THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 457/09

MANONG AND ASSOCIATES (PTY) LTD

Appellant

and

CITY OF CAPE TOWN

First Respondent

FUTUREGROWTH PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT
Second Respondent
COMPANY (PTY) LTD

______________________________________________________________

Neutral citation:
Manong v City of Cape Town (457/09) [2010] ZASCA 169
1 December 2010)

CORAM:

Navsa, Cloete, Van Heerden and Mhlantla JJA and

Ebrahim AJA

HEARD:

15 November 2010
DELIVERED:
1 December 2010

SUMMARY: Unfounded complaints in Equality Court ─  formulation of
complaints not in accordance with the manner envisaged by the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000 ─ costs in matters concerning the assertion of constitutional rights
─ manner in which litigation conducted justifying costs order against
complainant ─ concerns expressed about irrelevant and outrageous
statements by complainant during course of enquiry.

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from:
Western Cape Equality Court (Cape Town) (Moosa J
sitting as court of first instance).
1.
The appellant’s appeals in respect of its exclusion from the CBD
project and the upholding by the court below of the second respondent’s plea
of misjoinder in relation to the Setsing project are dismissed with costs,
including the costs of two counsel.

2.
The cross-appeal by the first respondent in respect of the broader
Khayelitsha enquiry is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
3.
The cross-appeals by the first and second respondents, in relation to
the costs order in both cases, are upheld with costs, including the costs of two
counsel.
4.
The finding of the court below set out in para 36 and the costs order
contained in para 64 of the judgment dated 12 November 2008 are set aside
and substituted as follows:
‘1.
The applicant’s complaint that it was discriminated against in general by the first
respondent and its predecessor in the allocation of contracts in Khayelitsha is dismissed with
costs, including the costs of two counsel and such costs are to include the costs reserved on
18 August 2007.
2.
The applicant is ordered to pay the first and second respondents’ costs in relation to
the complaint concerning its exclusion from the CBD project, including the costs of two
counsel and such costs are to include the costs reserved on 18 August 2007, which also
encompass the second respondent’s costs in relation to the Setsing project.’
5.
The appellant is ordered to pay the respondents’ wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement of the appeal on 20 August 2010.
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

NAVSA and MHLANTLA JJA (CLOETE, VAN HEERDEN JJA and EBRAHIM
AJA concurring)

[1] This case implicates the right to equality in the procurement of State
related (municipal) contracts. The Constitution guarantees equality before the

law and prohibits unfair discrimination by the State and/or individuals directly
or indirectly on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. Section 9(3) of the
Constitution obliges the State to enact national legislation to prevent or
prohibit unfair discrimination. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Act), which came into operation on 16
June 2003, is an important statute to that effect. Its purpose is to prevent or
prohibit unfair discrimination and to promote equality.

[2] The promotion of equality is a noble goal and as we transform our
society and meet the myriad challenges associated with change we should
always act on a principled basis. Where there are legitimate grievances based
on racial exclusion, we should deal with them promptly and firmly. Racism
was the scourge of our nation and we should, where it is shown to exist, resist
it strenuously and take all the necessary steps to eliminate it from our midst.
Courts, when faced with legitimate complaints of racial exclusion should not
hesitate to show their disapproval by means of appropriate orders. On the
other hand, given South Africa’s peculiar history, racism is such a serious
charge that care should be taken to ensure that such a complaint is well-
founded. A contrived charge is equally deserving of censure. In this case we
have to decide on which side of the dividing line the appellant’s complaint in
the Equality Court falls. The evidence and issues in this case demonstrate the
complex challenges facing the State in its management and promotion of
fundamental change in society.

[3] The procurement of State-related contracts for the acquisition of
professional or other services, whether by way of tender or otherwise, has
become a hotly contested field with courts frequently being the battleground.
Litigation has included a range of legal issues, including but not limited to
charges by unsuccessful service-providers of being victims of racial
discrimination or bias. The question in the present appeal is whether the
complaint of racism brought by the appellant in the Equality Court (Cape
Town) in relation to the procurement of municipal contracts was warranted.

The appeal is before us with the leave of that court. The two judgments of the
court below which are the subject of the present appeal and cross-appeal are
reported as Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others
2008 (2) SA 601 (C) and Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd v City Manager,
City of Cape Town, & others 2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC). The first judgment deals
with practice directions and preliminary points.

[4] The appellant, Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd, describes itself as a
national
company
specialising
in
civil,
structural
and
development
engineering. The engineering practice progressed from initially operating only
in Cape Town as a one person practice, to operating as a close corporation,
and ultimately expanding its presence as a national company to Port
Elizabeth, Johannesburg, East London and Mthatha. Notwithstanding its
national footprint the company has a fairly limited professional staff
complement comprising four full time directors who are qualified engineers,
four professional associates and eleven professional technical staff.

[5] The driving force behind the appellant is Mr Mongezi Stanley Manong
(Manong), who is its managing director and a professional engineer. The
complaint in the court below leading up to the present appeals is the
culmination of a deep sense of injustice on the part of Manong, which appears
to have developed over many years based on his perception of treatment
meted out to him by officialdom. Unless the context otherwise requires, we
shall refer to the engineering practice headed by Manong in its various forms
over the years as ‘the company’.

[6] The company’s complaint as initially formulated in its founding affidavit
was that it was discriminated against by the first respondent, the City of Cape
Town (CCT), and its predecessor, the City of Tygerberg (COT), by being
generally excluded from municipal contracts in relation to Khayelitsha and
specifically in relation to a proposed retail development in the Central
Business District (CBD) in that township. The company alleged that the CCT
and the COT implemented policies and practices designed to exclude and
limit its access to municipal projects. Interestingly, even though the COT and

the CCT were implicated in relation to the CBD complaint no relief was
claimed against the CCT. As regards the CBD, the company alleged that the
second respondent, Futuregrowth Property Development Company (Pty) Ltd
(FG) discriminated against it by excluding it from that development. The
company also complained that FG had excluded it from the ‘Setsing project’ in
the Free State and had again discriminated against it by doing so. Manong’s
founding affidavit comprised 92 paragraphs extending to 30 pages.  The
characterisation of the complaint, outlined earlier in this paragraph, is our best
attempt at encapsulating what is set out by Manong in rather convoluted form.
Manong’s method of formulating a complaint is criticised later in this
judgment.

[7] In the replying affidavit, after being invited by the respondents to state
the basis of the company’s complaint more precisely, Manong relied on the
provisions of ss 7(c) and (e) of the Act, which read as follows:
‘Prohibition of unfair discrimination on ground of race
Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of
race, including-
(a)
. . .
(b)
. . .
(c)
the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice that
appears to be legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining exclusive control by a
particular race group;
(d)
. . .
(e)
the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual
opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably
accommodate the needs of such persons.’

[8] The factual basis for the complaint was set out by Manong.1 He blamed
the company’s exclusion from opportunities in Khayelitsha on Mr Hendrik
Barnard, employed by CCT as a civil engineering technologist. For the greater
part of his career with the COT and CCT, Barnard was involved with the
allocation and administration of municipal contracts in Khayelitsha. According
to Manong, the antagonism between Barnard and the company arose as a
result of Barnard’s contrived complaint concerning the quality of services
provided by the company to COT in relation to a contract involving the
installation of a boardwalk leading to a platform with a sea view at a site on
Lookout Hill in Khayelitsha. Barnard was accused of being racist and of
conspiring with others to ensure that only white-controlled institutions received
municipal work.

[9] As the enquiry progressed in the court below, the company’s case
crystallised as follows: Barnard, driven by racism, fabricated and/or
exaggerated the complaint referred to in the preceding paragraph, and then,
using it as a reason, vowed never again to allocate any municipal work in
Khayelitsha to the company. Barnard conspired with other like-minded
officials of the COT and CCT to achieve that end. Accordingly, in respect of
the CBD project, Barnard conspired with other CCT officials and with
employees of FG to exclude the company. This was achieved through
privatising the CBD project so as to have it developed on a turnkey ‘design,
develop and deliver’ basis.2 This enabled the CCT to shift the blame for the

1In his replying affidavit under the heading ‘CAUSE OF ACTION’, inter alia, the following
appears:
’40.
Advocate Jamie SC representing the first and third respondents during the directions
hearing of 06 March 2007 issued a practice note directing the complainant to explain some
issues that would clarify its cause of action against the first respondent. The complainant sets
out its reply to the queries raised by the first respondent.
40.1
The complainant in its complaint of unfair discrimination against the first respondent
relies on its exclusion from the procurement process in Khayelitsha on direct discrimination
against the complainant as witnessed by the behaviour of Barnard in the Lookout Hill project;
40.2
On the Khayelitsha CBD project the complainant relies on both on an act and
omission on the part of the first respondent as fully described under the preliminary issues of
this affidavit;
40.3
The policy of the first respondent of appointing consultants “HCB1” found on page
166 of the record is deemed to be imposing conditions which are unfairly discriminating to the
complainant.’
2 A turnkey development is one where for an agreed sum the contractor appointed undertakes
to provide a fully operational facility on an agreed date. The contractor is accordingly at risk
should the deadline not be met or should there be any defects in the design or construction.

company’s exclusion to FG. In short, the company’s case was that the CCT,
in order to exclude him from the CBD contract, decided to develop the CBD
project on a turnkey basis enabling the principal contractor to appoint the
consulting engineers and others without having to comply with State
procurement requirements and that this was done solely to exclude the
company.

[10] In the court below the company sought an order against the CCT in
terms of which the latter would be prohibited from excluding the company
from procurement opportunities in Khayelitsha and would be obliged to make
such opportunities available to it. The company also sought an order in terms
of which the CCT would be required to compensate it for financial losses
sustained as a result of being ‘deliberately marginalised . . . in Khayelitsha’.
Against FG, the company sought compensation in the sum of R1.74 m which
it alleged was the financial loss it suffered as a result of being unfairly
excluded from the CBD project. Additionally, it sought compensation from FG
in the sum of R240 000 which it claimed represented the loss it suffered as a
result of cancellation by FG of a contract to be a consultant on the ‘Setsing
Project’ in the Free State. It is difficult to discern the basis on which this latter
claim falls within the jurisdiction of the Equality Court. Later, when we set out
the background in greater detail and evaluate the evidence, its lack of
relevance will become clear.

[11] Although stating early on in the judgment that a complainant bears the
onus to establish discrimination on the basis of race, the court below
(Moosa J sitting with two assessors), in evaluating the evidence presented
during the enquiry, at the outset, adopted the wrong approach. It held that the
CCT was ‘burdened with the onus of showing on a balance of probabilities
that the discrimination did not take place or that the impugned conduct was
not based on race or that the discrimination was fair’. The court below
considered that the thrust of the CCT’s case was that the discrimination did
not take place. It was on that basis that the evidence was evaluated. As we
will show later, this inverts the approach that should be followed when a case
of discrimination is adjudicated.

[12] In assessing the evidence the court below took the view that the CCT’s
complaint in relation to the quality of work on the first phase of the Lookout Hill
project had never been formally communicated to the company and that it had
in any event been shown that such issues that had arisen had been resolved
at a meeting in February 2002. The court below stated that Barnard gave no
reason for not appointing the company to the second phase of the Lookout
Hill project. Compounding the erroneous approach referred to in the
preceding paragraph the court below held it against the CCT that it had failed
to conduct a formal performance evaluation on the work done by the company
on the first phase of the Lookout Hill project. A formal performance evaluation
is required by the procurement policy adopted by the CCT pursuant to the
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 ─ but that only
applied from September 2003, which was after the first phase of the Lookout
Hill project had been completed.3 The court below took into account that the
company received no further work in Khayelitsha and concluded as follows:
‘From the objective facts the only reasonable inference we can draw is that the complainant
was excluded from the second phase of the Lookout Hill project on the basis of race and such
exclusion continued on subsequent appointments.’

[13] Having arrived at the conclusion referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the court below nevertheless proceeded to consider affirmative
action measures adopted by the CCT and its predecessor, the COT, in
relation to Cape Town in general and to Khayelitsha in particular. It had
regard to targets that were set and the database of consultants which it is
common cause had shortcomings. The court below took into account the
reappointments of consultants other than the company on Khayelitsha
projects within particular timeframes and the CCT justification, namely, that
they had been reappointed because they had the exposure to the first phase
of particular developments or that they had special expertise and skills that

3 The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 is legislation contemplated by
s 217(3) of the Constitution which provides that national legislation must prescribe a
procurement policy that allows for categories of preference in the allocation of contracts and
the protection or advancement of persons previously disadvantaged.

were required on the second phase. This, according to the CCT, was done to
retain expertise and to ensure continuity.

[14] The court below concluded that such policies and practices as were
resorted to by the CCT in the allocation of municipal contracts, although
appearing to be legitimate on the face of it, perpetuated unfair discrimination
on the basis of race and had the effect of maintaining exclusive control of
such professional work in the hands of white professional consultants (see
para 30 of the judgment of the court below). In effect, the court below held
that the company’s complaint of being racially discriminated against generally,
in respect of the allocation of work in Khayelitsha, was justified in respect of
ss 7(c) and (e) of the Act.

[15] In respect of the company’s exclusion in relation to the CBD
development, the court below had regard to its progression from inception to
completion. It concluded that although the processes followed by the CCT in
initiating and promoting the development were suspect, from an administrative
law point of view, the conspiracy relied on by Manong referred to in paras 8
and 9 above was not proved and consequently held that the complaint in
terms of either of the sections of the Act referred to above could not be
upheld.

[16] The effect of the court’s findings was that the quantum of the
compensation the company sought against the CCT in relation to its exclusion
generally from municipal projects in Khayelitsha based on the CCT’s racism
stood over for later adjudication.

[17] In the first judgment referred to in para 3 above, the court below held
that FG had no connection to or involvement in the Setsing project and that
there had been a misjoinder. The court had found that the company had made
no attempt to join the entities to which the Setsing project was related, namely
Futuregrowth Asset Management (Pty) Ltd and Community Property
Company (Pty) Ltd.  The costs relating to that dispute was held over for ‘later
determination’.

[18] After disposing of the issues set out above, the court below dealt with
the question of costs. It took the view that an equality court should be careful
to avoid deterring bona fide litigants from asserting constitutional rights to
equality by making costs orders against unsuccessful parties and
consequently made no order as to costs. That costs order appears to have
encompassed the costs referred to at the end of the preceding paragraph.

[19] The company appeals against the finding of the court below in respect
of its exclusion from the CBD project. It also appeals against the finding of
misjoinder as set out in para 17 above. The CCT cross-appeals against the
conclusion by the court below that it had discriminated against the company
on the basis of race in the allocation of civil engineering contracts for the area
of Khayelitsha generally. Furthermore, it appeals against the finding that its
practices and policies had been designed to maintain exclusive control by
white professional consultants. The CCT and FG appeal against the costs
order in the court below, submitting that although courts should be careful not
to mulct parties who bona fide seek to assert constitutional rights, this case
was an abuse and was brought solely to promote the company’s commercial
interests. A further issue that we will deal with in due course is the costs of the
postponement of the appeal on 20 August 2010, when senior counsel
representing the company suddenly took ill and had to be hospitalised.

[20] Thankfully, the following questions are no longer in issue:
(a)
whether entities such as the company can be discriminated against on
the ground of race;
(b)
whether a Trust established by the CCT and the company which it
controlled are municipal entities and as such are organs of state;
(c)
whether the Act has retrospective effect.
In relation to the last question the parties were agreed that the historical
enquiry into racism was relevant only to the extent that it could be shown to
have existed in the first place and to have continued to periods after the
commencement of the Act.

[21] The assessment by the court below of the evidence adduced was terse
and it made no credibility findings. The proceedings in the court below
endured over a period of more than three years. The record extended over 34
volumes comprising more than 3000 pages. A considerable part of the record
contained irrelevant material, an aspect to which we will revert later in this
judgment. The court below ought to have conducted a more thorough,
comprehensive and accurate evaluation of the evidence. That exercise is one
we now embark on. We will also determine whether the reasoning and the
conclusions reached by the court below are correct.

[22] At the outset it is necessary to record that when Manong testified, a
persistent theme was that both the CCT and the COT were reluctant to
appoint him over a period spanning almost ten years. Throughout his
testimony he sought to emphasise that officials partial to the apartheid regime
and presently in the employ of the CCT were intent on preserving the privilege
of white persons and institutions, consequently denying him the opportunity of
procuring municipal contracts. We interpose to state that Manong produced
irrelevant documentation and often made speeches about the injustices of the
past and on occasion made outrageous statements, thereby detracting from a
proper enquiry and protracting the proceedings. When it was put to Manong
under cross-examination that his allegations about racial discrimination were
unsustainable because the parties who were appointed to a particular project
instead of the company were black persons or entities controlled by black
persons, he invariably responded by stating that he was principally concerned
to promote the company’s interests.

[23] Another feature of Manong’s testimony is that he often relied on
allegations made by himself in letters sent to various individuals including the
Presidency and commercial and other entities as ‘proof’ of his complaint. He
also made references to newspaper articles. Furthermore, he repeatedly
resorted to other hearsay evidence which was never substantiated and was
plainly shown to be unreliable.

[24] Manong initially operated an engineering practice under the style of a
close corporation. It started business operations in 1995. The appellant was
formed in 2002 and took over the business formerly run by the close
corporation. When the close corporation started its operations, Manong was
the only professional employed by it. Almost immediately after the close
corporation started conducting business, it was appointed to a municipal
project by the CCT. The close corporation added to its staff as it procured
more projects. It is undisputed that from 1996 to 2002 the close corporation
and thereafter the company procured municipal work from the CCT in at least
15 projects, the total value of which is approximately R137 m. From 2003 until
the complaint in the court below the company procured ten more contracts to
do municipal work for the CCT. The total fees paid to it in respect of the latter
contracts amounted to R1 523 221.27. To sum up, between 1996 until the
beginning of 2005 the CCT awarded the company a total of 25 projects
outside of Khayelitsha. That equates to approximately 2.8 projects per annum.

[25] Before the COT was incorporated as part of the CCT in 2000 it alone
was responsible for awarding municipal contracts in Khayelitsha, which at that
time fell under its jurisdiction. It is common cause that Manong formally
introduced himself and the company to the COT for the first time in 1997, by
way of a letter in which he extolled the company’s skills, experience and
virtues. Between 1998 and 2000 the company was awarded two municipal
contracts to do work in Khayelitsha. Those projects are all relevant to
Manong’s perception of being unfairly discriminated against and they deserve
closer attention. They are as follows:
(a)
The Mew Way Sports project ─ the fee was R25 000.
(b)
The Lookout Hill project phase 1 ─ the total value of the project was
R1.5 m.

[26] In 1998, shortly after Manong had introduced himself to the COT,
Barnard himself thought it might be worthwhile to award a small project in
Khayelitsha to the company to see what it was capable of. That was how the
company became involved in the Mew Way project, which is described
hereafter. The COT appointed the company to this project jointly with Wouter

Engelbrecht, an established white-controlled engineering firm, which had vast
experience in sport facility development. Their brief was to prepare a master-
plan for the development of sport facilities in Khayelitsha. When he was cross-
examined about being given this opportunity Manong was dismissive,
suggesting that the Mew Way project was awarded to set him up for failure,
since the company had no prior experience in the development of sporting
facilities. He was especially disparaging concerning the total amount of fees
which had to be shared equally with Wouter Engelbrecht, namely R50 000.
He was adamant that there was no empowerment potential of any kind in this
project. We pause to state that counsel for the company rightly found
themselves unable to contend that the awarding of the project was designed
to ensure the company’s failure.

[27] Manong himself was contradictory when he contended that on other
projects where the company did not have the necessary experience, the CCT
or its predecessor ought to have considered pairing it with established entities
which had specialised skills and experience.

[28] From 2000 to 2005 only 12 new projects were awarded to consultants
in Khayelitsha by Barnard, acting with a colleague, Mr Tertius de Jager.
Barnard’s evidence that the clamour for work in Khayelitsha by a host of
consultants is far in excess of available projects was not contradicted. Of the
12 new projects, one was awarded in 2000 to the company, namely, the first
phase of the Lookout Hill project.

[29] As stated above, the first phase of the Lookout Hill project
contemplated a boardwalk leading to a platform with a sea view. According to
Manong, a key black employee of the COT, acting on his behalf, to his
knowledge falsely represented to Barnard that the company had done work
on the project on risk. Impressed by this, Barnard appointed the company as
an engineering consultant on the first phase of the Lookout Hill project.
Barnard was thus instrumental in awarding the Mew Way Project and the first
phase of Lookout Hill to the company.

[30] It is now necessary to look at the problems that arose in relation to the
first phase of the Lookout Hill project. It is common cause that the company
was responsible for the technical information to be provided to prospective
tenderers on the project. It had to ensure that the information was such that a
person or entity wishing to tender for the construction of the boardwalk could
draw up a bill of quantities so as to put a price to a tender. It is common cause
that the thickness of the slurry on which the boardwalk had to rest had not
been provided in the documents on which tenders had to be based.
Furthermore, it is common cause that no provision had been made for
handrail specifications which also would have caused a difficulty in drawing up
a bill of quantities. It is uncontested that the timber for the boardwalk that was
delivered to the site and accepted was not in accordance with specification.
What is instructive in this regard is the initial testimony of an important figure
in the company, namely, Mr Lyndon Davids, who at the outset accepted that
the company bore the overall and ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the
documents that went out to tender were complete. He initially accepted
responsibility on behalf of the company for the failures referred to above.
Later he retracted that evidence and both he and Manong attempted to shift
the blame to the landscape architect who had been employed on the project,
namely, Mr Eamonn O’Rourke. That exercise proved unconvincing,
particularly if one has regard to the written recommendation made by Barnard
to the COT, which reads as follows:
‘7.1
That Manong and Associates be appointed for the design-,tender- and construction
supervision stages of the first phase of the civil engineering works associated with the Look-
out Hill Tourism Facility in Khayelitsha.’

[31] It is clear from the relevant documentation, including the fees charged
by the company and the manner of calculating those fees, the testimony of
Barnard and the initial concessions by Davids that, as the consulting
engineers, the company bore the responsibility to ensure that the document
that went out to prospective tenderers was accurate and complete. It also
bore responsibility for ensuring that the timber and other materials received on
site were as specified in the relevant plans. It is difficult to make sense of
Manong’s grievance that he had not received a letter of appointment from

Barnard in respect of the first phase of Lookout Hill. It appears that he was
suggesting that this failure is somehow connected to the conspiracy to
undermine the company and to exclude it from further work in Khayelitsha.
Barnard testified that he could not recall whether a letter of appointment was
sent to the company but stated that if that had not been done it was purely an
oversight and that there was no sinister motive behind it. There is no other
evidence from which it can be inferred or concluded that Barnard was
untruthful on this aspect.

[32] From the minutes of site meetings and the evidence referred to in
paras 30 and 31 it is palpably clear that the concerns expressed by Barnard,
about the quality of the work done by the company in respect of the first
phase, were genuine and justified. They certainly were not contrived. The
conclusion of the court below that these concerns were never communicated
to the company is therefore incorrect.

[33] Manong complained that the company was excluded from the second
phase of the Lookout Hill project because of Barnard’s racism. It is necessary
to consider the facts. The boardwalk referred to above was to form part of a
tourist centre with a parking area. The work beyond the boardwalk comprised
the second phase of the project. Before decisions were finally made by the
architect, Dr Mlamli Magqwaka, about the composition of his project team on
the second phase of the Lookout Hill project, including the consulting
engineer, he happened to have an informal discussion with Barnard. The
latter mentioned the problems he had encountered with the company on the
first phase. Magqwaka said that he knew Manong, had worked with him in the
past and was comfortable with him. Barnard replied that it was up to
Magqwaka to make the final decision about whether to persevere with
Manong. Magqwaka’s recollection of that conversation was hazy. He did not
contradict Barnard, save that he stated that the nature of the opposition was
such that he thought it best not to endanger his own reputation and appointed
in the company’s stead an entity called Iliso Consulting, which was 67 per
cent black-owned. Barnard was not responsible for appointing the consulting
engineer on the second phase of the project.

[34] Given that the engineering consultant appointed to the second phase
of the Lookout Hill project was black-controlled, the suggestion that the motive
for excluding Manong was racist is ill-conceived. In any event, the final
decision to exclude the company appears to have been made by Magqwaka.
That the first phase was completed within budget was fortuitous and occurred
despite the company’s shortcomings. In a project with a greater value and
with greater dimensions the failures referred to above could have had
disastrous financial consequences.

[35] A further complaint by the company was that a number of consultants
had been reappointed to projects in Khayelitsha, thus denying other
consultants an opportunity of doing work in Khayelitsha. It will be recalled that
the court below thought that this was a significant factor indicating racial bias.

[36] In dealing with the multifarious and rambling nature of the company’s
complaint of discrimination extending over a number of years, including a time
when the COT was still in existence and later after it had been absorbed into
the CCT, Barnard was compelled to reconstruct records of allocations of
contracts in Khayelitsha because many officials had left the department and
relevant documents could no longer be located. When Barnard was cross-
examined on the reasons for the reappointment of certain consultants he
stated that generally the reasons were to ensure continuity, to capitalise and
build on the consultant’s exposure to first phases of particular projects and to
use the specialised skills of particular consultants. He could not provide
specific motivations for each project on which there had been a reappointment
of contractors because contemporaneous notes were not always available. It
is clear that a number of firms with a majority black shareholding were also
reappointed during particular cycles.

[37] We turn to deal with the affirmative action policies and practices of the
COT and the CCT over the relevant period. It is common cause that one of
the measures adopted by the COT and CCT to promote transformation, was
that a minimum quota of 30 per cent of municipal work was reserved for

allocation to historically disadvantaged individuals or entities. Another
measure was that the companies to whom such work had to be allocated
were required to have a minimum 30 per cent shareholding by previously
disadvantaged individuals. These measures were resorted to in order to
promote transformation. Section 217(1) and (2) of the Constitution provide:
‘(1)
When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or
any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must
do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective.
(2)
Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for ─
(a)
categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and
(b)
the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged
by unfair discrimination.’

[38] The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003,
which came into operation on 21 April 2004, established a legislative
framework for the promotion of Black Economic Empowerment. It uses the
expression ‘Black people’ as ‘a generic term which means Africans,
Coloureds and Indians’.4 Manong laid great store by the fact that the company
is a hundred per cent African-owned. He repeatedly emphasised that the
company was the only engineering practice in the Western Cape which was a
hundred per cent African-owned. Manong and Magqwaka testified about the
difficulties faced by black Africans to overcome obstacles and prejudices in
the Western Cape which historically was ‘a Coloured preference area’. In this
latter contention they cannot be faulted.

[39] Some government departments have in the recent past adopted
measures to prefer black Africans to other segments of the black population of
South Africa in the allocation of contracts. The parties were agreed that during
the timeframe relevant to the present appeal that preference did not apply.

[40] Following the issue by the CCT of a Procurement Policy Initiative dated
September 2003, a database was used in an attempt to ensure a fair spread

4 See s 1 of the Act.

of contractual opportunities. It is unchallenged that the database was
ineffective. This was due to it being technically deficient. There is no
sustainable evidence that it was designed to favour anyone or discriminate
against any person or entity. It is abundantly clear that whilst the targets
initially set by the COT and CCT might be susceptible to the criticism that they
were not sufficiently ambitious, the transformation thrust nevertheless gained
momentum over the years leading up to the time when the complaint was
lodged. A greater percentage of the total value of the municipal work was
allocated to previously disadvantaged individuals. The graph was decidedly
moving upwards and at an accelerated pace.

[41] Barnard testified with reference to a schedule compiled in conjunction
with counsel representing the CCT that in 2002/2003 seventy-one per cent of
projects in Khayelitsha was awarded to firms comprising a black shareholding
of more than 50 per cent. For the year 2003/2004 eighty-nine per cent went to
black-controlled firms. In 2004/2005 seventy per cent was allocated in this
way. In 2005/2006 seventy-five per cent was awarded to black-controlled
firms. Significantly, most of these appointments were made by Barnard.

[42] More importantly, the evidence of Barnard, which did not enjoy
sufficient attention in the court below, was that the CCT did not deal with
Khayelitsha in isolation. In attempting to ensure the fairest spread of work and
employing the measures referred to earlier, the frequency and value of work
allocated to consultants were measured across the entire metropole. As can
be seen from the allocation of work to the company from 1996 to the
beginning of 2005 a total of 27 projects, including Khayelitsha, was awarded
to the company. This approximates to 3 contracts per annum. The total value
is considerably more than R140 m. Not only is this a hugely significant
number of valuable contracts but it also reflects that the company must have
been reappointed in any given annual cycle.

[43] We now turn to deal with the background to the CBD project. In 1999
the COT called for expressions of interest in the development of a CBD in
Khayelitsha. A series of consultations and interaction with interested parties

and community organisations followed. This culminated in the conclusion of a
framework agreement, to which attendees subscribed. A provision in this
framework agreement, whilst committing to fair and transparent procurement
procedures, nevertheless purported to grant the signatories preference in the
procurement process. The company was one such signatory.

[44] Having absorbed the COT in 2000, the CCT accepted the broad
principles contained in the framework agreement but not all the details. The
land owned by the CCT and earmarked for the CBD was sold to a Trust which
the CCT had established and controlled. The Trust held 100 per cent of the
shares in KBD Management (Pty) Ltd which was the vehicle that would
receive the financing for the project by way of a loan from a bank. KBD
Management (Pty) Ltd established KBD Retail (Pty) Ltd for the sole purpose
of developing and constructing the CBD. KBD Retail in turn appointed FG as
project managers for the development and construction of the CBD.

[45] Manong repeatedly stated, without substantiation, that there had been
keen interest shown by a number of banks to finance the project. The truth is
that only one bank was prepared to do so, namely Rand Merchant Bank
(RMB). That bank insisted that the building contractor commissioned to
construct the CBD be one of the big four building contractors in South Africa
and that the project be completed on a turnkey basis. This led to WBHO (Pty)
Ltd (WBHO) being appointed as the contractor. WBHO, because it bore the
risk and the cost of development up until delivery of the project, insisted, as is
usual in turnkey projects, that it have a free hand in appointing consultants,
including the engineers. This was of course subject to transformation targets
being met, namely, that at least 30 per cent of consultants be made up of
previously disadvantaged persons.

[46] Because of the conditions set by RMB and WBHO, referred to in the
preceding paragraph, FG and the CCT effectively played no further part in the
development of the CBD. However, the Trust that the CCT initially controlled5

5 City councillors, because of later regulatory legislation, were forced to resign as trustees.

would ensure, after construction and after the loan was repaid, that the
community of Khayelitsha would reap the financial benefits of the project.

[47] The engineering entity that was appointed by WBHO to the CBD
project, namely, Axis Consulting, was black-owned, albeit by a person who is
coloured. It is preposterous to suggest, as Manong does, that the
arrangement involving RMB and WBHO was designed specifically to exclude
him. It is a proposition that merely has to be stated to be rejected.
Regrettably, it took almost five years for this proposition to be finally rejected.

[48] Manong contended further that the company had been appointed to the
CBD project as the engineering consultant by Mr Van Der Vent, a director of
FG, and that it had subsequently been excluded by some form of racist
conspiracy between Barnard and Van der Vent. According to Manong he had
a legitimate expectation that he would be part of the CBD project team. This,
however, was not borne out by the evidence. When Van der Vent and
Barnard testified, they both denied that Van der Vent had in fact appointed the
company to the CBD project and also that Van der Vent had made a public
announcement to that effect. The overwhelming weight of evidence is that
RMB insisted on the turnkey arrangement and that Van der Vent had no
authority to appoint consultants. Furthermore, the main consultants that were
appointed to the CBD project were black. Magqwaka was the architect, Axis
Consulting, which was black-owned, was the engineering consultant and the
electrical consultants were Johaardien and Associates, also a black-controlled
entity. There is not a tittle of evidence to support Manong’s allegations of a
conspiracy of any sort to exclude the company.

[49] The legal advice received by the COT and CCT on how to deal with the
disposal of the land on which the CBD was to be developed, and the
privatisation of the project without tender or other prescribed procedures
being followed, does appear to be suspect from an administrative law point of
view. However, it does not follow that there was a racist motive for the
development proceeding as it did. Put differently, the charge of racism
appears unfounded in relation to the manner in which the development

proceeded. In order for the company to succeed in the court below that
charge had to be proved.

[50] Without condoning the CCT’s apparent failure to follow proper tender
or other prescribed procedures for the disposal of the land on which the CBD
was to be developed, the reality is that the development would probably never
have seen the light of day had the measures referred to above not been
employed. The principle of legality in relation to the establishment of the Trust
and the company that it controlled and the manner in which the COT and the
CCT were involved in the CBD project prior to the final agreement for its
construction is not what the court below was constrained to adjudicate upon. It
was called upon to decide whether a charge of racial discrimination was
properly brought.

[51] We now turn our attention briefly to the Setsing project. In the first
judgment of the court below dealing with practice directions and preliminary
points, it held that FG’s plea of misjoinder was well-founded. It accepted FG’s
assertion that it had no connection to the Setsing project and pointed out that
the entities responsible for that project were Futuregrowth Asset Management
(Pty) Ltd and Community Property Company (Pty) Ltd. Before us the company
adopted the view that, since Van der Vent was a director of all three
companies, the court below ought to have held that at material times he was
representing FG. That submission is somewhat confusingly tied to a further
contention on behalf of the company, namely, that the court below ought to
have directed that the two companies responsible for the Setsing project be
joined in the proceedings.

[52] A careful examination of the complaint and the evidence adduced by
Manong reveal that his baseless perception was that Van der Vent had
offered him an opportunity to be a consultant on the Setsing project in the
Free State as a trade-off for ending his crusade in relation to the CBD project.
The total value of the Setsing project was R12 m, two per cent of which would
have accrued to the company as fees. According to Manong, this offer was
made to the company when he confronted Van der Vent, after he had been

informed by Magqwaka that the company was not going to be part of the CBD
project team. After an acrimonious exchange of correspondence concerning
the Setsing project, the relationship between Manong and Van der Vent broke
down and that put paid to any further involvement by the company in the
Setsing project.

[53] In his testimony Van der Vent was adamant that the Setsing project
was unconnected to the CBD venture. He was emphatic that he had offered
the project to the company in line with his commitment to transformation and
to making opportunities available to black consultants. He referred to his track
record in this regard. Even Manong conceded that Van der Vent had an
admirable transformation record, but stated that he had become disillusioned
with Van der Vent after the company was excluded from the CBD project.
Manong was unable to substantiate his allegations in relation to the Setsing
project. They amounted to nothing more than (at best for him) unfounded
supposition.

[54] As stated early in this judgment, the court below approached the
evidence on the basis that it was for the CCT to prove that it had not
discriminated against the company. The burden of proof in cases of
discrimination brought in the Equality Court is dealt with in s 13 of the Act. The
relevant part of s 13(1) provides:
‘(1)
If the complainant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination─
(a)
the respondent must prove, on the facts before the court, that the discrimination did
not take place as alleged; . . .’
‘Discrimination’ is defined in s 1 of the Act as follows:
‘[It] means any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation
which directly or indirectly─
(a)
imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or
(b)
withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more of
the prohibited grounds.’
The prohibited ground of unfair discrimination relied on by the company is
race and as pointed out above it relied specifically on ss 7(c) and (e).

[55] In Prinsloo v Van der Linde & another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 23,
the Constitutional Court, in dealing with the equality clause in the interim
Constitution (s 8), said the following:
‘The idea of differentiation (to employ a neutral descriptive term) seems to lie at the heart of
equality jurisprudence in general and of the s 8 right or rights in particular.’
In Harksen v Lane NO & others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 42 the following
appears:
‘Where s 8 is invoked to attack a legislative provision or executive conduct on the ground that
it differentiates between people or categories of people in a manner that amounts to unequal
treatment or unfair discrimination, the first enquiry must be directed to the question as to
whether the impugned provision does differentiate between people or categories of people.’

[56] Thus, to even begin to get off the ground the company must at the very
least show that it was treated differently to other engineering consultants in
relation to COT or CCT projects. The company had to show that in the totality
of City projects, it received disproportionately fewer contracts so in relation to
other consultants. Since the very premise of the company’s case was race it
had to establish a prima facie case that the differentiation was race-based.

[57] The litigation in the court below was preceded by litigation in the Cape
High Court in terms of which the company sought an interdict against CCT
and FG in terms of which they would be prohibited from continuing to
construct the CBD in Khayelitsha pending the furnishing of information by
them. Although that litigation was withdrawn with the company tendering costs
it is clear that Manong considered it a worthwhile exercise. According to him
he received ‘crucial information’ to assist him in lodging the complaint in the
court below. It is clear from that statement by Manong and the manner in
which the enquiry was conducted by him, including the paucity of
substantiating evidence, that he and the company were on a fishing
expedition, hoping somehow that the complaint would ultimately be proved.
The following part of his evidence shows that the complaint was contrived:
‘I just went in there with eyes closed, literally. But the papers that came from the interdict gave
me more hope that I’ve got a case here, that’s why I did not even continue to argue the case,
I said okay, let us pay the costs and start a new fresh ─ a fresh case, based on the answering
affidavit of the interdict. In fact, in the beginning of my founding papers I said based on the

information that we received from the interdict papers, then we are doing this, instituting this
litigation.
Okay, so let’s just take it one step at a time then. On your own evidence you took a shot in the
dark with the interdict application? --- Absolutely.’

[58] As stated earlier, the court below made no credibility findings. In our
view, Barnard and Van der Vent were credible and reliable witnesses as were
other material witnesses who testified on behalf of the respondents. Manong
was an unsatisfactory witness. He clearly made up his case as he went along.
He made scandalous allegations that he could not justify, he drew conclusions
that were unwarranted and he was unable to provide any concrete evidence
supporting the company’s case. Insofar as Davids’ evidence was in conflict
with Barnard’s, particularly in relation to the latter’s concerns about the quality
of the company’s work on the first phase of Lookout Hill, Barnard’s evidence
is to be preferred. The detailed analysis of the evidence set out above shows
that the company’s case did not get out of the starting stalls.

[59] It is clear that at the end of the company’s case on the merits in the
court below, it had failed to establish a prima facie case, either in respect of its
complaint of being discriminated against in general in relation to work in
Khayelitsha, or in regard to its exclusion from the CBD project. Its case
consisted mostly of self-serving and unsubstantiated statements by Manong.
The evidence he had indicated that would be forthcoming in substantiation of
his case did not materialise. For example, he had indicated that Magqwaka
would testify that Barnard had excluded him from the second phase of the
Lookout Hill project on the basis of race. According to Manong, Magqwaka
had telephoned him and told him that Barnard had said that for as long as he
(Barnard) was responsible for awarding work in Khayelitsha the company ‘will
never be appointed for any project full stop’. Magqwaka did not testify to that
effect.

[60] Furthermore, in respect of its complaint that it was discriminated
against in general by the CCT in respect of Khayelitsha, the company failed to
bring into account all the projects that had been awarded to it across the

metropole. Manong was dismissive, without justification, of the CCT’s claims
that projects in Khayelitsha were not considered in isolation and that the fair
distribution of work to consultants was weighed citywide. In deciding that the
company suffered racial discrimination in respect of the allocation of work in
Khayelitsha generally, the court below was clearly wrong.

[61] At the end of the company’s case of general discrimination in respect
of projects in Khayelitsha, the CCT unsuccessfully applied for absolution from
the instance. It ought to have succeeded.

[62] In our view, the court below was correct in its conclusion on the
company’s exclusion from the CBD project. As demonstrated above the
exigencies of a successfully funded development in Khayelitsha drove the
turnkey arrangement. The main consultants appointed by WBHO in
accordance with set Black Economic Empowerment targets were all black. It
is preposterous to suggest, as Manong did, that the final agreement which
gave WBHO the right to appoint consultants was a ploy to exclude him and
was racially motivated.

[63] Section 7(c) of the Act provides that the impugned rule or practice,
although appearing legitimate, must be ‘aimed’ at maintaining exclusive
control by a particular race group. The targets set by the COT and the CCT
were intended to have the opposite effect. They were not proved to have been
applied in a manner calculated to maintain exclusive control by a particular
race group. Section 7(e) of the Act prohibits the denial of access to
opportunities to particular categories of persons. Under this section unfair
discrimination may include the failure to take steps to reasonably
accommodate the needs of particular categories of persons. The company’s
case, based on this section, was also not established.

[64] In our view the court below was undoubtedly correct in upholding the
plea of misjoinder of FG in relation to the Setsing project. The court below
made that decision after being informed that FG had no connection to the
Setsing project. Counsel on behalf of FG disclosed the identities of the entities

responsible for that project. It was contended before us that because the
litigation occurred in the Equality Court there was a duty on the court below to
have had those entities joined in the proceedings. We have difficulty in
understanding this proposition. First, Manong made no complaint of racist
conduct on the part of those entities. Second, his misconception that the
Setsing project was a trade-off, which was central to his complaint ─ such as
it is ─ against FG, can hardly hold sway against these other entities. Third,
Manong is no ordinary lay litigant. He is correctly described by counsel for the
respondents as a serial litigant.6 He has been quick to resort to litigation when
the company has a grievance against any person or entity. When he was
informed of the identities of the entities connected to the Setsing project, he
had to choose whether he could make a sustainable case against them in the
Equality Court. It does not behove the company to lay the blame at the door of
the court below for not joining them. Fourth, the relevant evidence in relation
to Setsing shows that it has no bearing on his complaint of racism. This
means that the joinder he contends should have occurred would have been
pointless.

[65] Before turning our attention finally to the question of costs, we briefly
address related issues of concern. As this court observed in Manong &
Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape, &
others (No 2) 2009 (6) SA 589 (SCA) paras 53 and 57, the Equality Court was
established in order to provide easy access to justice to enable even the most

6 In Manong & Associates v Minister of Public Works 2010 (2) SA 167 (SCA) this court
dismissed an appeal against a judgment of the Equality Court (TPD) in terms of which an
application by the company for an interim interdict preventing the Director-General and the
Minister of Public Works from implementing a Professional Services Supplier Register was
rejected. The company had submitted in the Equality Court that the abandonment by the
Department of Public Works of a roster in favour of the register referred to above would
prejudice particularly African professional consultants. The Department justified the departure
on the basis that its policy to promote transformation had to be in line with the Public Finance
Management Act 1 of 1999 and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of
2000. The Department sought by way of the register to expand the categories of formerly
disadvantaged persons who would benefit from its transformation policy. In dismissing the
appeal this court stated (at para 1) that the application in the Equality Court was ‘somewhat
ambitious’.
In the two other judgments of this court involving the company referred to elsewhere in this
judgment the company succeeded on procedural aspects and the matter was referred back to
the Equality Court for adjudication. In one of the judgments, this court commented
unfavourably on the extent of the record filed on behalf of the company.

disadvantaged individuals or communities to walk off the street, as it were into
the portals of the Equality Court to seek speedy redress against unfair
discrimination through less formal procedures.7

[66] Section 20(2) of the Act provides that a person wishing to institute
proceedings in terms of or under the Act must, in the prescribed manner,
notify the clerk of the Equality Court of their intention to do so. Regulation 6 of
the Regulations governing proceedings in the Equality Court provides for a
prescribed form to be completed in which the complaint is to be formulated. It
is clear that a succinct statement of complaint is required. In response, the
person or entity against whom or which the complaint is lodged similarly has
to complete a prescribed form in which information in limited form is required.
It also requires any documentation on which reliance is to be placed to be
attached. This is clearly intended to focus the minds of the parties and the
court leading to expedition.

[67] As stated earlier, Manong, instead of using the prescribed form,
resorted to a rambling 30 page exposition. If his annexures are included his
complaint took up a total of almost 100 pages. It is therefore unsurprising that
the enquiry in the court below extended over more than three years.

[68] Included in the documentation presented to the court below was
documentation relating to alleged racism in the judiciary and the church.
Allegations implicating the media and copies of court judgments were
included. Before the hearing of this appeal, this court directed the parties to
consider more carefully which parts of the record it was necessary to read. A
note by the respondents indicated that approximately 750 pages of record that

7 In that case the company’s complaint was that it was unsuccessful in a tender process on
the basis of experience requirements which Manong contended discriminated against black
engineers who historically did not have an opportunity to develop experience. In the absence
of directions by the court below, the enquiry did not sufficiently explore whether a scoring and
roster system provided sufficient opportunity for developing the required experience. In that
case this court referred the matter back to the Equality Court for further exploration. This court
was sympathetic to the company in that case on the basis that Manong who drove the
litigation was a lay litigant and on the information before it took the view that the Equality
Court ought to have been of greater assistance.

had been filed were unnecessary to read. These parts of the record were filed
despite an agreement between the parties that they were unnecessary.
Before us counsel representing the company apologised for this and
disavowed any involvement in how this had occurred. By the time the record
was filed the company was represented by attorneys. In Manong &
Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape &
another (No 1) 2009 (6) SA 574 (SCA) para 44, this court commented
unfavourably on the unnecessary parts of the record filed by the company in
that case. It is unacceptable that the same litigant conducts litigation in this
court repeatedly in this unsatisfactory manner.

[69] If litigation is to be conducted in the Equality Court on this basis rather
than in the intended manner, the envisaged expedition and easy access to
justice will be undone. A factor that may require legislative attention is
whether entities that are financially able to litigate on a grand scale should be
able to use the machinery of the Equality Court to clog up a system intended
to benefit particularly lay litigants and the public at large.

[70] Of course, government must be held to account and where the
principle of legality or other fundamental constitutional principles have been
breached by the State, appropriate relief should be afforded to a complainant.
However, it does not follow that procedures intended to benefit lay litigants
and to have legitimate complaints speedily adjudicated should be allowed to
be abused to the extent that government is unnecessarily tied up in extended
litigation.

[71] During his testimony in the court below and whilst he was conducting
the company’s case, Manong made a number of outrageous and irrelevant
statements deserving of censure. At one stage, whilst being cross-examined
by counsel for FG, Manong testified that black Africans will not deal with other
Africans ‘unless they get kickbacks’. He went on to say ‘they’ll prefer Whites’.
He stated that that was a reason he had ‘cases’ in the Eastern Cape.

[72] At one stage in his cross-examination of Barnard, Manong stated that
in all the problems he encountered concerning procurement, the common
denominator was Afrikaans speakers. When Barnard testified about
interacting with certain individuals and offered up names including those
against whom no charge of racism was levelled by Manong, the latter asked
whether that person was an Afrikaner, suggesting collusion in the racist
conspiracy. This, not surprisingly, resulted in an objection by counsel for the
CCT that Manong was resorting to racial stereotypes.

[73] Manong was not short on threats either. When he was cross-examined
by counsel for FG and was reminded that the company had received work
from the COT on Lookout Hill and was asked to confirm that fact, Manong’s
response was:
‘Don’t involve yourself, otherwise I will join you and ask damages. . . ’

[74] Manong accused Van der Vent of deliberately defacing an FG
letterhead in a telefacsimile in which Van der Vent informed him that his
services were no longer required on the Setsing project. Manong surmised
that this was calculated to prevent the company from ascertaining
Futuregrowth Asset Management (Pty) Ltd’s particulars and designed to
enable FG to raise the plea of non-joinder. Manong labelled the ‘deliberate’
distortion a criminal offence in terms of the Companies Act. This accusation is
ridiculous. That company appears to be well-known and is registered in
accordance with company legislation. Van der Vent testified that the distortion
that obfuscates the names of directors at the bottom of the letterhead was
probably due to a problem encountered in the transmission of the
telefacsimile. Since it had no such distortions on the dispatching end it might
even be due to problems at the receiving end. This unwarranted allegation of
criminal conduct against Van der Vent is not atypical.

[75] At one stage of his evidence, Manong, consistent with his stance of
making up his case as he went along and in line with being a conspiracy
theorist, said, without any prior warning, that he had information from State
agencies, including the office of the Presidency, the National Intelligence

Agency and the Scorpions, a police investigative unit, that the company was
being specifically targeted by government officials, including those within the
CCT and the Western Cape Provincial Government. When counsel for the
CCT asked about the basis for this general conspiracy, Manong’s response
was that it was based on correspondence that he had written to these
agencies. Questioned further he stated that he had reports from the National
Intelligence Agency. The following is a part of his evidence in this regard:
‘These reports, we got them from the National Intelligence Agency. Somebody from the
National Intelligence Agency said: “Look, be careful. Your company is specifically targeted by
these individuals and State organisations.” ‘

[76] On top of all of this is a bizarre moment when Manong, interrupting his
cross-examination of Barnard, asked for a minute to pay tribute to Dr Piet
Koornhof, a former Minister in the apartheid government. He had just heard of
Dr Koornhof’s death. The following are extracts from the record on this
aspect:
‘[L]ast night I heard the sad news that Dr Piet Koornhof passed away I want just for one
minute to pay tribute to him how it also affected my life, just one minute I won’t take much of
the Court’s time. In 1971 Dr Piet Koornhof was the Minister of Bantu Affairs and
Development. Now his Department was in charge of forced removals and so on, now why I
am mentioning this because at that stage in fact Africans were staying in the Karoo because
I’m from Victoria West, they started with Beaufort West and Middelburg in the Cape, they
moved them to Thembaza. Now the Daily Despatch that was under the editorship of Donald
Woods at that time . . .’
At that stage the court below questioned the relevance of these statements.
Unflustered, Manong went on to say the following:
‘No it’s not relevant but about him, the good part of him, only to say the good heart of Dr
Koornhof in that process but if the Court feels I’m going to clutter the record . . .’
The court then put it to Manong that he was saying that Dr Koornhof was a
good man to which he replied:
‘Yes because when he was sent there to Thembaza and saw the situation he literally cried
and said this policy is inhuman.
. . .
After a week when he went to Pretoria he was removed from the position. I am just saying
that was the type of person he was, although he was serving that Government but he had the
human heart in him.’

[77] These statements and this kind of conduct should not be tolerated in
any court, least of all the Equality Court. Even accepting that the Act
envisages a less formal manner of conducting enquiries, this manner of
leading evidence and conducting a case is beyond the pale.

[78] It is not lost on us that Manong himself was not averse to being
expedient. As pointed out above, whilst ostensibly championing fair and
transparent procurement procedures, Manong nevertheless sought to assert a
dubious claim by the company to preferential treatment in terms of the
framework agreement relating to the CBD project. The same applies to
Manong’s assertion that he was awarded the Elsies River depot project by
virtue of the ‘intervention’ of a black COT councillor.  In the same vein he saw
nothing wrong with engaging a key employee of the COT fraudulently to
misrepresent that he had done work on risk on the first phase of Lookout Hill
in order to facilitate an appointment to that project. Despite his assertion that
he was championing social justice he was dismissive of socially meritorious
projects such as Mew Way because the financial rewards were small. Whilst
asserting emphatically that the company is the only wholly-African owned
engineering practice in the Western Cape, Manong conveniently chose to
ignore or downplay the prominent role in the company played by Davids, a
coloured person. It is common cause that on one of the biggest projects that
the company undertook, namely, the Stanhope Bridge Project in Claremont,
Davids was the principal actor on behalf of the company. From Davids’ own
evidence he was so busy seeing to the company’s affairs that it took him
several more years than usual to obtain his professional accreditation. This is
yet another example of double standards by Manong.

[79] Manong, having had the experience of that case and the others listed
earlier in this judgment, continues unabatedly to litigate in shotgun fashion. He
can no longer elicit any sympathy or goodwill on the basis of being a lay
litigant.

[80] Our comments in respect of the merits in this case are not intended to
minimise the problems facing government in the Western Cape. Deeply

embedded prejudice is difficult to overcome. It is clear that black Africans
suffered severe prejudice in the Western Cape in the past. Much effort, time
and resources are required to overcome that disadvantage. We express the
hope that all role players will do their utmost to undo the ravages of the past
and that everyone concerned will understand that it is in the national interest
to be inclusive.

[81] It is now necessary to deal with costs. Section 21(2)(o) of the Act
provides:
‘After holding an inquiry, the court may make an appropriate order in the circumstances,
including an appropriate order of costs against any party to the proceedings.’
Thus, it is clear that in respect of costs an equality court exercises its
discretion in the light of all the circumstances.

[82] It was submitted on behalf of the company that an order by this court
reversing the costs order by Moosa J in respect of both appeals would have a
chilling effect on future complaints that could legitimately be brought in the
Equality Court. It was submitted that particularly where constitutional rights
were being asserted a court should be slow to order a litigant to pay costs.

[83] In Biowatch Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 (6) SA 232
(CC), the Constitutional Court said the following (para 16):
‘Equal protection under the law requires that costs awards not be dependent on whether the
parties are acting in their own interests or in the public interest. Nor should they be
determined by whether the parties are financially well-endowed or, as in the case of many
NGO’s, reliant on external funding. The primary consideration in constitutional litigation must
be the way in which a costs order would hinder or promote the advancement of constitutional
justice.’

[84] At para 22 of Biowatch the Constitutional Court referred to its earlier
judgment in Affordable Medicines Trust & others v Minister of Health & others
2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) which established the principle that ordinarily, if the
State loses, it should pay the costs of the other side and if the government
wins, each party should bear its own costs.

[85] At para 23 of Biowatch the court stated:
‘If there should be a genuine, non-frivolous challenge to the constitutionality of a law or of
State conduct, it is appropriate that the State should bear the costs if the challenge is good,
but if it is not, then the losing non-State litigant should be shielded from the costs
consequences of failure. In this way responsibility for ensuring that the law and State conduct
are constitutional is placed at the correct door.’

[86] However, in the paragraph that follows the Constitutional Court
qualified that statement and said the following:
‘If an application is frivolous or vexatious, or in any other way manifestly inappropriate, the
applicant should not expect that the worthiness of its cause will immunise it against an
adverse costs award. Nevertheless, for the reasons given above, courts should not lightly turn
their backs on the general approach of not awarding costs against an unsuccessful litigant in
proceedings against the State, where matters of genuine constitutional import arise. Similarly,
particularly powerful reasons must exist for a court not to award costs against the State in
favour of a private litigant who achieves substantial success in proceedings brought against
it.’ (Footnotes omitted.)

[87] In Biowatch, the Constitutional Court warned that the mere labelling of
litigation as constitutional and the dragging in of specious references to
sections of the Constitution would of course not be enough, in itself, to invoke
the general principle that ordinarily, if government wins in a constitutional
case, each party should bear its own costs. It stated that the issues must be
genuine and substantive and truly raise constitutional considerations relevant
to the adjudication.8

[88] In Affordable Medicines the Constitutional Court said the following at
para 138:
‘There may be circumstances that justify departure from this rule such as where the litigation
is frivolous or vexatious. There may be conduct on the part of the litigant that deserves
censure by the Court which may influence the Court to order an unsuccessful litigant to pay
costs. The ultimate goal is to do that which is just having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case.’

8 See para 25.

[89] In Weare v Ndebele NO 2009 (1) SA 600 (CC) para 78, the
Constitutional Court stated the following:
‘The ordinary rule in the court is that where litigants unsuccessfully raise important
constitutional issues against the State, costs will not be awarded against them. There is an
exception to this rule; this is when the litigation is pursued for private commercial gain.’
(Footnote omitted.)
There appears to be a tension between that conclusion and what is set out in
the first sentence of the dictum referred to in para 83 above. In Weare,
notwithstanding the exception referred to in the dictum set out above, the
Constitutional Court did not order costs against the losing litigant, a business-
man who had embarked on a commercial venture and where, no doubt, the
litigation was pursued for commercial gain. In Weare, the Premier of KwaZulu-
Natal had no objection to each party paying its own costs.

[90] Moosa J, in making the costs order in the court below, considered the
general principle referred to in the judgments of the Constitutional Court, cited
in the preceding paragraphs. The learned judge stated that the principle could
only be departed from in ‘exceptional circumstances’. He took into account in
the company’s favour that it had done some work on the CBD project on risk
and thought that it had a legitimate expectation to be appointed. Against that,
he reasoned that because of matters beyond the control of the CCT, the
company had lost out on that opportunity. In conclusion the court below said
the following:
‘In the light of these circumstances, the court is of the opinion that equity and fairness
demand that the court applies the spirit and ethos of the Equality legislation by making no
order as to costs.’

[91] In the case dealing with practice directives and preliminary points
where FG’s plea of misjoinder was upheld, the question of costs was held
over for ‘later determination’. As we have said, it appears that the order
referred to at the end of the preceding paragraph encompassed those costs.
We shall assume in the company’s favour that it did. If it did not, this court is
entitled to make an appropriate costs order itself.

[92] The discretion exercised by a court in making a costs order is not a
‘broad’ discretion or a ‘discretion in the wide sense’ or a ‘discretion loosely so
called’, where a court of appeal is at liberty to substitute its decision for the
decision of the court below simply because it considers its conclusion more
appropriate. The discretion in relation to costs is a discretion in the strict or
narrow sense, which is also described as a ‘strong’ or a ‘true’ discretion. In
such a case, the power to interfere is limited to cases in which it is found that
the court vested with the discretion did not exercise the discretion judicially,
which can be done by showing that the court of first instance exercised the
power conferred on it capriciously or upon a wrong principle, or did not bring
its unbiased judgment to bear on the question or did not act for substantial
reasons. See Naylor & another v Jansen 2007 (1) SA 16 (SCA) para 14.

[93] In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & others v Minister
of Home Affairs & others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 11, the Constitutional
Court, in dealing with a similar kind of discretion in relation to a postponement,
said the following about the powers of a court of appeal:
‘[I]t may interfere only when it appears that the lower court had not exercised its discretion
judicially, or that it had been influenced by wrong principles or a misdirection on the facts, or
that it had reached a decision which in the result could not reasonably have been made by a
court properly directing itself to all the relevant facts and principles.’ (Footnote omitted.)

[94] In the present case the court below did not, as stated above, conduct
an exhaustive analysis of the evidence. It did not take into account, as it was
obliged to, that the complaint was contrived and that Manong representing the
company made up its case as he went along. The court below did not
consider the reprehensible manner in which the litigation was conducted.
Despite the pretention that the complaint in the court below was
constitutionally founded, it was in fact purely mercenary. The sympathy of the
court below expressed in respect of the CBD project is in our view misplaced.
It is thus clear that the court misdirected itself in this regard. Notwithstanding
that the court found in the company’s favour in respect of the complaint of
general discrimination in respect of the allocation of work in Khayelitsha, the
court below did not follow the general rule that the State should pay the

winning litigant’s costs. It is clear that the court misdirected itself in all the
respects listed above and that this court is entitled to interfere with the order it
made in respect of costs. In our view, it would indeed be appropriate to set
aside the costs order made by the court below and to hold the company liable
for the respondents’ costs, including the costs of two counsel. The same
result should ensue in respect of the costs in this court.

[95] We now address the costs of the postponement occasioned by the ill-
health of the company’s senior counsel hours before the scheduled hearing of
the appeal on 20 August 2010. The heads of argument had been drawn by
junior counsel. It is necessary to record that on that day junior counsel
representing the company informed the court that the company insisted that it
be represented by the senior counsel it had retained and his instructions were
that he should not present the company’s case on his own. In Cape Law
Society v Feldman 1979 (1) SA 930 (E), the respondent was confined to
hospital and too ill to attend the hearing necessitating a postponement. In that
case, there was a dispute concerning liability for the wasted costs. The court,
in dealing with the contention that the award of costs should depend on the
outcome of the case on the merits, stated the following (at 934A-C):
‘Because of the enforced absence of the respondent this case has had to be postponed sine
die. To that substantial extent the respondent’s rights have been safeguarded and to that
extent he has benefited but to that same extent the applicant has been prejudiced. It would be
manifestly inequitable to prejudice the applicant further by placing it in a potentially vulnerable
position of having to pay the costs of postponement if it should lose the main case.’

[96] That approach should be followed. The present is an a fortiori case,
because a postponement of the appeal was not inevitable. The company
sought an indulgence, which was granted. Its rights were thereby
safeguarded. In light of the view we take in regard to costs generally in this
matter, as set out above, the company should also pay the costs occasioned
by the postponement.

[97] The following order is made:
1.
The appellant’s appeals in respect of its exclusion from the CBD
project and the upholding by the court below of the second respondent’s plea
of misjoinder in relation to the Setsing project are dismissed with costs,
including the costs of two counsel.

2.
The cross-appeal by the first respondent in respect of the broader
Khayelitsha enquiry is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
3.
The cross-appeals by the first and second respondents, in relation to
the costs order in both cases, are upheld with costs, including the costs of two
counsel.
4.
The finding of the court below set out in para 36 and the costs order
contained in para 64 of the judgment dated 12 November 2008 are set aside
and substituted as follows:
‘1.
The applicant’s complaint that it was discriminated against in general by the first
respondent and its predecessor in the allocation of contracts in Khayelitsha is dismissed with
costs, including the costs of two counsel and such costs are to include the costs reserved on
18 August 2007.
2.
The applicant is ordered to pay the first and second respondents’ costs in relation to
the complaint concerning its exclusion from the CBD project, including the costs of two
counsel and such costs are to include the costs reserved on 18 August 2007, which also
encompass the second respondent’s costs in relation to the Setsing project.’
5.
The appellant is ordered to pay the respondents’ wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement of the appeal on 20 August 2010.

_________________
M S NAVSA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

_________________
N Z MHLANTLA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:

M Madlanga SC

T Masuku

Instructed by

Nongogo Nuku Inc, Cape Town

E G Cooper Majiedt Inc, Bloemfontein

For 1st Respondent:
I Jamie SC

R Paschke

Instructed by

Webber Wentzel, Cape Town

Webbers, Bloemfontein

For 2nd Respondent:
N Arendse SC

M Janisch

Instructed by

Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc, Cape Town

Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
1 December 2010
Status:
Immediate
Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal

On 1 December 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed an
appeal by Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd, a company specialising in
civil, structural and development engineering, against a decision of the
Western Cape Equality Court in terms of which it was held that the City
Council of Cape Town (the CCT) and Futuregrowth Property
Development Company (Pty) Ltd (FG) had not discriminated against it
on the basis of race by excluding it from the development of a central
business district in Khayelitsha. Furthermore, it dismissed the
company’s appeal against a decision of the Equality Court upholding
FG’s plea of misjoinder in respect of a complaint concerning the Setsing
project in the Free State.

The SCA also upheld a cross-appeal by the CCT against a decision of
the Equality Court in terms of which it held that the CCT had
discriminated against the company on the basis of race by excluding it

from municipal contract opportunities in Khayelitsha. The Equality Court
held that the CCT had employed measures, which although they
appeared legitimate, were aimed at maintaining exclusive control by
white professional firms.

In respect of municipal opportunities in Khayelitsha allegedly being
denied to the company on the basis of racial discrimination, the SCA
held that the Equality Court had not conducted a proper factual analysis
of the evidence and had adopted the wrong approach concerning the
onus of proof. The SCA found that the allegations of race discrimination
were wholly unfounded and that the individuals complained of had in fact
provided the company with opportunities. This court held that the CCT
was justified in its view that the allocation of work in Khayelitsha should
not be viewed in isolation but should be considered across the
metropole. In nine years the CCT had awarded 27 municipal projects to
the company with a total value of more than R140 m.

The SCA expressed concern about the manner in which the company
had conducted the litigation in the Equality Court. Its complaint spanned
almost 100 pages. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 envisaged that complaints should be
succinctly stated. This would focus the minds of the parties and the court
and would contribute to expedition. The litigation in the Equality Court
extended beyond three years and was the antithesis of what was
intended.

This court was dismayed at some of the comments made by the
company’s managing director during the course of the enquiry in the

Equality Court. A number of outrageous statements were made
deserving of censure.

The SCA considered the submission on behalf of the CCT and FG that
the Equality Court should, instead of making no order as to costs, have
ordered the company to pay their costs, including the costs of two
counsel. It took into account that in general, parties genuinely asserting
their constitutional rights should not have to pay the State’s costs even
where they lost the case. Having regard to the manner in which the
litigation was conducted by the company and the wholly unfounded
charges of racism, the SCA reversed the order of the Equality Court and
ordered the company to pay the respondents’ costs, including the costs
of two counsel. The SCA ordered the company to pay the CCT and FG’s
costs of appeal, including the costs of two counsel, and the costs of a
postponement of the appeal occasioned by the sudden illness of the
company’s senior counsel.