THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Reportable
Case No:  505/99
In the matter of:
THE BODY CORPORATE OF CAROLINE COURT                  APPELLANT
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Coram:
Vivier ADCJ, Olivier, Schutz, Navsa JJA and Cloete AJA
Date of hearing:
17 August 2001
Date of delivery:
12 September 2001
Summary:
In an application by a body corporate, established in terms of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, for
a provisional order for its winding-up due to its inability to pay its debts, notice should have been given
to all interested parties for them to be heard on whether a winding-up is competent, and, if so, the form
of the order.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

NAVSA JA:
[1] The appellant is a body corporate established in terms of section 36 of the
Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) and is responsible, in terms of the Act, for the
enforcement of the rules relating to the control, administration and management of a
building named Caroline Court (the building), situated at 48 Caroline Street,
Hillbrow, Johannesburg.  The building forms part of a sectional title scheme with
individuals owning sectional units.
[2] During July 1999 the appellant, on the ground of its inability to pay its debts,
applied ex parte in the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court for an order that
its affairs be provisionally wound up and that certain provisions of the Companies Act 61
of 1973 be made applicable to the winding-up.  In addition it sought, inter alia, an order
that upon its dissolution following on the winding-up, a new body corporate be declared
to be in existence comprising existing owners of individual units.
[3] The matter was decided by Coppin AJ.  In a brief judgment the learned judge
considered section 36(5) of the Act which states that the provisions of the Companies Act
shall not apply to a body corporate established in terms of the Act. Since the body
corporate could not be wound up in terms of the Companies Act, Coppin AJ had regard
to the provisions of section 48 of the Act and concluded as follows:
...section 48(6) of the…Act is the only provision...dealing with the
winding-up of a body corporate. In my view upon a proper construction of
that section, a body corporate…can only be wound up when the building

to which it attaches is damaged or destroyed.  This is not the position in this
case.  I accordingly dismiss the application with costs.
Coppin AJ refused an application for leave to appeal.  The present appeal is with
the leave of this Court.
[4] The appellant contends that in terms of section 48(6) of the Act or in terms of
section 48(1)(c) read with section 48(6) of the Act a Court is empowered to wind up the
affairs of a body corporate due to its inability to pay its debts.
[5] The learned judge in the court below did not consider whether he should refuse to
entertain the application because of the ex parte procedure adopted by the appellant and
was content to decide a complex issue on which no Court had pronounced before,
without the benefit of such argument and evidence that might have been advanced by the
various interested parties.  The fate of this appeal rests on the procedural issue
overlooked by Coppin AJ. I will deal with this issue in due course.
[6] I turn to set out in some detail the basis of the application as presented to the Court
below:  There are 34 units in the building, the total market value of which is estimated to
be approximately R340 000-00.  Many units are subject to mortgage bonds.  Some
owners of sectional title units in the building have over the years defaulted in the payment
of their contribution levies with the consequence that the appellant was unable to meet
its obligation to pay all water and electricity charges and assessment rates, resulting in an
indebtedness to the local authority concerned in an amount approximating R1 million, as

at 29 April 1999.  In May 1998 during negotiations between the appellant and the local
authority the appellant made an offer to settle its indebtedness on specified terms, inter
alia, that the amount of R577 000-00 then owing be paid over a ten-year period without
interest accruing.  The offer included an undertaking by the appellant that upon
acceptance of the offer it would embark on major renovations.  The offer has not been
responded to.  In the interim the building has had its electricity supply intermittently
suspended by the local authority.  The appellant asserts that the local authority may reject
its offer of settlement with the attendant risk of further suspensions of the electricity
supply.  The appellant faces mounting debts which it is unable to pay.  Owners of units
in the building continue to default on the payment of their levies.  Attempts by the
appellant to execute judgments obtained by it against some defaulting owners have come
to nought.  In a number of instances this was due to the attitude adopted by bondholders.
The appellant has no cash reserves.  The appellant states that although it is unable to pay
its debts a winding- up of its affairs will benefit the general body of creditors since a
liquidator will be able to take effective steps to recover monies from debtors and be in a
better position to reach agreement with the local authority on the settlement of its
account.
[7] It appears that many bodies corporate established in terms of the Act find
themselves in a chaotic financial position similar to that of the appellant.  In the June 2001
issue of the attorneys journal De Rebus, Roger Green and Peter Feuilherade in an article

entitled Lost Property (at p 18) state the following:
Bodies corporate have always had to contend with members who have
not been able to maintain payment of regular monthly levies because of
financial difficulties.  However, in the past few years a tendency has
developed for some owners to refuse to pay levies.  This has occurred
very often when most of the purchase price of the unit has been funded
by a bank loan.  In some instances the owners who are members of the
body corporate fail to recognize that the body corporate is their alter ego,
namely the corporate representative of all the owners of the units in the
scheme.  Instead the body corporate has been seen as an alien body to
which no allegiance is owed.  Failure to recognise the obligations of
communal living and to pay levies has resulted in several sectional title
schemes being placed in jeopardy.  The members of the scheme who
have been diligent in paying their levy contributions have been
prejudiced.
The authors state (at p.20) that there has been a tendency on the part of some
bondholders to be obstructive when a body corporate attempts to sell a defaulting
members unit in execution.  The authors note that in some schemes, members of the
body corporate who are in arrears with payment of their levies and are in the majority
have themselves elected as trustees of the body corporate and choose not to take action
against defaulting members, resulting in the financial affairs of the body corporate
becoming chaotic.
[8] It is clear from the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application, the

prayer in the notice of motion for an order declaring a new body corporate to come into
existence comprising the same members as before and a concession before us by
appellants counsel, that the appellants trustees, who authorised the application, hold the
view that an order winding up its affairs is a speedy and simple solution to its financial
predicament. They believe that after a new body corporate has been established it can
continue with its business unburdened by the previous debts.  It is clear that the trustees
authorised an application for a winding-up having such an effect and bearing only on the
affairs of the body corporate.  There was no appreciation that in the event of a winding-
up, assuming it to be competent, a Court might hold that the individual owners could be
pursued for such debts as are owing by them to the body corporate.  This means that
there is a risk that individual units would have to be sold to recover the amounts owing.
The entire scheme may be at risk:  see in this regard section 47 of the Act which
provides that a creditor who has obtained a judgment against a body corporate, which
remains unsatisfied, may apply to the Court which gave the judgment for the joinder of
the members of the body corporate in their personal capacities as joint judgment debtors
in proportion to their respective participation quotas; and section 36(6)(c) of the Act,
which provides that a body corporate shall have perpetual succession and be capable of
suing and being sued in its corporate name in respect of any matter in connection with the
land and building for which the body corporate is liable or for which the owners are
jointly liable.  There appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the

appellant to the effect that in respect of debts such as assessment rates and water and
electricity charges, individual owners are not co-debtors with the body corporate.
[9] I now turn to deal with the ex parte procedure adopted by the appellant.  The
appellants notice of motion is addressed only to the registrar of the Court below and was
not served on any other person.  It is a principle of our law that interested parties should
be afforded an opportunity to be heard in matters in which they have a direct and
substantial interest.  In Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949(3)
SA 637 (A) (at 651) the following is stated:
It was rather a subtle reasoning, which helped the Court to do what it no
doubt regarded as substantial justice in the peculiar circumstances of the
case, while at the same time enabling it to stand firm on the two essential
principles of law that had to be borne in mind, viz.(1) that a  judgment
cannot be pleaded as res judicata against someone who was not a party
to the suit in which it was given, and (2) that the Court should not make
an order that may prejudice the rights of parties before it.
Later in the judgment (at 659-660) the following appears:
Indeed it seems clear to me that the Court has consistently refrained
from dealing with issues in which a third party may have a direct and
substantial interest without either having that party joined in the suit or,
if the circumstances of the case admit of such a course, taking other
adequate steps to ensure that its judgment will not prejudicially affect the
partys interests… It must be borne in mind, however, that even on the

allegation that a party has waived his rights, that party is entitled to be
heard;  for he may, if given the opportunity, dispute either the facts
which are said to prove his waiver, or the conclusion of law to be drawn
from     them, or both.
This principle finds expression in Rule 6 (2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court which
states that where it is necessary or proper to give any person notice of an intended
application, the notice of motion shall be addressed to both the registrar and such person.
[10] On the applicants version of events there are numerous interested parties who in
the ordinary course would have been entitled to receive notice of the intended application.
The local authority, which is the major creditor, is an interested party. Individual owners,
who in terms of section 36 of the Act are all members of the body corporate are clearly
interested parties.  This is particularly so given the potential risks to owners and the
sectional title scheme spelt out earlier in this judgment.  Bondholders are clearly also
interested parties.
[11] Counsel representing the appellant submitted that the ex parte procedure adopted
by the appellant is in line with the generally accepted procedure followed in applications
for the winding-up of a company and the sequestration of individuals, namely, that a
provisional order is granted ex parte with standard directions that the order be served on
interested parties including creditors pending a return day.  This analogy is unfounded.
[12] The law regulating the winding-up of companies and close corporations and the

sequestration of individuals is largely settled and the procedure is well established.  Of
course novel questions may arise and a Court will deal with them as and when they arise
in such manner as it deems fit.  Section 48 of the Act, on the other hand, is complex in
structure and its provisions concerning a winding-up of the affairs of a body corporate are
brief to the extent of inadequacy.  No Court has yet pronounced on the interpretation of
section 48(6) of the Act.  Difficult questions arise when the interpretation and application
of section 48 are to be decided.  This is demonstrated by the brief and limited
consideration of section 48 which follows.  Section 48 bears the heading: Destruction
of or damage to building.”  Section 48(1) of the Act provides:
The building or buildings comprised in a scheme shall, for the purposes
of this Act, be deemed to be destroyed -
(a) upon the physical destruction of the building or buildings;
(b) when the owners by unanimous resolution so determine and all holders
of registered sectional mortgage bonds and the persons with registered real
rights concerned, agree thereto in writing; or
(c) when the Court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances,
it is just and equitable that the building or buildings shall be deemed to have
been destroyed, and makes an order to that effect.
Section 48(2) states:
In any case where an order is made under subsection (1)(c), the Court
may impose such conditions and give such directions as it deems fit for the
purpose of adjusting the effect of the order between the body corporate and

the owners and mutually among the owners, the holders of registered
sectional mortgage bonds and persons with registered real rights.
Section 48(3) is irrelevant for present purposes.  Section 48(4) lists the persons who may
apply for an order in terms of section 48(1)(c) as:  a body corporate, an owner, a
bondholder, a registered lessee, an insurer who has effected insurance on the building and
a local authority.  Unlike section 48(6) the list does not include creditors but does include
a local authority.
Section 48(6) reads as follows:
“(a) The Court may, on the application of a body corporate or any member
thereof or any holder of a registered real right concerned, or any judgment
creditor, by order make provision for the winding-up of the affairs of the
body corporate.
(b) The Court may, by the same or any subsequent order, declare the body
corporate dissolved as from a date specified in the order
The following questions readily present themselves:
• Do the circumstances referred to in the appellants affidavit in support of the
application justify an order in terms of section 48(1)(c), or would this be stretching
notional destruction beyond the provisions of the Act?
• Do the provisions of section 48(2), which prospectively regulate the relationship
between affected parties, indicate that section 48(1)(c) operates only in

circumstances where it is envisaged that the scheme will come to an end or not
continue in its existing form and consequently, that they do not apply in
circumstances such as the present, where it is intended that the scheme will
continue as before?
• Does section 48(6) enjoy an existence and application independent of the
remainder of the section of which it is part?
• Does the heading of section 48 assist in the interpretation of section 48(6)?
• Does the distinction drawn between the persons who may bring an application in
terms of section 48(1)(c) and those who may bring an application in terms of
section 48(6) support a contrary conclusion?
• What is meant by the expression winding-up of the affairs of the body corporate
as it appears in section 48(6) - does it relate to the relationship between the
members and the body corporate and to their position as joint debtors as set out
in section 47 of the Act?
• Assuming that it is held that a winding-up of the affairs of a body corporate based
on its inability to pay its debts is competent, is the Court at large to fashion
directions for such a winding-up?
• May the Court, in giving such directions, have regard to such mechanisms as are
set out in the Companies Act and employ them, despite the provisions of section
36(5) of the Act?

• In particular, what happens to the pro rata liability of an owner for the debts of
other owners, provided for in s 47?
• How, in formulating directions, does the Court deal with the body corporate in
relation to its members and what directions may it give insofar as individual
defaulting and non-defaulting unit owners are concerned?
• Should the Court consider other remedies that the Act provides to owners,
bondholders, members, trustees and local authorities when it considers whether to
grant a winding-up order?
• What are the circumstances which in terms of section 48(6)(b) will justify a Court
granting an order for the dissolution of a body corporate at the same time as it
grants an order for the winding-up of its affairs?
• What are the circumstances that will justify a Court withholding an order for the
dissolution of the body corporate at the time that it grants an order that its affairs
be wound up?
• What happens after a body corporates affairs are wound up?
[13] These questions are not meant to be exhaustive but to demonstrate how necessary
it is for such issues as may arise from the interpretation of section 48 to be fully ventilated
among all interested parties.  Lamentably, the Legislature neglected to deal with questions
which would obviously arise.  This makes it all the more necessary for a Court to have
the benefit of argument by parties who may be affected by its decision.

[14] Coppin AJ was faced with a manifestly incomplete set of facts in the absence of
a range of interested parties, who might have wished to present argument on a novel issue
of public importance concerning the interpretation of legislation which raises more
questions than it answers.  This situation does not begin to compare with the asserted
analogous situation of an ex parte application for a provisional winding-up of a company
or for the provisional sequestration of an individual.  The company being wound up or
the individual being sequestrated is usually the debtor whose assets have to be
surrendered so that they may be sold to meet debts owed to creditors.  A body corporate
established in terms of the Act represents its members and such debts as the body
corporate incurs are usually incurred on behalf of its members.  Members of a body
corporate have assets apart from the body corporate. Usually the body corporates assets
will be negligible when seen against the collective assets of its members.  As stated earlier,
the rules and procedure governing the winding-up of companies and close corporations
and the sequestration of individuals are established and clear.  The complex of questions
raised in the present case does not arise.  A primary question in the present case on which
the Court should have the benefit of argument of all interested parties, is whether it is
empowered in the circumstances of this case to issue any winding-up order at all-
provisional or otherwise.  In this regard a dictum in a recent decision of this Court is
relevant.  In Pretorius v Slabbert 2000 (4) SA 935 (SCA) at 939 C-F the following is
stated:

Mr Louw, for the respondent, sought to persuade us that Syfrets had no
material interest in the proceedings, so that the appeal might proceed.
There is an immediate difficulty with this argument, as it appears to
contradict the very contention upon which the respondent succeeded below
and wishes to succeed here, namely that the appellants rights in the deed
of sale (reversionary rights excepted) had become vested in
Syfrets.  Depending upon a variety of possible considerations, upon which
the record throws no clear light, Syfrets might have an interest.  For
instance, it may have something to say about the form of order, which
envisages payment to the appellant and not itself as cessionary.  But more
to the point, as was rightly said in Selborne Furniture Store (Pty) Ltd v
Steyn NO 1970(3) SA 774 (A) at 780G, the substantial question is whether
it is proper for this Court to proceed to draw an inference as to Syfrets
rights, without giving it an opportunity of being heard in regard thereto.  The
answer is no.”
The basic principle of our law that interested parties who may be prejudiced by an order
issued by a Court should be joined in the suit, as set out in the Amalgamated
Engineering and Pretorius cases, supra, and expressed in Rule 6(2)(a) of the Uniform
Rules of Court should have been applied by Coppin AJ.
[15] For these reasons it follows that although Coppin AJ erred in his approach to the
matter, his decision to dismiss the application should remain unaffected. In the light of all
the circumstances of the case it would serve no useful purpose to remit the matter to the
Court below.  It follows that the appeal should fail. The appeal is dismissed.

MS NAVSA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:
VIVIER ADCJ
OLIVIER JA
SCHUTZ JA
CLOETE AJA