reportable
case no: 60/99
In the matter between:
CAPE EXPLOSIVE WORKS LIMITED
s
t
Appellant
AECI LIMITED
2nd Appellant
and
DENEL (PTY) LTD
1st Respondent
ARMAMENTS CORPORATION
2nd Respondent
OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, CAPE TOWN
3rd Respondent
Coram:
Vivier, Olivier, Zulman, Streicher, JJA and Mthiyane, AJA
Heard:
22 February 2001
Delivered: 19 March 2001
Summary:   Real rights erroneously omitted from subsequent title deeds - Binding on present owner
J U D G M E N T

STREICHER JA:
[1] This is an appeal against a judgment in the Transvaal Provincial Division
reported as Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd 1999 (2) SA 419 (T). The
main issue to be decided in this appeal is whether certain conditions registered in
a title deed and erroneously omitted from subsequent title deeds are binding on the
present owner of the relevant property.
[2] During 1973 the first appellant, Cape Explosive Works Ltd (“Capex”) sold
two immovable properties to the second respondent, the Armaments Development
and Production Corporation of South Africa Limited whose name was
subsequently changed to the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited
(“Armscor”). The properties were Farm No 1065, measuring 459.6830 ha, and
Portion 3 of the Farm Helderberg Sleeper Plantation No 787, measuring 11.3903 ha.
Both properties were situated in the Administrative District of Stellenbosch. In
terms of clause 6 of the deed of sale Armscor undertook that the properties would

only be used for the development and manufacture of armaments and in terms of
clause 7(a) thereof Armscor granted to Capex the “first right to repurchase” the
properties, at a price to be determined in a prescribed manner, in the event of the
properties no longer being required for the use set out in clause 6. Armscor agreed
in terms of clause 7(a)(vii) to the registration of the right conferred on Capex in
terms of clause 7(a) against its title deeds to the properties in the Deeds Office.
Clause 7(b) provided that in the event of Capex repurchasing the properties Capex
would have the right to purchase all or any of the improvements and other facilities
erected on the properties which Armscor was desirous of selling, at a price and on
such further terms as might be agreed upon between Capex and Armscor. Clause
6 (with the exception of certain definitions) and clause 7 are quoted in full in the
judgment of the court a quo at 426D-G and 426H-427I respectively.
[3] The two properties were transferred to Armscor and “(i)ts Successors in
Title or Assigns (hereinafter styled the Transferee)” by Deed of Transfer
T40652/1974. The deed of transfer provided in respect of each of the properties:

“FURTHER SUBJECT in respect of the whole of the property hereby
transferred to the following conditions which shall be binding on the
Transferee herein and its Successors in Title and which are imposed by the
Transferor herein its favour, namely:
1.
The property hereby sold shall be used by the Transferee only:
(i)
for the development and manufacture of armaments by virtue
of the provisions of the Armaments Act No. 87 of 1964 as
amended and the Armaments Development and Production Act
No. 57 of 1968, as well as any future amendments of both the
aforesaid Acts, and/or
(ii)
by the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the
development and manufacture of armaments, and
(iii)
whilst such development and manufacture of armaments as set
out in (i) and (ii) above are being carried out, for any defence
or military operational purpose by the South African Defence
Force, and
(iv)
whilst such development and manufacture as set out in (i) and
(ii) are being carried out, for the manufacture at any time of
anything whatsoever for commercial exploitation provided that
such operations will in no way impinge on or compete directly
or indirectly with the businesses conducted bona fide at that
time by AE & CI Limited (“AE & CI”) and/or any of its
subsidiary and/or associated companies.
(v)
for the purposes of the aforegoing condition:
(a)
the word “armaments” shall mean . . .
(b)
“subsidiary company” . . .
(c)
“associated company” . . .

(d)
“equity share capital” . . .
2.
(i)
In the event of the property being no longer required for the use
as set out in clause 1(i) and 1(ii) above, the Transferor herein
shall have the first right to repurchase the property (exclusive
of improvements) from the Transferee, at the price paid by the
Transferee herein suitably adjusted to make provision for any
change in the value of money between the date of sale to the
Transferee herein and the time of receipt by the Transferor of
the notice referred to in clause 2(ii) hereunder.
(ii)
The Transferee hereby undertakes that upon the property no
longer being required for the use referred to in 2(i) above to
advise the Transferor of that fact by notice in writing. The
Transferor shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the right
referred to in clause 2(i) above within 90 days after the
repurchase price has been agreed upon between the Transferor
and the Transferee or failing such agreement, within 90 days
after determination of the repurchase price as hereinafter
provided.
(iii)
Should the Transferor and the Transferee fail to reach
agreement on the price at which the Transferor shall be entitled
to repurchase the property within fourteen days following the
date of receipt of the notice referred to in 2(ii), the price shall,
if demanded by the Transferor by notice in writing to the
Transferee within a period of seven days following the date of
expiration of the aforesaid fourteen days, be submitted for
determination to . . .

(iv)
. . .
(v)
If the Transferor within the said period of 90 days referred to
in 2(ii) by notice in writing to the Transferee signifies that it will
repurchase the property, the Transferee shall sell the property
to the Transferor at the price agreed upon between the
Transferor and the Transferee and failing agreement , at the
price determined in accordance with the provisions of this
condition. Until the expiration of the said period of 90 days, the
Transferee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of or alienate the
property or any portion thereof unless the Transferor has by
notice in writing to the Transferee declined to repurchase the
property.
(vi)
. . .”
(I shall hereinafter refer to these conditions as condition 1 and
condition 2 respectively.)
Clauses 6 and 7 of the deed of sale differ in material respects from
conditions 1 and 2. Clause 7(b), for example, has no counterpart in the deed of
transfer and unlike clauses 6 and 7 conditions 1 and 2 were expressly stated to be
binding on Armscor’s successors in title.
[4] Subsequent to the transfer of the properties-

4.1
conditions 1and 2 in so far as they applied in respect of Portion 3 of
the Farm Helderberg Sleeper Plantation No. 787 was cancelled by way
of a notarial deed of cancellation registered on 25 October 1977;
4.2
a portion, measuring 7007 m², of Farm 1065 was transferred leaving
a remaining extent measuring 458,9823 ha;
4.3
a piece of land, measuring 7007 m² was consolidated with the
Remaining Extent of Farm 1065 to form Farm 1105 measuring
459,6830 m² and a certificate of consolidated title no T33717/1977
was issued in respect of the consolidated property;
4.4
Portion 1 of Farm 1105 measuring 1,9258 ha, was excised from Farm
1105 and a certificate of registered title was issued in respect thereof;
4.5
the Remaining Extent of Farm 1105 measuring 457,7572 ha, was
renamed to become the Remaining Extent of Erf 632 Firgrove;
4.6
the Remaining Extent of Erf 632 Firgrove was transferred by Armscor
to the first respondent, Denel (Pty) Limited (“Denel”), in terms of
Deed of Transfer T75861/92;

4.7
the Remaining Extent of Erf 632 Firgrove was consolidated with a
number of smaller properties to form Erf 635 Firgrove measuring
458,0678 ha and Certificate of Consolidated Title T1178/94 was
issued in respect thereof;
4.8
Erf 637 Firgrove, measuring 1,7163 ha was excised from Erf 635 and
Certificate of Registered Title T1179/94 was issued in respect thereof
leaving a remaining extent of Erf 635 measuring 456,3515 ha held by
Denel in terms of Certificate of Consolidated Title T1178/94.
[5] From the aforegoing it is clear that most of the land forming part of the
Remaining Extent of Erf 635 also formed part of Farm 1065 which had been
transferred subject to conditions 1 and 2. However, condition 2 was omitted from
Certificate of Registered Title T 33717/77, the subsequent Deed of Transfer T
75861/92, Certificate of Consolidated Title T 1178/94 and Certificate of Registered
Title T1179/94 and condition 1was according to the first three of those title deeds
only applicable to a very small portion of the land presently known as Remaining

Extent of Erf 635.
[6] A dispute arose between Capex and Denel as to whether Capex would be
entitled to repurchase that portion of Erf 635 which formed part of Farm 1065 in
the event of it no longer being required for the use set out in condition 1. As a result
Denel applied for an order declaring that its ownership of Erf 635 was not in respect
of any portion thereof subject to condition 2. Capex, in a counter-application,
applied for an order directing the Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town to rectify
Certificate of Consolidated Title T 33717/77, Deed of Transfer T 75861/92 and
Certificate of Consolidated Title T 1178/94 so as to include conditions 1 and 2 in
so far as they related to the portions of Farm 1065 which had been incorporated
into the Remaining Extent of Erf 635 Firgrove; an order directing the Registrar of
Deeds to rectify Certificate of Registered Title T1179/1994 so as to include the
conditions; orders declaring that Denel was bound to comply with the conditions;
an order interdicting Denel from failing to comply with the provisions of the
conditions; and an order interdicting Denel from selling or transferring the restricted

properties to any person without complying with condition 2.
[7] The court a quo held at 430A-B:
“In my view the only logical explanation for the difference between the land
use restriction in title deed 33717/77 from what it was in title deed 40652/74
and the omission in title deed 33717/77 of the right of repurchase is an error,
and a very big one, by the conveyancer and the Registrar of Deeds.
Incidentally, the Registrar of Deeds confirms that. It follows then that I
accept on probability both as far as the application and the counter-
application are concerned that the difference between the two title deeds was
caused by an error.”
The correctness of this finding was not challenged before us..
[8] The court a quo also found that:
8.1
Clause 7(b) was void for vagueness because neither the improvements
which the appellant had the right to purchase, nor the price payable in
respect thereof was certain or determinable. Clause 7(a) could not be
severed from clause 7(b) and was, for that reason, also void. Neither

1S 63(1) provides as follows: “(1) No deed, or condition in a deed, purporting to create or
embodying any personal right, and no condition which does not restrict the exercise of any right of
ownership in respect of immovable property, shall be capable of registration: Provided that a deed
containing such a condition as aforesaid may be registered if, in the opinion of the registrar, such
condition is complementary or otherwise ancillary to a registrable condition or right contained or
conferred in such deed.”
could therefore be registered as it could not be the duty of the
Registrar of Deeds to register the terms of void agreements.
8.2
Clause 6 was registrable in terms of s 63(1) of the Deeds Registries
Act 47 of 1937 (“the Deeds Registries Act”) in that it restricted the
exercise of Armscor’s right of ownership in respect of the properties
but the parties did not intend the restriction to be binding on
Armscor’s successors in title and specifically agreed not to register
it against the property.1 Clause 7 did not affect the property or curtail
Armscor’s right of enjoyment of the property in the physical sense.
On its own it was not registrable in terms of s 63(1). It was not
ancillary to clause 6 and therefore not registrable on that basis either.
On the strength of these findings the court a quo dismissed the counter-
application and granted an order declaring that Denel’s right of ownership in erven

635 and 637 Firgrove was in no way encumbered by condition 2.
[9] Notwithstanding the material differences between conditions 1 and 2 and
clauses 6 and 7, counsel for Denel submitted that the deed of sale, more particularly
clauses 6 and 7 thereof, constituted the causa for the registration of conditions 1
and 2. For this reason, so he submitted, the court a quo correctly decided that if
clauses 6 and 7 were not capable of being registered or not intended to be
registered, conditions 1 and 2 were not registrable. In support of this contention he
relied on the judgment in De Wet v Apex Mines, Ltd 1943 TPD 190. In that case a
testator bequeathed two farms to certain of his children and grandchildren. Clause
8 of the will provided, inter alia: “Ik begeer dat indien de kolemijnen op mijne
genoemde plaatsen . . . ter eeniger tijd mochten betalen dat de zuiwere opbrengst
daarvan gelijkelijk onder mijne kinderen voornoemd (referring to all his children)
zal verdeeld worden.” In the deed of transfer the transfer was expressed to be
“onderhewig aan die kondisie vervat in die testament van . . . luidende . . . ” and
then followed verbatim the provision cited. The condition was omitted from

subsequent title deeds. In an application for the rectification of a subsequent title
deed, so as to include the condition, the court had to determine whether the
condition was capable of being registered. The court said at 195:
“The persons claiming that there is a burden upon the land which ought to
be registered against the first respondent’s transfer must stand or fall by the
will; and the first respondent is quite entitled to say that in as much as its
predecessors ought, on a proper construction of the will, to have had a clean
transfer, there can be no compulsion upon it to submit to any endorsement
of the terms of the will upon the transfer now in question. Mr. Price, for the
third respondent, is, therefore, right in saying that the whole controversy
between the parties is as to the intention of the testator as manifested in the
will.”
Read in isolation the passage would seem to support counsel’s contention.
However, it was stated expressly in the deed of transfer that the condition registered
was the condition contained in the will. It was therefore necessary, in order to
determine whether the condition which had been registered was capable of being
registered, to interpret the condition within the context of the will. The sentence in
the judgment preceding the passage cited above makes it clear that it was for this

reason that the applicant had to stand or fall by the will. The court said:
“They did no more than reproduce upon the titles the actual words of the
will; and if these words do not bring about the legal result now contended
for, or any other registrable detraction from full rights of ownership, the form
in which the earlier deeds of transfer were registered takes the matter no
further.”
[10] In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson,
Ltd 1941 AD 369 at 398 Watermeyer JA said in respect of the passing of
ownership of movable property:
“Ownership of movable property does not in our law pass by the making of
a contract. It passes when delivery of possession is given accompanied by
an intention on the part of transferor to transfer ownership and on the part
of the transferee to receive it. . . .If the parties desire to transfer ownership
and contemplate that ownership will pass as a result of the delivery, then they
in fact have the necessary intention and the ownership passes by delivery.”
This decision was followed in Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western Bank
Bpk 1978 (4) SA 281 (A). At 301 in fine-302A Trengove AJA said:

“Volgens ons reg gaan die eiendomsreg op ¿ roerende saak op ¿ ander oor
waar die eienaar daarvan dit aan ¿ ander lewer, met die bedoeling om
eiendomsreg aan hom oor te dra, en die ander die saak neem met die
bedoeling om eiendomsreg daarvan te verkry. Die geldigheid van die
eiendomsoordrag staan los van die geldigheid van enige onderliggende
kontrak.”
There is no reason why the same principle should not apply to the transfer
of ownership of immovable property (see Van der Merwe Sakereg 2nd ed p310;
Silberberg and Schoeman The Law of Property 3rd ed Kleyn and Boraine at 110).
It follows that it is the intention with which transfer was given and received which
had to be determined in so far as a causa was required for the transfer of the
properties subject to conditions 1 and 2.
[11] Capex passed transfer of the properties subject to conditions 1 and 2. Prima
facie, therefore, it was Capex’s intention to do so. Armscor, which was the second
respondent in the court a quo and which is the second respondent in this appeal,
never claimed rectification of Deed of Transfer T40652/1974 in terms of which the

properties were transferred to it and never denied its intention to receive transfer of
the properties subject to conditions 1 and 2. It never complained about the
presence of the conditions or about the wording of the conditions in the deed of
transfer. Moreover, during 1977 it entered into a notarial agreement with Capex in
terms of which it was agreed that the conditions be cancelled in so far as they
applied to Portion 3 of the Farm Helderberg Sleeper Plantation. This latter fact is
particularly significant in that it indicates that Armscor had full knowledge of the
terms of conditions 1 and 2 but did nothing about them. Prima facie, therefore,
Armscor intended to receive transfer of the properties subject to conditions 1 and
2. Denel similarly did not allege that Capex and Armscor had not intended to pass
and receive transfer of the properties subject to conditions 1 and 2. The matter
therefore had to be decided on the basis that Capex and Armscor intended to pass
and receive transfer subject to conditions 1 and 2. The issue which had to be
decided on that basis was whether conditions 1 and 2 were capable of being
registered and what the effect of their omission from subsequent title deeds was.

[12] In terms of s 3 of the Deeds Registries Act all real rights in respect of
immovable property are registrable. To determine whether a particular right or
condition in respect of land is real, two requirements must be satisfied:
The intention of the person who creates the real right must be to bind
not only the present owner of the land, but also his successors in title;
and
The nature of the right or condition must be such that the registration
of it results in a ‘subtraction from dominium’ of the land against
which it is registered.
(Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 (1) SA 879 (A) at
885B.)
[13] Counsel for Denel contended that condition 2 constituted a personal right
(in the nature of an option) to re-purchase which could not be converted into a real
right by registration. An option consists of an offer to enter into a contract together

with an agreement to keep that offer open for a certain time (Boyd v Nel 1922 AD
414 at 421). Condition 2 does not contain an offer to enter into a contract and
does, therefore, not purport to be an option.
[14] It was further contended on behalf of Denel that condition 2 could not
constitute a valid real right as it imposed an obligation on the transferee to notify the
transferor when the properties were no longer required for the use to which they
had been restricted. As authority for this proposition he referred to Schwedhelm
v Hauman 1947 (1) SA 127 (E) in which the court applied the rule of the Roman
law that, with the exception of the servitudes oneris ferendi and altius tollendi, a
servitude cannot cast upon the owner of the servient tenement an obligation actively
to do something. In my view the stipulation referred to was not intended to burden
the transferee with an obligation. Condition 1 contained a use restriction and
condition 2 provided that in the event of the property no longer being required for

the use to which it was restricted Armscor or its successors in title would advise
Capex accordingly, whereupon Capex would become entitled to re-purchase the
property failing which the property would no longer be subject to the use
restriction. Upon the property no longer being required for the restricted use it
would be useless to the owner thereof unless Capex repurchased it or the use
restriction could be terminated. Condition 2 was intended to provide Armscor and
its successors in title with a mechanism for such termination. Hence, although
framed as an obligation the giving of notice was as much a right as an obligation.
I therefore do not consider it necessary to deal with the question as to whether or
not the rule relied upon in Schwedhelm is absolute. ( See Van der Merwe v Wiese
1948 (4) SA 8(C), Van der Merwe Sakereg 2nd  ed 474-476, Silberberg and
Schoeman The Law of Property 3rd ed (Kleyn and Boraine) at 378-379).
[15] The use restriction according to condition 1 was materially different from the

use restriction according to condition 1 read with condition 2. The two conditions
were not independent of one another and they could not be separated. They formed
a composite whole. They were specifically stated to be binding on the transferee,
being Armscor, and its successors in title. Furthermore, they constituted a burden
upon the land or a subtraction from the dominium of the land in that the use of the
property by the owner thereof was restricted. The right embodied in conditions 1
and 2, read together, therefore constituted a real right which could be registered in
terms of the Deeds Registries Act.
[16] A real right is adequately protected by its registration in the Deeds Office (see
Frye’s (Pty) Ltd v Ries 1957 (3) SA 575 (A) at 582A). Once Capex’s rights had
been  registered they were maintainable against the whole world (Frye’s case at
583E). They were not extinguished by their erroneous omission from subsequent
title deeds and the fact that Denel’s title deed, registered in the Deeds Office, did

not reflect those rights does not assist Denel. We have a negative system of
registration where the deeds registry does not necessarily reflect the true state of
affairs and third parties cannot place absolute reliance thereon (see Knysna Hotel
CC v Coetzee NO 1998 (2) SA 743 at 753A-D; Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk v
Registrateur van Aktes 1975 (4) SA 936 (T); and Standard Bank van S.A. Bpk v
Breitenbach 1977 (1) SA 151 (T) at 156C-E). In Sakereg op cit at 342 the negative
system of registration is explained as follows:
“In die geval van ¿ negatiewe registrasiestelsel word nie gewaarborg dat die
inligting wat in die register vervat is, korrek is nie. Indien ¿ bona fide derde
dus op die registers staatmaak, doen hy dit op eie risiko en word hy die
slagoffer van valse inliging in die register. Die ware eienaar verloor in geen
omstandighede sy reg ten gunste van die bona fide verkryger nie. Hierdie
stelsel bied dus groter sekuriteit aan die ware eienaar as aan die bona fide
derde wat die slagoffer van ¿ foutiewe inskrywing kan word.”
And later on the same page:
“Hoewel eiendom en beperkte saaklike regte nie sonder registrasie oorgedra
kan word nie, word nêrens gewaarborg dat die aktesregister ¿ juiste beeld

van die ware toedrag van sake gee of dat derdes absoluut daarop kan
staatmaak nie.”
(See also The Law of Property loc cit 106)
In Grant v Stonestreet 1968 (4) SA 1 (A) Ogilvie Thomson JA said at 20A-B:
“Having regard to our system of registration, the purchaser of immovable
property who acquires clean title is not lightly to be held bound by an
unregistered praedial servitude claimed in relation to that property. If,
however, such purchaser has knowledge, at the time he acquires the
property, of the existence of the servitude, he will . . . be bound by it
notwithstanding the absence of registration”
However, in that case the court was not dealing with a real right: it was dealing with
an agreement in terms of which reciprocal servitudes, which had never been
registered, had been granted. An agreement to grant a servitude gives rise to a real
right only when it has been registered (see Van Vuren v Registrar of Deeds 1907
TS 289 at 295; Van der Merwe Sakereg op cit 526-527, and The Law of Property
op cit 380-381). Dealing, at 23H-24E, with the distinction between real rights and
contractual rights, in that case unregistered servitudes, Ogilvie Thomson JA referred

to Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 where
Innes CJ said at 16:
“Now a servitude, like any other real right, may be acquired by agreement.
Such an agreement, however, though binding on the contracting parties, does
not by itself vest the legal title to the servitude in the beneficiary, any more
than a contract of sale of land passes the dominium to the buyer. The right
of the beneficiary is to claim performance of the contract by delivery of the
servitude, which must be effected coram lege loci by an entry made in the
register and endorsed upon the title deeds of the servient property.”
The Grant case is therefore no authority for a proposition that a registered real right
is no longer maintainable against the whole world when it is erroneously omitted
from a subsequent title deed.
[17] Before us it was submitted on behalf of Denel that because of the release of
the Farm Helderberg Sleeper Plantation No 787 from the use restriction it was no
longer possible to arrive at a purchase price for the property that remained subject
to conditions 1 and 2 in that a separate price was not agreed in respect of the

remaining property. However, Denel did not base its application or its defence to
Capex’s counter-application on this ground. The issue was not raised in the
affidavits filed or during argument in the court below. This court cannot therefore
be satisfied that all the relevant facts relating to this issue have been placed before
it. We are in no position to deal with the issue at this late stage.
[18]     Capex reserved a real right in the terms set out in conditions 1 and 2 in
respect of Farm No. 1065 and that real right has not been extinguished. It follows
that Denel’s application should have been dismissed. It follows, furthermore, that
conditions 1 and 2 should have been carried forward into subsequent title deeds in
respect of property that formed part of Farm 1065.
[19] Counsel for Denel contended that even if the conditions should have been
carried forward Capex was not entitled to orders interdicting Denel from using the
restricted properties for uses other than those specified in condition 1 and from
selling or transferring the restricted properties to any person without complying with

the provisions of condition 2. He submitted that there was no evidence justifying
a reasonable apprehension that Denel would act contrary to the provisions of these
conditions. However, in a letter dated 12 November 1996 Capex’s attorneys wrote
to Denel as follows-
“(O)ur client requires an undertaking that you will not seek to use the
relevant properties for anything other than the development and manufacture
of armaments and that you will not dispose of any part of the property in
breach of our client’s pre-emptive right as contained in clause 7 of the
relevant sale agreement and in clauses 1.1 and 1.2 on pages 15 to 19 and 25
of deed of transfer T40652/1974 pending the determination of the court
proceedings.”
Such an undertaking was not given. Instead, Denel proceeded to produce a
development plan relating to the relevant property which indicates that the property
is to be developed and sold off for, amongst others, residential and commercial
purposes. The plan has been submitted to the Helderberg Municipality and to the
public at large for comment and objection. For these reasons Capex is entitled to
orders  interdicting  Denel  from acting contrary to the provisions of conditions 1
and 2.

[20] The following order is made:
The appeal is upheld with costs including the costs of two counsel.
The following order is substituted for the order of the court a quo:
2.1
The applicant’s application is dismissed with costs including
the costs of two counsel.
2.2
The following order is made in respect of the first respondent’s
counter-application:
2.2.1 Subject to compliance with all relevant statutory provisions and
Deeds Office requirements the Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town
is ordered to rectify Certificate of Consolidated Title T1178/94
and Certificate of Registered Title T1179/1994 so as to include
the conditions reflected from p 15 line 7 to p 19 line 29 of Deed
of Transfer T40652/1974.
2.2.2 it is declared that the restricted properties may be used, in so
far as the conditions apply to them, only for the purposes
described in clause 1 of the said conditions.

2.2.3 it is declared that in the event of the restricted properties no
longer being required for the uses set out in clauses 1(i) and
1(ii) of the said conditions the first respondent has the first right
to repurchase them in accordance with clauses 2(i) to (vi) of the
said conditions.
2.2.4 the applicant is interdicted from using the restricted properties
for uses other than those specified in clause 1 of the said
conditions.
2.2.5 the applicant is interdicted from selling or transferring the
restricted properties to any person without complying with the
provisions of clause 2 of said conditions.
2.2.6 the applicant is ordered to pay the costs including the costs of
two counsel.
___________________
P E STREICHER, JA
Vivier,
JA)
Olivier,
JA)

Zulman,
JA)
Mthiyane,   AJA)     concur