THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

CASE NO: 131/07
Reportable
In the matter between:

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
First Appellant
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Second Appellant
THE MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
Third Appellant

and

SEKELE MICHAEL MOLEKO
Respondent

Coram:
Farlam & Van Heerden JJA et Kgomo AJA

Heard:
12 March 2008

Delivered:
31 March 2008

Summary:
Malicious prosecution – requirements for –– act or omission
by magistrate in the exercise of his judicial functions –
section 60(11)(a) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 –
release on warning of persons charged with Schedule 6
offences without any evidence being led.

Neutral citation: This judgment may be referred to as Minister for Justice
& Constitutional Development v Moleko (131/07) [2008] ZASCA 43 (31
March 2008)

VAN HEERDEN JA:

Introduction
[1] The respondent, Mr Moleko, instituted an action for damages in
the Transkei High Court against the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development (the first appellant), the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) (the second appellant) and the Minister of Safety and
Security (the third appellant) based on his alleged malicious prosecution
by the defendants. By agreement between the parties, the trial in the court
a quo was confined to the merits of the claim, with the question of
quantum standing over for later determination if necessary.
[2] Matthee AJ held that Mr Moleko had established that he was the
victim of a malicious prosecution and that, as a result of such prosecution,
his dignity and self-respect were impaired. The learned judge ordered the
first and third appellants (the two Ministers) to pay the costs of the matter,
jointly and severally. The present appeal comes before us with leave of
this court granted on petition. (A further claim by Mr Moleko, based on
his alleged unlawful arrest, was dismissed by the trial court and no cross-
appeal has been noted against that part of the judgment.)
[3] Mr Moleko is a magistrate at Engcobo in the Eastern Cape. On 16
January 2002 whilst he was presiding as a magistrate, a case involving
three persons accused of armed robbery and ‘hijacking’ came before him.
Two of the accused (accused no’s 2 and 3) were in custody after they had
previously been refused bail by another magistrate at Engcobo in October
2001, after a fully-fledged bail hearing. Accused no 1, who appears to
have been arrested shortly before the other two, had been released by Mr
Moleko on bail of R500, with the agreement of the control prosecutor, Mr
Nogcanzi, on 13 September 2001, without any evidence being led.

[4] The other two accused were due to appear in court on 16 January
2002 in order for them to bring a renewed bail application based on new
facts. However, on that day, only one of them appeared in court, the other
apparently being ill and in hospital. The defence attorney, Mr Songo, thus
informed the prosecutor, Mr Mgudlwa, that he would request a
postponement for hearing of the bail application and a suitable date was
set. According to Mr Mgudlwa, the State was at that stage ready to
proceed to trial and was awaiting a date in the regional court.
[5] From the record before Mr Moleko, it appeared that the two
accused had been in custody since their arrest in September of the
previous year. The matter had been postponed on a number of occasions
since the accused first appeared in court. When Mr Mgudlwa called the
matter, Mr Moleko expressed his displeasure at the fact that accused no’s
2 and 3 had been in custody since September 2001 and intimated that he
was intent on releasing them on warning. According to Mr Mgudlwa, he
expressly informed Mr Moleko that the accused were charged with
Schedule 6 offences and of the provisions of s 60(11)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 1   He also allegedly drew Mr Moleko’s
attention to the fact that the previous bail application by the two accused
had been rejected, that the investigation had been completed and that the

1 Section 60(11)(a) provides that:
‘(11) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with an offence referred
to –
(a) in Schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he or she is
dealt with in accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable
opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that exceptional circumstances
exist which in the interests of justice permit his or her release.’
(The effect of this subsection is discussed by the Constitutional Court in S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v
Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) paras 61 to 65.)

matter was ready to be postponed for a regional court date, but for the
fresh bail application which had been arranged for that date (16 January
2002). In the event, however, Mr Moleko granted the request for a
postponement to a specified date, but ordered the release on warning of
both accused until such date.
[6] The State immediately brought an urgent application in the
Transkei High Court to review and set aside Mr Moleko’s order releasing
the accused on warning. On 25 January 2002, the High Court issued a rule
nisi, which rule was confirmed four days later, setting aside Mr Moleko’s
earlier order. This led to the re-arrest of the two accused and the sub-
sequent decision by the DPP to prosecute Mr Moleko for ‘defeating the
course of justice in contravention of section 40(a) and/or (c) of the
Transkei Penal Code, 1983, read with sections 17 and 32 of the Transkei
Penal Code’.2 In the charge sheet it was alleged that Mr Moleko –
‘(…) did unlawfully, with the intent to defeat and/or obstruct and/or prevent the course
of justice and mala fide, commit an act to wit
Releasing an accused person, charged with offences in terms of Schedule 6 of Act 51 of
1977, on warning contrary to the provisions of Section 60 of Act 51 of 1977 and/or;
Releasing an accused person on warning without receiving evidence contrary to section
60(11)(a); and/or

2 Section 17 reads as follows:

‘Except as expressly provided by this Code, no judge or other judicial officer shall be criminally liable for
anything he has done or omitted in good faith in the exercise of his judicial functions, even if the act so
done was in excess of his judicial authority or if he was bound to do the act omitted.’
In terms of s 40 of the Code:
‘Any person who –
(a) accuses any person falsely of any crime or does anything to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat
the course of justice; or
(b) . . .
(c) obstructs or in any way interferes with or knowingly prevents the execution of any legal process,
civil or criminal, shall be guilty of an offence’.

Failing to implement the relevant provisions of section 60 of Act 51 of 1977 after he
had been informed that it was applicable.’
[7] At his subsequent trial in the regional court, Mr Moleko was
eventually acquitted of the charge. This gave rise to his claim for damages
for malicious prosecution which forms the subject of the present appeal.
Claim for malicious prosecution: requirements
[8] In order to succeed (on the merits) with a claim for malicious
prosecution, a claimant must allege and prove –
(a)
that the defendants set the law in motion (instigated or instituted the
proceedings);
(b)
that the defendants acted without reasonable and probable cause;
(c)
that the defendants acted with ‘malice’ (or animo injuriandi);3 and
(d)
that the prosecution has failed. (In this case, of course, Mr Moleko
was acquitted at the end of his criminal trial and requirement (d)
need detain us no further.)
Ad (a) – Instigation or institution of proceedings
[9] The trial judge dealt with the first requirement rather perfunctorily,
finding that it was clear ‘that various servants of the appellants were all
involved in setting the law in motion which led to the prosecution of the

3 See Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe [2007] 1 All SA 375 (SCA) para 5, referring to Lederman v
Moharal Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 (1) SA 190 (A) at 196G–H; Thompson v Minister of Police 1971 (1)
SA 371 (E) at 373F-H and J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed
(2005) pp 124-125 (see also pp172-173 and the authorities there cited). Cf 15 Lawsa (sv ‘Malicious
Proceedings’ by DJ McQuoid-Mason) (reissue, 1999 para 441; François du Bois (General Editor) Wille’s
Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) pp 1192-1193; LTC Harms Amler’s Precedents of Pleadings
6 ed (2003) p 238-239.

plaintiff’. According to the trial judge, he understood counsel for the
appellants to have conceded this point.
[10] Leaving aside the fact that the court cannot be bound by an
incorrect concession by a litigant with regard to a legal issue, it was sub-
mitted before us that the trial judge erred in failing to have regard to the
fact that the prosecution occurred at the instance of the DPP and that the
role of the police was merely to gather relevant information.
[11] With regard to the liability of the police, the question is whether
they did anything more than one would expect from a police officer in the
circumstances, namely to give a fair and honest statement of the relevant
facts to the prosecutor, leaving it to the latter to decide whether to prose-
cute or not.4
[12] On behalf of the third appellant (the Minister of Safety and
Security), a certain Captain Gwayi (attached to the Serious Violent
Crimes Unit based in Mthatha) testified that, as a result of a report (‘in the
nature of a complaint’) by one of his subordinates, Inspector Didiza, he
went to Engcobo on 17 January 2002 to investigate the events giving rise
to the complaint. Inspector Didiza’s complaint related to the
abovementioned incident on 16 January 2002. Captain Gwayi interviewed
the public prosecutor involved (Mr Mgudlwa) and also spoke to the senior
public prosecutor (Mr Nogcantsi) and to the Chief Magistrate. He was
told that Mr Moleko was on leave. Mr Mgudlwa ‘echoed’ Inspector
Didiza’s complaint about how Mr Moleko had released two accused on

4 Prinsloo & Another v Newman 1975 (1) SA 481 (A) at 492C–F and 495A. See also 15 Lawsa  op cit
para 445.

warning despite the fact that they were charged with Schedule 6 offences
which ‘required an enquiry about bail to be heard’. Mr Mgudlwa informed
him that he was going to report the matter to the DPP in Mthatha.
[13] It is important to note that the case docket in this matter (about
which more later) contains two affidavits deposed to by Captain Gwayi,
both of which refer to a letter (what he calls ‘an official correspondence’)
written by him to ‘both the Local Prosecutor and Magistrate of Engcobo .
. . appealing for the review of Mr Moleko’s decision /ruling of releasing
the robbery accused on warning’. This letter, dated 17 January 2002, also
forms part of the case docket (as document B.1). It is addressed by
Captain Gwayi to the Chief Magistrate and the Control Prosecutor of the
Engcobo Magistrate’s Court and purports to be a formal complaint against
‘the judicial officer, Mr Moleko’. In this letter, Captain Gwayi recounts
the report given to him by Inspector Didiza regarding the incident on 16
January 2002 during which Mr Moleko had released on warning two
persons charged with Schedule 6 offences without hearing any evidence
and ‘without making any enquiries to other role players who are very
conversant with the merits of the case nor referring to the court record that
was [available] to him as to what the reasons for such “elongated”
detention were’. He also stated that the ‘other role players’ (referring to
the public prosecutor (Mr Mgudlwa), the investigating officer (Inspector
Didiza) and the defence attorney (Mr Songo) ‘were more than ready to
proceed with the formal bail application but he (Mr Moleko) simply
[shouted] everybody down’. Captain Gwayi asked for answers to a series
of questions posed in the letter and requested the addressees of the letter
to treat it seriously. There is no indication in the case docket or in the

record that either the chief magistrate or the control prosecutor ever
responded to this letter.
[14] Captain Gwayi eventually received an instruction from Mr Lusu,
the Head of the Office of the DPP in Mthatha, to investigate the matter.
He therefore returned to the Engcobo Magistrate’s Court on 5 February
2002, that being the day on which, according to his information, Mr
Moleko was due to return from his leave. He informed Mr Moleko of the
nature of the charges which were being investigated against him, first at
the Magistrate’s Court and thereafter at the police station opposite the
court. At the request of Mr Moleko, he agreed to continue the interview
on 7 February 2002 at Mr Moleko’s office.
[15] On 7 February 2002, Captain Gwayi met with Mr Moleko at the
Engcobo Magistrate’s Court and informed him of the allegations against
him and of his constitutional rights. Mr Moleko elected to make a
‘warning statement’ and wrote it out himself. Captain Gwayi issued Mr
Moleko with a ‘provisional summons’ for trial, provisional in the sense
that the matter had to be returned to the office of the DPP for further
instructions. The Captain filed Mr Moleko’s warning statement in the case
docket which was thereafter submitted to the office of the DPP for a
decision. On 19 February 2002, the DPP’s office informed Captain Gwayi
of its decision to prosecute Mr Moleko and the latter was then arraigned
for trial at the regional court in Mthatha.
[16] Captain Gwayi testified that he had nothing to do with the decision
to prosecute Mr Moleko – he merely conducted the investigation and
collected evidence. As far as he was concerned, the decision to prosecute
was ‘the prerogative of the National Prosecuting Authority’.

[17] Based on these facts, it is clear to me that Captain Gwayi at all
times acted on the instructions and under the direction of the office of the
DPP. Neither he nor any other policeman employed by the third appellant
was responsible for the decision to prosecute the plaintiff. For this reason
alone, I am of the view that the appeal must therefore succeed in so far as
the third appellant is concerned.
[18] As far as the first appellant, the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development, is concerned, the National Prosecuting
Authority Act 32 of 1998 provides that the Minister exercises final
responsibility over the national prosecuting authority established in terms
of s 179 of the Constitution, but only in accordance with the provisions of
that Act (s 33(1)). Thus, the National Director of Public Prosecutions
(NDPP) must, at the request of the Minister, inter alia furnish her with
information in respect of any matter dealt with by the NDPP or a DPP,
and with reasons for any decision taken by a DPP, ‘in the exercise of their
powers, the carrying out of their duties and the performance of their
functions’ (ss 33(2)(a) and (b)). Furthermore, the NDPP must furnish the
Minister, at her request, with information regarding the prosecution policy
and the policy directives determined and issued by the NDPP (ss 33(2)(c)
and (d)). However, the prosecuting authority is ‘accountable to Parliament
in respect of its powers, functions and duties under this Act, including
decisions regarding the institution of prosecutions’ (s 35(1)). It is
therefore clear that the Minister (the first appellant) is not responsible for
the decision to prosecute Mr Moleko and the appeal must also succeed as
far as the first appellant is concerned.

[19] It follows that the remaining requirements are only relevant
insofar as they concern the potential liability of the DPP.
Ad (b): Absence of reasonable and probable cause
[20] Reasonable and probable cause, in the context of a claim for
malicious prosecution, means an honest belief founded on reasonable
grounds that the institution of proceedings is justified. The concept there-
fore involves both a subjective and an objective element5 –
‘Not only must the defendant have subjectively had an honest belief in the guilt of the
plaintiff, but his belief and conduct must have been objectively reasonable, as would
have been exercised by a person using ordinary care and prudence.’6
[21] Mr Moleko was charged with defeating or obstructing the course
of justice. The essential elements of this crime at common law 7 are
described by JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol
II Common Law Crimes 3ed (1996) as follows (p 102):
‘Defeating or obstructing the course of justice consists in unlawfully doing an act
which is intended to defeat or obstruct and which does defeat or obstruct the due
administration of justice.’ (Footnote omitted.)

5 Prinsloo v Newman at 495H and the cases referred to therein. See further Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v
Shongwe para 14.
6 15 Lawsa op cit para 449 and the authorities there cited. See also Wille’s Principles of South African
Law  pp 1193-1194.
7 Which for the purposes of this case are clearly the same under s 40 of the Transkei Penal Code (see note
2 above).

It is immaterial whether the alleged conduct has merely a tendency to
defeat or obstruct the course of justice or is capable of defeating or
obstructing the course of justice.8
[22] Counsel for the appellants pointed out that the actus reus which
forms the basis of a charge of defeating or obstructing the course of
justice may take a number of different forms,9 and contended that the
unlawful and unprocedural release by a judicial officer of an accused
person may fall within the type of conduct which may be characterised as
defeating or obstructing the course of justice. For the purposes of this
judgment, I will assume in favour of the appellants that this proposition
may well, in appropriate (and, it is to be hoped, rare) circumstances,
indeed be correct.
[23] In determining whether or not the decision by the DPP to
prosecute Mr Moleko amounted to malicious prosecution, it must also be
remembered that, in the relevant charge sheet,10 the State alleged that Mr
Moleko had acted ‘with the intention to defeat and/or obstruct and/or
prevent the course of justice and mala fide’.11
[24] Ms Neveling, the Senior State Advocate in the office of the DPP
in Mthatha who took the ultimate decision to prosecute Mr Moleko,
testified that at the time she took this decision, she had before her the
following documents:

8 JRL Milton op cit p 117.
9 JRL Milton op cit pp 118 et seq and the authorities there cited.
10 The wording of which is quoted in para 6 above.
11 Emphasis added.

• the case docket, a copy of which was, by agreement between
the parties, handed in to the court a quo at the conclusion of
the trial;12
• the ‘warning statement’ by Mr Moleko, which formed part of
the abovementioned docket; and
• affidavits by Mr Mgudlwa and by Inspector Didiza (both of
whom were present in court on 16 January 2002), which
affidavits were used in support of the urgent application
(launched in the Transkei High Court on 24 January 2002) to
set aside Mr Moleko’s order of 16 January 2002 releasing the
two accused on warning.13
[25] According to Ms Neveling, she also had before her at that time an
affidavit by the interpreter who was on duty in the Engcobo Magistrate’s
Court at the time the incident took place on 16 January 2002.14 However,
as this affidavit was only deposed to on 15 May 2002 and her decision to
prosecute was taken by no later than 19 February 2002, this was clearly
not the case.
[26] Ms Neveling testified further that her office has a manual
produced by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), containing policy
directives for all NPA employees dealing with, inter alia, the making of
decisions whether or not to prosecute. This NPA policy manual contains
specific provisions dealing with judicial officers. In her words:

12 The docket did not form part of the record and copies thereof were only furnished to this Court on 4
March 2008 at the request of the presiding judge.
13 These affidavits and the Notice of Motion with which they were filed were contained in the docket, but
also formed part of the record before Matthee AJ.

‘[W]e have to treat those matters with the utmost tact and . . . we have to be obviously
very sure when we take decisions against judicial officers. But also the penal code [the
Transkei Penal Code, 1983] section 17 . . . [a]lso has a specific provision in this regard
. . . the judicial officers will not be held responsible or liable for acts or omissions
committed by them in the execution of their duty if that omission or act was
committed bona fide. . . . [T]hat was obviously also one of the considerations that I
had to take into account in deciding whether to prosecute or not.’
[27] Ms Neveling stated that it appeared from the case docket that a
possible crime of defeating the ends of justice had been committed and
that Mr Moleko was ‘linked to that offence’. On the documents before her
at the relevant time, she was convinced that there was a reasonable
prospect of a ‘successful prosecution’ of Mr Moleko:
‘It was in my view from the affidavits before me, and even from the warning statement
made by Mr Moleko himself. . . clear that there [was] definitely evidence of mala
fides. I made a decision on the 19 of February to charge him with defeating the ends of
justice’.
[28] At the time of making her decision, Ms Neveling did not know
(and did not know of) Mr Moleko, had never had any dealings with him,
and had never received any complaints about him.
[29] Under cross-examination, it was put to Ms Neveling that, once the
Transkei High Court had on 29 January 2002 set aside Mr Moleko’s
order, it was not necessary for the DPP to prosecute him. Her response
was as follows:

14 Copies of which also did not form part of the record and were only furnished to this Court on 26
February 2008 at the request of the presiding judge.

‘. . . I disagree with that. It is our duty  . . . I had the statements the affidavits under
oath in my possession and from that it was clear that a crime had been committed. It’s
our duty then to make decisions on those kind of things. As I have said we had to take
into consideration also the circumstances surrounding that. From the affidavit . . . it
was clear that there [was] mala fides. That we had to make a decision to prosecute. Not
only for that specific case, but also to prevent any other further cases like that
happening.’ (Emphasis added.)
[30] It appears from Ms Neveling’s evidence that, in concluding that
Mr Moleko had acted in bad faith, she had relied on three aspects of the
‘evidence’ before her at the time:
(a)
Mr Moleko had released the two accused, including the one in
hospital, despite the ‘fact’ that he had been informed by the prosecutor
that they were charged with Schedule 6 offences and that they had
previously been refused bail by another magistrate. She also relied on
the fact that, in his warning statement, Mr Moleko had said that he was
‘a seasoned magistrate, implying thereby . . . that he knows the
Criminal Procedure Act.’
(b)
Mr Moleko had said to the accused who was in court on the
relevant day ‘that he is being punished by the State without being
found guilty’. From this she had ‘gained the impression’ that Mr
Moleko had already made up his mind to release the accused from
custody.
(c)
She had also ‘gained the impression’ that Mr Moleko was ‘in
principle against’ all accused persons being held in custody.
[31] As regards point (c) above, Matthee AJ pointed out in his
judgment (in my view correctly) that no evidence was led to support this

opinion and that it was ‘puzzling how she could arrive at this opinion in
the light of her evidence that she ‘did not know the Plaintiff [Mr Moleko]
and had previously never received any report about him’.
[32] Ms Neveling’s evidence as a whole makes it clear that her
decision to prosecute Mr Moleko for the crime of defeating or obstructing
the course of justice was not based only on the fact that he had, in
contravention of s 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, released the
two accused on warning without any evidence being heard. When asked
by the court a quo how she drew the distinction between a judicial officer
acting inconsistently with the Criminal Procedure Act and hence
irregularly (or ‘just making a bad legal decision’), on the one hand, and
acting with mala fides, on the other, she responded as follows:
‘[M]y understanding of the difference is that once you have established whether he has
acted irregularly is then to establish whether it was a bona fide mistake, or whether
there [was] mala fides involved in that specific action. So . . . my understanding is that
the irregular acting comes first, and once that has been established, then you establish
whether it was a mala fide act, or whether it was a bona fide mistake if I can put it that
way.’
[33] In this regard, Ms Neveling also testified that:
‘I think the factors that I have mentioned to your Lordship those factors definitely
indicated mala fides to me . . . I think if it was merely  a  bad mistake, once the correct
facts were brought to his attention he would have acted differently . . . both the fact
that the bail had already been refused, as well as the fact that it was a Schedule 6
offence. . . if he made a mistake on one of the two. In my opinion that would still be
understandable. But the correct facts were brought to his attention, and despite that he
still released them. . . I think also in the warning statement it was never Mr Moleko’s

version that he made just a mistake that he wasn’t aware. I was in possession of his
warning statement when I made the decision.’
[34] According to Ms Neveling, Mr Moleko’s version was that:
‘[I]n his warning statement he said that he agreed that he released them out on bail.
That it was a Schedule 6 offence, he was aware of the fact that it was Schedule 6
offences. But that he had the interest of the accused at heart, as some accused had
previously died in Butterworth in holding cells at court . . . He also referred to the fact
if I remember correctly, to the effect that the police and the Prosecutors lied to him. . .
that accused are being punished . . . [T]hat explanation coupled with what happened in
court on that day to me indicated mala fides.’ (Emphasis added.)
[35] There are several serious factual inaccuracies in the abovequoted
portions of Ms Neveling’s evidence. First, Mr Moleko did not state in his
warning statement that he was aware of the fact that Schedule 6 offences
were involved. On his version as set out in the warning statement –
‘. . . the Public Prosecutor brought such a bulky roll after 4.00 pm and I was refusing
to take such cases and he appealed to me just do the “Remands” and as such [there
was no] time to read the records of such cases due to [the] lateness of [the] hour  . . .
[a]fter all I did not know that such cases were at any stage heard [by] or brought
[before] any particular magistrate . . . I also [did] not undermine any rulings previously
given by Mr Nangu [the magistrate who had dismissed the previous bail application by
accused no’s. 2 and 3] as I was not even aware that a ruling regarding this case was
ever given the other way.’
This version, together with the fact that Mr Moleko referred to the case, in
his warning statement, as ‘case no. 851/2001 (Engcobo) being a charge of
Robbery [not armed robbery] – three counts’, should in my view certainly
have alerted Ms Neveling to the reasonable possibility that, at the time Mr
Moleko decided to release the two accused on warning, he was not aware

of the fact that the charges against the accused were Schedule 6 offences
or that a bail application previously brought by the two accused before
another magistrate had been refused.
[36] It is true that, at the time Ms Neveling made her decision to
prosecute, she had ‘in front of’ her the affidavits deposed to on 24 January
2002 by Mr Mgudlwa and by Inspector Didiza in support of the
abovementioned urgent application to the Transkei High Court. In his
‘founding affidavit’, Mr Mgudlwa stated the following:
‘I called the matter and as I was about to inform the first respondent [Mr Moleko] of
the arrangements, he addressed the second respondent [accused no. 2], enquiring from
him whether he had been in custody since his arrest in September [2001]. As the
second respondent replied in the affirmative, the first respondent became infuriated . . .
The first respondent then said that the prosecutor and police are punishing the second
respondent without being found guilty  . . .
Mr Songo [the defence attorney for both accused] attempted to explain the position to
the first respondent but was prevented by the first respondent who ordered the
immediate release of the second respondent as well as the release of the third
respondent [accused no. 3] in his absence . . .
I informed the first respondent that the second and third respondents are charged with
Schedule 6 offences and that they had to show exceptional circumstances to the court
before release. I also drew his attention to the fact that the previous bail application by
the respondents was refused. I further informed the first respondent that all
investigation had been finalised and the matter was ready to be postponed for a
regional court date, but for the application for bail which had been arranged for that
day, to wit 16 January 2002. The first respondent did not give any attention to my
submissions.’
[37] In his ‘supporting affidavit’, Inspector Didiza stated that he had
read the affidavit deposed to by Mr Mgudlwa, and that he confirmed the

‘the contents thereof as being true and correct as [he] was present in court
at all material times’. He further stated that ‘[t]he crimes committed by the
second and third respondents are of an extremely serious nature’.
[38] While these affidavits supported Ms Neveling’s evidence to the
effect that Mr Moleko was informed by the prosecutor that the accused
were charged with Schedule 6 offences and that a previous application for
bail had been rejected by another magistrate, there were also other
documents in the case docket before her (quite apart from Mr Moleko’s
warning statement referred to above – about which more later), which
should have alerted her, as a reasonable senior state advocate in her
position, that these affidavits did not necessarily reflect what had
happened on 16 January 2002 fully and/or with complete accuracy. So, for
example, the case docket also contained (as document A.2) a so-called
‘Sworn Declaration’ by Mr Mgudlwa (although it was not in fact made
under oath). The relevant parts of this statement read as follows:
‘The presiding officer, Mr Moleko, mero motu enquired from accused no. 2 if he had
been in custody since September 2001. Upon receiving a response in the affirmative
he became angry saying that the prosecutor and the police are punishing him before he
is found guilty by the court, that it is the duty of the State to expedite the matter. He
then ordered that the accused person be released on warning. He actually ordered that
he must right away leave the court room. He said this is something that he can’t allow
unless he does not know why he is here in the first place. He went on to say it would
otherwise be better for him to leave the service.
I tried my level best to reason with him, stating that in this matter we are only awaiting
a date in the Regional Court. I also pointed out that the offence is quite serious. I told
him that a formal bail application was moved by Mr Songo before Mr Nangu and that

the State succeeded in refusing bail.  All my pleas fell on deaf ears.’ (Emphasis
added.)
[39] The case docket that Ms Neveling had at her ‘disposal’ at the time
she made the decision to prosecute also contained another affidavit
deposed to by Inspector Didiza on 24 January 2002 (document A.3 in the
docket), viz the same date as that upon which Inspector Didiza deposed to
his abovementioned supporting affidavit. In the former affidavit, the
following relevant passages appear:
‘On the 2001-12-20 the case was postponed to the 2002-01-16 for [a] bail application,
the accused were supposed to give new facts. On the 2002-01-16 all parties were
present except one suspect who was at hospital for medication. This case is at regional
court for trial; at district court it was just for bail application.
The prosecutor called the case and the attorney appeared for accused no. 2 and no. 3.
Then he addressed the court explaining that he was not going to proceed with [the]
bail application. Before giving the reasons, the magistrate Mr Moleko ordered him to
sit down. The magistrate asked . . . the accused whether [he was] in custody for  . . . a
long time and [he] agreed. The same question was asked to the prosecutor.
The prosecutor tried to explain what was happening to the case since the arrest of the
accused until 2002-01-16. Without listening to the PP, the magistrate ordered him to
sit down . . .
The magistrate said that police and public prosecutor were punishing the suspects
before being found guilty by the court of law. He said he would not allow their
conduct. He said he would be failing in doing his job if he allowed the conduct [cited]
above. He attacked the police and the public prosecutor in a [bad] manner. . .
He ordered the suspects to go out on warning. No bail conditions were given to them.
Necessary administration was not done on the release of suspect because Mr Moleko
was very angry. The police and public prosecutor were betrayed by the magistrate to
the suspects and the public.’

[40] To return to Mr Moleko’s warning statement, Ms Neveling, on her
own evidence, also had regard to this statement before making her
decision to prosecute Mr Moleko. As appears from the extracts from her
evidence quoted above, she testified that, in this warning statement, Mr
Moleko said that he was aware of the fact that the accused were charged
with Schedule 6 offences and that –
‘in spite of that he ordered the accused to be released not even on warning. To be
released without hearing any evidence’. (Emphasis added.)
[41] Once again, this evidence is incorrect in two material respects.
First, as indicated above, nowhere in his warning statement does Mr
Moleko state that he was on the relevant date aware of the fact that the
accused were charged with Schedule 6 offences. Second, Mr Moleko did
not order the accused to be released without a warning. Under cross-
examination, it was put to Ms Neveling that Mr Moleko had testified that
he had given the two accused a date upon which they had to return to
court. She replied that, as far as she could remember, this was not the
case. However, she later testified, in response to questions posed by
Matthee AJ, that Mr Moleko had indeed ‘released the accused on
warning’.
[42] The handwritten record of the proceedings in the case against the
three accused is contained in the case docket (as document B.4) and was
thus also before Ms Neveling at the time she made her decision to
prosecute. From this handwritten record, unfortunately sketchy though it
is,15 it appears that on 16 January 2002, Mr Moleko released accused no’s

15 In view of the fact that the magistrate’s courts are courts of record.

2 and 3 from custody and at the same time warned them to appear before
the Engcobo Magistrate’s Court on 11 February 2002, the date to which
he postponed the matter. It also appears from the handwritten record for
13 September 2001 that accused no.1, who was charged with the same
offences as accused nos. 2 and 3, was on that date released on bail of
R500, without any evidence being led. The handwritten notes for both 13
September 2001 and 16 January 2002 are in the same handwriting (thus
obviously that of Mr Moleko). On the other hand, the handwritten record
of the proceedings in respect of the previous bail application brought in
October 2001 by accused no’s 2 and 3, including the arguments advanced
by the defence attorney on 5 October 2001 in support of the bail
application and the response by the public prosecutor (again Mr
Mgudlwa), are in a different handwriting altogether.
[43] The fact that it was evident from the case docket that one of the
three accused persons, all of whom were charged with the same Schedule
6 offences, had previously been released on bail of R500, without any
evidence being led, should in my view reasonably have alerted Ms
Neveling, as a senior state advocate, to the need to make further enquiries
as to precisely what had happened in the criminal case up to 16 January
2002. She did not do so.
[44] As already stated, Ms Neveling testified that she considered Mr
Moleko’s warning statement before taking her decision to prosecute him.
(It is unfortunately necessary, for the purposes of this judgment, to quote
from this warning statement in some detail.) The statement (dated 7
February 2002) contains the following relevant passages:

‘On the day in question ie 16/01/2002 I was in the normal execution of my duties as a
Magistrate at Engcobo Magistrate’s Court. Among the cases which I presided over,
there also was a case no. 851/2001(Engcobo) being a charge of Robbery – 3 counts.
The accused were called in . . . and it appeared that, from the explanation from the
Prosecutor Mr Mgudlwa that one accused person was in absentia, due to [his] being
extremely sick and therefore only one accused person appeared before court on that
day . . .
I personally made enquiries further about the convalescence of that absentee whether
he was in . . . police custody or whereabouts [he was] and the Public Prosecutor gave a
confusing answer by saying he does not know where the sickly accused person was.
As a Presiding Judicial Officer, I was greatly concerned when the Accused could not
stand . . . trial and the Public Prosecutor could not give a direction. I further asked the
Public Prosecutor as to what he wanted the Court to do if he did not know the
whereabouts of such an extremely sick accused person.
It is at this stage that both the Public Prosecutor Mr Mgudlwa and the Accused’s Legal
Representative Mr Songo both stood up to make explanations . . . the Court ended up
not clear as to what was really taking place.
I asked Mr Mgudlwa further as to why this case was . . . not ready to be taken for trial
as it appeared that [the] Accused persons had been . . . incarcerated [since their arrest].
He then told me that he did not have the Police Docket with him. I further told Mr
Mgudlwa the PP of my concern for the long dragging [out of] the case and with no
indication as to when it would be tried . . .
I then told the Public Prosecutor that, I would come to the rescue of the State as I do
not want people to die in the hands of the Police. I further [said] that the Public
Prosecutor does not . . .  indicate whether the Accused (absentia) was either
hospitalised or where he was. I further asked as to when did the man (Accused)
become sick; whether the Police have taken him to a Doctor; where is the Doctor’s
certificate. All the details that were asked by the Court (myself) to Mr Mgudlwa were
unanswered as he did not know.
The Public Prosecutor (Mr Mgudlwa) was extremely confused. Then I told the
Prosecutor that, lest the man (Accused) dies in the hands of the State, I am remanding

the Accused on warning so that the relatives could engage in taking the man [Accused]
for medical attention as a matter of [urgency] . . .
Due to such . . . confusion that was brought [about] by the Public Prosecutor, I
therefore stated that as soon as all the questions asked . . . are cleared [up] to the court,
then the “Prison Stay” can always be re-arranged. My action of the day was not in bad
faith at all but was directed at the welfare of both the State and that of the Accused
person.   . . .
Responding to the allegations of . . . defeating the ends of justice, I was not at all
acting to commit such crimes. . . I remember that when telling the Prosecutor about the
plight of Accused that die in the hands of the State, I quoted to him the incident of
Butterworth, where a prisoner died in Court lock-up cells.
As a Magistrate, I feel that my actions were appropriate and aimed at the welfare of
the Accused and to safeguard the State . . . The Public Prosecutor was not helpful at all
towards the court about things which needed clarity as he (the Public Prosecutor) was
just confused.’ (Emphasis added.)
[45] On Ms Neveling’s own evidence, the documents referred to above
were before her when she took her decision to prosecute Mr Moleko. As
illustrated, these documents contained various allegations which were
contradictory in many important respects. This being so, I am of the view
that Ms Neveling should reasonably have been aware of the very real
possibility that, if Mr Mgudlwa had indeed informed Mr Moleko16 that the
two accused were charged with Schedule 6 offences, that they had to
show exceptional circumstances to the court before release, and that a
previous bail application brought by them had been refused, Mr Moleko’s
‘anger’ and ‘fury’ was such that he simply did not hear this. Indeed, Mr
Mgudlwa himself said, in his earlier statement referred to above, that ‘all
[his] pleas fell on deaf ears’.

16 As Mr Mgudlwa stated under oath in his abovementioned ‘founding affidavit’.

[46] Moreover, Inspector Didiza, in the other affidavit (not his
‘supporting affidavit’) to which he deposed on 24 January 2002, alleged
that when Mr Mgudlwa tried to explain to Mr Moleko what had happened
in the criminal case from the time of arrest of the accused up to 16
January 2002, Mr Moleko ordered Mr Mgudlwa to sit down ‘without
listening to him’.
[47] This very real possibility that, during the incident in question, Mr
Moleko – who was variously described as having been ‘infuriated’, ‘very
angry’ and ‘very disturbed’ upon being informed by accused no 2 that he
and accused no 3 had been incarcerated since their arrest in September
2001 – is further borne out by what Captain Gwayi said in his
abovementioned letter of complaint dated 17 January 2002 (document B.1
in the case docket). To reiterate, Captain Gwayi stated that, although Mr
Mgudlwa, Inspector Didiza and the defence attorney Mr Songo ‘were
more than ready to proceed with the formal bail application’, Mr Moleko
was not prepared to listen to anybody and ‘simply [shouted] everybody
down’.
[48] Upon reading Mr Moleko’s warning statement, Ms Neveling knew
that Mr Moleko was adamant that he had not acted in bad faith on the day
in question, but that all his actions had been taken in the interests of ‘the
welfare of the accused and to safeguard the State’. As appears from the
extracts quoted above, Mr Moleko twice expressed his concern that
accused no. 3 – who, he said, was ‘extremely sick’ according to the
explanation given to him by Mr Mgudlwa – might ‘die in the hands of’
the State. He also referred to an incident at Butterworth, where ‘a prisoner

had died in the Court lock-up cells’. Ms Neveling herself testified to the
effect that:
‘. . . in his warning statement he said . . . that he had the interest of the accused at
heart, as some accused had previously died in Butterworth in holding cells at court’.
[49] It is quite clear from her evidence that, although aware of these
serious allegations made by Mr Moleko, Ms Neveling made no queries in
this regard prior to taking her decision to prosecute him. She testified that
she had not been informed of, nor was she aware of, a problem of
overcrowding in cells in Engcobo, or of (to use the words of Matthee AJ
during the trial) ‘some sort of decision locally to try and address that issue
. . . that people not be kept in custody for too long’. However, she
conceded that she was aware of a big national campaign to address the
problem of overcrowding in prisons, to reduce the number of awaiting-
trial prisoners and the ‘number of cases and backlogs on rolls’. This
national campaign included the area under her jurisdiction.
[50] In respect of the requirement of ‘absence of reasonable and
probable cause’ for Mr Moleko’s prosecution, counsel for the appellants
submitted that Matthee AJ had in effect based his judgment upon a
‘central consideration of judicial independence’. Counsel contended that
the learned judge seemingly elevated this principle to ‘an almost
immutable rule’.
[51] In the relevant part of his judgement, Matthee AJ stated as
follows:
‘Section 1(c) of Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter “the constitution”) makes it clear that the
rule of law is one of the cornerstones of the constitution. Central to the implementation

of the rule of law is the role of judicial officers. Section 165 of the constitution makes
this role clear. If judicial officers are to perform the duty set out in section 165(2) it
goes without saying that they inter alia must be free from any fear whatsoever that
they might be arrested and/or prosecuted as a result of them performing their judicial
duties, even where their application of the law is completely wrong. (This obviously
cannot exempt judicial officers from criminal prosecution where for example they
have accepted a bribe to make a certain finding.) This principle is so fundamental and
obvious that anything submitted contrary to it only needs to be stated to be rejected.
Sections 165(3) and 165(4) of the constitution emphasises that there is a special
responsibility on all organs of state to help judicial officers perform their constitutional
duties.’
[52] To my mind, this is too strongly stated. It is correct that the
independence of the judiciary is enshrined in s 165 of the Constitution, the
relevant subsections of which provide as follows:
‘(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law,
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.’
[53] These provisions make it clear that, whilst the courts are
independent, they are nevertheless subject to the Constitution and the law.
A discussion of the principle of judicial independence, as enshrined in the
Constitution, is certainly not necessary for the purpose of this judgment.
Suffice it to say that, in De Lange v Smuts NO,17 the Constitutional Court
(per Ackermann J) stated that –
‘Judicial officers enjoy complete independence from the prosecutorial arm of the State
and are therefore well-placed to curb possible abuse of prosecutorial power.’

17 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 63

[54] So too, in Van Rooyen v The State,18 Chaskalson CJ stated that:
‘In deciding whether a particular court lacks the institutional protection that it requires
to function independently and impartially, it is relevant to have regard to the core
protection given to all courts by our Constitution, to the particular functions that such
court performs and to its place in the court hierarchy. Lower courts are, for instance,
entitled to protection by the higher Courts should any threat be made to their
independence. The greater the protection given to the higher Courts, the greater is the
protection that all courts have.’
[55] Referring specifically to the magistrate’s courts, Chaskalson CJ
pointed out19 that ‘magistrates are entitled to the protections necessary for
judicial independence, even if not in the same form as higher Courts.’20
[56] All this being so, however, the provisions of s 165(2) of the
Constitution21 compel the conclusion that the fundamental principle of
judicial independence cannot simply be equated with a principle of
immunity of judicial officers from criminal prosecutions for all acts
and/or omissions in the exercise of their judicial functions, irrespective of
the circumstances of the individual case. It goes almost without saying
that the criminal prosecution of judicial officers for such acts and/or
omissions will – and must – remain an extraordinary and exceptional step.
Any decision by the office of the DPP to prosecute a judicial officer must
be taken with the utmost caution, due regard being had to the fundamental
principle of judicial independence, but also to the related principle that
judicial officers are subject to the Constitution and the law and thus

18 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) para 23.
19 Para 28.
20 See also Travers v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (3) SA 242 (T) paras 20 et seq and
the numerous authorities there cited.
21 Quoted in para 54 above.

cannot be completely immune from criminal prosecution, in appropriate
cases, for their acts and/or omissions in the exercise of their judicial
functions.
[57] In Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe,22 this court stated the
following:
The requirement for malicious arrest and prosecution that the arrest and prosecution be
instituted “in the absence of reasonable and probable cause” was explained in
Beckenstrater v Rottcher and Theunissen [1955 (1) SA 129 (A) at 136A-B] as follows:
“When it is alleged that a defendant had no reasonable cause for prosecuting, I
understand this to mean that he did not have such information as would lead a
reasonable man to conclude that the plaintiff had probably been guilty of the
offence charged; if, despite his having such information, the defendant is shown
not to have believed in the plaintiff’s guilt, a subjective element comes into play
and disproves the existence, for the defendant, of reasonable and probable
cause.”
It follows that a defendant will not be liable if he or she held a genuine belief founded
on reasonable grounds in the plaintiff’s guilt. Where reasonable and probable cause for
an arrest or prosecution exists the conduct of the defendant instigating it is not
wrongful. The requirement of reasonable and probable cause is a sensible one: “For it is
of importance to the community that persons who have reasonable and probable cause
for a prosecution should not be deterred from setting the criminal law in motion against
those whom they believe to have committed offences, even if in so doing they are
actuated by indirect and improper motives” [see Beckenstrater v Rottcher and
Theunissen at 135D-E].23 (Footnotes omitted.)
[58] In this case, Ms Neveling – although by her own admission aware
of the provisions of s 17 of the Transkei Penal Code, 1983, and of the

22 [2007] 1 All SA 375 (SCA) para 14.

‘utmost tact’ and caution required in making any decision to prosecute a
judicial officer for something done or omitted in the exercise of his or her
judicial functions24 – did not in my view exercise the requisite ‘ordinary
care and prudence’25 in making the decision to prosecute Mr Moleko.
[59] It would appear that Ms Neveling did not even ascertain whether
Captain Gwayi had received any response, from either the chief magistrate
or the control prosecutor of the Engcobo Magistrate’s court to his
abovementioned letter dated 17 January 200226 (document B.1 in the case
docket) before deciding to prosecute Mr Moleko. Her decision was taken
by no later than 19 February 2002, just more than one month after the date
of the incident (16 January 2002) forming the subject of the subsequent
prosecution.
[60] It can hardly be said that, objectively, Ms Neveling took such
reasonable measures as could be expected of someone in her position to
inform herself fully of what had happened on 16 January 2002 and
whether this provided ‘reasonable and probable cause’ for Mr Moleko’s
prosecution. This means that Mr Moleko in my view discharged the onus
of proving absence of reasonable and probable cause and thus satisfied the
second requirement of a claim for malicious prosecution.
Ad (c) ‘Malice’ or animus injuriandi

23 See also 15 Lawsa op cit paras 449-450 and 452; J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s
Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) pp 176-179 and the authorities cited by these authors.
24 See para 26 above.
25 See 15 Lawsa  op cit para 449 and see also para 452.
26 Para 13 above.

[61] In the Relyant case,27 this court28 stated the following in regard to
the third requirement:
Although the expression “malice” is used, it means, in the context of the actio
iniuriarum, animus iniuriandi. In Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd and
another Wessels JA said:
“Where relief is claimed by this actio the plaintiff must allege and prove that the
defendant intended to injure (either dolus directus or indirectus). Save to the
extent that it might afford evidence of the defendant’s true intention or might
possibly be taken into account in fixing the quantum of damages, the motive of
the defendant is not of any legal relevance.” ’
[62] In so doing, the Court decided the issue which it had left open in
Lederman v Moharal Investments (Pty) Ltd29 and again in Prinsloo v
Newman,30 namely that animus injuriandi, and not malice, must be proved
before the defendant can be held liable for malicious prosecution as
injuria.31
[63] Animus injuriandi includes not only the intention to injure, but
also consciousness of wrongfulness:
‘In this regard animus injuriandi (intention) means that the defendant directed his will
to prosecuting the plaintiff (and thus infringing his personality), in the awareness that
reasonable grounds for the prosecution were (possibly) absent, in other words, that his
conduct was (possibly) wrongful (consciousness of wrongfulness). It follows from this
that the defendant will go free where reasonable grounds for the prosecution were

27 Para 5.
28 Referring to Heyns v Venter 2004 (3) SA 200 (T) para 12 at 208B; Moaki v Reckitt & Colman (Africa)
Ltd 1968 (3) SA 98 (A) at 104A-B (see also 103F-104A); Neethling et al op cit 124-125 (see also 179-
182).
29 1969 (1) SA 190 (A) at 196G-H.
30 1975 (1) SA 481 (A) at 491H-492B.
31 But cf 15 Lawsa op cit para 455; Wille’s Principles of South African Law 1194-1196 and Harms op cit
pp 238-239.

lacking, but the defendant honestly believed that the plaintiff was guilty. In such a case
the second element of dolus, namely of consciousness of wrongfulness, and therefore
animus injuriandi, will be lacking. His mistake therefore excludes the existence of
animus injuriandi.’32

[64] The defendant must thus not only have been aware of what he or
she was doing in instituting or initiating the prosecution, but must at least
have foreseen the possibility that he or she was acting wrongfully, but
nevertheless continued to act, reckless as to the consequences of his or her
conduct (dolus eventualis).33 Negligence on the part of the defendant (or, I
would say, even gross negligence) will not suffice.34
[65] In this case, I am of the view that Mr Moleko did prove animus
injuriandi on the part of the DPP. Ms Neveling clearly intended to
prosecute Mr Moleko and was fully aware of the fact that, by so doing, he
would in all probability be ‘injured’ and his dignity (‘comprehending also
his . . . good name and privacy’)35 in all probability negatively affected.
Despite this knowledge, she took the decision to prosecute without
making any of the enquiries which cried out to be made, thus acting in a
manner that showed her recklessness as to the possible consequences of
her conduct.
Costs
[66] It follows that the appeal by the second appellant must fail, while
the appeal by the first and third appellants succeeds. In this regard,

32 Neethling et al p 181.
33 See Heyns v Venter paras 13-14.
34 See Relyant Trading para 5; but cf Heyns v Venter para 14 at 209C-H.
35 See Relyant Trading  para 5.

counsel for the appellants conceded that, if this were the outcome of this
appeal, then the second appellant must be held liable for Mr Moleko’s
costs.
Conclusion
[67] I would therefore make the following order:
1. The appeal by the first and third appellants succeeds.
2. The appeal by the second appellant is dismissed.
3. The second appellant is ordered to pay all the costs of
the appeal.
4. Paragraph 5 of the order of the court a quo to the
effect that ‘the first and third defendants jointly and
severally are liable for the costs of the matter’ is set
aside and replaced with the following:
‘The second defendant is liable for the costs of the
matter.’

B J VAN HEERDEN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Concur:
FARLAM JA
KGOMO AJA
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

31 March 2008

STATUS: Immediate

Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and others v S. M.
Moleko

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media
and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal by the Director of
Public Prosecutions against a judgment of the Transkei High Court holding
that the respondent had established that he was the victim of a malicious
prosecution by the DPP.  The respondent was charged with defeating or
obstructing the course of justice, but was subsequently acquitted in the
regional court. This gave rise to his claim for damages for malicious
prosecution. The SCA upheld the appeal by the first and third appellants (the
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and the Minister of Safety
and Security, respectively) holding that neither Minister was responsible for
the decision to prosecute the respondent.

The respondent, a magistrate at Engcobo in the Eastern Cape, had released
accused persons charged with Schedule 6 offences on warning without any
evidence being led contrary to the provisions of section 60(11)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Respondent submitted that he did so
because the accused had been in custody since their arrest some four
months earlier. Furthermore, one of the accused was ill and no-one could
inform the respondent whether this accused was in the holding cells or in
hospital and he did not want anybody to die in the police holding cells.
Respondent also held that his actions were not taken in bad faith but were
taken in the interests of both the state and of the accused.

The Supreme Court of Appeal held that a decision taken by the office of the
DPP to prosecute a judicial officer must be taken with the utmost caution, due
regard being had to the fundamental principle of judicial independence, but
also to the related principle that judicial officers are subject to the Constitution
and the law and thus cannot be completely immune from criminal prosecution,

in appropriate cases, for their acts and/or omissions in the exercise of their
judicial functions.

Taking into account the requirements to be proved in order to establish
malicious prosecution, the Court held that, objectively, it could not be said that
the DPP took such reasonable measures as could be expected from that
office to inform itself of the events of the day in question and whether these
provided ‘reasonable and probable cause’ for the respondent’s prosecution.
Furthermore, the respondent proved animus injuriandi (intention to injure) on
the part of the DPP. The DPP clearly intended to prosecute the respondent,
being fully aware of the fact that, by so doing, the respondent would in all
probability be injured and his dignity in all probability negatively affected.
Despite this knowledge, it took the decision to prosecute, acting in a manner
that showed recklessness as to the possible consequences of its conduct.

ends.