THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No: 977/2019
Reportable
In the matter between:

SIVALUTCHMEE MOODLIAR
FIRST APPELLANT
TREVOR PHILIP GLAUM
SECOND APPELLANT
KEITUMETSE TAUNYANE
THIRD APPELLANT
And

RECYCLING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA NPC
FIRST RESPONDENT
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
THIRD RESPONDENT

And in the matter between:

STEPHEN MALCOLM GORE
FIRST APPELLANT
TREVOR PHILIP GLAUM
FRANCIS TJALE
SECOND APPELLANT
THIRD APPELLANT

And

KUSAGA TAKA CONSULTING (PTY) LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT
BOWMAN GILFILLAN
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
THIRD RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Moodliar and Others v Recycling and Economic Initiative of South
Africa NPC (Case no. 977/2019) [2020] ZASCA 101 (15 September 2020)

Coram:
NAVSA, MBHA, and PLASKET JJA, WEINER and UNTERHALTER AJJA

Heard:
27 August 2020

Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website
and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on
15 September 2020.

Summary: Companies Act 61 of 1973 – winding-up – appropriation or retention of
company funds by liquidators to pay or secure their proposed fees – Act and the
Regulations do not permit the liquidators to retain any company assets upon discharge
of the provisional liquidation order – assets must be restored- liquidators not permitted
to draw their remuneration until the estate account has been taxed and confirmed.

ORDER

On appeal from: The Western Cape Division of the High Court (Le Grange J, sitting
as court of first instance):

1. Save to the limited extent related to the costs order of the counter-applications
in the court below, reflected in 2 below, the appeal is dismissed with costs, such
costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.
2. The order of the court below is amended to read as follows:
‘The relief sought by both Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of
South Africa NPC and Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd in prayer 3 of their
Notices of Motion respectively, is granted with costs. The Counter Applications
are dismissed. The Joinder Applications are dismissed with costs. The costs
are to include the costs attendant upon two counsel.
JUDGMENT

Weiner AJA (Navsa, Plasket JJA and Unterhalter AJ concurring)):
[1] When a company is discharged from winding-up, are its former liquidators
entitled to appropriate or retain company funds to pay or secure their proposed fees
(as yet untaxed) before they restore control of the balance of the company’s assets to
its directors? The court a quo found that former liquidators were not entitled to retain
such funds and ordered them to pay over the amounts, held in trust by their attorneys,
to the companies formerly in liquidation in each of the two cases that served before it.
This appeal comes before us with the leave of the court a quo.
[2] The appeal comprises two matters, which concern the same issue. They were
consolidated for the hearing before the court a quo. The appellants in the first case
are Sivalutchmee Moodliar, Trevor Philip Glaum and Keitumetse Taunyane, the former
liquidators of the first respondent in that case, Recycling and Economic Development
Initiative of South Africa NPC (‘Redisa’). In the second case, the appellants are
Stephen Malcolm Gore, Trevor Philip Glaum and Francis Tjale, the former liquidators
of the first respondent therein, Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd (‘KTC’). For
convenience, these respondents will be referred to as Redisa or KTC or as ‘the
companies’, where applicable. For purposes of convenience the former liquidators of
Redisa and KTC will be referred to as the liquidators. The second respondent in each

of the cases is Bowman Gilfillan (‘Bowmans’), a firm of attorneys into whose trust
account the liquidators paid the funds, which they had retained to cover their
remuneration (‘the disputed funds’). Bowmans abides the decision of this Court.
[3] The material facts in this matter are largely common cause. Redisa was
responsible for the implementation of an Integrated Industry Waste Tyre Management
Plan (the ‘Redisa plan’), which was promulgated in late 2012 by the Minister of
Environmental Affairs (the ‘Minister’), in terms of the National Environment
Management Waste Act 59 of 2008. Redisa engaged KTC to provide administrative
and management services in respect of the scheme. The Redisa plan was to operate
indefinitely, subject to a review to be conducted every five years. The Redisa plan was
apparently approved by the Minister, but on 1 June 2017, the Minister, on an urgent
ex parte basis, sought and obtained a provisional winding-up order, first against
Redisa and then, on the same basis, a week later, against KTC. At the time Redisa
and KTC were solvent.
[4] The Minister contending, inter alia, that since certain of Redisa’s directors had
not disclosed their relationship with or significant shareholding in KTC and that this
enabled Redisa to misappropriate public funds by using KTC as a vehicle to channel
monies for their personal benefit, sought the winding-up of both entities on the basis
that it was just and equitable to do so. Provisional liquidation orders were granted ex
parte and provided, inter alia, that the Master of the High Court (the ‘Master’) was to
appoint provisional liquidators within 24 hours of the orders being granted. In the case
of Redisa, the provisional liquidators were ordered to take immediate control of
Redisa's business, including the administration and implementation of the Redisa
plan. The court ordered further that the provisional liquidators’ powers were extended
to include the power and authority to continue to conduct the business of Redisa as a
going concern. In the case of KTC, the provisional liquidators were directed to take
immediate control of the assets and business of KTC. Upon their appointment, the
liquidators took control of the assets of the companies including all funds in the
companies’ bank accounts, and were obliged to manage such businesses in
accordance with their duties as liquidators.
[5] Upon learning of the provisional orders, the companies applied for the
provisional winding-up orders to be discharged. On 15 September 2017, these

applications were refused and judgments were granted finally winding-up both Redisa
and KTC.  When they were placed under winding-up. Redisa’s cash reserves
exceeded R170 million and KTC’s exceeded R9 million. Redisa and KTC appealed
against the winding-up orders and the appeals were set down for hearing in this Court
on 1 and 2 November 2018. On 24 October 2018, a week prior to the hearings, the
Redisa liquidators transferred R20 million from the current account which they
operated in Redisa's name into Bowmans’ trust account. The KTC liquidators
transferred R2 million from the current account which they operated in KTC's name
into Bowmans’ trust account. This appeal concerns these disputed funds.
[6] The final winding-up orders were set aside by this Court on 24 January 2019.
It substituted the order of the high court to reflect that the provisional winding up orders
were discharged1.
[7] The liquidators in each case had been appointed in June 2017, as the
provisional joint liquidators of Redisa and KTC, and held office until the companies
were discharged from liquidation in January 2019.
[8] After the appeal had been upheld and the companies were discharged from
liquidation, a meeting was held between the directors of the companies, the
liquidators, and their legal representatives, regarding the return of control of the
companies to the directors. The liquidators informed the meeting that they had taken
the decision to ‘ring-fence’ an amount of R 20 million as cover for their fees in respect
of Redisa and R 2 million in respect of KTC and that such sums had been transferred
into the trust account of Bowmans.
[9] The liquidators delivered draft intromissions accounts in regard to the estate in
which they reflected the proposed fees – just over R14 million in the case of Redisa,
and just over R1.5 million in the case of KTC. On 19 February 2019, an amount (the
difference between the original amounts transferred to Bowmans and the proposed
fees) was accordingly paid out by Bowmans to the companies on the instructions of

1 Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa NPC v Minister of Environmental
Affairs [2019] ZASCA 1; 2019 (3) SA 251 (SCA).

the liquidators. Approximately R17.8 million of the disputed funds remains in
Bowmans’ trust account. The companies disputed both the probity and the quantum
of such accounts and insisted that they be paid what was being held by Bowman’s at
the instance of the liquidators. The companies launched proceedings in the court a
quo on 20 February 2019 seeking an order that the funds held by Bowmans be paid
to them.
[10] The companies contended that whilst a company is in liquidation, the liquidators
occupy a position in relation to the company which approximates that of a company’s
board of directors.2 Upon discharge of the companies from provisional liquidation, the
liquidators were divested of their powers and were required to restore control of all of
the companies’ assets, which included the disputed funds, to the former controllers.3
The companies also disputed that Bowmans were holding the disputed funds as a
stakeholder.
[11] The liquidators, on the other hand, contended that, as a matter of law, the
companies were liable for their remuneration and they were thus entitled to payment
of such remuneration from the assets of the companies. They stated that they paid
over the disputed funds to Bowmans, as a stakeholder. They submitted further that
the companies were liable to pay the reasonable remuneration as taxed or agreed,
and that the monies could be retained by Bowmans pending taxation or agreement.
Having regard to communications between the parties and to the assertions or a lack
of them in the founding affidavits, the liquidators had a reasonable apprehension that
payment for their services would be disputed. It was for that reason, in response to the
applications by the companies, that they brought counter-applications, seeking an
order that the companies were liable to pay their reasonable remuneration.
[12] Section 3424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the Act) deals with how assets
of a company are to be applied in a winding--up and s 3915 of the Act sets out the

2 Howat Motors (Pty) Ltd v Waterson [1963] 4 All SA 54 (T); 1963 (3) SA 669 (T) at 673B-C.
3 AMS Marketing Co v Holzman and Another [1983] 4 All SA 316 (W); 1983 (3) 263 (W) at 270A-C.
4 Section 342. Application of assets and costs of winding-up
(1) In every winding-up of a company the assets shall be applied in payment of the costs, charges and
expenses incurred in the winding-up and, subject to the provisions of section 435 (1)(b), the claims of
creditors as nearly as possible as they would be applied in payment of the costs of sequestration and
the claims of creditors under the law relating to insolvency . . . shall be distributed among the members
according to their rights and interests in the company.’
5 Section 391. General Duties

general duties of a liquidator. Section 384 of the Act deals specifically with the
remuneration of a liquidator.
[13] Section 384(1) of the Act provides that, in a winding-up, a liquidator is entitled
to a reasonable remuneration for their services, which requires taxation by the Taxing
Master in accordance with the prescribed tariff. In terms of s 384(2), the Taxing
Master may reduce or increase or disallow such remuneration on certain grounds.
For this reason, the companies contended that the entitlement to payment of the fees
cannot arise before taxation.
[14] The liquidators relied on s 384(3) of the Act, which provides that the liquidator
is entitled to be paid their remuneration, to which they are entitled under the Act ‘out
of the assets of the company’. They submitted that there was thus statutory
justification for retention of certain of the assets (the disputed funds) to be applied in
relation to fees due to liquidators, as opposed to the other assets which must be
restored upon discharge from liquidation.
[15] The liquidators also sought to place reliance on regulation 24 read with
Annexure CM104.2 of the Regulations in terms of the Act, which provides that, when
an appointment is provisional, and the application is dismissed, the liquidator is entitled
to ‘fees to be taxed by the Taxing Master with due regard to the special circumstances
of the case’.
[16] Furthermore, the liquidators relied on In re Insolvent Estate Paruk,6 Rose v
Kemp7 and Van Eck v Meyer8 as well as Blackman: Commentary on the Companies
Act.9

A liquidator in any winding-up shall proceed forthwith to recover and reduce into possession all the
assets and property of the company, movable and immovable, shall apply the same so far as they
extend in satisfaction of the costs of the winding-up and the claims of creditors, and shall distribute
the balance among those who are entitled thereto.’
6 In re Insolvent Estate Paruk (1913) 34 NPD 424.
7 Rose v Kemp 1914 WLD 14.
8 Van Eck v Meyer [1964] 4 All SA 137 (GW); 1964 (4) SA 609 (GW).
9 M S Blackman et al Blackman’s Commentary on the Companies Act 2011 (RS 8) 14-324. The full
passage reads: ‘Where after the appointment of a provisional liquidator the liquidation proceedings are
withdrawn, the provisional liquidator is entitled to deduct his expenses and remuneration. But he is not
entitled to sell assets solely for the purpose of paying himself. He has no lien on any assets or books
or papers for his remuneration.’

[17] In Paruk, a provisional trustee who had been appointed prior to a sequestration
petition being withdrawn, drew an account for his administration of the insolvent estate,
in which he reflected that rentals had been collected on the insolvent property, and
against these rentals, he charged the expenses of the administration of the estate.
The court upheld what the liquidator had done. It held: ‘…such expenses [ie the
liquidators’ remuneration and disbursements] must be charged against the rents which
were the only moneys in the trustee’s hands’.10
[18] The court a quo held that Paruk was not authority for the proposition relied upon
by the liquidators. It found that Paruk did not hold that liquidators may retain or withhold
a ‘self-determined fee’ from company assets. On a proper interpretation of Paruk, the
liquidators could ‘reflect’ the fees in the estate account, but were not permitted ‘to draw’
the remuneration until reflected in a taxed and confirmed account.11
[19] The liquidators contended that the court a quo’s interpretation of Paruk does
not accord with the view expressed by Blackman that a provisional liquidator is entitled
to retain sufficient assets of the company to cover his or her expenses and
remuneration. The liquidators stated that they have not drawn the remuneration prior
to the confirmation of the estate account and that the disputed funds are being held in
Bowmans’ trust account.
[20] In Van Eck, an order of provisional sequestration had been set aside and the
former provisional trustee (the plaintiff) handed all assets back to the defendant. The
plaintiff then sued the defendant for his reasonable remuneration as erstwhile
provisional trustee. The court held that the plaintiff had a claim for reasonable
remuneration and that he had not lost that claim by returning the defendant’s assets
to him.12 The court held further that the trustee had no choice but to return all the
assets to the former insolvent upon the revocation of the order.13 (Emphasis added.)
[21] The liquidators also relied on Rose where the court held that when a provisional
sequestration order is discharged, it was the former provisional trustee’s duty to

10 Paruk, supra at 428.
11 See also Strydom NO v The Master of the High Court [2010] ZAGPPHC 164; 2010 (6) SA 630 (GNP)
para  27.
12 Van Eck, supra at 612C.
13 Ibid at 612A-D; see also Paruk, supra in which case this issue was dealt with similarly.

account to the former insolvent and that the property of the insolvent, which vested in
the former provisional trustee, as a matter of law, vested in the former insolvent. The
court, however, held that the disputed amount which had been deducted by the
provisional trustee did not vest in the former insolvent on discharge but that ‘there
arises a right in the insolvent to claim an account of the amount due.’
[22] As set out above, the companies, on the other hand, contended that as on the
discharge of the companies from liquidation, the liquidators are divested of their
powers and must therefore restore control of all the assets of the company to the
directors. They are not entitled to deduct their remuneration from the assets of the
companies before handing back such assets.
[23] The companies also relied on Regulation 24 and Annexure CM101 and CM104
to the Regulations.14 They submitted that Annxeure CM104 did not support the
liquidators’ contentions. They contended that it supported their case. Annexure CM101
provides general directions on the form and contents of liquidators' accounts. Item 5
of CM101.5 reads:
‘The account of payments may provisionally be credited with the amount claimed in respect of
the liquidator's remuneration, but no such remuneration or part thereof shall, except by
permission of the Master... or the Court, be drawn until the account in which it appears has
been confirmed’.15
[24] At common law, a trustee in an insolvent estate may not claim or draw his or
her remuneration before the estate account reflecting this remuneration has been
taxed and confirmed. This common law principle is equally applicable to liquidators,16
and, as demonstrated below, it is bolstered by the provisions of the Act and
Regulations.
[25] In assessing whether the authorities cited by the liquidators support the
contention that they are entitled to retain the disputed funds, reference can be made

14 Note 4 above.
15 In TLE (Pty) Ltd v The Master of the High Court, the court held that insofar as CM 101.5 provides that
liquidators may, with the Master’s permission, draw their remuneration before the Taxing Master has
confirmed the estate account reflecting such remuneration, this would be ultra vires the Act.
16 Strydom, supra paras 27-32. See also Howat Motors (Pty) Ltd, supra where the court held that the
position of a provisional liquidator was no different to that of a provisional trustee as the provisions in
the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the provisions in the previous 1926 Companies Act relating to
provisional liquidators shared the same purpose.

to   Strydom NO v The Master of the High Court,17 where Tuchten J held that ‘[u]nder
the common law, a trustee cannot claim or draw his remuneration until the account in
the estate showing the amount thereof has been confirmed. This common-law
principle is by no means repugnant with the provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of
1936, and is thus an applicable principle of our insolvency law today.’18 (Emphasis
added.)

[26] There are certain administrative processes applicable to an estate account.
They are contained in, inter alia, ss 403, 406 and 407 of the Act. Section 403 obliges
every liquidator (which includes a co-liquidator and a provisional liquidator unless the
context otherwise indicates), to frame and lodge accounts with the Master containing
an account of receipts and payments and a plan of distribution. Under s 406, the
estate account must lie for inspection for a period of at least 14 days at the office of
the Master. Notice that the account is lying for inspection must be given in the
Government Gazette. The account is open to objection. Section 407 provides for
objections to be made and considered. The Master also has the power, even if
objections are not made, to direct the liquidator to amend his account or give any
other directions he thinks fit. Once the account has lain for inspection and the period
for objections has passed, without objections or, if an objection has been lodged,
dealt with or withdrawn, the Master must, under s 408, confirm the account. Such
confirmation has the effect of a final judgment save in limited circumstances.

[27] It was submitted on behalf of the liquidators that these sections do not apply
to provisional liquidators because a provisional liquidator does not liquidate or
distribute the assets of a company in liquidation. In dealing with such a submission,
Tuchten J stated in Strydom:
‘This is no doubt the general position, but it is not always so . . . the submission does not
seem to me to explain why the provisional liquidator's account, whatever it contains, should
not lie for inspection and be open to objection under the Companies Act. The applicant
submits that his provisional account will lie for inspection as an attachment to the liquidator's

17 Strydom, supra.
18 Tuchten J in Strydom, supra para 27, citing Bertelsmann et al Mars: The Law of Insolvency in South
Africa (9 ed) at 310 and 13; Meskin: Insolvency Law (service issue 34) para 4.21; Abbott v Bryant 20
CTR 943; R v Macleod 1935 EDL 284; Elliot Brothers (East London) (Pty) Ltd v The Master and Another
NO [1988] 1 All SA 53 (E); 1988 (4) SA 183 (E) at 192I.

account. But by then, if the applicant gets his way, the fees dealt with in the provisional
account will have been paid out, to the potentially irreversible prejudice of creditors. To use
the language of the definition of liquidator in s 1 of the Companies Act, I do not see that the
context of these sections indicates that provisional liquidators are to be excluded from their
reach.’19
[28] In AMS Marketing Co v Holzman and Another20 it was held that once the
company is discharged from liquidation, a liquidator is divested of all his powers and
‘[t]here are no grounds upon which he may retain any assets of the company and any
books, records, and documents which came into existence must remain with the
company when he vacates his office.’ (Emphasis added.)
[29] Contrary to the liquidators’ contention that they were entitled to retain sufficient
funds to cover their remuneration, Van Eck says the very opposite. The court held that
the trustee had no option but to return all of the assets to the insolvent upon discharge
of the sequestration order. Paruk, like Van Eck, held that where a sequestration
application is withdrawn (or discharged), the trustee may reflect a claim for his
remuneration in the estate account. Paruk is not authority for the liquidators’
submission that pending taxation and confirmation, they may retain a ‘self-determined’
fee from the companies’ assets, and only restore those assets which are in excess of
their proposed fee.
[30] Reliance on Paruk and Rose is misplaced for the additional reasons that follow.
First, these cases precede the Act and the Regulations, its immediate predecessor
and the Insolvency Act. Second, they deal with a trustee in insolvency proceedings.
Unlike an insolvent, whose assets vest in the trustee once a sequestration order is
made and the trustee appointed,21 a company being wound up is not divested of its
assets. This only occurs if an order is made in terms of s 361 of the Act, which provides
that the court may order that ‘all or any part of the property. . .  belonging to the
company. . . shall vest in the liquidator in his official capacity, and thereupon the
property. . .  shall vest accordingly’. No such order was made in the present case and

19 Strydom, supra para 29.
20 AMS Marketing supra at 270A-C.
21 Section 20(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1926 provides that the effect of a sequestration order is to
divest the insolvent of their estate and to vest it in the Master until a trustee is appointed, and in the
trustee once they are appointed.

all the assets, including funds in bank accounts, remain the property of the companies.
Thus, once the liquidators’ powers end, they have a claim for their taxed or agreed
remuneration, but no right at common law or under the Act or Regulations to retain
control over the assets of the company to secure their claim.
[31] A liquidator conducts the affairs of a company as if they are an officer of the
company. The liquidators conceded that they did not made out a case for an anti-
dissipation interdict. They relied solely upon a statutory right as a necessary incident
of the liquidators’ entitlement to remuneration in terms of s 384(3). Although the
liquidators also conceded that they would not be entitled to hold the funds under a lien,
their conduct, in effect, has the characteristics of a lien and is not permitted – as is
clear from Howat Motors where Galgut J held:
‘...the fact that the books are the books of the company and that he [the liquidator] was acting
only as an officer of the company is also an answer to the submission that the respondent has
a lien. His position can be compared with that of the manager or managing director of the
company. It surely could not be said that such a manager or managing director has a lien on
the books of the company in respect of emoluments due to him by the company and not paid.’22
[32] To summarise, the liquidators may reflect their fees in their account, but upon
discharge of the order, all assets, including funds which would cover their fees, must
be returned to the companies. The provisions of the Act and the Regulations do not
permit the liquidators to retain the disputed funds. These are assets of the companies.
The liquidators are not permitted to draw their remuneration until the estate account
has been taxed and confirmed. Their interpretation of the commentary in Blackman on
this point is also flawed. If one has regard to the full passage in Blackman,23 it accords
with the general principles referred to in Howat, AMS Marketing and Strydom i.e ‘a
liquidator is entitled to deduct his expenses and remuneration. But he is not entitled to
sell assets solely for the purpose of paying himself. He has no lien on any assets or
books or papers for his remuneration.’ The implication is that the liquidators are not
entitled to ‘sell’ or ‘retain’ or ‘transfer’ the disputed funds to cover their remuneration.
The liquidators’ distinction between their remuneration, on the one hand, and other
assets of the companies, on the other, is ill-conceived.24 There is thus no lawful basis

22 Howat Motors, supra at 673B-C.
23 Blackman supra Note 8
24 Howat, supra and AMS Marketing, supra are clear on this point.

upon which the liquidators are entitled to retain fees and/or transfer such funds to
Bowmans, in trust, for their reasonable remuneration.
[33] The decision to which I have come is dispositive of the appeal. It is not strictly
necessary to deal in detail with the dispute between the parties as to whether
Bowmans was acting as a stakeholder. Suffice it to say that the liquidators’ version
that they transferred the monies to Bowmans in anticipation of the appeal being upheld
and their fear of not being paid, contradicts the allegation that Bowmans was acting
as a stakeholder. This position was also only belatedly raised by the liquidators many
months after the monies had been transferred to Bowmans. Nor is it plain how a
tripartite agreement came to be formed between the liquidators, acting both in their
own interests and on behalf of the companies, and Bowmans. The court a quo dealt
comprehensively with this issue and the reasoning in the judgment cannot be faulted.
[34] In regard to the appeal against the finding in relation to the companies’ striking-
out applications, the court a quo correctly found that the offending allegations
contained in the liquidators’ affidavits fell to be struck-out. The reasons advanced by
the court a quo also cannot be faulted.
[35] In relation to the costs of the counter-applications and the joinder applications,
in their founding affidavits the companies did not admit liability to pay the liquidators
their reasonable remuneration. As a consequence, the liquidators sought a
declaratory order to that effect in counter-applications. They later sought to join the
Minister on the basis that, if it was held that the companies were not liable to the
liquidators,
the
Minister
would
be
liable.

The
companies’
equivocal
acknowledgements in their answering affidavits in the joinder applications did not
help. By the time of the hearing, it became clear that there was an acknowledgement
by the companies that they were liable for the fees of the liquidators. The costs of the
dismissal of the counter-applications should thus not have been awarded against the
liquidators. I did not understand counsel for the companies to contend otherwise.
Counsel for the liquidators did not seek to overturn the costs order in respect of the
joinder applications.

[36] The following order is made:

1. Save to the limited extent related to the costs order in the counter-application
in the court below, reflected in 2 below, the appeal is dismissed with costs,
such costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment of two
counsel.
2. The order of the court below is amended to read as follows:
‘The relief sought by Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South
Africa NPC and Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd in prayer 3 of their Notices
of Motion respectively, is granted with costs. The Counter Applications are
dismissed. The Joinder Applications are dismissed with costs. The costs are to
include the costs attendant upon two counsel

______________________
WEINER AJA

ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES
For the appellants:
B Manca SC with C Morgan
Instructed by:

Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Incorporated, Cape Town
Lovius Block Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For the respondents :
J Dickerson SC with K Reynolds and L Kelly
Instructed by:

Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Incorporated, Cape Town

Claude Reid Attorneys, Bloemfontein