THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case No: 393/2015

In the matter between:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION SOC LIMITED

FIRST APPELLANT
THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS

SECOND APPELLANT
HLAUDI MOTSOENENG: THE CHIEF OPERATING
OFFICER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION SOC LIMITED

THIRD APPELLANT

and

DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

FIRST RESPONDENT
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION SOC LIMITED

SECOND RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION SOC LIMITED

THIRD RESPONDENT
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
FOURTH RESPONDENT
SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

FIFTH RESPONDENT

THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE FOR COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

SIXTH RESPONDENT
THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT

and

CORRUPTION WATCH
AMICUS CURIAE

Neutral Citation:
SABC v DA (393/2015) [2015] ZASCA 156 (8 October 2015).

Coram:
Mpati P, Navsa, Ponnan, Swain and Dambuza JJA

Heard:

18 September 2015

Delivered:

8 October 2015

Summary:

Remedial action by Public Protector – has legal effect – absent
review – cannot be ignored by State and public institutions – discussion of
constitutional and legislative scheme regulating powers of Public Protector – order
suspending Chief Operating Officer of the South African Broadcasting Corporation –
held not to offend against separation of powers doctrine – reiteration of caveat
against piecemeal litigation.

___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town (Schippers J
sitting as court of first instance), judgment reported sub nom Democratic Alliance v
South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd & others 2015 (1) SA 551 (WCC).

The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs attendant upon the
employment of two counsel.

___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
Navsa and Ponnan JJA (Mpati P, Swain and Dambuza JJA concurring):

[1] ‗Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?‘1 In posing that question, the Roman Poet
Juvenal (Satura VI lines 347-8) was suggesting that wives could not be trusted and
that keeping them under guard was no solution because guards could not
themselves be trusted. Leonid Hurwicz, in accepting the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences, stated: ‗Yes, it would be absurd that a guardian should need a guard.‘2

[2] In constitutional democracies, public administrators and State institutions are
guardians of the public weal.3 In South Africa that principle applies to administration

1 ‗But who will guard the guards themselves?‘
2 Leonid Hurwicz ‗But who will guard the guardians?‘ Nobel Prize Lecture delivered on 8 December
2007, available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/hurwicz
_lecture.pdf, accessed on 1 October 2015.
3 So, for example s 195(1) of the Constitution provides:
‗Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the
Constitution, including the following principles:
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained.
(b) Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted.
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented.
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias.

in every sphere of government, organs of State and public enterprises.4 Section 41
of the Constitution requires all spheres of government and all organs of State to,
amongst other things, ‗secure the wellbeing of the people of the Republic‘, to
‗provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government‘, to ‗respect
the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the
other spheres‘ and not to exercise their powers and functions in a manner that
encroaches upon the institutional integrity of government in another sphere.
Significantly, s 41 of the Constitution dictates that all spheres of government and all
organs of State must co-operate with one another and must assist and support one
another. They are required to co-ordinate their actions, to adhere to agreed
procedures and to avoid legal proceedings against one another. In constitutional
States there are checks and balances to ensure that when any sphere of
government behaves aberrantly, measures can be implemented and steps taken to
ensure compliance with constitutional prescripts. In our country, the office of the
Public Protector, like the Ombud in comparable jurisdictions, is one important
defence against maladministration and corruption. Bishop and Woolman state the
following:5
‗The Public Protector‘s brief, as initially adumbrated in the Interim Constitution, and as now
determined by the Final Constitution and the Public Protector Act . . . is to watch the
watchers and to guarantee that the government discharges its responsibilities without fear,
favour or prejudice.‘ (Footnotes omitted.)

(e) People‘s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-
making.
(f) Public administration must be accountable.
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate
information.
(h) Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human
potential, must be cultivated.
(i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African People, with
employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need
to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.‘
4 Section 195(2) of the Constitution reads:
‗The above principles [see footnote 3 above] apply to –
(a) administration in every sphere of government;
(b) organs of State; and
(c) public enterprises.‘
5 See the chapter entitled ‗Public Protector‘ by Michael Bishop and Stuart Woolman, in Stuart
Woolman and Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Service 6, 2014), at 24A-
2.

[3] In modern democratic constitutional States, in order to ensure governmental
accountability, it has become necessary for the guards to require a guard. And in
terms of our constitutional scheme, it is the Public Protector who guards the guards.
That fundamental tenet lies at the heart of this appeal, in which we consider the
Public Protector‘s powers and examine the constitutional and legislative architecture
to determine how State institutions and officials are required to deal with remedial
action taken by the Public Protector.

[4] The litigation culminating in the present appeal arose, so it is alleged,
because of the failure by the first appellant, the South African Broadcasting
Corporation (the SABC), a national public broadcaster, regulated by the
Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 (the BA) and the second appellant, the Minister of
Communications (the Minister), to implement remedial action directed by the Public
Protector, a Chapter Nine institution established by s 181(1)(a) of the Constitution, in
a damning report compiled by her. At the outset it is necessary to record that the
State, in terms of s 8A(2) of the BA, is the sole shareholder in the SABC. Section
3(1) of the BA provides, inter alia, that the South African broadcasting system:
‗(a)
serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic
fabric of South Africa;
(b)
operates in the public interest and strengthens the spiritual and moral fibre of society;
. . .‘

[5] Between November 2011 and February 2012 the Public Protector received
complaints from three former employees of the SABC. Those complaints in essence
related to the alleged irregular appointment of the third appellant, Mr Hlaudi
Motsoeneng, as the Acting Chief Operations Officer (the Acting COO) as well as
systemic maladministration relating, inter alia, to human resources, financial
management, governance failure and the irregular interference by the then Minister
of Communications,6 Ms Dina Pule, in the affairs of the SABC. On 17 February 2014
and following upon a fairly detailed investigation of those allegations, the Public

6 The Minister of Communications is the Minister charged with the administration of the Broadcasting
Act.

Protector released a report relating to her investigation entitled ‗When Governance
and Ethics Fail‘.7

[6] The Public Protector concluded that there were ‗pathological corporate
governance deficiencies at the SABC‘ and that Mr Motsoeneng had been allowed ‗by
successive [b]oards to operate above the law‘. Her key findings in respect of Mr
Motsoeneng, who she singled out for particularly scathing criticism, were that:
(i)
his appointment as Acting COO was irregular;
(ii)
the former Chairperson of the SABC Board, Dr Ben Ngubane, had acted
irregularly when he ordered that the qualification requirements for the
appointment to the position of COO be altered to suit Mr Motsoeneng‘s
circumstances;
(iii)
his salary progression from R1.5 million to R2.4 million in one fiscal year was
irregular;
(iv)
he had abused his power and position to unduly benefit himself;
(v)
he had fraudulently misrepresented, when completing his job application form
in 1995 and thereafter in 2003 when applying for the post of Executive
Producer: Current Affairs, that he had matriculated;
(vi)
he had been appointed to several posts at the SABC despite not having the
appropriate qualifications for those posts;
(vii)
he was responsible, as part of the SABC management, for the irregular
appointment of the SABC‘s Chief Financial Officer;
(viii)
he was involved in the irregular termination of the employment of several
senior staff members resulting in a substantial loss to the SABC;
(viiii) he had unilaterally and irregularly increased the salaries of various staff
members which resulted in a salary bill escalation of R29 million.

7 Public Protector‘s Report No 23 of 2013/2014.  The full title of the Report, filed by the Public
Protector in terms of s 182(1)(b) of the Constitution and  s 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, reads: ‗A
report on an investigation into allegations of maladministration, systemic corporate governance
deficiencies, abuse of power and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).‘
The Public Protector borrowed from a former member of the SABC Board, who had stated: ‗When
governance and ethics fail, you get a dysfunctional organization. Sadly those in charge cannot see
that their situation is abnormal. That has been the case at the SABC for a long time . . . ‘ A copy of the
report is available at: http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2013-14/SABC%20FINAL%
20REPORT%2017%20FEBRUARY%202014.pdf, accessed 1 October 2015.

Moreover, the Public Protector found that the Department of Communications and
the then Minister Pule, aided and abetted by Mr Motsoeneng, had unduly interfered
in the affairs of the SABC. Such conduct, so she stated, ‗was unlawful and had a
corrupting effect on the SABC Human Resources‘ practices‘ and ‗was grossly
improper and constitutes maladministration‘.

[7] As regards the Minister, the Public Protector, purportedly in terms of s 182 of
the Constitution, directed the following to the Minister of Communications at the time
of the report, Mr Yunus Carrim (who had since replaced Ms Dina Pule):
‗11.2 The current Minister of the Department of communications: Hon. Yunus
Carrim
11.2.1. To institute disciplinary proceedings against Mr Themba Phiri in respect of his
conduct with regard to his role in the irregular appointment of Ms Duda as the SABC
CFO.
11.2.2. To take urgent steps to fill the long outstanding vacant position of the Chief
Operations Officer with a suitably qualified permanent incumbent within 90 days of
this report and to establish why GCEO‘s cannot function at the SABC and leave
prematurely, causing operational and financial strains.
11.2.3. To define the role and authority of the COO in relation to the GCEO and ensure that
overlaps in authority are identified and eliminated.
11.2.4. To expedite finalization of all pending disciplinary proceedings against the suspended
CFO, Ms Duda within 60 days of this report.‘

[8] The Public Protector directed the Board of the SABC to ensure that:
(i)
all monies are recovered which were irregularly expended through unlawful
and improper actions from the appropriate persons;
(ii)
appropriate disciplinary action was taken against Mr Motsoeneng for his
dishonesty relating to the misrepresentation of his qualifications, abuse of
power and improper conduct in the appointments and salary increments of
certain staff and for his role in the purging of senior staff members resulting in
numerous labour disputes and settlement awards against the SABC;
(iii)
any fruitless and wasteful expenditure that had been incurred as a result of
irregular salary increments to Mr Motsoeneng is recovered from him.

The Public Protector also required each of the Minister and the SABC Board to
submit an implementation plan within 30 days indicating how the remedial action
would be implemented and for all such actions to be finalised within six months.

[9] On 7 July 2014, instead of implementing the Public Protector‘s remedial
action and without notice to her, the SABC Board resolved that Mr Motsoeneng be
appointed the permanent COO of the SABC. This was accepted by the new Minister
(who had by that stage replaced Mr Yunus Carrim), Ms Faith Muthambi, who
approved and formally announced his appointment the next day. Both the Board and
the Minister acted as they did without reference to the Public Protector. Aggrieved,
the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition political party in the National
Assembly, applied to the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town (the
High Court), to first suspend and then set aside Mr Motsoeneng‘s appointment. It
contended that in the light of the damning findings of the Public Protector in relation
to Mr Motsoeneng and the clear requirements for the appointment of the COO, his
appointment to that position was irrational and unlawful.

[10] The application was brought in two parts. Part A was an urgent application
seeking, inter alia, the following relief:
‗2. Directing that the Seventh Respondent (―Motsoeneng‖) is suspended with immediate
effect from his position as Chief Operating Officer (―COO‖) of the First Respondent (―SABC‖),
and shall remain suspended at least until the finalization of the disciplinary proceedings to be
brought against him in terms of para 3 and the determination of the review relief sought in
Part B;
3. Directing the Second Respondent (―the Board‖) to institute disciplinary proceedings
against Motsoeneng within five (5) days of the date of this court‘s order;
4. Directing the Board, within five (5) days of the date of this court‘s order, to appoint a
suitably qualified person as acting COO to fill the position pending the appointment of a
suitably qualified permanent COO;
5. Ordering that the members of the Board who voted in favour of the appointment of
Motsoeneng as COO, and the Fourth Respondent (―the Minister‖) in their personal capacities
pay the Applicant‘s costs on an attorney and client scale;
. . . . ‘

[11] Part B sought relief as follows:

‗7. Reviewing and setting aside the decision taken by the Board, on or about 7 July 2014, to
recommend the appointment of Motsoeneng as COO;
8. Reviewing and setting aside the decision taken by the Minister, on or about 7 July 2014,
to approve the recommendation made by the Board to appoint Motsoeneng as COO;
9. Directing the Board to recommend the appointment of, and the Minister to appoint, a
suitably qualified COO within 60 days of the date of the court‘s order;
10. Directing that, if the Board and/or the Minister fail to comply with the terms of paragraph
9, the Third Respondent (―the Chairperson‖), and the Minister, shall file affidavits within 70
days of the date of this court‘s order giving reasons why all the members of the Board and
the Minister should not be held in contempt of court;
11. Declaring that, the decisions to recommend and appoint Motsoeneng as COO before
responding to the report of the Ninth Respondent [the Public Protector] dated 17 February
2014 and titled ‘When Governance and Ethics Fail’, the Board and the Minister respectively
were inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly section 181(3) of the Constitution, and
invalid;
12. Ordering that the members of the Board who voted in favour of the appointment of
Motsoeneng as COO, and the Minister in their personal capacities pay the Applicant‘s costs
on an attorney and client scale;
. . . .‘

[12] The application cited the SABC, the Board of Directors of the SABC and the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the SABC (collectively referred to as the
SABC) as the first to third respondents. The Minister of Communications, the
President of the Republic of South Africa, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the
Portfolio Committee for Communications of the National Assembly, Mr Motsoeneng
and the Public Protector were cited as the fourth to ninth respondents respectively.
No relief was sought against the President, the Speaker and the Portfolio
Committee. They accordingly took no part in the proceedings either in this court or
the one below. The SABC opposed the application as did the Minister and Mr
Motsoeneng. We turn presently to the role played by the Public Protector in the
preceding litigation and the present appeal.

[13] In support of the application, Mr James Selfe, the chairperson of the Federal
Executive of the DA, relying principally on the Public Protector‘s report, stated in the
founding affidavit:

‗34.
First, the Public Protector concluded that Motsoeneng had lied about his
qualifications when applying for the COO position, and when applying for his earlier positions
at the SABC. Motsoeneng lied about having obtained a matric certificate and made up
imaginary grades on his application form. It appears that the SABC Board may have been
aware of this misrepresentation and appointed Motsoeneng nonetheless. As the Public
Protector notes, Motsoeneng‘s attempt to rely on this connivance only exacerbates his crime
as he showed no remorse for his unethical conduct. The lie was necessary as a matric was
a minimum requirement for the position (as it had been for his earlier positions). The Public
Protector described this as fraudulent.
35.
Importantly, Motsoeneng admitted in his interview that he had lied in his application
form. In addition, his fraudulent misrepresentation was known to the SABC from at least
2003 when a Group Internal Audit into the allegation that found he had indeed
misrepresented himself by stating that he passed matric in 1991. The audit recommended
that action should be instituted against Motsoeneng for his misrepresentation. This did not
occur.
. . .
51.
Appointing Motsoeneng in a permanent position would have been unlawful and
irrational even if all the correct procedures had been followed. However, not only did the
Board and the Minister appoint an admitted fraudster who had single-handedly cost the
SABC tens of millions of rand and completely undermined public confidence and good
corporate governance, it completely ignored the relevant legal provisions when it did so.
52.
The DA was not privy to the details of the appointment of Motsoeneng, but those
details have been widely exposed in the press. I rely on several of those media reports for
the facts contained [in this] section. I attach several of them as annexures . . . . Rather than
refer to the media reports for each allegation, I tell the sordid story with reference to all the
media reports together as the source. Except where I note otherwise, none of the key
allegations have been denied by the Board or the Minister.
53.
One of the obstacles to filling the post of COO – and part of the reason Motsoeneng
served in an acting capacity for so long – was that Mr Mvuzo Mbebe had obtained an
interdict preventing the post from being filled on a permanent basis. Mbebe had been
recommended as COO in 2007 by the Board, but his recommendation was overturned when
a new chairperson – Ms Khanyi Mkhonza – took office. The interdict prevented the Board
from permanently filling the post pending Mbebe‘s review of the Board‘s reversal.
54.
This matter was close to being resolved by the previous Minister, Mr [Yunus] Carrim.
It appears that the matter may have been finally settled by the current Minister [Ms Faith
Muthambi] sometime in early July. The Minister arrived at a Board meeting on 7 July 2014 in
possession of a note of settlement of the Mbebe dispute. If valid this would open the way for

the appointing a new COO. However, Mbebe had denied that there has been a final
settlement.
55.
Even if the matter had been settled, it would merely start the process of advertising,
shortlisting and interviewing candidates. That process had not yet started because it was
believed Mbebe‘s interdict prevented any fresh appointment. In addition, the question of
filling the new post of the COO was not on the agenda of the 7 July Board meeting.
56.
However, it appears that when the Minister arrived at the SABC at 19:00 on 7 July
2014, she entered into a private conference with the Chairperson. When the Chairperson
emerged from that conference at about 21:00, she proposed to the Board that it immediately
appoint Motsoeneng as the permanent COO.
57.
It appears that, in addition to the fact that the Mbebe issue had been resolved, the
Chairperson informed the Board that it was necessary to appoint Motsoeneng because of a
threat from his lawyers. Motsoeneng‘s attorneys had written stating that he was entitled to be
appointed based on a ―legitimate expectation‖, as he had been acting in the position for so
long. The Chairperson relied on this document, and his assertion that Motsoeneng was
performing well in his position to justify the appointment. The Chairperson also read out a
letter from Motsoeneng that one Board member described ―saying what a great person he is.
In the letter, Hlaudi attributes all the success of the SABC to himself . . . like there is no one
else working there‖.
58.
Understandably, several board members objected. They claimed that the proper
process – which, as I explain below, requires that the position be advertised, candidates
shortlisted and interviewed – had not been followed. It is unclear whether they also raised
the Public Protector‘s Report. Five of the eleven board members did not support his
appointment: two abstained (Prof Bongani Khumalo and Vusumuzi Mavuso) and three voted
against (Ronnie Lubisi, Krish Naidoo and Rachel Kalidass). The remaining six board
members voted in favour (The Chairperson, Prof Mbulaheni, Obert Maghuve, Nomvuyo
Mhlakaza, Ndivhoniswani Tshidzumba, Leah Khumalo and Hope Zinde).
59.
After resolving to appoint Motsoeneng, the Board passed its recommendation on to
the Minister for her approval at around 23:30 on 7 July 2014. The Minister informed the
Board that she would ―apply her mind‖ to the issue. She applied it extremely quickly as, the
next day, 8 July 2014, she announced the appointment of Motsoeneng.
60.
At no point did the Board or the Minister explain to the Public Protector why they
were ignoring her findings and appointing Motsoeneng in a permanent position. Indeed,
when responding to queries about how Motsoeneng could possibly be appointed in light of
the PP Report, the SABC‘s spokesperson Kaizer Kganyago replied: ―The Public Protector
has nothing to do with [the permanent appointment of Motsoeneng]. The two are not
together . . . I don‘t know how the two are related.‖

61.
However, at a press briefing on 10 July 2014, the Minister indicated that the SABC
Board had obtained the opinion of an independent law firm ―to investigate all the issues
raised by the Public Protector‖. The Minister stated that she and the Board were ―satisfied
that the report . . . cleared Mr Motsoeneng of any wrongdoing‖. The Minister provided no
details about the contents of the law firm‘s report.‘ (Emphasis in original, formatting altered
slightly.)

[14] In opposing the application, both Ms Tshabalala, the then Chairperson of the
SABC Board and Minister Muthambi denied that the Public Protector‘s findings and
remedial action had been ignored or that Mr Motsoeneng‘s permanent appointment
was irregular. In that regard the former said:
‗49.
Reasonably soon after receipt of the Public Protector‘s Report, and in addition
to internal considerations of the Public Protector‘s Report and its findings and
recommendations, the Board procured the services of Mchunu Attorneys, a firm of attorneys,
to assist it in considering and investigating the veracity of the findings and recommendations
by the Public Protector, as well as to assist the Board and management to respond to the
Public Protector. Mchunu Attorneys reviewed the Public Protector‘s Report and investigated
its findings and recommendations for purposes of advising the Board. Mchunu Attorneys
prepared a report in respect of its task and gave advice to the Board.‘

[15] Ms Tshabalala did not annex a copy of the report from the firm of attorneys to
her affidavit, stating that it was privileged. She added that the Board did not
disregard the report of the Public Protector. According to her, a Committee of Chairs
had been established to deal with it. She asserted that the Board had been in
constant communication with the Public Protector regarding her implementation plan
and the Board‘s difficulties therewith. And later on in her affidavit, she stated quite
emphatically:
‗125.2. I deny what may be defamatory statements that Mr Motsoeneng is a fraudster
as alleged in paragraph 51 [of the founding affidavit], based on the findings of the Public
Protector, which have been demonstrated to be false in this regard.
125.3 The allegations contained in paragraphs 53 to 64 [of the founding affidavit] are based
on media reports. They constitute hearsay evidence. Once the review record has been filed,
reliable evidence will be before the Court and the Board will deal with the allegations in full in
response to Part B of the notice of motion. Suffice to state that the allegations are denied to
the extent that they suggest that the appointment of Mr Motsoeneng is unlawful and
irrational. . .

125.4. The Minister was empowered to accept the recommendation of the Board and to
appoint Mr Motsoeneng as the COO of the SABC. Any alleged failure by the Board to follow
procedures set out in the Articles of Association did not preclude the 100% shareholder,
empowered under the Broadcasting Act read with the Articles of Association to appoint a
COO, to approve the appointment of Mr Motsoeneng. The legal basis for this contention, as
well as the relevant facts, will be fully set out in the answering affidavit to Part B of the notice
of motion. The outcome of Part A does not depend on this. I am advised and respectfully
submit that this is not a case of an applicant seeking interim relief that is linked directly to the
final relief sought – as in Part A (allegedly interim) and Part B of the notice of motion (final).‘
(Our emphasis.)

[16] In opposing the DA‘s application the Minister stated in her answering affidavit:
‗14.
[At the meeting with the chairperson of the Board on 7 July 2014] I then
raised my concerns with the Chairperson of the board of the [SABC] who then provided to
me the transcript of the interview between the Public Protector and [Mr Motsoeneng]. After
reading such transcript, I was satisfied that the [Mr Motsoeneng] did not lie to the first
respondent about the Matric qualification. I was then satisfied that the [Mr Motsoeneng] is
competent and has the necessary expertise to be appointed as the Chief Operations Officer.
15.
I considered in that regard the further qualifications which [Mr Motsoeneng] had
obtained throughout his employment with the [SABC] which are mentioned in the report of
Mchunu Attorneys. I also considered the fact that [Mr Motsoeneng] had gained the
necessary experience and acquitted himself exceptionally well for a period of almost three
years when he was acting as the Chief Operations Officer.
. . .
33.2
The report of Mchunu Attorneys shows that the [SABC Board] has not ignored the
findings of the Public Protector. That report shows that the [SABC Board] sought advice on
how to deal with that report. Based on the advice it received the [SABC Board] considered it
appropriate to conclude that the [Mr Motsoeneng] did not mislead the [SABC] about his
qualifications.
. . .
41.4
However, I intend to engage the Public Protector on her findings, and bring to her
attention facts which were uncovered by Mchunu Attorneys which could well affect her
findings.
42.
I have already indicated that I intend to engage the Public Protector in the light of
facts which were established by Mchunu Attorneys, in their investigation. I have prepared the
response of my office to the Public Protector of which such report will reach the Public

Protector‘s office in time, I will also meet the portfolio committee on communications on the
26 August 2014 to take them through my reply to the Public Protector.
43.1
Once again, I point out that the findings contained in the report of the Public Protector
should be considered in the light of the report by Mchunu Attorneys and the transcript of the
interview between [the] Public Protector and [Mr Motsoeneng], which I meant to believe that
the [SABC] will bring it to the attention of this court.‘
. . .
45.2. I have been advised that the [DA] is not entitled to rely on newspaper reports referred
in this paragraph. I object to the admissibility of annexure[s] . . . on the grounds that they
constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence.
. . .
46.3. I deny that I arrived at the board meeting of the 7 July 2014 with a so called note of
settlement on Mbebe‘s matter. It is further not true that I had a two hours meeting with the
[SABC Board Chairperson] upon my arrival to the said board meeting. As a matter of
protocol it is the duty of the [SABC Board Chairperson] to give me a brief of the issues.
. . .
47.1. I admit that I was present at the offices of the [SABC] on 7 July 2014. I went to those
offices upon the invitation of the chair of the [SABC].
47.2. I only entered the meeting room after the [SABC Board] had concluded deliberations
as per invitation of its chair.
47.3. I did not propose to the [SABC Board] that its members should appoint [Mr
Motsoeneng] in a permanent capacity or in any capacity at all. I could not have done so,
having regard to the independence of the [SABC Board], and the decision-making process
that must be followed in making such appointments.
. . .
50.2. I informed the chair of the [SABC Board] that I can only act upon the decision of the
[SABC Board] once I received a recommendation from the [SABC Board] which motivated its
decision to recommend the appointment of the [Mr Motsoeneng].
50.3. On 8 July 2014 I received recommendation from the [SABC Board], together with
several documents, including the report of Mchunu Attorneys which deal with their advice on
the findings and remedial action of the Public Protector.
50.4. I did consider that recommendation and supporting documents, and thereafter
decided to accept the recommendation on 8 July 2014.
50.5. I considered it my duty to make the decision on the recommendation of the [SABC
Board] as expeditiously as was possible because the matter was urgent, and I had the
constitutional duty to make a decision on that recommendation diligently and without delay.
. . .

51.3. I will continue to engage the Public Protector on her findings and remedial action
relating to [Mr Motsoeneg]. I will, in that regard, make available to her the findings of Mchunu
Attorneys, and ask her to consider whether that report impacts on her findings, and if so, to
what extent.‘

[17] After initially intimating that she would abide the decision of the High Court,
the Public Protector felt constrained to file an affidavit with that court because, as
she put it:
‗No relief is sought by the Applicant against me. Nor do any of the Respondents seek to
launch a counter-application to review the Report and set aside my findings contained
therein. Therefore, when I originally received the application, I did not file a notice of
intention to oppose the application. However, when I read the answering affidavits filed on
behalf of the First – Third Respondents [the SABC, the SABC Board, and the SABC Board
Chairperson] and the Eighth Respondents [Mr Motsoeneng], it became clear that the main
thrust of their case was to discredit the Public Protector‘s reports and the findings and
remedial action taken therein. The First – Third and Eighth Respondents seek to do this in
circumstances where no Respondent had brought a counter-application to review and set
aside the Report and its contents. Moreover, the answering affidavits filed by those
Respondents are replete with inaccuracies with respect to the Report and its contents. It
therefore became clear to me, that I need to place certain facts and considerations before
this Court in an effort to assist the Court in its adjudication of this matter and in order to
clarify the role of the Public Protector and the status of the findings and remedial action
taken in my Report.‘

[18] The Public Protector expressed the view that the principles of co-operative
governance contemplated in the Constitution required the Minister and the SABC to
have submitted an implementation plan to her, which they had failed to do. She
therefore suggested that she was obliged to ventilate the issues in the current
proceedings, rather than through co-operative governance processes. According to
the Public Protector, Mr Yunus Carrim, undertook in Parliament to implement the
remedial action. However, this was not done. Also the Board of the SABC, on more
than one occasion, had indicated that it was engaging with the report and sought
extensions from her in order to comply. The extensions were granted and
notwithstanding indications by the Chairperson of the Board that the report was

being given due consideration and that an implementation plan would be furnished,
her remedial action was ignored.

[19] The court below (Schippers J), formulated the primary question for
adjudication as follows: Are the findings of the Public Protector binding and
enforceable? He examined the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Public
Protector Act 23 of 1994 (the Act) and reasoned:
‗50.
. . . The powers and functions of the Public Protector are not adjudicative.
Unlike courts, the Public Protector does not hear and determine causes. The Report itself
states that in the enquiry as to what happened the Public Protector relies primarily on official
documents such as memoranda and minutes, and less on oral evidence. In the enquiry as to
what should have happened the Public Protector assesses the conduct in question in the
light of the standards laid down in the Constitution, legislation, and policies and guidelines.
51.
Further, unlike an order or decision of a court, a finding by the Public Protector is not
binding on persons and organs of State.8 If it were intended that the findings of the Public
Protector should be binding and enforceable, the Constitution would have said so. Instead,
the power to take remedial action in s 182(1)(c) of the Constitution is inextricably linked to
the Public Protector‘s investigatory powers in s 182(1)(a). Having regard to the plain wording
and context of s 182(1), the power to take appropriate remedial action, in my view, means no
more than that the Public Protector may take steps to redress improper or prejudicial
conduct. But that is not to say that the findings of the Public Protector are binding and
enforceable, or that the institution is ineffective without such powers.‘
Then, somewhat contradictorily, he stated:
‗59.
However, the fact that the findings of and remedial action taken by the Public
Protector are not binding decisions does not mean that these findings and remedial action
are mere recommendations, which an organ of State may accept or reject.‘9

[20] Schippers J concluded:
‗74.
For these reasons I have come to the conclusion that the findings of the
Public Protector are not binding and enforceable.10 However, when an organ of State rejects
those findings or the remedial action, that decision itself must not be irrational.‘

8 And in a footnote, the court below refers to section 165(5) of the Constitution, which reads:
‗An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of State to which it
applies.‘
9 Note that where we have quoted from other judgments, we have omitted the square brackets around
the relevant paragraph numbers so as to avoid confusion.

He thus proceeded to consider whether the decision by the SABC to recommend -
and the Minister‘s decision to appoint - Mr Motsoeneng as the permanent COO was
rational. On that score the learned judge held:
‗83.
The conduct of the board and the minister in rejecting the findings and
remedial action of the Public Protector was arbitrary and irrational and, consequently,
constitutionally unlawful. They have not provided cogent reasons to justify their rejection of
the findings by the Public Protector of dishonesty, maladministration, improper conduct and
abuse of power on the part of Motsoeneng.‘

[21] The learned judge accordingly issued the following order:
‗1.
The Board of the South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd (SABC) shall, within 14
calendar days of the date of this order, commence, by way of serving on him a notice
of charges, disciplinary proceedings against the eighth respondent, the chief
operations officer (COO), Mr George Hlaudi Motsoeneng, for his alleged dishonesty
relating to the alleged misrepresentation of his qualifications, abuse of power and
improper conduct in the appointments and salary increases of Ms Sully Motsweni;
and for his role in the alleged suspension and dismissal of senior members of staff,
resulting in numerous labour disputes and settlement awards against the SABC,
referred to in para 11.3.2.1 of the report of the Public Protector dated 17 February
2014.
2.
An independent person shall preside over the disciplinary proceedings.
3.
The disciplinary proceedings referred to in para 1 above shall be completed within a
period of 60 calendar days after they have been commenced. If the proceedings are
not completed within that time, the chairperson of the board of the SABC shall deliver
an affidavit to this court:
(a)
explaining why the proceedings have not been completed; and

10 We note that some support for the approach of Schippers J is to be found in Bishop & Woolman (op
cit), who opine that one of the most common criticisms levelled at the Public Protector or ombudsmen
generally is that the institution lacks the power to make ‗binding decisions‘. According to them, the
real strength of the office lies in the power to investigate and report effectively. In this regard they
refer (at 24A-3) to the following from Stephen Owen (S Owen 'The Ombudsman: Essential Elements
and Common Challenges' in Linda C Reif (ed) The International Ombudsman Anthology (1999) at 51,
54–5):
‗Through the application of reason the results are infinitely more powerful than through the
application of coercion. While a coercive approach may cause a reluctant change in a single decision
or action, by definition it creates a loser who will be unlikely to accommodate the recommendations in
future actions. By contrast when change results from a reasoning process it changes a way of
thinking and the result endures for the benefit of potential complainants in the future.‘

(b)
stating when they are likely to be completed. The applicant shall be entitled,
within five calendar days of delivery of the affidavit by the Chairperson, to
deliver an answering affidavit.
4.
Pending the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in para 1, and for
the period referred to in para 3 above, the eighth respondent shall be suspended on
full pay‘.

[22] With the leave of the court below, the SABC, as the first appellant, the
Minister, as the second, and Mr Motsoeneng, as the third, appeal to this court
against the judgment of the court below. The DA opposes the appeal. The Public
Protector instructed counsel to file heads of argument and address us from the bar
on the status and effect of her findings and remedial action. Corruption Watch, a civil
society organisation, who was granted leave by the President of this court to
intervene as an amicus curiae in the appeal, endorses the Public Protector‘s
contention that on a proper interpretation of s 182 of the Constitution, read with the
Act, she has the power to take remedial action which cannot be ignored by organs of
State.

[23] For a proper understanding, it is necessary to contextualise the position and
purpose of the Public Protector within our Constitutional framework, and to consider
her powers.  As our interpretation differs from that of the court below, it is necessary
that we do so in some detail.  South Africa‘s Chapter Nine institutions were
established as independent watchdogs to strengthen constitutional democracy in the
Republic. Section 181(1) of the Constitution lists the institutions supporting
constitutional democracy as:
‗. . .
(a) The Public Protector.
(b) The South African Human Rights Commission.
(c) The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities.
(d) The Commissioner for Gender Equality.
(e) The Auditor-General.
(f) The Electoral Commission.‘

[24] Section 181(2) of the Constitution states that ‗[t]hese institutions are
independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law‘. For their part, ‗they
must be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without
fear, favour or prejudice‘. Section 181(3) imposes a positive obligation on other
organs of State, who ‗through legislative and other measures, must assist and
protect these institutions‘ to ensure their ‗independence, impartiality, dignity and
effectiveness‘. Section 181(4) specifically prohibits any ‗person or organ of the State‘
from interfering with the functioning of these institutions. However, our Constitution
does attempt to strike a balance between their independence, on the one hand, and
accountability, on the other. To that end, s 181(5) provides that: ‗[t]hese institutions
are accountable to the National Assembly, and must report on their activities and the
performance of their functions to the Assembly at least once a year.‘ But as the
Constitutional Court pointed out in Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg
Municipality [2001] ZACC 23; 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC) para 27: the Constitution, in
effect, describes Chapter Nine institutions as State institutions that strengthen
constitutional democracy; Chapter Nine institutions are independent and subject only
to the Constitution and the law; it is ‗a contradiction in terms to regard an
independent institution as part of a sphere of government that is functionally
interdependent and interrelated in relation to all other spheres of government‘; and
independence cannot exist in the air and it is thus clear that independence is
intended to refer to independence from the government.

[25] Thus even though these institutions perform their functions in terms of
national legislation they are not organs of State within the national sphere of
government. Nor are they subject to national executive control. Accordingly, they
should be, and must manifestly be seen to be, outside government.11 In New
National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa & others [1999] ZACC
5; 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) para 98 and 99, it was stated by Langa DP, writing in a
separate concurring majority judgment:
‗In dealing with the independence of the [Independent Electoral] Commission, it is
necessary to make a distinction between two factors, both of which, in my view, are relevant
to ―independence‖. The first is ―financial independence‖. This implies the ability to have
access to funds reasonably required to enable the Commission to discharge the functions it

11 See also Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality para 31.

is obliged to perform under the Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act. This does not
mean that it can set its own budget. Parliament does that. What it does mean, however, is
that Parliament must consider what is reasonably required by the Commission and deal with
requests for funding rationally, in the light of other national interests. It is for Parliament, and
not the Executive arm of Government, to provide for funding reasonably sufficient to enable
the Commission to carry out its constitutional mandate. The Commission must, accordingly,
be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend its budgetary requirements before Parliament
or its relevant committees.
The second factor, ―administrative independence‖, implies that there will be [no]
control over those matters directly connected with the functions which the Commission has
to perform under the Constitution and the Act. The Executive must provide the assistance
that the Commission requires ―to ensure (its) independence, impartiality, dignity and
effectiveness‖.‘
Langa DP was elaborating there on the independence of the Independent Electoral
Commission but those considerations apply with equal force to the office of the
Public Protector.

[26] The Public Protector, which is the first on the list of Chapter Nine institutions,
has its historical roots in the institution of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombud.12 That
office was established with the adoption of the Swedish Constitution Act of 1809 and
is said to have been a response to the King‘s authoritarian rule. The task assigned to
the Swedish Ombud, which had been conceived as far back as 1713, was to ensure
that public officials acted in accordance with the law and discharged their duties
satisfactorily in other respects.13 If the Ombud found this not to be the case he was
empowered to institute legal proceedings for dereliction of duty.14 Like similar
institutions around the globe,15 the purpose of the office of the Public Protector is to
ensure that there is an effective public service which maintains a high standard of
professional ethics and that government officials carry out their tasks effectively,

12 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (the First Certification
Judgment) para 161.
13 See The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman ‗History‘, available at http://www.jo.se/en/About-
JO/History/, accessed 5 October 2015.
14 See also Stig Jagerskiöld ‗The Swedish Ombudsman‘ (1961) 109 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1077 for a general historical background of the Swedish ombudsman.
15 Finland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Spain and countries in South America are the examples
provided by Bishop & Woolman (op cit) at 24A-1.

fairly and without corruption or prejudice.16 The term ‘Defenser del Pueblo’ employed
in Spain and some South American countries translates into ‗Public Defender‘. This
emphasises ‗the protection of the people‘ and ‗the public good‘.17

[27] When the office of an Ombud or Public Protector in the new constitutional
dispensation was first mooted in this country, the African National Congress, the
current ruling political party in Parliament, in a document entitled ‗Ready to Govern:
Policy Guidelines on a Democratic South Africa‘,18 said the following:
‗The ANC proposes that a full-time independent office of the Ombud should be created with
wide powers to investigate complaints against members of the public service and other
holders of public office and to investigate allegations of corruption, abuse of their powers,
rudeness and maladministration. The Ombud shall have the power to provide adequate
remedies. He shall be appointed by and answerable to Parliament.‘
This predated the adoption of our Interim Constitution.

[28] The most significant constitutional provision is s 182, which reads:
‗(1)
The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation –
(a) to investigate any conduct in State affairs, or in the public administration in any
sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any
impropriety or prejudice;
(b) to report on that conduct; and
(c) to take appropriate remedial action.
(2)
The Public Protector has the additional powers and functions prescribed by national
legislation.
(3)
The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions.
(4)
The Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and communities.
(5)
Any report issued by the Public Protector must be open to the public unless
exceptional circumstances, to be determined in terms of national legislation, require
that a report be kept confidential.‘

[29] The independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the Public Protector are
vital to ensuring accountable and responsible government. The office inherently

16 First Certification Judgment para 161.
17 See Bishop & Woolman (op cit) at 24A-1.
18 ‗Ready to Govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa‘, as adopted at the African
National Congress‘ National Conference, and dated 31 May 1992.  A copy of this policy paper is
available at: http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=227, accessed 1 October 2015.

entails investigation
of
sensitive
and potentially
embarrassing
affairs
of
government.19 In terms of s 182(2) of the Constitution the Public Protector also ‗has
the additional powers and functions‘ prescribed by national legislation. The national
legislation that is referred to in s 182 is the Act, which makes it clear that, while the
functions of the Public Protector include those that are ordinarily associated with an
ombudsman, they also go much beyond that.20 The office of the Public Protector
provides ‗. . . what will often be a last defence against bureaucratic oppression, and
against corruption and malfeasance in public office that are capable of insidiously
destroying the nation.‘21 It follows that in fulfilling its constitutional mandate that office
will have to act with courage and vigilance.22

[30] Sections 193 and 194 of the Constitution provide for the appointment and
removal of the Public Protector. The Public Protector is appointed by the President
on the recommendation of the National Assembly. The National Assembly must
recommend persons: (i) nominated by a committee of the Assembly proportionally
composed of members of all political parties represented in the Assembly; and
(ii) approved by the Assembly by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at
least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. In addition to being a South
African citizen and a fit and proper person,23 the Public Protector must have at least
ten years‘ relevant experience or be a judge of the High Court.24 This obviously
suggests that the incumbent must be someone who is beyond reproach, a person of
stature and suitably qualified. Section 183 of the Constitution provides for a non-
renewable tenure of seven years. The Public Protector may be removed from office
only on: (a) the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence; (b) a finding to
that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; and (c) the adoption by the
Assembly of a resolution calling for her removal from office. A resolution of the
National Assembly concerning the removal of the Public Protector from office must
be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of the members of the
Assembly. Upon the adoption of such a resolution the President must remove the

19 First Certification Judgment para 163.
20 See Public Protector v Mail & Guardian Ltd & others [2011] ZASCA 108; 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA)
para 9.
21 Public Protector v Mail & Guardian para 6.
22 See Public Protector v Mail & Guardian para 8.
23 See section 193(1) of the Constitution and s 1A of the Act.
24 See s 1A(3) of the Act.

Public Protector from office. The Public Protector is thus well protected and a high
threshold is set for her removal. Significantly, in the First Certification Judgment, the
Constitutional Court found that the provisions in the Interim Constitution governing
the removal of the Public Protector from office did not pass constitutional muster.25

[31] The predecessors of the Public Protector are the Advocate-General and the
Ombudsman. The office of the Ombudsman, like the Advocate-General that came
before it, had the power under the (now repealed) Ombudsman Act 118 of 1979 to
investigate reports of maladministration, but not to take remedial action directly. In
other words, the Legislature expressly limited the Ombudsman‘s remedial powers.
She had to refer her findings to other institutions for remedial action.26 The office of
the Public Protector was established by s 110 of the Interim Constitution. Section 112
of the Interim Constitution, which set out the powers and functions of the Public
Protector, echoing the Ombudsman Act and the Attorney-General Act 92 of 1992
before it, merely stated that it was competent for the Public Protector, pursuant to an
investigation:
‗. . . to endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to resolve any dispute or rectify any act or
omission by –
(i)
mediation, conciliation or negotiation;
(ii)
advising, where necessary, any complainant regarding appropriate remedies; or
(iii)
any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances.‘

[32] It is necessary to have regard to the relevant provisions of the Act to see how
action by the Public Protector is triggered as well as to examine the range of
statutory measures available to that office. But before we do that it is worth noting
the material parts of the Preamble to the Act:

25 See the First Certification Judgment para 163.
26 Section 5(4) provided that the Ombudsman could, whether or not he or she held an inquiry, and at
any time before, during or after such inquiry:
‗(a)
if he is of the opinion that the facts disclose the commission of an offence by any person,
bring the matter to the notice of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions;
(b)
if he deems it advisable, refer any matter which has a bearing on mismanagement to the
institution, body, association or organization affected by it or make an appropriate recommendation
regarding the redress of the prejudice referred to in section 4(1)(d) or make any other
recommendation which he deems expedient to the institution, body, association or organisation
concerned.‘

‗Whereas sections 181 to 183 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act
108 of 1996),[27] provide for the establishment of the office of Public Protector and that the
Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation, to investigate any
conduct in State affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, that is
alleged or suspected to be improper or to have resulted in any impropriety or prejudice, to
report on that conduct and to take appropriate remedial action, in order to strengthen and
support constitutional democracy in the Republic; . . . .‘

[33] Importantly, s 6 of the Act is entitled ‗Reporting matters to and additional
powers of Public Protector‘. Section 6(1) provides that any person may, in any matter
over which the Public Protector has jurisdiction, report a complaint to that office. The
Public Protector, may, in terms of s 6(3), refuse to investigate a matter reported, if
the person ostensibly prejudiced is a State official or employee and that person has
not exhausted remedies conferred in terms of the provisions of the Public Service
Act, 199428 or if the affected person has not taken all reasonable steps to exhaust
available legal remedies.

[34] Section 6(4)(a) of the Act deals with the Public Protector‘s additional
competencies and provides that she is entitled to act on her own initiative. It
provides:
‗The Public Protector shall, be competent-
(a) To investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, any alleged–
(i) maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at any level;
(ii) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, discourteous or other
improper conduct or undue delay by a person performing a public function;
(iii) improper or dishonest act, or omission or offences referred to in Part 1 to 4, or
section 17, 20 or 21…of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt
Activities Act, 2004 with respect to public money;
(iv) improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper advantage, or promise of
such enrichment or advantage, by a person as a result of an act or omission in the
public administration or in connection with the affairs of government at any level or of
a person performing a public function, or;

27 Note that the Act came into force during the time of the Interim Constitution, and the reference here
to the Final Constitution is as a result of an amendment to the Act by the Public Protector Amendment
Act 113 of 1998.
28 Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994, published in GG 15791, 3 June 1994).

(v) act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any level, or a person
performing a public function, which results in unlawful or improper prejudice to any
other person‘.

[35] Section 6(4)(b) of the Act gives the Public Protector resort to what might, in
broad terms, be described as alternative dispute resolution measures.  It provides
that the Public Protector shall be competent:
‗(b) to endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to resolve any dispute or rectify any act or
omission by–
(i) mediation, or conciliation or negotiation;
(ii) advising, where necessary, any complainant regarding appropriate remedies; or
(iii) any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances‘.

[36] Section 6(4)(c)(i) states that if the Public Protector is of the opinion that the
facts presented to her disclose the commission of an offence she is entitled to refer it
to the authority charged with prosecutions. Section 6(4)(c)(ii) provides that if the
Public Protector deems it advisable she may refer:
‗. . . any matter which has a bearing on an investigation, to the appropriate public body or
authority affected by it or to make an appropriate recommendation regarding the redress of
the prejudice resulting therefrom or make any other appropriate recommendation he or she
deems expedient to the affected public body or authority.‘

[37] Section 6(5)(a) of the Act is especially pertinent to this matter. It provides that
the Public Protector has the same powers referred to in s 6(4) set out above in
relation to the affairs of an institution in which the State is the majority or controlling
shareholder or in relation to any public entity as defined in s 1 of the Public Finance
Management Act 1 of 1999 (the PFMA). This subsection of course encompasses the
SABC.

[38] Section 7 of the Act gives the Public Protector extensive powers of
investigation. She is entitled to subpoena persons and require them to give
evidence. Persons being investigated have the right to be heard. Section 7A gives
the Public Protector search and seizure powers.

[39] Section 8(1) of the Act provides:
‗The Public Protector may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), in the manner
he or she deems fit, make known to any person any finding, point of view or
recommendation in respect of a matter investigated by him or her.‘
Section 8(3) reads as follows:
‗The findings of an investigation by the Public Protector shall, when he or she deems it fit but
as soon as possible, be made available to the complainant and to any person implicated
thereby.‘

[40] Section 11 of the Act makes it an offence for anyone to interfere with the
functioning of the office of the Public Protector ‗as contemplated in section 181(4) of
the Constitution‘.29

[41]  As can be seen Parliament took very seriously its constitutional mandate to
legislate the additional powers of the Public Protector. In that regard, conscious of
the importance of the office, the Legislature was thorough and thoughtful.

[42] Subsections 6(4)(b), (c) and (d) of the Act, which was enacted pursuant to the
Interim Constitution, appear to mirror the language of s 112(1)(b) of the Interim
Constitution.30 The Final Constitution, however, in a significant shift in language,
conferred an express further power on the Public Protector. Instead of empowering
the Public Protector to ‗endeavour‘ to resolve a dispute, or ‗rectify any act or
omission‘ by simply ‗advising‘ a complainant of an appropriate remedy as under the
Interim Constitution, the Final Constitution empowers the Public Protector to ‗take
appropriate remedial action‘.31 Significantly, the Constitution itself directly confers
powers on the Public Protector. Section 182(1) confers the power on the Public
Protector to: (a) investigate; (b) report; and (c) take appropriate remedial action.
Those powers are complementary. If, of course, a complaint, or an investigation on
her own initiative yields no indication of maladministration or corruption there will be
no need to take remedial steps or utilise any of the other measures available to her.

29 It will be recalled that that section of the Constitution provides that no person or institution of State
may interfere with the functioning of a Chapter Nine institution.
30 The Interim Constitution was enacted on 25 January 1994. The Public Protector Act was enacted
on 16 November 1994.
31 See, in this regard, the Public Protector Amendment Act 113 of 1998. The Public Protector Act was
also later amended by the Public Protector Amendment Act 22 of 2003.  However, the Public
Protector Amendment Acts did not amend s 6(4) at all.

Once the Public Protector establishes State misconduct, however, she has the vast
array of measures available to her as provided in the Constitution and the Act.

[43] Before us, all counsel accepted that the powers conferred on the Public
Protector in terms of s 182(1)(c) of the Constitution far exceeded those of similar
institutions in comparable jurisdictions. There was, however, a faint suggestion by
counsel on behalf of the Minister, that the powers of the Public Protector ought
rightly to be sourced from the Act, being the legislation envisaged by the Constitution
rather than from the Constitution itself. The problem with that suggestion is that the
Constitution is the primary source and it stipulates and refers to ‗additional‘ powers to
be prescribed by national legislation.32 The proposition on behalf of the Minister is
contrary to the constitutional and legislative scheme outlined above and would have
the effect of the tail wagging the dog.

[44] Our Constitution sets high standards for the exercise of public power by State
institutions and officials.33 However, those standards are not always lived up to, and
it would be naïve to assume that organs of State and public officials, found by the
Public Protector to have been guilty of corruption and malfeasance in public office,
will meekly accept her findings and implement her remedial measures. That is not
how guilty bureaucrats in society generally respond. The objective of policing State
officials to guard against corruption and malfeasance in public office forms part of the
constitutional imperative to combat corruption. The Constitutional Court in Glenister v
President of the Republic of South Africa & others [2011] ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347
(CC) noted (paras 176 and 177):
‗Endemic corruption threatens the injunction that government must be accountable,
responsive and open; that public administration must not only be held to account, but must
also be governed by high standards of ethics, efficiency and must use public resources in an
economic and effective manner. As it serves the public, it must seek to advance

32 In this regard, see the title on ‗Constitutional Law: Government Structures‘ in 5(3) Lawsa 2 ed
replacement volume by D W Freedman, para 265.
33 The Constitution‘s founding values include accountability, responsiveness and openness in
government (s 1(d)). Section 7(2) obliges the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in
the Bill of Rights. Section 33(1) requires administrative action to be lawful, reasonable and
procedurally fair. Section 41 requires all organs of State to respect and co-operate with one another
and inter alia to ‗provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the
Republic as a whole‘. Section 195 requires all organs of State and public officials to adhere to high
standards of ethical and professional conduct.

development and service to the public. In relation to public finance, the Constitution
demands budgetary and expenditure processes underpinned by openness, accountability
and effective financial management of the economy. Similar requirements apply to public
procurement, when organs of State contract for goods and services. . .
. . . Section 7(2) [of the Constitution] casts an especial duty upon the State. It requires the
State to ―respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.‖ It is incontestable
that corruption undermines the rights in the Bill of Rights, and imperils democracy. To
combat it requires an integrated and comprehensive response. The State‘s obligation to
―respect, protect, promote and fulfil‘ the rights in the Bill of Rights thus inevitably, in the
modern State, creates a duty to create efficient anti-corruption mechanisms.‖‘ (Footnotes
omitted.)
The Public Protector, in her answering affidavit, expressed concern that:
‗This matter represents yet another example of what would appear to have become a
trend amongst politicians and organs of State to simply disregard reports issued and
remedial actions taken by the Public Protector‘.

[45] Two considerations appear to have weighed with the High Court in its
conclusion that the findings of the Public Protector were not ‗binding and
enforceable‘. First, it appears to have compared the powers of the Public Protector
with that of a court and, second, it relied on a judgment of the English Court of
Appeal in R (on the application of Bradley & others) v Secretary of State for Work
and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 36; [2009] QB 114 (CA). Regarding the first
consideration, it is so that section 165(5) of the Constitution provides: ‗An order or
decision by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies‘
(our emphasis). But a court is an inaccurate comparator and the phrase ‗binding and
enforceable‘ is terminologically inapt and in this context conduces to confusion. For,
it is well settled in our law that until a decision is set aside by a court in proceedings
for judicial review it exists in fact and it has legal consequences that cannot simply
be overlooked (Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others [2004]
ZASCA 48; 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) para 26). It was submitted, however, that that
principle applies only to the decision of an administrative functionary or body, which
the Public Protector is not. It suffices for present purposes to state that if such a
principle finds application to the decisions of an administrative functionary then,
given the unique position that the Public Protector occupies in our constitutional
order, it must apply with at least equal or perhaps even greater force to the decisions

finally arrived at by that institution. After all, the rationale for the principle in the
administrative law context (namely, that the proper functioning of a modern State
would be considerably compromised if an administrative act could be given effect to
or ignored depending upon the view the subject takes of the validity of the act in
question (Oudekraal para 26)), would at least apply as much to the institution of the
Public Protector and to the conclusions contained in her published reports.

[46] Regarding the second consideration, Bradley held as follows (para 51):
‗It follows that, unless compelled by authority to hold otherwise, I would conclude that
. . . the Secretary of State, acting rationally, is entitled to reject the finding of
maladministration and prefer his own view. But, as I shall explain, it is not enough that the
Secretary of State has reached his own view on rational grounds: it is necessary that his
decision to reject the Ombudsman‘s findings in favour of his own view is, itself, not irrational
having regard to the legislative intention which underlies the 1967 Act [the Parliamentary
Commissioner Act]. To put the point another way, it is not enough for a Minister who decides
to reject the Ombudsman‘s finding of maladministration simply to assert that he had a
choice: he must have a reason for rejecting a finding which the Ombudsman has made after
an investigation under the powers conferred by the Act.‘
With reference to Bradley, Schippers J held:
‗66.
It seems to me that before rejecting the findings or remedial action of the
Public Protector, the relevant organ of State must have cogent reasons for doing so, that is
for reasons other than merely a preference for its own view. In this regard, Bradley is
instructive.‘ (Footnote omitted.)
Bradley does not in any way assist in the interpretation of our Public Protector‘s
constitutional power ‗to take appropriate remedial action‘. It concerned a different
institution with different powers, namely, the powers of the Parliamentary
Commissioner under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, who undertakes
investigations at the request of Members of Parliament. She does not have any
remedial powers. Section 10 of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act merely requires
her to report on her investigation to the Member of Parliament who laid the
complaint, the Department of State against whom the complaint was laid and, if any
injustice has been done, to the Houses of Parliament. The function of the
Parliamentary Commissioner appears, in other words, to be confined to a reporting
function, which is merely one of the functions of our Public Protector, and is specified
under s 182(1)(b) of the Constitution. The Parliamentary Commissioner does not

have any equivalent of our Public Protector‘s power to ‗take appropriate remedial
action‘. Bradley is consequently not of any assistance in the interpretation and
understanding of our Public Protector‘s remedial powers. Schippers J‘s reliance on
Bradley was therefore misplaced.

[47] Here, there is no suggestion that the Public Protector exceeded her powers or
that she acted corruptly. Nor have any of the other traditional grounds for a review
been raised. The principal reason advanced by both the SABC and the Minister for
ignoring the Public Protector‘s remedial action is that the former had appointed
Mchunu Attorneys to ‗investigate the veracity of the findings and recommendations
of the Public Protector‘. That, in our view, was impermissible. Whilst it may have
been permissible for the SABC to have appointed a firm of attorneys to assist it with
the implementation of the Public Protector‘s findings and remedial measures, it was
quite impermissible for it to have established a parallel process to that already
undertaken by the Public Protector and to thereafter assert privilege in respect
thereof.  The assertion of privilege in the context of this case is in any event
incomprehensible.34  If indeed it was aggrieved by any aspect of the Public
Protector‘s report, its remedy was to challenge that by way of a review. It was not for
it to set up a parallel process and then to adopt the stance that it preferred the
outcome of that process and was thus free to ignore that of the Public Protector. Nor
was it for the Minister to prefer the Mchunu report to that of the Public Protector.  It
bears noting that the Public Protector is plainly better suited to determine issues of
maladministration within the SABC than the SABC itself. That, after all, is why the
office of the Public Protector exists. The Public Protector is independent and
impartial. Mchunu Attorneys, who had already represented the SABC during the
course of the Public Protector‘s investigation, was not. The Public Protector
conducted a detailed investigation in which she interviewed all the relevant role

34 It is unclear on what basis the SABC asserts privilege in respect of the Mchunu report. First, the
report appears to have been procured by the SABC with the aim of investigating and assessing the
veracity of the Public Protector‘s findings.  Thus notwithstanding the fact that the relationship between
Mchunu Attorneys and the SABC appears facially at least to have been that of an attorney and client,
it is doubtful whether, properly construed, the Mchunu Report is in the nature of a communication
between an attorney and client in respect of which privilege from disclosure can rightly be asserted.
Second, the Mchunu report was furnished by the SABC to the Minister, who in turn stated in her
answering affidavit: ‗I will ensure that the findings of Mchunu Attorneys are made available to the
Public Protector for her consideration‘.  It is contradictory to assert privilege and then at the same time
to offer to make it available to another party.

players, considered all relevant documents, and gave all affected parties an
opportunity to comment on her provisional report. Only after following that process,
did she make her findings and take remedial action. That cannot simply be displaced
by the SABC‘s own internal investigation. Thus, absent a review, once the Public
Protector had finally spoken, the SABC was obliged to implement her findings and
remedial measures.

[48] Both the Minister and the SABC complain that they were still intent on
engaging with the Public Protector about her report. But, once she has finally
spoken, following upon a full investigation, where those affected have been afforded
a proper hearing, as happened here, there should have been compliance. However,
as the Public Protector pointed out in her affidavit ‗[t]he deadline for compliance . . .
is 17 August 2014. At the time of filing this affidavit, on 14 August 2014, no
compliance has been effected.‘35 In addition, as pointed out in paras 14 and 16
above, it is clear that the SABC adopted an intransigent approach to the remedial
action and the Minister followed suit. Moreover, on the evidence, the claim that they
were intent on engaging the Public Protector rings hollow. The permanent
appointment of Mr Motsoeneng as the COO in the face of the extremely serious
findings made by the Public Protector against him is inconsistent with that claim. It
appears to be undisputed that: (i) the position of COO was not formally advertised
and, accordingly, no other candidates were considered for what, after all, was a very
senior position at a public broadcaster; (ii) the filling of that position did not appear on
the agenda for the meeting at which the decision of the Board to recommend the
appointment was taken; and (iii) no interviews were held, not even with the single
candidate that the Board chose to recommend. All of that despite the SABC‘s own
Articles of Association that required the Board to interview other candidates and
prepare a shortlist. What is more is that Mr Motsoeneng‘s appointment appears to
have taken place in the face of an interdict granted in Mr Mbebe‘s favour. It thus
appears that despite the Public Protector‘s damning findings, both the SABC and

35 From the explanation of the Public Protector, it seems that she had given a number of extensions to
the deadline originally specified in her report, and so at the time that she deposed to the affidavit on
14 August 2014, the extended deadline was 17 August 2014.  And although she deposed to the
affidavit before the deadline had arrived, she took the view that the actions of the SABC and the
Minister made it clear that they were in any event not going to meet it.

Minister were dead set on Mr Motsoeneng‘s appointment and had no genuine
intention of engaging with the Public Protector.

[49] It is important to emphasise that this case is about a public broadcaster that
millions of South Africans rely on for news and information about their country and
the world at large and for as long as it remains dysfunctional, it will be unable to fulfil
its statutory mandate.36 The public interest should thus be its overarching theme and
objective. Sadly, that has not always been the case. Its Board has had to be
dissolved more than once and its financial position was once so parlous that a loan
of R1 billion, which was guaranteed by the National Treasury, had to be raised to
rescue it. Here as well, the public interest appears not to have weighed with the
Board of the SABC. The Public Protector observes in her report:
‗. . . I found it rather discouraging that the current SABC Board appears to have blindly
sprung to Mr Motsoeneng‘s defence on matters that preceded it and which, in my considered
view, require a Board that is serious about ethical governance to raise questions with him.‘
That approach by the Board appears to have carried through in this litigation.  By
way of example, the Public Protector pointed out in her report that:
‗. . . Mr Motsoeneng admitted, during his recorded interview, that he had falsified his matric
qualifications‘.
She added that:
‗Mr Motsoeneng indicated that he had passed Standard 10 (―matric‖) in 1991 at the age of
23 years and indicated five (5) symbols he had purported to have obtained in this regard.‘
In his written response to the Public Protector‘s provisional report, Mr Motsoeneng
accepted that the information furnished on the form when he first sought employment
at the SABC ‗was clearly inaccurate‘ and that his assertion that he had passed
standard ten was ‗inaccurate and false‘. That notwithstanding, Ms Tshabalala, who
had been appointed Chairperson of the SABC Board shortly before the application
was launched in the court below stated: ‗The objective facts contradict the finding by
the Public Protector that Mr Motsoeneng misrepresented his qualifications . . .‘ and

36 In terms of s 6(4) of the BA, the SABC must:
‗encourage the development of South African expression by providing, in South African official
languages, a wide range of programming that –
(a) reflects South African attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity;
(b) displays South African talent in education and entertainment programmes;
(c) offers a plurality of views and a variety of news, information and analysis from a South African
point of view;
(d) advances the national and public interest.

‗the findings of the Public Protector . . . have been demonstrated to be false in this
regard‘.  Likewise, the Minister‘s assertion that after reading the transcript of the
interview between the Public Protector and Mr Motsoeneng she was satisfied that he
did not ‗lie to the [SABC] about the matric qualification‘ can hardly withstand scrutiny.

[50] The following parts of a transcript of the interview conducted on 19 July 2013
by the Public Protector with Mr Motsoeneng, concerning his matric qualification,
appear to support that part of the Public Protector‘s report referred to in the
preceding paragraph:
‗Adv Madonsela: But you knew . . . you are saying to me you knew that you had failed, so
you . . . because when you put these symbols you knew you hadn‘t found . . . never seen
them anywhere, you were making them up. So I‘m asking you that in retrospect do you think
you should have made up these symbols, now that you are older and you are not twenty-
three?
Mr Motsoeneng:  From me . . . for now because I do understand all these issues, I was not
supposed, to be honest. If I was . . . now I was clear in my mind, like now I know what is
wrong, what is right, I was not supposed to even put it, but there they said ―No, put it ‖, but
what is important for me Public Protector, is everybody knew and even when I put there I
said to the lady ―I‘m not sure about my symbols‖ and why I was not sure Public Protector,
because I got a sub, you know I remember okay in English I think it was an ―E‖, because you
know after . . . it was 1995.
If you check there we are talking about 1991, now it was 1995 and for me I had even to go
to . . . I was supposed to go to school to check. Someone said ―No, no, no, you know what
you need to do? Just go to Pretoria.‖ At that time Public Protector, taxi, go and check, they
said, ―No, you fail‖, I went and. . . . That one is . . . and people who are putting this, Public
Protector . . . and I‘m going to give you. . . I know it is Phumemele and Charlotte and this
people when SABC were charging me, they were my witness.
Mr Madiba: I think if. . . I want to understand you correctly. You say you were asked by the
SABC to put in those forms. . . I mean to put in those. . .
Adv Madonsela: To make up the symbols.
Mr Madiba: To make up the symbols. Do you recall who said that to you?
Mr Motsoeneng: Marie Swanepoel.‘
This explanation by Mr Motsoeneng is muddled and unclear. Even after the passage
of a considerable period of time and sufficient opportunity for reflection on his part, it
does reveal an alarming lack of insight. He appears not to fully appreciate that this

was an admitted deliberate falsehood and that in that sense his explanation lacks
contrition and honesty. But his explanation evidently satisfied both the Board and the
Minister that he did not lie about his matric qualification. It is not clear how they could
have come to that conclusion because it is not in dispute that: (a) he did not have a
matric qualification; and (b) when he first sought employment with the SABC he
misrepresented that he did. It matters not, as he suggests in seeking to justify his
behaviour, that certain persons at the SABC might have known that he did not in fact
have a matric. That others may have known the truth simply makes them complicit in
the lie. It does not excuse his lie. Mr Motsoeneng‘s more recent lack of candour and
contrition is also cause for concern. He does not furnish a confirmatory affidavit from
Ms Swanepoel. In his answering affidavit Mr Motsoeneng states ‗I have been unable
to trace Swanepoel again‘. But it would seem that she did depose to an affidavit in
which she disputes his version. That affidavit, for some inexplicable reason, does not
form part of the appeal record. In his judgment on the application for leave to appeal,
Schippers J records:

‗25.
The need to implement the order is further strengthened by the evidence
disclosed in the affidavit of Ms Mari Swanepoel, which she made in this application. Mr
Motsoeneng‘s evidence in this court is that when he applied for a job at the SABC, he told
Ms Swanepoel that he had attempted but not passed standard 10, but that she had indicated
that he should fill in ―10‖ under the heading, ―highest standard passed.‖ Then he said he was
unable to trace Ms Swanepoel again.
26.
Ms Swanepoel refutes this evidence. She says that she made it clear to Mr
Motsoeneng that he must not fill in a qualification which he had not yet finished; that he
would have to provide an original certificate to prove whatever he filled in on the application
form; and that after he had completed the form she repeatedly contacted Mr Motsoeneng to
produce his matric certificate which he promised to do, but never did. Ms Swanepoel says
that she also repeatedly followed up Mr Motsoeneng‘s failure to produce a matric certificate
with her superiors, including Mr Paul Tati. It will be recalled that Mr Tati insisted that Mr
Motsoeneng produce his matric certificate by no later than 12 May 2000. Mr Motsoeneng
replied that he would furnish the certificate as soon as he received it.
27.
Ms Swanepoel left the SABC in 2006. In late 2012 Mr Motsoeneng telephoned her.
He told her that the SABC was trying to fire him and he wanted to keep his job. He said that
his attorneys wanted her to make an affidavit about his matric certificate and the form he had
completed. He indicated to Ms Swanepoel that she should say that he had told her that he
did not have matric when he filled in the form. She refused. She also told Mr Motsoeneng

that she did not wish to speak to him as she had a sexual harassment suit pending against
the SABC at the time. He knew about the case and asked what she wanted from the SABC.
She said she wanted R2 million in compensation. Mr Motsoeneng, then the Acting COO,
replied, in Ms Swanepoel‘s words that, ―he could organise for the SABC to pay me the
R2 million, if I was willing to depose to the affidavit about the certificate.‖ She again refused.
Ms Swanepoel says that for some four weeks thereafter Mr Motsoeneng phoned her
repeatedly, but she generally ignored his calls. On the occasions that she did answer, Mr
Motsoeneng asked her if they could meet just to talk or if his attorney could speak to her
about the matter. She replied that she would talk to him but that she would not lie in an
affidavit for him.‘ (Footnotes omitted.)

[51] There is yet a further context in which the public interest does not appear to
have been well served. The affidavits filed on behalf of the Minister and the SABC
treat with disdain the allegation that Mr Motsoeneng‘s appointment was irrational and
unlawful because those allegations are pieced together from media reports and thus
constitute hearsay evidence. But that may well be to misconceive the position,
because, as Nugent JA, albeit in a different context, put it in Mail & Guardian (above)
(para 26), ‗[a] newspaper that publishes a series of articles on matters of great public
concern can only be seriously damaged by a finding that much of what was
published is not correct or cannot be substantiated.‘  Moreover, it is no less important
for the public as it is for the court to be reassured that there has been no impropriety
in public life. There is no justification for saying to either that they must simply accept
that there has not been conduct of that kind. The Minister and chairperson of SABC
Board are senior public office bearers, whose function it is to inspire confidence that
all is well in public life. In those circumstances we think it is unfortunate that they
should have chosen to respond to the evidence as they did. Unlike the DA, they
were present and intimately involved in what had transpired. In those circumstances
they owed not just the court but also their fellow citizens an explanation.  In our view
the overriding public interest obliged them to make full and frank disclosure rather
than shield themselves from scrutiny by resorting to technical points in opposition.
After all, the information pertaining to Mr Motsoeneng‘s appointment was peculiarly
within their knowledge.

[52] The Public Protector cannot realise the constitutional purpose of her office if
other organs of State may second-guess her findings and ignore her
recommendations. Section 182(1)(c) must accordingly be taken to mean what it
says. The Public Protector may take remedial action herself. She may determine the
remedy and direct its implementation. It follows that the language, history and
purpose of s 182(1)(c) make it clear that the Constitution intends for the Public
Protector to have the power to provide an effective remedy for State misconduct,
which includes the power to determine the remedy and direct its implementation. All
counsel before us rightly accepted that the Public Protector‘s report, findings and
remedial measures could not be ignored.

[53] To sum up, the office of the Public Protector, like all Chapter Nine institutions,
is a venerable one. Our constitutional compact demands that remedial action taken
by the Public Protector should not be ignored. State institutions are obliged to heed
the principles of co-operative governance as prescribed by s 41 of the Constitution.
Any affected person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or action taken by
the Public Protector might, in appropriate circumstances, challenge that by way of a
review application. Absent a review application, however, such person is not entitled
to simply ignore the findings, decision or remedial action taken by the Public
Protector. Moreover, an individual or body affected by any finding, decision or
remedial action taken by the Public Protector is not entitled to embark on a parallel
investigation process to that of the Public Protector, and adopt the position that the
outcome of that parallel process trumps the findings, decision or remedial action
taken by the Public Protector. A mere power of recommendation of the kind
suggested by the High Court appears to be more consistent with the language of the
Interim Constitution and is neither fitting nor effective, denudes the office of the
Public Protector of any meaningful content, and defeats its purpose. The effect of the
High Court‘s judgment is that, if the organ of State or State official concerned simply
ignores the Public Protector‘s remedial measures, it would fall to a private litigant or
the Public Protector herself to institute court proceedings to vindicate her office.
Before us, all the parties were agreed that a useful metaphor for the Public Protector
was that of a watchdog. As is evident from what is set out above, this watchdog
should not be muzzled.

[54] After lengthy debate in this court all counsel were agreed that the Public
Protector‘s directive that Mr Motsoeneng be subjected to a disciplinary enquiry must
be respected and consequently had to be implemented. Counsel on behalf of Mr
Motsoeneng insisted that he was eager to clear his name through that process and
thus welcomed it. For all the aforesaid reasons it was rightly conceded that the order
by the court below that disciplinary proceedings should be instituted was
unassailable.

[55] What occupied a greater part of the debate in this court was an attack on the
correctness of the order of the High Court suspending Mr Motsoeneng. It was
submitted on behalf of all three appellants that in her determination of an appropriate
remedy as contemplated by s 182(1)(c) of the Constitution, the Public Protector had
not seen fit to order Mr Motsoeneng‘s suspension. Accordingly, so the submission
went, it was not competent for Schippers J to do so. It is so that in ordering the
SABC to commence disciplinary proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng, the High
Court primarily sought to vindicate the Public Protector. But sight cannot be lost of
the fact that matters did not end with the report of the Public Protector. The Public
Protector observed quite correctly in her report that the Board ‗appears to have
blindly sprung to Motsoeneng‘s defence‘ and ‗at times . . . appeared more defensive
on his behalf‘ than Mr Motsoeneng himself. In earlier correspondence with Ms
Tshabalala, the Public Protector observed:
‗. . . unlike the outgoing Board, Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the GCEO, you appear to deny
any governance failure on the part of the erstwhile Board. Even more concerning, is how the
Board whose role is to guide the SABC‘s ethical conduct reacts to my intended findings
regarding Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng‘s dishonesty‘.
We know how the Board reacted to the Public Protector‘s findings: In the face of her
serious findings of dishonesty, abuse of power and maladministration against Mr
Motsoeneng, the SABC purported to recommend him for appointment as the
permanent COO. And the Minister, on the strength of that recommendation,
purported to appoint him.

[56] On the undisputed evidence it would appear that the Minister was able to
apply her mind to the Mchunu Report, the recommendation of the Board and the
transcript of Mr Motsoeneng‘s interview before acting on the recommendation of the

SABC Board. She had to then weigh that against the 150 page Public Protector
Report, which she already had in her possession. She did all of that within a single
day.  As this court has previously pointed out: ‗Promptitude by public functionaries is
ordinarily meritorious, but not where that is at the cost of neglecting the task.‘37
Moreover, the Minister seems to have restricted herself to a consideration of only
one of the several negative findings against Mr Motsoeneng, namely, the allegation
of dishonesty concerning his matric qualification. She does not state that she
considered the findings of abuse of power, waste of public money, purging of senior
staff and the disregard for principles of good corporate governance, all of which were
plainly relevant to her decision. She also says nothing about the failure of the Board
to advertise the post, consider other candidates or hold interviews before
recommending Mr Motsoeneng for appointment in circumstances where, had she
properly considered the Public Protector‘s Report, she would have known that the
Public Protector had found that he had ‗been allowed by successive Boards to
operate above the law‘. Armed with that knowledge, she ought to have considered
that greater vigilance was required of her in acting on the recommendation of the
Board. Thus, despite the appellants‘ protestations to the contrary, the permanent
appointment of Mr Motsoeneng is inconsistent with the Public Protector‘s findings
and remedial action and is inconsistent with the principles of co-operative
governance.

[57] The principal attack on the suspension order on behalf of both the Minister
and the SABC was that such an order had the effect of offending the separation of
powers doctrine. In that regard reliance was placed on National Treasury & others v
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance & others [2012] ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
(OUTA), para 71 in which the Constitutional Court stated:
‘71.
The high court does not mention a word about the submission of the
government applicants on separations of powers. As a result we do not have the benefit of
its attitude to the submissions. It is equally unclear whether the high court had considered
the submissions at all. Before granting interdictory relief pending a review a court must, in
the absence of mala fides, fraud or corruption, examine carefully whether its order will
trespass upon the terrain of another arm of government in a manner inconsistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers. That would ordinarily be so, if, as in the present case, a

37 Public Protector v Mail & Guardian (above) para 3.

state functionary is restrained from exercising statutory or constitutionally authorised powers.
In that event, a court should caution itself not to stall the exercise unless a compelling case
has been made out for a temporary interdict. Even so, it should be done only in the clearest
of cases. This is so because in the ordinary course valid law must be given effect to or
implemented, except when the resultant harm and balance of convenience warrant
otherwise.‘

[58] It was submitted that the power to remove the COO was one vested in the
President and that it was not competent for a court to usurp that function. We were
referred to s 15 of the BA which deals with the removal from office of a ‗member‘. In
s 1 of the BA, a ‗member‘ is defined to include executive members of the SABC
Board, which in turn includes the COO, in terms of s 12(b).
Section 15(1) of the BA provides:
‗(1)
The appointing body –
(a) may remove a member from office on account of misconduct or inability to perform
his or her duties efficiently after due inquiry and upon recommendation by the Board;
or
(b) must remove a member from office after a finding to that effect by a committee of the
National Assembly and the adoption by the National Assembly of a resolution calling
for that member‘s removal from office in terms of section of 15A.‘
The appointing body in terms of s 1 read with s 13 of the BA is the President acting
on the advice of the National Assembly. The submission on behalf of the Minister
and the SABC was that it was for the President to suspend or remove permanently
and not for a court to direct a suspension.

[59] In the present case the Minister and the SABC both erred in their approach to
the task that confronted them. In this regard it is important to emphasise that the
Constitution requires that public power vested in the Executive and other
functionaries be exercised in an objectively rational manner.38 The exercise of public
power must therefore comply with the Constitution, which is the supreme law, and
the principle of legality, which is part of that law. The principle of legality, which is an
incident of the rule of law, is one of the constitutional controls through which the
exercise of public power is regulated by the Constitution. It entails that both the

38 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & another: In re ex parte President of the
Republic of South Africa & others [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 89.

Legislature and the Executive are constrained by the principle that they may exercise
no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law. In this
sense the Constitution entrenches the principle of legality and provides the
foundation for the control of public power.39 Thus, although the common law remains
relevant to this process,40 the nature and characterisation of the public power
exercised, namely, whether executive or administrative, matters less now than it did
under the common law, pre-Constitution.41 As Nugent JA pointed out in Minister of
Home Affairs & others v Scalabrini Centre & others [2013] ZASCA 134; 2013 (6) SA
421 (SCA), para 61:
‗Professor Hoexter has observed that the doctrine [of legality] is in the process of
evolution, and will continue to evolve —
―quite possibly to the extent that it eventually encompasses all the grounds of review
associated with regular administrative law. Meanwhile, the principle fairly easily covers all
the grounds ordinarily associated with authority, jurisdiction and abuse of discretion: . . .
Here at least, the principle of legality is a mirror image of administrative law. It is
administrative law under another name.‖‘ (Footnote omitted.)
As this court has previously explained:
‗To ensure a functional, accountable constitutional democracy, the drafters of our
Constitution placed limits on the exercise of power. Institutions and office bearers must work
within the law and must be accountable. Put simply, ours is a government of laws and not of
men or women.‘42

[60] The question, whether the Minister and the SABC have to give effect to
remedial action by the Public Protector is one eminently for a court to decide. In any
event, according to the Public Protector, the Executive through Minister Carrim had
undertaken in Parliament to give effect to the remedial action taken by her. In that
regard the Portfolio Committee on Communications held a meeting on 18 February
2014, with the purpose of allowing the Minister and Deputy Minister of
Communications to present a progress report on the commitments made to the

39 See Affordable Medicines Trust & others v Minister of Health & others [2005] ZACC 3; 2006 (3) SA
247 (CC) para 49; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council & others [1998] ZASCA 14; 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58.
40 See MEC for Environmental Affairs and Development Planning v Clairison’s CC [2013] ZASCA 82;
2013 (6) SA 235 (SCA) para 19.
41 Democratic Alliance & others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions & others [2012]
ZASCA 15; 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para 29.
42 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa & others [2011] ZASCA 241; 2012
(1) SA 417 (SCA) para 66.

Portfolio Committee covering the period November 2013 to January 2014.  The
Parliamentary Monitoring Group‘s report of this meeting records the then Minister
Carrim as suggesting that:
‗. . . if it was legally tenable:
- he would commit to giving a report, by end March [2014], or at least prior to the election
- if necessary, there could be teleconferences arranged to discuss the matter
- whatever the [Department of Communication] and Ministry must legally do, they would
- an exit report would be written telling the incoming executive to proceed with whatever was
outstanding‘. (Our emphasis.)
What is more, is that on 4 July 2014, the new Minister, Ms Faith Muthambi, appeared
before a joint sitting of the Portfolio Committees on Communications, and on
Telecommunications and Postal Services, and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group‘s
report of this meeting records that:
‗Minister Muthambi said the SABC matters were not new, and she was paying urgent
attention to ensuring that SABC served the interests of the nation as a whole. SABC would
submit a report to her, on issues raised by the Public Protector, on 28 July 2014. She was
equally upset with some of the matters at SABC and this was in the public domain. SABC
must comply with the Public Protector’s recommendations. Human resource issues raised by
the Public Protector were also being addressed.‘ (Our emphasis.)
The SABC and the Minister appear to have vacillated between resisting the Public
Protector‘s remedial action and undertaking to comply therewith.  Unlike in OUTA,
here the Minister and the SABC were afforded every opportunity to discharge their
constitutional duty. In fact, they were directed to do so by the Public Protector. They
declined to do so because, as we have shown, they misconceived the import of the
Public Protector‘s powers and acted irrationally in their response to it. This is thus a
case of both the SABC and the Minister failing to understand the effect of the Public
Protector‘s remedial action as well as failing in their obligation to the SABC and the
country at large. That is a matter pre-eminently for a court.

[61] In light of the Public Protector‘s findings and the events subsequent to her
report, the High Court was rightly concerned that Mr Motsoeneng should not
continue to be in office with serious allegations concerning maladministration and the
integrity of the SABC hanging over him. The High Court approached the enquiry
thus:

‗95.
The allegations of misconduct against Motsoeneng are serious. He is the
COO of the SABC. He is an executive member of the Board. He has virtually unlimited
authority over his subordinates and access to all the documentation in relation to the
charges of misconduct that will be preferred against him. Given the nature of the allegations
and the persons involved, referred to in the report, Motsoeneng‘s fellow Board members and
his subordinates would have to be interviewed, and documents produced.
96.
What this shows is that unless he is suspended, Motsoeneng poses a real risk not
only to the integrity of the investigation concerning the allegations of his misconduct, but to
the disciplinary enquiry itself. It is untenable that he should remain in office while disciplinary
proceedings are brought against him.
97.
In these circumstances, and in the light of the allegations of abuse of power in the
Report, in my opinion there can be no doubt that it is just and equitable that Motsoeneng
should be suspended, pending finalisation of disciplinary proceedings to be brought against
him. Good administration of the SABC, and openness and accountability, demand his
suspension.‘
The approach of the High Court cannot be faulted.

[62] In addition, in arriving at its conclusion that a suspension was appropriate, the
high court exercised a narrow discretion. The test for interference in a discretion of
that sort is that formulated in Ex parte Neethling & others 1951 (4) SA 331 (A) at
335C-F. Here it has not been shown that Schippers J exercised his discretion
capriciously or upon a wrong principle or upon any other ground justifying
interference. See also Ferris & another v Firstrand Bank Ltd [2013] ZACC 46; 2014
(3) SA 39 (CC) para 28.

[63] Further, it bears noting that a judicial decision is only appealable if it has the
following three attributes: first, it must be final in effect and not susceptible of
alteration by the court of first instance; second, it must be definitive of the rights of
the parties; and third, it must have the effect of disposing of at least a substantial
portion of the relief claimed (see Zweni v Minister of Law and Order [1992] ZASCA
197; 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) at 532I - 533B, cited with approval by the Constitutional
Court in International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty)
Ltd [2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC) para 49). The suspension of Mr
Motsoeneng pending finalisation of his disciplinary proceedings, appears to have
neither the second nor third of the required attributes. That would be enough to

disqualify it as an appealable decision, because the first attribute – assuming it to be
present – cannot on its own confer appealability. Mr Motsoeneng has been
suspended pending finalisation of his disciplinary proceedings. That does not, one
would imagine, in and of itself dispose of even a portion of the relief claimed. It is
thus also distinctly questionable at this stage whether the order suspending Mr
Motsoeneng will have any final effect.43 The facts of this case thus distinguish it from
those dealt with by the Constitutional Court in OUTA.

[64] As the excerpts from the affidavits of both the Minister and Ms Tshabalala
show, they express themselves in strong language. Both appear to have already
exonerated Mr Motsoeneng of any wrongdoing. For it seems to be inconsistent to
promote a person to one of the most senior positions at the public broadcaster if
there had been any genuine intention of instituting disciplinary proceedings against
him. Rationally, implicit in his promotion has to be a rejection of the rather damning
findings by the Public Protector. Not only does all of that render their assertion that
they were still intent on engaging with the Public Protector contrived and
disingenuous, but it strongly dispels the notion that they can still bring an open and
impartial mind to bear on the matter. The appeal against the suspension order must
therefore also fail.

[65] One further aspect requires further brief consideration. As set out earlier in
this judgment, relief was sought in two parts. Schippers J rightly held that on a
proper construction of the relief sought in Part A of the notice of motion, namely that
disciplinary proceedings be instituted, the claim was one for final relief. The
suspension order, as outlined above, is an interim order pending the outcome of
review proceedings. We were informed by counsel on behalf of all the parties that
the contemplated review application has been allocated a preferential date and will
be heard during the first week of October 2015.

[66] At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, we were occupied with some
debate as to whether it was desirable that this court consider the appeal in respect of

43 See, inter alia, African Wanderers Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Wanderers Football Club 1977 (2) SA
38 (A) 47C–D; Cronshaw & another v Fidelity Guards Holdings Pty Ltd [1996] ZASCA 38; 1996 (3) SA
686 (A); and International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd para 49,
where the above two cases are cited with approval.

Part A at this stage given that: (a) the proceedings in the High Court are un-
terminated inasmuch as Part B has yet to be determined by the High Court; and (b)
entertaining the appeal now would result in a proliferation of piecemeal hearings and
appeals. See Walhaus & others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg & another
1959 (3) SA 113 (A) at 119H-120C. In Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Searle
NO [1999] ZASCA 3; 1999 (3) SA 296 (SCA) at 301A-C, the following was stated:
‗As previous decisions of this Court indicate, there are still sound grounds for a basic
approach which avoids the piecemeal appellate disposal of the issues in litigation. It is
unnecessarily expensive and generally it is desirable, for obvious reasons, that such issues
be resolved by the same Court and at one and the same time.‘

[67] In Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Mobile Telephone
Networks (Pty) Ltd & another [2009] ZASCA 130; 2010 (3) SA 382 (SCA), this court
said the following (paras 89 and 90):
‘89.
Before concluding we are constrained to make the comments that follow.
Piecemeal litigation is not to be encouraged. Sometimes it is desirable to have a single issue
decided separately, either by way of a stated case or otherwise. If a decision on a discrete
issue disposes of a major part of a case, or will in some way lead to expedition, it might well
be desirable to have that issue decided first.
90.
This court has warned that in many cases, once properly considered, issues initially
thought to be discrete are found to be inextricably linked. And even where the issues are
discrete, the expeditious disposal of the litigation is often best served by ventilating all the
issues at one hearing. A trial court must be satisfied that it is convenient and proper to try an
issue separately.‘ (Footnotes omitted.)

[68] The course followed by the litigants and the court below will no doubt result in
protracted and cross-cutting litigation. So, for example, this judgment might be
appealed to the Constitutional Court. The review application, if decided in favour of
the DA, might result in Mr Motsoeneng no longer holding office, but that judgment
might also be appealed, first to this court and then to the Constitutional Court. It
might well have been in the interest of justice for the review application to have been
heard expeditiously with that decision being determinative, either at High Court level
or, ultimately, one of the appellate courts. The manner in which the matter was dealt
with will lead to protraction and all the while the institution will have to endure the
uncertainty that will follow.

[69] We appreciate that we were called upon to adjudicate only that part of the
relief sought in part A of the notice of motion. However, part A is not a hermetically
sealed enquiry and because of the manner in which the litigation was conducted we
were obliged to range beyond it to a consideration of some matters upon which the
High Court is yet to finally pronounce. In determining whether a suspension order
was apt, it was necessary for us to consider, at least on a prima facie basis, as was
done by the court below, matters pertaining to part B of the notice of motion. For, it
must be accepted that the suspension order could only issue if there were prospects
of success in relation to part B. That is not to suggest that we have made any final
decisions in relation to the review application nor have we pre-empted any decision
that the High Court might in due course be called upon to make, including those that
relate to relevant Ministerial decisions and their proper classification.44

[70] It follows for all of the aforesaid reasons that the appeal must fail.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs including the costs attendant upon
the employment of two counsel.

______________________
M S Navsa
Judge of Appeal

_____________________
V M Ponnan
Judge of Appeal

44 See in this regard Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau & others [2014] ZACC 18;
2014 (5) SA 69 (CC).

Appearances:

For First Appellant:

N H Maenetje SC (with him H Rajah)

Instructed by:

Mchunu Attorneys, Cape Town

Bokwa Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Second Appellant:
V Maleka SC (with him K Pillay)

Instructed by:

State Attorney, Cape Town

State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For Third Appellant:
N M Arendse SC (with him S Fergus)

Instructed by:

Majavu Inc, Johannesburg

Rampai Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For First Respondent:
A Katz SC (with him N Mayosi and M Bishop)

Instructed by:

Minde Schapiro & Smith, Cape Town

Symington & de Kok, Bloemfontein

For Seventh Respondent:
G Marcus SC (with him E Labuschagne SC and N Rajab-
Budlender)

Instructed by:

Adams & Adams, Pretoria

Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Amicus Curiae:
C Steinberg (with her L Kelly) (Heads of argument prepared by
W Trengove SC and C Steinberg and L Kelly)

Instructed by:

Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, Johannesburg

Matsepes Inc, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

8 October 2015

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form part of
the judgment.

SABC v DA (393/2015) [2015] ZASCA 156

MEDIA STATEMENT

Today, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed the appeal by the South African Broadcasting
Corporation SOC Ltd (SABC), the Minister of Communications (the Minister) and Mr Hlaudi
Motsoeneng (the appellants) against Part A of an order granted by the Western Cape Division of the
High Court, Cape Town.  In the result, the court below‟s order was confirmed, in terms of which the
SABC was directed to institute disciplinary proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng and he was
suspended from his position as Chief Operations Officer (COO) of the SABC at least until the
finalisation of such disciplinary proceedings.

The primary issues before the SCA were whether the court below was correct, firstly, in directing the
SABC to institute disciplinary proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng; and secondly, in ordering that Mr
Motsoeneng be suspended pending finalisation of such proceedings.  However, in deciding these
issues, the SCA considered the powers and position of the Public Protector, as a report authored by
her concerning the management of the SABC formed the basis for the original application by the first
respondent, the Democratic Alliance (DA).

The facts of the case are as follows.  In February 2014, the Public Protector released a report
detailing „pathological corporate governance deficiencies at the SABC‟, and singled out Mr
Motsoeneng (the Acting COO at the time) for particularly scathing criticism.  Amongst other things,
the Public Protector had found that: his appointment as Acting COO was irregular; his salary
progression from R1,5 million to R2,4 million in one fiscal year was irregular; and he had fraudulently
misrepresented to the SABC that he had a matric qualification.  Consequently, the Public Protector
directed the SABC and Minister to implement various remedial steps, including the institution of

disciplinary proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng.  The Public Protector also required them to submit
implementation plans.

On 7 July 2014, instead of implementing the Public Protector‟s remedial action and without notice to
her, the appellants permanently appointed Mr Motsoeneng as COO.  The justification for ignoring the
Public Protector‟s remedial action was that a firm of attorneys, Mchunu Attorneys, had been
appointed to investigate the veracity of the findings contained in her report, and a report prepared by
them had apparently exonerated Mr Motsoeneng.  Aggrieved, the DA approached the court below for
an order in two parts.  Part A was an urgent application for inter alia the suspension of Mr
Motsoeneng and the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.  Part B was for inter alia the
setting aside of his appointment.  The court below granted the order in Part A, which formed the
subject of the appeal.  Part B remains to be finalised by the Western Cape Division of the High Court.

Regarding the first issue, the SCA confirmed the finding of the court below that the SABC must
institute disciplinary proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng.  In arriving at this conclusion, however, the
SCA rejected the reasoning of the court below, which had concluded that the directions of the Public
Protector were not „binding and enforceable‟ in the same way as a court order.  The SCA noted that a
court order is an „inaccurate comparator and the phrase “binding and enforceable” is terminologically
inapt and in this context conduces to confusion‟.  The SCA considered in depth the place of the Public
Protector in our constitutional framework, and concluded as follows:
„. . . the office of the Public Protector, like all Chapter Nine institutions, is a venerable one. Our
constitutional compact demands that remedial action taken by the Public Protector should not be ignored. State
institutions are obliged to heed the principles of co-operative governance as prescribed by s 41 of the
Constitution. Any affected person or institution aggrieved by a finding, decision or action taken by the Public
Protector might, in appropriate circumstances, challenge that by way of a review application. Absent a review
application, however, such person is not entitled to simply ignore the findings, decision or remedial action taken
by the Public Protector. Moreover, an individual or body affected by any finding, decision or remedial action
taken by the Public Protector is not entitled to embark on a parallel investigation process to that of the Public
Protector, and adopt the position that the outcome of that parallel process trumps the findings, decision or
remedial action taken by the Public Protector. . . Before us, all the parties were agreed that a useful metaphor for
the Public Protector was that of a watchdog. As is evident from what is set out above, this watchdog should not
be muzzled.‟

Regarding the second issue, the court below had concluded that in light of Mr Motsoeneng‟s position
at the SABC and the findings made against him by the Public Protector, there was a real risk that the
integrity of the disciplinary process against him might be undermined if he was not suspended.  The
SCA upheld this conclusion, and so also confirmed the suspension order.

Accordingly, the SCA dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the court below and in the
process clarified the powers of the Public Protector.
--- ends ---