REPORTABLE
Case No: 297/98

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA

In the matter between:

THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

APPELLANT

and

PATRICIA DE LILLE MP

FIRST RESPONDENT

THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA        SECOND RESPONDENT

COURT:
MAHOMED CJ, VAN HEERDEN DCJ, NIENABER, OLIVIER JJA, and
FARLAM AJA

DATE OF HEARING:
24-25 MAY 1999

DATE OF DELIVERY: 26 AUGUST 1999

SUMMARY:
A Member of Parliament (MP) made a number of unsubstantiated
allegations against other named members in the National Assembly.
On being reprimanded by the Speaker, she unconditionally
withdrew her remarks.  Despite this, the Assembly sought to punish
her by excluding her from its deliberations for 15 days.  The
Constitution does not grant the Assembly authority to suspend the
MP in these circumstances for that period.

JUDGMENT

. . . MAHOMED CJ
MAHOMED CJ

The first respondent (Arespondent@) in this appeal is a member of the National Assembly
(Athe Assembly@).  During an interpellation debate in the Assembly on 22 October 1997, the
respondent stated that the second respondent had information pertaining to twelve members of
the Aother side of the House@ (the ANC) who had been accused of having been Aspies for the
apartheid regime@.  She said it was necessary to know whether these accusations were true.  She
called on the Government to Atell the public at large who the agents are who received blood
money to betray the genuine struggle of the African people@.  She said it was no longer the
prerogative of the President to withhold information about who betrayed the soul of the nation.
These remarks provoked various interventions and the respondent was challenged to give the
names of those who were alleged to be Aspies@.  She eventually reacted to this challenge by
mentioning the names of eight persons including some who were not members of the Assembly.

The Speaker of the Assembly, who is the appellant, ruled that it was unparliamentary for
the respondent to use the word Aspies@ in referring to members of the Assembly and in doing so
to name such members of the Assembly.  The respondent was asked to withdraw this part of her
statement in the Assembly.

The respondent initially agreed to withdraw her remarks conditionally, because she
wanted an opportunity to consult the relevant rules of the Assembly.  The appellant insisted that
the respondent had to decide whether she was withdrawing the offending remarks or not.  She
was not entitled to a conditional withdrawal.  The respondent thereupon withdrew her statement
and was thanked by the appellant.

The matter was again raised on 27 October 1997 by the appellant who had in the
meanwhile examined the unrevised Hansard of the interpellation debate on 22 October.  She
referred to those parts of the statement previously made by the respondent which referred to
Aagents . . . who received blood money to betray the genuine struggle of the African people@ and
to Apeople who betrayed the soul of the nation@.  The respondent was asked also to withdraw
these parts because they were unsubstantiated allegations against members which reflected on
their integrity.  The respondent unconditionally withdrew the offending remarks.

The appellant thereupon said that the AHouse has accepted the practice that  members
should not be attacked by name in the House without prior notification.@  She added that she
wanted Ato encourage members to follow this practice in future.@

Later on 27 October 1997 a member of the ANC in the House proposed a motion to
appoint an Aad hoc committee to report to the House . . . on the conduct of Mrs P de Lille, in
making serious allegations without substantiation against members of the House on 22 October
1997, and to recommend what, if any, action the House should take in the light of its report.@
The motion was adopted by the Assembly by a majority of votes.  Only members of the
ANC supported the motion.

The ad hoc committee authorised by this resolution was duly appointed.  It consisted of
eight members of the ANC and seven members from the opposition.  It was at all times chaired
by a member of the ANC.  It convened on 5 November 1997 and continued its sittings on 6 and
25 November 1997.

The ad hoc committee adopted a report to the Assembly which included recommending
that the respondent:
a.
Be directed to apologize to the Assembly by means of a letter addressed to the
appellant;
b.
Be suspended for fifteen parliamentary working days with effect from the next
sitting day.

In substance these recommendations were adopted by the Assembly on 25 November
1997.  In addition it resolved that the apology which the respondent was directed to make
extended also to the individual members of the Assembly she had previously named in the
interpellation debate.  In a letter dated 15 December 1997 the Secretary of the Assembly wrote to
the respondent formally informing her of these decisions and stating that the Aperiod of
suspension would . . .  run from 2 to 20 February 1998.@

The respondent was aggrieved by these decisions and launched a formal application in
the Cape High Court impugning the relevant resolutions of the ad hoc committee and the
Assembly which led to her suspension, on the grounds that the majority of the members of the ad
hoc committee and the Assembly were biased against her, that they were mala fide and that she
did not receive a fair hearing before the impugned resolutions were adopted.

A full bench of the Cape High Court consisting of King DJP and Hlope J upheld this
attack and granted an order declaring void the relevant resolutions of the Assembly on 25
November 1997 impacting on the respondent.1

De Lille and another v Speaker of the National Assembly 1998 (3) SA 430 (C).

Mr Gauntlett SC who appeared for the appellant (together with Mr Heunis SC and Mr
Ngalwana) submitted that the evidence on affidavit which was relied on by the court a quo, did
not justify the conclusion that the majority of the ad hoc committee or the Assembly were biased
against the respondent or that they were mala fide or that they failed to accord to the respondent
a fair hearing before supporting the impugned resolutions.  This is strenuously disputed by Mr
Trengove SC who appeared for the respondent (with Mr Chaskalson and Mr Tredoux).  In the
view I take of this appeal, I shall assume without deciding that Mr Gauntlett is correct in his
submission.

That assumption is not sufficient, however, to resolve the appeal in favour of the
appellant.  Even if the impugned resolutions were adopted bona fide and even if the respondent
did receive a fair hearing preceding such adoption, the essential enquiry  which needs to be made
is whether or not in the circumstances disclosed by the record  the Assembly had any lawful
authority to take any steps to suspend the respondent from Parliament.

This enquiry must crucially rest on the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  It is
Supreme - not Parliament.  It is the ultimate source of all lawful authority in the country.  No
Parliament, however bona fide or eminent its membership, no President, however formidable be
his reputation or scholarship and no official, however efficient or well meaning, can make any
law or perform any act which is not sanctioned by the Constitution.  Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly provides that law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and the
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.  It follows that any citizen adversely affected by any

decree, order or action of any official or body, which is not properly authorised by the
Constitution is entitled to the protection of the Courts.  No Parliament, no official and no
institution is immune from Judicial scrutiny in such circumstances.2

Executive Council, Western Cape Legislative v President of the RSA 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC). at
para=s 61-62, Ex parte Speaker of the National Assembly: In re Dispute Concerning the
Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the National Education Policy Bill 83 of 1995 1996
(3) SA 289 (CC)  (1996 (4) BCLR 518) at para 22.

It is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of the Constitution to determine
whether there is any Constitutional authority which entitled the Assembly to suspend the
respondent in the circumstances relied on by the appellant.

The first section of the Constitution upon which reliance is placed on behalf of the
appellant is section 57.3  This section provides that the National Assembly Amay determine and
control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures@.  There can be no doubt that this

Section 57 reads as follows:
A(1)  The National Assembly may -
(a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and  procedures;
and
(b) make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to  representative
and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency  and public
involvement.
(2)  The rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for -
(a) the establishment, composition, powers, functions, procedures and  duration of its
committees;
(b) the participation in the proceedings of the Assembly and its committees of all
minority political parties represented in the Assembly, in a manner  consistent
with democracy;
(c) financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly
in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform
their functions in the Assembly effectively;  and
(d) the recognition of the leader of the largest opposition party in the Assembly as
the Leader of the Opposition.@

authority is wide enough to enable the Assembly to maintain internal order and discipline in its
proceedings by means which it considers appropriate for this purpose.  This would, for example,
include the power to exclude from the Assembly for temporary periods any member who is
disrupting or obstructing its proceedings or impairing unreasonably its ability to conduct its
business in an orderly or regular manner acceptable in a democratic society.4  Without some such
internal mechanism of control and discipline, the Assembly would be impotent to maintain
effective discipline and order during debates.

For this reason the Standing Rules for the Assembly give powers to the Speaker to suspend a
member of the Assembly in such circumstances for a maximum period of five Parliamentary
working days on the first occasion (See Rules 85 - 88 of the Standing Rules).  No such power
is given to the Assembly in terms of the relevant rules.

But it does not follow from this that the Assembly necessarily had the Constitutional
authority to suspend the respondent from its proceedings in the circumstances which it resolved
to do.  It is clear that the respondent was not suspended because her behaviour was obstructing or
disrupting or unreasonably impeding the management of orderly business within the Assembly,
but as some kind of punishment for making a speech in the Assembly some days earlier which
did not obstruct or disrupt the proceedings in the Assembly at the time, but was nevertheless
considered objectionable and unjustified by others including the majority of members of the ad
hoc committee and the Assembly.  As was explained by the Privy Council in Kielley v Carson5
the former kind of suspension is a necessary protective measure, the latter not.  The question
therefore that needs to be determined is not whether the Assembly or the appellant had lawful
authority to suspend the respondent from the Assembly as an orderly measure to protect
proceedings of the Assembly from obstruction or disruption, but whether or not it had the
authority to do so as a punishment or disciplinary measure for making a speech which was not in
any way obstructive or disruptive of proceedings in the Assembly, but which was nevertheless
open to justifiable objection.  That question cannot properly be answered by interpreting the
ambit of section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution in isolation, but  by reading it together with other
relevant provisions including section 58.6

[1842] 13 ER 225 (PC).

The full text of section 58(1) and (2) reads as follows:
A(1)
Cabinet members and members of the National Assembly -
(a) have freedom of speech in the Assembly and in its committees, subject  to its
rules and orders; and
(b)
are not liable to civil or criminal proceedings, arrest, imprisonment or
damages for -
(i) anything that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the
Assembly or any of its committees; or
(ii) anything revealed as a result of anything that they have said in,
produced before or submitted to the Assembly or any of its  committees.
(2) Other privileges and immunities of the National Assembly, Cabinet members  and
members of the Assembly may be prescribed by national legislation.@

Section 58(1)(a) provides that Cabinet members and members of the National Assembly
have freedom of speech in the Assembly and its committees, subject to its rules and orders.
Section 58(1)(b)(i) goes on to provide that such members are not liable to civil or criminal
proceedings, arrest or imprisonment or damages Afor anything they have said in, produced before
or submitted to the Assembly or any of its committees@.  Section 58(2) states that A[o]ther
privileges and immunities of the National Assembly . . . may be prescribed by national
legislation.@

The main argument of Mr Gauntlett on behalf of the appellant was based on section
58(2).  He contended that if section 57(1)(a) is read with section 58(2) it ultimately provides
constitutional authority for the suspension of the respondent in the circumstances I have referred
to.  This submission is based on a series of interrelated, complex and sometimes even perplexing
propositions.  The first proposition is that section 36 of the Powers and Privileges of Parliament
Act No 91 of 1963 (Athe PPP Act@) (which preserves in general terms the Aprivileges, immunities
and powers@ which Parliament enjoyed at the date of the enactment of Act 32 of 1961)7
constitutes Anational legislation@ which Aprescribes other privileges and immunities of the
National Assembly@ within the meaning of section 58(2) of the Constitution.  The second
proposition is that the effect of section 36 of the PPP Act in so preserving the Aprivileges,

Section 36 of the PPP Act provides as follows:
ASave as is otherwise expressly provided by this Act, Parliament, a member and an officer of
Parliament, respectively, shall have all such privileges, immunities and powers as at the time
of the promulgation of the Constitution were applicable in the case of the House of Assembly
referred to in the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961 (Act 32 of 1961), and any
member or officer thereof and also such privileges, immunities and powers as are from time to
time conferred by any law of the Republic.@

immunities and powers@ which Parliament enjoyed at the date of the enactment of 1961, was also
to preserve the provisions of section 36 of Act 19 of 1911 which provided inter alia that save as
otherwise expressed in that Act, the members of the House of Assembly would enjoy the same
privileges enjoyed by the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or the
members thereof.  The third proposition is that one of the privileges or powers, which the House
of Commons in the United Kingdom enjoys (although rarely exercised) is the power to suspend a
member of the House for contempt and other breaches of privilege.  This power, it is argued, is
part of the law and custom of Parliament in the United Kingdom.8  The fourth proposition is that
the end result of the previous three propositions is to render lawful the respondent=s suspension,
because it would be lawful in terms of the parliamentary law and custom of the United Kingdom
which is incorporated through an interpretation of a successive web of South African legislation
over a period of more than eighty years.

Halsbury=s Laws of England (4th ed Vol 34 para 1009); O Hood Phillips: Constitutional and
Administrative Law (7th Edition p 131); Coke: Fourth Institutes of the Laws of England (1797)
p 50.
Central to the edifice which the appellant seeks to erect on the strength of these
propositions in defence of the respondent=s suspension is one basic premise.  It is this: By

incorporating a reference to other laws which in turn incorporate further laws which incorporate
the Parliamentary law and custom of the United Kingdom which arguably allows for the
suspension of members of Parliament, section 36 of the PPP Act is Aprescribing@ Aother
privileges and immunities of the National Assembly@ and its members within the meaning of
these expressions in section 58(2) of the Constitution.  In my view this basic premise is unsound
in law.  Section 58(1) expressly guarantees freedom of speech in the Assembly (subject to its
rules and orders).  It is a crucial guarantee. The threat that a member of the Assembly may be
suspended for something said in the assembly inhibits freedom of expression in the Assembly
and must therefore adversely impact on that guarantee.  Section 58(2) must not be interpreted in
the manner contended by Mr Gauntlett so as to detract from that guarantee.  What section 58(2)
does is to authorise national legislation which will itself clearly and specifically articulate the
Aprivileges and the immunities@ of the National Assembly which have the effect of impacting on
the specific guarantee of free speech for members in the Assembly.  It does not contemplate a
tortuous process of discovery of some obscure rule in English Parliamentary law and custom
justifying the suspension of a member of Parliament which is not identified within section 36
itself, but is to be inferred from a South African statute in 1911 which is inferentially
incorporated in another statute in 1961 which is itself incorporated by reference in section 36 of
the PPP Act.  Section 36, in my view, therefore, does not constitute Anational legislation@ which
Aprescribes@ any Aprivileges and immunities@ of the National Assembly (within the meaning of
section 58(2) of the Constitution), which justifies the invasion of the guarantee of free speech in
section 58(1) through the mechanism of the punitive suspension of a member of the Assembly.

Mr Gauntlett relied heavily on the case of Poovalingam v Rajbansi9 in support of his

1992 (1) SA 283 (A).

interpretation of section 58(2).  He drew our attention to the review of Parliamentary privilege in
South Africa contained in the judgment of Corbett CJ10 in that matter.  In my view
Poovalingam=s case does not assist the argument of Mr Gauntlett in the present appeal.  The
dispute in Poovalingam=s case was whether a certain letter delivered by one member of a
Parliament to other members and which was said to be defamatory of a particular member
was protected by the guarantee of free speech in Parliament contained in sections 2 and 8
of the PPP Act.  Corbett CJ held that it was not.  In the course of doing so he analysed the
history of the privilege conferred on members of Parliament, through its origins in
English law and concluded that there was a Aclose bond between our law and English law
on the subject of Parliamentary privilege.@11  The Court was not confronted with or
required to deal with the issue as to whether or not an express Constitutional guarantee of
free speech for members of a Parliamentary Assembly such as that protected by section
58(1) of the present Constitution could be restricted through Aother privileges and
immunities@ inherited from English Parliamentary custom in a general way without being
specifically prescribed by national legislation of the nature contemplated by section 58(2).

Moreover, the constitutional regime which operated when Poovalingam=s case was
decided was the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 which had no provisions
corresponding with important provisions of the present (1996) Constitution  relevant to the
present debate.  Not only is the right to freedom of speech in the Assembly expressly

Especially at pp 290-91.
At 291F-G.

constitutionalised in section 58(1)(a) (subject to its rules and orders), but the Arules and orders@
which the Assembly makes to control its Ainternal arrangements, proceedings and procedures,@
must, in terms of section 57(1)(b), have Adue regard to representative and participatory
democracy.@  These provisions are also materially different from the comparable provisions of
the interim Constitution contained in Act 200 of 1993.12

Properly interpreted, the provisions of section 58(2) of the Constitution therefore do not
support the approach contended for by Mr Gauntlett.  Section 58(2) does not itself Aprescribe@
any other Aprivilege or immunity@, to limit the right of free speech in the Assembly protected by
section 58(1).  National legislation is necessary to achieve that result.

See sections 55 and 58 of Act 200 of 1993.

The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant based on section 58(2) of the
Constitution and Section 36 of the PPP Act is countered by Mr Trengove by another suggested
obstruction.  It is this: Section 36 of the PPP Act is preceded by the phrase A[s]ave as is otherwise
expressly provided by this Act@.  This means that the Aprivileges, immunities and powers@ of the
National Assembly at the time of the promulgation of Act 32 of 1961 which the section seeks to
preserve, only apply to the extent to which the PPP Act does not provide otherwise.

It is contended that Section 10 of the PPP Act, does however, provide very elaborate
mechanisms to discipline and punish members of the Assembly.  Section 10(3) refers to 13
different forms of contempt which Parliament can punish.  They include the kind of contempt
which the respondent in this matter is said to have committed.  Section 10 also provides for
punishment in the form of a fine and detention where such fine has not been paid.  Mr Trengove
argued that in effect the PPP Act codifies what the different forms of contempt are and how they
are to be punished.  No provision is made, however, for suspension as a form of punishment for a
member who is guilty of contempt of the kind attributed to the respondent.13

Section 10(1) of the PPP Act read with section 10(2) and section 32.

Mr Gauntlett, contended, however, that section 10 is not exhaustive.  He argued
that it is not inconsistent with the retention of the power of suspension in appropriate
cases, if this is permitted by the legislation incorporating English Parliamentary law and
custom in the manner I have previously described.  Mr Trengove argued that  the detailed
structure of the PPP Act, does not permit of such an interpretation but even if it did, the
Act is also at least reasonably capable of the interpretation that it is indeed exhaustive in
respect of the punishments which are competent for contempt.  It was contended that in
that event the latter construction must be preferred because it would be more consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution and its anxiety to protect freedom of
speech and more particularly the right of members representing voters, to express
themselves freely and without fear on matters of public interest.  It was pointed out that
section 39(2) of the Constitution expressly directs that Awhen interpreting any legislation .
. . every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.@14

Although the alternative submissions of Mr Trengove referred to in paragraphs 24,

See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (1996 (5) BCLR
658) at paras 60-66, 86, 141; Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588 (W) at
596C-598E; Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and another v Save the Vaal
Environment and others unreported decision of the SCA, 133/98 (12 March 1999).

25, and 26 are certainly arguable, I find it unnecessary to decide on the correctness
thereof, because of the conclusions I have come to in respect of his other submissions
dealt with in this judgment.

If section 58(2)  provides no constitutional authority for the suspension of the respondent
from the National Assembly, is there any other provision in the Constitution which does?  In the
alternative to his main argument, Mr Gauntlett contended that such authority is to be inferred
from section 58(1)(a) which limits the right to freedom of speech in the Assembly by making it
subject to its rules and orders.  It was conceded that the rules and orders of the Assembly do not
themselves make any provision for the suspension of the members by the Assembly, but it was
contended that this effect is achieved through Rule 77(A)(1) of the Standing Rules of the
Assembly which makes freedom of speech and debate in the House itself Asubject to the
restriction placed on such freedom in terms of the Constitution, any other law or these Rules.@15
It is argued again that this incorporates section 36 of the PPP Act, which through a series of
subsequent incorporations of other laws, ultimately incorporates English Parliamentary law and
custom, which in certain instances allows the House of Commons to suspend its members.  The
reasons which I have set out in rejecting a similar argument in dealing with the submission that
section 58(2) provides constitutional authority for the suspension of the respondent, are of equal

Rule 77(A)(1) of the current Standing Rules of the Assembly provides that:
AIn accordance with section 55(2) of the [interim] Constitution [now section 58(1) of the
Constitution] there shall be freedom of speech and debate in or before this House and any
committee thereof, or any joint committee of Parliament, subject only to the restrictions placed
on such freedom in terms of or under the Constitution, any other law or these Rules.@

application to the appellant=s case in this respect based on section 58(1).

There is therefore nothing in the Arules and orders@ of the Assembly, which qualifies in
any respect relevant to the appeal, the right to freedom of speech in the Assembly which section
58(1) guarantees.  More directly, there is nothing which provides any constitutional authority for
the Assembly, to punish any member of the Assembly, for making any speech, through an order
suspending such member from the proceedings of the Assembly.  The right of free speech in the
Assembly protected by section 58(1) is a fundamental right crucial to representative government
in a democratic society.  Its tenor and spirit must conform to all other provisions of the
Constitution relevant to the conduct  of proceedings in Parliament.

In the result, the appellant has failed to persuade me that the National Assembly had any
constitutional authority to suspend the respondent from the National Assembly in the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence adduced before the High Court.

The respondent would therefore be entitled to an order declaring her purported
suspension to be void, unless there is some legal basis for excluding the jurisdiction of the Court
to afford such relief to her.

In the context under consideration there was considerable debate by counsel in the heads
of argument, with regard to the implications and the correctness of various dicta in the Canadian
case of New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia.16  The issue in that case was whether the
exclusion of media representatives from proceedings in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly

(1993) 13 CRR (2nd) 1 (SC).

because they were seeking to televise the proceedings violated the right to freedom of expression
articulated in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter.  McLachlin J held in that case that the
Legislative Assembly concerned had an inherent constitutional right to exclude strangers from its
chambers in order to protect itself against the disruptions of its business.  Our attention was
drawn to the following dicta by the learned Judge:17

AHaving concluded that the Assembly had the Constitutional right to do what it did, it
follows that the Charter cannot cut down that right, on the principle that one part of the
Constitution cannot abrogate another part of the Constitution.@

At 21.

The approach of McLachlin J in this case was not fully shared by the other Judges18 and is
the subject of considerable controversy in Canada.19  It is, however, unnecessary in the
present appeal to pursue this controversy.  Nothing in any of the judgments in the case of
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia supports the proposition that a purported
exercise of power, not properly authorised by the Constitution, is immune from judicial
scrutiny and convention.  The issue in that case was whether the exercise of such a power
violated the Canadian Charter of fundamental rights, and if it did so, whether it was
subject to ACharter review@.  Those questions might or might not have risen in the present
appeal if it was necessary to decide that the appellant or the National Assembly had
violated the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, by failing to afford to the
respondent a fair bona fide hearing.  I have found it unnecessary to decide that issue.  The
only relevant issue is whether or not the suspension of the respondent by the National
Assembly was constitutionally authorised.  I have held that it was not.

The appellant also adduced a certificate in terms of section 5 of the PPP Act20 in the court
a quo ostensibly as some kind of obstacle to the jurisdiction of the Court to afford to the
respondent the relief she sought.  Counsel for the appellant, before us, however expressly

Cory J at p 58; Lamer CJ at p 42.
See Peter W Hogg: Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf edition Vol. 2 pp 34-9 to 34-10.
Section 5 provides as follows:
AAt any stage of any civil or criminal proceedings instituted for or on account or in respect
of any matter of privilege, upon production to the court or judge by the defendant or
accused, of a certificate by the Speaker or, in his absence or other incapacity, by the
Secretary, stating that the matter in question is one which concerns the privilege of
Parliament, that court or judge shall immediately stay such proceedings, which shall
thereupon be deemed to be finally determined.@

abandoned any reliance on this certificate.

The court a quo was therefore correct in holding that the decision of the National
Assembly on 25 November 1997 to suspend the respondent was void.  The order made by the
Court however to uphold prayers 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5 of the notice of motion needs re-examination.
Prayer 2.1 sought to declare void the whole of the resolution passed by the National Assembly on
25 November 1997.  That resolution included two parts: the first part directed the respondent to
apologise, and the second part resolved to suspend her from Parliament.  The attack of the
respondent was confined to the second part.  The period of suspension has in any event expired.
Counsel were agreed that if the submissions on behalf of the appellant made by Mr Gauntlett
failed, the proper course would be to make an order declaring that the National Assembly was
not entitled in law to make an order purporting to suspend the respondent from the National
Assembly.

Costs

Notwithstanding the fact that the whole of the order of the court a quo cannot be
sustained on appeal, the respondent has achieved substantial success on appeal.  There is no
reason why the appellant should ordinarily  not be directed to pay the costs of the respondent.
The respondent engaged three counsel on appeal.  They were Mr Trengove,  Mr Chaskalson and
Mr Tredoux.  Mr Trengove and Mr Chaskalson, however, appeared pro-amico.  Mr Trengove for
the respondent, therefore asked for an order dismissing the appeal, and an order of costs
consequent upon the employment of Mr Tredoux and in respect of only the disbursements of Mr
Trengove and Mr Chaskalson.

Order

It is ordered that:
(1)
The order made by the court a quo is set aside, subject to paragraph 2.
(2)
The order of costs made by the court a quo is upheld.
(3)
It is declared that that part of the resolution of the National Assembly adopted on
the 25 November 1997 which purports to suspend Mrs Patricia De Lille is void
and is set aside.
(4)
The appellant is directed to pay the costs of the respondent on appeal.  Such costs
shall include:
(a)
The costs attendant upon the employment of Mr Tredoux;
(b)
Only the disbursements incurred by or on behalf of Mr Trengove and Mr
Chaskalson, (including the reasonable costs of accommodation and
travel).

I MAHOMED
CHIEF JUSTICE

CONCUR:
VAN HEERDEN DCJ

NIENABER JA

OLIVIER JA

FARLAM AJA