THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No: 510/09

In the matter between:

THE CURATORS AD LITEM
TO CERTAIN POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES OF
THE EMMA SMITH EDUCATIONAL FUND
Appellant
and

THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL &
28 OTHER APPLICANTS

Respondents

Neutral citation:
Curators Ad Litem to Certain Beneficiaries of Emma
Smith Educational Fund v The University of KwaZulu-
Natal (510/09) [2010] ZASCA 136 (1 October 2010)

Coram:
Navsa, Cloete and Shongwe JJA, Bertelsmann and

Ebrahim AJJA

Heard:
23 AUGUST 2010

Delivered:
1 OCTOBER 2010

Summary: Trust: Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 – amendment of
trust deed; educational fund administered by publicly funded
university – benefits restricted to white bursars – racially restrictive
clause in will in conflict with public policy as it offended against the
equality clause in the Bill of Rights – high court deleting racially
restrictive clause by applying section 13 of the Trust Property Control
Act 57 of 1988 – appeal against that order dismissed.
Further clause that beneficiaries must have resided in ‘Durban’ also
deleted by high court and substituted with ‘the Ethikwini Municipality’.
This order set aside because of absence of proof that geographical
description hampered achievement of the objects of the fund.

________________________________________________________________

ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban (Nicholson J sitting as
court of first instance).

The order of the court a quo substituting ‘the Ethikwini Municipality’
for ‘Durban’ in para 26(f)(2) of the will of Sir Charles George Smith
is set aside
Save as set out in 1 the appeal is dismissed.

________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________

BERTELSMANN AJA (Navsa, Cloete, Shongwe JJA and Ebrahim AJA
concurring):

[1] At the centre of this appeal, which is before us with the leave of the
court below, are the provisions of a will creating a charitable trust, the Emma
Smith Educational Fund (the Fund). It is administered by the first respondent,
the University of Kwazulu-Natal. Its benefits are, in the original terms of the
will, reserved solely for white South African women who need financial
support for a tertiary education. Applicants for a bursary must have lived in
‘Durban’ for at least three years to qualify. The question is whether this
bequest to be administered by the University can be allowed to stand in its
racially exclusive form.

[2] The court below granted an order in favour of the respondents, the
University and the members of its Council, who are the trustees of the Fund,
deleting the racially restrictive provisions of the bequest and substituting ‘the
Ethekwini Municipality’ for ‘Durban’. In doing so, Nicholson J relied upon the

provisions of s 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (the Act). I
shall refer to the first respondent as the University.

[3] The appellants are the curatores-ad-litem for potential beneficiaries of
the Fund.

[4] More than seven decades ago, on 21 July 1938, Sir Charles George
Smith executed his last will and testament (the will) to dispose of his
considerable estate. Sir Charles had arrived in South Africa in his youth and
lived in Durban until his death in 1941. He was the founder of CG Smith and
Company, a major member of the sugar industry, and the founder of a
shipping line that later became part of Unicorn Shipping. He became a
prominent industrialist and politician.

[5] Sir Charles was a great admirer and friend of General JC Smuts. He
was a member of the latter’s political party and served as a nominated
senator for the then province of Natal for ten years. Sir Charles shared
General Smuts’ vision of a united white South African nation.

[6] Sir Charles was known as an exceptionally generous man who took a
keen interest in education, which interest was stimulated by his mother,
Emma Smith. She was his inspiration.

[7] In 1920, during his lifetime, Sir Charles instituted a scholarship in his
mother’s name, for the funding of overseas studies of intending painters,
sculptors, architects or art teachers. In the will a similar scholarship was
instituted at the Durban Technical College. In terms of a further provision of
the will the Fund was bestowed upon the then Natal University College, a
predecessor of the first respondent. The terms of the will in relation to the
Fund are the focus of the present appeal.

[8] The relevant clauses of the bequest contained in clause 26(f) of the will
read as follows:

'(f)
As to three tenths thereof [of the residue of his estate] to the Council of the
NATAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE (hereinafter with their Successors in Office called the
Council) to be taken and held by the Council in trust to the intent that the same shall be
dedicated in perpetuity for the promotion and encouragement of education in manner
hereinafter appearing, namely:-

1.
The proceeds of this bequest shall form a fund to be called THE EMMA SMITH
EDUCATIONAL FUND in memory of my Mother.

2.
The Council shall stand possessed of the said Fund and the investments from time to
time representing the same upon trust to apply the income thereof in and towards the higher
education of European girls born of British South African or Dutch South African parents, who
have been resident in Durban for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the
grant, payment or allowance hereby authorised.

3.
The income shall be applied at the discretion of the Council :-

(a)
In the maintenance of Exhibitions for the benefit of poor girls who but for such
assistance would be unable to pursue their studies of such value and for such period as the
Council may determine in each case, tenable to any institution of higher education or of
technical professional or industrial instruction approved by the Council;

(b)
In payment at the discretion of the Council of an Allowance for the maintenance of
such Exhibitioners for such period as the Council may determine in each case to their parents
so long as the Exhibitioners reside with them or to some other person with whom the
Exhibitioners may reside with the approval of the Council;
. . .

(f)
In the event of the Council of the Natal University College being unable or unwilling to
undertake the office conferred upon them hereunder I nominate, constitute and appoint the
Town Council of the City of Durban, to be the Trustees of the said Fund with the same powers
and authority as are hereby conferred upon the Council of the Natal University College.' (My
emphasis.)

[9] The Council of the Natal University College accepted the bequest and
it and its successors in title administered the Fund.

[10] The Natal University College later became a constituent college of the
University of South Africa and thereafter became autonomous as the

University of Natal. The latter was amalgamated with the University of
Durban-Westville in 2001 by a decision of the Minister of Education in terms
of s 23 of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 to form the University.

[11] When Sir Charles passed away in 1941, the fund was established with
an initial capital base of 42 000 pounds sterling, representing three-tenths of
the residue of his estate. Today it is one of the largest administered by the
University. At the time the proceedings were launched in the court below, its
assets had increased in value to about R27 m, of which about R4 m was
available for distribution to potential bursars.

[12] Because of the racially exclusive nature of the bequest, the Fund,
instead of being depleted, has grown exponentially. Over the years the
amount that has been paid out to successful applicants for funding has
consistently been lower than what the Fund could afford. This was due not
only to the racially exclusive nature of the bequest but also because of the
difficulties attendant upon determining who qualified as ‘European girls born
of British South African or Dutch South African parents’. This is due to
dramatically changed circumstances from the time that the will was made.
The parties are ad idem that 'European' is an obsolete reference to white
South Africans.

[13] The University’s Principal and Vice-Chancellor, Professor Malegapuru
William Makgoba, was the principal deponent in support of its case. He
recorded that the University has experienced considerable embarrassment in
performing its function as trustee of the Fund because of the racially exclusive
basis upon which bursaries have to be awarded. The University argued that
such discrimination is self-evidently unfair. It is common cause that the first
respondent is a public institution largely funded by government. The
University is committed to non-racialism, yet the majority of its students do not
qualify for an Emma Smith bursary.

[14] Over and above the embarrassment caused by administering a fund
that is racially exclusive the University is concerned that it might be

challenged in the Equality Court under the provisions of the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 because it
administers a fund exclusively reserved for Whites.

[15] Similarly, the reference to 'Durban' has given rise to possible
challenges in the interpretation of the bequest. The city by that name that
existed in 1938 has expanded to a large metropolitan municipality now known
as the Ethekwini Municipality. It has incorporated formerly outlying boroughs
and townships, with the result that uncertainty might exist in respect of the
neighbourhood in which a potential beneficiary has to reside in order to qualify
for a bursary.

[16] During 1999 the University launched an application in the Durban High
Court to vary the provisions of the will creating the Fund in terms of s 13 of the
Act, the provisions of which will be dealt with in due course. That application,
intended to obtain the same result that is now sought to be brought about,
was withdrawn when evidence showed that the availability of the bursaries
had not been widely advertised and that the bursaries that were awarded had
been restricted to studies at the University.

[17] The position has since improved, both in respect of the number of
bursaries awarded and the range of institutions at which such bursaries may
be taken up, but still the available funds are not fully applied to achieve the
Fund's objects.

[18] The litigation culminating in the present appeal was launched in
December 2005. As indicated above, the University was the first applicant in
the court below and the individual members of its Council, led by Professor
Malegapuru William Makgoba, were the second to twenty-ninth applicants.

[19] Adv Douglas Jamieson Shaw QC and adv Andrea Astrid Gabriel were
appointed as curators for potential beneficiaries of the Fund to report to the
court how the latter might be affected by the proposed changes. At the

direction of the court below, the Master was served with a copy of the papers.
He abided the decision of the court.

[20] The curators filed two reports. They submitted that the application
should be dismissed for the following reasons:
a.
The Act does not apply to the Trust. The latter was transferred from the
Natal University College to the present first respondent by way of statutory
enactments, which resulted in the Trust effectively having been '. . . written
into the statute. . . '. No amendment of its terms through the mechanism of s
13 of the Act is therefore possible;
b.
Freedom of testation is not only a fundamental principle of the law of
succession, but also an essential part of the right not to be deprived of
property. Freedom of testation is therefore enshrined in s 25 of the
Constitution. This fundamental right is as important as any other fundamental
right in the absence of a hierarchy of fundamental rights. Nothing contained in
the provisions of the Trust justifies an interference with this right against the
factual background of this matter;
c.
Interfering with the right to leave property to a person or class of the
testator’s choice might diminish the willingness of future testators to establish
charitable trusts for educational purposes;
d.
A decision to amend the provisions of the Trust may open the
floodgates to have similar testamentary charitable trusts amended, with
resultant prejudice to existing and potential beneficiaries;
e.
If the present Trust were to be amended, private testamentary
dispositions to a religious community, a club or a school might also fall foul of
the law. This would clearly not be in the public interest;
f.
A charitable trust that conformed to public policy when it came into
effect might well be said to remain inoffensive in spite of the passage of time.
The Trust instrument is therefore not in conflict with the present public interest
or public policy;
g.
In the alternative, and in the event of it being held that the Act does
apply to the Trust, the curators submitted that there is no provision in the will
that brings about consequences that the testator, a man of foresight and
vision, did not foresee in broad and general terms. The provisions were lucid

when the Trust was created. The haze of imprecision surrounding some of
them now was brought about by the passage of time, but they were not
thereby rendered ambiguous or ineffective. Section 13 of the Act could thus
not be invoked in this instance; and
h.
The respondents’ embarrassment in having to administer the Trust
according to the terms of the will does not justify an amendment of the Trust.
The trustee’s function could be transferred to a private administrator.

[21] The curators recommended that, in the event that the Trust was held to
fall under the Act, the following amendments should be made:
(i)
The reference to British South African and Dutch South African
parentage should be deleted;
(ii)
The reference to residence in Durban should be deleted and replaced
with a requirement that exhibitioners should have attended an educational
institution in the Province of Kwazulu-Natal for a period of three years prior to
the application for a bursary;
(iii)
The reference to 'poor' should be deleted and substituted with the
phrase that the intending exhibitioner would not be able to pursue a course of
study without financial assistance;
(iv)
The reference to 'European' (white) girls should be retained;
(v)
The proper approach – if an amendment to the Trust was to be
considered – should be to recognize that women as a class are still
disadvantaged as they were in the testator’s day, to preserve some distinction
between the various sub-categories in this class and to divide the trust income
on the basis that 30 per cent should be allocated to white women, any
balance of the thirty percent plus a further 50 per cent of the income should
be allocated for bursaries for women who are not white and the balance
should be distributed in the trustees’ discretion or be accumulated as capital;
and
(vi)
The University should not act as trustee of the Fund in order to avoid
any conflict or embarrassment. This function should be transferred to a private
trust administrator.

[22] It had been submitted on the University’s behalf that the racial
discrimination inherent in the application of the will’s provisions is contrary to
public policy and in conflict with the public interest. That submission found
favour with the court below which ordered the deletion from clause 26(f)(2) of
the will of the words 'European', 'British', or 'Dutch South African'; and
substituted for 'Durban' the words 'the Ethekwini Municipality'.

[23] Prior to the hearing of the appeal, the curators requested that an
amicus curiae should be appointed to investigate issues that fell outside their
mandate. They suggested that the Trust might be potentially void because of
the vagueness of its provisions, that its purpose might have fallen away or
that subsequent circumstances might have led to its demise. Mr Pammenter
SC was appointed as amicus. The court is indebted to him for his contribution.

Conclusions
[24] Section 13 of the Act reads as follows:
'13
Power of court to vary trust provisions
If a trust instrument contains any provision which brings about consequences which in the
opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee and which-
(a)
hampers the achievement of the objects of the founder; or
(b)
prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or
(c)
is in conflict with the public interest,
the court may, on application of the trustee or any person who in the opinion of the court has
a sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or vary any such provision or make in respect
thereof any order which such court deems just, including an order whereby particular trust
property is substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust.'

[25] Section 13 of the Act authorises a court to vary or delete the provisions
of a trust instrument in the contemplated circumstances. The submission on
behalf of the curators that the Act does not apply to the Fund because it is
now written into statute and somehow is not a trust instrument that can be
varied or otherwise dealt with in terms of the Act, is fallacious. This is best
demonstrated by a consideration of the history of how the Fund came to be
administered by the University.

[26] The Natal University College was established by the Natal University
College Act 18 of 1909, s 3 of which entrusted its council with the
administration of all grants of money to the College ‘. . . according to the
objects and conditions of such grants.’

[27] The University of South Africa Act 12 of 1916 identified the College as
a constituent college of the University of South Africa. Section 3(2) of this Act
determined that the provisions of any law by which the constituent colleges
had been established and governed until then would remain in force together
with every rule or regulation made in terms thereof.

[28] The University of Natal (Private) Act 4 of 1948 created the University of
Natal. All the assets and liabilities, rights, powers and privileges of the Council
of the Natal University College were transferred to the new university. Section
14 of this Act deals, inter alia, with trusts and similar bequests, which are to
be applied ‘. . . and exercised by the University in accordance with the
conditions of such trust, donation or bequest.'

[29] The University of Natal (Private) Act of 1948 was replaced by the
University of Natal (Private) Act 7 of 1960. It contains only one relevant
provision, s 6, which reads: 'The Council shall administer all the property of
the University and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall have the
general control of the University and of all its affairs, purposes and functions'.

[30] The Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 transformed existing universities
into public higher education institutions and created the legal framework for
the merger of two or more such institutions.
Section 22 (5) of this Act,
dealing with an institution such as the first respondent, provides that all funds
vested in the educational institution by virtue of a trust, donation or bequest
must be applied in accordance with the terms upon which such trust, donation
or bequest was created.

[31] The University of Natal (Private) Act of 1960 was repealed by the
Higher Education Amendment Act 23 of 2001, which confirmed the continued

existence of the University of Natal and of its institutional statute in section
28(1) thereof. This institution was merged with the University of Durban-
Westville as contemplated in the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997.

[32] These statutory provisions did not alter the terms and conditions of the
original Trust, nor did they alter its essential nature. The University is the
ultimate successor in title to the Natal University College. Although
administered by the successive institutions set out above, the Trust has
continued to exist. It must now be  - and is in fact - administered by the
University’s Council. The Act therefore applies to the Trust.

[33] As stated above, a court is authorised in terms of s 13 to delete or vary
a provision in the trust instrument which hampers the achievement of the
objects of the founder, or which prejudices the interests of the beneficiaries or
is in conflict with the public interest.

[34] The court below granted the relief sought by the University on the basis
that the offending provisions were against the public interest. It relied, inter
alia, on the decision in Minister of Education & another v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO
& another 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). In considering public policy the court below
took into account that equality was a foundational constitutional value.
Furthermore, the court below thought it significant that the University, a public
body maintained by public funds, was entrusted with the administration of the
bequest.

[35] Equality is enshrined in s 9 of the Constitution in the Bill of Rights:

'9
Equality
(1)
Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
(2)
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination may be taken.

(3)
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language and birth.
(4)
No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted
to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5)
Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.'

[36] The legislation contemplated in subsection 4 is the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. It is only
necessary to refer its preamble, section 7 and its Schedule :

'Preamble
The consolidation of democracy in our country requires the eradication of social and
economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in nature, which were
generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, and which brought
pain and suffering to the great majority of our people; . . . .'

'7
Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of race
Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the
ground of race, including-
. . . .
(b)
the engagement in any activity which is intended to promote, or has the effect
of promoting, exclusivity, based on race;
. . . . .
(d)
the provision or continued provision of inferior services to any racial group,
compared to those of another racial group;
(e)
the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or
contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take
steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons.'

'Schedule
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF UNFAIR PRACTICES IN CERTAIN SECTORS
(Section 29)

. . . . .

. . . .
Education
(a)
Unfairly excluding learners from educational institutions, including learners
with special needs.

(b)
Unfairly withholding scholarships, bursaries, or any other form of assistance
from learners of particular groups identified by the prohibited grounds.

(c)
The failure to reasonably and practicably accommodate diversity in education.
. . . .'

[37] The Bill of Rights applies to all law, including the law relating to
charitable trusts: '. . .the objects of a trust will have to conform with the
disavowal of unfair discrimination under the 1996 Constitution and the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, which
envisage equality even in person-to-person relations'. (Cameron et al
Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5th ed (2002) pp 171-172).1

[38] In the public sphere there can be no question that racially
discriminatory testamentary dispositions will not pass constitutional muster.
Public policy ‘is now rooted in our Constitution and the fundamental values it
enshrines, thus establishing an objective normative value system. In
considering questions of public policy for purposes of the present application,
therefore, the Court must find guidance in "the founding constitutional values
of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism".' (Syfret’s case, supra,
quoting Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 SCA para 7).2 The Syfret’s

1 See further Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa, 2nd ed (2001) p133; Du Toit
'The constitutionally bound dead hand? The impact of constitutional rights and principles on
freedom of testation in South African law', (2001) Stellenbosch LR 222, in particular, p 236: 'It
is submitted that the following rights included in the South African Bill of Rights will in all
likelihood constitute the principal counterweight to freedom of testation: (a) The right to
equality in section 9 . . . . The validity traditionally attributed to charitable testamentary
bequests which limit benefits on the basis of race, nationality and religion will have to be . . .
re-examined'.
2 See further Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security & another (Centre for Applied
Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 54. 'In South Africa the highest test of

case concerned a public charitable educational fund administered by the
University of Cape Town which excluded black persons, women and
members of the Jewish faith as beneficiaries. In a comprehensive judgment
with copious reference to authority Griesel J came to the conclusion that the
discrimination against the excluded persons was in conflict with public policy
because it transgressed the equality provision of the Bill of Rights. Applying
the common law, he ruled that the offending provisions had to be deleted.

[39] The University is a higher education institution as defined in the Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997, bound by s 37(3) of that Act to '. . .  provide
appropriate measures for the redress of past inequalities and  . . . not (to)
discriminate unfairly in any way’ in its admission policy, and by section 4 of
the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 to direct such policy to respect
every person’s right '. . .  to basic education and equal access to educational
institution.' The University is obliged to apply public policy.

[40] Section 13 (a) and (c) of the Act apply to the present issue, as the
racially restrictive nature of the Fund prevents the realisation of the testator’s
intentions while it is, in addition, in conflict with the public interest (the term is
a synonym of 'public policy': Syfret’s case, supra, para 24). The court below
correctly decided to remove the racially restrictive conditions of the will.

[41] The curators argued that the judicial amendment of a public charitable
trust’s provisions would have a chilling effect upon future private educational
bequests. I cannot agree. We are not called upon to decide the case of a
testator who is a member of a congregation wishing to create a trust for

public policy is our Constitution', per Crouse AJ in Burchell v Anglin 2010 (3) SA 48 (ECG)
para 127. Before the advent of the Constitution Berman J said, in Ex parte President of the
Conference of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa NO: In re William Marsh Will Trust
1993 (2) SA 697 (C) in respect of children’s homes restricted for white children that could not
fill all their beds because of the restriction: ‘'It cannot seriously be contended that by
continuing to restrict the intake of destitute children to the homes to those whose skins are
white will better serve the interests of the public than to open their half-empty premises to
children who are destitute but are excluded therefrom solely by reason of the fact that their
skin is coloured brown or black or indeed any other colour but white. The contrary is
unarguably the case – the interest of the public in this country, the inhabitants of which are
mainly non-white in colour, cries out for the need to house and to care for destitute children,
whatever their ethnological characteristics may be'.

members of his or her faith or a club member intending to benefit the children
of fellow members. Testators who intend to benefit the underprivileged in the
educational field will not be dissuaded, I think, from doing so by the
implications of this judgment.

[42] The curators contended that the amendment of the will would interfere
with freedom of testation which, they argued, is not only a fundamental
principle of the law of succession but also part of the fundamental right not to
be deprived of property in an unjustifiable fashion.3  The constitutional
imperative to remove racially restrictive clauses that conflict with public policy
from the conditions of an educational trust intended to benefit prospective
students in need, administered by a publicly funded educational institution
such as the University, must surely take precedence over freedom of
testation, particularly given the fundamental values of our Constitution and the
constitutional imperative to move away from our racially divided past. Given
the rationale set out above it does not amount to unlawful deprivation of
property.

[43] The curators suggested that the University’s qualms concerning the
Fund’s administration could be met by transferring the responsibility to a
private institution. This submission overlooks the fact, as emphasised by
Nicholson J in the court below, that the testator deliberately decided to entrust
the University with the function of administering the Fund. It bears repetition
that the University is a publicly funded institution that is obliged to serve all
sections of society and cannot be seen to associate itself with racially
discriminatory practices. In the English decision of In re Lysaght, Hill v the
Royal College of Surgeons [1966] Ch 191 the court was faced with a bequest
for scholarships to the College, made with the proviso that the recipients

3s 25.(1)  and (2) of the Constitution read:
‘No one may be deprived of property except
in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2)
Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application -
(a)
for a public purpose or in the pubic interest; and
(b)
subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment
of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.
. . .

should be neither Jews nor Catholics. The College refused to administer the
gift. Although the bequest as such might not have been regarded as being
against public policy (Blathwayt v Lord Cawley [1975] 3 All ER 625 (HL)) the
court struck down the offending provision to enable the College to administer
the bursaries by the application of the cy près doctrine. There is good reason
to follow this example

[44] The suggestion that the Fund might be void for vagueness will lose any
validity if the offending provisions are deleted and it is clear that the Fund’s
proceeds may be applied to assist all South African women in need of
financial support of a tertiary education. The same holds good for the
argument that its object may have fallen away as ‘British’ and ‘Dutch’ South
Africans have become united, or that new circumstances have caused the
objects of the Fund to become unattainable.

[45] The curators’ suggestion that, should the Trust be amended in respect
of the group from which applicants for bursaries should be drawn, a racial
quota should be introduced for future applicants was not supported by any
evidence, statistics or precedent. It would, in the absence of compelling
considerations to the contrary, constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the
exercise of the Trustees’ discretion and it would furthermore smack of a
residual retention of race-based selection of potential bursars and is
unacceptable for these reasons.

[46] The appeal against the order deleting the words 'European', 'British'
and or 'Dutch South African' in clause 26(f)(2) of the will of Sir Charles Smith
must be dismissed.

[47] The parties were ad idem in the court a quo that the reference to
'Durban' in clause 26(f)(2) had to be amended as it referred to the city as it
existed at the time of the execution of the will. They made conflicting
proposals to replace the existing reference to the city in which the testator
lived.

[48] The court a quo substituted the name of the present municipality for the
original appellation. With due respect, it appears to have been overlooked
while debating the amendment of the existing geographical description that no
evidence was placed before the court that the first respondent experienced
any difficulty in attracting bursars because of the fact that the will refers to
'Durban', or would experience such after the removal of the racial limitations.
The testator witnessed a continued expansion of his home city during his
lifetime. He must have been fully aware of the certainty that it would continue
to expand after his Trust was established. The provisions of s 13 of the Act
can therefore not be invoked in the absence of any jurisdictional facts that
would render any one of them operative. The appeal against this part of the
order must succeed.

[49] The parties were ad idem that no costs order should issue.

[50] The following order is made:
1.
The order of the court a quo substituting ‘the Ethekwini Municipality’ for
‘Durban’ in section 26(f)(2) of the will of Sir Charles George Smith, is set
aside,
2.
Save as set out in 1 the appeal is dismissed.

__________________
E BERTELSMANN
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For appellant:
D J Shaw QC

A A Gabriel

(Curator Ad Litem)

Instructed by:

Goodrickes Attorneys, Durban

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

For respondent:
A M Stewart SC

S Mahabeer

C J Pammenter SC (Amicus Curiae)

Instructed by:

Shepstone & Wylie, Durban

Matsepes Incorporated, Bloemfontein
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

FROM:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE:
1 OCTOBER 2010

STATUS:   Immediate

Curators ad litem to certain potential beneficiaries of the Emma Smith
Educational Fund v The University of Kwazulu-Natal & 28 other applicants

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media
and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal against a judgment
and order by the high court that set aside a racially restrictive clause limiting
the beneficiaries of the Emma Smith Educational Fund to white women; and
overturned an amendment granted by the high court to a clause that potential
bursars must have lived in ‘Durban’ for three years to qualify as such, by
substituting ‘the Ethikwini Municipality’ for ‘Durban’. The fund was established
by a bequest to the then Natal University College in the will of Sir Charles
George Smith, a prominent industrialist and politician, who passed away in
1941. Three-tenths of the residue of his estate – amounting to 42 000 pounds
sterling - was bequeathed to the College, which accepted the bequest and
established the Fund. The Fund is now administered by the University of
Kwazulu-Natal, the eventual successor in title of the Natal University College.
The University applied successfully to the high court to have the racially
restrictive clause removed and the residential qualification amended. The
curators ad litem for potential beneficiaries of the Fund appealed. The
Supreme Court of Appeal held that there is a constitutional imperative to
remove racially restrictive clauses that conflict with public policy from the
conditions of an educational trust intended to benefit prospective students in

need, administered by a publicly funded educational institution such as the
University, particularly given the fundamental values of our Constitution, of
which the right to equality in particular was offended by this condition. The
appeal against this part of the order was dismissed.
Sir Charles’ will determined that beneficiaries of the Fund should have lived in
‘Durban’ for at least three years. The high court deleted this description and
substituted ‘the Ethekwini Municipality’ in its stead. This part of the order was
set aside on appeal as there was no evidence supporting the finding that the
fact that a potential bursar had to live in ‘Durban’ would hamper the
achievement of the Fund’s objectives.