THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No:   271/2008

No precedential significance

MARK ANTHONY MORGAN

Appellant

and

THE STATE                                                                           Respondent

Neutral citation: Morgan v The State (271/2008)[2008] ZASCA 147
(27 November 2008)

Coram:
Mthiyane, Heher and Ponnan JJA

Heard:
5 November 2008
Delivered:
27 November 2008

Summary:
Appellant implicated by two members of a gang in a
shooting and killing of a fellow gang member – appellant
perceived as member of a rival gang - evidence to be treated
with caution to eliminate the risk of false incrimination.

Alleged conspiracy between witnesses to falsely implicate
appellant found not to exist – their evidence considered in
its totality found to be acceptable despite contradictions.

___________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from: High Court, Witwatersrand Local Division (Full Court
per Bham AJ, Blieden and Makhanya JJ)

The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGMENT

MTHIYANE JA (HEHER and PONNAN JJA concurring):

[1] The appellant stood trial in the Johannesburg High Court
(Satchwell J) with a co-accused, Kenneth Morgan (accused 1) on charges
which included murder, attempted murder, unlawful possession of a
firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition in contravention of ss 2
and 36 of the Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 respectively. The
charges arose out of an incident in Westbury on 30 November 2003 in
which Adrian Barris (‘the deceased’) was shot and killed. At the time of
the incident shots were also fired at the deceased’s friend, Godfrey
Leghlo – hence the charge to attempted murder.

[2] The appellant was convicted and sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment for the murder and six years’ imprisonment for the
attempted murder, the latter to run concurrently with the 15 year
sentence. In addition, the appellant was sentenced to three years’
imprisonment for the unlawful possession of a firearm and six months’
imprisonment for the unlawful possession of ammunition, the latter to run
concurrently with the three year sentence imposed for the unlawful
possession of a firearm. It was further ordered that half of the sentences

imposed in respect of the unlawful possession of a firearm and
ammunition were to run concurrently with the sentence of 15 years’
imprisonment imposed for the murder. The appellant was thus sentenced
to an effective term of imprisonment of 16 years and six months.

[3] The state alleged that the deceased was shot and killed by the
appellant. The appellant denied the allegations and raised an alibi defence
and tendered a plea explanation in terms of s 115 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to that effect. He also denied that he shot at
Godfrey Leghlo or that he was in possession of a firearm and
ammunition.

[4] The trial judge rejected the appellant’s alibi defence and accepted
the evidence of the three state witnesses, Leghlo, Iva Kiranie and Aubrey
Baardman, who placed appellant on the scene and implicated him in the
offences of which he was subsequently convicted.

[5] With the trial court’s leave the appellant and his co-accused
appealed to the Full Bench of the Witwatersrand Local Division against
both their convictions and sentences. Accused 1’s appeal succeeded but
the appellant failed in his appeal against the conviction. The appellant
succeeded only in having his sentence reduced to an effective term of
imprisonment of 15 years.

[6] On appeal the Full Bench (Bham AJ with Blieden and Makhanya
JJ concurring) found Satchwell J to have been correct in accepting the
evidence of the three witnesses especially on the crucial issue of whether
or not the appellant was present at the scene at the time of the shooting.
The Full Bench also found that on the evidence taken as a whole the state

had proved its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

[7] The appellant was granted special leave by this court to appeal
against the conviction. Before considering the correctness of the
conviction it bears mention that in its assessment of the evidence the trial
judge made no credibility findings and thus we are not precluded on
appeal from making our own assessment of the evidence, with due regard
to the probabilities.

[8] Leghlo testified that on the day of the incident he and the deceased
were returning from a ‘function’. As they were walking along Du Plessis
Street towards Gavin Flats they observed Gato, who was standing outside
the building drinking beer. At that point Leghlo saw a white BMW motor
vehicle belonging to accused 1 which had pulled up in Du Plessis Street.
Accused 1 was behind the wheel while the appellant and Ricardo were
standing next to the vehicle at the driver’s door. He then saw the
appellant and Ricardo receiving two firearms from accused 1. Ricardo
and the appellant tucked the firearms underneath their shirts and walked
away from the vehicle towards Gavin Flats. Accused 1 drove away.

[9] Leghlo heard people screaming. He saw Baardman and Gato
fighting. As Leghlo and the deceased were on their way to where the fight
was taking place Leghlo heard what sounded like a firearm being cocked.
When he turned to look he saw the appellant about four metres behind
them pointing a firearm at him and the deceased. Leghlo touched the
deceased alerting him to the danger, shouted and then jumped clear, as a
result of which he fell. While he was on the ground Leghlo heard a shot
being fired and saw the deceased falling. Before falling the deceased had
had his firearm in his hand. Leghlo snatched it from him and started firing

back. After a brief exchange of gunshots the appellant and Ricardo fled
from the scene. Leghlo then handed the firearm to Baardman.

[10] Kiranie told the court that she and her daughter were on their way
to the shop when she saw Leghlo and the deceased walking along Du
Plessis Street. She then heard gunshots and saw appellant shooting at
Leghlo and the deceased. She saw the deceased falling down and Leghlo
take the firearm from him and fire at the appellant. The appellant ran
away.

[11] Baardman testified that on the day of the incident he and Pulen
attended the same function as Leghlo and the deceased. When the
deceased and Leghlo left he and Pulen followed out of curiosity. He saw
accused 1 in his white BMW motor vehicle in Du Plessis Street and the
appellant and Ricardo standing next to it. When the two of them walked
from the vehicle towards Gavin Flats, they had their shirts pulled over
their trousers but he did not see any firearms in their possession.

[12] Baardman saw Gato standing alone near Gavin Flats, drinking beer
from a bottle. Gato approached Baardman and started swearing at him
and, for no apparent reason started to assault him. A fight broke out
between them. While they were fighting Baardman saw the deceased and
Leghlo approaching. However, before they arrived, Baardman heard a
gunshot go off and saw the deceased falling. On turning he saw the
appellant shooting at Leghlo. He saw Leghlo fall and take a firearm from
the deceased and fire shots at the appellant who turned and ran away
while continuing to fire at Leghlo. After the shooting Baardman went to
where the deceased had fallen. Leghlo handed him the firearm.

[13] The appellant testified in his own defence. He also relied on the
evidence of accused 1. It is convenient to refer first to the latter’s
evidence. He told the court that on the day of the incident he attended a
soccer match at Westbury. After the match he took Gato, Ricardo and
Josie to Du Plessis Street in his BMW motor vehicle. He denied seeing
the appellant at all. He recalled seeing Leghlo in the parking area
adjoining Du Plessis Street before driving away.

[14] The appellant testified that he also attended the soccer match at
Newlands Stadium. He did not see accused 1 – he had travelled to and
from the match on foot. Afterwards the match he escorted his girlfriend to
her home in Du Plessis Street. He thereafter went home where he spent
the rest of the evening with a neighbour.

[15] The appellant also relied on the evidence of two defence witnesses,
Ms Shereen Snell and Ms Ricordia Arends. These witnesses do not
however take the matter any further. Snell testified that while she was
with Gato, Leghlo, Baardman and another person approached them and
started assaulting Gato for no reason. She fled. After she reached home
she heard the sound of gunfire, and looking out of her window, saw
Baardman and Leghlo arguing over two firearms. She had seen Leghlo
shooting at Gato as the latter ran away but did not see the deceased being
shot or Leghlo being shot at. She could thus not say who was responsible
for these shootings, or whether the appellant was present at the time.

[16] Similarly Arends was of no assistance. Her evidence related to an
incident involving the deceased which had nothing to do with the
offences of which the appellant was convicted.

[17] In the appeal before us it was submitted that in his defence the
appellant could take the matter no further than to assert that he was not at
the scene at the time of the shooting. The appellant’s counsel was critical
of the evidence of Leghlo, Baardman and Kiranie which he dismissed as
unreliable and riddled with contradictions. The evidence, submitted
counsel, should not have been accepted by Satchwell J. In addition,
counsel cautioned that the evidence had to be approached with caution as
the witnesses Leghlo and Baardman were members of a rival gang, the
Majimbo’s and the risk of false incrimination was very real. There is a lot
to be said for this submission as the witnesses Leghlo and Baardman were
indeed avowed members of the rival gang. Although the appellant denied
that he was a member of the other gang, the Fast Guns, he was perceived
by the witnesses as a member of this gang. Accused 1 was alleged by the
witnesses, to be the leader of the Fast Guns. Accused 1 admitted
membership of the gang but denied that he was its leader.

[18] It is convenient to deal first with the submissions relating to the
contradictions. There is no doubt that the witnesses Leghlo, Baardman
and Kiranie contradicted themselves in certain respects. Both the trial
court and the court a quo were alive to this aspect in their assessment of
the evidence. Bham AJ in dealing with the contradictions in their
evidence said the following in a passage which I adopt:
‘Whilst it is important to consider, in determining whether the state has proved its
case beyond reasonable doubt, the component parts of the evidence tendered on
behalf of the state, one should be careful not to sink into the detail of such component
parts in a manner which obviates the totality of the picture.’
It is however clear that, despite the contradictions, their testimony on the
crucial question of whether the appellant was at the scene and whether he
shot at and killed the deceased was unshaken. While Leghlo came across

as garrulous especially during cross examination it cannot be said that he
was an untruthful witness. The criticism of Kiranie as a witness is not
without substance. She was not an impressive witness and no doubt, her
evidence has value only in so far as it is reliably confirmed. In the last
mentioned regard it is important to evaluate that evidence which placed
the appellant at the scene.

[19] Did gang rivalry play any role in the implication of the appellant in
the offences of which he was convicted? The potential for deceit,
particularly in the case of Leghlo and Baardman, who were admittedly
members of the Majimbos, cannot be ignored and consequently their
evidence has to be approached with caution. In the case of the three
witnesses Leghlo, Boardman and Kiranie some assurance that their
evidence could be relied on is to be found in the fact that they corroborate
each other on the crucial aspects of whether the appellant was at the scene
and whether he shot and killed the deceased. Furthermore Kiranie was not
a member of either of the rival gangs. She had no axe to grind with the
appellant and no reason or motive to implicate the appellant falsely. In
my view the admission by accused 1 that he arrived on the scene shortly
before the shooting and dropped off Ricardo and two other persons in Du
Plessis Street provides a measure of support for the evidence of Leghlo,
Kiranie and Baardman. All of the above factors in my view serve to
reduce the risk of false incrimination.

[20] This brings me to the question of the conspiracy theory advanced
by counsel for the appellant. The real question on this point is whether the
witnesses, Leghlo, Kiranie and Baardman deliberately substituted the
appellant for the real killer in pursuance of a conspiracy falsely to
implicate him. It was suggested by counsel that the three witnesses must

have come together at some point and conspired to implicate the
appellant falsely.

[21] The conspiracy theory was not accepted by the trial court. On the
probabilities it seems highly unlikely. If it occurred it would not have
preceded the making of the statement to the police by Kiranie. She told
the court that after the shooting (which occurred at about 18h00) she
accompanied the deceased to hospital. She made a statement to the police
in a police vehicle at the hospital later that evening at about 20h00,
implicating the appellant in the shooting. There is no evidence that she
met either Leghlo or Baardman at any stage before then. If the conspiracy
theory is to be believed it would mean that Leghlo and Baardman would
thereafter have had to tailor their version of events to fit in with the
events as described by Kiranie in her statement. Even the contradictions
in their evidence negate the suggestion. So far from supporting any theory
of deliberate fabrication and thus a conspiracy between the eyewitnesses,
the discrepancies in their evidence point rather to honest and independent
observation and recollection.

[22] A persuasive aspect of the evidence of Leghlo was the fulsome and
coherent detail of his testimony which nevertheless contained surprisingly
little internal contradiction. It carries an overall ring of truth rather than
conveying the impression of a story stitched together to serve an end. In
short one is persuaded that he lived through the nail-biting events that he
described and did not deliberately exaggerate or tailor his version.

[23] On a consideration of the evidence in its totality and in the light of
the probabilities the case against the appellant was, in my view, proved
beyond reasonable doubt. (See S v Radebe 1998 (1) SACR 422 (SCA) at

426F-H) When the evidence of the three witnesses is considered
separately and individually there are undoubtedly some glaring
weaknesses but when taken together there is no doubt as to the guilt of
the appellant. A further factor which provides a measure of support for
the above conclusion is that, once one accepts that the appellant was at
the scene, the appellant’s overall testimony is fundamentally undermined.
The appellant was well known to the three witnesses. All three say they
saw him at the scene. Leghlo saw that he had a gun. Kiranie also saw him
firing shots from a gun. When all of these facts are taken together they
allow if no other conclusion than that the case against the appellant was
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

[24] Finally, as something of a throw away, counsel for the appellant
submitted that the deceased might have been shot by Ricardo. In my view
the suggestion is speculative and fanciful. It was never put to any of the
state witnesses during cross-examination and no evidence was led to
substantiate the point. In any event it is not incumbent upon the state to
eliminate every conceivable possibility that may depend upon pure
speculation. (See S v Reddy 1996 (2) SACR 1 (A).) The witnesses were in
no doubt that it was the appellant who shot and killed the deceased.

[25] In the result the appeal is dismissed.

__________________________

KK MTHIYANE

JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For Appellant:
E Classen

Instructed by:
David H Botha, Du Plessis & Kruger Inc
Johannesburg

Symington & De Kok Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
(Ms) J Steyn

Instructed by:

The Director of Public Prosecutions Johannesburg

The Director of Public Prosecutions Bloemfontein