THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable
CASE NO 464/2001
In the matter between
DUMISANI SITHOLE
Appellant

and

THE STATE
Respondent
____________________________________________________________

CORAM:
HARMS, CONRADIE JJA et JONES AJA

HEARD:
19 SEPTEMBER 2002
DELIVERED:
30 SEPTEMBER 2002
____________________________________________________________

SUBJECT:  Sentence for drunken driving; effect of alcoholism on
sentencing.

_____________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

CONRADIE  JA

[1]  The appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty in the magistrates’
court on two charges of having contravened section 122 (1)(a) of the Road
Traffic Act 29 of 1989 by driving a vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.  He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each
charge and his driver’s licence was cancelled. On appeal to the Natal
Provincial Division against the sentence of imprisonment and the
cancellation of the licence, the Court declined to interfere with the latter, but
set aside the sentence of six years’ imprisonment. Instead, it imposed a
sentence of four years’ imprisonment in terms of section 276(1)(i) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Its effect is that the appellant must serve
at least one sixth of this by way of a custodial sentence and the rest of the
period under correctional supervision.

[2] The appellant, with the leave of the court a quo, appeals against the
sentence.

[3] The appellant’s history of aberrant road conduct started in 1987 with a
conviction for negligent driving and failure to report an accident within the
time allowed. For his first offence of driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor the appellant was in March 1989 sentenced to four
months’ imprisonment with the option of a fine. If he learned a lesson from
this experience, it was not a salutary one. Two years later, in April 1991, he
was again convicted. The fine was ten times greater than it had been the first
time; moreover, in addition to imprisonment in default of payment of the
fine, a year’s imprisonment suspended for five years was imposed and the
appellant’s driver’s licence was suspended for two years.

[4] In May 1996 the appellant was convicted once more. The offence
appears to have been committed within the period of suspension of the
earlier term of imprisonment. His punishment was less severe than it had
been on the previous occasion, which can only be explained by the fact that
the appellant’s previous convictions were not proved. The new suspended
sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was so carelessly imposed that no
period of suspension was mentioned. This probably worked to the
appellant’s advantage because on 1 June 1998, three years later, he was
drinking and driving again. This transgression, involving a collision, was his

fourth offence of the same sort. On 7 November 1998, and while he was
awaiting trial on the previous offence, he committed his fifth.

[5] Although the appellant had not previously been imprisoned for driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor (he had been for fraud), the
magistrate was not persuaded that the appellant should have the ‘benefit’ of
a sentence of correctional supervision under section 276(1)(h) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, that is to say one without any custodial
element but one which, as the appellant’s counsel has contended throughout,
would have the merit of being tailored to ensure a supervised program of
structured rehabilitation.

[6] The Court a quo disagreed with the magistrate’s assessment of the
appellant’s situation. This appeal raises, once again, the tension that tends to
arise in cases of this kind between deterrent and preventative (on the one
hand) and reformatory aims (on the other) and the endeavour to find a
satisfactory balance between the two.

[7] Courts in this country have long acknowledged that alcohol addiction is a
disease and that it would be to the benefit of society and of the offender if

the condition can be cured. But it is necessary to make the obvious point that
drunken driving is not a disease. One is distressingly familiar with maudlin
pleas in mitigation that the drunken driver in the dock is an alcoholic, as if
the disease excused the crime.  It does not (S v Fraser 1987 (2) SA 859 (A)
at 864B-D).

[8] Addiction to alcohol is not an excuse for driving under the influence of
liquor. In many cases the addiction would be an aggravating feature of the
offence. The alcoholic who takes his car to the pub knows when he parks it
outside that he will probably not be sober enough to drive it home. He
recklessly courts the danger of criminal conduct. His conduct is more
reprehensible than that of the person who carelessly has one too many. Drug
dependence in general is often characterized by associated criminal conduct.
Driving under the influence of liquor is criminal conduct associated with
alcoholism. There is no reason why the courts should be more tolerant of
that than they are of, say, stealing to support a drug habit.

[9] The need to impose sentences that provide for the rehabilitation of those
addicted to alcohol and, for that matter, to other kinds of drugs has
frequently been stressed. This is a laudable object of sentencing but not the

only and there is obviously no point in devising a rehabilitative sentence if
the offender’s rehabilitation prospects are remote. (Cf  S v Fraser (supra) at
864J – 865A;  S v Noemdoe 1993 (1) SACR 264  (c) at 273 b – c;  S v
Keulder 1994 (1) SACR  91 (A); S v Labuschagne 1995 (2) SACR 200 (W).
It is on the question of rehabilitation, mainly, that the paths of the two courts
below diverged.

[10] The trial court was skeptical of reports prepared by the probation officer
and the correctional supervision officer. Both of them recommended
correctional supervision as a sentencing option, but their reports were woolly
and poorly researched. On the prospect of rehabilitation the social worker
reported that the appellant had once before been admitted to a rehabilitation
center, that he had had implants, psychiatric treatment and psychological
counseling and that ‘nothing had worked.’ That was hardly encouraging for
someone out to satisfy the court that he was capable of reform; but she did
add that ‘since the incident (she probably refers to the second of the two) the
wife has reported that she has not seen him drunk and also the accused has
confirmed that he has not taken any liquor since the accident.’ That was
rather more encouraging, as far as it went, but its persuasive force was
diminished by the failure of the appellant and the observant wife to testify.

[11] The Court a quo was more receptive. On the evidence, scanty as it was,
it accepted that the appellant had shown a willingness to change. It was, in
this regard, assisted by a finding of fact made by the magistrate (which was
not challenged in the Court a quo, or before us on appeal) that the appellant
has abstained from liquor since his convictions on the two charges.
It evidently considered that society’s interests and those of the appellant
would best be served by a much shorter period of imprisonment followed by
a compulsory rehabilitation program.  On the evidence, it may have been a
little too sanguine of the appellant’s rehabilitation prospects, but that is not a
misdirection vitiating the exercise of its discretion, particularly since the
Court was alive to the fact that the public’s interest in reducing the dangers
on our roads called for a measure of deterrence.

[12] The thrust of the appellant’s argument on appeal was that correctional
supervision under section 276(1)(h) – an entirely non-custodial sentence –
would have adequately taken account of societal interests. I disagree. A
person with the appellant’s record cannot expect to escape prison altogether.
Too many people die on our roads for that to be an option. Driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor is a serious crime and repeated offences

greatly augment its seriousness, particularly where, as here, one of the
offences is committed during the currency of a suspended sentence for the
very same kind of offence, and another is committed while awaiting trial on
an earlier offence of the same kind.

[13] Nevertheless, the Court a quo was correct in concluding that the
sentences imposed by the magistrate, at least cumulatively, were too severe.
The discretion, which it then exercised in imposing a fresh sentence, cannot
be faulted.

[14] The magistrate cancelled the appellant’s driver’s licence immediately
on conviction and before having heard evidence in mitigation of sentence. It
was argued that she should not have done this at the time that she did.  The
appellant’s representative at the trial was asked whether he could argue
against immediate cancellation of the accused’s licence.  He replied that he
could not. There was no irregularity; even if there were, it would be hard to
extract from it the smallest bit of prejudice.

The appeal is dismissed.

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J H CONRADIE

JUDGE OF APPEAL

HARMS JA
)
JONES AJA
)
CONCUR