THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable
Case no: 314/03

In the matter between:

GOUDA BOERDERY BK

Appellant

and

TRANSNET  LIMITED

Respondent
___________________________________________________

Coram

:
SCOTT, NAVSA, CONRADIE, CLOETE

JJA et  ERASMUS AJA
Date of Hearing :
31 August 2004
Date of delivery :
27 September 2004

Summary:
Fire in railway reserve 20 m wide – not a ‘veldfire’ within the
meaning of s 34 of  of Act 101 of 1998 – meaning of that section – appellant’s
action in delict – legal duty on respondent not to cause harm negligently –
failure to establish firebreak in reserve not negligent in the circumstances.
____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________

SCOTT JA/…

SCOTT JA:

[1] The appellant is the owner of the farm Nuwewater and two
adjacent farms in the district of Gouda, Western Cape. Nuwewater
is bisected by a ‘railway reserve’ which is a strip of land 20 metres
wide fenced on both sides and along the centre of which runs the
main line from Cape Town to the north. The direction of the line at
that point is approximately south to north. The station immediately
to the south is Voëlvlei; the station immediately to the north is
Gouda. The reserve is owned and controlled by the respondent.
On 8 February 2001, between 12.30 pm and 1.30 pm, a fire was
observed on Nuwewater in close proximity to the reserve.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the fire had started within
the reserve itself on the western side of the tracks close to a level
crossing which provides vehicular access from one portion of
Nuwewater to the other. Fanned by a stiff south-easterly wind, the
fire progressed in a north-westerly direction both in the reserve
and through the fence onto the appellant’s property where it
jumped a firebreak running parallel to the reserve and entered a
harvested wheat field, referred to in evidence as ‘stubble land’.
From there it spread rapidly, jumping several firebreaks in the
process. It was finally extinguished some six hours later. By then it
had caused considerable damage, not only on Nuwewater but on

neighbouring farms as well. The cause of the fire was never
established. Gates on both sides of the crossing were locked at
the time. According to the respondent’s records the last trains to
have passed through the area were the northbound and
southbound Trans Karoo Express at about 12 noon. These would
have crossed at the nearby Gouda station. Neither train driver
reported having seen a fire or anything untoward at the place
where the fire started.

[2] The appellant instituted proceedings against the respondent
for damages in the Cape High Court. It founded its claim, in the
first instance, on the provisions of s 2 of Schedule 1 to the Legal
Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989,
alleging that the fire had been caused by a burning object coming
from a locomotive or train operated by the respondent. Had this
been established the respondent would have been liable in terms
of the schedule, subject to certain limitations, to compensate the
appellant for its loss without the need for the latter having to prove
negligence on the part of the former or its employees. In the event,
no evidence was adduced to establish how the fire started and
nothing further need be said about this aspect of the appellant’s

case. Section 2 of the Schedule has since been repealed by Act
16 of 2002.

[3] In the alternative, the appellant alleged that the damage it
had suffered was caused by the negligence of the respondent. The
grounds of negligence relied upon were in essence the following:
(i)
The respondent failed to keep the area alongside the tracks

free of vegetation although it knew that sparks emanating

from a train could cause a fire.
(ii)
The respondent failed to take reasonable steps to prevent a

fire from occurring in the reserve.
(iii)
The respondent failed to establish and maintain a firebreak

on the western side of the tracks so as to prevent a fire

spreading to the  appellant’s property.
In the course of the trial the appellant amended its particulars of
claim to allege that the fire had constituted a ‘veldfire’. The object
of the amendment was to bring the claim within the ambit of s 34 of
the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998 (‘the Act’) which
would have had the effect of placing the burden upon the
respondent of proving that it was not negligent. The section reads:
‘34
(1)
If a person who brings civil proceedings proves that he or she

suffered loss from a veldfire which –
(a)
the defendant caused; or

(b)
started on or spread from land owned by the defendant,

the defendant is presumed to have been negligent in relation to

the veldfire until the contrary is proved, unless the defendant is

a member of a fire protection association in the area where the

fire occurred.

(2)
The presumption in subsection (1) does not exempt the plaintiff

from the onus of proving that any act or omission by the

defendant was wrongful.’

[4] By agreement between the parties the court a quo was
called upon to decide only the issue of liability for such damages
as may later be determined. The court (Jamie AJ) came to the
conclusion that the fire in question was not a ‘veldfire’ within the
meaning of the section quoted above and that the appellant had
failed to establish negligence on the part of the respondent. It
accordingly dismissed the appellant’s claim with costs, but granted
leave to appeal to this court.

[5] It is convenient to consider first the provisions of s 34 of the
Act and whether on the facts of the case the effect of the section
was to shift to the respondent the burden of proving that it was not
negligent. In passing I should mention that although the section
does not apply if the defendant is a member of a fire protection
association in the area, no evidence was led as to the existence or

otherwise of such an association in the area. In the court a quo it
appears to have been accepted by both parties that the
respondent was not such a member and I shall presume this to be
the case. Section 34 differs markedly from its predecessor, s 84 of
the Forest Act 122 of 1984. The latter reads:
‘When in any action by virtue of the provisions of this Act or the common law
the question of negligence in respect of  a veld, forest or mountain fire which
occurred on land situated outside a fire control area arises, negligence is
presumed, until the contrary is proved.’
This section and its predecessors (ie s 23 of Act 72 of 1968 and s
26 of Act 13 of 1941) were cast in such wide terms as to give rise
to a need to cut them down in some way. It was accordingly held
that for the presumption to operate the plaintiff had to establish ‘a
nexus or connection between the fire and the party against whom
the allegation is made’.1 In enacting the present s 34 the
legislature abandoned the wide terms employed in the earlier
enactments and sought to avoid the difficulties of the past by
prescribing more closely what had to be established for the
presumption to come into operation. In terms of the section, a
litigant in civil proceedings seeking to invoke the presumption is

1 Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Forestry 1972 (2) SA 783 (N) at 788H; see also
Steenberg v De Kaap Timber (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA 169 (A) at 174F-G; Van Wyk v Hermanus
Municipality 1963 (4) SA 285 (C) at 295A-B.

required to prove ‘that he or she suffered loss from a veldfire
which -
(a)   the defendant caused; or
(b)   started on  or  spread  from  land  owned  by  the defendant
. . .’ .
As far as the situation contemplated in (b) is concerned, an
ordinary reading of the section indicates, I think, that what is
required is that the fire that starts on or spreads from the
defendant’s property must at that stage be a ‘veldfire’ and not
some other kind of fire. In other words, the presumption does not
operate if the fire that starts on, or spreads from, a defendant’s
property is not a veldfire on the defendant’s property, but becomes
one at some later stage. In the case of doubt, the section,
containing as it does a so-called reverse onus provision, should in
principle be given a restrictive rather than a liberal interpretation.
But any doubt is in any event removed, I think, by s 12(1) of the
Act, which provides:
‘12(1) Every owner on whose land a veldfire may start or burn or from whose

land it may spread must prepare and maintain a firebreak on his or her

side of the boundary between his or her land and any adjoining land.’
The section clearly contemplates the preparation and maintenance
of firebreaks on land, ie veld, on which a veldfire may start, burn or

from which it may spread. If s 12(1) and s 34 were to be construed
as applying to some other kind of fire that may start on, burn on or
spread from, a defendant’s property and later develop into a
veldfire, it would mean that an owner of a residential property in a
township adjacent to veld would be obliged to prepare and
maintain a firebreak. That could never have been what was
intended.

[6] As previously indicated, it is not in dispute that the fire
started on and spread from the respondent’s property. Whether the
presumption in s 34 applies or not depends therefore on whether
the fire on the respondent’s property was a veldfire; in other words
whether the strip on either side of the rails in the reserve
constituted veld.

[7] The word ‘veldfire’ is defined in s 1 of the Act as meaning ‘a
veld, forest or mountain fire’. The fire in the present case was not a
forest or mountain fire so the definition is of little assistance. ‘Fire’
is defined as including a veldfire which means of course that the
Act contemplates a fire which is not a veldfire as defined. Section
2(3) reads:

‘A reasonable interpretation of a provision which is consistent with the
purpose of this Act must be preferred over an alternative interpretation which
is not.’
This provision, too, would seem to provide little assistance. In the
absence of a more specific definition in the Act, the starting point
must necessarily be the ordinary grammatical meaning of ‘veldfire’.

[8] The word ‘veld’ was borrowed by the English language in
South Africa from the Afrikaans or Dutch early in the 19th century.
When used with a distinguishing epithet denoting a characteristic
feature of an area it has a wide meaning. One speaks for example
of ‘highveld’, ‘lowveld’, ‘swartveld’ and ‘backveld’. In this sense it
may include a vast area including cities, towns and farmland. (See
under ‘veld’ A Dictionary of South African English on Historical
Principles.) But when used on its own – or for that matter as an
epithet to describe a fire – as it commonly is by both English and
Afrikaans speakers, it has an ordinary meaning which is well
understood and is reflected in the definitions contained in both
English and Afrikaans dictionaries. The Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary defines ‘veld’ as: ‘In South Africa, the unenclosed
country, or open pasture-land’. The definition in The South African
Concise Oxford Dictionary is similar: ‘Open, uncultivated country or
grassland in Southern Africa’, while the meaning given in A

Dictionary of South African English on Historical Principles is:
‘Uncultivated and undeveloped land with relatively open natural
vegetation’. The Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse
Taal defines ‘veld’ as: ‘Onbewerkte, onbeboste gebied of streek
weg van ‘n stad, dorp, plaaswerf e.d. af, met of sonder die
gewasse daarop’, while the Kernwoordeboek van Afrikaans gives
the following meaning: ‘onbeboude, oop, vormlose stuk grond
bedek met plantegroei, dikwels as weiding gebruik’.

[9] The meaning of ‘veld’ was considered by this court as long
ago as 1925. In  West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance
Co Ltd 1925 AD 245 it was necessary to construe a term in an
insurance policy which excluded liability for loss or damage
occasioned by or happening through ‘the burning of forests, bush,
prairie, pampas or jungle and the clearing of lands by fire’. Both
Solomon JA and Kotzé JA took the view that the nearest
equivalent in South Africa to a prairie fire was a veldfire and
proceeded to consider what was meant by the latter.  After noting
that every grass fire was not a veldfire, Soloman JA had the
following to say:2
‘But generally it may be said that the expression grasveld conveys the idea of
an area covered with veld grass of considerable extent and in its original

2 At 253

rough state. Any land, therefore, which had been cultivated or which was
immediately connected with buildings, either residential or industrial, would
not, in my opinion, be included under the word veld. Thus the ground
immediately about a farmhouse is spoken of as “werf” and not veld, even
though veld grass may be growing upon it. So that in determining in any case
whether a certain area is veld or not, it is not sufficient that it should be
covered with ordinary grass, but its extent and the use to which it is put must
also be regarded.’
Kotzé JA observed that:3
‘The mere fact that grass, which grows in the veld, happened also to be
growing near and between the buildings destroyed, and that this grass caught
fire within this area belonging to the appellants, does not constitute a veld
fire.’
and added:4
‘By veld is generally understood the uncultivated and unoccupied portion of
land, as distinct from the portion which is cultivated, occupied and built upon.
It is that part of open and unoccupied land over which cattle and sheep and
other stock are turned for grazing purposes.’
I am unaware of any judicial interpretation to the contrary. In Van
Wyk v Hermanus Municipality5 this meaning of veld was accepted
by Watermeyer J who was not prepared to regard a fire on a golf
course as a veldfire.

3 At 264
4  Ibid
5 Supra, (n1)

[10] To return to the facts, the distance between the fence on the
western side of the railway reserve and ‘the edge of the grass’
(presumably adjacent to the aggregate supporting the rails) was
measured at the in loco inspection to be 7.5 metres. Running
parallel with the rails on the western side, ie within the 7.5m strip,
was a service road which was measured to be 2.3 metres wide
and was bisected by what was described as a ‘middelmannetjie’.
Judging from the condition of the unburnt vegetation in the reserve
between the rails and the fence on the eastern side immediately
after the fire, it was accepted that the reserve on the western side
prior to the fire was generally covered in dry grass with clumps of
small bushes of the kind one would normally find in the veld in that
locality. Being the dry season, the vegetation would have been
readily combustible. There was also some wheat growing in the
reserve caused by the wind dispersing seed from the adjacent
wheat fields. It was explained in evidence that the service road,
which amounted to little more than twin tracks, was no longer
maintained as the railway line was maintained and repaired by
railway employees travelling on trucks that ran on the rails
themselves.

[11] As indicated, the court a quo come to the conclusion that the
railway reserve did not constitute ‘veld’ and that a fire in the
reserve was accordingly not a veldfire within the meaning of the
Act. In my judgment this finding was correct. The reserve is a
relatively narrow strip, fenced and immediately connected with the
railway line and the structures serving it such as poles supporting
overhead wires and the like. One of the objects of an enclosed
reserve is presumably to prevent or at least deter unauthorised
people for their own good from coming too close to or onto the rails
or from interfering with railway structures. Another would be to
accommodate equipment that may have to be offloaded when
necessary to effect repairs, whether to the rails themselves or
other structures, including the bed on which the rails are laid, and
to afford workers some space within which to operate. Although,
therefore, the vegetation growing in the reserve may be similar to
that found in the veld, the reserve differs from the ordinary
meaning of veld both in relation to its shape and use. It is in reality
a strip of land with an industrial use. A further indication that the
respondent’s property is not ‘veld’ within the meaning of the Act
appears from the Act itself. In terms of s 12(1), quoted above, an
owner of land on which a veldfire may start is obliged to prepare
and maintain a firebreak ‘on his or her side of the boundary

between his or her land and any adjoining land’.  Where the land in
question takes the form of a strip 20 metres wide it would mean
that whatever the use to which the land may be put owner would
be obliged to turn nearly the entire strip into a firebreak. Such a
result could never have been what was intended. The result would
be that virtually every stretch of railway reserve, and for that matter
road reserve, in the rural areas would have to be turned into a
firebreak. It follows that in my view the appellant was not assisted
by s 34 of the Act and bore the onus of proving on a balance of
probabilities all the elements of its action for damages against the
respondent.

[12] It is now well established that wrongfulness is a requirement
for liability under the modern Aquilian action. Negligent conduct
giving rise to loss, unless also wrongful, is therefore not actionable.
But the issue of wrongfulness is more often than not uncontentious
as the plaintiff’s action will be founded upon conduct which, if held
to be culpable, would be prima facie wrongful.6 Typically this is so
where the negligent conduct takes the form of a positive act which
causes physical harm. Where the element of wrongfulness gains
importance is in relation to liability for omissions and pure

6 Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd and another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd  and
another  2000(1) SA 827 (SCA) para [19] at 837H

economic loss.7 The inquiry as to wrongfulness will then involve a
determination of the existence or otherwise of a legal duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff to act without negligence: in other
words to avoid negligently causing the plaintiff harm.8 This will be a
matter for judicial judgment involving criteria of reasonableness,
policy and, where appropriate, constitutional norms.9 If a legal duty
is found to have existed, the next inquiry will be whether the
defendant was negligent. The test to be applied will be that
formulated in Kruger v Coetzee10 , involving as it does, first, a
determination of the issue of foreseeability and, second, a
comparison between what steps a reasonable person would have
taken and what steps, if any, the defendant actually took. While
conceptually the inquiry as to wrongfulness might be anterior to the
enquiry as to negligence11, it is equally so that without negligence
the issue of wrongfulness does not arise for conduct will not be
wrongful if there is no negligence.12 Depending on the
circumstances, therefore, it may be convenient to assume the
existence of a legal duty and consider first the issue of

7 See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A); Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank
van Afrika  Bpk 1979 (3) SA 834 (A)
8 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) at 797F; Minister of
Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) para [12] at 441F-G
9 See eg Minister van Polisie v Ewels  (n7) at 597A-B; Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995
(1) SA 303 (A) at 318E-G; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (n8) para [22]
at 447F-H
10 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) at 430E-F
11 Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 (3) SA 1049 (SCA) para [9] at 1054H-I
12 Cape Metropolitan Council  v Graham 2001 (1) SA 1197 (SCA) para [6] at 1203E-G

negligence.13 It may also be convenient for that matter, when the
issue of wrongfulness is considered first, to assume for that
purpose the existence of negligence.14 The courts have in the past
sometimes determined the issue of foreseeability as part of the
inquiry into wrongfulness and, after finding that there was a legal
duty to act reasonably, proceeded to determine the second leg of
the negligence inquiry, the first (being foreseeability) having
already been decided. If this approach is adopted, it is important
not to overlook the distinction
between
negligence
and
wrongfulness.

[13] In the court a quo Jamie AJ considered first the question of
wrongfulness and thereafter the question of negligence. As to the
former, he expressed himself as follows:

‘I am of the view that the legal convictions of the community would, in a
case such as the present, expect that if the defendant’s negligent conduct
leads to harm by fire to a neighbour’s property, such harm should be regarded
as having been wrongfully inflicted, or, put another way, that the defendant
should be regarded as having been subject to a duty not to cause such harm.
In arriving at this conclusion I particularly bear in mind the fact that the

13 See eg Sea Harvest Corporation and another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and
another (n6) para [20] at 838H-J; Mkhatswa v Minister of Defence 2000 (1) SA 1104 (SCA)
para [18] at 1111E-G; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd and
another  2000 (4) SA 1019 (SCA) para [7] at 1024F; Mostert v Cape Town City Council 2001
(1) SA 105 (SCA) para 43 at 120I-121C
14 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden (n8) para [12] at 442A-B

defendant is a commercial entity, all of whose shares are held by the State,
and that its purpose is to conduct a commercial rail operation. That being the
case, and if it can be shown to have acted negligently and in a manner to
have caused harm, there can be no reason to excuse it from liability. In
arriving at this conclusion, I take into account the fact that the net of liability
will not be cast too wide as a plaintiff still needs to establish both negligence
and causation before it is entitled to succeed.

In the premises, I hold that the defendant was under a legal duty to the
plaintiff not to negligently cause harm to it, more particularly by allowing a fire
to spread from its property to that of the plaintiff.’
I am in full agreement with both the reasoning of the learned judge
and his formulation of the inquiry. Neither party in this court sought
to attack this aspect of the judgment, and rightly so.

[14] Turning to the question of negligence, there can be no doubt
that the reasonable possibility of a fire in the reserve and of it
spreading to neighbouring properties was foreseeable. The
respondent was accordingly obliged to take such precautions as
were reasonable to guard against that eventuality. What those
steps would have been depends on an examination of all the
relevant circumstances and involves a value judgment which is to
be made by balancing various competing considerations. These
have been said to include:

‘. . . (a) the degree or extent of the risk created by the actor’s conduct; (b) the
gravity of the possible consequences if the risk of harm materialises; (c) the
utility of the actor’s conduct; and (d) the burden of eliminating the risk of
harm.’15
If a reasonable person would have done no more than was
actually done, there is no negligence.

[15] Evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent was to the
effect that the risk of fire caused by a train had become almost
negligible subsequent to the respondent ceasing to use coal-fed
steam locomotives except on occasions in the wet months of
winter. Nonetheless, there remained the risk of fire resulting from
overheated brakes or axles igniting vegetation in the reserve. But
this risk was said to be minimal. To guard against it, heat detectors
were placed on the tracks at various points. One such detector
was positioned between Voëlvlei and Hermon to the south of the
appellant’s property. There was another to the north between
Wolseley and Romansrivier. If the heat caused by a train passing
over a detector was excessive an alarm would go off at the
Centralised Traffic Control Centre at Worcester and the train would
be stopped. But nothing like this occurred on the day in question.
On the contrary, it was common cause that the fire had not been

15 Ngubane v South African Transport Services 1991 (1) SA 756 (A) at 776G-J

caused by a train; nor was there any suggestion that railway
employees had been working in the area. What was suggested in
argument was that the fire may have been started by unauthorised
persons trespassing on railway property. This may well have been
the case, but in that event, the trespasser may just as well have
started the fire in the appellant’s stubble lands which, judging from
the manner in which the fire spread, would have been no less
combustible than the vegetation in the railway reserve.

[16] The main argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was
that the respondent ought to have established and maintained
adequate firebreaks in the reserve on both sides of the tracks and
that had it done so, the fire would not have spread. Mr Adriaan
Visagie, a fire officer employed in the Bellville office of the
respondent’s fire department, readily conceded that the fire would
probably not have spread to the appellant’s property had there
been a firebreak within the reserve on its western boundary. He
explained, however, that the making and maintenance of
firebreaks were way beyond the resources of his department. His
office alone, he said, was responsible for some 3 000 km of track
in the Western Cape. He testified further that given the limited
extent of the risk and the fact that in the area concerned farmers

had made firebreaks adjacent to the reserve, further firebreaks
actually in the reserve were considered unjustified. He said that a
machine which ran on the rails was used to spray the vegetation in
the railway reserves with a herbicide, but he was unable to say
how frequently or in what circumstances this was done as it was
not something with which he was concerned. Another witness
called by the respondent, Mr Hannes de Kock, the track manager
at the Centralised Traffic Control Centre at Worcester, explained
that all train drivers in the area maintain radio contact with the
centre. In the event of a fire or anything untoward they are required
immediately to inform the Centre which relays the message to the
Joint Operation Centre in Johannesburg. Should there be a fire,
the latter alerts the appropriate body.

[17] Mr Barend Kotze, a member of the appellant, testified that he
had previously made a firebreak on the appellant’s property
adjacent to and on the western boundary of the railway reserve.
He explained that he had done so in October or November the
previous year using a disc plough extended to its maximum of four
metres. By ploughing in both directions he had made the firebreak
eight metres wide. Subsequently and from time to time, he had
reploughed certain sections when weeds came up after the rain.

He said he regarded the firebreak to be adequate and in good
condition at the time of the fire on 8 February 2001. In passing I
should mention that he would have made the firebreak with the full
knowledge that there was no firebreak in the railway reserve.
There is nothing to suggest that he ever complained to the
respondent about the condition of the reserve.

[18] The appellant called as an expert Mr Josias Visser who was
employed by the Breë Rivier District Council as head of the fire
department and whose office was at Ceres. He expressed the view
that the appellant’s firebreak was adequate in the circumstances,
but then added that this was so only if there was an adjacent
firebreak within the reserve, also eight metres wide, so that there
existed an effective firebreak 16 metres wide. This evidence was in
conflict with his expert summary in which he expressed the view
that a firebreak having a width of 10 metres would have been
adequate in the circumstances. His explanation that the opinion
expressed in his summary was of general application and did not
pertain  to  the  firebreak  in  question  was  rejected  by the court a
quo, which held that Visser had adapted his evidence so that it
would coincide with that of Kotze who testified that the width of the
firebreak on the appellant’s property was 8 metres as opposed to

10 metres. This finding was not challenged on appeal and rightly
so.

[19] In my judgment, the failure of the respondent to establish
firebreaks within the reserve cannot in the circumstances be
regarded as unreasonable. To require the respondent to do so
would be to place a burden upon it which would be quite
intolerable and incommensurate with the risk involved. The
appellant’s property, moreover, falls within an area in which open
fires in the summer months had been prohibited by the local
agricultural society. It was no doubt for this reason that the
firebreak on the appellant’s property was made by ploughing and
not by burning. If counsel’s contention were to be upheld it would
mean that notwithstanding the existence of the appellant’s
firebreak and the minimal nature of the risk, the respondent would
have been obliged to turn virtually the entire reserve into a
firebreak and to achieve this by a means other than burning.

[20] A further argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was
that the appellant had failed to adequately reduce the extent of the
vegetation in the reserve by spraying with a herbicide. It was not
suggested that by spraying it could be reasonably expected that all
combustible plant material would be eradicated. But  no  evidence

was led as to when the respondent ought to have sprayed, at what
intervals, what the cost would have been and what its effect would
have been on the state of the vegetation in February when the fire
occurred. There was therefore no evidence to enable the court to
judge the reasonableness or otherwise of what it was the appellant
contended that the respondent ought to have done, as opposed to
what it did do. The contention was simply founded on the
assumption that because the fire spread to the adjacent property it
had to follow that there had been no spraying or if there had been,
it was inadequate. But the assumption is misplaced. Given the
vagaries of an open fire in a strong wind it does not at all follow
that the fire would have been confined to the reserve and would
not have spread had the plant material been reduced by some
unknown extent by spraying.

[21] It follows that in my view the appellant failed to establish that
the respondent was negligent and the appeal must therefore fail.
[22] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

D G SCOTT

JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:
NAVSA

JA
CONRADIE
JA
CLOETE

JA
ERASMUS
AJA