REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case number:112/2002
Reportable

In the matter between:

SOUTH AFRICAN VETERINARY COUNCIL                  First Appellant
RJ NAGEL NO                                                                   Second Appellant
and

VETERINARY DEFENCE ASSOCIATION                            Respondent

CORAM:
MARAIS, SCHUTZ, FARLAM, MTHIYANE JJA, et
HEHER AJA

HEARD:

28 FEBRUARY 2003

DELIVERED:
27 MARCH 2003

SUMMARY: SA Veterinary Council – locus standi of Veterinary Defence
Association to review disciplinary action against member – disciplinary inquiry –
correct approach where respondent does not testify – when failure to cross-examine
significant.
_____________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________

FARLAM JA

[1] This is an appeal against a judgment and order granted by Roux J,
sitting in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court, in terms of
which a finding made by a tribunal appointed by the first appellant, the
South African Veterinary Council, in terms of section 12(1) of the
Veterinary and Para-Veterinary Professions Act 19 of 1982, as amended
(‘the Act’), to the effect that Dr SB Krawitz, a member of the respondent,
the Veterinary Defence Association, was guilty of unprofessional,
improper or disgraceful conduct, was set aside with costs.
[2] The first appellant is a statutory body established by section 2 of the
Act.
[3] The second appellant is Raynier Johannes Nagel, who was the
chairman of the tribunal which found Dr Krawitz guilty.
[4] The respondent is the Veterinary Defence Company Ltd, a public
company registered in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which,
according to the founding affidavit deposed to by its chairman, ‘trades’ as
‘the Veterinary Defence Association’.
[5] The respondent brought an application in the court a quo for an order
setting aside the finding against Dr Krawitz, who is one of its members. It
alleged that it had locus standi in terms of section 38(e), alternatively section
38(c) of the Constitution. The basis on which it sought relief was its

contention that, despite the absence of a prima facie case against Dr
Krawitz, he had been found to be guilty because he had failed to testify at
the inquiry.
[6] The application was opposed by the appellants on two grounds: first,
that the respondent lacked locus standi to bring the application because it
had no direct and substantial legal interest in the proceedings, which should
have been brought by Dr Krawitz himself, and because section 38(c) and (e)
of the Constitution did not apply; and secondly, that no reviewable
irregularity had taken place.z
[7] In the charge which Dr Krawitz was called upon to answer it was
alleged that he, being a veterinarian registered in terms of the Act, had acted
unprofessionally, improperly or disgracefully in that he had admitted as a
patient a dog, which was the property of a Mr Potgieter and a Ms Kruger,
but failed to render the necessary timeous veterinary assistance to it. In the
alternative it was alleged that he failed to refer the dog elsewhere when he
should have done so.
[8] At the inquiry the pro forma prosecutor called the owners of the dog
as witnesses, whereafter the tribunal of its own motion called Dr Krawitz’s
receptionist.

[9] The first witness, Mr Potgieter, told the inquiry that the dog, which
had apparently been struck by a motorcar while roaming on a highway and
had been away from its home without food or drink for three days, was taken
to a veterinarian, not Dr Krawitz, who gave the dog an injection and said
that it had to be watched and if it had not come right within a week or two it
was to be brought back.
[10] About six days later, when the witness noticed that the dog’s
breathing had become laboured and it started getting sick, he took the dog to
Dr Krawitz’s clinic between 10.30 and 10.45 am. There his receptionist said
that Dr Krawitz ‘was in theatre and would attend to [the dog] thereafter’. Mr
Potgieter left the dog in the clinic. Later he telephoned in order to ascertain
when it would receive treatment. As the clinic was closed at that stage, he
left a message on the answering service, on which a message had been
recorded to the effect that the service was frequently checked for messages.
While he could not remember exactly what message he had left, the effect
was that the veterinarian or his receptionist was to get back to him urgently
as he needed to retrieve his dog if it was not going to receive attention for
some time. He stated that he also went back to the clinic and found it closed.
He telephoned the clinic at about 3.05 pm and was told that the doctor was
still unavailable. When he said that he wished to collect his dog so that it

could get the medical attention it needed the receptionist said that there was
no chance of his getting the animal but that Dr Krawitz would telephone
him. He also stated that Dr Krawitz sent Ms Kruger and himself an invoice
in which he claimed fees for x-rays and cremation and R32.21 for treatment.
[11] Ms Kruger testified that at about 4 pm on the day in question she
received a telephone call from Dr Krawitz, who told her that the dog had
died. He also stated that he had done a post-mortem and that he had taken x-
rays which showed that the dog had had a hernia. He asked Mr Potgieter and
Ms Kruger to come to his rooms that evening to view the x-rays. They did so
but after waiting for some time (according to Mr Potgieter about 45 minutes)
they left.
[12] After the pro forma complainant had closed her case Dr Krawitz’s
attorney closed the case for the defence and asked for his acquittal. He stated
that his application was based on the fact that there was in his view no
evidence before the tribunal upon which Dr Krawitz could be found guilty.
[13] The tribunal then ruled that before it gave its verdict it wished to call
Dr Krawitz’s receptionist, as it put it, ‘to clarify the time issue when the dog
was taken up into the possession of the clinic and the availability of Dr
Krawitz thereafter after this dog was admitted to the clinic’.

[14] Ms Chilton, Dr Krawitz’s receptionist, thereafter testified. She said
that Mr Potgieter and the dog came to the surgery ‘probably between 11.00
and 11.30’ and that she told Mr Potgieter that Dr Krawitz was in theatre
doing surgery but that he would see the dog ‘between surgery and
afterwards’. She said that she expressly gave Mr Potgieter the opportunity to
try another vet and mentioned that as far as she knew all the veterinarians
were in surgery at that time. She stated that when she left, between 12.15
and 12.30 pm, Dr Krawitz was still busy and that he had been operating on
the same dog throughout. She had asked one of the men working at the clinic
to take the dog to their hospital and had told Dr Krawitz, while he was
operating, that there was a dog which needed to be seen. In regard to the
telephone answering service, she said that it is switched on at 12 noon and
switched off again at 3.00 pm: it tells a person who calls to telephone Dr
Krawitz on his cell phone. When asked by a member of the tribunal whether,
when she told Dr Krawitz in theatre about the dog, she indicated to him that
its condition was serious, she replied that she merely said that there was a
patient, without commenting on its condition. When cross-examined by the
pro forma complainant she elaborated on what she had said to Mr Potgieter
when he brought the dog to the clinic: Dr Krawitz would look at the dog
when he had a chance. She also said that Mr Potgieter did not give her an

indication that this was an emergency but wanted a second opinion on the
dog’s condition from Dr Krawitz.
[15] At the conclusion of Ms Chilton’s evidence the second appellant gave
Dr Krawitz’s attorney an opportunity to reopen his case but he did not wish
to do so. He then repeated his earlier submission that Dr Krawitz should be
acquitted because there was no basis in the evidence that had been led upon
which the tribunal could find that the allegations against Dr Krawitz had
been proved.
[16] It appears from the transcript of the inquiry that when he was
originally informed of the allegations made against him, Dr Krawitz had
made an affidavit, as had Ms Chilton, and these had been sent to the council
before the charge sheet was drawn up and the summons issued.
[17] In the judgment delivered at the end of the inquiry the second
appellant referred to the following dictum by Van Dijkhorst J in
Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans 1995(1) SA 839(T) at 853 G-H:
‘Uit die aard van die dissiplinêre verrigtinge vloei voort dat van ’n respondent verwag
word om mee te werk en die nodige toeligting te verskaf waar nodig ten einde die volle
feite voor die Hof te plaas sodat ’n korrekte en regverdige beoordeling van die geval kan
plaasvind. Blote breë ontkennings, ontwykings en obstruktionisme hoort nie tuis by
dissiplinêre verrigtinge nie.’

[18] The second appellant said his interpretation of this passage differed
from that argued by Dr Krawitz’s attorney.
He proceeded:
‘the crux of what was said by the judge is that in disciplinary actions it is expected of the
respondent to go along with the rules, give the necessary information.
... [I]t is expected from a respondent to co-operate and assist the court so that all relevant
facts [are] placed before you. Meaning that if there is specific knowledge into a specific
matter it is expected of that respondent to play along and give that information.
Dr Krawitz is the only one that can submit certain facts. Obviously then in this matter the
only one that does have the knowledge of the real facts regarding time and the timeous
assistance is Dr Krawitz. He elected not to testify.
His statement that was handed in with the bundle does not have the necessary evidential
value because the contents of that statement [were] never proved to be correct. Dr
Krawitz himself never testified regarding that matter nor was there any cross-examination
to test the correctness thereof.
His failure to co-operate and to assist into his behaviour when and at what time he
rendered any assistance to [the dog] he leaves the Tribunal with no option but to find that
he failed to render the necessary veterinary assistance timeously.
What happened to the animal after it was admitted into the hospital until such time that it
died, the only one with that knowledge, if the necessary assistance was given or not and if
it was timeously or not, is Dr Krawitz. [His] failure to testify leaves the tribunal with the
only inference from that, due to his failure to testify that Dr Krawitz failed to render the
timeous veterinary assistance to [the dog], the property of Mr Potgieter and Ms Kruger.

Therefore you are found GUILTY AS CHARGED.’
[19] Subsequently the second appellant supplemented the judgment given
during the inquiry. He pointed out that the finding as reflected on the record
should be corrected to reflect that Dr Krawitz was found guilty as charged
on the main allegation. It is thus clear that Dr Krawitz was found guilty of
acting unprofessionally, improperly or disgracefully in failing to render the
necessary timeous veterinary assistance to the complainant’s dog after it had
been admitted to his clinic.
(It is noteworthy that the tribunal does not appear to have applied its mind to
the question whether the conduct of which it found Dr Krawitz guilty was
unprofessional or improper or disgraceful. These adjectives are used
disjunctively in section 33(1) of the Act and it is incumbent, on a
disciplinary tribunal functioning under the section, one would think, to
specify which adjective was appropriate. The point was not taken by the
respondent and need not be considered further in this case.)
[20] In his supplementary reasons the second appellant proceeded to deal
with certain criticisms of the finding which were contained in a draft
affidavit prepared for Dr Krawitz’s signature and which was sent to the first
appellant.
[21] In paragraph 8 of the draft affidavit the following appears:

‘I was advised that as no prima facie case had been made against me, I need not tender
evidence to the Tribunal which decision was conveyed to the Tribunal members.’
[22] The second appellant responded to this paragraph as follows:
‘This inquiry is not a criminal case and to speak of “no prima facie case had been made
against me” is not correct. It is an inquiry into transgressions and it is expected of both
sides involved to place the relevant facts before the Tribunal for evaluation for the
purpose of making a finding from it.’
[23] Later in the supplementary reasons, the second appellant said:
‘... [W]hen the patient was admitted to the clinic it was still alive. Dr Krawitz was aware
that the dog was admitted. Ms Kruger was later informed telephonically by Dr Krawitz
that the dog died.
A patient does not just die from nothing. Dr Krawitz was the only one that was in a
position to tell the tribunal if the necessary timeous treatment was given to the patient and
notwithstanding that, the animal still died. The cause of death of the patient is something
that occurred later. The patient was admitted at 11.00. Dr Krawitz informed Ms Kruger at
16.00 that the animal died, five hours [elapsed] from the time that the patient was
admitted and it was therefore of great importance to know what happened during that
period of time. Dr Krawitz is the only one able to answer that and therefore it is expected
of him to co-operate and to assist that all relevant facts are placed before the tribunal. He
elected not to do so. The evidence tendered, therefore, [proved] that Dr Krawitz failed to
render the necessary timeous veterinary assistance to [the dog] . . .’
[24] After quoting a number of decisions on disciplinary proceedings, the
second appellant said:

‘If the respondent is of the opinion that evidence against him is weak or inconclusive he
may remove any doubt by denying it under oath which will result in giving him the
benefit of such doubt at the end of the hearing. The rules of natural justice [need] to be
adhered to, which means that, in disciplinary hearings, both sides must be viewed fully.’
[25] Roux J held that there was no evidence to support the conviction and
that the finding of the tribunal had accordingly to be set aside: reference was
made in this regard to Mpemvu and Others v Nqasala (1909) 26 SC 531, SA
Medical and Dental Council v McLoughlin 1948(2) SA 355 (A) at 393 and
SA Medical and Dental Council v Lipron 1949(3) SA 277 (A) at 283. He
proceeded to distinguish the dictum in Prokureursorde van Transvaal v
Kleynhans, supra, upon which the second appellant had relied, holding that
it was not authority for the proposition that where there are no facts proven
to support a finding of guilt ‘silence fills the gaps’.
In regard to the locus standi of the respondent, Roux J held that section
38(e)1 of the Constitution provided for the procedure adopted in this case.
[26] It is convenient at this stage to set out sections of the Constitution that
are relevant.
[27] Section 38 of the Constitution, in so far as it is relevant, is in the
following terms:

1 The judgment refers to section 38(3) but this is clearly a misprint.

‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened and the court may grant
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a
court are –
. . .
(c)
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons;
. . . and
(e)
an association acting in the interest of its members.’
[28] Section 33(1) and (3) of the Constitution, in so far as they are
relevant, read as follows:
‘(1)
Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair.
(3)
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights . . .’
[29] Item 23(2)(b) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution, in so far as it is
relevant, reads as follows:
‘Until the legislation envisaged in [section] 33(3) of the new Constitution is enacted

. . .

(b)
section 33(1) . . . must be regarded to read as follows:

“Every person has the right to

. . .
(b)
procedurally fair administrative action where any of their rights or
legitimate expectations is affected or threatened . . .”’

(The facts giving rise to this case arose before the legislation envisaged in
section 33(3) of the Constitution, viz the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000, was enacted with the result that item 23(2)(b) of
Schedule 6 applies.)
[30] In arguing the appeal before us Mr Stoop contended that a prima facie
case had been established against Dr Krawitz on the main count. Referring
inter alia to the decisions of this Court in Union Government (Minister of
Railways) v Sykes 1913 AD 156 and Venter and Others v Credit Guarantee
Insurance Corporation of Africa Ltd and Another, 1996(3) SA 966 (A) he
submitted that because the answers to the questions as to whether he treated
the dog and if he did so, when treatment was given, were peculiarly within
the knowledge of Dr Krawitz, less evidence than otherwise would suffice to
establish a prima facie case. Further, that sufficient evidence had, in the
circumstances, been led. The prima facie case thus established, he
contended, became conclusive when Dr Krawitz closed his case without
testifying.
[31] He also relied on the principle approved by this Court in Galante v
Dickinson 1950(2) SA 460(A) at 465, viz that a court is entitled, in the
absence of evidence from the defendant, to select out of two possible
alternative explanations as to what happened, that explanation which favours

the plaintiff, rather than that which favours the defendant, where the matter
in question is unquestionably within the knowledge of the defendant.
He submitted that two alternatives presented themselves to the tribunal after
the close of Dr Krawitz’s case: (1) that Dr Krawitz did not only conduct a
post-mortem examination on the dog but also rendered the necessary
timeous assistance to the dog; or (2) that he only conducted a post-mortem
examination and failed to render the necessary timeous assistance so that in,
the circumstances, the tribunal was entitled to regard the second alternative
as proven, given Dr Krawitz’s failure to testify.
[32] Mr Stoop did not contend that if there had been no prima facie case
against Dr Krawitz the tribunal would have been entitled to regard his
silence as filling the gap notwithstanding that the facts may have lain
peculiarly within his knowledge.
[33] He also argued that because Dr Krawitz’s legal representative did not
at any stage put to any of the witnesses that his client did render the
necessary timeous assistance, this amounted to a tacit admission on the part
of Dr Krawitz that he did not render such assistance.
[34] On the locus standi point Mr Stoop conceded that the decision taken
by the tribunal constituted administrative action within the meaning of
section 33 of the Constitution, read with item 23(2)(b) of Schedule 6 of the

Constitution. It follows from this concession, with which I agree, that Dr
Krawitz had the right to procedurally fair administrative action by the
tribunal, as his right to continue to practise as a veterinarian was affected or
threatened as a result of the proceedings and that the requirement in the first
part of section 38 of the Constitution is accordingly satisfied. Mr Stoop
contended, however, that the court a quo erred in holding that section 38(e)
was satisfied. This paragraph, it will be recalled, gives locus standi, where
the enforcement of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights is concerned, to
‘an association, acting in the interest of its members’. Mr Stoop argued that
it was significant that section 38(e) spoke of ‘the interest of its members.’ He
said that the plural was not a coincidence and that, on the facts of this case,
none of the respondent’s members other than Dr Krawitz have an interest in
the outcome of these proceedings. It followed, so he contended, that the
respondent did not have the necessary locus standi to bring the proceedings
for review of the tribunal’s finding.
[35] I turn to consider whether a reviewable irregularity took place. It is
clear from the authorities that if a disciplinary tribunal has applied the wrong
criterion in making a finding of guilt the application of such criterion
constitutes a reviewable irregularity, which can only be ignored if it is clear
that if the correct criterion had been applied the finding would have been the

same: see, eg, Hira and Another v Booysen and Another 1992(4) SA 69(A)
at 95 C-F.
[36] It appears from both the judgment given when the finding was made
and the supplementary reasons furnished subsequently that the tribunal
adopted the wrong approach when it considered the evidence at the end of
the proceedings. It did not approach the matter in the manner outlined by Mr
Stoop.
[37] I say this because in my view the tribunal did not consider whether
there was a prima facie case (which became conclusive when it was not
answered). It is plain both from the tribunal’s reliance on the second
appellant’s interpretation of the decision in Prokureursorde van Transvaal v
Kleynhans, supra, and its statement that Dr Krawitz’s failure to co-operate
and assist left it with no option but to find him guilty, together with the
statement in the supplementary reasons that it was not correct to speak of a
prima facie case not having been established against Dr Krawitz, that it
approached the matter on a totally erroneous basis and, as Roux J correctly
found, that it found Dr Krawitz guilty simply because he failed to testify,
without considering whether a prima facie case had been made out.
[38] The second appellant’s interpretation of the Kleynhans decision is also
clearly wrong. The passage relied on by the pro forma complainant in

argument before the tribunal does not mean that an onus is placed on a
respondent in disciplinary proceedings to prove his or her innocence or that
a failure to testify in answer to a charge, even where no prima facie case is
made out, will leave the tribunal with no option other than to find the
respondent guilty and no such approach was adopted by the court which
heard the Kleynhans case. All that was said was that disciplinary
proceedings are sui generis (and not to be conducted as if they were a
criminal case (see Cirota and Another v Law Society, Transvaal 1979(1) SA
172(A) at 187 G, one of the cases cited by Van Dijkhorst J in Kleynhans’s
case) nor ordinary civil proceedings (Cirota, supra, at 187 H)). It was also
said that because these were disciplinary proceedings it was expected of the
respondent to co-operate and that obstructionism was not appropriate.
[39] The dictum in any event does not apply to the facts of this case. Dr
Krawitz, it will be recalled, did not indulge in tactical denials or
obstructionism: on the contrary he provided the first appellant with a written
explanation in the form of an affidavit when notified in terms of section
31(5) of the Act of the matter to be inquired into. It is not suggested that that
affidavit (which was not put before us) consisted simply of denials and a
refusal to provide information.

[40] In view of the fact that it is clear that the tribunal adopted an
erroneous approach to the matter the proceedings can only be saved if it is
clear that despite the irregularity Dr Krawitz was not prejudiced because the
finding would have been the same if the correct approach had been applied:
cf Le Roux and Another v Grigg-Spall 1946 AD 244 at 254.
[41] In my view, unless Mr Stoop’s contention that Dr Krawitz’s attorney
tacitly admitted that his client did not give timeous and necessary treatment
to the dog (by failing to put to the witnesses who testified at the inquiry that
Dr Krawitz denied the allegations against him on this point) is correct, it is
not possible to say what the tribunal’s decision would have been on the
point.
[42] The contention was based on the summary appearing in Phipson,
Evidence, 7 ed, 460 of remarks made by the House of Lords in Browne v
Dunn  (1894) 6 R 67, quoted with approval by Davis AJA (with whom
Watermeyer CJ, Greenberg JA and Schreiner JA concurred) in R v M 1946
AD 1023 at 1028 and subsequently approved by the Constitutional Court in
President of the RSA v SA Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at 37
B-C. As far as is material the passage reads:
‘As a rule a party should put to each of his opponent’s witnesses in turn so much of his
own case as concerns that particular witness . . .’ (My emphasis.)

[43] As none of the witnesses who testified at the inquiry knew anything
about the treatment (if any) given by Dr Krawitz and no witness testified
directly on the point it was neither appropriate nor necessary for Dr
Krawitz’s legal representative to put his denial to them and there can be no
question of any tacit admission having been made by him in this regard.
[44] I am accordingly satisfied that the tribunal’s finding against Dr
Krawitz was vitiated by a reviewable irregularity.
[45] The next question to be considered is whether the respondent had the
necessary locus standi to institute review proceedings to have that finding
set aside.
[46] I do not agree with Mr Stoop’s contention that in bringing the
application for the setting aside of the tribunal’s finding against Dr Krawitz
the respondent was acting only in the interest of one of its members, Dr
Krawitz, and not that of the others as well. As long as the finding stood,
even if it was not binding on future tribunals on some form of stare decisis
doctrine, there was at least a danger that future tribunals, especially those
presided over by the second appellant, would adopt the same attitude and
find other members of respondent guilty, without considering whether a
prima facie case had been established against them, simply because they
failed to testify. In the circumstances one can readily understand why the

respondent was of the opinion, as stated in the affidavit of Dr Carser, the
chairman of the respondent, that the manner in which the first and second
appellants conducted the inquiry and the manner in which Dr Krawitz was
found guilty were matters of importance to all members of the respondent. It
follows that the respondent did have locus standi in terms of section 38(e) of
the Constitution to institute the present proceedings.
[47] The following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Concur
Marais
JA
Schutz
JA
Mthiyane
JA
Heher AJA
......................
IG FARLAM
JUDGE OF APPEAL

MARAIS JA:
[1] I concur in the judgment of Farlam JA. I do so dubitans in so far as
the finding that the respondent had locus standi to challenge the outcome of
disciplinary proceedings is concerned. If its interest is, as it is said to be, the
correction of the reasoning employed by the committee so that the members
of the association, should they have the misfortune to be charged with
unprofessional conduct, will not in future suffer from the same erroneous
reasoning and thus be subjected to unfair administrative action, and if that is
a sufficient interest to entitle it to seek relief in terms of s 38 (e) of the
Constitution, it would have locus standi to approach the court for a
declaratory order. But non constat that it would necessarily have locus
standi to review the outcome of a disciplinary enquiry involving a third
party (whether or not that party was a member) in order to protect the
interests of its members generally.

[2] The locus standi of the respondent cannot depend upon whether or not
the subject of the enquiry approves or disapproves of the challenge to the
outcome of the enquiry. It either has locus standi or it does not. That is a
mixed question of law and fact. Allowing outsiders to challenge, because
there is a Bill of Rights principle which was not honoured, the outcome of
proceedings the result of which is acceptable to the subject of the
proceedings and which he or she does not wish to challenge or have
disturbed, is fraught with potential problems.
[3] No doubt there may be infractions which are so grave that the new
constitutional order will require the interests of the subject of the enquiry to
be subordinated to the interests of the public in having strict adherence to the
values enshrined in the Bill of Rights. To take an extreme example:  A
whipping is ordered by a disciplinary tribunal. The person disciplined
prefers that fate to a more serious disciplinary action which it is open to the

tribunal to take. It may well be that even outsiders who have no connection
with the person concerned will have locus standi to attempt to prevent the
whipping from being carried out. But I doubt whether the same would apply
to any infraction whatsoever of a right contained in the Bill of Rights no
matter how little prejudice, if any, has been caused by it.
[4] Had it not been for the fact that the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 has now been enacted and brought into operation, I
would have felt obliged to come to a firm conclusion on the issue as the
question would have continued to arise in the future and brave souls who
might have wished to attempt to persuade this court to revisit the issue might
have wanted to know what the detailed reasons for the misgivings are. But
the present answer to the question is ephemeral as the provisions of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act will henceforth have to be taken
into account as well in answering such questions and we have obviously not

been addressed on the proper interpretation of the provisions of that Act. I
shall therefore not say more than I have said.

_____________________

R M MARAIS

JUDGE
OF
APPEAL

HEHER AJA )  CONCUR