THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT
REPORTABLE
Case No: 865/13

In the matter between:

MINISTER OF EDUCATION FOR THE
WESTERN CAPE

FIRST APPELLANT
WESTERN CAPE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

SECOND APPELLANT

and

BEAUVALLON SECONDARY SCHOOL

FIRST RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
BEAUVALLON SECONDARY SCHOOL

SECOND RESPONDENT
BERGRIVIER NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL

THIRD RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
BERGRIVIER NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL

FOURTH RESPONDENT
BRACKENHILL EK PRIMARY SCHOOL

FIFTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
BRACKENHILL EK PRIMARY SCHOOL

SIXTH RESPONDENT
DENNEPRAG PRIMARY SCHOOL

SEVENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
DENNEPRAG PRIMARY SCHOOL

EIGHTH RESPONDENT
KLIPHEUWEL PRIMARY SCHOOL

NINTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
KLIPHEUWEL PRIMARY SCHOOL

TENTH RESPONDENT
KROMBEKSRIVIER NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
KROMBEKSRIVIER NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWELVTH RESPONDENT
LK ZEEMAN PRIMARY SCHOOL

THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
LK ZEEMAN PRIMARY SCHOOL

FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT
LAVISRYLAAN PRIMARY SCHOOL

FIFTHTEENTH RESPONDENT

SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
LAVISRYLAAN PRIMARY SCHOOL

SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT
PROTEA PRIMARY SCHOOL

SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
PROTEA PRIMARY SCHOOL

EIGHTTEENTH RESPONDENT
REDLANDS PRIMARY SCHOOL

NINETEENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
REDLANDS PRIMARY SCHOOL

TWENTIETH RESPONDENT
RIETFONTEIN NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-FIRST RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
RIETFONTEIN NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-SECOND RESPONDENT
RONDEVLEI EK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-THIRD RESPONDENT
SCHOOLGOVERNING BODY OF
RONDEVLEI EK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTH-FOURTH RESPONDENT
URIONSKRAAL NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-FIFTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
URIONSKRAAL NGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-SIXTH RESPONDENT
VALPARK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-SEVENTH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
VALPARK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-EIGHTH RESPONDENT
WANSBEK VGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
TWENTY-NINETH RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
WANSBEK VGK PRIMARY SCHOOL
THIRTIETH RESPONDENT
WARM BAD-SPA PRIMARY SCHOOL
THIRTY-FIRST RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
WARM BAD–SPA PRIMARY SCHOOL
THIRTY-SECOND RESPONDENT
WELBEDACHT UCC PRIMARY SCHOOL
THIRTY-THIRD RESPONDENT
SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY OF
WELBEDACHT UCC PRIMARY SCHOOL
THIRTY-FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC
TEACHERS UNION

THIRTY-FIFTH RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Minister of Education for the Western Cape v Beauvallon
Secondary School (865/2013) [2014] ZASCA 218 (9 December 2014)

Coram:
Brand, Maya, Leach and Willis JJA and Mathopo AJA
Heard:
17 November 2014

Delivered: 9 December 2014

Summary: Closure of schools under s 33 of Act 84 of 1996 – nature of reasons
to be given under s 33(2) – gist of reasons sufficient – effect of
new reasons emerging during consultative process – SADTU need
not be consulted before school closed.

________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town (Bozalek, Le Grange,
and Dolamo JJ sitting as court of first instance):

(a)
The appeal succeeds to the extent that paras 1 and 3 of the order of the
court a quo are set aside and substituted with the following:
‘1
(a)
The first respondent’s decision to close Beauvallon
Secondary School (the first applicant) with effect from
31 December 2012 is reviewed and set aside;

(b)
The review application in respect of the first respondent’s
decision to close another 16 schools with effect from 31 December
2012 is dismissed;

. . .
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the
first and second applicants jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to be absolved, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.’
(b)
(i)
The first and second appellants are to pay the first and second

respondents’ costs of appeal, jointly and severally, the one paying

the other to be absolved.

(ii)
Save to the extent in (b) (i) above, there will be no further

order as to costs of the appeal.
(c)
No order is made on the cross-appeal.

_______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________

Leach JA (Brand and Maya JJA and Mathopo AJA concurring)

[1] The dispute between the parties arises from a decision taken by the first
appellant, the Minister of Education in the Western Cape Government (‘the
Minister’) acting under s 33 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (‘the
Act’) to close a number of schools in the province. Eighteen of the affected
schools and their respective school governing bodies (‘SGBs’) launched an
application seeking, inter alia, an order reviewing and setting aside the
Minister’s decision. The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU),
a trade union representing the interests of certain teachers, also joined the fray
as the thirty seventh applicant. However one of the schools and its SGB
withdrew and were no longer parties when the matter came before the court a
quo. Those that remained are the first to thirty fourth respondents in this appeal.

[2] Cited as respondents in the application were the Minister as well as the
Western Cape Department of Education, the second appellant in this appeal
(‘the department’), and two ministers in the national government, the Minister
of Basic Education and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.
The last-mentioned has played no part in any of the proceedings whilst the
Minister of Basic Education (‘the National Minister’) joined the fray solely to

defend the provisions of s 33(2) of the Act, the constitutionality of which was
sought to be impugned.

[3] The matter came before a full court of the Western Cape High Court
which unanimously rejected both the attack upon the constitutionality of s 33
and the Minister’s contention that his decision to close the schools was not
reviewable under the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000 (PAJA). But although the court was also unanimous that the decision
to close the Beauvallon Secondary School (the first respondent in this appeal)
should be set aside under PAJA, its members were not ad idem in regard to the
remaining 16 schools. The majority (Le Grange and Dolamo JJ) concluded that
their closures should also be set aside whilst the minority (Bozalek J) concluded
otherwise. The order of the court, reflecting the findings of the majority, was
thus as follows:
‘1.
The first respondent’s decision made on or about 15-16 October 2012, to close the
affected schools with effect from 31 December 2012 is reviewed and set aside;
2.
The application for declaratory relief in relation to s 33(2) of the South African
Schools Act, 81 of 1996 is dismissed;
3.
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the applicants’ costs (except the
costs of the 35th applicant, SADTU), jointly and severally, the one paying the other to
be absolved and such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
4.
In respect of the 35th applicant, SADTU, each party to pay its own costs.’

[4] The Minister and the department were granted leave to appeal to this
court against paras 1, 3 and 4 of this order (and for convenience I intend to refer
to them collectively as ‘the appellants’). On the other hand, the schools, their
SGBs and SADTU (collectively ‘the respondents’) applied for leave to
conditionally cross-appeal against the order in para 2 that s 33 was not
unconstitutional. That application was dismissed but leave on this issue was
granted by this court. It was solely on this issue that the National Minister

entered the lists in the appeal to defend the constitutionality of the section. As
things turned out, as more fully set out below, this issue largely became
something of a damp squib.

[5] The material facts relevant to the review of the Minister’s decision to
close the affected schools are not in dispute. It is common cause that for some
years the policy of the national education authorities has been to close small and
under-performing public schools. The national Department of Education, in its
guidelines given to provincial departments of education to expedite this process,
identified a number of reasons justifying such action. These include the number
of learners at each school, as a declining number of learners ‘at rural or farm
schools challenges the costs effectiveness of maintaining such schools’, and that
a low learner enrolment ‘results in schools being unable to provide adequate
curriculum choices’. Other considerations recorded are that it is undesirable for
educators ‘to teach many grades across phases in one classroom’ and that a lack
of adequate facilities has led to many rural and small schools failing to function
properly. It also stressed the advantage of merging small schools in close
proximity to each other so as to provide for infrastructure in addition to
classrooms, such as libraries, laboratories, sports fields etc.

[6] The national guidelines go on to outline a suggested process to be
followed in the merger or closure of public schools, and that a provincial co-
ordinating team should be established to guide the merger and closure process.
This end was facilitated at provincial level by the department adopting
guidelines to effectively and fairly manage the closure of non-viable public
schools so as to best promote the interests of learners concerned and the
interests of sustainable quality schooling. The provincial guidelines also detail

various reasons for closing a public school, echoing in broad terms the problems
identified in the national guidelines.

[7] In the Western Cape there are approximately 1450 public schools, more
than 10 per cent of which have less than 100 learners. However, the
department’s view is that in order to provide an acceptable level of educational,
extra-curricular and social opportunities, and having regard to budgetary
restraints and its resources, it can maintain and resource only approximately
1000 schools having more than 100 learners. That many small and under-
performing schools should be closed is therefore part of the policy adopted at
both national and provincial levels of government. Indeed, in the 12 years
immediately preceding the institution of these proceedings in the high court,
more than 2 500 such schools were closed country wide.

[8] In order to facilitate this policy and in an effort to improve levels of
education by obliging many learners to attend schools ‘that are better equipped
to provide a quality education’, the provincial guidelines lay down an annual
process for each district office to identify public schools ‘that are no longer
educationally viable and which in the interests of sustainable quality schooling,
should be considered by the Minister for closure’ and state:
‘The (Department) must identify public schools within the province for closure as follows:
 With reference to the guidelines . . . each district office must identify public
school(s) within its area of jurisdiction for closure; and
 Each district office must then prepare an application for the closing of each school
identified . . . and submit this application to the Head of (the department) not fewer
than 10 working days before the end of the first term of the school year.’

[9] In 2012, the department in this way identified 27 schools in the Western
Cape as candidates for possible closure, and submitted a recommendation in this
regard to the Minister in respect of each school. In respect of each such school,
the following process was adopted:
(a)
The district office, on recommending closure, submitted a written
application form completed by the director of the education district and the
circuit manager of the relevant region to the head of the department. Completed
in line with the department’s guidelines for the closing of non-viable public
schools, this application contained, inter alia, particulars of the school, the
number of learners in each grade, its proximity to nearby schools, the number of
educators in each grade, each educator’s post-level, the post-level of other
members of its staff, the reasons for recommending closure and the comments
of various senior department officials on closure.
(b)
On receipt on this application, the Director: Infrastructure Planning and
Management prepared a report with a recommendation addressed to the
Minister containing information in regard to the school, the current enrolment of
learners, the grades taught and the primary reasons for the suggested closing of
the school, as well as where the learners and staff could be accommodated at
other schools if the school be closed. This report’s recommendation was
supported by various senior members of the department including the Chief
Director: Physical Resources, the Chief Director: Districts, the Deputy Director-
General: Education Planning, the Deputy Director-General: Institutional
Development and the Head of Department. The report was then forwarded to
the Minister for consideration.
(c)
The Minister, in turn, addressed a letter to the SGB of the school giving
notice of his intention to close the school under s 33(2)(a) of the Schools Act
(the provisions of which are dealt with in more detail below) giving his reasons

for doing so and inviting the SGB, should it so wish, to make representations
either orally at a meeting to be held with the department’s officials or in writing
using a standard form.
(d)
At a subsequent meeting between officials of the department and the
SGB, the latter submitted representations it considered relevant to the school’s
closure. Thereafter the department submitted a further report to the Minister
detailing the SGBs’ objections to the proposed closure but recommending the
continuation of the closure process.
(e)
The Minister decided to continue with the process, and notices were
published informing the public both of his intent to close the school and of a
public hearing to be held on a particular date to discuss the proposal; and
inviting written representations in respect of the matter. A public hearing was
thereafter held and a transcript of the proceedings prepared. So too were
minutes of the meeting and a report by the presiding official to which were
attached any written representations that had been made.
(f)
A final report to which all relevant documentation was attached and
supported by the recommendations, once more, of a number of senior
departmental officials was then made available to the Minister who took the
final decision on closure (his decision was to close 20 of the 27 schools) and a
notice to this effect giving his reasons for closure was published in the
Provincial Gazette on 16 October 2012.

[10] As already mentioned, in considering the lawfulness of the Minister’s
decision to close these schools, both the majority and minority judgments in the
court below held that it had been an administrative action reviewable under
PAJA. The appellants argued on appeal that the court a quo had erred in this
regard and that, in deciding to close the schools in question, the Minister had

performed not an administrative but an executive function that is not subject to
review under PAJA.

[11] Courts are so often called upon to decide whether or not a decision by a
public official is administrative in nature that one is left to ponder to what extent
PAJA has in fact muddied the waters rather than provided certainty on the issue.
Part of the problem is the definition of ‘administrative action’ set out in PAJA.
Variously and correctly described as being ‘extremely narrow and highly
convoluted’1 and ‘cumbersome’,2 it embraces the concept of an action or
decision taken by a public body, official or functionary of ‘an administrative
nature’. Conduct of that nature was described, in broad terms, by this court in
Grey’s Marine3 as ‘the conduct of the bureaucracy (whoever the bureaucratic
functionary might be) in carrying out the daily functions of the State, which
necessarily involves the application of policy, usually after its translation into
law, with direct and immediate consequences for individuals or groups of
individuals’. And although administrative action excludes ‘the executive powers
or functions of the Provincial Executive’ – which clearly include the
formulation of government policy – the implementation of policy is generally
regarded as being administrative in nature.4 Moreover, a procedural requirement
affording affected parties a hearing before a decision is taken (the purpose of
which is of course to ensure that there has been a full and proper appraisal of the
relevant facts and circumstances, including possible alternatives to the proposed
action) is the hallmark of administrative action.

1 Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) at 195.
2 Minister of Home Affairs v Scalabrini Centre 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA) para 48 where Nugent JA found it
unnecessary to set out the definition beyond stating that it requires a decision of an ‘administrative nature’ that
has various features including that it ‘adversely affects the rights of any person’.
3 Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA) para 24.
4 Permanent Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21)
Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 18 and Hoexter at 177-178.

[12] There is no simple litmus test to determine whether a decision by a public
official is administrative or executive in nature, and in order to determine the
issue a close analysis needs to be undertaken of the nature of the public power
or function in question5 in the light of the facts of each case.6 In doing so, it is
important to remember that a decision heavily influenced by considerations of
policy is a clear indication of it being executive, rather than administrative, in
nature. In Scalabrini, dealing with the closure of a refugee reception office,
Nugent JA stressed the importance of the separation of powers and that a
court’s primary responsibilities do not include making decisions reserved for the
other branches of government7 before going on to say:
‘The question whether a Refugee Reception Office is necessary for achieving the purpose of
the Act is quintessentially one of policy. Where, and how many, offices should be established
will necessarily be determined by matters like administrative effectiveness and efficiency,
budgetary constraints, availability of human and other resources, policies of the department,
the broader of political framework within which it must function, and the like. I do not think
courts, not in possession of all that information, and not accountable to the electorate, are
properly equipped or permitted to make those decisions.’8

[13] It is significant that that in order to give effect to the right to procedurally
fair administrative action, s 4(1)(b) of PAJA provides for a ‘notice and
comment procedure’ as a possible measure to be adopted where an
administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public.
Section 4(3) goes on to provide:
‘If an administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, the administrator
must-
(a)
take appropriate steps to communicate the administrative action to those likely to be

materially and adversely affected by it and call for comments from them;

5 Sokhela & others v MEC for Agriculture and Environmental Affairs (KwaZulu-Natal) & others 2010 (5) SA
574 (KZP) para 61 quoted with approval in Scalabrini para 52.
6 Viking Pony Africa Pumps (Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) SA 327 (CC)
para 37.
7 Paras 54-56.
8 Scalabrini para 58

(b)
consider any comments received;
(c)
decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or without changes; and
(d)
comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with notice and comment

procedures, as prescribed.’

[14] In the present case, not only was a notice and comment procedure
adopted by the Minister but the procedure followed was specifically prescribed
by ss 33(1) and (2) of the Schools Act. Echoing the notice and comment
procedure in s 4(3) of PAJA, these sections provide:
‘33(1) The Member of the Executive Council may, by notice in the Provincial Gazette, close

a public school.
(2)
The Member of the Executive Council may not act under subsection (1) unless he or

she has-

(a)
informed the governing body of the school of his or her intention so to act and his

or her reasons therefor;

(b)
granted the governing body of the school a reasonable opportunity to make

representations to him or her in relation to such action;

(c)
conducted a public hearing on reasonable notice, to enable the community to

make representations to him or her in relation to such actions; and

(d)
given due consideration to any such representations received.’

[15] The respondents’ argument, as I understood it, was that the necessity to
follow a notice and comment procedure under s 33(2) before closing a school
under s 33(1) is a clear indication that even though such decision may well be
influenced also by factors such as budgetary constraints, national and provincial
policies relevant to education, resources and administrative efficiency, it
materially affects the rights of members of the public, amounts to an
implementation of policy, and is administrative rather than executive in nature;
so that the court a quo correctly held PAJA to be applicable.

[16] Attractive though this argument may be, I do not think it is necessary in
the present circumstances to reach a final decision on the issue. I am aware that
as a rule a court considering the review of a decision of a public official should
determine whether or not the proceedings are governed by PAJA.9 But I do not
believe that rule to be rigid and inflexible, as it is indeed now well established
that even in cases where PAJA is not of application, the principle of legality
may be relied upon to set aside an executive decision made not in accordance
with the empowering statute.10 And in the present case the statutory
incorporation into s 33(1) of the Schools Act of a notice and comment
procedure essentially the same as that envisaged by s 4(3) of PAJA renders
superfluous any attempt to pigeon-hole the decision to close the schools as
either executive or administrative in nature. After all, however it may be
categorised, if the Minister’s decision was taken without proper compliance
with that prescribed procedure it must fail for lack of legality.

[17] In the light of this consideration both sides did not press their respective
arguments on the precise nature of the Minister’s decision with any great vigour
and contented themselves in the main with the issue of legality, to which I now
turn.

[18] The principal issue debated in this court in regard to the question of
legality was whether the Minister, in acting under s 33(2), gave the affected
schools sufficient information for them or their SGBs to make meaningful
representations relating to their closure. In contending the Minister had not, the
respondents submitted that the reasons provided in the May 2012 letter warning
them of possible closure and calling for representations on the issue were

9 Minister of Health & another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (Treatment Action Campaign
& another as amici curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) paras 436-438.
10 See eg National Director of Public Prosecutions & others v Freedom Under Law 2014 (4) SA 298 (SCA)
para 29 and Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) paras 48-50.

‘shockingly short’ and did not adequately set up ‘the nature and substance of the
case that they had to meet’, and that at the very least the length of the
department’s report to the Minister recommending the closure of each school
ought to have been matched.

[19] In considering this argument, it must be remembered that although the
fairness of any procedure followed will depend on the circumstances of each
particular case,11 a person affected by a decision usually cannot make
meaningful representations without knowing what factors are likely to be taken
into account. Accordingly, in a test regularly approved by this court, ‘fairness
will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to
answer’.12 As long as the gist of his reasons was conveyed, the Minister was
thus not obliged to spell out in great detail why the particular schools were
being considered for closure. In this regard, the reasons given in the May 2012
letter to each SGB were the same as those set out in the department’s
recommendation, and although the latter document was not attached to the letter
that in itself does not result in the letter falling short of the mark.

[20] Similarly, in my view, the Minister was not obliged to inform the schools
of ‘adverse policy considerations’ and information concerning the department’s
finances and resources to facilitate their making of proper representations, as the
respondents further argued. This argument loses sight of the realities of what the
Minister was about. It was for him to consider what was in the best interest not
only of the learners and staff of the affected schools, but of education in the

11 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 56.
12 Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department & other appeals [1993] 3 All ER 92 (HL) at 106b-h
cited with approval in this court, inter alia, in Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade & others v Brenco Inc &
others 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA) para 13 and Du Preez & another v Truth & Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3)
SA 204 (A) at 232C.

province as a whole, taking into account budgetary restraints, available
resources and the implementation of both provincial and national policies
relating to education. Those policies are in the public domain and, if disputed,
are matters for debate in the forums in which they were determined, but not
between the functionary charged with their implementation and those who
might be affected.13 Policies such as multi-grade teaching and the desirability of
closing small rural schools were therefore not issues on which the Minister
needed to consider the views of the affected schools and it would have been
wholly unnecessary and superfluous for him to have called for their input
thereon. Accordingly, in my view, the majority in the court below wrongly
concluded that the failure to provide a brief background to the department’s
policy regarding the closure of the schools had impeded effective and proper
representations and fell short what had been required under s 33(2).

[21] I turn to consider the reasons given more closely. They were undeniably
terse, but that of course does not mean that they could not be addressed.
Although somewhat differently worded in the case of different schools, certain
of the reasons were common to most. The most common was ‘dwindling learner
numbers’, a reason offered in respect of all but two of the schools, the only
exceptions being the Beauvallon Secondary School (the first respondent) to
which I shall refer in more detail later, and the Wansbek VGK Primary School
(the 29th respondent). The second most common reason was ‘multi-grade
teaching’, which national education policy regarded as undesirable, was taking
place at the school. This was a reason given in respect of nine of the 17 schools
(the third, fifth, and seventh, eleventh, nineteenth, twenty first, twenty third,
thirty first and thirty third respondents). These two main complaints were the
sole reasons given in respect of five schools (the third, fifth, seventh, eleventh
and thirty first respondents) but I do not see that anyone could have entertained

13 Compare Scalabrini para 67.

any doubt as to why the closure of those schools was being considered. Nor for
that matter could there have been such doubt in the cases where in addition to
the two main considerations was added a further reason: for example, ‘poor
LITNUM results of the school’ in the case of the nineteenth respondent;
‘learners can be accommodated at [neighbouring schools]’ in the case of the
twenty first respondent; and that learners were being transported from another
town in the case of the twenty third respondent. In the result I once again find
myself in respectful disagreement with the majority in the court below who
concluded that reasons such as dwindling learner numbers and learners not
benefitting from multi-grade teaching were too brief for any of the meaningful
representations to be made.

[22] Similarly where, such as in the cases of the thirteenth and fifteenth
respondents, the reason of dwindling learner numbers was supplemented by the
further reason of there being sufficient accommodation for learners at
neighbouring schools, those affected could have had no doubt as to why the
schools were being considered for closure. And in the case of the 29th
respondent in which the sole reason given was that its ‘learner enrolment is
lower than 25’ the reason behind its possible closure was clearly self-evident
and did not need to be spelled out any clearer. Indeed one is hard pressed in this
last case to consider what else could have been said.

[23] I do not think it is necessary to consider the reasons given in respect of
any of the schools in any greater detail.  In none of the cases can it be said that
the gist of why closure was being considered was not apparent from the initial
reasons. That being so, the conclusion of the court below that there was a failure
to meet the requirements of s 33(2) which justified it interfering with the
ultimate decision is unsustainable.

[24] This leads me to consider a further issue arising from the initial reasons
given by the Minister in his letter of May 2012. In certain instances the reasons
for closure of the schools finally set out in the media statement issued by the
Minister on 16 October 2012 differed somewhat from those initially given to the
SGBs of the schools and in the notice of the public hearings. It was argued on
behalf of the respondents that as these reasons had not been disclosed at the
outset, the schools and the public had not been in a position to deal with them in
making their representations to the Minister rendering the final decision to close
those schools procedurally unfair. It was indeed on this process of reasoning
that the court a quo concluded that the closure of the first respondent,
Beauvallon Secondary School, should be set aside.

[25] As a starting point in considering this argument, I accept that the
circumstances of a matter may be such that procedural fairness will demand that
in the event of a fresh reason arising after the Minister has given initial reasons,
interested parties should be given the opportunity to comment thereon before a
final decision is taken. That may particularly be the case where the ultimate
decision is taken on the strength of a new reason forthcoming from the
department in respect of which no comment had been called for nor made
during the s 33(2) process. But this does not mean that comment must be called
for in all cases in which these fresh reasons emerge during the course of that
process. To hold otherwise would require the Minister to embark upon a
lengthy, drawn-out investigative process – a potentially ‘never-ending story’ –
before making a decision, and the importance and necessity of the executive
being able to act efficiently and promptly has been authoritatively stressed.14
This is particularly so in context of education and the need to close public

14 Premier, Mpumalanga & another v Executive Committee, Association of State-aided Schools, Eastern
Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) para 41.

schools to benefit learners and husband the department’s finances and resources
to the best advantage.

[26] Thus, for example, in the case of thirty third respondent where parents of
learners had expressed the view during the consultative process that the quality
of education was higher at a school proposed as an alternative, it would be
ridiculous to suggest that this be ignored until such time as the school, its SGB
and the public be asked to comment further on the issue. Indeed the consultative
process envisaged by s 33(2) is to ensure that the Minister, in taking a final
decision, has all the available facts on the circumstances of the school and
whatever views there may be on closure available in order to take an informed
decision. For him to have closed his mind to this additional information would
have subverted that process.

[27] Consequently, the fact that the Minister’s ultimate reasons for closure
may not have tallied precisely with his initial reasons does not mean either that
his final decision is vitiated by procedural unfairness or that additional reasons
emerging during the process prescribed by s 33(2) cannot be taken into account
and relied upon without giving further notice to the schools or public.

[28] Different considerations may apply where the additional reason or
reasons ultimately relied upon did not emerge during the consultative process
but were forthcoming from the department itself, especially where those reasons
were known to the department before notice of intention to close the school had
been given to the relevant SGB and public under s 33(2). In such a case the
Minister would not have complied with his obligation under s 33(2)(a) to
inform the SGB of his reasons for intending to close the school, and a
subsequent final decision would thus be one taken without complying with the
necessary statutory requirement. But this is a far cry from the Minister taking

into account a reason which emerged during the process of receiving
representations invited under the section.

[29] Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to consider in more detail the
position of the first respondent, Beauvallon Secondary School. The initial
reasons given for closure were stated by the Minister as being ‘consistent under-
performance in the NSC examination as well as grades 8-11’ and ‘high dropout
rate’. However, in the media statement on 16 October 2012, it was stated that
the school was to be closed as its infrastructure was becoming increasingly
unsuitable, that this impacted on the safety of learners and teachers, the security
of the school and its ability to retain learners, and that its learners could be
accommodated at the nearby John Ramsay High School which had achieved
better academic school results, had a better retention rate and offered safe
facilities. The court below concluded that the unsuitable school infrastructure
and its consequences for the school and its learners was a significant, if not the
primary reason, for Beauvallon’s closure and that, as this reason had not been
raised in the s 33(2) process, the Minister’s decision to close it had been
procedurally unfair.

[30] The Minister, in his answering affidavit, alleged that his reasons for
closing the school, namely, the under-performance in examinations, the high
drop-out rate, the unsuitable infrastructure and the problems relating to the
security of the school and its learners, had been known to all concerned since at
least 2010. And it is indeed so that in the department’s initial application to the
Minister for closure of the school both the IMG Advisor (who alleged that the
school’s building ‘was not conducive to teaching and learning’) and the Circuit
Team Manager ( who stated, inter alia, that a learner had been fatally stabbed in
March 2012 and that the poor condition of the infrastructure was ‘an injustice to
the school community’) had raised not only the reasons initially given but the

further additional reasons that were, at the end of the day, also relied upon by
the Minister.

[31] However, the fact that all the final reasons for Beauvallon’s closure had
been known to the appellants before the commencement of the closure process
makes it surprising, to say the least, that they were not mentioned by the
Minister in giving his reasons at the commencement of the s 33(2) process. But
the additional reasons relating to infrastructure, safety and security were not
given, and those concerned were thus not called on to make representations in
regard to them as they had not been raised. Significantly, the response of the
school’s SGB dealt with the reasons that had been given and further mentioned
vandalism and burglaries at the school, but did not address the additional
reasons, presumably as those issues had not been raised as reasons for closure.
Furthermore, the additional reasons were not ventilated or raised during the
public hearings. The only reference to the aspect of safety and security that one
can extract from the transcript of those proceedings was a statement made in
support of the school not being closed to the effect that, due to gangster activity
and violence, the learners would not be safe if they were to attend another
school outside of the area in which Beauvallon was situated.

[32] Consequently, material reasons on which the Minister based his decision
to close Beauvallon were not given under s 33(2)(a) and no representations
were made to or received by the Minister relevant to those reasons. The
procedure followed in regard to these particular schools was thus fatally flawed
as, simply put, the Minister did not comply with the provisions of the section by
properly giving his reasons, nor even the gist of his reasons, for considering
closing the school. That being so, his final decision in respect of the school
offends the principle of legality and the court a quo correctly set it aside. The
appeal in regard to Beauvallon must accordingly fail.

[33] Beauvallon was not the only school where the final reasons for closure in
the media statement of 16 October 2004 included reasons additional to those
initially given by the Minister. Thus in the case of Klipheuwel Primary School
(the ninth respondent), where the initial reasons had been simply that there was
no ‘feeder community’ and dwindling numbers, the final reasons included the
fact that the school relies on multi-grade teaching, that the learner number of 31
was low, that no viable solutions to increase the learner numbers could be
identified, and that the learners could conveniently be accommodated at a
nearby school where there are better literacy and numeracy development
opportunities. Similarly in the case of Urionskraal NGK Primary School (the
twenty fifth respondent), in which the initial reasons were identical to those
given in the instance of Klipheuwel, it was stated in the final reasons that
learner numbers were low at 34 learners; that the school relies on multi-grade
teaching with the staff of two educators required to teach 34 learners across
grades 1-6; that the 34 learners could be accommodated at a nearby primary
school; and, most importantly, that during the public participation process it had
been noted not only that the principal of the school was transporting almost a
third of the learners in a single vehicle, but that the school’s SGB had expressed
its support for the proposed closure.

[34] I do not think it is either necessary or useful to embark upon further
analysis of the differences between the Minister’s initial and final reasons. The
instances quoted above indicate that in most cases certain facts emerging during
the course of the consultation process or reflected in national educational
policies were mentioned in the final reasons, and that the original reasons were
either expressed somewhat differently or were substantiated by the
recommendations made during the participation process under s 33(2).
However, as the minority in the court a quo correctly held, a decisive
consideration is that apart from the instance of Beauvallon, none of the other

schools relied upon any differences between the initial reasons and those later
given to suggest that the process under s 33(2) had been procedurally unfair.
Consequently, apart from the instance of Beauvallon, the procedure followed by
the Minister complied with the requirements of s 33(2) and the majority in court
a quo erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.

[35] The respondents argued further, however, that the Minister had failed to
comply with his obligations under s 33(2) in that he had failed to consult with
the thirty fifth respondent, SADTU, before taking his final decision to close the
schools. This argument, advanced in the papers but rejected in the court a quo,
was put forward once more in the respondents’ heads of argument in this court.
But although not abandoned, it was not presented within any vigour by
respondents’ counsel, whose hesitancy on this score is understandable.

[36] The simple fact is that consultation with SADTU, or any other trade
union that might represent the interests of educators or other members staff of a
school, is not a requirement specified in s 33 as a prerequisite for closure of the
school. Even though it was alleged in the supplementary founding papers that
the Minister’s failure to consult was ‘without precedent’, it appears that at best
the views of the leadership of SADTU had been obtained previously only at an
informal level before a decision to close a school was taken. Members of
SADTU were, of course, perfectly entitled to make representations on the
proposed closing of the schools, either in their capacities as members of the
relevant SGBs or as members of the public, and some of them did. But there
was no obligation on the part of the Minister to consult with SADTU, and the
fact that he did not is no reason to impugn his decision.

[37] The respondents also alleged the decision to close each of the schools was
arbitrary and irrational. In particular, in this regard, it was argued that as the

circumstances of the seven schools the Minister had decided not to close were
comparable to certain of the schools that he did close, this demonstrated ‘an
inconsistency and vacillation in standards and policies that is entirely irrational’.
In this regard attention was focussed on the Minister having replaced the school
principal of certain schools to avoid closure but not in other schools that he
closed where leadership was cited as a concern. The respondents also
emphasised that although multi-grade teaching was cited as a reason for the
closure of all of the rural schools, some schools in which there was multi-grade
teaching were kept open.

[38] It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to closely analyse the
respects in which it is alleged the decision relating to each school had been
irrational, particularly as I did not understand counsel for the respondents, at the
end of the day, to place undue emphasis on this aspect of the case. Indeed the
attack upon the Minister’s decision on the basis of its alleged irrationality can
be swiftly dealt with. Courts must be wary of trespassing into the domain of
public officials by interfering with decisions entrusted by the Constitution or
legislation to them. As long as there is a rational connection between the facts
and information available to a public official and the achievement of the
purpose falling within the power being exercised, a court cannot interfere
merely because it considers a decision to be wrong or that a different outcome
would have been preferable.15 As was emphasized by Ngcobo CJ in Albutt:16
‘Courts may not interfere with the means selected simply because they do not like them, or
because there are other more appropriate means that could have been selected. But, where the
decision is challenged on the grounds of rationality, courts are obliged to examine the means
selected to determine whether they are rationally related to the objective sought to be
achieved. What must be stressed is that the purpose of the enquiry is to determine not

15 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) para 45.
16 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation & others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) para 51.

whether there are other means that could have been used, but whether the means selected are
rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved.’
Thus the requirement of rationality is not aimed at testing the reasonableness,
fairness or appropriateness of a decision nor whether an alternative or better
means could have been employed to achieve the desired end. It is restricted to
the ‘threshold question’ whether the decision taken ‘is properly related to the
public good it seeks to realise’.17

[39] The majority in the court a quo held that the decision to close the affected
schools was irrational, particularly as even though multi-grade teaching and the
benefits of smaller schools were clearly issues of policy falling within the
domain of the Minister and the department, ‘where multi-grade teaching was
cited as the primary reason to close certain schools, in circumstances in which
schools where the method is implemented and with an equally successful rate
are given a reprieve to continue, then the complaint of arbitrariness is not
without merit and cannot be ignored on the basis of policy consideration’.

[40] With respect, this conclusion was clearly incorrect The Minister had the
power under s 33(1) to close the affected schools. Hard choices had to be made,
and the fact that in the exercise of his function he closed a school whose
circumstances may have been similar to another school that was not closed does
not, in itself, establish irrationality. The truth is that no two schools can ever be
regarded as identical and the Minister, as functionary, was called upon to make
what may be colloquially described as being a ‘judgment-call’ on which of the
27 schools under consideration should be closed to achieve the desired end of
improving education in the province. Thus, for example, multi-grade teaching
can obviously not be phased out overnight, whatever national policy might be,

17 Per Moseneke DCJ the Law Society of South Africa & others v Minister for Transport & another 2011 (1) SA
400 (CC) para 35.

and the fact that a school offering multi-grade teaching was not closed does not
mean that the closure of a school at which there is such instruction is irrational.

[41] As appears from the evaluation process that I have already described in
some detail, the Minister made his decision in the light of the facts made
available to him, and after considering the recommendations, representations
and debates that had taken place during a lengthy and careful evaluation
process. There is no suggestion that he was not bona fide in taking his decision.
Indeed, the converse is glaringly apparent. The closure of each of the schools
was in line with national policies relating to similar schools and there is thus no
room for a finding that his decision was vitiated for being irrational or arbitrary.
Consequently, the conclusion of the minority in the court a quo that the closure
of the schools had not been shown to have been irrational, was correct.

[42] In the light of all the afore-going, save for the instance of Beauvallon, the
court a quo’s decision to review and set aside the Minister’s decision to close
the remaining schools cannot stand and the appeal must succeed.

[43] That brings me to the respondent’s cross-appeal in which it was sought to
impugn the provisions of s 33(2) of the Act as unconstitutional. This challenge
was conditional upon the assertion that if the section is to be interpreted in such
a way as to permit the Minister to close a school without giving substantive
reasons for proposing to do so, it would offend the right to just administrative
action enshrined in s 33 of the Constitution. However, it was not suggested by
any of the parties that s 33(2) of the Act was to be so interpreted and, that being
so, the debate on the validity of the section fell away. The National Minister,
who was represented solely in order to support the constitutional validity of
s 33(2), did not seek to recover costs for appearing. In these circumstances, it is
appropriate to make no order in the respect of the conditional cross-appeal.

[44] In regard to the costs of the appeal itself, although the appellants must
succeed in setting aside the order of the court a quo in respect of all of the
affected schools, save for Beauvallon, they did not seek a costs order against
any of the schools or their SGB’s as would inevitably have to be discharged
from the public purse. In addition, whilst the appellants, in their heads of
argument, had indicated that they would seek a costs order against SADTU
should the appeal succeed, their counsel did not persist in seeking such relief
and, most properly, conceded that the appellants would in any event have been
before this court had SADTU not been a party. In these circumstances, save for
the first and second respondents (Beauvallon and its SGB, the first and second
applicants in the court below) being entitled to their costs in successfully
resisting the court a quo’s judgment in their favour,  no further order need be
made in respect of the costs of appeal.

[45] Of course the first and second respondents in the appeal were also entitled
to their costs in the court below; as was indeed reflected in the order of the
minority. It was also not suggested that the order in the majority judgment
below relating to the issue of costs between the appellants (as respondents
below) and SADTU should change. In the result, only the first and third
paragraphs of that order need be altered.

[46] For these reasons it is ordered as follows:
(a)
The appeal succeeds to the extent that paras 1 and 3 of the order of the
court a quo are set aside and substituted with the following:
‘1
(a)
The first respondent’s decision to close Beauvallon
Secondary School (the first applicant) with effect from
31 December 2012 is reviewed and set aside;

(b)
The review application in respect of the first respondent’s
decision to close another 16 schools with effect from 31 December
2012 is dismissed;

. . .
The first and second respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the
first and second applicants jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to be absolved, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.’
(b)
(i)
The first and second appellants are to pay the first and second

respondents’ costs of appeal, jointly and severally, the one paying

the other to be absolved.

(ii)
Save to the extent in (b) (i) above, there will be no further

order as to costs of the appeal.
(c)
No order is made on the cross-appeal.

_______________
L E Leach
Judge of Appeal

Willis JA:

[47] Having read the fine and comprehensive judgment of Leach JA, I agree
with his proposed order that each of the individual decisions to close 16 of the
affected schools, is not one with which a court may interfere. Indeed, I should
have gone one step further. In the case of the Beauvallon Secondary School , I
consider the difference given in the final reasons as to why the school was to be
closed was neither so materially different from those originally put before the
meetings with the school governing bodies (SGBs) nor so strikingly unfair in
the overall process as to be 'fatally flawed'. I therefore disagree that there was,
accordingly, a justification for judicial interference with the decision to close
that school. Relevant is the totality of the history of the process. Having as its
wellspring the best interests of those who teach and those who learn, the
decision to close the school was, in each instance, taken after careful
consideration and extensive consultation over a protracted period of time. In this
regard, my conclusions mirror those of Davis J who delivered a dissenting
judgment when the application for an interim interdict in this matter was
considered. In my opinion, this court should, therefore, also have sanctioned the
closure of Beauvallon Secondary School.

[48] Additionally, there are a few other aspects in the reasoning of Leach JA
where I respectfully find myself not to be in unqualified agreement with him.
Here below I shall attempt to set out briefly the features of the case which, in
my deliberations of the matter, warrant a separate consideration.

[49] I agree with Leach JA that, in general, administrative action is
characterised by the requirement of procedural fairness whereas executive
action is not. This is made clear in Masetlha v President of the Republic of

South Africa & another.18 It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact
that the requirement of procedural fairness is a consequence of a decision being
administrative rather than the reason why it is so.

[50] In my opinion, it follows from President of the Republic of South Africa
& others v South African Rugby Football Union & others,19 Premier,
Mpumalanga & another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided
Schools, Eastern Transvaal20 and Masetlha21 that the development, formulation
and implementation of policy are executive decisions. It is in regard to the use
of the word ‘implementation’22 that confusion may arise. Mr Fagan, who
appeared for the appellants, argued that all that they had done was to implement
policy and, therefore, the application was not amenable to review.

[51] The implementation of policy will almost always require some degree of
individuation. The implementation of a policy to build more clinics, for
example, would require that specific contracts be entered into for the building of
particular units in different places. The former is not amenable to review in
terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), but the
individuated tenders awarded as a result thereof would be.

[52] ‘Policy’ has a ‘general’ character.23 It is in the nature of things that the
implementation of policy entails a process of moving from the general to the
particular. Ordinarily, once a process of decision-making has been
particularised to the extent that an individuated decision has been made, having
concrete, measurable and finite results and which are not of general application,

18 Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa & another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC) para 78.
19 President of the Republic of South Africa & others v South African Rugby Football Union & others 2000 (1)
SA 1 (CC) para 143.
20 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) para 41.
21 Para 77.
22 See Premier, Mpumalanga para 41, approved in Masetlha para 77.
23  See for example The Oxford English Dictionary, 2006.

there is a change of character: executive decision-making becomes
administrative action. In a certain sense, as the colloquial expression has it: ‘The
devil is in the detail’. Policy has an abstract quality: it is separated from
particularity.24 The fingerprint of administration, on the other hand, is precisely
the particularity of its consequences in the hand of the State. Administrative
action, in a manner different from executive decision-making, affects human
beings in the singularity of their lives, their hopes, their futures. Therein reposes
the wisdom of the constitutional requirement25 that there should be a statute
such as PAJA.

[53] Not every individuated decision made the executive authority or an organ
of State is, however, amenable to review. Certain decisions, such as those
historically derived from the royal prerogative and that are unrestrained by the
Constitution would, by way of illustration, be beyond review in terms of PAJA.
The closure of schools is not such a prerogative decision.

[54] By reason of my minority judgment in Minister of Home Affairs & others
v Scalabrini Centre & others26 to which Leach JA has referred with approval, I
should record,  as an aside, that I agree that Scalabrini makes it clear that the
decision to close particular or individual schools is an administrative one.
Scalabrini dealt with the closure of a Refugee Reception Office in Cape Town.
In that case it was held that the decision to close the office was an
administrative one. In principle, there is no difference, in regard to the question
of its amenability for review, between the decision to close a Refugee Reception
Centre and a school. Although I wrote a minority judgment in Scalabrini, all the
judges hearing the matter agreed that the decision to close the office was
reviewable in terms of PAJA.

24 Ibid.
25 See s 33 of the Constitution, 1996.
26 Minister of Home Affairs & others v Scalabrini Centre & others 2013 (6) SA 421 (SCA).

[55] I am considerably more phlegmatic than Leach JA about the
shortcomings of PAJA, such as they are. In my opinion, it has served us well
since its coming into operation. Certainly, it has been a huge improvement on
the situation that previously prevailed. The consideration of PAJA has come
before the Constitutional Court in cases to innumerable to mention. As far as I
am aware, the Constitutional Court has not found it necessary to criticise the
crafting of the Act. In this regard, I take my cue from them. Indeed, in what was
effectively the unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court in Bato Star
Fishing (Pty) Limited v Minister of Environmental Affairs & others,27 PAJA
seems to have received a sterling endorsement.28

[56] I otherwise agree with the judgment and order proposed by Leach JA,
including his reasons therefor.

__________________
N P WILLIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL

27 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Limited v Minister of Environmental Affairs & others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC).
28 See esp paras 25 and 26.

Appearances:

For the Appellant:

E W Fagan (with him E F van Huyssteen)

Instructed by:

State Attorney, Cape Town

State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For the Respondents:

N Arendse SC (with him D Simonsz and

S Fergus)

Instructed by:

Botha, Pretorius and Andrews Inc, Cape Town

Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For the Respondent in the
Cross-Appeal:

Kemp J Kemp SC (with him T Masuku)

Instructed by:

State Attorney, Cape Town

State Attorney, Bloemfontein