THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no:   532/08

In the matter between:

CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY

Appellant
and
ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA  First Respondent
ADRIANUS JACOBUS WEYERS

Second Respondent

Neutral citation: City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v
Engineering Council of South Africa and another
(532/08) [2009] ZASCA 151 (27 November 2009)
Coram:
MPATI P, NAVSA, NUGENT and MLAMBO JJA AND
WALLIS AJA
Heard:
16 November 2009
Delivered: 27 November 2009
Summary: Whistleblower – employee writing a letter to Engineering
Council
and
Department
of
Labour
concerning
appointments to posts – whether contents of the letter
constituted a protected disclosure under the Protected
Disclosures Act 26 of 2000.

ORDER

On appeal from: High Court at Pretoria (Prinsloo J sitting as court of
first instance).

The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include those
consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

JUDGMENT

WALLIS AJA (MPATI P, NAVSA, NUGENT AND
MLAMBO JJA concurring)

[1] Mr Weyers, the second respondent, is an electrical engineer holding a
Masters degree in engineering and registered as a professional engineer
with the first respondent in terms of section 18(1)(a)(i) of the Engineering
Profession Act, 46 of 2000 (the “EPA”). He has been employed by the
appellant since 1996 and since 2003 has held the position of Managing
Engineer: Power System Control (PSC). As such he is responsible for
Tshwane’s PSC centre the primary function of which is to ensure that
correct systems of configuration and safety measures are applied in
Tshwane’s high, medium and low voltage networks so as to ensure
continuity, quality and safety of electrical supply to all consumers within
the metropolitan area.

[2] On 31 August 2005 Mr Weyers addressed a letter to Dr Lukhwareni,
the Strategic Executive Officer (SEO) of the Electricity Department, in
which he expressed concerns about the employment of new system
operators in the PSC centre. He copied the letter to Mr Benny Mahlangu,
the General Manager: Electricity Development and Energy Business and
to the Municipal Manager. Whilst it is clear that the contents of the letter
were not well received, at least by Mr Mahlangu, it is not suggested that
there was anything untoward in his addressing the letter to them.
However he also sent the letter to the Department of Labour and to the
Engineering Council, which is constituted in terms of the EPA and
discharges a range of statutory responsibilities, most importantly for
present purposes dealing with improper conduct by professional
engineers.

[3] On 9 November 2005 Mr Weyers was suspended and disciplinary
proceedings were commenced against him. Initially he faced a number of
charges, but at the hearing all charges were abandoned other than one
‘that you copied a letter you had written to the SEO Electricity
Department to … the Department of Labour and the Engineering Council
of South Africa … without authorisation and/or prior approval and/or
knowledge of the Head of the Electricity Department’ When he was
convicted on that charge, he approached the Pretoria High Court, with the
support of the Engineering Council, for an order interdicting the appellant
from imposing any disciplinary sanction upon him. That order was
granted on the basis that sending the letter to these parties was a protected
disclosure under various statutes and as such that it was impermissible for
the municipality to impose a disciplinary sanction on Mr Weyers for
doing so. This appeal lies against that order with the leave of the court
below.

[4] In order to appreciate the circumstances leading up to the sending of
the letter and the basis for the claim that its being copied to parties
outside the municipality is a protected disclosure it is necessary to give
some background based on the facts that are not in dispute between the
parties. One of the major functions of the PSC centre is to ensure safe
electrical operations on the network. Key employees in this regard are the
system operators who are all qualified electricians, who have completed
an 11kV switching course,1 and who have the necessary technical
knowledge and skill to undertake this work, which is more complex and
potentially more dangerous than the work of an electrician working solely
on low voltage systems. All qualified electricians are qualified to work on
low voltage networks (400 volts and below) but work on medium and
high voltage networks (11kV and 132kV respectively) requires specialist
skill and knowledge because of the high levels of danger involved.

[5] The system operators work with the network when it is live at all
voltage levels, whilst electricians in the municipality’s Maintenance and
Construction depots work on the low voltage and medium voltage
sections of the network and then only when they have permission from
the PSC centre. Generally (there may be exceptions) they only work on a
network when the system is dead and certified to be such by a PSC
system operator. The PSC section deals with complaints about electrical
shocks; takes steps to prevent power failures in overload conditions and
reconnects a network after a power failure. It is accepted that the higher
the voltage level in a network the higher the fault level (the energy or

1 Electrical switching is a process whereby the voltage of current is altered, the position being that
current is obtained by the local authority from Eskom at 132kV but this has to be transformed to lower
levels for use by consumers. System operators also control when there is power in the network by
switching.

‘spark’ emitted if a fault occurs) and therefore the more potentially
dangerous the associated electrical work on such a network. Every time
an electrical connection in a network is broken by a switch operation it
also creates an electrical spark the size of which is dependent upon the
voltage level in the system. The system operators work with high,
medium and low voltages.

[6] The electrical work performed by the PSC system operators has
considerably greater potential for negative consequences than the work
done by electricians in the Maintenance and Construction depots. The
latter’s actions may result in the power supply to between one and twenty
consumers being affected. Errors by system operators may cause a power
failure in an entire suburb or even throughout the municipality.

[7] All of the above is common cause on the papers. There was some
dispute whether the work performed by system operators is, as Mr
Weyers contends, significantly more dangerous than the work done by
electricians in the Maintenance and Construction depots. However, that
was not persisted in before us and can be disregarded. On the basis of the
matters that are common cause it is an obvious conclusion that the
systems operators perform more dangerous work and consequently must
be more skilled than ordinary electricians, even if the additional
competence is something that can be acquired with training and
experience.

[8] Turning then to the circumstances leading up to Mr Weyers writing
the letter in question these emerge from the following facts that are either
common cause or are no longer in dispute because the appellant no longer
seeks to rely on the series of bald and unsupported denials in relation

thereto contained in the answering affidavit. The starting point is that in
2005 there was a significant shortfall in the municipality’s complement of
system operators with only 13 of the 48 posts specified in the approved
structure for the PSC section being filled. In the result those who were so
employed were required to perform excessive and dangerous levels of
overtime, well in excess of 60 hours a month and sometimes running to as
much as 100 hours a month. The municipality accepts that staff was
overworked and blamed exhaustion for accidents. In February 2005 Mr
Weyers was given permission to recruit a foreman and eight additional
system operators in order to address this problem.

[9] In late February Mr Weyers and three of his subordinates prepared a
test when considering applications for a system operator foreman. This
test was approved by Mr Booysen, who was Mr Weyers’ immediate
superior, and had been sent to Ms Zaayman, the Deputy Manager:
Recruitment and Selection in the human resources department. She
returned it with the comment that it asked the right type of question but
was possibly a little long. She accordingly said that Mr Weyers should
ensure that candidates had sufficient time to answer the test. The test was
used to shortlist candidates for the post of foreman in April 2005 and,
after interviews had been conducted, led to a Mr von Gordon being
appointed. It is plain from the internal e-mails that passed between Mr
Weyers, Mr Booysen and Mr Ratsiane, the Manager: Recruitment and
Selection in the human resources section of the electricity department,
that the last-mentioned was aware that the test had been used to select
those who were short-listed and raised no objection to its use as a tool for
that purposes.

[10] Applications for the system operators’ posts were considered at the
same time as the foreman’s position. The posts were advertised internally
and attracted 13 applicants. Mr Weyers decided that the foreman’s test
should also be used for the operators because in his view the technical
and safety requirements for the positions were the same and the test was
directed to these. He discussed this with Mr Booysen, who agreed with
him, although one of his subordinates thought the standard might be too
high. This was a view he was prepared to accept and his later conduct
bears that out. When the initial batch of applicants fared poorly, he
suggested that all eight of those who achieved better than 31% should be
interviewed, although he qualified that by saying that they ‘may very well
constitute a huge risk to Tshwane Electricity and to themselves’ in view
of their lack of knowledge. In due course only the four candidates who
achieved better than 40% were short-listed by Mr Booysen. This
happened on 8 April, but thereafter the forms changed and it was
necessary for Mr Weyers to re-submit them, which he did on 24 April,
recommending that two candidates be short-listed for the foreman’s
position and four for the system operator posts.

[11] The immediate response from Mr Ratsiane was that the shortlists
were unacceptable and he asked for a meeting. The problem was that all
the persons on the list were white and all the existing foremen and system
operators were white. In the result the appointment of those on the lists
would not satisfy transformation objectives within the municipality or
assist in achieving its goals under the Employment Equity Act.2 Mr
Weyers was clearly aware of this as he dealt with this issue in an e-mail
accompanying the list, saying that the employment equity candidates had

2 Act 55 of 1998.

lacked sufficient technical knowledge of the network to be appointed
even when 10% had been added to their marks.

[12] The suggested meeting took place on 10 May in Dr Lukhwareni’s
office and was attended by Mr Booysen and Mr Ratsiane amongst others.
On 19 May Mr Booysen circulated a summary of the agreement reached
at the meeting and a memorandum on further appointments of system
operators.3 The agreement was that 60% of the vacancies would be filled
by ‘competent personnel based on training and test results’ and the
balance from ‘qualified trainable personnel’. Accordingly four system
operator posts were to be filled ‘from the competent group based on test
results’; four system operator posts were to be re-advertised and a
foreman was to be appointed. The agreement appears to have struck a
reasonable balance between the urgent needs of the PSC centre and the
pursuit of transformation and employment equity. It had the endorsement
of the SEO and Mr Ratsiane from human resources as well as Mr Weyers
and his immediate superior. It led to Mr von Gordon being appointed. It
also meant that the four white males, identified as the best candidates by
the tests, would be appointed. Meanwhile an advertisement was placed in
the Pretoria News on 18 May in respect of the posts to be re-advertised.

[13] Although it was submitted that the test became a bone of contention
and its appropriateness had been challenged, this did not emerge at that
time. Not only was the foreman position filled on the basis of the test,4
but Mr Booysen’s minute reflects that the test was to be used in the

3 Whilst the answering affidavit denied that an agreement was reached and denied that the addressees
of the two documents received them, the appellant does not persist in this stance in its heads of
argument or in oral submissions.
4 It was in respect of this position that the test had the most impact on employment equity candidates,
because seven of the fourteen applicants for this position were equity candidates whilst only one of the
applicants for a systems operator post came from this group

future. In addition had the test been controversial in itself, as opposed to
in the results it produced, one would have expected there to be a clear
instruction to Mr Weyers and Mr Booysen that it was not to be used in
short-listing the candidates for the positions that were to be re-advertised.
There is no such instruction. Instead, once the applications were received,
the applicants were required to sit the test. It is inconceivable that this
would have occurred if the test had been rejected as inappropriate in May
2005. The issue surrounding the test only arose later when Mr Mahlangu
came on the scene.

[14] Fifteen employment equity candidates applied for the system
operator positions but when they sat the test they performed dismally.5
With one exception, who with the benefit of an adjustment for
employment equity that added 10% to the mark scored 42.22%, they all
scored less than 40% and only two managed, with the same adjustment,
to score more than 30%. Mr Weyers forwarded the results to Mr Booysen
on 29 July and asked for a meeting to discuss a shortlist.

[15] While this was going on an important change occurred in the
Electricity Department. Mr Benny Mahlangu was appointed to the
position of General Manager: Electricity Development and Energy
Business. On 28 July Dr Lukhwareni informed his staff that he had
delegated to Mr Mahlangu all transformation responsibilities with regard
to human resources. From then on all applications for posts were to be
forwarded to Mr Mahlangu who would appoint a committee for short-
listing and a committee, chaired by himself, to conduct interviews. The
decision of that committee in regard to appointments would be binding.

5 This is the description in the appellant’s heads of argument.

Accordingly Mr Mahlangu would now play the central role in all new
appointments.

[16] The impact of this change was immediate insofar as the appointment
of system operators in the PSC section was concerned. On 1 August 2005
Mr Booysen sent him the list of applicants for the systems operator posts
‘with test results for approved test’ and the document embodying the
agreement reached on 10 May 2005 in regard to these positions.
According to Mr Weyers two of his existing operators had resigned by
this stage and the need for new appointments had become even more
urgent. However, Mr Mahlangu immediately made it clear that he was
dissatisfied with what he saw (although there is no indication that either
Mr Weyers or Mr Booysen had made any recommendations in regard to
short-listing from these applicants) and a meeting was convened on 3
August 2005 attended by Messrs Mahlangu, Booysen, Weyers and some
others.

[17] The meeting started with Mr Mahlangu stating that shortlists had to
be approved by him, something that was not in dispute. Mr Weyers
suggested that he shortlist the top six employment equity candidates.
However as Mr Booysen suggested that managers internally had sought
to discourage their best workers from applying, Mr Mahlangu directed
that the posts should again be advertised internally. It is now accepted
that Mr Mahlangu undertook personally to visit the depots and make sure
that the best employment equity electricians applied. This was baldly
denied in the answering affidavit, but as that denial is inconsistent with
contemporary documents it carries no weight. On 4 August Mr Weyers
sent an e-mail to Mr David Mahlangu (apparently in error) referring to
the meeting the previous day; recording the decision to re-advertise

internally and that Mr Benny Mahlangu would speak to the depots with a
view to getting employment equity candidates to apply. It is
inconceivable that he could have sent that e-mail had no such decision
been made and even more inconceivable that, if they were untrue, he
could, in response to the e-mails referred to in the next paragraph, have
repeated these statements. This he did on 5 August 2005 in an e-mail to
Mr David Garegae, the manager: electricity support services responsible
for human resources within the electricity department, who was himself a
party to the agreement of 10 May 2005.

[18] What appears to have happened is that Mr Mahlangu changed his
mind after the meeting. This emerges from two e-mails that he sent out on
the afternoon of 4 August. The first addressed to Mr Booysen reads as
follows:
‘I am disappointed to see that a list containing only Whites was submitted to HR
against what was agreed upon.6 This act can be construed as fighting against
transformation. To fast track transformation all tests are to be submitted to me and HR
for review and it is HR that shall administer all the tests if there is a need for one.
The lack of skills and expertise is not the fault of the Black employees but of their
managers who did not ensure that everyone irrespective of colour acquired experience
and expertise. Given our numbers with regards to equity, candidates who do not
comply with equity requirements will not be short-listed at all. This is the policy that
has to be adopted and has the full support of council.’
The second, sent less than an hour later to Mr Weyers, reads as follows:
‘It has been decided that only candidates that comply with the requirements of equity
shall be considered. Your previous agreement with David Garegae and Ndhivo [Dr
Lukhwareni] does not hold anymore. Tests shall be approved by me and HR and HR
shall conduct the testing without your involvement.
The list that you had, shall be used for short listing for equity candidates.’

6 It is unclear to what list he was referring, as no shortlist had been prepared in regard to the
employment equity candidates. If he was referring to the four recommended in May it had already been
agreed that they should be employed.

[19] The effect of these e-mails was considerable. No white males were
to be considered for appointment notwithstanding the agreement on 10
May with Dr Lukhwareni, who was the head of the electricity department
and Mr Mahlangu’s superior. Accordingly the four candidates who had
been identified as suitable to commence work immediately would not be
appointed. Mr Weyers would be removed from any process of assessing
the competence of the candidates and the previous agreement in regard to
the filling of these posts was set aside. Finally the blame for the absence
of suitable black candidates was simply laid at the door of their managers
without more. That left Mr Weyers in the position that he recorded in his
e-mail to Mr David Garegae on 5 August namely that:
These positions I would like to fill are critical to the Service Delivery of Tshwane
Electricity, and while they are not filled with competent personnel we are sacrificing
Batho Pele.”

[20] Mr Weyers’ difficulties were compounded by the fact that on 25 July
Dr Lukhwareni had circulated a letter dealing with staff working overtime
beyond the conventional limit of 40 hours a month. This was directed at
ensuring that staff did not exceed this level of overtime. With his current
staff complement this was impossible for Mr Weyers to achieve. One of
the suggestions in the letter was that breakdowns in the network would
have to be left overnight to be dealt with when staff came on duty in the
morning. That would clearly impact upon service delivery. In addition
there had been at least some discussion (of which staff had become
aware) that the municipality would program its computers dealing with
salaries to prevent payment of more than 40 hours of overtime a month.
This had led to talk of industrial action over the issue.

[21] Over and above the problems with overtime the system operator
posts had been advertised twice, no new appointments had been made and
virtually no employment equity candidates had come forward who
possessed what Mr Weyers regarded as the basic level of skills to perform
these jobs. Now all this was largely taken out of his hands and only
employment equity candidates were to be considered for the eight
positions. He was no longer even able to employ the four candidates
identified in the original process whose employment had been agreed to
in May. The view he formed was that candidates would be employed
irrespective of their level of skills or their ability to perform the tasks of a
system operator and that the absence of skills would be disregarded in
making appointments. That he held that view bona fide was accepted in
argument before us, and it was an inference he could legitimately draw
from what had happened.

[22] In those circumstances Mr Weyers sought guidance from his
professional body the Engineering Council. He wanted to know what his
professional responsibilities were if, as he feared, system operators were
appointed in the PSC centre who in his judgment lacked the requisite
skills to perform the work entrusted to such operators. He was advised
that it would be unprofessional and misconduct on his part were he to be
party to the appointment of persons to positions where, in his judgment,
their lack of skills meant that they were not competent to fill those posts
and that might give rise to safety risks. He was also advised that in the
event that his employer forced him to make such appointments he would
be obliged to report that to the Engineering Council. He informed a top
management meeting of this on 10 August. Dr Lukhwareni convened the
meeting and Mr Mahlangu was listed in the notice as one of the
participants. The denial in the answering affidavit that such a meeting

took place was demonstrated to be false and, even though a fourth set of
affidavits was delivered on behalf of the municipality it did not deal with
this meeting. Accordingly Mr Weyers’ version of what transpired stands
unchallenged. He says that Mr Mahlangu’s response to being told that he
would have to make a report to the Engineering Council was to say that
the Engineering Council could not dictate to the municipality who it
should employ. His reply was that the council could not instruct him on
how to conduct himself professionally.

[23] That the problems in the PSC centre remained critical is apparent
from an e-mail addressed by Mr Booysen to Mr Garegae on 11 August in
which he said that:
‘We are not coping with the increasing number of resignations and not filling of
vacancies resulting in people [having] to work overtime in excess of 40 hours and
people working alone without assistants which could be seen as one of the reason for
increasing incidents which could lead to incidents similar to the equipment blow-up at
Morgan road in Mayville where members of the public were hurt.’
Mr Booysen finished by saying: ‘We need internal electricians with
experience on our network.’

[24] A further management meeting took place on 15 August at which Mr
Weyers said that it appeared to be impossible to find internal employment
equity candidates with the necessary competence and experience to fill
the vacant system operator posts and requested that outside candidates
should be head-hunted. He also proposed that in order to overcome the
lack of skills internally 40 electricians in the municipality’s employ be
made available for training by him. In the meantime and in order to
address the urgent existing problem he should be authorised to appoint
people capable of fulfilling the immediate need for skilled system

operators. It is accepted that this is what he said at the meeting and that
Mr Mahlangu was opposed to these proposals.

[25] On 17 August Mr Mahlangu asked Mr Weyers to provide him with
the ‘job specs and job requirements’ for inter alia the system operator
positions. This led him again to seek the advice of the Engineering
Council, which on this occasion was furnished by its Manager: Legal
Services, Mr Faul. The advice he received was to report his concerns to
the mayor of Tshwane and that he was obliged also to report them to both
the Engineering Council and the Department of Labour.

[26] On 24 August Mr Weyers sent to Mr Booysen and Mr Mahlangu a
list of names of those employment equity candidates who had the
minimum academic qualifications necessary for amongst others the
system operator posts and said in the covering e-mail:
‘Please note that academic qualifications are not enough as additional qualities are
also needed. All of the positions to be filled are operational positions ie the people
appointed need to take up the job immediately, failure to perform satisfactorily will
endanger the lives of the candidates, their colleagues and the public.’
There was no response to this. On 25 August a further e-mail was sent to
Mr Ratsiane and copied to Mr Mahlangu querying the decision to
invalidate the tests (or more accurately the results of the tests) he had
given to candidates and saying that he did not regard this as being in the
best interests of the municipality as they had been devised to see if the
candidates had the knowledge necessary to perform satisfactorily in the
positions under consideration. Once again there was no response.

[27] The final act in the drama was a meeting on 29 August to prepare a
short-list for the vacant positions. In the case of the system operators Mr

Mahlangu proposed simply to short-list all the black applicants and none
of the others. The range of unadjusted scores for these candidates on Mr
Weyers’ test ranged between 32,2% and 2,22%. Not surprisingly Mr
Weyers said that he could not agree to and sign this shortlist as he
regarded it as contrary to his professional obligations to do so. He told Mr
Mahlangu that if he continued with this process he would be compelled to
write a letter to the Department of Labour reporting the issue to them.
The response was: ‘You can write a letter. I don’t care.’ As Mr Mahlangu
says he cannot recall the meeting this stands unrebutted. Mr Weyers says
that Mr Mahlangu then said he had heard that Mr Weyers was a racist, a
charge that was strongly rejected. Mr Booysen also expressed concern
about the competence of the candidates but Mr Mahlangu said that they
would be sent for training at Eskom.7 A check made by Mr Weyers the
following day revealed that no arrangements had been made for any such
training and this compounded his scepticism whether the training would
eventuate.

[27] Against that background Mr Weyers wrote his letter of 31 August. It
was addressed to the persons mentioned in paragraph [2] above and reads
as follows:
‘SHORT LISTING OF INCOMPETENT CANDIDATES
Dear Sir,
In my capacity as a Professional Electrical Engineer bound by the Engineering
Profession of South Africa Act, 1990 (Act No. 114 of 1990) and as a Municipal Staff
member bound by the Code of Conduct of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality ... I am compelled to inform the Council about possible irregularities in
the process of the appointment of personnel in the Power System Control Section of
which I am the Managing Engineer.

7 Mr Booysen, who did not depose to an affidavit, clearly shared Mr Weyers’ concerns. That much
emerges from a memorandum he prepared on 12 September and from an e-mail he sent to Dr
Lukhwareni on 5 October.

As the Section of Power System Control is primarily involved in ensuring the supply
of electricity to the Tshwane Community and is required to work with dangerous live
electrical equipment, the Managing Engineer sets high standards in appointing staff
that have the best skills and competencies in the field. It is my professional opinion
that academic qualifications alone, is not sufficient and therefore all applicants are
tested on their knowledge of the theory, work, electrical network and of safety
procedures. These tests are approved by Human Resources before being used.
After obtaining the test results, the best candidates are invited for an interview. It was
however found that the highest marks were mostly obtained by white candidates, and
in order to adhere to the Employment Equity (EE) Act, 10% was added to each EE
candidate’s test result to give them a better chance of being invited to an interview.
This whole process was implemented in order to appoint System Operators and a
shortlist was ready to be signed by HR on 8 April 2005. There was a great deal of
unhappiness from HR as the shortlist only contained white candidates purely for the
reason that they scored the highest marks and that it would be in the best interests of
Council to interview such candidates for possible employment in the section. It was
decided by HR and Top Management of Electricity to re-advertise the positions
externally to draw a greater complement of possible EE candidates. With this done
the candidates were tested again and very few EE candidates proved to be competent
enough. No further actions as suggested by myself, such as ‘Head Hunting’ or the use
of personnel agencies to find specific candidates, was taken by HR to find the right
EE candidates for the positions.
On 29 April8 2005 I was involved in a meeting with HR and Members of Top
Management where it was decided that my competency test marks will be totally
disregarded and only black candidates, some of whom scored worst in the tests, be
short listed this was done for the position of System Operator, System Controller and
Dispatch agent, all positions that are critical for effective and safe service delivery.
The personnel structure of Power System Control currently consists of 54,5% EE
candidates, 1,5% women and 44% white candidates. The Technical Service section
under which Power System Control resides has 48% EE personnel, 4,3% Female
personnel and 47,7% White personnel.

8 Clearly this should be August.

“The report to Council 23 June 2005: ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT: SUPPORT
SERVICES DIVISION UPDATE ON THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY STATUS OF
THE DEPARTMENT AND PLANS TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS, where the
equity target is set at 50% was disregarded by the short-list team, all white candidates
applications were removed and only black candidates applications were accepted, no
one cared about the levels of competency of persons being short-listed.
I raised my concern about the fact that it should not be a question of white or black
but of the most competent person in order for it to be in the best interest of the
Council’s Service Delivery and Electrical Safety. The General Manager responded to
my concern by implicating me of being a racist.
The decision was however taken that all black candidates will be sent to training at
ESKOM and will be certified competent by ESKOM before they are allowed to
perform operational functions in the Power System Control Section. (Arrangements
with ESKOM have yet to be made and money for the training must still be found).
I wish to confirm that I support the policy to train EE candidates to increase levels of
competent service delivery to the public. This is in the best interest of our
municipality. I have on different occasions proposed to different members of HR and
Top Management to give me 30 EE candidates in special training positions created for
this purpose, who will then be trained on the job, but as the Section is an operational
section with immense staff shortages, the personnel needed NOW has to be competent
to perform the work required of them without endangering their own lives, the lives of
their colleagues or those of the public.
I believe that the short-listing of the candidates with the lowest competency levels,
even though they will be sent for training (probably for a period of 2 months) is not in
the best interest of the Council. With the current staff levels of Power System Control
at a mere 58%, having no competent people appointed and with the possibility of
training being done that may take a great deal of time, or even may not even
materialise at all, it is my Professional opinion that the following Acts, collective
agreements and codes could be contravened.
[A list of the provisions then follows.]
I wish therefore to distance myself from this process, and I wish to be exonerated of
the negative impact this process might have on the performance of the Power System
Control Section, the Electricity Department, the Council and the public of Tshwane in
regards to safety as well as service delivery. I would also like to humbly request that

my 2(7) appointment according to the OHS Act hereby be withdrawn and that
someone else be appointed with that capacity.
Please be assured that despite this problematic situation, I remain committed to doing
my job to the best of my ability and with the necessary diligence with the limited
resources I have, whilst acting in the best interests of the City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality.
I eagerly await your response regarding the abovementioned issues and am looking
forward to receiving guidance from your office in respect of the issues raised by me in
this letter.’

[29] On receipt of the letter Dr Lukhwareni responded by e-mail saying:
‘Should you colleagues not discuss matters personally with me before sending letters
to the MM (municipal manager)?’
The reply from Mr Weyers was that he had been instructed by the lawyer
at the Engineering Council to do this. The following day Mr Mahlangu
addressed this e-mail to Dr Lukhwareni:
‘To avoid such incidents where junior officials jump the SEO and run to the MM,
calls for strong disciplinary measures. This is perturbing especially from an individual
who has failed to demonstrate a commitment to transformation. If disciplinary
measures are not taken, this scenario will be a recurring event where the SEO’s
directives are challenged by everyone and you can’t run the department in this
fashion.
Your mandate to transform this section is being challenged and failure to act will
result in every decision that you make being challenged because someone does not
like it.
That is my contribution to this matter and I personally will not change from the stance
I have taken unless you give in to this threat.”

[30] It is a curious feature of this case that the initial complaint was not
that the letter had been copied to the Engineering Council and the
Department of Labour, but that it had been sent to the Municipal Manager
and Mr Weyers was perceived to have gone over Dr Lukhwareni’s head

thereby challenging his authority. What is clear is that the entire
imbroglio arose when Mr Mahlangu intervened to prevent the
implementation of the agreement of 10 May and it seems from this e-mail
that he was also largely the driving force behind the disciplinary
proceedings. Be that as it may, until his suspension on 9 November, Mr
Weyers continued in his post thereafter trying to resolve the impasse and
participated in an interview process that resulted in six employment
equity candidates being selected for system operator positions on the
basis that they would undergo training. His conviction on the one
disciplinary charge ultimately pursued against him precipitated the
present proceedings. The only issue in the appeal is whether the court
below was correct to hold that the distribution of the letter to the
Engineering Council and the Department of Labour was protected under
one or other of the statutes relied upon by Mr Weyers.

[31] It is perhaps as well at the outset to make it clear what this case is
not about. It is not about the disciplinary proceedings and whether the
sending of the letters in fact constituted misconduct or whether Mr
Weyers received a fair hearing. Nor is the case about the application of
the Employment Equity Act in the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
Nor does it require any view to be expressed on the wisdom of the
approach adopted by either of the main protagonists, Mr Weyers and Mr
Mahlangu, to the appointment of system operators and other staff in the
PSC centre. Quite plainly they approached that issue from different
perspectives and senses of priority. Whilst one might hope that these
difficult issues in our society would always be resolved by mature
discussion and mutual understanding, that did not occur in this instance
and it is not for this court to determine the rights and wrongs of the
situation that arose. Our only task is to determine whether the sending of

the letter to the Engineering Council and the Department of Labour was
protected by statute. It is to that question that I now turn.

[32] Mr Weyers relies on three statutory provisions to justify what he did.
They are section 30 of the Engineering Profession Act, 46 of 2000;
section 26(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993
(OHSA) and section 3 of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (‘the
PDA’). All the oral argument revolved around this latter provision and in
view of the conclusion I have reached it is necessary for me to deal only
with that aspect.

[33] According to its long title the purpose of the PDA is to make
provision for procedures in terms of which employees in both the private
and the public sectors may disclose unlawful or irregular conduct by their
employers or by other employees and to provide for the protection of
employees who make such disclosures. The preamble records that
employees bear a responsibility to disclose criminal and any other
irregular conduct in the workplace, and that employers have a
responsibility to take all necessary steps to protect employees who make
disclosures from reprisals as a result of making such disclosures. All of
this is located within the constitutional imperative of good, effective,
accountable and transparent government in organs of state. Section 3(1)
of the PDA states as its objects the protection of an employee who makes
a protected disclosure from any occupational detriment; the provision of
remedies for those who suffer an occupational detriment in consequence
of having made a protected disclosure and the provision of procedures to
enable an employee, in a responsible manner, to disclose information
concerning improprieties by his or her employer. Whilst it was submitted
to us that the purpose was to have the subject of a disclosure investigated,

and no doubt it is hoped that will flow from disclosures, that is not a
stated purpose of the PDA. It recognises that disclosures are frequently
not welcome to an employer and seeks to protect the employee who
makes a protected disclosure from retribution from their employer in
consequence of having made a protected disclosure.9

[34] Before addressing the question whether Mr Weyers’ letter contained
a protected disclosure it is necessary to deal with a contention on behalf
of the appellant that this is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the High
Court, but one exclusively within the jurisdiction of the labour tribunals
established under the LRA.10 The basis for that contention is an
interpretation of section 4 of the PDA in the light of certain recent
decisions by the Constitutional Court and this Court. The starting point is
section 4 itself, the relevant portions of which read as follows:
‘(1) Any employee who has been subjected, is subject or may be subjected, to an
occupational detriment in breach of section 3, may —
(a) approach any court having jurisdiction, including the Labour Court established by
section 151 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No 66 of 1995), for appropriate
relief; or
(b) pursue any other process allowed or prescribed by any law.
(2) For the purposes of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, including the consideration of
any matter emanating from this Act by the Labour Court —
(a) any dismissal in breach of section 3 is deemed to be an automatically unfair
dismissal as contemplated in section 187 of that Act, and the dispute about such a
dismissal must follow the procedure set out in Chapter VIII of that Act; and
(b) any other occupational detriment in breach of section 3 is deemed to be an unfair
labour practice as contemplated in Part B of Schedule 7 to that Act, and the dispute
about such an unfair labour practice must follow the procedure set out in that Part…’

9 See in general Tshishonga v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2007 (4) SA 135
(LC) paras 166 to 169 and 170 to 175.
10 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.

[35] In my opinion the clear answer to this contention is that section 4(1)
specifically states that an employee who may be subjected to an
occupational detriment by his or her employer in consequence of having
made a protected disclosure may approach ‘any court having
jurisdiction’. In principle that is the appropriate High Court bearing in
mind the jurisdiction conferred on High Courts by section 169 of the
Constitution, read with section 19 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959,
and that the reference to ‘any court’ is extremely broad. There is nothing
in section 4 to exclude that jurisdiction. Instead the section says that the
Labour Court will also be included as a court having jurisdiction. Bearing
in mind that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction is carefully circumscribed in
sections 156 and 157 of the LRA that statement alone might have
occasioned some difficulties in understanding the precise extent of the
Labour Court’s jurisdiction under the PDA. Accordingly the legislature
went on in section 4(2) to place any dismissal in the category of
automatically unfair dismissals and any other occupational detriment in
the category of unfair labour practices, thereby locating the jurisdiction of
the Labour Court under the PDA within the framework of its existing
jurisdiction in respect of unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices.
Subsequently it introduced sections 186(2)(d) and 187(1)(h) into the LRA
to harmonise the two statutes. There is nothing in any of this to indicate
that it was intended to deprive the High Court of jurisdiction in these
matters.

[36] That straightforward reading of section 4 was challenged on the
basis that because section 4(2) created what were referred to as LRA
rights and remedies that meant that the Labour Court has exclusive
jurisdiction. The explanation proffered for the reference to ‘any court
having jurisdiction’ was that section 2 of the LRA excludes from its

ambit members of the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence
Agency, the South African Secret Service, the South African National
Academy of Intelligence and Comsec and accordingly it was necessary to
provide for another court to have jurisdiction in respect of these
employees. The submission for the appellant is that the Labour Court is
the court having primary jurisdiction in cases under the PDA with the
jurisdiction of the High Court being incidental thereto and limited to the
excluded employees who amount at most to a few percent of all
employees in South Africa.

[37] The answer is that this inverts the language and structure of the
section. The section starts by saying that all employees may have resort to
any court having jurisdiction. It then says that the Labour Court is
included in that broader category presumably because otherwise it would
have had no jurisdiction at all in respect of cases arising under the PDA.
Perhaps the effect is that for these purposes employees otherwise
excluded from the scope of the LRA may have resort to its provisions and
to the Labour Court or the CCMA, but it cannot mean that they are
obliged to do so. Nor can it mean that employees otherwise subject to the
LRA are deprived of the right to approach the ordinary courts for relief
under the PDA. The language of the section is simply not apt for that
purpose. There was a strong body of authority prior to the Constitution
that held that the jurisdiction of the then Supreme Court was not lightly
excluded.11 That is now reinforced by the Constitution, which provides in
section 169(b) that the High Court may decide any matter not assigned to
another Court by an Act of Parliament. Where the statute in question
gives the right to approach any court having jurisdiction and then adds by
way of inclusion the Labour Court that is not an assignment of the matter

11 Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union v Pienaar NO 1993 (4) SA 621 (A) at 635A-C.

to the Labour Court. Had the intention been as suggested the section
would have started by referring all cases under the PDA to the Labour
Court and then, if necessary, dealing separately with the few employees
who fall outside the purview of the LRA. It does not do so.

[38] Mr Pauw SC, who appeared for the appellant, sought to support his
argument by reference to the recent decision of this Court in Makhanya v
University of Zululand12 and that of the Constitutional Court in Gcaba v
Minister for Safety and Security and others.13 He submitted, with
reference to paragraph 66 of the latter judgment, that this was ‘a
quintessential labour-related issue’ and accordingly that the Labour Court
has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to disputes arising under the PDA,
with the exception of disputes in regard to those employees excluded
from the scope of operation of the LRA. However that quotation is taken
out of context. It must be seen in the light of paragraph 64 of the
judgment where it was said that: ‘Generally, employment and labour
relationship issues do not amount to administrative action within the
meaning of PAJA.’ and also in the light of the full passage where the
phrase occurs, which reads:
'In Chirwa Ngcobo J found [at paras 142 and 150] that the decision to dismiss Ms
Chirwa did not amount to administrative action. He held that whether an employer is
regarded as "public" or "private" cannot determine whether its conduct is
administrative action or an unfair labour practice. Similarly, the failure to promote
and appoint Mr Gcaba appears to be a quintessential labour-related issue, based on the
right to fair labour practices, almost as clearly as an unfair dismissal. Its impact is felt
mainly by Mr Gcaba and has little or no direct consequence for any other citizens.'

12 [2009] ZASCA 69.
13  [2009] ZACC 26; [2009] 12 BLLR 1145 (CC).

The basis of the judgment in Gcaba is that the decision in regard to Mr
Gcaba’s promotion did not amount to administrative action.14 Whilst
pointing to the advantages of specialised courts and the undesirability of
forum shopping15 it laid down no wider principle. The reference to a
‘quintessential labour-related matter’ is made in the context of the
constitutional concept of an unfair labour practice that is given shape and
form by the LRA.

[39] The issues in this case, whilst arising in the context of employment,
relate to questions of public safety and the professional obligations of
persons in the position of Mr Weyers in the context of the accountability
of a municipality for proper service delivery of electricity within its
municipal area. Those issues are by no means solely or at all labour-
related matters. The questions that can arise in relation to a protected
disclosure, such as whether the person concerned had reasonable grounds
for believing that a criminal offence had been committed or that a
miscarriage of justice had occurred or that the environment is likely to be
damaged16 are not labour-related issues and are more appropriately dealt
with in the ordinary courts. The mere fact that it is an employee who is
protected under the PDA from an occupational detriment in relation to
that employee’s working environment does not mean that every issue
arising under the PDA is a ‘quintessential labour-related issue’ as
contended by Mr Pauw. For those reasons I reject the challenge to the
High Court’s jurisdiction.17

14 As has been held in two recent decisions by this Court. Tshavhungwa v NDPP [2009] ZASCA 136
and Mkumatela v The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality [2009] ZASCA 137.
15 Paragraphs 56 and 57.
16 See the definition of ‘disclosure ‘ in section 1 of the PDA.
17 As did Kroon J in Young v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2009 (6) SA 118 (ECP).

[40] I turn then to consider the provisions of the PDA. Under section 3 of
the PDA an employee who makes a protected disclosure may not be
subjected to an occupational detriment by his or her employer on account,
wholly or partly, of having made that disclosure. An occupational
detriment is defined in section 1 as including being subjected to any
disciplinary action. Accordingly the question is whether Mr Weyers’
action in sending his letter to the Department of Labour and the
Engineering Council constituted a protected disclosure. If it did then the
appellant was not entitled to institute disciplinary proceedings against
him and he was entitled to obtain the interdict that was granted by the
Pretoria High Court.

[41] The material portion of the definition of a disclosure reads:
‘...any disclosure of information regarding any conduct of an employer, or an
employee of that employer, made by any employee who has reason to believe that the
information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the following:
(a) ...
(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal
obligation to which that person is subject;
(c) ...
(d) that the health or safety of an individual has been, is being or is likely to be
endangered...’
The first argument advanced before us was that the contents of the letter
did not constitute information because they contained only Mr Weyers’
opinion that people who were not competent were about to be appointed
as system operators and not a fact or similar form of information.18
However a person’s opinion is itself a fact, for as Bowen LJ pointed out:

18 Reliance was placed on CWU and another v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd [2003] 8 BLLR
741 (LC) at para 22. To the extent that it was held that a subjective opinion cannot be information the
judgment is wrong.

‘the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion’.19
In addition an opinion often relates to a fact the existence of which can
only be determined by considering the views of a suitably qualified
expert. Whether a person has the requisite skills to undertake a dangerous
and skilled task is a question of fact, but prior to their appointment, which
was the relevant time in this instance, that fact can only be ascertained by
way of tests and the assessment of people who know what the job
requires of their level of skill. The letter dealt with that issue and as such
contained information concerning the possible lack of competence of
those who were likely to be appointed to the system operator posts. It also
contained information to the reader about the state of mind of Mr Weyers
as the person in charge of the PSC centre and the person responsible, both
under his contract and by virtue of his appointment under the OHSA, for
the safety of the machinery under his control and that of the PSC centre
staff.

[42] A further difficulty with this approach to the nature of information
under the PDA is that its narrow and parsimonious construction of the
word is inconsistent with the broad purposes of the Act, which seeks to
encourage whistleblowers in the interests of accountable and transparent
governance in both the public and the private sector. That engages an
important constitutional value and it is by now well-established in our
jurisprudence that such values must be given full weight in interpreting
legislation. A narrow construction is inconsistent with that approach. On
the construction contended for by Mr Pauw the threat of disciplinary
action can be held as a sword of Damocles over the heads of employees
to prevent them from expressing honestly held opinions to those entitled

19 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 (CA) at 483.

to know of those opinions. A culture of silence rather than one of
openness would prevail. The purpose of the PDA is precisely the
opposite.

[43] For those reasons I am satisfied that the letter contained a disclosure
of information regarding the conduct of those employees of the
appellant20 who had taken responsibility for the selection of people to be
appointed as system operators and a professional view on the suitability
of the persons concerned to be appointed to those jobs. Both the letter
itself and the background sketched earlier in this judgment demonstrate
quite clearly that this information concerned the actual or prospective
health and safety of individuals in the employ of the municipality and
possibly outsiders as well and related to compliance with statutory
obligations in regard to safety. Accordingly the letter constituted a
disclosure in terms of the PDA. In terms of the definition of a protected
disclosure in section 1, whether it was protected depends upon whether it
was made to the Department of Labour and the Engineering Council in
accordance with section 9 of the PDA.

[44] Section 9 reads in its material part as follows:
‘General protected disclosure
(1). Any disclosure made in good faith by an employee –
(a) who reasonably believes that the information disclosed, and any allegation
contained in it, are substantially true; and
(b) who does not make the disclosure for purposes of personal gain, excluding any
reward payable in terms of any law;
is a protected disclosure if –
(i) one or more of the conditions referred to in subsection (2) applies; and

20 Referred to in the letter as ‘HR”, an abbreviation for human resources, and ‘Top Management”
referring to senior management in the electricity undertaking.

(ii)  in all the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to make the disclosure.”
The conditions in subsection (2) that are relevant for the purposes of this
case are contained in paragraphs (c) and (d) which read:
“(c) that the employee making the disclosure has previously made a disclosure of
substantially the same information to:
(i) his or her employer; or
(ii) a person or body referred to in section 8,
in respect of which no action was taken within a reasonable period after disclosure; or
(d) that the impropriety is of an exceptionally serious nature.”

[45] The effect of these provisions is that the disclosure would be
protected if Mr Weyers acted in good faith; reasonably believed that the
information disclosed and the allegations made by him were substantially
true; was not acting for personal gain and one or other of the conditions in
section 9(2)(c) and (d) was satisfied. Mr Pauw rightly conceded that the
first three requirements were satisfied. In the light of the evidence
summarised earlier in this judgment he could do no less. It is plain that
Mr Weyers was throughout painfully aware of his professional
responsibilities and of the need to provide residents of Tshwane with a
safe and reliable electricity supply. His concern about the dangers arising
from appointing people who, after testing, he regarded as insufficiently
skilled to undertake the onerous duties attaching to a system operator
position shines through each document. His bona fides and his belief in
the truth of what he was saying are apparent. As this case shows he made
the disclosure at considerable personal cost and not for personal gain. He
acted in the discharge of what he conceived, and had been advised, was
his professional duty. The disclosure was made to parties that would
manifestly be interested in such disclosure. It would be surprising in those
circumstances to learn that the disclosure was not protected.

[46] Mr Pauw confined his contentions on this part of the case to the
submission that Mr Weyers had not made a prior disclosure to his
employer of substantially the same information in terms of paragraph (c),
as the latter was at all times aware of his view, so that nothing was
disclosed to it. He also contended that the disclosure did not relate to any
impropriety as required by paragraph (d). Accordingly, so he submitted,
the last necessary element of a protected disclosure was missing.

[47] I cannot accept these contentions. In regard to the first it was put to
him that the effect of his submission was that if the employer knew of a
problem before the employee went and reported it there could be no prior
disclosure to the employer and accordingly no protected disclosure could
be made to anyone else. There was no answer to this point and the
postulate cannot be correct. Its effect is that if an employee goes to the
managing director and reports that bribes are being paid in order to secure
contracts flowing from successful tenders that is not a disclosure if the
managing director authorised the payments, and that knowledge would
bar a protected disclosure to anyone else, such as the party issuing the
tenders. Such a construction would undermine the whole purpose of the
PDA because it has the result that the more culpable the employer in the
conduct giving rise to the report and the greater its knowledge of
wrongdoing, the less would be the protection enjoyed by the employee.

[48] The alternative submission was that the letter merely reflected a
disagreement between Mr Weyers and his employer and therefore there
had been (and could be) no previous disclosure to the employer because
that disagreement did not amount to a disclosure. However that is merely
the argument that the letter contained no information decked out in a
different guise and the way in which it is couched further undermines that

original submission. If the letter is so construed then the information it
contains is that there is a disagreement between the manager of the PSC
centre, a skilled and highly qualified electrical engineer, and the
representatives of management and human resources concerning the
abilities of persons to be appointed as system operators in the PSC centre.
That is a most important item of information that could cause the
Department of Labour to intervene to conduct a safety inspection and
engage with the relevant individuals to address the concerns being raised
by Mr Weyers. Equally it could cause the Engineering Council to become
involved in the interests of public safety and protecting the standing and
reputation of its member. It also illustrates why these were the
appropriate parties to whom to make the disclosure in question.

[49] In my view therefore the requirements of section 9(2)(c) were
satisfied, it being common cause that the relevant officials in the
municipality had disregarded Mr Weyers’ concerns and intended to ride
roughshod over them. Accordingly he had made the disclosure to his
employer and no action had been taken consequent upon it, other than to
disregard his bona fide concerns. It was not suggested that a reasonable
period for acting upon his disclosure had not passed.

[50] That conclusion suffices to hold that the letter embodied a protected
disclosure. The same result is reached by considering the requirements of
sub-section (d). An ‘impropriety’ is defined in section 1 as being conduct
in any of the categories in the definition of disclosure, which includes any
conduct that shows or tends to show that the health or safety of an
individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered. Having regard
to the nature of the enterprise and the nature of the work that system
operators would be employed to perform it would be likely that the safety

of an individual would be endangered by the appointment of a person
who did not possess the skills necessary to do the job safely. That is an
impropriety as defined and, against the background set out in paragraphs
[3] to [6] above, it cannot be contended that it was not an impropriety of
an exceptionally serious nature. Clearly lives were at risk as the
municipality’s own advertisement for the position had stated.

[51] It follows that the respondents proved that the publication of the
letters to the Department of Labour and the Engineering Council
constituted a protected disclosure by Mr Weyers. It was accordingly
impermissible for the municipality to discipline him for doing so and it
would be impermissible for it to impose any sanction upon him for doing
so. Lest it be taken that in referring to the municipality in this regard I am
attributing conduct to the council of the municipality it is appropriate for
me to record that it is unclear from the record, and counsel were not in a
position to inform us, of the extent to which the council, as opposed to its
officials acting in accordance with their delegated powers were
responsible for both the disciplinary proceedings and the opposition to the
present litigation, including this appeal. Accordingly my references to the
municipality must be understood as referring to the conduct of those
officials as representatives of the municipality. It is important to say this
because it is not apparent that in the dispute that arose the broader
interests of the residents of Tshwane and their need for service delivery,
in the form of a safe and stable supply of electricity, were always kept in
mind. In addition the manner in which these proceedings were conducted
was deplorable with an answering affidavit being delivered by the
manager: legal support services supported by purely formal confirmatory
affidavits. The answering affidavit was replete with vague, evasive and in
many cases demonstrably untruthful denials, as well as an attack on Mr

Weyers’ bona fides that could not be, and was not, supported by counsel
in argument. This judgment would not be complete without recording that
this was not justified and that it was not in the interests of the residents of
Tshwane.

[52] The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include those
consequent upon the employment of two counsel.

M J D WALLIS
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES

FOR APPELLANT:
PIETER PAUW SC (with him S SHABA)
Instructed by
Ngoepe Attorneys, Johannesburg
Webbers, Bloemfontein

FOR RESPONDENT:
J
F
MULLINS
SC
(with
him
P
A
SWANEPOEL)
Instructed by
Serfontein Viljoen & Swart, Pretoria
Vermaak & Dennis, Bloemfontein.
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa

MEDIA SUMMARY– JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

From:   The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:  Friday 27 November 2009

Status:  Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does
not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY v
ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA and ADRIANUS
JACOBUS WEYERS

The Supreme Court of Appeal today handed down judgment in a case
involving Mr Weyers, an employee of the Tshwane Municipality, who
wrote a letter to the Department of Labour and the Engineering Council
of South Africa concerning the possible employment in the Power System
Control centre of system operators whom he regarded as not qualified to
undertake the dangerous work attaching to those positions. The letter was
written against an urgent need to employ additional system operators as
the centre was understaffed and the existing operators were working
dangerously high levels of overtime.
Mr Weyers was suspended and subjected to a disciplinary enquiry
because he had distributed the letter to the two outside parties. He
brought proceedings to interdict the municipality from imposing any
disciplinary sanction on him arising from his distribution of the letter to
the Department and the Engineering Council. He sought protection under
the Protected Disclosures Act, which protects whistleblowers against
disciplinary sanction arising from their whistleblowing activities.

The High Court in Pretoria granted Mr Weyers relief and the Supreme
Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It held that the contents of the letter
constituted a protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act
and that it had been written bona fide in the belief that its contents were
true and not for personal gain. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.