following divorce of the parties, that all such dividends received by him during marriage were marital property. We affirm.\\nI\\nUnder the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act, 13 Del.C. Chapter 15, all property acquired by either spouse during marriage, and regardless of how such property be titled, is \\\"presumed\\\" to be marital property, subject to division by the Family Court upon divorce. 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1513(c). Section 1513(b) provides that the marital property presumption is subject to only three exceptions. Those exceptions are: \\\"(1) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage; (2) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and (3) the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.\\\" 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1513(bXlM3).\\nThe burden of overcoming this statutory presumption and proving that the property sought to be excluded falls within one of the three statutory exceptions is placed upon the party seeking to exclude the property from division between the parties. See Husband R. T. G. v. Wife G. K. G., Del.Supr., 410 A.2d 155 (1979); and J. D. P. v. F. J. H., Del.Supr., 399 A.2d 207 (1979). With this brief background of the statute, we take up the facts and husband's contention that the stock dividends in question are excluded from \\\"marital property\\\" under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1513(b).\\nII\\nThe parties were married in 1966 and divorced in 1978. Before marriage, husband owned some 800 shares of the capital stock of a Delaware corporation (\\\"the Company\\\") for whom he worked. During the marriage, husband acquired a significant number of additional shares of stock of the Company-increasing his ownership by seven-fold. The increase during marriage resulted from three sources: first, from a \\\"swap\\\" of shares in two other concerns that husband had owned before marriage; second, from direct acquisitions of additional shares of the Company stock; and third, from stock dividends. The stock dividends had been declared, according to the President of the Company, for two reasons: (1) to \\\"lock in\\\" surplus by a transfer of earned surplus to capital to avoid erratic payment of dividends; and (2) to increase the number of issued shares and thereby reduce the price per share so as to give younger employees a better opportunity to acquire stock in the Company.\\nThe parties do not contest the Trial Court's treatment of husband's stock acquisitions falling in the first and second categories. The Court found the Company stock acquired during marriage by \\\"swaps\\\" to be excluded from marital property as property acquired by \\\"exchange\\\" under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1513(b)(1). And husband conceded that all shares directly acquired by him-presumably by purchase or by gift-were marital property under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1513(c). Husband also conceded that all cash dividends on his Company stock received by him from time to time during marriage were marital property.\\nAs to the third category of stock received by husband during marriage-amounting to some 2,250 shares distributed on husband's pre-marital shares of stock-the Court below concluded that they were stock dividends, not stock splits, and to be considered marital property.\\nIll\\nOn appeal, husband concedes that the distributions in question were stock dividends but contends that the Trial Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that stock dividends acquired during marriage were not exempt under \\u00a7 1513(b) from marital property subject to division between the parties.\\nHusband argues that stock dividends come within the exclusion of \\u00a7 1513(b)(1) as \\\"property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage.\\\" Husband says this is so because a stockholder's percentage of equity interest in a corporation remains unaffected by a stock dividend de-dared out of earnings. Since the value of husband's premarital shares was proportionately reduced by the additional shares issued to him, husband states that he has received nothing of value above what he previously owned. Husband adds that the payment of a stock dividend is no different than if the Company had retained its earnings for the years in question and had paid no dividend.\\nA.\\nIt is true, as husband says, that as a result of the stock dividends, husband now has a larger number of shares representing exactly the same percentage of outstanding stock having the identical cumulative market value as he had before the stock dividends. However, the fact remains that with a stock dividend earnings or profits are capitalized, and there is an offsetting distribution to the shareholders of shares evidencing the value of the assets transferred to capital. In this respect, a stock dividend differs from a stock split which \\\"is merely a dividing up of the outstanding shares of the corporation into a greater number of units, without disturbing the stockholder's original proportional participating interest in the corporation.\\\" 19 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, \\u00a7 808 at page 285.\\nIn its ordinarily accepted meaning, a stock dividend is a dividend payable in stock instead of cash, the declaration of which involves the creation and issuing of new stock to be distributed pro rata to the shareholders as evidence of the contemporaneous transfer of an equivalent amount of the surplus earnings or profits to the capital fund of the corporation. It differs materially from a cash dividend. A stock dividend takes nothing from the property of the corporation and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders as such . The interests of the shareholders in the corporation remain the same and in the same proportions, assuming that the dividend is declared in the same kind of stock, since the whole number of shares after the pro rata distribution, as before, represent the same corporate assets. Such a \\\"dividend\\\" does not distribute property to the shareholder; it changes the form of his investment, ordinarily by increasing the number of his shares, thereby diminishing the value of each share and leaving the aggregate value of all his stock substantially the same. Such an increase simply dilutes the shares as they existed before. Unlike a cash dividend, therefore, the stock dividend cannot be translated into money for the shareholder without a corresponding dimunition in the proportionate interest formerly held by him and in the ratable amount of future dividends and distributions to which he would otherwise be entitled.\\n19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, supra, \\u00a7 812, pages 288, 289.\\nGiven this characterization of stock dividends, husband contends that it is \\\"obvious\\\" that the shares in question were acquired by him \\\"in \\u00e9xchange for property acquired prior to the marriage\\\" under \\u00a7 1513(bXl)- We cannot agree.\\nThe fact that husband's overall percentage ownership of the capital of the Company has not been increased by the payment of the stock dividends does not mean that property of value has not been received by him through the stock dividends. For husband has clearly received during marriage property of value that he did not have before marriage. And while the value of husband's premarital shares in the Company may have been proportionately reduced by the dividends, no exchange has occurred with respect to his premarital shares. Rather, husband has received additional shares of the Company stock-without giving up any of his previously acquired shares. The fact that the value of husband's previously acquired shares has been reduced is not equivalent to an \\\"exchange.\\\" Had the Company declared a stock split it could be said that an exchange had taken place since additional shares would be issued based on a reduced per share value without any increase in the outstanding shares' aggregate value.\\nB.\\nIn the absence of available precedent for this question under the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act, husband refers to case law in community property states as authority for his position. See Blaine v. Blaine, Ariz.Supr., 63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Daigre v. Daigre, La.Supr., 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955); and Johnson v. First National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 306 S.W.2d 927 (1957). However, the critical distinction between the law of those states and Delaware is that in Delaware we start with the explicit presumption that all property received during marriage is marital property. This is a wholly different starting point from that found in many community property states which, by statutes drawn from civil code origins, presume that fruits and profits of separate property are also separate property.\\nWhile wife has referred us to the law of trusts and its rules as to allocation of stock dividends between an income beneficiary and a remainderman, we find the reference unhelpful because of the lack of any clear analogy between the competing parties. And since the enactment of 12 Del.C. \\u00a7 3526, the so-called prudent man rule controls the allocation of corporate distributions between trust income and principal.\\nAffirmed.\\n. 13 DelC. \\u00a7 1513(c) provides in part as follows:\\n\\\"All property acquired by either party subsequent to the marriage is presumed to be marital property . The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subdivisions (1) through (3) of subsection (b) of this section.\\\"\\n. The dividends in the form of stock had been issued on two occasions: in 1968, when 528 shares were issued to husband; and in 1977, when an additional 2,204.5 shares were received by husband on the Corporation's declaration of a 50 percent dividend.\\n. Husband had apparently contended below that such distributions represented stock splits while wife contended that they were in fact, stock dividends.\\n. Husband's actual phraseology is that nothing has been added \\\"to the capital of the shareholder.\\\"\\n. The Trial Court valued each share of stock received by husband during marriage at $25.\\n. Statutes of other community property states vary significantly from this general rule. For example, by the Louisiana Civil Code the fruits and profits of paraphernal (separate) property, \\\"including interest, dividends and rents, or from the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership . . unless the wife, by written instrument, shall declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate use and benefit .\\\" La. Civil Code, Art. 2386. Even with this presumption, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that absent a declaration of separate property stock dividends on parapher-nal property of the wife is separate property. Daigre v. Daigre, supra.\\nTexas adopts the principle of Spanish Civil Law that fruits and profits of separate property are community property. Texas courts in a marital property division have distinguished dividends paid in cash and those paid in stock, the former being community property and the latter separate property. See, e. g., Johnson v. First National Bank, supra.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7987057.json b/delaware/7987057.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..91e369e14c5435d7cb1f0e2d647d9e2b90d6c44f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7987057.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7987057\", \"name\": \"Ernest HUFFMAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. C. C. OLIPHANT & SON, INC., a Delaware corporation and United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, Defendant Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Huffman v. C. C. Oliphant & Son, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-07-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1207\", \"last_page\": \"1211\", \"citations\": \"432 A.2d 1207\", \"volume\": \"432\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:26:56.707484+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before HERRMANN, C. J., McNEILLY and QUILLEN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Ernest HUFFMAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. C. C. OLIPHANT & SON, INC., a Delaware corporation and United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, Defendant Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ernest HUFFMAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. C. C. OLIPHANT & SON, INC., a Delaware corporation and United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company, Defendant Below, Appellees.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted June 8, 1981.\\nDecided July 14, 1981.\\nDouglas W. Lundblad (argued), and John J. Schmittinger of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, Dover, for plaintiff below, appellant.\\nFrederick W. Iobst (argued), of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellees.\\nBefore HERRMANN, C. J., McNEILLY and QUILLEN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1750\", \"char_count\": \"11050\", \"text\": \"McNEILLY, Justice:\\nThis case involves a question of the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction in a suit to compel payment of workmen's compensation benefits under a compensation agreement. The Superior Court held that it had concurrent jurisdiction over the case along with the Industrial Accident Board (\\\"Board\\\") and deferred to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board. Therefore, the Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's action therein. We reverse.\\nThe basic facts underlying this controversy are quite simple. Plaintiff received a compensable injury in an industrial accident while working for C. C. Oliphant & Son, Inc. (\\\"Oliphant\\\"). Oliphant's workmen's compensation insurance carrier is U. S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co. (\\\"USFG\\\"). USFG entered a compensation agreement with plaintiff for payment of benefits. Some time thereafter, the parties agreed that plaintiff was no longer disabled and payments were discontinued by mutual agreement. Approximately four years after the accident, plaintiff's injury recurred. Consequently, plaintiff and USFG entered a second agreement for payment of compensation which was approved by the Board. In June, 1979, USFG allegedly received information that plaintiff had rejected a suitable employment offer which had been arranged for him by USFG. Claiming that plaintiff was no longer entitled to compensation pursuant to 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2353(c) for unreasonable refusal of the employment offer, USFG unilaterally stopped payments to plaintiff under the agreement. USFG neither sought nor received permission to discontinue payments from plaintiff or the Board. In August, 1979, plaintiff submitted a written demand to USFG for payment of compensation under the Board-approved agreement; USFG refused. In September, 1979, plaintiff filed this action in the Superior Court seeking payment of the compensation withheld by USFG, statutory liquidated damages and attorney's fees. On December 6, 1979, plaintiff also filed a petition with the Board for a rule to show cause why USFG should not be held in contempt for failure to pay plaintiff's compensation under the agreement and for an order requiring the insurer to pay such compensation. On December 7, 1979, Oliphant and USFG filed a petition with the Board to terminate plaintiff's compensation under the agreement. In January, 1980, while both petitions were pending before the Board, USFG finally made payment to plaintiff of all amounts due under the agreement from the time of the unilateral termination of payments the previous June. Thereafter, USFG and Oliphant moved for dismissal of the Superior Court action. Before the Superior Court ruled on defendants' motion, the Board held a hearing to consider, inter alia, the merits of the petition to terminate plaintiff's compensation. In May, 1980, the Board entered its decision denying the petition to terminate compensation, finding that plaintiff continued to be totally disabled. In January, 1981, the Superior Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's action. From that determination plaintiff has appealed.\\nIn order to properly address the jurisdictional issue presented, it is first necessary to focus upon the substantive basis for plaintiff's action in the Superior Court. Plaintiff's basic claim is that from June, 1979 to January, 1980, Oliphant and its insurer wrongfully withheld payment of compensation due to plaintiff. On the basis of undisputed facts in the record, the only possible conclusion is that the insurer's unilateral decision to suspend payments under the agreement with plaintiff was wrongful. Specifically, 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2347 expressly prohibits this kind of unilateral action. That statute provides in pertinent part:\\n\\\"Compensation payable to an employee . . shall net terminate until and unless the Board enters an award ending the payment of compensation after a hearing upon review of an agreement or award, provided that no petition for review, hearing or an order by the Board shall be necessary to terminate compensation where the parties to an award or an agreement consent to the termination.\\\"\\nIn this case defendants admitted that payments of compensation to plaintiff had been made pursuant to a Board-approved agreement and were unilaterally suspended by defendants without a Board award ending the payment of compensation and without the consent of plaintiff to the termination. The alleged \\\"good faith\\\" belief of an employer or an insurer that the employee is no longer entitled to compensation is irrelevant under this statute. If the employee does not consent to the termination of compensation, payments must be continued until such time as the Board determines, after a hearing on the merits, that compensation should be terminated. In short, absent the employee's consent, the determination of whether an employee continues to be entitled to compensation under the law is to be made by the Board before compensation is suspended or terminated, and not by the employer or its insurer. Thus, defendants herein clearly violated the express terms of \\u00a7 2347 by unilaterally suspending payments to plaintiff under the agreement.\\nOnce it is determined that the suspension of payments by Oliphant and USFG was wrongful, the question becomes one of what relief is available to plaintiff and from whence is such relief obtainable. We partially agree with the Court below that the Board had jurisdiction to provide relief to plaintiff in this situation. As noted above, the suspension of payments was unlawful under \\u00a7 2347. Under 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2121(a), the Board has general jurisdiction over matters arising under the workmen's compensation laws of this State, including, inter alia, claims of wrongful termination of compensation payments under \\u00a7 2347. However, the only relief which the Board may grant to an employee bringing such a claim is to simply order that payments be made according to law. Although in certain limited situations the Board may also enter sanctions against an insurer that fails to make compensation payments as due, see 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2362, nothing in the workmen's compensation laws gives the Board the power to grant relief to an employee beyond the payment of past due compensation amounts from the insurer.\\nPlaintiff argues, and we agree, that there is an additional remedy available to employees in wrongful suspension or termination of compensation situations. The Legislature has expressly provided, in 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2357, that, \\\"If default is made by the employer for 30 days after demand in the payment of any amount due under this chapter, the amount may be recovered in the same manner as claims for wages are collectible.\\\" Wage claims are covered by Title 19, Chapter 11 of the Delaware Code. Thus, pursuant to \\u00a7 2357, an employee with a claim based on the employer's alleged failure to pay compensation due after proper demand has been made may elect to pursue an action under Chapter 11. It is undisputed in this case that plaintiff did make a written demand for payment which the insurer refused to honor, thus bringing the case within the terms of \\u00a7 2357.\\nJurisdiction to hear claims under Chapter 11 is conferred by 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 1113(a) which provides:\\n\\\"A civil action to recover unpaid wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any 1 or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action.\\\"\\nObviously, in order to give effect to the provisions of \\u00a7 2357, the reference in \\u00a7 1113(a) to \\\"wages\\\" must be construed to include claims based on unpaid workmen's compensation benefits due after proper demand therefor has been made. Section 1113(a) grants jurisdiction over such cases to \\\"any court of competent jurisdiction.\\\" Clearly, this includes the Superior Court. Equally clear is the fact that the statute does not confer jurisdiction over workmen's compensation claims arising under \\u00a7 2357 and Chapter 11 on the Board. Therefore, to the extent that the decision below was based on the Superior Court's view that the Court and the Board have concurrent jurisdiction over workmen's compensation claims arising under \\u00a7 2357 and Chapter 11, it was in error and must be reversed.\\nThis latter point is important since the relief available to an employee under Chapter 11 is broader than that available from the Board in eases such as this. As indicated above, the only relief which the Board may grant to an employee is an order that the employer or insurer make payment of all compensation wrongfully withheld. Such relief is also available in an action under Chapter 11. However, additionally 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 1103(d) provides that in a proper case \\\"the employer shall, in addition, be liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of 10 percent of the unpaid wages for each day, except Sunday and legal holidays, upon which such failure continues after the day upon which payment is required or in an amount equal to the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller . . \\\" Also, 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 1113(c) provides that if an employee is entitled to a judgment under Chapter 11, the judgment \\\"shall include an award for the costs of the action, the necessary costs of prosecution and reasonable attorney's fees, all to be paid by the defendant.\\\" The decision of the Superior Court dismissing plaintiff's action effectively precluded plaintiff from recovering the liquidated damages, costs and attorney's fees to which he may well be entitled under Chapter 11.\\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's action arising under 19 Del.C. \\u00a7 2357 and Chapter 11, and that the Board did not have such jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court below erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims without consideration of the merits thereof.\\nThe judgment of the Superior Court dismissing plaintiff's action is hereby REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent herewith.\\n. This statute provides:\\n\\\"If an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal, unless in the opinion of the Board such refusal was justifiable.\\\"\\n. Section 2121(a) provides in pertinent part:\\n\\\"The Board shall have jurisdiction over all cases arising under Part II of this title and shall hear disputes as to compensation to be paid under Part II of this title.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/7990488.json b/delaware/7990488.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2d94e5add3535e2f0bfbd5392a9c9a4bf2485305
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/7990488.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7990488\", \"name\": \"Tony T. DEBERRY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Deberry v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-01-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"744\", \"last_page\": \"755\", \"citations\": \"457 A.2d 744\", \"volume\": \"457\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:20:21.524822+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before QUILLEN, HORSEY and MOORE, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Tony T. DEBERRY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Tony T. DEBERRY, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted Oct. 19, 1982.\\nDecided Jan. 27, 1983.\\nRaymond J. Otlowski, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nJames B. Ropp, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for appellee.\\nBefore QUILLEN, HORSEY and MOORE, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"5638\", \"char_count\": \"34327\", \"text\": \"MOORE, Justice:\\nThe defendant, Tony T. Deberry, challenges his convictions in the Superior Court for first degree rape (11 Del.C. \\u00a7 764), first degree kidnapping (11 Del.C. \\u00a7 783A), and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (11 Del.C. \\u00a7 1447). He has been sentenced to life imprisonment.\\nDeberry first contends that reversible error occurred when the State did not produce or account for potentially exculpatory evidence. We agree and reverse since this deprived Deberry of evidence to which he was entitled under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(b) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). He also argues that the victim's out-of-court identification should have been suppressed, but in our opinion the identification evidence was properly admitted. Because the kidnapping and weapons charges necessarily depend upon the rape conviction and cannot stand independently of it, we reverse all of the convictions and remand the case for a new trial, subject to certain conditions.\\nI.\\nA.\\nThe alleged victim, Beverly, and Deberry were both employed by Delaware Park racetrack during the summer of 1980. The State's evidence was that on August 14, 1980, Beverly, her boyfriend, Mark, and De-berry had been attending a party which began about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. on the track premises. People were drinking all afternoon and taking drugs. As the party went on into the night, Mark became involved in several fights, and on one occasion Deberry helped break up an altercation. After-wards Deberry invited Beverly and Mark to his room to calm down from these incidents. There, they continued to drink and take drugs. According to Beverly, Deberry tried to persuade her to spend the night with him. Soon after Deberry's proposition, Beverly went to another bunkhouse to sleep with two other men, one of whom Mark had fought earlier. Mark accompanied her but decided to sleep outside because of his earlier fight with one of the occupants.\\nBeverly claims she was awakened by De-berry shortly after falling asleep. She told him to leave, and he did so. Sometime later she was again awakened by Deberry, who was attempting to pull her pants off. This time Deberry put a knife to Beverly's throat. When she saw the knife, she supposedly grabbed for it and cut several fingers.\\nBeverly and Deberry then went about one hundred yards from the bunkhouse to a spot behind a barn. He threatened to kill her if she screamed, and he ordered her to undress. After partially undressing, Deber-ry had intercourse with her. They spent about thirty minutes behind the barn when Deberry began to fear discovery. He ordered Beverly to dress and led her at knife point to a more secluded area outside the track enclosure. To reach this location, they had to pass a guard station, where a guard observed two people leave the track. When they reached the second spot, Deber-ry made Beverly undress, and for an hour or more they had intercourse.\\nThe two then returned to the track complex. The guard at the gate asked for and examined their employee identification cards. When they separated, Deberry warned Beverly not to mention the incident. Returning to her boyfriend, Beverly woke him to take her to the hospital to have her hand treated (which later required sutures). On the way out of the track complex, she told him that Deberry had raped her. The police were called and arrived about ten minutes later. Beverly explained what happened and led them immediately to Deberry's bunkhouse. An officer went inside and brought Deberry to the door. Beverly was sitting in a police car about 20-30 feet from Deberry, and the ear's headlights were aimed toward the door in which Deberry stood. A policeman asked her if Deberry was the assailant, and she answered without hesitation that he was.\\nDeberry's version of the facts was that after accompanying Beverly and Mark to the bunkhouse where she wanted to sleep, both Deberry and Mark bedded down outside her door. However, the ground was damp, and after a few minutes he returned to his own bunkhouse where he promptly went to sleep. The next thing he knew was when he was awakened by the police. He has consistently denied any participation in the alleged attack on Beverly.\\nB.\\nIn a pre-trial discovery request, the defense asked for the following:\\n3. A list of all books, papers, documents or tangible objects in the possession of the State pursuant to its investigation of the above-captioned case.\\n*\\n5. All information and materials in the possession of the State which fall within the scope of Brady v. Maryland . and its progeny as to the defendant in the above-captioned ease.\\nThe State replied that there were no objects in its possession, and that there was no Brady material.\\nImmediately before the start of Deberry's first trial (which resulted in a mistrial), the defense inquired about production of the clothes Deberry wore during the alleged attack. The clothing was of obvious relevance since the likelihood of Beverly's blood being found on it was very strong. She and the defendant purportedly had intercourse in two places for IV2 hours or longer; she claimed to have been cut when Deberry awoke her; and the injury was severe enough to require stitches several hours later. Under such circumstances the defense argued that Deberry could not avoid getting Beverly's blood on his clothes if he in fact was her assailant. Counsel asked the court to determine if the clothing was available, and he indicated that the defendant would seek dismissal of the charges if these items were not produced.\\nIn response to the defense allegation that the presence or absence of blood on Deber-ry's clothing was material to the case, the prosecutor stated that he was unaware of any blood found on Deberry's clothes. The trial judge observed that if the presence of blood was at issue, testimony that there was no blood on the clothing would be an acceptable substitute for the actual clothing. However, the judge's ultimate ruling went only to the scope of testimony about the injury on Beverly's hand, rather than the potentially exculpatory effect of the absence of blood on Deberry's clothes. The prosecutor was also directed to determine if the clothing was available and to so advise the defense. The clothing, however, was not found.\\nAt the second trial, one state police detective testified, consistent with his testimony at Deberry's first trial, that a detective assigned to the evidence unit took Deberry's clothing and the victim's clothing. The evidence unit detective, however, testified that Deberry's clothing had not been seized and had not been sent to the FBI for analysis. Furthermore, he did not know what had happened to those items. Deberry testified that the police took all of his clothing from his room. He never returned there, having been incarcerated since his arrest. Thus, he states that the police have had full control over his personal effects since that night.\\nThe forensic evidence introduced at trial consisted of results of blood and hair comparisons. From the victim's jeans, a black head hair of Negroid origin was recovered. Though the majority of structural characteristics resembled those of Deberry's hair, there were sufficient disparities to prevent the FBI analyst from reaching any conclusion as to its origin. . In the combings obtained from Deberry's pubic region, a hair was found that was dissimilar to that of the victim, and no other hair was recovered. While there were blood and semen stains on Beverly's clothes, results of blood typing tests were inconclusive. There was no evidence about blood on the knife allegedly used by Deberry in the attack. The doctor who examined the victim testified that there were no signs of forcible intercourse, but the absence of trauma would be consistent with either non-eonsensual or consensual intercourse.\\nII.\\nA.\\nDeberry contends that the State was required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), to produce his clothing for examination. In light of the inconclusive results of the forensic tests, Deberry's clothes, on the basis of possible stains and hairs, could have disputed the victim's story. Furthermore, the absence of stains and hairs on his clothing would have been material to the issue of guilt since the evidence could have created a reasonable doubt not otherwise present.\\nIn response, the State argues that the duty under Brady and Agurs attaches only when it actually possesses or has access to the requested material. Boyer v. State, Del.Supr., 436 A.2d 1118, 1126-27 (1981). Since the evidence at trial was unclear as to the State's possession of the clothing, so the argument goes, there was no duty to produce it. The State further contends, relying on Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07, 96 S.Ct. at 2398-2399, that in the context of the defense's general request for Brady material, the clothing was not so obviously exculpatory as to trigger the State's duty to disclose it. Finally, according to the State, the absence of blood, semen, or hair on the clothes would not create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist as to Deberry's guilt, and the clothing was therefore immaterial evidence by the standards of Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402.\\nThe parties have argued this case along the lines suggested by Brady and Agurs, i.e., was the evidence favorable to the defense, and was the evidence material? However, we view the issue differently. The question is not whether the clothing was subject to discovery by the defense, but what should be done when the State takes possession of exculpatory (or potentially exculpatory) evidence and then loses or destroys it before or in response to the defendant's discovery request. Perhaps in a broad sense Brady, Agurs, and Stokes v. State, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 376 (1979), which sets forth additional factors to be considered when deciding a Brady claim, are relevant here. But those cases beg the question which we face: what relief is appropriate when the State had or should have had the requested evidence, but the evidence does not exist when the defense seeks its production? The State argues that its duty under Brady attaches only when the State has possession of or access to the requested items (Boyer, 436 A.2d at 1126-27), but we think there is little doubt that the State actually had possession of Deberry's clothing at one time and then lost or destroyed it, thus distinguishing this case from Boyer. Brady and Agurs form a backdrop against which we decide this case, but they are analytically distinct and not strictly applicable to this situation. E.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Brown v. United States, D.C.Ct. App., 372 A.2d 557 (1977).\\nInstead, claims of this type must be examined as follows:\\n1) would the requested material, if extant in the possession of the State at the time of the defense request, have been subject to disclosure under Criminal Rule 16 or Brady?\\n2) if so, did the government have a duty to preserve the material?\\n3) if there was a duty to preserve, was the duty breached, and what consequences should flow from a breach?\\nBrown, 372 A.2d at 559. See also, e.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.1975). There may be a tendency to only ask what happened to the requested evidence and what effect on the trial should its loss have. To so restrict the inquiry, however, presumes too much. In a particular case the State may be able to claim that the evidence is not subject to discovery or that there is no duty to preserve it. See Super. Ct.Crim.R. 16(b). See also DeSalvatore v. State, Del.Supr., 163 A.2d 244 (1960); State v. Traenkner, Del.Super., 314 A.2d 202 (1973); Annot., 19 A.L.R.4th 509, 515-18 (1983). But any claim that potentially exculpatory evidence was lost or destroyed by the State can only be decided after each element of the above analysis has been considered.\\nB.\\nSuperior Court Criminal Rule 16(b) allows a defendant \\\"to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody or control of the State.... \\\" In State v. Winsett, Del.Super., 200 A.2d 237 (1964), the trial court ordered production, pursuant to Rule 16, of both the car, which the defendants were using when the victim was killed, and the alleged weapon. As the court stated, the car and the weapon were tangible objects apparently obtained from the defendants and were clearly material to the defense. Thus, disclosure was required under Rule 16. Id. at238.\\nHere, Deberry first asked for a list of materials and objects that would have been subject to disclosure. We assume that Deberry intended to use this list to prepare a subsequent discovery request, specifying as required by Rule 16(b) the particular items he wished to inspect or copy. See State v. Traenkner, Del.Super., 314 A.2d 202 (1973); Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16(b). In any event, Deberry's clothing clearly was subject to disclosure under Rule 16(b), in accordance with Winsett. Furthermore, the State did not object to disclosure on grounds of immateriality or that the request was unreasonable. See Super.Ct. Crim.R. 16(b). The State, therefore, is precluded from now arguing that the clothing, if preserved, was not subject to disclosure under Criminal Rule 16. Supr.Ct.R. 8.\\nC.\\nThe second step in our analysis \\u2014 the State's duty to retain discoverable evidence \\u2014 is well settled: the failure of the government \\\"to take adequate steps to preserve evidence may deny a defendant due process and thereby jeopardize otherwise viable convictions\\\". E.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 & n. 7 (3d Cir.1978) (collecting cases). The requirement of preservation is not explicitly set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), or in Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, but as was observed in United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C.Cir.1971):\\nIt is most consistent with the purposes of those safeguards to hold that the duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the Government has first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question. Otherwise, disclosure might be avoided by destroying vital evidence before prosecution begins or before defendants hear of its existence . Only if evidence is carefully preserved during the early stages of investigation will disclosure be possible later.\\nWe fully endorse this view, and hold that the State's duty to disclose evidence includes a duty to preserve it as well. The obligation to preserve evidence is rooted in the due process provisions of the four teenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution, article I, section 7. The duty of preservation extends not only to the Attorney General's office, but all investigative agencies, local, county, and state. Bryant, 439 F.2d at 650. See Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir.1964); Lewis v. United States, D.C.Ct.App., 393 A.2d 109 (1978), aff'd on rehearing, 408 A.2d 303 (1979); State v. Giles, Md.Ct.App., 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967); State v. Thurlow, Me. Supr.Jud.Ct., 414 A.2d 1241 (1980). We do not purport to explicitly prescribe what administrative procedures are necessary for the Attorney General and the various law enforcement agencies in this State to fulfill the duty to preserve evidence. But we observe that under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(b), a defendant need only show that an item \\\"may be material to the preparation of his defense\\\" to be discoverable. Cf. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir.1982) (disclosure of statements made by defendant); United States v. Felt, 491 F.Supp. 179 (D.D.C.1979) (discovery under criminal procedure rules requires lesser showing of materiality than does discovery under Brady v. Maryland, supra.). As a matter of prudence, therefore, agencies that create rules for evidence preservation should broadly define discoverable evidence to include any material that could be favorable to the defendant. See Bryant, 439 F.2d at 652 n. 21.\\nD.\\nThe last step in our analysis is whether the State has breached its duty to preserve evidence, and if so, what effect such breach has on this conviction. In making that analysis, we draw a balance between the nature of the State's conduct and the degree of prejudice to the accused. The State must justify the conduct of the police or prosecutor, and the defendant must show how his defense was impaired by loss of the evidence. In general terms, the court should consider \\\"(1) the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the importance of the lost evidence, and (3) the sufficiency of the other evidence adduced at the trial to sustain the conviction\\\". United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir.1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) [quoting United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17, 21 (9th Cir.1976) ].\\nMore specifically, when examining the conduct of the State,\\nthe court should inquire whether the evidence was lost or destroyed while in [the State's] custody, whether the [State] acted in disregard for the interests of the accused, whether [the State] was negligent in failing to adhere to established and reasonable standards of care for police and prosecutorial functions, and, if the acts were deliberate, whether they were taken in good faith or with reasonable justification . It is relevant also to inquire whether the government attorneys prosecuting the case have participated in the events leading to loss or destruction of the evidence, for prosecu-torial action may bear upon existence of a motive to harm the accused.\\nLoud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1152 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Particularly relevant to this inquiry is testimony of persons who had custody of the material before its loss (and after its loss, assuming recovery), any procedures for preserving evidence, specific practices followed in the particular case, and steps taken to recover the lost material after discovery of the loss. E.g., Brown v. United States, D.C.Ct.App., 372 A.2d 557, 560-61 (1977); Johnson v. United States, D.C.Ct.App., 298 A.2d 516, 519 (1972). Against this must be weighed the prejudice to the defense resulting from the loss of such evidence. When analyzing prejudice, the court should consider:\\nthe centrality of the evidence to the case and its importance in establishing the elements of the crime or the motive or intent of the defendant; the probative value and reliability of the secondary or substitute evidence; the nature and prob able weight of- factual inferences or other demonstrations and kinds of proof allegedly lost to the accused; [and] the probable effect on the jury from absence of the evidence....\\nLoud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1152 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir.1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1167 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C.Cir.1971).\\nHaving outlined the inquiry that a court should make, we find the record devoid of any explanations as to the loss of this evidence. Deberry says that the police removed all of his clothing from his room; one detective testified that another detective took the clothes; and the second detective denies doing so. In the usual situation, we would remand the case for additional findings of fact. See Bryant, 439 F.2d at 653; Johnson, 298 A.2d at 519. See generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error \\u00a7 974, at 401-03 (1962). However, it is apparent that a remand in this case would add nothing to the record now before us. See Bryant, 439 F.2d at 653 (McGowan, J., concurring). Furthermore, the concept of balancing in itself implies that when loss of evidence has severely prejudiced the accused, the degree of culpability of the State is immaterial. See Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1152 (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1324, 1327 (2d Cir.1975); Cotton v. United States, D.C.Ct.App., 388 A.2d 865, 871 (1978). Therefore, deciding this case on the record as it now stands is not inconsistent with the general analysis we have adopted.\\nThough the record contains a minimum of information about the loss of De-berry's clothing, we think that the responsibility for the lost evidence must lie with the State. First, Deberry was an itinerant race track worker. His meager possessions were all located in his room, including the clothes he allegedly wore during the attack. When the police took him into custody he had no way of preserving or protecting this all important physical evidence. On the other hand the police were in an absolutely superior position to do so, and one officer has identified another detective as having taken possession of those items. Second, in a crime of this type, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that the apparel of both the victim and the alleged perpetrator would be crucial evidence of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Certainly, the actions of the police reflect the importance of the clothing since they clearly obtained Beverly's clothes, and the record supports the conclusion that they seized Deberry's clothes as well. Having done so, the police had a duty to preserve such vital evidence. Thus, when physical evidence of this type is lost or otherwise becomes unavailable through some apparent default of the police, the State bears a heavy burden of overcoming the defendant's claim of prejudice. A haphazard explanation of the loss is insufficient, since anything less than the fullest possible accounting could stymie the defendant's efforts to show improper or inadequate handling of evidence and to obtain appropriate relief.\\nThough the track guard claimed to have checked an employee's pass with Deberry's name on it at the time Beverly claimed to have left and returned to the track complex, the only evidence linking Deberry to the actual rape was Beverly's account. The physical and medical evidence was inconclusive at best. If the clothing did not contain Beverly's hair, or blood from her serious hand wound, or semen stains, the absence of such evidence would support Deberry's denial of having intercourse with her. Admittedly, Deberry's disclaimer was less credible in light of the guard's testimony, corroborating Beverly's account of leaving and returning to the track, and the medical evidence that she had engaged in sexual intercourse, but that only underscores the potential importance of the clothing. The results of any scientific tests performed on the clothes were clearly important to either the prosecution or defense of the crime, and the weight of substitute evidence, in effect only Deberry's denial, might well have been less in the minds of the jurors than that of any scientific test. The degree of prejudice caused by the loss of the clothing is more than sufficient to justify relief, particularly considering the duty imposed on the police to obtain and preserve physical evidence clearly within its control at the scene of a crime or the site of an arrest.\\nThe failure of the State to produce Deberry's clothes upon request or to conduct scientific tests, as was done on the victim's apparel, permits us to infer that any scientific evidence obtained from such items would have been favorable to Deber-ry. The State's production of otherwise inconclusive scientific evidence, when presumably strong evidence was available (or would have been, if the evidence had been handled properly), implies that the strong evidence would have been adverse to the prosecution. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226, 59 S.Ct. 467, 474, 83 L.Ed. 610 (1939); 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence \\u00a7 145, at 246 (13th ed. 1972); 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence \\u00a7 178, at 221 \\u2014 23 (1967). Considering the circumstances leading to the loss of Deberry's clothing and the prejudice to his defense, the appropriate relief here can only be a reversal of these convictions. The State has the option of entering a nolle prosequi to any or all of the charges against Deberry or retrying him. Cf. Waters v. State, Del.Supr., 443 A.2d 500, 506 (1982). Because the State must bear the responsibility for the loss of this evidence, and the defendant therefore enjoys the inference that evidence of the clothing would be exculpatory in nature, in a retrial the State must stipulate that if Deberry's clothing was introduced it would not contain any evidence incriminating to him.\\nIII.\\nDeberry also challenges the admission into evidence of his identification by Beverly. He contends that the on-site confrontation between them was unnecessarily suggestive and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. This, according to him, led to an unreliable in-court identification by Beverly. The State responds that the confrontation was not unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to mistaken identification.\\nIn this instance, the prompt on-site confrontation was not unnecessarily suggestive, being an \\\"immediate product of the offense and defendant's apprehension\\\". Watson v. State, Del.Supr., 349 A.2d 738, 740 (1975). See Gates v. State, Del.Supr., 424 A.2d 18 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Del.Supr., 413 A.2d 874 (1980); Smith v. State, Del.Supr., 352 A.2d 765 (1976); Harris v. State, Del.Supr., 350 A.2d 768, 770-71 (1975) (first show-up). Beverly knew the defendant and, in fact, had spent a considerable part of the previous day with him. She identified him initially by his first name and the bunkhouse in which he lived, and according to the police officer who was with her, she unhesitatingly identified De-berry as her assailant. The defense makes much of Beverly's inability to further describe Deberry, other than by the part in his hair. Certainly, a detailed description is always helpful, but we think such a requirement was unnecessary here since it is clear that Beverly knew Deberry. See Watson, 349 A.2d at 740 [quoting Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C.Cir.1969) ]. Assuming without deciding that we must consider the issue of reliability after finding that the procedures involved were not unnecessarily suggestive, on the basis of the above facts we must conclude that the victim's identification of Deberry was reliable. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Because Beverly's out-of-court identification was admissible, the issue of her in-court identification need not be reached. See Watson, 349 A.2d at 741. See also Baker v. State, Del.Supr., 344 A.2d 240 (1975).\\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\\nORDER ON CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR REARGUMENT\\nThis 16th day of February, 1983, the Court has before it the State's Motion For Reargument, submitted to us on February 14, 1983. It now appears that following issuance of our opinion on January 27,1983, the State found the clothes seized at the time of defendant's arrest. The State also admits that these items have been in its possession at all times relevant to these proceedings, despite the fact that it was twice ordered by the trial court to search for and produce them, and on each occasion the State represented to the trial court that they could not be found. Indeed, the State denied both here and in the Superior Court that it ever had such items. Even now it continues to base its arguments on that premise. After carefully considering the State's position, we do not believe that this belated discovery of evidence, which the defendant has repeatedly sought at two separate trials, alters our conclusions. If anything, the circumstances which have now come to light only underscore the importance of and need for the rules we announced regarding the State's handling of evidence in criminal matters.\\nAccordingly, the Motion For Reargument is DENIED.\\n. This appears from the following exchange between the trial judge and the deputy attorney general trying the case:\\nTHE COURT: Well, let me just make this point: That if the clothing is itself not available, the State shouldn't attempt to introduce any testimony that there was blood, unless notice is given to the defendant, and I can hear any further application.\\nMR. MIECZKOWSKI [Deputy Attorney General]: When you say blood on the clothing\\u2014 THE COURT: Yes.\\nMR. MIECZKOWSKI: I don't think we expect doing that. The only evidence we intend to introduce of the injury would be the victim's treatment and the doctor who examined and treated that injury.\\nTHE COURT: Well, I would ask you\\u2014\\nMR. MIECZKOWSKI: I'll avoid any reference to it.\\nTHE COURT: Yes.\\n. The State argued that the detective's recollection about who had custody of the evidence might have been faulty since it was clear that the victim's clothing had been taken by a hospital employee and not by the evidence unit detective. However, the detective's statement that the evidence unit detective took the victim's clothing can also be interpreted to mean that the evidence officer took the clothing after the hospital staff took it from the victim. This latter interpretation is supported by the testimony of a nurse at the hospital: the victim's clothing was bagged, labeled, and then given to a detective.\\n. Rule 16 provides in pertinent part:\\n(a) Defendant's Statements; Reports of Examinations and Tests; Defendant's Grand Jury Testimony. The defendant may serve upon the Attorney General a request to permit the defendant or someone acting in his behalf to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or a co-defendant (whether or not charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory in the same or in a separate proceeding), or copies thereof, and the substance of any oral statement which the State intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a state agent which are known by the Attorney General to be within the possession, custody or control of the State, (2) written reports of autopsies, ballistics tests, fingerprint analyses, handwriting analy-ses, blood, urine and breath tests, and written reports of physical or mental examination of the defendant or the alleged victim by a physician, dentist or psychologist made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, which are known by the Attorney General to be within the possession, custody or control of the State, and (3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.\\n(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents or Tangible Objects. The defendant may serve upon the Attorney General a request to permit the defendant or someone acting on his behalf to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody or control of the State, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. This subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal State documents made by agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule, or of statements made by State witnesses or prospective State witnesses (other than the defendant or a co-defendant) to agents of the State.\\n. At the time of the Winsett decision, Rule 16 read:\\nUpon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the Attorney General to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents, tangible objects, confessions or written statements obtained from or belonging to the defendant or a co-defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.\\n. As we have noted, determining whether the clothing would have been discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) is an artificial exercise since the clothing is not available for review. If Deber-ry's clothing did not contain any blood or semen stains or hair, this would have supported his denial of any sexual activity with the victim. The only evidence linking Deberry to the rape was the victim's account, and the physical and medical evidence was inconclusive at best. The verdict is therefore based on what amounts to a bare minimum of evidence, and the absence of hairs and stains on Deberry's clothes was pertinent to the issue of reasonable doubt. Since the defense only made a general Brady request, the clothing is material for Brady purposes only if in the context of the entire record, the clothing would create a reasonable doubt not otherwise present. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402. Assuming the absence of hair or stains on the clothing, it clearly would have been discoverable under Brady and Agurs. See also Stokes v. State, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 376 (1979).\\n. Vouras v. State, Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 1165, 1169 (1982). But see Watson, 349 A.2d at 741. Cf. Harris, 350 A.2d at 770-71; Clark v. State, Del.Supr., 344 A.2d 231, 237 (1975).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8011921.json b/delaware/8011921.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3bbcc1cb6cdde86deaf5c1a5ff77fa63f73415e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8011921.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8011921\", \"name\": \"STATE of Delaware ex rel. Attorney General Richard R. WIER, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edward Francis PETERSON, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Wier v. Peterson\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1076\", \"last_page\": \"1081\", \"citations\": \"369 A.2d 1076\", \"volume\": \"369\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:34:26.245861+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before HERRMAN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Delaware ex rel. Attorney General Richard R. WIER, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edward Francis PETERSON, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Delaware ex rel. Attorney General Richard R. WIER, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Edward Francis PETERSON, Defendant.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted Oct. 6, 1976.\\nDecided Oct. 7, 1976.\\nOpinion Dec. 29, 1976.\\nRichard R. Wier, Jr., Atty. Gen., State of Delaware, Norman A. Barron, State Solicitor, Wilmington, and Milton P. Shaf-ran, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs.\\nHarvey B. Rubenstein, Wilmington, and Clifford B. Hearn, Jr., of Balick & Hearn, P. A., Wilmington, for defendant.\\nBefore HERRMAN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2350\", \"char_count\": \"14043\", \"text\": \"DUFFY, Justice:\\nThis certification proceeding arises from an action filed in the Superior Court by the Attorney General and the Board of Elections, Department of Elections for New Castle County (plaintiffs), seeking- a declaratory judgment concerning defendant's eligibility to hold the Office of President of New Castle County Council. The following questions of law were certified and accepted by this Court:\\n\\\"1. Does not Article II, \\u00a7 21, of the Delaware Constitution render Edward F. Peterson incapable of holding the office of President of New Castle County Council and ineligible for election to that office?\\nA. Do the provisions of Article II, \\u00a7 21, of the Delaware Constitution apply to a candidate for the county-wide office of President of New Castle County Council ?\\nB. If the Answer to A is Yes, are any or all of the following offenses 'infamous crimes' within the provisions of Article II, \\u00a7 21, of the Delaware Constitution: Sodomy; assault with intent to ravish; indecent assault; aggravated assault and battery; assault and battery?\\nC. If the answer to B is Yes, is a conviction of such crime(s) in Pennsylvania a conviction under the provisions of Article II, \\u00a7 21, of the Delaware Constitution ?\\nD. If the answer to C is Yes, what effect does a Pennsylvania pardon on such a conviction on a Delaware resident have on the applicability of Article II, \\u00a7 21,' to such resident who is seeking election to an 'office of trust, honor or profit under this State' ?\\nE.Does a pardon which does not on its face cover one or more convictions apply to such convictions ?\\\"\\nWe discuss the questions seriatim.\\nI.\\nDefendant was an appropriately certified candidate of the Democratic Party for the Office of President of New Castle County Council in the general election held on November 2, 1976. In the years 1949 and 1952, he had been convicted in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of the offenses stated in Question IB. In 1969, defendant received a pardon from the Governor of that Commonwealth covering some or all of such offenses. After defendant had been certified as a candidate, the Attorney General and the other plaintiffs filed this action, alleging that defendant was ineligible to hold the office he sought because of the provisions of Art. II, \\u00a7 21 of the Delaware Constitution. Defendant joined issue on that contention, and this certification followed.\\nn.\\nThe first question was whether the Office of President of the New Castle County Council is an office within the scope of Art. II, \\u00a7 21. At the present time, there is not a Delaware decision dispositive of this issue.\\nUnder our constitutional scheme a county is a political subdivision of the State without an independent or self-supporting life of its own. It is a political subdivision of our State, State v. Warwick, Del.Super., 9 Terry 568, 108 A.2d 85 (1954), \\\"created, organized and existing for civil and political purposes, particularly for the purpose of administering locally the general powers and policies of the state . . . .\\\" 20 C.J.S. Counties \\u00a7 1, at 754-755. New Castle County is such an entity deriving its existence, 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 101, its boundaries, 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 102, and its authority to govern directly from the State. 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 1101, et seq.\\nWhile the viability of county government is derived entirely from the State, it does not automatically follow that a county officer is an officer \\\"under this State,\\\" which is the requirement of Art. II, \\u00a7 21. On the contrary, a county officer will be regarded as an officer of the State only when his Office \\\"embraces the right to exercise a state function or employment\\\" and possesses \\\"the authority and duty to exercise some part of the sovereign power of the state either in making, administering or executing the laws of the State.\\\" State ex rel. Biggs v. Corley, Del.Ct.Banc., 6 W.W.Harr. 135, 172 A. 415, 419 (1934). See Opinon of the Justices, Del.Supr., 245 A.2d 172, 174 (1968). Accordingly, we must determine whether the Presidency of the New Castle County Council is such an office.\\nBy statute, the New Castle County Council is the legislative branch of the County government. 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 1146. Its President is authorized to preside over that body and is vested with all the powers of a county legislator. 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 1145(a). Since the County is a political subdivision of the State entitled to exercise some of its sovereign powers, (for example, the zoning power, 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 2601-2611, and the power to levy and collect taxes, 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 8001 et seq.), it follows that the Office of President of New Castle County Council is an \\\"office of trust, honor or profit under this State\\\" within the meaning of Art. II, \\u00a7 21. Compare Raduszewski v. Superior Court, Del.Supr., 232 A.2d 95 (1967); State ex rel. Green v. Glenn, Del.Super. (3-Judge Court), 9 W.W.Harr. 584, 4 A.2d 366 (1939); Wood v. Miller, 154 Ark. 318, 242 S.W. 573 (1922); Willis v. Potts, Tex., 377 S.W.2d 622 (1964); 63 Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees \\u00a7 11; 67 C.J.S. Officers \\u00a7 5b; Mechem on Public Officers \\u00a7 1.\\nIII.\\nThe next question was whether any of the offenses stated in Question IB are \\\"infamous crimes\\\" within the meaning of the Delaware Constitution. In Fonville v. McLaughlin, Del.Supr., 270 A.2d 529, 530 (1970); this Court affirmed a Superi- or Court determination that grand larceny, a \\\"felony,\\\" is an \\\"infamous crime\\\" within the meaning of Art. II, \\u00a7 21'. It does, not follow from that opinion, however, that every felony is necessarily a crime of infamy; on the contrary, the totality of the circumstances in each case must be examined before a determination may be made that a specific felony is infamous.\\nHere, the record shows that in 1949 defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging that he \\\"with force and arms, . . . did carnally know . a female personally by feloniously forcing [her] to submit to carnal knowledge\\\" (in the way described in the indictment) in violation of P.L. 872 \\u00a7 501; 18 P.S. \\u00a7 4501. We hold that a conviction for felonious sodomy, under the circumstances in the record before us, is a conviction of an infamous crime within the meaning of our Constitution. As to the other offenses, we deem it unnecessary to answer the question.\\nIV.\\nThe third question certified was whether a foreign conviction of an infa mous crime is a \\\"conviction\\\" within the meaning of Art. II, \\u00a7 21. A majority of states which have considered this problem have held that the term \\\"conviction\\\", when used in such a specific disability provision, includes a foreign conviction. See The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand.L.Rev., 929, 961, n. 145 (1970) and the cases cited therein. We approve and adopt such majority view for Delaware.\\nIt seems plain that this provision was designed to prohibit a person, after a conviction of the kind specified, from exercising the authority of Government. Implementation of that purpose requires, of course, that an ineligible candidate not be placed on the ballot. And, in our view, the constitutional purpose would not be served by narrowly construing Art. II, \\u00a7 21 to include only forum convictions. We say this because it is the nature of the offense which renders a person ineligible to hold public office, not the place where it occurred. Here, the sodomy took place in our neighboring State of Pennsylvania and, at the time, the act was a felony under Delaware law as well as under Pennsylvania law. Under these circumstances we hold that the Pennsylvania conviction is a conviction within the scope of Art. II, \\u00a7 21 of the Delaware Constitution.\\nV.\\nFinally, there was the central question presented in this certification: what is the effect of the Pennsylvania pardon on the applicability of Art. II, \\u00a7 21, to a resident seeking election to an \\\"office of trust, hon- or or profit under this State.\\\"? There is neither a Delaware or Pennsylvania decision dispositive of this issue.\\nWhile there may be doubt as to whether the pardon technically reaches all of the convictions, we assume for present purposes that it does.\\nRelying on the broad language of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1867), and its progeny, defendant asserts that the pardon effectively cleansed his record, emanicipating him from all penalties and disabilities which flowed from his conviction.\\nIf Garland ever had the broad impact on post-pardon proceedings which the sweep of its language implies, a century of judicial sculpturing has left more form than substance to the opinion. It can no longer be seriously contended, for example, that a pardon erases an offender's past, making it \\\"as if he had never committed the offense.\\\" As courts have had to wrestle with specific post-pardon problems, it has been held, for example, that a pardoned conviction may be used for impeachment purposes, State v. Grant, Del.Ct.Gen.Ses., 3 W.W.Harr. 195, 133 A. 790 (1926); Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 A. 89 (1928); to increase a sentence of incarceration under a multiple offender statute, Commonwealth v. Smith, 324 Pa. 73, 187 A. 387 (1936); and as the basis for disbarment of an attorney. State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So. 381, 382 (1939); In re Bozarth, 178 Okl. 427, 63 P.2d 726 (1936); Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33, 36 (1930); In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A. 732 (1927). See Generally, Anno., 58 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1974).\\nTo fully understand the operation of Art. II, \\u00a7 21, it is necessary to examine its purpose. In our view, it is essentially a character provision, mandating that all candidates for State office possess high moral qualities. It is not a provision designed to punish an offender. While conviction of an infamous crime does not imply than an offender is incapable of functioning as a respected and productive member of society, it is irreversible evidence that the offender does not possess the requisite character for public office. It is important to emphasize that we are not concerned here with the standard of compassion which should govern daily interpersonal relationships. We deal, rather, with a norm established by our Constitution for those who seek to govern us. Without question, it is a demanding norm.\\nIndeed, the principles governing pre-election disqualification appear to be equally applicable to post-election situations. For example, Art. XV, \\u00a7 6, gives the Governor the authority to \\\"remove from office any public officer convicted of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.\\\" Compare also, Art. VI, \\u00a7 2, which provides for impeachment and removal from office of \\\"civil officers . . . for treason, bribery or any high crime or misdemeanor in office.\\\"\\nWhile a pardon removes all legal punishments and disabilities attached to a conviction, we hold that it cannot erase the fact that the offender was convicted of an infamous crime and it is the fact of conviction alone, not its continuing viability, which renders the offender ineligible to hold public office. Ridgeway v. Catlett, 238 Ark. 323, 379 S.W.2d 277 (1964); State v. Grant, supra. As this Court said in Grant, 133 A. at 791:\\n[A pardon] . . . removes the disability, but does not change the common-law principle that the conviction of an infamous offense is evidence of bad character for truth. (Citing Curtis v. Cochran, 50 N.H. 242.)\\nThus, the Pennsylvania pardon neither obliterates the prior conviction nor restores defendant's eligibility for office under Art. II, \\u00a7 21 of the Del.Const.\\nVI.\\nSince we assumed that the pardon covered all convictions and ruled that the pardon does not restore defendant's eligibility for office, it was unnecessary to address question 1 E.\\nThe certified questions were answered as indicated above. We concluded that defendant was ineligible to hold the Office of President of New Castle County Council.\\n. Del.Const., Art. 4, \\u00a7 11(9) provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction:\\n\\\"To hear and determine questions of law certified to it by the Court of Chancery, Superior Court or Orphans' Court where it appears to the Supreme Court that there are important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination of such questions by it. The Supreme Court may by rules define generally the conditions under which questions may be certified to it and prescribe methods of certification.\\\"\\nSee also Supreme Court Rule 20.\\n. Because of the limited time period between the date of submission of the issues for de-cisi\\u00f3n by this Court and the date of the general election, we answered the Questions on October 7, 1976, by Judgment Order with this Opinion to follow.\\n.The Delaware Constitution, Art. II, \\u00a7 21 provides:\\n\\\"No person who shall be convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the General Assembly, or capable of holding any office of trust, honor or profit under this State.\\\"\\n. In G-arland, the Supreme Court said:\\n\\\"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8019874.json b/delaware/8019874.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..504ac9b58bf922392e4c42170ffd918371a0da3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8019874.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8019874\", \"name\": \"Fred W. VETTER, Jr. and Phyllis M. Vetter, his wife, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. The DIAMOND STATE TELEPHONE CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vetter v. Diamond State Telephone Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-08-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"877\", \"last_page\": \"886\", \"citations\": \"450 A.2d 877\", \"volume\": \"450\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:16:07.128867+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McNEILLY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Fred W. VETTER, Jr. and Phyllis M. Vetter, his wife, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. The DIAMOND STATE TELEPHONE CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Fred W. VETTER, Jr. and Phyllis M. Vetter, his wife, Defendants Below, Appellants, v. The DIAMOND STATE TELEPHONE CO., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: April 14, 1982.\\nDecided: Aug. 23, 1982.\\nThomas C. Jackson (argued) of Terry, Jackson, Terry & Wright, Dover, for appellants.\\nDouglas B. Catts (argued) of Schmittinger & Rodriguez, P. A., Dover, for appellee, cross-appellant.\\nBefore McNEILLY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"6218\", \"char_count\": \"36747\", \"text\": \"HORSEY, Justice:\\nDefendants, Fred W. Vetter, Jr. and Phyllis M. Vetter, his wife, appeal the Court of Chancery's only ruling after trial that was adverse to them, namely: that a telephone conduit of plaintiff, The Diamond State Telephone Company, that crossed defendants' residential lot beneath ground level was lawfully placed and lay in the bed of an unopened but nevertheless dedicated public alley.\\nThe Trial Court's ruling permitted Telephone Co. to leave in place under defendants' premises a 9 inch telephone conduit or cable crossing lying between 6 and 9 feet below ground. The conduit is part of a main trunk line which provides ongoing essential telephone and telecommunication services to a large number of inhabitants of Kent County. The conduit has been in place for over 50 years \\u2014 having been installed in 1929 or 1930 with the approval of the City of Dover \\u2014 and was in place 40 years before defendants' purchase of the improved parcel which is their home.\\nOn these and other facts hereafter referred to, the Court found: (1) the alley to have been a public alley through dedication to its entire plotted length; and (2) Telephone Co. to have been granted by the City of Dover a legal franchise, in effect, to install and maintain the conduit in the bed of the public alley, known as \\\"State Street Alley.\\\"\\nHowever, the Court also found Telephone Co.'s rights created by franchise (rather than easement) to have been substantially diminished by the public utility's intervening inaction. Hence, Telephone Co. was permanently enjoined from entering upon defendants' premises (except with defendants' permission) to service the conduit. The Court thereby limited Telephone Co. to underground access to its conduit from manholes off defendants' premises \\u2014 provided defendants' surface rights were not disturbed. The Court also rejected Telephone Co.'s alternative claims to have acquired an easement by prescriptive user or by estop-pel (if not by grant) for the conduit's underground crossing.\\nDefendants appeal, seeking nothing less than the removal of the conduit, claiming it to be an impermissible trespass and encroachment upon their fee title to the premises. Telephone Co. has filed a defensive cross appeal limited to the Trial Court's rejection of its prescriptive easement claim and to be abandoned if the Trial Court's public alley franchise ruling is affirmed. We so affirm.\\nDefendants appeal naturally focuses on the Court's acceptance of Telephone Co.'s franchise grant argument. The linch-pin of the Court's franchise grant ruling was its finding that by 1929, if not before, State Street Alley had been effectively dedicated to public use. Defendants contend that the Court's dedication finding is erroneous \\\"as a matter of law.\\\" We understand defendants not to mean that the Trial Court erred in its statement of the law of common law dedi cation but in the Court's application of the law to the facts. Defendants appear to contend that the Court relied on facts that, if not erroneous, were not material to the determination of whether there had been an effective common law dedication of the Alley. Defendants also seek to narrow the issue of dedication by focusing, erroneously we think, upon only that portion of State Street Alley that was plotted to cross defendants' parcel. Defendants thereby ignore the private or public status of the remainder of the Alley and of the other plotted streets of the Subdivision.\\nCertain findings of fact of the Trial Court are either undisputed or conceded, implicitly if not explicitly:\\n(1) The chain of title to defendants' parcel goes back to an 1869 or 1870 plot of a residential subdivision known as \\\"Silver Lake City\\\" or \\\"Addition to Silver Lake City\\\" that was recorded in 1871 in the Kent County Office of the Recorder of Deeds and remains of record.\\n(2) The plot subdivided the land immediately north of the Town of Dover in a grid-type manner into a series of rectangular blocks subdivided into lots with the blocks laid out to front on extensions of three existing Dover streets, \\\"Maine\\\", later State Street, Bradford Street and Governors Avenue, all running in a generally north-south direction.\\n(3) The plot shows an alley, \\\"State Street Alley\\\", as bisecting the block of subdivided lots that includes defendants' parcel. That particular block of lots is bounded on the east by State Street, on the west by Bradford Street, on the north by Walker Road and on the south by Hall, later Ross Street. The alley as plotted runs parallel with State and Bradford Streets for the entire length of the block between Ross Street and Walker Road.\\n(4) The alley divides the block into two sets of lots, one fronting on State Street and the other fronting on Bradford Street, with the rear of each group of lots being the alley.\\n(5) The alley as shown on the plot extends in like fashion through three other blocks of similarly subdivided lots lying immediately to the south of defendants' parcel and between State and Bradford Streets. No similar alley was plotted to bisect the series of north-south lots lying between Bradford Street and Governors Avenue.\\n(6) Thomas B. Bradford, creator of the subdivision plan and owner of the tract of some 80 acres, died in 1871, a few months before the recording of the subdivision plan and before any out-conveyances had been made pursuant to the plan.\\n(7) From 1871 to 1911 all deeds transferring title to the land plotted for subdivision were conveyances of the entire 80 acre tract describing the land as a farm and without any deed reference being made to the recorded plot plan of Silver Lake City.\\n(8) In 1911 first mention was made of the \\\"Silver Lake City\\\" plot in a deed of a block of the numerated lots lying between State and Bradford Streets. Indeed, the parcel so conveyed was the particular block of lots lying between Ross Street and Walker Road that included defendants' parcel.\\n(9) Between 1924 and 1927 there were further conveyances of the particular block of lots that included defendants' parcel and which likewise \\\"referred to the aforesaid lots as well as to the recorded plot.\\\" These conveyances also made express reference to the streets shown on the recorded plot which bounded the block of lots, to wit, \\\"bounded on the East by State Street of said Town [of Dover] extended one [sic] called Maine Street; on the North by the Walker Road; on the West by Bradford Street of said Town extended, and on the South by a proposed Street once called Hall Street, now called Ross Street, and containing lots designated by the numbers 31, . on a plat of lots called 'Silver Lake City', laid out by Thomas B. Bradford in the year 1869 and of record....\\\"\\n(10) However, \\\"[t]here was no development or construction in the area above described\\\" (i.e., the particular block of lots of Silver Lake City that includes defendants' parcel) until some later unspecified date.\\n(11) In 1929 the City of Dover annexed an unincorporated area that included \\\"Silver Lake City\\\"; and shortly thereafter the Dover City Manager, on request of Telephone Co., granted it permission \\\" 'to lay a toll cable underground in what is known as State Street Alley from Walker Road' southerly .\\\" through the annexed area and into Town to Telephone Co.'s building.\\n(12) In 1929 or 1930 the conduit was installed within the bed of State Street Alley throughout its plotted length, that is, the opened and used portion of the Alley extending from downtown Dover to the cross street immediately south of Ross Street and through the Alley's unopened section extending from that point to Walker Road. And the conduit has continuously remained there to date, though with additional cables periodically added.\\n(13) In 1930 the then-owner of the tract of land deeded to the State of Delaware a right of way for an extension of \\\"Governors Boulevard\\\", the effect of which was to slice through the block of lots of Silver Lake City which included the present parcel and to sever the triangular parcel eventually acquired by defendants in 1970 from the remaining lots of the particular block.\\n(14) The portion of State Street Alley lying north of Ross Street was never opened for use as an alley. However, the remaining portion of State Street Alley as plotted and lying south of Ross Street has for many years been opened and used as a public alley (along with the subdivision's other plotted streets, including State and Bradford) and apparently continues to be so used.\\nOn these findings of fact, especially those summarized under paragraphs (1), (8), (9) and (11) above, the Court concluded that there had been a dedication of State Street Alley as a public way \\\"for its full length\\\" as plotted and an acceptance of the dedication by the City of Dover in 1929. Relating what it found to be the pertinent facts to the law of a common law dedication, the Court stated:\\n\\\"In Singewald v. Girden, Del.Ch., 127 A.2d 607 (1956) it was held that when a person subdivides property and lays out lots on a plot made or adopted by him, showing the lots as bordering streets and alleys delineated on the plot, and then sells 'any of the lots' with reference to the plot, he thereby dedicates the streets and alleys upon which the sold lots bind to the public. And in Reinhardt v. Chalfant, Del.Ch. [12 Del.Ch. 214], 110 A. 663 (1920) it was held that by the plotting of land, the recording of the plot, and the conveyance of lots according thereto abutting on the streets shown thereon, the street throughout its length and breadth is dedicated to public use as a highway. Here the evidence shows that over the years there were numerous conveyances of lots abutting on the alley in question as designated on Bradford's recorded plot of Silver Lake City. This constitutes a dedication of the alley for public use for its full length as shown on the recorded plot. The annexation of Silver Lake City into the City of Dover by act of the General Assembly in 1929 did not alter this situation. Upon the annexation of new territory a municipality takes such public ways in trust for the public...\\n*\\nIt is true, as defendants argue, that a dedication to public use is not complete in the absence of an acceptance. It has also been held that in the absence of action by the public authorities, the only evidence of acceptance of a street that can be asserted is public user. Reinhardt v. Chalfant, supra. But there can be acceptance by act of the public authorities. Singewald v. Girden, supra. Here there has clearly been at least one act of acceptance by the public authorities. Specifically, in 1929, the City of Dover, acting through its City Manager, expressly granted the request of the Company and gave it permission to bury its utility conduit in the bed of the alley to the full extent of its recorded length. The City, by this act if no other, clearly indicated that it considered the alley, as shown and dedicated by virtue of the recorded plot, to be a public alley within its dominion and control.\\nOn the evidence I find that there clearly was a dedication of the alley for use as a public way and an acceptance by the authorities of the municipality in which it was located, including that recorded but apparently unopened portion of the alley which crossed the area in question to Walker Road.\\nFrom this it follows that the Company had lawful authority to install the conduit in 1929 or 1930 as the case may be, and accordingly it did not require a deed of easement from anyone in the defendants' chain of title at the time in order to enable it to do so.\\\" Diamond State Telephone Company v. Vetter, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 563 (Unreported Opinion, February 18, 1981). (underlining added for emphasis).\\nThe Court also rejected defendants' argument that any offer to dedicate had either been revoked or withdrawn or had lapsed before any acceptance of the offer. Treating defendants' argument collectively as a claim of \\\"abandonment\\\" of a public way, the Court found no \\\"clear intention to abandon . the portion of the alley here in issue .\\\" by the City of Dover. But the Court also noted that since the City was not a party to the action, the issue could not be resolved against the City's interests.\\nOn appeal, defendants contend that the Trial Court's ruling must be reversed for error \\\"as a matter of law.\\\" In contrast, plaintiff contends that this Court's scope of review of the Trial Court's legal franchise ruling is a \\\"clearly erroneous\\\" standard permitting reversal only if the findings of the Trial Court were clearly wrong. In support of their contention that the Trial Court committed \\\"legal error\\\" in ruling that State Street Alley north of Ross Street had been effectively dedicated as a public way, defendants make essentially three arguments: (1) that the evidence of an offer to dedicate [all(?) of the ways of Silver Lake City as public ways] was insufficient as a matter of law because of the developer Bradford's death in the year of recording of the subdivision plan and before he had made any lot sales pursuant to the plot plan; (2) that if an offer to dedicate had been made, it was withdrawn, revoked or lapsed, as a matter of law, before any action constituting a legal \\\"acceptance\\\" occurred; and (3) that the Town of Dover's action in 1929 was ineffective to constitute an \\\"acceptance\\\", as a matter of law, for: (a) failure of the City to put the northerly end of the alley (above Ross Street) to its originally intended use\\u2014 as a surface way; and (b) for lack of authority of the City Manager (i) to accept the dedication \\\"offer\\\" and (ii) to grant Telephone Co. permission to make its installation in the bed of State Street Alley.\\nThe question whether State Street Alley, including the portion thereof lying north of Ross Street, ever became a public way through a common law dedication is a mixed question of fact and law. On the law there is no dispute between the parties as to the legal requirements for an effective common law dedication of ways within a recorded subdivision plan; that is, the requirement of an offer to dedicate and an acceptance of the offer. Compare, Fulton v. Town of Dover, Del.Ch., 6 A. 663 (1886)\\nand Singewald v. Girden, Del.Ch., 127 A.2d 607 (1956). Fulton held that a street was dedicated through the recording of a survey map showing the street, followed by sale of lots with reference to the recorded plot plan. Singewald held that dedication of a private way as a public street required two elements: intent of the owner to dedicate and public acceptance of such intent, either through public user of the way or action by public authorities. The Court stated:\\n\\\"... [I]t is well known that while some kind of acceptance is necessary, it need not be acceptance by the general public. There can be acceptance by action of public authorities. See 11 McQuillen Municipal Corp., \\u00a7 33.47.\\\" 127 A.2d at 616.\\nMcQuillen explains that an acceptance may be either express or implied, and arrived at in one of several ways: \\\"... (1) by expressed act; (2) by implication from the acts of municipal officers; and (3) by implication by the public for the purposes for which the property was dedicated.\\\" 11 McQuillen Municipal Corporations, \\u00a7 33.47 (3d Ed. 1977). In Poole v. Commissioners of Rehoboth, Del.Ch., 9 Del.Ch. 192, 80 A. 683 (1911), it was held that an acceptance of a private way for public use did not require any particular ceremony and could be accomplished either through an express or a constructive dedication. There, acceptance of a dedication offer was found through public user. In Reinhardt v. Chalfant, Del. Ch., 12 Del.Ch. 214, 110 A. 663 (1920), the plotting of land, the recording of the plot and conveyance of lots abutting on streets shown on the subdivision plan constituted a dedication to public use of the plan's streets to their entire length as public ways. See also, Hart v. Durr, Del.Supr., 154 A.2d 898 (1959). As stated in McQuillen:\\n\\\"There need be little affirmative action to indicate an intention to accept a dedication. So there need not be any affirm ative action on the part of the municipal authorities.\\nTo constitute an acceptance the property dedicated need not be in the actual use or occupation of the public.\\\" 11 McQufflen Municipal Corporations \\u00a7 33.47.\\nThe disagreement between the parties is, in reality, over the application of the law to the facts. Thus, defendants, in urging that the Trial Court's findings are to be judged by a legal error guideline, are in essence urging that the Trial Court relied on findings that are not material to the \\\"dedication\\\" issue. But materiality is a mixed question of fact and law involving application of a legal standard to a pertinent set of facts. See, TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), cited in Dower v. Mosser, 3d Cir., 648 F.2d 183 (1981). Thus, the question of whether State Street Alley \\u2014 within the confines of defendants' parcel \\u2014 ever became a public way through a common law dedication is neither solely a question of law nor a question of fact but a mixed question of fact and law. The question then is whether the Trial Court's State Street Alley \\\"dedication\\\" finding rests on substantial material facts, as Telephone Co. contends, or on findings of fact that are immaterial and hence clearly erroneous, as defendants, in effect, contend. We conclude that the Trial Court's dedication findings are based on substantial material evidence and hence should be affirmed.\\nWe take up the first asserted ground for reversible error, that is, whether Bradford's death before recording of the plot plan and his failure to make any conveyance under the plan required the Trial Court to rule that no intent to dedicate the plotted streets and alley as public ways could be inferred as a matter of law. The Trial Court did not explicitly deal with this contention in that it did not focus upon Bradford's death and failure to make lot sales. Rather, the Court simply found that the act of subdivision, recording and sale of lots with reference to the recorded plot was sufficient to constitute a dedication to the public of the ways binding the lots. (See quoted portion of Opinion below at pages 9, 10 above.)\\nWe are not impressed by the sparse and generalized textual authority relied upon by defendants as supportive of defendants' position. While defendants' inference is a plausible one, clearly the Court was not bound over 100 years later to conclude solely on the basis of documentary evidence that an intent to dedicate was lacking. Given these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to support the dedication and evidence that Bradford's death did not work a withdrawal of any intent to dedicate. As stated in Durr v. Hart, Del. Ch., 150 A.2d 316, affd, Del.Supr., 154 A.2d 898 (1959), \\\" '[t]he existence or nonexistence of the intent to dedicate in any particular case is a question of fact rather than of law.'\\\" 150 A.2d at 318. See also, 26 C.J.S. Dedication \\u00a7 60 (1956); 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property \\u00a7 1107 (3d Ed. 1975).\\nDefendants next argue that the operative facts summarized in paragraph (7) above (the absence of any land transfers by reference to the Silver Lake City subdivision plot from 1871 forward) required the Court to rule that the lack of any evidence of \\\"acceptance\\\" of the offer to dedicate before 1929 worked, as a matter of law, a lapse, withdrawal or revocation of the offer. Defendants assert the time interval to be nearly 60 years or from 1871 to 1929, not 40 years, thereby tacking on the additional intervening years between 1911 and 1929. The contention fails for several reasons. First, it ignores the several recorded conveyances between 1911 and 1927 of the very block and lots of the subdivision that lie within defendants' chain of title. (See paragraphs (8) and (9) above.) Second, defendants overlook the fact of development having occurred in at least the southerly portion of Silver Lake City by 1927. (See footnote 7 above.) The weight of the evidence from at least 1911 forward suggests that lot purchasers constituting the public at large were indeed relying upon the Silver Lake City plot to make lot purchases by reference to the plotted streets and ways. Thus, assuming a 40 year hiatus in activity within the subdivision between 1879 and 1911 (see paragraph (7) above), events from 1911 forward preclude the drawing of any inference, certainly as a matter of law, that any offer to dedicate had indeed been withdrawn, revoked or lapsed before the Town of Dover's annexation of the area in 1929.\\nFurther, the law is fairly clear that mere passage of time will not bar acceptance of an offer to dedicate unless the offer is expressly time-conditioned. See, Singewald v. Girden, supra; Velasco v. Goldman Builders, Inc., N.J.Super. A.D. 93 N.J.Super. 123, 225 A.2d 148 (1966); Marwell Const. Co. v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen, R.I. Supr., 61 R.I. 314, 200 A. 976 (1938); DiCioccio v. Town of Wethersfield, Ct.Supr., 146 Conn. 474, 152 A.2d 308 (1959). The law is generally stated to be that, \\\"[a] dedication must be accepted within a reasonable time and what is a reasonable time is to be determined by the consideration not merely of the time elapsed but of the need and convenience of the public and all other pertinent facts and circumstances.\\\" 11 McQuillen Municipal Corporations \\u00a7 33.55 (3d Ed. 1977).\\nFinally, defendants' argument overlooks the alternative findings-ruling by the Trial Court that \\\"the evidence shows that over the years there were numerous conveyances of lots abutting on the alley in question . . . [and] . [t]his constitutes a dedication of the alley for public use for its full length as shown on the recorded plot.\\\" The Court thereby relied upon Singewald v. Girden, supra, and Reinhardt v. Chalfont, supra. The Court's ruling is also consistent with general principles of dedication to the effect that acceptance of an offer to dedicate may be accomplished \\\"by implication by the public\\\" as well as by the alternative means already cited above. 11 McQuillen Municipal Corporations \\u00a7 33.47 and cases cited at page 882 above. See also, 26 C.J.S. Dedication \\u00a7 58 (1956), stating:\\n\\\"Dedication by sale with reference to plat. There is a split of authority as to whether a dedication by sale of land with reference to a plat . is revocable. According to the weight of authority a dedication of land for public use effected by platting and the sale of lots with reference thereto is, in the absence of statute providing for annulment, a completed and irrevocable dedication, even though there has been no formal acceptance by the public authorities, or the property is not, or cannot, at once be subjected to the uses designated, or for a considerable period of time only a part of the land designated is used, or can be used. Neither the lapse of time nor the act of a municipal government can waive the public right to take possession of a street or highway so dedicated, since the legislature alone has the power to release the dedicated land and to discharge the public servitude. The view taken by many decisions is that the purchase of a single lot is sufficient to perfect the dedication.\\nHowever, in some jurisdictions it is the rule that the mere making of the sale of lots with reference to a map or plat does not constitute an irrevocable dedication to the public, but amounts to a mere offer of dedication, which may be withdrawn if not accepted by the public within a reasonable time; and that the platting and sale of lots constitute a dedication of the streets and alleys delineated on the plat only as between the grantors and purchasers. It follows that the dedication can be revoked prior to acceptance, provided the claims of grantees are extinguished, or they all consent.... \\\" (footnotes omitted) (underlining added for emphasis).\\nFor the purpose of this case, we need not decide if Delaware follows the majority or the minority common law rule on whether there can be a revocation of a dedication of ways for public use where a purported dedication is accomplished by the fact of a recording of a subdivision plot and subsequent lot sales. Compare, Singewald, supra, with Whilden v. Richie, Del.Ch., 203 A.2d 617 (1964). Suffice it to say that on the record before us the evidence was clearly insufficient to support a ruling as a matter of law that the offer to dedicate had been revoked, withdrawn or lapsed before the Town of Dover's annexation and other action undertaken in 1929, for the reasons stated at pages 883-884 above.\\nLastly, defendants contend that State Street Alley north of Ross Street did not become a public way in 1929 because the evidence of the Town of Dover's \\\"acceptance\\\" of that portion of the Alley as a public way was insufficient as a matter of law. The argument, of course, presumes the requirement of an explicit \\\"acceptance\\\" for the accomplishment of an effective dedication of a public way. The argument also assumes that the Court below erred as a matter of law in ruling, on its finding of State Street Alley as plotted to have been dedicated as a public way, that the dedication extends to its full plotted length. See the Court's ruling and discussion of D\\u00e9la-ware authorities at page 881 above.\\nDefendants' argument is in part eviden-tiary and in part legal. It is evidentiary in that defendants argue that there is no evidence that the Town ever intended to open the portion of the Alley north of Ross Street. It is legal in that defendants contend that the Town's City Manager lacked the authority first to accept dedication of the Alley (to its entire plotted length) and second, to grant Telephone Co. permission to lay its conduit within the bed of the Alley to its full plotted length.\\nAs to defendants' contention that there is no evidence the Town ever intended to open the Alley north of Ross Street, defendants argue that this lack of municipal intent is patent or demonstrable by the failure of the Town at any later date to open the Alley north of Ross Street. Defendants thereby employ 20-20 hindsight by using post-1929 facts \\u2014 that the Alley was never later extended north of Ross Street \\u2014 as confirming a 1929 municipal intent that the Town at time of annexation of the subdivision never intended to open the Alley north of Ross Street. Such after-the-fact inferences were clearly insufficient to support a conclusive presumption of municipal intent not to \\\"accept\\\" (assuming acceptance was required) a dedication of State Street Alley to its full plotted length. Defendants' case authorities are simply inap-posite.\\nTurning to the legal issues, we think the Court properly applied Delaware dedication law in ruling that the \\\"numerous conveyances of lots abutting on the alley in question . . constitutes a dedication of the alley for public use for its full length as shown on the recorded plot.\\\" (See pages 9, 10 and 17 above.) Such is clearly the general law as discussed at pages 13-14 above; and defendants have failed to demonstrate the lack of any substantial evidence to support the Court's ruling as applied to the operative facts of this case.\\nThe remainder of defendants' legal arguments center around the City Manager's authority both to accept an offer of dedication and to grant permission to a utility to use the Town's public ways. Defendants argue: (1) that any offer to dedicate was extended only to the public officials of Kent County and not to the Town of Dover and hence the Town was outside the scope of the offer; and (2) assuming the Town was within the scope of the offer of dedication, the Town's authority to accept an offer of dedication and to grant a franchise was exclusively vested in the \\\"street committee\\\" of the Town and not in the Town's City Manager.\\nThe Court below rejected both prongs of defendants' \\\"authority\\\" argument on the strength of (a) the Town's 1929 charter grant from the General Assembly authorizing the annexation of the subdivision; (b) a 1914 Town ordinance authorizing public utilities to install utility lines either over or within the rights of way of streets and alleys within the Town's corporate limits; and (c) Town records showing written permission to have been granted Telephone Co. by the Town's City Manager \\\"to open the bed of [State Street] Alley north to the southerly side of Walker Road for the purpose of installing telephone conduits and cables.\\\" On these facts, the Court concluded: that the Town of Dover had clearly evidenced its intent in 1929 to accept State Street Alley as a public way to its full plotted length; and that \\\"[t]he conduit was lawfully installed pursuant to this authorization\\\" of the Town \\\"acting through its City Manager.\\\"\\nDefendants say that this does not answer its contention that the Town of Dover lacked the authority to \\\"accept\\\" an offer to dedicate the ways of the subdivision and that the City Manager's 1929 letter exceeded his authority. Technical arguments of this nature clearly do not improve with age, particularly when not raised until 50 years later and in a proceeding to which the City of Dover is not a party. In any event, we think the Court correctly determined the Town of Dover's act of annexation of the subdivision constitutes substantial, if not controlling, evidence of the Town's acceptance of the subdivision's streets and alley as public ways. As the Court below stated:\\n\\\"Upon the annexation of new territory a municipality takes such public ways in trust for the public, subject to established grades and rights reserved by dedicator, and there are imposed upon [the municipality] the same municipal duties and liabilities in the annexed territory as rest on it with respect to those in the original territory. 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations \\u00a7 76; 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations \\u00a7 56.\\\"\\nAs to the City Manager's asserted lack of authority to grant permission to Telephone Co. to lay its conduit within the bed of the Alley, the evidence may understandably be sparse 50 years later as to the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the letter. However, defendants have clearly not established that the City Manager did not obtain the \\\"street committee's\\\" approval before granting Telephone Co.'s request. Defendants have also not overcome the presumption \\\"that public officials discharge their duties and perform the acts required of them by law in accordance with the law and the authority conferred upon them and that they act fairly, impartially and in good faith.\\\" Phillips v. Board of Education of Smyrna School District, Del.Super., 330 A.2d 151, 154 (1974); Glisson v. Glisson, Del.Supr., 237 A.2d 393 (1967); Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, Del.Supr., 43 Del.Ch. 485, 238 A.2d 331 (1967). A fortiori the presumption should apply to action taken over 50 years ago by the city manager of a small municipality.\\nAFFIRMED.\\n. As will be seen, defendants contest both of these findings.\\n. The Court does not use the term \\\"franchise\\\"; but counsel appear to agree that that is the effect of the Court's finding of the City's authority to permit installation of the conduit in a public way.\\n. As will be seen, defendants rely on this set of operative facts as requiring the Trial Court to rule as a matter of law that no intent to make an offer of dedication [presumably of any of the plotted ways within the subdivision] could be inferred from the recording of the plan.\\n. As will also be seen, defendants rely on this set of operative facts as requiring the Trial Court to rule as a matter of law that any offer to dedicate lapsed or was presumably withdrawn or revoked by reason of the 40 years of inaction as to the subdivision plan between 1871 and 1911.\\n.All quotations are from the Chancellor's unreported Opinion, unless otherwise noted.\\n. By virtue of the 1911 deed as well as the deeds between 1924 and 1927, defendants were on record notice that their parcel's chain of title went back to the \\\"Silver Lake City\\\" plot and block therein bounded by State and Bradford Streets and Ross and Walker Road and that the plotted \\\"State Street Alley\\\" bisected their parcel. Such conveyances between 1911 and 1927 also put defendants on notice of reliance by the particular grantors and grantees on the Silver Lake City plot. Nevertheless, neither defendants' deed in 1970 nor their predecessor's deed in 1960 made any reference to the Silver Lake City plot.\\n. A 1927 aerial photograph clearly depicts the presence of numerous houses in the southerly portion of the Silver Lake City subdivision as of that date. However, the photograph also confirms that the northern extremity of the subdivision, including the lands lying both north and south of Ross Street, was still vacant and apparently being farmed.\\n. As will also be seen, defendants rely upon this set of operative facts as requiring the Court to rule as a matter of law that the Town of Dover did not validly \\\"accept\\\" any offer to dedicate and lacked the power to do so.\\n. Governors Avenue became the hypotenuse of a triangular parcel whose other two sides were Bradford Street and Walker Road. It was this parcel which defendants purchased forty years later which carried with it the plotted but unopened State Street Alley.\\n. The Court's express finding is, \\\"[t]he physical existence of the alley as it runs northerly from downtown Dover stops at its intersection with Ross Street to the south of defendants' property [and] does not continue on to Walker Road as indicated on Bradford's 1869 plot....\\\"\\n. Defendants never explicitly state whether their \\\"revocation\\\" argument extends to all of the plotted streets and ways of Silver Lake City, or is confined to State Street Alley to its entire plotted length, or is limited to only that portion of the Alley lying north of Ross Street. But for the purposes of this litigation, the argument must be limited to the latter, i.e., the Alley within the short block north of Ross Street that includes defendants' premises. Such a limited application of its \\\"revocation\\\" argument reveals, we think, its inherent weakness. For no contention is made that Bradford and State Streets, as well as all intersecting or cross streets within the subdivision, as well as the Alley south of Ross Street, have not become public ways.\\n. Here, defendants are presumably applying their revocation/lapse argument to State Street Alley to its entire plotted length.\\n. Here, defendants are clearly limiting their revocation/lapse argument to the portion of the Alley lying north of Ross Street. However, logically, the argument would apply to the Alley to its entire length.\\n.The Court did not impose any further requirement for an effective dedication by way of an explicit \\\"acceptance\\\" of an offer to dedicate.\\n. Both parties cite with approval this section in McQuillen.\\n. As stated above (see footnote 11) this amounts to an \\\"all or nothing\\\" argument by defendants, in the sense that to accept it would require a finding that none of the plotted ways of the subdivision were effectively dedicated. Of course, defendants do not urge this result.\\n. A further reason to reject the contention is the lack of any record evidence of intent by the then-owner to seek to rescind or withdraw the subdivision plan between 1871 and 1911.\\n. See footnote 14 above, questioning the requirement under any circumstances of an explicit \\\"acceptance\\\" of an offer to dedicate to accomplish a dedication of plotted streets as public ways.\\n. Curiously, the text does not take a position as to where Delaware stands on this question, or cite any Delaware cases, perhaps due to uncertainty of the current state of Delaware law.\\n. Acceptance by a public authority of offers to dedicate ways in subdivisions for public use in Kent County has, since 1967, been governed by 9 Del.C. \\u00a7 4810, enacted by 51 Del.Laws, c. 103 (1967).\\n. Of course, the Town's authority to permit Telephone Co. to lay its conduit within the bed of the proposed Alley depends upon the alley land having been dedicated as a public way not later than 1929.\\n. The argument is also legal in its implicit rejection of the Court's ruling that State Street Alley was dedicated to its full plotted length by virtue of the plotting, recording and conveyancing of lots abutting on the streets and alley of the subdivision. See page 881, above.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8038441.json b/delaware/8038441.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f29097c5ddbb69d72f799e50638340b34b86e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8038441.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8038441\", \"name\": \"WIFE R. v. HUSBAND R.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wife R. v. Husband R.\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-07-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"877\", \"last_page\": \"880\", \"citations\": \"310 A.2d 877\", \"volume\": \"310\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:05:05.660603+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WIFE R. v. HUSBAND R.\", \"head_matter\": \"WIFE R. v. HUSBAND R.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware, New Castle.\\nJuly 20, 1973.\\nFrank J. Gentile, Jr., Wilmington, for plaintiff.\\nClement C. Wood, of Allmond & Wood, Wilmington, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1153\", \"char_count\": \"6803\", \"text\": \"OPINION OF THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S PRAYER FOR COUNSEL FEES AND NECESSARY EXPENSES IN THE CONDUCT OF THIS ACTION\\nTAYLOR, Judge.\\nPlaintiff, June M. Rickerson, filed this divorce action alleging incompatibility. The issue is whether a wife who is plaintiff in a divorce action based on incompat-ability may be awarded counsel fees and necessary expenses to be paid by her husband.\\n13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1530 provides that:\\n\\\"The court may grant alimony to the wife for her sustenance pending her petition for divorce, and order and direct the husband to pay such sum as is deemed necessary to defray the expenses in conducting her case, whether the application is on the part of either the wife or husband, and shall protect her from personal restraint.\\\"\\nA necessary element to an allowance under this section is that a wife lack available funds to engage and pay counsel. Husband S. v. Wife S., Del.Supr., 294 A.2d 89 (1972). For purposes of this motion, it will be assumed that the requisite need of wife exists.\\nThe terms of \\u00a7 1530 clearly contemplate relief for the plaintiff wife. The objective of the statute is that in a pending divorce action \\\"a wife should be in a position adequate to present her side of the controversy\\\", ibid, p. 153, and \\\"to prevent a failure of justice\\\". Hopkins v. Hopkins, Del.Super., 8 Terry 515, 47 Del. 515, 94, A.2d 222 (1953). The statute empowers the Court \\\"to equalize the positions of the parties and to protect the court's jurisdiction over the pending divorce cause by insuring that the wife's side will be adequately and effectively presented.\\\" Gilbert v. Gilbert, 5 Storey 138, 55 Del. 138, 185 A.2d 73, 76 (1962).\\nThe determination of such allowance is based upon facts existing before trial of the divorce and does not depend upon the divorce allegations or the charges of wrongdoing. Husband S. v. Wife S., Del.Supr., 294 A.2d 89 (1972). The section is not confined to particular grounds for divorce and has been considered applicable to divorce actions irrespective of whether divorce could have been obtained on the particular ground at the time of the enactment of 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1530 or whether subsequent amendment to the divorce law established the ground for divorce. Such an allowance may be made even though wrongdoing on the part of the wife is charged and thereafter proved, ibid.\\nThe language of the section does not make an award dependent upon the existence of fault. Compare Rolph v. Rolph, Del.Super., 1 Storey 552, 51 Del. 552, 149 A.2d 744 (1959). This contrasts with \\u00a7 1531 which relates entitlement to property allowance or division to particular divorce grounds and to specified status of the applicant. ibid.\\nThe contention is that 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1537, which was enacted to deal specifically with divorce action based upon incompatibility, limits the applicability of \\u00a7 1530 in incompatibility divorce actions. Subsection (a) authorizes the Court to award periodic support payments to a defendant, upon a proper showing, \\\"to continue while the defendant remains alive and unmarried or for such shorter period\\\" as the Court fixes. This subsection was designed to permit continuing support to a defendant where a defendant is not chargeable with the more stringent historic grounds for divorce and the mutuality contemplated by incompatibility is the sole basis for the divorce. Prior to enactment of that section there was no statutory authorization to award support payments (in contrast to allowance or division of property under 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1531), after the divorce decree became final. Beres v. Beres, Del.Super., 2 Storey 133, 52 Del. 133, 154 A.2d 384 (1959). Subsection (b) of \\u00a7 1537 provides:\\n\\\"Where dependency shall be put in issue, the Court may allow defendant alimony and expense money as provided in \\u00a7 1530 of this title.\\\"\\nIt is difficult to determine the reason for the inclusiorb of subsection (b). As noted above, the specific language of \\u00a7 1530 refers to an allowance to wife \\\"pending her petition for divorce\\\". It is possible that the draftsman of \\u00a7 1537 concluded that in view of the wording of \\u00a7 1530 and in view of the allowance in \\u00a7 1537 of support after the final decree to a defendant in an incompatibility action, a specific reference should be made to the fact that the defendant could also be allowed alimony and expense money prior to the final decree. The language in \\u00a7 1537 does not by its terms preclude alimony and expense money to a plaintiff under \\u00a7 1530 as such right can be found within the language of \\u00a7 1530. It is concluded above that the language of \\u00a7 1530, standing alone, would permit a plaintiff wife in any divorce action to seek alimony and expense money upon a proper showing.\\nRepeal by implication is not favored. Improved Parcel of Land Known as No. 900 West Second Street, Etc., v. State ex rel. State Highway Department, Del.Supr., 195 A.2d 390 (1963). A statutory provision will not be found to have been repealed by implication except to the extent necessary to give meaning and effect to a statutory enactment. DuPont v. DuPont, Del.Supr., 7 Terry, 592, 46 Del. 592, 87 A.2d 394 (1952). The test is whether an irreconcilable inconsistency exists between a later statute and a pre-existing statute. Bank of Delaware v. Bancroft, Del.Ch., 269 A.2d 254 (1970).\\nThe specific language of subsection (b) merely authorizes the Court to allow temporary alimony and expenses to a defendant in an incompatibility divorce action. It does not by its terms bar such award to a plaintiff. The exclusion of plaintiff wife in an incompatibility divorce action is not necessary to give meaning and effect to \\u00a7 1537(b). Moreover, in view of the specific language of \\u00a7 1530, \\u00a7 1537(b) was'justified to cover the specific matter dealt with in subsection (b). The apparent object of the statute was to expand the jurisdiction of the Court. Nothing indicates a legislative intent to narrow the existing jurisdiction conferred by \\u00a7 1530. Accordingly, there is no sufficient basis for concluding that the General Assembly intended when it enacted \\u00a7 1537(b) to place a limitation upon the applicability of \\u00a7 1530 as to a plaintiff wife in an incompatibility divorce action.\\nAccordingly, defendant's motion is denied.\\nIt is so ordered.\\n. This Court held in Brown v. Brown, Del.Super., 3 Terry 157, 42 Del. 157, 29 A.2d 149 (1942) that the same relief is available to the defendant wife.\\n. Nothing in the statute (56 Del.Laws, Ch. 296) which added incompatibility as a ground for divorce indicates a legislative intent to exclude this ground from the coverage of \\u00a7 1530. \\u00a7 1537 was enacted by 57 Del. Laws, Ch. 540.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8058310.json b/delaware/8058310.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed219deb58c82195c4c6c092224c215f4b708c07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8058310.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8058310\", \"name\": \"Francis J. MARTIN, Jr., Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Martin v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-10-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"158\", \"last_page\": \"160\", \"citations\": \"346 A.2d 158\", \"volume\": \"346\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:26:11.857300+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY, and McNEILLY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Francis J. MARTIN, Jr., Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Francis J. MARTIN, Jr., Defendant below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted Sept. 16, 1975.\\nDecided Oct. 7, 1975.\\nRichard Allen Paul and Donald W. Huntley, Asst. Public Defenders, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.\\nRichard J. McMahon, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.\\nBefore HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY, and McNEILLY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1069\", \"char_count\": \"6482\", \"text\": \"DUFFY, Justice:\\nDefendant appeals from convictions for rape and assault in the third degree as a result of which he was ordered imprisoned for life. He makes three arguments to this Court.\\nI\\nThe first of defendant's contentions refers us to the current statute. On July 1, 1973 a new Criminal Code became effective in Delaware and rape is defined therein as follows:\\n\\\"A male is guilty of rape when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a female not his wife without her consent, or when he intentionally engages in sexual intercourse with a male without such male's consent.\\\" 11 Del.C. \\u00a7 763.\\nIn this case the State's evidence proved oral and rectal intercourse with the victim without her consent. The Commentary to the Code specifically states that such conduct is rape under \\u00a7 763. See the Commentary to \\u00a7 763, 766. Defendant argues that the Legislature exceeded the reasonable limits of its police power in making non-genital intercourse \\\"rape.\\\" He says, quite correctly, that under prior law such conduct amounted to sodomy which traditionally carried a lesser penalty than rape. Cf. State v. Maida, 6 Boyce 42, 96 A. 207 (1915). But his attack on Legislative power is made without case support of any kind and, indeed, is unsupported by any citation to authority.\\nOn a number of occasions this Court has stated clearly that the wisdom of legislative policy is not a matter of judicial review. See, for example, Kreisher v. State, 303 A.2d 651 (Del. 1973). Manifestly, the General Assembly must' have some flexibility in defining criminal conduct and establishing penalties for it. Law is an evolutionary and, hopefully, an ascending process, and statutory law is the public consensus of where public policy stands at the time in question. With reference to sexual crimes, the General Assembly must have discretion in updating laws to make them consistent with the needs and mores of the times. Defendant's argument is without merit.\\nII\\nNext, defendant contends that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to strike an in-court identification. There is no objection to the pre-trial photographic and line-up identification procedures which were followed.\\nAt trial the State elicited an identification of defendant by the victim. Thereafter, as part of direct examination and over objection, the State had the victim select from a collection of photographs those she had earlier identified as pictures of her assailant. Given the prior positive identification of defendant by the victim, both in and out of court, the evidence was corroborative only and would have been more appropriately offered during the State's rebuttal. But, in any event, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.2d 705 (1967).\\nIII\\nFinally, defendant contends that repeated references to his prior conviction of a felony precluded an impartial verdict.\\nOn direct examination defendant testified that he had three times been convicted of a felony. During- cross-examination one question and one answer covered the same ground, thus:\\n\\\"Q. How many times have you been convicted of a felony ?\\nA. Three.\\\"\\nAs part of the charge to the jury the Trial Judge read 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 4303 and explained its meaning.\\nQuestions regarding prior felony convictions are relevant to the credibility of a witness and are admissible under the statute. Miller v. State, Del.Supr., 224 A. 2d 592 (1966). See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). Here, defendant attempted to take some of the sting out of his prior record by presenting the facts to the jury when he testified under examination by his own attorney. Where did that tactic leave the cross-examiner ?\\nSpeaking generally, there is a wide discretion given to counsel during cross-examination as he tests, among other things, the credibility of a witness as well as his ability to observe, remember and relate. But, given the narrow context in which evidence of prior felony convictions is admissible in Delaware, we conclude that the State should not be permitted to simply develop a repetition of what came out during direct testimony. That fact is before the jury and subject to summation comment by either side. The tendency to judge on the basis of a bad general record is too strong to encourage repetition of it. Michelson v. United States, supra. But in imposing this limitation we are concerned only with a cross-examination limited to repetition of the direct. If the State is prepared to go beyond what was developed during direct, the limitation does not apply.\\nHere, a single question and answer is the extent of the repetition and, under the circumstances of the case, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, supra. As to the Court's instruction, it was cautionary and appropriate, not erroneous.\\nAffirmed.\\n. The Commentary to the Model Penal Code, on which the Delaware Code is based in part, states:\\n\\\"Prom the point of view of the woman who is attacked, these deviate forms of aggression (abnormal intercourse by the mouth or anus) would be equally shocking and abhorrent.\\\" Comments \\u00a7 207.4(3). Tentative drafts of the Modern Penal Code, No. 4, p. 243 (parentheses added).\\n. The Court said:\\n\\\"Evidence has been introduced which indicates the Defendant's prior record of conviction. There is a statute dealing with this type of evidence to which I now direct your attention, and that is 10 Del.C. \\u00a7 4303, which reads as follows: 'No person shall be excluded from testifying as a witness by reason of his having been convicted of a felony, hut evidence of the fact may be given to affect his credibility.' The meaning of the statute is that evidence of a prior conviction of any witness may be considered by you in determining the credibility of that witness's testimony; that is, whether or not his testimony is worthy of your belief. Evidence of a prior felony conviction of any witness has no direct bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence and should not be considered as such.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8061555.json b/delaware/8061555.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..142900781119c7027c0d8802b43223e71b805429
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8061555.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8061555\", \"name\": \"RICE'S BAKERY, Employer Below, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Gerald ADKINS, Claimant Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rice's Bakery v. Adkins\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-07-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"215\", \"last_page\": \"217\", \"citations\": \"269 A.2d 215\", \"volume\": \"269\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:47:17.463636+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMAN, JJ., sitting.\", \"parties\": \"RICE\\u2019S BAKERY, Employer Below, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Gerald ADKINS, Claimant Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"RICE\\u2019S BAKERY, Employer Below, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Gerald ADKINS, Claimant Below, Appellee, Cross-Appellant.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nJuly 27, 1970.\\nWilliam J. Alsentzer, Jr., Wilmington, for Rice\\u2019s Bakery.\\nJoseph T. Walsh, Wilmington, for Gerald Adkins.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMAN, JJ., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"544\", \"char_count\": \"3528\", \"text\": \"WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.\\nThis is an appeal by Rice's Bakery, the employer of a claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Law from an order of the Superior Court remanding the claimant's case to the Industrial Accident Board for further findings.\\nThe claimant, Gerald Adkins, was a driver salesman for Rice's Bakery and in the course of his employment received a personal injury. The accident resulted in a prolonged period of difficulty with his back which subsequently required two operations. He received a laminectomy and spinal fusion in 1962, and suffered a second spinal fusion in 1963.\\nIn 1961 claimant entered into an agreement with the employer providing for compensation for total disability. This agreement was approved by the Industrial Accident Board. Compensation was paid from 1961 until February, 1964 in which month a subsequent agreement was entered into between the parties. The second agreement provided compensation for partial disability for a period of 150 weeks. - Following the termination of the second agreement for the payment of partial disability, claimant petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for a review on the ground that his incapacity for work had subsequently become permanent and total.\\nFollowing a hearing, the Industrial Accident Board held that a preponderance of evidence established that Adkins was still totally disabled. The Board ordered psychiatric treatment to be started at the cost of the employer's insurance carrier, and further provided that the case be reviewed six months after the date of the award to determine the effects of the psychiatric treatment.\\nThe employer appealed to the Superior Court. That court held that there was no evidence of a competent nature in the record to justify a holding of any causal connection between the psychosomatic condition of the claimant's back and the accident suffered by him in the course of his employment. The cause was therefore remanded to the Industrial Accident Board with leave to both parties to produce further evidence upon the causal connection between the industrial accident and the psychosomatic disability the claimant is currently suffering under.\\nThe trial judge in effect sent the cause back to the Industrial Accident Board to determine whether or not there was any causal connection between the industrial accident he suffered and his present psychological or neurotic disorder which prohibits him from working. The law seems settled that, provided a sufficient causal connection is proved by competent evidence between an industrial accident and a resulting psychological or neu rotic disorder resulting therefrom, such disability is compensable under Workmen's Compensation Law. See Fiorucci v. C. F. Braun & Co., 4 Storey 79, 173 A.2d 635 (Del.1961). We so hold.\\nThe trial judge recognized that this might be the result and accordingly remanded the cause for further consideration by the Industrial Accident Board. He set forth his reasons in a well-considered opinion. Rice's Bakery v. Gerald Adkins, Del. Super., 267 A.2d 461 (1970).\\nWe have considered the opinion of the court below, approve it, and accordingly affirm the remand to the Industrial Accident Board upon that opinion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8061962.json b/delaware/8061962.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76b7d2207e04866b2706288ccf13fe37924c46d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8061962.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8061962\", \"name\": \"WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. DELAWARE AUTO SALES, a business association of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wilmington Trust Co. v. Delaware Auto Sales\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"41\", \"last_page\": \"42\", \"citations\": \"271 A.2d 41\", \"volume\": \"271\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:24:40.970725+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and SHORT, Vice-Chancellor, sitting.\", \"parties\": \"WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. DELAWARE AUTO SALES, a business association of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. DELAWARE AUTO SALES, a business association of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nNov. 4, 1970.\\nRodney M. Layton and Jane R. Roth, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.\\nJay H. Conner, of Conner & Daley, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.\\nCAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and SHORT, Vice-Chancellor, sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"602\", \"char_count\": \"3615\", \"text\": \"CAREY, Justice.\\nThis is an appeal by Wilmington Trust Company, defendant below, from a judgment in Superior Court based upon a holding that plaintiff below, Delaware Auto Sales, was a holder in due course of a treasurer's check, issued but later cancelled by defendant, and was therefore entitled to the amount of the check with interest and costs.\\nThe facts are essentially undisputed: Robert Hoopes, of Seaford, purchased a used car from Delaware Auto Sales and paid for it with a personal check drawn on Wilmington Trust Company in the amount of $1550.00. Early the next morning, due to dissatisfaction with the car, which he later returned, Hoopes called the Seaford branch of the bank and stopped payment on his check. This order was noted in the Wilmington office at 8:35 a. m. That same morning, Al Kutner, owner of Delaware Auto Sales, went to the Greenville branch of the bank between 9:00 and 9:30 a. m., and exchanged the personal check of Hoopes for a treasurer's check in the same amount. The Assistant Treasurer investigated the adequacy of Hoopes' funds, failed to discover or had not yet received notice of the stop-pay ment order. At 9:24 a. m., the Hoopes account was charged with a \\\"hold\\\" for the amount of the treasurer's check. Later, when the treasurer's check was presented for payment, the stop-payment order was noticed and the check was can-celled. Defendant below alleged want or failure of consideration and mistake. Plaintiff below contended that it was a holder in due course and therefore not subject to those defenses.\\nIt is clear that Delaware Auto Sales cannot assert the rights of a holder in due course as against Wilmington Trust Company. The rights of a holder in due course are defined in 5A Del.C. \\u00a7 3-305:\\n\\\"To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from.\\n\\\"(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt \\\" (emphasis added).\\nIn other words, personal defenses are available between immediate parties. Delaware Auto Sales dealt directly with Wilmington Trust Company; even if the auto dealer was a holder in due course, it is not immune to the defense of want or failure of consideration, as set forth in 5A Del.C. \\u00a7 3-306(c). Brotherton v. McWaters, Okl., 438 P.2d 1 (1968); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., Del.Supr., 256 A.2d 739 (1969).\\nWe find that there was a failure of consideration here. Since the bank received the stop-payment order before it issued the treasurer's check, it had no right to charge the account of Hoopes, its depositor. A complete failure of consideration for the treasurer's check resulted and the bank had the right to refuse to honor it when presented by the payee. Tropicana Pools, Inc. v. First National Bank of Titusville, Fla.App., 206 So.2d 48 (1968); Wright v. Trust Company of Georgia, 108 Ga.App. 783, 134 S.E.2d 457 (1963) and Pyle v. Gallaher, Del.Super., 6 Pennewill 407, 75 A. 373 (1908).\\nWe need not consider the defense of mistake also asserted by the bank.\\nJudgment reversed.\\nThere was testimony that stop-payment notices require one to two hours to process.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8062715.json b/delaware/8062715.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1df0045e5833fe4b4a5fc70a598fa80f5106cb7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8062715.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8062715\", \"name\": \"Dorothy B. MENGELE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CHRISTIANA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF WILMINGTON, Defendant Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mengele v. Christiana Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n\", \"decision_date\": \"1972-01-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"395\", \"last_page\": \"398\", \"citations\": \"287 A.2d 395\", \"volume\": \"287\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:26:43.397159+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"parties\": \"Dorothy B. MENGELE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CHRISTIANA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF WILMINGTON, Defendant Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Dorothy B. MENGELE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CHRISTIANA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF WILMINGTON, Defendant Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware, New Castle.\\nJan. 6, 1972.\\nGeorge F. Gardner, III, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nRoger Sanders of Prickett, Ward, Burt & Sanders, Wilmington, for appellee.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"1701\", \"char_count\": \"10211\", \"text\": \"WOLCOTT, Chief Justice:\\nThis is an appeal from the Superior Court after jury trial from a directed verdict in favor of Christiana Federal Savings and Loan Association of Wilmington. The action below was brought against Christiana and two individuals, Anthony G. Bariglio and Sharon Lynn Bariglio, his wife, by Dorothy B. Mengele, the mother of Sharon Lynn Bariglio. A directed verdict was entered in favor of Christiana. The jury disagreed with respect to Anthony G. Bariglio and Sharon Lynn Bariglio.\\nThe facts are that, following the death of her husband, Mrs. Mengele, with the proceeds of certain insurance on the life of her deceased husband, opened a savings account with Christiana. The account was opened in her name and jointly with her daughter, Sharon Lynn Bariglio. On opening the account, Mrs. Mengele was furnished with a passbook for Account No. 4267. At the time, her son-in-law, Anthony G. Bariglio, was employed by Christiana as a bookkeeper.\\nThereafter, a series of eight share loans were made by Anthony and Sharon Bariglio, secured by Joint Savings Account No. 4267, with the consents being signed by Sharon and/or Anthony Bariglio. Subsequently, Christiana caused the loans to be paid off from the existing balance in Account No. 4267.\\nAt trial, Mrs. Mengele unequivocally testified that before this action she had never heard of a share loan secured by a passbook of an account; that she had never authorized any loans to be madei against Account No. 4267; that she had never been aware of any loans made against the account, and that if she had known of such loans she would not have approved them. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Mengele learned of the existence of the loans and their payment from the proceeds of the account only when she sought to withdraw the full amount of the account for redeposit in another banking institution.\\nThe evidence further discloses that Anthony Bariglio, who occasionally had possession of the original passbook in order to have the interest posted in it, prepared a duplicate passbook for Account No. 4267. He did this by taking a blank passbook from a box kept under Christiana's counter and duplicating in it the entries of the original passbook. He left the original with Christiana as security for the passbook loans, and returned the duplicate passbook to Mrs. Mengele. Mrs. Mengele thought that she retained in her possession the original passbook and thus had control over the account. Mrs. Mengele also testified that the setting up of the joint account was basically for the purpose of a testamentary disposition.\\nIn setting up Account No. 4267, Mrs. Mengele and Sharon Bariglio, her daughter, signed a signature card, which apparently constitutes the contract between the joint depositors and Christiana. The full text of this agreement is as follows:\\n\\\"You are directed to act pursuant to any one or more of the joint tenants' signatures, shown below, in any manner in connection with this account and to pay, without any liability for such payment, to anyone of the survivor or survivors at any time.\\\"\\nAt the conclusion of Mrs. Mengele's case, the Trial Judge ruled that she had failed to establish a creditor/debtor relationship between herself and Christiana, and that, accordingly, Christiana was not bound by the rules governing the conduct of a banking institution in the State of Delaware; also, that she had failed to establish any negligence on the part of Christiana and, accordingly, directed a verdict in favor of Christiana. The cause was submitted to the jury against the individual defendants and the jury disagreed.\\nIn this appeal, Mrs. Mengele argues that it was error for the Trial Judge to rule that a cr\\u00e9ditor/debtor relationship had not been created between herself and Christiana by the opening of the joint account. Further, it is argued that if a creditor/debtor relationship existed between Christiana and Mrs. Mengele, the burden was on Christiana to demonstrate by evidence that it had not been negligent in permitting the fabrication of a second passbook upon which she relied to her detriment.\\nChristiana is a federal savings and loan association organized under federal law and, under 12 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1464(b) (1), the holder of an account becomes a member of the association and acquires the rights of a stockholder. It was apparently this facet of the federal savings and loan association which led the Trial Court to rule that no creditor/debtor relationship existed between an accountholder and the savings and loan, itself.\\nWe think, however, that the problem is not that simple. The general trend of authority among the States seems to be that ownership of an account in a savings association is not to be designated solely as the ownership of stock in the association, even though the opening of an account automatically makes the accountholder a shareholder of the association, but is in fact a sui generis relationship which is more nearly comparable to the relationship between a commercial bank and a depositor in an account in that bank. It is a contractual relationship enforceable in law to have the money deposited repaid to the depositor according to the terms of the contract between the depositor and the savings and loan association. Prather, Savings Accounts, Ch. 3; Bell v. Bakerstown Savings and Loan Assn., 385 Pa. 158, 122 A.2d 411 (1956); Family Savings and Loan Assn. Shareholders' Protective Committee v. Stewart, 241 Md. 89, 215 A.2d 726 (1966); Benton's Apparel, Inc. v. Hegna, 213 Minn. 271, 7 N.W.2d 3, 143 A.L.R. 1148 (1942).\\nWe think the cited authorities are persuasive as to the relationship created between a depositor in a savings and loan association and the association, itself. While such an association has two facets with respect to the depositor and the association, the primary facet is that of a creditor and debtor. It is true that the depositor, merely by reason of the deposit, becomes a shareholder, but at the same time the depositor is a creditor of the association and is entitled to rely upon a creditor/debtor relationship between himself and the association. The question is apparently one of first instance in this State but, relying upon the authorities cited above, we hold that the opening of a savings account with a savings and loan association ipso facto creates a creditor/debtor relationship between the depositor and the association.\\nWe are aware of the holding in Central Nat. Bank of Wilmington v. Rubenstein, 5 W.W.Harr. 154, 160 A. 871 (Super.Ct.1932) to the effect that shares in a building and loan association may be seized in attachment by a creditor of the shareholder. We make no comment upon the Rubenstein case because the point of whether or not the shares of a member of a loan association are attachable is not before us in this appeal.\\nIt therefore follows that Mrs. Mengele was in the status of a creditor of Christiana which, by the same token, was her debtor. As such, the two parties stood in relationship to each other as any depositor in a banking institution of this State stands with respect to the bank. The rule governing such a relationship between a bank and its depositor is that, as long as the bank acts in accordance with the contract existing between itself and its depositor, the bank is not liable if it makes payments from the depositor's account in conformity with the depositor's orders to the bank when the account is created. Only if a payment is made contrary to or outside the provisions of the contract existing between the depositor and the bank may the bank be held liable, and the bank is required to refute charges of negligence against it only when its actions have been contrary to the directions contained in the contract between it and its depositor. National Dredging Co. v. President, etc., of Farmers' Bank, 6 Pennewill, 580, 69 A. 607 (Supr.Ct.1908); Bank of Delaware v. Union Wholesale Co., 7 Storey 531, 203 A.2d 109 (Supr.Ct.1964). It is therefore only when a bank or, as we have held, a savings and loan association, passes out the money of a depositor against the depositor's orders expressed in the contract between them, that the burden of establishing non-negligence on its part in a suit brought by the depositor for improper withdrawals is placed upon the bank or savings and loan association.\\nThe contract between Mrs. Mengele and Christiana is evidenced by the signature card signed by her and her daughter. That card directed Christiana to act pursuant to one or more of the joint tenants' signatures \\\"in any manner in connection with this account\\\". In our opinion the authorization to act \\\"in any manner\\\" authorized Christiana to make loans against the balance in the joint account. This is what was done and, consequently, Christiana has not acted in violation of the terms of the agreement between Mrs. Mengele and itself. This being so, Christiana is not obligated to show itself free of negligence in so acting under the rule of law in this State.\\nWe think therefore that the Trial Judge was correct in directing a verdict in favor of Christiana at the close of the plaintiff's case but for a different reason than he gave, viz., that a creditor/debtor relationship in fact existed between Christiana and Mrs. Mengele, but that Christiana had acted entirely within the terms of the contract existing between the two.\\nWith respect to the second point raised in this appeal concerning the exclusion of the proposed testimony of two expert witnesses on the standards of care utilized by Christiana and savings banks in the local area, we think the Trial Judge's ruling was proper. As a matter of fact, under the conclusions we have reached, the testimony was irrelevant to the issues to be submitted to the jury.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8067641.json b/delaware/8067641.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2124715c0bf817e834a467e16c86eb4c0877232b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8067641.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8067641\", \"name\": \"The STATE of Delaware, upon the relation of the STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff, v. 0.622 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ETC., Samuel Schneider and Hannah Schneider, his wife, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. State Highway Department v. 0.622 Acres of Land\", \"decision_date\": \"1969-05-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"57\", \"last_page\": \"58\", \"citations\": \"254 A.2d 57\", \"volume\": \"254\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:44.682811+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The STATE of Delaware, upon the relation of the STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff, v. 0.622 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ETC., Samuel Schneider and Hannah Schneider, his wife, et al., Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"The STATE of Delaware, upon the relation of the STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff, v. 0.622 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ETC., Samuel Schneider and Hannah Schneider, his wife, et al., Defendants.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware. New Castle.\\nMay 12, 1969.\\nAubrey B. Lank, Wilmington, for plaintiff.\\nHoward M. Handelman, Wilmington, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"615\", \"char_count\": \"3773\", \"text\": \"QUILLEN, Judge.\\nThe Schneiders own property which is being condemned by the State Highway Department. They also own a corporation which leases part of the property to operate a retail liquor store pursuant to license to operate a retail liquor store at that location only. The corporation, Printz Liquor Mart, Inc., contends it is entitled to compensation under the Delaware Constitution for the taking of its license and business.\\nArticle 1, Section 8, Del.C.Ann. provides in pertinent part:\\n\\\" nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without compensation being made.\\\"\\nIn general, a property owner is only entitled to compensation for the real estate interest taken and not for any business operated on the real estate. Wilmington Housing Authority v. Nos. 312-314 East Eighth St., 5 Storey 252, 191 A.2d 5 (Sup.Ct.1963); Improved Parcel of Land, etc. v. State, 7 Storey 454, 201 A.2d 453 (Sup.Ct.1964).\\nThe defendant claims, however, that this case is unique because, under the Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Law, it cannot move its current business to a new location comparable to the site of its present location. Under the geographic limits in law, an existing licensee can only move within 300 feet of its current location. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 543(f) (3) as added by 55 Del.Laws. Ch. 342, eff. May 26, 1966. No such site is available. Moreover, under the remaining portion of 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 543(f), geographical monopolies are effectively given and new licenses are restricted and would be unavailable for the current business of the defendant. 4 DelC. \\u00a7 543(f) as added by 55 Del.Laws Ch. 116, eff. July 10,1965.\\nThe defendant raises a substantial problem which can have a significant economic impact. But, even assuming, without deciding, that these facts are enough to create an exception to the general rule that a condemnation does not take a business but only the real estate, the very peculiar liquor laws that lend credence to the defendant's claim also destroy it. The State of Delaware exercises peculiar and exclusive control over alcoholic liquors. A license to sell alcoholic liquor is not property in any legal and constitutional sense. It is a mere temporary permit issued under the authority of the State in the exercise of its police power to do that which otherwise would be unlawful. Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del.Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803 (Sup.Ct.1941); Demarie v. Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, 1 Storey 206, 143 A. 2d 119 (Sup.Ct.1958). Unfortunately, every licensee in liquor business runs the substantial risk that his permit may be eliminated for a number of reasons. In hardships like the instant case, the Legislature has provided only a limited degree of relief by permitting some preference to licensees in the defendant's position in regard to obtaining a new license. 4 Del.C. \\u00a7 543(g) as added by 55 Del.Laws Ch. 116. This Court cannot give relief in an eminent domain proceeding by judicially declaring the permission to operate a retail liquor store is a Constitutional property right. It is established that such permission is not \\\"property\\\" in a Constitutional sense and this necessarily precludes relief under Article 1, Section 8 of the Delaware Constitution.\\nThe defendant is not entitled to compensation for its license to sell alcoholic beverages and for its retail liquor business.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8072808.json b/delaware/8072808.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3e46de4e717d072bd77767d59d59f67a09c2100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8072808.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8072808\", \"name\": \"WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Kirk KERKORIAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Kerkorian\", \"decision_date\": \"1969-05-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"240\", \"last_page\": \"242\", \"citations\": \"254 A.2d 240\", \"volume\": \"254\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:44.682811+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"parties\": \"WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Kirk KERKORIAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Kirk KERKORIAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nMay 27, 1969.\\nJames M. Tunnell, Jr., and Walter K. Stapleton, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, and Donald Keith Hall, of Darling, Mack, Hall & Call, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.\\nCharles S. Crompton, Jr., of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for appel-lee.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"854\", \"char_count\": \"5199\", \"text\": \"WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.\\nThis was an appeal by Western Air Lines, Inc. from as order of the Chancellor ordering it to permit Kirk Kerkorian, or his agents, to inspect and copy its list of stockholders. By reason of the exigencies of time, we heard immediate oral argument and entered an order affirming the action of the Chancellor. By this opinion, we set forth our reasons for having done so.\\nIn the action, Kerkorian, a substantial stockholder of record of Western, sought under 8 Del.C. \\u00a7 220 a list of Western's stockholders in order to communicate with them on matters of mutual interest as stockholders, and in order to solicit their proxies for Western's annual stockholders' meeting, scheduled to be held some six weeks from the date of suit.\\nWestern resisted the inspection on several grounds: (1) That Kerkorian had acquired and held his stock in violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board; (2) that the purpose for which Kerkorian desired inspection was improper because, if his purpose was accomplished, it would place Western in violation of the Federal Aviation Act, and (3) that inspection would cause Western irreparable harm without any legitimate benefit to Kerkori-an. The Chancellor ruled against Western on all defenses.\\nAt the argument before us, Western abandoned its contention as to the adequacy of the statement of purpose in the demand for inspection. In view of General Time Corporation v. Talley Industries, Inc., Del., 240 A.2d 755, it seems apparent that Kerkorian's statement of intent to solicit proxies constituted the statement of a proper purpose under \\u00a7 220.\\nWestern's attack upon Kerkorian's status as a Western stockholder was for the reason that he may be in violation of the Federal Aviation Act in holding Western stock. Basically, the contention was that Kerkorian may have violated the Federal Act in acquiring Western stock since he was a stockholder of other airlines. The precise details of the possible violation are not important to relate for the reason that we considered them to be irrelevant.\\nBy 8 Del.C. \\u00a7 220, a stockholder of record has a right to inspection of the stock ledger for any purpose \\\"reasonably related\\\" to his interest as a stockholder. When these facts are established, the stockholder is entitled to inspect and copy the list. General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, supra. Since Western conceded the propriety of Kerkorian's purpose in seeking inspection, it necessarily was limited to contesting his status as a stockholder. To do so, it was necessary to go behind the evidence of the stock ledger which, at least, establishes prima facie stockholder status.\\nThe Chancellor held that in an application under \\u00a7 220, the Court of Chancery has the authority to go beyond the record title of stock, and to take evidence upon the status of the person demanding an inspection of the stock list. Under some circumstances, the Chancellor may ignore the stock record title in proceedings attacking the right of a record stockholder to vote his stock, In re Diamond State Brewery, 22 Del.Ch. 364, 2 A.2d 2S4; In re Canal Construction Co., 21 Del.Ch. 155, 182 A. 545, but we thought we did not have to pass, in this case, upon the point that he has similar authority in \\u00a7 220 proceedings.\\nWe thought the General Time case controlled the question. That case held irrelevant in connection with the determination of proper purpose in seeking the stock list evidence as to the acquisition of General Time stock by allegedly illegal action on the part of the stockholder in violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We saw no difference in principle between the determination of proper purpose there and the determination of stockholder status here. Evidence irrelevant as to one is equally irrelevant as to the other under the circumstances.\\nSince, therefore, Kerkorian proved that he was a stockholder of record of Western, and since we thought evidence of possible violation of the Federal Aviation Act was irrelevant in a \\u00a7 220 proceeding, we held that he was entitled to obtain the Western stock list.\\nWith respect to Western's contention that inspection would cause irreparable harm to it without any benefit to Kerkorian, we were of the opinion, particularly since the possibility of ultimate harm to Western depended on a number of suppositions, that the matter is immaterial. If the threat of irreparable harm comes to pass, the company, or its stockholders, have a remedy in the courts. E. L. Bruce Company v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 1 Storey 252, 144 A.2d 533.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirmed the Chancellor's order for inspection.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/80819.json b/delaware/80819.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7a85756875d002574e431c99d75abc554e55a676
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/80819.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"80819\", \"name\": \"In Re Petition of Edward F. Cannon, et al., legatees and beneficiaries under the last will and testament of Harriet H. Cannon, for the removal of Rebecca P. Pepper, Administratrix, c. t. a., of said Harriet H. Cannon's will\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Cannon\", \"decision_date\": \"1904-10-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"115\", \"last_page\": \"123\", \"citations\": \"5 Penne. 115\", \"volume\": \"21\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:18:25.497580+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In Re Petition of Edward F. Cannon, et al., legatees and beneficiaries under the last will and testament of Harriet H. Cannon, for the removal of Rebecca P. Pepper, Administratrix, c. t. a., of said Harriet H. Cannon\\u2019s will.\", \"head_matter\": \"In Re Petition of Edward F. Cannon, et al., legatees and beneficiaries under the last will and testament of Harriet H. Cannon, for the removal of Rebecca P. Pepper, Administratrix, c. t. a., of said Harriet H. Cannon\\u2019s will.\\nAppeal from Register of Wills\\u2014Removal of Administratrix\\u2014Inability and Failure to do her Duty\\u2014Reversal of Decree.\\nOrder of Court reversing decree of Register of Wills removing administratrix.\\n(October 7, 1904.)\\nLore, C. J., and Grubb and Pennewill, J. J., sitting.\\nWoodburn Martin and Charles M. Curtis for petitioners.\\nC. W. Cullen, Charles F. Richards and Robert C. White for appellants.\\nSuperior Court, Sussex County,\\nOctober Term, 1904.\\nAppeal from Register of Wills.\\nThe record sent up by the Register was as follows:\\n\\u201cCopy of the proceedings in the matter of the application for the removal of Rebecca P. Pepper, Administratrix c. t. a., of Harriet H. Cannon, deceased.\\nTo Daniel J. Layton, Esq., Register of Wills of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County.\\nPetition.\\n\\u201cThe petition of the undersigned legatees and beneficiaries under the will of Harriet H. Cannon, deceased, respectfully represents,\\n\\u201c That Rebecca P. Pepper was on the second day of May, A. D. 1902, appointed administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of the said Harriett H. Cannon, deceased, by William F. Causey, Esq., late Register of Wills; John H. Elliott, the executor named in the said will having renounced his office as appears by the records of this Court.\\n\\u201c That the said Rebecca P. Pepper, administratrix as aforesaid through inability or otherwise, has neglected her duties as such administratrix, among other things in the following respects, to wit:\\n\\u201c 1. She has failed to file a list of the debts and credits due the estate of the said deceased.\\n\\u201c 2. She has failed to file or state any account of her administration, before the Register of Wills.\\n\\u201c 3. She has been hostile to the said will and opposed to carrying out the provisions thereof, having opposed the probate thereof and promoted litigation of an appeal to the Superior Court from the order of the Register of Wills granting the probate thereof, which appeal was afterward dismissed, for want of prosecution.\\n\\u201c 4. On July 6th, 1904, without the knowledge of her counsel Edward D. Hearne and Charles W. Cullen, Esqrs., or any of your petitioners and being herself unrepresented by any other counsel, she entered into an amicable action in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County as defendant, with her son, Horace B. Pepper, as plaintiff and agreed to a rule of reference, whereby all matters in controversy were referred to three referees, selected by the parties.\\n\\u201c That the said plaintiff was represented by his counsel at the said hearing; that at the said hearing the plaintiff produced as his cause of action against the estate of the said deceased a probate of his demand, a copy of which is hereto annexed; that the said claim except a very small part thereof was upon its face barred by the statute of limitations; that the said administratrix not only did not oppose the allowance of the claim of the plaintiff, as it was her duty to do, by pleading the statute of limitations or by giving or procuring evidence within her own knowledge to the effect that the said deceased was not indebted to the plaintiff or otherwise contesting its validity; but, also, colluded with and assisted the plaintiff in proving his claim upon insufficient evidence; and your petitioners allege that the said claim is unjust and without a legal foundation and that the said deceased was not indebted to the said Horace B. Pepper, at the time of her death, in any sum of money.\\n\\u201c That, if the report of the said referees be confirmed and the award paid by the said administratrix, all of the personal estate of the deceased will be thereby absorbed and almost all of the proceeds received by said administratrix from the sale of the real estate of the deceased will also be so absorbed and the beneficiaries, under the said will, to whom the testatrix bequeathed the greater part of her estate, will be deprived of their legacies and bequests.\\n\\u201c Therefore, your petitioners, both on account of her inability and the neglect of her duties as administratrix as aforesaid, and because your petitioners are apprehensive that she will further waste and mismanage the estate of the deceased and neglect the duties of her office as administratrix to the detriment of the estate and of the beneficiaries thereof, respectfully request that the said Rebecca P. Pepper be removed by your Honor from her said office as administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of the said Harriet H. Cannon, deceased, and that some other suitable person be appointed in her place and your petitioners respectfully recommend that your Honor appoint Daniel Short or William A. Cannon in her place.\\n\\u201c And as in duty bound they will ever pray, &c.\\n\\u201c Filed August 30th, 1904.\\n\\u201c (Exhibit filed as ann\\u00e9xed to petition.)\\n\\u201c Harriet H. Cannon,\\n\\u201c To Horace B. Pepper, Dr.\\n\\u201c To services and use of team from Sept. 2nd, 1885, to Dec. 7th, 1901, at $50.00 per year,...........................$ 812.50\\nTo board for herself during the year 1886, 9 mos. at $10 90.00\\nTo board for Jennie Parker for the year 1886, at $6 per month,........................................................ 72.00\\nTo board for herself during the year 1887,9 mos. at $10 90.00\\nTo board for Jennie Parker for the year 1887 at $6 per month ...................................................... 72.00\\nTo board for herself during the year 1890, six months at $10,........................................................ 60.00\\nTo board for herself during the year 1891, six months at $10,........................................................ 60.00\\n$1256.50\\u201d\\n\\u201c Personally appeared before me, Henry S. Marshall, a Justice of the Peace in and for said county, Horace B. Pepper, and maketh solemn oath that nothing has been paid or delivered towards satisfaction of said debt except what is mentioned and that the sum of $1256.50 is justly and truly due from the estate of Harriet M. Cannon, deceased, with interest.\\n\\u201c Horace B. Pepper.\\n\\u201c Sworn and subscribed before me this sixth day of July, A. D. 1904.\\n\\u201c Henry S. Mashall, J. P.\\u201d\\n\\u201c The above and foregoing petition having been read and duly considered it is ordered by the Begister that Bebecca P. Pepper, administratrix aforesaid, be cited and the cause assigned for hearing on Thursday, the fifteenth (15th) day of September at ten (10) o\\u2019clock, a. m., A. D. Nineteen Hundred and Four (1904).\\n\\u201c 1904, September 1st. Citation issued to John B. Steel, Sheriff \\u2018 to cite Bebecca P. Pepper, administratrix c. t. a. of the said deceased, to appear and answer in the matter touching a petition of Edward F. Cannon et. ah, praying for the removal of said Bebecca P. Pepper from her said office of administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of the said Harriet H. Cannon, deceased.\\u2019\\n\\u201c 1904, September 8th. \\u2018 Cited,\\u2019 says John B. Steele, Sheriff.\\n\\u201c 1904, September 8th. Buie ordered for administratrix to show cause why the prayer of the petitioners should not be granted.\\n\\u201c 1904, September 15th. Attorney for petitioners appears and asks an extension of the time for hearing until Thursday, September 22d, 1904.\\n\\u201c Extension granted upon consent of defendant\\u2019s cousel.\\n\\u201c September 15th, 1904, subpoenas issued for witnesses.\\n\\u201cAnd now to wit, this 22nd day of September, A. D. 1904, the above stated cause coming on to be heard, counsel for defend ant moved to discharge the rule and dismiss the petition, on the ground that it did not set forth or allege any statutory grounds for removal.\\n\\u201c After argument, motion denied.\\n\\u201cAttorney for petitioners tendered and offered in evidence Judgment Docket, 1900, Superior Court, Ho. 45, to April Term, 1901, and execution thereon Ho. 155, to April Term, 1902. Amicable Action Docket, Superior Court, 1902, page 1 and all papers connected with the same.\\n\\u201c Motion made by defendant\\u2019s counsel to dismiss petition on ground that there was no proof offered to sustain allegations.\\n\\u201c Motion overruled.\\n\\u201c And now, to wit, this twenty-second day of September, A. D. nineteen hundred and four (1904), the above cause was regularly heard before the Register, and it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the said Register, that the rule be made absolute.\\n\\u201c Therefore it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the prayer of the petitioners be granted; and that the said Rebecca P. Pepper, be and she is hereby removed from her said office of administratrix c. t. a. on the grounds stated in the said petition; and the Letters of Administration c. t. a. heretofore granted are hereby revoked.\\n\\u201c And it is further ordered that John H. Elliott, be, and he is hereby appointed administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of Harriet H. Cannon, deceased; and that the said John H. Elliott, administrator aforesaid, pay all the costs in this action, out of the estate of said deceased.\\n\\u201c Daniel J. Layton,\\n\\u201cRegister.\\n\\u201c And now, to wit, this twenty-second day of September, A. D. nineteen hundred and four (1904), the said Rebecca' P. Pepper, by Robert C. White and Charles W. Cullen, Esquires, her attorneys, appeals from the order of the Register in this case and requests that copy of the record and proceedings be filed in the Superior Court.\\n\\u201c Robert C. White,\\n\\u201c Charles W. Cullen,\\n\\u201c Attorneys for Rebecca P. Pepper.\\n\\u201c September twenty-third (23rd), nineteen hundred and four (1904). Copy of record sent up and filed in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, for Sussex County.\\n\\u201c Daniel J. Layton,\\n\\u201cRegister.\\u201d\\nArguments.\\nCharles W. Cullen for appellants: \\u2014Our appeal is based on the ground that the petitioners have failed to prove fraud before the Register. There is no evidence except what is stated in the petition and in the two exhibits.\\nThe petition was filed under Rev. Code, p. 670, Section 12, that \\u201cIf the administrator, through inability or otherwise, neglect his duty, he shall be removed.\\u201d The counsel for the petitioners have confined themselves to the one ground for removal, namely, that through inability or otherwise the appellant neglected her duty as such administratrix. They have not set out in what her neglect consists. They have not shown that an inventory was not filed or that an appeal was not passed. Nor have they shown that she failed to prosecute the application to set aside the will in the Superior Court, or that she was in any way antagonistic to the will. The only testimony offered is a record of a judgment in the Superior Court of Harriet H. Cannon against Horace B. Pepper for $100. They do not allege fraud here. The statute under which the petition is filed does not cover fraudulent acts and if he seeks to show fraud that statute does not apply.\\nTherefore we ask that the decree of the Register be reversed.\\nMarlin, of counsel for the petitioners, replied:\\nThe Register\\u2019s Court, as established by the Constitution, is given certain powers. One of the powers is that he may remove an administrator for certain causes.\\nCertain matters were before the Register. For instance, the matter of the administratrix having failed to-file any list of debts or credits as required by statute, is a matter of which the Register had personal knowledge. The suspicious nature of the bill of Horace B. Pepper against the estate of Harriet H. Cannon running back to 1885, and the confessing of judgment by the administratrix in an amicable action without interposing the plea of the statute of limitations in order to protect the estate; the fact that the records of the Superior Court disclosed at the same time a judgment and execution for $100 in favor of Harriet H. Cannon against Horace B. Pepper, which was not set off by the administratrix against the claim of said Pepper, were all before the Register and were ample justification in his mind for the removal of this administratrix, because of inability and collusion with her son, Horace B. Pepper, and it was apparent to the Register that she was physically, mentally, or morally unable to do her duty, and he therefore removed her and appointed another administrator to protect the estate.\\nWe therefore claim that the Register was fully justified in the action he took and that his judgment should be sustained by this Court.\", \"word_count\": \"2131\", \"char_count\": \"12727\", \"text\": \"Lore, C. J.:\\nIn the matter of the petition of Edward F. Cannon et al. for the removal of Rebecca P. Pepper, administratrix c, t. a. of Harriet H. Cannon, deceased, the Court have considered quite fully the case presented, and we do not find sufficient evidence to sustain the order of the Register as sent up. We are all of the opinion, therefore, that the appeal should be sustained and the order of the Register reversed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8094116.json b/delaware/8094116.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c487e6ff07e9cdc0889adf763d83b49c79e5e53b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8094116.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8094116\", \"name\": \"Ira Lee SHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Shy v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-09-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"926\", \"last_page\": \"927\", \"citations\": \"246 A.2d 926\", \"volume\": \"246\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:07:10.617231+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ-, sitting.\", \"parties\": \"Ira Lee SHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ira Lee SHY, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSept. 24, 1968.\\nRichard Allen Paul, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nJay H. Conner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for the State.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ-, sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"594\", \"char_count\": \"3403\", \"text\": \"WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.\\nThe appellant, in 1963, received two five-year concurrent sentences for burglary (4th degree), and was placed on probation for a period of five years. On August 19, 1966, he received a sentence of three years on a charge of grand larceny; his probation on the two burglary charges was revoked, and he was sentenced to serve the five-year sentences on those charges.\\nOn December 14, 1966, the appellant wrote the Superior Court. His letter was docketed as a motion for reduction of sentence under Criminal Rule 35(b), Del.C. Ann. No action was taken thereafter until present counsel for appellant requested a hearing on the motion on December 8, 1967. On December 13, 1967, the Superior Court, without hearing, denied the motion for reduction of sentence.\\nIn this appeal from the order denying the motion to reduce the sentence, the appellant asserts a single ground for reversal, viz., lack of due process by reason of the failure of the Superior Court to hold a hearing on the motion with counsel present.\\nIt is clear by reason of Criminal Rule 43 that it is necessary for a criminal defendant and his counsel to be present at every stage of the trial when the Superior Court is exercising original jurisdiction over the defendant. This requirement em-braces the imposition of final sentence following conviction. It was so held in United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 163, 84 S.Ct. 295, 11 L.Ed.2d 224.\\nAn application for reduction of sentence under Criminal Rule 35(b), however, is outside of the requirement of Criminal Rule 43, for such a motion comes after the imposition of a final sentence. Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the court.\\nCriminal Rule 35 contains two subsections. Rule 35(a) permits the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. It provides that \\\"unless the motion and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is not entitled to relief\\\", the court shall hold a hearing on the motion. The meaning is clear to the effect that if, on the face of the papers, the prisoner is not shown to be entitled to relief, the court is not required to hold a hearing, but may deny the motion summarily. This procedure finds implicit approval in United States v. Behrens, supra.\\nCriminal Rule 35(b) permits the filing of a motion for the reduction of a sentence within four months of its imposition. No guidelines similar to those set out in Rule 35(a) are specifically set forth in Rule 35(b), but we think a Rule 35(b) motion to reduce may not rise any higher than a Rule 35(a) motion to correct. The Rule 35(a) guidelines are by implication incorporated in Rule 35(b).\\nIt follows, therefore, that a motion under Criminal Rule 35(b) is addressed to the discretion of the court, and if the moving papers fail to make some showing for relief, the motion, in the discretion of the court, may be denied without hearing. In the case before us, it is clear that the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion summarily without hearing. There is no failure of due process.\\nThe judgment below is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8097232.json b/delaware/8097232.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0dcf5962f0688c3a1a5794d25f486b461da7ccf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8097232.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8097232\", \"name\": \"Melvin F. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Frances B. BUCHANAN, Defendant Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Buchanan v. Buchanan\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-05-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"832\", \"last_page\": \"833\", \"citations\": \"229 A.2d 832\", \"volume\": \"229\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:23:26.893205+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J., sitting.\", \"parties\": \"Melvin F. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Frances B. BUCHANAN, Defendant Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Melvin F. BUCHANAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Frances B. BUCHANAN, Defendant Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nMay 12, 1967.\\nRalph F. Keil, and Carl Goldstein, of Keil & Keil, Wilmington, for appellant.\\nRobert K. Payson, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for appellee.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, J., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"774\", \"char_count\": \"4749\", \"text\": \"CAREY, Justice.\\nFrom the Superior Court's denial of a divorce decree, Melvin F. Buchanan has appealed. The complaint was based upon voluntary separation for a period of more than three years with no reasonable expectation of reconciliation. T. 13 Del.C. \\u00a7 1522(11). The Court below held that the original separation was not voluntary on defendant's part, and that it had not become voluntary during the intervening years. Appellant contends that the Court erred in this finding because the wife's failure to seek a reconciliation during the past eleven years shows her tacit acquiescence requiring an inference of voluntariness.\\nThe action was commenced on August 8, 1966. The evidence, viewed most favorably to appellee, was this: The parties were married on May 5, 1934. After a number of episodes involving threats and abusive conduct by the husband due largely to his drinking habits, the separation took place on September 23, 1955. He had just returned from New York, and made serious threats against the wife and their son, aged thirteen. After the husband went to sleep, the wife and son left the house. They have not since lived together. The trial Judge held that her departure was justified by appellant's actions.\\nA few days after the separation, the husband wrote to the wife apologizing for his conduct, and stated that he still loved her and would stop drinking if she returned. She wrote him that she would consider returning only if he stopped drinking and assumed responsibility for the full support of his family. Arrangements were thereafter made between them to meet in New York. They did meet at a hotel on October 17, 1955 to discuss reconciliation. Unfortunately, after they had talked very briefly, the wife fainted. During the conversation which took place, however, the husband said he would not stop drinking for anybody. The trial Judge held that this statement was a repudiation of her demand that he reform his ways.\\nAfter the New York meeting neither party contacted the other concerning a reconciliation. The husband testified that his failure to do so was due to his ignorance of the wife's whereabouts, although a support proceeding took place resulting in a consent decree. In any event, appellant contends that the wife's failure for eleven years to take any affirmative steps towards reconciliation shows an acquiescence in the separation, requiring a finding that it became voluntary on her part at some time more than three years before the action was started.\\nIn Willcox v. Willcox, Del., 209 A.2d 166, we held that, even though the original separation may have been involuntary, subsequent events indicated such acquiescence as to justify the trial Court's finding that the separation had become voluntary. That conclusion was, of course, based upon the evidence presented in that case, the conflicts in testimony having been resolved in the plaintiff's favor. We pointed out that, if separation is caused by the fault of one against the will of the other, it is not voluntary. We also said that the wife's failure to make any attempt to persuade the husband to return was some evidence of acquiescence; we did not go so far as to hold that such failure, in and of itself, was sufficient evidence. /\\nIn Paraskewich v. Paraskewich, Del., 223 A.2d 530, a wife brought suit on the ground of wilful desertion. She had made one attempt at reconciliation which failed. She made no further effort because her husband had rebuffed her first attempt. The trial Court held that she had, at some time after the separation, acquiesced therein. We reversed, holding that her attitude of \\\"resignation\\\" was simply a recognition of a condition she was powerless to prevent and did not constitute voluntariness within the meaning of our statute.\\nWe think the present case is controlled by Paraskewich, supra, rather than Will-cox, supra. Here, the trial Judge observed the witnesses and resolved the factual disputes in appellee's favor. He held that the original separation was involuntary, that the failure of the reconciliation attempts was caused by the appellant's refusal to change his drinking habits, and that the appellee's inaction thereafter was not an acquiescence and did not show voluntariness on her part. There was ample evidence to justify that ruling. We agree with these findings of fact and the conclusions drawn therefrom.\\nThe judgment below will be affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8099117.json b/delaware/8099117.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34db3d68dae315821a7b5d5cc6994d0b9a8224b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8099117.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8099117\", \"name\": \"Blanche WHARTON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Thomas WHARTON, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wharton v. Wharton\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"824\", \"last_page\": \"825\", \"citations\": \"226 A.2d 824\", \"volume\": \"226\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:23:49.725117+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"parties\": \"Blanche WHARTON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Thomas WHARTON, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Blanche WHARTON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Thomas WHARTON, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware,\\nJan. 30, 1967.\\nVictor F. Battaglia, of Theisen & Lank, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.\\nThomas G. Hughes, of Berl, Potter & Anderson, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, ap-pellee.\\nWOLCOTT, C. J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.\", \"word_count\": \"246\", \"char_count\": \"1532\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM:\\nUpon careful review of the record of this case, we have concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, and that the most reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts is that the defendant committed an act of adultery as found by the trial court. The review of that inference is the main function of this court in this appeal. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 2 Storey 174, 154 A.2d 676 (1959). Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court's finding of adultery.\\nThe trial court did not err in ruling that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof necessary to support a finding of adultery in a divorce case. Compare Lecates v. Lecates, Del., 190 A. 294 (1937).\\nNo circumstantial evidence rule is applicable in this case; and the authorities dealing with circumstantial evidence, cited by the defendant, are inapposite. This case was decided upon the basis of direct evidence from which the trial court correctly drew the inference of adultery.\\nThe Jacobs case, upon which the defendant places principal reliance, is not controlling because of the factual differences.\\nThe judgment below is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8099837.json b/delaware/8099837.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f89731e3b85a1753832961187f29fc455a3ca375
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8099837.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8099837\", \"name\": \"Alfred L. PEREZ, Individually, and Alfred L. Perez, Guardian and Next Friend of James Buechse, Plaintiffs, v. The SHORT LINE INC. OF PENN., a corporation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Perez v. Short Line Inc. of Penn.\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"642\", \"last_page\": \"645\", \"citations\": \"231 A.2d 642\", \"volume\": \"231\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:23:48.482052+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Alfred L. PEREZ, Individually, and Alfred L. Perez, Guardian and Next Friend of James Buechse, Plaintiffs, v. The SHORT LINE INC. OF PENN., a corporation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Alfred L. PEREZ, Individually, and Alfred L. Perez, Guardian and Next Friend of James Buechse, Plaintiffs, v. The SHORT LINE INC. OF PENN., a corporation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendant.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware, New Castle.\\nJune 5, 1967.\\nRehearing Denied June 26, 1967.\\nJohn Biggs, III, Wilmington, for plaintiffs Alfred L. Perez, individually, and Alfred L. Perez, Guardian and next friend of James Buechse.\\nJames T. McKinstry, Wilmington, for defendant Short Line Inc. of Penn.\\nRoger P. Sanders, Wilmington, for Pauline Perez.\", \"word_count\": \"1640\", \"char_count\": \"9821\", \"text\": \"STIFTEL, President Judge.\\nOn December 24, 1964, an automobile operated by Pauline Perez (\\\"Pauline\\\") and occupied by her husband, Alfred L. Perez (\\\"Alfred\\\"), and her son, James Buechse, all residents of Delaware, collided with a bus owned and operated by Short Line, Inc. of Penn., a Pennsylvania corporation. The accident occurred in the State of Pennsylvania. On March 30, 1966, Alfred, in his own right and as next friend of James Buechse, filed suit against Short Line for the injuries they sustained in the accident. On July 12, 1966, Short Line filed a motion under Rule 14(a), Del.C.Ann., for leave to bring Pauline Perez into the suit as a third-party defendant, in order to assert a claim against her for contribution, stating that she was either wholly or partly responsible for the accident. On July 13, 1966, plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 21 to add Pauline Perez as a party plaintiff and to amend their complaint under Rule IS to include a claim for damages for injuries they claim she sustained in the accident. This is the decision on these motions.\\nI will deal first with defendant's motion to add Pauline as a third-party defendant. This involves a question of conflict of laws. It is apparently conceded by each side that Pennsylvania law permits a defendant to assert a claim for contribution against the spouse or parent of the plaintiff and that Delaware law does not permit this to be done. Thus, the question is whether Pennsylvania or Delaware law applies to defendant's claim for relief. Naturally, if Delaware law is applicable, Pauline may not be made a third-party defendant, since she is the wife of one plaintiff and the mother of the other.\\nIt is beyond dispute that \\\"the law of the place in which a tort takes place governs the substantive rights of the parties in an action based upon the tort brought in Delaware.\\\" Friday v. Smoot, Del., 211 A.2d 594, 595 (S.Ct.1965). But matters of remedy are governed by the law of the forum. Lutz v. Boas, 40 Del.Ch. 130, 176 A.2d 853 (Del.Ch.1961); Skillman v. Conner, 8 W.W.Harr. 402, 193 A. 563 (Super.Ct.1937); Restatement, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 585; 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 584.1; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 8A.27, 8A.28; Goodrich, Conflict of .Laws, 4th ed. by Scoles, \\u00a7 80. Whether a question involves a matter of substance or a matter of remedy is determined according to the law of the forum. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 7(a); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 7.1. The question here for decision is whether contribution is a substantive or a remedial right. I now look to the law of Delaware for the answer.\\nDefendant argues that as a matter of general law, contribution is a substantive right. Many Pennsylvania cases are cited to support this view; but they are not relevant, because Delaware Courts have categorized it as a remedial right.\\nIn Halifax Chick Express v. Young, 11 Terry 596, 137 A.2d 743 (S.Ct.1958), our Supreme Court had occasion to express its views on the nature of the right of contribution. It said, in discussing the case of Deuscher v. Cammerano, 256 N.Y. 328, 176 N.E. 412 (1931), at page 744:\\n\\\" The New York statute, Civil Practice Act, \\u00a7 211-a, permits contribution in cases where judgment has been recovered. The court held that a claim of contribution could be based upon a judgment recovered after the passage of' the act, although the accident happened' before its passage. The court said that-the act was remedial only, because the-liability of all joint tortfeasors for the-entire amount of the damages existed' from the date of the commission of the tort, and the effect of granting the remedy of contribution was to reduce \\u2014 not to create or increase \\u2014 the liability of the non-paying joint tortfeasor. With this view we agree. It is the discharge of the common liability that gives rise to the right of contribution; not the commission of the tort.\\\" (Emphasis supplied.)\\nDefendant insists that the quoted language is dictum, in view of the specific question which was decided in Halifax. This may be; but nevertheless, it cannot be ignored. Not only did the Court specifically label contribution a matter of remedy, it also expressed a rationale \\u2014 that the discharge of common liability and not the commission of the tort gives rise to the right of contribution \\u2014 which mitigates against the theory that contribution is a part of the substantive law of the tort. In Halifax, the Supreme Court expressly disagreed with the earlier decision of Distefano v. Lamborn, 7 Terry 195, 207, 81 A.2d 675, 83 A.2d 300 (Super.Ct.1951), which held contribution' a substantive right.\\nLutz v. Boas, supra, is even more to the point. Therein the Court applied the Delaware contribution statute to settle contribution rights between defendants who had been held jointly liable for the consequences of acts committed within the State of New York. The Chancellor's mode of analysis in reaching this conclusion seems quite pertinent to the question before me:\\n\\\"The next issue is the effect the approval of the Model settlement will have on the judgment to be entered against Dr. Rice and what contribution rights, if any, Dr. Rice will have as against Model.\\n\\\"Model claims that the New York law governs these issues because the activities for which Model was held liable occurred in New York. This is important because it seems clear that the New York contribution statute has no application to claims of the types here involved. Both Funds (Managed Funds, Inc.) and Dr. Rice claim that the tort-feasor contribution statutes are procedural and that the Delaware law should therefore apply.\\n\\\"Regardless of the place where the wrongs occurred for which Dr. Rice and Model are liable, does the application of the doctrine of contribution involve substantive law in contrast to procedural or remedial law? The New York Court of Appeals in the case of Deuscher v. Cammerano, 256 N.Y. 328, 176 N.E. 412, has concluded that the New York contribution statute is remedial (\\u00a7 211-a, N.Y. Civil Practice Act). The Supreme Court of Delaware in the case of Halifax Chick Express, Inc. v. Young, 11 Terry 596, 50 Del. 596, 137 A.2d 743, has also determined that our contribution statute is remedial. It is well established that the law of the forum governs questions of remedial or procedural law. Skillman v. Conner, 8 W.W.Harr. 402, 193 A. 563; Connell v. Delaware Aircraft Industries, 5 Terry 86, 55 A.2d 637; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7 8A.28. It follows that this court must apply its own contribution statute (10 Del.C. \\u00a7 6301, et seq.) in determining the rights of Funds as. against Dr. Rice and Model and in determining the rights as between Dr. Rice and Model. . (176 A.2d at 857).\\nDefendant argues that this, too, is dictum and ought to be disregarded. Defendant says that the court was concerned only with the procedural aspects of the contribution act, because traditionally contribution was considered a substantive right in equity. If this be so, a judgment that the substantive law of New York permitted contribution between joint tortfeasors would have been necessary, before the court could begin to-apply the procedural feature of the Delaware law, because our conflict of laws rule refers questions of substantive law to the place of the tort. Yet the Chancellor did not indulge in a consideration of New York equitable contribution law. The existence of contribution rights in Luts, if based (as-it was) on Delaware law, was justified only if the Court deemed contribution a matter of remedial law.\\nI conclude that contribution is classified in Delaware as a matter of remedy and consequently Delaware law applies to defendant's claim. I am not unmindful that the general rule elsewhere is that the right of contribution is governed by the law of the place of the tort. See, 95 A.L.R.2d 1096; 18 Am.Jur.2d, \\\"Contribution\\\" \\u00a7 44. Since Delaware law does not permit a defendant to assert a claim for contribution against the spouse or parent of a plaintiff, defendant's motion is denied.\\nI turn now to plaintiffs' motion to add Pauline as an additional party plaintiff pursuant to Rule 21 and to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 15 in order to assert a claim for Pauline's injuries. The record does not indicate that Pauline joins in plaintiffs' motion; she appeared through separate counsel to oppose defendant's motion to implead her. The claim which plaintiffs allege she has is separate from plaintiffs' claims, even though all claims arise out of the same transaction. Plaintiffs have not shown that her presence is necessary to a proper adjudication of their claims. To grant plaintiffs' motion would be to compel Pauline to litigate a claim.\\nDefendant's motion to implead Pauline Perez is denied; and plaintiffs' motion to add Pauline Perez as a party plaintiff is denied.\\n. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).\\n. Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 11 Terry 50, 123 A.2d 107 (S.Ct.1956) (unemancipated minor cannot sue parent for negligence in Delaware); Ferguson v. Davis, 9 Terry 299, 102 A.2d 707 (Super.Ct.1954).\\n.The right of contribution in Delaware was created by the enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act, 10 Del.C.Ann. Ch. 63. Prior thereto, no right of contribution was recognized.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8104802.json b/delaware/8104802.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0f8b8188e10b53c5d852ea2621a74a35f6b88afe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8104802.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8104802\", \"name\": \"FARMERS BANK OF the STATE OF DELAWARE, a Corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Mildred HOWARD and Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, Executor of the Estate of Sadie Cooper Rust, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Howard\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-03-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"744\", \"last_page\": \"747\", \"citations\": \"276 A.2d 744\", \"volume\": \"276\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:29:04.374555+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"FARMERS BANK OF the STATE OF DELAWARE, a Corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Mildred HOWARD and Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, Executor of the Estate of Sadie Cooper Rust, Defendants.\", \"head_matter\": \"FARMERS BANK OF the STATE OF DELAWARE, a Corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff, v. Mildred HOWARD and Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, Executor of the Estate of Sadie Cooper Rust, Defendants.\\nCourt of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle.\\nMarch 22, 1971.\\nFranklin S. Eyster, II, and Martin I. Lubaroff, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for plaintiff.\\nSamuel Handloff, Wilmington, for defendant Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, Executor of the Estate of Sadie Cooper Rus...\\nClifford B. Hearn, Jr., of Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, for defendant Mildred Howard.\", \"word_count\": \"1124\", \"char_count\": \"6299\", \"text\": \"DUFFY, Chancellor:\\nThis is an interpleader action by Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware to determine which of two claimants is entitled to a savings deposit: Mildred Howard or the Executor of the Estate of Sadie Cooper Rust, deceased.\\nThe account was in the name of Mrs. Rust, only. On July 8, 1967 she directed the Bank to add to the account the name of Mildred Howard but specifically instructed that Mrs. Howard not be told of this until after her own death. The Bank followed that instruction. Mrs. Rust died on February 22, 1968, this action was brought thereafter.\\nMrs. Howard originally contended that Mrs. Rust made a gift to her of a joint interest in the account, but that argument was not persuasive. Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware v. Howard, Del.Ch., 258 A.2d 299 (1969). The Supreme Court affirmed. 268 A.2d 870 (1970), but remanded the case to permit Mrs. Howard, on a special showing, to argue that she was a third party beneficiary of the contract between Mrs. Rust and the Bank. In order to do justice between the parties, this Court permitted briefing on that theory and this is the decision thereon.\\n(1) A contract made for the benefit of a third party is entorceable in Delaware and the third party may sue to enforce a promise made for his benefit, even though he is a stranger to both the contract and the consideration. Bryant, Griffith & Brunson v. General Newspapers, 6 W.W. Harr. 468, 36 Del. 468, 178 A. 645 (Super. Ct.1935); 17A C.J.S. Contracts \\u00a7 519(3) ; 2 Williston on Contracts (3 ed) \\u00a7 347.\\n(2) A donee beneficiary is such a third party and he may sue to enforce a contract made for his benefit, even though he did not assent to the contract nor have knowledge of its existence. Restatement, Contracts \\u00a7 135(a) ; 4 Corbin on Contracts \\u00a7 783.\\n(3) The right of such a donee beneficiary to enforce a contract depends on its terms, and these are determined by the intent of the parties as expressed in the words they used. 17A C.J.S., supra, \\u00a7 519(4) h (b).\\n(4) Mrs. Howard contends that she was a donee beneficiary of a contract between Mrs. Rust and the Bank. Specifically, she says that Mrs. Rust had moneys on deposit, she directed the Bank to pay the balance thereof to Mrs. Howard after her death, the Bank accepted the instruction. She says that the Court is obliged to give effect to Mrs. Rust's intent which was to benefit Mrs. Howard after her own death.\\n(5) The record here consists of the signature card signed by Mrs. Rust, the note she wrote, the account record and the letter sent by Mr. Richardson (the substance of which appears in the Appendix).\\n(6) It might be argued that this record shows an intent by Mrs. Rust to benefit Mrs. Howard and that she did so by utilizing one of three legal concepts:\\n(a)She created a joint account with Mrs. Howard, with right of sur-vivorship. Mrs. Howard argues this anew, but the argument has been considered and rejected by both this Court and the Supreme Court.\\n(b) She contracted with the Bank to pay the balance of the account at the time of her death to Mrs. Howard as a third party beneficiary. This is the thrust of Mrs. Howard's present argument but it suffers from three infirmities: (1) she has not cited authority to support the proposition that a bank account may be the subject of a donee beneficiary contract with payment made only at death of the promisee; (2) Mrs. Rust's intent probably was to create a co-ownership interest with right of survivorship (as indeed Mrs. Howard argues in her most recent brief) and not to create a third party contract; (3) if her intent was to create such a contract with performance only at death, then it was a testamentary gift which in form does not comply with the Wills Act. 12 Del.C. \\u00a7 102; see the Supreme Court comment at 268 A.2d 872.\\n(c) She created a trust comparable in law to the so-called Totten trust. The Totten concept has been approved in Delaware. Delaware Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del.Ch. 101, 31 A.2d 383, 391 (1943), aff'd in part [Crumlish v. Delaware Trust Co., 27 Del.Ch. 374] 38 A.2d 463 (1944). Counsel have not briefed this concept and, while I am most reluctant to require further briefing, I must do so. Honoring Mrs. Rust's intention is the objective here and the Court is obliged to do that if there is a basis in law for it. Cf. 51 Yale L.J. 1, 38; Corbin on Contracts, supra; Willison, supra, \\u00a7 348.\\nOrder on notice.\\nAPPENDIX\\nOn July 8, 1967 Mrs. Rust gave a writing to the Bank stating as follows:\\n\\\"Will you please add this name to Pass book the way that we discussed. Thank you.\\nMRS. MILDRED HOWARD\\nI do not zuish her to be notified.\\\"\\nUnder date of July 11, 1967 Mrs. Rust signed a signature card reading in part as follows:\\n\\\"IT IS HEREBY stipulated and agreed that this account is a joint account, subject to withdrawal by any one of the depositors in this account whose signatures appear below, and that in the event of the death of any one or more of said depositors, the moneys then due thereon shall belong to, and/or shall be subject to withdrawal by, any or either of the survivors and/or the last survivor.\\nAuthorized\\nSignatures of s/ Sadie Cooper Rust\\nMildred Howard\\nAddress 201 W. 20th Street Wilmington,\\nDel. 19802\\\"\\nOn July 12, 1967 a Vice President of the Bank wrote to Mrs. Rust saying in part as follows:\\n\\\"I am enclosing, herewith, your savings account passbook #3011-573-8, showing a balance of $8,687.45, the interest on which you receive by check each period.\\nIn accordance with your instructions, we have added the name, Mildred Howard to this account, as a co-owner. She is not to be advised of this fact, and in the event of your passing away first, she will become the owner of the account as the survivor.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8323672.json b/delaware/8323672.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8e02ce83ca75a59c8da14229f64b07db940bab01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8323672.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8323672\", \"name\": \"Allan J. PRINCE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Prince v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-02-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 388, 2006\", \"first_page\": \"400\", \"last_page\": \"403\", \"citations\": \"920 A.2d 400\", \"volume\": \"920\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:10:54.705279+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Allan J. PRINCE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Allan J. PRINCE, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 388, 2006.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 17, 2007.\\nDecided: Feb. 27, 2007.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"1140\", \"char_count\": \"6944\", \"text\": \"RANDY J. HOLLAND, Justice.\\nThis 27th day of February 2006, it appears to the Court that:\\n(1) The defendant-appellant, Allan J. Prince (\\\"Prince\\\"), filed an appeal from the Superior Court's judgments of conviction for Trafficking in Heroin and Possession with Intent to Deliver Controlled Substances. For Trafficking in Heroin, Prince was sentenced to five years of Level Y imprisonment, with five days credit, suspended after three years, for two years of Level IV halfway house supervision. The Level IV supervision is suspended after six months for eighteen months at Level III supervision. For Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin, Prince was sentenced to three years of Level V imprisonment, suspended after one year for eighteen months at Level III supervision. For Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping Controlled Substances, Prince was sentenced to two years of Level V imprisonment, suspended after serving six months for eighteen months at Level III supervision. For Resisting Arrest, Prince was ordered to pay a fine of $200, and sentenced to twelve months of Level V imprisonment, suspended for twelve months of Level I supervision.\\n(2) Prince filed a motion for the suppression of 478 bags of heroin (totaling almost ten grams), $1700 in cash, a 1992 Lexus and all other evidence seized from his residence at 707 W. Fourth Street, Apt. A. According to Prince, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence found at his residence.\\n(3) In this appeal, Prince argues that his convictions should be reversed because the warrant to search his residence was granted pursuant to stale information. Prince also claims that the police would not have had cause to interview him, had they not improperly searched his house, and consequently, the admissions made in his interview should also be excluded as \\\"fruit of the poisonous tree.\\\" We find no merit to his appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.\\n(4) On January 6, 2005, Wilmington police received a tip from Delaware Crime Stoppers that Prince was selling drugs from a certain apartment on West Fourth Street. The informant alleged personal knowledge and gave Crime Stoppers a detailed physical description of Prince, two known aliases of him, and his home and cellular telephone numbers.\\n(5) During the week of January 16, 2005, the police opened an investigation into Prince's activities, and confirmed details of the tip, including Prince's age, address, home telephone number and known abases, through a Delaware Justice Information System computer check. Through this check the police learned that Prince was on probation and obtained a copy of his mug shot. At this time, the police also began intermittent surveillance of Prince's residence.\\n(6) On January 21, 2005, the police witnessed Prince leave his residence, walk a block and get into a car occupied by two women. The car circled the block once, and Prince got out and returned to his residence. The two women drove away. Suspecting that they had just witnessed a drug sale, the police stopped the women and recovered four bags of heroin from the driver. The driver told the police she had just bought the heroin from a dealer she knew only as \\\"Black.\\\" Shown Prince's photograph by the police, the driver identified him as the dealer, \\\"Black.\\\"\\n(7) Based upon the tip from Crime Stoppers and the information gathered from the surveillance of Prince's residence, the police obtained a warrant to search his apartment on January 27. During the search, police found 478 bags of heroin with a total weight of just under ten grams and $1,700 in cash. While police were obtaining a search warrant, the officers on surveillance saw Prince leave the residence and drive away. Aware that Prince lacked a valid driver's license, police arrested him for violating his probation by driving without a license. Prince gave a full confession, when he was questioned later about the drugs and money found in his apartment.\\n(8) The trial court rejected Prince's claim that the information contained in the warrant affidavit was stale by the time the warrant was issued and executed. The trial judge ruled that the police moved with reasonable dispatch in investigating and confirming the original tip and, three weeks later, obtaining and executing the warrant. The legal principles applicable to a staleness inquiry are set forth in this Court's decision in Jensen v. State: \\\"probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant must be manifest at the time the warrant is sought to make the search.... It is not sufficient that at some prior time there existed circumstances that would have warranted the search in question.\\\"\\n(9) Whether the warrant affidavit \\\"meets the test of temporal proximity is determined on an ad hoc basis in light of the circumstances of each case.\\\" The circumstances of this case are not in dispute. The police received a tip from Crime Stoppers on January 6. Two weeks later, on January 21, 2006, the police surveillance uncovered further evidence of Prince's drug dealing. Six days after that, on January 27, 2006, the police applied for, and were granted, a search warrant for Prince's residence.\\n(10) Considering the totality of the evidence in this case, the Superior Court held that the magistrate issuing the search warrant reasonably concluded that the passage of six days between the evidence of Prince's sale of heroin on January 21, and the application for the warrant on January 27, did not render the evidence supporting probable cause stale. In Windsor v. State, this Court held that the passage of nine days between learning the location of drugs and procuring a search warrant did not render the information stale. Accordingly, we hold that Prince's first claim is without merit.\\n(11) Prince's second claim is that all evidence seized must be suppressed because it is the fruit of an illegal search, and the search was sufficiently connected to the seizure of the evidence such that the evidence cannot be purged of its primary taint. Prince also claims that the admissions from his interview with the police should also be suppressed as they were also directly derived from the illegal search. Prince's second claim of error is predicated upon a determination by this Court that his first claim is meritorious. Because we have already held that Prince's first claim is without merit, a fortiori, we also conclude that his second claim is without merit.\\nNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superi- or Court are AFFIRMED.\\n. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).\\n. Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984).\\n.Id.\\n. Windsor v. State, 676 A.2d 909 (Table), 1996 WL 145800 (Del.Supr.).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8351704.json b/delaware/8351704.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..35188d40f38696f954a63678345e7d67b53fbede
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8351704.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8351704\", \"name\": \"Terrence ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Anderson v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-07-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 607, 2006\", \"first_page\": \"898\", \"last_page\": \"904\", \"citations\": \"930 A.2d 898\", \"volume\": \"930\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:14:07.772555+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Terrence ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Terrence ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 607, 2006.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: June 13, 2007.\\nDecided: July 19, 2007.\\nAndrew J. Witherell, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.\\nTimothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"2680\", \"char_count\": \"16519\", \"text\": \"HOLLAND, Justice.\\nThe defendant-appellant, Terrence Anderson (\\\"Anderson\\\"), was indicted on charges of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited, five counts of Criminal Mischief, and Resisting Arrest. The State entered a nolle prose-qui on a number of charges prior to or during trial. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Anderson was convicted of the following offenses: Assault in the First Degree, a lesser-included offense of Attempted Murder, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.\\nIn this direct appeal, Anderson raises two issues that both relate only to his judgment of conviction for Assault in the First Degree. First, Anderson contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the charge of Assault in the First Degree. Second, Anderson submits the trial judge committed plain error by prohibiting him from presenting his defense to the jury that the State had not established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the offenses as charged in the indictment or any applicable lesser-included offenses.\\nWe have concluded that both arguments are without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.\\nFacts\\nWhile on patrol on September 30, 2005, Officers Vincent Jordan and Martin Len-hardt of the Wilmington Police Department heard numerous gunshots. They followed the sounds and observed a white Dodge vehicle \\\"nose into the intersection [of South Van Bur\\u00e9n and Linden Streets].\\\" The officers also saw a black male walking backwards toward the white Dodge, while firing a black semiautomatic handgun in the direction of Hector Perez. Notwithstanding the officers' orders to drop his weapon, the man fired two more shots in the direction of Perez and then fled the scene. Officers Jordan and Lenhardt later identified the shooter as Anderson. Neither officer saw any other shooter.\\nHector Perez testified that as he walked towards his nephew Edgardo Cruz's parked car, he heard three shots. Upon hearing the shots, Perez ran south on South Van Bur\\u00e9n Street. Cruz corroborated Perez's testimony, stating that he saw someone get out of a white Dodge and fire two or three shots, causing Perez to run. Perez was not hit by this round of shots. After the first round of shots, Cruz testified that he looked up and saw a second shooter, later identified as Anderson, firing in the direction of a fleeing Perez. While running, Perez testified that he \\\"felt something hot\\\" in his stomach and later felt another bullet hit him in the face, eventually causing him to collapse. Perez was taken to St. Francis Hospital and later to Christiana Hospital for treatment.\\nAnderson initially fled on foot, but later got back into the white Dodge and sped away, heading southbound on Route 1-95. Officer Mark Wohner of the Newport Police department spotted the vehicle. After a short pursuit, three occupants exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Later, Officer Donald Bluestein of the Wilmington Police Department observed two men walk out of a wooded area and enter a Ford Crown Victoria. One of those individuals was later identified as Anderson.\\nThe police searched the area where the shooting took place and found a silver .44 Colt revolver, a .44 caliber bullet, eight shell casings and two bullets that appeared to have been fired from a .45 Para-Ordinance semiautomatic firearm. The police recovered a black .45 Para-Ordinance semiautomatic near the abandoned Ford Crown Victoria.\\nAssault Evidence Sufficient\\nAnderson first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which the jury could find him guilty of Assault in the First Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, as their case failed to show that the bullets causing Perez's injuries were fired from Anderson's gun. On appeal, challenges to the sufficiency of evidence are reviewed to determine \\\"whether a rational trier of fact, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\" In performing our appellate review, we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.\\nThe record reflects that Anderson was charged with the Attempted Murder of Hector Perez. The indictment read:\\nTERRANCE ANDERSON AND BOBBY THOMAS, on or about the 30th day of September, 2005, in the County of New Castle, State of Delaware, did intentionally attempt to cause the death of Hector Perez by shooting him, which under the circumstances as they believed them to be, constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime of Murder in the First Degree, in violation of Title 11, Section 636 of The Delaware Code.\\nAnderson was convicted of the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree. The trial judge instructed the jury on the Assault charge, as follows:\\nIn order to find the defendant guilty of Assault in the First Degree, you must find that each of the following two elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt:\\nOne, the defendant engaged in conduct which created a substantial risk of death to Hector Perez and thereby caused serious physical injury to Hector Perez.\\nAnd [second] the defendant acted recklessly.\\n\\\"Serious physical injury\\\" means any physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.\\n\\\"Recklessly\\\" means the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to Hector Perez that would result from his conduct.\\nAt trial, Anderson's attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of Attempted Murder, arguing that \\\"the State had not offered a prima facie case, that, in fact, Anderson is the one who shot Perez and that there had been sufficient evidence . that would go towards the intent to commit a murder.\\\" With regard to the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree, however, Anderson's attorney stated:\\nI would have to in my argument, I suppose, review the fact that an assault and serious physical injury has at least been presented of [sic] the prima facie case by the State. With respect to that charge, I will defer to Your Honor's discretion. But with respect to the Murder First charge, Attempted Murder First, it is lacking in two elements, two very specific elements that would be required for a guilty verdict.\\nThe denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal is not an issue on appeal because the jury acquitted Anderson of Attempted Murder and convicted him of Assault in the First Degree, a lesser-included offense.\\nOn appeal, Anderson now argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of Assault in the First Degree. At trial, however, Anderson's attorney moved for judgment of acquittal only on the charge of Attempted Murder, of which he was acquitted. Accordingly, Anderson's first claim on appeal has been waived. Moreover, in addressing whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the Attempted Murder charge to the jury, Anderson's attorney acknowledged that the State has established a prima facie case of Assault in the First Degree. On appeal, Anderson is bound by his attorney's limited motion for a judgment of acquittal of Attempted Murder only and separate factual acknowledgment that the State had established a prima facie case of Assault in the First Degree.\\nAlternatively, we hold that even if there has been no waiver or acknowledgement by Anderson's trial attorney, a reasonable jury could have concluded from the direct and circumstantial evidence that Anderson caused Perez's injuries. Cruz testified that Bobby Thomas exited a white Dodge and fired two or three shots in the direction of his uncle, Hector Perez. Perez testified that when he heard three shots, he ran south on South Van Bur\\u00e9n Street. Perez was not hit by any of those shots. At that point, Cruz looked up and saw a second gunman, later identified as Anderson, appear and begin firing in the direction of Perez. As Perez was running away, he \\\"felt something hot . in [his] stomach\\\" and \\\"when [he] got in the middle of the street, [he] felt another bullet hit [him] in [his] cheek,\\\" eventually causing him to \\\"[collapse] at the end of the street.\\\"\\nWhen officers appeared on scene, Anderson was the only one shooting. Officer Jordan testified that he \\\"observed [Anderson] backing up toward the [white Dodge] holding a large black in color semiautomatic handgun, which he was observed firing.\\\" Based on this testimony, the jury could have concluded that the first shooter fired three shots, all of which missed Perez, and then stopped shooting. At that time, Anderson began shooting and struck Perez with two bullets. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational jury could have found that Anderson was guilty of Assault in the First Degree by recklessly causing serious physical injury to Perez. Accordingly, for the alternative reasons of waiver and sufficiency of the evidence, we hold that Anderson's first argument is without merit.\\nClosing Argument Ruling Proper\\nAnderson next contends that the Superior Court erred by prohibiting him from presenting a valid defense to the jury. Specifically, Anderson argues that because the indictment charged him with Attempted Murder \\\"by shooting [Perez],\\\" he should have been allowed to argue that the State failed to prove that Anderson committed that offense as charged by the indictment. The jury ultimately acquitted Anderson of Attempted Murder and found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree. Because the jury convicted on a lesser-included crime, however, Anderson's specific argument on appeal about that lesser-included crime was not presented to the trial judge. Therefore, Anderson acknowledges that plain error is the applicable standard of appellate review.\\nThe evidence at trial indicated that there were two shooters. Anderson and Bobby Thomas were indicted for Attempted Murder and related crimes. The Attempted Murder count read that Anderson and Thomas \\\"did intentionally attempt to cause the death of Hector Perez by shooting him.\\\" Perez was shot at least twice, but no bullets remained in his body. The trial testimony indicated that Anderson was armed with a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol and fired at least eight shots. The record reflects that the other shooter was probably armed with a .44 caliber revolver.\\nAt Anderson's trial, the defense focused on the words \\\"by shooting him\\\" to argue that the State had to prove that one of the eight bullets fired by Anderson actually hit the victim. According to Anderson, if Perez had been struck only by bullets fired by the other shooter, Anderson could not be held accountable. Since no bullets were recovered from Perez's body, Anderson submits it was impossible for the State to introduce direct evidence on that matter.\\nThe record reflects that the \\\"by shooting him\\\" issue came up initially at the prayer conference in the context of the Attempted Murder charge. The State proposed amending the indictment to read \\\"by shooting at him,\\\" but the trial judge denied that request because it would be a \\\"material change\\\" in the indictment. This issue was raised again in connection with Anderson's motion to dismiss the Attempted Murder charge. The prosecutor argued that the indictment, as written, did not specify that Anderson actually succeeded in shooting the victim, only that he tried and, in trying, intended the victim's death. The trial judge ruled that the indictment, as written, did not require proof that Perez was hit at all, only that Anderson attempted to do so.\\nThe \\\"by shooting him\\\" language in the indictment came up for the last time during defense counsel's summation. When Anderson's attorney drew the jury's attention to the language of the indictment, the prosecutor, anticipating defense counsel's argument, asked to approach the bench. At the sidebar conference, defense counsel contended that he should be allowed to argue to the jurors that, in order to convict Anderson of Attempted Murder, they had to find that one of the bullets fired by Anderson actually struck the victim. The prosecutor argued that neither the language of the indictment nor the trial judge's jury instructions required such a finding.\\nThe trial judge ruled that defense counsel could not argue legal standards that were not contained in the court's jury instructions, although defense counsel was free to argue that the State had not proved that any of Anderson's shots hit Perez:\\nI will allow you to discuss the fact that he was not shot by that gun, that type of thing.... I think that argument is fair game. But I think you're taking the legal instruction that's actually presented. I mean, you're fine with the argu ment, you're f\\u00edne with pointing out this, but you can't say this is an element that the State has failed to prove.\\nThe State argues that this case is distinguishable from the two decisions upon which Anderson relies. In Herring v. New York, a total denial of the right to argue a defense was found to violate the Sixth Amendment. In Dailey v. State, the trial judge restricted defense counsel's right to raise an argument that the Superi- or Court, on appeal, held to be proper. Both of those cases relied upon by Anderson are not only distinguishable but recognize the trial judge's responsibility to prohibit counsel from raising questionable legal arguments.\\nOn appeal, in the absence of \\\"a clear abuse of discretion or undue prejudice to the defendant, we will not interfere with the trial court's determination as to the proper bounds of closing argument.\\\" The record reflects that there was no abuse of discretion in the parameters set by the trial judge regarding the closing argument by Anderson's attorney regarding the Attempted Murder charge. Since there was no abuse of discretion with regard to the charge of Attempted Murder, a fortiori that ruling did not constitute plain error with regard to the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree.\\nConclusion\\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.\\n. Title 11, section 531 of the Delaware Code.\\n. Title 11, section 513(1) of the Delaware Code.\\n. Title 11, section 1447A of the Delaware Code.\\n. Tide 11, section 1448 of the Delaware Code.\\n. Title 11, section 811 of the Delaware Code.\\n. Title 11, section 1257 of the Delaware Code.\\n. He was sentenced to four years Level V incarceration with credit for thirty-one days, the first two years of which are mandatory.\\n. He was sentenced to three years Level V incarceration, which is a mandatory sentence.\\n.He was sentenced to eight years Level V, the first three years are mandatory, suspended after serving four years Level V for four years Level IV Work Release, suspended after six months for two years at supervision Level III.\\n. Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del.2005).\\n. Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Del.1990).\\n.Although Anderson and Thomas were indicted together, Anderson was tried separately. Thomas had pleaded guilty to reduced charges prior to Anderson's trial.\\n. Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560 (Del.1995). See also Hardin v. State, 844 A.2d 982, 990 (Del.2004) (sufficiency of the evidence claim deemed waived where, at trial, defendant challenged only one element of the charge, but, on appeal, challenged another element).\\n. Id.\\n. Thomas accepted the State's plea offer pri-mar to trial.\\n. See Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18 (Del.Supr.1998).\\n. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Dailey v. State, 1986 WL 2280 (Del.Super.).\\n. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975).\\n. Dailey v. State, 1986 WL 2280 (Del.Super.).\\n. Burke v. State, 484 A.2d 490, 498 (Del.1984).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8468385.json b/delaware/8468385.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..deb8dd882201d54ef487c251c80370c3f84dfbe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8468385.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8468385\", \"name\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Robert S. COURSEY, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Coursey\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-09-11\", \"docket_number\": \"Cr. I.D. 0602020812\", \"first_page\": \"845\", \"last_page\": \"848\", \"citations\": \"906 A.2d 845\", \"volume\": \"906\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:22:11.469395+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Robert S. COURSEY, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Delaware, v. Robert S. COURSEY, Defendant.\\nCr. I.D. 0602020812.\\nSuperior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.\\nSubmitted: Aug. 21, 2006.\\nDecided: Sept. 11, 2006.\\nCaterina Gatto, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, DE, for the State of Delaware.\\nJoseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, DE, for defendant Robert S. Coursey.\", \"word_count\": \"1366\", \"char_count\": \"8173\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nDEL PESCO, J.\\nDefendant's motor vehicle was stopped for suspected window tint violation based on the officer's perception that the vehicle's window tint prevented the officer from seeing all occupants in the vehicle. The standard applied is legally incorrect, thus the stop does not meet the requirements of probable cause.\\nFactual Background\\nOn February 24, 2006 Delaware State Police Officer Nicholas Terranova was on patrol on Dupont Highway when he observed a vehicle traveling parallel to his patrol car with dark tinted windows. The vehicle, later determined to be operated by defendant Robert S. Coursey (\\\"Coursey\\\"), made an abrupt turn into the parking lot of a 7-11 store. Officer Terranova followed the vehicle into the parking lot with his lights activated. The defendant complied with the stop and parked the vehicle in a marked handicapped parking spot. Coursey had three minor children in the vehicle at the time of the stop. As a result of the traffic stop, Coursey was charged with multiple drug offenses, multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a minor, failure to use a child restraint, no proof of insurance, and operating a vehicle with improper window tinting.\\nAnalysis and Discussion\\nThe defendant Robert S. Coursey has filed a motion to suppress the evidence which resulted from a motor vehicle stop on February 24, 2006. The stop was based on the fact that the police officer observed that the vehicle defendant was operating had tinted windows which \\\"concealed] all the occupants within the vehicle.\\\"\\nChapter 21, Section 4313(a) of the Delaware Code provides:\\n(a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle on any public highway, road or street with the front windshield, the side windows to the immediate right and left of the driver and/or side wings forward of and to the left and right of the driver that do not meet the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 (\\\"FMVSS 205\\\") in effect at the time of its manufacture.\\nThe express purpose of FMVSS 205 is \\\"to reduce injuries resulting from impact to glazing surfaces, to ensure a necessary degree of transparency in motor vehicle windows for driver visibility, and to minimize the possibility of occupants being thrown through the vehicle windows in collisions. (emphasis supplied)\\nWhen the State was asked to identify the standards that apply to the enforcement of this statute, the State responded:\\nThe purpose of FMVSS 205 is \\\"to ensure a necessary degree of transparency in motor vehicle windows.\\\" (citing 49 C.F.R. \\u00a7 571.502 S2) In the Code of Delaware Regulations 85 800 067, the Delaware Department of Transportation, division of Motor Vehicles, adopted a regulation specifically addressing the tinting of side windows in vehicles. The regulation references 21 Del.C. \\u00a7 4313 and states that the purpose behind the regulation is because \\\"the Department of Public Safety needs a more definitive method in which to determine which products or materials are acceptable at the time of the vehicle safety inspection, and to assist police officers in enforcing the law.\\\"\\nThe Code of Delaware Regulations, Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicles. Regulation 85 800 067 says:\\n(2) The front side wing vents and windows to the immediate right and left of the driver must comply with the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205. Glass coating material (film tint), when used in conjunction with glazing (vehicle glass) material, must provide a light transmission of not less than 70 percent. All specifications in this rule shall be within normal manufacturer's tolerance i.e., 1 \\u2014 3%.\\nThe State's effort to inform the Court as to the standard for the enforcement of 21 Del.C. \\u00a7 4313 does not quote FMVSS 205 because it cannot. FMVSS 205 does not articulate a specific standard for enforcement. FMVSS 205 incorporates by reference ANS Z26. It is ANS Z26 which contains the 70% requirement which appears to have been the basis for the Regulation 85 800 067.\\nWhen the suppression hearing commenced, it was alleged that the defendant was stopped for two reasons. First, because of the tint of the windows. Second, because he parked in a handicapped space. The evidence revealed, and I find as fact, that the officer activated his lights before the defendant pulled into the handicapped parking place, thereby eliminating the parking location as a basis for the stop. The issue remains regarding window tint.\\nTo be valid under the Fourth Amendment, an automobile stop must be based on an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is subject to seizure for violation of the law. Reasonable suspicion requires an objective basis. Officer Terranova testified:\\nQ. What's the law?\\nA. The law for what the tinted windows?\\nQ. Yes.\\nA. You can't operate a vehicle \\u2014 I can't recite it word for word.\\nQ. I don't expect you to do it word for word.\\nA. You want my interpretation?\\nQ. I want the substance of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 205 that in your estimation was violated that day?\\nA. You can't have window tint to the point where it conceals all occupants of the vehicle.\\nQ. And that's what you thought 205 says?\\nA. Yes. Not word for word.\\nQ. I am going to hand you standard number 205 glazing materials and I would like to you isolate in there where it says that the law is that it is illegal glazing or tinting if the occupants cannot be seen inside the vehicle. Just find that for me please.\\nHave you ever seen that before in your life?\\nA. I never seen this copy sir, no.\\nQ. I will give you the chance to read all nine pages if you'd like, but I am going to suggest to you a question. Would it surprise you to no that nowhere in there does it make any reference to the number of persons in a vehicle as being law?\\nThe Court: Number of persons?\\nMr. Hurley: Of people being visible inside a vehicle. Would it surprise you to know it's not even mentioned directly, indirectly, implicitly?\\nMs. Gatto: Your Honor, before we waste any of the Court's time I could stipulate based on what Hurley says that that is not in fact located in the Code.\\nMr. Hurley: Thank you.\\nThe Court: Are you comfortable accepting that stipulation?\\nThe Witness: Yes.\\nThe Court: Very well.\\nBy Mr. Hurley:\\nQ. You agree with me if you thought that the standard legal standard under the referenced Federal Law was the visibility of occupants in the car and that is not the relevant legal standard you didn't properly understand the law?\\nThe Witness: Not that section of law, sir.\\nFailure to understand the law by a person charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable.\\nConclusion\\nI find that the officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on fact and law. The motion to suppress is GRANTED.\\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\\n. Transcript of suppression hearing, p. 2.\\n. FMVSS 205, S2, LEXSTAT 49 CFR 571.205.\\n. The incomplete quotation of the Purpose section of this statute, by omitting of the words \\\"for driver visibility\\\", in the context of the facts of this case, raises a question of candor.\\n. Emphasis supplied in State's letter of August 18, 2006.\\n. S5.1.1 Glazing materials for use in motor vehicles, except as otherwise provided in this standard shall confirm to the American National Standard \\\"Safety Code for Safety Glazing Materials for Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways\\\" Z-26.1-1977, January 26, 1977, as supplemented by Z26.1a, July 3, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as \\\"ANS Z26\\\").\\n.I will leave for another case, the issue of whether this statute is unconstitutionally vague to justify a stop.\\n. Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 498 (Del.2005).\\n. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), affirming 382 A.2d 1359 (Del.1978).\\n. Transcript of suppression hearing, pp. 20-23.\\n. United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir.2005).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8483172.json b/delaware/8483172.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b91fd435382de8cb34a16f53779cd176ebc78b00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8483172.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8483172\", \"name\": \"James E. LINEBERGER and Arthur W. Lowe, Plaintiffs, v. John WELSH, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lineberger v. Welsh\", \"decision_date\": \"1972-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"847\", \"last_page\": \"849\", \"citations\": \"290 A.2d 847\", \"volume\": \"290\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of Chancery\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:44:21.562196+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James E. LINEBERGER and Arthur W. Lowe, Plaintiffs, v. John WELSH, Defendant.\", \"head_matter\": \"James E. LINEBERGER and Arthur W. Lowe, Plaintiffs, v. John WELSH, Defendant.\\nCourt of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle.\\nApril 5, 1972.\\nSteven D. Goldberg, of Theisen, Lank & Kelleher, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.\\nJohn P. Sinclair, and Michael D. Goldman, of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"683\", \"char_count\": \"4094\", \"text\": \"SHORT, Vice Chancellor.\\nThis is an action for specific performance of a contract by which defendant agreed to sell to plaintiffs 50,000 shares of the common stock of Sensormatic Electronics Corporation at the price of $7.50 per share or a total purchase price of $375,000 of which $50,000 was paid down and the balance payable over a period of five years. Defendant has moved (1) to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and (2) to quash sequestration. Since the motion to dismiss is supported and opposed by affidavits it will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. This is the decision on that motion.\\nWhether the subject matter of a contract is real or personal property the test for availability of the remedy of specific performance is inadequacy of the remedy at law. Satterthwait v. Marshall, 4 Del.Ch. 337. As to contracts for the sale of corporate stock our courts have uniformly held that where the stock is purchasable in the market, or its value otherwise ascertainable, specific performance is not available, the legal remedy of damages being adequate. Diamond State Iron Co. v. Todd, 6 Del.Ch. 163, 14 A. 27, aff'd 8 Houst. 372; G. W. Baker Mach. Co. v. United States Fire Apparatus Co., 11 Del.Ch. 386, 97 A. 613; Francis v. Medill, 16 Del.Ch. 129, 141 A. 697; Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 34 Del.Ch. 249, 102 A.2d 538; U. S. Dimension Products, Inc. v. Tessette, Inc., Del.Supr., 290 A.2d 634.\\nHere plaintiffs concede that Sensormatic stock is traded nationally over-the-counter so that its value is easily ascertainable. But they contend that the stock which they bargained to purchase is unique as to them and that damages would not adequately compensate them. They say that they purchased the stock for investment, not for quick profit, and that it was only because of the favorable credit terms that they were able to make the bargain. No authority is cited holding that either of these or similar circumstances is sufficient to take the case out of the general rule applicable to contracts for the sale of corporate stock. Though there are expressions in reported Delaware cases to the effect that \\\"circumstances\\\" may be sufficient to except a case from the general rule and warrant specific performance, it is significant that the only type of circumstances to which the courts have specifically pointed relate to uniqueness in the stock itself. Thus, if the subject matter of the contract is shares of stock in such amount as to give a majority control the shares are deemed to \\\"possess [no] value peculiar to themselves.\\\" Francis v. Medill, supra. Or, if the stock is so-called \\\"investment stock\\\" which cannot be traded on the market, equitable relief is available because of the difficulty of determining its value. U. S. Dimension Products, Inc. v. Tassette, Inc., supra.\\nPlaintiffs argue that there is doubt of defendant's ability to pay a judgment which they might recover at law. Not only is the relevance of this contention questionable but the only evidence adduced to support it is an affidavit which fails to meet the requirements of Chancery Rule 56(e) and is therefore not available to show the existence of a disputed fact. Woodcock v. Udell, 9 Terry 69, 97 A.2d 878.\\nFinally, plaintiffs contend that specific performance should here be granted under the liberal terms of the Uniform Commercial Code (5A Del.C.). The short answer to this contention is that investment securities are expressly excluded from the sales article of the Code. 5A Del.C. \\u00a7 2-105.\\nSince I am satisfied that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law an order may be submitted, on notice, granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In view of this finding it is unnecessary to consider the second ground of the motion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8877301.json b/delaware/8877301.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..050bca8877b56e88ea31449d46d862cd5975c9a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8877301.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8877301\", \"name\": \"THE STATE, for the use of JOSEPH S. TOWNSEND, use of LEWIS WEST vs. ROBERT HOUSTON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Townsend v. Houston\", \"decision_date\": \"1839\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"15\", \"last_page\": \"20\", \"citations\": \"3 Harr. 15\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:38:42.629396+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE, for the use of JOSEPH S. TOWNSEND, use of LEWIS WEST vs. ROBERT HOUSTON.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE, for the use of JOSEPH S. TOWNSEND, use of LEWIS WEST vs. ROBERT HOUSTON.\\nQuere~ Can a guardian sell the real securities of his ward without the leave of the Orphans\\u2019 Court?\\nAn attorney of the court may sue or defend without proof of his authority; hut the court, under circumstances, will order him to produce his warrant, or prove his authority.\\nScire facias on a recognizance in the Orphans\\u2019 Court, for the appraised value of intestate lands.\\nThe action was in the name of the State, for the use of a party entitled to a share of the recognizance who was a minor, and was marked for the use of Lewis West, a purchaser of the minor\\u2019s interest from his guardian. The defendant was a surety in the recognizance.\\nOn the motion of Mr. Brinckloe, of counsel for the defendant,\\nand affidavit filed, the court laid a rule to show cause why the scire fa-cias should not be quashed and stricken from the record, or the second use stricken out; on the ground, that the guardian had not the power to transfer the real securities of his ward without the direction of the Orphans\\u2019 Court.\\nThe affidavit stated that Joseph S. Townsend was an infant under the age of twenty-one years; that on the 23d Sept. 1835, Alexander Campbell was appointed his guardian; that Lewis West sues as the purchaser of said Joseph\\u2019s share in the recognizance set out in the scire facias, claiming under an assignment made by the said guardian on 9th May, 1837, without any direction or authority of the Orphans\\u2019 Court; and that the guardian had since left the State.\\nThe rule was argued by Houston and J. M. Clayton for the defendant and Cullen and Booth for the plaintiff.\\nHouston, in support of the rule:\\nThe sum due the minor on this recognizance is his whole estate; as appears from the distributive account on the estate of his father, Thomas Townsend. The question is, whether the guardian has power -to transfer such real security, without the order of the Orphans\\u2019 Court.\\n\\u201cSeo. 10. A guardian shall have the care of the person of the ward, and the possession and management of the real and personal property of the ward, and shall have authority to receive all debts, rents and things in action, due or belonging to the ward, and to sell the personal property of the ward of a perishable nature, and also, with the direction of the Orphans\\u2019 Court, to sell any other personal property of the ward; and the receipts, discharges and transfers of the guardian made in good faith in the exercise of this authority, shall be valid and effectual,\\u201d (Dig. 424.)\\nThe act authorizes the guardian to sell the minor\\u2019s property of a perishable natm\\u2019e; this is not such. We agree that it was competent to the guardian to reduce the recognizance into possession. But it is at least doubtful whether he can assign. If he cannot legally assign, then it would be no protection to this defendant, who is a surety in the recognizance to pay the amount even after judgment, and having no power t<? plead this matter to another scire facias on this recognizance, he resorts to this motion for his own protection. In an action at the suit of Townsend against this defendant, he could not plead to such an action a payment to Lewis West as assignee, unless such an assignment was authorized by the law.\\nThe facts are, that the recognizance has been assigned to Lewis West by xilexander Campbell, the guardian, who has left the State; that the guardian previously applied to the Orphans\\u2019 Court of this county for leave to expend on the ward more than the income of his estate, which was refused: that this recognizance is the whole estate of the ward; and that the ward is still a minor.\\nThe guardian, without reducing the sum due on the recognizance into possession, sold it to Lewis West, for whose use this suit has been brought; and the defendant, doubting the guardian\\u2019s right to sell this property of his ward, without authority from the Orphans\\u2019 Court, now raises the question for his own protection.\\nCullen.-^-.The act of assembly authorizes the guardian to assign such a security as this, It is implied and contained in the power to collect the sum due on the recognizance. The act gives him the power to collect and receive all the debts, &c., due his ward, and having the right to collect and receive, he necessarily has the right to assign. The surety in a debt has by law a right to make a pay ment, and to demand an assignment of the security as against the principal debtor to him. How then would a guardian be circumstanced, if he is unable to make this assignment? And by such assignment the ward is in no danger. It is a reducing of the recognizance into possession; the guardian with his sureties become responsible, and it is not denied here, that these are sufficient and solvent. Neither is there any allegation of fraud or want of good faith. But even if this transfer were illegal, the court would only strike out the use and not put an end to this suit; it would go on for the benefit of the'ward,\\nBooth. \\u2014 It is an unusual application to trike off a suit on any hearing in a summary way. But as to the.right to assign such a security, it is necessarily included in the power to collect the money due on it. And it would frequently be for the interest of the minor as well as for the convenience of the guardian to continue the security in favor of an assignee, who might advance the money instead of discharging it. I agree that fraud would vitiate such a transaction, but -nothing of the kind is alledged here; nor is it pretended that the rights or interests of this minor have been compromitted or jeopardized by this transfer. The act of assembly is merely in affirmance of the common law principle, substituting the Orphans\\u2019 Coui\\u2019t for the Court of Chancery. And even on the common law principle, if a guardian do an act not authorized, except under the direction of the Court of Chancery, such act is not void, but only voidable upon it being shown not to have been for the benefit of the ward. If it appear to be for his benefit it will stand good and be confirmed. The act authorizing directions to be given by the Orphans\\u2019 Court is as much for the guardian\\u2019s benefit as the minor\\u2019s; for his complete protection in doubtful cases, as in transfers of bank stock; and yet a transfer of bank stock even though subsequently disapproved of, would only charge the guardian with the loss, not impair the validity of the transfer. In this case, even if the transfer should not hereafter be recognized by the courts, the ward could not. be prejudiced, because the guardian and his sureties are liable,\\nJ. M. Clayton. \\u2014 It is to be regretted that a question of such grave consequences should be presented on this side bar motion; and yet the interests of my client are vitally concerned in it. If this as-signee be permitted to recover, and the transfer to him beheld good, the defendant who is a surety in the recognizance, will have to pay this assignee (West) and run the risk when the minor comes of age of being sued by him again- And this is no slight risk; for I maintain, that when the ward attains his age he would at least have thg election to sue the recognizance on the guardian bond. A recognizance in the Orphans\\u2019 Court is the highest form of security for a minor\\u2019s property; as high as a mortgage or judgment. The powers of a guardian are all created by statute \\u2014 given to him by the act. They must be construed for the benefit of the ward, and not for the benefit of the guardian. The power must then be apparent on the act. Where then is the authority to sell the ward\\u2019s property not perishable, without the direction of the Orphans\\u2019 Court? The counsel say that the power to receive the debt includes a power to sell it; then all the words of the act which follow are nugatory. There is a manifest distinction between selling property of a perishable nature, and other property. It may be necessary to invest the guardian with power to receive a debt when the debtor chooses to pay it; but it does not follow, that because the law has, perhaps of necessity, invested a guardian with that power, he has also the power to sell the real securities and debts due his ward, whether the debtor is paying them or not; and go off with the proceeds beyond the jurisdiction of the State. The argument confuses all property, perishable with imperishable; and, though the act makes a manifest distinction, gives the same power to a guardian to assign the most permanent and stable kind of property that a minor can have, just as if it were perishable property, without the direction of the Orphan\\u2019s Court. The act makes valid the transfers of the guardian madexmdcr such authority: that is, the transfers of perishable property by the guardian\\u2019s own authority; and the transfers of other property with the Orphans\\u2019 Court\\u2019s direction. Has this guardian obtained such direction? So far from it he applied for leave to exceed the income, and was refused.\\nThis question is not to be decided by reference to the powers of an English guardian, or a guardian in any sister State; it must be decided in reference to our own act of assembly, which gives to a guardian here all the powers he has. That act makes a distinction in reference to the power of a guardian to sell perishable property and other property. The former he can sell without, the latter with direction of the Orphans\\u2019 Court. What kind of property then is embraced within this latter kind, if the real securities of the ward, the highest and most permanent personal property he can have, is not embraced within it? Then, what relief have we but under this motion? What plea can we plead to this scire facias, so as to deny the right of this assignee. On the law side of the court, they will not even look upon this cestui que use, and he cannot be reached except by a motion here at side bar, on the equity side of the court, to stay proceedings.\\nBut it has been objected that this motion can extend properly no further than to strike out the use. Admit it; but that puts an.end to the suit, for being in the name of the State, it is of no avail without a cestui que use.\\nMr. Cullen now said, he was the counsel both .of the first and second cestui que use; both of the minor by his guardian and of Lewis West, the assignee; and if the second use were stricken out, the suit would still proceed.\", \"word_count\": \"2683\", \"char_count\": \"14936\", \"text\": \"By the Court:\\nBayard, Chief Justice:\\nThe scire facias takes no notice of the second use. It is an action by the State for the use of the minor, brought by an attorney of this court against the surety in the recognizance. Such an action is in form authorized by the act \\\"regulating proceedings upon public recognizances and bonds,\\\" under which any person interested in the recognizance \\\"may in the name of the State, but for his, her or their use, institute suit- upon such recognizance, and prosecute such suit to judgment and execution, and for that purpose may employ any attorney of the court wherein the suit shall be brought, who may in the declaration and other pleadings, use his own name instead of the name of the attorney general.\\\" From all that appears then, this is a suit by the minor, or at least by the guardian, prosecuted by an attorney of this court in the usual form, and the payment by the defendant of a judgment recovered against him in such suit, would undoubtedly be a protection to him.\\nBut it is suggested that an attorney might abuse his office, and sue upon a recognizance without authority from the persons interested under it. The same might be said of any other case where the cause of action is of record, as of all mortgages and judgments, where an attorney might sue out a scire facias without authority. The objection supposes fraud in the attorney, and a degree of hardihood in the use of means that can hardly be conceived of as dangerous in practice. To say nothing of the responsibility of the attorney, both to the party and to the court, the publicity of the suit in its progress to judgment would ensure detection by the party for whom he dared to sue without authority. The objection moreover extends to almost all cases, and could only be met by a general rule or other provision requiring proof of the attorney's authority to sue or defend. There has never been any such practice, and in point of fact our attornies seldom take from their clients any other than a verbal authority.\\nCullen and Booth, for plaintiff\\nHouston and Clayton, for defendant.\\nAnciently the attornies were appointed in court* when actually present; afterwards by warrant in writing. (1 Tidd 64; 1 Wils. 39.) But it was very early determined that an authority by parol was sufficient to support a judgment. (2 Keb. 199.) At common law the warrant of attorney might be filed at any time before final judgment. (1 Tidd 65.) Afterwards by several enactments, made chiefly for the purpose of revenue, the warrant was required to be starhped and filed early in the cause, under a penalty of ten pounds. (Idem 65.) But these statutes are no longer in force; and, even in the English practice, the warrant has long ceased to be filed; and by the late rules of court they are prohibited from being entered upon the record. (3 Ch. Gen. Pr. 114.) Yet it is still strongly recommended to attor-nies for their own protection and character, to obtain from their clients written authority to sue or defend, in order that the same may be the more easily susceptible of proof,\\nIn our practice, therefore, the court would expect some ground to be laid by affidavit or otherwise, before they would at the instance of the defendants, require the plaintiff's attorney to produce a written warrant, or other proof of his authority. Doubtless where fraud Was suggested, and especially if a minor was concerned and in danger of being injured by an unauthorized proceeding before us, we would for the protection of either guardian, ward, or defendant, inquire into the attorney's authority; and would, if the case required it, apply other remedy than by merely striking off the suit.\\nBut the present motion goes on its principle only to the second use; that alone brings up the question of a guardian's right to assign the recognizance without an order of the Orphans' Court; this use the plaintiffs' counsel proposes to strike off, and to go on with the suit, in the name and for the use of the ward, having authority as he asserts, from the guardian for that purpose. The defendant denies that he has any such authority, and suggests that he is in danger, if the authority be hereafter disclaimed, of having the debt to pay over again. The question then is whether there is enough presented by the affidavit, or on the case itself, to induce the court to order the plaintiffs' counsel to produce his warrant of attorney, or other authority.\\nMr. Cullen here expressed his readiness to do so, if time were allowed to send for his client, which the court readily granted and the cause was continued.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8879457.json b/delaware/8879457.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7643f40b4d8b211f4d95de3dcc831dfab5ffb0cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8879457.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8879457\", \"name\": \"T. J. & C. WRIGHT vs. CLEMENT CANNON, Constable\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wright v. Cannon\", \"decision_date\": \"1842\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"487\", \"last_page\": \"489\", \"citations\": \"3 Harr. 487\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:38:42.629396+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"T. J. & C. WRIGHT vs. CLEMENT CANNON, Constable.\", \"head_matter\": \"T. J. & C. WRIGHT vs. CLEMENT CANNON, Constable.\\nThe act of 1833, (8 vol. 265,) giving a, summary remedy against constables for neglect of duty, applies to the case of neglecting to return execution process, as well as that of making false return.\\n\\\\ party cannot object as error, that the judgment in his own favor was for too much.\\nCeb.tiorari to justice Morgan, in a judgment given by the justice igainst the defendant, as,a constable, for neglecting to return an ex-cution in his hands at plaintiff\\u2019s suit against Henry Hazzard. The lefendant appeared and admitted that he had no cause to show why udgment should not be rendered against him and execution issued or the amount, of the original execution and costs. That execution \\u00a1ras stated to be $47 24 debt, fifty-six cents costs, and the judgment low rendered was $48 97 and costs.\\nThe exceptions were 1st, that the justice had no jurisdiction; 2d, that it did not appear for what neglect of duty of the constable the suit was brought; 3d, that the service of the summons was not verified by oath, and 4th, that judgment was rendered against the constable for more than the amount of the original execution.\\nThe record stated that the summons issued 5th of January, 1839, against C. Cannon, constable, requiring him to appear on the 9th of January, to show cause why execution should not be issued against him for the amount of a judgment at suit of the Wrights against H. Hazzard for the amount of $47 24 debt, with fifty-six cents costs, on the 11th of September, 1838, on which judgment execution issued to said constable, returnable 1st of October, 1838, which execution he failed to return in the time aforesaid; and also to comply with and perform his duty as in said execution required. Summons served. Defendant appeared personally on the 9th of January, and then and there sets forth that he can show no cause why judgment of execution should not be entered and issued against him for the aforesaid debt, interest and costs of the afoi\\u2019esaid claim: therefore, judgment accordingly for $48 97 and costs $1 01.\\nMr. Houston, for plaintiff,\\nargued \\u2014 1st. That the act of 1833 onlyi applied to cases where improper, false or defective returns had been made by the constable, and not to the case where no return had been made. 2d. That it did not sufficiently appear for what neglect of duty! the proceeding was instituted against the constable. 3d. That the) judgment was rendered against the constable for too large a sum,I being for more than the amount of the original execution. (2 Harr.\\\\ Rep. 245.)\", \"word_count\": \"602\", \"char_count\": \"3460\", \"text\": \"But the court overruled all the objections, and affirmed the judg. ment.\\n1. The act of 1833 was designed to give a summary remedyl against constables for neglecting to make return of executions, as| well as for making false or insufficient returns. (8 Del. Laws 265 jDig. 341, sec. 18.)\\n2. It appears that this proceeding was for not returning the execution, which is sufficient, without referring to any other breach of| duty.\\n3. It is not competent for the plaintiff to alledge as error, that the amount of the judgment in his own favor is more than he was enti-l tied to recover; and if it was, it appears that though this judgment iJ for more than the amount stated in the summons, it is only for the amount of the original execution, with interest and costs; the interest having accrued whilst the proceedings were pending.\\nHouston, for plaintiff.\\nRidgely, for defendant.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/8880087.json b/delaware/8880087.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb2e6e29f5488d3ab30a5670b50737f9c1844bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/8880087.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8880087\", \"name\": \"THE STATE vs. WILLIAM W. BENNET\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Bennet\", \"decision_date\": \"1840\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"565\", \"last_page\": \"567\", \"citations\": \"3 Harr. 565\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Delaware Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware Court of General Sessions\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:38:42.629396+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE STATE vs. WILLIAM W. BENNET.\", \"head_matter\": \"THE STATE vs. WILLIAM W. BENNET.\\nIndictment for selling spirituous liquor sustained by proof of the sale of common cordial.\\nThe defendant was indicted for selling spirituous liquor by a measure less than a quart to one John C. Wilson.\\nJohn C. Wilson. \\u2014 Bought a pint of peppermint cordial of defendant; paid him eight cents for it. It was strong drink; would intoxicate; don\\u2019t know what cordial is made of.\\nRobert Polk \\u2014 Has been a merchant. The common cordials sold in stores are made of whiskey, sweetened, and scented with peppermint, or other things. It is( a mixed liquor to this extent.\\nRogers, for defendant,\\nobjected that the proof did wot sustain the indictment, which was for selling spirituous liquor, and the proof was of a sale of mixed liquor. The act of assembly, (Dig- 519,) distinguishes between spirituous and mixed liquors, and the indictment must distinguish. Indeed, though the practice has been otherwise, he contended that the rules of criminal pleading required that an indictment should distinguish th\\u00a9 precise kind of liquor sold, whether brandy, gin, Whiskey or other spirituous liquor, or a mixed liquor.\\nThe act prohibits the sale of -\\u201cany wine, rum, brandy, gin, whiskey or any spirituous liquor, by any measure less than a quart, or any punch or other mixed liquor by any measure whatever.\\u201d\", \"word_count\": \"665\", \"char_count\": \"3879\", \"text\": \"The Court divided.\\nLayton, Justice\\ndelivered the 'opinion of a majority of the court, (Booth, Chief Justice dissenting.) \\u2014 The act not only particularizes several kinds of liquor, 'but prohibits the sale of any kind of spirituous liquor under general terms. If the act had stopped at an enumeration of wine, rum, brandy, gin, &c., an indictment for selling any one of these specifications would not be supported by proof of selling another kind; but the specification being followed by a prohibition of selling any spirituous liquor by a measure less than a quart, it Is not necessary, and has not been the practice, to specify in the indictment the hind of spirituous liquor sold.\\nThen, there being a 'further prohibition of selling \\\"any punch or other mixed liquor by any measure whatever,\\\" the question Is made whether cordial, such as that usually sold in the stores, and such as was sold in this case, comes under the description of spirituous liquor, or the mixed liquor intended by the act. We think the mixed liquor intended by that act, following as it does the specification of punch, is a mixture of the spirituous or other liquors before prohibited to be sold separately; and, where the basis 'or substance of the liquor sold ' is spirituous and not mixed by the vender, \\u00a1it -comes within the previous prohibition of selling spirituous liquor. Otherwise it would be impossible to convict in any case, for no liquor is entirely unmixed. We think the cordial here proved is spirituous liquor, and of a kind intended to be prohibited by the act. If it is to be regarded as a mixed liquor, then the sale of it is entirely prohibited by any measure, and all the shopkeepers Who sell liquors have been violating the law by selling cordials, even 'by the quart.\\nIt has been urged that this construction will prohibit the sale of medicines, the basis of which is spirituous liquor, such as Godfrey's cordial, Elixer paregoric, &c. Not so. The question \\u2022will always be, whether it is a sale of medicine, or of liquor. If an apothecary sell brandy, as such, it would be a violation of the law; if brandy made up into laudanum or other medicines, it is not a violation of a law prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquor. It will never be difficult to distinguish. Common store cordial is sweetened whiskey, sold as spirituous liquor; Godfrey's cordial is a very different thing, known for, and sold as, medicine; and there can be no danger, from the sale of it, of promoting tippling, which is. the evil designed to be provided for by our act of assembly.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/9087848.json b/delaware/9087848.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7775d8626dad08ef7183affe753969e177336f8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/9087848.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9087848\", \"name\": \"Phillip PURNELL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Purnell v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-09-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 671,2002\", \"first_page\": \"714\", \"last_page\": \"724\", \"citations\": \"832 A.2d 714\", \"volume\": \"832\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:33:45.986599+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Phillip PURNELL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Phillip PURNELL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.\\nNo. 671,2002.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: May 20, 2003.\\nDecided: Sept. 16, 2003.\\nJohn S. Malik, Wilmington, DE, for Appellant.\\nTimothy J. Donovan, Jr., John Williams (argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Appellee.\\nBefore VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.\", \"word_count\": \"4205\", \"char_count\": \"25291\", \"text\": \"VEASEY, Chief Justice:\\nIn this appeal, we consider the validity of a second search following a lawful Terry stop. Here, a police officer conducted a pat-down search incident to a Terry stop and found no weapons. Later, the officer conducted an additional search, without consent, after the pat-down had been concluded. The record shows that the purpose of the additional search was not to protect the officers, but to gather evidence. The Superior Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the fruit of the second search. We reverse on the ground that the search violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment right that protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence gathered pursuant to this second search should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.\\nFacts\\nOn November 9, 2001, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the police received a tip from a confidential informant who had supplied reliable information in the past. The informant told an officer that two black males were standing on the corner of Fourth and Delamore Streets in Wilmington and were in possession of narcotics and handguns. The informant also provided information on the clothing the two men were wearing. One man was wearing black pants and a black three-quarter length jacket partially made out of leather. The jacket had white writing on the back. This man was said to have held the drugs. The second man wore a three-quarter length jacket made entirely of leather. The informant stated that this man was Shannon Black. He also wore a black hat trimmed in red with white writing on the front. Black was said to have had a handgun in his waistband and possibly had drugs in his possession as well.\\nAfter receiving the tip, Detective Vincent Jordan and two other undercover officers immediately drove to the area the informant had identified. Upon arrival, the detectives were unable to locate the two men in the vicinity. The officers decided, however, to circle the block looking for the two individuals. A half-block from the area identified by the informant the officers noticed a man entering a Chinese restaurant. The man fit the description given by the informant of the unidentified man. The man had on a three-quarter length jacket with leather sleeves and white writing on the back. Detective Jordan testified that the man was not walking to the restaurant from the vicinity of Fourth and Delamore. Rather, he was walking from the opposite direction. Also, at no time did it appear to the detectives that the man was doing anything unusual or suggestive of criminal activity.\\nAfter a moment the man emerged from the Chinese restaurant. As the man walked out of the restaurant the three officers approached him, identified themselves, escorted the man to their unmarked car and told him they were investigating a complaint regarding handguns and narcotics. The man was later identified as the appellant, Phillip Purnell. The detectives asked Purnell if they could speak with him, and he agreed. The police then asked if they could pat him down for weapons, and he again agreed.\\nOne of the officers conducted the pat-down but found no weapons. The officer did, however, detect a large bulge in Pur-nell's right pants pocket. When asked what the bulge was, Purnell stated it was approximately $800 in cash that he had earned from a temporary job. Purnell then gave consent for the detective to remove the money from his pocket. Detective Jordan testified that the money was \\\"very crumpled up in disarray\\\" and appeared to total more than $800.\\nAfter the search, the officers asked Pur-nell to provide identification and state his business abroad. Purnell produced valid identification and told the detectives that he was visiting his grandmother. He then pointed down the street to a house the police believed to be vacant. The officers also asked Purnell how he had traveled to his grandmother's house. Purnell responded that he had taken the bus. This aroused the detectives' suspicions, however, because during the pat-down the officer felt what he believed to be a remote control automobile keypad in Purnell's jacket. The officers then conducted a second, non-consensual search of Purnell and removed the keypad from his jacket. Purnell told the officers that the keys belonged to his grandfather's Buick which he had permission to drive.\\nParked on the street near the house Purnell had pointed to was a black Buick. The detectives asked Purnell if the vehicle was his or his grandfather's. Purnell stated that it was neither his nor his grandfather's. The officers then walked toward the car and pressed the keypad they had taken from Purnell. The doors of the car unlocked. The detectives then locked the car and requested a K-9 unit to conduct a search of the vehicle. The officers also ran a license plate check of the vehicle and found that it was registered to Purnell.\\nThe detectives detained Purnell until the K-9 unit arrived. Upon arrival a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the car. The officers then towed the car and transported Purnell to the Wilmington Police Station.\\nAt the station the officers ordered Pur-nell to remove his jacket. As he removed his jacket a small bag of marijuana fell from the left sleeve of the jacket. A further search of Purnell also revealed four more small bags of marijuana. Purnell was read his Miranda, rights. He then made a statement admitting that he purchased five small bags of marijuana from an unknown black male. He also stated that the Buick belonged to him and that there was more marijuana in the trunk of the car. The officers then obtained a warrant to search the car where they discovered in the trunk a large quantity of marijuana and, in the passenger area, plastic bags used to package marijuana for sale.\\nPurnell was indicted on charges of Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana, Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Possession of a Controlled Substance Within 300 Feet of a Park, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Purnell filed a motion to suppress evidence. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied the motion.\\nThen Purnell entered into a Stipulated Trial Agreement with the State whereby he waived his right to a trial and admitted to having committed the charged offenses. Purnell did, however, preserve his right to appeal the order denying the motion to suppress. The court then sentenced Pur-nell to the mandatory minimum term of three years for the Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana charge. On the remaining charges he received probationary sentences. Purnell now appeals the sentence that resulted from the denial of his motion to suppress.\\nIssue on Appeal\\nPurnell makes one argument on appeal: that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the stop. He asserts three reasons for error: (1) the totality of the circumstances did not establish reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) the keys used to search his vehicle were seized in violation of his rights; and (3) the search of his vehicle, by unlocking the car doors with the keypad, was performed without a warrant in violation of his rights. The State asserts that the search was valid and that the trial court properly denied the motion.\\nWe review for abuse of discretion the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to suppress evidence. Thus, the judgment is reversible only if \\\"this Court finds the Superior Court's decision to be clearly erroneous.\\\"\\nReasonable and Articulable Suspicion to Stop\\nA trial court's determination whether a police officer possessed reason able and articulable suspicion to stop a person is an issue of law and fact. In this case the facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this aspect of the issue is reviewed de novo.\\nPurnell contends the police officers did not possess reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and question him. The State argues that the stop was proper. To determine whether the stop was proper this Court must first examine the point at which Purnell was stopped. Then we must determine whether the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion at that time to make the stop.\\nA stop occurs when a police officer displays conduct that \\\"would communicate to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.\\\" Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution a seizure \\\" 'requires either physical force . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.'\\\" Here Purnell was approached by the police officers after he left the Chinese restaurant. After approaching Purnell, the officers advised him that they were investigating a complaint regarding handguns and narcotics. They then asked Purnell if he wished to speak with them and he agreed. Afterward, the officers escorted Purnell to their unmarked vehicle.\\nIn California v. Hodari D. the United States Supreme Court ruled that submission to the assertion of authority constitutes a seizure. Purnell submitted to the officers' authority when he followed them to their car. Furthermore, a reasonable person probably would not have believed he or she was able to leave after agreeing to speak with the officers and being escorted to the officers' car. Thus, a stop occurred at this point, and this Court must determine whether the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop.\\nIn certain circumstances, \\\"law enforcement officers may stop or detain an individual for investigatory purposes, but only if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the individual to be detained is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.\\\" Reasonable and articulable suspicion is a less stringent standard than the probable cause standard and requires a quantum of proof that is less than preponderance of the evidence. In determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists a court \\\"must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation 'as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer's subjective interpretation of those facts.' \\\" Courts will defer to the experience and training of police officers.\\nIn this case Purnell matched the description given by an informant who had given reliable information in the past. Purnell was wearing the black jacket with the white writing on the back and -the black pants described by the informant. He was also in the general vicinity of the area where the informant had stated that the crime occurred. Although Purnell was seen walking from a direction opposite from the area identified by the informant, he was, nevertheless, in the vicinity.\\nIn Adams v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court found that a tip provided by an informant was sufficient to justify a stop where the informant was known personally by the officer and had given reliable information in the past. The Court held that the circumstances surrounding the stop present \\\"a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip.\\\" Specifically, the Court ruled that \\\"the information carried' enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop.\\\"\\nIn Jones v. State this Court did not find that reasonable articulable suspicion existed from an informant's tip. Jones, however, involved merely a tip from an anonymous caller who stated that there was a \\\"suspicious black male wearing a blue coat\\\" in the vicinity.\\nThe informant in Purnell's case was known to the police as a source of reliable information. Furthermore, the informant gave a detailed description of what each of the males was wearing and the activity they were engaging in. The officers spotted Purnell, who matched the description of the unidentified man given by the informant. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers did possess reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Purnell, given that he matched the description provided by the informant and was in the vicinity stated by the informant. Therefore, the trial court properly found that there was reasonable articula-ble suspicion to stop Purnell.\\nSeizure of the Keys\\nPurnell asserts that the officers' search and seizure of the keys in his jacket was an illegal search and seizure, in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State argues that the search was proper.\\nPursuant to a brief stop of an individual an officer \\\"may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons.\\\" This is known as a \\\"Terry search.\\\" \\\"[T]he purpose of a Terry search is 'not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.' \\\" \\\"So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose.\\\"\\nAs noted, a permissible search for weapons is very limited. \\\"'[I]f the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.' \\\" Therefore, a search outside of the scope of the limitations of a Terry stop is illegal.\\nIn Hicks v. State an officer detained a woman in her car, in a residential driveway, for a traffic violation. Soon after the stop, a crowd gathered around the officer and the woman in the car. Of the members of the crowd, one man, the defendant Hicks, was extremely close to the officer and was constantly asking the officer questions. Hicks also kept his hands concealed in his pocket. The officer was apprehensive and concerned about his exposure to harm from Hicks. The officer asked Hicks to leave, but he refused. At this point the officer detained Hicks and conducted a pat-down search for weapons. The officer felt a large bulge which the officer thought might be a weapon. The officer removed the object and discovered it was a green pouch. After opening the pouch the officer found it contained money and a sandwich bag. Knowing that drugs are frequently packaged in sandwich bags the officer seized the pouch and decided to examine further its contents to determine if it concealed drugs. The officer later found drugs in the pouch.\\nOn appeal, Hicks argued that the officer's conduct was illegal, asserting that the stop and pat-down were impermissible, as was the seizure and search of the pouch. This Court held that the stop and pat-down of Hicks were legal, but that the reexamination of the contents of the pouch violated state and federal constitutional law. Specifically, we held that, \\\"Once the pouch was removed, seized and inspected by the arresting officer, no reasonable basis remained to believe that Hicks was presently armed and dangerous.\\\" Thus, a reexamination of the pouch was held to be outside the scope of the protective search.\\nIn this case the officers conducted two searches of Purnell. The first was a search for weapons. The Superior Court correctly found that this search was proper. The informant had relayed to the officers that the men were armed. Furthermore, the officers knew from experience that people who deal in drugs are often armed. Thus, the officers were justified in searching Purnell for weapons to protect themselves.\\nThe second search occurred after the officers knew that Purnell was unarmed. In ruling on the legality of this search the trial court found:\\nThe defendant was then asked how he got there. He said he came by bus. The officers [sic] who conducted the pat-down thought he had felt keys or keypad in the defendant's pocket. Asked to see it. Defendant showed it to him. And it's the keys to a Buick.\\nBut, as I said, in any event, the Court has no evidence that there was any demand that the keys be given up. And the evidence is that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave them up.\\nThe Court's findings are inaccurate and not clearly supported by the record. The testimony of Detective Jordan revealed two things. First, his testimony was not definite on whether the officers received permission to search for the keys. He stated only that he \\\"believe[d]\\\" they asked to continue the search. Second, Detective Jordan did not recall whether permission was given to seize the keys. The record also revealed that the police report explicitly indicates that permission was given to conduct the first search and that Purnell gave permission for them to seize the money. The report does not state, however, that they received permission to conduct the second search or that Purnell gave permission for them to take the keys.\\nThe State argues the seizure of the keys was proper and cites this Court's decision in Mosley v. State. In Mosley, an officer noticed a piece of plastic protruding out of the defendant's brassiere during the course of a pat-down search in connection with a drug deal. After noticing the plastic, the female officer believed it to contain narcotics so \\\"she placed her hand over the area and felt a 'rocky substance' that she suspected was crack cocaine.\\\" The officer seized the object and determined that the plastic bag appeared to contain crack cocaine. Mosley was then arrested.\\nOn appeal Mosley argued that the seizure of the drugs was illegal. Citing Minnesota v. Dickerson as controlling, we disagreed, holding that, \\\"a police officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected during a pat-down search if the identity of that contraband is immediately apparent from plain sight or plain touch.\\\"\\nIn Dickerson the United States Supreme Court ruled that contraband may be seized without a warrant where the contraband is in plain sight. The Court based its holding on a prior case, Horton v. California. Specifically, the Dickerson Court cited Horton's holding that if \\\"the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object \\u2014 i.e., if 'its incriminating character [is not] \\\"immediately apparent,\\\" ' the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.\\\"\\nThe State's argument in support of the second search fails for several reasons. First, the keys were not seized during the pat-down search but during a subsequent search. The officers did not hav\\u00e9 authority to conduct this second search because the first search revealed that Purnell did not have any weapons. Thus, the second search was not for the purpose of protecting the officers.\\nSecond, the incriminating character of the keys was not \\\"immediately apparent.\\\" The officers had no reason to know whether the keys were linked to the Buick. Even if the officers did suspect that the keys belonged to the Buick, it was still not \\\"immediately apparent\\\" that the Buick contained drugs. Thus the keys were not of an \\\"incriminating character.\\\" Furthermore, the State cannot support its argument by contending that because Purnell stated he had taken the bus, the officers knew he was lying and the keys incriminated him on this point. Detective Jordan admitted during his testimony that Purnell could have had the keys in his possession and still could have taken the bus. Thus, this reason also does not give the keys an \\\"incriminating character.\\\"\\nFinally, in this context one cannot reasonably describe car keys as \\\"contraband.\\\" Webster's Dictionary defines contraband as \\\"goods or merchandise the importation, exportation, or sometimes possession of which is forbidden.\\\" The cases that the State cites all deal with instances where a police officer felt or saw drugs, or what the officer believed to be drugs. Clearly, drugs are contraband. In Purnell's case, however, the officers felt keys and a keypad, which they clearly believed to be keys and a keypad. Neither keys nor a keypad, in this situation, are contraband. The State's reliance on Mosley and Dickerson, therefore, lacks merit.\\nA search pursuant to a Terry stop is conducted for the limited purpose of protecting the officer by determining if the person stopped has weapons. The officers in this case knew from the first search that Purnell was not in possession of weapons. After Purnell stated that he took the bus to the area the officers conducted a second search. This was not a search for weapons. Rather, it was a search for evidence. The record indicates that the State does not have proof that Purnell gave permission to conduct this search or to remove the keys from his pocket. Given that Terry searches may be conducted only for a limited purpose, Purnell's right to be protected from an unreasonable search and seizure was violated by the officers' second search. The trial court, therefore, abused its discretion by denying Purnell's motion to suppress the evidence that was based on the illegal search and seizure of the keys.\\nWarrantless Search of the Vehicle\\nPurnell contends that the officers conducted a warrantless, and thus illegal, search of his vehicle by unlocking the doors to the Buick. We find no need to address this issue, as all evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure of the keys is fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed.\\nConclusion\\nAccordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED.\\n. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).\\n. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).\\n. Del Code Ann. tit. 16, \\u00a7 4752 (2001).\\n. Del Code Ann. tit. 16, \\u00a7 4755 (2001).\\n. Del Code Ann., tit. 16, \\u00a7 4768 (2001).\\n. Del Code Ann. tit. 16, \\u00a7 4771 (2001).\\n. Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1261 (Del.2001).\\n. Id.\\n. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del.1999). (Jones was decided under the Delaware detention statute and the Delaware Constitution, but for this purpose the analysis under the United States Constitution is the same.)\\n. Id. at 863.\\n. Id.\\n. Id. at 862 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)).\\n. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547.\\n. Woody, 765 A.2d at 1262.\\n. Id. at 1263.\\n. Id. (quoting Jones, 745 A.2d at 861 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981))).\\n. Id. at 1262.\\n. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).\\n. Id.\\n. Id. at 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921.\\n. Jones, 745 A.2d at 873-74.\\n. Id. at 858.\\n. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921.\\n. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).\\n. Hicks v. State, 631 A.2d 6, 11 (Del.1993) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)).\\n. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921.\\n. Hicks, 631 A.2d at 11 (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130).\\n. Id. at 7-8. Hicks was the woman's boyfriend but did not mention this to the officer.\\n. Id. at 8.\\n.Id.\\n. Id.\\n. Id. at 9.\\n. Id. at 10.\\n. Id. at 11.\\n. Trial Transcript at 104.\\n. The record states:\\nPurnell's Attorney: Okay. Now, with the renewed interest \\u2014 and, again, not to beat this to death \\u2014 but with the renewed interest in the car keys, the affidavit of probable cause, and I don't think the report as well nor the affidavit of probable cause for the arrest indicates that Mr. Purnell was asked for permission to go into his jacket pocket to retrieve the keys.\\nIs it your testimony today that he.was asked permission to go into his pocket to retrieve the keys?\\nDetective Jordan: I believe they asked to continue their search. Whether there was permission granted for the keys, that I don't recall. I know he specifically gave permission to take the money out. The keys, I don't recall.\\nTrial Transcript at 45-46.\\n. No. 451, 1998, 748 A.2d 407, 2000 Del. Lexis 90 (Del.2000) (ORDER).\\n. Id. at 407, 2000 Del. Lexis 90 at *2.\\n. 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).\\n. Id. at 407, 2000 Del. Lexis 90 at *3.\\n. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).\\n. Id. at 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (alteration in original) (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).\\n. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 494 (8th ed. 2002).\\n. In Adams the United States Supreme Court stated, \\\"The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence_\\\" Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (emphasis added).\\n. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (holding that \\\"evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search\\\" (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914))).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/delaware/9179563.json b/delaware/9179563.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6b4589ab7a7013fe8932e2ea90fff12bef11cf11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/delaware/9179563.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9179563\", \"name\": \"Danielle SAMPSON, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES and Court Appointed Special Advocate, Petitioners Below, Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sampson v. Division of Family Services\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-02-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 337,2004\", \"first_page\": \"832\", \"last_page\": \"836\", \"citations\": \"868 A.2d 832\", \"volume\": \"868\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Delaware Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Delaware\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:36:51.406787+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.\", \"parties\": \"Danielle SAMPSON, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES and Court Appointed Special Advocate, Petitioners Below, Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"Danielle SAMPSON, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES and Court Appointed Special Advocate, Petitioners Below, Appellees.\\nNo. 337,2004.\\nSupreme Court of Delaware.\\nSubmitted: Jan. 12, 2005.\\nDecided: Feb. 25, 2005.\\nGlynis Gibson, Esquire, of Gibson & No-wak, LLP, Dover; Delaware; for Appellant.\\nPeter S. Feliceangeli and Lorin M. Hochman, Esquires, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee.\\nMitchell W. May, Esquire, of Street & Ellis, P.A., Dover, Delaware; Court Appointed Special Advocate.\\nBefore STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.\\n. The Court, sua sponte, has assigned pseudonyms to the parties under supr. ct. r. 7(d).\", \"word_count\": \"1745\", \"char_count\": \"10953\", \"text\": \"JACOBS, Justice.\\nThe respondent-below appellant, Danielle Sampson, appeals from an order of the Family Court terminating her parental rights in her biological child, Samuel L. Sampson. Sampson argues that the statute under which her parental rights were terminated is unconstitutional because it deprived her of her constitutional right to due process. That statute, 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1103(a)(6), provides in essence that parental rights may be terminated where: (1) a parent's rights over another child have previously been involuntarily terminated, and (2) termination is in the best interests of the child.\\nWe conclude that Section 1103(a)(6) affords sufficient due process. Because the Division of Family- Services satisfied the requirements of that statute by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.\\nFacts\\nThe petitioner-below appellee, the Division of Family Services (\\\"DFS\\\"), took temporary custody of Samuel in February 2001, while DFS was investigating a case against Sampson relating to her four older children. On March 22, 2002, the Family Court terminated Sampson's parental rights in those four children. In that proceeding, the Family Court also found that Samuel would be dependent or neglected if he was placed in Sampson's custody, a ruling that this Court affirmed on February 11, 2003. As a result of that ruling, DFS took custody of Samuel.\\nDFS then offered to provide Sampson with reunification services so that Samuel could be returned to her care, but Sampson refused to work cooperatively with DFS. Consequently, DFS filed a petition to terminate Sampson's parental rights to Samuel. On July 6, 2004, The Family Court terminated Sampson's parental rights after concluding that DFS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements for termination under 13 Del C. \\u00a7 1103(a)(6) had been satisfied.\\nAnalysis\\nSampson claims that 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1103(a)(6) violates her right to due process of law because the statute creates a presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently or in the future, solely because her parental rights to her older children were previously terminated. Stated differently, Sampson argues that because of the prior termination of her parental rights in her four older children, she was denied the opportunity to prove that she was- able to care for Samuel. This Court reviews constitutional claims de novo.\\nSection 1103(a)(6) relevantly provides that \\\"... termination of parental rights . may be initiated whenever it appears to be in the child's best interest and [when] . the respondent's parental rights over a sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition have been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.\\\" DFS must prove each statutory element by clear and convincing evidence.\\nSampson does not claim any constitutional infirmity in the earlier Family Court termination of her parental rights. That determination is res judicata and cannot now be challenged. Instead, Sampson argues that by establishing that prior termination as a basis for terminating her rights to a, different child, Section 1103(a)(6) violates procedural due process by denying her the opportunity to show that despite the prior termination, she is fit to continue as Samuel's parent. The short and dispositive answer is that the statute does not deny her that opportunity.\\nIn determining whether a statute violates procedural due process, this Court must balance three factors (the \\\"Eldridge factors\\\"): (1) -the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the government, interest involved, and (3) the risk that there will be an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures currently used, and the probable value of any additional or substitute safeguards.\\nThe first and second Eldridge factors require this Court to consider both the private interest and the government interest at stake. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. That interest, however, must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting the welfare of minor children who have been placed in State custody because their natural parents are unable to provide adequate care. Both factors are highly significant.\\nThe third Eldridge factor requires us to consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of rights resulting from the current statutory procedure, and the potential value of any additional or substitute procedures. Sampson claims that the \\\"prior termination\\\" provision of Section 1103(a)(6) precludes a parent from demonstrating his or her ability to care for a child, thereby creating a risk that the parent will be deprived of her parental rights on grounds that are contrary to fact. That argument fails, because by requiring DFS to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests, the current Section 1103(a)(6) procedure permits inquiry into a parent's fitness to rear the particular child .whose custody is at issue.\\nSpecifically, in determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, the Court is mandated to consider: (1) the wishes of the child's parents; (2) the wishes of the child (or the child's custodian); (3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and other relatives; (4) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community; (5) the mental and physical health of all the individuals involved; (6) the past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to their child under 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 701; and (7) evidence of domestic violence.\\nThe Family Court considered these factors, and it found that DFS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that it was in Samuel's best interests for Sampson's parental rights to be terminated. Sampson does not challenge that Family Court finding.\\nContrary to Sampson's argument, Section 1103(a)(6) does not foreclose judicial inquiry into her fitness to care for one child solely because her parental rights in her older children had previously been involuntarily terminated. By requiring DFS to prove that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest, that statute protects against an erroneous deprivation of parental rights.\\nIn accordance with this Court's holding in Watson, Sampson was represented by counsel throughout the dependency and the termination proceedings. Sampson initially was afforded her right to due process at a dependency hearing in the Family Court that resulted in Samuel's temporary placement in the custody of DFS. Thereafter, Sampson was afforded additional due process rights when DFS offered to provide Sampson with reunification services so that Samuel could be returned to her care. Sampson refused to work cooperatively with DFS, however. Finally, at the termination hearing Sampson, again assisted by counsel, was afforded an opportunity to demonstrate why it was not in Samuel's best interest for her parental rights to be terminated.\\nSampson's parental rights were terminated not only because her parental rights over her other children had been involuntarily terminated, but also because, as a result of her failure to work cooperatively with DFS to be reunified with Samuel, it was also in Samuel's best interest to have her parental rights over him terminated. Despite the fact that Sampson's parental rights over her other children had been terminated involuntarily, Section 1103(a)(6) required DFS independently to present proof that termination was in Samuel's best interest. The foregoing procedures dispose of Sampson's claim that the statute denies Sampson's constitutional right to procedural due process.\\nConclusion\\nFor these reasons the judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED.\\n. DFS was investigating charges that Sampson's former husband had physically and sexually abused their four children, and that Sampson knew of the abuse but did nothing to stop it. Sampson's husband confessed to abusing Sampson's four older children physically and sexually. The Family Court found that Sampson was aware of that abuse and did nothing to stop it, and that she failed adequately to plan for her children's physical needs or mental and emotional health. Spence v. Division of Family Services, C.A. Nos. 217, 2002 & 224, 2002, 2003 WL 329590 (Del. Feb. 11, 2003).\\n. Spence, 2003 WL 329590. A dependency-neglect hearing is the first step taken by DFS in the process of terminating parental rights. If the Family Court finds that a child is dependent, custody is transferred to the State, and the child is placed in foster care. DFS is then obligated to reunite the family, if possible. If its efforts to reunite the parent(s) and child are unsuccessful, DFS files a petition to terminate parental rights. Watson v. Division of Family Serv., 813 A.2d 1101, 1106 (Del.2002).\\n. The Family Court granted partial summary judgment to DFS on the second statutory ground (the prior involuntary termination of parental rights in another child) after this Court affirmed the order of the Family Court terminating Sampson's parental rights in her four older children. The Family Court then held a hearing and determined that DFS had proved the first statutory element (that termination would be in the child's best interests) by clear and convincing evidence.\\n. U.S. Const. Amend V; Del. Const. Art. I, \\u00a7 9.\\n. Grace v. State, 658 A.2d 1011, 1015 (Del.1995); Hercules, Inc. v. Leu Trust & Banking (Bah.) Ltd., 611 A.2d 476, 481 (Del.1992).\\n. 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 1103(a)(6) (emphasis added).\\n. In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del.1995) (quoting Patricia A.F. v. James R.F., 451 A.2d 830 (Del.1982)).\\n. In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 645-46 (Del.1986) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).\\n. In Re Burns, 519 A.2d at 645 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)).\\n. In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1177 (Del.1989).\\n.This Court has held that in a termination proceeding, the statutory factors listed in Section 722(a) should be used to determine the best interests of the child. In re Hanks, 553 A.2d at 1179; In re Burns, 519 A.2d at 644.\\n. 13 Del. C. \\u00a7 722(a).\\n. Watson v. Division of Family Serv., supra, n. 3.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file