THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No:       412/10

In the matter between:

THE STATE                                                                               Appellant

and

STEPHEN ROMER                                                               Respondent

Neutral citation: State v Romer (412/10) [2011] ZASCA 46 (30 March
2011)

Coram:
LEWIS, BOSIELO JJA and PETSE AJA

Heard:
25 February 2011
Delivered:
30 March 2011

Summary: Sentence ─ Murder and attempted murder committed when
respondent in a state of diminished responsibility ─ Sentence of ten
years’ imprisonment wholly suspended, coupled with a sentence of
correctional supervision ─ appeal by state.

___________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from: Eastern Cape High Court (Port Elizabeth) (Jansen J as
court of first instance):

Both the application for leave to lead further evidence by the respondent
and the appeal against sentence by the State are dismissed.
__________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

PETSE AJA (LEWIS and BOSIELO JJA concurring)

[1] The respondent, Mr S Romer, was convicted by Jansen J in the
Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth on one count of murder and two
counts of attempted murder. The high court found, however, that Romer
was in a state of diminished responsibility (though not acting as an
automaton) at the time of the shootings. Romer was sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on the usual
conditions. In addition he was sentenced to three years’ correctional
supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977. An application for leave to appeal by the State in terms of s 316B
of the Act was refused by the court a quo but was subsequently granted
by this court.

[2] The murder and attempted murder charges against Romer arose
when Romer shot three people in Port Elizabeth on 17 October 2007. Mr
G du Mordt was fatally wounded and Ms K Heuer and Mr E G Janse

were seriously injured. The shooting incidents took place at three
different locations and were witnessed by various witnesses, amongst
whom were police officers who pursued Romer as he drove from one
crime scene to the other. Romer was arrested and detained on the same
day after having been cornered by the police.

[3] The appeal before us is brought by the State which contends that
the sentence imposed on Romer is disturbingly lenient given the serious
consequences of his conduct, and thus warrants interference by this court.
However, before I turn to consider this question there is a preliminary
issue that requires to be addressed and it is this. Romer brought an
application (opposed by the State) in terms of s 22(a) of the Supreme
Court Act 59 of 1959 to adduce further evidence on appeal in relation to
the sentence imposed. We refused the application, for the reasons that
follow.

[4] The further evidence is contained in two affidavits. The first one is
that of Ms A Ferreira who is the social worker responsible for monitoring
the correctional supervision and community service of Romer. The
second is that of Dr Y Lucire who describes herself as a medical
practitioner, specialising in forensic and medico-legal psychiatry, who
formerly practised in the State of New South Wales, Australia.

[5] Ferreira’s evidence pertains to facts which occurred after the
imposition of sentence on Romer. The purpose of the affidavit is to
demonstrate to this court that the conditions imposed by the court a quo
have been complied with by Romer who has been fully integrated as a
useful member of society. This is of no relevance to the appropriateness
of the sentence at the time of its imposition.

[6] The evidence of Lucire seeks to bolster Romer’s case that when he
committed the crimes he was suffering from sane automatism. The same
evidence was adduced when he sought leave from this court to appeal
against his conviction. Leave was refused and the application to place
Lucire’s evidence before the court was accordingly also refused. Its
relevance to the question of sentence, as I understood Ms Crouse, counsel
for Romer, was that the evidence was the basis of his opposition to the
appeal: that at all material times he was acting under circumstances of
severe diminished responsibility.

[7] Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act provides:
‘The appellate division or a provincial division, or a local division having appeal
jurisdiction, shall have power ─
(a)
on the hearing of an appeal to receive further evidence, either orally or by
deposition before a person appointed by such division, or to remit the case to the court
of first instance, or the court whose judgment is the subject of the appeal, for further
hearing, with such instructions as regards the taking of further evidence or otherwise
as to the division concerned seems necessary; and
(b)
. . . .’

[8] It is trite that s 22 vests in the appeal court a wide discretion to
receive further evidence in order to do justice between the parties.
However the circumstances under which the appeal court will exercise
such discretion are circumscribed and the factors to be borne in mind in
the exercise of such discretion have crystallised over the years. This court
almost a century ago (dealing with a similar provision contained in s 4 of
the Appellate Division Further Jurisdiction Act 1 of 1911) held in Shein v
Excess Insurance Company Ltd1 that the following are some of the
factors to be borne in mind: (a) neither party should be placed at an unfair

1 Shein v Excess Insurance Company Ltd 1912 AD 418 at 428-429.

advantage by the reception of further evidence; (b) special grounds
should be fully set out substantiating the application; (c) the nature of the
further evidence sought to be adduced must be set out, including its
material relevance to the issue on appeal; (d) the appeal court should not
lightly exercise its power in favour of granting the application more
especially on points which have been contested and decided at the trial;
and (e) there should be some reasonably sufficient explanation, based on
allegations which may be true, why the evidence which is sought to be
adduced was not led at the trial.

[9] It is thus apparent  that, ordinarily, the appeal court will receive
further evidence on appeal only if special grounds underlying such
request exist, such as that the evidence was either not available during the
trial or could not have been obtained despite due diligence to procure it.2

[10] There are two fundamental objections to allowing Lucire’s
evidence. First, it is not capable of being properly tested in this court. In
In Re Certain Amicus Curiae Applications: Minister of Health & others v
Treatment Action Campaign & others3 the Constitutional Court, in the
context of an application to place further evidence before that court, said:
‘[H]owever, this is subject to the condition that such facts “are common cause or
otherwise incontrovertible” or “are an official, scientific, technical or statistical
nature, capable of easy verification”. This Rule has no application where the facts
sought to be canvassed are disputed.’
Lucire’s evidence, on her own account, is controversial. Secondly, it is
relevant only to Romer’s conviction, and that is not the subject of the
appeal. There is no basis for its admissibility. And as indicated, Ferreira’s

2 Deintje v Gratus & Gratus 1929 AD 1 at 6-7.
3 In Re Certain Amicus Curiae Applications: Minister of Health & others v Treatment Action
Campaign & others 2002 (5) SA 713 (CC) para 8.

evidence is irrelevant to the imposition of sentence.

[11] I turn then to the question of the appropriateness of the sentences
imposed on Romer. As indicated earlier, Romer was charged with one
count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. He pleaded not
guilty and raised a defence of sane automatism substantiated by a
comprehensive written plea explanation under s 115 of the Criminal
Procedure Act. The State called several witnesses, one of whom was
Professor Visser, a member of the panel that examined the accused at
Fort England Hospital in Grahamstown, pursuant to an order made under
s 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Romer testified in his defence and
called three other witnesses: his son, Mr Derick Romer, Mr Ian Meyer
who is a clinical psychologist practising in Port Elizabeth and Professor
Daya who was the Head of the Pharmacology Department at Rhodes
University, Grahamstown.

[12] The evidence relating to the three shooting incidents in various
streets of Port Elizabeth and the fact that the accused fired shots through
the driver’s window, windscreen and front passenger window of his
motor vehicle whilst occupying the driver’s seat was largely common
cause and need not be traversed here. It was also not disputed that shortly
before the shootings, Romer had visited a friend, drunk a beer and had
agreed to return to the friend’s home later in the evening for a braai. The
evidence of his friend that he had appeared normal at the time was also
not contested.

[13] The evidence of the three experts who testified at the trial was
directed at establishing whether Romer, in firing such shots, was acting in
a state of sane automatism at the time. Visser for the State was of the

view that he was not, whereas both Meyer and Daya held the opposite
view.

[14] Romer’s bizarre conduct on the day when he shot three strangers,
randomly and at different places, was attributed by his expert witnesses to
an intake of anti-depressant medication that had been prescribed for him
by various doctors including psychiatrists as well as over-the-counter
medication. He had consulted doctors about his emotional upheaval
triggered by the disintegration of his marriage. Romer’s depression had
begun in December 2001 when he had caught his wife with her lover, and
subsequently divorced her.

[15] In December 2001 he was admitted to St Mark’s Clinic in East
London where he was diagnosed by a psychiatrist as having an
adjustment disorder. He was treated as an in-patient for two weeks and
medication was given to him. He was thereafter on several occasions re-
admitted to St Mark’s Clinic for treatment. His successful career as a car
salesman in East London came to an abrupt end.

[16] During 2007 Romer moved to Port Elizabeth where he stayed with
his son, Derick, who testified that there had been a steady deterioration of
Romer’s mental state from the end of 2000 which rendered him a shell of
his former self. On occasions Romer would remain in bed for up to a
week at a time, getting up only for short periods. Derick observed Romer
experiencing frequent nightmares, accompanied by violent tremors. There
came a point when Derick could no longer cope with living together with
his father in his house and requested him to leave. Romer then went to
live with a relative, Gary Romer, in Sardinia Bay in the Port Elizabeth
district.

[17] Meyer’s view was that when Romer fired shots at his victims he
was not acting rationally: his acts were a consequence of the combined
effects of depression aggravated by the intake of anti-depressants, and the
taking of four sleeping pills the night before the shootings. This, testified
Meyer and Daya, resulted in Romer’s automatism.

[18] However, the high court found that although Romer had suffered
from diminished responsibility he had not acted in a state of sane
automatism when shooting. The court accepted the evidence of Visser
that Romer had been able to direct his actions: he had driven some
distance, in peak traffic, in unfamiliar areas and through traffic circles
and lights. He had, for the most part, obeyed traffic rules. He had
deliberately tried to evade police vehicles, driving at speed to escape
them. Accordingly, he was not acting as an automaton when he shot his
three victims.

[19] But the court, in imposing sentence, did place great emphasis on
Romer’s condition, induced by drugs. Of course Romer’s conduct and its
consequences are horrific. They could be aptly described in the words of
Marais JA in S v Roberts4 where he said that ‘[v]iewed objectively and in
isolation’ the crimes were ‘horrific’.

[20] In considering what a suitable sentence should be that would
satisfy the objectives of punishment the court a quo took cognisance of
the following factors:
‘(a) that Romer had committed the crimes under circumstances of severe
diminished responsibility; (b) that he expressed genuine contrition; (c)
that he took full responsibility for the hardship, misery and agony that he

4 S v Roberts 2000 (2) SACR 522 (SCA) para 5.

caused to his victims and members of their families; (d) that when
symptoms of his emotional disintegration precipitated by the irretrievable
breakdown of his marriage caused by his wife’s infidelity manifested
themselves he sought professional help; (e) that he was prescribed drugs
by doctors which far from alleviating the state of his emotional upheavals
aggravated it; (f) that the accused had over an extended period of time in
his adult life lived a model and exemplary life; (g) that the accused was
no longer taking drugs, abstained from alcohol, undergoing counselling
and psychological therapy which all evinced a determination on his part
to rehabilitate himself; (h) that the chances of him ever repeating what he
did were extremely remote; and (i) that imposing direct imprisonment in
order to deter others would serve no useful purpose but rather amount to
sacrificing Romer on the altar of deterrence.’ This approach is, in my
respectful view, unassailable.

[21] By way of prelude I want to say that had I sat as the court of first
instance I would in all probability have imposed a direct custodial
sentence with a portion suspended on suitable conditions, given that
Romer acted with diminished responsibility. But we are a court of appeal.

[22] It has been held in a long line of cases that the imposition of
sentence is pre-eminently within the discretion of the trial court. The
appellate court will be entitled to interfere with the sentence imposed by
the trial court only if one or more of the recognised grounds justifying
interference on appeal has been shown to exist.5 Only then will the
appellate court be justified in interfering. These grounds are that the
sentence is ‘(a) disturbingly inappropriate; (b) so totally out of proportion
to the magnitude of the offence; (c) sufficiently disparate; (d) vitiated by

5 See S v Mtungwa en ‘n ander 1990 (2) SACR 1 (A).

misdirections showing that the trial court exercised its discretion
unreasonably; and (e) is otherwise such that no reasonable court would
have imposed it.’ See S v Giannoulis;6 S v Kibido;7 S v Salzwedel &
others.8

[23] In S v Matlala9 it was held that in an appeal against sentence the
fact that the sentence imposed by the trial court is wrong is not the test.
The test is whether the trial court in imposing it exercised its discretion
properly or not. Consequently, the circumstances in which an appellate
court will interfere with the exercise of such discretion are circumscribed.
In S v Sadler10 Marais JA, writing for a unanimous court, had occasion to
re-state them when he said the following:
‘The approach to be adopted in an appeal such as this is reflected in the following
passage in the judgment of Nicholas AJA in S v Shapiro 1994 (1) SACR 112 (A) at
119j-120c:
“It may well be that this Court would have imposed on the accused a heavier sentence
than that imposed by the trial Judge. But even if that be assumed to be the fact, that
would not in itself justify interference with the sentence. The principle is clear: it is
encapsulated in the statement by Holmes JA in S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at
857D-F:
“1.
In every appeal against sentence, whether imposed by a magistrate or a Judge,
the Court hearing the appeal ─
(a)
should be guided by the principle that punishment is ‘pre-eminently a matter
for the discretion of the trial Court’, and
(b)
should be careful not to erode such discretion: hence the further principle that
the sentence should only be altered if the discretion has not been ‘judicially and
properly exercised’.
2.
The test under (b) is whether the sentence is vitiated by irregularity or

6 S v Giannoulis 1975 (4) SA 867 (A) at 873G-H.
7 S v Kibido 1998 (2) SACR 213 (SCA at 216 g-j.
8 S v Salzwedel & others 1999 (2) SACR 586 (SCA) para 10.
9 S v Matlala 2003 (1) SACR 80 (SCA) at 83d-e.
10 S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331 (SCA) paras 6-9.

misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate”.’

Counsel for the State submitted that the trial court had misdirected itself in
various material respects when imposing sentence. I do not find it necessary to reach
any firm conclusion in that regard. I shall assume in favour of respondent that no such
misdirections exist.

The traditional formulation of the approach to appeals against sentence on the
ground of excessive severity or excessive lenience where there has been no
misdirection on the part of the court which imposed the sentence is easy enough to
state. It is less easy to apply. Account must be taken of the admonition that the
imposition of sentence is the prerogative of the trial court and that the exercise of its
discretion in that regard is not to be interfered with merely because a appellate Court
would have imposed a heavier or lighter sentence. At the same time it has to be
recognised that the admonition cannot be taken too literally and requires substantial
qualification. If it were taken too literally, it would deprive an appeal against sentence
of much of the social utility it is intended to have. So it is said that where there exists
a ‘striking’ or ‘startling’ or ‘disturbing’ disparity between the trial court’s sentence
and that which the appellate Court would have imposed, interference is justified. In
such situations the trial court’s discretion is regarded (fictionally, some might
cynically say) as having been unreasonably exercised.

The problem is to give practical content to these notions. The comparison
involved in the exercise may sometimes be purely quantitative, say three years’ versus
six years’ imprisonment or a fine of R50 000 versus a fine of R100 000, or it may be
qualitative, say a custodial versus a non-custodial sentence. Where quantitative
comparisons are involved there is the problem of deciding how great the disparity
must be before it attracts the epithet ‘striking’ or ‘startling’ or ‘disturbing’. Where
qualitative comparisons are involved one faces a similar problem. When compared
with a sentence of wholly suspended imprisonment which an appellate Court
considers would have been appropriate, a trial court’s decision to impose a substantial
fine with an alternative of imprisonment may not be regarded as giving rise to a
disparity of that character. As against that, the distinction which exists between a non-
custodial and a custodial sentence, as those terms are commonly understood, is so
generally recognised to be profound and fundamental that, save possibly in rare
instances, the conclusion that a custodial sentence was called for where a non-
custodial sentence has been imposed (or vice versa) will justify interference with the

sentence imposed.’

[24] In imposing sentence the high court had regard, inter alia, to a
probation officer’s report that had been prepared at its behest and took
into account the recommendations of the probation officer. It is not
necessary, for present purposes, to traverse the various grounds of appeal
against sentence relied upon by the State. It suffices merely to record that
the common thread running through all of them is that the trial court
overemphasised the personal circumstances of Romer at the expense of
the gravity of the crimes committed, the interests of society and the
interests of the victims.

[25] Mr Nel SC, who appeared for the State, sought to persuade us that
it was manifest from the sentence imposed by the court a quo that the
learned judge misdirected himself in several respects. He stressed that,
given the gravity of the offences of which Romer was convicted, a long
term of imprisonment was called for and that the court erred in
suspending the sentence when in the nature of things a sentence of 15
years’ imprisonment would have been appropriate.

[26] In my view there are at least two fundamental fallacies inherent in
Mr Nel’s submission. First, this argument entirely ignores the fact that the
term of ten years’ imprisonment, albeit wholly suspended, is in itself
punishment. Second, in S v Shapiro11 this court had occasion to observe
(remarks that I find apposite in this context) that:
‘[Counsel for the State’s] main argument was that although he did not dispute [the
opinion of the psychologist called by the defence], this Court should not lose sight of
the unchallenged evidence of independent by-standers, that Shapiro’s actions

11 S v Shapiro 1994 (1) SACR 112 (A) at 123c-f.

appeared to be cool, calm and calculated. Outwardly he gave no sign of emotional
confusion. Moreover, the provocation he experienced was limited. He brutally
executed a man who was helpless and dying. He acted without compunction, and
thereafter showed a callous indifference to what he had done.
The assumption underlying this argument is that the conduct of a person who has
been found to have diminished criminal responsibility is to be measured by the same
yardstick as the conduct of a person with undiminished criminal responsibility. Such
an assumption is fallacious, for a person who has diminished criminal responsibility
is by definition a person with a diminished capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his act, or to act an accordance with an appreciation of its wrongfulness.’ (My
emphasis.)
The learned acting judge of appeal went on to say this:12
‘I do not think that in the light of the finding of diminished responsibility this case is
one which is clamant for retribution. It does not appear from the evidence that Shapiro
is likely to again commit a violent crime. He has no previous convictions relevant to
show propensity for violence. It does not seem that he is a danger to society which
would call for his separation from the community for a long time. In regard to the
deterrence of others, it does not seem to me that in the present case a long prison
sentence is called for. The concatenation of circumstances was highly unusual and is
unlikely to occur again.’

[27] I also understood Mr Nel to contend that the sentence of
correctional supervision was not only a slap on the wrist but also had the
effect of trivialising the gravity of the crimes committed by Romer with
no deterrent effect on both Romer himself and other would-be offenders.
To underscore his contention Mr Nel asked, somewhat indignantly,
whether ‘picking up cigarette ends’ (what he termed stompies) at a police
station was an appropriate punishment when, given the gravity of the
crimes committed by Romer, the retribution element of punishment
should have been brought to the fore. I do not agree. More than a decade

12 At 124b-d.

ago this court recognised the utility of a sentence of correctional
supervision. In S v R13 Kriegler AJA was at pains to point out that the
statutory dispensation introduced by s 276(1)(h) of the Criminal
Procedure Act (viz correctional supervision) was intended to distinguish
between two types of offenders, namely those who ought to be removed
from society and imprisoned and those who, although deserving of
punishment, should not be removed from society. He exhorted judicial
officers to take advantage of this statutory provision in appropriate cases.

[28] There are two other pertinent decisions of this court that followed S
v R. The first is S v Ingram14 where the accused was sentenced to eight
years’ imprisonment for shooting and killing his wife. Smalberger JA had
the following to say in relation to s 276(1)(h) of the Act at 8j-9c:
‘Murder, in any form, remains a serious crime which usually calls for severe
punishment. Circumstances, however, vary and the punishment must ultimately fit the
true nature and seriousness of the crime. The interests of society are not best served
by too harsh a sentence; but equally so they are not properly served by one that is too
lenient. One must always strive for a proper balance. In doing so due regard must be
had to the objects of punishment. In this respect the trial Judge held, in my view
correctly, that the deterrent aspect of punishment does not play a major role in the
present instance. The appellant is not ever likely to repeat what he did. Deterrence is
therefore only relevant in the context of the effect any sentence may have on
prospective offenders. A suspended period of imprisonment is accordingly rendered
largely superfluous.’

[29] The second is S v D15 in which Nicolas AJA expressed himself in
these terms:
‘In its nature a sentence of correctional supervision is not denunciatory. It does not

13 S v R 1993 (1) SACR 209 (A) at 221g-i.
14 S v Ingram 1995 (1) SACR 1 (A).
15 S v D 1995 (1) SACR 259 (A) at 266c-d.

follow, however, that such a sentence is necessarily inappropriate because the case is
one which excites the moral indignation of the community. The question to be
answered is a wider one: whether the particular offender should, having regard to his
personal circumstances, the nature of his crime and the interests of society, be
removed from the community.’

[30] Finally on this point there is also the minority judgment of Cloete
JA in Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Venter16 where he
said:
‘So far as the deterrence is concerned, the respondent is a first offender; there is no
suggestion that he is a violent person ─ indeed the panel of psychiatrists found that
his amnesia was in keeping with a suppression of events which were “out of character
with his personality”; and it does not seem that the respondent is a danger to society at
large, so his removal from the community for a long time is not necessary for that
reason. In such circumstances, this court has repeatedly held that deterrence of a
person who commits murder acting with diminished responsibility, is not an important
factor when it comes to punishment: see, for example, S v Campher [1987 (1) SA 940
(A) at 964C-H and 967D-E]; S v Smith [1990 (1) SACR 130 (A) at 136b); S v Ingram
[1995 (1) SACR 1 (A) at 96]; and S v Shapiro [1994 (1) SACR 112 (A) at 124c-d].
Deterrence of others is also not important in a case such as the present. This court
held in S v Shapiro:
“In regard to the deterrence of others, it does not seem to me that in the present case a
long prison sentence is called for. The concatenation of circumstances was highly
unusual and is unlikely to occur again.”
The same applies here. I would merely add that to my mind there would seem to be
little purpose in attempting to deter a person not in full control of his or her faculties.’

[31] I am thus not persuaded that the court a quo committed any
misdirection in imposing the sentence it did or that such sentence is
disturbingly inappropriate. I am satisfied after much anxious
consideration that deterrence of Romer or others is not an overriding

16 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Venter 2009 (1) SACR 165 (SCA) para 61.

consideration, regard being had to ‘the concatenation of circumstances’
which were of a highly unusual, if not bizarre, nature and which are
unlikely to recur.

[32] In the result the following order is made:
Both the application for leave to lead further evidence by the respondent
and the appeal against sentence by the State are dismissed.

___________________

XM Petse
Acting Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES

APPELLANT:
CDHO Nel SC
Instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Port
Elizabeth;
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.

RESPONDENT: (Ms) L Crouse
Instructed by Legal Aid Board, Port Elizabeth;
Legal Aid Board, Bloemfontein.
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY ─ JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
30 March 2011
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

STATE V ROMER

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today dismissed an appeal by the State against the
sentence imposed on Mr Stephen Romer by the Eastern Cape High Court (Port Elizabeth)
for one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The SCA had, on the day of
the hearing of the appeal, dismissed an application by Mr Romer to lead further evidence
on appeal.

Romer had shot three people, one of whom was fatally wounded and the other two
seriously injured. The high court found that he had suffered from diminished responsibility
triggered by the disintegration of his marriage and the intake of anti-depressant medication
prescribed by various doctors for his condition. However, it found that he had not acted in a
state of sane automatism when he shot his victims. It sentenced him to ten years’
imprisonment wholly suspended for five years on certain conditions. In addition it
sentenced him to three years’ correctional supervision.

Romer applied for leave to lead the evidence of a social worker responsible for monitoring
his correctional supervision and community service, and of a medical practitioner formerly
specialising in forensic and medico-legal psychiatry. The evidence of the social worker was
intended to demonstrate that he had complied with the conditions imposed upon him by the
high court. And the medical evidence was intended to bolster his case that he had
committed the crimes when he was suffering from sane automatism. The SCA held that the
evidence of the social worker was of no relevance to the appropriateness of sentence at the
time of its imposition. It further held that the medical evidence was, firstly, controversial
and, secondly, it was relevant only to his conviction (his application for leave to appeal
against his conviction had been dismissed by the SCA). There was, therefore, no basis for
its admissibility. Mr Romer’s application to lead further evidence was therefore dismissed.

The State argued that the high court had overemphasized the personal circumstances of
Romer at the expense of the gravity of the crimes he had committed, the interests of society
and the interests of the victims. It further argued that a long term of imprisonment (15
years) was called for and that the high court had erred in suspending the sentence it had
imposed. The SCA held that the high court had not committed any misdirection in
imposing the sentence it did and that the sentence was not disturbingly inappropriate given
Romer’s diminished responsibility at the time. The deterrence of Romer, the SCA held, was
not an overriding consideration. The appeal against sentence by the State was also
dismissed.