THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 116/08

SILOUETTE INVESTMENTS LIMITED

Appellant

and

VIRGIN HOTELS GROUP LIMITED

Respondent

Neutral citation:
SILOUETTE INVESTMENTS LTD v VIRGIN HOTELS
GROUP LTD (116/08) [2009] ZASCA 40 (31 MARCH
2009)

Coram:
FARLAM, NAVSA, MTHIYANE, MLAMBO et
CACHALIA JJA

Heard:
17 FEBRUARY 2009

Delivered:
31 MARCH 2009

Summary:
Extinctive Prescription – whether debtor 'outside the
Republic' in terms  of s 13(1)(b) of Prescription Act 68 of
1969 – whether interruption of prescription effected by
service of summons lapsed in terms of s 15(2) of the Act
when summons amended so as to substitute new
plaintiff, after which summons re-amended so as to re-
introduce original plaintiff.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from:
High Court Johannesburg (Joffe J sitting as a court of first
instance).

The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those occasioned by the
employment of two counsel.

JUDGMENT

FARLAM JA (NAVSA, MTHIYANE, MLAMBO et CACHALIA JJA
concurring)

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of Joffe J, sitting in the
Johannesburg High Court, in which he upheld a special plea of prescription
raised by the respondent, Virgin Hotels Group Limited, against a claim for
R561 308-41 brought against it by the appellant, Silouette Investments
Limited.

FACTS
[2] In 2001, the appellant, together with its co-plaintiff, Ajubatis Properties
(Pty) Ltd, instituted action against the respondent for amounts owing under a
written agreement for the sale of shares in a company, Investment Facility
Company Forty (Pty) Ltd. Separate amounts were claimed by the appellant
and Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd.

[3] On 16 November 2004 the appellant and its co-plaintiff gave notice of

their intention to amend the particulars of claim by (a) substituting one John
Brook Dyer as the plaintiff and (b) alleging that Mr Dyer during 2003 had
acquired, by cession, their claims against the respondent. The amendments
sought were effected on 15 April 2005.

[4] The respondent pleaded to the amended particulars of claim. One of
the defences raised in the plea was that in terms of the sale agreement the
sellers, ie, the appellant and its erstwhile co-plaintiff, were not entitled to cede
any of their rights.

[5] This defence led to a further amendment to the particulars of claim in
terms of which the appellant was substituted for Mr Dyer as the plaintiff in the
action and the appellant claimed its share of the amount outstanding (its claim
for which it had purported to cede to Mr Dyer). Notice of this amendment was
given in October 2006 and the amendment was effected on 10 November
2006.

[6] The respondent then pleaded to the re-amended particulars of claim,
raising a special plea of prescription as well as pleading defences on the
merits (with which it is unnecessary to deal in this judgment).

[7] The special plea of prescription was based on s 11(d) of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969. The averments pleaded in support thereof may
be summarised as follows:
(a)
the debt was due on or before 30 September 2001;
(b)
during April 2006 the appellant and its co-plaintiff were replaced by Mr
Dyer as the plaintiff;
(c)
during November 2006 Mr Dyer was replaced by the appellant as the
plaintiff;
(d)
the question as to whether the appellant's claim has prescribed must
be determined by reference to the amendment which most recently
made it a party to the proceedings, ie, the amendment effected on 10
November 2006.

[8] At the commencement of the trial Joffe J ruled mero motu, in terms of
rule 33(4), that the special plea be determined before any other issues.

[9] After argument, the learned judge gave judgment upholding the special
plea. Before his judgment is summarised it will be convenient if the relevant
provisions of Act 68 of 1969 are set out.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[10] Section 11(d) provides that the period of prescription in respect of a
debt such as the one presently under consideration shall be three years.

[11] Section 12(1) provides that subject to subsections (2) and (3), which
are not relevant in this case, prescription shall commence to run as soon as
the debt is due.

[12] Section 13 deals with circumstances in which completion of
prescription is delayed. Subsection (1) provides as follows:
'(1)
If─
(a)
the creditor is a minor or is insane or is a person under curatorship or is prevented by
superior force including any law or any order of court from interrupting the running of
prescription as contemplated in section 15(1); or
(b)
the debtor is outside the Republic; or
(c)
the creditor and debtor are married to each other; or
(d)
the creditor and debtor are partners and the debt is a debt which arose out of the
partnership relationship; or
(e)
the creditor is a juristic person and the debtor is a member of the governing body of
such juristic person; or
(f)
the debt is the object of a dispute subjected to arbitration; or
(g)
the debt is the object of a claim filed against the estate of a debtor who is deceased
or against the insolvent estate of the debtor or against a company in liquidation or
against an applicant under the Agricultural Credit Act, 1966; or
(h)
the creditor or the debtor is deceased and an executor of the estate in question has
not yet been appointed; and
(i)
the relevant period of prescription would, but for the provisions of this subsection, be
completed before or on, or within one year after, the day on which the relevant
impediment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) has ceased to
exist,

the period of prescription shall not be completed before a year has elapsed after the day
referred to in paragraph (i).'

[13] Section 15, as far as is material, provides as follows:
'(1)
The running of prescription shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be
interrupted by the service on the debtor of any process whereby the creditor claims payment
of the debt.
(2)
Unless the debtor acknowledges liability, the interruption of prescription in terms of
subsection (1) shall lapse, and the running of prescription shall not be deemed to have been
interrupted, if the creditor does not successfully prosecute his claim under the process in
question to final judgment or if he does so prosecute his claim but abandons the judgment or
the judgment is set aside.
. . .
(6)
For the purposes of this section, "process" includes a petition, a notice of motion, a
rule nisi, a pleading in reconvention, a third party notice referred to in any rule of court, and
any document whereby legal proceedings are commenced.'

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT A QUO
[14] The only point considered by the learned judge in the court a quo
related to the question as to whether the service of the original summons in
this matter, in terms of which the appellant together with Ajubatis Properties
(Pty) Ltd claimed monies from the respondent, interrupted prescription. In his
view it did not because, as he put it, they 'did not prosecute their claim until
final judgment.' When the amendment introducing Mr Dyer as the plaintiff was
effected, he held, the appellant and Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd
'fell out the proceedings. Furthermore in terms of s 15(2) of the act, the summons issued by
them did not have the effect of interrupting prescription.'

GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[15] In its application for leave to appeal (which Joffe J granted) the
appellant sought leave to appeal on the ground that the proceedings which
were commenced by way of summons at the instance of the appellant and
Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd were not terminated by the substitution of Mr
Dyer as the plaintiff and that the re-introduction of the appellant as the plaintiff
in the place of Mr Dyer did not constitute a fresh action which commenced
only after the debt allegedly owing by the respondent to the appellant had

prescribed.

[16] In the heads of argument filed on behalf of the appellant by counsel
(who had not appeared in the High Court) the judgment of the court a quo was
attacked on two grounds: the ground on which leave was granted and a new
ground to the effect that the prescription of the appellant's claim had been
interrupted, in terms of s 13(1)(b) of the Act, because at all material times the
respondent had been outside the Republic. This submission was based on
the fact that the respondent is a foreign company, incorporated and registered
in the United Kingdom, with its chosen domicilium citandi et executandi at an
address in London. The appellant applied at the hearing of the appeal for
leave to file a replication to the respondent's special plea in which this ground
was specifically pleaded. The respondent not having opposed the application,
the application was granted.

[17] The appellant's replication reads as follows:
'1.At all times material hereto:
1.1.
The defendant's citation has been as pleaded in the particulars of claim, namely, the
defendant has been incorporated and registered in accordance with the Laws of
England and Wales under registration number 2857671, and with its chosen
domicilium citandi et executandi at 120 Campden Hill Road, London, V87AR, United
Kingdom.

1.2.
The defendant has accordingly been outside the Republic, as contemplated by
section 13(1)(b) of the Prescription Act, 68 of 1969 ("the Act").

2.
At no stage has the above impediment ceased to exist, for the purposes of section
13(1)(i) of the Act.

3.
In the premises, any period of prescription relied upon by the defendant has not been
completed.

WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays that the defendant's special plea be dismissed with costs.'

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
[18] In argument before this court counsel for the appellant contended that
the court a quo erred in two respects. Its first error was the result, so it was

contended, of its failure to have regard to the fact that the respondent debtor
is a British company and accordingly that s 13(1)(b) of the Act applied so as to
delay the completion of the period of prescription. It was contended further
that the respondent, being a peregrine company, was ex facie the admitted
facts on the pleadings at all relevant times absent from the Republic. It was
pointed out that the respondent is not an external company with its
memorandum registered in this country as was the case in Dithaba Platinum
(Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd 1985 (4) SA 615 (T).

[19] Counsel also contended that the fact that the respondent was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the South African court, either by owning
property in this country or by consenting to the jurisdiction of the High Court,
does not detract from the fact that the respondent remained absent from the
Republic: in support of this submission counsel referred to Grinaker
Mechanicals (Pty) Ltd v Societé Francaise Industriale et D'Equipment 1976
(4) SA 98(C), esp at 102A-H.

[20] Since the respondent has at all material times been absent from the
Republic, the argument proceeded, and the respondent itself led no evidence
nor suggested that that was not the case, the running of prescription could not
be completed before one year had elapsed after the respondent ceased to be
absent from the Republic – 'if that were ever to occur.' It was accordingly
submitted that as the relevant impediment never ceased the period of
prescription provided in s 13 has never been completed.

[21] The court a quo's second error, according to the argument of counsel
for the appellant, consisted in holding that s 15(2) of the Act applied. Counsel
submitted that it was not in dispute on the common cause facts that by the
institution of the original proceedings in 2001 the running of prescription in
respect of the claim against the respondent was interrupted. They contended
that, despite the substitution of Mr Dyer as the plaintiff in 2005 and the
subsequent re-substitution of the appellant in 2006 as the plaintiff in respect of
part of the original claim, 'the process that commenced with the institution of
action [in 2001] is in substance the same process that was being conducted at

the instance of the appellant when the matter came before Joffe J' and
'section 15(2) of the . . . Act could have had no application.'

[22] They went on to submit that the significance of the phrase 'the process
in question' is apparent if regard is had to the memorandum on the draft bill
prepared for the South African Law Commission by the late Professor JC de
Wet in which the mischief at which s 15(2) is directed is set out. The
memorandum in question is published in JC de Wet: Opuscula Miscellanea:
Regsgeleerde Lesings en Adviese (1979) at pp 77 et seq. In the passage on
which counsel relied (at p 128) Professor De Wet said that the service of a
summons ought
'sy stuitende werking te verloor indien die skuldeiser die proses nie aan die gang hou nie,
anders kan dit gebeur dat die skuldeiser telkens deur dagvaarding die loop van verjaring stuit
en daardeur die toestand van onsekerheid verleng. Indien my voorstel aanvaar word sal die
diening van dagvaarding sy stuitende werking verloor indien die skuldeiser die dagvaarding
intrek, aliter Djaperides v Federal Insurance Corporation of SA Ltd 1955 (2) SA 396 (W) of the
hof die gedaagde van die instansie absolveer, aliter Pistorius & Kie v Steyn 1958 (3) SA 440
(T).'

[23] Counsel argued that the appellant had acted diligently in instituting the
proceedings in 2001, that the substitution of Mr Dyer as plaintiff and its
resubstitution did not evince a subjective intention on the part of the appellant,
which at all times remained the creditor, to release the respondent from the
debt owed and that 'the same proceedings (as that expression is generally
used) were still in esse before Joffe J.' Although there had been a substitution
of plaintiff the same debt had throughout been pursued by way of the same
litigation. The appellant, they submitted, had continued to prosecute its claim
'under the process in question' (viz the summons issued in 2001) and there
had accordingly been no lapsing of the interruption of prescription.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
[24] Counsel for the respondent submitted that on a proper construction of
s 13(1)(b) of the Act the respondent was not 'outside the Republic'. It was
pointed out that the original summons in this matter was served in South
Africa on the respondent in the following circumstances:

(a)
the respondent agreed to accept service care of its South African
attorneys; and
(b)
the shareholders' agreement on which the appellant's cause of action
is based provided that the parties thereto submitted themselves to the
non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Johannesburg High Court for the
purposes of any proceedings arising out of or in connection with the
agreement.

[25] Pointing to the fact that the absence of a debtor from the Republic is
described in s 13(1)(i) as an 'impediment', they submitted that at no stage was
the registration of the respondent as a foreign company an impediment to the
service of summons in South Africa.

[26] They contended further that the argument raised by the appellant
leads, as they put it, to the 'absurd conclusion' that despite the respondent's
having consented to be sued in South Africa, the appellant's claim against the
respondent will never prescribe because the respondent will always be absent
from the Republic.

[27] With regard to the contention raised by the appellant's counsel based
on s 15(2) of the Act counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant
did not prosecute its claim under the original summons to final judgment and
accordingly the interruption of prosecution by that process lapsed.

[28] Referring to the fact that the amendment of October 2006, in which
notice was given that the appellant was to be substituted for Mr Dyer as the
plaintiff, qualifies as process under s 15(6) (see Mias de Klerk Boerdery
(Edms) Bpk v Cole 1986 (2) SA 284 (N) at 287I-288B), counsel for the
respondent submitted that this is the process whereby it now claims the debt
and under which, if it were to obtain judgment in its favour, it would
successfully prosecute its claim to final judgment. Without the October 2006
notice of amendment the appellant could not have claimed payment of the
debt.

[29] Counsel for the respondent contended further that if their argument on
this point were to be upheld this would not be at variance with the mischief s
15(2) was designed to prevent. This was because the appellant had not kept
its original process going.

[30] It followed, so they submitted, that the second point raised by the
appellant also had to be rejected.

DISCUSSION
(i)
Was the respondent 'outside the Republic' in terms of s 13(1)(b)?
[31] As appears from s 13 read as a whole the fact that a debtor is outside
the Republic (as a result of which the completion of prescription is delayed) is
regarded by the legislature as an 'impediment'. The various impediments
listed in s 13(1) are circumstances which, as Professor M M Loubser puts it in
his work Extinctive Prescription at p 117, 'have in common some legal or
practical problem which makes it difficult or undesirable for a creditor to
institute proceedings for the enforcement of his claim against the debtor.' See
also ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd 1999 (3) SA 924
(SCA) at 930I-931A, where it was said that '(t)he word impediment . . . covers
a wide spectrum of situations ranging from those in which it would not be
possible in law for the creditor to sue to those in which it might be difficult or
awkward, but not impossible, to sue.' Where, as in the present case, the
debtor has not only consented to the jurisdiction of the South African Court
but also agreed to accept service of process care of its South African
attorneys1 there is no circumstance which gives rise to a problem which
creates a difficult or undesirable situation for a creditor seeking to institute
legal proceedings against the debtor in this country. Is it likely that Parliament
would have intended the completion of prescription to be delayed in those
circumstances? The only purpose that it would serve would be to prevent
prescription from ever being completed against the respondent, which as the
respondent's counsel submitted, would lead to an absurd conclusion. It

1 On the face of the original summons the following appears after the name and address of
the respondent: 'who has agreed to accept service care of its attorneys, Bowman Gilfillan
Incorporated, 9th Floor, Twin Towers West, Sandton City, Sandton, Johannesburg.'

certainly would not advance the evident purpose of the provision, which is to
assist a creditor which has a legal or practical problem in relation to the
institution of legal proceedings in South Africa against its debtor.

[32] I think that to interpret the phrase 'outside the Republic' as covering a
case where, although the debtor itself is physically outside the Republic, it has
consented to the jurisdiction of the South African courts in respect of a claim
and has a representative here whom it has authorised to receive service on its
behalf of any process in which the claim in question is sought to be enforced
would give a meaning to the provision under consideration which Parliament
could never have intended.

[33] The first South African statute which provided for the completion of
prescription to be delayed while the debtor was 'absent from the Colony' was
s 6 of the Prescription Amendment Act 6 of 1861 (Cape), which was based on
s 19 of the Act for the Amendment of the Law and the better Advancement of
Justice, 4&5 Anne, c 16, passed by the English Parliament in 1705. Similar
legislation to the Cape act was passed in Natal (s 10 of Law 14 of 1861), the
Orange Free State (s 6 of Chapter XXIII of the Law Book) and the Transvaal
(s 11(2) of Act 26 of 1908). The pre-Union statutes were repealed by the
Prescription Act 18 of 1943, which provided in s 7(1)(c) for the suspension of
prescription 'during the absence of the debtor from the Union for a period
exceeding six months' and in s 10 that '(w)hen the debtor is absent from the
Union extinctive prescription shall not begin to run until the date of his return'
(which was interpreted as meaning the date when the debor ceased to be
absent: see Grinaker's case, supra, at 100C to 102A, and the authorities there
referred to).

[34] The provision in the statute from Queen Anne's reign on which s 6 of
the Cape Act of 1861 was based was also copied, with various forms of
wording, in the various states of the United States of America, where
suspending or stopping the running of a statute of limitations is called 'tolling'
('it is analogous to a clock stopping then restarting', 51 American
Jurisprudence 2d, para 169). A very informative annotation headed 'Absence

as Tolling Statute of Limitations' is to be found in 55 American Law Reports 3d
at p 1158 et seq. It is an annotation on Byrne v Ogle (1971 Alaska) 55 ALR 3d
1151, a decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska. The annotation collects and
discusses
American
cases
considering
whether
and
under
what
circumstances a provision 'tolling' the statute of limitations while a party is
outside the jurisdiction applies where, notwithstanding such absence, the
party remains amenable to service of process which subjects him to the
personal jurisdiction of the state.2 As is to be expected, the American courts
have not spoken with one voice on the topic, nor have the statutory provisions
considered been uniformly drafted. Many of the cases discussed have turned
on the particular wording of the statutes under consideration. In others,
however, general considerations apart from the construction of particular
tolling provisions have been discussed and these cases raise points which
have relevance in the present context. In particular at pp 1186-1187 Kenneth
J Rampino, the author of the annotation, refers to a series of cases, the latest
of which was Byrne v Ogle, supra, in which it was held that the purpose of the
statute of limitations, that of eliminating stale claims, would be contravened if
the running of the period were suspended during mere physical absence of a
party who remained subject to personal jurisdiction by some form of
substituted process.

[35] The present case is, of course, stronger than the American cases to
which I have referred because here it was possible for the appellant to serve
the original summons served on the respondent not by substituted service but
by service on its own attorneys who were authorised to receive service on its
behalf.

[36] As I have said the appellant's counsel relied strongly on the decision in
Grinaker Mechanicals Ltd, supra, which was cited as authority for the
proposition that
'(t)here is nothing in the wording of sec 10 [of the 1943 Prescription Act] to justify the

2 After their attention had been drawn to the American authorities on the point, counsel on
both sides submitted supplementary heads of argument dealing therewith, for which I wish to
express my gratitude.

conclusion that the Legislature intended to confer the benefit of prescription upon a debtor
who, despite his continued absence from the Republic, became amenable to be sued in
respect of his debt in a Republican Court. If that was the intention of the Legislature it
certainly has not been made apparent in the terms of sec 10.'

[37] The debtor in Grinaker's case was a company incorporated according
to the laws of France and carrying on business in Paris. At all relevant times it
was physically absent from the Republic. In an action brought against it for
moneys due under a contract for work and labour it filed a special plea that
the plaintiff's claim had prescribed as the cause of action arose prior to 1
October 1968 and the summons was served on 4 December 1974, although it
had been issued on 13 January 1969. In response to a request for particulars
by the plaintiff the defendant stated that it was a peregrinus and had never
been present in the Republic of South Africa. The plaintiff took exception to
the plea on the ground that as the defendant had at all material times been
absent from the Republic within the meaning of s 10 of the 1943 Prescription
Act the period of extinctive prescription had not begun to run against the
plaintiff.

[38] The defendant then sought to amend its special plea by inserting an
averment to the effect that on 18 December 1968 and by order of the Cape
Provincial Division the plaintiff attached property of the defendant ad
fundandam jurisdiction, from which date the plaintiff's right of action against
the defendant became enforceable in the Cape Provincial Division.

[39] The application to amend the special plea was refused and the
exception taken to it was upheld on the basis that the insertion of the
averment summarised above would not save it from being excipiable. The
reason for this conclusion is set out in the passage cited above.

[40] It is thus clear that the amenability to the court's jurisdiction which was
held not to lead to the conclusion that the debtor was no longer 'absent' was
based on the attachment ad fundandam jurisdictionem of its property. As is
well known, an attachment of a debtor's property to found jurisdiction does not

render the debtor personally liable to the court's jurisdiction. A judgment
obtained on the strength thereof only binds the property attached and has no
extra-territorial force and obligation: Jamieson v Sabingo 2002 (4) SA 49
(SCA) at 58G-H. On the other hand a judgment founded on voluntary
submission to jurisdiction by a debtor would bind the debtor personally and
would be internationally enforceable: ibid at 58H. The amenability to
jurisdiction discussed in the Grinaker case only concerned jurisdiction based
on an attachment to found jurisdiction. Other considerations may well apply
where the amenability to jurisdiction arises from a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction by the debtor. Indeed it has been decided in the United States 'by
the great weight of authority' that the suspension of the running of the statute
of limitations is not prevented by the fact that the absent defendant had
property in the state which might have been subject to attachment before the
expiration of the period of limitation, without the necessity of personal service
on the defendant: see Annotation at 119 ALR 331 at 337 et seq.

[41] It is not necessary, however, in this case to decide whether amenability
to jurisdiction over the debtor personally in circumstances where a judgment
can be given which can be enforced against him internationally will lead to the
conclusion that he is not to be regarded as 'outside the Republic' for the
purposes of s 13(1)(b) of the Act. I say that because I am satisfied that the
combined effect of the submission by the respondent to the court's jurisdiction
and the authorisation to its attorneys to accept service of the summons clearly
leads to the conclusion, for the reasons I have stated, that it would go beyond
the purpose of s 13(1)(b) if it were held that the respondent in this matter,
despite what it had done to remove any difficulty or awkwardness which the
appellant might otherwise have encountered in an attempt to institute
proceedings against it to claim the debt allegedly owing in this matter, was
'outside the Republic'. It follows that the first contention advanced by the
appellant's counsel must fail.

(ii)
Does s 15(2) apply?
[42] In regard to the second point raised by counsel for the appellant I
agree with the argument of counsel for the respondent that if the appellant

were to obtain final judgment in its favour in this matter, the process under
which it would obtain such judgment would be the notice of amendment of
November 2006. It follows that s 15(2) of the Act applied and the interruption
of prescription brought about by service of the original summons lapsed. In
the circumstances the second point raised by the appellant's counsel must
also fail.

ORDER
[43] The following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those occasioned by the
employment of two counsel.
…………….
IG FARLAM

APPEARANCES:

FOR APPELLANT:
J J GAUNTLETT SC

J C BUTLER SC

Instructed by
Routledge Modise in Association with Eversheds
Johannesburg

McIntyre & Van der Post Bloemfontein

FOR RESPONDENT:
A F BHAM SC

W PYE

Instructed by

Bowman Gilfillan Inc Johannesburg

Lovius-Block Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE:
31 MARCH 2009

STATUS:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal brought by Silouette
Investments Ltd against a judgment delivered by Mr Justice Joffe, sitting in the
Johannesburg High Court, in which he upheld a special plea of prescription raised
against it by the respondent, Virgin Hotels Group Ltd.

The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected two arguments advanced by the appellant's
counsel that their client's claim had not prescribed. The first argument was based on
the fact that Virgin Hotels Group Ltd was an English Company and was accordingly
outside the Republic with the result that the completion of prescription against it was
delayed.

The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the respondent could not be regarded as being
outside the Republic for the purposes of the Prescription Act because it had submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Johannesburg High Court and had agreed that the summons
in the case could be served on its Johannesburg attorneys.

The appellant's counsel had also argued that the running of prescription had been
interrupted by the service of the original summons in the case in 2001 in which it had
figured as a co-plaintiff. Subsequently the summons had been amended and it and its
co-plaintiff had been replaced by a Mr Dyer, but thereafter it had come back into the
case as plaintiff when the summons was re-amended.

The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with Mr Justice Joffe that the interruption of
prescription effected by the service of the original summons had lapsed when it was
amended and Mr Dyer had become the plaintiff.