THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 318/2013

Reportable

In the matter between

THUTHUKANI NDLANZI

APPELLANT

and

THE STATE

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Ndlanzi v The State (318/13) [2014] ZASCA 31
(28 March 2014)

Coram:
Mhlantla, Bosielo and Petse JJA and Swain and Mathopo
AJJA

Heard:
27 February 2014

Delivered: 28 March 2014

Summary: Criminal appeal – against conviction – whether the appellant
had a fair trial – appellant‟s counsel adopting a trial strategy
contrary to the appellant‟s warning statement – whether the
evidence supported a conviction of murder by dolus
eventualis or culpable homicide – appeal against sentence –
whether a sentence of imprisonment for 15 years appropriate
in the circumstances.

___________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________

On appeal from: The South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (Willis J
and Bashall AJ sitting as a court of appeal):

1. The appeal against the conviction in count 1 (murder) is upheld.
2. The conviction of murder is set aside and replaced with a conviction of
culpable homicide.
3. The sentence imposed by the court below in respect of the count of
murder is set aside and replaced with the following:

„The accused is sentenced to imprisonment for five years, two years of
which is suspended for five years on condition that the appellant is not
convicted of culpable homicide arising from the driving of a motor
vehicle during the period of suspension‟.

4. The convictions and sentences in respect of counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 are
confirmed. The sentences are and ordered to run concurrently with the
sentence in respect of count 1.
5. The order cancelling the appellant‟s drivers‟ licence issued under
licence number 200900013 CJN is confirmed.

___________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________

Bosielo JA (Mhlantla and Petse JJA and Swain and Mathopo AJJA
concurring):

[1] The appellant was charged in the regional court, Johannesburg on
multiple charges including one count of murder, read with the provisions
of s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997; reckless or
negligent driving of a motor vehicle; failure to stop his vehicle after an
accident; failure to ascertain the nature of the injury sustained by any
person(s) and failure to render such assistance to the injured person(s); as
he was capable of rendering.

[2] The appellant was convicted on all the counts and sentenced as
follows:
(a) Ad Count 1 (murder) – fifteen years‟ imprisonment;
(b) Ad Count 2 (negligent driving) – twelve months‟ imprisonment,
(c) Ad Count 3 (failure to stop the vehicle after a collision)
(d) Ad Count 4 (failure to ascertain the nature and extent of the injuries
sustained by a person after the collision);
(e) Ad Count 5 (failure to render assistance to an injured person after the
collision).
Counts 3, 4 and 5 were taken as one for purposes of sentence and the
appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years. The sentences
imposed on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 were ordered to run concurrently with the
fifteen years‟ imprisonment imposed for count 1. The effective sentence
is therefore 15 years‟ imprisonment. Furthermore, an order was made

cancelling the appellant‟s driver‟s licence under licence number
200900013CJN.

[3] Aggrieved by the convictions and the sentences imposed on him by
the regional magistrate, the appellant appealed to the South Gauteng High
Court (Willis J and Bashal AJ). His appeal was dismissed and the
convictions and sentences were confirmed. The court below having
refused him leave to appeal, this appeal is with the special leave granted
by this court.

[4] The background facts to this case are to a large extent common
cause. The State called four witnesses. Three of these witnesses are the
eye-witnesses whilst the fourth is a sergeant in the Johannesburg
Metropolitan Police who took down the appellant‟s warning statement.

[5] The picture which emerges from the combined evidence of all
these witnesses is as follows: On the afternoon of 18 April 2005, Ms Lulu
Macala, complainant in count 2 (Lulu) accompanied by Ms Princess
Ndlela, her friend (Princess) stood at the corner of Bree and Sauer streets,
Johannesburg intending to cross Sauer Street en route to a nearby taxi
rank. As the robot was green, she proceeded to cross. Princess was
following her. Whilst in the middle of the street, a taxi came from around
the corner and hit her. She fell to the ground. Princess helped her to stand
up.

[6] After Princess had helped Lulu to her feet, they walked to a nearby
police station to report the incident but found it closed. Princess told Lulu

that she had written down the registration number of the taxi that hit her,
but she could not identify its driver.

[7] After some time, Lulu was alerted to an article which had appeared
in the Daily Sun newspaper which carried a report about the accident and
which apparently had the details of a police officer called Owen who
could be contacted. Armed with this information, she, accompanied by
Princess, went to Johannesburg Central Police Station where the matter
was reported.

[8] Princess testified. To a large extent, she corroborated Lulu in all
material aspects of her evidence. Crucially, she testified that after the
accident, she went after this vehicle and recorded its registration number
in her mobile phone. Princess testified further that she gave Owen the
registration number of the vehicle that was involved in the collision,
which is RVL 929 GP.

[9] The State then called sergeant Joseph David du Plessis, who is the
officer from the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police who attended the
scene of the accident on the same day. He handed into court the accident
investigation report which contains some photographs of the scene and
the taxi involved in the accident as well as a sketch-plan with some
measurements as an exhibit. When the State sought to introduce the
appellant‟s warning statement made to sergeant du Plessis, the appellant‟s
counsel raised an objection on admissibility. As a result, a trial-within-a
trial was held to determine if the statement was made by the appellant
freely and voluntarily and without any undue influence. Suffice to state
that the warning statement was admitted after the regional magistrate had

found that it was made by the appellant freely and voluntarily and without
any undue influence. Aggrieved by this adverse finding, counsel for the
appellant, Mr Bishop, indicated that he had instructions to take the
decision to admit the warning statement into evidence on review. In order
to afford Mr Bishop the opportunity to prepare his review application, the
cross-examination of du Plessis was reserved whilst the trial continued.

[10] The next witness was Mr Harry Schoolboy Dlamini (Dlamini), a
security officer employed at the main entrance of the Bree Street taxi
rank. Whilst on duty on this ill-fated day controlling taxis at the entrance
to the Bree Street taxi rank, he heard a loud noise. When he looked up he
saw a white taxi colliding with a newspaper stall, then a dustbin and then
a female pedestrian who was walking on the pavement next to the
entrance to the taxi rank. This vehicle continued to move on until it hit a
stop sign. It then reversed and drove over the female pedestrian who had
fallen to the ground. As the vehicle did not stop, he wrote its registration
number in his pocket book. These are RVL 929 GP. He then called his
senior to whom he reported the incident. According to Dlamini he was
virtually in front of this taxi. However, Dlamini conceded in cross-
examination that he cannot say with certainty that the appellant was the
driver of the taxi on the ill-fated day. He further conceded that it could
have been another person as he never had a good look at him. This is
notwithstanding the fact that in his statement to the police he had said that
he would be able to identify the driver if he were to see him again.
Crucially, Dlamini had pointed a wrong person out at an identification
parade arranged by the police.

[11] I pause to observe that a very important incident occurred when the
trial resumed. In the interim the appellant had terminated the mandate of
his lawyers, namely Mr Nkwashu and Mr Bishop, and had appointed a
new lawyer, Mr Krause, to represent him. Without enquiring from the
appellant‟s attorney about the reasons why his mandate was terminated,
the regional magistrate excused him from the trial and allowed Mr Krause
to take over. It emerged from Mr Krause‟s address to the court that the
main reason why the appellant terminated the mandate of his previous
team of legal representatives was essentially that he was dissatisfied with
the manner in which Mr Bishop conducted his defence. Essentially he
averred that Mr Bishop had not conducted his trial in accordance with his
instructions. In fact, the allegation is that instead of admitting that he was
the driver of the taxi involved in the collision in issue in this case as he
had disclosed in his warning statement, Mr Bishop cross-examined the
State witnesses in a manner which suggested that the appellant had
denied that he was the driver.

[12] With the appellant‟s consent, Mr Krause introduced into the record
as exhibits, written admissions in terms of s 220 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the Act). In this statement, the appellant
admitted all the essential allegations against him, his only defence being
that he did not stop after the two accidents because of fear for his life as
the people around the scene threatened to attack him.

[13] Without expressly requesting the regional magistrate to recuse
himself, Mr Krause sought to persuade the regional magistrate to mero
motu recuse himself as he feared that his continued presiding over the
trial, given appellant‟s new version which was contradictory to what Mr

Bishop had conveyed to the court, would make it difficult for him to
remain impartial as it was likely that his judgment could have been
clouded by the conflicting versions adduced by the appellant. He
contended that this was likely to infringe the appellant‟s right to a fair
trial.

[14] The regional magistrate refused to recuse himself. Instead he
acceded to the appellant‟s request to have the State witnesses who had
already testified recalled so that Mr Krause could have the opportunity to
cross-examine them further, presumably on the appellant‟s new version
and to put the appellant‟s version to them. Suffice to state that,
notwithstanding some valiant efforts by the investigating officer, these
witnesses were never procured.

[15] Mr Krause applied for the discharge of the appellant in terms of s
174 of the Act. When this failed, he called the appellant to testify.

[16] The appellant confirmed what he had disclosed in his s 220
admissions. Regarding why he never stopped after the two collisions, he
explained that this was due to the fear for his life induced by a mob which
threatened to attack him at the scene. His evidence was further that the
same fear persisted at the second set of robots because whilst stopping
there for the robots to turn green for him, he heard the noise of that
murderous mob coming from behind. He then drove his vehicle over the
pavement in an attempt to flee from this mob. He maintained that at no
stage did he see the deceased. He only saw the concrete block and the
newspaper stall on the pavement but thought that he could manoeuvre

himself around them. Unfortunately, in his confused state he collided into
them.

[17] He then reversed to extricate himself and drove away to the
Johannesburg Central Police Station where he had intended to report the
incident. As he alighted there he saw a vehicle which looked similar to
the one he had seen earlier at the scene. Suspecting that it might be part of
the mob that threatened to kill him at the scene, he abandoned his vehicle
and fled on foot. He later contacted his employer telephonically and
reported what had happened. Arrangements were then made for him to
hand himself over to the police the next day which he did. With the help
of Mr Nkwashu, his attorney, he made a warning statement which was
admitted as exhibit H. I interpose to state that this evidence is the same as
his warning statement.

[18] The appellant was cross-examined at length on what appeared to be
a volte face. He explained that he never instructed his counsel to deny that
he was the driver of the taxi which caused the accident as he had admitted
this in his warning statement. Although he agreed that he understood the
evidence in court, he explained that he was taken aback when Mr Bishop
told him to plead not guilty. This is the main reason why he later
terminated his mandate. On being asked why he had waited until after all
the State witnesses had testified, he explained that it was because he had
trust in his counsel. He thought that it was perhaps because his counsel
knew the law, suggesting that he must have known what he was doing.

[19] Before us, counsel for the appellant launched a two-pronged attack
against his conviction. The main attack was based on the allegation that

the appellant did not receive a fair trial as envisaged by s 35(3)(g) of the
Constitution because of the manner in which his defence was conducted.
The second attack was against the finding of murder based on dolus
eventualis.

[20] The main thrust of the appellant‟s argument is that his counsel
adopted a trial strategy inconsistent with his instructions. It was
contended that based on his warning statement which he made on 19
April 2005, ie one day after the collision, the appellant would never and
had never instructed his lawyers to deny that he was the driver of the
offending vehicle. Crucially, the appellant contended that this trial
strategy was never discussed with him, the suggestion being that he
would not have approved it as it conflicted with his warning statement.

[21] It is clear from the cross-examination of all the State witnesses that
primarily because of the trial strategy adopted, counsel was not able to
cross-examine the witnesses effectively on what actually occurred.
Furthermore, counsel failed to put the appellant‟s defence of necessity or
emergency to the State witnesses. As a result of this failure the court
never had an opportunity to hear and see how the State witnesses reacted
to the appellant‟s version of the events and to assess its cogency. At face
value and absent any explanation, this might lead to the conclusion that
the appellant‟s right to a fair trial was subverted. (S v P 1974 (1) SA 581
(RA) at 582E; S v Mafu & others 2008 (2) SACR 653 (W) para 24.)

[22] The right to a fair trial for every accused is constitutionally
protected by s 35(3) of the Constitution. Integral to this right, amongst

others, is the right to legal representation. The importance of the right to
legal representation is underscored by s 35(3)(g) which demands that, in
the event that substantial injustice might redound to an accused who
cannot afford private legal representative, the State is obliged to assign a
legal representation to such an accused at State expense. This is the
raison d’ être for the existence of the Legal Aid Board, the primary
mandate of which is to ensure that people who are indigent and can
therefore not afford legal representation are not compelled to defend
themselves in our courts. This is particularly important in our criminal
justice system which is adversorial. A failure to accord an accused legal
representation without any good reason might, in appropriate
circumstances render his or her trial unfair. S v Halgryn 2002 (2) SACR
211 (SCA) para 14.

[23] However, the appellant‟s position is different as he had private
legal representation by counsel and an instructing attorney. His complaint
is not that he did not have legal representation but that his lawyers
deviated from his instructions without his consent. This resulted in his
true version being withheld from the court.

[24] Undoubtedly, the appellant‟s allegations, albeit unsupported by
evidence, are very serious and warrant serious consideration because, if
proved to be true, they might justify the conclusion that the appellant did
not receive a fair trial, bearing in mind the manner in which the state
witnesses were cross-examined, in particular, the failure by his counsel to
put the appellant‟s version to the State witnesses. (S v Majola 1982 (1)
SA 125 (AD) at 133D-G.)

[25] I interpose to state that no evidence was put before the regional
magistrate in support of these allegations, other than the say-so of the
appellant through his counsel. Of even greater significance is the fact that
neither Mr Bishop nor Mr Nkwashu were given an opportunity to respond
to these allegations. The appellant offered no explanation for this default.
Predictably the appellant was cross-examined pertinently on why, if he
did not agree to this trial strategy, he permitted his counsel to pursue it up
to the close of the State‟s case without demur. The appellant was not able
to proffer any explanation. However, I regard the following exchange
which took place between the prosecutor and the appellant to be
revealing:
„Now when you decided to allow Mr Bishop and the instructing attorney to conduct
the defence on your behalf was it your expectation that there was a possibility that you
would be found not guilty, acquitted? – The motive for me or behind everything is
that I explained the counsel or Mr Bishop that I was the driver of the taxi so I was
now taken aback when I was told that I must tender a plea of not guilty. That is why I
had to terminate their mandate and go to (intervenes).
To seek other legal assistance? –Yes. Now there were many witnesses called. Mr
Bishop at length cross-examined them and specifically about the point whether you
were the driver or not. The proceedings went further that at the stage when you
handed yourself over admitting the fact that you were the driver we had to go into
more deeper proceedings, trial-within-a trial where this aspect was fought for days.
Do you recall that? – Ja I still recall.
Why do you wait so long to then seek alternative counsel or advice, legal advice?
Why go through all of that? Why not in court stand up and, or stop Mr Bishop and say
whoa, this is not what I wanted?
I did explain to Mr Bishop, counsel that I admit that I had knocked a person down but
now he, I had trust in him but now I do not know, maybe he knows the law. Maybe he
might have seen a loophole, I do not know.
When it was ruled that the fact that you admitted you were the driver, it was ruled
now admissible, it could be considered as evidence did you realise you were now in
trouble, that you could be convicted of not necessarily what was murder or whatever

but that you could be convicted of something now, that you faced this possibility? –
Yes I had foreseen that. Another thing that I was very bitter of myself that I had
knocked somebody down. I would not beat about the bush, I would not lie again.‟
To my mind this has exposed the fallacy in the appellant‟s belated
complaint.

[26] A fact which exacerbates the position further is that du Plessis, the
police officer who took down the statement, was cross-examined at length
in the presence of the appellant. After he had testified and the warning
statement was admitted, the matter was postponed for some time. In a
rather lengthy exchange with the regional magistrate, Mr Bishop
indicated that he had instructions to take the ruling on review. In the
interim, the State led the evidence of Dlamini. It was only when the case
resumed that all of a sudden the appellant expressed some unhappiness
with his counsel‟s trial strategy. It is clear that the appellant had more
than enough time during the trial to raise any objection to the manner in
which his trial was conducted if he had any. Quite inexplicably he failed
to do that.

[27] It is easy to understand the trial strategy. Having studied the
docket, the appellant‟s counsel must have become aware that none of the
State‟s eye-witnesses could identify the appellant as the driver. The
reasoning must have been that, if his warning statement was not admitted
as evidence, the State would not have been able to identify him as the
driver. The trial strategy therefore was to not admit that he was the driver
and see if the State could prove it. The probabilities are overwhelming
that the appellant was made aware of these defects in the State‟s case
which, incidentally became apparent when the witnesses testified. It was

then agreed with his lawyers that rather than for him to admit that he was
the driver and take a risk with his defence, disclosed only when he
testified which might not succeed, he would rather exercise his
constitutional right to remain silent. It is not surprising that when the
warning statement was admitted, against his expectation, that the
appellant then realized that he had met his Waterloo and the only escape
route was to put the blame on his counsel. Hence this belated volte face.

[28] An important fact which weighs heavily against accepting
appellant‟s belated volte face is that, given the strict ethics governing the
lawyers‟ profession, a presumption of regularity operates in favour of
accepting that the lawyers acted in terms of their mandate from the
appellant. There has to be some cogent evidence to displace this
presumption. A court cannot afford to accept any criticism by a litigant
against his or her lawyer. Such an approach has the potential to open
floodgates of spurious complaints by disgruntled litigants. (Strikland v
Washington 466 U.S. 688 (1984).) It is trite that ordinarily counsel acts
on a brief from an attorney who in turn acts on instructions from the
client. Absent any instructions from the appellant, both Mr Bishop and
Mr Nkwashu would be guilty of very serious professional misconduct
which could have led to disciplinary proceedings by their professional
bodies concomitant with serious consequences for them. One cannot, on
the mere say-so of the appellant and without more conclude that both Mr
Bishop and Mr Nkwashu could have taken such a serious risk. Based on
the above-stated facts, I am constrained to conclude that the appellant had
consented to the trial strategy, alternatively that he acquiesced in it. (S v
Louw 1990 (3) SA 116 (A) at 125E-J.) It follows that there is no merit in
this ground of appeal.

[29] However, this is not the end of the matter. A more vexing legal
question is whether or not the proven evidence establishes dolus
eventualis. The appellant testified that when he drove onto the pavement
he never saw the deceased. He only saw a newspaper stall and a concrete
pole. He was not even aware that he had collided with the deceased. This
was never disputed.

[30] The legal question to be answered is whether, given these
circumstances, it can be found that the appellant subjectively foresaw the
possibility of colliding with the deceased and causing her death, and
further, whether notwithstanding that realization, he proceeded to drive in
the manner he did.

[31] The correct legal approach to this vexed legal question was
enunciated as follows in S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 570B-E:
„That, however, does not conclude the enquiry because the following propositions are
well settled in this country.
(1)
The expression “intention to kill” does not, in law, necessarily require that the
accused should have applied his will to compassing the death of the deceased. It is
sufficient if the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of his act causing death
and was reckless of such result. This form of intention is known as dolus eventualis as
distinct from dolus directus.
(2)
The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably have foreseen such
possibility is not sufficient. The distinction must be observed between what actually
went on in the mind of the accused and what would have gone on in the mind of a
bonus paterfamilias in the position of the accused. In other words, the distinction
between subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not become blurred.
The factum probandum is dolus, not culpa. These two different concepts never
coincide.

(3)
Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference.
To constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt the inference must be the only one which
can reasonably by drawn.‟
Recently this approach was refined by this court in S v Humphreys 2013
(2) SACR 1 (SCA) by Brand JA at 8a-b as follows:
„In accordance with trite principles, the test for dolus eventualis is twofold:
(a) Did the appellant subjectively foresee the possibility of the death of his passengers
ensuing from his conduct; and
(b) did he reconcile himself with that possibility (see eg S v De Oliveira 1993 (2)
SACR 59 (A) at 65i-j)?
Sometimes the element in (b) is described as “recklessness” as to whether or not the
subjectively foreseen possibility ensues (see eg S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at
570B-E‟.

[32] It is clear that the requisite subjective foresight may be proved by
inferential reasoning based on the premise that „… in accordance with
common human experience, the possibility of the consequences that
ensued would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence‟,
see Humphreys at 8e.

[33] Thereafter, „the next logical step would then be to ask whether, in
the light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, there is any reason
to think that the appellant would not have shared this foresight, derived
from common human experience, with other members of the general
population.‟ See Humphreys at 8f.

[34] The appellant conceded that it was peak hour traffic and there were
many pedestrians. They were rushing to catch taxis and were on the
pavement and in the road. The appellant maintained, however, that the

pedestrians on the pavement were at a distance moving away from him.
When he drove onto the pavement he saw the newspaper stand and the
other objects in his vehicles path but be believed he would „overcome‟
them but collided with them. He maintained that he never saw the
deceased because he „was looking back and sideways‟.

[35] Any person with a modicum of intelligence would have
appreciated that driving a motor vehicle onto the pavement in the
prevailing circumstances of this case, raised the possibility that a collision
with a pedestrian would occur with fatal consequences. Any right-minded
person would have foreseen the possibility of the death of a pedestrian.

[36] On the evidence there is no basis for concluding that the appellant
did not possess the requisite subjective intent in accordance with this
standard.

[37] The second element of dolus eventualis requires proof that the
appellant reconciled himself with the foreseen possibility of the death of a
pedestrian. As pointed out by Brand JA in Humphreys at 9i-j:
„The true enquiry under this rubric is whether the appellant took the consequences that
he foresaw into the bargain; whether it can be inferred that it was immaterial to him
whether these consequences would flow from his action. Conversely stated, the
principle is that if it can reasonably be inferred that the appellant may have thought
that the possible collision he subjectively foresaw would not actually occur, the
second element of dolus eventualis would not have been established.‟

[38] In this regard, the appellant stated that when he drove onto the
pavement his vehicle was in first gear travelling at between 10 to 15

kilometres per hour. Dlamini confirmed that the vehicle was not
travelling at a high speed. The appellant maintained that the pedestrians
he saw were on the other side of the objects his vehicle collided with near
the taxi rank. The appellant stated that he therefor turned back onto the
road to avoid colliding with them. He said he could not swerve to the left
to avoid colliding with these objects, because he would then have collided
with the pedestrians.

[39] On this evidence, the appellant believed he would be able to avoid
colliding with the pedestrians on the pavement by turning to the right
back onto the road. Consequently it cannot be inferred that it was
immaterial to the appellant whether he collided with a pedestrian on the
pavement. It can also reasonably be inferred that he may have thought
that a collision with a pedestrian, which he subjectively foresaw, would
not actually occur. In other words, the appellant „took a risk which he
thought would not materialise‟, see Humphreys at 10D. The second
element of dolus eventualis was accordingly not established on the
evidence.

[40] However, it is clear from the conduct of the appellant that he did
not act like a reasonable driver. Notwithstanding the fact that he was
frightened, his driving of his vehicle into the pavement which is reserved
for pedestrians at peak hour, near a taxi rank and at a time when the place
was teeming with pedestrians, was clearly negligent. As this negligence
led to the death of the deceased in count 1, it follows that the appellant is
guilty of culpable homicide.

[41] Having altered the conviction in count 1 from murder to culpable
homicide, it follows that a sentence of imprisonment for 15 years cannot
stand as it is undoubtedly shocking. This court is at large to reconsider it
afresh. Counsel for the appellant submitted that, given the reports by the
various experts on sentence, a sentence in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Act
would be appropriate. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent
contended that the overall behaviour of the appellant was seriously
reprehensible, more so that a person lost her most precious possession,
life. She suggested a custodial sentence of between seven and ten years.

[42] In determining an appropriate sentence, it is important for the court
to maintain the delicate balance between the triad, difficult as the task
might be. Friedman J expounds the approach as follows in S v Banda &
others 1991 (2) SA 352 (BGD) at 355A-B:
„The elements of the triad contain an equilibrium and a tension. A court should, when
determining sentence, strive to accomplish and arrive at a judicious counterbalance
between these elements in order to ensure that one element is not unduly accentuated
at the expense of and to the exclusion of the others. This is not merely a formula, nor
a judicial incantation, the mere stating whereof satisfies the requirements. What is
necessary is that the court shall consider, and try to balance evenly, the nature and
circumstances of the offence, the characteristics of the offender and his circumstances
and the impact of the crime on the community, its welfare and concern. This
conception as expounded by the courts is sound and is incompatible with anything
less.‟

[43] I find the following facts to be aggravating: The appellant is not an
ordinary driver. He is a taxi driver and therefore a professional driver. In
order to qualify as a taxi driver, he is required to have a public drivers‟
permit which implies that he is well trained and qualified to drive public
vehicles. He is involved in the conveyance of people on a daily basis on

our public roads. This calls for more care and caution from him. He failed
to apply the care and skills required of a reasonable driver. Undoubtedly,
the fact that a person died from the appellant‟s negligent conduct
aggravates the appellant‟s conduct. Such conduct warrants serious
condemnation and a severe sentence. See S v Nxumalo 1982 (3) SA 856
(A) at 861H.

[44] I am of the view that, given the senseless carnage which occurs on
our roads daily, the appellant deserves a sentence which will address the
legitimate concerns and the natural indignation of members of the public.
The failure by the court to impose appropriate sentences for such offences
might lead to loss of confidence in the criminal justice system by the
public, who might take the law into their hands. Ironically, this is best
illustrated by the instantaneous behaviour of members of the public, who
according to the appellant were baying for his blood after the collision.

[45] However, a sentencing court should never allow the public interest
to eclipse the other considerations relevant to sentencing, in particular the
appellant‟s personal circumstances. The circumstances surrounding these
offences, show that the appellant acted under some kind of emergency. It
will be unrealistic if not cynical to say that it was self-created. This
would, to my mind, be akin to resuscitating the versari in re illicita
doctrine which was buried many years ago. The reality is, however, that
the appellant‟s negligent conduct led to the death of the deceased.

[46] The appellant was 35 years old; married with three children; and he
is now a taxi-owner with seven taxis. In addition to his family which he
maintains, he has seven drivers who drive his taxis, who are his

responsibility. He is personally responsible for the management of his
fleet of taxis. He has one relevant previous conviction which happened in
the year 2000. The appellant handed himself over voluntarily to the police
a day after the incident. He expressed his remorse at the turn of events.

[47] That the appellant has been convicted of a very serious offence
admits of no doubt. Although the sentence to be imposed must reflect the
seriousness of the appellant‟s conduct, it must not be such that it has the
effect of destroying him on the alter of general deterrence or retribution.
This court must guard against pandering to the whims of the public at the
expense of the appellant. It is clear from the expert‟s report that over time
the appellant has improved himself from an ordinary driver to a taxi
owner with a fleet of seven taxis which creates employment for at least
seven people. This is proof that the appellant is a productive and useful
member of society. It cannot be said that he is not amenable to
rehabilitation. I am of the view that the sentence which should be
imposed should be such that it does not destroy him, but gives him hope
and opportunity to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time so that he can
return to society a rehabilitated and better person, to play a useful role.

[48] As I indicated earlier, the appellant was convicted on five counts.
However, all these counts emanate from one event. Although the
appellant deserves to be sentenced for each count, I am of the view that
the cumulative effect of the separate sentences would result in a sentence
which might be shockingly disproportionate to his blameworthiness. It is
for this reason that I will confirm the order by the regional magistrate that
the sentences in respect of counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 should run concurrently
with the sentence in respect of count 1.

[49] In the result I make the following order:
1. The appeal against the conviction in count 1 (murder) is upheld.
2. The conviction of murder is set aside and replaced with a conviction of
culpable homicide.
3. The sentence imposed by the court below in respect of the count of
murder is set aside and replaced with the following:

„The accused is sentenced to imprisonment for five years, two years of
which is suspended for five years on condition that the appellant is not
convicted of culpable homicide arising from the driving of a motor
vehicle during the period of suspension.‟

4. The sentence in respect of counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 as imposed by the
regional magistrate are confirmed. The sentences are ordered to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in respect of count 1.
5. The order cancelling the appellant‟s drivers‟ licence issued under
licence number 200900013 CJN is confirmed.

_________________

L.O. BOSIELO

JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:
For Appellant
:
PJ du Plessis

Instructed by:
David H Botha, Du Plessis & Kruger Inc.
Johannesburg

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

For Respondent
:
GE Market

Instructed by:

Director Public Prosecutions; Johannesburg

Director Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein