THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No:  542/2009

In the matter between:

FERNDALE CROSSROADS SHARE BLOCK
First Appellant
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
FERNDALE INVESTMENTS SHARE BLOCK
Second Appellant
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
URBAN REAL ESTATE (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
Third Appellant

and

CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG PROPERTY COMPANY
Second Respondent
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
Third Respondent
(PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
RANDBURG PROFESSIONAL HAWKERS
ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
Fourth Respondent
RANDBURG MANAGEMENT DISTRICT INC.
Fifth Respondent

Neutral citation:
Ferndale Crossroads Share Block v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
(542/09) [2010] ZASCA 126 (30 September 2010)

Coram:
MPATI P, HEHER, CACHALIA JJA, BERTELSMANN and EBRAHIM AJJA

Heard:

19 August 2010

Delivered:

30 September 2010

Updated:

Summary:

Local authority: Section 79(18) of Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939 –
power of local authority to alienate immovable property – no such power in

absence of preconditions – lease agreement concluded without compliance
with preconditions invalid.
___________________________________________________________
ORDER

On appeal from: South Gauteng High Court (Johannesburg)(Marais J sitting as court
of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed with costs, which shall include those of two counsel.

_______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________
MPATI P (HEHER, CACHALIA JJA, BERTELSMANN and EBRAHIM AJJA):

[1]   Two applications came before the Johannesburg High Court (Marais J) concerning the
same issue, which is also the primary issue in this appeal, viz the validity of a written
agreement (the agreement) concluded between the first and second appellants (of the one
part) and the first respondent.  Clause 5 of the agreement reads:
`[The City of Johannesburg] agrees to lease the land. . .marked in Red between BE and F on the
Drawing at an annual nominal rental of R499 . . . to [the first and second appellants].  The land
leased in terms hereof measures approximately 627 square meters and is in accordance with the
draft surveyors’ diagram attached hereto as annexure “A”. . .’
In part B of their notice of motion the appellants sought an order, inter alia, ‘[d]eclaring that
the written agreement concluded between the first and second appellants (of the one part)
and the first respondent on 27 March 2002 is valid and enforceable’.  No relief was sought
against the second, fourth and fifth respondents; they were cited by virtue of the interest
each held in the subject matter of the application.  The third respondent featured in part A
of the notice of motion where interdictory relief was sought against it and the first
respondent, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality.  Part A of the appellants’
notice of motion is not relevant for purposes of this appeal.

[2] In its notice of motion, which was coincidentally issued on the same day as that of
the appellants, the first respondent sought the following order:

`1.
That the lease agreement entered into between [first and second appellants] and the City
of Johannesburg dated 27 March 2002. . .be declared to be invalid ab initio;

2.
In the alternative to prayer 1, if the lease is found to be valid, that clause 18.2 of the lease
be declared invalid;

3.
In the alternative to prayer 2, if clause 18.2 is found to be valid, that an order of specific
performance of the lease agreement by [the City of Johannesburg] would be inappropriate.’

Clause 18.2 of the agreement provides that ‘. . . no party shall in any circumstances be
entitled to cancel this agreement’.

[3] The appellants own commercial property in the Randburg Central Business District
(CBD).  The property consists of a shopping centre known as the Oriental Plaza, one of a
number of such centres forming the Randburg Mall (the mall).  A major thoroughfare,
Hendrik Verwoerd Drive (H V Drive), separates the CBD and the Randburg Civic Precinct
(Civic Precinct) which is located on  a triangular-shaped piece of land owned by the first
respondent and bounded by H V Drive, Jan Smuts Avenue (Jan Smuts) and Selkirk
Avenue.  Jan Smuts and H V Drive meet at a point close to the Oriental Plaza while Selkirk
Avenue, which links Jan Smuts and H V Drive, is the base of the triangle.  The Civic
Precinct is utilized for a variety of purposes, including a taxi rank and a traders’ market.
The Oriental Plaza is situated opposite the taxi rank and traders’ market, across H V Drive.

[4] Prior to the conclusion of the agreement the taxi rank was partly enclosed by walls,
the side closest to the Oriental Plaza being left open. Entry to it was gained from Jan
Smuts. Thus, to reach the mall and the rest of the CBD from the taxi rank pedestrians had
to cross H V Drive.  It is common cause that the conflict between pedestrian and vehicular
traffic constituted a safety hazard.  The appellants, who were the lessors of all the shops
inside the Oriental Plaza, saw in this an opportunity for securing their lessees’ tenancy. So
they devised a plan to ‘channel’ the pedestrians from the taxi rank to the Oriental Plaza
through an overhead bridge across H V Drive. They anticipated that this would increase
business for their tenants.  To achieve their goal the appellants applied to the first
respondents’ property management forum, the City of Johannesburg Property Company

(Pty) Ltd (JPC), in May 2001 to lease a portion of the land making up the Civic Precinct
and from which the bridge could be accessed. (One foot of the envisaged pedestrian
bridge would rest on the leased land.)  Considering that an overhead bridge would assist in
solving the problem of the safety hazard caused by pedestrians crossing H V Drive the first
respondent approved the application and on 27 March 2002 the agreement, which is the
subject matter of this appeal, was concluded.

[5] In addition to the lease provisions in clause 51 the agreement also provided, inter
alia, for the appellants to extend the existing walls around the taxi rank so that the taxi rank
would be completely enclosed (clauses 6.2 and 6.3).2  Clause 7.1 is in these terms:
‘7.1 [The appellants] undertake, as soon as possible after signature of this Agreement and the
obtaining of all necessary approvals from all relevant authorities, to attend to the passing of plans
for the design and construction of a pedestrian bridge . . . over [H V Drive] close to the intersection
with [Jan Smuts] . . . which Bridge will link the taxi rank with the Oriental Plaza Shopping Centre.’

Clause 7.2 stipulated that a consideration of R1.00 ‘will be payable by [the first respondent]
to [the appellants] . . . for the construction of the Bridge’.  In terms of clause 8.2 the bridge
and a certain barrier, also to be constructed by the appellants at their own cost, would
become the property of and be controlled and maintained by the first respondent.  Subject
to the support of the Randburg Chamber of Commerce, the appellants would be entitled to
construct and lease to hawkers twelve kiosks at the foot of the bridge (clause 9).

[6] The parties appear to have complied with their respective obligations in terms of the
agreement until the beginning of May 2006 when the first respondent caused hawkers’
facilities to be erected outside the wall enclosing the taxi rank. Thereafter, it caused a
portion
of
the
wall
to
be
demolished
in
order
to
allow
access
from
the enclosed area to the newly constructed hawkers’ facilities.  It is alleged in the
appellants’ papers that this led to ‘thousands of pedestrians streaming through the gap in
the wall and traversing [H V Drive] on their way to and from the taxi rank’.  This resulted in
some skirmishes between the parties to the agreement the detail of which is not necessary

1  Quoted in paragraph 1 above.
2 Clause 6.4 reads: ‘The walls referred to in 6.2 and 6.3 are to be or have been constructed in such a way
to ensure that the commuters at the taxi rank who wish to exit the taxi rank will be prevented from doing
so and that the exit of such commuters will be directed towards the pedestrian bridge referred to in 7.1.’

for present purposes. In the meantime, during September 2004, a Ms Tanya van
Schalkwyk of JPC discovered that the first respondent had not published a notice of its
resolution to lease the land concerned as required by the provisions of s 79(18) of the
Local Government Ordinance (the Ordinance)3, calling for objections, if any, to the
proposed lease.  The relevant part of the Ordinance reads:
’79 General Powers – The Council may do all of the following things – namely:
. . .
(18)(a) . . . [S]ubject to the succeeding paragraphs and the provisions of any other law –
(i) let, sell, exchange or in any other manner alienate or dispose of any movable or immovable
property of council . . .;
(b) whenever a council wishes to exercise any of the powers conferred by paragraph (a) in respect
of immovable property, excluding the letting of any other property than land in respect of which the
lease is subject to section 1(2) of the Formalities in respect of Leases of Land Act, 1969 (Act 18 of
1969), the council shall cause a notice of the resolution to that effect to be –
(i)   affixed to the public notice board of the Council; and
(ii)  published in a newspaper in accordance with section 91 of the Republic of South African
Constitution Act, 1983;
in which any person who wishes to object to the exercise of any such power, is called upon to
lodge his objection in writing with the Town clerk within a stated period of not less than fourteen
days from the date of the publication of the notice in the newspaper. . .
(c) where any objection is received by the Town clerk in terms of paragraph (b),  the council shall
not exercise the power concerned if it is-
(i) a council referred to in part I or II of the Sixth Schedule to this Ordinance, unless the council has
considered any objection; or
(ii) . . . .’
After they had been advised of this fact the appellants forwarded a written request to JPC
to advertise the lease.  Notices calling for objections to a proposed ‘long-term lease of the
pedestrian bridge across [H V Drive]’ were published in two newspapers on 19 November
2004.  In response to the notices three objections were received, after which certain further
developments occurred, culminating in the first respondent obtaining legal advice to the
effect that the agreement (lease) was void ab initio.  In January 2007 the first respondent’s
Director: Legal Services gave instructions that application proceedings be instituted on
behalf of the first respondent for an order, inter alia, declaring the lease to be invalid.

3 17 of 1939.

[7] For the order it sought declaring the ‘lease agreement’ to be void ab initio the first
respondent relied on its own failure to comply with the provisions of section 79(18) of the
Ordinance. It asserted in its founding affidavit that the agreement constituted a lease and
thus that the council was obliged to publish its resolution to lease the land described in it
and to invite objections to it.

[8] That the first respondent is a local authority as contemplated in Part 1 of the Sixth
Schedule to the Ordinance is not in issue.  And it is common cause that the provisions of s
79(18) were not complied with before the conclusion of the agreement.

[9] In the founding papers in their application the appellants intimated that it would be
contended on their behalf that upon a proper consideration of its contents the agreement is
not essentially a lease agreement (as contemplated, and provided for, in terms of s
79(18)), but is rather a composite arrangement, the true nature of which is not governed by
the provisions of s 79(18) of the Ordinance.  That stance was maintained in their
answering affidavit in the first respondent’s application.  However, the court a quo found
that the agreement ‘in its own terms was a lease and was so regarded by the parties. . .’
and that s 79(18) of the Ordinance applied to it. Consequently, in the first respondent’s
application the court declared the agreement void ab initio and ordered the appellants to
pay the first respondent’s costs. It dismissed the appellants’ application with costs.  The
appellants are before us with leave of this court, the court a quo having refused leave to
appeal.

[10] The issues on appeal are (1) whether the agreement, properly construed,
constitutes a lease, in which event it would have been subject to the provisions of s 79(18)
of the Ordinance; (2) whether, if the agreement is a lease, the court a quo had a discretion
nevertheless to uphold it and, (3) if it had such a discretion, whether the court a quo should
have exercised it in favour of the appellants.  A related issue is whether, if the agreement
were found to be valid, an order for specific performance of the first respondent’s
obligations would be appropriate.

[11] Since, on the side of the appellants, the issues in the appeal concern only the first

and second appellants I shall, for convenience, refer to them collectively as ‘the
appellants’.  The third appellant, although a party to the proceedings against the
respondents by virtue of the fact that it had acted as the first and second appellants’ agent
in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the agreement, was not cited as a party in
the first respondent’s application against the first and second appellants. I shall also refer
to the first respondent as ‘the respondent’ and to the first and second respondents
collectively as ‘the respondents’.
[12]   The respondent asserts in its founding affidavit that the agreement constitutes a
lease and that it (the respondent) was therefore obliged to publish its resolution embodying
its intention to lease the land described in it (the agreement) and to call for objections.
‘A contract of lease is entered into when parties who have the requisite intention agree together
that the one party, called the lessor, shall give the use and enjoyment of immovable property. . . to
the other called a lessee, in return for the payment of rent.’4
In Kessler v Krogmann5  Innes CJ said the following on the essentials of a lease:
‘A reference to the authorities will show that the essentials of a contract of lease are that there
must be an ascertained thing, and a fixed rent at which the lessee is to have the use and
enjoyment of that thing.’6
In the present matter counsel for the appellants conceded that clause 5 of the agreement
utilizes language typically associated with a lease – the clause identifies a specific piece of
land to be leased (an ascertainable thing) at an annual nominal rental of R499 – but he
submitted that the clause is only part of the agreement and not of itself determinative of its
character. The import and essence of the agreement, so it was contended, was for a
bridge to be constructed at the appellants’ cost to serve as a conduit for the safe
conveyance of commuters between the taxi rank and the Oriental Plaza over the H V
Drive.  The substratum of the agreement, the argument continued, is identified in clause 5
where it is recorded that ‘[i]n the event of the taxi rank . . . being moved from the [Civic
Precinct] and the demolition of the kiosks then the lease may be terminated by either [of

4   A J Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (2004) p245.
5  1908 TS 290.
6  At 297.

the parties]’.  It was contended further that clause 7.1 is fundamental to the overall
purpose of the agreement.7

[13] It is true, as the court a quo observed, that the agreement ‘contains other provisions
not normally part of a lease agreement’ and that the appellants entered into the agreement
with the objective of effecting the ‘funnelling’ of commuters from the taxi rank to the
Oriental Plaza, while the respondents’ objective was to obtain a pedestrian bridge over H V
Drive which would eliminate the problem of a safety hazard caused by pedestrians
crossing H V Drive at ground level. But to achieve their objectives, the appellants, on the
one hand, had to construct the pedestrian bridge and extend the existing walls around the
taxi rank so as to enclose it completely, while on the other hand the respondent had to
make available a piece of land on which one of the legs of the bridge was to rest.

[14]   I agree with counsel for the respondents, however, that the objectives and motives of
the parties are of secondary importance in characterising the agreement and that the
primary indicator for such characterisation is the intention of the parties as expressed by
them in creating the contractual rights and obligations contained in the agreement.  As was
said by this court a century ago, ‘as a general rule, the parties to a contract express
themselves in a language calculated without subterfuge or concealment to embody the
agreement at which they have arrived. They intend the contract to be exactly what it
purports; and the shape which it assumes is what they meant’.8 The issue in that case was
whether a certain transaction constituted a sale or a pledge.  After referring to the old
authorities and, with approval, to English authority, Innes JA said:
‘We may take it, therefore, both on principle and on authority, that in considering whether the real
nature of any particular contract is different from its ostensible form, we must endeavour from all
the circumstances to get the actual meaning of the parties.’9

[15] It was not suggested on behalf of the appellants that there was any subterfuge

7  Clause 7.1 reads: ‘[The appellants] undertake as soon as possible after signature of this agreement and
the obtaining of all necessary approvals from all relevant authorities to attend to the passing of the plans
for the design and construction of the pedestrian bridge’ . . . over [H V Drive] close to the intersection with
Jan Smuts Avenue as depicted on the Drawing, which Bridge will link the taxi rank with the Oriental Plaza
Shopping Centre.’
8  Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 at 309.
9 At 310.

about the transaction between them and the respondent.  With regard to the
circumstances relevant to the present matter, I have mentioned above that the appellants
saw, from the many commuters who crossed H V Drive from the taxi rank into the CBD, an
opportunity to bolster the trade conducted by their lessees in the Oriental Plaza by
‘funnelling’ the commuters from the taxi rank through an overhead pedestrian bridge to the
Oriental Plaza.  For the construction of the pedestrian bridge they required the use of a
piece of land owned by the respondent.  In the respondent’s founding affidavit in its
application the allegation is made that  Urban Real Estate (Pty) Ltd (third appellant), acting
on behalf of the appellants, ‘submitted an application to JPC to lease a portion of [the Civic
Precinct], belonging to [the respondent]’. (My underlining.) The appellants admitted the
allegation, but qualified their admission by adding that ‘upon a proper construction of the
agreement . . . it is not, in essence, a lease, but rather a composite agreement, of which
the lease provisions forms an insignificant part.’ It was accordingly submitted, on behalf of
the appellants, that there had been no obligation on the respondent to comply with the
provisions of s 79(18) of the Ordinance.

[16] Before us counsel sought support for this proposition from this court’s decision in
Wed (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council & others,10  a case in which the Pretoria City Council
(the Council) had expropriated two adjacent buildings which it intended to redevelop.
Eighteen years later it decided to approach interested persons and bodies to assist with
the restoration of the buildings.  The appellant, who occupied part of one of the buildings
caused to be submitted, on its behalf, proposals to the Council for the restoration of the
buildings.  But the Council resolved to conclude a contract with the second respondent
who had also submitted proposals.  The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision and
instituted motion proceedings against the Council and the second respondent for the
review and setting aside of the former’s decision on grounds of non-compliance with the
provisions of s 35(1) of the Ordinance, which provides, inter alia, that ‘before a council
enters into any contract for the execution of any works . . . it shall give . . . notice of its
intention to enter into such contract. . .’ and call for tenders.  No such notice had been
given and no tenders were invited. In terms of the proposed agreement the second
respondent would finance the cost of the restorations by means of a loan and would, in

10  1988 (1) SA 746 (A).

return, be granted (by the Council) a long-term lease of the buildings which it would then
be entitled to sub-let. In considering whether the proposed agreement was one ‘for the
execution of any works for and on behalf of the Council’ this court said:
‘For the purposes of this case it may be assumed that the activities which the second respondent
will perform in restoring the buildings will amount to the carrying out of “works” within the ordinary
meaning of the word . . . These activities will, however, form only one facet of a composite contract
which will also sanction the occupation of the buildings by the second respondent for at least 50
years and will contain the financial arrangements between the parties consisting in part of the
payment of rent by the second respondent and in part of the sharing of profits. The contract as a
whole is therefore clearly something more than a mere contract for the execution of works.’11
This court consequently held that the section ‘is intended to apply only to contracts to
which the procedures laid down in [it] are capable of being applied . . .’ and that ‘it must
accordingly be limited to contracts for the execution of works in return for a money
consideration’.

[17] I do not agree with the submission by the counsel for the appellant that the facts in
the Wed case are similar to those of the present matter.  It is true, as I have already
stated, that in the instant case the agreement contains other provisions not normally part of
a lease agreement.  But unlike the Wed case where the Council was not going to spend
any public funds on restoring the buildings – which, in my view, was the main ground upon
which this court came to the conclusion that the agreement in that case was not struck by
s 35(1) of the Ordinance – in the present matter the first respondent was required to make
available (let) what may be referred to as public space to private entities mainly for the
latter’s own advantage.

[18]   That the agreement contains a lease element is common cause.  And again, I do not
agree with counsel for the appellants that the lease provisions form an insignificant part of
the agreement.  In my view, they form an integral part of the agreement without which the
parties’ objectives could not have been realised.  Indeed, as the respondent’s counsel
correctly pointed out, without the lease element, in terms of which the respondent was
obliged to permit the bridge to occupy the leased area of land on the Civic Precinct for a
lengthy period the agreement would not make any sense.  It cannot stand without the

11 At 757G – I.

lease element.

[19] Apart from the fact that the appellants had applied to the first respondent to lease
the piece of land concerned and apart from the contents of clause 5 of the agreement,
which contains the essentialia of a lease – it identifies the thing to be leased and the
annual rental to be paid in exchange – there are other indicators present, evidencing the
substance of the parties’ intention, viz to conclude a lease agreement and, in addition, to
record other rights and obligations flowing from it.  In terms of the agreement the
appellants ‘shall be entitled to cede, transfer or assign any of [their] rights under this lease
. . .’ (clause 15). (My underlining.)  The agreement makes provision for ‘advertisement
costs’ and a ‘valuation fee’ to be paid by the appellants (clause 5.3), a clear indication that
the parties had the provisions of s 79(18) of the Ordinance in mind.  And the parties
themselves in fact treated the agreement as a lease.  When the appellants were informed
that the respondent had not complied with the provisions of s 79(18) they requested that
the lease be advertised so as to overcome the problem. In correspondence that passed
between the parties’ legal representatives the agreement was constantly referred to as a
lease.

[20] In my view, the appellants failed to discharge the onus resting upon them, of
proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the agreement is something different from what
it appears to be: a contract of lease,12 or that the lease element of it is so insignificant that
compliance with the provisions of s 79(18) of the Ordinance was not required or
necessary.

[21] Section 79(18)(b) is intended to ensure that no immovable property of a local
authority is alienated or disposed of without notice to its ratepayers and the affording to
interested persons of the opportunity to object and have such objections duly considered.
‘Alienation’ and ‘disposal’ are concepts which are obviously to be liberally construed in the
public interest. The agreement in question detracts from the Council’s ownership of 627
square meters of its immovable property by transferring rights in that property to the
appellants for 20 years. Such rights may be registered as real rights. Thus, the agreement

12 See Zandberg v Van Zyl above, at 314.

factually gives rise to the very situation that the subsection was designed to regulate.
The fact that the alienation may appear to be insignificant in the scheme of the agreement
is irrelevant: the only question is whether or not there is an alienation or disposal. Once
there is, interested parties could not be deprived of the opportunity to object.

[22] The effect of non-compliance with the provisions of s 79(18)(b) and (c) of the
Ordinance, ie failure by the respondent to cause a notice of its resolution, embodying its
intention to let the area of land described in the agreement to be affixed to its public notice
board and to publish it (the resolution) in a newspaper calling for objections to the
proposed lease before exercising the power to let, is that the jurisdictional fact necessary
for the exercise of the power was absent.  In terms of s 79(18)(c) a council ‘shall not
exercise the power [to let immovable property] . . . unless [it] has considered every
objection’. (My underlining.) In the absence of the necessary jurisdictional fact the
respondent could not validly exercise the power,13 with the result that the lease element of
the agreement was ab initio invalid.

[23] The appellants contended, in the alternative, that should it be found that the court
below was correct in its conclusion that the agreement contained a lease, the court
nevertheless failed to exercise its discretion in favour of condoning the invalidity. I shall
assume, without deciding, that such a discretion exists.14 It is not in dispute that the
learned judge did not bring any discretion to bear on this question. And ordinarily this
would be a sufficient ground for an appellate tribunal to interfere with an order of a court of
first instance.15

[24] The appellants did not, however, raise this issue in their founding affidavit in their
application and made only a passing reference in their replying affidavit to it being ‘unfair
and inappropriate to now declare it [the contract] void’ because ‘too much water has

13 See Paola v Jeeva NO & others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 14 -16; Kimberley Junior School v Head,
Northern Cape Education Department 2010 (1) SA 217 (SCA) para 11. Compare also Foundation Estate
& Finance Co. (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1978 (1) SA 92 (W).
14 For a contrary view, see DM Pretorius ‘The Status and Force of Defective Administrative Decisions
Pending Judicial Pronouncements’ (2009) 126 SALJ 537.
15 Davidson v Honey 1953 (1) SA 300 (A) 309A.

already passed under this bridge to reverse the transaction’.  The issue appears to have
been only faintly argued in the court a quo and was raised expressly for the first time in the
appellants’ amended notice of application for leave to appeal – obviously as an
afterthought.

[25] It should be mentioned that the appellants’ failure to raise the issue was not an
oversight. Their case was that the parties had entered into a commercial contract and it
was in the law of contract – not in public law or administrative law – that they sought their
remedy. Thus, in their answering affidavit in the respondent’s application they sought to
establish that they were entitled to an order for specific performance, which is a contractual
remedy. Having failed to deal with the issue pertinently in their affidavits they cannot now
seek to elevate it as a ground on appeal.

[26] Furthermore, in his judgment dismissing the appellants application for leave to
appeal, Marais J found that even if the contract was valid he would, in the exercise of his
discretion, not have ordered specific performance because this would have the effect of
frustrating the respondent’s redevelopment plans for Randburg’s central business district,
which would not be in the public interest. And he concluded, fittingly, that this consideration
would have been decisive had he exercised his discretion in relation to the declaratory
relief that was sought.  I agree with this approach.

[27]   The appeal is dismissed with costs, which shall include those of two counsel.

____________________

L Mpati

President

APPEARANCES
APPELLANTS:
S Snyman SC with him S J Bekker

Instructed by Salant Attorneys, Johannesburg;

Matsepes Inc., Bloemfontein

RESPONDENT:
S J Du Plessis SC with him L B van Wyk SC

Instructed by Brink Cohen Le Roux, Johannesburg;

Symington & De Kock, Bloemfontein