THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not reportable
Case no: 1067/2022

In the matter between:
DANNY JOSEPH SIBIYA
FIRST APPELLANT
DU TOIT-SMUTS ATTORNEYS
SECOND APPELLANT
REUBEN JADO KRIGE
THIRD APPELLANT

and

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Danny Joseph Sibiya and Others v Road Accident Fund
(1067/2022) [2023] ZASCA 171 (05 December 2023)

Coram:
MBATHA, CARELSE and HUGHES JJA and KOEN and
CHETTY AJJA
Heard:
06 November 2023

Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be
11h00 on 05 December 2023
Summary: Practice and procedure – Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 – whether
the high court ruling met the benchmark of fairness, rationality and
reasonableness – whether the high court acted in a procedurally fair manner.

ORDER

On appeal from: Mpumalanga Division of the High Court, Mbombela (Legodi
JP sitting as a court of first instance):
In the result the following order is granted:
The appeal is upheld with no order as to costs.
The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘The referral by the taxing master in terms of rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) is dismissed.’

JUDGMENT

Mbatha JA (Carelse and Hughes JJA and Koen and Chetty AJJA
concurring):
[1] This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Mpumalanga
Division of the High Court, Mbombela (the high court), per Legodi JP, granted
in chambers on 2 June 2022 against two plaintiffs, one of whom is the first
appellant, Mr Danny Joseph Sibiya (Mr Sibiya). Mr Sibiya sought leave to appeal
against the judgment and order of the high court.1 The second appellant, Du Toit-
Smuts Attorneys (D-S Attorneys) and the third appellant, Reuben Jado Krige (Mr
Krige), were granted leave to intervene and join in the proceedings. They also
sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the court a quo. The applications
for leave to appeal were consolidated and heard on 7 July 2022. On 20 July 2022
the applications for leave to appeal by Mr Sibiya, D-S Attorneys and Mr Krige
were dismissed with no order as to costs.

1 The judgment of the court a quo was in respect of two plaintiffs. D Sibiya and A E Chiaw. The high court
consolidated both matters as they involved what Legodi JP termed “contingency fee agreements which in their
form and substance, are both null and void for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act”.

[2] Dissatisfied with the outcome of the application for leave to appeal from
the high court, Mr Sibiya, D-S Attorneys and Mr Krige petitioned this Court for
leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the high court. On 28 September
2022, they were granted leave to appeal to this Court. The Road Accident Fund
(RAF), cited as the respondent, does not oppose this appeal. It abides by the
decision of this Court.

[3] The common cause facts are that on 4 March 2014, Mr Sibiya, appointed
D-S Attorneys to lodge a claim against the RAF for damages arising from a motor
vehicle accident which occurred on 16 February 2014. He signed an attorney and
client fee agreement with D-S Attorneys for their services. On 8 October 2021
the RAF conceded the merits of Mr Sibiya’s claim and tendered payment of his
costs on a party and party scale. The party and party bill of costs was subsequently
set down for taxation on 3 February 2022. As early as 24 January 2022, Mr Krige
had already filed an affidavit with the taxing master to the effect that no
contingency fee agreement existed between Mr Sibiya and D-S Attorneys.

[4] On the date of the taxation, the taxing master adjourned the proceedings
and furnished Mr Krige with a letter of even date. The letter acknowledged that
Mr Krige had attached an affidavit to the bill of costs to the effect that no
contingency fee agreement existed between D-S Attorneys and Mr Sibiya. In
addition, the taxing master in paragraph 5 of the letter posed the following
questions to D-S Attorneys:
‘5.       However as a follow-up on our conversation, I have the following questions to ask, as
a follow-up to the issue of “no contingency”.
a)
My question was whether the client paid cash or not?
b)
When was the fee agreed upon?
c)
When was such a fee paid in total?
d)
What is the amount of the fee agreed upon?

e)
If no fee was paid or was paid in part, when was such a fee or remaining part thereof
supposed to be paid?
f)
If no fee was paid, what is the basis upon which it is alleged that no contingency fee
agreement was concluded?’
It was conveyed to Mr Krige that the information required by the taxing master
was for the purposes of approaching one of the judges in chambers in terms of
rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) of the Uniform Rules of Court (the Rules) for directions
regarding bringing the taxation of the bill of costs to finality. Mr Krige was
directed to furnish his response by way of an affidavit to be filed by no later than
10 February 2022.

[5] By way of a letter dated 8 February 2022, Mr Krige furnished his response
in writing to the taxing master. On the very same day, it was communicated to
Mr Krige that the matter had been referred to the Judge President for directions
in terms of rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) of the Rules. It was pointed out to Mr Krige that he
should respond by way of an affidavit to be filed by no later than 11 March 2022,
as previously requested by the taxing master. He was specifically requested to
respond to the questions posed in paragraph 5 of the taxing master’s letter quoted
above. On 16 March 2022 Mr Krige submitted his affidavit as directed by the
Judge President.

[6] In summary, Mr Krige’s response was that Mr Sibiya did not pay cash for
their services as the matter had not yet been finalised, save for the merits which
had been settled; that Mr Sibiya would only be required to settle their fees once
the matter had been finalised in toto; that no fees had been agreed upon hence the
taxation was required; that the costs to be paid by the RAF after taxation of the
bill of costs would be taken into account once the matter had been finalised; that
no fees had been paid by Mr Sibiya and that he would be debited for professional
services rendered as per attorney and client fee in terms of the agreement signed
by him once the issue of quantum had been dealt with. As regards the reference

to rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) Mr Krige confirmed that he was ‘unaware of any
misbehaviour’. Mr Krige did not receive any further communication from the
Judge President.

[7] On 2 June 2022, the high court delivered an extensive joint judgment under
case number 557/2016, in Danny J Sibiya v RAF and Anita Ernesto Chiau v The
RAF, case number 1150/20.2 The high court in respect of Mr Sibiya’s matter
granted the following orders:
‘84.6 The fee agreement concluded between the plaintiff and his attorney of record is hereby
reviewed and set aside due to its illegality as set out in this judgment and the plaintiff is not
obliged to pay any fee or costs to his or her attorneys of record.
84.7 Settlement on the matter on merits between the plaintiff and defendant is hereby noted
and taxation thereof to be stayed over until finalisation of the case in its entirety.
84.8 The Legal Practice Council to consider whether the conduct of attorney Krige in
concluding the fee agreement as he did which has now been found to be illegal, constituted
unprofessional conduct and if so to take such steps as it might deem appropriate.
84.9 The Legal Practice Council is hereby directed to advise the plaintiff to consider instructing
another attorney to proceed with his matter to its finality and the plaintiff should also be advised
that he is not obliged to pay anything to the attorneys of record due to the illegality of the fee
agreement.
84.10 The plaintiff’s attorneys are hereby directed to bring this Judgment to the attention of the
plaintiff and explain the contents thereof to the plaintiff and confirm in an affidavit to be filed
by not later than Friday 10 June 2022 that the order in this paragraph has been complied with.’

[8] Before us, the three appellants challenge the aforementioned orders on
procedural and substantive grounds: first, that the court a quo formulated a
judgment in chambers in the absence of the appellants and without affording them
an opportunity to be heard in regard to the specific relief granted; secondly, that
the orders had the effect of depriving D-S Attorneys and Mr Krige of their earned
fee for services rendered to Mr Sibiya; third, that the court was wrong in finding

2 Sibiya v Road Accident Fund: In the matter of Chiau v Road Accident Fund [2022] ZAMPMBHC 40.

that the fee agreement with Mr Sibiya was illegal and therefore unenforceable;
and lastly, that the court findings were premised on a misdirection of fact and law.

[9] The referral by the taxing master to a judge in chambers was in terms of
rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) of the Rules. The rule reads as follows:
‘Where a party or his or her attorney or both misbehave at a taxation, the taxing master may —
(ii) adjourn the taxation and refer it to a judge in chambers for directions with regard to the
finalisation of the taxation’.
It is trite that a statutory provision needs to be interpreted purposively,
consideration must be given to language used in the light of the ordinary rules of
grammar and syntax and contextually.3
[10] It is clear from the language of the provision that rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) is not
a referral for consideration of a contingency fee, or attorney and client fee
agreements. Its purpose is to deal with misbehaviour of a party and his or her
legal representative, or both, before a taxing master and nothing else. It is not a
mechanism for bringing the fee agreement before a court, for determination of
whether it is a contingency fee agreement or not. There was furthermore no
evidence of any misbehaviour. The approach adopted by the Judge President’s
office was procedurally flawed and irregular.

[11] A fundamental rule of our law is that a wrong process vitiates the
proceedings. Astoundingly, the high court proceeded with the irregular process
of using rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) even though Mr Krige had pointed this out in his
affidavit. The high court consciously disregarded what Mr Krige had pointed out.
A proper consideration of all the documents indicates that nothing required the

3 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA);
2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 25.

intervention of the Judge President at that stage, as the bill of costs to be taxed
was on a party and party scale between the RAF and Mr Sibiya, following a
capitulation on the merits of Mr Sibiya’s claim against the RAF. I point out that
the approach adopted by the courts should only advance the interest of justice.
The doctrine of legality demands that no one, not even a court of law, should
exercise powers they do not have, this is sometimes referred to as judicial
restraint. Judge Richard S Arnold quoted with approval in Estate Late Stransham-
Ford and Others 2017 (3) BCLR 364 (SCA) para 24 stated that:
‘[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. We wait for
cases to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the
parties. Counsel almost always know a great deal more about their cases than we do.’4
The consequences of the breach of such doctrine of law are that a court of law
would find itself making irreversible orders which will have a detrimental impact
on the litigants as well as their legal representatives.

[12] The high court did not inform nor invite the parties, including the RAF, to
make representations regarding the fee agreement and its legality. The rules of
court require the parties to file their affidavits and heads of argument before the
matter serves before a Judge for a hearing. The rules serve to regulate the conduct
of proceedings in civil and criminal matters and govern how a case may be
commenced, the service of processes and setting down of matters for hearing in
an open court. In that regard, no court may mero motu in chambers deal with
matters that are not properly placed before it.5 The handling of the matter by the
court in chambers was irregular, a hearing by ambush and a breach of one of the
fundamental principles of our law, the right to be heard.

4 Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v Estate Late Stransham-Ford and Others 2017 (3)
BCLR 364 (SCA) para 24.
5 Fisher and Another v Ramahlele and Others 2014 (4) SA 614 (SCA) para 13-14.

[13] Although the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the High
Courts have in terms of Section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, an inherent power to protect and regulate their own processes, a hearing
needs to be in an open court. Kriegler J in Botha v Minister van Wet en Orde en
Andere,6 pronouncing on undesirable possible results of secret or non-public
court proceedings, quoted the following words of Justice Brennan in the United
States Supreme Court:
'Secrecy is profoundly inimical to this demonstrative purpose of the trial process. Open trials
assure the public that procedural rights are respected and that justice is afforded equally. Closed
trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness which in turn spawns disrespect for law.
Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the objective of
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.'7
The right of access to courts is generally guaranteed to safeguard equal protection
of the law and to ensure that no person will be deprived of due process of the law.
The failure to hear a litigant impacts on s 34 of the Constitution which provides
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum’.

[14] Equally so, the audi alteram partem rule is a fundamental principle of our
law enshrined in the Constitution. Every litigant is entitled to be afforded a
hearing before a court of law. The high court had a duty to act procedurally fair
to the three appellants as its decision had an adverse impact on their rights. By
inviting the appellants to participate in the proceedings would have contributed
to the accuracy of the decision of the court. I do not need to traverse the
substantive challenges made by the appellants as the issues which I have dealt
with are dispositive of the appeal.

6 Botha v Minister Van Wet en Orde en Andere [1990] 4 All SA 461 (W); 1990 (3) SA (937) (W).
7 Ibid at 464.

[15] A further reason why the audi alteram partem was imperative is that the
orders which followed cast aspersions on Mr Krige’s professional competence
and ethical behaviour, and resulted in a referral of the matter to the professional
regulatory authority without him being afforded the opportunity to defend the
findings. For these reasons alone the appeal should also be upheld. In addition,
the Judge President failed to have sight of the fee agreement. There was no
attempt to engage with its contents, although inferences were drawn from it albeit
not a document before the court. These in themselves represent an egregious
breach of fundamental rules of judicial etiquette.

[16] In the result the appeal must succeed. A procedural defect is an absolute
bar to the court’s jurisdiction. When the court lacks jurisdiction the appeal must
be upheld. I therefore find that the orders were erroneously granted in light of the
procedural irregularities aforesaid.

[17] This Court raised the issue whether the appellants were entitled to costs
and who should bear the cost of appeal, as the RAF was not a party to the
proceedings. Though the high court went off on a tangent and decided the matter
without the benefit of the views of the parties, it cannot be mulcted with costs.
Counsel for the appellants proposed that costs should be costs in the cause. I do
not agree with that proposition as it means that eventually the cost will have to be
borne by RAF and the RAF cannot be burdened with costs in a litigation relating
to an event to which it was not a party. Counsel for the appellants offered to waive
his fees in the interest of justice, which is commendable. It is unfortunate that it
has been a costly exercise for the appellants. Having regard to the aforementioned
and for all the reasons given, it follows that the appeal must succeed with no order
as to costs.

[18] In the result, the following order is granted:
The appeal is upheld with no order as to costs.
The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘The referral by the taxing master in terms of rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) is dismissed.’

Y T MBATHA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances

For the appellants
B P Geach SC
Instructed by:
Du Toit-Smuts Attorneys, Johannesburg
Pieter Skein Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For the respondent:
C Bernman
Instructed by:
Road Accident Fund, Pretoria.
State attorney, Mpumalanga, Mbombela (on a
noting or watching brief)
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:

05 December 2023
Status:
Immediate
The following summary is for the benefit of the media in the reporting of this case and does not
form part of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Danny Joseph Sibiya and Others v Road Accident Fund (1067/2022) [2023] ZASCA 171 (05 December
2023)
Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment upholding an appeal against the
decision of the Mpumalanga Division of the High Court, Mbombela (the high court), with no order as to
costs and replaced it with the following order: ‘The referral by the taxing master in terms of rule
70(5A)(d)(ii) has been dismissed’
The common cause facts were that on 4 March 2014, Mr Sibiya, appointed D-S Attorneys to lodge a
claim against the RAF for damages which arouse from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 16
February 2014. He signed an attorney and client fee agreement with D-S Attorneys for their services.
On 8 October 2021 the RAF conceded the merits of Mr Sibiya’s claim and tendered payment of his
costs on a party and party scale. The party and party bill of costs was subsequently set down for taxation
on 3 February 2022. As early as 24 January 2022, Mr Krige had already filed an affidavit with the taxing
master to the effect that no contingency fee agreement existed between Mr Sibiya and D-S Attorneys.
On the date of the taxation, the taxing master adjourned the proceedings and furnished Mr Krige with a
letter of even date. The letter acknowledged that the Mr Krige had attached an affidavit to the bill of
costs to the effect that no contingency fee agreement existed between D-S Attorneys and Mr Sibiya. In
addition, the taxing master posed several follow-up questions to D-S Attorneys relating to issues of
contingency fees. It was further conveyed to Mr Krige that the information required by the taxing master
was for the purposes of approaching one of the judges in chambers in terms of rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) of the
Uniform Rules of Court (the Rules) for directions regarding bringing the taxation of the bill of costs to
finality. Mr Krige was directed to furnish his response by way of an affidavit to be filed by no later than
10 February 2022.
In summary, Mr Krige’s response was that Mr Sibiya did not pay cash for their services as the matter
had not yet been finalised, save for the merits which had been settled; that Mr Sibiya would only be
required to settle their fees once the matter had been finalised in toto; that no fees had been agreed
upon hence the taxation was required; that the costs to be paid by the RAF after taxation of the bill of
costs would be taken into account once the matter had been finalised;  that no fees had been paid by
Mr Sibiya and that he would be debited for professional services rendered as per attorney and client
fee in terms of the agreement signed by him once the issue of quantum had been dealt with. As regards
the reference to rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) Mr Krige confirmed that he was unaware of any misbehaviour. Mr
Krige did not receive any further communication from the Judge President. On 2 June 2022, the high
court delivered an extensive joint judgment under case number 557/2016, in Danny J Sibiya v RAF and
Anita Ernesto Chiau v The RAF, case number 1150/20 and ordered that the fee agreement entered
between D-S Attorneys and Mr Sibiya be reviewed and set aside due to its illegality and that  Mr Sibiya
was not obliged to pay any fee or costs to his or her attorneys of record; that taxation thereof to be
stayed over until finalisation of the case in its entirety; that the Legal Practice Council (LPC) to consider
whether the conduct of Mr Krige in concluding the fee agreement as he did which has now been found
to be illegal, constituted unprofessional conduct and if so to take such steps as it might deem

appropriate;  that the LPC advise the plaintiff to consider instructing another attorney to proceed with
his matter to its finality and the plaintiff should also be advised that he was not obliged to pay anything
to the attorneys of record due to the illegality of the fee agreement.
The appellants applied for leave to appeal the high court’s judgment and order, however, such
application was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the application for leave to appeal from the
high court, they petitioned this Court for leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the high
court.  On 28 September 2022, they were granted leave to appeal to this Court. The RAF, cited as the
respondent, did not oppose this appeal. It abided by the decision of this Court.
Before this Court, the three appellants challenged the aforementioned orders on procedural and
substantive grounds: first, that the court a quo formulated a judgment in chambers in the absence of
the appellants and without affording them an opportunity to be heard in regard to the specific relief
granted; secondly, that the orders had the effect of depriving D-S Attorneys and Mr Krige of their earned
fee for services rendered to Mr Sibiya; third, that the court was wrong in finding that the fee agreement
with Mr Sibiya was illegal and therefore unenforceable; and lastly, that the court findings were premised
on a misdirection of fact and law.
The SCA held that it was clear from the language of the provision that rule 70(5A)(d)(ii) was not a
referral for consideration of a contingency fee, or attorney and client fee agreements. Its purpose was
to deal with misbehaviour of a party and his or her legal representative, or both, before a taxing master
and nothing else. It was not, according to the SCA, a mechanism for bringing the fee agreement before
a court, for determination of whether it was a contingency fee agreement or not. There was furthermore,
no evidence of any misbehaviour. The approach adopted by the Judge President’s office was
procedurally flawed and irregular. The SCA further held that the high court erred in not informing nor
inviting the parties, including the RAF, to make representations regarding the fee agreement and its
legality. The rules of court required the parties to file their affidavits and heads of argument before the
matter was served before a Judge for a hearing. The rules serves to regulate the conduct of proceedings
in civil and criminal matters and govern how a case may be commenced, the service of processes and
setting down of matters for hearing in an open court. In that regard, no court could mero motu in
chambers deal with matters that were not properly placed before it.  The handling of the matter by the
court in chambers was irregular, a hearing by ambush and a breach of one of the fundamental principles
of our law, the right to be heard. The SCA pointed out that the audi alteram partem rule was a
fundamental principle of our law enshrined in the Constitution. Every litigant was entitled to be afforded
a hearing before a court of law. It further held that the high court had a duty to act procedurally fair to
the three appellants as its decision had an adverse impact on their rights. By inviting the appellants to
participate in the proceedings would have contributed to the accuracy of the decision of the court. In
addition, according to the SCA, the Judge President failed to have sight of the fee agreement. There
was no attempt to engage with its contents, although inferences were drawn from it albeit not a
document before the court. These in themselves represented an egregious breach of fundamental rules
of judicial etiquette. In the result the appeal must succeed.

~~~~ends~~~~