THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT
Case No: 44/2009

HENDRIK PIETER LE ROUX

First Appellant
BURGERT CHRISTIAAN GILDENHUYS

Second Appellant
REINARDT JANSE VAN RENSBURG

Third Appellant

and

LOUIS DEY

Respondent

Neutral citation:
Le Roux v Dey (44/2009) [2010] ZASCA 41 (30 March 2010)
Coram:
Harms DP, Mlambo and Malan JJA and Griesel and Majiedt AJJA
Heard:
8 March 2010
Delivered:
30 March 2010
Summary: Actio iniuriarum – defamation – humiliation – jest – wrongfulness –
animus iniuriandi – consciousness of wrongfulness not required - damages

__________________________________________________________________

ORDER
__________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Du Plessis J sitting as court
of first instance):
The following order is made:
1 The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
2 The cross-appeal is upheld with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.
3 The order of the court below is amended by substituting para 3 with „Koste,
insluitend die koste van twee advokate‟.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

HARMS DP (MLAMBO and MALAN JJA and MAJIEDT AJA)

[1] This appeal relates to a claim for sentimental damages for the infringement of
the dignity (dignitas) and reputation (fama) of the plaintiff, the present respondent,
who was a vice principal at a well-known secondary school in Pretoria. The
perpetrators were three scholars, the defendants. The high court upheld both claims
and awarded a composite amount of R45 000 with costs on the magistrates‟ courts‟
scale. With the leave of the trial court the defendants appeal the judgment while the
plaintiff cross-appeals the quantum of the award and the costs order.
[2] The claims arose from these facts: the first defendant, who then was fifteen
and a half and in grade 9, one evening searched the internet for pictures of gay
bodybuilders. He found one. It showed two of them, both naked and their legs
astride, sitting next to each other in a rather compromising position – a leg of the one
was over a leg of the other – and the position of their hands was indicative of sexual
activity or stimulation. He manipulated the photograph by pasting a photo of the

plaintiff‟s face on the face of the one bodybuilder and the face of the principal of the
school onto the other. He also covered the genitals of each with pictures of the
school‟s badge.
[3] He sent the manipulated photo to a friend who, in turn, sent it by cell phone to
the second defendant, who was in grade 11 and 17 years old. The picture spread
like fire amongst the scholars. A few days later the second defendant showed the
picture to a female teacher during class and later decided to print the photo in colour
and showed it around on the playground. At his behest and because he did not have
the necessary „guts‟ the third defendant, who was in the same grade and of the
same age, placed the photograph prominently on the school‟s notice board. A
teacher saw it quite soon and removed it.
[4] As a result, the plaintiff instituted an action against them based on the actio
iniuriarum, claiming damages for defamation as well as for his humiliation. The facts
are fairly uncontentious and the main issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal
concerned (a) wrongfulness; (b) the presence of fault in the form of animus
iniuriandi; (c) the quantum of damages; and (d) the appropriate costs order. There is,
however, another fundamental question relating to splitting of causes of action that
will be dealt with in the course of the judgment. It may be pointed out at this early
stage that the first two issues are essentially related to the evidence of the
defendants that the publication of the picture was intended as a joke and was
perceived as such and that, accordingly, they could not be liable under the actio
iniuriarum because their actions were not wrongful and because they did not have
the intent to injure the plaintiff (a lack of animus iniuriandi).
DEFAMATION: WRONGFULNESS
[5] I begin with the defamation claim. The first matter to consider is the
wrongfulness of the publication of the manipulated photo. It is well established that
the determination of whether a publication is defamatory and therefore prima facie
wrongful involves a two-stage inquiry. (I use the word „publication‟ to include a
pictorial representation such as a photograph.) The first is to determine the meaning

of the publication as a matter of interpretation and the second whether that meaning
is defamatory.1
[6] To answer the first question a court has to determine the natural and ordinary
meaning of the publication:2 how would3 a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence
have understood it? The test is objective. In determining its meaning the court must
take account not only of what the publication expressly conveys, but also of what it
implies, ie, what a reasonable person may infer from it. The implied meaning is not
the same as innuendo, which relates to a secondary or unusual defamatory meaning
that flows from knowledge of special circumstances. Meaning is usually conveyed by
words but a picture may also convey a message, sometimes even stronger than
words.
[7] It may be accepted that the reasonable person must be contextualised and
that one is not concerned with a purely abstract exercise.4 One must have regard to
the nature of the audience. In this case the main target was the school children at
the particular school but it also included at least teachers.5
[8] A publication is defamatory if it has the „tendency‟ or is calculated to
undermine the status, good name or reputation of the plaintiff.6 It is necessary to
emphasise this because it is an aspect that is neglected in text-book definitions of
defamation because it is usually said that something can only be defamatory if it
causes the plaintiff‟s reputation to be impaired.7 That is not the case, as Neethling
explains with reference to authority:8

„It is notable that the question of a factual injury to personality, that is, whether the
good name of the person concerned was actually injured, is almost completely ignored in

1 F D J Brand „Defamation‟ in 7 Lawsa 2 ed para 237.
2 Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate [1993] ZASCA 205; [1994] 2 All SA 160
(SCA); 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 20E-21B.
3 Corbett CJ used the word „might‟ because he was dealing with an exception. At the trial stage the
test is different. To the extent that Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd [2004] ZASCA 64;
[2004] 3 All SA 511; 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 25 might have applied the „might‟ test at the trial
stage it erred. The perceived error had no effect on the outcome of the case.
4 Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd para 26.
5 Mohamed v Jassiem [1995] ZASCA 115; 1996 (1) SA 673 (A).
6 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) p 131, Sindani v Van der Merwe 2002
(2) SA 32 (SCA); [2002] 1 All SA 311 (A).
7 J Burchell The Law of Defamation in SA (1985) p 34-35 contains a collection. I shall refer to this
work as „Burchell I‟.
8 Supra p 136.

the evaluation of wrongfulness of defamation. In fact, generally9 a witness may not even be
asked how he understood the words or behaviour. In addition, it is required only that the
words or behaviour was calculated or had the tendency or propensity to defame, and not
that the defamation actually occurred. In short, probability of injury rather than actual injury
is at issue. It can be concluded, therefore, that the courts are not at all interested in whether
others‟ esteem for the person concerned was in fact lowered, but only, seen objectively, in
whether, in the opinion of the reasonable person, the esteem which the person enjoyed was
adversely affected. If so, it is simply accepted “that those to whom it is addressed, being
persons of ordinary intelligence and experience, will have understood the statement in its
proper sense”.‟
[9] It is often said that jest may exclude animus iniuriandi, something to which I
shall return.10 Masch v Leask,11 however, held that jest could be a defence only if it
was something that would have been understood by the reasonable person as jest –
„if a man says that the words were used in jest, he must prove that it could be taken
up in no other light by a reasonable person.‟ Melius de Villiers, like so many before
(such as Voet 47.10.8)12 and after him (including this court), did not distinguish
clearly between wrongfulness and animus iniuriandi in his classical work on
iniuriae.13 Ignoring this failure, his views on jest in the present context are
illuminating. He drew a distinction between legitimate jest and jest that is not
legitimate. Jest is not legitimate, he said, when in order to amuse yourself or to show
off your wit, you say or do things which, considering the occasion or personal
circumstances of another, would be insulting, offensive or degrading.
[10] It appears to me that if a publication is objectively and in the circumstances in
jest it may not be defamatory.14 But there is a clear line. A joke at the expense of
someone – making someone the butt of a degrading joke – is likely to be interpreted
as defamatory. A joke at which the subject can laugh will usually be inoffensive.

9 The author explains that the exception applies to an alleged innuendo only, something not relevant
to this case.
10 Eg Herselman NO v Botha [1993] ZASCA 144; [1994] 1 All SA 420 (A); 1994 (1) SA 28 (A) at 35E.
11 1916 TPD 114 at 116.
12 Johannes Voet is an institutional writer on Roman-Dutch law. The reference is to his Commentarius
ad Pandectas, a commentary on the Digesta of Justinian. The standard English translation of Voet is
that of Percival Gane.
13 The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) p 195.
14 Compare Jansen Van Vuuren & another NNO v Kruger [1993] ZASCA 145, [1993] 2 All SA 619 (A);
1993 (4) SA 842 (A) at 855B-856G.

[11] In determining whether a publication is defamatory regard must be had to the
person who was allegedly defamed. What may be defamatory of a private individual
may not necessarily be defamatory of a politician or a judge. By virtue of their public
office they are expected to endure robust comment but that does not imply that they
cannot be defamed or should not be entitled to turn to courts to vindicate
unjustifiable attacks on their character.15 This is to a lesser extent also true of
teachers. They must expect to be the subject of robust comment and the butt of
jokes by scholars but, once again, there is a line that may not be crossed because
they, too, have the right to reputation and dignity, which must be protected.
[12] The plaintiff alleged that the publication was per se defamatory and in the
alternative alleged in effect that the photo implied that he masturbated in the
presence of another, was guilty of immoral exposure, had a low moral character, had
a homosexual relationship with the principal, or was homosexual. He did not rely on
an innuendo.
[13] The learned judge, in determining the objective „message‟ conveyed by the
publication, held that although it was obvious that the faces did not belong to the
bodies, the transposition of the faces onto the bodies associated the two teachers
with the bodybuilders and their behaviour. They were busy with some sexual activity
(even though one could not see what the two men did because of the positioning of
the school badges) and that the photo created the impression that the two figures
have low moral values and immodest sexuality.
[14] As to the question whether the publication was defamatory, the learned judge
said that the reasonable person would have viewed the photo through the lens of the
Constitution, more particularly s 10, which provides that everyone has the right to
have their dignity respected and protected; s 14, which guarantees the right to
privacy; and s 9(2) and (3), which demand that everyone‟s sexual orientation should
be respected. The publication raises questions about the plaintiff‟s sexuality and
sexual orientation, he said. It ridicules the plaintiff‟s moral values and disrespects his
person. However, the sexual orientation itself, he said, is of little moment because

15 Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 23C-29A; Mthembi-
Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd [2004] 3 All SA 511, 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) paras 33-43.

the ridicule would not have been different if the other person had been a female
member of staff.
[15] The defendants‟ counsel attacked these findings on a number of grounds. His
main argument was that the implicit meaning, especially the association between the
plaintiff and the bodybuilders, had not been pleaded. The answer is that
interpretation is for the court and need not be pleaded. Meaning, express or implied,
is a matter for argument and not evidence. It is also not understood where this
technical argument was supposed to lead. Counsel sought to rely on evidence that
this is not how the picture was perceived and also on evidence that one or two
persons who had seen the picture did not believe that it reflected the true
relationship between the two teachers or that they did not think less of the plaintiff as
a result of the publication. As mentioned above, all this is beside the point.
Interpretation is an objective issue. Actual loss of reputation is not required, nor is
belief in the defamation.
[16] Something was also made of the fact that the defendants were school
children and that the reasonable person would have taken that into account in
assessing the meaning of the photo. I have some difficulty in appreciating how the
identity of the alleged defamer can determine the objective meaning of a publication.
The picture was created and distributed anonymously. Its origin down the line would
not have been known since it was in the nature of a chain letter. An addressee may
or may not have suspected that children were behind it all but there was no reason
for them to have accepted that as a fact.
[17] The picture was not published in isolation. There was a background to it. The
plaintiff‟s name rhymes with „gay‟, and a ditty based on this association and a
pamphlet with the same tenor was in circulation amongst the children. This
background, which probably led to the creation of the photo and its publication, is
relevant in determining its meaning.16 Counsel also argued that although the
publication would have been defamatory if, say, a parent or minister of religion had
been portrayed in this manner it cannot be defamatory of a teacher because he is a

16 Geyser & ‘n ander v Pont [1968] 1 All SA 43 (W); 1968 (4) SA 67 (W) at 69E-H.

person in authority. I mention this submission only because it was repeatedly made
and not because it deserves judicial consideration.
[18] There is nothing that, objectively speaking, indicates that the photo was
perceived as a joke, let alone a legitimate one. Counsel could not explain the joke.
People may have laughed, just as they laughed at someone being pilloried – not
because it was funny but because of the humiliation of the victim. Schadenfreude,
the Germans would have called it. Laughter remains a curious psychological
phenomenon. Sigmund Freud divided jokes into two broad categories: „innocent‟
jokes and „tendentious jokes.  Innocent jokes are jokes without an underlying
hostility and do not evoke laughter at the expense of anyone in particular.
„Tendentious‟ jokes are jokes made with aggressive or sexual provocations, to elicit
strong emotional response. The philosopher Alfred M Stern, for instance, argues that
we laugh at degraded values, or in order to degrade values. He said:17
„In my theory, laughter is interpreted as a value judgment, an instinctive, negative
value judgment concerning a degradation of values. This judgment is not expressed in
words, but in the inarticulate sounds we call laughter. Laughter, however, is not only our
reaction towards a degradation of values. Sometimes it is also an action provoking a
degradation of values or, at least, trying to provoke it. When we laugh at a person, or a
thing done by a person, although no value degradation can be found in them, we try to
degrade their value. And often we succeed.
There is a French saying, Ie ridicule tue, the ludicrous kills. Of course, it does not kill
physically, but it may kill morally, axiologically; it may kill values, and then laughter may have
tragic consequences.
If we laugh at a serious person or his work, this person is offended. And he is right to
be offended, for instinctively he recognizes in this laughter an attempt to degrade his value
or that of his work in the eyes of other people.‟

This accords with the views expressed by the anonymous author of the title „Humour
and Wit‟ in 9 Encyclopaedia Britannica p11:
„Humour today seems to be dominated by two main factors: the influence of the
mass media and the crisis of values affecting a culture in rapid and violent transition. The

17 „Why do we laugh and cry?‟ calteches.library.caltech.edu/154/01/stern.pdf. (Accessed on 15 March
2010.) For a detailed discussion see the article „Comedy‟ in 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica 15 ed.

former tends toward the commercialized manufacture of laughter by popular comedians and
gags produced by conveyor-belt methods; the latter toward a sophisticated form of black
humour larded with sick jokes, sadism, and sex.‟
In fairness to counsel, his ultimate submission was that although the photo was not
objectively funny, it would have been for scholars who would have enjoyed the photo
because it held the plaintiff up to ridicule, something I would have thought means
that they would have interpreted the photo as being defamatory. As the learned
judge said, even adolescents know where to draw the line between jest and ridicule.
[19] I therefore conclude that the photo was defamatory of the plaintiff and that its
publication was wrongful. It matters not for this conclusion what his sexual
orientation was or what the sex of the other person on the photo was because it
deals with his sexual orientation in a derogatory manner.18 It ridicules him, his moral
values and disrespects his person.

A DIVERSION: SPLITTING OF ACTIONS.
[20] The plaintiff‟s second cause of action was for the impairment of his dignity
flowing from the publication. The term „dignity‟ covers a number of concepts in s 10
of the Constitution but in the present context we are concerned with the plaintiff‟s
sense of self-worth. Melius de Villiers19 spoke of the inborn right to the tranquil
enjoyment of one‟s peace of mind; and the valued and serene condition in one‟s
social or individual life which is violated when one is subjected to offensive and
degrading treatment, or exposed to ill-will, ridicule, disesteem or contempt.
[21] The plaintiff gave extensive evidence of how the publication of the photo had
affected and humiliated him. It placed him in an invidious position as deputy principal
who was responsible for religious events and educating and upholding morals at the
school. The court below upheld this claim but, as mentioned, did not make a
separate award of damages in respect thereof. This led to a major attack on the
award by the plaintiff in the course of the cross-appeal. The defendants, on the other

18 J Burchell Personality Rights and Freedom of Eexpression: the Mmodern Actio Iniuriarum (1998) p
184 n 4 (hereinafter „Burchell II‟).
19 Op cit p 24-25.

hand, attacked the judgment on the grounds that it should have held that plaintiff‟s
dignity was not impaired or because they lacked animus iniuriandi.
[22] There is, however, an anterior question that has to be considered: can the
same act give rise to two actiones iniuriarum in the hands of the same plaintiff? To
illustrate, an assault gives rise to an actio iniuriarum. Does a humiliating assault give
rise to an additional action for the impairment of dignity? Or does the nature of the
assault simply impact on the quantum of damages? I believe that the answer to this
example is on consideration evident: there is only one cause of action.
[23] I am unaware of any instance in the history of the actio iniuriarum where a
particular defamatory act gave rise to two causes of action. (I exclude the cases
where patrimonial damages are also claimed.) The reason is in my view that any
defamation is in the first instance an affront to a person‟s dignity which is aggravated
by publication. Someone who is not affronted by a publication and who does not feel
humiliated will not sue for defamation.20 That is why the award of damages
compensates „the plaintiff for injured feelings and for the hurt to his or her dignity and
reputation.‟21 As F P van den Heever J once said, „an action on defamation has
several purposes: to kill libel, to recover a solatium for injured feelings and to recover
a penalty from the slanderer‟.22 In other words, in assessing compensation in a
defamation case a court must have regard to the effect the publication had on the
plaintiff.23 In Gelb v Hawkins24 this court‟s determination of compensation in a
defamation case was said to relate „in the main to contumelia,25 but does not
overlook the elements of loss of reputation, and penalty‟, which means that on the
facts of the case the plaintiff‟s humiliation and not loss of reputation was the major
factor in deciding quantum.26

20 Compare Voet 47.10.19 in a somewhat different context.
21 7 Lawsa 2 ed para 260. See also SA Associated Newspapers Ltd & ‘n ander v Samuels [1980] 3 All
SA 227 (A); 1980 (1) SA 24 (A) at 39F-G read with 40B.
22 Kriek v Gunter 1940 OPD 136 at 144.
23 Muller v SA Associated Press 1972 (2) SA 589 (C) at 595A.
24 [1960] 3 All SA 371 (A); 1960 (3) SA 687 (A) at 693H.
25 Which means contempt or insult.
26 Also Van der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd & others [2001] 1 All SA 425 (A); 2001 (2)
SA 242 (SCA) at 260H.

[24] Risking the wrath of those who believe that our law of defamation has not
been contaminated by the common law, I believe that the following statement by
Windeyer J encapsulates what I wish to say:27
„It seems to me that, properly speaking, a man defamed does not get compensation for his
damaged reputation. He gets damages because he was injured in his reputation, that is[,]
simply because he was publicly defamed. For this reason, compensation by damages
operates in two ways as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as consolation to him
for a wrong done. Compensation is here a solatium rather that a monetary recompense for
harm measurable in money. The variety of the matters which, it has been held, may be
considered in assessing damages for defamation must in many cases mean that the amount
of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations.‟
[25] I therefore conclude that the plaintiff‟s additional claim based on the affront to
his dignity was ill-founded and does not require further consideration and I proceed
to consider the second leg of the defamation claim, namely animus iniuriandi.
DEFAMATION: ANIMUS INIURIANDI
[26] It is trite that delictual liability depends in general terms on fault which, in the
case of defamation and all other iniuriae, is fault of a particular nature, namely
animus iniuriandi. As mentioned, the defendants say that they did not have the
intention to defame the plaintiff because their intention was to make a joke and, in
any event, they did not know that there was such a thing as defamation. It was not
always clear from the evidence whether the defence was one of legal incapacity due
to the inability to distinguish between right and wrong but it was not argued that the
presumption of legal capacity was rebutted.28
[27] To assess the defence of lack of animus iniuriandi it is necessary once again
to visit the issue as to its meaning and application in the context of the actio
iniuriarum in its different forms. Much has been said in judgments and academic
works on the issue and my failure to refer to many of them is not due to a lack of
respect but only because I do not wish to clutter this judgment unduly.

27 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd 117 CLR 118 (HC of A) 150. A part of the quotation appears in
Burchell I p 292.
28 Melius de Villiers op cit p 29-30.

[28] Our Roman-Dutch writers did not distinguish clearly or consistently between
wrongfulness and animus iniuriandi (or dolus malus). This gave rise to much
confusion. In any event, animus iniuriandi means the intention to injure. That is how
this court has understood the concept since at least Whittaker v Roos and
Bateman.29 This is also the meaning attached to the term by early proponents of
animus iniuriandi as an essential element of defamation, Melius de Villiers,30 Prof D
Pont31 and Prof T W Price.32
[29] The Continental Pandectists of the 19th Century analysed the concept of
dolus and added another element to the intention to injure, namely consciousness of
the wrongfulness of the act (coloured intent or „wederregtelikheidsbewussyn‟).33 In
spite of my high regard for them it has to be conceded that by systemising the
Roman law concepts they did not necessarily state the Roman-Dutch law. This
means that an adherence to the roots of our law does not necessarily require an
adoption of Pandectist theories.
[30] Legal theory is important but law is not a natural science and, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jnr had said, „the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience‟34 and that „general propositions do not decide concrete cases.‟35 Prof J
C van der Walt once referred to the poet and philosopher N P van Wyk Louw who
spoke of the „spookagtige dans van logiese kategorieë‟ and indicated that although
general rules are on the one hand necessary for legal certainty they may on the
other hand impede justice:36
„Daar bestaan dus „n ewige, inherente spanningsverhouding tussen die eise van
regverdigheid en regsekerheid. . . . Die reg kan dus vanweë sy inherente
kompromiekarakter nooit volkome seker of regverdig wees nie.‟

The bon mot of Holmes must, nevertheless, be seen in context. It was not a call for
irrational judging or an abandonment of general principles or consistency. As Max

29 1912 AD 92 at 124-125.  I do not intend to list the annotations on this statement.
30„Animus iniuriandi: An essential element in defamation‟ 48 (1931) SALJ 308.
31 Case note in 1940 THRHR 270 at 278-279.
32 „Animus iniuriandi in defamation‟ 66 (1949) SALJ 4 at 6 and 26.
33 J R Midgley and J C van der Walt „Delict‟ in 8(1) Lawsa 2 ed para 105 n 3.
34 The Common Law (1881) p 1.
35 Lochner v New York (1905) 198 US 45 at 76.
36 „N P van Wyk Louw: Enkele konsekwensies vir die regsdenke‟ 1986 TSAR 257 at 268.

Rheinstein explained in his introduction to Max Weber‟s Law in Economy and
Society:37
„Not only the context in which this famous passage appears but Holmes‟s entire life and
work should have made it clear that he would have been the last to disparage logical
thinking, that is, thinking which tries to avoid intrinsic contradiction and to maintain
consistency within a given line of argumentation. Clearly, Holmes was also far from
disparaging the use of concepts. Thinking without concepts is as unthinkable as painting
without paints or making music without sounds. The only problem is what sort of concepts
we use or, from what premises we start when we begin to think. This is what Holmes means:
that we derive our premises from the experience of life rather than formulating them as
artificial and purely formal concepts.‟
[31] Probably the first reference to coloured intent in our legal literature is to be
found in the first edition of Strafreg by J C de Wet and H L Swanepoel (p 91). The
authors, significantly, did not pretend to find the concept in our law but relied
exclusively on Dutch and German textbooks that were current at the time (1949). In
the delictual context the first reference to the requirement (at least to my knowledge)
appeared in N J van der Merwe and P J J Olivier‟s 1966 edition of Die Onregmatige
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (p 72 and 75). The authors must have thought that
the matter was self-evident because they did not rely on any authority for their
statement.
[32] This court in O’Malley38 accepted that coloured intent formed an essential part
of animus iniuriandi for purposes of defamation. The statement was in context obiter
and it will be recalled that this case created an exception to the general requirement
of animus iniuriandi by holding that the public media could not escape liability by
relying on its absence. The ratio was later overruled in Bogoshi.39 As far as iniuria in
general is concerned, Jansen JA sought to hold in Ramsay40 that coloured intent
was a general requirement but the majority (per A S Botha AJA) held otherwise.41 It
held, significantly, that whether or not coloured intent should be required for any

37 Simon & Schuster 1954 at p xlvi in the 1967 paperback edition.
38 Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie v O’Malley [1977] All SA 631 (A); 1977 (3) SA 394 (A) at 403C-
D.
39 National Media Ltd v Bogoshi [1998] 4 All SA 347 (SCA); 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).
40 Ramsay v Minister van Polisie & andere [1981] 4 All SA 692 (A); 1981 (4) SA 802 (A).
41 Supra at 817F-819C.

particular iniuria is a matter of legal policy and, by implication, not a matter of legal
philosophy.
[33] To test the correctness of the assumption that colourless intent is a valid
defence in the case of iniuria it is useful to consider the case law in this regard. One
seeks rather in vain for an instance where the defence was accepted.42 The opposite
is true. It is not a defence in the case of invasion of privacy,43 unlawful arrest or
detention,44 assault,45 defamation by the press,46 or wrongful attachment.47
[34] Malicious prosecution appears to be an exception because it has been held
firmly that coloured intent is a requirement for liability.48 The interesting aspect of this
cause of action is that it is probably the only iniuria where the plaintiff must prove
animus iniuriandi instead of the defendant having to prove its absence. This, and the
common name of the action, indicates that there is something special about this
cause of action. It appears to me that this is an instance where coloured intent forms
part of the wrongfulness element: public policy considerations demand that a plaintiff
should only be compensated for a prosecution that was instigated without
reasonable or probable cause if, in addition, it was „malicious‟ (in the sense of
coloured intent). The practical effect of this might be that a further inquiry into the
fault element may become unnecessary because it has already been established by
the plaintiff and there is accordingly nothing for the defendant to disprove.
[35] Aquilian causes such as intentional interference with contractual relationships
and injurious falsehoods have been explained on the same basis. The theoretical
problem with these is that the general requirement of fault under the lex Aquilia is
negligence while they require dolus or animus iniuriandi. This court held in Gore49
that animus iniuriandi is in these instances a requirement for wrongfulness because

42 The authorities relied on by Neethling op cit p 197 n 75 do not bear out the statement that
colourless intent is a defence in cases of an invasion of dignity.
43 C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T) at 306A-F.
44 Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr [1993] 2 All SA 232 (A); 1993 (3) SA 131 (A) at 154–157; Ramsay v
Minister van Polisie [1981] 4 All SA 692 (A); 1981 (4) SA 802 (A) at 818.
45 Bennett v Minister of Police [1980] 3 All SA 817 (C); 1980 (3) SA 24 (C).
46 National Media Ltd v Bogoshi [1998] 4 All SA 347 (SCA); 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).
47 Coetzee (Sheriff, Pretoria East) v Meevis [2001] 1 All SA 10 (SCA), 2001 (3) SA 454 (SCA).
48 Rudolph & others v Minister of Safety and Security & another [2009] ZASCA 133; [2009] 3 All SA
323; 2009 (5) SA 94 (SCA) para 18.
49 Minister of Finance & others v Gore NO [2007] 1 All SA 309 (SCA); 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA). For
criticism of the terminology used: J Neethling and J M Potgieter „Middellike aanspreeklikheid vir „n
opsetlike delik‟ 2007 TSAR 616.

public policy considerations demand that a plaintiff should be compensated for an
interference with contractual relationships only where the interference was
accompanied by coloured intent.50
[36] Reverting to defamation, the defence of privileged occasion provides another
illustration.51 The plaintiff may prove that, although the defendant had published the
statement on a privileged occasion, he had overstepped the mark by having spoken
animo iniuriandi in the sense of coloured intent. Although this is usually said to be
part of the fault investigation it is indeed part of the investigation into wrongfulness
and a close reading of the cases dealing with privileged occasions, beginning with
Jordaan v van Biljon52 and Craig v Voortrekkerpers Bpk,53 confirms this conclusion.
[37] A purely Pandectist approach does get one into a bind. This was even
recognised by De Villiers AJ in the commendable judgment in Maisel v van
Naeren,54 which gave rise to the whole debate.55 It appears to me to be incongruous
that a defendant who, for example, cannot establish truth and public benefit to justify
defamation, can nevertheless escape liability by relying on a belief in either the truth
or public benefit. Not only that, the approach also inhibits the development of this
part of the law under the Constitution. Van Dijkhorst J, not surprisingly, sought to
develop the common law in this regard by holding that a lack of coloured intent could
not be a defence if it was due to negligence,56 a view similar to that of F P van den
Heever J,57 Colman J,58 P Q R Boberg59 and Burchell.60
[38] It might be opportune to revisit with the wisdom of hindsight the judgment in
Bogoshi.61  The judgment was primarily concerned with the correctness of O’Malley,

50 Dantex Investment Holdings Pty Ltd v Brenner & others NNO [1988] ZASCA 122; [1989] 1 All SA
411 (A); 1989 (1) SA 390 (A) at 396G-I.
51 Anton Fagan „Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict‟ 122 (2005) SALJ 90 at p 99 deals with
this issue.
52 [1962] 1 All SA 350 (A); 1962 (1) SA 286 (A).
53 1963 (1) SA 149 (A). The same applies to Nydoo & andere v Vengtas 1965 (1) SA 1 (A)
54 1960 (4) SA 836 (C) at 850E-H.
55 Burchell II p 308.
56 Marais v Groenewald [2000] 2 All SA 578 (T); 2001 (1) SA 634 (T) at 646F-G.
57 Kriek v Gunter 1940 OPD 136.
58 Hassen v Post Newspapers (Pty) Ltd & others [1965] 3 All SA 528 (W); 1965 (3) SA 562 (W) at
570G-H.
59 „Animus iniuriandi and mistake‟ 88 (1971) SALJ 57.
60 Burchell I p 166-174.
61 National Media Ltd v Bogoshi [1998] 4 All SA 347 (SCA); 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). For those
learned authors who have criticized this court for having failed to decide the case under the interim

which had held that the press could not rely on a lack of animus iniuriandi as a
defence in a defamation case. The judgment also dealt with the anterior question of
justification: the publication of a defamatory statement will be lawful if it was
reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In other words the general criterion of
reasonableness determines whether a defamatory publication was wrongful or not.62
„Reasonableness‟ in this context must not be conflated with negligence.63 If
justifiable, the question of fault cannot arise. I agree in this regard with Lewis JA64:
„However, fault need not be in issue at all if in the particular circumstances anterior
inquiry shows that the publication is lawful because it is justifiable. Bogoshi indicates that the
reasonableness of the publication might also justify it. In appropriate cases, a defendant
should not be held liable where publication is justifiable in the circumstances – where the
publisher reasonably believes that the information published is true. The publication in such
circumstances is not unlawful. Political speech might, depending upon the context, be lawful
even when false provided that its publication is reasonable. . . . This is not a test for
negligence: It determines whether, on grounds of policy, a defamatory statement should not
be actionable because it is justifiably made in the circumstances.‟
It appears that on this analysis the discussion of negligence in Bogoshi might have
complicated matters unnecessarily. Once it is found that the publication was
unreasonable the next question should simply be whether it was published with the
intent to injure.65
[39] The effect of this is that mistake or bona fides might in appropriate
circumstances justify a defamatory statement (ie, if it was reasonable to have been
made) and that it is accordingly not necessary to require coloured intent. I therefore
conclude, especially in view of precedent and the constitutional emphasis on the

Constitution of 1994, it could be mentioned that the defamatory articles complained of, as the
judgment indicates, mostly pre-dated its adoption.
62 Burchell II p 207-208.
63 See the discussion by J Neethling and J M Potgieter „Wrongfulness and negligence in the law of
delict: a Babylonian confusion?‟ 2007 (70) THRHR 120 and the cases referred to.  See also the
debate between J Neethling „The conflation of wrongfulness and negligence: is it always such a bad
thing for the law of delict?‟ 123 (2006) SALJ 204 and R W Nugent „Yes, it is always a bad thing for the
law: a reply to Professor Neethling‟ 123 (2006) SALJ 557. Further Anton Fagan „Blind faith: a
response to Professors Neethling and Potgieter‟ 124 (2007) SALJ 285.
64 Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd [2004] 3 All SA 511; 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 47
discussed by J Neethling „Die locus standi van „n kabinetsminister om vir laster te eis, en die verweer
van redelike publikasie van onwaarheid op politieke terrein‟ 2005 (68) THRHR 321.
65 J Neethling „Aanspreeklikheid van die massamedia weens laster: die nalatigheidsvraag‟ 2004
TSAR 406.

protection of personality rights, that the animus iniuriandi requirement generally does
not require consciousness of wrongfulness (wederregtelikheidsbewussyn).66
[40] In addition, and pace the obiter in Herselman NO v Botha (mentioned earlier
to which I was a party) and authors such as Neethling,67 I do not believe that jest
excludes the intention to injure. It goes to motive and, as Melius de Villiers said,68 if a
joke is degrading the defendant‟s motive does not matter.
[41] The court below found that since the defendants knew that what they did was
wrong in the general sense, they indeed did have the required coloured intent in the
sense of consciousness of wrongfulness. Although the factual finding was fully
justified I have some difficulty with the conclusion because it could confuse moral
and legal blameworthiness. It is sufficient to rely on counsel‟s concession, correctly
made, that the defendants‟ intention was to ridicule the plaintiff. This means that the
defendants are liable. The remaining issues are quantum and costs.
QUANTUM
[42] As mentioned, the court below awarded R45 000 to the plaintiff. Assessment
of compensation is a matter for the trial court and a court of appeal may interfere
under limited circumstances only. One is where the court had misdirected itself on a
material issue. The parties were agreed that the court indeed misdirected itself. It
dealt with the matter as if the assessment of quantum was similar to the
determination of sentence in a criminal case.69 Factors taken into account were that
the perpetrators should not at this young age be burdened with a debt that might
affect their future; and that their interests should be considered. This misdirection
may require a re-assessment of quantum. The defendants argue that the amount
should be reduced while the plaintiff, who had claimed R300 000 in relation to each
of the two „delicts‟, argued for a substantial increase.
[43] The defamation and consequent humiliation was in my view serious. The
publication was, on the probabilities, widespread under the scholars. The photo may
still be available on many a cell phone or computer and there is no reason to believe

66 It should be clearly understood that this judgment does not deal with crimen iniuria or with dolus in
criminal law where other policy considerations may apply.
67 Op cit p 165-166.
68 Op cit p 195.
69 Mogale & others v Seima [2005] ZASCA 101; 2008 (5) SA 637 (SCA) para 11.

that the dissemination has stopped. The plaintiff was known to the audience; and his
position of authority was materially undermined. He had reason to suspect that he
became the laughing stock of the school.
[44] The plaintiff submitted that because the right to dignity is now a protected
right in terms of the Constitution, this justifies a new approach to quantum because,
as counsel said, the values underlying the Constitution are not otherwise
appropriately protected. The problem with the argument is that it assumes that the
common law on defamation is deficient and that one is entitled, albeit indirectly, to
constitutional damages. It also ignores the fact that there are many rights
guaranteed in the Constitution and if one were to re-assess the „monetary‟ value of
one the others, such as free speech, might be implicated.70
[45] An apology impacts on quantum and the defendants submit that they sought
to apologise to the plaintiff but that he refused to speak to them on the advice of his
lawyers. The evidence of the defendants on their attempted apology appears to me
to be somewhat suspect.71 However, the attempt was made long after the event on
the advice of a third party. The manner in which they conducted their defence during
the trial and the manner in which they gave evidence indicate clearly that they were
disrespectful towards the plaintiff, had no remorse, and did not wish to apologise.
They justified their arrogance on the basis that the plaintiff should not have taken
offence at what they did, and that he should have been content with the disciplinary
steps that had been taken by the school and the community service to which they
had been subjected. I agree with plaintiff‟s counsel that all this was aggravating.
[46] The court below had regard to the impact of the publication on the plaintiff‟s
dignity but, said his counsel, insufficiently so. As mentioned, the plaintiff gave
extensive evidence on this. It was one of the considerations he took into account in
moving to another school. I do not wish to elaborate. It is clear that the plaintiff is a
sensitive person but he may have taken this matter too much to heart. In my view
one cannot assess quantum subjectively. One must have regard to the probable
consequences for someone in the position of the plaintiff. In other words, the

70 Compare Mogale & others v Seima 2008 (6) SA 637 (SCA) para 9.
71 Compare Tsedu & others v Lekota & another [2009] ZASCA 11; [2009] 3 All SA 46 (SCA); 2009 (4)
SA 372 (SCA) para 21-24.

determination must be objectively justifiable.72 I am not convinced that the court
below erred in this regard.
[47] The last aspect that I wish to address in this context is whether the fact that
the defamers were school children and the defamed their teacher has an impact on
quantum. In other words, should the plaintiff not have taken the publication from
whence it came? To illustrate: is an allegation by a dissatisfied litigant that a judicial
officer was dishonest less serious than a similar allegation by the minister of justice?
I think that the question has to be answered in the affirmative because it is less likely
that the allegation by the litigant would be taken seriously by an objective person. In
other words, although the source cannot affect the defamatory nature of the
statement it might affect the award.
[48] After anxious consideration I have come to the conclusion that in spite of the
misdirection the award of the court below was fair in all the circumstances. I may
have awarded more but since my award would not have been substantially more an
interference cannot be justified. It should be remembered that there was a
countervailing misdirection because the court had upheld the loss of dignity claim as
a separate claim, which might have affected his assessment. I do recognise that the
plaintiff may eventually be out of pocket due to the cost of litigation but defects in the
costs structure cannot be rectified through awards of damages.
COSTS
[49] As mentioned, the court below ordered costs on the magistrates‟ courts‟
scale. This means, if regard is to be had to the amount awarded, that the plaintiff has
to bear a substantial percentage of his own costs. The parties on both sides
employed two counsel for the trial and each submitted that, if successful, the
success should carry the costs of two counsel, which is only possible if costs were to
be awarded on the high court scale. On appeal they also employed two counsel and
agreed, correctly in my view, that the costs of two counsel were justified. It appears
to me to be somewhat incongruous in those circumstances to hold that the trial costs
should have been on the lower scale.

72 Compare Delange v Costa [1989] 2 All SA 267 (A); 1989 (2) SA 857 (A) at 861-862.

[50] Costs are within the discretion of the trial court and unless there is a
demonstrable error this court cannot intervene. The high court correctly held that the
mere fact that the case concerned defamation did not justify without more a costs
order on the higher scale.73 However, the court misdirected itself in my view by
regarding the case as an ordinary run of the mill defamation case. The matters of
principle involved justified in my view a costs order on the higher scale and also
costs of two counsel.74
ORDER
[51] The following order is made:
1 The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
2 The cross-appeal is upheld with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel.
3 The order of the court below is amended by substituting para 3 with „Koste,
insluitend die koste van twee advokate‟.

________________________
L T C Harms
Deputy President

73 Graham v Odendaal 1972 (2) SA 611 (A); Mogale & others v Seima [2005] ZASCA 101; 2008 (6)
SA 637 (SCA).
74 McKay v Editor City Press and another [2002] 1 All SA 538 (SE).

GRIESEL AJA:
[52] Laughter can be a serious business with serious consequences, as the
defendants in this case discovered to their detriment. They testified that their
intention was not to injure the reputation of the plaintiff, but to make a joke. They
also testified that the overwhelming reaction of the recipients of the manipulated
picture was one of hilarity. Thus, to put their defence in a nutshell, the defendants
maintained that the manipulated picture was not intended seriously and was not
taken seriously.
[53] Trying to explain to others why we find certain jokes or situations humorous
can be problematic. As it was graphically put by E B White:75 „Humor can be
dissected as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are
discouraging to any but the pure scientific mind.‟  Nonetheless, attempts have been
made from time to time to dissect humour. One of these attempts was by the British
comedian, Rowan Atkinson (better known as Mr Bean), who explained that an object
or a person can become funny in three different ways: by behaving in an unusual
way; by being in an unusual place; or by being the wrong size.76
[54] It seems to me that this was what the defendants were trying to convey
when pressed to explain the joke to the court below: they referred to the incongruity
(„teenstelling‟) created by the manipulated picture. The defendants said what made
the picture so funny – in their eyes and in the eyes of their fellow learners who saw it
– was not the fact that it was so close to the truth, but that it was so very far removed
from reality. The following extract from the second defendant‟s evidence in response
to questions by the court illustrates the point:
‘HOF: Wat is eintlik dan snaaks? U moet my verskoon, mnr Gildenhuys, maar as u nie eintlik ’n
negatiewe konnotasie geheg het nie, dan wat was snaaks? --- Omdat dit sovêr van die werklikheid af
is. Dr Dey is iemand wat hoë morele waardes voorgestaan het by die skool en . . . dit wat hy voor die

75 US humourist and author (1899–1985) in Some Remarks on Humor, Introduction, accessed at
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/E. B. White on 24 March 2010.
76 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humour accessed on 24 March 2010.

skool gesê het is al wat ek van hom geken het, en dit was altyd goeie goed. Dit was hoë morele
waardes.’
[55] The first defendant explained that what he found funny about the picture was
the fact that it was so „far fetched‟, namely to see the principal and the vice principal
in such a compromising position. The third defendant said much the same. When
asked, „So dit is die teenstelling wat snaaks is?‟, he replied: „Dit is definitief die
kontras en die ironie.‟ (Rowan Atkinson would explain that the figures in the picture
are depicted as behaving in an unusual way or being in an unusual situation.)77
[56] Prof Kriegler, an educational psychologist who was called as an expert on
behalf of the defendants, lent theoretical support to their defence by explaining that
often it is the element of incongruity that makes something funny:
„Teenstelling is soos in inkongruensie, twee goed wat eintlik glad nie bymekaar pas nie,
soos sê nou maar ons sit Margaret Thatcher se gesig op ‟n Penthouse Pet se lyf, dit sou
snaaks wees omdat dit rym nie, dit hoort glad nie bymekaar nie. Maar dit is ‟n komplekse
onderwerp.‟
[57] Further light is thrown on this „complex subject‟ in the article by Prof Stern,
quoted by my colleague,78 where the author makes the following perceptive and
apposite remarks:
„There exist as many classes of jokes as classes of values. There are jokes degrading
intellectual values, others degrading moral values, esthetic values, religious values, vital
values, instrumental values, economic values, etc.

. . . .

The number of anecdotes drawing their comic effects from a degradation of those moral
values which characterize the erotic life is especially noticeable. On the one hand, we have
the vigorous sexual passions; on the other hand, the rigorous restrictions of these passions

77 Para 53 above.
78 Para 18 above.

by ethics, religion, social conventions, and penal prohibitions. The individual can not escape
the social pressure exerted by these conventions and taboos. He can violate them only at
the risk of social and sometimes even of penal sanctions. The individual takes his revenge
in trying, by means of jokes and anecdotes, to degrade those moral values of erotic life
which the social and moral conventions and legal prohibitions try to protect. The laughter
resulting from those degradations is for the individual a kind of symbolic liberation from a
social pressure from which he suffers. When the individual ceases to suffer from the effect of
those conventions and prohibitions, he is no longer so eager to degrade their value.
Therefore, it is neither the old ladies nor the old gentlemen who tell us the most piquant
stories.‟
[58] The fact that the court – and the plaintiff – may find the defendants‟ attempt
at humour banal or in bad taste or unamusing is neither here nor there. This does
not transform a bad joke into a defamatory statement. In this regard I respectfully
endorse what was said by Sachs J in the Laugh it Off matter79 in a slightly different
context:
„We are not called upon to be arbiters of the taste displayed or judges of the humour offered.
Nor are we required to say how successful Laugh It Off has been in hitting its parodic mark.
Whatever our individual sensibilities or personal opinions about the T-shirts might be, we are
obliged to interpret the law in a manner which protects the right of bodies such as Laugh It
Off to advance subversive humour. The protection must be there whether the humour is
expressed by mimicry in drag, or cartooning in the press, or the production of lampoons on
T-shirts. . . . They chose parody as a means, and invited young acolytes to join their gadfly
laughter.‟
[59] With that prelude I turn to the first inquiry, namely to establish the natural or
ordinary meaning of the picture in question. As rightly observed by the trial judge,
any person who looks at the picture would immediately observe that it is not in fact a
photograph of the plaintiff and the principal, but rather the product of amateurish
manipulation. One is also struck by the fact that the principal (who, incidentally,

79 Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom
of Expression Institute as amicus curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 108.

accepted the apologies of the defendants and did not take legal action against them)
is depicted in the picture with a broad smile on his face, as if recognising the humour
in the situation.
[60] If one were to apply the traditional test by postulating the reaction of hypo-
thetical ordinary right-thinking persons generally, such persons who are outsiders to
the particular school would not know or understand the context in which it was
created or published: thus, they would not know the two men whose faces have
been superimposed onto the naked bodies; they would not know their true character
and disposition; they would therefore not see the incongruity in the situation; they
would not recognise the strategically placed school emblems and would not
understand the significance of those emblems in relation to the two figures depicted
in the picture. They would not know that the picture was created and circulated by
adolescent schoolboys in an attempt to poke fun at their principal and vice-principal.
In short, such outsiders would not understand the „natural and ordinary meaning‟
conveyed by the picture – as little as if a picture were shown to them bearing a
subtitle in Mandarin. The subtitle in Mandarin would first have to be translated before
the reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would be able to determine whether
or not it carries a defamatory meaning. Here, the reasonable outsider would require
a „translation‟ of a different kind before being able to interpret the picture in question.
[61] The audience for which the picture was intended, namely the defendants
and their fellow learners at the school, saw it quite differently. Some of them
received it on their cell phones, others saw the printout that was made by the second
defendant. Their reactions, while not decisive, were certainly significant. Being
familiar with the context, they immediately recognised the attempt at humour and
laughed at the incongruity conveyed by the picture.
[62] I pause here to deal briefly with Masch v Leask, referred to in my colleague‟s
judgment.80 There, the words used by the defendant – „Dit lieg jij‟ („You are telling a

80 Para 9 above.

lie‟) – were defamatory per se. It was in that context that Wessels J said the
following:
„It is perfectly clear that the animus injuriandi lies with the person who uses the words, but if
a person utters words that are per se libellous, he is responsible for what he does, and he is
responsible if he injures the business of another. If, therefore, he was to excuse himself that
he merely spoke in jest, he must prove to the Court that it was in jest, and that the words
must have been accepted as such by the by-standers.‟81
The present situation is different: here, it cannot be held that the picture is
defamatory per se and the court has to grapple with the natural and ordinary
meaning thereof. It would be wrong, in these circumstances, to require the
defendants to prove that it could be taken up in no other light by a reasonable
person. The onus rests on the plaintiff to prove the defamation on which he relies
and if it were to be found that the publication in issue is ambiguous or that doubt
exists as to the meaning thereof, then the presumption of law is in favour of an non-
injurious meaning.82

[63] The present situation is analogous to the defamation relied upon in
Mohamed v Jassiem,83 where the court held that it was defamatory to call someone
„an Ahmadi sympathiser‟, even though it was only understood in a defamatory sense
by „a tiny fraction of our national population‟ in the Western Cape Muslim
community.84 Likewise it would be inappropriate in this case to postulate the
reactions of „ordinary right-thinking persons generally‟, instead of restricting the
inquiry to the microcosm comprising the particular school community and examining
the way in which they understood the picture. Applying that test, the plaintiff has
failed to prove, in my view, that the meaning conveyed by the picture is the one
relied on in the particulars of claim. It follows that the claim based on defamation

81 At 116.
82 Melius de Villiers op cit p 91.
83 Note 5 above.
84 At 703B–H.

fails at the first stage, with the result that it is not necessary for me to consider the
other aspects raised in the erudite judgment of my colleague.
[64] Having said that, I accept, as does my colleague, that there is only one
cause of action arising from the defendants‟ conduct herein. It is self-evident that
whereas defamation invariably involves „in the first instance an affront to a person‟s
dignity which is aggravated by publication‟,85 the converse is not always true; in
other words, an affront to a person‟s dignity does not necessarily amount to
defamation.86 On the facts of this case, I am firmly of the view that the defendants‟
conduct amounts to an impairment of the plaintiff‟s dignity, not his reputation.
[65] Turning to the claim based on the impairment of the plaintiff‟s dignity, the
requisites for this cause of action are „firmly entrenched in our law‟ and do not
require repetition.87 Essentially, the concept of dignitas is a subjective one.88 In the
present matter, the plaintiff testified as to how he, subjectively, experienced the
picture and its aftermath and how it negatively affected his own feelings of self-
respect and dignity.89 That evidence was accepted by the trial court and its findings
in that regard have not been assailed on appeal. For the reasons given by my
colleague,90 I agree that it is not open to the defendants to rely on jest as a defence
against the claim based on iniuria. It does not protect them in these circumstances
where they foresaw the possibility that their attempts at humour might be perceived
as insulting, offensive or degrading by the plaintiff.
[66] For these reasons and for the reasons furnished by Harms DP in relation to
quantum and costs, I agree with the order proposed by him.

85 Para 23 above.
86 Melius de Villiers op cit p 90.
87 Delange v Costa 1989 (2) SA 857 (A) at 860I–861B.
88 Ibid.
89 Cf para 21 above.
90 Para 9 above.

B M GRIESEL
Acting Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES:

APPELLANTS:

T Strydom

H van Tonder

Instructed by Zietsman-Horn

Attorneys, c/o Beyers & Day

Incorporated, Pretoria

Claude Reid Attorneys, Bloemfontein

RESPONDENTS:

M C Maritz SC

J du Plessis

Gerhard Wagenaar Attorneys,

Pretoria

Symington & De Kok Attorneys,

Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
30 March 2010
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
* * *
LE ROUX V DEY

Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against an order of
the North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) finding in favour of the respondent in an
action for defamation and awarding him damages, and upheld a cross-appeal by the
respondent against a costs order of the high court.

The appellants published a manipulated photo of two naked gay bodybuilders sitting
next to each other in a compromising position. The photo of the respondent (the vice
principal of their school) was pasted on the face of the one bodybuilder and the face
of the principal of the school onto the other.

The high court, in determining the objective ‘message’ conveyed by the publication,
held that although it was obvious that the faces did not belong to the bodies, the

transposition of the faces onto the bodies associated the two teachers with the
bodybuilders and their behaviour and that the photo created the impression that the
two figures had low moral values and immodest sexuality. As to the question
whether the publication was defamatory, it held that it ridiculed the respondent’s
moral values and disrespected his person. The high court also found that the
respondent’s dignity had been impaired but did not award him damages for
impairment of dignity. It awarded the respondent costs on the magistrates’ courts’
scale.

The SCA held that the photo was defamatory of the respondent and that its
publication was wrongful. It held in respect of the respondent’s additional claim
based on impairment of dignity that it was ill-founded as a particular defamatory act
cannot give rise to two causes of action. It held in respect of the respondent’s cross-
appeal against the quantum of damages that the award of the high court was fair in
the circumstances. In upholding the cross-appeal against the costs order of the high
court, the SCA held that the matters of principle involved in the matter justified a
costs order on the higher scale and also costs of two counsel.