THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case no:  493/2016

In the matter between:

NIEKARA HARRIELALL                                                              APPELLANT

and

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Harrielall v University of KwaZulu-Natal (493/2016) [2017]
ZASCA 25 (27 March 2017)
Coram:
Cachalia and Swain JJA, and Molemela, Gorven and
Mbatha AJJA
Heard:

16 February 2017
Delivered:

27 March 2017
Summary: Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 : refusal of
application for admission to course of study leading to MBChB degree :
application for review of decision : new challenge on appeal : not raised in
founding affidavit : appeal dismissed.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from: KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg
(Moodley J sitting as court of first instance):

The appeal is dismissed with costs.
______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________
Swain JA and Mbatha AJA (Cachalia JA and Gorven AJA concurring)

[1] The appellant, Ms Niekara Harrielall, aspires to be a medical doctor
and in pursuit of this objective unsuccessfully applied to the respondent, the
University of KwaZulu-Natal for admission to study for an MBChB degree in
2015. Undaunted by this rejection the appellant registered and pursued a
course of study for the degree of Bachelor of Medical Science (Anatomy), with
the respondent during 2015. She did so in order to enhance her prospects for
admission to the MBChB degree in 2016, within the category described as
„Mature Students‟ forming part of the respondent‟s admissions policy.

[2] Regrettably the appellant's application as a „mature student‟ for the
2016 academic year was also unsuccessful. Aggrieved at the outcome the
appellant launched an application before the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the
High Court, Pietermaritzburg (Moodley J) seeking orders reviewing and
setting aside the decision of the respondent on the grounds that it had failed
to consider, alternatively apply, its own admissions policy in refusing the
appellant's application. In further alternative relief, the appellant sought an
order reviewing and setting aside the refusal of her application to be admitted
to the first-year of study for the MBChB degree for the 2016 academic year.

[3] The court a quo dismissed the application with costs, concluding that
the appellant had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the respondent
had not considered her application properly, alternatively had acted
capriciously and arbitrarily in deviating from its admissions policy in refusing to
admit the appellant to the 2016 academic year, for the MBChB degree.

[4] Section 37(3) of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 provides that:
„The admission policy of a public higher education institution must provide
appropriate measures for the redress of past inequalities . . .‟
This requirement is reflected in the admissions policy of the respondent
contained in a document described as „Undergraduate Selection Process‟.
The „mature student‟ category is described as follows:
„3. MATURE STUDENTS
Mature students will comprise 20% (40 students) of the class. Mature students are
categorized as follows:
a. Candidates who have completed the Matriculation/Grade 12 examination and
exceeding the minimum standards for entry into the MBChB programme as defined
above; and have done a year or more of a degree course at a recognised university
in South Africa; and achieved outstanding results (Open). Twenty five percent (10
students) will be from this open competitive category.
b. BSc and BMedSc access programmes (reflecting Quintile 1 and 2 students) -
racial groups do not apply for the selection of Quintile 1 and 2 students (BSc/BMedSc
Access). Fifty percent of the mature students (20 students) will be from the BSc and
BMedSc access programmes (reflecting Quintile 1 and 2 students).
c. Twenty-five percent (10 students) will be from BSc/BMedSc graduates from Health
Science related degrees, (Health Sciences Open).‟

[5] The complaint raised by the appellant in her founding affidavit was that
the respondent in awarding places within the „mature student‟ category, had
only considered for selection students who had completed their degrees. As a
result it was alleged that the appellant‟s application had not been considered
by the respondent. It was on this basis that the appellant alleged that the

respondent's failure to consider her application, alternatively apply its own
admissions policy, contravened the provisions of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).

[6] In the appellant's heads of argument before this Court the challenge to
the respondent‟s decision was however no longer based upon a failure of the
respondent to consider her application at all, but rather a failure of the
respondent to properly differentiate between the three categories which
comprise „mature students‟. The argument advanced was that the appellant
should only have competed against applicants that fell within category 3a,
which the appellant described as „degree incomplete students‟ and not
against „degree complete students‟. It was alleged that „the respondent on its
own version ignored these categories and pitted “degree incomplete students”
against those with degrees and ranked all mature applicants according to
completed degrees (Masters, Honours, undergraduate) and then year of study
in postgraduate degree‟. It was alleged that this was a new criterion which
referenced a ranking system in respect of „mature students‟, which was
entirely absent from the respondent's admissions policy and had been
disclosed by the respondent for the first time in its answering affidavit.

[7] On appeal the challenge of the appellant was again altered.
Appellant‟s counsel expressly disavowed any reliance upon this argument and
conceded that so-called „degree complete students‟ could compete within
category 3a, with „degree incomplete students‟. The argument now advanced
was that the respondent had failed to explain its preferential admissions policy
in respect of the various degrees that could be considered in terms of
category 3a. It was submitted that the respondent should have set out in its
admissions policy the points that would be allocated for each type of degree
within the category, as well as the points to be allocated to each of the
subjects making up the degree under consideration.

[8] When counsel for the appellant was asked to identify the passages in
the founding affidavit where this new challenge was raised, he requested an

opportunity to examine the founding affidavit. When court resumed he
referred to certain paragraphs in the founding affidavit in support of the
argument. However an examination of these paragraphs does not support his
contention that the argument was properly raised. The only reference by the
appellant to the ranking system of the respondent was in reply where the
following was stated: „However the respondent has made it clear that it has,
independently of its own policy, applied a ranking system to these
applications,‟ because it chose completed degree applicants ahead of the
appellant's application. In addition it was alleged that „There is no such
ranking provision provided for in the policy and therefore whomever applied
this criteria was not consistent with the policy.‟  The appellant did not however
persist with this argument that the ranking system applied by the respondent,
did not form part of its admissions policy. A complaint that the respondent had
failed to disclose in advance how it applied this ranking policy was never
raised. Counsel conceded that if this new challenge was not raised in the
appellant‟s founding affidavit the appeal could not succeed. This concession
was correctly made. It was incumbent upon the appellant to make out her
case in the founding affidavit.1

[9] We turn to the costs of the appeal. In argument, the decision in
Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources, & Others [2009] ZACC 14;
2009 (6) SA 232 (CC), was referred to, but is not applicable on the facts of
this case. No constitutional issues were implicated. This case is simply a
review under PAJA of an administrative decision by the respondent, not to
admit the appellant to the course of study leading to the MBChB degree. Of
importance in a consideration of this issue is that the appellant altered the
basis for her challenge to the respondent's decision several times during the
litigation. In addition, the final challenge advanced on appeal was not
contained in the appellant's founding affidavit. These shortcomings could have
been avoided if the appellant had utilised the provisions of rule 53 of the
Uniform rules of court at the outset, to obtain the respondent's reasons for

1 Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd & others v Government of the Republic of South Africa &
others 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 323 F-J and 324A.

rejecting her application, as well as any documentation forming part of the
record of the admissions process. Because of the urgency of the matter, the
court hearing the application could have been asked to direct that the
respondent furnish its reasons and any relevant documentation sooner than
the period of 15 days specified in rule 53(1)(b). Interim relief restraining the
respondent from finalising the list of successful applicants pending the
outcome of the review proceedings, could have been sought. In this manner
the appellant would have been informed in advance of the respondent‟s
reasons for the decision and enabled to properly formulate her challenge to
the rejection of her application. The need for changes to be made to the
appellant's challenge to the respondent's decision during the course of the
litigation, could have been avoided.

[10] For these reasons the appellant should be ordered to pay the
respondent's costs. The issues raised were not complex and did not justify the
employment of two counsel.

[11] In the result the following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs.

_________________________

K G B Swain

Judge of Appeal

_________________________

Y T Mbatha

Acting Judge of Appeal

Molemela AJA

[12] I have had the benefit of reading the majority judgment of my
colleagues Swain JA and Mbatha, AJA. I agree that the appeal must fail. I
also agree, on the same reasoning adopted by the majority judgment, that the
Biowatch principle is not applicable in this matter. I, however, disagree with
the majority judgment‟s reasoning and order relating to the costs of the
appeal. It is appropriate to preface my reasoning with the reiteration of the
applicable legal principles to cost awards.

[13] It is well established that a court has a discretion in relation to the
award of costs.  In Ferreira v Levin NO & others,2 Ackerman J said:
„The Supreme Court has, over the years, developed a flexible approach to costs
which proceeds from two basic principles, the first being that the award of  costs,
unless expressly otherwise enacted is in the discretion of the presiding judicial
officer, and the second that the successful party should, as a general rule , have his
or her costs. Even this second principle is subject to the first. The second principle is
subject to a large number of exceptions where the successful party is deprived of his
or her costs. Without attempting either comprehensiveness or complete analytical
accuracy, depriving successful parties of their costs can depend on circumstances
such as for example, the conduct of parties, the conduct of their legal
representatives, whether a party achieves technical success only, the nature of the
litigants and the nature of the proceedings . . . If the need arises the rules may have
to be substantially adapted; this should however be done on a case by case basis.‟
(My emphasis.)
Indeed, even a court of Appeal has a wide discretion on the question whether
a successful appellant should be awarded costs.3

[14] As I will demonstrate hereunder, this case is a perfect illustration of
how the facts of a particular case, cumulatively considered, may justify a
deviation from the general rule that costs must follow the result.

2 Ferreira v Levin NO & others; Vryenhoek & others v Powell NO & others 1996 (2) SA 621
(CC) para 3.
3 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 204 (T) at 215-
216.

[15] It is necessary to give a brief background about the respondent‟s
admission policy. It is common cause that „Annexure D‟ constitutes the
respondent‟s published policy. It is evident from Annexure D that  clause 3
thereof outlines three categories of „mature students‟ who qualify for
admission under categories 3a, 3b and 3c. It is common cause that the
category applicable to the appellant is Clause 3a of Annexure D. This clause
describes mature students as follows:
„Candidates who have completed the Matriculation/Grade 12 examination and
exceeding the minimum standards for entry into the MBChB programme as defined
above; and have done a year or more of a degree course at a recognised university
in South Africa; and achieved outstanding results (Open). Twenty five percent (10
students) will be from this open competitive category‟. (My emphasis.)

[16] In its answering affidavit, the respondent averred that the selection
policy and criteria it applied to the appellant‟s application were, as specified in
clause 3 of Annexure SC3. That clause reads as follows:
„Mature students are candidates who have completed the Matriculation/Grade 12
examination and exceeding the minimum standards for entry into the MBChB
programme as defined above; and have done a year or more of a degree course, at
a recognised university in South Africa; and achieved outstanding results; Mature
students will comprise 20% (40 students) of the class; 50% of the mature students
(20 students) will be from the BSc and BMedSc access programmes (reflecting
Quintile  1 and 2 students) and selected in the different racial groups. Twenty five per
cent (10 students) will be from BSc/BMedSc graduates and 25 per cent (10 students)
will be from Health Science related degrees, open competitive category.‟

[17] The respondent contended that there is no discrepancy between
Annexures D and SC3. The High Court found that the discrepancies between
the policy in Annexure D and the one in Annexure SC3 pertained only to the
„layout‟ of the policy. It also found that despite any variations in the wording of
Annexure D and Annexure SC3, the qualification for the open category is the
same. For the reasons discussed below, I disagree.

[18] A very brief discussion of the trite principles applicable to interpretation
of documents is apposite. It is well-established that when interpreting a
document, it is necessary to consider the language of the provision in the light
of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax. The words used must be read in
the context of the document as a whole and in light of all relevant
circumstances. Where the words in the documents are capable of more than
one meaning, a sensible meaning should be preferred over one that
undermines the apparent purpose of the document.4

[19] Having read the respondent‟s policy, it is rather self-evident that
category 3a includes graduates and under-graduates of any degree, which
means that students who are pursuing non-health-related degrees are also
entitled to be considered. Importantly, category 3a stipulates that 25 per cent
(10 students) of the students „will be‟ selected from this „open competitive
category‟ and thus guarantees consideration of students from this category.
Clauses 3b and 3c specifically mention the degrees from which prospective
students will be selected, namely BSc and BMedSc access programmes
(clause 3b); and BSc/BMedSc graduates from Health Science degrees
(clause 3c). A purposive interpretation of clause 3 of Annexure D, which sets
out three distinct categories, leads me to conclude that the provisions of that
policy are intended to grant access to prospective medical students from a
diverse educational background.5

[20] In my view, category 3a of „mature students‟ embraces this diversity by
accommodating students whose matric results exceeded the minimum
standards for entry into the MBChB programme but are not registered for the
degrees mentioned in clause 3b or 3c of Annexure D, for example, students
who are registered for non-health-related degrees such as Engineering,
Veterinary Science, Actuarial Science, and Commerce.

4 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para
(18).
5 Section 37(3) of the Higher Education Act 55 of 1999 states: „The admission policy of a
public higher education institution must provide appropriate measures for the redress of past
inequalities and may not unfairly discriminate in any way.‟

[21] Ironically, a sensible interpretation of clause 3 of Annexure D is
eloquently articulated in the Respondent‟s heads of argument. I can do no
better than to quote this interpretation verbatim:
„20.
The category 3a includes all candidates that “have done a year or more of a
degree course”. That “includes” degree complete students not falling under
categories 3b and 3c‟. [The footnote to this paragraph reads: this is most easily
understood when one considers a hypothetical commerce or engineering graduate
who would undoubtedly not qualify under section 3c.]
21.
The interpretation for which the appellant contends would necessarily exclude
from access to the medical school under any circumstances, degree complete
students not falling in categories 3(b) and 3(c).
22.
That is not a sensible interpretation and should be rejected.‟

[22] Although the respondent did not persist with nor disavow this argument
during the hearing of the appeal, I am of the view that the interpretation
postulated above is indeed the most sensible one in respect of clause 3 of
Annexure D as it embraces students from a diverse educational background.
Regrettably, this laudable inclusiveness is conspicuously absent from clause
3 of Annexure SC3 because the latter does not cater for undergraduates or
graduates from non- health- related degrees. Furthermore, it also does not
extend the same guarantees granted by Annexure D. In my view, clause 3 of
Annexure SC3 is more exclusionary and cannot be a sensible interpretation of
the respondent‟s published policy.6

[23] I am of the view that the interpretation attached by the respondent to its
policy, as reflected in clause 3 of Annexure SC3, „undermines the purpose‟7 of
the inclusionary stipulations of clause 3a of Annexure D. The discrepancies
between these two policies bear testimony to the ambiguity in the
respondent‟s undergraduate selection criteria. Given these circumstances, the
appellant‟s contention that the „subtle alteration of the words‟ in clause 3 of
Annexure SC3 has resulted in the policy leading to different consequences
than clause 3a of Annexure D, is not misplaced. Similarly, her contention that

6 See s 37(3) of the Higher Education Act above.
7 See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund above para (18).

an ambiguity in the policy may be prejudicial to other students is not
unfounded.

[24] Another important consideration in this matter is that in the exchange of
correspondence that preceded the commencement of litigation, the
respondent advised the appellant that the selection criteria it had applied to
the appellant were in accordance with clause 3 of Annexure D. As correctly
pointed out in the majority judgment, s 37(2) of the Higher Education Act
enjoins the council of a university to publish its admission policy and to make
it available on request. The appellant‟s founding affidavit was prepared on the
acceptance that clause 3 of Annexure D was the applicable policy. It was only
in its answering affidavit that the respondent unveiled Annexure SC3 to the
appellant. It is therefore not difficult to understand why the appellant took
issue with clause 3 of Annexure SC3 for the first time in her replying affidavit.
It is for this reason that I hold the view that the majority judgment‟s criticism of
the appellant for making new allegations concerning clause 3 of Annexure
SC3 in the replying affidavit is, with respect, unjustified.8

[25] I have already alluded to the material discrepancies between Annexure
D and Annexure SC3. Under such circumstances, it is not inconceivable that
the appellant could have pleaded her case differently if Annexure SC3 had
been disclosed to her before the commencement of the litigation. I am also of
the view that the finding of the majority judgment that the appellant could have
invoked the procedures laid down in Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules to obtain
certain documents is, with respect, overly technical. For example, it would
have been pointless for the appellant to invoke Rule 53 merely to obtain a
policy that the respondent had already furnished to her by way of
correspondence.

[26] Furthermore, the nature of the right the appellant was seeking to
protect is another important consideration. Her litigation was not in pursuit of a

8 Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Lehane NO & others 2016 (3) SA 143 (SCA) para 15-16;
Pretoria Portland Cements Co Ltd v Competition Commission & others 2003 (2) SA 385
(SCA) para 63.

commercial interest; rather it was in a bona fide pursuit of admission to her
preferred field of study. In the broader scheme of things, her litigation was
about access to education. Moreover, it was not based on spurious grounds,
as the respondent had previously admitted under-graduates on the strength of
the provisions of clause 3a of Annexure D.

[27] Despite the fact that the outcome sought by the appellant in her
application would have been for her sole benefit, her application served to
highlight the flaws attendant on the interpretation of Annexure SC3, which
have already been canvassed earlier in this judgment. The appellant‟s
litigation exposed the potential prejudice that some prospective medical
students who fall within the category of „mature students‟ may suffer as a
result of the ambiguity of the respondent‟s admission policy. This litigation
therefore raised an important matter of broad concern.

[28] Furthermore, the appellant decided to litigate as a last resort, having
personally engaged the respondent‟s officials before seeking the intervention
of the Students Representative Council (SRC). Several consultations were
held between the SRC delegation and the respondent‟s officials:
correspondence was exchanged. Sight must not be lost of the fact that the
appellant is a 19 year old fulltime student. She stated that her litigation was
funded by her parents. She also disclosed that the reason she prefers to
study at a medical school in Durban is because her parents are not wealthy
and would thus not afford to pay for her accommodation if she were to study
elsewhere. The fact that the appellant is evidently a person of modest
financial means is not an irrelevant consideration, given all the circumstances
of this case.9

[29] Having considered all the facts of this case, I am of the view that
mulcting the appellant with costs may discourage those who may legitimately
wish to challenge the respondent‟s policy on other grounds. This may have an

9 Tlale & Others v The University of the Witwatersrand & Another (JHC) unreported case no
38337/2016 of 3 November 2016 para 53.

unintended chilling effect on access to justice. Such an order would militate
against the „just and equitable‟ remedy envisaged in Section 8(1)(f) of the
Promotion of Administration Justice Act 3 of 2000, which dictates that costs
be determined in a manner that is fair to both parties. For all the reasons
alluded to above, I am of the view that there are special circumstances that
justify a departure from the general rule that costs must follow the event. I
would therefore make no order as to the costs of the appeal.

_________________________

M B Molemela

Acting Judge of Appeal

Swain JA

[30]  I have had the benefit of reading the dissenting judgement of Molemela
AJA on the issue of the award of costs in the appeal to the respondent.
Central to the reasoning in the dissent is that because of the alleged
ambiguity between annexures D and annexure SC3, in which the admissions
policy of the respondent was set out, the appellant's application „served to
highlight the flaws attendant on the interpretation of annexure SC3 . . .‟ and
„exposed the potential prejudice that some prospective medical students who
fall within the category of "mature students" may suffer as a result of the
ambiguity of the respondent's admission policy.‟

[31]  As I understand the argument, it is that the alleged ambiguity in the
respondent's admission policy was partially to blame for the institution by the
appellant of these proceedings, was the cause of the appellant only taking
issue with the provisions of annexure SC3 in her replying affidavit and if
annexure SC3 had been disclosed to the appellant before the commencement
of the litigation „it is not inconceivable that the appellant could have pleaded
her case differently‟. For these and other reasons, it is concluded that the
appellant should not be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

[32]  On appeal both parties accepted that there was no material difference
between annexure D and annexure EC3. This was made clear well in
advance of the hearing. The appellant in her heads of argument submitted
that, „As aforesaid, we contend that annexure D applied and that, in any
event, there is no material difference between annexure D and annexure
SC3.‟ The same view was advanced in the respondent's heads of argument
where the following submission was made, „In the circumstances of this
matter, "SC3" appears to be a minor redrafting of annexure "D" with no
material discrepancy between the two and only a slight reordering of
language.‟ In argument before this court, any alleged ambiguity between
these annexures was not referred to, nor relied upon, by either counsel. It is
therefore plain that the alleged ambiguity was not relied upon by the appellant
as a ground of appeal and did not serve as a reason for challenging the
decision on appeal. Although the alleged ambiguity may have served as an
argument for altering the costs order made by the court a quo, it can have no
bearing upon the costs of the appeal, which the dissent has as its objective.

[33]  In addition the only argument advanced by the appellant as to why she
should not be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, was that the Biowatch
principle was applicable. Molemela AJA agrees with the view of the majority
that this is not so. None of the other grounds relied upon by Molemela AJA, to
justify no order being granted as to the costs of appeal were relied upon by
the appellant. The respondent was accordingly never afforded an opportunity
to deal with any of these grounds.

[34]  I disagree with the contention of Molemela AJA that „it would have
been pointless for the appellant to invoke rule 53 merely to obtain a policy that
the respondent had already furnished to her by way of correspondence.‟ As
pointed out in the judgement, rule 53 could have been used to obtain the
respondent's reasons for rejecting her application, as well as any
documentation forming part of the record of the admissions process. The

object of such a procedure would never have been the pointless exercise of
using rule 53 to obtain a copy of the policy, which the appellant already had.
In this manner the appellant would have been enabled to properly formulate
her challenge to the rejection of her application.

[35]  I also take issue with the conclusion of Molemela AJA that, „It is for this
reason that I hold the view that the majority judgement‟s criticism of the
appellant for making new allegations concerning clause 3 of annexure SC3 in
the replying affidavit is, with respect, unjustified.‟ The only reference to the
replying affidavit of the appellant in the judgment was in the context of an
allegation by the appellant, that the application of a ranking system by the
respondent did not form part of the respondent's admissions policy. This was
referred to in the judgement in order to highlight the distinction between this
argument (which was abandoned) and the argument advanced on appeal by
the appellant, namely that the respondent had failed to disclose in advance
how it applied this ranking policy. As pointed out in the judgement, the latter
argument was never raised in the application papers. No criticism was
directed at the appellant in this context, for raising this argument in reply.

[36]  The fact that the litigation was not in pursuit of a commercial interest
but rather a bona fide pursuit of admission by the appellant to her preferred
field of study, and was therefore about access to education, cannot on all of
the evidence be regarded as a determining factor. Although it is true that the
appellant is 19 years old and dependent upon her parents, (who she
describes as „not wealthy‟) to fund the litigation, what must also be considered
is that the respondent is reliant upon and administers public funds to attain its
objectives.

[37]  I disagree with the conclusion that „mulcting the appellant with costs
may discourage those who may legitimately wish to challenge the
respondent's policy on other grounds. This may have an unintended chilling
effect on access to justice‟. No other grounds were raised by the appellant as

a basis for challenging the respondent's policy. The concern raised is not
based on any evidence and amounts to unjustified speculation.

[38]  For these reasons I disagree with the conclusion of Molemela AJA that
no order should be made as to the costs of the appeal.

_________________________

K G B Swain

Judge of Appeal

Appearances

For the Appellant:

G Marcus SC with A J Boulle

Instructed by:

Pather & Pather, Durban
Claude Reid Inc., Bloemfontein

For the Respondent:

A J Dickson SC with P J Wallis
Instructed by:

Shepstone and Wylie, Durban

Webbers, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

27 March 2017

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form
part of the judgment.

Harrielall v University of KwaZulu-Natal (493/2016) [2017] ZASCA 25 (27
March 2017)

Media Statement

The SCA dismissed an appeal against an order by the High Court dismissing an
application brought by the appellant, in which an order was sought directing the
respondent to admit the appellant into the first year of study for the MBChB degree,
for the academic year of 2016. On appeal the appellant abandoned the previous
grounds relied upon by her for challenging the decision of the respondent, refusing
her application for admission to the medical faculty of the respondent. A new ground
was advanced for the first time on appeal which was not contained in the appellant's
founding affidavit. For this reason the appeal was dismissed with costs.

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