REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable
Case number:  265/2000

In the matter between:

SAMCOR (MANUFACTURING) (PTY) LTD
Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE
Respondent

CORAM:

HOWIE, MPATI JJA and HEHER AJA

HEARD:

18 FEBRUARY 2002

DELIVERED:
27 MARCH 2002

Determination under s 65 of Customs and Excise Act; Commissioner requested to amend;
whether restatement of the determination a new determination and appealable.
___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________

MPATI JA:

[1] The Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (the Act) provides, inter alia, for the
levying of customs duty on goods that are imported into the Republic.  The amount of
duty to be paid depends mainly upon the value of the goods so imported.  Section 65
(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the value for customs duty
purposes of any imported goods shall, at the time of entry for home
consumption, be the transaction value thereof, within the meaning of
section 66.”

In terms of s 66 (1) the transaction value of any imported goods “shall be the price
actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to the Republic, adjusted in
terms of section 67 ….”.
[2] This appeal concerns adjustments to the “price actually paid or payable” to an
exporter in respect of imported goods as sanctioned by s 67 of the Act.  Section
67(1)(c) is in the following terms:

“In ascertaining the transaction value of any imported goods in terms of s
66(1), there shall be added to the price actually paid or payable for the
goods-
(a) …
(b) …
(c)  royalties and licence fees in respect of the imported goods,
including payments for patents, trade marks and copyright and for
the right to distribute or resell the goods, due by the buyer, directly
or indirectly, as a condition of sale of the goods for export to the
Republic,  to the extent that such royalties and fees are not
included in the price actually paid or payable, but excluding
charges for the right to reproduce the imported goods in the
Republic.”

[3] The appellant unsuccessfully applied before Smit J in the Transvaal Provincial
Division for an order declaring the fees and royalties paid or payable by the appellant
to two Japanese motor vehicle companies in terms of certain agreements not dutiable in
terms of s 67 (1) (c) of the Act, and setting aside a determination said to have been
made by the respondent on 9 September 1997 to the effect that in ascertaining the
transaction value of the relevant goods the said fees and royalties were to be added to

the price actually paid or payable.  An application for leave to appeal was dismissed by
Smit J but granted by this Court.
[4] The Samcor Group of Companies (Samcor), of which the appellant forms part,
imports, assembles, manufactures, markets, sells and exports motor vehicles, motor
vehicle parts and accessories.   The appellant is the manufacturing arm of Samcor and
manufactures Mazda and Ford motor vehicles from component parts which it imports
from Japan together with other components parts sourced locally or elsewhere.
[5] The history of Samcor is the following:  Ford Motor Company of SA Limited
was incorporated on 29 December 1923.  On 11 December 1980 it changed its name to
Ford Motor Company of South Africa (Pty) Limited and operated under that name
until 1985.  Another motor vehicle company, Chrysler (SA) Pty Limited, was
incorporated on 16 January 1959 and on 12 November 1976 changed its name to
Sigma Motor Corporation (Proprietary) Limited (Sigma).  On 1 September 1984 Sigma

changed its name to Amcor Motor Holdings (Proprietary) Limited.  On 7 March 1985
the business operations of Amcor Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Ford Motor Company
of SA (Pty) Ltd were amalgamated and rationalised under a holding company, South
African Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd (Samcor).  The manufacturing operations were
taken over by Ford Motor Company of SA (Pty) Ltd, which thereafter changed its
name on a further three occasions.  It is presently registered as Samcor
(Manufacturing) (Pty) Limited.  That is the appellant.  The marketing operations of
Samcor were taken over by Amcor Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd, which changed its name
twice and is presently known as Samcor (Marketing) (Pty) Ltd.
[6] During 1977 Sigma took over a franchise agreement which another South
African Company, Illings (Pty) Ltd, had with a Japanese company, Toyo Kogyo Co,
Ltd, now known as Mazda Motor Corporation (Mazda).
[7] On 8 May 1979 Sigma concluded three related agreements with a Japanese

motor company, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (Mitsubishi), viz a Manufacturing and
Patent Licence and Technical Assistance Agreement, a Distribution and Supply
Agreement and a Trade Mark Licence Agreement.  In terms of the first-mentioned
agreement Mitsubishi, inter alia, granted Sigma the exclusive licence to assemble and
progressively manufacture in the Republic, for resale in the Republic and neighbouring
territories under the Distribution and Supply Agreement, Mitsubishi Motor products,
purchased from it in “Knocked Down” (unassembled) condition.  Sigma was entitled
to manufacture or purchase locally, component parts, referred to as “omissions”, which
it used with the Knocked Down component parts to assemble or manufacture a
complete motor vehicle.  It would also be furnished with technical assistance and other
benefits in consideration of which it agreed to pay to Mitsubishi,
“an amount of money as a fee determined for each and every MMC
[Mitsubishi Motor Corporation] motor product and omission assembled
and/or manufactured by or for Sigma as follows:”

The agreement then dealt with the manner of calculation of such fees.  The Trade Mark
Licence Agreement is not relevant for present purposes.
[8] On 31 October 1979 Sigma entered into three related agreements with two other
Japanese motor companies, Mazda and C.Itoh & Co, Ltd (Itoh), viz a Technical
Assistance Agreement, a Memorandum Agreement and a Distributorship Agreement
for Mazda CKD Vehicles.  In terms of the Technical Assistance Agreement Mazda,
inter alia, granted Sigma “the exclusive licence to assemble and/or manufacture in
Territory”, being the Republic and certain neighbouring States, certain Mazda motor
vehicles as “CKD vehicles”.  “CKD” stands for “Completely Knocked Down” and
“CKD vehicles” was defined as
“the motor vehicles planned and designed by [Mazda] and assembled
and/or manufactured by [Sigma] in Territory under the rights and
technical assistance herein granted …”.

The component parts supplied by Mazda for the assembly or manufacture of CKD
vehicles came in the form of a kit known as a CKD kit, which did not contain all the
component parts necessary for the assembly or manufacture of a complete vehicle.
Omissions were used with the component parts in the CKD kit in the assembly or
manufacture of a completely built up vehicle.  The exclusive right to import Mazda
component parts, spare parts and accessories and for the resale and distribution of the
CKD motor vehicles, spare parts and accessories was granted to Sigma in terms of the
Distributorship Agreement.
[9] A Technical Assistance Agreement also provided for the use, by Sigma, of
Mazda’s intellectual property such as patent, trade mark and utility model design rights
pertaining to the CKD vehicles.  Mazda also undertook to furnish Sigma with technical
assistance which included the making available of technical information and other data
necessary for the assembly or manufacture of the CKD vehicles.

[10] In terms of article 19 of the Technical Assistance Agreement Sigma, in
consideration of the licence granted to it by Mazda, would pay Mazda royalties
calculated as a factor of 1.15% of the FOB (Free on Board) Japan price of “one set of
all component parts necessary for one unit of completely built up vehicle
corresponding to CKD vehicle except tyres, tubes, batteries and paint”.  It will be noted
that although Mazda did not supply Sigma with a full set of all the component parts
necessary for one unit of completely built up vehicle, the royalty was calculated on the
price of a full kit.
[11] Pursuant to these agreements Sigma embarked upon the assembly and
manufacture of Mitsubishi and Mazda motor products, marketing and selling them.
The agreements have been replaced over the years by virtually identical agreements
between the Japanese companies and, after amalgamation and restructuring referred to
in par 5 above, the relevant Samcor companies.

[12] During 1983 the respondent requested Sigma to furnish him with the amounts of
its annual royalty payments as well as its “free on board” imports during the 1982
financial year.  On 10 November 1983 the respondent dispatched a letter to Sigma, the
first two paragraphs of which read as follows:
“VALUE FOR CUSTOMS PURPOSES OF GOODS SUPPLIED BY
MITSUBISHI MOTOR CORPORATION LTD. JAPAN.

With reference to your letter NR/JM of 3 October 1983 and the
information supplied on form DA 55 you are informed that transactions
between you and the above-named supplier are, from a customs
viewpoint, not regarded as open market transactions.  His prices to you
cannot, therefore, be accepted as a basis for the value for customs
purposes and must be uplifted by an average of 1%.  This figure has been
arrived at by using Customs Valuation Method 1 provided for in Section
66(1) of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964, and by adding the royalties
provided for in Section 67(1)(c).

In calculating the value for customs purposes uplifts must be applied to
prices after they have been adjusted to a free on board basis, i.e. after
freight and insurance have been deducted in the case of CIF invoices.
The costs, charges and expenses provided for in Section 67 of the Act

must be added after the uplift has been applied.”

A similar letter dated the previous day was written to Sigma in relation to goods
supplied by Toyo Kogyo Co Ltd (now Mazda).
[13]  It is common cause that the notifications of 9 and 10 November 1983 to Sigma
constituted a determination, in terms of s 65(4) of the Act, of the transaction value of
the goods respectively imported from Mitsubishi and Mazda.  For convenience I shall
refer to both determinations as the value determination of 9 November 1983.  Section
65(4)(a), as it read prior to its substitution by s 59(a) of Act 53 of 1999, provided that:
“If the transaction value of any imported goods cannot be ascertained in
terms of section 66 or has been incorrectly ascertained by the importer,
the Commissioner may determine a value, which shall, subject to a right
of appeal to the court, be deemed to be the value for customs duty
purposes of the goods.”

Such determination may be amended or withdrawn by the commissioner, who may
issue another determination in its stead in terms of s 65(5) of the Act.  A determination

by the commissioner may be appealed against in terms of s 65(6) of the Act, which
reads:
“(a)  An appeal against any such determination shall lie to the division of
the High Court of South Africa having jurisdiction to hear appeals in the
area wherein the determination was made, or the goods in question were
entered for home consumption.

(b)  Such appeal shall, subject to section 96(1), be prosecuted within a
period of one year from the date of the determination.”

Sigma did not appeal against the determination of 9 November 1983.
[14]  In 1983 a local content programme was in operation, which was one of various
incentive schemes introduced by the Government over the years in an endeavour to
encourage a South African motor industry, especially the use of local content in motor
vehicles, parts and accessories and the concomitant reduction in foreign exchange
expenditure.  In terms of the programme motor vehicle manufacturers were entitled to
a rebate of the excise duty payable on  locally manufactured motor vehicles and

component parts.  It is alleged in the founding affidavit that:
“In the circumstances the imposition by the Respondent of the 1% uplift
was of little or no practical significance to Sigma since it applied only to
occasional imports of specified items from Mitsubishi.  Any appeal
against the Respondent’s aforesaid directives would therefore have been
of purely academic interest.”

The 1% uplift has been imposed in respect of all subsequent Manufacturing and Patent
Licence and Technical Agreements and Technical Assistance Agreements between
Samcor on the one hand and Mitsubishi and Mazda respectively on the other.
[15] Between June 1989 and May 1991 certain legislative developments took place in
the country pertaining to the calculation of excise duty payable on imported motor
vehicle parts.  It is not necessary to detail them for present purposes.  Suffice it to say
that because of an error he had made in regard to the calculation of duty after an
amendment to legislation introduced on 30 May 1991, the respondent, on 12 June 1996
and after he had been approached by an accounting and auditing firm on behalf of a

number of local motor manufacturers , gave a ruling in terms of which manufacturers
were allowed to claim back duty which they had paid as a result of such error
retrospectively from the date of the amendment.  The respondent expressly excluded
the fees and royalties paid to Mitsubishi and Mazda by the appellant from the benefit
of the ruling.
[16] On 27 June 1996 the same auditing firm made representations to the respondent
on behalf of the appellant, requesting the respondent to make a determination in respect
of the royalty payments to Mazda.  On 10 July 1996 similar representations were made
in respect of the fees payable to Mitsubishi.  It was stated in the representations that the
appellant believed that the royalties and fees were not dutiable as they did not relate to
any imported goods.
[17] After further correspondence between him and the appellant’s representatives,
the respondent eventually replied on 9 September 1997, in the following terms:

“SAMCOR MANUFACTURING (PTY) LTD : DUTIABILITY OF
ROYALTY PAYMENTS

Your representations regarding the abovementioned matter dated 13 June
1997 and 2 September 1997 refer.

After due consideration of the submissions on behalf of Samcor, the view
is held that the provisions of section 67(1)(c) of the Customs and Excise
Act, 1964, are applicable to the royalties and fees provided for in the
relevant agreement and that the said royalties and fees must be added to
the price actually paid or payable in ascertaining the transaction value of
the relevant goods.”

A request for reasons for his view that the provisions of s 67(1)(c) were applicable to
the royalties and fees in issue in ascertaining the transaction value of the imported
goods drew no response from the respondent.  The appellant, in line with advices it
received before the respondent’s reply of 9 September 1997, then launched an
application to the Transvaal Provincial Division for rectification of the clauses in the
agreements which provided for the royalty payments and fees in issue.  However, the

appellant withdrew the application when the respondent filed opposing papers.  The
reason for the withdrawal is stated in the founding affidavit as follows:
“38. In view of the Respondent’s unanticipated action in opposing the
application and the fact that in terms of Section 65(6) [of the Act] the
appeal against the determination in question had to be prosecuted within a
year from the date of the determination viz by 8 September 1998, and as
the Respondent was well aware, it would be pointless to pursue the
application.”

Consequently the proceedings in the court a quo were instituted, which Martha
Woolard, Samcor’s public officer, described in the founding affidavit as “an appeal in
terms of sub-section 65(6) read with section 96(1) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of
1964 … against the determination by the Respondent on 9 September 1997 that fees
and royalties paid or payable to two Japanese companies [Mitsubishi and Mazda] …
were dutiable in terms of section 67(1)(c) of the said Act”.
[18] Three defences were raised by the respondent before the court a quo apart from

contesting the merits of the matter.  Two of those defences were repeated in the
respondent’s heads of argument in this Court.  They are (1) that the respondent’s letter
of 9 September 1997 did not constitute a value determination in terms of s 65 of the
Act, but was merely to the effect that the respondent stood by his value determination
of 9 November 1983 and that the contents of the letter of 9 September 1997, therefore,
are not susceptible of an appeal in terms of s 65(6) of the Act;  and (2) that the purpose
of the appeal was to enable the appellant to claim a refund of duties paid in respect of
the period ending 31 August 1995;  that such claim had in any event prescribed and
that the relief sought would be purely of academic interest, were it to be granted.  Smit
J found it unnecessary to deal with these additional defences, having decided the matter
in favour of the respondent on the merits.  In this Court counsel for the respondent did
not persist in the second defence.
[19] In giving judgment the court a quo said:

“On analysing the clauses of the agreement … it is clear in my view, that
the payment of royalties is inextricably linked to parts and components
supplied to Samcor.  It is also clear that the legislator, by inserting the
words ‘directly or indirectly’ in section 67(1)(c) of the Act, intended to
include not only royalties for which direct provision is made in an
agreement but also to include royalties which in an indirect manner fall to
be classified as being due as a condition of sale of the goods for export.”

The court a quo accordingly held that “the wording of the agreement clearly indicates
that the royalties were at least indirectly due as a condition of sale” of the goods.
[20] Counsel for the appellant attacked the learned judge’s reasoning firstly on the
basis that the words “directly or indirectly” in s 67(1)(c) of the Act do not qualify the
words “as a condition of sale”, but rather the words “due by the buyer”.  Secondly,
counsel submitted that not only must the royalties and fees be due directly or indirectly
by the buyer “as a condition of sale” to qualify to be added to the price actually paid or
payable for the goods, but they must also be paid or payable “in respect of the goods”.
These are two distinct and separate requirements, so counsel argued.  Counsel for the

respondent conceded, correctly so in my view, that this is indeed the position.  The
appellant’s counsel further argued that for the royalties and fees in question to be due
by the buyer “as a condition of sale”, it must appear from the relevant agreement or
agreements or otherwise that the seller would not sell the imported goods to the buyer
unless the buyer undertook to pay such royalties and fees.  Again counsel for
respondent accepted this as the correct test.
[21] In the view I take of the matter it is not necessary to deal with these pertinent
issues raised by counsel.   Suffice it to say that it does not seem to me, at least from a
reading of the agreements, that the fees and royalties were paid or payable “in respect
of the goods”.  However, I express no firm view on the point.
[22] In this Court counsel for the appellant, in an attempt to counter the submissions
on behalf of the respondent that the respondent’s letter of 9 September 1997 was not a
determination and thus not susceptible of an appeal in terms of s 65(6) of the Act,

commenced his argument by saying that the proceedings before the court  a quo were
not an appeal, but rather an application for a declarator that the royalties and fees do
not fall within the ambit of s 67(1)(c) of the Act and therefore do not fall to be added to
the price actually paid for the imported goods in ascertaining the value of the goods for
customs duty purposes in terms of s 66(1).
[23] Although the appellant sought an order “declaring” the fees and royalties in
issue not to have been dutiable in terms of s 67(1)(c) of the Act,  the notice of motion
commences by giving notice that appellant “intends to appeal and make application to
this Court” for that order.  It is then alleged in the founding affidavit:
“The present application is an appeal in terms of sub-section 65(6) read
with section 96(1) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 … against
the determination by the Respondent on 9 September 1997 that fees and
royalties paid and payable to two Japanese Companies [Mitsubishi and
Mazda] in terms of various agreements with those corporations were
dutiable in terms of section 67(1)(c) of the said Act.”

Section 96(1) provides that no legal proceedings shall be instituted against, amongst
others, the commissioner “for anything done in pursuance of” the Act “until one month
after delivery of a notice in writing setting forth clearly and explicitly the cause of
action” and other information.  It is stated in the founding affidavit that due notice “of
the appellant’s intention of prosecuting this appeal was given to the respondent on 7
August 1998 in terms of sub-section 96(1) of the Act”.
[24] In spite of these and other clear indicia that what was contemplated in the
proceedings in the court a quo was an appeal in terms of s 65(6) of the Act, counsel for
the appellant submitted that a statement in the founding affidavit that this “is an
appeal” could not turn what is not an appeal into an appeal.  In response to the
respondent’s submission that the peremptory notice required by s 96(1) was lacking in
respect of an application for a declarator, counsel for the appellant argued that the
declarator was sought on the basis of a dispute between the commissioner and the

importer.  The proceedings were thus not for anything done in pursuance of the Act
and consequently no notice was required.  Further, the question had to be asked
whether the commissioner would have conducted the matter differently had such notice
been given.
[25] In my view, and as counsel for the respondent pointed out, the entire
proceedings were premised on the alleged value determination of 9 September 1997,
and it is clear that that is the basis upon which the matter was conducted before the
court a quo.  This is evident from the judgement of Smit J, which commences with the
words:
“This is an appeal in terms of the provisions of section 65(6) of the
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 … by the appellant … .”

His order reads:

“The appeal is dismissed with costs.”

[26] This issue (that the proceedings before the court  a quo were no appeal but in
fact an application for a declarator) was not raised before the court a quo, nor in the
papers.  It was raised for the first time during argument  in this Court.  The fact that the
order sought in the notice of motion includes a declaratory order does not change the
position.  What was before the court  a quo was in substance an appeal in terms of s
65(6) of the Act.
[27] As to the question whether the respondent would have conducted the matter
differently had a notice in terms of s 96(1) of the Act been given, an analogy may be
drawn, in my view, from a judgment of this Court in Road Accident Fund v Mothupi
2000 (4) SA 38 (SCA) at 53 B-C, a case dealing, inter alia, with an amendment which
was sought to be introduced at appeal stage.  Nienaber JA said that one of the reasons
why the amendment should not be granted was that “one cannot be confident that, if
pleaded initially, it (the amendment) would not have had some bearing on the course of

the trial – in the sense of relevant matter not being explored in cross-examination nor
led in evidence”.  In the present matter the commissioner’s approach, in my view, may
well have been otherwise if the point had been raised earlier.
[28] Were the appellant’s change of stance to be allowed, i.e. were the proceedings
now to be treated as an application for a declaratory order, it would involve unfairness
to the respondent (cf Road Accident Fund v Mothupi, supra, at 54 C-D;  Paddock
Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 (A) at 230  D-H;  Bank of Lisbon and
South Africa Ltd v The Master and Others 1987 (1) SA 276 (A) at 290 E-H).  The
result would be to deprive the respondent of having the defence which he raised
considered, viz that the appellant could not appeal against the letter of 9 September
1997.  That was a legitimate defence taken in proceedings no one doubted was an
appeal in terms of s 65(6) of the Act.  I have expressed misgivings above as to the
correctness of the decision of Smit J on the merits.  Consequently the respondent is

entitled, as he would have been in the court a quo had the merits gone against him, to a
consideration of that defence.  I proceed to consider it.
[29] In the letter of 27 June 1996, in which the respondent was requested to make a
determination in respect of the royalties paid and payable to Mazda, reference was
made to the value determination of 9 November 1983.  The respondent was requested
“to amend the valuation determination”, which he was empowered to do in terms of
s 65(5) of the Act, “with retrospective effect to the date of the original ruling”.  In the
letter of 10 July 1996 relating to the fees paid and payable to Mitsubishi, he was
requested to “review the determination” (of a 1% uplift) and to “reverse the ruling with
retrospective effect to 12 April 1985”.  The significance of this date is not clear from
the papers.  In a letter to Samcor dated 22 March 1994 the respondent advised that the
value determination of 9 November 1983 was still applicable.  Clearly the requests in
the letters of 27 June 1996 and 10 July 1996 “to amend” and “review” the value

determination could only have referred to the value determination of 9 November
1983.  There had been no other determination.
[30] In my view, the respondent’s reply of 9 September 1997 did not constitute a new
determination.  Nor did the respondent amend or withdraw the determinations which
he had been asked to amend or review.  There is no indication in the letter of the
formality which one would expect to attach to an official determination (which is
apparent from the determination made in November 1983) such as the attaching of a
number to it for use on bills of entry and the specification of a date from which it is to
take effect.  The letter is clearly intended to convey his refusal to amend or review the
determination which he had already made on 9 November 1983.  It follows that the
contents of his reply of 9 September 1997 were not susceptible of an appeal.
[31] Counsel for the appellant contended, however, that since the appellant sought
declaratory orders before the court  a quo, the issue as to whether or not the letter of 9

September 1997 constituted a value determination in terms of s 65 of the Act was
academic, because the granting of the declaratory orders  was not dependent upon it.
As has been mentioned in paragraph 3 above, in addition to the declaratory orders
sought by the appellant an order setting aside “the respondent’s determination of 9
September 1997 …” was also sought.  In view of the fact that the letter of 9 September
1997 did not constitute a value determination, such an order could not be granted.  This
means that the value determination of 9 November 1993 still applies.  Section 65(4)(c)
of the Act provides that any determination made by the Commissioner “shall be
deemed to be correct” and any amount due in terms of any such determination “shall
remain payable as long as such determination remains in force”.  The declaratory
orders sought by the appellant would be contrary to the express provisions of the Act.
They could not be granted.
[32] It was further argued on behalf of the appellant that the determination of 9

November 1983 pertained not to the appellant, but to Sigma;  that the letter of 22
March 1994 was a confirmation of the earlier determination and thus not a
determination binding it and that it is accordingly entitled to its own value
determination.  Not only were the determinations of  November 1983 addressed to
Sigma, but they were also in respect of different agreements, so counsel continued.
The appellant’s history is set out in paragraph 5 above.  Counsel conceded that what
were Sigma’s undertakings in terms of the original agreements are now the appellant’s.
As has been already mentioned, the agreements which were originally between Sigma
and the two Japanese companies have been replaced over the years by virtually
identical agreements.  Sigma’s successors, including the appellant (even if the
appellant is not strictly a successor in title), have throughout recognized the value
determinations of  November 1983.  At no stage did the appellant, or its predecessors
after Sigma, consider that because new agreements were concluded new

determinations should be made, until it saw an opportunity of reclaiming duty that it
had paid.  Even then it did not demand a new determination, but merely requested that
the determination of 9 November 1983 be amended or reviewed.  It clearly considered
itself bound by such determination.  In adopting that view it was in any event correct in
law.  Upon a proper construction of s 65 of the Act a value determination  by the
Commissioner is not a directive or ruling which pertains to the person of the importer
but to the importation carried on.  This is illustrated by the respondent’s requirement in
the letter conveying the value determination of 9 November 1983 that a particular
determination number be inserted on bills of entry “in respect of importations from this
supplier”.  It must follow that if the identity of the importer changes subsequent to such
a determination this alone cannot render the determination ineffective if precisely the
same importation of the same type of goods from the same foreign exporter continues
to be carried out precisely as before but by someone else who has to all intents and

purposes taken over the importation business.
[33] It follows that the appellant was bound by the determination of 9 November
1983.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.

……………….

L MPATI

JUDGE OF APPEAL

Concur:

HOWIE JA)
HEHER JA)