THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Reportable

469/2002

In the matter between

WIMPIE  BARNARD

APPELLANT

and

THE  STATE

RESPONDENT

CORAM

:
MARAIS,  CAMERON  JJA  et  MLAMBO AJA

HEARD

:
21 MAY 2003

DELIVERED
:
30 MAY 2003

Summary:  Sentence in terms of s 276(1)(i) for theft of money from
employer.

J U D G M E N T

MLAMBO AJA/…

MLAMBO AJA:
[1] This is an appeal against sentence. The appellant,  a thirty four year old
man, pleaded guilty to 30 counts of theft from the complainants, involving an
amount of R30 069. Consequent upon his plea he was convicted and
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.  His appeal against sentence to the
Transvaal Provincial Division (Kirk-Cohen and Webster JJ) was
unsuccessful, but leave to appeal to this Court was granted.
[2] The appellant was employed as a clerk in the complainants’ business.
He also performed bookkeeping functions and was placed in charge of a safe
where cash was kept.  He had custody of the key to that safe. His
responsibilities are indicative of the trust placed in him by the complainants.
He however succumbed to dishonesty and started stealing money.  This went
undetected for some fifteen  months.  As was bound to happen, the thefts
were discovered.  Upon being confronted with the thefts, he simply undertook

to repay the money he had stolen.  The complainants, however, in addition to
laying charges against him, dismissed him from employment and withheld his
final month’s salary of R3 000.
[3] The appellant, for his part, reported certain alleged VAT irregularities
by the complainants to the South African Revenue Services (SARS).   He also
joined the Mineworkers Union as a member and laid a complaint about the
withholding of his final salary of R3 000.  Acting on his report SARS officials
instituted an investigation in the complainants’ business. This investigation
was not yet finalised when the trial took place but the complainants stated that
minimal irregularities were discovered. The Mineworkers Union also referred
the appellant’s complaint to the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and
Arbitration (‘CCMA’) which culminated in the complainants paying the
appellant the amount of R3000.

[4] In mitigation of sentence, the appellant gave evidence primarily about
his current employment situation and offered to pay back the amount he had
stolen in an amount of R700 per month.  A report in terms of s 276(1)(h) of
the Criminal Procedure Act, Act no 51 of 1977 (‘the Act’) was also handed
in.  This report recommended correctional supervision as a sentencing option.
[5] The  State tendered the evidence of the complainants in aggravation of
sentence.  The gist of this evidence was that the appellant’s reports to the
South African Revenue Services and the CCMA had engendered a sense of
indignation in the complainants.  It was also claimed that it was impossible to
determine the full extent of the thefts because of  the measures the appellant
took  to conceal them.
[6] The trial Court based its decision on sentence on the following essential
findings:

6.1
theft by an employee in circumstances where the employee is in a
position of trust was to be viewed in a very serious light and direct
imprisonment was the rule;
6.2
the appellant had shown scant remorse for his dishonesty, by blowing
the whistle on complainants to SARS, as well as invoking his labour
law remedies to claim the R3000,00 withheld by the complainants;
6.3
the appellant’s offer to repay the stolen money was made for the
first time during the trial which gave the impression that he was not as
serious about  repayment as he was about being sentenced lightly;  and
6.4
correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the act was limited
to a period of three years and as such it would not have the necessary
deterrent effect.
[7] The Court a quo in turn agreed with the trial Court that the appellant
had failed to show remorse for his dishonesty.  The Court a quo reasoned that

the fact that up to the time of the appeal  the appellant had made no
repayment of any of the stolen money suggested, in effect, that the appellant’s
offer of repayment was a ploy to avoid direct imprisonment. The Court a quo
also found that the appellant’s offer of repayment  was essentially an offer to
repay only the capital without any interest;  that there was uncertainty
whether the appellant would retain the employment he secured after his arrest;
and that the appellant’s evidence that he used part of the stolen money to help
his father was not persuasive.
[8] The Court a quo further agreed with the trial Court’s reasoning that
correctional supervision as a sentencing option was not appropriate.  The
Court a quo went on to conclude that there was no material disparity between
the sentence imposed by the trial Court and the sentence that it would have
imposed, and, in the absence of any misdirection by the trial Court, it could

find no reason to interfere with the sentence of five years imposed by the trial
Court.
[9] The issue is therefore whether the trial Court exercised its discretion
properly and judicially in imposing a sentence of 5 years’ direct
imprisonment.  It is trite that sentence is a matter best left to the discretion of
the sentencing Court.   A court sitting on appeal on sentence should always
guard against eroding the trial Court’s discretion in this regard, and should
interfere only where the discretion was not exercised judicially and properly.
A misdirection that would justify interference by an appeal Court should not
be trivial but should be of such a nature, degree or seriousness that it shows
that the Court did not exercise its discretion at all or exercised it  improperly
or unreasonably.
[10] In my view this test is satisfied in the present case for the following
reasons. The trial Court misdirected itself in finding that the appellant’s

conduct after his arrest in blowing the whistle on his employer for alleged
VAT irregularities and the institution of proceedings in the CCMA  were not
reconcilable with remorse. This finding clearly played a large part in the trial
Court’s imposition of the sentence of five years.  This finding was in my view
actuated by the trial Court paying insufficient regard to the appellant’s
motive  for acting in that manner.
[11] The appellant testified in this regard that after the thefts were
discovered, he was confronted by the complainants.  He offered to repay the
money he had stolen.  The appellant testified that after his undertaking of
repayment an arrangement was struck to the effect that the complainants
would instruct their attorney to draw up an agreement which the appellant
would sign binding himself to the offer to pay.  He testified that the
complainants reneged on that arrangement by instead opting to have him

arrested.  On realising that the repayment arrangement was off the table, he
then went to the SARS and to the CCMA.  This version was not contradicted.
These facts were misconstrued, to the prejudice of the appellant, in the trial
Court’s judgment on sentence.
[12] The trial Court found that a sentence of correctional imprisonment in
terms of s 276(1)(h) was not appropriate in this case and that it would not
have the necessary deterrent effect.  This finding appears to have been
influenced by the trial Court’s view that direct imprisonment in this type of
offence was the rule.  In this regard the trial Court appears to have limited its
sentencing options by positing  a choice between direct imprisonment and
correctional supervision.  Hence the trial Court’s statement that this type of
sentence was limited to a period of three years which it did not consider
would have the necessary deterrent effect. .  This was clearly a misdirection in
that the trial Court failed to consider other options provided in s 276 such as

the sentence provided in s 276(1)(i) which caters for a period of direct
imprisonment of up to five years, albeit imprisonment capable of subsequent
conversion to a sentence of correctional supervision.
[13] In my view the Court a quo also misdirected itself in a number of other
respects.  It doubted the appellant’s evidence that he used part of the stolen
money to assist his father.  It is however clear  that the State did not contest
the appellant’s version that he assisted his father.  The complainant as it
happened had also assisted the appellant’s father with motor vehicle parts but
this did not stave off his subsequent sequestration. The Court a quo further
found that the appellant’s erstwhile employer was ‘negative’ towards a
continuation of the appellant’s employment.  This is another misdirection.
The appellant’s evidence that the pending charges against him were known to
his employer and that they did not affect the continuation of his employment
was clear and was not contradicted.

[14] The Court a quo’s finding that the applicant’s offer to repay the money
he had stolen did not encompass an offer to pay interest is clearly misdirected.
Analysis of the appellant’s offer to repay the stolen money in monthly
instalments of R700,00 reveals that both capital and interest would have been
fully paid off in a markedly  shorter period than the twenty or so years
suggested to the appellant by the State prosecutor during his cross-
examination (which timeframe the trial Court and the Court a quo mistakenly
seemed to endorse).
[15] The misdirections discussed in the preceding paragraphs are in my
view material. They are material in that, taken individually and cumulatively,
they provided the basis for the trial Court rejecting correctional supervision as
a sentencing option.  Under the circumstances this Court is at large to
reconsider the question of sentence afresh.  It remains for me to consider what
sentence to impose. This Court has consistently held that theft of this nature is

serious.  What also makes it serious is that the appellant was in a position of
trust and betrayed that trust. This Court in S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331
(SCA) dispelled the notion that persons convicted of this type of offence were
not criminals and were therefore entitled to be kept out of prison.  In that case
Marais JA, acknowledging the seriousness of this type of offence, stated that
in appropriate cases direct imprisonment was not to be shied away from.
[16] A balance needs to be struck between the interests of society in having
deterrent sentences imposed and the interests of the appellant in having his
personal circumstances taken into account in amelioration of his  sentence, as
well as the purposes of judicial punishment per se.  The  recurrence of this
type of offence needs to be curbed by the imposition  of sentences which
address this upsurge. Deterrence is therefore crucial. Appropriately severe
punishment should, therefore, be imposed to achieve this objective.  The

quest for severity in a sentence should however not override considerations of
mercy and an understanding of human weaknes.
[17] In this case the amount of R30 069  stolen by the appellant may appear
relatively small if one considers the amounts involved in other cases
considered by this Court.  However, if one considers that the business of the
complainants was not a large one, then the amount stolen assumes graver
proportions.  It is also   correct that when the appellant’s conduct was
discovered he offered to repay the money he had stolen. He was in fact
prepared to sign a document signifying his willingness to pay.   He also
pleaded guilty and made an offer to repay the money in monthly instalments
of R700,00 having secured alternative and sustainable employment.  This
tends to signify remorse.
[18]  It is not in dispute, too, that the appellant used some of the money he
stole to assist his father who was beset by financial woes.  The appellant is

also a first offender.  It is also true that the commission of this type of offence
is rampant, and a clear message needs to be sent out that this will not be
countenanced.
[19] It is opportune at this stage to deal with  the appellant’s application for
this Court to consider the fact, now sought to be placed before us, that after
the dismissal of his appeal by the Court a quo, he effected full payment of the
capital and interest to the complainants.  Only in exceptional cases will a
court, sitting on an appeal on sentence, consider a fact that came to light after
proceedings in a court a quo.  In S v Marx 1989 (1) SA 222 (A) at 226 B – C
Smalberger JA said:
‘Vonnis word bepaal na aanleiding van feite en omstandighede wat ten tyde
van vonnisoplegging bekend is.  Slegs in uitsonderlike gevalle kan feite wat
eers na vonnisoplegging bekend  word op appèl in aanmerking geneem word.’

The payment this Court is requested to consider was effected by the appellant.
The timing of the payment was therefore determined by him.  We have no
explanation why the payment occurred only after the unsuccessful appeal to
the Court a quo and why it was not made at any other time. The repayment
was no doubt of advantage to the complainant. Had there been no
misdirections by the Court a quo and had this Court not been at large to
consider the question of sentence afresh, taking into account the repayment
would not have been justified. It would encourage others to manipulate their
dealings in an effort to influence the outcome of appeals.
[20]   That must in my view be the general rule. However, in view of the fact
that a number of material misdirections have been found, this Court is at large
to impose an appropriate sentence.  In this sense the appellant’s position
before this Court is similar to a convicted accused awaiting sentence.  In S v
Mpendokana 1987 (3) SA 20 (C) the Court considered an appeal from a

magistrate in which the appellant had been sentenced to two years’
imprisonment.  In that appeal the Court was of the opinion that the sentence
imposed was not appropriate and reserved judgment. Before the Court could
pronounce its sentence the legislation applicable to those offences was
amended to make provision for a fine.  The Court imposed a sentence based
on the new legislation.  Marais  J (as he then was) stated at 23 E – G:
‘Na my mening is ‘n Hof van appèl nie genoop om ‘n minder paslike vonnis
op te lê slegs omdat dit nie bestaan het ten tye van die aanvanklike
vonnisoplegging nie.  As hierdie Hof die saak na die landdros sou
terugverwys het vir vonnisoplegging opnuut, sou die landdros geregtig
gewees het om van die nuwe vonnis gebruik te maak.  Myns insiens sou dit
absurd wees om te bevind dat ‘n Hof van appèl nie self van die nuwe
strafmaatreël gebruik kan maak nie en dat die enigste wyse waarvolgens so ‘n

resultaat bereik sou kon word, sou wees om die saak na die hof a quo terug te
verwys vir vonnisoplegging opnuut.’
[21]  This approach was approved by this Court in Prokureur-Generaal,
Noord-Kaap v Hart 1990 (1) SA 49 (AD) at 57 A – B.1 Even though that case
and S v Mpendokana (supra) and the cases2 discussed therein dealt with
supervening legislation, the approach is in principle applicable also to other
situations. Given that we are ourselves imposing sentence as if none had been
previously imposed I can see no impediment to  considering the fact that the
appellant has now fully repaid the complainants the money he stole from
them.  It seems obvious that since his trial and the hearing of his appeal in the
Court a quo the appellant has been able to raise the money needed to
reimburse the complainant whereas he was not able to do so at any earlier
date.

1 ‘Ek volstaan deur te sê dat bostaande redenasie na my beskeie mening suiwer is, en ten volle versoenbaar
met die grondbeginsels van ons reëls van wetsuitleg betreffende straftemperende wysigingswette.’ Per
Hoexter JA
2 S v Crawford and Another 1979(2) SA 48 (AD);  S v Loate 1983(3) SA 400 (T);  S v Mpetha 1985(3) SA
702 AD and S v Innes 1979(1) SA 783 (C)

[22] All the circumstances of this case persuade me that this is a suitable
case for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment which is capable of
conversion to correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)(i) of Act 51 of
1977.  Such a sentence is appropriate in this case as it strikes a balance
between the public interest in the retributive and deterrent elements of
sentence and the personal interests of the appellant.
[23] In the circumstances the  appeal succeeds and the sentence imposed by
the Court a quo is set aside.  The following order is substituted:
‘The appeal succeeds.  The sentence of the trial Court is set aside.  In
its place there is substituted the following sentence:
The accused is sentenced  to five years’ imprisonment in terms of s
276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act read together with s
276A(2)(b).’

____________

D  MLAMBO

ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:
MARAIS

JA
CAMERON
JA

MARAIS JA:
[1] With some reluctance I concur in the judgment of Mlambo AJA. I am
less inclined to accept that the appellant was and is genuinely remorseful. He
is not of course being sentenced for seeking to cause his employer
embarrassment and discomfiture by reporting alleged tax irregularities to
SARS. Nor  is  he  being  sentenced  for  his  insistence  upon  being  paid  his
salary  of R3 000,00 despite the fact that he had stolen from and therefore
owed his employer over R30 000,00. But I find it very difficult to reconcile
that behaviour, even if it was retaliatory, with a sense of genuine remorse for
his misdeeds and to accept that he is entitled to be given the benefit of such a
finding. The plea of guilty in the face of an open and shut case against him is,
in my opinion, a neutral fact. That said, I agree with respect that there were
other material misdirections by the trial court and that we are therefore at
large in relation to sentence. I agree too that we may properly take the

repayment of the money stolen into account. I myself would have been
inclined to impose a sentence more severe than that which Mlambo AJA has
imposed and which would have approximated more closely to the sentence
which the trial court imposed, but I do not feel sufficiently strongly about the
matter to warrant a positive dissent.

____________________

R M MARAIS

JUDGE
OF
APPEAL