THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Not reportable
Case No: 680/2015

In the matter between:

JACOBUS VAN SCHALKWYK
APPELLANT

and

THE STATE
RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation:
Van Schalkwyk v The State (680/15) [2016] ZASCA 49
(31 March 2016)
Coram:
Lewis, Tshiqi and Willis JJA and Plasket and Baartman AJJA
Heard:
10 March 2016
Delivered:
31 March 2016
Summary:  Criminal Law and Procedure – mens rea – evidence – assault with hay
hook across the chest of the deceased – piercing heart and severing rib – conviction
of murder with intention in the form of dolus eventualis not correct.

ORDER
On appeal from: Northern Cape Division of the High Court, Kimberley (Tlaletsi AJP
and Phatshoane J sitting as court of appeal):
1 The appeal is upheld to the extent set out below.
2 The conviction of murder, and the sentence of eight years‟ imprisonment, are set
aside.
3 The order of the Northern Cape Division of the High Court is replaced with the
following:
„The appellant is convicted of culpable homicide, and is sentenced to six years‟
imprisonment, dated back to 14 February 2014, three years of which are suspended
for a period of five years on condition that the appellant is not convicted of any crime,
of which violence is an element, committed during the period of suspension.‟

JUDGMENT
Baartman AJA (dissenting, Willis JA concurring with her)
[1] The sole issue before us is whether in the circumstances of this matter the
appellant was guilty of murder with intent in the form of dolus eventualis or of
culpable homicide.

[2] On 6 October 2013, the regional magistrate at Upington convicted the
appellant, Mr Jacobus van Schalkwyk, a farmer at Bertiesdraai Farm in
Groblershoop, Northern Cape of murder with intent in the form of dolus eventualis
(count 1), and attempting to defeat or obstruct the ends of justice (count 2). On 11
February 2014, that court sentenced the appellant to eight years‟ imprisonment on
count 1 of which two years were suspended on certain conditions, and to twelve

months‟ imprisonment on count 2, ordered to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed in respect of count 1. The trial court refused the appellant leave to appeal.
On petition to the Northern Cape Division of the High Court, leave to appeal was
limited as follows:
„Did the respondent prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner intentionally caused
the death of the deceased, i.e. intent in the form of dolus eventualis.‟
On 27 February 2015, the court below confirmed the conviction of murder with intent
in the form of dolus eventualis despite finding that the regional magistrate had
applied the wrong test.1 That court refused leave to appeal against the conviction.
The appeal to this court lies with its leave.

The circumstances of the offence
[3] The deceased, Mr Jan Klaaste, was a farm worker employed by the appellant
at the time of his death on 14 February 2014. The appellant had instructed the
deceased to feed the cattle over the weekend of 12 to 13 February 2014. The
deceased failed to do so. In addition, the deceased reported for duty on Monday,
14 February 2014, with a blood alcohol content of 0.26g/100ml blood, and was
obstructive and unresponsive. The appellant was annoyed by the deceased‟s failure
to have fed the cattle over the weekend.

[4] It was harvest time and the appellant‟s seasonal workers were already in the
vineyard ready to harvest the grapes, but the crates for packing them were not in the
vineyard. The appellant instructed Mr Erin Kalanie, another farm worker, to fetch the
tractor and a second trailer, load the crates and deliver them to the workers in the
vineyard. When Kalanie returned with the trailer, the deceased was standing on it
holding two iron hay hooks, apparently intending to do the work he had neglected to
do over the weekend. The appellant, standing on the ground next to the trailer,
instructed the deceased to leave the hooks and get off the trailer. The deceased
remained unresponsive, standing on the trailer holding the two iron hay hooks. All
this was common cause.

1 Regrettably for the acting regional court magistrate, he concluded as follows:
„By striking the deceased with the hook on the left side of the chest [the] accused ought to have
foreseen that death may occur. [The] [a]ccused reconciled himself with the eventuality.‟

[5] The State‟s version, as told by Kalanie and Mr Samuel Persoon, another farm
worker, was that the appellant grabbed the hooks from the deceased and hit him with
one of the hooks on the left side of his chest. It was common cause that the iron hay
hook pierced ten centimetres into his heart and in the process also severed his fifth
rib; he died pursuant to that injury. This version was accepted by both the trial court
and the court below, sitting as court of appeal. There were discrepancies between
Kalanie‟s and Persoon‟s versions that both courts acknowledged and found
immaterial. I agree.

[6] The appellant denied striking the deceased with the hook. Instead, he
admitted grabbing the hooks from the deceased, at which point the deceased moved
backwards and turned his chest to the left before immediately moving forward
towards the hooks and falling to his knees. The appellant said that after he had
seized the hook, he threw it to the floor and reached for the other hook, which he
realised had become hooked onto the deceased‟s overalls. The appellant allegedly
unhooked it and threw it to the ground. Following this incident, the deceased got up,
got off the trailer, and walked off.

[7] The post-mortem findings, were as follows: „Stab wound of 1 x 1cm below the
nipple, with abrasions around the edges, 10 cm deep, entering the chest between
ribs 4 and 5 with transection of rib 5, passing through the front wall of the right
ventricle of the heart. (A). Superficial abrasions of the left eyebrow and cheek. (B)‟.

[8] Dr Leon Wagner, a forensic pathologist, testified for the defence in support of
the appellant‟s version. He concluded that the deceased had been of slender build
and therefore did not have a strong skeleton, meaning his rib would have fractured
with minimal force, thereby supporting the appellant‟s version of how the deceased
had sustained his injuries. Dr Wagner did not examine the corpse but relied on
information contained in the post-mortem report. He was reluctant to make any
concession which might adversely affect the appellant‟s version. At the hearing
before us, counsel for the appellant, Mr Katz SC, accepted the finding that the
appellant had hit the deceased. The trial court said the following about Dr Wagner‟s
evidence: „I am not persuaded by the reasoning behind Dr Wagner which excludes

that the deceased could have sustained the injuries in circumstances described by
Auron Kalanie and Sameul Persoon‟. It follows that once the appellant had conceded
that he hit the deceased, Dr Wagner‟s evidence was of no assistance to the court
and correctly found wanting.

[9] Both the trial court and the court below rejected the appellant‟s version and
accepted the State‟s version that the deceased had been standing on a trailer, with a
blood alcohol content of 0.26g/100ml blood, when the appellant, who faced him,
struck him on the upper part of his body causing the injuries recorded in the post-
mortem.

[10] Dr G A Isaacs, who conducted the post-mortem in his capacity as a forensic
medical officer in the Department of Health, testified that the position of the wound
suggested that the weapon used must have moved from the deceased‟s left to his
right across his chest penetrating his heart. Supporting the version of the State
witnesses that the appellant was in front of the deceased when he struck him.
Dr Isaacs was familiar with a hay hook and, having seen the hook involved in this
incident, said that it did not have a knife-like sharp edge. He therefore concluded that
force had been necessary to pierce the deceased‟s heart ten centimetres deep and
sever his rib. The trial court and the court below accepted Dr Isaacs‟ reasoning. I
cannot fault that conclusion. This court has seen a photograph depicting the hook
which the court below described as „. . . a metal hook with [an] elongated shaft and a
handle almost ellipse-shaped‟. I agree with the description.

[11] I now turn to enquire whether the appellant was correctly convicted of murder
with intent in the form of dolus eventualis.

[12] Mr Katz and counsel for the respondent, Mr Rosenberg, referred us to
S v Sigwahla2 where Holmes JA said the following relevant to the present enquiry:3
„1. The expression “intention to kill” does not, in law, necessarily require that the accused
should have applied his will to compassing the death of the deceased. It is sufficient if the
accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of his act causing death and was reckless of

2 S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A).
3 At 570B-E.

such result. This form of intention is known as dolus eventualis, as distinct from dolus
directus.
2.  The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably to have foreseen such possibility
is not sufficient. The distinction must be observed between what actually went on in the mind
of the accused and what would have gone on in the mind of a bonus paterfamilias in the
position of the accused. In other words, the distinction between subjective foresight and
objective foreseeability must not become blurred. The factum probandum is dolus, not culpa.
These two different concepts never coincide.
3.  Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference. To
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt the inference must be the only one which can
reasonably be drawn. It cannot be so drawn if there is a reasonable possibility that
subjectively the accused did not foresee, even if he ought reasonably to have done so, and
even if he probably did do so.
See S v Malinga and Others, 1963 (1) SA 692 (AD) at p. 694 G–H; and S v Nkombani and
Another, 1963 (4) SA 877 (AD) at pp. 883 A–C, 890B, 895F.‟

[13] Against this background of legal principle, the facts in Sigwahla are striking.
Having set out the law, Holmes JA, continued to outline the essential facts as
follows:4
„…[T]he appellant was armed with a long knife which he held in his hand; that he advanced
upon the approaching deceased; that as he came up to him he jumped forward and raised
his arm and stabbed him in the left front of the chest; that the force of the blow was sufficient
to cause penetration for four inches and to injure his heart; and that there is nothing in the
case to suggest subjective ignorance or stupidity or unawareness on the part of the appellant
in regard to the danger of a knife thrust in the upper part of the body. In my opinion the only
reasonable inference from those facts is that the appellant did subjectively appreciate the
possibility of such a stab being fatal.
In other words I hold that there exists no reasonable possibility that it never occurred to him
that his action might have fatal consequences, as he was advancing on the deceased with
the knife in his hand and as he was raising his arm to strike and as he was aiming a firm
thrust in the general direction of the upper part of his body . . . .‟
Holmes JA concluded: „In the result the State proved the required legal intention to
kill (dolus eventualis); and the conviction was justified‟.

4 At 570G-H.

[14] Recently, this court, in Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius
said the following:5
„. . . [A] person‟s intention in the form of dolus eventualis arises if the perpetrator foresees the
risk of death occurring, but nevertheless continues to act appreciating that death might well
occur, therefore “gambling” as it were with the life of the person against whom the act is
directed. It therefore consists of two parts: (1) foresight of the possibility of death occurring,
and (2) reconciliation with that foreseen possibility. This second element has been expressed
in various ways. For example, it has been said that the person must act “reckless as to the
consequences” (a phrase that has caused some confusion as some have interpreted it to
mean with gross negligence) or must have been “reconciled” with the foreseeable outcome.
Terminology aside, it is necessary to stress that the wrongdoer does not have to foresee
death as a probable consequence of his or her actions. It is sufficient that the possibility of
death is foreseen which, coupled with a disregard of that consequence, is sufficient to
constitute the necessary criminal intent.‟ (My emphasis.)

[15] In this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) the
appellant had had the subjective foresight of the possibility that striking the deceased
on the upper part of his body with the hay hook could have fatal consequences; and
(b) the appellant had „a disregard of that consequence‟; put differently, he had
reconciled himself with the foreseen possibility. The two legs are not considered in
isolation. Brand JA in S v Humphreys described the test as follows:
„On the other hand, like any other fact, subjective foresight can be proved by inference.
Moreover, common sense dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out
from the premise that, in accordance with common human experience, the possibility of
consequences that ensued would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence.
The next logical step would then be to ask whether, in the light of all the facts and
circumstances of this case, there is any reason to think that the appellant would not have
shared this foresight, derived from common human experience, with other members of the
general population.‟6

[16] The appellant disarmed the deceased who was standing in front of him. The
appellant had 40 years‟ experience as a farmer and was familiar with hay hooks. In

5 Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius (96/2015) [2015] ZASCA 204; [2016] 1 All SA
346 (SCA) para 26.
6 S v Humphreys (424/2012) [2013] ZASCA 20; 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA); 2015 (1) SA 491 (SCA) para
13.

my view, the weapon used, the appellant‟s knowledge of the weapon and the
wounded part of the body all lead to the inescapable inference that he subjectively
foresaw „the risk of death occurring‟. To infer otherwise would be comparable to a
denial of foreseeing the possibility that a stab wound in the chest may be fatal‟.7 It
follows that the first leg of the enquiry has been proved.

[17] I turn to the second leg of the enquiry. It is necessary to deal with the facts in
Humphreys. Humphreys, a minibus driver who operated a shuttle service for school
children, had on numerous occasions successfully crossed the railway line against
the warning signals, red lights and booms. On those occasions his actions were
reckless, calculated and put his life and those of his passengers in great danger. On
the day of the great tragedy, Humphreys, the chancer (waaghals), was hoping for the
happy ending he had previously had. Instead he collided with an oncoming train
killing some of his passengers and injuring others. It is important to bear in mind that
Humphreys involved conscious negligence.8 Therefore, the second question posed
by Brand JA was answered in the negative. Humphreys‟ exaggerated confidence in
his ability to continue to successfully execute the life threatening manoeuvre
distinguishes his actions from those associated with „foresight, derived from common
human experience‟.

[18] The appellant‟s conduct differed materially from that of Humphreys. As an
experienced farmer of approximately 40 years, he, like Dr Isaacs, was no doubt
familiar with a hay hook and knew the hook would move like a pendulum.9 Therefore
when the appellant hit the deceased across the chest, the appellant foresaw that the
hook would penetrate the deceased‟s upper body and cause the injury sustained.

7 Humphreys para 15 where the court stated: „To deny this foresight would in my view be comparable
to a denial of foreseeing the possibility that a stab wound in the chest may be fatal‟.
8 F Lareau „The Difference Between Negligent Homicide and Reckless Homicide when Both of them
Involve Consciousness of the Risk‟ (1987) vol 1 Criminal Law Forum.
9 Dr Isaacs said: „Ek kan miskien byvoeg en ek het op „n plaas groot geword en ek het baie gesien hoe
die wapen gebruik word of die instrument gebruik word. Wat gewoonlik was om lusern bale te beweeg
te skuif. En die klasieke aksie was altyd om beide te hê in beide hande heen en dan in te kap. Dit
begin wel bo maar dit kap dan lateraal in om die baal dan in te kap en dan op te lig. So iemand wat
gewoond was om die tipe instrument te gebruik het „n natuurlike aksie ontwikkel en hy kon baie vinnig
met die werk in daardie spesifieke beweging om bale te verskuif.‟

The appellant, who had been a good employer, had reason to be annoyed with the
deceased, although, the appellant described his mood as no more than upset. While
the deceased was a good employee, the best driver on the farm at the time, there
was urgency to get the crates to the seasonal workers waiting in the vineyard. The
relationship between the offender and the victim, however, is irrelevant to this
enquiry. The appellant testified that he had taken the hooks from the deceased to
avoid the deceased getting off the trailer, intending for him to remain on the trailer
and pack the crates.

[19] In those circumstances, the only reasonable inference is that the appellant
struck the deceased to vent his anger. It would also explain the wound inflicted,
ten centimetres into the heart severing a rib. Common sense dictates that force
would have been necessary to inflict such an injury. After the deceased got off the
trailer (jumped or staggered) the appellant saw him collapse. This is evident from
Kalanie‟s evidence: „Accused came and told me that he saw Lucky [deceased] and
he fell there‟. The appellant later drove with Kalanie to where he had earlier seen the
deceased collapse. Mr Edeling, who appeared on behalf of the appellant at the trial,
put the following to the appellant: „Goed en ons weet toe wat later gebeur het en toe
u hom gesien inmekaar sak en val en die res is geskiedenis . . .‟ The appellant
agreed. It is so that when the appellant realised that he had in fact fatally wounded
the deceased, he showed immediate remorse. This is, however, not to be confused
with his initial indifference to the consequences of his actions: the appellant had
driven off, only returning to where the deceased had fallen later on. I agree with the
trial court‟s assessment of the remorse shown: „…[T]here is a chasm between
remorse and regret, remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of
another; whether the offender was sincerely remorseful or not simply feeling sorry for
himself at having been caught was a factual question . . .‟

[20] The appellant‟s behaviour subsequent to the death of the deceased was
calculated to conceal his criminal deed. Once the appellant realised that the
deceased had died, he set about influencing the potential State witnesses in an
attempt to avoid prosecution. He kept up that lie during the trial and presented expert
evidence, probably at great cost, to support his fabricated version. I am prepared to

assume in the appellant‟s favour that he had remorse; however, neither remorse nor
regret is an element of this offence. In the circumstances of this matter, I cannot fault
the finding that the appellant committed murder with intent in the form of dolus
eventualis. As Holmes JA confirmed the conviction of murder in Sigwahla, I am
fortified in my view that the correct verdict in this case is one of murder.

Conclusion
[21] In the result I would dismiss the appeal.

_____________________________
E D Baartman
Acting Judge of Appeal

Willis JA ( Baartman AJA concurring):
[22] I have read the judgments prepared by Lewis JA and Baartman AJA. I shall
deal first with that by Lewis JA.  In my opinion, it matters not at all that there were
discrepancies in the version of the eyewitnesses. Both courts below found these
discrepancies to have been immaterial. What matters, as a matter of objective fact, is
that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the chest with a hay hook and that the
stab wound penetrated ten cm into the chest cavity of the deceased, severing one of
his ribs. What also matters is that the appellant‟s version that the deceased
accidentally fell on the hay hook was abandoned by his counsel in this court. Against
the weight of evidence, it was false. That the appellant did not give a version that
could be believed operates against him and not in his favour. Lewis JA says:  „We do
not know what he would have said about the way in which he had struck the
deceased‟. It is my opinion that this operates against him.

[23] It also matters not that a hay hook is not a weapon made to kill. An ice-pick
similarly is not. So too, is an antique marble bust, used to hit someone on the head.
Hammers, chisels, screwdrivers, garden rakes, bricks, stones, rocks and broken

glass bottles – none of which is designed or made to kill – have been used as
instruments of murder. Typically, one works a hay hook such as the one in question
by jabbing bales of hay and in doing so is able to lift a considerable weight. It is a
formidable weapon if used as one.

[24] I do not consider that the differences in size and weight of the appellant and
the deceased is of any relevance. In my opinion, the converse is true. Imagine if his
victim had been a child or a woman. Would the consequence of death really have
been less foreseeable? I do not think so.

[25] Lewis JA asks „What facts?‟ The relevant facts, in my opinion, are that a
defenceless, intoxicated farm worker was stabbed in the chest with a hay hook, the
force of which was strong enough to penetrate ten cm into his chest cavity and sever
one of his ribs. These facts, it seems to me, speak for themselves. This kind of injury
does not occur negligently. I have not conflated the tests for negligence and dolus.

[26] I also disagree with Lewis JA‟s finding in favour of the appellant on the facts
that he showed remorse, that he protested that he had not intended to kill the
deceased and that the appellant was a good employer with no history of abusing his
workers. As the court below correctly noted: „…the ex post facto melancholic reaction
by a perpetrator can in most cases be expected‟. After all, husbands have been
known to murder their darling wives in a fit of pique or rage. I turn now to deal with
Baartman AJA‟s judgment.

[27] I agree with Baartman AJA. There are, however, some additional observations
which I wish to make. In S v Dladla en andere,10 Botha AJA examined the Dutch
writers in order to help one better understand „opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn‟
(intention in regard to an awareness of possibility) and quotes Van Hattum as saying:
„De wilstheorie stelt de vraag anders, nl in deze vorm: wat zou de dader liever hebben
gewild, het verwezenlijken van het door hem beoogde gevolg te zamen met het niet beoogde
gevolg of het achterwege laten van zijn handeling (en dus afzien ook van het beoogde
gevolg)? Komt men tot de conclusie dat er den dader zoveel aangelegen was het beoogde
gevolg te bereiken, dat dit hem liever was, zelfs tezamen met het niet beoogde gevolg, dan

10 S v  Dladla en andere 1980 (1) SA 1 (A).

het afzien van zijn daad, dan besluit men daaruit dat de dader ook het mogelijke (eventuele)
gevolg in zijn wil heeft opgenomen. Er is dus dolus (eventualis). . . '11
This may be translated as follows:
„The reasoning concerning the question of intention puts the question differently,12 namely in
this way: what would the perpetrator rather have intended, the realisation of that which
accompanies his intended act together with that which had been intended or the
abandonment  of his act (and therefore the setting of his face against that which he had
intended)? If one comes to the conclusion that the perpetrator was so focused on achieving
that which he had intended that he would rather continue with his intended act, despite its
unintended consequences, rather than set his face against it, then one deduces therefrom
that the perpetrator brought into his intention even that emergent possibility. That is then
dolus (eventualis)‟ (My translation and my emphasis).

[28] It is this concept of „bringing into‟ one‟s intention an emergent possibility that
explains why the presence of dolus eventualis as an element of the crime results in a
conviction. Murder is an intentional act. So too, the concept of „afzien‟ (setting one‟s
face against something, abandoning it) is important. It is the failure to do so, once
one has foreseen the possibility of the consequence ensuing, that is critical.  This, in
my opinion, is what is meant by the requirement of nevertheless proceeding
„recklessly‟, which has been recognised in this court as being part of our law since at
least R v Valachia.13

[29] In  S v Swanepoel14 this court referred, with approval,  to Snyman‟s Strafreg in
which it was said that, in addition to the requirement of subjective foresight, the
perpetrator must „versoen hom met hierdie moontlikheid‟.15 Snyman, however, subtly
reinterpreted a negative obligation – to refrain or abstain from doing something into a
positive requirement that the perpetrator must „versoen‟ himself with the possibility of
it occurring.

11 At 4E.
12 From culpa.
13 R v Valachia & another 1945 AD 826 at 831.
14 S v Swanepoel 1983 (1) SA 434 (A).
15 At 456H.

[30] Apparently influenced by Swanepoel, in S v Ngubane16 this court began using
terminology like „taking a conscious risk‟, „consenting', „reconciling‟, „taking into the
bargain‟ in addition to „nevertheless persisting in his conduct‟ in order to describe this
so-called „volitional element‟ in dolus eventualis.17 In his article „Dolus eventualis
reconsidered‟18 Professor Andrew Paizes gives a useful outline of the conceptual
evolution of this volitional element.19

[31] Ordinarily, „versoen‟ translates into English as „be reconciled with‟. Something
is, however, lost in translation in the process.  „To be reconciled‟ has connotations of
mature and considered intellectual and moral reflection, an introspection and self-
examination, often over a period of time. This is not what is required before a
conviction based on dolus eventualis can ensue. Nuances of translation may explain
some of the difficulties that appear to have been associated with the term „be
reconciled with‟ in regard to this volitional element. „Versoen‟ derives from the root
word „soen‟ -  a kiss.

[32] The ordinary, everyday idiomatic expressions in the English language such as
„do not flirt with death‟, „do not court death‟, „do not play with death‟ and „do not dance
with death‟ capture better, in my opinion, what the law demands, rather than an
abstract conceptualisation as to what it means to be „reconciled with‟ the possibility of
death occurring.

[33] As was noted in S v Dougherty20  the law requires that the  prohibited act must
have been committed dolo malo, that is with a bad, evil or wicked intention. A value
judgment has to be made concerning this volitional element – as to whether or not
the accused should „afzien‟ at the critical moment.

16 S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A).
17 At 685D-686A.
18 A Paizes „Dolus eventualis reconsidered‟ (1988) 105 SALJ 636. See also P Smith  „Recklessness in
Dolus Eventualis‟ (1979) 96 SALJ 81.
19  See also S v Humphreys (424/2012) [2013] ZASCA 20; 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA) para 17 and
Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius (961/2015) [2015] ZASCA 204; [2016] 1 All SA
346 (SCA) paras 26 and 51.
20 S v Dougherty 2003 (4) SA 229 (W).

[34] It is helpful to refer to another article by Paizes, „Dolus eventualis revisited: S v
Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA)‟21 – a sequel to his earlier one on the topic –  in
which he refers to an article by Professor Roger Whiting22 to underscore the point
that the type of activity involved may be critical in determining whether dolus
eventualis was present and that, for example, even though the foresight of the
possibility of death and a person‟s being reconciled thereto may be present in
everyday activities such as driving or mining, deaths that result from such activities
ordinarily do not result in a conviction of murder. Dolus eventualis is a tainted
intention. As Paizes said in his earlier article on the subject, „when all is said and
done‟, a moral judgment has to be formed to determine whether dolus eventualis is
present. In his later article Paizes argues that factors such as callousness and the
purpose of exposing the victim to the risk of death all weigh in the equation to
determine whether dolus eventualis was present.

[35] S v Humphreys23 makes it clear that ordinarily a denial of foreseeing that a
stab wound in the chest may be fatal is not credible.24 The inference is irresistible
that when the accused was about to strike the deceased with a hay hook, he foresaw
the possibility that death might ensue even though that may not have been what he
wanted to happen. He should have stopped himself there and then. He did not do so.
He flirted with death. He did not „afzien‟ from his intended act. Having gone ahead,
despite having foreseen such a well-known risk and of which he, as a farmer, must
have been acutely conscious, the accused is confronted with a moral judgment of the
community that is one of deep opprobrium. He is therefore guilty of murder.

______________________
N P Willis
Judge of Appeal

21 Paizes „Dolus eventualis revisited: S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA)‟ (2013) 1 Criminal
Justice Review.
22 R Whiting „Thoughts on dolus eventualis‟ (1988) 3 SACJ 440.
23 S v Humphreys footnote 6.
24 Paragraph 14.

Lewis JA (Tshiqi JA and Plasket AJA concurring)
[36] I have read the judgments of my colleagues Baartman AJA and Willis JA. I do
not agree with their conclusion, and thus write separately.

[37] Neither judgment deals with the fact that the State‟s case was far from clear.
The State witnesses‟ accounts of how the appellant struck the deceased with the hay
hook were different, and the appellant‟s version, which he no longer advances, was
also different. The only thing that is clear from the record is that the appellant struck
the deceased with the hay hook using some force. The experts to whom Baartman
AJA refers differed in regard to the degree of force used, but nothing turns on that.
The appellant in this court accepted that he was causally responsible for the death of
the deceased, and that he should have foreseen that striking the deceased with the
hay hook might have the consequence that the deceased would die. He was, his
counsel argued, guilty of culpable homicide.

[38] The first question to be asked is whether the State proved, beyond reasonable
doubt, that the appellant had actual foresight of the possibility of his conduct causing
the death of the deceased.

[39] As the regional magistrate said, „by striking the deceased with the hook on the
left side of the chest the accused ought to have foreseen that death may occur. The
accused reconciled himself with the eventuality‟. The test, as noted by the full bench,
was incorrectly stated by the magistrate. But it appeared not to worry the full bench
since it found on the facts that the appellant had had actual foresight of the death of
the deceased. No such finding was made by the magistrate, however, and it is far
from clear to me how the full bench reached that conclusion.

[40] Baartman AJA has set out the factual background. What she does not do,
however, is consider the inconsistent versions of the two eyewitnesses, Persoon and
Kalanie. Kalanie‟s evidence is somewhat difficult to follow because the transcript of

the evidence was for some unexplained reason not available. It was reconstructed
from the magistrate‟s notes, and those of the prosecutor and the appellant‟s attorney.

[41] It is not disputed that the deceased was intoxicated the morning that he was
killed – the post-mortem report revealed that. It is also not disputed that the appellant
had confronted the deceased about his failure to tend to the cattle on the farm over
the weekend, and that he had instructed the farm workers, including Kalanie and
Persoon, to load crates onto two trailers that were hooked to a tractor.

[42] Kalanie said that before the incident, the deceased had stood on top of one of
the trailers hooked to the tractor. He was holding a hay hook in each hand. The
appellant told him to get off the trailer but the deceased ignored him. The appellant
had been angry, and had pulled the hooks out of the deceased‟s hands. He then
struck him with one of the hooks, held in the appellant‟s right hand, on the left side of
the deceased‟s chest. He hit him only once, and then pulled the deceased towards
him with the hook.

[43] He said that the deceased had staggered to the other side of the trailer and
then fallen off. He got up and ran to the other side of the storeroom. The appellant
had then driven away. He later told Kalanie that the deceased had fallen behind the
storeroom. They drove to the spot together and the appellant asked Kalanie to turn
him over and look to see where he had been struck. Kalanie had opened the
deceased‟s overall jacket and saw that he had been struck in the chest. He was still
alive at that stage, but stopped breathing as they stood there. The appellant had then
taken off his hat and said he had not meant to kill the deceased. He also told Kalanie
that he must not tell anyone that he had hit the deceased, but must say that he fell on
the hook.

[44] The appellant‟s counsel asked Kalanie to demonstrate how the hay hook had
been used to strike the deceased. The court observed, after the demonstration, that:
„he hold hook with right hand 90 degree above head with the sharp edge of the hook

facing forward and swing it 180 degrees half a circle wide forward towards the target
in front of his arm in extend to his back with 90 degree bent in the elbow and from
there hooks was above head‟. Kalanie then said that the appellant had hit with great
force forward.

[45] Persoon‟s account
was
somewhat
different,
which
the
full bench
acknowledged. When Persoon‟s version was put to Kalanie, he said that it was not
correct, notably that people were in different locations, and that the deceased had not
moved forward before the appellant struck him. He also said that he did not hear the
appellant swearing at the deceased. Persoon, on the other hand, heard the appellant
using vulgar and abusive language.

[46] Persoon‟s demonstration of how the appellant had struck the deceased was
different. The hay hooks, he said, were held with the curved end upwards and the
handles downwards, which was quite different from Kalanie‟s demonstration.

[47] Given that the appellant has abandoned the version he maintained at the trial
(that the deceased fell on the one hay hook), we do not know what he would have
said about the way in which he had struck the deceased. And so the facts that would
give rise to an inference (the only reasonable inference to be drawn) that the
appellant had actual foresight that the blow that he struck might kill the deceased, are
far from clear. They do not emerge from the evidence of the State witnesses. And
they do not emerge from the evidence of the doctors. That evidence related purely to
the nature of the wound inflicted and the degree of force used by the  appellant. The
evidence of Dr Isaacs as to how the blow was probably struck does not accord with
either of the demonstrations of Kalanie or Persoon.

[48] The onus is on the State to prove that the appellant had actual foresight of the
possibility of death. The evidence it adduced is such that no reasonable inference of
actual foresight, let alone of accepting the consequences of his conduct, can be
drawn. On the contrary, the appellant‟s reaction immediately after the deceased died

was that he had not meant to kill the man. This was not just an expression of
remorse: it was a clear indication that he had not actually foreseen death as a
possibility.

[49] This is not a case where an accused, armed with a weapon used to injure, like
a knife or a dagger, stabs another, having intended to injure and having foreseen the
possibility of death, but carries on regardless. A hay hook is not a weapon: it is an
implement used to move bales of hay. Although it tapers to a point, is is not a
particularly sharp one. The appellant seized the hay hooks from the deceased
because he wanted the deceased to get off the trailer and start taking crates to the
seasonal workers on the farm. He was either angry or frustrated and struck out at the
deceased. But that does not justify the finding of the full bench that:
„Regard being had to the nature of the weapon used the possibility of the consequences that
ensued would have been apparent to any person of normal intelligence. On the facts, the
only reasonable and inexorable inference to be drawn is that when he gave vent to his ire it
was immaterial to the appellant whether the consequences would flow from his action; put
differently, he proceeded nevertheless or persisted with his conduct indifferent to the fatal
consequence of his action.‟ (My emphasis.)

[50] The question that springs to mind is „What facts?‟ since there is so much
uncertainty as to how the wound was inflicted and what the state of mind of the
appellant was. In S v Humphreys [2013] ZASCA 20; 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA) Brand
JA said (para 13):
„For the first component of dolus eventualis it is not enough that the appellant should
(objectively) have foreseen the possibility of fatal injuries to his passengers as a
consequence of his conduct, because the fictitious reasonable person in his position would
have foreseen those consequences. That would constitute negligence and not dolus in any
form. One should also avoid the flawed process of deductive reasoning that, because the
appellant should have foreseen the consequences, it can be concluded that he did. That
would conflate the different tests for dolus and negligence.‟

[51] In my view, that is precisely what the full bench did and my colleagues would
do now. They have inferred from the fact that a hay hook has a relatively sharp end,
that the reasonable person would have foreseen that the impulsive striking out at a
person in the position of the deceased might result in the death of the deceased, and
that the appellant thus did foresee the possibility of death ensuing. That is to conflate
the tests for negligence and dolus.

[52] The hay hook in question,  a picture of which appears below, is not like a long
knife with a sharp end that would inevitably inflict a serious or fatal wound. It was a
farm implement used for a different purpose, not inflicting harm on a person. And
there is nothing to suggest that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the
appellant struck the deceased with it is that he actually foresaw the possibility of
death ensuing.

[53] There is even less to suggest that he continued regardless, reconciling himself
to that possibility. While Baartman AJA concludes that, as a farmer with experience
in using hay hooks for moving bales of hay, the appellant would have known what the
consequences of hitting a person with one would be, it can hardly be said that the
common experience of farmers hitting people with hay hooks is that they will be
seriously, even fatally, wounded. Hay hooks are designed for moving bales of hay.

They are not weapons used to inflict harm on a person. And there is absolutely no
evidence that the appellant had any experience of hitting a person with a hay hook
himself, or seeing anyone else do it.

[54] Given the circumstances, and the nature of the implement used to strike at the
deceased, the case is to be distinguished from that described by Holmes JA in S v
Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 570F-H (referred to by Baartman AJA, but worth
repeating to demonstrate the differences in circumstances):
„In the present case the salient facts are that the appellant was armed with a long knife which
he held in his hand; that he advanced upon the approaching deceased; that as he came up
to him he jumped forward and raised his arm and stabbed him in the left front of the chest;
that the force of the blow was sufficient to cause penetration for four inches and to injure his
heart; and that there is nothing in the case to suggest subjective ignorance or stupidity or
unawareness on the part of the appellant in regard to the danger of a knife thrust in the upper
part of the body. In my opinion the only reasonable inference from those facts is that the
appellant did subjectively appreciate the possibility of such a stab being fatal. In other words I
hold that there exists no reasonable possibility that it never occurred to him that his action
might have fatal consequences, as he was advancing on the deceased with the knife in his
hand and as he was raising his arm to strike and as he was aiming a firm thrust in the
general direction of the upper part of his body.‟

[55] Baartman AJA states that „the only reasonable inference is that the appellant
struck the deceased to vent his anger‟. That may be so. But it does not give rise to
the next necessary inference, which is that he actually foresaw that the deceased
might be killed by his conduct. As Leach JA said in Director of Public Prosecutions,
Gauteng v Pistorius [2015] ZASCA 204; [2016] 1 All SA 346 (SCA) para 34:
„As this court has pointed out, while the subjective state of mind of an accused person in a
case such as this is an issue of fact that can often only be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the infliction of the fatal injury, the inference to be properly drawn must be
consistent with all the proved facts.‟

[56] The only proven facts in this matter are that the appellant struck the deceased
with a hay hook, which penetrated his heart and fractured a rib. The deceased was
slight and thin, the appellant was much bigger and heavier, and the reasonable man
would have foreseen that the hook might penetrate the body if he hit a person with it.
Given that we do not know how the hook penetrated the body, and what degree of
force was used, we cannot infer that the appellant actually foresaw the death of the
appellant and struck him regardless of the consequences. There is also no dispute
that, immediately after discovering the death of the deceased, he said in the
presence of his employees that he had not intended to kill him. The inference to be
drawn from that is that he did not foresee that death would result from his hitting the
deceased with the hay hook. At the very least this is one reasonable inference that
may be drawn from the facts, assuming that there may be others.

[57] The full bench thus erred in finding that the appellant actually foresaw the
possibility of death. There is accordingly no need to consider whether he had
reconciled himself to the possibility of death occurring. In the circumstances, I
conclude that the appellant is not guilty of murder, but is guilty of culpable homicide.

[58] The appellant and the State agree that this court is in as good a position as
the trial court would be to determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed for
culpable homicide. There has already been considerable delay in the finalization of
this matter, which is not in the interests of justice. The appellant has been in prison
since the conviction by the trial court on 11 February 2014.

[59] The evidence of both Persoon and Kalanie was that he was a good employer,
who had no history of abusing his workers. On the morning of the incident, he was
provoked by the deceased who had not fed the animals on the farm and was drunk
on a Monday morning. He lashed out impulsively. That does not mean that he should
not be punished. He has caused the death of another person and must suffer the
consequences. Society should not tolerate crimes of violence and especially those
against employees on farms.

[60] The appellant‟s incarceration has led to many people being deprived of
employment. His family is dependent on him. He is at this stage a man in his sixties.
The trial court had before it the evidence of a probation officer and a social worker for
the appellant. They reported that the appellant had serious health problems.

[61] I consider that a sentence of six years‟ imprisonment, three of which should be
suspended on the usual conditions, is appropriate.

[62] It is accordingly ordered that:
1 The appeal is upheld to the extent set out below.
2 The conviction of murder, and the sentence of eight years‟ imprisonment, are set
aside.
3 The order of the Northern Cape Division of the High Court is replaced with the
following:
„The appellant is convicted of culpable homicide, and is sentenced to six years‟
imprisonment, dated back to 14 February 2014, three years of which are suspended
for a period of five years on condition that the appellant is not convicted of any crime,
of which violence is an element, committed during the period of suspension.‟

______________________
C H Lewis
Judge of Appeal

For Appellant:
A Katz SC

L Stansfield

Instructed by:
Liddell Weeber & Van der Merwe Inc, Cape Town
Du Plooy Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
J Rosenberg

Instructed by:

The Director of Public Prosecutions, Kimberley

The Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein