THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

REPORTABLE
CASE NO:   609/2007

In the matter between

ENRIQUE ABREY LENDOL MOCKE                         APPELLANT

and

THE STATE                                                                    RESPONDENT

CORAM:
MTHIYANE, CLOETE JJA and MHLANTLA
AJA

HEARD:

27 MAY 2008
DELIVERED:
2 JUNE 2008

Summary: Accused convicted of murder by regional magistrate on evidence
of single witness – no reasons given nor credibility findings made by magistrate
on evidence of witnesses.
On appeal – this held to be misdirection entitling appellate court to interfere and
reassess evidence itself - Conviction and sentence set aside and replaced with one
of being accessory after fact to murder.
Sentence – two years of correctional supervision imposed.
Costs – State ordered to pay wasted costs occasioned by non-appearance of its
representative on attorney and client scale.

Neutral Citation: EAL Mocke v The State (609/2007) [2008] ZASCA
80 (2 June 2008).

MTHIYANE JA

MTHIYANE JA:

Introduction

[1] The appellant was convicted in the Bellville Regional Court on a
charge of murder and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. His appeal
to the Cape High Court with leave of the magistrate against both the
conviction and sentence failed. The appellant was however granted leave
by the court a quo to appeal to this court against both the conviction and
sentence.

[2] The charge arose from an incident in Ravensmead on Saturday 6
April 2002. On the day in question Ms Maureen Adams (‘the deceased’),
who lived and worked on the business premises of the appellant’s father,
Mr William John Mocke, was brutally killed. Her ‘common law’
husband, Mr Joseph Marshall, lived with her on the premises.

[3] The State alleged that it was the appellant who killed the deceased
by stabbing her with a knife or other sharp instrument and by inflicting
other acts of violence upon her. The State relied on the evidence of a
single witness, one Henry Daniels, a friend of the appellant, who, like
him, was 16 years old at the time of the incident. He testified that the
appellant had killed the deceased by grabbing her by her arm and
stabbing her several times around the neck with a shining object or a pair
of scissors. The appellant denied these allegations and averred that it was
Daniels who stabbed and killed the deceased.

[4] The magistrate rejected the appellant’s version and accepted the
evidence of Daniels without giving reasons. In a one page judgment he
did not embark on any analysis of the evidence and made no credibility
findings on the evidence of the witnesses.

The Principles
[5] The approach which should have been adopted by the magistrate in
dealing with the conflicting versions of the appellant and Daniels was
articulated by Joubert AJA in a judgment of this court in S v Guess1
‘The magistrate obviously misdirected himself in accepting Makapan’s evidence
without stating his reasons for believing him and without stating his reasons for
disbelieving the appellant and Miss Brown. The correct approach which the
magistrate should have adopted in weighing up the evidence of the State and that of
the defence appears from the dicta of the following two reported cases:
(1)
Per DE VILLIERS, J.P., in Schoonwinkel v. Swart’s Trustee, 1911 T.P.D. 397
at p. 401:
“This Court, as a Court of appeal, expects the court below not only to give its findings
on the facts, but also its reasons for those findings. It is not sufficient for a magistrate
to say, ‘I believed this witness, and I did not believe that witness’. The Court of
appeal expects the magistrate, when he finds that he cannot believe a witness, to state
his reasons why he does not believe him. If the reasons are, because of inherent
improbabilities, or because of contradictions in the evidence of the witness, or
because of his being contradicted by more trustworthy witnesses, the Court expects
the magistrate to say so. If the reason is the demeanour of the witness, the Court
expects the magistrate to say that; and particularly in the latter case the Court will not
lightly upset he magistrate’s finding on such a point”.
This dictum was intended for a civil case but it is equally applicable to a criminal
case.
(2)
Per LEON, J., in S v Singh, 1975 (1) S.A. 227 (N) at p. 228:
“Because this is not the first time that one has been faced on appeal with this kind of
situation, it would perhaps be wise to repeat once again how a court ought to approach

1 1976 (4) SA 715 (A) at 718E-719A.

a criminal case on fact where there is a conflict of fact between the evidence of the
State witnesses and that of an accused. It is quite impermissible to approach such a
case thus: because the court is satisfied as to the reliability and the creditably of the
State witnesses that, therefore, the defence witnesses, including the accused must be
rejected. The proper approach in a case such as this is for the court to apply its mind
not only to the merits and demerits of the State and defence witnesses but also to the
probabilities of the case. It is only after so applying its mind that a court would be
justified in reaching a conclusion as to whether the guilt of an accused has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The best indication that a court has applied its
mind in the proper manner in the above-mentioned example is to be found in its
reasons for judgment including its reasons for the acceptance and rejection of the
respective witnesses.”
Makapan’s evidence should be treated with circumspection, since he left the appellant
because he had not been paid adequately. On the probabilities of the case it is by no
means unlikely that he nurtured a grievance against the appellant.’

[6] Daniels was not only a single witness whose testimony had to be
clear and satisfactory in every material respect but he was also implicated
by the appellant in the murder. The reasonable possibility of his
involvement in the murder is beyond question. In my view Daniels should
have been treated as an accomplice even though he was not warned in
terms of section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (‘the Act’)
at the trial. Support for this view is to be found in DT Zeffert, AP Paizes
and A St Q Skeen in The South African Law of Evidence,2 where the
learned authors say the following:
‘In some cases the term “quasi-accomplices” has been used to describe persons who
are not technically accomplices but appear to know a good deal about the offence and
have some purpose of their own to serve in giving evidence. The reasons for the
accomplice rule apply equally to such persons and similar circumspection ought
therefore to be shown in dealing with their evidence. The following are examples of
quasi-accomplices: fellow members of an illegal organization according to some

2 4 ed (2003) p 802.

decisions (but the Appellate Division in S v Sauls & Others refused to treat a witness,
who had played no part in the alleged crime, as an accomplice, merely because he was
a member of the same illegal prison organisation as the accused and, as such, under
suspicion); police informers, and persons borrowing money at usurious rates of
interest. There is some dispute over whether in such cases the cautionary rule applies
as a requisite of procedural law or whether caution is simply dictated by
commonsense; but the point is somewhat academic since, as we have seen, the
cautionary rule is itself no more than an admonition to use commonsense.’

[7] On the same theme Holmes JA expressed himself as follows in S v
Malinga:3
‘The Court a quo treated Mabaso as an accomplice and an informer. He was certainly
an informer. Whether in the circumstances he was de jure an accomplice I need not
decide, for the trial Court’s view that he was could only redound to the benefit of the
accused. Whatever the juristic niche into which he may be classified as a witness, his
evidence had two things in common with that of an accomplice. First, he had a
possible motive to benefit himself by false implication of others, for he was an
escaped indeterminate convict who had agreed to help the police to round up his
confederates in crime. Second, by reason of his participation in this crime he was in a
position in Court to deceive the unwary by a realistic account of it, his only fiction
being the deceptive substitution of the accused for the real culprits, or the addition of
one or more participants for good measure. Hence the prudence of applying to his
testimony the cautionary rule enunciated in R. v. Ncanana, 1948 (4) S.A. (A.D.) at pp.
405/6 and R. v. Gumede, 1949 (3) S.A. 749 (A.D.).’
I am in agreement with the principles set out above.

[8] In the court a quo Motala J, with Zondi J concurring, correctly
found that the magistrate had misdirected himself and that the court was
accordingly at large to reassess the evidence and determine for itself
whether on the evidence the guilt of the appellant had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

3 1963 (1) SA 692 (A) 693H–694A.

[9] There are two further instances of misdirection alluded to by the
court a quo. Firstly the magistrate described the cause of death as being
several stab wounds in the deceased’s chest area (‘verskeie steekwonde in
die borskasarea’) whereas the post mortem report records that the stab
wounds found on the deceased’s body were concentrated in the neck area
and did not cause her death. There it is recorded that the deceased died of
chest injuries – an obvious reference to the multiple fracture of the ribs.
Secondly, the magistrate noted that the appellant’s DNA profile could be
read into the results of the analysis of two cigarette stubs found at the
scene whereas the generic material found on one of the butts was
definitely not from the appellant and no generic material could be
retrieved from the other butt.

The Evidence
[10] Daniels told the court that he and the appellant were good friends.
On the day of the incident he was fetched by the appellant and the
appellant’s cousin, Mr Ashley Stephanus in a ‘bakkie’. They went to a
shebeen in 16th Avenue Ravensmead where they drank liquor until they
had no money left. The appellant suggested that they go to the business
premises of appellant’s father to make certain telephone calls to ask for
money for more beer. The three of them and two others went there. Upon
their arrival Daniels remained seated on the bakkie. The appellant jumped
over a fence which surrounded the premises and went to fetch the keys to
a gate and to the office in the building. All five of them entered the
building, but at some stage the other three went out again. Daniels
telephoned his mother and the appellant, his father. Daniels then went out
and joined the others on the bakkie. He then saw the appellant coming out
carrying a telefax machine. Daniels and the others objected to what the
appellant was doing. Daniels and appellant then returned to the building

leaving the telefax machine on the bakkie. Ashley, however, took it from
the bakkie and passed it over to Wayne who was already on the other side
of the fence to receive it.

[11] As the fax machine was being passed over the deceased appeared
and enquired what it was that was being passed over. She then threatened
to report to appellant’s father that he was bringing unknown persons to
the premises. She said she had seen the telefax machine being passed
over the fence and said she was going to report the matter to the
appellant’s elder brother, William. The appellant and Daniels pleaded
with her not to report the incident. She agreed on condition that they re-
plugged the telefax machine in its place. Daniels did so. The deceased
then noticed that a drill stand had been moved from its usual location. She
now resolved to report what was happening to William as things had then
got out of hand.

[12] While she was busy sweeping the floor Daniels says he saw the
appellant grabbing the deceased by her arm and stabbing her. The
appellant shouted at him to also stab the deceased but Daniels ran out and
went to sit outside on a box. By then their three companions had driven
away in the bakkie. The appellant remained inside for some time while
Daniels was seated outside. Marshall arrived and asked where the
deceased was but Daniels said he did not know. Marshall then went to the
building where the appellant told him that the deceased had gone to the
shops. A short while thereafter the appellant came out of the building and
he and Daniels then ran away. On the way, appellant told Daniels that he
had stabbed the deceased and did not have long to live. He showed
Daniels certain marks on his arm and claimed he had been scratched by

the deceased. Daniels noticed that the appellant’s trousers were blood-
stained.

[13] About a week later, the appellant told him that he had exchanged
his trousers with his cousin. He had with him a bag containing a blood-
soaked sweater which he later burnt in the presence of Daniels.

[14] Testifying in his defence the appellant told the court that he had
earlier that morning been drinking at Ashley’s home and not at the
shebeen in 16th Avenue as alleged by Daniels. His version on this point
was confirmed by Ashley. The appellant agreed with Daniels that he and
the others went to his father’s business premises to use the telephone. He
said Daniels phoned a few girl friends and he had phoned his father who
declined to provide any money. According to him it was Daniels who
suggested that power tools on the premises be taken to be pawned. The
appellant considered the drill stand to be too bulky and did not think that
it would be a good idea to remove it.

[15] Daniels then disconnected the telefax machine. Although he did
not think that it was a good idea he nevertheless agreed to go along with
the idea that it being removed and sold so that they could get money to
buy beer. The appellant confirmed Daniels’s version that the telefax
machine was returned after the deceased scolded them and threatened to
report the incident to the appellant’s brother, William. He also confirmed
that she agreed not to report the incident after the fax machine was
returned. He also agreed with Daniels that when the deceased noticed that
the drill stand had been removed from its place she resolved to report the
incident to the appellant’s father.

[16] It was then that Daniels told the appellant that he was going to stab
the deceased. The appellant thought that Daniels was joking. Daniels then
passed a pair of scissors to him, and armed himself with a broken spear.
Daniels later returned the pair of scissors. The appellant then heard a
sound, like a head hitting the ground and the sound of someone struggling
to speak. He went outside and saw Daniels sitting on top of the deceased.
He pulled Daniels off. Daniels then said “ek [i.e. appellant] moet iets vir
die bloed kry”. The appellant then removed his t-shirt and threw it to
Daniels who wiped his hands with it. He took his t-shirt back and felt the
deceased’s neck to see if she was still alive. He then went to the bathroom
and washed his hands. He threw water on his bloody footprints. He hid
his t-shirt in a disused toilet. He and Daniels then ran away. Along the
way, Daniels handed him a pair of scissors which he threw away. A
month or two later, he retrieved his t-shirt and he and Daniels burnt it.’

[17] The trial court was confronted with these two conflicting versions.
There is very little to choose between them. Neither was an impressive
witness. Both lied about the crucial aspects of the incident and both had
equal motive to kill the deceased and to distance themselves from the
incident.

Discussion
[18] The onus was on the State to prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. As already indicated it relied on Daniels who
was a single witness and whose evidence had to be treated with caution.
The court a quo found that he lied about the reason for going to the
premises. It also found that there were discrepancies between what he
said in court and his statement to the police. Daniels had intimate
knowledge of what had happened at the scene of crime and he, like the

appellant, was in danger of being reported to the appellant’s father. He
lied to Marshall as to the deceased’s whereabouts. Daniels admitted that
at one stage he had a broken spear in his hand. He claimed that he had it
when he was outside. There is to my mind more than a reasonable
possibility of his involvement in the murder. Before the deceased was
killed on his own admission he was carrying a broken spear; he can’t
explain why. He lied to the deceased’s husband, Marshall, when the latter
asked where his wife was. He fled from the scene together with the
appellant and offers no explanation for it.

[19] It seems to me that the court a quo unwittingly fell into the same
trap as the trial court of expressing a preference for a version that could
not bear scrutiny. Having come to the conclusion that the evidence of
Daniels had to be treated with a high degree of caution, the court a quo
went on to look for factors which it considered would lessen the risk of
relying on the evidence of Daniels. The factors the court found were the
appellant’s evidence relating to the t-shirt: the fact that he handed it over
to Daniels to wipe his hands, that it was blood-soaked, that he had wiped
off his footprints with it, that he hid the t-shirt and subsequently burned it
in the presence of Daniels, that before leaving the scene the appellant had
thrown water on his bloody footprints. All of the above factors were
considered to be irreconcilable with the appellant’s innocence.

[20] A further factor which the court a quo considered as providing
some guarantee that Daniels was telling the truth was confirmation by
Marshall that when he returned, Daniels was sitting outside while the
appellant remained inside the building.

[21] The court concluded that on all of the above factors, especially the
fact that the appellant’s t-shirt was soaked in blood, is that the appellant
was involved in the assault on the deceased, either alone or together with
Daniels. It dismissed appellant’s version that he had handed the t-shirt to
Daniels to wipe his hands with it as ‘absurd’. As contended by counsel
for the appellant this piece of evidence might be suspicious but to dismiss
it as absurd is taking the matter too far. The confirmation by Marshall that
Daniels was sitting outside at some stage does not take the matter any
further. In any event it is an aspect that is common cause. It will be
recalled that it was the appellant’s case that after the assault there was a
stage when Daniels went out. It is in any event conceivable that there
would have been blood on the appellant’s t-shirt if, as he says, he at some
stage had to pull Daniels off the deceased.

[22] The main focus of the court a quo was the evidence of Daniels and
the appellant.

[23] The finding of the court that Daniels was possibly involved must of
necessity imply a finding that his denial in the witness box of any
involvement was a blatant lie. Although the appellant appears from the
record not to have been a particularly impressive witness, he was not
shown to be a liar and his shortcomings do not in any way supplement the
deficiencies in the State case.

[24] It was conceded on the appellant’s behalf that on his own version
he had made himself guilty of being an accessory after the fact. That is
clear from the evidence relating to the burning of his t-shirt, the wiping of
the blood and that he lied to Marshall as to the whereabouts of the
deceased. In my view the concession was properly made. On all the

evidence the appellant should have been convicted of being an accessory
after the fact to murder.

Sentence
[25] I do not think that any purpose would be served by referring the
matter to the trial court for sentence. All the facts relevant to sentence are
before us. There is in addition a report of the probation officer who
recommended that in the circumstances of this case correctional
supervision in terms in terms of section 276(1)(h) of the Act would be a
more appropriate sentence. Counsel for the appellant supported this
recommendation. Counsel for the State also conceded that if we were
minded to substitute a conviction of being accessory after the fact to
murder, the sentence of correctional supervision proposed by the
probation officer would be appropriate.

[26] At the time of the incident the appellant was a school going lad
aged 16 years old and 20 years when sentence was handed down on 13
March 2006. At present he is 22 years old and his circumstances have
now changed. We were informed from the bar by his counsel that he
currently assists his father in his building contracting business. The
appellant is a first offender. As can be gleaned from the history of this
matter the case has been hanging over his head for some time.

[27] Although the appellant has been convicted of a lesser offence of
being an accessory after the fact to murder it is still a very serious matter.
The actions of the appellant were aimed at assisting the perpetrator to
avoid the consequences of his actions. But for his youth a term of
imprisonment would have been an appropriate sentence. There is no
doubt however that the case is deserving of stringent corrective measures

to bring home to the appellant seriousness of the offence he committed. It
also appears that liquour played a role in the incident. They came to his
father’s business premises in an attempt to get money to buy more beer.
The conditions applicable to a sentence of correctional supervision can be
tailored to take this into account.

Wasted Costs
[28] Before deciding on the appropriate order there is one further matter
I wish to deal with. This appeal was originally enrolled for hearing on 15
May 2008. There was no appearance for the State and we were totally in
the dark as to what had happened. It was the industrious effort of counsel
for the appellant, Mr Maartens, to whom this court is indebted, who
telephoned the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Cape
Town and established that that office was unaware that the matter was set
down for that date. This, despite the fact that the Notice of Set Down of
the appeal was forwarded by the Registrar of this court to that office by
registered post, and was signed for at the DPP’s office. The appeal was
then postponed to 27 May 2008 with an order directing the Registrar to
seek an explanation from the DPP’s office for the non-appearance of the
representative of the State at the appeal hearing. Some few days before
the postponed hearing a letter explaining how the debacle occurred and
tendering the necessary apology to the court was received. It also
contained an undertaking that certain measures have been put in place
and an assurance that a recurrence would be avoided. At the postponed
hearing the State was represented by Ms Raphels who offered the State’s
apology to the members of the court and repeated the explanation and
assurances given in the letter addressed to the court by the DPP. We
accept the apology.

[29] It must be stressed however that the appellant was put to
considerable expense as a result of the negligence of the State in failing to
ensure that it was represented at the hearing. Quite rightly counsel for the
appellant asked for an order directing the State to pay the wasted costs
occasioned by the non-continuation of the matter on 15 May 2008.
Counsel for the State could not oppose the application. I agree with
counsel for the appellant that this is a proper case for a suitable order for
costs against the State to compensate the appellant for the wasted costs
incurred as a result of the State’s non-appearance on 15 May 2008. Such
cost should in my view be taxed on the scale as between attorney and
client to minimise the prejudice to the appellant.

Order
[30] In the particular circumstances of this case I consider that an
appropriate sentence would be one of correctional supervision. In the
result the appeal is allowed to the extent set out below. I shall set out the
conditions of the correctional supervision order in Afrikaans, as that is the
appellant’s home language. The order of the court a quo is set aside and
replaced with the following:
‘1.
The appeal is allowed.
2.
The conviction of murder and the sentence imposed are set aside,
and the following substituted:
“Die beskuldigde word skuldig bevind aan begunstiging tot moord en
gevonnis tot twee jaar korrektiewe toesig in terme van artikel 276(1)(h)
van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 op die volgende voorwaardes:
1(a) Huisarres te Rangeweg 8, Matroosfontein, Elsiesrivier, Wes-Kaap
gedurende die tye soos deur die Kommissaris van Korrektiewe
Dienste bepaal vir die volle duur van korrektiewe toesig. Met dien
verstande dat die Kommissaris gemagtig word om die plek te

wysig en enige tydperk van huisarres op te skort of te verleng
onder die voorwaardes wat hy goedvind of, daarna, vir solank en
onder sodanige voorwaardes as wat hy mag goedvind, her in te stel.
(b)
Gemeenskapsdiens vir ‘n maksimum periode van 16 uur per maand
vir die duur van die vonnis.

Die diens sal bestaan uit skoonmaak en instandhouding van perseel
te SAPD Kuilsrivier onder toesig van die stasie kommissaris of sy
gevolgmagtige.

Met dien verstande dat die Kommissaris gemagtig word om:

Die aard van die diens en die plek waar dit gelewer word, te wysig
indien dit nodig is om die nakoming van die vonnis te bevorder.

Indien verdienstelik, hoogstens een derde van die tyd waarin
Gemeenskapsdiens verrig moet word, op te skort onder
voorwaardes wat hy goed vind.

Addisionele gemeenskapsdiens by te voeg ten einde nakoming van
die vonnis te bevorder, maar wat nie die oorspronklike hoeveelheid
ure oorskry nie.
(c)
Onderwerping aan behandelingsprogram(me)/rehabilitasieprogram
soos bepaal met re-assessering deur maatskaplike werker by
Gemkor kantoor.
(d)
Die plek waar, tye waartydens, duur en inhoud van sodanige
programme/toesigdiens sal deur die Kommissaris van Korrektiewe
Dienste bepaal word. Enige koste verbonde aan sodanige
programme/toesigdiens kan van die beskuldigde verhaal word.
(e)
Onderwerping aan monitering deur die Kommissaris van
Korrektiewe Dienste ten einde die oogmerke van hierdie vonnis te
verwesenlik.
2.
Die beskuldigde mag nie sonder toestemming van die Korrektiewe
Beampte die landdrosdistrik waar hy woon en werk verlaat nie.

3.
Die beskuldigde moet:
(a)
By die korrektiewe beampte aanmeld by Landdroshof Bellville,
kamer 311 binne 14 dae na afloop van verrigtinge in die hof.
(b)
Hom vir die volle duur van hierdie vonnis van die gebruik van
sterk drank of die gebruik van dwelmmiddels anders as op
voorskrif van’n mediese praktisyn weerhou.
(c)
Enige redelike opdragte betreffende die nakoming en administrasie
van hierdie vonnis wat die Kommissaris van Korrektiewe Dienste
uitreik, uitvoer.
(d)
Die Kommissaris van Korrektiewe Dienste vooraf in kennis stel
van enige verandering van woon- of werksadres.
(e)
Hom ook skuldig maak aan enige verdere misdaad nie.”’
3.
The State is ordered to pay to the appellant the wasted costs
occasioned by the non-appearance of its representative on 15 May
2008. Such costs are to be taxed by the taxing master of the Cape
High Court according to the attorney and client scale in civil cases
applicable in that court, and are to be paid within 30 days of the
taxing master placing his allocatur on the bill of costs.4

_________________________
KK MTHIYANE

JUDGE OF APPEAL

CONCUR:

CLOETE JA
MHLANTLA AJA

4 Cf ss 310A(6) and 311(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:
2 June 2008

Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal.

EAL MOCKE v THE STATE (609/2007) [2008] ZASCA 80 (2 June
2008).

[1] The SCA today, 2 June 2008, upheld an appeal by the appellant,
Mr Enrique Abrey Lendol Mocke, against the conviction by the Bellville
Regional Court on a charge of murder and replaced it with a conviction of
being an accessory after the fact to murder. It sentenced the appellant,
who was 16 years old at the time of the incident on 6 April 2002 to 7
years imprisonment. The sentence imposed on the appellant, which was
confirmed by the Cape High Court was set aside by the SCA and replaced
with one of two years of correctional supervision, subject to certain
conditions.

[2] The murder arose from an incident in which one Ms Maureen
Adams of Ravensmead, was brutally killed. The State alleged that it was
the appellant who killed the deceased by stabbing her with a knife or
other sharp instrument and inflicted other acts of violence upon her. In his
defence the appellant testified that it was the witness, Mr Henry Daniels,
who committed the offence.

[3] The magistrate accepted the version of Daniels and rejected that of
the appellant, without giving reasons and without making any credibility
findings on the evidence of witnesses.

[4] The SCA, like the Cape High Court, found that the magistrate had
in this regard misdirected himself. Unlike the Cape High Court which
found that the evidence of Daniels could be relied on, the SCA took a
contrary view. It found that Daniels who was a single witness and had
also been implicated in the murder, had as much motive to kill the
deceased as the appellant. It also found that his evidence could not be
relied on as it was found to be untruthful in a number of material respects
and his evidence was not corroborated in any material respect.

[5] The court found however that on his own version the appellant had
made himself guilty of being an accessory after the fact to murder and
returned that verdict.

[6] The SCA also ordered the State to pay to the appellant, the wasted
costs occasioned by the non-appearance of the State’s representative on
15 May 2008 – a date on which the matter was initially enrolled for
hearing.