SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case No: 20063/2014
In the matter between:

SOUTH AFRICAN LAND ARRANGEMENTS CC    First Appellant

GUIDO LOUIS MARC MARIEN
Second Appellant

ANNE JOSEPHA LOUIS DELAET
Third Appellant

and

NEDBANK LIMITED

Respondent

Neutral citation:   South African Land Arrangements CC & Others v
Nedbank LTD (20063/2014) [2015] ZASCA 88 (29
May 2015).

Coram:
Mhlantla, Majiedt, Pillay and Mbha JJA and Van der
Merwe AJA
Heard:
05 May 2015
Delivered: 29 May 2015

Summary: Civil procedure–summary judgment–defence–counterclaim–
reliance on agreement which never came into operation–not bona fide
defence–summary judgment correctly granted.

________
ORDER

___

On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town
(Griesel and Samela JJ sitting as court of appeal):

1 The application for the postponement of the appeal is dismissed with
costs on an attorney and client scale.
2 The appeal is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.

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JUDGMENT

___

Mhlantla JA (Majiedt, Pillay and Mbha JJA and Van Der Merwe
AJJA concurring):

[1] This appeal, with special leave of this court, arises from summary
judgment proceedings in the Magistrates‟ Court, Somerset West launched
by Nedbank Limited (the bank) against South African Land Arrangements
CC (the first appellant), Guido Louis Marc Marien and Anne Josepha
Louis Delaet (the second and third appellants respectively). An appeal to
the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town (per Griesel J
and Samela J concurring) against the summary judgment granted in the
magistrates‟ court, was dismissed. It is against this decision that the
appellants appeal to this court.

[2] The appeal concerns two issues. First, whether leave to adduce
further evidence in the form of a written agreement should be granted.

Second, whether the appellants have set out sufficient facts to establish a
defence on the merits and in the form of a counterclaim. The background
is set out hereafter.

[3] During July 2009 the bank concluded a loan agreement with the
first appellant in terms of which the bank lent and advanced to the first
appellant an amount of R1 250 000 on various terms. The bank also
granted the first appellant an overdraft facility with a limit of R365 000
which was later increased to R667 000. A mortgage bond over the
property of the first appellant was registered in favour of the bank. The
second and the third appellants signed deeds of suretyship guaranteeing
the first appellant‟s obligations to the bank.

[4] The first appellant defaulted with the repayment of the loan capital
and exceeded the limit of the overdraft facility. As a result the bank
instituted action in the magistrates‟ court, against the first appellant as
principal debtor as well as against the second and third appellants in their
capacities as sureties. The bank claimed an amount of R1190 590.27,
being the balance on the loan, and R725 966.75 in respect of the overdraft
facility. The appellants entered an appearance to defend.

[5] Upon the expiry of the dies, the bank applied for summary
judgment. The appellants opposed this application. In their opposing
affidavit, the appellants admitted that they were indebted to the bank but
averred that the amounts were not yet due. They further alleged that they
had a counterclaim which was in excess of the amounts claimed by the
bank. The appellants‟ defence was that the facility agreement relied upon
by the bank had been superseded by a credit restructuring agreement
dated 28 June 2010 (the restructuring agreement). In terms of this

agreement, the first appellant would be replaced by another entity,
Seasons Find 593 CC (Seasons Find), as principal debtor. Furthermore
the appellants alleged that the bank had breached the terms of that
agreement and that they had demanded from the bank payment of an
amount of R2 800 000. In support of this allegation, a letter of demand
which had been sent to the bank was annexed to the opposing affidavit.
This was their counterclaim to the bank‟s claims.

[6] After the application was heard, the magistrate concluded that the
appellants had no bona fide defence to the bank‟s claim and granted
summary judgment. An appeal against the magistrate‟s decision was
dismissed by the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town.
Griesel J held that the restructuring agreement was subject to suspensive
conditions and these had not been fulfilled. He concluded that that
agreement never came into effect and therefore the appellants had failed
to disclose a defence.

[7] In the circumstances that will be described later, the appeal in this
court proceeded in the absence of the appellants‟ counsel after their
application for the postponement of the appeal was dismissed with costs.
In the result, this court when considering the issues in the appeal, had
regard to the appellants‟ heads of argument which were filed on 6
October 2014.

[8] Regarding the first issue, the appellants in their heads of argument
sought leave to adduce further evidence, in the form of the restructuring
agreement. They contended that the said document was erroneously
omitted and should have been attached to the affidavit opposing summary
judgment. They further submitted that their legal representative had

referred to this agreement during the hearing of the summary judgment
application and the magistrate had deprived them of an opportunity to
tender this written agreement in evidence.

[9]    Section 19 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 empowers a court
on hearing an appeal to receive further evidence. It is incumbent upon an
applicant for leave to adduce further evidence to satisfy the court that it
was not owing to any remissness or negligence on his or her part that the
evidence was not adduced at the trial1.

[10] In this case, no application was launched for leave to present a
supplementary affidavit to introduce the restructuring agreement. The
appellants could have done so in the Magistrate‟s Court in terms of Rule
552. Furthermore no proper application was launched in this court.
Instead, the appellants raised this issue in their heads of argument. No
explanation has been furnished for the failure to tender the document save
to state that the restructuring agreement was erroneously omitted from the
record. In my view, that explanation is insufficient and does not
constitute exceptional circumstances. In the result, the application to
adduce further evidence must fail.

[11] In my view, the granting of leave to adduce further evidence
would, in any event, not have assisted the appellants in that the
restructuring agreement relied upon was not signed by all the parties and
it was subject to suspensive conditions or „conditions precedent‟. In this
regard, the first appellant and Seasons Find were obliged to provide

1 De Aguiar v Real People Housing (Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) SA 16 (SCA) at para 11.
2 Rule 55 (1) (a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Rules provides:
55 Applications
(1)(a)  Every application shall be brought on notice of motion supported by an affidavit as to the facts
upon which the applicant relies for relief.‟

various documents, amongst others; their financial statements, auditor‟s
certificates, cession of certain insurance policies, suretyships by the
second and third appellants as well as by a third party. Furthermore they
were required to register a first covering bond over certain immovable
property in favour of the bank. It is common cause that the suspensive
conditions were never fulfilled, and that therefore the restructuring
agreement never came into existence.

[12] This then brings me to the next question, that is, whether the
appellants disclosed a bona fide defence and in particular whether their
counterclaim can be regarded as a defence that is good in law.  Rule 14 of
the Magistrates‟ Courts Rules and which is similar to Uniform rule 32 of
the Superior Courts enables the plaintiff to apply for summary judgment
where the claim is:
(a)
on a liquid document;
(b)
for a liquidated amount in money;
(c)
for delivery of a specified movable property; or
(d)
for ejectment,
together with any claim for interest and costs. The defendant, on the other
hand, must set out a defence that is bona fide and good in law and also
disclose fully the nature and grounds of his or her defence.

[13] The legal principles governing summary judgment proceedings are
well-established. In Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd, 3Corbett JA
outlined the principles and what is required from a defendant in order to
successfully oppose a claim for summary judgment as follows:
„…[One] of the ways in which a defendant may successfully oppose a claim for
summary judgment is by satisfying the Court by affidavit that he has a bona fide

3 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 426 A-D.

defence to the claim. Where the defence is based upon facts, in the sense that material
facts alleged by the plaintiff in his summons, or combined summons, are disputed or
new facts are alleged constituting a defence, the Court does not attempt to decide
these issues or to determine whether or not there is a balance of probabilities in favour
of the one party or the other. All that the Court enquires into is: (a) whether the
defendant had “fully” disclosed the nature and grounds of his defence and the material
facts upon which it is founded, and (b) whether on the facts so disclosed the defendant
appears to have, as to either the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is both
bona fide and good in law. If satisfied on these matters the Court must refuse
summary judgment either wholly or in part, as the case may be. The word “fully”, as
used in the context of the Rule (and its predecessors), has been the cause of some
judicial controversy in the past. It connotes, in my view, that, while the defendant
need not deal exhaustively with the facts and the evidence relied upon to substantiate
them, he must at least disclose his defence and the material facts upon which it is
based with sufficient particularity and completeness to enable the court to decide
whether the affidavit discloses a bona fide defence.‟

[14]  Regarding
the
remedy
provided
by
summary
judgment
proceedings, Navsa JA said in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks
Mavundla Zek Joint Venture4:

„[31]…The summary judgment procedure was not intended to “shut a defendant out
from defending”, unless it was very clear indeed that he had no case in the action. It
was intended to prevent sham defences from defeating the rights of parties by delay,
and at the same time causing great loss to plaintiffs who were endeavouring to enforce
their rights. [32] The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The
procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a sustainable
defence of her/his day in court. After almost a century of successful applications in
our courts, summary judgment proceedings can hardly continue to be described as
extraordinary.‟

4 Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA).

[15] Where a counterclaim is put up as a defence, a full disclosure of the
nature and the grounds of the counterclaim as well as the material facts
upon which a defendant relies must be made in order for it to be
successful in a defence5.

[16] In this case the appellants relied on their counterclaim as a defence.
They contended that the bank had breached the terms of the restructuring
agreement in that it prevented the first appellant from accessing its
available funds and that it closed all the banking facilities of Seasons Find
in breach of the agreement. The appellant, however, did not provide any
facts supporting the allegation of the breach.

[17]    On the appellants‟ own version they admit that they are indebted to
the bank. Furthermore on their own version they admit that the
restructuring agreement never came into effect. This is so because that
agreement was subject to suspensive conditions which were not fulfilled.
It follows that an agreement that never came into effect cannot be
breached. No reliance can be placed on this contract and the alleged
breach thereof. The appellants‟ reliance on this non-existent contract is
misplaced and the counterclaim falls away. In the result, the defence
raised by the appellant is not bona fide. Therefore, I am satisfied that the
court a quo was correct when it dismissed the appeal against the grant of
summary judgment. The appeal falls to be dismissed.

[18] Insofar as the costs are concerned, counsel for the bank advised the
court from the bar that clause 17 of the agreement concluded by the
parties made provision that all legal costs shall be on an attorney and

5 Soil Fumigation Services Lowveld CC v Chemfit Technical Products 2004 (6) SA 29 (SCA) at para
10.

client scale. An order to that effect will be made.

[19] It remains for me to deal with the issue of the application for the
postponement of the appeal. The appeal in this court was heard on
Tuesday 5 May 2015. On the day before the hearing of the appeal, the
appellants filed an application for a postponement of the appeal. This
application was supported by an affidavit deposed to by the second
appellant. The bank opposed the application. After considering argument
the application was dismissed with costs. Mr Lubbe, who represented the
appellants, excused himself from the proceedings stating that he held no
instructions with regard to the appeal. As previously indicated, the appeal
thereafter proceeded in the absence of appellants‟ representative.

[20] It is apposite at this stage to consider the principles governing the
grant or refusal of postponements. In National Police Service Union &
others v Minister of Safety and Security & others, 6 Mokgoro J held that a
postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date cannot
be claimed as of right. An applicant for a postponement seeks an
indulgence from the court and must show that there is good cause for the
postponement. The applicant must furnish a full and satisfactory
explanation of the circumstances that gave rise to the application. Lastly,
whether a postponement will be granted is in the discretion of the court
and cannot be secured by mere agreement between the parties.

[21] In McCarthy Retail v Shortdistance Carriers CC, 7Schutz JA said:
„A party opposing an application to postpone an appeal has a procedural right that the
appeal should proceed on the appointed day. It is also in the public interest that there

6 National Police Service Union & others v Minister of Safety and Security & others 2000 (4) SA 1110
(CC) at 1112C-F.
7 McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC [2001] 3 All SA 482 (A) para 28.

should be an end to litigation. Accordingly in order for an applicant for a
postponement to succeed, he must show a “good and strong reason” for the grant of
such relief…‟

[22] The Constitutional Court restated these principles in Lekolwane &
another v Minister of Justice and Development,8 where it held:
„The postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date cannot be
claimed as a right. An applicant for a postponement seeks an indulgence from the
court. A postponement will not be granted, unless this Court is satisfied that it is in the
interests of justice to do so. In this respect the applicant must ordinarily show that
there is good cause for the postponement. Whether a postponement will be granted is
therefore in the discretion of the court. In exercising that discretion, this Court takes
into account a number of factors, including (but not limited to) whether the
application has been timeously made, whether the explanation given by the applicant
for postponement is full and satisfactory, whether there is prejudice to any of the
parties, whether the application is opposed and the broader public interest.‟

[23] In this matter, the application for a postponement was filed in court
on the eve of the hearing of the appeal. The second appellant furnished an
explanation that their advocate had returned his brief on 21 April 2015
and their attorney, Mr Osborne, had withdrawn on 28 April 2015 after he
was not successful in engaging new counsel to argue the appeal on short
notice. The second appellant, however, failed to take the court into his
confidence and set out the steps he took to obtain the services of new
attorney and counsel, nor did he provide the reason for Mr Osborne‟s
withdrawal, who continued to act for the appellants in other matters
before the high court. Regarding counsel‟s withdrawal, the second
appellant merely stated that counsel who previously attended to the
matter was involved in a dispute with Mr Osborne. It is worth mentioning

8 Lekolwane & another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2007(3) BCLR 280 (CC)
para 17.

that the notice of withdrawal prepared by the attorney stated that the
appellants had terminated the mandate. This explanation differs from the
explanation provided by the second appellant under oath.

[24] In the result the applicant has failed to provide a full and
satisfactory explanation of the circumstances that gave rise to the
application. The application on this ground alone had to fail.

[25] In addition to the abovementioned factor it became clear to the
court that the appellants had no intention of proceeding with the appeal in
view of their responses to the respondent when the issue of a
postponement was raised between the parties. In this regard it is apposite
to refer to the decision of Harms JA in Take and Save Trading CC &
others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd, 9 where he said:
„A supine approach towards litigation by judicial officers is not justifiable either in
terms of the fair trial requirement or in the context of resources. One of the oldest
tricks in the book is the practice of some legal practitioners, whenever the shoe
pinches, to withdraw from the case (and more often than not to reappear at a later
stage), or of clients to terminate the mandate (more often than not at the suggestion of
the practitioner), to force the court to grant a postponement because the party is then
unrepresented. Judicial officers have a duty to the court system, their colleagues, the
public and the parties to ensure that this abuse is curbed by, in suitable cases, refusing
a postponement. Mere withdrawal by a practitioner or the mere termination of a
mandate does not, contrary to popular belief, entitle a party to a postponement as of
right.‟

[26] This is precisely what transpired in this case. The second appellant
raised every possible excuse in an attempt to have the appeal postponed.
He initially relied on the withdrawal of their legal representatives. When

9 Take and Save Trading CC & others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at para 3.

he was advised that he could engage another team of legal representatives
from Cape Town or Bloemfontein, he responded that there was
insufficient time to do that. When it was then brought to his attention that
he, as a member of the first appellant, could represent it and himself, he
furnished a bizarre explanation that the first appellant had since April
2015 been converted into a company and since directors were not allowed
to appear on behalf of companies, he could not attend court. There is
however no confirmation from the Registrar of the Companies and
Intellectual Property Commission of the first appellant‟s conversion.
Regarding his appearance, he stated that he had to appear in the court a
quo in respect of other applications (this turned out to be interlocutory
applications where his presence was not required). Strangely enough, Mr
Osborne who had withdrawn in this matter, was representing the
appellants in those applications. The third appellant, in her affidavit,
deposed that she was ill and annexed a doctor‟s certificate dated 28 April
2015. Curiously, the diagnosis was that she suffered from general anxiety
disorder and that she should not be exposed to any form of stress or to
appear before any court. It is clear that the appellants tried every trick in
the book to get the appeal to be postponed.

[27] On the other hand, the interests of the bank had to be considered.
The bank would be severely prejudiced by the postponement as it would
not obtain final determination of its claim and payment of a debt that has
been outstanding since 2011.

[28] It was for these reasons why the postponement was refused. For
purposes of completeness, I intend to include an order in respect of the
appellants‟ application for a postponement.

[29] Consequently, I make the following order:

1 The application for the postponement of the appeal is dismissed with
costs on an attorney and client scale.
2 The appeal is dismissed with costs on an attorney and client scale.

__________________
NZ MHLANTLA

JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:
E L Lubbe
Instructed by:
Thomas Wilks Inc
Stellenbosch
c/o Van Pletzen Lambrechts Attorney
Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
C W Kruger
Instructed by:
Van der Spuy Attorneys
Cape Town
c/o Hill, McHardy & Herbst Inc,
Bloemfontein