THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case No 39/2002
REPORTABLE

In the matter between:

Wimbledon Lodge (Pty) Ltd

Appellant

and

Stephen Malcolm Gore NO
First Respondent

Robert John Walters NO

Second Respondents
Trevor Philip Glaum NO

Harbour’s Edge Body Corporate                          Third Respondent

Before:
Olivier, Schutz, Zulman, Streicher JJA and Heher AJA

Heard:
7 March 2003

Delivered: 31 March 2003

Sectional titles – disparity between deeds of sale and registered sectional plan – common
areas lost – fraud – voting – use of nay votes gained by fraud – resolution deemed passed –
appointment of curator to body corporate – whether sum of deeds of sale equivalent to pre-
incorporation contract for benefit of body corporate – powers of same.
_______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________

SCHUTZ JA

[1] The applicant below (now appellant) complains that a fraud was
committed on him, and others, by one Scharrighuisen.  The latter’s estate has
been sequestrated and two of the corporations which he used for his schemes
have been liquidated.  The first two respondents (below and here), Messrs
Gore, Walters and Glaum, are liquidators of the one or the other of these
corporations.
[2] The appellant, Wimbledon Lodge (Pty) Ltd (‘Wimbledon’), owns a unit
in a sectional title development on erf 4600 Gordon’s Bay.  The third
respondent (here and below) is the Harbour’s Edge Body Corporate, which
controls the scheme.  Wimbledon is owned by one Cuninghame, who deposes
on its behalf.  His accusation is that a large part of the common property was
secretly appropriated by Scharrighuisen for the benefit of the two corporations
which he controlled.  They are Casisles Coastal Property Investments CC
(‘Casisles’)  (which was the ‘developer’ in terms of the Sectional Titles Act 95
of 1986 – ‘the Act’) and Harbour’s Edge Commercial Properties Holding
(Pty) Ltd (‘Harbour’s Edge’).
[3] The building was not intended to be occupied by the unit-holders. It was
to be used as a hotel. The rentals earned were to be placed in a pool which,
after expenses had been met, was to be distributed according to individual
participation quotas. According to the plan which was annexed to the deeds of
sale, the common property was to include restaurants, kitchens, a parking
basement, a squash court, necessary service areas and much more. That plan

showed that there would be 86 sections with a total area of 5 886 square
metres. It is not Wimbledon’s case that a fraudulent misrepresentation was
made when the sales took place, in the sense that Scharringhuisen then already
intended to cheat buyers.  Wimbledon’s case is that the sectional title plan
which Scharrighuisen had registered in the Deeds Registry subsequently,
without informing buyers, provided for 120 sections with a total area of 14
420 square metres. The extra area was achieved, not by enlarging the building,
but by the appropriation of a large part of the common property. Of the 34
extra sections, 10 are registered in the name of Casisles and 12 in the name of
Harbour’s Edge. How the 12 sections reached Harbour’s Edge (these are the
valuable ones) we are not told, as, despite a challenge to disclose, there came
only the statement that the sections ‘were purchased’ from Casisles. As the
entries in the Deeds Registry stand those 22 sections are owned by the one or
the other of the two corporations, now in liquidation, and their area has been
subtracted from the common property of the other unit-holders. It is these
doings that Cuninghame describes variously as a fraud or a theft. The exact
legal categorisation hardly matters. These allegations stand essentially
unchallenged.
[4] Section 41 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 provides:
‘Proceedings on behalf of bodies corporate.-(1)  When an owner is of the opinion
that he and the body corporate have suffered damages (sic) or loss or have been deprived of
any benefit in respect of a matter mentioned in section 36 (6), and the body corporate has

not instituted proceedings for the recovery of such damages, loss or benefit, or where the
body corporate does not take steps against an owner who does not comply with the rules,
the owner may initiate proceedings on behalf of the body corporate in the manner
prescribed in this section.
(2) (a) Any such owner shall serve a written notice on the body corporate calling on the
body corporate to institute such proceedings within one month from the date of
service of the notice, and stating that if the body corporate fails to do so, an
application to the Court under paragraph (b) will be made.
(b)
If the body corporate fails to institute such proceedings within the said period of one
month, the owner may make application to the Court for an order appointing a
curator ad litem for the body corporate for the purposes of instituting and
conducting proceedings on behalf of the body corporate.
(3)
The court may on such application, if it is satisfied –
(a)
that the body corporate has not instituted such proceedings;
(b)
that there are prima facie grounds for such proceedings; and
(c)
that an investigation into such grounds and into the desirability of the institution of
such proceedings is justified,
appoint a provisional curator ad litem and direct him to conduct such investigation and to
report to the Court on the return day of the provisional order.
(4)
The Court may on the return day discharge the provisional order referred to in
subsection (3), or confirm the appointment of the curator ad litem for the body corporate,
and issue such directions as it may deem necessary as to the institution of proceedings in
the name of the body corporate and the conduct of such proceedings on behalf of the body
corporate by the curator ad litem.’

[5] The relief that Wimbledon seeks is the appointment of a curator to the
body corporate, so that he may investigate these events, and, if so advised,
take action against Casisles and Harbour’s Edge, aimed at somehow restoring
the position. The three liquidators resist this claim on a variety of legal, not
factual, grounds, mainly directed against Wimbledon’s locus standi to apply
for the appointment of a curator or against the body corporate’s locus to bring
the proceedings contemplated. Van Reenen J, sitting in the Cape Provincial
Division of the High Court, held in favour of the respondents. The body
corporate, acting through its trustees, did not resist the application.
[6] It will be observed that one of the jurisdictional facts provided for in
s41(1) is, that an owner be of the opinion that he and the body corporate ‘have
been deprived of any benefit in respect of a matter mentioned in section
36 (6)’.
[7] Section 36 (6) provides:
‘The body corporate shall have perpetual succession and shall be capable of suing
and of being sued in its corporate name in respect of –
(a)
any contract made by it;
(b)
any damage to the common property;
(c)
any matter in connection with the land or building for which the body corporate is
liable or for which the owners are jointly liable;
(d)
any matter arising out of the exercise of any of its powers or the performance or
non-performance of any of its duties under this Act or any rule; and

(e)
any claim against the developer in respect of the scheme if so determined by special
resolution.’
[8] Van Reenen J found against Wimbledon, inter alia on the ground that
no special resolution in terms of s36(6)(e) to sue Casisles had been passed,
which is indeed the case. The ‘developer’ was, as stated, Casisles, so that
against it a special resolution was required. An ordinary resolution to allow
Harbour’s Edge to be sued was also rejected. The uncontradicted evidence of
Cuninghame makes it plain that if it had not been for the improprieties to be
described below the ordinary resolution would have been passed. Whether, but
for them, the special resolution would also have been passed is nowhere
clearly stated.
[9] Confining myself then to the ordinary resolution, in order to decide
whether it was properly rejected one must have regard to how the voting went,
and why it went the way it did. At the general meeting 44 unit-holders voted
in favour of a resolution that the body corporate take action against
Scharrighuisen’s two corporations. All the trustees, who included
Cuninghame, voted in favour of the motion. But their votes were swamped by
the votes that Casisles and Harbour’s Edge had acquired in the way described,
plus the contrary votes of six other unit-holders. Those six were all controlled
by one Krecklenburg, a chartered accountant who worked for Scharrighuisen.
Had the two corporations not voted against it, the resolution would have been
carried. (In terms of the definition contained in s1 of the Act a special

resolution requires a three-fourths majority both in number and in value.
What the requirements for an ordinary resolution may be depends upon s32(3)
and (4) of the Act and upon the content of the rules.  We do not have the rules
before us.)
[10] Can this situation be countenanced? I think not. I am content to start
with the Roman Law.  In D50.17. 134.1 Ulpian tells us ‘Nemo ex suo delicto
meliorem suam condicionem facere potest’, rendered in Watson’s translation
as ‘No one is allowed to improve his own condition by his own wrongdoing’.
This fundamental principle has been applied expressly at least twice in this
court, in Principal Immigration Officer v Bhula 1931 AD 323 at 330 and
Parity Insurance Co Ltd v Marescia and Others 1965 (3) SA 430(A) 433 and
435. It finds exact application to this case. Scharrighuisen, through his
corporations, by means of his fraud, obtained at least apparent ownership of
the contested sections. That carried with it the apparent right to direct the
votes of the owners of those sections. This vote was then used to smother an
attempt to reverse the consequences of the fraud; ie his successors, the
liquidators, in casting their votes were using his estate's strengthened position,
obtained by fraud, to maintain the hold over those sections.
[11] Not confining oneself to the language of delict or wrongfulness, one
finds the quoted precept scattered about the law. The principle of fictional
fulfilment in contract is an example. If a party is under a duty not to prevent
the fulfilment of a condition, he is treated as if has been fulfilled, if he fails in

that duty. Similarly the principle that a provision in a contract that has been
obtained by fraud may be rectified: Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD
282 at 288, 292 and Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418(A) at 422A, 425if-
426A.
[12] Applying the principle, the case must then be seen as if the resolution
had been passed. But the trustees, whilst finding themselves among the 44 aye
voters, and being apparently sympathetic to Cuninghame’s cause, consider
themselves to be incompetent to bring action because of what they assumed to
be a vote binding them not do so. Perhaps it would have been wise for the
trustees and/or Cunninghame to have proceeded to court, before the meeting
or during its adjournment, in order to obtain a determination that the votes of
the liquidators and the six were not to be counted against the proposed
resolutions.  And I would suggest to the trustees and Cunninghame that they
may choose to dispense with the services of the curator to be appointed once
this court has made it clear that the resolution should be treated as having been
passed. I shall make provision in the order at the end of this judgment to
facilitate agreement along these lines. However, as things stand now the body
corporate declines to institute action and the question remains whether
Wimbledon is entitled to have a curator appointed.  Although I have confined
myself to the clear case of the ordinary resolution, the reasoning is equally
applicable to a special resolution procured by reliance on a voting base
derived from fraudulent conduct.  There is no reason why the curator should

not investigate this question and, if the established facts justify action against
the developer, deal with the matter in his report to court.
[13] The jurisdictional facts that an owner must establish in order to entitle
him to apply for the appointment of a curator are set out in s41(1). They are:
1.
The owner must hold an opinion.
2.
The opinion must be either (a) that he and the body corporate have
suffered damages (again sic) or loss or (b) that he and the body corporate have
been deprived of a benefit in respect of a matter mentioned in s36(6).
3.
The body corporate has not instituted proceedings for recovery.
[14] The third requirement has been established. That this should be a
requirement seems to me to be a necessary counterpart to the sections of the
Act divesting individual owners of control and vesting it in the body
corporate. If the body corporate is seen not to do its duty, then an individual’s
powers may, to an extent, be restored.
[15] As to the first requirement, it is clear that Wimbledon, through the mind
of Cuninghame, held the opinion.  I shall assume, without deciding the point,
that the mere existence of a subjective opinion is not enough, but that there is
also an implicit requirement that such an opinion can reasonably be held. The
argument for the respondents is essentially that on the facts of this case it is
not legally possible to reasonably form the opinion. Whether this is correct is
bound up with the enquiry into the second requirement, which is concerned
with the content of the opinion.

[16] The first legal argument is that neither the body corporate nor the
trustees, as opposed to individual members, may pursue an action against the
developer or his creatures, based on a difference between what he has sold to
them, on the one hand, and the building as actually built according to the
registered sectional title plan – this in fraud of them. The argument is that
when the corporation comes into being it does so to administer what has been
built according to the registered plan, so that it has and can have no concern
with what has gone before.  (But note that fraud in relation to the parking area
may have been practised after the body corporate was formed.) I do not agree
with the argument. In the first place, s36(6)(e) expressly contemplates a
developer being sued by the corporation (or failing it by a curator) ‘in respect
of the scheme’. In the second place, section 1 defines a ‘scheme’ as a
‘development scheme’ and the latter is defined as meaning ‘a scheme in terms
of which a building or buildings situated or to be erected on land . . . is . . . for
the purposes of selling . . . to be divided into two or more sections . . .’
(emphasis supplied). So the scheme may exist before even the building has
been erected. See also the definition of ‘developer’ in s1 in which the phrase
‘or to be erected’ also appears. In the legislative contemplation it would have
been strange if the developer could be sued by the corporation for deviation
from the registered plan but not for deviation from the plan on which the
whole development was sold.

[17] Indeed it seems to me that a developer’s position is closely analogous to
that of a promoter of a company, who owes fiduciary duties to the company
being formed before it is able to function for itself. These duties bear close
comparison with the duties of directors once the company is operational. A
promoter’s position was described by Bristowe J in In re The Contributories
of the Rosemount Gold Mining Syndicate in Liquidation 1905 TH 169 at 196:
‘It is well established that promoters stand in a fiduciary relation to the company
which they promote. They are not merely its parents, but they are its creators. They fashion
and mould it according to their will. They endow it with powers or limit its activities in any
manner they think fit. And they cannot complain if the law makes them (as it does) the
guardians and protectors of its infant life. The duties and obligations which this position of
trust places upon promoters are (to use the words of LINDLEY, LJ, IN Re Olympia Limited
[1898] 2 Ch 165) “imposed by the plainest dictates of common honesty as well as by well-
settled principles of company law”. They include the duty of not making a secret profit at
the company’s expense, and also (if they wish it to enter into contracts with or make
payments to themselves) to furnish it with a board of directors, “who can and do exercise
an independent and intelligent judgment on the transaction” (see Erlanger v New Sombrero
Phosphate Co 3 AC 1236 per Lord CAIRNS). It was held in the Erlanger case that a
contract for sale between the promoters and the company could not stand where the
company’s concurrence had been obtained by means of a board of directors who were
merely the nominees and creatures of the promoters.’
[18] These remarks seem to me apposite to the developer of a sectional title
scheme.  According to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER
189, it is the company (in this case the corporation) and not individual

members, which should, in the first place and unless other factors be present,
hold a developer responsible for his misdeeds. It is then only right (as I think
the statute provides) that the individuals complaining should have the
advantage of the information and the funds of their corporation in pursuing an
allegedly errant developer.
[19] Supporting the conclusion that the developer in this case should be
equated to a promoter, is the fact, in my view, that there was a pre-
incorporation contract, in part for the benefit of the third party yet to come
into being, the body corporate, which would come into being upon the
registration of the transfer of the first unit. That contract, in my view, consists
of the sum of the contracts between the developer and individual buyers and it
explicitly includes in what was to be received those parts of the common
property which have since been excluded. It is suggested that a difficulty may
arise if it emerges that all the plans attached to deeds of sale were not the
same.  That has not been raised by the respondents, but if there is indeed a
problem then the curator may have to think about it. The possibility is no
reason for refusing relief now. As far as acceptance of the benefit goes, it is
plain that the body corporate implicitly accepted the benefits and duties of the
pre-incorporation contracts.
[20] The other legal argument for the respondents is that because it is the
unit-holders and not the corporate body who own the common property (in
undivided shares), there can be no talk of the corporation having suffered

damage or loss or having been deprived of a benefit, upon its not receiving a
large part of the hitherto common property. I am of the view that in order to
satisfy the subsection these adverse events must be suffered not only by the
applicant for the appointment of a curator but by the body corporate as well,
for the reasons that the ‘and’ in ‘he and the body corporate’ not only ordinarily
conveys a conjunctive meaning, but that the word is twice succeeded by the
plural verb ‘have’, indicating that both he and the body are being referred to.
Moreover, one would hardly expect that the legislature would require the body
corporate to sue in matters which did not concern it.
[21] Does the fact that the body corporate arguably (I leave the matter open)
does not own the common property in the technical legal sense mean that it
does not suffer loss in a case like this, where it has not received an important
part of what it was supposed to receive, so that it might control and use it? I
think not. Again ignoring the legal technicalities of how a sectional title
scheme is structured, the substance of the matter is that the body corporate is
little more than the aggregation of all the individual owners. Their good is its
good. Their ill is its ill. The body corporate is not an island, whatever the law
of persons may say. Most of the rent that it earns may ultimately go to the
owners, but in the meantime it collects the rent and uses a part of it to perform
its manifold duties of control, administration and management, of not only the
common property but of the scheme as a whole – see sections 36(4), 36(6), 37,
38 and 39.

[22] It will be observed that one of the subsections which I have just listed is
s36(6), already quoted. Section 41(1) states as an express alternative matter
upon which an opinion may be formed, the deprivation of a benefit in respect
of a matter mentioned in that subsection. Does the contemplated action fall
within any of its subdivisions? Let me start with s36(6)(a), which confers the
power to sue in respect of ‘any contract made by it’. I have already explained
why, in my opinion, there is a pre-incorporation contract in existence which
confers on the body corporate benefits with regard to the common property.  If
that be so then (a) is satisfied.
[23] It this be not correct, another basis is provided by s36(6)(d), which
gives power to sue in respect of ‘any matter arising out of the exercise of any
of its powers or the performance or non-performance of any of its duties under
this Act or any rule’. Once one rejects the argument that the body corporate is
entitled only to what is presently registered in its favour and not what was
undertaken to be given prior to registration, then, in my opinion the body
corporate is under a duty to recover for its members and itself that to which it
was entitled.
[24] That leaves s36(6)(e) – dealing with a claim against the developer. The
reason for the inclusion of this subsection seems to be to require that a strong
majority is needed before the unit-holders may turn against the person who
has been responsible for the creation of their units. A decision to proceed

against any other person could be taken by ordinary resolution under s36(6)(d)
or one of the other subsections.
[25] For the reasons given I am of the opinion that Wimbledon has
established also that it will be competent for the body corporate to institute
action in some or other form, so the last bar to establishing its locus standi
falls.
[26] As to whether a curator ought to be appointed, the court has a discretion
under s41(3), having regard to whether it is satisfied that the body corporate
has not sued (satisfied), that there are prima facie grounds for such
proceedings (a strong prima facie case of fraud has been made) and that an
investigation into the desirability of instituting proceedings is justified.  In my
opinion there is ample justification.
[27] Finally, we are sought to be persuaded of the incompetence or ultimate
futility of any action that is contemplated. Wimbledon has not spelt out what
relief the body corporate ought to seek. It has merely suggested possibilities.
The Act does not require exact specification. That should, in my view, await
the completion of the investigation. The respondents know that the case that
the estates that they are liquidating face is fraud.  That is enough. The curator
should obtain proper advice and properly investigate the facts. There has been
no complete investigation in the case before us and that is unsurprising. Fraud
is a crime committed in a corner. To give an instance of the arguments raised
by the respondents, it is said that if a claim for rectification of the deeds

registry is brought (this is one of the suggested remedies) the interests of bona
fide third parties may be affected. These include bondholders. The
bondholders are not before us. In the order I propose, provision will be made
for them to be served. It may be (I say may) that if the Deeds Registry is
rectified their bonds will have to stand. I do not know. There was also
reference to a lease over part of the property, but that lease appears to have
expired.
[28] I can see other possible difficulties ahead, difficulties which may be
overcome, or which may prove fatal, but it is not for me to express opinions at
this stage. For the respondents’ arguments to succeed they will have to
persuade me, at least, that there is little chance of any claim ever succeeding.
That they have not done.
[29] The appeal is allowed with costs including the costs of senior counsel.
The order of the court a quo dismissing the application with costs is set aside
and replaced with the following order:
1.
Mr D R Mitchell SC, a practising advocate of the Cape Bar is appointed
to act as a provisional curator ad litem to the third respondent in terms of
section 41(3) of the Sectional Titles Act, 95 of 1986.
2.
The return day of this order before the Cape High Court is to be
Thursday, 12 June 2003 when the provisional order may be discharged or the
appointment of a curator ad litem may be confirmed and further directions

may be given by the Court for the institution of proceedings in the name of the
third respondent.
3.
This appointment of the provisional curator ad litem shall take effect
two weeks after the date of this order.
4.
The provisional curator ad litem is directed to:
4.1
conduct an investigation into the grounds and desirability of the
institution of proceedings on behalf of the third respondent in order to:
4.1.1 take such steps as are necessary to obtain registration of the immovable
property listed in the schedule annexed to this order as common
property of the Harbour’s Edge Sectional Title Scheme;  and/or
4.1.2 claim such damages as may be legally recoverable as a result of the
alleged misconduct of the developer and any of its successors in title as
set out in the affidavits filed of record on behalf of the applicant.
4.2
Report the results of his investigation and his recommendations to the
Cape High Court on the return day.
5.
The fees and disbursements of the provisional curator ad litem shall
be paid
by
the
third
respondent,
subject
to
such
rights
of
recovery thereof from the first and/or second respondents as may be a part of
the proceedings referred to in paragraph 4.1 above.
6.
Service of this order is to be effected upon:
6.1
The Registrar of Deeds;
6.2
Nedbank Limited;

6.3
The third respondent.
7.
This order shall be published once in the Cape Times and
Die Burger newspapers.
8.
The first and second respondents, in their nominal capacity as cited, are
ordered to pay the costs occasioned by their opposition to the application for
the appointment of a provisional curator ad litem, jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved.

_____________
W P SCHUTZ
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR
OLIVIER JA
ZULMAN JA
HEHER AJA

STREICHER JA:
[1] The appellant applied in the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division in
terms of s 41 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1996 (‘the Act’) for an order (a)
appointing a provisional curator ad litem (‘the curator’) to the third
respondent being the Harbour’s Edge Body Corporate (‘the body corporate’)
and (b) directing the curator to conduct an investigation as to the grounds and
desirability of the institution of proceedings on behalf of the body corporate
‘in order to claim and re-transfer certain immovable property’. In the replying
affidavit filed by the appellant it is stated that the reference to the re-transfer
of the property was perhaps unfortunate as ‘the claim on behalf of the body
corporate essentially (boiled) down to the rectification of the sectional plans’.
It is stated further that the curator would ‘naturally also investigate an
alternative claim of damages’ based on a fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation. The proceedings envisaged by the appellant were therefore
claims for rectification of the sectional plan and for damages. The court a quo
dismissed the application. Schutz JA, with whom the other members of this
court agree, is of the view that the appeal against the court a quo’s judgment
should be upheld. I disagree for the following reasons.
[2] Section 41(1) of the Act provides as follows:
‘When an owner is of the opinion that he and the body corporate have suffered
damages or loss or have been deprived of any benefit in respect of a matter mentioned in

section 36 (6), and the body corporate has not instituted proceedings for the recovery of
such damages, loss or benefit, . . . the owner may initiate proceedings on behalf of the body
corporate in the manner prescribed in this section.’
I accept that the appellant is of the opinion that he and the body corporate
suffered damage or loss or have been deprived of a benefit in respect of a
matter mentioned in s 36(6). It is common cause that the body corporate has
not instituted proceedings for the recovery of such damages, loss or benefit. It
follows that I accept that the appellant could initiate proceedings in the
manner prescribed in the section.
[3] Subsection (2) provides as follows:
‘(a) Any such owner shall serve a written notice on the body corporate calling on
the body corporate to institute such proceedings within one month from the date of service
of the notice, and stating that if the body corporate fails to do so, an application to the Court
under paragraph (b) will be made.
(b) If the body corporate fails to institute such proceedings within the said period of
one month, the owner may make application to the Court for an order appointing a curator
ad litem to the body corporate for the purposes of instituting and conducting proceedings
on behalf of the body corporate.’
Again I accept that the formalities prescribed in this section were complied
with and that the appellant could in terms of the section apply for an order
appointing a curator ad litem to the body corporate for the purposes of
instituting and conducting proceedings on behalf of the body corporate.
[4] Subsection (3) provides as follows:

‘The court may on such application, if it is satisfied-
(a) that the body corporate has not instituted such proceedings;
(b) that there are prima facie grounds for such proceedings; and
(c) that an investigation into such grounds and into the desirability of the institution
of such proceedings is justified,
appoint a provisional curator ad litem and direct him to conduct such investigation and to
report to the Court on the return day of the provisional order.’
It follows that the appellant had to satisfy the court a quo that there were
prima facie grounds for the proceedings it required the body corporate to
institute. In my view the appellant failed to make out a case which could
satisfy a court that there were prima facie grounds for such proceedings.
[5] A sectional title development at Harbour’s Edge, Gordon’s Bay gave
rise to these proceedings. The development comprises hotel rooms,
penthouses, basement parking, recreational facilities, shops, a dining room or
restaurant, kitchen and conference facilities. A Mr Scharrighuisen through
Casisles Coastal Property Investments CC (‘the developer’) conducted the
development.  The developer is presently in liquidation and the first
respondent has been appointed its liquidator. During the planning stages of the
development a Mr Cuninghame, who deposed to the founding affidavit filed
by the appellant, and other prospective purchasers, became interested in
purchasing apartments also described as a hotel suites in the development and
conducted negotiations with Scharrighuisen and his representatives.
According to Cuninghame he attended a meeting with such other prospective

purchasers at which an agent of the seller told them ‘that they were not only
purchasing a fully-furnished hotel suite (section) but also an undivided share
in the common property, which included parking, conference facilities, hotel
reception and offices, hotel dining-room and kitchen, passages, squash court,
swimming pool, etc’. He says, furthermore, that during the negotiations
Scharrighuisen relied heavily upon the income that the hotel/conference
facility would generate, and produced cash flow projections which showed
that one could settle his bond in seven years from the income generated by the
hotel/conference facilities after which the investment would be ‘a great
pension plan’.
[6] On 18 June 1996 ‘Cuninghame or nominee’ (‘the purchaser’) as
purchaser concluded a written agreement of sale (‘the deed of sale’) with the
developer as seller in terms of which the developer sold to the purchaser a unit
in a proposed sectional title development scheme in respect of a hotel it
intended to erect on erf 4600, Gordon’s Bay. The unit consisted of a section,
being apartment no B82, together with an undivided share in the common
property apportioned to the section in accordance with its participation quota
of 1,1893%. It was recorded in clause 8.1 of the deed of sale that it was the
intention of the parties that the scheme would operate as a hotel apartment
scheme and that ‘to this end the SELLER has retained various sections within
the scheme in order to provide the necessary facilities for the operation of the
hotel’. The parties agreed that the seller would ‘place these sections at the

disposal of the Management Company so as to enable the Management
Company to contract with the Operator for the operation of the scheme as a
hotel apartment scheme’. The purchaser similarly undertook and agreed to
place the section purchased at the disposal of the management company and to
enter into a rental pool agreement, as per a draft annexed to the agreement of
sale, with the management company.
[7] The rental pool agreement was to be an agreement between the
developer, the purchaser and a management company which was to be
appointed by the developer. It provided that the purchaser would let the
relevant unit to the management company; that the management company
would enter into a similar agreement with the owners of other units in order to
create a rental pool; that the management company would contract with an
operator to endeavour to let the units to guests; and that the management
company would pay to the purchaser a monthly rental calculated according to
the following formula:
A x owner’s points/total points
Where:
‘A’ represents the net accommodation revenue received
from the rental pool:
‘Owner’s points’ represents those points allocated to the
owner and calculated as the product of the number of
nights in any one month that the unit was pooled and the
income participation share allocated to the unit: and

‘Total points’ represents the sum of all points allocated to
the owners participating and whose units together form the
rental pool for the month in question.
[8] At the time when the agreement of sale was concluded the building had
not been erected yet. Drawings were, however, annexed to the deed of sale
and the purchaser acknowledged that he had read and approved the drawings
and that he would be obliged to accept delivery of the unit completed
substantially according to the drawings and as finally depicted and delineated
on the sectional plan. The parties agreed that the buildings, being the
‘Harbour’s Edge Hotel’, would be built substantially in accordance with the
drawings provided that the developer was entitled to inter alia substitute items
of a similar standard and quality for any specified item referred to in the
finishing schedule or the schedule of furnishings or vary the sectional plans
for the building should the seller consider it reasonably necessary for technical
or aesthetic reasons.
[9] According to Cuninghame the basement parking, conference facilities,
utility rooms and staff canteen (‘the disputed properties’) were all defined as
common property in the deed of sale. However, no such definition is to be
found in the deed of sale. In terms of s 1 of the Act the land and such parts of
the building as were not included in a section would have constituted common
property. I have already referred to the provision in the deed of sale to the
effect that the seller ‘retained various sections within the scheme in order to

provide the necessary facilities for the operation of the hotel’. The appellant
contends that the sections referred to must be hotel suites in that only hotel
suites are mentioned in the Participation Quota List annexed to the deed of
sale. The contention cannot be sustained. Firstly, hotel suites do not provide
facilities for the operation of a hotel. Secondly the list, despite adding up to a
participation quota of 100%, does not purport to be a list of all the sections in
the development. It is quite apparent that the list only relates to residential
sections or apartments. Each residential apartment is identified by its number
according to the drawings annexed to the deed of sale. Cuninghame was well
aware that the list was not intended to be a list of all the sections in the
building. He states that during the negotiations with the seller the seller
pointed out ‘that the areas designated “shop 1 – shop 5”, the “restaurant” and
the “tavern” reflected on the ground floor plan were to be “commercial
property”, i.e., property retained by the Seller’ and not common property.
Section 32(1) provides that in the case of a scheme for residential purposes
only, the participation quota of a section shall be expressed as a percentage
arrived at by dividing the floor area of the section by the floor area of all the
sections in the building or buildings comprised in the scheme. In the case of a
scheme that is not for residential purposes only, the developer has to
determine the participation quota (subsection (2)). To the extent that the
scheme is residential the total of the quotas allocated by the developer to the
residential sections shall be divided among them in proportion to a calculation

of their quotas made in terms of subsection (1). The appellant’s contention
that the reference in clause 8.1 must be a reference to hotel suites is, therefore,
wrong. The retention of various sections within the scheme in order to provide
facilities for the operation of the hotel together with an undertaking to ‘place
these sections at the disposal of the Management Company so as to enable the
Management Company to contract with the Operator for the operation of the
scheme as a hotel apartment scheme’ may have obliged the developer to place
these sections at the disposal of the management company (maybe at a fair
rate depending on the proper interpretation of the undertaking) but not to have
these sections designated common property.
[10]  Cuninghame also contends that the operating budget in respect of the
first year of operating the hotel indicates that the disputed sections formed part
of the common property of the development. He suggests that that is so
because parking revenue is listed and because no expenditure is listed for the
hiring of the conference rooms. Apart from parking revenue (R142 312) the
only sources of revenue listed are rooms revenue (R10 455 604), telephone
revenue (R347 873) and sundry revenue. No revenue is budgeted in respect of
the dining room, food and beverages or the conference facilities. That in my
view is a clear indication that in terms of the deed of sale the dining room and
conference facilities were not intended to be common property.
[11] Cuninghame concludes that it is ‘clear from the various provisions of
the Deed of Sale and the Act quoted above, that all property outside hotel

suites, penthouses and the commercial properties described above were
intended to, and did, constitute common property for the benefit of all
individual purchasers/owners’. In my view, for the reasons set out above, that
conclusion is wrong. At best for the appellant, it appears from the provisions
of the deed of sale that, of the disputed properties, only the basement parking
was intended to be common property.
[12] Cuninghame nevertheless alleges that he was under the impression that
all the disputed properties were common property. As proof that he was under
that impression he refers to the fact that he, as a qualified land surveyor,
during October 1996 submitted a quotation for the preparation of sectional
plans in terms of which quotation he treated all the disputed properties as
common property. He says that Scharrighuisen referred him to Mr Rick
Granville, the architect, to obtain plans for the quotation and that he confirmed
the common property areas with Granville. Although Granville was never
consulted with regard to which portions of the building would be either
common property or sections he states in a supporting affidavit that his own
understanding of the matter was that the conference facilities were intended to
be common property. He states, furthermore, that the fact that the kitchen was
designed such that it could serve one of the conference rooms indicated that it
was also intended to be common property.
[13] The initial working drawings prepared by Granville in mid-1996 were
revised 15 times between 19 August 1996 and 2 September 1997. As a result

the building eventually erected on erf 4600 was not built substantially in
accordance with the drawings annexed to the deed of sale as was required by
the deed of sale. According to these drawings the ground floor was to consist
of inter alia a restaurant, a tavern, five shops, two conference rooms and a
squash court. However, the layout of the ground floor was changed and
eventually the tavern had to make way for a hotel dining room cum restaurant;
the restaurant and the squash court disappeared and a kitchen and two more
shops were added. The layout of the first floor also changed in that a hotel
dining room and kitchen were replaced with five new hotel suites.
[14] Sections 4 and 7 of the Act require a developer who intends to establish
a development scheme to cause a draft sectional plan to be submitted to the
Surveyor-General. The scheme may relate to an existing building or to a
building to be erected or being in the process of erection (s 4(2)). The draft
sectional plan has to be prepared by a land surveyor or architect from an actual
measurement undertaken by him or under his direction (s 6(1)). It has to
include a plan to scale of each storey in the building shown thereon; define the
boundaries of each section; distinguish each section by a number; show the
floor area of each section and the total floor area of all the sections; and have
endorsed upon or annexed to it a schedule specifying the quota of each section
in accordance with section 32(1) or (2) and the total of the quotas of all
sections shown thereon (s 5). After approval of the draft sectional plan by the
Surveyor-General the developer may apply to the Registrar of Deeds

concerned for the opening of a sectional title register in respect of the land and
building and for the registration of the sectional plan (s 11(1)). Simultaneously
with the opening of the sectional title register the Registrar of Deeds has to
issue to the developer a certificate of registered sectional title in respect of
each section and its undivided share in the common property. Thereupon the
building and the land shown on the sectional plan are deemed to be divided
into sections and common property as shown on the sectional plan (s 13(1)). It
is only after such deemed division has taken place that ownership in a unit in
the sectional title development can be transferred by means of a deed of
transfer (s 15B(1)). All of these formalities were apparently complied with on
or before 19 September 1997 being the date of the certificate of registered
sectional title in terms of which all the disputed properties were registered in
the name of the developer. Subsequently some of the disputed properties were
transferred to Harbour’s Edge Commercial Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd
(‘Harbour’s Edge Commercial Property Holdings’). Like the developer
Harbour’s Edge Commercial Property Holdings is presently in liquidation and
the second respondents have been appointed its liquidators.
[15] With effect from the date on which the first person other than the
developer became the owner of a unit in the sectional title development
scheme there was deemed to be established for that scheme a body corporate
of which the developer and such person were members. Every person who

thereafter became a member of a unit also became a member of the body
corporate. (S 36(1)).
[16] Cuninghame attended the official opening ceremony of the hotel in
November 1997 and then realized that the basement parking was not being
treated as common property. By that time the sectional title plan had been
registered and the sectional title register had been opened. The various
sections and the common property in the development had, therefore, already
been determined. The purchaser had, however, not yet taken transfer of a
section in the sectional title development. It was only on 11 February 1998
that Cuninghame’s nominee, the appellant, took transfer of section 91. The
appellant is a company of which Cuninghame is the sole director and a
shareholder.
[17] On these facts the court a quo had to decide, before a curator ad litem
could be appointed, whether there were prima facie grounds for proceedings
for the recovery of damages, loss or benefit in respect of a matter mentioned
in s 36(6). The section reads as follows:
‘(6) The body corporate shall have perpetual succession and shall be capable of
suing and of being sued in its corporate name in respect of-

(a)
any contract made by it;

(b)
any damage to the common property;
(c)
any matter in connection with the land or building for which the body
corporate is liable or for which the owners are jointly liable;

(d)
any matter arising out of the exercise of any of its powers or the
performance or non-performance of any of its duties under this Act or any rule; and
(e)
any claim against the developer in respect of the scheme if so determined by
special resolution.’
[18] Counsel for the appellant submitted that ‘Scharrighuisen had clearly
indicated (and indeed promoted sales on this basis) to all concerned that the
areas in question would be part of the common property, and then, unbeknown
to them, had prepared the sectional title plan in such a manner that this was
not the case, enabling him to appropriate/sell off such sections, which, in the
circumstances, constitutes fraudulent conduct on his part’. He submitted that
the appellant was entitled to rectification of the registered sectional plan so
that it would reflect the contract between the parties alternatively that the
appellant was entitled to the rectification of both the deed of sale and the
registered sectional plan so as to reflect the true intention of the parties which
was that the disputed properties should be common property. In making these
submissions he relied on Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 and
Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (A) at 428. In the alternative he
submitted that the body corporate is entitled to claim damages in respect of the
misrepresentations.
[19] At best for the appellant, the aforesaid facts establish, prima facie, that
Scharrighuisen or the developer misrepresented to Cuninghame that in terms
of the deed of sale the disputed properties were going to be common property

whereas in terms of the deed of sale, of the disputed properties, only the
basement parking was going to be common property. Thereafter the developer
proceeded to erect a building that differed substantially from the building that
was to be erected in terms of the drawings annexed to the deed of sale. It also
proceeded to have a sectional plan registered and a sectional title register
opened in respect of a scheme substantially different from the proposed
scheme according to the deed of sale. One of the differences being that the
basement parking was shown as a section and not as common property. The
appellant became aware of the fact that a sectional plan in respect of a
substantially different scheme had been registered before transfer of section 91
was passed to it. In particular it became aware that the extent of the common
property differed materially from the common property according to the
proposed scheme as per the deed of sale in that the basement parking was not
common property in terms of the scheme that was registered. The appellant
was, therefore, aware that the seller was not able to perform in terms of the
deed of sale. However, it did not resile from the deed of sale as it was entitled
to do but now wants the body corporate to claim, by way of rectification of the
sectional plan, a conversion of the disputed properties into common property
and/or damages. The basis upon which the appellant wants the body corporate
to claim rectification and/or damages is spelt out in paragraphs 2.4, 2.5 and
4.5.2 of the appellants founding affidavit. These paragraphs read as follows:

‘2.4
The application/potential claim by the body corporate as against the
Respondents is based thereon that certain parts of the development, which had, in terms of
the Deeds of Sale with the various purchasers of the units, and in terms of representations
made by the developer, been designated as common property . . . were, contrary to the said
Deeds of Sale/representations, sold/registered in the name of the Respondents, which
properties the majority of bona fide purchasers of the units now wish to recover as common
property.’
‘2.5
Since the body corporate is, by definition and in terms of the Act, the
custodian of common property, it is appropriate that the Body Corporate seeks the
retransfer of the properties concerned, and, to the extent necessary, rectification of the
sectional plans, and /or damages.’
‘4.5.2 We accordingly seek the rectification of the sectional plans to the extent that
the common property will constitute the portions of the building defined as common
property in the Deed of Sale agreement and retransfer of the properties, alternatively, a
claim for damages.’
Before us the appellant argued, inter alia, that the registration of the sectional
title plan constituted a fraud. That is not the case advanced in the founding
affidavit. In fact, there is no express allegation of any fraudulent conduct to be
found in the founding affidavit. In the replying affidavit there is a reference to
fraudulent alternatively negligent misrepresentation but it is not at all clear
what representation is being referred to. In any event, the registration of the
sectional title register and the transfer of some of the disputed properties to
Harbour’s Edge Commercial Property Holdings could have constituted a
breach of the deed of sale on the part of the developer but it is difficult to

imagine how these actions by themselves could have constituted a fraud vis a
vis the purchaser or the body corporate.
[20] I have already stated that in terms of the deed of sale, of the disputed
properties, only the basement parking was going to be common property.
However, notwithstanding the fact that no express allegation of fraud is made
in the founding affidavit, I will assume in favour of the appellant that a case
has been made out that a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the terms of the
deed of sale was made. I furthermore assume in favour of the appellant that,
because of such fraud, the purchaser became entitled to rectification of the
deed of sale so as to reflect the disputed properties as common property (see
Benjamin v Gurewitz supra at 424F-426H). It does, however, not follow that
the purchaser, let alone the body corporate in its stead, became entitled to the
rectification of the sectional plan and the Weinerlein-case, contrary to the
submission by the appellant, is not authority for the proposition that it does. In
the Weinerlein-case it was alleged that a deed of sale as well as the subsequent
deed of transfer, as a result of a mistake, did not reflect the common intention
of the parties correctly. An exception to a claim for the rectification of the
deed of sale and the deed of transfer was dismissed.
[21] The ownership of immovable property is transferred from an owner to
another person when transfer is given by the owner with the intention to
transfer ownership and received by the other person with the intention to
acquire ownership (see Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles,

Brothers & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369 at 368; Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v
Western Bank Bpk en Andere NNO 1978 (4) SA 281 (A) at 301 in fine –
302A; and Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and
Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) at 577G). Transfer of ownership therefore
takes place in terms of an real agreement between the parties (see Air-Kel
(Edms) Bpk H/A Merkel Motors v Bodenstein en `n Ander 1980 (3) SA 917
(A) at 922F-G). If the deed of transfer, as a result of mistake or fraud does not
carry out the real intention with which transfer is given and received the
aggrieved person may in terms of the common law apply to court for a
rectification thereof (see Ludolph and Others v Wegner and Others 6 SC 193
at 198; Saayman v Le Grange 1879 Buch 10). (It is not necessary to consider
to what extent, if any, statutory provisions such as the provisions of the Deeds
Registries Act 47 of 1937, affected the common law.) It follows that it is the
real agreement between the parties as reflected in the deed of transfer which
may be rectified in terms of the common law. Kotzè JA said in the
Weinerlein-case at 294:
‘The written contract and transfer deed were intended to embody a previous verbal
agreement between the parties, and to convey to the plaintiffs the property agreed to be
sold. . . . The question is whether, under the circumstances, the written instruments can be
rectified on the ground of the said mistake. . . .
. . . [T]he Court can, upon the . . . ground of fraud, rectify the mistake in the written
instruments, if it is satisfied that these instruments do not in some material respect contain
the actual intention of the parties.’

[22] A sectional plan is not analogous to a deed of transfer. The registration
of a sectional plan constitutes the approval of a unilateral application by the
developer. It is not intended to and does not purport to reflect a common
intention between the developer and another party or parties. The remedy of
rectification which is available in respect of agreements, that, due to a
common mistake, do not reflect the intention of the parties, is therefore not
applicable.
[23] As a result of the fraudulent misrepresentation the purchaser was
entitled to rescind the deed of sale and claim damages, or to hold the
developer to the contract and claim specific performance, in so far as it was
possible for the developer to specifically perform, and damages. The question
is, however, whether it has prima facie been established that the body
corporate suffered damage or loss or has been deprived of any benefit  in
respect of a matter mentioned in s 36(6), as a result of the developer not
having performed in terms of the deed of sale. Put differently has it prima
facie been established that the body corporate suffered damage or loss or that
it was deprived of a benefit and, if it has, does the body corporate, in terms of
s 36(6), have the power to sue for such damages or loss or benefit. As s 41 is
concerned with a claim in respect of which the body corporate may institute
action against a third party ‘deprived of a benefit’ must in my view be
interpreted to mean deprived of a benefit to which the body corporate was

entitled. I shall hereinafter refer to ‘damage or loss or deprivation of a benefit’
as ‘a loss’.
[24] The appellant contends that the body corporate suffered a loss in that in
terms of the deed of sale the common property should have included the
disputed properties which would have generated an additional income to the
body corporate. I disagree. The body corporate came into existence in respect
of a scheme as reflected in the registered sectional plan. In terms of s 37(1)(r)
it is obliged, in general, to control, manage and administer the common
property for the benefit of all the owners. In order to do so it is empowered by
s 38(j) to do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the rules
and for the control, management and administration of the common property.
The common property referred to is the common property as per the registered
sectional plan. The disputed properties and the income generated by them
never formed part of the common property and the body corporate never had
any entitlement to them. The fact that they do not form part of the common
property, therefore, cannot constitute a loss to the body corporate.
[25] My colleague Schutz JA is of the view that the deed of sale was a pre-
incorporation contract, in part for the benefit of the body corporate which was
to come into existence. He is, furthermore, of the view that it is clear that the
body corporate implicitly accepted the benefits and duties of the ‘pre-
incorporation contract’. A contract for the benefit of a third party is not simply
a contract which will benefit a third party; ‘what is required is an intention on

the part of the parties to a contract that a third person can, by adopting the
benefit, become a party to the contract’. (See Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Bekker NO 1992 (1) SA 617 (A) at 625E-G.) In Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v
Cleveland Estates(Pty) Ltd; Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Vorner Investments
(Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 155 (A) at 172B-D Corbett JA quoted the following
passage in Crookes NO and Another v Watson and Others 1956 (1) SA 277
(A) at 291E-F with approval:
‘[T]he typical contract for the benefit of a third person is one where A and B make a
contract  in order that C may be enabled, by notifying A, to become a party to a contract
between himself and A. What contractual rights exist between A and B pending acceptance
by C and how far after such acceptance it is still possible for contractual relations between
A and B to persist are matters on which differences of opinion are possible; but broadly
speaking the idea of such transactions is that B drops out when C accepts and
thenceforward it is A and C who are bound to each other.’
It does not appear from the deed of sale and it was never contended in the
papers filed that the parties intended to contract for the benefit of a third party.
It has furthermore not been suggested by anybody in the papers filed or
anywhere else that if there was such a pre-incorporation contract for the
benefit of the body corporate that the body corporate adopted the contract. In
the circumstances there is in my view no basis for a finding that the alleged
claim relates to a contract made by the body corporate. In any event a body
corporate comes into existence in respect of a registered sectional plan from
which it will appear which parts of the building is common property. A

contract for the benefit of the body corporate in respect of such common
property would not make any sense. A contract for the benefit of the body
corporate that any other parts of the building, that is to say sections in terms of
the registered sectional plan, would be common property would make even
less sense. I therefore find it inconceivable that the parties would have
intended to contract for the benefit of the body corporate as to what part of the
building to be erected would constitute common property. In terms of the deed
of sale the developer bound itself to deliver to the purchaser an apartment in a
sectional title development as per the drawings annexed to the deed of sale. It
did not bind itself to provide, at that time, a non-existent body corporate with
certain common property to administer.
[26] Even if the fact that the disputed properties do not form part of the
common property of the development is to be considered a loss to the body
corporate, prima facie grounds for the proposed proceedings have not been
shown to exist as it is not a loss in respect of a matter mentioned in s 36(6) or
put differently it is not a loss in respect of which the body corporate has the
power to sue in terms of the section.
[27] The alleged loss does not relate to a contract made by the body
corporate; it does not relate to damage to the common property; and it did not
arise out of the exercise by the body corporate of any of its powers or the
performance or non-performance of any of its duties under the Act or any rule.
Section 36(6)(a), (b) and (d) are therefore not applicable. Section 36(6)(c)

deals with the body corporate’s capability of being sued and is, therefore, also
not applicable.
[28] It remains to consider whether the alleged loss is a loss ‘in respect of the
scheme’ in which event it will be a loss in respect of which the body corporate
may sue in terms of the provisions of s 36(6)(e). ‘Scheme’ is defined in the
Act as a development scheme and a development scheme is in turn defined as
‘a scheme in terms of which a building or buildings situated or to be erected
on land within the area of jurisdiction of a local authority is or are, for the
purposes of selling, letting or otherwise dealing therewith, to be divided into
two or more sections . . . ’. There can only be one scheme in respect of a
particular body corporate and that is the scheme that brought it into being. In
respect of the body corporate we are dealing with, the scheme is the scheme
reflected in the registered sectional plan and not the scheme envisaged in the
deed of sale which latter scheme was not proceeded with. The body corporate
did not suffer loss in respect of the scheme as reflected in the registered
sectional plan. Before us the question arose what claims a body corporate
could have against a developer if the section was so construed. There are
various possibilities. One such possibility is a claim for the costs of correcting
an incorrect sectional plan (s 14(2)). Another one is a claim in terms of s
36(7)(a)(ii) which requires a developer to convene a meeting of the members
of the body corporate at which he has to furnish the members with a certificate
from the local authority to the effect that all rates due by him up to the date of

establishment of the body corporate have been paid. Yet another one is a claim
in terms of s 36(7)(a)(iii) and s 36(7)(aA) for proof of revenue and
expenditure concerning the management of the scheme from the date of the
first occupation of any unit until the date of the establishment of the body
corporate and for payment of any residue revealed by such proof.
[29] The appellant’s claim is a personal claim which remained the
appellant’s claim when the body corporate was established. Owners other
than the developer and Harbour’s Edge Commercial Holdings own fifty-
three hotel suites and 2 penthouses. Forty-four of those owners supported
a resolution that the sectional plans be amended and that, to the extent
necessary, action be instituted against the first and second respondents to
this end. Six voted against the resolution. The others were apparently not
present or represented at the meeting. Cuninghame says in the founding
affidavit that the circumstances giving rise to his own deed of sale
generally pertained to the other individual units. I do, however, not think
that he intended to suggest that misrepresentations or the same
misrepresentations were made to all the purchasers or that all their
contracts are identical. The fact that there may be differences illustrates
how untenable it is to suggest that the body corporate acquired the rights
to performance and damages of the individual owners. If only some
purchasers were entitled to damages as a result of a particular section not
being common property and if the body corporate were to have acquired

their rights to such damages the owners who were not entitled to such
damages would benefit at the expense of the owners who were so entitled.
[30] For these reasons I am of the view that the appellant failed to make
out a case that there are prima facie grounds for proceedings to be
instituted on behalf of the body corporate for the recovery of damages,
loss or of a benefit of which it had been deprived in respect of a matter
mentioned in s 36(6).
[31] It follows that in my view the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

_______________

P E STREICHER

Judge of Appeal