THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No: 356/11

No Precedential Significance
In the matter between:
Sagren Perumal
First Appellant
Pushpaganthie Perumal
Second Appellant
Rajambal Pillay
Third Appellant
Sadhasivan Pillay
Fourth Appellant
P3 Trucking CC
Fifth Appellant
Sadhasivan Pillay N.O.
Sixth Appellant
Poogendran Naidoo
Seventh Appellant
Loganathan Perumal
Eighth Appellant
Marilyn Hariputh
Ninth Appellant
and
The National Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent

Neutral citation:
Sagren Perumal v NDPP (356/11) [2011] ZASCA 37 (29
March 2012)
Coram:
MPATI P, HEHER, SNYDERS, and MAJIEDT JJA and
PLASKET AJA
Heard:
15 March 2012
Delivered:
29 March 2012
Summary:
Forfeiture of assets – proceeds of unlawful activities –
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.

ORDER
On appeal from: KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Durban (Moosa AJ sitting as court
of first instance):
The appeal is upheld with costs.
The order of the court below is set aside and replaced by the following:

‘The application is dismissed with costs.’
JUDGMENT
SNYDERS JA (MPATI P, HEHER and MAJIEDT JJA and PLASKET AJA
concurring):
[1] This matter is before us with leave of the court below (Moosa AJ in the Kwa-
Zulu-Natal High Court, Durban). It originated as an ex parte application by the
National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), the respondent, in terms of s 38
of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA).1 An order was
obtained on 12 March 2004 (the preservation order) and the property attached in
terms of that order comprises 221 items and some cash, as reflected in an
inventory compiled by the curator bonis appointed by the court to take control of
the property. It includes immovable and movable property owned by each of the
appellants. The order was published in the Government Gazette on 2 April 2004
in terms of s 40 of POCA.2 The respondent timeously approached the court, on
essentially the same founding papers, for an order in terms of s 48 of POCA for
the forfeiture of the property seized under the preservation order. The application
was opposed by all the appellants, argued on 20 October 2008 and on 3 March

1 Section 38 empowers the NDPP to approach a high court, ex parte, for an order preserving
property reasonably believed to be ‘an instrumentality of an offence’, ‘the proceeds of
unlawful activities’ or ‘associated with terrorist and related activities’. When such an order is
obtained the relevant high court authorises the seizure of the property and makes ‘ancillary
orders that the court considers appropriate for the proper, fair and effective execution of the
order’.
2 Section 40 provides for the expiry of a preservation order, 90 days after publication in the
Government Gazette, unless there is an application for a forfeiture order pending before a
high court in relation to the preserved property.

2011 a forfeiture order was granted of all the assets attached pursuant to the
preservation order. The appellants appeal that order.
[2] All of the appellants that are natural persons are related to each other. The
first appellant is married to the second appellant. The third appellant is the
second appellant’s mother. The fourth appellant is the second appellant’s brother
and is the sole member of the fifth appellant and also the sixth appellant, in his
capacity as the sole member of the fifth appellant. The first four appellants and
their families lived together in a house registered in the third appellant’s name, to
which I will refer as the Kings Avenue house. The seventh appellant is the
nephew of the first appellant. The eighth appellant is the first appellant’s brother,
and is married to the ninth appellant.
[3] The third appellant passed away before the hearing of the matter in the court
below. Both counsel confirmed that application was made and granted by the
court below for the substitution of the third appellant with the first and second
appellants, the executors in the estate of the third appellant. That amendment is
not reflected in any of the papers, but I accept that it was duly made. Purely for
convenience, I will continue to refer to the third appellant as such.
[4] The attached property comprises the Kings Avenue house, registered in the
name of the third appellant, its contents, various motor vehicles, the content of
the Boyz-2-Men night club and an investment policy. The case of the respondent
was that all of the assets belong to the first appellant, despite being registered in
the names of his various family members, and are either the proceeds of
unlawful activities, or an instrumentality of crime.
[5] At the commencement of the hearing in this court, counsel informed us that
the respondent has partially abandoned the judgment of the court below to the
extent that the dispute between the parties in this court only involves the Kings
Avenue house, an Iveco Eurotech truck (the truck) and a Henred Freuhauf
Platform truck trailer (the truck trailer), registered in the name of the fifth
appellant, and a Volkswagen Caravelle motorvehicle, registered in the name of
the first appellant. The rest of the property has already been returned to the
appellants. This agreement between the parties limits the issues between them
to the extent that the interests of the seventh to ninth respondents are no longer

affected. Counsel were also agreed that the effect of this agreement should not
have any influence on the costs order to be made.
[6] A successful application for forfeiture of assets in terms of s 48(1) of POCA
requires a court to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the property concerned
is either an instrumentality of an offence or the proceeds of unlawful activities.3
Section 48 is part of chapter 6 of POCA which focuses, unlike chapter 5, on
property and not on the wrongdoer. There is therefore no need for an existing
criminal conviction or pending criminal proceedings before the NDPP avails
himself of the provisions of s 48 and there were none in this case.4 The court,
faced with an application in terms of s 48, simply asks the question whether the
property was an ‘instrumentality of an offence’ or ‘the proceeds of unlawful
activities’.5
[7] The abandonement of part of the judgment of the court below and the
confinement of the case to the limited items of property listed above, further
restricted the enquiry to whether the property was the proceeds of the alleged
unlawful drug dealing activities of the first appellant and it is no longer necessary
to consider whether any property was an instrumentality of an offence.
[8] The respondent’s case is that the first appellant is one of the biggest, if not the
biggest, drug dealer in the greater Durban area, that the assets still under
preservation belong to him, are the proceeds of his drug dealing activities and
have been registered in the names of his family members or their businesses in
order to falsely create the impression that they do not belong to him. In order to
establish these allegations in application proceedings the respondent faced the
application of the well known principles established in Plascon-Evans Paints

3 Section 50: ‘(1) The High Court shall, subject to section 52, make an order applied for under
section 48(1) if the Court finds on a balance of probabilities that the property concerned – (a)
is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1; (b) is the proceeds of unlawful
activities; or (c) is property associated with terrorist and related activities.’
4 Section 50(4) ‘The validity of an order under subsection (1) is not affected by the outcome of
criminal proceedings, or of an investigation with a view to institute such proceedings, in
respect of an offence with which the property concerned is in some way associated.’
5 National Director of Public Prosecutions v R O Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; National Director
of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd & another; National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA) paras 19-21.

Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634H-635C. The
issue in this appeal therefore turns on whether the trial court correctly concluded
that the undisputed allegations in the founding affidavit, taken with the appellants’
allegations in the answering affidavits that are not clearly untenable, establish, on
a balance of probability, that the first appellant is indeed a drug dealer and that
he acquired the identified assets from the proceeds of his drug dealing activities.
[9] It is clear from the founding affidavits on behalf of the respondent that the first
appellant had been under investigation by various members of the then
Directorate of Special Operations for drug-related offences since the early
1980s.6 Apart from ordinary investigative procedures of questioning potential
witnesses, the provisions of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127
of 1992 were used to eavesdrop on the first appellant’s conversations, s 252A of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) was used to attempt to entrap the
first appellant and various searches in terms of the CPA were conducted, all in
an effort to gather evidence of his drug dealing activities. Several of the
investigators deposed to the affidavits that constitute the founding papers against
the appellants.
[10] Amod Khalil Hoosen (Hoosen), a senior special investigator employed by the
National Prosecuting Authority and attached to the DSO, adduces direct
evidence in the second sentence of the following extract from his affidavit (the
references to ‘Perumal’ in all the quotations that follow are references to the first
appellant):
‘My investigations revealed that Perumal had been involved in drug dealing activities for
the past 16 years. On or about 1990 while conducting drug investigations in the
Chatsworth area I arrested Perumal for possession of about 250 mandrax capsules.’
Hoosen does not mention any of the relevant circumstances surrounding this
arrest. The first appellant discloses in his answering affidavit that the arrest never

6  The DSO was created by s 7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, and
special investigators could be appointed in terms of s 19A of the same Act. The DSO was
disbanded by the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act 56 of 2008 and replaced by
the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation by the South African Police Service
Amendment Act 57 of 2008.

led to a prosecution. This fact casts serious doubt over the cogency of Hoosen’s
allegation.
[11] The rest of Hoosen’s affidavit does not reveal any personal knowledge of the
first appellant’s alleged drug dealing activities, but consists of conclusions based
on affidavits gathered in the course of the investigations of the first appellant.
What follows are his main conclusions:
‘During the said investigations Perumal was linked and implicated in numerous drug-
dealing incidences in which large amounts of drugs were found and seized from various
persons whom Perumal used to store and sell drugs.
My investigations revealed that even though Perumal used Runners to conduct his drug
dealing activities he was nevertheless directly actively involved in negotiating and
conducting the drug dealing transactions himself.
My further investigations revealed that the proceeds derived from the sale of drugs were
ultimately paid over to Perumal and that he regularly handled large amounts of cash,
which was generated from the sale of drugs.’
[12] Clarence Francisco Jones (Jones), an investigator in the same position as
Hoosen, described his conclusions as follows:
‘My analysis of Perumal’s drug dealing activities revealed that Perumal conducted his
drug dealing activities in a highly organized and secretive manner. He only employed
and used close associates and family members that he trusted to conduct his drug
dealing activities. He further sold and supplied drugs mainly to established clientele
whom he trusted. He did not directly do the selling of the drugs himself and he generally
did not agree to be directly approached to do drug dealing transactions.’
[13] These conclusions contain an obvious contradiction with those drawn by
Hoosen in the second extract quoted in para 11 above. The true source of the
conclusions is the affidavits of interviewees. The interviewees’ affidavits reveal a
missing link between the available evidence that they provide and the confidently
stated factual conclusions reached by the deponents to the founding affidavits.
What follows are a few examples.

[14] Hoosen relied on an affidavit by one Crystal Moodley. She described herself
as the mistress of one ‘Shangwen’, who had since passed away. The part of her
affidavit that comes closest to implicating the first appellant, reads as follows:
‘There was one occasion I was introduced to a person by the name of Bimbo. This
Bimbo was the person that was Shangwen’s friend and I was present when a deal was
made for him to supply Ecstacy tablets. I knew Ecstacy as “E”. The deal was done
outside the nightclub owned by Bimbo known as Boyz to Men. The person that handed
the “E” tablets to Shangwen was Poogen that worked for Bimbo. Shangwen was on
numerous occasions with Bimbo and he used to phone him often and it would seem to
me that they were close. There were occasions that I was present when he picked up
monies form a drug dealer known as “Bill Kandasamy” or Merebank. Shangwen told me
that he supplied “buttons” to this person.’
[15] This evidence does not support any of the conclusions drawn by Hoosen.
Even if it is accepted that the reference to ‘Bimbo’ in the extract is a reference to
the first appellant the allegations lack detail, fail to disclose the basis of the
knowledge professed therein and, more fundamentally, do not provide any
connection relating to drug dealing between the first appellant and any of the
persons implicated.7
[16] Hoosen also relies on an affidavit by Krishnan Kamalasen Pather (Pather).
He is a family member of the first appellant and made an affidavit after he was
allegedly assaulted by, amongst other members of his family, the first appellant
because he disclosed details of a stolen vehicle in the possession of the first
appellant to the police. The only reference to a stolen vehicle in the papers
concerns a vehicle that the first appellant bought that was later discovered to
have been previously stolen. The vehicle was confiscated by the police, the first
appellant made an affidavit in this regard and that appears to have been the end
of the matter. Pather’s objectivity and reliability, by reason of his alleged conflict
with the first appellant, seem questionable. The contents of his disclosures affirm
this.

7  There is evidence in the papers that the first appellant was also known as Bimbo, but
whether all references to ‘Bimbo’ are necessarily references to the first appellant, is by no
means clear.

‘. . . . [the first appellant] bought two houses in Pinetown, one which Steven and his
mother-in-law lived in, and the other, which Colleen and he stayed in. I knew that
Colleen and [the first appellant] had registered the house on her parents’ name. But I
was also aware that the parents could not afford to buy the house as Rajambal’s
husband did not earn well.
. . . [the first appellant] received a call after which he went to the outside dirt bin and took
out a few tablets, which I was informed and knew to be mandrax (± 4 tablets). He then
asked me to accompany him. We proceeded to the Pavilion Shopping Complex and met
people outside Nando’s. There were three gentlemen in the car and one of whom I knew
by sight. . . .
Thereafter using his cell phone [the first appellant] called his nephew Gordon whom we
had left behind at the house in Pinetown. Gordon arrived a few minutes later and Bimbo
told him to go into the gentlemen’s car and count the money. After doing so Gordon
handed them a parcel, which I assumed could only be drugs (mandrax). This was the
only incident that I had sight of and interaction with Bimbo’s drug deals. . . .
About four years ago I just moved to my current residence when Bimbo on one of his
frequent visits asked me to store drugs for him. He offered to pay my rent and see to my
food cost in return for me agreeing to his request. I blankly refused and it was the turning
point in our relationship.’
[17] Suspicion may be aroused if all the allegations by Pather are accepted as
fact. However, it is clear that, in relation to the immovable properties, he resorted
to sweeping statements without revealing the source of his knowledge. In relation
to the alleged drug dealing his statements are founded on speculation and
presumption and do not warrant the factual conclusions sought to be drawn by
Hoosen.
[18] Farouk Naroth (Naroth) also made an affidavit on which Hoosen relied for his
factual conclusions against the first appellant. The highpoint of his allegations
against the first appellant reads as follows:
‘Bimbo’s nephew, Poogen who also worked at the factory was also involved in the
running of the Club. On numerous occasions I noticed Poogen selling ecstasy to patrons
at the club. This was done in the presence of Bimbo and with his full knowledge. . . .

Bimbo employed an Indian male known to me as Tony to sell drugs inside the club . . .
On numerous occasions I observed customers hand cash to Tony and he in return
hands them pills. At the end of the evening or morning Tony hands the cash to either
Bimbo or Poogen. I noticed that Bimbo’s nephew Poogen was in charge of most of the
operations of the club. . . .
On several occasions during 2000 until 2003 I noticed a drug dealer known as
Shongwan to visit the Club and to be engaged in deep conversations with Bimbo. On
some of these occasions whilst they spoke Bimbo would call Poogen to him and after a
short conversation Shongwan would hand over a parcel to Poogen. This parcel in some
instances would be wrapped in newspaper and would be tightly taped in brown tape.
Poogen would take control of the parcel and after Shongwan had left I would see Bimbo
with the parcel. I had occasion to find out the contents of such parcel when I witnessed
Bimbo opening this parcel and it revealed large bundles of cash.’
[19] These allegations are largely based on the presumption that it was
prohibited substances which were being discussed and sold. It also presumes
knowledge of relationships whilst the facts that brought about that knowledge are
not disclosed. It should also be borne in mind that what remains of the
respondent’s case after partially abandoning the judgment of the court below,
only pertains to the first appellant’s alleged drug dealing activities and not the
question whether the Boyz-2-Men nightclub was an instrumentality of an offence.
[20] The affidavit by Naroth contradicts the affidavit by Pather in one vital respect.
Whilst Naroth purports to describe drug dealing activities at the nightclub, Pather
states that he attended the club on a number of occasions and did not see any
drug related activities in the club.
[21] The respondent also relies on evidence seized by Hoosen from the seventh
appellant’s car. According to Hoosen numerous pieces of paper were seized
which contain entries of names and amounts typical of keeping records of the
sale of drugs. Copies of the seized pieces of paper are annexed to his affidavit.
The first difficulty with this evidence is that the author of the documents is
unknown. Secondly, no connection between the documents and the first
appellant is alleged. There is a reference to ‘Bimbo’ in some of the pieces of
paper, for example, ‘39/Bimbo Paid’. Insofar as this evidence is relied on by the
respondent as evidence of the first appellant’s involvement in drug dealing

activities, it fails hopelessly. The reference to ‘Bimbo’ is not alleged to be a
reference to the first appellant. It is furthermore highly unlikely that the first
appellant, an alleged major drug dealer, would buy small amounts of drugs from
someone else.
[22] The affidavit of Jones reveals the same inadequacies. He relies on and
attaches affidavits by interviewees who recount purchases of mandrax tablets
from ‘Guy’, ‘Aka’ and ‘Anita’. Not a single allegation is made that constitutes
evidence that any of the said sellers conducted the sales for and on behalf of the
first appellant. Jones also makes the allegation that conversations of the first
appellant were recorded during which he had discussions with the second
appellant about dealing in 500 mandrax tablets. He arrested the first and second
appellants on the strength of these recordings and charged them with conspiracy
to deal in mandrax. However, quite startlingly, what the respondent does not
disclose in his founding papers is that by the time Jones made the allegations he
knew, but failed to disclose, that the criminal prosecution that followed upon this
charge had been withdrawn, because the recordings were found to be
‘unsuitable for voice comparison analysis’.
[23] Despite having investigated the first appellant for almost 20 years prior to
launching proceedings under POCA, despite intercepting the first appellant’s
conversations, despite searches and seizures of various premises and property,
despite trying to entrap the first appellant, the respondent has only put up a
smoke and mirrors case which at best raises suspicion but does not sway the
balance of probability in his favour.
[24] All of the affidavits relied upon by the respondent fall short of age-old basic
principles that pertain to evidence on affidavit. The following quote from
Geanotes v Geanotes 1947 (2) SA 512 (C) at 514 is relevant:
‘It will be noticed that the petitioner fails to give the source of her information, or the
grounds of her belief. In Grant-Dalton v. Win and Others (1923, W.L.D. 48), it was laid
down that the Court will not admit statements of belief and information in interlocutory
matters unless the grounds of such information and belief are set out and the Court is
satisfied that it is necessary to act upon such statements by reason of the grave urgency
of the matter or for purpose of preventing an injury or a threatened illegal invasion of

rights. Mr. Justice Krause at page 186 said, inter alia: “The grounds of the deponent’s
belief must be stated so as to show that he has some reasonable and proper cause for
making the statement, and has not sworn merely to raise an issue. The Court of Appeal
in England In re Young Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (1900, 2 Ch. 753), held that an affidavit
of information and belief not stating the sources of information or belief, is irregular, and
therefore inadmissible as evidence, whether on an interlocutory or a final application;
and a party or solicitor attempting to use such an affidavit will do so at his peril as to
costs.”’
[25] The first appellant denies being involved in any form of drug dealing. He also
denies that any of the property of the other appellants is his. On behalf of the
respondent it was argued that the appellants have not answered the case against
them fully or convincingly, but that their denials are vague, sketchy and lacking in
details. Accepting, without deciding, that complaint as valid, the case that the
appellants had to meet is a poor one and their response to it should be assessed
in that light. That their response was not detailed does not supplement the case
for the respondent.8 The denial of drug dealing activities is consistent with the
appellants’ average middle class lifestyle which is apparent from the papers.
Nothing the respondent has disclosed points to an affluent lifestyle lived off the
proceeds of drug dealing. An intensive investigation over almost two decades
has not revealed evidence of the proceeds of drug dealing, or a level of affluence
that could possibly sustain an inference of unlawful activities.
[26] Aside from the first appellant’s denial of the respondent’s case, the latter
faces an insurmountable hurdle when the allegations by the third appellant are
considered. The immovable property the respondent seeks to have declared
forfeit is registered in the name of the third appellant. She put up an affidavit
explaining that her late husband had been economically active for all of his adult
life and that he always managed to save some money. This much is apparent
from the fact that during his lifetime they bought two immovable properties. When
they acquired the second of the two they lived in one and rented out the other.
This continued to render an income to her after his death. She also states that he
kept his savings in cash in a safe at home and upon his death at the beginning of

8 Administrator, Transvaal & others v Theletsane & others 1991 (2) SA 192 (A) at 196C-E.

1998 he left her with approximately R500 000 in cash. She utilised R300 000 of
this money to acquire the Kings Avenue property and with the rest she helped
her son, the fourth appellant, to acquire the truck and truck trailer that enabled
him to earn a living from conducting a transport business.
[27] Nothing in the papers suggests that her version is clearly untenable. The
respondent suggests that it is improbable that her late husband earned enough
to have enabled him to save an amount of approximately R500 000. No facts are
alleged that give rise to such an improbability. On the contrary, the lifestyle of all
the appellants supports the third appellant’s version. Their lifestyle seems
anything but extravagant. They live together, their vehicles are second hand and
are relatively old. The Kings Avenue property was purchased during 2002 for
R800 000 and was funded by a cash deposit of R300 000 and a mortgage bond
in favour of a financial institution in the amount of R500 000 for which friends of
the third appellant stood surety. That the money was not disclosed in the
liquidation and distribution account drawn by the executor of the deceased estate
of the third appellant’s late husband gives rise to several plausible inferences and
not only the one that the respondent seeks to draw, namely that the money was
supplied by the first appellant.
[28] The nature of the property sought to be forfeited does not suggest the
presence of an affluent drug dealer trying to hide his wealth, but of an average
middle class family going about their daily living. The mere fact that the first
appellant was present and, to some extent, instrumental in negotiating the
acquisition of the property, does not give rise to the conclusion that the
respondent seeks to draw. The allegations on behalf of the respondent that the
first appellant is the owner of the Kings Avenue property, the truck and the truck
trailer are based on hearsay evidence and assumption, the source or basis of
which is not disclosed, and is no stronger than the allegations of his alleged drug
dealing activities. The allegations that the first appellant disclosed to the sellers
of the Kings Avenue property, the truck and the truck trailer that he was in actual
fact the purchaser are highly improbable in the light of the respondent’s case that
the first appellant was weaving a highly secretive web of deceit about his
ownership of the property. If that was so, it is unlikely that he would disclose his
deceit to all and sundry.

[29] The respondent has failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the
first appellant was a drug dealer and also that the first appellant funded the
acquisition of the Kings Avenue house, the truck and truck trailer. Consequently,
the court below came to an incorrect conclusion on the application of the
principles set out in Plascon-Evans.
[30] On behalf of the respondent this court was requested, in the event of a
conclusion adverse to the respondent, to refer the matter back to the high court
for the hearing of oral evidence. The conclusion to which I have come serves to
illustrate a finding of the absence of a dispute of fact that requires a referral for
the hearing of oral evidence.9 In addition, the desirability of a referral at a stage in
the proceedings when much time has expired, witnesses have passed away and
the respondent has not availed himself of the fact-finding proceedings available
in terms of s 28 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, is
questionable.
[31] Unfortunately something needs to be said about the judgment of the court
below. It consists of 37 pages. Except for two paragraphs it summarises the
history of the case, the evidence and the contentions on behalf of the parties.
The last two paragraphs read:
‘Summary
a)
If this Court was to analyse and dissect the evidence in detail of many hundreds
of pages placed before the above Honourable Court, it will unnecessarily burden this
Judgment.
b)
The Court has taken the approach that it has recorded in this Judgment, a
Summary of the main points argued by the Applicant and the main points argued by the
Respondent.
c)
In the end result, the Court comes to the conclusion set out in the next
paragraph.
Judgment by Court

9 Rawlins & another v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 537 (A) at 544G-I.

After having carefully considered and weighed up all the evidence in the Application
papers and the Respondents’ Opposing Affidavits, and mindful of the fact that the onus
is on the Applicant on a balance of probabilities to establish its case, this Court comes to
the conclusion that the Applicant has discharged the onus, and that the Application for a
forfeiture order is well founded and that the order is hereby granted.’
[31] The judgment contains no evaluation of the evidence, no application of legal
principles and no reasoning that sustains the conclusion reached. As such it falls
short of principles repeatedly stated in this regard. See Botes & another v
Nedbank Ltd 1983 (3) SA 27 (A) at 27H-28A; Road Accident Fund v Marunga
2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA) paras 31-32; Mphahlele v First National Bank of SA Ltd
1999 (2) 667 (CC) para 12. Furthermore, the judgment was delivered two years
and five months after the matter was argued. A delay of that duration is simply
unacceptable, particularly in the light of the deficiencies that I have highlighted.
[32] The following order is made:
The appeal is upheld with costs.
The order of the court below is set aside and replaced by the following:

‘The application is dismissed with costs.’

__________________________

S SNYDERS

JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellants:
K J Kemp SC

Instructed by:

Shashi Marajh & Company, Chatsworth,Durban

Webbers, Bloemfontein

For the Respondent:
V I Gajoo SC (with him R Naidoo and A Naidoo)

Instructed by:
State Attorney, KwaZulu – Natal, Durban

State Attorney, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
29 March 2012
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal.

The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) has failed, despite
employing mighty investigative State machinery, to prove allegations that the
first appellant has been, since the early 1980’s, one of the biggest drug
dealers in the greater Durban area who sponsored the acquisition of assets
by his family members in an attempt to hide the money he had earned from
drug dealing.

The NDPP managed to obtain a preservation order and subsequently a
forfeiture order in respect of the assets of the first appellant and eight other
appellants, mainly members of his extended family, in the Kwa-Zulu Natal
High Court, Durban in terms of the provisions of the Prevention of Organised

Crime Act 121 of 1998. In the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) the NDPP
abandoned part of the judgment obtained in the high court.

Today the SCA upheld the appeal against the NDPP on the basis that the
case against the appellants was not proved on a balance of probability, as
the evidence on behalf of the NDPP amounted to ‘smoke and mirrors’* * *