THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 260/11
Reportable

In the matter between:

HORATIO STEPHEN MATHEWSON

First Appellant
ANNEMI MARGERETHA MATHEWSON

Second Appellant

and

MARTHA FRANCINA VAN NIEKERK

First Respondent
CHRISTOFFEL PETRUS PRINSLOO VAN NIEKERK     Second Respondent
STANDARD BANK BEPERK

Third Respondent
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS

Fourth Respondent
DITSOBOTLA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY

Fifth Respondent
WILLEM CHRISTOFFEL JANSEN VAN RENSBURG          Sixth Respondent

Neutral citation: Mathewson & another  v Van Niekerk & others (260/11)

[2012] ZASCA 12 (16 March 2012).

Coram:
NAVSA, CLOETE, VAN HEERDEN and LEACH JJA, and

BORUCHOWITZ AJA

Heard:
8 March 2012

Delivered:
16 March 2012

Summary:
Sale of land: tacit term: not excluded by ‘sole contract’
clause; motion proceedings: dispute of fact: rejection of
respondents’ version as farfetched or clearly untenable: test
stringent and not easily satisfied.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________
On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Ebersohn AJ sitting as
court of first instance):
1.
The appeal succeeds, with costs.
2.
The order of the court a quo is set aside and the following order
substituted:
'The application is dismissed, with costs.'
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

CLOETE JA  (NAVSA, VAN HEERDEN and LEACH JJA, and
BORUCHOWITZ AJA concurring):

[1] The first and second respondents, as applicants, brought motion
proceedings in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria against (amongst
others) the appellants as the first and second respondents, for relief that
depended on the valid cancellation by the appellants of a deed of sale of
immovable property. Ebersohn AJ granted the application and refused leave
to appeal. The appeal is with the leave of this court. It would be convenient to
refer in this judgment to the parties as they were in the court a quo.

[2] In terms of the deed of sale concluded on 26 March 2007 the
respondents sold, and the applicants purchased, an erf in a township being
developed by the respondents. Clause 17 of the deed of sale read as follows:
'17.
DIENSTE
Die Ontwikkelaar waarborg dat die erwe voorsien sal wees met elektriese
aansluiting, wateraansluiting sowel as riolering (septiese tenk of tenkstelsel soos
goedgekeur deur die Plaaslike Munisipaliteit).'

[3] On 6 May 2009 the applicants' attorney wrote to the respondents in the
following terms:

'Voormelde koopooreenkoms sowel as klousule 17 van die ooreenkoms verwys.
Ons kliënt se instruksies is dat geen dienste voorsien is aan die voormelde
plaasgedeelte nie en dat hulle [sic: sc "u"] derhalwe waarborg breuk plaasgevind [sic:
sc “gepleeg”] het, alternatiewelik repidiasie [sic] van die ooreenkoms plaasgevind het
welke repidiasie [sic] van die ooreenkoms aanvaar word.
Gevolglik is dit ons instruksies om u in kennis te stel dat indien voormelde gebrek nie
reggestel word binne 7 (sewe) dae vanaf datum van hierdie skrywe nie, ons kliënte
die reg behou om hierdie ooreenkoms te kanselleer.'
The notice of motion which followed was issued on 2 June 2009.

[4] The court a quo, having quoted clause 17 of the deed of sale,
reasoned as follows:
'15.
Dit blyk oorvloediglik uit die stukke:
(a)
die elektriese aansluiting was nie in plek nie;
(b)
die wateraansluiting was nie in plek nie; en
(c)
die riolering was nie in plek nie.
16.
. . .
17.
Die applikante, as kopers, het per kennisgewing gedateer die 6de Mei 2009
die verkopers in kennis gestel dat as die dienste nie verskaf is binne 7 dae die koop
gekanselleer sal word. Aan hierdie aanmaning is nie voldoen deur die verkopers nie
en die aansoek aan hierdie hof het gevolg.
18.
Dit bly onteenseglik so dat die verkopers inderdaad kontrakbreuk gepleeg het
en die applikante is geregtig op die regshulp wat hulle vorder.'

[5] The court a quo ignored the respondents' contention, which was plainly
and unambiguously made in the answering affidavit, that the obligation to
install the services referred to in clause 17 was subject to the tacit term that
the applicants had to indicate to the respondents where the services were to
be installed on the erf which they purchased. The court a quo further ignored
the first respondent's assertion, also plainly and unambiguously made in the
answering affidavit, that despite his repeated oral requests, the applicants had
not given such an indication.

[6] Clause 11 of the deed of sale is no answer to this case. That clause
(which is poorly drafted) reads:

'GEHELE OOREENKOMS
Die partye kom ooreen dat hierdie dokument die enigste ooreenkoms tussen hulle
daar stel en dat enige [sic; sc "geen"] ander waarborge of voorstellings van watter
aard ookal gemaak is, anders as wat hierin vervat is nie. Geen ander of verdere
ooreenkoms of ooreenkomste met betrekking tot die onderwerp van hierdie kontrak
is op enige van die partye bindend nie tensy op skrif gestel en deur beide partye
onderteken.'
The reason why the clause is no answer is set out in Wilkens NO v Voges
1994 (3) SA 130 (A). In that matter Nienaber JA was dealing with a written
agreement for the sale of land which contained a clause 12 reading as
follows:
'12
Entire Agreement
This document contains the entire agreement between the parties in respect of the
matters dealt with herein and any variation or mutual cancellation of this agreement
will only have legal force or effect if such variation or mutual cancellation is reduced
to writing and signed by the parties hereto' (at 138B).
The learned judge of appeal held (at 143J-144D):
'One final observation: it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff apropos of certain
remarks in the judgment of the Court a quo (at 783C-784D) that the tacit term
pleaded, if found to exist, would offend against both clause 12 of the agreement and
the provisions of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 ("the Act"). Clause 12 is
quoted earlier in this judgment. Section 2 of the Act provides:
"2.
Formalities in respect of alienation of land.
(1)
No alienation of land after the commencement of this section shall, subject to
the provisions of s 28, be of any force or effect unless it is contained in a deed of
alienation signed by the parties thereto or by their agents acting on their written
authority."
A tacit term in a written contract, be it actual or imputed, can be the corollary of the
express terms ─ reading, as it were, between the lines ─ or it can be the product of
the express terms read in conjunction with evidence of admissible surrounding
circumstances. Either way, a tacit term, once found to exist, is simply read or blended
into the contract: as such it is "contained" in the written deed. Not being an adjunct to
but an integrated part of the contract, a tacit term does not in my opinion fall foul of
either the clause in question (cf Marshall v LMM Investments (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA
55 (W) at 58A-B) or the Act.'

[7] Counsel for the applicants in argument before us did not rely on clause
11 but advanced a different argument. He acknowledged that, as his clients
had instituted motion proceedings and because of the dispute of fact as to the
existence of the tacit term relied upon by the respondents, the appeal would
have to be decided on the respondents' version unless he could persuade us
that the allegations made by the respondents were so far-fetched or clearly
untenable that we were justified in rejecting them merely on the papers:
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) 623 (A) at
634E-635C. It needs to be emphasised that the test is a stringent one not
easily satisfied. Two submissions were made.

[8] First, it was submitted that the defence should be rejected as an
afterthought because it had never been raised in the emails which passed
between the parties. But counsel was unable to refer us to an email from his
clients to which one would have expected the respondents to have replied by
asserting the tacit term. The only email which could possibly be relevant in
this context was dated 16 September 2008, wherein the first appellant said:
'Ons het daardie erf gekoop met die wete dat daar 'n infrastruktuur gaan wees, wat
daar nie is nie.'
But that statement did not specifically refer to the services in clause 17 (it
could also, or exclusively, have referred to roads and a surrounding wall, as
counsel readily conceded) and the statement was made in the context of a
more general complaint ─ the email continues:
'Daar is gesê ander het gekoop, insluitende Willem van Rensburg, wat nie waar was
nie.
Daar is gesê ons mag nie uitklim nie, terwyl ander dit gedoen het sonder gevolge.
So kan jy ons kwalik neem as ons ongeduldig klink.
So asb Horatio, ons weet jy het ook dinge om uit te sorteer, en dit respekteer ons.'
It is also important to bear in mind the wider context in which the email was
sent. At that stage the parties were negotiating on the basis that the
respondents would repurchase the erf from the applicants ─ not that the
applicants wanted the services referred to in clause 17 to be installed
because they intended building on the erf.

[9] Second, it was submitted that further proof that the defence was an
afterthought is to be found in the contradiction between, on the one hand, the
first respondent's assertion that the services referred to in clause 17 were
available 'op die landgoed' at the time the deed of sale was concluded (which,
as I have said, was on 26 March 2007), and on the other, his statement
(supported by documentary evidence) that the electricity supply agreement
with Escom was only concluded on 5 June 2007. It may well be that the first
respondent's first assertion was false. But the contradiction (assuming that
there is one) is on an irrelevant aspect because it was not a term of the deed
of sale that the services referred to in clause 17 had to have been installed at
the time the deed of sale was concluded ─ clause 17 reads 'Die Ontwikkelaar
waarborg dat die erwe voorsien sal wees . . .', not 'Die Ontwikkelaar waarborg
dat die erwe voorsien is . . . .' The apparent contradiction would provide
ammunition for cross-examination of the first respondent had the applicants
requested a reference to oral evidence or trial (which they did not), but it is not
a sufficient reason for rejecting the respondents' defence based on the tacit
term, particularly for the reason given in the next paragraph.

[10] The probabilities support the existence of the tacit term for which the
respondents contend. The erf was 10 500 square metres in extent. In those
circumstances, the following statement by the first respondent in his
answering affidavit has the ring of truth:
'[A]s gevolg van die groottes van die standplase (erf groottes wissel van 1.030 en
1.43 hektaar) is dit vir my as Ontwikkelaar 'n onbegonne taak om te bepaal waar
iedere eienaar sy of haar woning gaan oprig en waar hy of sy byvoorbeeld sy
elektrisiteits, water en rioleringspunt . . . geïnstalleer wil hê.'

[11] In the circumstances it cannot be said that the respondents' version
that the deed of sale contained the tacit term on which they found their
defence, is so far-fetched or clearly untenable that the court would be justified
in rejecting this version merely on the papers. As counsel on both sides
agreed that this conclusion would dispose of the matter, the following order is
made:

1.
The appeal succeeds, with costs.
2.
The order of the court a quo is set aside and the following order
substituted:
'The application is dismissed, with costs.'

________________
T D CLOETE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:
APPELLANTS:

A Vorster
Instructed by Van Rooyen Thlapi Wessels,
Pretoria
Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

FIRST and SECOND
RESPONDENTS:

M Ackermann
Instructed by Couzyn Hertzog & Horak, Pretoria
Hill, McHardy & Herbst Inc, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From: The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date: 16 March 2012

Status: Immediate
Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

H S MATHEWSON & ANOTHER v M F VAN NIEKERK & OTHERS

1.
The appellant sold and transferred land in a township in the course of development by
him to the respondents. The respondents obtained an order in the court below which
depended upon the valid cancellation of the sale. The court below held that the respondents
were entitled to cancellation as essential services had not been installed, despite demand.

2.
The SCA held that the court below was wrong in ignoring a tacit term relied upon by
the appellant that before the essential services could be installed, the respondents had to
indicate where on the property they required the installation to take place which, according to
the appellant, they had not done. The argument that the tacit term was so farfetched or clearly
untenable that it could be rejected on the papers was dismissed.
--ends--