THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No: 499/2010
In the matter between:
THE ATTORNEYS FIDELITY FUND BOARD OF
CONTROL
Appellant
and
METTLE PROPERTY FINANCE (PTY) LTD
Respondent
Neutral Citation:  Attorneys Fidelity Fund v Mettle Property Finance
(499/2010) [2011] ZASCA 133 (16 September 2011)
Coram:
HARMS DP, VAN HEERDEN, MAYA, THERON &

WALLIS JJA
Heard:
25 August 2011
Delivered:
16 September 2011
Summary:
Claim against Fidelity Fund in terms of s 26(a) of the
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 – pecuniary loss suffered
allegedly as a result of attorney’s theft of money
entrusted to him – entrustment not proved.

ORDER

On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (Tolmay J sitting as
a court of first instance):

(a) The appeal is upheld with costs.
(b) The order of the court below is set aside and replaced with the
following:

‘The action is dismissed with costs.’

JUDGMENT

VAN HEERDEN JA (HARMS AP, MAYA, THERON AND WALLIS
JJA concurring):
[1] Mettle Property Finance (Pty) Ltd, a factoring company, paid
certain sums of money into an attorney’s trust account pursuant to three
bridging finance transactions. In terms of an agreement between Mettle and
the attorney, the latter undertook to make payments to Mettle from the
proceeds of the registration of a bond and two property transfers, once such
proceeds were received. When the funds did not materialise and the
attorney was sequestrated, Mettle sued the Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board
of Control in terms of s 26(a) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979, claiming the

pecuniary loss that it had suffered, allegedly as a result of the attorney’s
theft of money entrusted to him by Mettle. These claims succeeded before
Tolmay J in the North Gauteng High Court, hence the appeal by the
Fidelity Fund which comes to us with the leave of the court below.
[2] The applicable provisions of s 26(a) of the Act read as follows:
‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, the fund shall be applied for the purpose of
reimbursing persons who may suffer pecuniary loss as a result of – (a) theft committed
by a practising practitioner . . . of any money or other property entrusted by or on behalf
of such persons to him . . . in the course of his practice . . . .’
[3] The issues on appeal are whether Mettle succeeded in proving that
the money in question had been ‘entrusted’ to the attorney by or on behalf
of Mettle and, if so, whether the attorney had stolen such money, both
being requirements for a claim in terms of s 26(a).
[4] To the extent here relevant, Mettle’s particulars of claim allege:
‘THE PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS
5. The Plaintiff’s business is and was at all times relevant hereto inter alia the factoring
of immovable property transactions where-

5.1 a mortgage bond or mortgage bonds is/are to be registered over the immovable
property of an owner of such immovable property; or

5.2 an owner of immovable property sells his immovable property to a purchaser of
such immovable property,

and such owner requires the loan equity of the bond(s) to be registered or the equity of
the sale before registration of the mortgage bond or registration of transfer to the
purchaser, in which case the conveyancing attorney attending to such bond registration

or registration of transfer undertakes to counter-perform on date of registration from the
proceeds of the bond or from the proceeds of the sale, as the case may be; or

. . .

MASTER AGREEMENT

6. On 23 January 2007 the Plaintiff and the Attorney concluded a written agreement
titled: MASTER AGREEMENT (ATTORNEY) (PURCHASE OF SELLER’S
EQUITY AND MORTGAGOR’S LOAN EQUITY) (hereinafter referred to as “the
master agreement”).

. . .

9. In the master agreement the Plaintiff is referred to as “Mettle” and the Attorney is
referred to as “the Conveyancer”.

10. Express terms of the master agreement are inter alia the following:

10.1 the purchase price payable by the Plaintiff in respect of each sold claim (as defined
in clause 2 of the master agreement) shall be an amount equal to the sum of the initial
purchase price and the additional purchase price (as defined in clause 2 of the master
agreement).

(Clause 6.1)

10.2 the purchase price shall be discharged as follows-

10.2.1 the initial purchase price shall be paid into the Attorney’s trust account in cash on
the second business day following the date of acceptance of the offer in accordance with
the provisions of Clause 5.2 of the master agreement; and

10.2.2 the additional purchase price, on the date of registration of transfer of the
property in the relevant deeds office, against payment of the sale proceeds to the
Plaintiff, which amount the Plaintiff authorises the Attorney to deduct from the sale
proceeds, and to pay same directly to the client;

(Clause 6.2)

10.3 accordingly, on the date of registration of transfer of the property, the Attorney
irrevocably undertakes to distribute the sale proceeds as follows:

10.3.1 by deducting an amount equal to the additional purchase price, and paying same
to the client (or its creditors); and

10.3.2 by paying the balance to the Plaintiff in cash, without any deduction or set-off.’
[5] In this case, the attorney, Mr Langerak, approached Mettle to
arrange for bridging finance on his own behalf as well as on behalf of two
clients.  As was Mettle’s practice, it verified Langerak’s standing in the
legal profession and his possession of a fidelity fund certificate.
[6] Pursuant to the conclusion of the master agreement, Langerak
requested Mettle to enter into three bridging finance transactions, which
transactions form the basis of Mettle’s three claims against the Fidelity
Fund. One was a Purchase of Bond Proceeds Agreement in which the
mortgagor was Langerak in his personal capacity, the second was a
Purchase of Seller’s Claims Agreement in which the seller was Whirlaway
Trading 120 CC and the third was also a Purchase of Seller’s Claims
Agreement, in which the seller was Angelfish Investments 709 CC.
[7] The thrust of Mettle’s case was that it had in terms of the aforesaid
three agreements and pursuant to various warranties and undertakings
issued by Langerak, effected payment of ‘initial purchase prices’ of
R400 000, R560 000 and R600 000, respectively, into Langerak’s trust
account on behalf of the mortgagor or seller concerned. It relied on the fact
that, in terms of the Master Agreement, Langerak undertook to repay

Mettle these amounts on the date of registration, from the bond proceeds or
the sale proceeds, as the case may be, and that he had failed to do so.
[8] Needless to say, Langerak did not procure registration of transfer of
the relevant properties in the second and third transactions and did not
make any payment to Mettle in respect of any of the three transactions.
While the bond was registered in the first transaction, there is no evidence
that the proceeds were received in Langerak’s trust account.
[9] Mettle alleged that Langerak had committed theft of the money
entrusted to him and reported this to the Law Society of the Northern
Provinces. Langerak was subsequently struck off the roll of attorneys
following a financial investigation by the Law Society.
[10] Both Whirlaway and Angelfish have been liquidated. Mettle sued
Langerak and obtained judgement against him for all three claims.
However, the estate of the attorney was sequestrated on 2 October 2008. It
was agreed between the parties that Mettle would receive no dividend from
any of the three estates.
[11] The meaning of the word ‘entrust’ for the purposes of a claim in
terms of s 26(a) of the Act has been dealt with in a number of cases. In
Industrial & Commercial Factors (Pty) Ltd v Attorneys Fidelity Fund 1997
(1) SA 136 (A) at 144B-D, this court (per F H Grosskopf JA) quoted with
approval the following passages of the judgment of Nicholas J in Provident
Fund for the Clothing Industry v Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers
Fidelity Guarantee Fund 1981 (3) SA 539 (W) at 543E-F:

‘From these definitions it is plain that “to entrust” comprises two elements: (a) to place
in the possession of somebody, (b) subject to a trust. As to the latter element, this
connotes that the person entrusted is bound to deal with the property or money
concerned for the benefit of others (cf Estate Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustee
1915 AD at 499).
“(The trustee) is bound to hold and apply the property for the benefit of some
person or persons or for the accomplishment of some special purpose” (ibid at 508).’

[12] The first element is not contentious – the moneys, representing the
initial purchase price in each case, were indeed placed in Langerak’s
possession. The second element is more problematic. There is no doubt that
Mettle trusted the various warranties and the undertakings given by
Langerak and relied upon Langerak for repayment of, inter alia, the initial
purchase price on the date of registration. That does not, however, mean
that Mettle ‘entrusted’ the money to Langerak as required by s 26(a) of the
Act.
[13] As indicated above, Langerak is referred to throughout the Master
Agreement as the ‘Conveyancer’. The agreement provides that:
‘3.1 The Conveyancer has been and will from time to time hereafter be duly authorised
by a Client to conclude a transaction with Mettle for and on their behalf.
3.2 Any reference in this Agreement to a Client shall (unless the context indicates to the
contrary) be a reference to that Seller, Purchaser or Mortgagor duly represented by the
Conveyancer.’
[14] Importantly, ‘Client’ – who could be a seller, a purchaser or a
mortgagor – is defined as ‘the Conveyancer’s Client’. ‘Client’s claim’ is
defined as a ‘loan claim’ or a ‘seller’s claim’.

[15] It follows that Mettle – in paying the initial purchase price in each
transaction to Langerak as the representative of the mortgagor or seller
from whom Mettle had purchased a loan claim or a seller’s claim – was
simply discharging its debt to such mortgagor or seller. The payment was
unconditional and, the moment the initial purchase price was paid into
Langerak’s trust account in terms of the Master Agreement, Mettle’s debt
was discharged. Langerak was no more than a conduit for the money. All
this was largely borne out by the evidence of both Ms Nichols, a trader
employed by Mettle, and Mr Prinsloo, a director of Mettle. It also accords
with the express terms of the Master Agreement and the Purchase of Bond
Proceeds and of Seller’s Claims Agreements in regard to the payment of
the initial purchase price.
[16] This being so, there was no ‘entrustment’ of money by Mettle to
Langerak. In the words of F H Grosskopf JA in the Industrial &
Commercial Factors case:1
‘Where money is paid into the trust account of an attorney it does not follow that such
money is in fact trust money . . . If money is simply handed over to an attorney by a
debtor who thereby wishes to discharge a debt, and the attorney has a mandate to
receive it on behalf of the creditor, it may be difficult to establish an entrustment.’2
[17] It must be remembered that ‘the indemnity against loss for which
the Act provides is not unlimited in its scope. It does not provide

1 At 143I-144A.
2 See also Provident Fund for the Clothing Industry at 544B-G.

indemnification against any kind of loss suffered as a consequence of any
conceivable kind of knavery in which an attorney might indulge in the
course of his or her practice.’3 It is not an insurance policy against all ills
that may befall money paid to an attorney. In this case, Mettle may well
have claims in contract or delict against Langerak based on the warranties
and undertakings given – and, in some instances, breached – by Langerak.
But Mettle does not have a claim against the Fidelity Fund in terms of
s 26(a) of the Act.
[18] In view of my finding that there was no ‘entrustment’ of the money
paid by Mettle to Langerak, it is not necessary to decide whether Langerak
was guilty of the theft of such money. Suffice it to say that, in the case
where Langerak in his personal capacity was the mortgagor, the initial
purchase price paid by Mettle into Langerak’s trust account belonged to
Langerak as the client. He could hardly be said to steal his own money. As
regards Whirlaway and Angelfish, there was simply no evidence
whatsoever as to what happened to the initial purchase price paid by Mettle
in respect of each of these entities.
[19] It follows that the appeal should succeed.
[20] The following order is made:
(a)
The appeal is upheld with costs.

3Industrial & Commercial Factors at 146F-G (per Marais JA).

(b)
The order of the court below is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘The action is dismissed with costs.’

______________________
B J VAN HEERDEN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:
APPELLANT:
Q PELSER SC
Instructed by Petzer, Du Toit & Ramulifho,
Pretoria
McIntyre & Van Der Post, Bloemfontein

RESPONDENT:
H M DE KOCK

Instructed by Smit & Marais Attorneys,
Pretoria

Goodrick & Franklin, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN COURT OF
APPEAL
FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

16 September 2011

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

THE ATTORNEYS FIDELITY FUND BOARD OF CONTROL V
METTLE PROPERTY FINANCE (PTY) LTD
(499/10) [2011] ZASCA 133 (16 September 2011)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA) today set aside an order of the North
Gauteng High Court (Pretoria), and replaced it with an order dismissing the action
with costs.

The respondent, Mettle Property Finance (Mettle), had deposited sums of money
into an attorney’s trust account pursuant to three bridging finance transactions. In
terms of an agreement between Mettle and the attorney, the latter undertook to
make payments to Mettle from the proceeds of the registration of a bond and two
property transfers, once the proceeds were received. When the funds did not
materialise and the attorney was sequestrated, Mettle sued the appellant, the
Attorneys Fidelity Fund (the Fund), in terms of s 26(a) of the Attorneys Act 53 of
1979, claiming pecuniary loss suffered allegedly as a result of the attorney’s theft of
money entrusted to him by Mettle.

The issues on appeal were whether Mettle had succeeded in proving that the money
in question had been entrusted to the attorney by or on behalf of Mettle and, if so,
whether the attorney had stolen such money, both being requirements for a claim in
terms of s 26(a).

The SCA analysed the so-called ‘Master Agreement’ between the parties and came
to the conclusion that the attorney acted as the representative of the mortgagor or
seller to whom bridging finance was provided. By paying the money to the attorney
as such representative, Mettle was simply discharging its debt to the mortgagor or
seller. The payment was unconditional and the moment the money was paid into the
attorney’s trust account in terms of the Master Agreement, Mettle’s debt was
discharged. The attorney was no more than a conduit for the money.

The SCA held that there was no entrustment of money by Mettle to the attorney.
While Mettle might have a claim in contract or delict against the attorney, it did not
have a claim against the Fund in terms of s 26(a) of the Act. Since there was no
entrustment of the money by Mettle to the attorney, it was not necessary to decide
whether the attorney was guilty of the theft of such money.

The appeal was upheld with costs.

-- ends --