THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case
No:   339/08

NAME OF SHIP: mv 'CAPE COURAGE'

In the matter between:

BULKSHIP UNION SA
APPELLANT

and

QANNAS SHIPPING COMPANY LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT

DRY BULK MARITIME LTD

SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd & Another
(339/08) [2009] ZASCA 74 (1 June 2009)

Coram:
FARLAM, MAYA JJA, HURT, LEACH et GRIESEL AJJA

Heard:
5 MAY 2009

Delivered:
1 JUNE 2009

Summary:
Shipping – Admiralty Jurisdic tion Regulation Act 105 of
1983, s 3(7) - interpretation of phrase 'when the maritime
claim arose'.

____________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from:
High Court Durban and
Coast Local Divis
ion
(Balton J sitting as court of first instance).

The following order is made:
1.
The appeal is allowe d with cos ts including those oc casioned by the
employment of two counsel.

2.
The order made by the court a quo is set aside and replaced with an
order in the following terms:
'1.
Subject to paragraph 2 below, the application is dismissed with costs
including those occasioned by the employment of two counsel.

2.
The order of arrest granted on 15 June 2006 is amended by adding the
following at the end of paragraph 1:
"save for the claim brought by t
he applic ant in respect of an alleged
breach of clause 5(a) of the Memorandum of Agreement".'

JUDGMENT

FARLAM JA (Maya JA, Hurt, Leach et Griesel AJJA concurring)
[1] This is an appeal against a judg ment delivered and an order granted by
Balton J sitting in the Durban High Court, on 4 March 2008, in which the
deemed arrest of the the MV 'Cape Courag e' was set aside. The judgment of
the court a quo has been reported: see MV 'Cape Courage': Bulkship Union
SA v Qannas Shipping Company Ltd v Bulkship Union SA SCOSA C 124(D).
The vessel had been arrested on 15 June
2006 in terms of s 5(3) of the
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983, as  amended (which I shall

call in wha t follows 'th e Act'), for the purpose of providing security  for claims
brought by the appellant, Bulkship Uni on SA, against t he second respondent,
Dry Bulk Maritime Limited, in arbitr ation proceedings in London . The claim s
which are the subject of t he arbitration are in respect of alleged br eaches of a
memorandum of agreement for the sale and purchase of another  vessel, MV
'Pearl of Fujairah', and for misrepresentatio ns relating to the condition of that
vessel.

[2] The MV 'Cape Courage'  was arrested as an 'a ssociated ship' pursuant
to s 3(6) and (7) of the Act on the basis that the second respondent owned the
MV 'Pearl of Fujairah' when the appella
nt's claims arose, and the same

person or persons controlled the sec
ond respondent at the time when the
claims arose and the first respondent,
Qannas Shipping Co mpany Limited,
(the owner of the MV 'Cape Courage') at t he time of  the arrest. Security was
established by the provision of a guarantee and the MV 'C ape Courage' was
released but she remains deemed to be under arrest in terms of s 3(10) of the
Act.

[3] On 23 August 2006 the first
and sec ond respondents brought an
application for an order setting aside the deemed arrest and the return of the
guarantee, alternatively for the reduction of the amount of the security, and in
addition an order that t he appellant provide t hem with counter-security in t he
arbitration. The alternative claim for a reduction in the quantum of security and
the claim for counter-security were t
hereafter resolved between the parties
and it is unnecessary to make further re ference to them. The only issue in t he
appeal is therefore whether the court a quo correctly set aside the deemed
arrest of MV 'Cape Courage'.

[4] As
the original application for the arrest of the vessel was brought ex
parte the appellant was obliged in the application before Balton J to justify the
arrest. It accordingly  had to s
how: (a) that the MV 'Cape Courage'
is
susceptible to arrest in rem in respect of its claim;  and (b) that it has a prima
facie case in respect thereof. In respect of  the first issue the appellant had t o
establish its case on a balance of probab
ilities while on the second issue it

had only t o establish that there was
evidence whic h, if  accepted, would
establish a cause of action.

[5] Before I set out the issues which have to be considered in this appeal it
is desirable to set out sections 3(4), (6) and 3(7) and s 5(3)(a) of the Act, as
far as they are material.

Section 3(4), (6) and (7) provide:
'(4)
Without prejudice to any other remedy t hat may be a vailable to a claimant or t o the
rules relating to the joinder of causes of action a maritime claim may be enforced by an action
in rem–
. . .
(b)
if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action
in personam in respect of the cause of action concerned.

(6) . . . [A]n action in rem . . . may be brought by the arrest of an a ssociated ship instead
of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose.
(7)
For the p urposes of ss (6 ), an a ssociated ship means a ship, other than the ship in
respect of which the maritime claim arose –
. . .
(iii)
owned at the time when the action i s commenced, by a company which is controlled
by a person who . . . controlled the co
mpany which owned the ship concerned, when the
maritime claim arose.'

Section 5(3)(a) of the Act is in the following terms:
'(a)
A court may in the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction order the arrest of any property
for the pu rpose of provi ding security  for a cl aim whi ch is or may be the  subje ct of an
arbitration or any proceedings contemplated, pending or proceeding, either in the Republic or
elsewhere, and whether or not it is sub ject to the law of th e Republic, if th e person seeking
the arrest has a claim enforceable by an action in personam against the owner of the property
concerned or an action in rem against such property or which would be so enforceable but for
any such arbitration or proceedings.'

[6] In the present case the MV 'P
earl of F ujairah' was owned by the
second respondent prior to her transfer in
terms of the contract of sale
between the second respondent and the ap pellant, which it is common caus e
took plac e when the vessel was deliver
ed to the appellant at Lianyungang

Roads, China, at 7.05 pm, local time on 20 October 2005. It is not disputed, at
least for the purpos
e of these proceedings, that the first and second

respondents were controlled at the rele
vant times by the same person or
persons. What is in dispute,  however, is whether it can be said that the MV
'Pearl of Fujairah' was owned by the second respondent when the appellant's
claims 'arose' and whether one of the appe llant's claims, viz that based on an
alleged breach of clause 5(a) of the memorandum of agreement between the
appellant and the first respondent, was established prima facie.

[7] Counsel for the appellant stated that if this c ourt were satisfied that all
the claims arose at a time when the MV 'Pearl of Fujairah' was still owned by
the second respondent they would not persist in their c ontention that a prima
facie case had been made out in respect of t he alleged breach of clause 5(a)
of the memorandum of agreement.

[8] The other alleged breaches of the memorandum of agreement, whic h
the respondents concede were established prima facie, related to clause 11 of
the memorandum (which provided that  the vessel shoul d be delivered and
taken over in substantially  the s ame condition as whe n inspected, fair wear
and tear excepted), clause 18 (which
provided that the vessel should be
delivered ' with her present BV class
maintained, free of outstanding
recommendations and average damage affecting her present class at the time
of delivery') and a term implied by s 14 of  the English Sale of Goods Act 1979
(as amended) (that the vessel was of satisf actory quality or fit for the purpose
for which it was sold).

[9] The claims based on alleged misrepr esentations made by the second
respondent relating to the true condition of  the vessel were to the effect (a)
that the second respondent provided the appellant at the pre-purchase survey
with incorrect Ultra Thickness measur
ement readings (which showed the
extent to which the steel work had rusted away) and incorrect technical data
relating to the vessel's operating speeds
; (b) that the second respondent

incorrectly advised the appellant's agent
at the time of the pre-purchase
survey that the vessel was in 'norma
l operating condition'; and (c) that the

second respondent incorrectly represented to the appellant when the notice of
readiness for delivery was given on 18 October 2005 that the vessel was as of
that date in every respect physically re ady for delivery in accordance with the
terms of the memorandum of agreement.

[10] Before the vessel was delivered
to it the appellant
paid the second
respondent the purchase price of the ve ssel US $14 990 000. On doing so it
became entitled to delivery of t
he vesse l and, as I have said, it received
delivery of the vessel at 7.05 pm
local time on 20 October 2005, when
ownership in the vessel passed to it
. It accordingly received a right
in
personam against the first respondent (what we would call a ius in personam
ad rem acquirendam) on payment of the purch
ase price, and this was

followed by the real right of ownership, when delivery took place.

[11] The learned judge in the court
a quo held that the appellant's claims
against the second respondent did not ar ise until the appella nt had suffered
damage in consequence of the breaches of  the contract between t he parties
and the misrepresentations alleged. She came to this conclusion because she
held that the words 'when the maritime claim arose' in s 3(7)(a) mean when all
the juristic facts necessary for th e claim to exist have occurred, 'even though
the claim might not yet be
enforceable because, for example, a suspensive
condition has not been fulfilled.' She also held that the appellant did not suffer
any damage until it became owner of t he vessel on delivery. It followed in her
view that none of the appellant's claims arose when the second r espondent
owned MV 'Pearl of Fujairah', with the re sult that, as the appellant  had failed
to establish the necessary associat ion between the two vessels , the deemed
arrest had to be set aside.

[12] Counsel were agreed that the firs t issue to be decided related to the
interpretation of the expression 't he time when the maritime claim  arose' in s
3(7)(a) of the Act and that that
question is to be determined under South
African law.

[13] The second issue debated at the bar  related to when a cause of  action

accrues for the purposes of what is ca
lled limitation of actions under the
Limitation Act, 1980, in Engl and (what we would call prescription). Both the
appellant and the respondents  f iled opinions by Eng lish barristers on this
point, stating their views (which were sometimes in agreement and sometimes
not) as to when the appellant's
various  claims accrued und er English law,
which it was common cause was  the pr oper law of the contract between the
parties and of the arbitration. Both
barristers assumed that the appellant
's
causes of action bas
ed on the alleged
misrepresentations would als o be
governed by English law (whether that a ssumption was correct is a matter on
which I express no opinion).

[14] Counsel for the appell ant contended that the refe rence in s 3(7)(a) of
the Act to the time 'when the maritime
claim arose' with regard t o 'the s hip
concerned' is a reference to the time
when the wrong giving rise to the
maritime claim occurred or was
committe d and that it did not refer to the
existence of a complete cause of action. In particular, they submitted that in
the context of a claim based on a breach of contract a maritime claim arises at
the time of the breach, whether or not damage has as  yet been suffered. As
far as claims in delict (or tort) are concerned, they submitted that the maritime
claim arises at the time the delict  was committed, even if actual damage was
only suffered thereafter. In the circ
umstances, their argument continued,

where the breach takes the form of the delivery of a defective ship under  a
contract of sale the maritime claim
arises when t he seller performs its

obligation to deliver the ship and 'the performance of that obligation precedes
– and is completed prior to – the passing of ownership in the vessel sold from
the seller to the buyer.'

[15] As regards  the claims based on
alleged misrepres entations by  the
seller they submitted that, to the extent t
hat it is held that such claims aris
e
only when the buyer acts to its prej
udice, the payment of a deposit or the
purchase price is suffi cient prejudice, it not being nec essary that the buyer
also receive ownership of the de fective ship. In suppor t of their s ubmissions
on the meaning of the phras
e ' when the maritime claim arose'
they relied
heavily on the decis ion of this court in MV 'Heavy Met al': Belfry Marine Ltd v

Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD 1999(3) SA 1083 (SCA). They also relied on
an unreported judgment delivered in the Cape Town High Court by Foxcroft J,
MV 'Meng  Hai': Multi Spirit SA v MV 'Meng Hai ' and Cosco Bulk Carrier
Company Ltd, delivered on 10 September 2004.

[16] Counsel for the respondents submi tted that the phrase 'the time when
the . . . claim arose' refers, 'at the ear
liest, to the time when the c laim came
into existence and that in South African law, the law to be applied in regard to
this issue, the claims under  discussion cannot have arisen until at least som e
part of the damages claim ed had been suffered, which in each case did no
t
occur until delivery of the vessel had been accepted by the buyer.'

[17] Counsel on both sides sought to rely on the decision of this court in MV
'Forum Victory": Den Norske Bank ASA v Hans K Madsen CV 2001 (3) SA
529 (SCA) in which the express ion 'a claim which arose', which appears in s
11(4)(c) of the Act, was hel d (para [14] at 525G-H a nd para [17] at 536I) to
mean the ' claim came into existence' . It must be pointed out, however, that
Scott JA said (para [11] at 534G-J):
'The expression "when the maritime claim arose in s 3(7) is perhaps no less ambiguous than
the expression "claim which arose" in s 11(4)(c). In these circumstances there would seem
little to be gained by interpreting the one, in its different contextual setting, in order to serve as
an aid to the interpretation of the other.'

[18] As far as the decisio n of this court in the 'Heavy Metal' is concerned,
counsel for the respondents pointed out that the judgment does not deal with
the question as to whether the damages cl
aim in that case could only hav e
arisen when the damages were suffered. He pointed out that counsel for the
appellant in that case did not argue the point. In the circumstances counsel for
the present respondents submitted that the 'Heavy Metal' is not authority for
the propos ition relied on by
the appellant in this c
ase. I agree with this

contention. I was one of
the judges in the 'Heavy Metal' and the passage
relied on by the appellant's counsel co
mes from the judgment I delivered,

which on this point at least was conc
urred in by the other members of the
court. As counsel for the present re
spondent submits, the point was not

argued in the case nor consider ed in the judgment. If it had been argued it
would have been discussed in the judgment. It follows that the point will have
to be considered on the basis that it is res nova in this court.

[19] The unreported decis ion of Foxcroft J in
MV 'Meng Hai',  on whic h
counsel for the appellant relies, affords a useful starting point. The case also
concerned a claim for damages suffered
as a res ult of the deliv ery of a
defective ship and the arrest of a ship which was allegedly an associated ship.
The owner of the ship also argued, as  here, that the as sociation between the
two vessels had not been establis
hed because the applicant 's claim only
arose after it became the ow ner of the defective ship. Foxcroft J rejected this
contention, relying lar gely on the Heavy Metal, which he held  decided the
point. At pp 14-15 of his judgment, however, he said this:
When one looks at all the dictionary definitions of the word 'arise' one is struck by the idea of
origin. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives under the thi rd meaning of the verb, 'to
spring up, come above ground, into existence'. The transferred use is given as 'to ta ke its
rise, originate'. The second meaning under this third heading is 'to b e born, come into the
world of action'. Insofar as one can ever have regard to dictionary meanings, the idea of origin
in these meanings of the word 'arise' is paramount.'

[20] It is important to note that the phrase 'when the maritime claim arose'
was taken over by our legis
lature from  article 3(1) of
the International
Convention Relating to the Arrest of S ea-going Ships, signed in Brussels in
1952. (In what follows I shall refer to this c
onvention as the '
Arrest
Convention'.)

[21] The convention permitted a claimant to 'arrest either the particular ship
in respect of which the maritime claim arose, or any other ship which is owned
by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the owner
of the particular ship'. The article em bodied a compromise arrived at between
the representatives of the countries represented at the convention. The nature
of the compromise appears from a passa ge in the judgment  of Lord Denning
MR in The Banco: Owners of the Motor Vessel Monte Ulia v Owners of the
ships Banco and Others [1971] P 137 (CA) at 151F-H ([1971] 1 All ER 524 at
532a-c), which is quoted in the 'Heavy
Metal' case at 1098A- C and which

reads as follows:
'In 1952 there wa s an international convention held at Brussel s. . . . It was he ld because of
the differe nt rules of la w of di fferent countrie s abo ut the arrest of se a-going shi ps. So me
countries, like England, did not permit the arrest of any ship except the offending ship herself:
whereas many continental countries permitted t he arrest, not only of the offending ship, but
also of any other ship belonging to the same owner. In the result a middle way was found. It
was agreed that one ship might be arrested, but only one. It might either be the offending ship
herself or any other ship belonging to the same o wner: but not more. This wa s an advantage
to plaintiffs i n Engla nd b ecause it often ha
ppened previo usly t hat, after a
collision, th e
offending ship sank or did  not come to  these sh ores. So there was nothin g to arre st. Under
the Co nvention the plai ntiff could arrest any
oth er ship b elonging to the  same owner
whenever it happened to come to England.'

[22] In England a ship which may be a rrested despite the f act that it is not
'the offending ship' is  call ed a ' sister ship' . Our Act, of course, goes further

than the Arrest Convention and the Eng lish Act which follow ed it by widening
the net and providing for a st atutory piercing of the veil to combat the practice
frequently adopted by ship owners of s
eeking to evade the sister ship

provision by setting up a series of one-ship companies. On the point presently
at issue, however, the requirem ent that the owner or ultimate controller of the
ship sought to be arrested, ie, with us
the associated ship, must have be en
the owner or controller of the offending ship 'when the maritime claim arose' is
similarly worded. Counsel did not refer us to author ity on the meani ng of the
phrase in question in article 3 of the
Arrest Conv ention or  in legislation
elsewhere in the world in which it has been  adopted b y countries not parties
to the Convention, such as Australia which uses a similar formulation in s 1 9
of its Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth), nor was I able to find any. I note also that no
cases on the point ar e cited in t he leading textbook  on t he 1952 and 1999
Arrest Conventions,  Berlingieri on Arrest of Ships, 3 ed,  by Professor
Francesco Berlingieri.

[23] In my view it is significant t
hat in cases other
than those involving
maritime liens, where other considerati ons apply, for a mari time claim to be
enforced by an action in rem the owner of the property to be arrested must be
liable to the claimant in an action
in personam in r espect of the cause of
action concerned. When one r
ealises that  the owner or controller of the

'offending ship' has to be personally liable on the c laim, it becomes clear t hat
it is really  inappropriate to speak of
the 'offending ship': it is
really  the
'offending owner' (or controller) who shou
ld be look ed at because property
owned or controlled by it, in the form
of another ship, becomes liable to be
arrested when the as sociated ship provision is utilised. It accordingly  makes
sense, when a claim has 'originated'
and enough factors are present to
indicate that the owner or controller of
the ship conc erned at that time (or
those for whose actions or omissions it  is liable) has 'offended', that another
ship owned or controlled by that  person when the c laim is enforced may be
arrested in respect of the claim. Dam age resulting from the offending actions
or omissions by the owner or c ontroller (or for which  it is  liable) may not y et
have been suffered but if it is clear that it will in due course be suffered, I think
that it is not stretching language to sa
y that the claim  has 'aris en'. Although
the point did not form the s ubject of the decision in the case it is interesting to
note that Gaudron, Gu mmow and Kirby JJ, in their judgment in
Laemthong
International Lines Co Ltd v BPS Shipping Limited (1997) 190 CLR 181 (H C
of A) used the expres sion 'when the cause of action . . . arose' in speaking of
a date when a breach occurred but
before the damages in question were
suffered. The case c oncerned a voyage charter party for the carriage of
a
cargo of bagged ric
e from B
angkok to Nouakchott in Mauritania. The
agreement was breached on 8 July 1995
at Bangkok when the charterers
failed to ensure proper fumigation of t
he cargo, leading to the infestation of

the cargo by a species of beetle. As a result of this the vessel was arrested in
Mauritania and the owners subsequently  claimed $1 833 285 as damages
from the charterers in consequence of the arrest, which inc luded interest and
the cost of obtaining the release of the vessel and also certain demurrage and
dead freight charges
alleged to be
due under the charterparty. These
damages would all appear to have been s uffered after the failure to fumigate.
Yet Gaudron, Gummow and Kir by JJ said (at 200): '(o)n 8 July 1995, when
the cause of action of the respondent
against the appellant ar ose on  the
respondent's general maritime claim concerning the Nyanza . . .'

[24] In the circumstances I am sati
sfied that the appella nt's submissions
regarding t he meaning of the phrase 'w
hen the maritime claim  arose' in s

3(7)(a) are correct and that it was also
c orrectly submitted that the claim s
under clauses 11 and 18 of the memor andum of agreement and s 14 of the
English Sale of Goods Act 1979 as well as the claims in tort based on alleged
misrepresentations all arose when the fi rst respondent was st ill the owner of
the MV 'Pearl of Fujairah'.

[25] It is accordingly unnecessary to deal with the respondent's contentions
regarding a possible breach of clause 5(a) of the memorandum of agreement.

[26] Save for a slight alteration of the order of arrest in regard to the claim
under clause 5(a), the appeal in my view  must be allowed with costs including
those occasioned by the employment of two counsel.

[27] The
following order is made:
1.
The appeal is allowe d with cos ts including those oc casioned by the
employment of two counsel.

2.
The order made by the court a quo is set aside and replaced with an
order in the following terms:
'1.
Subject to paragraph 2 below, the application is dismissed with costs
including those occasioned by the employment of two counsel.

2.
The order of arrest granted on 15 June 2006 is amended by adding the
following at the end of paragraph 1:
"save for the claim brought by t
he applic ant in respect of an alleged
breach of clause 5(a) of the Memorandum of Agreement".'
……………..
IG FARLAM
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

FOR APPELLANT:
D A GORDON SC

S
R MULLINS SC

Instructed
by

Garlicke
& Bousfield Inc Durban

Webbers
Bloemfontein

FOR RESPONDENT:
A M STEWART SC

Instructed by

Shepstone
& Wylie Durban

Matsepe
Inc Bloemfontein