diff --git a/ga/1067617.json b/ga/1067617.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..892f42587499f9994f4b9f912f2e0c940d114536 --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1067617.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1067617\", \"name\": \"CENTRAL GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. POPE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Central Georgia Power Co. v. Pope\", \"decision_date\": \"1915-09-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"130\", \"last_page\": \"135\", \"citations\": \"144 Ga. 130\", \"volume\": \"144\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:30.107719+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur, except Fish, C. J., absent.\", \"parties\": \"CENTRAL GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. POPE.\", \"head_matter\": \"CENTRAL GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. POPE.\\n1. The question raised as to the disqualification of certain jurors because of relationship to plaintiffs in other eases against the same defendant is controlled by Central Georgia Power Co. v. Nolen, 143 Ga. 776 (85 S. E. 945).\\n2. There was no evidence authorizing a charge to the effect that a release from damages, contained in a deed from the plaintiff to the defendant, did not release the latter from damages arising from criminal' negligence.\\n(a) The charge which left to the jury to determine whether the damages involved were reasonably in the contemplation of the parties when the conveyance and release were executed by the plaintiff to the defendant was not altogether appropriate or adapted to the present case.\\n3. Prior to the construction of its dam or reservoir, a hydroelectric company, having the right of eminent domain, obtained from the owners of certain lots a deed to portions thereof, for the purpose of making a reservoir and backing water by means of its dam. In the deed, after describing the property conveyed, and referring to the easements, rights, members, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, appeared the following words: \\u201cThe said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, being hereby released and discharged by the said party of the first part, their heirs, personal representatives, and assigns, from any and all action's and rights of action, rights to or claims for damages of any nature, resulting from the construction, maintenance, or operation of said dam or power-plant and the consequent changes in the height of the water.\\u201d Held, that such conveyance released the defendant from all damages resulting from the proper and non-negligent construction, maintenance, or operation of the dam or power-plant; but did not operate as a release of damages resulting from a negligent construction and maintenance thereof.\\nSeptember 22, 1915.\\nAction for damages. Before Judge Beid. Newton superior court. August 8, 1914.\\nW. C. Pope brought suit against the Central Georgia Power Company, seeking to recover damages alleged to have arisen from a nuisance created by the backing of water caused by the dam of the defendant. The petition alleged that the defendant negligently and improp\\u00e9rly erected its dam and constructed its plant, in not acquiring, by condemnation or otherwise, sufficient land to enable it to carry on its business so as not to injure the plaintiff\\u2019s land; and in that the defendant did not clean off the reservoir and remove therefrom the wood and other substances before backing water over it, causing the water to collect in lagoons and low places and to become stagnant and infested with disease-bearing mosquitoes, and to fill the air with noxious vapors and gases. Diminution in market value and in rental value of the plaintiff\\u2019s property, loss of rents and crops during certain years, and rendering it inconvenient as a habitation, were alleged. By amendment it was alleged that the defendant acted maliciously with the specific intent and purpose of injuring the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff $346.42. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and it excepted.\\nHatcher & Smith and Greene F. Johnson, for plaintiff in error.\\nRogers & Knox, contra.\", \"word_count\": \"1933\", \"char_count\": \"11434\", \"text\": \"Lumpkin, J.\\n(After stating the foregoing facts.) This case was before the Supreme Court on exceptions to the ruling of the trial court upon a demurrer. 141 Ga. 186 (80 S. E. 642). Several of the grounds of the motion for a new trial were expressly abandoned in the brief. Some of the others were palpably without merit, and require no discussion.\\nThe contention that certain jurors were disqualified, because of relationship to plaintiffs in other cases against the defendant, is controlled by the decision in Central Georgia Power Co. v. Nolen, 143 Ga. 776 (85 S. E. 945). The proceeding was not a challenge of certain jurors on the ground of bias, but an effort to apply, as a legal test of disqualification, the relationship within the fourth degree of any juror to any plaintiff in the other cases pending.\\nThe defendant introduced a conveyance of parts of certain tracts of land by the plaintiff and others to the defendant, which contained the following clause of release, after the description of the land conveyed, and a reference to its easements, rights, members, and appurtenances: \\\"The said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, being hereby released and discharged by the said party of the first part, their heirs, personal representatives, and assigns, from any and all actions and rights of action, rights to or claims for damages of any nature, resulting from the construction, maintenance, or operation of said dam or power-plant and the consequent changes in the height of the water.\\\" The .court charged the jury that no release would he binding on a party so far as damages arising from criminal negligence of the other party were concerned, and defined criminal negligence to be a dereliction of duty under circumstances showing an actual intent to injure. There was no evidence of criminal negligence on the part of the defendant, and this charge was unwarranted and injurious to the defendant.\\nThe defendant company was one having the power of eminent domain. Had it acquired property from the plaintiff for the purpose of constructing its reservoir and operating its works, the damages awarded would have included such as arose from .a proper and non-negligent construction and operation; but would not have prevented a recovery for a negligent construction or operation. Central Georgia Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga. 120, 124 (72 S. E. 900).\\nIn 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), \\u00a7 710, it is said: \\\"When part of a tract is taken, the damages are not limited to such as result from the, mere severance of title caused by the taking, but include damages caused by the use of the property for the .purpose for which the condemnation is made. Such use embraces the construction of the work or improvement, and the maintenance, use, and operation of the same. Thus in a railroad case it was held proper to consider 'all incidental loss, inconvenience, and damages, present and prospective, which may be known or may reasonably be expected to result from the construction and operation of the road in a legal and proper manner.' \\\" In section 714 it is said: \\\"Damages are to be assessed on the basis that the works will be constructed and operated in a skillful and proper manner. Thus in case of railroads it must be assumed that they will construct necessary and proper culverts, and that, in bridging streams, they will make waterways of sufficient capacity and so place the piers and abutments as not to do any unnecessary injury to the adjacent lands. All damages resulting from neglect in construction or from negligence in the use of the property or works may be recovered by appropriate actions by the parties damnified when-such damages occur, and nothing should be allowed on the theory that such negligence may happen.\\\" In section 821 it is said: \\\"The authorities undoubtedly hold that the assessment of damages will be presumed to include all damages which arise from constructing the works in a reasonable and proper manner, having regard to the efficiency of the works on the one hand and the interest of the landowner on the other. Where a subsequent claim for damages is made, arising from the construction of works, the question will be whether the works have been constructed in a proper manner, and whether the damage necessarily results from the works as so constructed. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then the damages complained of will be presumed to have been considered in estimating the damages, and no further recovery can be had. If they are answered in the negative, then a recovery can be had in an appropriate common-law action.\\\" In this section possible negligent operation is not considered. Numerous authorities are cited under the sections quoted. See also \\u00a7 829; Missouri &c. Ry Co. v. Haines, 10 Kans. 439; Neilson v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co. 58 Wis. 516 (17 N. W. 310); Bungenstock v. Nishnabotna Drainage District, 163 Mo. 198 (64 S. W. 149). The author above mentioned urges, that, even in the absence of express constitutional or statutory provision on the subject of what damages are to be considered as included in the award, the decisions of various courts have been too broad. \\u00a7 82Q.\\nNo ruling was here made in regard to the provision of our constitution to the effect that private property shall not be taken or damaged without just and adequate compensation being first paid ; and no discussion thereof is required.\\nWhere, instead of condemning the land belonging to the plaintiff and others, the defendant obtained from them a conveyance con taining the words-of release above quoted, such words will not be construed as covering improper and negligent construction on the part of the defendant, or so as to release it from damages arising therefrom. The conveyance was made before completion of the work, or the doing of the damage, and does not fall within the reasoning of those decisions which dealt with a completed structure and existing status. Freemont &c. R. Co. v. Harlin, 50 Neb. 698 (70 N. W. 263, 36 L. R. A. 417, 61 Am. St. R. 578); Jungblum v. Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 70 Minn. 153 (72 N. W. 971); Brown v. Pine Creek Ry. Co., 183 Penn. St. 38 (38 Atl. 401). The decision in Seaboard Air-Line Railway v. McMurrain, 132 Ga. 181 (63 S. E. 1098), does not conflict with what is said above.\\n, It is true that general words are employed in the release, but they must be considered in connection with the other parts of the conveyance, which is to be looked to as a whole. There is nothing .to show an intention to include a release from damages arising from negligence; and the construction above stated is the proper one to be placed upon the instrument.\\nA release is to be construed according to the intent of the parties. Surrounding circumstances are admissible to explain an ambiguity. General words of release accompanying particular recitals are to be construed in connection with such recitals, so as to give effect to the intent exhibited by the instrument as a whole. See, in this connection, 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 290-294, and citations. Sometimes the expression has been used that certain damages were or were not in contemplation of the parties; and the trial court in this case submitted to the jury to determine whether the damages claimed in the present suit were or were not in the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed. We do not think that this form of instruction was well adapted to the case, or an apt method of expression. Parties may execute an instrument which will-release all claims of every character, although they may hot have in special contemplation a particular claim or item of damages. But under the construction which has been given above to the words of release included in the conveyance here involved, it is not necessary to discuss further what might be the best mode of submitting to the jury the question of intent in a proper case.\\nFrom what has been said a reversal of the judgment must be granted. As a new trial will be had, the evidence introduced on the last trial need not be discussed.\\nJudgment reversed.\\nAll the Justices concur, except Fish, C. J., absent.\"}" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ga/1067773.json b/ga/1067773.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ecaf21b9139f5529ebd284e9f34be28663c656fa --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1067773.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1067773\", \"name\": \"WILSON v. THE STATE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wilson v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-11-30\", \"docket_number\": \"S01A1315\", \"first_page\": \"637\", \"last_page\": \"640\", \"citations\": \"274 Ga. 637\", \"volume\": \"274\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:21:49.649227+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur.\", \"parties\": \"WILSON v. THE STATE.\", \"head_matter\": \"S01A1315.\\nWILSON v. THE STATE.\\n(555 SE2d 725)\", \"word_count\": \"1301\", \"char_count\": \"7858\", \"text\": \"Hunstein, Justice.\\nAppellant Keith Wilson was convicted of the malice murder of Ashante McRdne, two counts of aggravated assault on other individuals, and possession of a firearm during his commission of the crimes. Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, three consecutive five-year terms for the firearms offenses, and two consecutive twenty-year terms on the aggravated assault offenses. The trial court denied Wilson's motion for new trial and he appeals.\\n1. The evidence presented at trial shows that on the day of the crimes Wilson had an argument with one of the victims, Keith McClain. Later, while McClain and others sat outside an apartment, Wilson and a friend, Malcolm Reeves, positioned themselves in an alleyway across the street. Wilson yelled to the victims that somebody was going to die. Shortly thereafter, Wilson withdrew a weapon and began shooting at the victims. McKine died as a result of a bullet which passed through his chest. Immediately after the gunshots were fired, Wilson ran a few streets away where he was seen giving \\\"high fives\\\" to a group of friends and boasting that he killed someone.\\nConstrued in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Wilson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).\\n2. We reject Wilson's contention that the State failed to present sufficient evidence corroborating Reeves' testimony. Even assuming that Reeves' testimony required corroboration, only slight evidence is required and the sufficiency of the corroboration is a question for the jury. Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570 (1) (501 SE2d 810) (1998). Through the testimony of other witnesses, the State corroborated Reeves' testimony that Wilson and McClain had an altercation earlier in the day, Reeves and Wilson were standing in the alley just before the shooting occurred, Wilson made threatening statements to McClain and his friends from the alley, the shots came from the alley, both Reeves and Wilson ran from the alley immediately after the shooting, and Wilson was seen giving \\\"high fives\\\" and boasting that he \\\"got one\\\" minutes after the shooting. This evidence was sufficient to corroborate Reeves' testimony. See id.\\n3. Prior to trial the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel participated in an in-chambers conference during which the parties outlined their cases and estimated the length of trial. The State also brought and the court ruled upon an oral motion in limine to exclude from trial any evidence of the crimes being drug-related or that McKine had drugs on his person at the time of his death. Wilson con tends his absence from the conference violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against him. We disagree.\\nIt is well-established that a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at every stage of the proceedings materially affecting his case, Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII, and that the right to be present may be waived if the defendant later acquiesces in the proceedings occurring in his absence. Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 860-861 (5) (524 SE2d 473) (1999); Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479, 483-484 (3) (a) (299 SE2d 531) (1983); State v. Phillips, 247 Ga. 246, 248 (1) (B) (275 SE2d 323) (1981). In this case, it is undisputed that Wilson was not present during the in-chambers conference. The record affirmatively establishes, however, that Wilson was present on at least three occasions when the issue of the State's motion in limine and the trial court's ruling on the motion was raised during trial and discussed at length by all parties. On each such occasion, Wilson's counsel made no objection to Wilson's absence from the in-chambers conference and Wilson remained silent. Accordingly, we find that under the circumstances of this case Wilson acquiesced in the proceedings which occurred during the in-chambers conference in his absence. See Holsey, supra; Phillips, supra.\\n4. The trial court did not err in granting the State's motion to exclude speculative defense evidence suggesting that the crimes were drug-related or that the victim was in possession of drugs at the time he was killed. See Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36 (5) (495 SE2d 34) (1998).\\n5. Wilson was arrested several days after the shooting when he was discovered hiding under a house by an officer searching for a suspect in an unrelated crime and the officer recognized Wilson as the suspect wanted for McKine's murder. The arresting officer testified to the circumstances of Wilson's arrest at trial and Wilson contends the admission of this testimony impermissibly placed his character in issue. Even assuming the admission of the arresting officer's testimony was error, we conclude that the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Wilson's guilt and the fact that such evidence did not establish the commission of another crime. See Benford v. State, 272 Ga. 348 (3) (528 SE2d 795) (2000).\\n6. We reject Wilson's contention that there was a fatal variance between the State's allegation that he shot the aggravated assault victims and the evidence that he shot at those victims. Wilson was sufficiently informed of the charges against him so as to form a defense, and there was no danger that he could be prosecuted again for the same offenses. See Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. 284, 286 (3) (527 SE2d 872) (2000); Battles v. State, 262 Ga. 415 (5) (420 SE2d 303) (1992).\\nDecided November 30, 2001\\nReconsideration denied December 14, 2001.\\nJackson & Schiavone, Steven L. Sparger, Charles C. Grile, for appellant.\\nSpencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Melanie Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wylencia H. Monroe, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.\\n7. The trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the legal issues of immunity and leniency as there was no evidence to support Wilson's assertion that Reeves testified in exchange for immunity or leniency. See Monsalve v. State, 271 Ga. 523 (3) (519 SE2d 915) (1999).\\n8. The trial court did not err in charging the jury on parties to a crime. The State presented evidence from which the jury was authorized to find that Wilson committed the crimes charged as either a direct participant or as a party to the crimes. \\\" 'Where there is any evidence, however slight, upon a particular issue, it is not error for the court to charge the law in relation to that issue. (Cits.)' [Cit.]\\\" Rhodes v. State, 271 Ga. 481, 483 (3) (521 SE2d 579) (1999).\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nAll the Justices concur.\\nThe crimes occurred on August 25,1999. Wilson was indicted by the Chatham County grand jury on charges of malice murder, felony murder, five counts of aggravated assault and seven counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was tried before a jury on September 13-15, 2000. At the close of the State's case, the trial court dismissed two counts of aggravated assault and two related possession counts. Wilson was found guilty of the remaining counts and sentenced to fife imprisonment for malice murder, three consecutive five-year terms for the possession charges, and two consecutive twenty-year terms for the aggravated assaults. The charges of felony murder, aggravated assault upon McKine, and related possession charges were vacated as a matter of law. A motion for new trial was filed on October 9, 2000, amended on January 25, 2001, and denied on March 15, 2001. Wilson filed a notice of appeal on April 3, 2001. The appeal was docketed in this court on May 29, 2001 and orally argued on September 17, 2001.\"}" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ga/1082422.json b/ga/1082422.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d31417a6de21227f8058184e0c0fcfb6a9349b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1082422.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1082422\", \"name\": \"VADA NAVAL STORES COMPANY v. SAPP\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vada Naval Stores Co. v. Sapp\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-01-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 987\", \"first_page\": \"677\", \"last_page\": \"684\", \"citations\": \"148 Ga. 677\", \"volume\": \"148\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:13.269190+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur.\", \"parties\": \"VADA NAVAL STORES COMPANY v. SAPP.\", \"head_matter\": \"VADA NAVAL STORES COMPANY v. SAPP.\\n1. The petition as amended set forth a cause of action, and there was no error in overruling the general and special demurrers.\\n2. The vendee of a tenant who has an apparent legal title and from whom the purchase was made, with or without notice of the tenancy, can not dispute the title of the landlord, in an action of complaint for land, until he has restored the possession to the latter.\\n3. Without regard to the special assignments of error upon the admissibility of testimony and upon pertain instructions given by the court to the jury, the verdict for the plaintiff was demanded, and the court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.\\nNo. 987.\\nJanuary 15, 1919.\\nComplaint for land. Before Judge Worrill. Decatur superior court. May 4,- 1918.\\nThe following is a condensed statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the rulings made in this case: In July, 1904, H. H. Sapp purchased from the Troxwell heirs the west half of lot of land No. 382, containing 125 acres, more or less, in the 16th district of Decatur county. The deed was not recorded. Shortly after his purchase Sapp conveyed the land, for a valuable consideration, to Mrs. H. H. Sapp, his wife. Thereafter she leased the land to him, to be used as a location, as long as needed, for the purpose of manufacturing turpentine. The lease did not specify any particular part of the land, nor restrict the lessee to the use of any particular number of acres. In November, 1904, H. H. Sapp sold a half interest in the turpentine location to J. L. Peebles, executing to him a lease which was recorded on November 9, 1904, containing the following recital: \\\"The land on which said still is located belongs to Mrs. H. H. Sapp; the said H. H. Sapp hereby conveys to said Peebles a lease which he holds to said land to be used as a location as long as it is needed for the purpose of manufacturing turpentine.\\u201d Thereafter Sapp sold his remaining half interest in the turpentine location to M. A. Bethune; and the lease from Sapp to Bethune, also recorded on November 9, 1904, contained in substance the same recital. Peebles and Bethune were, at the time, members of the copartnership of J. L. Peebles & Company, or shortly thereafter formed said copartnership, of which D. A. Autry also was a member. In 1905 Emma H. \\\"Wright and Columbia H. Lewis, two of the Troxwell heirs, conveyed said west half of lot of land to J. E. Harrell by deed recorded on August 10, 1905. Harrell conveyed the land to J. L. Peebles & Company on September 6, 1905, by deed recorded on the following day. At or about the time of this last purchase Peebles & Company notified Mrs. Sapp, by letter, that they no longer held under herj but that they were the owners of the true title to the half lot of land upon which the still site was located. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Sapp, according to their contentions, received this notice. Peebles & Company did not surrender or offer to surrender the possession of the still site or any part of the land to Mrs. Sapp. On October 25, 1906, Bethune conveyed to his copartners his interest in the co-partnership and turpentine site; and on January 18, 1910, by deed recorded on March 12, 1910, the copartnership conveyed the property to D. A. Autry & Son. '\\nOn February 14, 1911, Mrs. Sapp filed suit against Autry & Son, alleging that she was the owner in fee simple of said west half of said lot of land and had a perfect paper title thereto; that the defendants were in possession of the timber on said land and were turpentining it under some pretended claim of right, to her injury and damage; and she prayed for injunction against the defendants, for damages in a sum stated, and for process. By amendment she alleged, in substance, that Autry & Son were her tenants; that they procured possession of the premises in the manner hereinbefore detailed, and, after the purchase from Harrell, attempted to set up an adverse claim of title, in disregard of plaintiff\\u2019s title; that the turpentine site was located on said half lot of land, that the defendants had the right to use the same, so long as needed, for the purpose of manufacturing turpentine, but that the boxing of the timber on the land was a trespass; and that inasmuch as defendants occupied the relation of tenants to the plaintiff, the trespass was wilful. She therefore prayed for damages in an increased amount. The defendants filed an answer in which they denied the trespass, and set up title in themselves to the half lot of land. On May 13, 1913, the plaintiff recovered a verdict against Autry & Son in the sum of sixty-five dollars. In 1911, after the filing of the suit aforesaid and before its termination, Autry & Son sold the half lot in dispute to the Yada Naval Stores Company, a copartnership, and delivered the possession to them. The purchase was negotiated by one Ball, a member of said copartnership. Mrs. Sapp filed suit to the May term, 1914, of the superior court, against the Yada Naval Stores Company, for the recovery of the land with mesne profits. In addition to the foregoing, she alleged that Ball had actual notice and knowledge of the suit against Autry & Son at the time of the purchase, and that whatever claim of title \\u201cdefendants had to said land is void as against plaintiff.\\u201d Before the trial she amended by praying that \\u201cshe recover possession of the property described in the petition, and that judgment be rendered directing the defendants to restore said property to the possession of the plaintiff,\\u201d and that she recover rents only from the filing of the petition. The defendants demurred generally and specially. The verdict was for the plaintiff for the premises, and one hundred dollars rents. The defendants filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and they excepted to that ruling, and to the overruling of the demurrer.\\nM. B. O\\u2019Neal, and:Hartsfield & Conger, for plaintiffs in error.\\nT. S. Hawes, contra.\", \"word_count\": \"3163\", \"char_count\": \"17679\", \"text\": \"George, J.\\n(After stating the foregoing facts.) The petition set forth a cause of action, and the court did not err in overruling the general demurrer: In so far as any of thq groiinds of special demurrer were meritorious, they were fully met by timely amendment. In our opinion the verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the court below for the premises in dispute was demanded by the evidence. The special assignments of error,' complaining of rulings of the court upon the admissibility of evidence and of instructions by the court to the jury, do not relate to the question of mesne profits; or if they do relate to that issue, no reason appears from any of them why the verdict for mesne profits should be disturbed.\\nThe relation of landlord and tenant existed between Mrs. Sapp and her husband, H. H. Sapp, as well as those holding the possession of the premises under him. In the assignment of his lease to Peebles & Company, or to Peebles and Bethune, it was recited that Mrs. Sapp was the owner of the half lot of land in controversy, but that the assignees of Sapp should have the right to use the land so long as needed for the purpose of manufacturing turpentine. The elder Autry was a member of the firm of Peebles & Company, and his possession of the premises was acquired with full knowledge of the tenancy of Sapp and of Peebles & Company. The relation of landlord and tenant, therefore, existed between Mrs. Sapp and Autry & Son. Autry & Son sold the land in controversy to the Yada Naval Stores Company. The evidence in the record does not require a finding that the Vada Naval Stores Company knew of the tenancy of Autry & Son at the time of the purchase from the latter. In the view we take of the cas\\u00e9, it is immaterial whether the Yada Naval Stores Company knew of the relation between Mrs.- Sapp and Autry & Son before or at the time of the purchase. The tenant is estopped, as against the landlord, to deny the lessor's title. As otherwise stated, the tenant can not dispute the title of his landlord. The tenant can neither dispute the title of his landlord nor attorn to another while in possession acquired by his contract or lease; and if after the expiration of his term he desires to contest the title of his landlord, he must first, surrender, the possession acquired from him. Civil Code, \\u00a7 3698; Williams v. Garrison, 29 Ga. 503; Grizzard v. Roberts, 110 Ga. 41 (2), 44 (35 S. E. 291). This rule of the common law, as well as of our code, will not be controverted. It is, however, insisted that the rule -has no application here, since the Yada Naval Stores Company had no knowledge of the tenancy of Autry & Son at the time of the purchase. As a general rule, when the relation of landlord and tenant is once- established, it attaches to all who may succeed to the possession through or under the tenant either immediately or remotely. Were this not so, the general principle above discussed would be of little benefit to the landlord. The fact that the assignment by the tenant is in the form of a fee-simple conveyance is immaterial. The fact that the tenant exhibited to the purchaser an independent title is, in our view of the matter, likewise immaterial. We are aware that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Thompson v. Clark, 7 Pa. 62, has reached a contrary conclusion, but, as we think, erroneously. In that case it was held: \\\"The vendee of a tenant who has an apparent legal title, and from whom the purchase was made without notice of the tenancy, is not bound to deliver up possession to the landlord, but may defend in ejectment.\\\"- In 2 Herman on Estoppel, \\u00a7 861, it is said that the same estoppel which prevents a tenant from disputing his landlord's title likewise extends to all persons who enter upon premises under a contract of lease, and to all persons who by purchase, fraud, or otherwise, obtain possession from such tenant. It is there, however, added: \\\"But if one, not knowing that the tenant holds a lease, purchases the estate by an absolute deed from the tenant, who has an apparent legal title other than his lease, such purchaser may contest the title of the lessor.\\\" The text is based upon Thompson v. Clark, supra, and upon intimations contained in Cooper v. Smith, 8 Watts (Pa.) 536, and Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow. (N Y. 3 123 (15 Am. D. 451). In White v. Barlow, 72 Ga. 887, the second headnote is as follows: \\\"A tenant can not dispute his landlord's title, and- the title of the landlord is good against such tenant, or one holding under him with notice.\\\" In the course of the opinion by Chief Justice Jackson it was observed that the proof in that case positively showed notice in the assignee or purchaser from the tenant. The apparent intimation contained in the decision must, therefore, be taken in connection with the facts of th\\u00e9 case.\\nIt is, of course, true that a purchaser from such tenant, without knowledge of the tenancy, may assert his adverse possession as a basis of prescriptive title. This principle is recognized in McDougald v. Reedy, 71 Ga. 750. These two distinct principles must not, however, be .confused. A clear statement of what we believe to be the sound rule upon the question presented in this case is found in Lane's Lessee v. Osment, 17 Tenn. 85: \\\"Neither the tenant himself, nor a purchaser of the land under him, whether with or without notice of the landlord's right, can dispute the title of the landlord within the period necessary to form the bar of the statute of limitations.\\\" In Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 323 (17 Am. D. 517), it was held: \\\"A purchaser from the tenant, entering under an absolute conveyance in fee, is deemed to enter as the lessor's tenant, though he may not have known that his grantor derived possession from the lessor.\\\" So also in Reed v. Shepley, 6 Vt. 602, it was ruled: \\\"One holding land under another cannot set up an adverse claim until he has first surrendered up the possession; and all who claim under him are tenants subject to the same rule, whether they knew of that relationship or not.\\\" See also Jackson v. Scissam, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 498; Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Grat. 220 (58 Am. D. 217); Jackson v. Davis, supra; Phillips v. Rothwell, 7 Ky. 33. Prior to the Code of 1863 a judgment in ejectment was not conclusive as to the title between the parties thereto. Parker v. Stambaugh, 71 Ga. 735. By section 3275 of the Code of 1863 (Code of 1910, \\u00a7 5583) it is declared that \\\"A judgment in ejectment shall be conclusive as to the title between the parties thereto, unless the jury find for the plaintiff less than the fee.\\\" The action of ejectment by the landlord against the tenant, where the landlord relies for recovery upon the privity existing between the parties, involves only the right of possession. Cases may be found to the contrary. Jochen v. Tibbells, 50 Mich. 33 (14 N. W. 690); Shaw v. Ilill, 79 Mich. 86 (44 N. W. 422); McKie v. Anderson, 78 Tex. 207 (14 S. W. 576). But the true rule is that such a judgment in favor of the landlord is not conclusive in a subsequent action by the tenant, because the tenant can not be concluded by a judgment as to matters which he could not litigate in the action in which the judgment was rendered. If the judgment in ejectment in favor of the landlord against the tenant is conclusive as to the title, equity, under proper pleadings, would certainly enable the tenant to formally admit the possession of the landlord and to assert that his title is in fact p\\u00e1ramount, thereby assuming the same burden that he would be required to assume and carry in a separate action. But in actions for rent and for use and occupation, the reason of the rule which estops the tenant from disputing the title of the landlord is plainly apparent. It is not apparent if the judgment in an action of ejectment by the landlord against the tenant is conclusive as to the title between the parties. Of course the tenant, in such air action, can not set up want of title in the landlord, nor can he set up paramount title in another; but if the judgment is conclusive as to the title, or the suit against the tenant is so framed in any case as to adjudicate the question of title, the English rule, which permits the tenant to set up paramount title in himself, is' sound in principle. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mackenzie, 5 Law T. (N. S.) 20, 10 C. B. N. S., Am. Reprint, 870. \\\"We are bound, under our decisions, to apply the estoppel in actions of ejectment, or .of complaint for land, by the landlord against the tenant; but our conclusion is that the effect of the judgment against the tenant, unless the suit be so framed aS to adjudicate the title, is to force the tenant to a separate action for the purpose of asserting his title. In the case at bar we are not embarrassed in applying the estoppel for any of the reasons suggested above, because the petition, as finally amended, prayed only for the recovery of the possession of th\\u00e9 land, together with the rents from the time of the filing of the petition. \\\"While some of the allegations in the petition may have been broad enough to call for an adjudication of the title, the landlord expressly alleged that the tenant's claim, of title was \\\"void as against plaintiff,\\\" and upon the trial she relied only upon the privity existing between the parties. The evidence, without dispute,'shows that Sapp had acquired the possession of the premises from the plaintiff under and by virtue of the lease. Sapp's possession thus acquired passed by successive assignments into the Yada Naval Stores Company. The possession of Sapp and of those who held under him, including the possession of \\u2022 that company, was therefore the possession of the original lessor. Her possession was notice, under our code, of whatever rights she had in the premises. It is this possession that must be restored before the tenant can assert title adverse to the landlord.\\nIn our opinion the most that can be said in favor of a vendee of a tenant who has an apparent legal title, and from whom the purchase was made without notice of the tenancy, is that as between such vendee and the lessor the equities are equal. In such case the landlord, having the prior equity, should prevail. We deem it unnecessary to say that the letter from Peebles & Company to Mrs. Sapp, conceding that it was received by Mrs. Sapp, did not amount to a surrender of the premises to Mrs. Sapp. We also think it unimportant that only a small part of the half lot of land involved was actually used by Sapp and those holding under him as a site for the manufacture of turpentine. The whole tract was leased for that .purpose, and, so far as the record discloses, there was no restriction, express or implied, in the lease as to the quantity of land that might be so used. The possession of the whole tract was therefore acquired under and by virtue of the lease, and the possession thereof must be restored to the lessor.\\nIn view of the ruling made upon the controlling question in this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether the suit for trespass brought by Mrs. Sapp against Autry & Son, which was pending at the time of the sale by Autry & Son to the Yada Naval Stores Company, was lis pendens, and whether this doctrine is to be applied in this case. We call attention, in passing, to the New York ease of Hailey v. Ano, 136 N. Y. 569 (32 N. E. 1068, 32 Am. St. R. 764), where it was ruled that in such an action, the land itself not being the subject-matter of the suit, and there being nothing in the pleadings *to show that title thereto is involved, the purchaser of the land pendente lite is not bound by the judgment in a subsequent action involving title to the same land.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nAll the Justices concur.\"}" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ga/1082546.json b/ga/1082546.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34f70a8d7c9aa5af03e4dff50744f3c450ae5e79 --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1082546.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1082546\", \"name\": \"Williams v. The State\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Williams v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1918-08-14\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 775\", \"first_page\": \"310\", \"last_page\": \"311\", \"citations\": \"148 Ga. 310\", \"volume\": \"148\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:13.269190+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur.\", \"parties\": \"Williams v. The State.\", \"head_matter\": \"Williams v. The State.\\nNo. 775.\\nAugust 14, 1918.\", \"word_count\": \"424\", \"char_count\": \"2400\", \"text\": \"Hill, J.\\nPreston Williams was indicted and convicted of the murder of J. W. Johnson. Having been denied a new trial, he excepted. The evidence for the State showed that on May 8, 1917, the defendant was operating an illicit whisky distillery near his residence. The deceased was a deputy sheriff, and attempted to arrest the defendant Williams at his still, while he was in the act of operating it. When the deceased came upon the, defendant he ordered the defendant to \\\"hands up,\\\" and the defendant threw up his left hand and pulled a pistol from his pocket with the other hand and shot twice, and then the deceased commenced shooting. The deceased died from the wounds thus inflicted. It is insisted that under such circumstances the defendant had the right to defend himself against an unlawful arrest, as he did not know the deceased was an officer, or who he was. Held:\\n1. It being a felony in this State to distil or manufacture intoxicating liquor at the date of the homicide (Park's Ann. Code Supp. 1917, \\u00a7 448 (rrrr)), and the defendant being engaged in the commission of such felony 'at the time the officer-sought to arrest him, such officer, as an officer or a private person, had the right to make the arrest with or without a warrant. Penal Code, \\u00a7 917, 921; and see 5 Corpus Juris, 392, \\u00a7 16. Therefore no rule of law relative to the right of a person to resist an unlawful arrest is applicable to the present case. It follows that the criticisms upon the charges given to the jury, and the complaints of omissions to charge, based on the theory of an illegal arrest, are without merit.\\n2. None of the special grounds of the motion require a reversal. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the accused was violating the law of the State by commiting a felony in the presence of the deputy sheriff. The jury were authorized, under the evidence, to find the defendant guilty of murder, and the court did not err in denying him a new trial. Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 176 (48 S. E. 962). See Johnson. v. State, 130 Ga. 27 (6), 30 (60 S. E. 160).\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nAll the Justices concur.\\nIndictment for murder. Before Judge Thomas. Thomas superior court. December 15, 1917.\\nJohn B. Cooper, for plaintiff in error.\\nClifford Walker, attorney-general, Fondren Mitchell, solicitor-general, and M. C. Bennet, contra.\"}" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ga/1109462.json b/ga/1109462.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e21c423b541ad120c640ebee4bbda480ce0e4998 --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1109462.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1109462\", \"name\": \"ESTES v. THE STATE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Estes v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"24846\", \"first_page\": \"687\", \"last_page\": \"689\", \"citations\": \"224 Ga. 687\", \"volume\": \"224\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:53:36.249306+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur.\", \"parties\": \"ESTES v. THE STATE.\", \"head_matter\": \"24846.\\nESTES v. THE STATE.\\nArgued September 12, 1968\\nDecided October 10, 1968.\\nJohn L. Bespess, Jr., James B. Venable, H. G. McBrayer, Jr., for appellant.\\nAlbert Wallace, Solicitor General, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"736\", \"char_count\": \"4403\", \"text\": \"Grice, Justice.\\nThis appeal is by Mrs. Felicia Estes following her conviction and sentence for the murder of her husband Joe Douglas Estes. She was indicted by the grand jury of Clayton County for the homicide, was found guilty with recommendation of mercy upon trial in the superior court of that county, and thereupon was sentenced to life imprisonment.\\nTwo of the enumerations complain of the admission of testimony of a police officer, in that his testimony related to conversations which were not in the defendant's presence and therefore were hearsay and inadmissible. These enumerations are quite similar and may be treated together.\\nThe police officer was asked what two named persons told him that caused him to go to a hospital to talk with the defendant after the homicide had been discovered. Upon objection to the question as calling for hearsay, the solicitor general replied that he was asking the question to explain the conduct of the police officer in going to the hospital to talk with the defendant, not as proof of the facts stated but merely to show that such persons told the officer this and he acted upon what the persons told him. The judge allowed the question to be asked. The officer answered to the effect that one person told him that the defendant said she had shot the deceased, and that another person told him that the first person asked him to help him at the defendant's home. Thereupon, the defendant's counsel again objected. The solicitor general reiterated its purpose and the judge allowed it only for that purpose, so instructing the jury.\\nNo error was committed in admitting this testimony since it was allowed for the sole purpose of explaining the officer's conduct. See Code \\u00a7 38-302; Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686 (14) (13 SE2d 820); Jones v. State, 224 Ga. 283, 285 (161 SE2d 302).\\nAnother enumeration relating to the admission of evidence complains of the testimony of two police officers as to a statement of the defendant at the hospital on the night of the homicide. The appellant urges that the statement was not freely and voluntarily made because she was not in a condition to make a coherent statement or to protect her constitutional rights, and that the written statement was not complete in that everything she said was not reduced to writing.\\nThe evidence was that the defendant made the statement while lying on a bed in the hall of the hospital awaiting treatment for self-inflicted gunshot wounds and while in an emotional state, crying intermittently during the interview. There was nothing to indicate that she was under the influence of drugs or sedatives of any kind, but she was obviously upset. The officers testified that they did not write every word she said, but that they read back to her what was written and she signed the statement.\\nThe facts and circumstances surrounding this statement were considered by the trial judge in a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury. He found that the statement was voluntary, and therefore this became an issue for the jury. Likewise, the accuracy of the statement was for the jury to determine. The mere fact that the defendant was emotionally upset did not render it inadmissible. The requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974), were met.\\nThe statement was properly admitted in evidence.\\nThe evidence was ample to support the verdict of guilty. That the defendant killed the deceased was established by her declaration to a neighbor immediately afterward, her incriminating statement above referred to, and the physical facts and circumstances of the homicide. The jury was likewise authorized to find that the homicide was not justified in law, but was occasioned by malice, as shown by her oral and written statements, and other evidence relating to the defendant's discovery earlier that day that the deceased was associating with another woman. Hence there is no merit in the enumerations complaining of denial of the motion for new trial because of the general 'grounds.\\nJudgment affirmed.\\nAll the Justices concur.\"}" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/ga/1115287.json b/ga/1115287.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0492c630c97f004fe04b7fd4e631fa8e110f0f42 --- /dev/null +++ b/ga/1115287.json @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +"{\"id\": \"1115287\", \"name\": \"MAR-PAK MICHIGAN, INC. v. POINTER et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mar-Pak Michigan, Inc. v. Pointer\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-02-05\", \"docket_number\": \"25612\", \"first_page\": \"146\", \"last_page\": \"147\", \"citations\": \"226 Ga. 146\", \"volume\": \"226\", \"reporter\": \"Georgia Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Georgia\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Georgia\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:11:53.584254+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"All the Justices concur.\", \"parties\": \"MAR-PAK MICHIGAN, INC. v. POINTER et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"25612.\\nMAR-PAK MICHIGAN, INC. v. POINTER et al.\", \"word_count\": \"234\", \"char_count\": \"1336\", \"text\": \"Undercofler, Justice.\\nThe appellee moved to dismiss this appeal because the appellant is not a party to the case. The record shows that the appellant filed a motion to intervene in the case of The Mitchell Corporation of Georgia v. Will H. Pointer in the Superior Court of DeKalb County on July 15, 1969, and that on November 26, 1969, the date of the judgment here appealed, no order had been issued on the motion to intervene.\\nThe motion to dismiss this appeal is granted. \\\"Only a party to the case can appeal from a judgment . or one who has sought to become a party, as by way of intervention under Code Ann. \\u00a7 81A-124 and has been denied the right to do so.\\\" Coogler v. Berry, 117 Ga. App. 614 (161 SE2d 428). The appellant's contention that the trial court's failure to rule on its motion to intervene is tantamount to' an order denying the same is without merit. See Webb v. Walker, 213 Ga. 285 (2) (99 SE2d 75); Hardin v. Homeyer, 213 Ga. 321 (4) (99 SE2d 136).\\nAppeal dismissed.\\nAll the Justices concur.\\nArgued January 14, 1970\\nDecided February 5, 1970\\nRehearing denied February 19, 1970.\\nM. H. B'lackshear, Jr., for appellant.\\n.Carley .& Ramsay, George H. Carley, Arnall, Golden