THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 161/08

JOOB JOOB INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD

Appellant

and

STOCKS MAVUNDLA ZEK JOINT VENTURE
Respondent

________________________________________________________________

Neutral citation:
Joob Joob v Stocks (161/08) [2009] ZASCA 23 (27 March
2009)

CORAM:

Harms DP, Navsa, Brand, Mhlantla JJA and Bosielo AJA

HEARD:

16 March 2009
DELIVERED:
27 March 2009
CORRECTED:

SUMMARY:
Building contract ─ interpretation of ─ nature of interim
certificates ─ validity of certification of damages ─ summary judgment
proceedings discussed ─ summary judgment rightly granted.

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from:
High Court, Durban (Gorven AJ sitting as court of first
instance).
The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs consequent upon the
employment of two counsel.
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________

NAVSA JA (Harms DP, Brand, Mhlantla JJA and Bosielo AJA concurring):

[1] This is an appeal against the grant of summary judgment in the Durban
High Court (Gorven AJ). The background is set out hereafter.

[2] During 2004 the parties concluded a written agreement in terms of which
the respondent, a partnership conducting the business of a building contractor,
undertook to build a resort hotel at Ocean View site, Zimbali Coastal Forest
Resort, Ballito for the appellant company. I shall hereafter refer to the appellant
as JJ and to the respondent as Stocks. These parties are referred to in the
agreement as the contractor and employer respectively.

[3] The terms of the agreement are embodied in a standard contract
recommended by the Joint Building Contracts Committee (JBCC).1 Clause 5.1 of

1 The constituents of which are :
Association of South African Quantity Surveyors
Building Industries Federation South Africa
South African Association of Consulting Engineers
South African Institute of Architects
South African Property Owners Association
Specialist Engineering Contractors Committee
It was not contested that the standard contract under consideration was the third in a series of
JBCC contracts. This is important because earlier editions of contracts have been the subject
matter of decided cases the findings of which were made on the basis of provisions in those
contracts.

the agreement provides that JJ shall appoint a principal agent2 with full authority
to act on its behalf in terms of the agreement.3 Clause 5.3 goes further and
states that only the agent has authority to bind JJ.

[4] The agreement provides for interim certificates to be issued by the
principal agent as well as a final certificate in respect of work completed as per
the schedule of works.4 It is common cause that Stocks cancelled the contract on
26 September 2005. Stocks’ entitlement to cancel the contract is not in issue.5 In
respect of work completed the principal agent issued four certificates. They are

2 It is worth noting that ‘agent’ is defined in the definitions and interpretations section of the
agreement as follows:
‘[T]he person or entity named in the schedule or appointed by the employer in terms of 5.0 to deal
with specific aspects of the work.’
‘Principal Agent’ is defined:
‘[T]he person or entity appointed in terms of 5.0 and named in the schedule’.
3 In terms of clause 5.1 JJ ‘warrants that the principal agent has full authority and obligation to act
in terms of the agreement, and where appropriate, the associated nominated and selected
subcontract agreements’.
4 The material part of clause 31.1 of the agreement provides as follows:
‘The principal agent shall issue an interim payment certificate every month on or before the date
stated in the schedule until the issue of the final payment certificate.’
Importantly, clauses 31.4.1-31.4.3 provide:
‘The value certified in an interim payment certificate shall separately include:
31.4.1 A reasonable estimate of the value of the work executed taken into account the
information submitted by the contractor in terms of 31.2 and making due allowance for
adjustments to the contract value in terms of 32.0.
31.4.2  A reasonable estimate of the value of materials and goods in terms of 31.6.
31.4.3  Amounts previously certified in terms of 31.4.1 and 31.4.2.’
5 JJ’s affidavit opposing summary judgment, relying on an arbitration clause in the agreement,
initially stated that there was a dispute about Stocks’ right to cancel the agreement which was
subject to arbitration, without stipulating what that dispute entailed. Towards the end of the
affidavit, JJ stated that on 24 January 2005 Stocks indicated that they had suspended the works
and only returned to site by 1 March 2005. JJ contended that this constituted a breach by Stocks,
which precluded it from cancelling the agreement. There is no challenge in the opposing affidavit
to Stocks’ assertion, in its particulars of claim, that JJ failed, in terms of the agreement: (i) to
make an advance payment before noon on 31 March 2005; (ii) to provide a payment guarantee in
the sum of R40 m before noon on 29 April 2005 and (iii) to provide by 29 April 2005 written
evidence that it had secured adequate financing to enable it to comply with its obligations. Stocks
asserted further that payment had not been made upon presentation of certificate 9. These,
according to Stocks, were the bases on which the agreement was cancelled. Gorven AJ therefore
correctly reflected in his judgment, that it was common cause before him that the contract was
properly cancelled by Stocks arising from JJ’s non-performance. Before us and the court below
only the validity of the certification was in issue ─ not the other grounds for cancellation. The
arbitration clause continued to be a live issue and is dealt with later.

as follows:
(a)
1 August 2005 (certificate 9) ─ in terms of which it was certified that the
amount due to Stocks was R129 100.48;
(b)
7 September 2005 (certificate 10) ─ certifying an amount of R2 704
425.78;
(c)
4 August 2006 (certificate 11) ─ for an amount of R14 568 177.68 and
(d)
6 November 2006 (certificate 12) ─ reflecting an amount of R9 690 000.
I will refer to the certificates by the certificate numbers that appear above.

[5] Clause 31.9 of the agreement states:
‘The employer shall pay to the contractor the amount certified within seven (7) calendar days of
the date of issue of the payment certificate. Payment shall be subject to the contractor giving the
employer a tax invoice for the amount due.’

[6] JJ refused to pay after the certificates referred to in para 4 had been
presented. On 8 December 2006 Stocks instituted action against JJ in the
Durban High Court in which it claimed payment of the four amounts reflected in
those certificates.

[7] JJ entered an appearance to defend. On 29 January 2007, in terms of
Uniform rule 32, Stocks brought an application for summary judgment which was
opposed by JJ. The summary judgment application was heard on 6 September
2007 and, on 25 September 2007, judgment was granted in favour of Stocks in
the amounts set out in certificates 10, 11 and 12, with interest thereon a tempore
morae. JJ was ordered to pay the costs of the action and the application for
summary judgment in respect of the three claims, on a scale as between attorney
and own client, including the costs consequent upon the employment by Stocks
of two counsel.

[8] Gorven AJ dealt, inter alia, with two of JJ’s defences which are relevant to
this appeal in some detail. They are set out below.

[9] First, in respect of certificate 10, that it was not due and payable as Stocks
had failed to deliver a tax invoice as required by clause 31.9 of the agreement. It
was pointed out on behalf of JJ that the date of valuation of the work done and
the materials on site set out in the certificate (22 July 2005), differed from the
date of valuation (15 August 2005) that appears in the tax invoice. Furthermore,
the tax invoice (6 September 2005) predated the payment certificate
(7 September 2005). Thus, it was submitted, clause 31.9 had not been complied
with.

[10] Second, certificates 11 and 12 related to damages and on a proper
construction of the agreement, the agent’s mandate did not extend to certification
of damages. It was contended that because the certificates were for damages,
they were illiquid. Allied to this defence was the contention that value added tax
(VAT) was included in the certificates and that such tax was not payable on
damages. This latter contention was not, however, persisted in before us.

[11] Insofar as certificate 9 was concerned, counsel representing Stocks
agreed before Gorven AJ, that summary judgment should be refused as the
amount in the payment certificate differed from the amount reflected in the tax
invoice. That certificate is not in issue in this appeal.

[12] In respect of certificate 10, Gorven AJ found that there was no
requirement in the agreement that a tax invoice must include a date of valuation.
He held that all that was required in terms of the agreement was a tax invoice for
the amount due. The earlier date of the tax invoice was therefore no bar to
recovering the amount set out in the certificate.

[13] In respect of the second defence, the court below held that JJ had not
shown that the certification of damages was not in accordance with the
agreement.

[14] On 19 October 2007 the court below refused JJ leave to appeal in respect
of its order in relation to certificate 10. Gorven AJ granted leave in respect of the
orders relating to certificates 11 and 12, but restricted it to the question of the
validity of the inclusion of VAT in the amounts certified. On 11 March 2008 this
court granted JJ leave to appeal to it against the whole of the judgment.

[15] In its affidavit resisting summary judgment, JJ contended that Stocks was
precluded from instituting action because of an arbitration clause in the
agreement. Gorven AJ dealt with this defence tangentially. It is necessary, at the
outset, to note that it is very difficult to discern, from the affidavit opposing
summary judgment, the essence of any sustainable defence to Stocks’ claims.
There are diverse references to clauses in the agreement, to the non-correlation
between the dates of the tax certificates and the certification by the agent. What
is conspicuously absent, is the substance of a triable defence.

[16] I proceed to deal first with JJ’s defence that an action was precluded
because of an arbitration clause in the agreement. Clause 40.1 of the agreement
under the heading ‘SETTLEMENT OF DISAGREEMENTS AND DISPUTES’
provides:
‘Should there be any disagreement between the employer or his agents on the one hand and the
contractor on the other arising out of or concerning this agreement, the contractor may request
the principal agent to determine such disagreement by a written decision to both parties. On
submission of such a request a disagreement in respect of the issues detailed therein shall be
deemed to exist.’ (My emphasis).
The agreement provides that a decision by the principal agent shall be final and
binding unless it is disputed, in which event, the dispute shall be submitted to
arbitration or where the parties agree, to mediation.6

[17] As is apparent from clause 40.1, the primary problem for JJ is that it is
only Stocks as the contractor ─ and not JJ as the employer ─ that is entitled to
refer a dispute to the principal agent for resolution. Moreover, a dispute has to

6 In this regard clauses 40.2 to 40.4 apply.

exist before it can be referred. Before litigation, JJ chose not to pay rather than to
declare a dispute.

[18] In any event, counsel for JJ, understandably, encountered difficulty in
elucidating the arbitral dispute. In muted fashion counsel contended that the
principal agent exceeded his mandate by completing the certificates in question.
This is a dispute between the employer and his agent and is not a dispute
envisaged by the arbitration clause referred to above, namely, between the
employer or his agents on the one hand and the contractor on the other, ie
between JJ and its agents on the one hand and Stocks on the other.

[19] Counsel on behalf of Stocks rightly pointed out that there was, in any
event, no prohibition in the agreement against the institution of action. There is
accordingly no merit to this defence.

[20] In respect of certificate 10, JJ’s main contentions as set out in para 9
above are without merit. The agreement does not provide for the tax invoice to
follow any particular format nor does it prescribe what information it has to
contain. Certificate 10 shows that the amount due is R2 704 425.78. The tax
invoice is in the same amount and refers to certificate 10. The previous gross
amount certified is the same and so too the nett amount. There can be no doubt
that there is a direct correlation between certificate 10 and the tax invoice in
question. Clause 31.9 was complied with and the court below cannot be faulted
in this conclusion.

[21] It was submitted on behalf of JJ that, after cancellation, the principal agent
was limited to preparing a final account and final payment certificate and there
was thus no room for an interim certificate such as certificate 11.7 This is

7 Certificate 11, in addition to certifying an amount in respect of damages, also includes
certification by the principal agent of the value of work executed and materials on site in an
amount of R2 369 383.08. The opposing affidavit does not contest the valuation of work done and
materials on site in relation to certificates 10 and 11. There are vague references to para 31.6 of

fallacious. In the relevant parts of para 38, which appear under the title
‘CANCELLATION BY CONTRACTOR – EMPLOYERS DEFAULT’ the following
appears:
‘. . .
38.5
Where the contractor cancels this agreement in terms of 38.0 the following shall apply:
. . .
38.5.3 The principal agent shall forthwith compile a report on the status of the portion of the
works executed by the contractor and shall issue such a report to the employer and the contractor
38.5.4 The principal agent shall forthwith commence and complete the final account within
ninety (90) working days of completion of such a report
. . .
38.5.7 The principal agent shall continue to certify the value of the work executed by the
contractor and the value of materials and goods for payment by the employer.’
Certificate 11 is in accordance with clause 38.5.7.

[22] I turn to deal with certificates 11 and 12 and the question of the
certification of damages. It was submitted that the principal agent had no
authority in terms of the agreement to certify damages. This submission is
without foundation. Clause 33 is entitled ‘RECOVERY OF EXPENSE AND
LOSS’ and provides for monthly ‘recovery’ statements by the principal agent on
which expense and loss shall be shown and amounts due to the contractor for
‘damages in terms of 38.5.6’, if any.8 Sub-clause 38.5.6 provides:
‘The employer shall be liable to the contractor for damages resulting from such cancellation.’
The interim certificates envisaged in clause 31.1 (recorded above9) may be
adjusted, inter alia, by amounts due to the employer or contractor in a recovery
statement issued in terms of clause 33.1.10 It was submitted, on behalf of JJ, that
since Stocks did not, in its particulars of claim, refer to or attach recovery
statements in relation to certificates 11 and 12, summary judgment ought not to
have been granted. This is a submission entirely without merit. It was never

the agreement which states that the value of materials and goods shall only be included in a
certificate if they are to the satisfaction of the principal agent on the bases set out in that clause.
Nowhere is the valuation per se challenged.
8 Clauses 33.1.3 and 33.1.6.
9 Note 4.
10 Clauses 31.5 and 31.5.4.

alleged by JJ that no recovery statements had been issued or that adjustments
had not been properly made. It is necessary to repeat that the basis of the
valuation or damages was not substantively challenged.

[23] To sum up: on a proper construction of the agreement it is clear that the
principal agent is not only entitled but is obliged, in appropriate circumstances, to
certify damages.

[24] In support of his contention that Gorven AJ ought nevertheless to have
exercised his discretion against granting summary judgment, counsel on behalf
of JJ urged us to bear in mind that summary judgment is a remedy of an
‘extraordinary and drastic nature’, based on ‘the supposition that the plaintiff’s
case is unimpeachable and the defendant’s defence is bogus or bad in law.’11 It
is necessary to place this characterisation of the summary judgment procedure in
a proper perspective.

[25] Uniform rule 32 enables a plaintiff to apply to court for summary judgment
in respect of four categories of claims:
(a)
on a liquid document;

11 See Tesven CC v South African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) at 275H referring to
Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 423F-G. In the last mentioned case
Corbett AJ (at 426A-E) said the following:
‘[O]ne of the ways in which a defendant may successfully oppose a claim for summary judgment
is by satisfying the Court by affidavit that he has a bona fide defence to the claim. Where the
defence is based upon facts, in the sense that material facts alleged by the plaintiff in his
summons, or combined summons, are disputed or new facts are alleged constituting a defence,
the Court does not attempt to decide these issues or to determine whether or not there is a
balance of probabilities in favour of the one party or the other. All that the Court enquires into is:
(a) whether the defendant has “fully” disclosed the nature and grounds of his defence and the
material facts upon which it is founded, and (b) whether on the facts so disclosed the defendant
appears to have, as to either the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is both bona fide and
good in law. If satisfied on these matters the Court must refuse summary judgment, either wholly
or in part, as the case may be. The word “fully”, as used in the context of the Rule (and its
predecessors), has been the cause of some judicial controversy in the past. It connotes, in my
view, that, while the defendant need not deal exhaustively with the facts and the evidence relied
upon to substantiate them, he must at least disclose his defence and the material facts upon
which it is based with sufficient particularity and completeness to enable the Court to decide
whether the affidavit discloses a bona fide defence. … At the same time the defendant is not
expected to formulate his opposition to the claim with the precision that would be required of a
plea; nor does the Court examine it by the standards of pleading.’ (My emphasis).

(b)
for a liquidated amount in money;
(c)
for delivery of specified immovable property; or
(d)
for ejectment

[26] Uniform rule 8 provides for provisional sentence where a claim is founded
upon a liquid document. The theory behind provisional sentence is that:
‘it is granted on the presumption of the genuineness and the legal validity of the documents
produced to the court. The court is provisionally satisfied that the creditor will succeed in the
principal suit. The debt disclosed in the document must therefore be unconditional and liquid
(zuiwer en klaar of liquid)’.12
If a document ‘upon a proper construction thereof, evidences by its terms, and
without resort to evidence extrinsic thereto…an unconditional acknowledgment of
indebtedness in an ascertained amount of money the payment of which is due to
the creditor’ it is one upon which provisional sentence may properly be granted.13

[27] Gorven AJ pointed out, with reference to Randcon (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v
Florida Twin Estates Ltd 1973 (4) SA 181 (D & CLD) at 183H-184H, that a final
payment certificate is treated as a liquid document since it is issued by the
employer’s agent, with the consequence that the employer is in the same
position it would have been in if it had itself signed an acknowledgment of debt in
favour of the contractor. Relying further on the Randcon case (at 186G-188G),
the learned judge held that similar reasoning applied to interim certificates. The
certificate thus embodies an obligation on the part of the employer to pay the
amount contained therein and gives rise to a new cause of action subject to the
terms of the contract.14 It is regarded as the equivalent of cash.15 The certificates
in question all fall within this ambit.

12 Harrowsmith v Ceres Flats (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 722 (T) at 728C; Van der Walt v Eiendomsreg
(Edms) Bpk 1986 (2) SA 461 (T) at 465D-H. See also PBJ Farlam & DE Van Loggerenberg
Erasmus Superior Court Practice B1─63 (service issue 25, 2006).
13 Rich v Lagerwey 1974 (4) SA 748 (A) at 754H followed in numerous subsequent cases. See
Erasmus Superior Court Practice B1─63.
14 Ocean Divers (Pty) Ltd v Golden Hill Construction CC 1993 (3) SA 331 (A) at 340E.
15 Randcon case at 184C-G.

[28] Stocks held three liquid documents, the equivalent of acknowledgements
of debt. It could have proceeded to obtain provisional sentence on them but
chose to apply for summary judgment.

[29] A summary judgment procedure was first introduced into our practice by
the Magistrate’s Court Act of 1917. It was based upon a procedure introduced in
England by Order XIV under the Judicature Acts whereby a plaintiff was able, by
means of a summary proceeding, to obtain a final judgment when there was no
bona fide defence to an action.16

[30] In John Wallingford v The Directors &c. of The Mutual Society (1880) 5 AC
685 (HL) at 699-700, Lord Hatherley referred to the objects of the new English
procedure as follows:
‘I apprehend that from the first the objects of these short methods of procedure has been to
prevent unreasonable delay, a delay which was very prejudicial to the creditors, and never, I am
afraid, or rather, I am pleased to say, can have been very beneficial to the debtor himself. Simply
allowing legal proceedings to take place, in order that delay may be applied to the administration
of justice as much as possible, is not an end for which we can conceive the Legislature to have
framed the provisions which now exist under the several Judicature Acts. If a man really has no
defence, it is better for him as well as his creditors, and for all the parties concerned, that the
matter should be brought to an issue as speedily as possible; and therefore there was a power
given in cases in which plaintiffs might think they were entitled to use the power by which, if it was
a matter of account, an account might be immediately obtained upon the filing of a bill, or, if it was
a matter in which the debt was clear and distinct, and in which nothing was needed to be said or
done to satisfy a Judge that there was no real defence to the action, recourse might be had to an
immediate judgment and to an immediate execution.’

[31] So too in South Africa, the summary judgment procedure was not
intended to ‘shut (a defendant) out from defending’, unless it was very clear
indeed that he had no case in the action. It was intended to prevent sham

16 See Schoeman v Newmark Ltd 1919 CPD 55.

defences from defeating the rights of parties by delay, and at the same time
causing great loss to plaintiffs who were endeavouring to enforce their rights.17

[32] The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The
procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a
sustainable defence of her/his day in court. After almost a century of successful
application in our courts, summary judgment proceedings can hardly continue to
be described as extraordinary. Our courts, both of first instance and at appellate
level, have during that time rightly been trusted to ensure that a defendant with a
triable issue is not shut out. In the Maharaj case at 425G-426E, Corbett JA, was
keen to ensure first, an examination of whether there has been sufficient
disclosure by a defendant of the nature and grounds of his defence and the facts
upon which it is founded. The second consideration is that the defence so
disclosed must be both bona fide and good in law. A court which is satisfied that
this threshold has been crossed is then bound to refuse summary judgment.
Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a defendant the precision apposite to
pleadings. However, the learned judge was equally astute to ensure that
recalcitrant debtors pay what is due to a creditor.

[33] Having regard to its purpose and its proper application, summary
judgment proceedings only hold terrors and are ‘drastic’ for a defendant who has
no defence. Perhaps the time has come to discard these labels and to
concentrate rather on the proper application of the rule, as set out with customary
clarity and elegance by Corbett JA in the Maharaj case at 425G-426E.

[34] In the present case, as demonstrated above, there is no discernable
sustainable defence put up by JJ. In respect of the valuation of work done and

17 See Meek v Kruger 1958 (3) SA 154 (T) at 156F-157A. In Jones v Stone 1894 AC 122 Lord
Halsbury, in the Privy Council, in relation to summary judgment proceedings in Western Australia,
similarly stated that the procedure was intended only to apply to cases where there could be no
reasonable doubt that a plaintiff was entitled to judgment and where it was inexpedient to allow a
defendant to defend for mere purposes of delay. The procedure is employed in Canada ─ see
Progressive Construction Ltd v Newton 117 DLR (3d) 591 and is known in the United States of
America ─ see Sartor v Arkansas Natural Gas Corp 321 US 620.

materials on site, JJ did not take issue with the principal agent’s valuation per se.
As shown, the references to various provisions of the agreement do not assist JJ
in establishing a defence. In respect of the certification of damages the merits of
the calculation were not challenged. There are vague references in the opposing
affidavit to clause 31.6 and a possible counterclaim (without quantification) in
respect of an alleged failure by Stocks to protect goods and materials on site.
Such ‘defences’ as were proffered are cast in the most dubious terms. Judgment
for Stocks in the court below was fully justified and Gorven AJ correctly refused
to exercise his discretion in favour of JJ.

[35] For all the reasons set out above the appeal must fail. The following order
is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs consequent upon the
employment of two counsel.

_________________
M S NAVSA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:
P M M Lane SC

Instructed by

Routledge Modise (In association with Eversheds) Johannesburg

Matsepes Inc Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
A K Kissoon Singh SC

M W Collins

Instructed by

Tiefenthaler Attorneys Durban

Honey Attorneys Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
27 March 2009
Status:
Immediate
Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal

On 27 March 2009 the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down
judgment in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek
Joint Venture, dismissing an appeal against an order of the Durban High
Court with costs including the costs of two counsel.

On 27 September 2007 the Durban High Court granted Stocks
Mavundla Zek Joint Venture, the respondent, summary judgment in the
following amounts:
(a)
R2 704 425.78;
(c)
R14 568 177.68 and
(d)
R9 690 000.
Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd, the appellant, was ordered to pay the
respondent’s costs on a scale as between attorney and own client,
including the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

The litigation between the parties followed on the cancellation by Stocks,
of a contract in terms of which it undertook to build a resort hotel at

Ocean View site, Zimbali Coastal Forest Resort, Ballito for Joob Joob
investments.

Stocks sued Joob Joob for amounts certified by the latter’s agent to be
due and payable. The first certificate related to the value of work done
and materials supplied. The second related in part to such work and
materials. The second and third certificates certified damages due to
Stocks.

After Joob Joob entered an appearance to defend, Stocks applied for
summary judgment ─ a procedure that creditors who hold liquid
documents can resort to when a debtor’s defence is not bona fide and is
entered merely to delay matters. The Durban High Court considered a
number of defences raised by Joob Joob, held them to be without any
substance and consequently granted summary judgment.

This court agreed with those conclusions. It held that the defences
raised were cast in dubious terms and were entirely without merit. It
scrutinised the certificates in question and found that they were issued
and completed in terms of the agreement between the parties. It
discussed the nature of such certificates and held that Stocks was
entitled to judgment on all three. It noted that summary judgment
proceedings hold terrors only for defendants who have no defence to the
claims brought against them. The appeal was dismissed with costs,
including the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel.