THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable
CASE NO 31/2007

In the matter between

MILLENNIUM WASTE MANAGEMENT
(PTY) LIMITED

Appellant

and

THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE TENDER
BOARD : LIMPOPO PROVINCE

First Respondent

MEC : DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, LIMPOPO PROVINCE
Second Respondent

THERMOPOWER TECHNOLOGY
PROCESSORS / BUHLE WASTE /
AFRIMEDICALS JV

Third Respondent

Coram:
Howie P, Nugent, Jafta, Maya JJA

and Mhlantla AJA

Heard:
02 NOVEMBER 2007
Delivered:
29 NOVEMBER 2007

Summary: The award of tenders constitutes administrative action and consequently
must comply with requirements of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 and s 217 of the Constitution.

Neutral citation: This judgment may be referred to as Millennium Waste
Management v Chairperson Tender Board [2007] SCA 165 (RSA)

____________________________________________________________________

JAFTA JA

[1] This is an appeal against a decision of Prinsloo J (sitting in the
Pretoria High Court) in which he dismissed the appellant’s application for
an order reviewing and setting aside the decision to award a tender to a
consortium
called
Thermopower
Technology
Processors/Buhle
Waste/Afrimedicals JV (the consortium). The tender was for the
provision of services relating to the removal, treatment and disposal of
healthcare waste material from hospitals in the province of Limpopo
(formerly called Northern Province). The appeal is with leave of this
court.

[2] This case is about the fairness of the process followed by the
Department of Health and Social Development which culminated in the
award of the impugned tender, underlying the agreement for procurement
of services by the department in question. Such process is governed by
legislation which can be traced back to the interim Constitution.1 It
required, among other things, that provincial legislation establishing
independent and impartial tender boards in each province, be passed.2

[3] The legislature in Limpopo passed the Northern Transvaal Tender
Board Act3 (the Act) in terms of which the impugned decision was taken.
This Act establishes a provincial tender board which is granted the sole
power ‘to procure supplies and services for the Province’ (s4).4 However,

1 Act 200 of 1993.
2 Section 187 of the interim Constitution provides: ‘(1) The procurement of goods and services for any
level of government shall be regulated by an Act of Parliament and provincial laws, which shall make
provision for the appointment of independent and impartial tender boards to deal with such
procurements. (2) The tendering system referred to in subsection (1) shall be fair, public and
competitive, and tender boards shall on request give reasons for their decisions to interested parties. (3)
No organ of state and no member of any organ of state or any other person shall improperly interfere
with the decisions and operations of the tender boards. (4) All decisions of any tender board shall be
recorded.’
3 Act 2 of 1994 which came into operation on 1 October 1994.
4 Section 4 of the Act provides: ‘(a) on behalf of the Province, conclude an agreement with a person
within or outside the Republic for the furnishing of supplies and services to the Province, or for the
hiring or letting of anything or the acquisition or granting of any right for or on behalf of the Province

the board is empowered to delegate ‘any of its powers to any of its
committees, any person (including any member of the board), any body
of persons or the holder of any post designated by the Board’ (s5).The
Act also empowers the Member of the Executive Council for Finance and
Expenditure (the MEC) to make regulations governing the tender process
(s9). On 14 February 1997 the MEC published such regulations.
Regulation 2 provides that procurement of goods and services shall be
done only through the board. 5

[4] The final Constitution lays down minimum requirements for a
valid tender process and contracts entered into following an award of
tender to a successful tenderer (s217).6 The section requires that the
tender process, preceding the conclusion of contracts for the supply of
goods and services, must be ‘fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and
cost-effective’. Finally, as the decision to award a tender constitutes
administrative action, it follows that the provisions of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act7 (PAJA) apply to the process. This is the
legislative background against which the present matter must be
considered.

or for the disposal of movable Provincial property; (b) with a view to concluding an agreement referred
to in paragraph (a), in any manner it may deem fit, invite offers and determine the manner in which and
the conditions subject to which such offers shall be made; (c) inspect and test or cause to be inspected
and tested supplies and services which are offered or which are or have been furnished in terms of an
agreement concluded under this section, and anything offered for hire; (d) accept or reject any offer for
the conclusion of an agreement referred to in paragraph (a);….’
5 Regulation  2 reads: ‘Subject to the provisions of any Act of the Provincial Legislature, supplies and
services for and on behalf the acquisition or granting of any right for and on behalf of the Province and
the disposal of movable provincial property shall be procured, arranged or disposed of only through the
Board.’
6 Section 217 provides: ‘(1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial or  local sphere of
government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it
must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective. (2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for– (a) categories of preference in the
allocation of contracts; and (b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. (3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within
which the policy referred to in subsection (2) must be implemented.’
7 Act 3 of 2000.

[5] The facts in this matter are largely not in dispute. An invitation to
tender was issued by the Department of Health and Social Development –
the second respondent – following an audit query by the Auditor-General.
The query related to the department’s failure to properly dispose of
medical waste in compliance with a range of statutes relevant to that
process. Having acquired the necessary funds, the department advertised
an invitation to interested parties to tender for the removal, treatment and
disposal of medical waste. The deadline for lodging tenders was 11h00 on
24 February 2005. This invitation contained documents setting out,
among others, the list of hospitals from which the medical waste would
be collected, specifications and conditions applicable to the tender
process.

[6] Fourteen companies responded to the invitation and timeously
delivered their tenders at the appointed address. The appellant was one of
them, as was the consortium. According to Mr Mpho Mofokeng – the
chairman of the departmental tender committee – the tenders received
were subjected to evaluation criteria which were ‘divided into two
phases, namely administrative compliance and technical compliance’.
Seven tenders were disqualified at the first phase for failing to comply
with the administrative requirements. These included the appellant’s
tender which was disqualified for failing to sign a form titled ‘declaration
of interest’.

[7] Six of the remaining tenders were disqualified at the second phase
for failing to comply with technical requirements. The consortium’s
tender was the only one remaining after disqualifications at the second
phase. All these disqualifications occurred in an ad hoc technical

evaluation committee constituted by two technical advisors who were
also members of the tender committee chaired by Mofokeng. At the
conclusion of the second phase the technical committee recommended to
the tender committee that the consortium be awarded the tender. After
deliberation the tender committee approved the recommendation but also
resolved that business premises of the fourteen companies that had
tendered be inspected, even though thirteen of them were no longer in the
running owing to disqualifications.

[8] During the period 8 to 10 March 2005, members of the tender
committee conducted inspections at business premises of eleven of the
fourteen companies that had tendered. The appellant’s business facilities
were inspected and so were facilities of the consortium. At the appellant’s
premises the inspection revealed that the equipment used in treating
medical waste did not possess the current technology and consequently it
failed to render such waste completely unrecognisable, as required by
tender specifications. The washing facility was not automatised and the
appellant’s employees were exposed to accidents and disease because
they were not supplied with the necessary protective clothing. This, in the
view of the committee, violated the Occupational, Health and Safety Act
85 of 1993 and the regulations made under it.

[9] Following the inspections, the tender committee held a meeting on
10 March 2005 at 18h10. In the committee’s view the consortium was the
only tenderer that complied fully with relevant legislation and had
submitted a clear proposal. It was resolved that the technical committee
must prepare a report the contents of which I refer to more fully below.
The tender committee’s recommendation that the consortium be awarded
the tender was communicated by Mofokeng to Dr Hlamalani Manzini –

the head of the department – to whom the power to award tenders was
delegated. On the same date she awarded the tender to the consortium on
specified conditions.8

[10] The report of the technical evaluation committee reveals (contrary
to the tender committee’s view) that the consortium did not comply with
technical requirements regarding the treatment of anatomical waste and
sharps. Sharps are defined (in the report) as objects such as hypodermic
needles, scalpel blades and other surgical accessories capable of cutting
or penetrating human skin. The report raises concerns regarding its
proposals and its ability to handle both anatomical waste and sharps,
including their treatment. Regarding transportation of waste material, the
report shows that it also failed to comply with legal requirements. This
necessitated a meeting between the tender committee and the consortium
on 23 March 2005 where an explanation for defects in its tender was
furnished. But at that stage the tender had already been awarded.

[11] On 7 April 2005 the appellant addressed a letter to Dr Manzini
asking which tenderer was successful. She replied by a letter dated
25 April 2005, informing it that its tender was disqualified for failing to
sign the declaration of interest and that the consortium had won the
tender. The declaration referred to was duly completed and initialled on
each of the two pages. It is necessary to set it out in full. In its completed
form it reads:

‘DECLARATION OF INTEREST

8 The decision to award the tender was communicated to the consortium by Dr Manzini in a letter dated
18 March 2005 which, in part, reads: ‘In a meeting of the 10th March 2005, the Department of Health
and Social Development approved that the bid be awarded to your company with the attendant
conditions hereinafter….’ It may be noted that on 10 March neither the tender committee’s written
recommendation nor the technical committee’s report existed.

1.
Any legal person, including persons employed by the principal, or persons
having a kinship with persons employed by the principal, including a blood
relationship, may make an offer or offers in terms of this invitation to tender.
In view of possible allegations of favouritism, should the resulting tender, or
part thereof, be awarded to persons employed by the principal, or to persons
connected with or related to them, it is required that the tenderer or his/her
authorized representative declare his/her position in relation to the
evaluating/adjudicating authority and/or take an oath declaring his/her interest,
where–
-
the tenderer is employed by the principal; and/or

-
the legal person on whose behalf the tendering document is signed, has
a relationship with persons/a person who are/is involved in the
evaluation and or adjudication of the tender(s), or where it is known
that such a relationship exists between the person or persons for or on
whose behalf the declarant acts and persons who are involved with the
evaluation and or adjudication of the tender.

2.
In order to give effect to the above, the following questionnaire must be
completed and submitted with the tender.

2.1
Are you or any person connected with the tenderer,

employed by the principal?   No

2.1.2 If so, state particulars. N/A

2.2
Do you, or any person connected with the tenderer,   have

any relationship (family, friend, other) with a person

employed by the principal and who may be involved with

the evaluation and or adjudication of this tender? No

2.2.1 If so, state particulars. N/A

2.3
Are you, or any person connected with the

tender, aware of any relationship (family, friend,

other) between the tenderer and any person

employed by the principal who may be involved

with the evaluation and or adjudication of this

tender? No

2.3.1 If so state particulars. N/A

DECLARATION
I, the undersigned (Name) R Gouws certify that the information furnished in
paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3.1 above is correct. I accept that the principal may act against me
in terms of paragraph 23 of the general conditions of contract should this declaration
prove to be false.

……………………….

23.2.05
Signature

Date

Regional General Manger

Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd.
Position

Name of tenderer’

[12] On 25 May 2005 the appellant instituted an urgent application in
the court below for relief divided into two parts. First, it sought an
interdict restraining the department from concluding and implementing a
contract with the consortium, pursuant to the award of the tender. Such
interdict was to be in force pending the determination of the review
sought in the second part of the relief. Unbeknown to the appellant the
department and the consortium had already entered into a service level
agreement which was concluded on 29 April 2005. The implementation
of this agreement commenced on 2 May 2005. These facts probably
influenced the decision not to grant the interdict. The record does not

shed light on the issue. Despite the application having been launched on
an urgent basis, the review only came before Prinsloo J for consideration
on 2 June 2006. I return to this point later in the judgment. As indicated
above the learned judge dismissed the application with costs.

[13] There are two issues raised in this appeal. The first issue is whether
the disqualification of the appellant’s tender violated its right to
procedural fairness. The second relates to the appropriate remedy in the
event of the first issue being decided in the appellant’s favour. I deal with
the disqualification issue first.

[14] Counsel for both the department and the tender board argued in the
court below and this court that the appellant’s tender was lawfully and
properly disqualified. In developing this argument, it was submitted that
the terms of the tender documents relating to administrative compliance
were couched in peremptory language which expressly stated that non-
compliance would result in disqualification. Proper signing of the tender
documents is one of the terms which if not complied with, it was argued,
led to disqualification. It was not procedurally unfair for the tender
committee to disqualify the tender on the basis of the appellant’s failure
to sign, continued the argument, because it was forewarned that such a
failure would lead to disqualification. Relying on the definition of
‘acceptable tender’ in the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework
Act 5 of 2000 (the Preferential Procurement Act), counsel concluded by
submitting that the appellant’s tender did not constitute an acceptable
tender due to the failure to sign.

[15] The department’s argument was upheld by the court below. The
learned judge, relying on Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism

v Pepper Bay Fishing9, found that the tender committee lacked authority
to condone the appellant’s failure to comply with the peremptory
requirements of the tender.

[16] I cannot accept the department’s argument. On the assumption that
there was a valid delegation of power from the tender board to Dr
Manzini and further to the tender committee, the answer to the question
of authority lies in regulation 5(c) which empowers the tender board to
accept tenders even if they fail to comply with tender requirements.10 In
these circumstances reliance on the Pepper Bay Fishing case was
misplaced. In that case the issue was whether the chief director to whom
the power to grant fishing licences was delegated, had authority to
condone procedural defects in applications for fishing rights submitted to
him. On the enquiry relating to the chief director’s powers Brand JA said
(para 31):

‘As a general principle an administrative authority has no inherent power to condone
failure to comply with a peremptory requirement. It only has such power if it has been
afforded the discretion to do so…. The Chief Director derives all his (delegated)
powers and authority from the enactment constituted by the general notice. If the
general notice therefore affords him no discretion, he has none. The question whether
he had a discretion is therefore entirely dependent on a proper construction of the
general notice.’

With this I agree and wish to add that in the present case the tender
committee was afforded the necessary discretion by reg 5(c). Therefore it

9 2004(1) SA 308 (SCA).
10 Regulation 5 provides: ‘When, at the invitation of tenders, offers are submitted for the purpose of
concluding an agreement referred to in section 4 (1)(a) of the Act– (a) the Board is not obliged to
accept the lowest or any offer; (b) the Board may, where an offer relates to more than one item, accept
such offer in respect of or any specific item or items; (c) the Board may accept any offer
notwithstanding the fact that the offer was not made in response to any particular tender invitation, or
does not comply with the tender invitation in respect of which the offer has been made.’

erred in thinking that it did not possess such power.

[17] Moreover, our law permits condonation of non-compliance with
peremptory requirements in cases where condonation is not incompatible
with public interest and if such condonation is granted by the body in
whose benefit the provision was enacted (SA Eagle Co Ltd v Bavuma).11
In this case condonation of the appellant’s failure to sign would have
served the public interest as it would have facilitated competition among
the tenderers. By condoning the failure the tender committee would have
promoted the values of fairness, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness
which are listed in s 217. The appellant had tendered to provide the
needed service at a cost of R444 244,43 per month whereas the
consortium had quoted and was awarded the tender at the amount of
R3 642 257,28 per month.

[18] I turn to the question whether the appellant’s tender constitutes an
acceptable tender as defined in the Preferential Procurement Act. It
defines an acceptable tender as ‘any tender which, in all respects,
complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the
tender document’. When Parliament enacted the Preferential Procurement
Act it was complying with the obligation imposed by s 217 (3) of the
Constitution which required that legislation be passed in order to give
effect to the implementation of a procurement policy referred to in s 217
(2). Therefore the definition in the statute must be construed within the
context of the entire s 217 while striving for an interpretation which
promotes ‘the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ as required

11 1985 (3) SA 42 (A) at 49G-H.

by s 39 (2) of the Constitution.12 In Chairperson: Standing Tender
Committee and Others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and Others13
Scott JA said (para 14):

‘The definition of “acceptable tender” in the Preferential Act must be construed
against the background of the system envisaged by section 217(1) of the Constitution,
namely one which is “fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective”. In
other words, whether “the tender in all respects complies with the specifications and
conditions set out in the contract documents” must be judged against these values.’

[19] In this context the definition of tender cannot be given its wide
literal meaning. It certainly cannot mean that a tender must comply with
conditions which are immaterial, unreasonable or unconstitutional. The
defect relied on by the tender committee in this case is the appellant’s
failure to sign a duly completed form, in circumstances where it is clear
that the failure was occasioned by an oversight. In determining whether
this non-compliance rendered the appellant’s tender unacceptable, regard
must also be had to the purpose of the declaration of interest in relation to
the tender process in question.

[20] Counsel for the department submitted that the purpose of the
declaration of interest was to curb corruption. As the failure to sign may
be intentional, so he argued, the possibility existed that a person or
persons inside the department had an interest in the tender of the
appellant. A perfunctory perusal of the appellant’s declaration shows that
the failure to sign was inadvertent. Secondly, the tender committee does
not say the information furnished by the appellant to the effect that it had
no relationship with the department’s employees (including those linked

12 For an elaborate discussion of s 39 (2) see Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) paras 88-92 and authorities there collected.
13 [2005] 4 All SA 487 (SCA).

to the evaluation and adjudication of tenders), was false. I am unable to
appreciate how the signing of the form would have safeguarded against
corruption. It seems to me that what is of paramount importance is the
nature of the information furnished and not the signature. As is apparent
from the declaration itself, Mr Rhyno Gouws inserted his name on it as
the person who furnished the necessary information. He was thus clearly
identified. If the appellant intended to misrepresent facts, it is unlikely
that Gouws would have exposed himself in that fashion. I may add that he
signed the tender on behalf of the tenderer on the very same date which
the declaration bears.

[21] Since the adjudication of tenders constitutes administrative action,
of necessity the process must be conducted in a manner that promotes the
administrative justice rights while satisfying the requirements of PAJA
(Du Toit v Minister of Transport).14 Conditions such as the one relied on
by the tender committee should not be mechanically applied with no
regard to a tenderer’s constitutional rights. By insisting on disqualifying
the appellant’s tender for an innocent omission, the tender committee
acted unreasonably. Its decision in this regard was based on the
committee’s error in thinking that the omission amounted to a failure to
comply with a condition envisaged in the Preferential Procurement Act.
Consequently, its decision was ‘materially influenced by an error of law’
contemplated in s 6 (2)(d) of PAJA, one of the grounds of review relied
on by the appellant. Therefore, the tender process followed by the

14 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC). Writing for the majority in that case Mokgoro J said (para 26): ‘Although the
[the National Roads Act 54 of 1971] has for nearly two decades been applied in the expropriation of
property and has been regarded as the major source of expropriation law in South Africa, it is important
to recognise and appreciate that, since the inception of the Constitution, all applicable laws must
comply with the Constitution and be applied in conformity with its fundamental values. It is therefore
now the Constitution, and not the Act, which provides the principles and values and sets the standards
to be applied whenever property, which in turn is now also constitutionally protected, is expropriated.
Every act of expropriation, including the compensation payable following expropriation must comply
with the Constitution, including its spirit, purport and objects generally and s 25 in particular.’

department was inconsistent with PAJA. In the light of this finding, it is
not necessary, in my view, to consider other grounds raised by the
appellant. Suffice it to say that they were all based on PAJA and it
appears that the appellant could have succeeded on more than one
ground.

[22] The question of relief remains for consideration. While
acknowledging that there was no culpable delay on the part of the
appellant to institute review proceedings, exercising its discretion the
court below dismissed the application with costs. In  so doing the court
overlooked the provisions of s 8 of PAJA which require that any order
granted in matters such as this be just and equitable.15 This guideline
involves a process of striking a balance between the applicant’s interests
on the one hand, and the interests of the respondents, on the other. It is
impermissible for the court to confine itself, as the court below did, to the
interests of the one side only. Furthermore, the section lists a range of
remedies from which the court may choose a suitable one upon a
consideration of all relevant facts. The dismissal of the application by the
court below does not constitute an appropriate and effective relief
contemplated in s 38 of the Constitution. In view of the court a quo’s
error this court is entitled to interfere with the order granted.

[23] The difficulty that is presented by invalid administrative acts, as

15 Section 8(1) provides: ‘(1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of
section 6 (1), may grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders–  (a) directing the
administrator–  (i ) to give reasons; or (ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; (b)
prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner; (c) setting aside the administrative
action and–  (i ) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without
directions; or (ii) in exceptional cases– (aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or
correcting a defect resulting from the administrative action; or (bb) directing the administrator or any
other party to the proceedings to pay compensation; (d) declaring the rights of the parties in respect of
any matter to which the administrative action relates; (e) granting a temporary interdict or other
temporary relief; or (f) as to costs.’

pointed out by this court in Oudekraal Estates,16 is that they often have
been acted upon by the time they are brought under review.  That
difficulty is particularly acute when a decision is taken to accept a tender.
A decision to accept a tender is almost always acted upon immediately by
the conclusion of a contract with the tenderer, and that is often
immediately followed by further contracts concluded by the tenderer in
executing the contract.  To set aside the decision to accept the tender,
with the effect that the contract is rendered void from the outset, can have
catastrophic consequences for an innocent tenderer, and adverse
consequences for the public at large in whose interests the administrative
body or official purported to act. Those interests must be carefully
weighed against those of the disappointed tenderer if an order is to be
made that is just and equitable.

[24] In this case there are four identifiable interests that need to be taken
into account in exercising that discretion.  In doing so it must be borne in
mind that the unfairness here does not lie in the process of inviting
tenders. It lies only in the omission of the appellant’s tender from the
process of evaluation.  It was accepted in argument before us that the
proper course that will need to be followed if the decision is set aside is
not to invite fresh tenders but rather for the tender board to properly
evaluate both tenders and decide which tender, if either, to accept.

[25] The loss to the appellant from the unfair act was no more than the
loss of the opportunity to have its tender considered.  It is by no means
clear that its tender would have been accepted or that it will be accepted
upon a fresh evaluation.  Even if its tender ought to have been accepted at
the outset its loss relates mainly to the profit it would have realised on the

16 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) para 46.

contract.  We are not told what that profit might be; it might be modest or
even minimal.  Against that must be weighed the potential loss that will
be caused if it’s tender is not accepted on reconsideration.

[26] There is no suggestion that the consortium was complicit in some
way in bringing about the exclusion of the tender – had that been shown it
would have been appropriate to set the decision aside for that reason
alone – and it must be accepted that it is an innocent party.

[27] With effect from 1 May 2005 the consortium became obliged to
perform, and has performed, the service that it tendered, under a contract
that was concluded on the terms of its tender with some supplementary
formal provisions.  On the strength of that contract it purchased eleven
vehicles and other equipment at a cost of about R3.5 million and incurred
other costs, and it hired 35 employees. (It is alleged that they were
employed on fixed term contracts.)  It also leased premises in Polokwane
upon which to construct a waste treatment plant, which it was obliged to
construct within four months.  Whether it has constructed the plant does
not appear from the evidence but in view of its contractual obligation it is
likely that it has done so.  The evidence does not disclose the cost of
constructing the plant.  The consortium’s return for providing the service
takes the form of a monthly fee over a period of five years.  No doubt the
monthly fee has been structured to recover its capital, running costs and a
profit.  We do not know whether or to what extent the capital costs will
have been recovered if the contract terminates midway through its term.

[28] From the point of view of the public serious questions arise if the
contract is now terminated. The service is for the removal and safe
disposal of medical waste from all public hospitals in Limpopo province

(it seems there are 44). The removal and disposal of medical waste must
be carried out without interruption and the province does not have the
capacity to step in itself if the contract is terminated.  No doubt some or
other interim measures are capable of being taken but how and at what
cost is uncertain.

[29] There is one further interest to be brought to account that changes
the picture and that is the public purse. At first sight the price differential
between the two tenders is enormous: the consortium provides the service
at a fee of R3 642 257 per month, while the appellant tendered to do so at
a monthly fee of R444 244.   We are not able to assess why the
differential is so large. It might be that the consortium is profiteering
obscenely or it might be that the service offered by the appellant was
materially different and hugely under-priced for what is required.  In
answer to the appellant’s charge that it is profiteering the consortium
pointed out that an earlier call by the province for tenders elicited only
one response, and that its price is in line with estimates that have been
made for a comparable service in Gauteng.  There are also at least two
elements of the respective tenders – the volume of material upon which
they were priced and the facilities for waste disposal that were proposed –
that at first sight might account for a large portion of the differential.  But
if the appellant is indeed able to provide the service at the price that it has
offered then the completion of the contract by the consortium even at this
stage – 29 months has yet to expire – will clearly be at enormous
unwarranted cost to the public purse that could be avoided if the decision
is set aside.
[30] Whether that cost to the public purse will ever eventuate is at this
stage a matter only for speculation.  It is only if the appellant’s tender is
now evaluated and found to be acceptable, and the decision to accept the

consortium’s tender is not set aside, that any loss will occur. But if the
appellant’s tender were  not to be accepted, and the decision to appoint
the consortium has meanwhile been set aside, nothing will have been
gained and there is the real prospect that loss and disruption might occur.
At best for the province there is the prospect that the consortium might be
willing to resume the contract or to conclude a fresh contract on the same
terms.  But it will have no obligation to do either and sound commercial
reasons can be envisaged for why it might decline to do so.  The province
might even be driven to commence the tender process all over again and
end up contracting at a higher price. Meanwhile there is the potential for
the interruption of the collection and disposal of medical waste
throughout the province.

[31] But all that is speculation at this stage.  We simply cannot predict
what will occur if the tender is now set aside and uncertainty is thereby
introduced.  I do not think we should make an order that creates
uncertainty – with no promise of gain but instead the potential for loss
and chaotic disruption – when that can be avoided.

[32] The effects that I have described can be avoided by an order that
requires the tenders to be evaluated, and sets aside the decision to accept
the consortium’s tender only if the appellant’s tender is found to be
accepted.  An order to that effect vindicates the appellant’s rights to the
full while it prevents the potential for disruption to the service, and it
avoids unwarranted loss to the public purse.  It might end up that the
consortium suffers loss – that will occur only if appellant’s tender is
accepted and even then commercial considerations that minimise the loss
might come into play – but that is inevitable if we are to accommodate
the potential loss to the public purse.  It seems to me that such an order

promises no loss to the public purse and an uninterrupted service.  And if
it turns out that the consortium has indeed been profiteering excessively
and loses the contract as a result, then any loss that it might suffer does
not weigh heavily with me. The order envisaged here maintains a balance
between the parties’ conflicting interests while taking into account the
public interest.

[33] The reconsideration of the tenders must, in my view, be carried out
by the tender board itself and not the departmental tender committee and
the departmental head. Although the Act permits the board to delegate
any of its powers, including the adjudication of tenders, it is undesirable
for it to delegate the latter power to persons or bodies which are neither
independent nor impartial. By conferring the sole power upon the board
to procure goods and services for the provincial government, both the Act
and the regulations seek to promote the values of independence and
impartiality. The process followed by the tender committee in this matter
shows that it did not only lack the skill necessary for adjudicating tenders
but also the understanding of the legislative prescripts. Furthermore, the
chairman of the tender committee incorrectly reported to the departmental
head that the consortium’s tender complied with all requirements when
this was not the case. On realising the contradiction in the technical
report, he invited its representatives to a meeting so that they could
explain the defects. This is proof of a process which is not ‘fair, equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost-effective’. Section 217 of the
Constitution was not the only provision overlooked by the departmental
tender committee.
[34] In conclusion there is one further matter that needs to be
mentioned. It appears that in some cases applicants for review approach
the high court promptly for relief but their cases are not expeditiously

heard and as a result by the time the matter is finally determined, practical
problems militating against the setting aside of the challenged decision
would have arisen. Consequently the scope of granting an effective relief
to vindicate the infringed rights become drastically reduced. It may help
if the high court, to the extent possible, gives priority to these matters.

[35] The following order is made:

1.
The appeal is upheld with costs including costs of two counsel.
Such costs to be paid by the first and second respondents jointly
and severally.

2.
The order of the court below is set aside and the following is
substituted:

‘(a)
The exclusion of the tender of the applicant (Millennium Waste
Management), and the consequent decision to accept the tender of
the third respondent (the consortium), are declared to have been
invalid.

(b)
The tender board is directed to evaluate the tender that was
submitted by Millennium Waste Management and the tender
submitted by the consortium relative to one another and to decide
by not later than 15 February 2008, or by such later date as may be
determined by a court before that period expires, which tender
ought properly to have been accepted.

(c)
Upon reaching such decision the tender board shall immediately
record the decision in writing in its official records and

communicate the decision to the respective attorneys of
Millennium Waste Management and the consortium such that it is
received by not later than 3 days after the decision has been made.

(d)
If it is decided that the tender of Millennium Waste Management
ought to have been accepted but only upon conditions then the
decision shall be deemed to have been made by the tender board
and recorded in its records for the purposes of paragraph (c) upon
receipt by the tender board or its nominated official of written
acceptance by Millennium Waste Management of those conditions.

(e )
If it is decided that the tender of Millennium Waste Management
ought to have been accepted – but only if it is so decided – then the
following further orders shall issue upon the last day of the month
in which such decision is recorded in the records of the tender
board as envisaged by paras (c) and (d):

(i)
the decision that is the subject of this review is set aside.

(ii)
the consortium shall be entitled to claim all moneys that
would properly have been due to it but for this order on that
date and to retain all moneys that were properly paid to it at
that date.

(iii)
this order shall not prejudice any claim in law that the
consortium might have for losses it might have suffered in
consequence of its tender being accepted and subsequently
being set aside.

(f)
If it is decided that the tender of Millennium Waste Management
ought properly to have been rejected then the acceptance of the
consortium’s tender will remain extant.

(g)
If notwithstanding the terms of this order no decision has been
made by the tender board by the date referred to in paragraph (b)
then an order shall issue on that date in the terms contained in paras
(i), (ii) and (iii) above.

(h)
The first and second respondents, jointly and severally, are ordered
to pay the costs of the applicant, including the costs of two
counsel.’

__________________
C N JAFTA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:
)
HOWIE P
)
NUGENT JA
)
MAYA JA

)
MHLANTLA AJA
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:
29   November 2007

Status:
Immediate

MILLENNIUM WASTE MANAGEMENT v CHAIRPERSON
TENDER BOARD AND OTHERS

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal

Today, the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA) has set aside a judgment
of the Pretoria High Court refusing to rescind a tender awarded to a
consortium called Thermopower Technology/Buhle Waste/Afrimedicals
JV by the head of the Department of Health and Social Development in
Limpopo Province. 14 companies bid for the tender which was awarded
to the consortium after other tenders were all disqualified for various
reasons.

The tender of Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd (the appellant)
was disqualified because the person who completed the declaration of
interest form had inadvertently failed to sign it. The form had been

properly completed and the only thing lacking was a signature, even
though the name of the person concerned was inserted on the form and he
had initialled each page. The appellant’s tender, as were all other tenders,
was disqualified by a departmental tender committee which subsequently
inspected the business facilities of 11 companies, including the
consortium’s premises. A report compiled by a technical committee at the
request of the tender committee, revealed that there were defects in all
tenders including that of the consortium. Nevertheless the tender
committee recommended that the tender be awarded to the consortium
whose tender was the only remaining tender after disqualifications. The
consortium was awarded the tender at a cost of R3 642 257 per month
whereas the appellant had quoted R444 244 for such service.

The SCA found that the disqualification of the appellant’s tender was
unfair and contravened the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000. The SCA ordered that both the appellant’s and the
consortium’s tenders be reconsidered by the tender board.