THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case No: 636/2015

In the matter between:

VUSI SAMUEL VILAKAZI

APPELLANT

and

THE STATE

RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation:
Vilakazi v The State (636/2015) [2015] ZASCA 103 (15 June
2016)
Coram:

Mhlantla, Shongwe, Theron, Dambuza and Mathopo JJA
Heard:

5 November 2015
Delivered:

15 June 2016
Summary:
Criminal Law – Evidence of young children in sexual assault cases –
imperfections in evidence not necessarily fatal – evidence to be considered carefully
and holistically to determine trustworthiness.

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from:    North Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Mavundla
and Potterill JJ, majority, and Makgoka, minority, sitting as a court of appeal):

The appeal is dismissed.
___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

Dambuza JA (Shongwe, Theron and Mathopo JJA concurring):

[1] On 10 May 2004 the 36 year old appellant was convicted by the Delmas
Regional Court of raping the complainant, a 12 year old girl. The matter was then
referred to the North Gauteng High Court (Delmas Circuit) for confirmation of
conviction and for sentencing in terms of s 52(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act 105 of 1997 (the Act) prior to its amendment. The high court, per Rabie J,
confirmed the conviction. That court found that there were no substantial and
compelling circumstances attendant in the case and it imposed the minimum
sentence of life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to the full court of the North
Gauteng High Court which confirmed the conviction (Mavundla and Potterill JJ, with
(Makgoka J dissenting) and altered the sentence to one of 18 years‟ imprisonment.
This appeal against the conviction is with the special leave of this court.

[2] At the trial it was common cause that the report about the rape was made by
the complainant pursuant to her mother having confronted her and given her a
hiding. The mother had noticed that the complainant was walking with discomfort. On
inquiring from her as to what was wrong the complainant replied that she had a
wound on her foot. On inspection the mother observed that the wound that the

complainant referred to was too small to cause the discomfort that she had
observed. She then gave the complainant a hiding (pakslae gegee). The
complainant then told her that the appellant had had sexual intercourse with her.

[3] The appellant and the complainant‟s mother had known each other for about
four years prior to the incident. The appellant lived with a neighbour, Mr Nhleko, a
religious leader. He and the complainant‟s mother were relatively close
acquaintances or even friends. He often visited the complainant‟s home and he and
the complainant‟s mother would smoke together. Sometimes they would „go away‟
together and „drink tea‟ together, as the complainant testified.

[4] On receiving the report of the rape from the complainant, the complainant‟s
mother went to confront the appellant. The appellant and Mr and Mrs Nhleko then
went to the complainant‟s home and the matter was discussed. During the
discussions the appellant denied the allegations.

[5] The complainant was taken to the hospital and examined by a medical doctor.
Although the J88 medico legal report is not part of the record before us, it was
admitted into evidence and it was common cause at the trial that the complainant
had indeed been sexually penetrated. The doctor had recorded in the report that the
history given was that the last incident of rape was about four weeks prior to the
medical examination.

[6] The complainant, who was still 12 years old at the time of the trial, gave
evidence of both a general nature, relating to many incidents of rape, and of a
specific incident of sexual intercourse between the appellant and herself. She
testified that during March 2003 the appellant had had sexual intercourse with her
ten times at her home. This would be either in the late afternoon after she came back
from school, or in the evening when her mother would not be at home. Her four year
old sister would be present in the house1. The appellant would tell the younger sister
to go and sleep.

1 In parts of the record the age of the younger sister is recorded as five years.

[7] On a specific occasion the appellant came to her home whilst the complainant
and her younger sister were alone at home. They were sitting in the dining room.
The appellant ordered the younger sister to go and sleep. He then told the
complainant to switch off the lights; thereafter he started fondling the complainant
while the latter was sitting on a sofa. He took off her underwear, told her to lie down,
undressed himself and had sexual intercourse with her. He told her to go and have a
bath which she did. He also gave her R2 and warned her not to tell anyone about
what had happened, threatening to slaughter her and throw her body in a dark forest
if she did.

[8] The complainant‟s younger sister also gave evidence. In her brief evidence
she related an incident in which the complainant was made to lie on a sofa by the
appellant. This was after the appellant had told her to go and sleep. From the other
room she „peeked‟ and saw the appellant „lying on top of the complainant‟. She
heard the complainant cry.

[9] The appellant‟s defence was a bare denial. He testified that he had left the
township in which he resided with the Nhleko family sometime in February 2003 and
returned during March 2003 when he started working on a building project. Out of
the blue he was accused of having raped the complainant.

[10] According to the appellant a discussion ensued between himself, the
complainant‟s mother and Mr Nhleko following the accusations. During that
discussion the complainant‟s mother told Mr Nhleko about a boy called Sam who
had been visiting the complainant at her home in the mother‟s absence. She also
revealed that she had told the complainant that she did not want to see Sam at her
home. According to the appellant the complainant‟s mother also said that if the
doctor found that Sam had raped her daughter, she would kill Sam with an axe.

[11] Mr Nhleko confirmed that the complainant‟s mother did report the rape to him.
His evidence was that on hearing the allegation he asked the complainant‟s mother
how the appellant could have raped the complainant as he (the appellant) had been
at KwaThema during February. The mother‟s response was to tell him about Sam‟s
suspicious visits to her house and her chasing him away from the house when she

returned from work. According to Mr Nhleko the mother told him that she intended to
take the complainant to a doctor for examination to find out what Sam had done to
her.

[12] In this appeal the appellant contended that the courts below erred in
convicting him as the State had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that he had
raped the complainant. The submission was that the cautionary rules were not
applied when considering the evidence of the complainant. It was further contended
that the complainant‟s cryptic evidence contained contradictions and improbabilities
which rendered it unsatisfactory in material respects. It was also submitted on behalf
of the appellant that his evidence was wrongly rejected. More specifically, the
submission was that the magistrate misdirected himself in admitting the report of the
rape which was elicited from the complainant by force and he (the magistrate) did
not consider the complainant‟s evidence with the necessary caution. The contention
was that the evidence of the complainant, her sister and her mother was unreliable;
that their version was improbable and that they contradicted themselves and each
other on material aspects. The complainant‟s „dispassionate‟ demeanour belied the
traumatic experience she claimed to have endured, so the argument went.

[13] This argument found favour with Makgoka J and forms the essence of his
dissenting judgment in the court a quo. On the other hand, the majority view was that
the contradictions were not material and that the magistrate‟s credibility findings
were correct. The learned judges were satisfied that even though the complainant
was a young single witness, her evidence found support in the medico legal report
and the evidence of her sister.

[14] The submissions on the impropriety of admitting the complaint are based on
S v T 1963 (1) 484 (A) at 487. In that case the complainant‟s mother had threatened
the complainant with a stick as a result of which the complainant reported that her
step father had had sexual intercourse with her. The court considered a number of
English authorities and concluded that the inference to be drawn from them was that
a complaint will not be admissible if it is made as a result of intimidation. However,
the court held that the central question was whether a failure of justice has resulted
from the wrongful admission of the complaint. Hoexter JA held (at 487F) that:

„The test to be applied is whether a trial court hearing all the evidence but refusing to admit
the complaint, would inevitably have convicted the appellant‟.
Put differently, where no voluntary report of rape was made the court must determine
whether the evidence (excluding the report obtained by coercion) proves the charge
of rape against an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

[15] It is my view that our courts have not considered the lack of evidence of a
voluntary complaint (also referred to as a „first report‟) to be fatal to a charge of rape.
In this regard, Milton2, in South African Criminal Law and Procedure, says:
„It is not mandatory that there should be evidence that the woman has complained
that she has been raped. However, if she has, such complaint is admitted in evidence to
show consistency and to negative a defence of consent, but not as proof of their contents
nor to corroborate the complainant. But it is not essential that consent should be in issue; the
complainant may, for instance, be a girl of under 12 years of age.
The purpose of admitting evidence of a complaint is that it serves to rebut any
suspicion that the woman has lied about being raped. The corollary is, of course, that should
a woman not complain, or not complain timeously, the conclusion may be drawn that she is
lying in her evidence that she was raped. The conclusion may well be unfair to the victim,
since women may hesitate to complain of rape for reasons of shame, embarrassment or
fear.‟

[16] Indeed where, such as in this case, the „first report‟ of rape resulted from
intimidation, it cannot constitute evidence of a voluntary or spontaneous first
complaint. But that does not render incomplete or insufficient the evidence led at a
consequent trial. And the fact that there was coercion is not, on its own, an indication
that the allegation of rape is a fabrication. The court must consider whether the rest
of the evidence proves the charge of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

[17] In this case I am satisfied that even if the evidence of the complaint is
excluded, on a holistic consideration of the evidence, the appellant‟s guilt was
proved beyond reasonable doubt. I agree that the evidence of the complainant had
to be considered carefully. She was a young child and her complaint had not been
made voluntarily. I am satisfied that both the trial court and the high court were alive

2 Milton J R L South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol II; 3 ed at 461.

to this fact. Medical evidence confirmed that the complainant had been sexually
penetrated. According to her the last incident of sexual intercourse had taken place
on the day before the medical examination. The doctor recorded that the
gynaecological examination was painful. The contention, on behalf of the appellant,
that she could have been „malingering‟ (the pain) is without merit. Furthermore, the
submission that she misled the doctor regarding the date of the last incident of
sexual intercourse in order to avoid DNA-testing and to protect the true perpetrator,
is farfetched.3

[18] The fact that there were contradictions in the evidence of the complainant
does not necessarily mean that her evidence is unreliable. In Woji v Sanlam
Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A) Diemont JA provided a helpful guide to
approaching the evidence of young children. The guide highlights, as the focal point,
the trustworthiness of the evidence. At 1028A-E of the judgment the learned judge
said:
„The question which the trial Court must ask itself is whether the young witness‟ evidence is
trustworthy. Trustworthiness, as is pointed out by Wigmore in his Code of Evidence para 568
at 128, depends on factors such as the child‟s power of observation, his power of
recollection, and his power of narration on the specific matter to be testified. In each instance
the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated. His capacity of observation will
depend on whether he appears “intelligent enough to observe”. Whether he has the capacity
of recollection will depend again on whether he has sufficient years of discretion “to
remember what occurs” while the capacity of narration or communication raises the question
whether the child has “the capacity to understand the questions put, and to frame and
express intelligent answers” (Wigmore on Evidence vol II para 506 at 596). There are other
factors as well which the Court will take into account in assessing the child‟s trustworthiness
in the witness-box. Does he appear to be honest – is there a consciousness of the duty to
speak the truth? Then also “the nature of the evidence given by the child may be of a simple
kind and may relate to a subject-matter clearly within the field of its understanding and
interest and the circumstances may be such as practically to exclude the risks arising from
suggestibility” (per SCHREINER JA in R v Manda [1951 (3) SA 158 (A)]). At the same time
the danger of believing a child where evidence stands alone must not be underrated.‟

3 It was recorded in the J88 medico legal report that the last incident was about three weeks prior to
the examination. The complainant and her mother stated that that information did not come from
them.

[19] The complainant‟s version was criticised because of her failure to report the
sexual abuse at the first available opportunity or voluntarily, allowing the appellant to
repeatedly come into her home although she claimed to be scared of him, and her
sister‟s evidence that she peeked and saw what was going on, whereas, according
to the complainant, the lights were usually switched off. Firstly, as Milton states,
reluctance on the part of rape survivors, or some of them, to report the rape at the
first opportunity is a firmly recognised fact. It is also generally accepted that with
young children the reluctance is compounded. In this case the complainant testified
that she was afraid of the appellant. I am persuaded that the prospect of accusing
her mother‟s friend who used to assist her in her studies must have compounded the
fear. In response to questions as to why he allowed the appellant to come into the
house she explained: „I wouldn‟t ask who was knocking‟; „it was during the day and
my mother told us that we can only ask during the evening who was knocking‟ and „I
would only say “come in” and the person [would] come in‟ were spontaneous and
have a ring in them. Further there is no basis for a finding that the complainant and
her sister, who knew the appellant well, colluded to protect the perpetrator and
falsely implicate the appellant. Both the complainant and her younger sister
emphatically denied that Sam ever did anything to the complainant.

[20] The complainant did not exaggerate the appellant‟s conduct. When she was
asked if the appellant had sexual intercourse with her every time he visited, her
response was that sometimes he would find her mother at home and would just
„have tea‟ with the mother. The evidence of the younger sister was also simple and
consistent with her age. She was persistent that the appellant had done „silly things‟
to the complainant. She testified that she saw the appellant „on top of [her] sister‟.
There is no basis for a finding that she had been coached into falsely implicating the
appellant.

[21] A further leg on which the appeal stands is the failure by the state to set out,
in the charge sheet, specific date(s) on which the incident(s) referred to happened.
The charge sheet referred to sexual intercourse between the appellant and the
complainant as having occurred in March 2003. Although the complaint‟s evidence
related to both a general conduct and a specific incident it is clear from the charge
sheet that the appellant was charged with rape of a 12 year old child that happened

in about March 2003. Section 84(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA)
provides that a charge must set forth the relevant offence in such a manner and with
such particulars as to the time and place at which the offence is alleged to have
been committed as may be reasonably required to enable the accused to plead. But
if the time when the offence occurred is not a material element of the offence, a
failure to specify the time does not render the charge defective. In this case the
appellant knew in no uncertain terms what case he had to respond to.4 In the
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act the writers Du Toit et al at 14-37, say:
„An accused who wishes to raise an alibi will not necessarily be prejudiced by the fact that
the charge only mentions a period during which an offence was allegedly committed, nor by
the State‟s inability to provide further particulars in respect of the dates. If such uncertainty
will in fact hamper him in his defence, he may reserve his cross examination of State
witnesses until after completion of the State case and then apply for an adjournment to
prepare . . .‟

[22] The appellant‟s version was inconsistent and not reasonably possibly true. In
his plea-explanation he suggested that the false accusations were an act of revenge
by the complainant because he had scolded her for having taken her younger sister
to town, thus exposing her to the dangers of busy traffic. According to the appellant
the allegations of rape surfaced a day after he had scolded the complainant. When
this was put to the complainant, she disputed it. She admitted the incident in which
her younger sister was nearly run over by a truck, but she said that the appellant was
not present at that incident; her father was. Significantly, the appellant gave no
evidence about the incident which, according to his plea explanation, resulted in the
complainant‟s vengeful allegations. He also said nothing in his evidence about his
suspicion that the charges were motivated by revenge. More significantly, this
suggested motive for false accusation was never put to the complainant‟s mother;
neither was it put to her that the appellant had been away from „home‟ from February
to March.

[23] Further, the detailed version that the complainant‟s mother suspected Sam
and had threatened to kill him with an axe, were never put to her. It was also never
put to the complainant. All that the complainant‟s mother was asked was whether her

4 S v Hugo 1976 (4) SA 536 (SCA) at 540E.

daughter had ever told her about something that had happened with Sam. She
replied that the complainant had told her that Sam had not done anything to her. The
complainant was asked, during cross-examination, if Sam ever did „silly things‟ to
her. She replied in the negative. The younger sister‟s reply to a similar question was
that Sam never did „silly things‟ to her sister, and that it was the appellant who had
done so. My view is that both the motive suggested in the plea-explanation and the
detailed evidence relating to the mother‟s suspicion about Sam were a fabrication. A
further instance of fabrication was the allegation by the appellant that the
complainant‟s mother had asked Mr Nhleko for a bribe in exchange for withdrawal of
the charge against the appellant. When Mr Nhleko testified the appellant tried to
„remind‟ him of the alleged demand for a bribe by the complainant‟s mother.
However, Mr Nhleko denied knowledge of thereof. Yet again, the allegation of a
bribe extortion was never put to the complainant‟s mother. The fact that Mr Nhleko,
from whom the bribe was allegedly extorted, knew nothing about it, showed the
extent to which the appellant was prepared to lie to refute the allegations against
him. A court is entitled to take into account the falsity by the appellant to show that
the child‟s evidence is unquestionably true, whilst the defence version, on the other
hand, is false.5

[24] In the end the evidence of the complainant, that of her sister and the contents
of the medical report proved the charge against the accused. I am satisfied that on a
holistic evaluation of the evidence the guilt of the appellant was established beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

______________________
N Dambuza
Judge of Appeal

5 Zeffert & Paizes op cit at 973.

Mhlantla JA

[25] I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Dambuza JA and regret that
I cannot agree with her reasoning and conclusion that the appeal should be
dismissed. My reasons for my disagreement are set out below.

[26] In considering the case of alleged sexual assault, it necessary to record that,
persons, especially children, who allege that they were victims of sexual offence,
should be treated with care and consideration. In S v Vilakazi6, this court said the
following:
„The prosecution of rape presents peculiar difficulties that always call for the greatest care to
be taken, and even more so where the complainant is young. From prosecutors it calls for
thoughtful preparation, patient and sensitive presentation of all the available evidence, and
meticulous attention to detail. From judicial officers who try such cases it calls for accurate
understanding and careful analysis of all the evidence. For it is in the nature of such cases
that the available evidence is often scant and many prosecutions fail for that reason alone.‟

[27] In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development7, the Constitutional Court said:
„Courts are now obliged to give consideration to the effect that their decisions will have on
the rights and interests of the child. The legal and judicial process must always be child-
sensitive.‟

[28] Having said that, it must be borne in mind that the fundamental principle of
our law is that in a criminal trial, the State or prosecution has a duty to prove the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The background facts in this matter have
been set out by my colleague and I do not intend to repeat these. The difference
between us lies with the manner in which the first report was dealt with and the
treatment of the evidence as a whole including the medical evidence.

[29] A complaint is not admissible if it is made as a result of intimidation8. In S v
MG9, a complaint was held to be inadmissible because the complainant, who was 12

6 S v Vilakazi 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) para 21.
7 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development &
Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) at para 74.

years old at the time, had made it after she had been intimidated and threatened by
her mother. In S v GS10, the complainant made a report after being confronted by her
mother about her whereabouts. The court concluded that the complaint was
inadmissible as there was a real suspicion that the complaint was made to deflect
the anger of the complainant‟s mother. My colleague‟s view is that this principle
should be revisited and that each case should be considered on its merits. Whilst
there may be some merit in her concerns, I am of the view that where a complaint
has been induced by intimidation, a court has a duty to consider that evidence and
pronounce on the admissibility thereof.

[30] In this case, the circumstances in which the complaint was made are more
serious than those mentioned in the cases referred to in para 5 above. In this case,
the mother subjected the complainant to an interrogation and when the latter failed to
provide a satisfactory report, the mother gave the child a hiding and insisted that she
tells the truth. It was at that stage that the complainant provided the identification of
the appellant as the person who had raped her. It seems to me that one cannot
exclude a possibility that the complainant made the report of the identification of the
person who raped her in an attempt to save herself from any further hiding. In the
light of these factors, the report was wrongly admitted by the trial court and should
have been ruled inadmissible.

[31] The question that has to be determined is: did the admission of this evidence
bring about a failure of justice? The test to be applied was formulated in S v T11 as
follows:
„The question remains whether a failure of justice has resulted from the wrongful admission
of the complaint. The test to be applied is whether a trial court hearing all the evidence but
refusing to admit the complaint, would inevitably have convicted the appellant.‟

[32] It is therefore necessary to consider the evidence in totality. The first aspect
that I wish deal with relates to the formulation of the charge sheet which referred to
the incident as having taken place during March 2003. I agree with my colleague that

8 S v T 1963 (1) SA 484 (A) at 486H to 487D.
9 S v MG 2010 (2) SACR 66 (ECG) at 73.
10 S v GS 2010 (2) SACR 467 (SCA) paras 23 and 24.
11 At 487F.

a failure to specify the time will not render the charge defective if the time of the
offence is not a material element of the offence. However, the circumstances of this
case are somewhat different and in my view, the State had a duty to provide a
charge sheet that was more specific as to time to enable the accused to know what
case he had to meet for the following reasons: First, the complainant initially testified
that all the rapes occurred in March. When questioned by the regional magistrate,
she testified that only five occurred in March but she did not remember the months
when the others occurred. One has to contrast the complainant‟s testimony with the
evidence of her mother who testified that it was on 25 March 2016 when she noticed
that something was wrong with her daughter. She testified that the complainant had
told her that the rapes began in February. Secondly the examination by the medical
doctor was conducted on 26 March and it was noted in the report that the last rape
incident occurred three weeks before the examination. The conclusion was that the
complainant had been penetrated several times. The mother denied conveying this
information to the doctor. In contrast, the complainant testified that the last incident
occurred a day before the examination. Unfortunately the doctor did not testify to
clarify the aspect relating to the source of the information in his report.

[33] Another unsettling feature is the conduct of the mother.  My colleague has
concluded that the mother‟s suspicion about Sam was fabrication by the defence. I
disagree. The complainant‟s mother during her evidence admitted that she had
asked the complainant whether „a certain Sam‟ had committed the offences, to which
the complainant had replied in the negative. It appears from the record that this
person „Sam‟ does exist and is known by all the parties. The question to be asked is
why would she ask the complainant about Sam, if she did not harbour any
suspicions about Sam‟s possible involvement? This aspect was crucial and the
prosecutor did not pursue it.

[34] This then leaves the evidence of the complainant‟s younger sister who was
either four or five years old at the time of the incident. She is supposed to have
witnessed an incident that occurred at night, where she was instructed by the
appellant to leave the dining room and where the complainant was instructed to
switch off the light. According to her, she „peeked‟ and saw the appellant on top of
the complainant. The sister did not provide any particularity as to how she was able

to observe what transpired in the dark dining room from her position. It is not clear
how she would have managed to see what was happening in that room whilst it was
dark. This evidence was readily accepted by the trial court without any further
interrogation.

[35] On the other hand, the appellant denied his guilt. In his plea explanation, he
stated he was falsely accused because he had in the past scolded the complainant.
During his testimony, he inter-alia, referred to an incident where he had scolded the
complainant after she had taken the children to town. He also suggested that a
certain person known as Sam was the perpetrator. In this regard, he testified that the
complainant‟s mother also suspected this Sam. The appellant further raised an alibi
defence. This defence was introduced during his testimony and was never put to the
witnesses. Regarding his alibi, he testified that between 21 February until 16 March
2003 he had worked in Kwa-Thema, Springs. His testimony in this regard was
corroborated by Mr Nhleko, the defence witness, who testified that when the
complainant‟s mother advised him of the allegation, he had immediately enquired
from her how it would have been possible for the appellant to commit these offences
when he had been miles away from Delmas. It is so that his alibi was not put to the
State witnesses. The State could have applied for the reopening of its case and
recall the complainant to rebut that evidence. This was not done. The alibi as well as
the other evidence was rejected by the trial court as a fabrication. In my view, there
was nothing improbable in the alibi defence. I accept that there were some
unsatisfactory aspects of the appellant‟s evidence and in particular, the allegation
that the complainant‟s mother attempted to solicit a bribe from Mr Nhleko.

[36] There is one aspect that I am constrained to address and this relates to the
conduct of the regional magistrate during the trial. He readily accepted the
complainant‟s evidence notwithstanding the contradictions inherent in her testimony.
Furthermore, he made complimentary remarks about the complainant‟s younger
sister at the end of her testimony. He repeated this at the end of the mother‟s
testimony. A judicial officer should avoid making remarks about a witness during the
trial. That should be done at the end of the trial and during judgment.

[37] In the light of these factors, and having regard to the unsatisfactory aspects of
the State‟s evidence referred to above, I am not persuaded that the State discharged
the onus of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt.

[38] In the result, I would have upheld the appeal against conviction.

_________________
NZ MHLANTLA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

H L Alberts

Instructed by:

Pretoria Justice Centre, Pretoria

Bloemfontein Justice Centre, Bloemfontein

For the Respondent:

C P Harmzen

Instructed by:

Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria

Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein