IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

REPORTABLE
CASE NO: 467/2000

In the matter between:

SICEBI JUSTICE ZULU                                                     FIRST APPELLANT
PATIENCE HLONGWANE                SECOND APPELLANT
THOKOZILE SARAH NYANGIWE                               THIRD APPELLANT

and

DUDUZILE MAJOLA                                                                              RESPONDENT

CORAM:
SMALBERGER
ADP,
STREICHER,
MPATI,
MTHIYANE and BRAND JJA

HEARD:
7 MAY 2002
DELIVERED:     29 MAY 2002

Summary:  Whether it is competent for a magistrate to substitute a
representative of a deceased estate appointed in terms of regulation 4(1) of the
Regulations promulgated under s23(10) of the  Black Administration Act 38 of
1927.

JUDGMENT

MTHIYANE JA:
[1] This appeal concerns the estate of one Aaron Ngqongqoza Mchunu (the
deceased), a taxi owner and operator, who died intestate on 11 April 1997.   The
first appellant claims that he is at present the duly appointed representative of the
estate.   At the time of his death  the deceased was married to the respondent by
customary  union.   The  second and third appellants contend that  they too were
married to him by customary union.   The deceased left an estate of just over R1.3
million, comprising 13 minibus taxis,  immovable property valued at R130 000,00
and a cash investment of  R550 711,69 (the estate).
[2] On 6 June 1997 the magistrate of Johannesburg  appointed Mr Frans
Mashele, an attorney, as the representative of the estate   in terms of regulation
4(1)1 of the Regulations  promulgated in terms of section 23(10) of the Black

1 Regulation 4(1) provides: ‘For the administration and distribution of any property in the estate of a deceased Black
referred to in regulation 2 the appointment of an executor shall not be necessary:  Provided that whenever the
magistrate in whose area of jurisdiction the deceased Black ordinarily resided considers it desirable, he may issue a
certificate to any person whom he may deem suitable, appointing him to represent the estate and to assume
responsibility for the payment of debts, the collection of assets and the general administration and distribution of
property.   Such certificate shall be issued in any case where it is necessary to pass transfer to any person of
immovable property, not being land in a location held under quitrent conditions, registered in the name of the
deceased.’ [Emphasis added]

Administration Act 23 of 1927 (the regulations).2   In terms thereof  Mashele was
authorised to collect the estate assets and to ‘pay all claims to the value of the
assets in the estate  and to award  the balance of the estate, including the
immovable property (if any),  to the rightful heir/s’.
[3] Although Mashele was not required by  the regulations to do so, he  prepared
a  liquidation and distribution account (the account) for the  estate.   In terms of the
account the estate  beneficiaries were the respondent and the second and third
appellants.   The respondent became entitled to receive  R223 162,09 in cash and  7
minibus taxis  (R557 374,66 in total value),  the second appellant,  R223 162,09 in
cash and  4 minibus  taxis (R407 374,66 in total value) and  the third appellant, 2
minibus taxis, R11 000,00 in cash  and the immovable property valued at R130
000,00 (R225 212,47 in total value).   The respondent and the second appellant
renounced all claims to the assets due to the third appellant.

2 Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks, published under
Government Notice R200 on 6 February 1987.

[4] On 29 August 1997 the account  was  approved  by the magistrate,
including the  payment  of R46 574,90 to Mashele  in his capacity as the
representative of the estate for his fees.   Despite the approval of the account  the
respondent  refused to hand over to the second and third appellants the minibus
taxis in her possession which they were entitled to receive  in terms of the account.
Her reason for refusing to do so was  that the second and third appellants were
never married to  the deceased as they had only been his lovers.
[5] On 10 March 1998 the second and third appellants, represented by Mashele,
launched an application in the magistrate’s court for an order compelling the
respondent to comply with the account, in particular to deliver the minibus taxis
due to them in terms of  the distribution account.   The application was, however,
not proceeded with as  the second and third appellants and Mashele inexplicably
failed to appear at the hearing,  and the respondent consequently  obtained an order
dismissing the application with costs.

[6] On 17 December 1998 Mashele advised the respondent’s attorneys of
record  that his mandate had been terminated in favour of the first appellant.   On
11 January 1999 the first appellant,  who is also the attorney of record for the
second and third appellants, was appointed as the representative of the estate  in
terms of regulation 4(1),  in substitution of Mashele.   The  certificate of
appointment issued to him by the magistrate  recorded that the first appellant was
to assume responsibility for the administration and distribution of exactly the same
assets listed in  the certificate previously  issued to Mashele.
[7]    An  attempt by the first appellant to assume control of the estate assets in
terms of his appointment  met with resistance from  the respondent who refused to
co-operate with him  and to release the undistributed  assets which were  in her
possession.   The respondent  adopted the   attitude that the estate fell to devolve in
accordance with customary law – in terms of which  the entire estate would be
inherited by her eldest son as the general heir.    The appellants disputed her
claims.

[8]   On 16 September 1999 the first, second and third appellants launched an
application in the Witwatersrand Local Division  for an order authorizing the first
appellant, as representative of the  estate, to collect all the assets belonging to the
estate and to take all incidental steps necessary to discharge the duties of an
appointed estate representative and certain ancillary orders.    The matter came
before Maseremule AJ who  dismissed the application on the basis that the estate
had already been finalized.   The learned judge found  that the appointment of the
first appellant as  representative of the estate was  not competent and ordered the
appellants to pay the respondent’s costs  jointly  and severally.   But as against the
first appellant, the learned judge ordered that the costs were to be borne by  him
personally and not   the deceased estate.   Leave to appeal was refused.   The
appellants now appeal to this Court against all those orders, with leave granted by
this Court on application to it.
[9]   The appellants’ heads of argument were filed late.   They applied for the
condonation of such late filing.   Apart from the late filing of the  heads,  the

appellants were confronted with a further difficulty when  the appeal came  before
us:  the record lodged in the appeal was defective in many respects.   First, the
appeal record was not properly indexed nor was it paginated so as to ensure that
every 10th line on each page was numbered.   Secondly, some pages contained
illegible parts.   Thirdly, certain pages including at least one important annexure,
were missing from the record.   Fourthly, the record was burdened with irrelevant
material.   Of the four volumes  filed of record, only two were relevant to the
matters in issue in this  appeal.   With the exception of only fourteen pages
(containing the judgment and order of the court a quo) in volume 3, the rest of the
material in volumes 3 and 4 was irrelevant.   On 9 October 2001 the first
appellant’s attention was drawn to the above defects by   senior counsel for the
appellants in his practice note.   He instructed the first appellant (who is also the
appellants’ attorney of record) to correct the record accordingly.   Nothing was
done.   At the hearing of the appeal   the first appellant was directed to  file an
affidavit by not later than 17 May 2002, explaining why  the record had not been

rectified.   On 16 May 2002 the first appellant submitted an affidavit in which he
stated that he was under the impression that the record had been corrected by his
articled  clerk, Ms Mabuchi Dama Maria Chipasula – now a qualified attorney.
Chipasula has left the first appellant’s employ and is now employed by the Road
Accident Fund.   She also filed an affidavit confirming the correctness of the
allegations made by the first appellant but says nothing  about why  the record was
not corrected.   Apart from exculpating  the first appellant she without protest
accepts all blame for the non-observance of the relevant rule3.   This is an
unacceptable state of affairs.   While the first appellant has tendered some
explanation for the late filing of the heads, none has been forthcoming for the
failure to correct the appeal record.   It is all very well for the first appellant to put
all blame for such failure to comply with the rules on his erstwhile articled clerk.
But it is  the first appellant who is  the  litigant and the  attorney of record in the
appeal.   And it was he who should have supervised the work of his articled clerk.

3 Rule 8 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules.

The rules  require that a proper record be lodged in the appeal.   It has been said
many times in this Court that an attorney is in duty bound to acquaint himself with
the rules of the Court in which the appeal is to be presented.4    This Court has
warned that   non-observance of the rules of the kind displayed by the appellants in
this case is viewed in a serious light and offending parties and their attorneys may
be subjected to punitive costs orders.5
[10]    Despite the unsatisfactory manner in which the matter has been dealt with
by the  first appellant, I am unable to say that the  explanation given for the late
filing of the heads and the failure to correct the record is so unworthy of
consideration, that the condonation application falls to be dismissed irrespective of
the prospects of success.   It is therefore essential to consider whether prospects of
success exist.  If they do, condonation should be granted, with an appropriate order
as to costs; if not, it should be refused.6

4 See Ferreira v Ntshingila 1990 (4) SA 271 AD at 281G.
5 See W.G. Davey (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 697 (SCA) at 707B-D.
6 cf South African  Allied Workers’ Union (in liquidation) and Others v De Klerk NO and Another 1992 (3) SA 1 at
4F-G, for the approach adopted.

[11]   In dismissing the application while upholding the point in limine   that the
estate had already been finalized , the judge a quo said:
‘…it is not competent to deal with disputes arising out of the distribution of
assets in a deceased estate where a liquidation and distribution account has
been drawn up and approved, by securing the appointment of another person
as the representative of an estate to collect and distribute afresh the same
estate assets which have already been dealt with in terms of the liquidation
and distribution account.’   [Emphasis added]

[12]    Consequently this  appeal turns on the competence of the magistrate to
substitute an estate representative duly appointed in terms of regulation 4(1).
There can be no question that if the estate was not finalized, it was competent for
the magistrate to appoint the first appellant as the representative of the estate, in
substitution of Mashele.   The difficulty with the reasoning of the judge a quo is
that while he   accepted that Mashele had  collected only ‘some of the assets’, and
distributed only ‘some of the assets’, and found that the respondent  had refused to
hand over to the second and third appellants the minibus taxis which ‘they were
entitled  to receive in terms of the liquidation and distribution account’, he

nevertheless concluded that the estate had been finalized.   The fact that  only
‘some of the assets’ had been distributed,  warranted a finding to the contrary.
Yet, the learned  judge held that the first appellant ‘could not validly be appointed
as representative of the estate in respect of which a liquidation and distribution
account had been finalized in the estate and approved by the magistrate’.    The
learned judge further found that the magistrate’s approval of the account signified
the finalization of the account and went on to equate the procedure in  the
regulations  with that provided for  in section 35(12)7 of the Administration of
Estate Act 66 of 1965.
[13]    The analogy drawn by the judge a quo is misconceived.    While the
procedure provided for in the  Administration of Estates Act is more elaborate and

7 Section 35(12) provides:  ‘When an account has lain open for inspection as hereinbefore provided and-
(a) no objection has been lodged; or
(b) an objection has been lodged and the account has been amended in accordance with the Master’s direction
and has again lain open for inspection, if necessary, as provided in sub-section (11), and no application has
been made to the Court within the period referred to in sub-section (10) to set aside the Master’s decision;
or
(c) an objection has been lodged but withdrawn, or has not been sustained and no such application has been
made to the Court within the said period,
the executor shall forthwith pay the creditors and distribute the estate among the heirs in accordance with the
account, lodge with the Master the receipts and acquittances of such creditors and heirs and produce to the Master
the deeds of registration relating to such distribution, or lodge with the Master a certificate by the registration
officer or a conveyancer specifying the registrations which have been effected by the executor.’

section 35(12) provides for  the estate  account  to lie open for inspection for a
certain period to enable interested parties to object to it and to have the account
amended at the Master’s direction, regulation 4 provides for a more simplified
procedure in which the magistrate exercises supervisory power over the
administration and distribution of the deceased estate.   In terms of regulation 4(3)8
the representative may be required to  render a ‘ just, true and exact account’ of his
administration but a liquidation and distribution account is not called for.   No
provision is made  for the  account to lie for inspection to enable  aggrieved  parties
to object to it.    The matter is left solely in the hands of the magistrate.   This does
not of course mean that errors may not be corrected if they occur.   It would be
within the magistrate’s power to do so.
[14]    Turning to the merits,  it  is clear that on the  available evidence not all the
estate assets were distributed in terms of the account.   As pointed out, the judge a

8 Regulation 4(3) provides:  ‘The magistrate may require any person to whom a certificate has been issued under
subregulation (1) to provide such security for the due and proper administration of such property as the magistrate
may deem necessary and to render a just, true and exact account of his administration within such period and at such
intervals as the magistrate may prescribe.’

quo himself found  that ‘only some of the assets’ were distributed by Mashele
and that the respondent had refused to hand over the minibus taxis that had been
allocated to the second and third appellants.   It is no answer  to suggest that an
application   should have been launched ‘to review the decision of the magistrate to
approve the account drawn by Mashele,’ nor  to suggest that an order should have
been sought  ‘to set aside the liquidation and distribution account …as well as the
part distribution which took place in accordance therewith’.   In terms of the
regulations (4(1)and(2))  the representative is entitled to take ‘control of the assets’
and to administer and distribute them.      The problem did not lie with the approval
of the account but with the failure to distribute the assets in terms thereof. It was
not necessary for the appellants to incur the expense of a review application when
a more simplified procedure  was available to them, to deal with  the actual
problem.
[15]   Because  the minibus taxis have not yet been distributed, it cannot be said
that the estate has been finalized.   The distribution of these assets is a matter

which the estate representative still needs to attend to.   On the papers it is not
clear  whether the immovable property (the dwelling house) allocated to the third
appellant has already  been transferred.   In terms of regulation 4(2)9 it is the first
appellant who is vested with such   power in his capacity as an estate
respresentative.   Argument to the contrary advanced by counsel for the
respondent, namely that the transfer could be effected by the magistrate ignores the
clear wording of the sub-regulation (4(2)).
[16]   The argument that at  the stage at which  the first appellant was appointed,
the magistrate was functus officio is not sound.    The functus officio rule only
applies ‘…when an administrative official has made a decision which bears
directly upon an individual’s interests, [and] it is said that the decision-maker has
discharged his office’.10    It was said that a person to whom statutory power has
been entrusted is functus officio once he has exercised it and he cannot himself call

9  Regulation 4(2) provides:  ‘A person to whom a certificate has been issued under subregulation (1) shall have full
power and authority to represent the estate in relation to such property, including power on behalf of the estate and
subject to the approval of the magistrate to pass and to receive transfer of immovable property’
10 See Baxter – Administrative Law 372.

his own decision in question.11      This was not the case in the present matter
where some of the  estate assets had  not yet been distributed at the time of the
appointment of the first appellant as a representative of the estate.   The functus
officio rule cannot apply  where, as here, the estate has not been finalized and the
magistrate is still expected,  in the exercise of his supervisory functions, to give
further directions concerning the undistributed assets.     It  therefore follows that
the substitution of the first appellant  fell  within the magistrate’s  powers.   In
terms of regulation 4(5)12 the magistrate is at any time entitled to revoke the
certificate issued by him to a  representative under sub-regulation (1).   On a proper
reading of regulation 4(5),  the power to revoke would, in my view, include in
appropriate cases the power to substitute, where the estate has not been finalized.
It follows  that  the power of substitution is implicit in  the power conferred on the
magistrate to appoint a representative and to revoke such appointment  because, in
a case like the present,  without such substitution there will be no one to finalize

11 See De Freitas v Somerset West Municipality 1997 (3) SA 1080 (C) at 1082 I-J.
12 Regulation 4(5) provides: ‘The magistrate may at any time revoke a certificate issued by him to any person under
subregulation (1).’

the administration and distribution of the estate, where the previously appointed
representative has failed to do so.   The substitution of the first appellant  was
reasonably incidental to the finalization of the administration and distribution of
the undistributed assets in the estate and  therefore competent.13
[17]     It follows from the above that the appeal must succeed and that the first
appellant is entitled to an order in terms of prayers 1 and 2 of the original notice of
motion.   The further relief that was sought is not being persisted with in view of
the decision of this Court in Mthembu v Letsela and Another.14
[18]   Three further matters require comment.   The first relates to the first
appellant’s dual role as representative of the estate and attorney of record for the
second and third appellants.   That situation gives rise to a potential conflict of
interest, as the interest of the estate, on the one hand, and the second and third
appellants, on the other, may not necessarily correspond in all respects.   It is
further undesirable that the estate’s appointed representative should act as the

13 cf Johannesburg Municipality v Davies and Another 1925 AD 395 at 403.
14 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).

attorney for certain interested parties against another interested party arising out
of the administration of the estate.   The first appellant should therefore cease to act
on behalf of the second and third appellants, in his own interests and theirs, and
should be precluded from recovering any costs from them in relation to the present
litigation, not recoverable from the respondent, which he might otherwise have
been entitled to in his capacity as their attorney.
[19]   The second matter is that the first appellant’s functions must be limited to the
recovery of all assets of the estate that have not yet been distributed in terms of the
account.   It is of some concern that the  estate having disbursed R46 574,90
towards Mashele’s fees/commission now faces the prospect of further
disbursements to meet the first appellant’s expenses in finalizing the estate.   As
this matter is destined to find its way back to the magistrate he, in the exercise of
his supervisory powers, must ensure as far as possible that any further
disbursements to be incurred by the estate are limited to services rendered in

respect of the undistributed assets, to avoid any duplication of fees to the
detriment of the estate.
[20]     The third matter relates to costs.   The conduct of the first appellant (or
members of his firm) in relation to the inept preparation and presentation of the
record of appeal, the failure to remedy the numerous defects when they were
pointed out to him and he was requested to do so by his counsel and his delay in
applying for condonation, requires a punitive costs order depriving the first
appellant of part of his costs on appeal.   Such an order would appropriately mark
this Court’s displeasure of his or his firms continued and persistent disregard of the
rules, conduct which borders on the contemptuous.
[21]   In the result the following order is made
1. Condonation is granted in respect of the appellants’ failure timeously to
file their heads of argument. The appellants are to pay the costs of the
application including the respondent’s costs of opposition thereto.

2. The appeal succeeds and the order of the Court below is altered to read:

‘The application is granted and an order is made:

(a)
Authorizing the first applicant, as the representative of the estate
of the late Mr Aaron Ngqongqoza Mchunu No. 1467/97, to
collect all the undistributed assets belonging to the said estate and
to take all incidental steps necessary to discharge the duties
attendant  on his representation of the said estate.
(b)
Directing the respondent to co-operate with the first applicant to
give effect to the order specified in prayer (a) hereinabove.
(c)
Ordering the respondent to pay the costs of this application.’

3. Subject to 4 below, the respondent is to pay two-thirds of the appellants’
costs of the appeal.

4. The appellants are not entitled to recover from the respondent any costs
in respect of volumes 3 and 4 of the appeal record, save in respect of the
fourteen pages relating to the judgment and order of the court a quo;

5. The first appellant is not entitled to recover any costs from the second
and third appellants,  in his capacity as their attorney of record arising
from the litigation in this matter.

___________________
KK MTHIYANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Concur:
Smalberger ADP)
Streicher JA)
Mpati JA)
Brand JA)