THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No: 156/14

Not reportable
In the matter between:

PETRUS RAMMBUDA

APPELLANT
and
THE STATE

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Rammbuda v The State (156/14) [2014] ZASCA 146 (26
September 2014)

Coram:

PONNAN, SALDULKER JJA and DAMBUZA AJA

Heard:
12 September 2014
Delivered:

26 September 2014
Summary:
Evidence – witnesses - competence of – child witness – manner of
questioning by presiding officer in an enquiry in terms of sections 162 and 164 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.

_________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_________________________________________________________________
On appeal from: L.impopo High Court, Thohoyandou (Hetisani J) sitting as a
court of first instance.
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The conviction and sentence are set aside.
_________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________________
Saldulker JA (Ponnan JA and Dambuza AJA concurring):
[1] The appellant, Mr Petrus Rammbuda, was convicted on 4 November 2002
in the regional court, Thohoyandou of the rape of a seven year old girl. Following
the conviction, the regional magistrate stopped the proceedings and committed
the appellant for sentencing by the high court in terms of section 52(1)(b) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. In the high court, Hetisani J confirmed
the conviction and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. The appellant
appeals to this court against the conviction and sentence with the leave of the
high court.

[2] Before us it was argued that  two of the child witnesses, including the
complainant on the rape charge, had not been properly sworn or admonished in
terms of s 164 read with s 162 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977  prior to
them testifying in support of the State‟s case.  Furthermore, it was submitted that
even if the evidence of the complainant had been properly received by the trial
court, it was riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies. Accordingly, so the
argument went, the conviction fell to be overturned.

[3] In regard to the complainant, the record reads:
„Court:

Right are you PN?
PN:

Correct.
Court

PN are you already in school?
PN:

Yes.
Court:

In what standard or grade are you now?
PN:

Grade 2.
Court:
Grade 2. Now at this stage PN what it means to tell truth, what is
the difference between the truth and a lie?
PN:

Yes I know

Court:
In court we only tell the truth and you do not tell us lies right. What
is also   important do not come and tell us what other people told
you to come and tell us, we only want what you have seen and
what you have experienced, is that clear?
PN:
Correct.
Court:
You are caution to tell the truth.‟

[4] Sections 162 to 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act provide:
‘162. Witness to be examined under oath.
(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 163 and 164, no person shall be examined as a
witness in criminal proceedings unless he is under oath, which shall be administered by
the presiding judicial officer or, in the case of a superior court, by the presiding judge or
the registrar of the court, and which shall be in the following form:
“I swear that the evidence that I shall give, shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help me God.”

(2) If any person to whom the oath is administered wishes to take the oath with uplifted
hand, he shall be permitted to do so.
163. Affirmation in lieu of oath.
(1) Any person who is or may be required to take the oath and–
(a) who objects to taking the oath;
(b) who objects to taking the oath in the prescribed form;
(c) who does not consider the oath in the prescribed form to be binding on his
conscience; or
(d) who informs the presiding judge or, as the case may be, the presiding judicial officer,
that he has no religious belief or that the taking of the oath is contrary to his religious
belief,
shall make an affirmation in the following words in lieu of the oath and at the direction of
the presiding judicial officer or, in the case of a superior court, the presiding judge or the
registrar of the court:
“I solemnly affirm that the evidence that I shall give, shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth”.
(2) Such affirmation shall have the same legal force and effect as if the person making it
had taken the oath.
(3) The validity of an oath duly taken by a witness shall not be affected if such witness
does not on any of the grounds referred to in subsection (1) decline to take the oath.
164. When unsworn or unaffirmed evidence admissible.
(1) Any person who, is found not to understand the nature and import of the oath or the
affirmation, may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking the
oath or making the affirmation: Provided that such person shall, in lieu of the oath or
affirmation, be admonished by the presiding judge or judicial officer to speak the truth.
(2) If such person wilfully and falsely states anything which, if sworn, would have
amounted to the offence of perjury or any statutory offence punishable as perjury, he
shall be deemed to have committed that offence, and shall, upon conviction, be liable to
such punishment as is by law provided as a punishment for that offence.‟

[5] In Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development & others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) paras 165–167, the
Constitutional Court said:

„The practice followed in courts is for the judicial officer to question the child in order to
determine whether the child understands what it means to speak the truth. As pointed out
above, some of these questions are very theoretical and seek to determine the child's
understanding of the abstract concepts of truth and falsehood. The questioning may at
times be very confusing and even terrifying for a child. The result is that the judicial officer
may be left with the impression that the child does not understand what it means to speak
the truth and then disqualify the child from giving evidence. Yet with skilful questioning,
that child may be able to convey in his or her own child language, to the presiding officer
that he or she understands what it means to speak the truth. What the section requires is
not the knowledge of abstract concepts of truth and falsehood. What the proviso requires
is that the child will speak the truth. As the High Court observed, the child may not know
the intellectual concepts of truth or falsehood, but will understand what it means to be
required to relate what happened and nothing else.
… When a child, in the court's words, cannot convey the appreciation of the abstract
concepts of truth and falsehood to the court, the solution does not lie in allowing every
child to testify in court. The solution lies in the proper questioning of children; in
particular, younger children. The purpose of questioning a child is not to get the child to
demonstrate knowledge of the abstract concepts of truth and falsehood. The purpose is
to determine whether the child understands what it means to speak the truth.‟

[6] In S v Raghubar 2013 (1) SACR 398 (SCA) paras 4–5 the following is
stated:
„The reason for giving evidence under oath (s 162), affirmation (s 163) or admonishment
(s 164) is to ensure that the evidence given is reliable.
Section 192 of the Criminal Procedure Act declares generally that unless specially
excluded, all persons are both competent and compellable witnesses. A witness is
competent to testify if his or her evidence may properly be put before the court. If a child
does not have the ability to distinguish between truth and untruth, such a child is not a
competent witness. It is the duty of the presiding officer to satisfy himself or herself that
the child can distinguish between truth and untruth. The court can also hear evidence as
to the competence of the child to testify. Such evidence assists the court in deciding (a)
whether the evidence of the child is to be admitted; and (b) the weight (value) to be
attached to that evidence. The maturity and understanding of the particular child must be

considered by the presiding judicial officer, who must determine whether the child has
sufficient intelligence to testify and a proper appreciation of the duty to speak the truth.
The court may not merely accept assurances of competency from counsel. The language
used in all three sections is peremptory.‟

[7] In S v Matshivha 2014 (1) SACR 29 (SCA) paras 10–11, this court stated
that:
„The reading of s 162(1) makes it clear that, with the exception of certain categories of
witness falling under either s 163 or 164, it is peremptory for all witnesses in criminal
trials to be examined under oath. And the testimony of a witness, who has not been
placed under oath properly, has not made a proper affirmation or has not been properly
admonished to speak the truth as provided for in the Act, lacks the status and character
of evidence and is inadmissible.
Section 164(1) is resorted to when a court is dealing with the admission of evidence of a
witness who, from ignorance arising from youth, defective education or other cause, is
found not to understand the nature and import of the oath or the affirmation. Such a
witness must, instead of being sworn in or affirmed, be admonished by the judicial officer
to speak the truth. It is clear from the reading of s 164(1) that for it to be triggered there
must be a finding that the witness does not understand the nature and import of the oath.
The finding must be preceded by some form of enquiry by the judicial officer, to
establish whether the witness understands the nature and import of the oath. If the
judicial officer should find after such an enquiry that the witness does not  possess the
required capacity to understand the nature and import of the oath, he or she should
establish whether the witness can distinguish between truth and lies and, if the enquiry
yields a positive outcome, admonish the witness to speak the truth.‟

[8] Here the enquiry conducted by the trial court into the competency of the
complainant (who was eight years old when she testified) in terms of s 162 read
with 164 was wholly inadequate. The questioning failed to establish whether the
child had: (a) the capacity to distinguish truth and untruth; or (b) had a proper
appreciation of these abstract concepts „truth‟ and „untruth‟ and was thus a

competent witness. As was pointed out in Matshiva [i]t is clear from the reading of
s 164(1) that for it [that section] to be triggered there must be a finding that the
witness does not understand the nature and import of the oath‟. There was no
such finding by the court in this instance. In any event, having concluded, it would
seem, that the answers elicited in response to the questions posed, did not afford
it an appropriate measure of comfort for the oath to be administered, the record
reflects that the child was simply cautioned by the court to tell the truth.
Cautioning the child to tell the truth (whatever that may mean) was far from
sufficient to satisfy requirements of S 164 of the Act. That section imposed a duty
on the presiding judicial officer to admonish the child to speak the truth. What
occurred in this instance fell far short of a proper admonition. The testimony of the
complainant thus lacked the status and character of evidence. Counsel for the
State was constrained to concede as much.

[9] The same line of questioning appears to have been followed by the court in
regard to the complainant‟s friend, PM who was also eight years old at the time of
giving evidence, and thus the enquiry in regard to PM suffers the same
deficiencies as that of the complainant.

[10] In any event, even if the evidence had been properly admitted by the trial
court, it was insufficient to sustain a conviction in the charge of rape. The
complainant‟s evidence and that of her aunt Ms Mchaba, to whom the first report
of the rape was made, was not analysed, nor were the contradictions and the
inconsistencies in their evidence properly considered and assessed by the trial
court.

[11] The only evidence regarding the rape is that of the complainant herself.
Her evidence was poor and unconvincing in material aspects. In her examination-
in-chief, the complainant testified that during the rape, the accused undressed

her, threatened her with a knife, brought her down onto the carpet and put some
pieces of cloth inside her mouth. He then climbed on top of her and began
„abusing‟ her. She stated that although she was injured in her vagina, she did not
bleed but there was some „greenish thing flowing from her vagina‟.  When she
arrived home after the incident, she was sent to buy liquor. She did not report the
incident to her grandmother. The following day she was told by her grandmother
not to go to school. Up to that stage she had not divulged her experience of the
rape by the appellant to anyone. On the following day the complainant testified
that her aunt Ms Mchaba arrived at her home. Her aunt examined her in the
presence of both her mother and her grandmother. She was then taken to the
hospital.

[12] However, when her aunt Ms Mchaba testified, her evidence as to what the
complainant related to her differed materially from the complainant‟s testimony.
Ms Mchaba testified that on a date she could not recall, she noticed that the
complainant was limping. She then questioned the complainant who informed her
that she had visited the appellant‟s homestead requesting the use of the toilet.
The appellant then took her into his house, put her on top of a bed, climbed on
top of her and „raped‟ her. He had blocked her mouth with his hand and after
raping her, he warned her not to tell anyone about it, threatening to kill her if she
did. Ms Mchaba then examined the complainant and found that there was a cut in
the complainant‟s vagina, that she was bleeding and that there was a white
discharge on her vagina. She then telephoned the complainant‟s mother and went
to the home of the complainant‟s grandparents where she reported the rape
incident. Thereafter the complainant was taken to hospital.

[13] Apart from the above contradictions in the evidence of the complainant and
that of her aunt, the medical report relating to the complainant is also problematic.
It is a troubling feature of this case that the medical doctor who examined the
complainant, Dr Molala, was not called to testify. The medical report does not

contain the date and the time of the medical examination of the complainant, nor
the date when Dr Molala found the injury that he noted on the medical report.

[14] It must follow, as counsel for the State was constrained to concede, that
the conviction cannot be sustained. In the result the appeal is upheld and the
conviction and sentence are set aside.

_______________
H SALDULKER
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:
For appellant:

M.J Manwadu

Instructed by:

Justice Centre, Thohoyandou

For respondent:
R.J Makhera

Instructed by:

Director of Public Prosecutions,

Thohoyandou