THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

CASE NO: 108/2004
Reportable

In the matter between

SEVEN ELEVEN CORPORATION OF SA (PTY) LTD    Appellant

AND

CANCUN TRADING NO 150 CC

Respondent

Coram:
Mpati DP, Farlam, Lewis, Heher, Ponnan JJA

Heard:
21 February 2005
Delivered:

Summary: On a proper construction of a franchise agreement in respect of a
Seven Eleven convenience store, the franchisee is not entitled to the benefit
of rebates or early settlement discounts received by the franchisor from
suppliers of goods:  appeal against the decision to allow the benefit of rebates
to a franchisee upheld and cross-appeal against decision not to allow benefits
of early settlement discounts to a franchisee refused.

JUDGMENT

LEWIS JA

Introduction

[1] The dispute between the parties in this appeal turns on a
franchise agreement. The appellant is a company that has
operated ‘convenience’ stores, known as ‘Seven Eleven’ stores,
primarily in the Western Cape, for many years. Most of the stores
are operated by franchisees to whom the appellant has sold the
business of a store and has given the right to manage the store
subject to the franchise agreement in issue. The respondent is a
close corporation, the sole member of which is Mr Herman
Fouché.

[2] In July 1999 the respondent, represented by Fouché,
purchased a store in Parow from the appellant and entered into a
franchise agreement in respect of it. Some years later, the
respondent sold the store back to the appellant and purchased
another, bigger, store in Table View, entering into a new, and

different, franchise agreement with the appellant. The respondent
remains the franchisee in respect of the Table View store.

[3] The dispute relates to various discounts that the respondent
claims should have been passed on to it by the appellant over the
period when he operated the store in Parow. In the court below
(the Cape High Court) the respondent  claimed the sum of R353
396.08, plus interest, representing such discounts, on four
different, alternative, grounds. The court (per Mitchell AJ) found for
the respondent on one basis, but, in terms of an agreement
between the parties, referred the determination of the quantum
payable to the respondent to a referee in terms of s 19bis of the
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. The appellant appeals against the
finding of liability, and the respondent cross appeals against the

finding that one particular class of discount (‘early settlement
discounts’) should not have been afforded to the respondent.

The background to the contract in dispute
[4] The background to the conclusion of the sale and franchise
contracts is briefly this. Early in 1999 Fouché was about to retire
from public service and considered starting a business of his own,
in particular to give employment to his son who is disabled. He
consulted various documents available about franchise operations
and investigated, amongst others, the franchise business run by
the appellant. He contacted the public relations officer of the
appellant, Ms Geraldine McConnagh, and met her to discuss the
possibility of becoming a franchisee with the appellant. She
described the business operation of the appellant to Fouché. At a
subsequent meeting, having concluded that Fouché was seriously

interested in becoming a franchisee, she gave him what was
termed a ‘disclosure document’.

[5] The disclosure document is important to the respondent’s
action. It tells the prospective franchisee that it is not a contract,
and cannot be relied upon to determine all the terms of the
contract. It also advises that the contract itself should be carefully
considered and referred to an attorney for advice. It describes,
inter alia, the history of the appellant and of Mr George Hadjidakis,
the managing director and founder of the appellant. It also gives
details of the staff members responsible for different spheres of the
operation; of the benefits of the franchise system (one being that
maximum discounts are passed on to the franchisee, and which
forms a significant element of the dispute to which I shall return);
the training given to franchisees; the financial arrangements and

requirements; trademark registrations; and the respective
obligations of the parties. In short, it tells a prospective franchisee
how the system operates. Fouché received the document on 31
May 1999 and at about that date also discussed the possibility of
buying a store and becoming a franchisee with Hadjidakis directly.

[6] Fouché, as advised, studied the document carefully,
highlighting passages he regarded as important, as he did the
franchise agreement. He met with Hadjidakis subsequently, and
eventually made an offer to purchase the store in Parow, which
took the form of the standard contract then used by the appellant.
Fouché’s impression created, he said, by discussions with
Hadjidakis, and by the disclosure document, was that he was
entitled to all the benefits obtained by the appellant as a result of
bulk purchasing. At the time of entering into the contract, however,

he did not know of any benefits other than ordinary trade
discounts and what Hadjidakis had referred to as ‘kickbacks’.

[7] At one of the discussions about becoming a franchisee,
Hadjidakis had mentioned to Fouché that there were a number of
franchisees who were dissatisfied with the business because they
believed they were not getting all the benefits to which they were
entitled. Indeed there had been press coverage about the
dissatisfaction before Fouché entered into discussions with
representatives of the appellant. And Fouché was invited to attend
a meeting between the appellant and franchisees at which the
dissatisfaction about not getting the benefit of rebates and early
settlement discounts was expressed. He did not attend the
meeting himself – but members of his family did. Aware of such
dissatisfaction on the part of franchisees, Fouché nonetheless, on

behalf of the respondent, entered into the contract of sale and the
franchise contract with the appellant.

[8] The disclosure document, in dealing with the advantages of
being a Seven Eleven franchisee, states that one of the benefits of
the franchise system of the appellant was that ‘maximum
discounts’ would be passed on to franchisees. Trade discounts
were indeed passed on to the respondent. Fouché subsequently
discovered, however, that the appellant received other reductions
in the prices payable to suppliers of the goods sold in the store:
what were termed ‘early settlement discounts’, which the court
below decided were not payable to the respondent, and certain
rebates given to the appellant by suppliers, which the court held
should have been passed on to the respondent.  It is the
respondent’s entitlement to rebates that forms the subject of the

appeal, and the entitlement to settlement discounts that forms the
subject of the cross appeal.

[9] Fouché did not succeed in running the store in Parow at a
profit. He testified that although he and his family worked long and
hard  the respondent was in financial difficulty. And so, he said,
despite not getting the benefit of the discounts to which he thought
the respondent  was entitled, Fouché approached Hadjidakis to
discuss the problems that he was encountering in running the
Parow store. Hadjidakis advised him to take on a second franchise
or to buy a bigger store with a bigger turnover. Fouché opted for
the second route.

[10] In August 2001 the respondent sold the Parow store back to
the appellant, and bought a new business in Tableview. He also

entered into a new franchise agreement. It is significant that the
terms of the franchise agreement are different: in particular, it
states that ‘the franchisor shall in its sole and absolute discretion
afford the franchisee the benefit of trade discounts received by it
as a result of bulk purchases for goods and merchandise
purchased on the franchisee’s behalf’. The action against the
appellant relates, however, to the first franchise agreement, which
makes no mention of any kind of discount at all.

The sale and franchise contracts and the alternative grounds for
the claim

[11] The  sale agreement between the parties is not in contention,
although it is relevant to the business scheme governing the
relationship between the parties. The respondent purchased the
business of the store in Parow, including goodwill, fixtures, fittings,

furniture, appliances and stock – a fully stocked convenience
store. The purchase price of the store was payable over a period
of three years and is discussed more fully below.

[12] The franchise agreement that regulates the relationship
between the parties is central to the action. It is silent on the
question of discounts to which the respondent might have been
entitled. The respondent claimed the discounts to which it
considered it was entitled on four alternative grounds. The first was
that it was entitled, on an interpretation of the franchise agreement,
to receive the benefit of any discounts ‘negotiated’ with suppliers
(wholesalers). The second ground was that as a result of ‘quasi
mutual assent’ the contract provided that the appellant would pass
on to the respondent any discounts so negotiated. Thirdly, that
there is a tacit or implied term to the effect that any discounts

would be passed on to the respondent; or, in the fourth place,
that Hadjidakis, the managing director of the appellant, had falsely
misrepresented to Fouché that discounts negotiated with suppliers
would be passed on to the respondent. Before turning to each
ground I shall deal with the structure of the business strategy put in
place by the appellant, to which effect was given by the franchise
agreements between the appellant and its franchisees.

The appellant’s business strategy
[13] The way in which the appellant operates is to a large extent
explained in the franchise agreement itself and the disclosure
document, and emerges also from the evidence of Hadjidakis and
Mr Russell Cameron, the chief buyer for the appellant.

[14] On conclusion of a franchise agreement the franchisee is
placed in control of a fully stocked Seven Eleven convenience
store. That stock is paid for by the appellant, and the franchisee is
given a period of three years in which to pay for it, no interest
being charged. The franchisee is obliged to pay 75 per cent of its
weekly turnover to the appellant in the week following the
purchase of stock. (In the respondent’s case this was amended to
the sum of the total purchase prices plus R1 000 a week.)

[15] The franchisee undertakes to make purchases for the store
only from the appellant or from its nominated suppliers. Crucially,
the appellant pays all suppliers itself, although the franchisee
receives an invoice from suppliers on delivery. The suppliers then,
at the end of each month, send a consolidated statement reflecting
the supplies to each franchisee to the appellant.  A specially

designed computer programme enables the franchisee to inform
the appellant of its purchases from each supplier: if the supplier’s
statement tallies with that of the franchisees, the appellant pays
the supplier.

[16] The goods stocked by the franchisees, in accordance with
the franchise agreements, are limited. As indicated, the
franchisees may purchase only from approved suppliers, and in
respect of certain items, such as meat and bakery products, the
appellant is itself the supplier.

[17] All negotiations, especially as to prices and discounts, for the
purchase of goods stocked in the Seven Eleven stores are done
by the appellant directly with the suppliers. And the franchisees

play no role in the payment arrangements between the appellant
and the suppliers.

[18] The business model on which the appellant relied entailed
that the franchisees mark up the price of goods sold by an average
of 39 per cent. Projections on yearly turnover in any store would,
provided the store was run in accordance with the principles laid
down by the appellant, yield an annual gross profit of 10 per cent.
The projections in respect of the Parow store first acquired by the
respondent were made available to Fouché before the contract
was concluded. These make no provision for  settlement discounts
or rebates. However, on certain invoices actually received by the
respondent the supplier did indicate the extent of a rebate.

The claim based upon the interpretation of the franchise
agreement

[19] The court below found that on an interpretation of the
franchise agreement, having regard to the disclosure document as
a background circumstance, the respondent had been entitled to
the benefit of rebates that the appellant received from suppliers.
As previously stated, no mention is made in the agreement of the
right of the respondent to benefit from any discount afforded the
appellant. Indeed the word ‘discount’ appears nowhere in the
agreement. The respondent argued, however, that such right could
be found by having regard to the background circumstances of the
contract. The court below found that a section in the preamble to
the contract could not be given meaning without reference to
background circumstances. Such meaning was found by the court
in the disclosure document. The respondent  relied also on clauses

14.1 and 14.2 of the contract to bear out the meaning for which
it contended. Clause 14 deals with the goods that may be sold by
the franchisee. Clause 14.1 reads:
‘In order to ensure uniformity in specification compliance and control, the
Licensee [franchisee] agrees to handle, promote and/or sell only those items
approved by the Licensor [franchisor] purchased only from the licensor and/or
such wholesalers and/or suppliers as are approved and/or nominated by the
Licensor.’
Clause 14.2 provides:
‘The Licensee shall consult with the Licensor in regard to pricing policies
recommended by the licensor in relation to the products and will adhere to
any recommended prices stipulated by the Licensor.’
It is immediately apparent that these clauses have no bearing at all
on the question whether the respondent was entitled to discounts
on the goods that it purchased for sale in the store.

[20] The court below did, however, consider that words in the
preamble to the contract were unclear and thus subject to
interpretation. The preamble records the background to the
agreement and certain facts about the appellant’s franchising
operation. It does not impose obligations on either party, as
counsel for the respondent conceded in argument before this
court. The clause relied upon reads as follows, the words
emphasised being those the court considered uncertain:
‘(c) The licensor is engaged in providing entities and individuals with a unique
and successful business support system, hereinafter referred to as the system
including information and analysis of researches in regard to equipping,
planning,
financing,
furnishing
and
establishing
SEVEN
ELEVEN
Convenience Stores, wholesale purchasing and retail marketing of stock in
trade, management expertise, knowledge and information and unique design
and set up of each SEVEN ELEVEN Convenience Store, inventories and
control systems, colour schemes and individually designed patterns of layout
of SEVEN ELEVEN Convenience Stores.’

[21] The court considered that in determining the meaning of
‘business support system’ it should have regard at least to
background circumstances – those facts known to all parties and
that are not in contention. The most important circumstance in this
matter, said Mitchell AJ, was the disclosure document prepared by
the appellant for prospective franchisees.  That document states
that ‘the benefits of belonging to the group are enormous’. One of
the reasons advanced for this is that ‘Head Office buys in bulk and
negotiates maximum discounts, which are passed on directly to
the franchisee’.  Much of the argument on the four alternative
grounds for the claim was directed to this statement.

[22] There is no doubt, in my view, that the trial judge, in
interpreting the contract, was entitled to have regard to the

disclosure document as one of the circumstances forming the
background.1 The document was a factor known to the
representatives of each: it had been prepared by the appellant and
given to Fouché by McConnagh before he had decided whether to
enter into the sale and franchise agreements on behalf of the
respondent.

[23] There are, however, two difficulties with the approach taken
by the court below. First, the words regarded as uncertain were in
the preamble to the franchise contract, and were conceded by the
respondent not to impose any obligations on the appellant.2 The
justification for having regard to the disclosure document was thus
flawed since no light was thrown on the obligations of the
appellant.

1 See for example Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767I-768E.
2 See ABSA Bank Ltd v Swanepoel NO  2004 (6) SA 178 (SCA)at 181D-G.

[24] Secondly, the court examined the words in isolation,
without having regard to the document as a whole. Particular
attention was paid to dictionary definitions of the words ‘discount’
and ‘rebate’, without considering the entire business system set
out in the document and in the projections on turnover and profit
given to Fouché before the contracts were concluded. The court
considered that the word ‘discount’ included rebates. It is true that
the dictionary definitions of rebate indicate that it is a retroactive
discount.3 Indeed, the Concise Oxford English Dictionary4 gives as
one of its meanings ‘a deduction or a discount on a sum due’
without reference to the aspect of retroactivity. But dictionary
definitions, as has so often been said by this court, are not always
helpful, let alone conclusive. In Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation)
v Van Deventer5  Hefer JA stated:

3 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 4 ed (1993).
4 10 ed 2002.
5 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) at 726H-727B.

‘Recourse to authoritative dictionaries is, of course, a permissible and often
helpful method available to the Courts to ascertain the ordinary meaning of
the words . . . . But judicial interpretation cannot be undertaken, as Schreiner
JA observed in Jaga v Dönges NO . . . .1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 664H, by
“excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without sufficient
attention to the contextual scene”.’
Similarly, in De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v
Ishizuka6 Nicholas J said, in relation to the interpretation of a
patent specification:
‘A dictionary meaning of a word cannot govern the interpretation. It can only
afford a guide. And, where a word has more than one meaning, the dictionary
does not, indeed it cannot, prescribe priorities of meaning. The question is
what is the meaning applicable in the context of the particular document under
consideration.’
Both these statements were referred to with approval by Harms JA
in Monsanto Co v MDB Animal Health (Pty) Ltd (Formerly MD

6 1980 (2) SA 191 (T) at 196E-F.

Biologics CC).7 Moreover, as  Lord Steyn said in R v Secretary
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly8 ‘in law context is
everything’, a statement referred to by Nugent JA with approval in
Aktiebolaget Hässle v Triomed (Pty) Ltd.9

[25] The proper question to be posed then, when having regard
to the entire context in which the parties found themselves at the
time of negotiating the contracts, is what was meant by the parties.
This enquiry requires a consideration of the whole disclosure
document which explains the appellant’s method of operation as a
franchisor. That document, the franchise contract, and the
evidence of Hadjidakis and Fouché, explain the context.

7 2001 (2) SA 887 (SCA) at 892A-E.
8 [2001] UKHL 26 para 28; [2001] 3 All ER 433 (HL) at 447a.
9 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA) at 157G.

[26] The evidence of Hadjidakis and of Cameron was that
trade discounts that were passed on to franchisees were of a
completely different nature from rebates. Both testified that a
discount is negotiated with a supplier before sales are made to the
franchisees, and are thus reflected on the invoices given to the
franchisee when goods are delivered to it. Rebates, on the other
hand, are given by manufacturers or suppliers after sales have
been made. They are given for reasons unrelated to the individual
franchisees: in general, they will be given to a purchaser as a
reward for growth, for example, reaching a target of a certain
number of stores, or because the purchases made over a period
have grown. The fact of a rebate, and its quantum, are generally
regarded as confidential. The major supermarket chains do not
know what rebates are given to others, and Hadjidakis said that
even the managing director of a major chain might not know what

rebates had been given – only the person in direct control of
buying would be aware of the full extent of it.  Rebates, he
testified, were an important  source of profit to the appellant.

[26] Furthermore, whereas trade discounts negotiated ahead of a
purchase, were taken into account when making the financial
projections for a potential franchisee, and in respect of which the
respondent obtained the benefit, rebates could never have been
part of the projections because they were not known when these
were calculated. And how, asked the appellant, if rebates were to
be  passed on to franchisees, would this be done? Rebates were
not linked to sales made to individual franchisees: they were linked
to the franchisor’s operation and growth.

[27] If one has regard to the contract in question, the
disclosure document and the evidence of Hadjidakis, it becomes
apparent that it could never have been intended that rebates be
passed on to the respondent or any other franchisee. In any event,
in so far as Fouché’s intention is concerned, he testified that at the
time of entering into the contract he had not been aware of the
existence of rebates. Obviously, then, he could not have expected
to get the benefit of any.

[28] In so far as early settlement discounts were concerned, no
provision was made in any of the documents concerned for
passing on the benefit of these to franchisees. It will be recalled
that all payments for goods sold to franchisees by suppliers are
paid for by the appellant. In certain cases if payment was made
promptly or before due date a discount would be given to the

appellant. The court below concluded that such discounts did
not relate to bulk purchasing: they were a function of payment
made timeously or early by the appellant. They therefore did not
accrue to the respondent on any interpretation of the franchise
contract.

[29] In my view, having regard to the terms of the franchise
contract and the disclosure document it is clear that the parties did
not intend that such discounts enured for the benefit of the
respondent. The claim on this ground must thus fail.

The claim based on quasi-mutual assent
[30] The first alternative claim made by the respondent was that,
prior to the conclusion of the franchise contract, the appellant had
led the respondent, represented by Fouché, reasonably to believe

that  any discounts negotiated with suppliers would be passed
on to the respondent. The response to that claim was that the
contract expressly excluded liability for representations or
warranties made by the appellant. The respondent then amended
its claim to aver fraudulent misrepresentations made by Hadjidakis
to Fouché. I shall deal with that ground in due course.

[31] In my view, the claim based on quasi-mutual assent is in any
event misconceived.  In order to rely on quasi-mutual assent one
must show that the person who has relied on terms different from
those appearing in the contract has done so reasonably.10 One
must ask first whether there has been a misrepresentation as to
one party’s intention; secondly, who had made that representation,
and thirdly, whether the other party was misled. Thus the essential
question is whether, as a result of misrepresentation, the contract

10 Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v
Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) at 239J-240A.

is different from what it appears to be. This approach requires
that one looks for a misrepresentation as to the terms of the
contract. Apart from the fact that there was no credible evidence to
show that Fouché had indeed been misled, the contract itself
precluded reliance on any misrepresentation, in the absence of
fraud. The action must thus fail on this ground too.

The claim based on an implied or a tacit term
[32] The distinction between implied and tacit terms is now trite.
The former is a term implied by the law, the latter a term implied by
the facts.11 It was not argued by the respondent that there is any
term relating to special forms of discount that must be available to
a franchisee implied by law.  But it was argued that the parties had
tacitly agreed that the respondent would receive the benefit of all
discounts given to the appellant by suppliers. Hadjidakis denied

11 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A).

that he would have agreed to such a term. It was the essence of
his business strategy that the appellant alone would be the
beneficiary of rebates and early settlement discounts. And Fouché
could hardly contend that he intended to get such discounts given
that he did not know of their existence at the time of entering into
the contract.

[33] The principle applied over many years is that the term to be
incorporated in the contract must be necessary, not merely
desirable.12 The classic tests used to give effect to this principle do
not, however, take into account the actual intentions of the
respective parties. They require the court to consider whether the
term contended for would give ‘business efficacy’ to the contract;13
or to ask what the ‘officious bystander’ – a person who is not a

12 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Faux Ltd 1916 AD 105; West End
Diamonds Ltd v Johannesburg Stock Exchange  1946 AD 910; Mullin (Pty) Ltd v Benade Ltd
1952 (1) SA 211 (A); Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) at 142B-E.
13 See Alfred McAlpine  above at 532 in fin-533B, where Corbett JA relied on a statement of
Scrutton LJ in Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co [1918] 1 KB 592 (CA) at 605; 118 LT 479
(CA) at 483.

party to the contract but asked whether the term is necessary –
would say.14 These are objective tests. On either test, when one
asks whether  it was  necessary to  incorporate a  term  in  the
franchise  contract  that the franchisee  would  receive the  benefits
of  all  discounts obtained  by the  franchisor,  the  answer  must
be that such a term was not necessary. On the contrary: it was
fundamental to the appellant that it received the early settlement
discounts and the rebates for its own benefit. These discounts
were what made the appellant’s business profitable.

[34] Whether one looks at the matter on a subjective basis – what
the parties actually thought at the time of entering into the contract
– or on the objective tests applied over many decades, the answer

14 See the dictum of Mackinnon LJ in Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB
206 (CA) at 227, and Barnabas Plein & Co v Sol Jacobson & Son 1928 AD 25 at 31-32 where
Stratford JA too had regard to what an independent person would say about the necessity of
incorporating the term in question.  However, Stratford JA also stated  that the ‘true view’ is
that ‘you have to get at the intention of the parties in regard to a matter which they must have
had in mind, but which they have not expressed’. He considered therefore that one had to
have regard not only to objective tests but also to what the parties claimed to have intended.

is clear. There was no tacit term that the respondent was
entitled to the benefit of early settlement discounts or of rebates.

The claim based on fraudulent misrepresentation
[35] The particulars of claim were amended, as I have said, to
allege fraud on the part of Hadjidakis when the appellant relied on
the clauses in the franchise contract that excluded liability for
misrepresentations. But such exemption clauses do not avail a
party who has made fraudulent misrepresentations to the other.15
The court below found that Hadjidakis had not made any
fraudulent misrepresentations on which the respondent could rely.
There was no proof that Hadjidakis had told Fouché that all
discounts obtained by the appellant would be passed on to the
respondent, let alone proof that he had done so deliberately in
order to mislead. At all times Hadjidakis had believed, the court

15 Wells v SA Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69; Reeves v Marfield insurance Brokers CC
1996 (3) SA 766 (A) at 775C-H.

found, that a distinction was to be drawn between discounts
negotiated in advance with suppliers, and which were thus for the
benefit of franchisees, and rebates and settlement discounts which
allowed the appellant to operate at a profit. Moreover, Fouché
conceded that he had not been aware of the existence of these
latter benefits when negotiating the contract. It would thus be
absurd to suggest that Hadjidakis had told him otherwise, or even
that he had a duty to disclose to Fouché that certain discounts
would not be passed on to the respondent.

[36] Moreover, Hadjidakis had told Fouché that there were
several dissatisfied franchisees before the contract was concluded,
and had invited Fouché to attend a meeting at which complaints
about not getting the benefit of rebates and early settlement
discounts were aired. Although Fouché had not attended the

meeting, members of his family had done so. And Fouché had
been put in touch with another franchisee, who was vociferous in
his complaints about the appellant, in order to receive training. It is
highly unlikely therefore that he believed, whether as a result of a
misrepresentation or a failure to disclose that certain discounts
would not enure for the respondent’s  benefit, that the respondent
was entitled to rebates and early settlement discounts.

[37] In any event, even if there had been a misrepresentation, or
non-disclosure, fraudulent, negligent or innocent, it is apparent that
Fouché had not relied, to his detriment, on such misrepresentation
or non-disclosure, in entering into the contracts in respect of the
Parow store. For at the stage when he was fully aware that
franchisees were not getting the benefits for which they were
clamouring, he nonetheless entered into a new arrangement with

the appellant, purchasing a different store and concluding a new
franchise agreement which expressly stated that the franchisor
‘shall in its sole discretion afford the franchisee the benefit of trade
discounts received by it as a result of bulk purchases for goods
and merchandise purchased on the franchisee’s behalf’ (my
emphasis).

[38] The finding of the trial court that Hadjidakis had not acted
fraudulently is thus correct. To this is added that Fouché had not
relied on any misrepresentation, if such there was, in entering into
the franchise contract. This claim is thus also unfounded.

[39] In summary: the respondent did not establish in the court
below that it was entitled to payment of any amount representing

the benefits of rebates or early settlement discounts afforded to
the appellant on any of the grounds alleged.

[40] It is ordered that:
The appeal is upheld with costs, including those consequent
on the employment of two counsel;
The order of the court below is set aside and replaced by:
‘The Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs including those
consequent upon the employment of two counsel.’
The cross appeal is dismissed with costs.

C H Lewis
Judge of Appeal
Concur:
Mpati DP
Farlam JA
Heher JA
Ponnan JA