THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No:  874/11

Reportable

In the matter between:

THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE
NORTHERN PROVINCES

Appellant

and

SIPHIWE FREEMAN DUBE

Respondent

Neutral citation:
Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Siphiwe
Dube  (874/2011) [2012] ZASCA 137
(27 September 2012).
Coram:
Mthiyane DP, Heher,Mhlantla, Pillay and Petse JJA
Heard:
27 August 2012
Delivered: 27 September 2012

Summary:   Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 – misconduct – appropriate order
– suspension or removal from roll – whether court a quo misdirected
itself in the exercise of its discretion in relation to an appropriate sanction
– whether the general rule relating to costs in matters involving the law
society should have been applied – acts of dishonesty not so serious to
warrant removal from roll – attorney conditionally suspended from
practice – costs order altered.

_____________________________________________________________________

ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________

On appeal from:   North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (Mothle and
Raulinga JJ sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed save for paragraph 3 of the order of the
court below which is set aside and substituted with the following:
‘3. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and
client scale.’
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
_____________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________
MHLANTLA JA (MTHIYANE DP, HEHER, PILLAY and PETSE JJA
concurring):

[1] The appellant is the Law Society of the Northern Provinces
incorporated in terms of section 56 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 (the
Act). The respondent is Mr Siphiwe Freeman Dube, an attorney
practising in the province of Gauteng. The appellant launched an
application in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria in terms of section
22(1)(d) of the Act and sought an order that the respondent’s name be
struck from the roll of attorneys. Instead of granting the relief sought, the
court below (Mothle J, Raulinga J concurring) suspended the respondent
from practice for one year. It further ordered him to pay R80 000 to his
former employer and R15 000 to a former client. Other ancillary orders
relating to his employment were made. The respondent was also ordered
to pay the appellant’s costs of the application on the party and party scale.
The appellant appeals against two of the orders contending that the

respondent should have been struck off the roll and that a punitive costs
order should have been issued against him. The appeal is with the leave
of the court below.

[2] Section 22(1)(d) of the Act provides that a person who has been
admitted and enrolled as an attorney may on the application of the law
society be struck off the roll or suspended from practice if he or she, in
the discretion of the court, is not a fit and proper person to continue to
practise as an attorney.

[3]   Regarding applications of this nature, Harms DP stated in Law
Society, Northern Provinces v Mogami:1
‘Applications for the suspension or removal from the roll require a three-stage
enquiry. First, the court must decide whether the alleged offending conduct has been
established on a preponderance of probabilities, which is a factual enquiry. Second, it
must consider whether the person concerned is “in the discretion of the court” not a fit
and proper person to continue to practise. This involves a weighing-up of the conduct
complained of against the conduct expected of an attorney and, to this extent, is a
value judgment. And third, the court must enquire whether in all the circumstances
the person in question is to be removed from the roll of attorneys or whether an order
of suspension from practice would suffice….’

[4] In Summerley v Law Society, Northern Provinces,2 Brand JA
enunciated the test to be applied during the third stage of the enquiry as
follows:
‘The third enquiry again requires the Court to exercise a discretion. At this stage the
Court must decide, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the person who has been
found not to be a fit and proper person to practise as an attorney deserves the ultimate

1 Law Society, Northern Provinces v Mogami 2010 (1) SA 186 (SCA) para 4.
2 Summerley v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA) para 2.

penalty of being struck from the roll or whether an order of suspension from practice
will suffice.’

[5]   Before us there is no dispute between the parties about the findings
of the court below in respect of the first and second stages of the enquiry.
The appeal concerns the third stage and in that regard two issues arise for
consideration in this appeal. First, whether the sanction imposed by the
court below is appropriate having regard to the respondent’s
unprofessional conduct and dishonesty. Put differently, the issue is
whether the court misdirected itself in the exercise of its discretion in
relation to an appropriate sanction. Second, whether the respondent
should have been ordered to pay the costs of the application on a punitive
scale.

[6] The application launched by the appellant in the court below arose
from the following factual background. The respondent was admitted as
an attorney of the North Gauteng High Court on 12 February 2007 at the
age of 28 years. On 1 February 2008, he was employed by Maluleke
Msimang & Associates, a firm of attorneys in Pretoria, (the firm) as a
professional assistant. On 7 October 2008, whilst still in the employ of
the firm, unbeknown to his employers and without their consent, the
respondent approached the appellant and registered an attorney’s practice
with the latter under the name of Freeman Dube Attorneys. In his
application for registration, he advised the appellant that although he was
opening his own practice, he would still remain in the employ of the firm.
The respondent commenced practising for his own account on 1
November 2008.

[7] The firm subsequently discovered that the respondent had stolen
some of its clients’ files. It was established that in certain instances the
respondent’s practice was acting for the firm’s clients. In one particular
instance a conflict of interest had arisen when in the same matter he acted
through his practice on behalf of a claimant in a third party claim whilst
he simultaneously acted on instructions of his employer and represented
the Road Accident Fund (RAF), a statutory insurer established in terms of
the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.

[8] On 5 June 2009, the firm launched an application in the high court
and sought an interdict against the respondent for the delivery of its
clients’ files. The application was settled on the basis that the respondent
would return the files and pay an amount of R80 000 to the firm, being
the fees due to it upon receipt of the proceeds of a  third party claim from
the RAF. On 3 July 2009 the respondent signed an undertaking to pay the
R80 000 but failed to do so. The firm lodged a complaint with the
appellant. The complaint related to the respondent’s unprofessional
conduct relating to his failure to obtain its consent before registering his
practice, the theft of the files as well as his failure to pay over to the firm
the amount of R80 000.

[9] The appellant, through its staff, conducted its own investigation
and uncovered further acts of misconduct and dishonesty against the
respondent. These related firstly, to the respondent’s failure to comply
with rule 70 of the appellant’s rules (the rules), which required timeous
submission of an auditor’s report. In this regard, the respondent was
obliged to have submitted an opening auditor’s report on or before 28
February 2009 and an auditor’s report for the period ending 28 February
2009 on or before 31 August 2009. The respondent obtained unqualified

audit reports. These were however only submitted on 27 October 2009
without any explanation for the late submission.  Secondly, the
respondent had simultaneously acted on behalf of the plaintiff and the
defendant in a third party claim and when the matter was settled, had
contravened rule 68.8 in that he had delayed in making payment to a
client or misappropriated the funds. Thirdly, he had submitted a bill of
costs that included false items to the RAF. In this regard, the respondent
had claimed fees for travelling from Pretoria to Limpopo and attending
court when he in fact never did so. He further claimed counsel’s fee of
R13 750 when no advocate nor attorney attended court.

[10] As a result of this discovery, the appellant launched an application
in two parts in the court below. Part A was for an interim order
suspending the respondent from practice pending the final determination
of part B of the application to have his name struck off the roll. On 17
December 2009, Botha J granted the interim order suspending the
respondent. He referred the matter back to the appellant to appoint a
disciplinary committee to hold an inquiry into the allegations of
unprofessional conduct against the respondent.

[11] The appellant instituted the disciplinary inquiry. The respondent
faced several charges involving dishonesty, unprofessional conduct and
non-compliance with the rules. Some of the charges were withdrawn at
the commencement of the inquiry. The respondent pleaded guilty and was
found guilty of the late submission of the auditor’s reports, conducting a
practice for his own account without the consent of his employer, theft of
three client files from his employer and creating a conflict of interest
when he simultaneously acted for the plaintiff and the defendant in the
same third party claim.

[12] The inquiry was finalised on 9 June 2010 and after consideration of
all the evidence, the respondent was found not guilty of overcharging a
client. He was in addition to the charges referred to in para 11 above
found guilty of the following charges:
(a)
submitting an account to the RAF for payment which included
false items in a party and party bill of costs;
(b)
misappropriating an amount of R15 000 from the proceeds of a
third party claim;
(c)
practising as an attorney for his own account without being in
possession of a fidelity fund certificate in contravention of section 41(1)
and (2) of the Act; and
(d)
failing to honour an undertaking to pay an amount of R80 000 to
the firm on receipt of the proceeds of a third party claim from the RAF.

[13] After the conclusion of the disciplinary enquiry, the appellant
served a supplementary affidavit on the respondent detailing the
investigations conducted by a firm of accountants appointed by the
appellant as well as the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary
committee. The council of the appellant resolved to launch an application
for the respondent’s name to be struck from the roll of attorneys. The
respondent did not file any affidavit to contest the allegations in the
supplementary affidavit.

[14] Part B of the application was heard by the court below. It
concluded that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to continue
practising as an attorney as provided for in section 22(1)(d) of the Act.
The court found that the respondent was naïve, immature, lacked
experience and insight and had as a result succumbed to greed. It
accepted that the respondent had committed acts of dishonesty and stated

that he had come perilously close to having his name struck from the roll.
It concluded that such a sanction was too severe and was not suitable
under the circumstances. The court held that an appropriate order would
be one suspending him from practice for a certain period and ordering
him to repay his ill-gotten gains. It accordingly issued an order
suspending the respondent from practice for one year and imposed further
restrictions on him after the expiry of the period of suspension. In this
regard, he was precluded from practising for his own account either as a
principal or in partnership or in association with or as a director of a
private company for a period of two years after the expiry of the period of
suspension. The court further ordered him to pay R80 000 to his former
employer and R15 000 to a former client as well as the costs of the
application on a party and party scale.

[15]    As I said earlier in this judgment, the court below, in the exercise
of its discretion, declined to grant the order sought by the appellant and
suspended the respondent from practice. It is trite that a court of appeal
has limited powers to interfere with the discretion of a lower court. In
Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Sonntag,3 Malan JA remarked
that:
‘The decision whether an attorney who has been found unfit to practise should be
struck off or suspended is a matter for the discretion of the court of first instance. That
discretion is a “narrow”one:
“The consequence is that an appeal court will not decide the matter afresh and
substitute its decision for that of the court of first instance; it will do so only where the
court of first instance did not exercise its discretion judicially, which can be done by
showing that the court of first instance exercised the power conferred on it
capriciously or upon a wrong principle, or did not bring its unbiased judgment to bear
on the question or did not act for substantial reasons, or materially misdirected itself

3 Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Sonntag 2012 (1) SA 372 (SCA) para 14, quoting Botha v
Law Society, Northern Provinces 2009 (1) SA 227 (SCA) para 3.

in fact or in law. It must be emphasised that dishonesty is not a sine qua non for
striking-off.”’

[16] Before I deal with the main issue it is appropriate that I dispose of
the issues relating to the general acts of misconduct and breach of the
rules by the respondent. These are the non-compliance with rule 70 and
the failure to honour an undertaking to pay his former employer.

Non-compliance with rule 70
[17] In this regard, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
respondent breached rule 70 in that he had failed to submit the auditor’s
reports and practised without the fidelity fund certificate. The evidence
revealed that the opening auditor’s report was submitted six months after
its due date whilst the annual report was two months late. Both reports
were unqualified. The purpose of rule 70 is to satisfy the appellant that
the attorney’s accounting records are kept in accordance with the Act and
the rules and that an attorney handles and administers trust moneys
properly and responsibly. The misconduct in issue here related to the late
submission of the reports. It seems to me that the respondent was slack in
the conduct of his practice and compliance with the rules. That may have
been due to the fact that he had just commenced practising for his own
account. It is apposite to state that in so far as the annual report for the
period ending 28 February 2010 is concerned, an auditor’s certificate was
in fact submitted on time and was unqualified. This, in my view, is an
indication that the respondent had learnt from his previous experience. I
consider that a warning would be an appropriate sanction for a
transgression of this nature.

Failure to honour the undertaking
[18] I turn to the respondent’s failure to honour the undertaking. It is not
in dispute that the respondent failed to honour the undertaking dated 3
July 2009. He only paid his former employer on 24 March 2012. In this
court, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the evidence
showed that on receipt of the proceeds of the third party claim, Mr
Msimang, a senior partner of the firm, had acceded to the respondent’s
request to grant him an extension of the period within which to pay the
R80 000. No evidence was presented on behalf of the appellant to contest
this explanation. In the result, we have to accept that the respondent had
made prior arrangements with Mr Msimang in this regard.

Acts of dishonesty
[19]   As regards the acts that involved an element of dishonesty, the
appellant’s legal representative submitted that the sanction imposed was
too lenient and that the court misdirected itself in the exercise of its
discretion. It was contended that the court did not have regard to the
general principles applicable where an attorney is found guilty of a
transgression involving dishonesty. He argued that the transgressions by
the respondent when viewed cumulatively are so serious as to warrant the
removal of his name from the roll. Although this argument merits serious
consideration, I think it falls to be rejected. It is true that the respondent
made himself guilty of certain serious transgressions. But every case must
be considered against the setting of its own peculiar facts. In my view,
some of the complaints against the respondent lacked particularity whilst
the others varied in seriousness. These are the theft of three files, the
misappropriation of an amount of R15 000, the submission of an inflated
bill of costs, registration of the respondent’s practice without his

employer’s knowledge and consent and the issue relating to conflict of
interests.  I propose to deal with each of these transgressions in turn.

Theft of files
[20] There is no doubt that the theft of client files by an employee is a
serious transgression. The respondent has to be censured.

Misappropriation of funds
[21] Mr Motimele, an attorney in Limpopo, was involved in a motor
collision and sustained bodily injuries. The respondent acted for Mr
Motimele in his third party claim. The matter was settled and the RAF
paid a lump sum of R15 000. The respondent transferred the entire
amount to his business account and when challenged about the transfer,
stated that he had concluded an oral loan agreement with Motimele. The
appellant did not provide any evidence to contest the respondent’s
explanation. It was not shown that the respondent was untruthful. Be that
as it may, it is irregular and unethical for an attorney to conclude a loan
agreement with his or her client.

Submission of an inflated bill of costs
[22] The third act involving dishonesty relates to the submission of a
bill of costs to the RAF. As indicated earlier in this judgment, the
respondent had claimed fees for travelling from Pretoria to Limpopo and
attending court when he in fact never did so as well as counsel’s fee when
no legal representative attended court. The respondent in his answering
affidavit admitted submitting the bill of costs with the false items and
expressed remorse for his conduct. He accordingly did not lie under oath.
The RAF did not suffer any prejudice as the act of dishonesty was

discovered before the bill of costs was taxed. One must infer though that
the respondent intended to mislead the RAF and has to be censured.

Registration of the respondent’s practice
[23] The issue of the registration of the respondent’s practice was
clarified by the appellant’s legal representative. He informed us that an
attorney may conduct a practice for his or her own account whilst
employed by another firm of attorneys provided he or she has obtained
prior consent from his or her employer to register the practice. He
submitted that the respondent committed an act of dishonesty when he
failed to disclose to his employer his intention to register the practice.
With that submission I agree. He further contended that the court below
erred in failing to treat the omission as dishonest but conceded that the
respondent’s failure did not of itself warrant an order for striking off.

Conflict of interests
[24]   Counsel for the respondent conceded that it bordered on dishonesty
for the respondent to represent the plaintiff and the defendant
simultaneously in a third party claim and fail to disclose such fact to
them. Be that as it may, the evidence against the respondent is far from
satisfactory. The complaint against the respondent was not adequately
investigated. The evidence does not indicate whether the respondent had
charged both parties or whether either of the parties was prejudiced in any
way. The matter was settled. Nothing flows from this complaint.

[25] To sum up the respondent was young, immature and inexperienced.
He stole three files. He was guilty of other transgressions that rendered
him unfit to practise his profession. It was irregular and unethical for him
to borrow money from a client, albeit a colleague. He admitted his

mistakes, which indicates a measure of remorse. He has not attempted to
deceive the court. In Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v C,4 Galgut
AJA said with regard to the implications of a striking-off order:
‘The implications of a striking-off order are serious and far-reaching. Such an order
envisages that the attorney will not be re-admitted to practise unless the Court can be
satisfied by the clearest proof that the applicant has genuinely reformed, that a
considerable time has elapsed since he was struck off, and that probability is that, if
reinstated, he will conduct himself honestly and honourably in the future.’

[26] Although each case stands against the setting of its own facts and
circumstances, it is necessary to have a look at comparable cases in
determining whether the court below misdirected itself in the exercise of
its discretion.

[27]    The first of these examples is Kekana v Society of Advocates of
South Africa,5  where the appellant had been practising as an advocate for
four years. He and his colleague had appeared as pro deo counsel at
Tzaneen Circuit Court. After the conclusion of the trial, they submitted
inflated claims to the Department of Justice together with their pro deo
claims (they had apparently entertained women). On two separate
occasions, they claimed the cost of restaurant meals. The accounts
reflected two main courses for each person per night. The bar council
held an internal enquiry and later launched an application for the removal
of their names from the roll of advocates. The appellant in his answering
affidavit made a false statement and denied the presence of the female
companions. He asserted that he and his colleague were very hungry and
each had consumed two main courses on each night. He repeated this
statement in his oral evidence. The court rejected his testimony as false.

4 Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v C 1986 (1) SA 616 (A) at 640C-D.
5 Kekana v Society of Advocates of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 649 (SCA).

His name was struck off the roll for perpetuating the lies under oath (in
his affidavit and in court).

[28] In Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Peter,6 the respondent
decided to set up practice as a sole practitioner shortly after her admission
as an attorney. She experienced financial problems and in the process
misappropriated R20 000 to cover the expenses of her practice. The court
held that the theft was not the result of a character defect inherent in her
but rather a moral lapse brought about by the pressure she had been
under. The court confirmed the order of the court of first instance
suspending the respondent from practice.

[29] There is no doubt that the appellant in Kekana was a senior
advocate with more experience and should have known better. He
committed perjury, whereas the respondent in this matter admitted his
transgressions and showed remorse. He provided plausible explanations
where necessary.

[30] Having regard to the sanctions imposed in the above-mentioned
cases as well as the respondent’s personal circumstances, the finding of
the court below cannot be faulted. It correctly set out the nature of the
case, the substance of the charges against the respondent and the findings
of the disciplinary committee. After evaluating the evidence, it declared
that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to practise as an
attorney. The court below thereafter proceeded to the third leg of the
enquiry. It correctly identified three acts of dishonesty and took into
account the respondent’s personal circumstances and that he had been in

6 Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Peter 2009 (2) SA 18 (SCA).

practice for a relatively short period. In its judgment, the court referred to
Peter to show that the respondent in that case was not struck off the roll
notwithstanding the fact that she was dishonest. It concluded that the
principle of redemption should apply.

[31]   The court set safeguards with regard to the respondent’s future
employment. It is common cause that the respondent has been suspended
from practice since December 2009 when the interim order was issued.
He has accordingly been excluded from the legal profession for almost
three years. He is furthermore precluded from practising for his own
account or either as a partner or a director for a period of two years upon
the expiry of the suspension period. It was conceded on behalf of the
appellant that there is no evidence that the respondent may repeat the
offences, more so since the respondent will not practise for his own
account. There is a further precaution in that the respondent, should he
elect to practise for his own account after the expiry of all these periods,
will have to satisfy the court that he has redeemed himself. In this regard
the appellant has the right to present evidence relating to the respondent’s
fitness.

[32] The court below was very conscious that the respondent’s conduct
had brought him to the brink of striking off. In concluding that he should
not be pushed over the edge it looked not at the individual offences but at
their cumulative effect and it made a value judgment on the rehabilitative
prospects of the respondent. The orders issued by the court below reveal
that it fairly weighed all the relevant factors including its duty to protect
the public and the profession. I cannot conclude that it misdirected itself
in the exercise of its discretion. There is accordingly no basis for this

court to interfere. The appeal against the order of suspension falls to be
dismissed.

[33] The final issue is costs. The general rule in matters of this kind, is
that the respondent has to pay the costs of the law society on an attorney
and client scale. This is so because the appellant is not an ordinary litigant
as it performs a public duty. It is obliged to approach the court when a
complaint, in particular one involving an act of dishonesty, is lodged
against an attorney. The appellant in this matter did not act on its own
frolic. It was accordingly entitled to an appropriate costs order. There was
no reason for the court below to depart from the general rule. In the
result, the court below erred and should have ordered the respondent to
pay the costs of the application on a punitive scale. The appellant is also
entitled to its costs on appeal notwithstanding the fact that the order of the
court below has not been set aside and replaced with an order striking the
name of the respondent off the roll.

[34] In the result, the following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed save for paragraph 3 of the order of the
court below which is set aside and substituted with the following:
‘3. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and
client scale.’
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

_____________________
N.Z MHLANTLA

JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:
J Leotlela

Instructed by:

Rooth & Wessels Inc, Pretoria

Naudes Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
Q Pelser SC

Instructed by:

TT Hlapolosa Inc, Pretoria

Matsepes, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
27 September 2012
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

LAW SOCIETY OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES v SIPHIWE DUBE

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today dismissed an appeal by the Law Society of the
Northern Provinces (the Law society) against an order of the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria suspending Mr Siphiwe Freeman Dube from practice for one year. However, the
SCA held that the high court had erred in not ordering Mr Dube to the pay costs of the Law
society on a punitive scale. It accordingly substituted the order of the high court with an
order directing Mr Dube to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and client scale.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal on the merits, the SCA ordered Mr Dube to
pay the Law society’s costs of the appeal.

Mr Dube, who was admitted as an attorney in 2007, was appointed as a professional
assistant by Maluleke Msimang & Associates, a firm of attorneys in Pretoria (the firm) in
February 2008. He registered his own practice with the law society whilst still employed by
the firm and without its consent. He commenced practising for his own account in

November 2008. The firm later discovered that Mr Dube had stolen its clients’ files and
that he had created a conflict of interest by acting, through his own practice, for a claimant
in a third party claim whilst simultaneously acting for the Road Accident Fund (RAF) on
the instructions of the firm in the same matter. The firm launched an application which was
subsequently settled on the basis that he would return the files and pay R80 000 to the firm,
being the fees due to it upon receipt of the proceeds of a third party claim from the RAF.
Mr Dube returned the files but failed to honour his undertaking to pay the R80 000. The
firm then lodged a complaint of unprofessional conduct against him with the law society.

The Law society conducted its own investigations and discovered further transgressions by
Mr Dube. First he had failed to submit auditor’s reports for his practice on time, thereby
contravening rule 70 of its rules. Second, he had contravened rule 68.8 in that he had
delayed to account to his client when the matter was settled or had misappropriated the
funds. Third, he had submitted a bill of costs that included false items to the RAF.

The Law society launched an application in the high court for an order striking Mr Dube’s
name off the roll of attorneys. An interim order, suspending him from practice, was issued.
When the striking off application came before the high court, it held that the order sought
was a severe sanction. It instead made an order suspending Mr Dube from practice for one
year and imposed certain restrictions regarding his employment after the expiry of the
suspension period. It further ordered him to pay the Law society’s costs on a party and
party scale. The Law society then appealed to the SCA against these orders.

Regarding the appeal against the order of suspension, the SCA held that the orders issued
by the high court revealed that it had fairly weighed all the relevant factors, including its
duty to protect the public and the attorneys’ profession. This court concluded that the high
court had exercised its discretion properly and that there was no basis to interfere. On the
issue of costs, the SCA held that the Law society had not acted on a frolic of its own and
that there was no reason for the high court to depart from the general rule that a respondent
has to pay costs of the Law society on an attorney and client costs. It accordingly made the
orders referred to above.