THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 291/12
Reportable

In the matter between:

THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICES
APPELLANT

and

PRETORIA EAST MOTORS (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
SARS v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd (291/12) [2014] ZASCA 91
(12 June 2014)

Bench:
Ponnan, Theron, Wallis, Willis JJA and Van Zyl AJA

Heard:
20 May 2014

Delivered:
12 June 2014

Summary:  Revenue – Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and Value Added Tax Act 89 of
1991 – assessment to additional income tax and value added tax – appeal against
dismissal of objection by taxpayer – onus of proof – evidence – sufficiency of to
discharge onus.

____________________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Tax Court, held at Pretoria (Goodey AJ sitting as court of first
instance):

1. The appeal and cross-appeal are each upheld in part, with the costs, including those
consequent upon the employment of two counsel, to be paid in each instance by the
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services.
2. The additional income tax assessments in respect of the 2000, 2001 and 2002 tax
years and the additional VAT assessments for the tax years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
and 2004 are set aside and referred back to the Commissioner for reassessment in the
light of this judgment.
3. The costs order of the court below is set aside and substituted with an order that
each party pay their own costs.

______________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________

PONNAN JA (THERON, WALLIS, WILLIS JJA and VAN ZYL AJA concurring):

[1] The Respondent, Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd (the taxpayer), an authorised
dealer on behalf of Toyota South Africa (Toyota SA), conducted business as a car
dealership at Menlyn and Garsfontein in Pretoria selling new and used vehicles. During
June and July 2003 officials in the employ of the appellant, the Commissioner for the
South African Revenue Services (SARS) conducted a detailed audit of the tax affairs of
the taxpayer for the period 2000 to 2004. At the conclusion of the audit various
additional Income Tax (IT) and Value-added Tax (VAT) assessments were raised by

SARS. Although the assessments themselves were omitted from the record it appears
that there were additional assessments for income tax in respect of each of 2000, 2001
and 2002. There were five additional VAT assessments, respectively for 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003 and 2004. There was also an assessment to Secondary Tax for Companies
but that appeal was dismissed by the Tax Court and not persisted with in this Court. The
taxpayer‟s objection to those assessments, having been disallowed by SARS, it then
appealed to the Special Tax Court: Pretoria. The Tax Court (Goodey AJ sitting with
assessors) upheld SARS assessment in relation to 18 of the 21 items in dispute and
found for the taxpayer in respect of the remaining 3 items. It also confirmed the
penalties at the maximum rate of 200 per cent that had been levied by SARS in respect
of the additional assessments. SARS was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal on the
basis that the taxpayer was „substantively successful and is entitled to costs‟. The
appeal by SARS and the cross-appeal by the taxpayer direct to this court in each
instance against the conclusions adverse to them are with the leave of the Tax Court.

[2] It is important at the outset to emphasise, as Curlewis JA did in Bailey v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1933 AD 204 at 220, that the Tax Court is not a court
of appeal in the ordinary sense: it is a court of revision. That means, as Centlivres JA
observed in Rand Ropes (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1944 AD 142 (at
150):
„. . . that the Legislature intended that there should be a re-hearing of the whole matter by the
Special Court and that that Court could substitute its own decision for that of the Commissioner.‟
As the fate of this appeal depends upon an interpretation of certain provisions of the
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the IT Act) and the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (VAT
Act), before passing to a closer consideration of the evidence and proceeding to narrate
the issues that arise for decision, it would be appropriate to first record, in broad outline,
some general observations about IT and VAT.

[3] Taxable income is the basis upon which normal tax is levied. It is arrived at by
first determining the taxpayer‟s gross income, consisting of all receipts and accruals,
other than those of a capital nature, and certain other specified amounts and then
deducting therefrom any amounts exempt from normal tax. One thereby arrives at the

income of the taxpayer. The taxpayer‟s taxable income is then determined by deducting
from its income the various amounts which the IT Act allows by way of deduction, of
which those covered by s 11(a) are of relevance to this matter. Section 23 prescribes
what deductions may not be made in the determination of taxable income. Subsections
(f) and (g) of s 23 represent what has been described as the „negative counterpart‟ of s
11(a) and, in determining whether a particular amount is deductible, it is generally
appropriate to consider whether or not such deduction is permitted by s 11(a) and
whether or not it is prohibited by s 23(f) and/or (g). (See Commissioner for Inland
Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A) at 946H-947C.)

[4] The general deduction formula laid down in s 11(a) of the IT Act permits the
deduction from the taxpayer‟s income of „expenditure and losses actually incurred in the
production of the income, provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital
nature‟, whilst ss 23(f) and (g) of the Act prohibit a deduction in respect of:
„(f)
any expenses incurred in respect of any amounts received or accrued which do not
constitute income as defined in section one;
(g)
any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to
which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of trade.‟
In Joffe & Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1946 AD 157 at 163 it was put
thus:
„All expenditure, therefore, necessarily attached to the performance of the operations which
constitute the carrying on of the income-earning trade, would be deductible and also all
expenditure which, though not attached to the trading operations of necessity, is yet bona fide
incurred for the purpose of carrying them on, provided such payments are wholly and
exclusively made for that purpose and are not expenditure of a capital nature.‟

[5] As its name signifies, VAT is a tax on added value. The system was introduced
by s 7(1) of the VAT Act, which provides that
„. . . there shall be levied and paid . . . a tax, to be known as the value-added tax–
(a)
on the supply by any vendor of goods . . . supplied by him on or after the
commencement date in the course or furtherance of any enterprise carried on by him;
. . .
calculated at the rate of 14 per cent on the value of the supply concerned . . . .‟

VAT is calculated on the value of each successive step as goods move along the
commercial chain. Kriegler J explains (Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner, SARS
2001 (1) SA 1109 (CC)):
„[14]
Being a tax on added value, VAT is not levied on the full price of a commodity at each
transactional delivery step it takes along the distribution chain. It is not cumulative but merely a
tax on the added value the commodity gains during each interval since the previous supply. To
arrive at this outcome a supplying vendor, when calculating the VAT payable on the particular
supply, simply deducts the VAT that was paid when the particular goods were supplied to it in
the first place. As a commodity is on-sold by a succession of vendors, each payment of VAT by
each successive supplier must then represent 14% of the selling price less the 14% of the price
which was payable when that commodity was acquired. According to the scheme of the Act the
tax that is payable by a supplying vendor is called output tax and the tax that was payable on
the supply to that vendor upon acquisition is called input tax.
[15] . . . In the result vendors are entrusted with a number of important duties in relation to VAT.
First there is the duty to calculate and levy VAT on each supply of goods; then to calculate the
output tax and the input tax on that transaction correctly; also to keep proper records supported
by the prescribed vouchers, periodically to add up the sum of output and input taxes attributable
to that period and appropriately deducting the total of the input taxes from those of the output
taxes; and, ultimately and crucially, to make due and timeous return and payment of the VAT
that is payable in accordance with the vendor‟s allocated tax period.
[16] . . . The first significant point to note is that VAT, quite unlike income tax, does not give rise
to a liability only once an assessment has been made. VAT is a multi-stage tax, it arises
continuously. Moreover VAT vendors/taxpayers bear the ongoing obligation to keep the
requisite records, to make periodic calculations of the balance of output totals over and above
deductible input totals (and any other permissible deductibles) and to pay such balances over to
the fisc. It is therefore a multi-stage system with both continuous self-assessment and
predetermined periodic reporting/paying.‟

[6] In terms of s 82 of the IT Act:
„The burden of proof that any amount is –
(a)
exempt from or not liable to any tax chargeable under this Act;
. . . shall be upon the person claiming such exemption, non-liability, deduction, abatement or
set-off, . . . and upon the hearing of any appeal from any decision of the Commissioner, the

decision shall not be reversed or altered unless it is shown by the appellant that the decision is
wrong.‟
A similar provision is to be found in s 37 of the VAT Act. The present appeal must
therefore be approached on the basis that the onus was on the taxpayer to show on a
preponderance of probability that the decisions of SARS against which it appealed were
wrong (CIR v SA Mutual Unit Trust Management Co Ltd 1990 (4) SA 529 (A) at 538D).
That, however, is not to suggest that SARS was free to simply adopt a supine attitude. It
was bound before the appeal to set out the grounds for the disputed assessments and
the taxpayer was obliged to respond with the grounds of appeal and these delineate the
disputes between the parties.

[7] To discharge the onus resting upon it, the taxpayer called two witnesses, Dr
WAA Gouws and Mr C Wolpe. The former, a chartered accountant, became involved in
the matter soon after the audit commenced. He prepared the letter of objection on
behalf of the taxpayer and later a report including annexures which formed part of the
record before the Tax Court on the strength of the taxpayer‟s contemporaneous
financial records and other documentation. The latter was the financial director of the
taxpayer and one of its principal shareholders. The managing director of the taxpayer,
Mr Dick Jacobs, who suffered from Alzheimer‟s disease, was unable to testify. For
SARS, Ms Jacqueline Victor, who had been principally responsible for conducting the
audit that gave rise to the assessments and for the disallowance of the various
objections, testified. Much of the evidence before the Tax Court, however, took the form
of documentary exhibits, primarily in the form of court dossiers prepared by the
taxpayer. Those included documents obtained or prepared by Ms Victor during the
course of the audit as well as the annexures to the letter of objection prepared by Dr
Gouws and his summary.

[8] It is so that the taxpayer‟s ipse dixit will not lightly be regarded as decisive. But it
must be considered together with all of the other evidence in the case. And, given the
unfavourable position of having the onus resting upon it – a „formidable and difficult‟ one
to discharge (per Trollip JA; Barnato Holdings Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1978
(2) SA 440 (A) at 454A-B) – the interests of justice require that the taxpayer‟s evidence

and questions of its credibility be considered with great care. Indeed the taxpayer‟s
evidence under oath and that of its witnesses must necessarily be given full
consideration by the court, and the credibility of the witnesses must be assessed as in
any other case that comes before the court. (See Malan v Kommissaris vir Binnelandse
Inkomste 1983 (3) SA 1 (A) at 18E.) It thus remains the function of the court to make a
determination of the issues that arise for decision on an objective review of all of the
relevant facts and circumstances. Not the least important of the facts, according to
Miller J (ITC 1185 (1972) 35 SATC 122 (N) at 124), „will be the course of conduct of the
taxpayer in relation to the transactions in issue, the nature of his business or occupation
and the frequency or otherwise of his past involvement or participation in similar
transactions. The facts in regard to those matters will form an important part of the
material from which the court will draw its own inferences against the background of the
general human and business probabilities‟.

[9] SARS raised the additional assessments on the basis of information in the
taxpayer‟s records and, in the case of the additional VAT assessments, the VAT 201
forms completed by the taxpayer for each period of assessment. The approach adopted
by Ms Victor was to examine the accounts and, where she found a discrepancy that she
did not understand and for which in her view no adequate explanation was furnished,
she raised an assessment to additional tax - either income tax or VAT or, in some
instances, both.

[10]  It does not appear that Ms Victor sought to familiarise herself with the workings of
the accounting system utilised by the taxpayer, even though the information available to
her, confirmed by the evidence in the appeal, was that it was a customised system
installed not by the taxpayer but by Toyota SA. It was designed not simply to reflect the
taxpayer‟s financial position, but to provide statistical information to Toyota SA and to
manage the complexities inherent in the taxpayer financing its operations under a floor-
plan agreement with Toyota Financial Services (Pty) Ltd. In the result a number of
transactions that were purely internal to the taxpayer‟s operations were reflected on that
system as „sales‟. Whilst that may have been useful as a management tool to enable
the taxpayer to assess the profitability of the different branches of its business, it could

be misleading if not properly understood. That was because it resulted in entries being
made in the accounts dealing with VAT that indicated that VATable transactions had
occurred, when in truth they had not and the entries were merely directed at maintaining
the accounts in balance. Ms Victor ignored the internal character of these transactions.
Thus she treated as taxable supplies: the transfer of vehicles from sales stock to
demonstration purposes; sales clearly reflected in the accounts as internal transactions;
and, the transfer of sales stock (swaps) between the two branches of the business. This
was incorrect, as it ignored the fact that under s 7(1)(a) of the VAT Act, read with the
definition of „supply‟ in s 1, output tax is to be raised only on taxable supplies by a
vendor and these internal activities did not constitute supplies to anyone.

[11]  As best as can be discerned, Ms Victor‟s approach was that if she did not
understand something she was free to raise an additional assessment and leave it to
the taxpayer to prove in due course at the hearing before the Tax Court that she was
wrong. Her approach was fallacious. The raising of an additional assessment must be
based on proper grounds for believing that, in the case of VAT, there has been an under
declaration of supplies and hence of output tax, or an unjustified deduction of input tax.
In the case of income tax it must be based on proper grounds for believing that there is
undeclared income or a claim for a deduction or allowance that is unjustified. It is only in
this way that SARS can engage the taxpayer in an administratively fair manner, as it is
obliged to do. It is also the only basis upon which it can, as it must, provide grounds for
raising the assessment to which the taxpayer must then respond by demonstrating that
the assessment is wrong. This erroneous approach led to an inability on Ms Victor‟s part
to explain the basis for some of the additional assessments and an inability in some
instances to produce the source of some of the figures she had used in making the
assessments. In addition, as a matter of routine, all the additional assessments raised
by her were subject to penalties at the maximum rate of 200 per cent, absent any
explanation as to why the taxpayer‟s conduct was said to be dishonest or directed at the
evasion of tax.

[12] According to the unchallenged evidence of Dr Gouws, who represented the
taxpayer from about the end of 2003 or early 2004, he had prepared schedules from the

taxpayer‟s records and offered to provide additional information to that already
furnished, but his overtures were rejected by Ms Victor. He stated that in response to a
suggestion that insufficient proof had been proffered by the taxpayer, all the ledger
accounts were put in a van and taken to the SARS office and Ms Victor was invited to
take whatever she needed, but she declined to do so. The SARS auditors had thus
been given access to all the documents foundational to the taxpayer‟s accounts but
chose not to examine any of them. This disturbing approach persisted in the Tax Court.
Prior to the hearing, Dr Gouws approached Mr Tjiane, who represented SARS at the
hearing, and after pointing out that there was a mass of invoices and files covering the
areas in dispute between the parties enquired what he should bring to the hearing. He
was told that it was unnecessary to bring everything and simply to bring an example.
During the course of the hearing documents were tendered for inspection but once
again the SARS representatives did not take up these offers. Mr Tjiane persisted in
cross-examination in asking Dr Gouws about source documents that demonstrated that
SARS was wrong, without ever indicating, beyond a question about invoices for
entertainment expenditure and charter fees, which documents he had in mind, or why it
was impermissible for Dr Gouws to make use of the audited figures in exactly the same
way as Ms Victor had done. It appeared as if he thought that it was necessary for the
taxpayer to reconstruct its accounts in order to discharge the onus resting on it.

[13] That approach was untenable, for, it left the taxpayer none the wiser as to what
was truly in issue and what needed to be produced in order for it to discharge the
burden of proof that rested upon it. The taxpayer thus adopted the general approach
that as Ms Victor had misunderstood the accounts and ignored the provisions in
particular of the VAT Act, it sufficed for it to demonstrate that through the evidence of Dr
Gouws. That was a perfectly proper approach in respect of most, but not all, items,
particularly in the light of Ms Victor having informed the taxpayer that all sales had been
properly entered in the company‟s accounts and that she had relied for the
assessments on the trial balances prepared by the company‟s auditors. The taxpayer
was not alerted to any other issue and was certainly not called upon to produce every
underlying voucher or invoice or to reconstruct its accounts from scratch for the Tax
Court.

[14] In these circumstances the submissions made to the Tax Court and repeated on
appeal in relation to many of the disputed items, namely that the original vouchers had
not been produced or that Dr Gouws‟ explanations were to be ignored because they
were based on hearsay, cannot be sustained. Whilst there are disputes in tax appeals,
such as the entertainment expenditure in the present appeal, where the production of
invoices or vouchers is called for if the taxpayer is to discharge the onus of proof resting
on it, that is not always the case. Everything will depend upon the nature of the dispute
between the parties as defined by the grounds of assessment and the grounds of
appeal. Where, for example, the SARS auditor has based an assessment upon the
taxpayer‟s accounts and records, but has misconstrued them, then it is sufficient for the
taxpayer to explain the nature of the misconception, point out the flaws in the analysis
and explain how those records and accounts should be properly understood. That can
be done by a witness such as Dr Gouws who, as a qualified chartered accountant, is
capable of giving such an explanation after a full and proper consideration of the
accounts. If there are underlying facts in support of that explanation that SARS wishes
to place in dispute, then it should indicate clearly what those facts are so that the
taxpayer is alerted to the need to call direct evidence on those matters. Any other
approach would make litigation in the Tax Court unmanageable, as the taxpayer would
be left in the dark as to the level of detail required of it in the presentation of its case. It
must be stressed that SARS is under an obligation throughout the assessment process
leading up to the appeal and the appeal itself to indicate clearly what matters and which
documents are in dispute so that the taxpayer knows what is needed to present its
case.

[15] Against that background I turn to the substantive issues raised by the appeal and
cross appeal.

The SARS Appeal

First ground: Input tax on the purchase of second hand vehicles
[16] Part of the taxpayer‟s business as a motor dealership involved the acquisition of
second-hand vehicles from third parties, either by way of an out-and-out purchase or as

a trade-in against the purchase of a new vehicle. In terms of s 16(3) of the VAT Act the
amount of VAT payable by a vendor is calculated by, inter alia, deducting from the sum
of the output tax of the vendor the amounts of input tax in respect of qualifying goods
and services. The taxpayer had claimed input VAT deductions in respect of the
purchase of second-hand vehicles for the period 2000 to 2003 in the total sum of
R14 099 943. Those were disallowed by SARS on the basis that the taxpayer had not
kept the necessary records as required by the VAT Act.

[17] Input tax is defined in s 1 of the VAT Act to include:
„(a)
tax charged under section 7 and payable in terms of that section by –
(i)
a supplier on the supply of goods or services made by that supplier to the
vendor;  or
. . .
(b)
an amount equal to the tax fraction . . . of the lesser of any consideration in money given
by the vendor for or the open market value of the supply (not being a taxable supply) to him by
way of a sale on or after the commencement date by a resident of the Republic . . . of any
second-hand goods situated in the Republic; . . . .‟
Therefore „input tax‟ in respect of second-hand goods acquired by a vendor is a deemed
amount equal to the tax fraction1 (namely 14 over 114) of the lesser of the sale price or
the open market value of such goods. Section 16(2)(c) of the VAT Act, however,
prohibits the deduction of input tax in respect of the supply of goods, unless inter alia:
„(c)
sufficient records are maintained as required by section 20(8) where the supply is a
supply of second-hand goods or a supply of goods as contemplated in section 8(10) and in
either case is a supply to which that section relates; . . . .‟
At the relevant time, s 20(8) read:
„Notwithstanding anything in this section, where a supplier makes a supply (not being a taxable
supply) of second-hand goods or of goods as contemplated in s 8(10) to a recipient, being a
registered vendor, the recipient shall, where the value of the supply is R1 000 or more, obtain
and maintain a declaration by the supplier stating whether the supply is taxable supply or not
and shall further maintain sufficient records to enable the following particulars to be ascertained
. . . .‟

1 According to s 1 of the VAT Act, tax fraction means the fraction calculated in accordance with the
formula R over (100 plus R) in which formula R is the rate of tax applicable under s 7(1), namely 14 per
cent.

[18] According to the taxpayer, the transactions fell into three categories, namely, the
acquisition of used vehicles from: (a) registered vendors; (b) non-vendors for resale;
and (c) non-vendors as a trade-in against the sale of a new vehicle. The taxpayer
asserted that it had specifically been brought to the attention of Ms Victor that each
individual vehicle bought or sold by it had a separate file. And as all of those files were
quite voluminous, it had been agreed between Dr Gouws and Mr Devlin Bissetty, the
legal officer then in the employ of SARS, that although all of those files were available
for inspection, a random sample of only 50 files would be scrutinised by SARS.

[19] In respect of the transactions covered by category (a), the evidence was to the
effect that the registered vendor in each case had supplied the taxpayer with a valid
invoice, which reflected its VAT registration number and otherwise complied with the
requirements of the VAT Act. But Ms Victor did not treat those transactions any
differently to those that fell into the other two categories. The impermissibility of Ms
Victor‟s approach was demonstrated by an exchange between her and one of the
assessors in which he asked whether she had disregarded transactions where there
was a valid tax invoice and she agreed that she had.

[20] In regard to categories (b) and (c), SARS disallowed the input tax deduction
solely on the basis that the taxpayer was not in possession of a „declaration by the
supplier stating whether the supply is a taxable supply or not‟ as contemplated by s
20(8) of the VAT Act. That requirement was introduced by way of an amendment to s
20(8) in terms of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 30 of 1998. When s 16(2)(c) was
first enacted, a declaration by the seller was not one of the documents contemplated by
the expression „sufficient records . . . as required by s 20(8)‟. Tellingly, when s 20(8)
was amended there was no corresponding amendment to s 16(2)(c). Section 20(8)
requires the recipient vendor to „maintain a declaration by the supplier‟ and in addition to
„further maintain sufficient records to enable the following particulars to be ascertained‟.
The „following particulars‟ to be ascertained from the records, include the name of the
supplier, a copy of the seller‟s identity document or details of the seller if not a natural
person, the address of the supplier, the date of sale, a description of the goods and the
consideration for the supply, all of which the taxpayer admittedly possessed in this case.

A declaration by the supplier was not one of those particulars. It was an additional
requirement over and above the requirement that „sufficient records‟ be kept of the
particularised matters. It follows that such a declaration - being a requirement that is
additional to those particulars - is plainly not encompassed by the expression „sufficient
records‟ in s 16(2)(c). Not being a requirement of that section, it must follow that SARS‟
disallowance of the input tax deduction on the basis that the taxpayer was not in
possession of those declarations, could not stand. In the result the appeal by SARS in
relation to this ground must fail.

Second ground: Fuel coupons
[21] SARS disallowed income tax deductions claimed by the taxpayer in respect of
the period 2000 to 2002 in the sum of R1 113 762 (involving tax of R334 129). This
pertained to the use of fuel coupons or vouchers to obtain fuel for demonstration
vehicles, delivery of vehicles or for other internal purposes by the taxpayer. Mr Wolpe
explained:
„And then if M‟Lord came in himself to buy a car, you would be insisting that you get a full tank
of petrol or half a tank, and this was the method that we put petrol in the tank.‟
His evidence was never challenged. Nor was it disputed that this type of expenditure
could be claimed by the taxpayer in terms of s 11(a) of the IT Act. In fact in its statement
of grounds of assessment filed in terms of rule 10,2 SARS conceded:
„22.
The Appellant claimed a deduction for the vouchers/coupons issued by it for the petrol
used on demo cars and other workshop vehicles. It is not disputed that such expenditure would
be deductible for tax purposes.
23.
However, the Appellant could not produce the proof of the expenditure for the period
assessed. The cash reconciliation presented by the Appellant was not for the period under
scrutiny. Therefore, the deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner.‟
It was thus disallowed because proof of the expenditure was not provided.

[22] In Dr Gouws‟ report it was explained that these amounts related to „coupons‟
which „authorised the petrol attendants to sell petrol to the value of the coupon and
accept it [the coupon] as payment‟. Moreover, it was stated „the disbursements in the

2 Rules promulgated under s 107A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, GN R467, GG 24639, 1 April 2003.

form of petrol coupons relates to expenditure incurred for petrol used for the
demonstration vehicles and other workshop vehicles where petrol is needed‟. According
to Dr Gouws, on a daily basis the petrol attendants completed and reconciled sales
reports which were forwarded to the accountant, who reconciled them with the shift
report and passed „the necessary journal entries to account for the sales of the floor‟. Dr
Gouws, asserted that: there was a daily reconciliation after every eight hour shift for the
entire year and specifically for the period which was the subject of the audit; and, while
all of the supporting documentation was available and had earlier been made available
to Ms Victor and had further been tendered at court, she had declined to peruse them.
Dr Gouws added that it would be „absolutely ridiculous‟ to bring „every petty cash
voucher‟ to court. What he did place before the Tax Court (as he had before the SARS
auditors) were separately numbered petrol vouchers and, as confirmation of the practice
then prevailing at the taxpayer, the following written statement:
„We hereby confirm that the following procedure relating to fuel provided for demo and the
delivery of vehicles is as follows:
1.
Coupons which are required for the above, are obtained from Mr D. Jacobs.
2.
On the issue of these coupons, the demo vehicle being taken out for demonstration
purposes, or new vehicles being delivered, are driven to the fuel pumps, and the necessary fuel
to the value of the coupon is inserted in the car.
THIS PROCEDURE IS CONFIRMED BY:
A. RAS

SALESMANAGER
DAAN BEKKER

SALESMAN
WILLIE VAN DEVENTER
SALESMAN
ELIZE LOMBAARD

SALESLADY‟
That statement bore the signature of each of those individuals alongside their name.

[23] It was not suggested, either during the course of the audit or before the Tax
Court, that the taxpayer‟s account on that score was untruthful and should be rejected.
Quite the contrary, all of that evidence simply did not elicit a response from Ms Victor.
Accordingly, SARS‟ disallowance of the income tax deductions claimed by the taxpayer
in respect of the fuel vouchers for the period in question could not stand. In the result
the appeal by SARS in relation to this ground must fail.

Third ground: Parking rentals
[24] SARS disallowed IT deductions and VAT input tax deductions in respect of
payments allegedly made as rentals to a landlord in respect of an additional parking
space leased by the taxpayer. Mr Wolpe testified that the basement of a neighbouring
shopping centre called Marylyn was rented for the parking of their new vehicles and
customers‟ vehicles. Ms Victor confirmed that she had seen a parking area where some
cars were parked. It therefore did not appear to be in dispute that a parking area was
rented. Ms Victor‟s initial complaint was that there was insufficient proof that the claimed
expenditure had in fact been incurred as rental payments.

[25] In support of the taxpayer‟s objection, Dr Gouws stated that the rental for the
premises was paid on an invoice and he attached what he said was an example of such
a monthly statement. He then went on to state that „the owner of the property insists that
part of the rent should be dealt with via invoice as above and the balance to be paid
monthly in cash to him‟. Ultimately, it was only the alleged cash payments (amounting to
R134 625.99) that remained in dispute in the Tax Court. The record of the proceedings
before the Tax Court reflects that whilst Mr Wolpe was testifying about the Marylyn
parking his evidence was interrupted by a question from one of the assessors about a
related matter. When he sought to revert to the parking rental, the learned Judge stated:
„COURT:
That was just an explanation what this flat is about as was the parking. And the
parking is clearly, what I can see here, for generating an income, because you have to have the
facilities so that the motor vehicles of the – the new ones as well as the ones of clients, not
standing in the hail.
MR CLOETE: Absolutely.
MR WOLPE: Yes.
MR CLOETE: And I can refer the court to the bundle which was prepared by SARS . . .
(intervention)
COURT:
No, well do you need to go any further than that. Because it was inspected that is
the end of the case.‟

[26] No doubt believing that no further persuasion was necessary, that is where
matters were allowed to rest. There was thus, regrettably, no further evidence adduced

on behalf of the taxpayer pertaining to those cash payments. The Tax Court‟s
conclusion that „[w]e find that SARS was not correct on this assessment‟, appeared not
to appreciate that at issue between the parties was not the entire rental but just the
alleged cash component and in that respect the evidence was insufficient to discharge
the onus. However, that was due to the intervention of the judge. As the taxpayer did
not discharge the onus of proof the appeal by SARS must succeed in relation to this
item, but the matter must be remitted to SARS for further investigation and assessment.

[27] To sum up on the appeal: In relation to SARS first and second ground, the
appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. In relation to SARS third ground, the appeal
succeeds. The cash component of the parking rentals allegedly paid by the taxpayer in
the sum of R134 625.99 is remitted in terms of s 83(13)(a)(iii) of the IT Act to the
Commissioner for further investigation and assessment.

The taxpayer’s cross appeal

First ground: The difference between the VAT reports and VAT 201 returns –
liability R681 208
[28] According to SARS, whilst the taxpayer‟s internal VAT control account and
accounting VAT reports correlated with one another, there was a discrepancy between
those and the VAT returns submitted by the taxpayer. Ms Victor asserted that as at 28
February 2003 there had been an under declaration of output VAT by the taxpayer in
the sum of R681 208. Mr Wolpe‟s evidence was to the effect that when the taxpayer‟s
auditors had informed him that the taxpayer had underpaid R500 000 in VAT, it had
sought to remedy the situation in its VAT return for March 2003 by including an
additional R500 000 to address the previous under-payment. SARS does not intimate
what its approach was to that subsequent payment. But, as this ground is inextricably
linked to the next, because they are both concerned with under declarations of supplies
and hence output VAT in the years in question and there can be only one shortfall in
that regard not two, the conclusion reached there is also determinative of this ground. I
accordingly turn, without more, to the taxpayer‟s second ground of cross appeal.

Second ground: The difference between output and turnover liability: R4 912 808
[29] SARS‟ auditors compared the taxpayer‟s internally generated VAT reports for
each of the 2000 to 2003 tax years with the actual sales turnover of its business as
reflected in its general ledger. According to Ms Victor, the general ledger turnover was
found to exceed the amounts reflected in the VAT reports by a total of R35 091 489
over the four years in question. SARS accordingly concluded that over that period the
taxpayer‟s output VAT had been under declared by an aggregate of R4 912 808. The
Tax Court appears to have accepted Ms Victor‟s calculations which differed from those
of Dr Gouws.

[30] Ms Victor produced the following table to illustrate the under declaration for the
tax years in question:

2000
2001
2002
2003
TOTAL

TURNOVER (G/L)
65,438,220 102,029,743 133,551,736 164,533,281 465,552,980
VAT REPORTS
38,280,538 101,298,671 129,426,745 161,455,538 430,461,491
DIFF Exclusive
27,157,682
731,072
4,124,991
3,077,743
35,091,489

Output Vat Under declared
3,802,075
102,350
577,499
430,884
4,912,808

Dr Gouws testified as follows about the turnover items in this table:
„On the 3rd page of the 102 million, if you go one page back. I‟ve analysed the sales and there is
a figure of 81 million, 732, which is actually VATable sales. And then there is a figure of 20
million which is non-vatable sales, is the internal swops between the company where vehicles
are transferred from one branch to another branch, but it is still recorded in the way of this
system, as a sale and a purchase. Then there are internal parts, and petrol is a substantial
amount which is tax free, or VAT free. So the allegation made by Mrs Victor, that the whole 102
million is VATable is incorrect. She is charging VAT on every item possible, which is not
VATable transactions.
The next one is exactly the same. The VATable transactions is only about 100 million and not
133 million. And for 2003, the VATable sales were 123 million and the internal sales and exempt
sales, was 41 million. Now once you compare this, now the turnover per VAT reports, there is a
big discrepancy. The VAT reports shows 101 million turnover in 2001, in 2002 there is 129

million turnover and for 2003, there is 160 million turnover, which indicates that there is
something wrong with the VAT reports. There is also something fundamentally wrong in her
assumption that total sales, minus the 14%, should produce that sort of VAT payable.‟

[31] The fallacy in Ms Victor‟s approach would seem to be that she employed gross
figures without deducting the internal sales or vehicle swaps between the taxpayer‟s two
branches at Menlyn and Garsfontein. The figures accepted by SARS as reliable were
the audited ledger accounts in the trial balances used to prepare the annual financial
statements. Ms Victor therefore ought to have taken the declarations of output tax in the
taxpayer‟s 201 forms and compared them with those accounts. She then ought to have
added up the total supplies as per the trial balances for 2001, 2002 and 2003 and
deducted the exempt or zero-rated supplies and the internal swaps between the
taxpayer‟s two branches. Dr Gouws testified as to the inappropriateness of Ms Victor‟s
methodology. According to him, given the nature of the business conducted by the
taxpayer, there were also many items which did not attract VAT such as petrol sales. Dr
Gouws performed a comparison between the turnover as it appeared in the general
ledger and what he described as the VATable sales. He concluded that the taxpayer
had in fact over declared output VAT for those years. On the audited figures in the
general ledger, which counsel for SARS accepted as correct, his logic cannot be faulted
in respect of those three years.

[32] For the 2000 year Ms Victor relied on a turnover figure of R 65 428 220. Counsel
for SARS conceded that he did not know where she had obtained that figure. However if
one were to have regard once again to the trial balance for that year, the vehicle sales
for that period totalled R 39 987 336.65. If one then adds the external sales in the ledger
accounts corresponding to the other trial balances (excluding internal sales, vehicle
swaps and exempt supplies of fuel), there were taxable supplies of a further
R6 118 636.13. The total for taxable supplies was therefore R 46 105 972.78. Here as
well Ms Victor ignored internal transactions, exempt supplies and vehicle swaps, which
explains the difference between this amount and her figure. The taxable supplies
reflected in the VAT 201 forms for that year were R 38 280 538. Accordingly, for that
year, there appears to have been an under declaration of taxable output sales of

R7 825 434.78, much less than Ms Victor‟s figure of R 27 157 682. But it is nonetheless
significant, attracting, as it does, additional tax in the amount of R1 095 560.87.

[33] It follows that the cross appeal on the first two grounds must be upheld entirely in
respect of the 2001, 2002 and 2003 years and in relation to the 2000 year it must
succeed to the extent that the assessment in respect of additional tax falls to be
reduced to R1 095 560.87.

Third ground: The zero per cent VAT amounts – liability: R1 407 279
[34] This ground concerns the treatment of demonstration stock. The taxpayer‟s
contention was that certain vehicles were removed from regular or „floor plan‟ stock to
be used by it as „demo vehicles‟ or were sold to staff or directors. Dr Gouws explained
in his evidence:
„It is a very complicated system that Toyota South Africa has got which requires far substantially
more information that you would normally have in an accounting system. Now what happens
here, is a new vehicle arrives from the factory. It goes onto the floor. That floor-plan is financed
by Toyota Financial Services or whatever finance house carries the book. That vehicle remains
on the floor. You cannot touch it. For various reasons, there is insurance involved, there‟s a lot
of cost involved. Then there‟s a policy of Toyota that certain amount of vehicles must be kept as
demonstration vehicles. Now, what happens is, there is a floor-plan arrangement, the specific
credit arrangements whereby this vehicle arrived and there is a liability which is guaranteed by
Toyota South Africa. The next thing that happens is now, once this vehicle moves from stock,
where you can‟t touch it, to demonstration stock it is no longer under the floor-plan of Toyota
South Africa. Consequently what you must do, you must repay the credit, as if the vehicle was
sold, and then you move it from, in your stock records, from new stock to demo stock.‟

Dr Gouws added:
„So what happens is, Toyota Oos, makes out an invoice as if it is a sale, to clear the credit in the
floor-plan. And then another invoice to take over the vehicle, back into stock. But virtually, it is
an internal sale, between himself. It is just to rectify the correctness of whether it is demo stock
or full stock, because you are the owner of both of them.‟

[35] If one followed the transaction through, according to Dr Gouws, there was no
furtherance of the enterprise of the taxpayer. So understood, according to him, those
sales which were not effective sales had to be disregarded. Dr Gouws‟ explanation was
not disputed. The taxpayer had already purchased the vehicle under the floor-plan
agreement and paid VAT. Until it disposed of the vehicle it would not recoup that VAT.
Output VAT must only be collected when there is a supply by a vendor in the
furtherance of the enterprise of the taxpayer. These internal transactions, reflecting only
a reallocation of existing assets, should have been disregarded. It follows that on this
ground the cross-appeal must be upheld.

Fourth ground: Sales at no consideration – VAT liability: R856 141 and IT liability:
R1 667 411
[36] According to Ms Victor, a number of sales of vehicles by the taxpayer to third
parties had apparently been effected at no consideration. Consequently, no output VAT
had been declared by the taxpayer on those sales. SARS assessed the taxpayer for
output VAT on those transactions, as well as for income tax on undeclared income. But,
as Dr Gouws explained:
„The Receiver stated, “Sold at no value”. But we say it is not sold at no value. What we are
saying, it is a different thing altogether. I‟d like to explain in short what happens. When a vehicle
comes in for a trade-in, that vehicle is mainly taken in and, for various reasons they want to
check the car for the engine and the gear box and what have you, and then places a value on it.
And mostly the person is interested in buying a new vehicle. The transaction then gets
processed . . . The documents are processed for the sale of the new vehicle. It then goes to the
finance houses and when it goes there, the application for finance is turned down. And the
transaction is cancelled and the motor vehicle that was given as trade-in is given back to the
original person, who wanted to trade it in.
MR SETSHEDI:  Dr Gouws are you telling me that when the trade-in comes in, does it trigger an
invoice?
MR GOUWS: No-no, what happens, there is a little pink form that they fill in of the car . . .
[T]hen they‟ll negotiate and then he accepts the offer, let‟s say for argument sake, it is R15000.
Now that car comes on the floor, it goes onto used motor vehicle stock. You debit your stock
with R15000, You credit your creditors with R15 000. Not exactly that, you debit the notional

input. Now when that transaction is cancelled, it has just been cancelled and removed from the
books. . . .‟
There was nothing to gainsay Dr Gouws‟ explanation. Ms Victor and the Tax Court
apparently thought that cancelling the transaction would only result in output VAT not
being payable if a credit note had been issued in terms of s 21(3)(a) of the VAT Act. But
that is clearly incorrect, because no VAT invoice would yet have been generated in
respect of the purchase underpinning the trade-in. It follows that the cross appeal in
relation to this ground must succeed.

Fifth ground: Incentive bonus liability: VAT – R470 172 and IT – R882 615
[37] The amounts in question here involved dealer incentive bonuses received by the
taxpayer from Toyota South Africa. Ms Victor took the view that those bonuses were
taxable by virtue of the definition of gross income in the IT Act and also in terms of s 7
of the VAT Act. She accordingly assessed the taxpayer to tax pursuant to those
provisions. In its objection the taxpayer stated:
„The amounts as stated in accounts 1075, 1075M, 1077 and 1077M are acceptable, although
the amounts for the year ending February 2003 had already been taking into consideration in
their tax calculations.
The amount of R2 258 897 is unacceptable as this amount appeared on a list of debtors which
were used as a working paper during a period when the computers crashed and the accounts
were rectified by Toyota‟s accountants.
We cannot trace the amount in any ledger account that it had been taken into consideration
whatsoever.‟
The taxpayer thus did not object to the amounts raised as the basis for additional
assessments in respect of 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively being R 185 139, R 316
061 and R 593 841.

[38] Dr Gouws testified:
„MR GOUWS: In my schedule Annexure 18 under paragraph 12 Annexure G, it is the
disallowance of the incentive bonuses. [Ms] Victor raised these additional assessments and a
reason for this was that these incentive bonuses received from Toyota South Africa are taxable
in terms of Section 1 of the definition of gross income and Section 7 of the Value Added Tax. So
this adjustment affects both income tax and VAT.

She went to Account 1075, Account 1075M and Account 1077 and Account 1077M, the M is for
Menlo Park and the G is normally for Garsfontein. She analysed these accounts and she got for
the three years, for years subtotals which in total comes to R1.589159.00.
MR CLOETE:  Sorry, Dr Gouws, sorry to hamper you, just, you know, in view of the dawning
Friday coming, and that is a repetition, isn‟t the gist of this it was claimed, she said it is taxable,
you provided proof and said and her finding was the documents provided is not for the 2000 or
the year under review. And then you said she is incorrect in that the schedule appearing in 18.2
and so on and in 18.1 is within the 2002 tax year and it is within her period of review.
MR GOUWS: That is correct, yes.
MR CLOETE: Is that the gist of it?
MR GOUWS: That is the gist of it, yes.
MR CLOETE: And further, my Lord, the one amount, the 2 million that appears on the schedule,
there is no information whatsoever. We just don‟t know where to find it and what to do with it.
COURT:  Yes, Mr Cloete?
MR CLOETE: Is there anything that you would like to add regarding this aspect, Dr Gouws?
MR GOUWS: Well, you know, the gist of it is the period, but what you also got completely
wrong that these were expense accounts and not income accounts or debit balances and not
credit balances. So the whole calculation from beginning to end is just completely wrong without
information.
MR CLOETE:  And you have actually looked at those ledger accounts?
MR GOUWS:  Yes, and I have got copies of the ledger accounts and the annexures that I have
added onto as examples 18.2, 18.3 where the transactions are being analysed and it is not
remotely close incentives from Toyota Financial Services.
MR CLOETE:  Can you refer the court to the discovery file where it was discovered?
MR GOUWS:  18.2, 18.3 on a schedule 2003, 2002, on account 1075 she‟s got 26 795 as being
an incentive bonus. If you go to that specific account in the ledger, which I have included under
18.2, the 26 000, it appears to be petty cash expenses incurred by the branch.
MR CLOETE:  And it is contained in the ledger that‟s . . .
MR GOUWS: Yes, in the general ledger that we have identified and followed the transactions
through.
MR CLOETE:  And it is in court, that is the ledger (indistinct).
MR GOUWS: Yes, yes, well, not all the ledgers, but that is an example.‟

[39] But much of Dr Gouws‟ evidence, in particular his criticism of account 1075,
addressed what was not in issue between the parties. The objection was directed at two
aspects of that assessment: namely, the R2 258 897, which „appeared on a list of
debtors which were used as a working paper‟; and, the „amounts for the year ending
February 2003‟. From the bar in this court counsel for SARS conceded that the R 2 258
897, which did not appear on any of the audited statements of the taxpayer, ought not to
have been taken into the reckoning. The matter thus reduced itself to the „amounts for
the year ending February 2003‟, which totalled R 474 118. In respect of that amount, as
I have shown, the evidence adduced by the taxpayer fell woefully short of supporting
the objection. Thus, save for the amount of R 2 258 897 which falls to be excluded, the
cross appeal on this leg must otherwise fail.

Sixth ground: Discount and over-allowance liability: VAT – R 605 725 and IT –
R737 942
[40] According to the taxpayer, clients who purchased new vehicles were afforded
discounts beyond the maximum discount threshold allowed by Toyota. Due to Toyota‟s
strict rule about a maximum discount threshold, the taxpayer would bypass that rule by
issuing cheques to their clients which could be cashed at its front desk. Ms Victor
asserted that as no proof existed for the discounts allowed, the deduction was to be
added back for both IT and VAT purposes. SARS appeared to accept that sale
discounts paid to clients would in principle be allowable as deductions. At issue
therefore was whether there was sufficient proof of discounts having been granted to
clients.

[41] Mr Wolpe testified:
„So the invoice would be made at, for example, the full retail price, but a cheque would be made
out if it was a fleet owner, or for whatever reason, a cheque would be made out to the
customer‟s name, which the customer would then cash with us, and either that money would be,
usually was used as part of his deposit to buy the new vehicle, or else the money belonged to
him. It was a discount that we allowed on that vehicle. But whenever, that cheque was always
cashed by us first. And then as I say, it was either used for him as part of his deposit or else it
was his.‟

In disallowing these allowances, Ms Victor stated: „[c]heques were made out to “POT /
Cash / Client name” but paid into your own bank account and the cash was received
over the counter on your own behalf.‟
In his evidence, Dr Gouws explained:
„These are allowances or discounts given to clients over and above the permitted allowance
granted by Toyota. Now it is normally given either in cash, or it is normally given by paying it in
cash, by cheque which is cash or cheque made out to the client and all these expenditure
which, according to Ms Victor, we did not supply documentary proof. If we go to the analysis
that I have made of that 1 300 files, there the whole account has been analysed what the selling
price was, what the deposit was, what additional expenses was, what the discount was, what
the whole analysis is there completely. So all Ms Victor had to do was to go to the specific file
as I have done and she will find the documentary proof where they had given the discount and
the cheque was cashed at the counter. I cannot give her more explanations than that.‟

[42] Dr Gouws‟ testimony was supported by an annexure to his report, which reflected
details of the purchaser, the date of purchase, the invoice number, whether the vehicle
being purchased was a new or used vehicle, the purchase price, the discount, and, if
applicable, the cheque number issued by the taxpayer. Dr Gouws was not cross
examined on any of this evidence. The accuracy of the schedule was never questioned.
Ms Victor appeared to suggest that the documents adduced and the schedule in
question was not for the period under review. In that she was wrong. It must follow that
the cross appeal on this ground must be upheld.

Seventh ground: Journals at year end added back: IT liability - R195 742
[43] According to Ms Victor, the taxpayer had effected two year end journal entries
that served to reduce its income and had claimed these deductions from IT. SARS had
accordingly disallowed those deductions on the basis that they „could not be explained
together with the necessary proof‟. In its notice of objection, the taxpayer asserted: „We
are awaiting full explanations from the previous auditors as to the particulars of this
account and upon receipt thereof, it will be forwarded to you‟.
In his report Dr Gouws stated:

„The auditors, after they had done the necessary reconciliation, of the VAT accounts, made the
adjustment by crediting the VAT account to bring it in line with the various VAT reports and
debiting the cost of sales.‟
He added:
„The entry is incorrect in the sense that they should not have debited cost of sales, but sale. The
reason for this being is that the VAT accounts were understated and the sales overstated.
These entries were necessary after there was a computer breakdown and certain accounts had
to be adjusted manually.‟

[44] In his evidence, Dr Gouws explained: „Now again I don‟t know why they have
done it. I don‟t know why they did not do it to the sales accounts, but nevertheless . . .‟.
The promised explanation from the previous auditors was never furnished. Instead Dr
Gouws had to resort to speculation when testifying as to what he „suspected happened‟.
In the circumstances the cross appeal on this ground must fail.

Eighth ground: Stock liability: IT - R576 642
[45] According to Ms Victor, during the course of the audit by SARS it was found that
in respect of the 2002 year of assessment vehicle creditors in the amount of R1 321 531
were not added back to closing stock on 28 February 2002. In her letter of assessment,
Ms Victor informed the taxpayer:
„As the creditors at year end were compared to the stock numbers and dates sold, it was found
that these vehicles were sold after year end, but were not included in the closing stock.‟
Later in SARS rule 10 statement, she asserted:
„The trading stock not sold in a specific tax year forms part of a taxpayer‟s closing stock. The
Appellant in its closing stock for the years 2002 omitted certain vehicles still held in stock.
The Commissioner found that these vehicles were only sold after year end. An income tax
assessment amounting to R576 642 was raised by the Commissioner in the 2002 tax year to
take into account these omitted sales.‟

[46] In support of her assertion Ms Victor produced the following schedule:

LIST OF CREDITORS ON 28 Feb 2002
T Inv #
Inv Date
Creditor
Inclusive
VAT
Excl
SELL
DATE
CLOSING
STOCK
Under
Stated

V04175

20010423
Carlona
Toyota

(66 981.00)

(8 226.00)

(58 756.00)

(58 755.50)
T357962 20020104
Toyota
SA
54 421.00
6 683.00
47 738.00 30/04/02
47 738.00
T362554 20020208
Toyota
SA
228 226.00
28 028.00
200 198.00 04/03/02
200 198.00
T363143 20020211
Toyota
SA
228 825.00
28 101.00
200 724.00 04/03/02
200 724.00
V05121
20020219
Toyota
SA
166 156.00
20 405.00
145 751.00 12/03/02
145 751.00
T365695 20020220
Toyota
SA
57 231.00
7 028.00
50 203.00 12/03/02
50 203.00
T365634 20020220
Toyota
SA
135 630.00
16 656.00
118 974.00 30/04/02
118 974.00
T365790 20020221
Toyota
SA
109 046.00
13 392.00
95 654.00 12/03/02
2 924.93
T365798 20020221
Toyota
SA
109 046.00
13 392.00
95 654.00 30/04/02
95 654.00
T365637 20020221
Toyota
SA
107 763.00
13 234.00
94 529.00 30/04/02
94 529.00
T365393 20020221
Toyota
SA
92 917.00
11 411.00
81 506.00 30/04/02
81 506.00
T366223 20020222
Toyota
SA
136 078.00
16 711.00
119 367.00 30/04/02
119 367.00
T366374 20020226
Toyota
SA
153 343.00
18 832.00
134 511.00 30/04/02
134 511.00

20020228
Toyota
SA
57 231.00
7 028.00
50 203.00 20/04/02
50 203.00

POT
5 321.00
38 004.00

38 003.92

1 321 531.35

[47] The response that this elicited from Dr Gouws was:
„The stock as detailed in your letter is detailed here below and all the vehicles had been properly
accounted for and no further explanations are necessary.

Stock
#
Creditor
Creditor
Inv No.
Creditor Inv
Date
Cost of
Vehicle
Exc VAT
Date of Sale
Inv #
Date
Settled
6073
Toyota SA
T357962
04/01/2002
47 738.00
04/01/2002 106667
20/03/2002
6198
Toyota SA
T362554
08/02/2002
200 198.00
22/02/2002 106887
05/03/2002
6203
Toyota SA
T363143
11/02/2002
200 724.00
25/02/2002 106893
05/03/2002
6251
Toyota SA
T365633
19/02/2002
145 751.00
19/02/2002 106868
12/03/2002
6264
Toyota SA
T365695
20/02/2002
50 203.00
26/02/2002 106908
12/03/2002
6265
Toyota SA
T365634
20/02/2002
118 974.00
25/02/2002 106894
20/03/2002
6270
Toyota SA
T365798
21/02/2002
95 654.00
28/02/2002 106827
20/03/2002
6273
Toyota SA
T365637
21/02/2002
94 529.00
21/02/2002 106879
20/03/2002
6278
Toyota SA
T365393
21/02/2002
81 506.00
28/02/2002 106921
20/03/2002
6281
Toyota SA
T366223
22/02/2002
119 367.00
27/02/2002 106914
20/03/2002
6290
Toyota SA
T366374
26/02/2002
134 511.00
27/02/2002 106917
20/03/2002
6303
Toyota SA

28/02/2002
50 203.00
28/02/2002 106925
20/03/2002

1 339 358.00‟

[48] The taxpayer thus explained that although the vehicles in question may have
been sold and invoiced prior to 28 February 2002, payment in each instance was only
received during the course of the subsequent tax year in March 2002. That evidence
was not disputed by SARS. As the sales had been concluded in the 2002 year the
income from them accrued in that year and income tax would be paid on it in that year.
Likewise the cost of those sales, including the cost of the vehicles, would serve as a
deduction in that year. Accordingly the removal of those vehicles from stock was
correct. It follows that the cross appeal in relation to this ground must be upheld.

Ninth ground: Creditors: accrued expenses and provision account – Liability:
R54 178
[49] According to Ms Victor, with regard to the 2001 year of assessment, the taxpayer
had claimed various deductions in respect of a range of accrued expenses amounting to
R143 603 plus a „provision for discount‟ in the amount of R36 989. Dr Gouws testified
that these expenses amounted to provision for known liabilities where the precise
amount of an incurred amount is not yet known because the invoice had not yet been
received by the taxpayer. He explained:

„Yes. My Lord, can I explain the nature of this transaction? Every year it is standard accounting
practices to make provision for certain expenses when you don‟t have the vouchers which is
known and you‟ve got them, like audit fee, bonuses, water and lights, telephone accounts. You
make provision for it. It is a standard practice. What happens in the next financial year, you
reverse the transaction and the normal expenditure. So from year-to-year this adjustment goes
through.
What had happened firstly, that was only done once-off. You must be consistent. You cannot
disallow the provisions in one year and allow them in the following year. No here she is very
inconsistent in what she did. So what in fact had happened, is she disallowed it in 2001, the
following year the expenditure was reduced with this amount. So she should have add it onto
the following, or made a deduction in the following year when the expenses occurred.  That is a
mere accounting adjustment going from year-to-year and must be done consistently.‟

[50] Before us, Counsel for the taxpayer conceded that these claims were allowable
at the discretion of the Commissioner. That being so, the objection to those
disallowances by the taxpayer had to fail because the Commissioner had exercised that
discretion against the taxpayer. In the result the cross appeal on this ground must fail.

Tenth ground: Expenses: liability - Vat: R280 363 and IT: R783 572
[51] The taxpayer had claimed a number of deductions both from IT and as input VAT
in respect of expenses listed under the headings „Pretoria Oos Cheques‟; „Rental: flat
and parking‟; „Charter Expenses and Hanger Fees‟; „Entertainment‟ and „General
Expenses‟. No case at all was pleaded in respect of the Pretoria Oos Cheques, hence
that disallowance must be deemed to have been accepted by the taxpayer. In its rule 11
statement, the taxpayer accepted that as far as the rent for the flat is concerned, „this
expense is not a deductible expense envisaged in section 11A of the [IT] Act‟; and, that
as far as the hangar fees were concerned, that „does not constitute a deduction in the
hands of the taxpayer appellant and therefore does not present a taxable deduction‟.
For the remaining items, there simply was no proof that those expenses had been
properly incurred in the production of income. It must follow that on this ground the Tax
Court cannot be faulted and the cross appeal in relation thereto must fail.

Eleventh ground: Salaries and wages: IT - R103 041
[52] For the 2002 year of assessment the taxpayer had reflected a total sum of
R4 669 901 in its annual financial statements as expenditure in relation to salaries
(R3 263 490), directors‟ remuneration (R393 000) and commission (R 1 013 411). The
taxpayer‟s IRP5 certificates and wage registers, however, only reflected expenditure of
R4 386 431. There was also an adjustment of R60 000 as a result of a difference
between the trial balance and the financial statements in relation to the directors‟
remuneration. Ms Victor thus took the view that the taxpayer had claimed R343 469
more in respect of deductions for salaries and wages than could be substantiated by its
records. Those deductions were accordingly disallowed. In its notice of objection, the
taxpayer contended that the directors‟ remuneration portion (R393 000) had to be
eliminated from this schedule as it had been „dealt with separately apparently in the
accounts and no further explanation is necessary‟. The evidence adduced on behalf of
the taxpayer however failed to indicate precisely where the amounts had been dealt
with. Ms Victor testified that an amount of R153 000 had appeared on Mr Wolpe‟s IRP5,
which is at odds with the R393 000 reflected in the taxpayer‟s annual financial
statements.

[53] Mr Gouws testified:
„Yes. Here again there are certain assumptions made. According to the financial accounts, Ms
Victor referred to salaries, directors‟ remuneration and commission, which is in total 4 696 901.
She then went to the IRP5 documents, which is the documents issued at year end to
employees. And when she totalled the IRP5 reconciliation, it disclosed an income, wages paid
of 3 531 186. She added thereto 153 000 for Mr Wolpe and she did some calculations as far as
wages are concerned, which comes to about 702 000 and she merely said but you‟ve claimed
salaries and wages for 4 669 000, but your records only show 4 386 000, so there is a deficit of
283 000 and there is also a difference on the trial balance of 60 000.  So you‟ve over-claimed
salaries and wages to the extent of R343 000.00. On that 30% tax is 103 000.‟
Dr Gouws added: „Now the big difference here relates to the remuneration of Mr Wolpe,
but if that is allocated correctly, there is hardly any difference‟. However, he did not
explain where this amount had been accounted for or where it should have been

allocated or what the effect of this on tax should have been. It follows that the cross
appeal on this ground must fail.

Twelfth ground: Penalties of 200 per cent raised (VAT and IT)
[54] SARS imposed, and the Tax Court confirmed, penalties of 200 per cent in
respect of various amounts of tax (both IT and VAT) held to be payable by the taxpayer.
The additional tax imposed was in terms of s 76 of the IT Act and s 60(1) of the VAT
Act. As the Tax Court, on appeal to it, was called upon to exercise its own, original
discretion, this court will interfere with that determination only on the limited grounds on
which a value judgment of a court of first instance may be set aside or varied on appeal
(Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Da Costa 1985 (3) SA 768 (A) at 774F-J). It bears
noting, however, that in this instance the Tax Court simply rubber-stamped SARS
decision. Its failure to even engage with the issue means that we are at large.

[55] Section 76(1)(b) of the IT Act provides that, if a taxpayer omits from his return
any amount which ought to have been included therein, he shall be required to pay, in
addition to the tax chargeable in respect of his taxable income, „an amount equal to
twice the difference between the tax as calculated in respect of the taxable income
returned by him and the tax properly chargeable in respect of his taxable income as
determined after including the amount omitted‟.
Subsections 2(a) and (b) read:
‘(a) The Commissioner may remit the additional charge imposed under subsection (1) or any
part thereof as he may think fit: Provided that, unless he is of the opinion that there were
extenuating circumstances, he shall not so remit if he is satisfied that any act or omission of the
taxpayer referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (1) was done with intent to evade
taxation.
(b) In the event of the Commissioner deciding not to remit the whole of the additional charge
imposed under subsection (1), his decision shall be subject to objection and appeal.‟
Section 83(13)(b) of the IT Act provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, in the
case of any appeal against the amount of the additional charge (the penalty) imposed
under s 76(1), the Special Court may reduce, confirm or increase the amount of the
penalty.

[56] Section 60 of the VAT Act reads:
„(1)
Where any vendor or any person under the control or acting on behalf of the vendor fails
to perform any duty imposed upon him by this Act or does or omits to do anything, with intent-
(a)
to evade the payment of any amount of tax payable by him; or
(b)
to cause a refund to him by the Commissioner of any amount of tax (such amount being
referred to hereunder as the excess) which is in excess of the amount properly refundable to
him before applying section 44 (6),
such vendor shall be chargeable with additional tax not exceeding an amount equal to double
the amount of tax referred to in paragraph (a) or the excess referred to in paragraph (b), as the
case may be.‟

[57] The key words of s 76(2)(a) are „any act or omission of the taxpayer . . . done
with the intent to evade taxation‟. In Da Costa (at 777A), Van Heerden JA suggested
that whilst it is certainly arguable that the phrase applies only to an actual - and not also
an imputed - intention of the taxpayer to deceive, it was unnecessary to decide the
point. Like Van Heerden JA, I also deem it unnecessary to decide the point, for it was
simply never suggested to either Mr Wolpe or Dr Gouws in evidence that an intention to
deceive was being imputed to the taxpayer. Like its counterpart in the IT Act, s 60 of the
VAT Act also required a finding that the taxpayer had conducted itself „with intent . . . to
evade the payment of any amount of tax payable by him‟. During argument counsel for
SARS submitted that the presumption in s 59(2) of the VAT Act availed it. But, as he
was ultimately constrained to concede, that presumption - as that section makes plain -
only finds application to proceedings under it, namely „offences and penalties in regard
to tax evasion‟. It must follow that the additional tax and penalties imposed by SARS
cannot stand and accordingly on this ground the cross appeal must succeed.

[58] To sum up on the cross appeal: It succeeds in respect of grounds 3, 4, 6, 8 and
12; and fails in respect of grounds 7, 9, 10 and 11. In respect of grounds 1 and 2 – the
cross appeal succeeds in respect of the 2001, 2002 and 2003 years and in relation to
the 2000 year it succeeds to the extent that the assessment in respect of additional tax
falls to be reduced to R1 095 560 - 87. In respect of ground 5 – save for the amount of
R 2 258 897, which falls to be excluded from any assessment, the appeal fails.

[59]   That leaves costs: The Tax Court ordered SARS to pay the taxpayer‟s costs
because the „taxpayer was substantively successful‟. Given the wide ranging disputes
between the parties and the manner in which the matter unfolded before the Tax Court,
there appears to have been no warrant for that order. Before us it was accepted that
that order should be substituted with one that each party pay their own costs. Turning to
the costs of the appeal and cross appeal: In the light of the substantial success that the
taxpayer has had in this court, SARS must be ordered to pay the taxpayer‟s costs, such
costs to include those of two counsel.

[60]  In the result:
1. The appeal and cross-appeal are each upheld in part, with the costs, including those
consequent upon the employment of two counsel, to be paid in each instance by the
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services.
2. The additional income tax assessments in respect of the 2000, 2001 and 2002 tax
years and the additional VAT assessments for the tax years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
and 2004 are set aside and referred back to the Commissioner for reassessment in the
light of this judgment.
3. The costs order of the court below is set aside and substituted with an order that
each party pay their own costs.

_________________
V M PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:

M.W. Janisch (with him P. Myburgh)

Instructed by:

The State Attorney, Cape Town

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

P. Pauw SC (with him S.S. Cohen)

Instructed by:

Gary Segal Attorneys, Johannesburg

Lovius Block, Bloemfontein