THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 161/12
Reportable
In the matter between:

THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE RIVONIA PRIMARY               FIRST APPELLANT
SCHOOL
RIVONIA PRIMARY SCHOOL                                                  SECOND APPELLANT

and

MEC FOR EDUCATION:  GAUTENG PROVINCE
FIRST RESPONDENT
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT: GAUTENG DEPARTMENT        SECOND RESPONDENT
OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT DIRECTOR:  JOHANNESBURG EAST D9 –           THIRD RESPONDENT
GAUTENG DEPARTMENTOF EDUCATION
CELE:  STHABILE                                                                  FOURTH RESPONDENT
MACKENZIE:  AUBREY                                                             FIFTH RESPONDENT
DRYSDALE: CAROL                                                                  SIXTH RESPONDENT
AMICI CURIAE, EQUAL EDUCATION AND
THE CENTRE FOR CHILD LAW

Neutral citation:
The Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School v MEC for
Education: Gauteng Province (161/12) [2012] ZASCA 194
(30 November 2012)
Coram:
Nugent, Cachalia, Shongwe, Wallis JJA and Saldulker AJJA

Heard:
16 November 2012

Delivered:
30 November 2012

Summary:
In terms of s 5(5) read with s 5A of the South African Schools Act
84 of 1996 the governing body of a public school has authority to determine the
capacity of a school as an incident of its admission policy. Provincial education
authorities may not ‘override’ the policy.

____________________________________________________________________

ORDER
____________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (Mbha J sitting as court
of first instance):

The appeal is upheld with costs, such costs to be paid by the first, second and third
respondents. The order of the high court is, save for paras 6 and 7 thereof, set aside
and the following order substituted in its place:
‘It is declared that the instruction given to the principal of the Rivonia Primary School
to admit the learner contrary to the school’s admission policy, and the placing of the
learner in the school, were unlawful.’

JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________

CACHALIA JA (NUGENT, SHONGWE, WALLIS JJA AND SALDULKER AJA
CONCURRING):

[1] What occurred in this case might have occurred at any public school that had a
waiting list for the admission of learners – and there are many such schools. As it
happens, it occurred at a school located in an affluent, historically white suburb, where
a little more than half the learners were white. Much was made of that in the judgment
of the court below, and in the affidavits filed by the respondents, and in argument that
was advanced before us on their behalf, but none of it is relevant to this appeal. The
issues before us concern the structure of governance of all public schools, wherever
located, whatever their circumstances, and whatever the composition of their learners.

[2] The school concerned is Rivonia Primary School. It declined to admit a child to
its Grade 1 class for the 2011 school year, because she was twentieth on the waiting
list, against the insistence of her mother. The mother persisted in her demand that the

child be admitted and garnered the support in her cause of officials of the Gauteng
Department of Education. Some weeks into the school year the head of the
department (HoD) instructed the principal to admit the child. Before the governing
body could meet to consider the instruction, officials of the department arrived at the
school and summarily deposited the child in a classroom. That high-handed conduct
can only be deprecated.  For reasons I now turn to it was also unlawful.

[3] Governance of public schools is regulated by the South African Schools Act 84
of 1996. Section 5(5) of the Act provides that:
‘[subject] to this Act and any applicable provincial law, the admission policy of a public school
is determined by the governing body of such school.’
The principal question that arises in the appeal is whether that entitles the governing
body to determine the number of learners the school may admit. The provincial
government contends that it falls within its authority to do so, and not the authority of
the governing body.

[4] Rivonia Primary School is a public school situated in one of Johannesburg’s
more affluent, historically white areas. Since the days when schools were racially
segregated, the school’s learner-profile has changed materially. In February 2011 it
had 388 black learners, 52 of whom were in Grade 1. This represented 46% of the
total learners at the school.

[5] The governing body had prepared an admission policy, which the department
accepted on 4 March 2010, in which the capacity of the school was set at 770
learners, of which 120 could be accommodated in Grade 1.

[6] The school’s post provisioning for the 2011 year, funded through the provincial
budget, was a total number of 22 educators – including the principal, a deputy
principal, three heads of department and 17 teachers – determined on the basis of 37
children per class. The school, however, had a lower learner-class ratio of 24 learners
per class – one of the lowest ratios in the province. This is because the governing
body employed 22 additional educators to ensure each child’s adequate supervision.
From 2000 to 2009 the governing body spent R3 251 036 on construction projects
including building nine further classrooms. The parents – not the department – funded

these extra costs. They did so to ensure that their children would have a solid
foundation to equip them for their later school years.

[7] The governing body determined its capacity by taking into account a number of
factors, including its statutory obligation to promote the best interests of the school,
and to ensure its development through the provision of quality education. The number
of educators, their space requirement, the number of designated classrooms, and the
optimum desk working space, were all factored into making this determination. There
is no suggestion that it set its capacity unreasonably or irrationally.

[8] The school opened its application process for admission of children to Grade 1
for the school year starting in January 2011 on 13 July 2010. Over the next few days
many application forms were collected. The mother of one of the children, with whom
this appeal is concerned, collected hers on 15 July and submitted it to the school on
21 July. At this stage the school had handed out 191 application forms of which 139
had been returned. At the time the child’s mother submitted her application for entry to
Grade 1 – which had a capacity of 120 – she was number 140 on the admission list.

[9] On 26 October 2010, the school informed the mother by e-mail that her child’s
application for admission was unsuccessful and that her details had been sent to the
District Office to assist her with finding a place for the child. The e-mail went on to say
that she would be advised in due course where her child may be accommodated.
Meanwhile the child would remain on the waiting list. Similar notices were sent to
other unsuccessful applicants.

[10] On 4 November 2010 the mother wrote to the principal, Ms Carol Drysdale,
asking why her application had not been accepted.  Ms Drysdale gave the reason in a
letter the following day: the school had reached its capacity. The letter also stated that
her application was then number 14 on the waiting list, presumably because some of
the children ahead of her on the waiting list had been accommodated at other schools.

[11] The mother then lodged an appeal against this decision with the MEC for
Education on 5 November 2010. Meanwhile she continued to put pressure on officials
of the department to place her child at the school. There were various meetings

between the governing body, Ms Drysdale and the department’s officials to find a
solution. At a meeting on 30 November 2010 it appears to have been accepted that
the child would have to wait her turn until a place became available. Her mother then
enrolled her at a private school, Lifestyle Montessori School, where she commenced
attending classes on 12 January 2011.

[12] Late in January 2011, with the school year well underway, the mother’s appeal
was brought to the MEC’s attention. Mr Len Davids, the Deputy Director General of
the department, and deponent to the respondents’ answering affidavit, explained the
extraordinary delay in bringing the matter before the MEC as ‘due to administrative
issues’. Bearing in mind that the appeal had been lodged on 5 November, and almost
three months had since passed, this anodyne explanation is hardly acceptable.

[13] The MEC, quite properly, declined to entertain the appeal before the HoD had
dealt with the matter in accordance with reg 13 made under the Gauteng School
Education Act 6 of 1995. This is because reg 14 allows an appeal to the MEC only
after the HoD has considered the matter, which had not happened.1 So the MEC
referred the matter to the HoD for attention.

[14] On 2 February 2011 the matter took a new turn. The HoD, Mr Boy Ngobeni,
informed Ms Drysdale by letter that the school’s ‘tenth day statistics’ revealed that it
had not reached its capacity. (The department uses these statistics to determine the
number of children who have been enrolled at a school.) The letter went on to instruct
her to admit the learner forthwith.

[15] It appears that Mr Ngobeni’s conclusion that the school had not reached its
capacity was based on information gleaned from the statistics, which showed that the
school had admitted 124 learners to Grade 1 even though its stated capacity was only
120. The school, however, explains that it is common practice to accept a few more
learners as substitutes for those who had been accepted but do not arrive to take up
their positions. This explains the discrepancy between the statistics and the actual
number of admitted learners, and refutes Mr Ngobeni’s suggestion that the school had
incorrectly stated its capacity. It is, however, clear that by instructing Ms Drysdale to

1 Regulations 13 and 14. GN 4138, PG 129, 13 July 2001.

admit the child, Mr Ngobeni was not acting on the terms of the mother’s original
complaint and in accordance with reg 13, but on this new information.

[16] Five days later, on 7 February, the mother arrived at the school to have her
child admitted. Ms Drysdale explained that an urgent meeting of the governing body
had been called to discuss the issue, and asked her to leave with her child while the
matter was being resolved. Not satisfied, the mother left after telling Ms Drysdale that
‘she is going straight to the MEC’s office’.

[17] The following day, on 8 February, she returned to the school with her child. This
time she was accompanied by an official from the department, Mr Thlage Petlele, who
was armed with an instruction from Mr Ngobeni to Ms Drysdale to admit the child.
They encountered a representative of the governing body, Mr Paul Lategan, who
requested them to await the outcome of their attempt to resolve the dispute, and not to
subject the child to any further unpleasantness.

[18] Mr Petlele presented a letter to Mr Lategan and Ms Drysdale from Mr Ngobeni.
It stated that Ms Drysdale’s admission function as the principal had been withdrawn.
Some thirty minutes later another official, Mr Babsy Matabane, arrived at the school.
He handed a letter to Ms Drysdale informing her that the admission function had now
been delegated to him.

[19] Mr Lategan again asked the officials to remove the learner pending a resolution
of the dispute. But they were adamant that they were acting on the authority of the
HoD, and they were there to place the learner. Mr Lategan phoned the department’s
legal division to intervene, but the official who responded, Mr Qinso Zwane, was not
willing to entertain his plea.

[20] The two officials, accompanied by a security guard, then proceeded to the
Grade 1 classrooms with the child and her mother. They arrived at one of the
classrooms with the least number of learners and after speaking to the teacher
decided not to place the child in that classroom. They then went to another classroom
where they met a teacher outside that classroom. They asked her to allow them entry
so that they could place the child there and she obeyed. They entered and seated the

child at an empty desk that had been installed earlier that morning for a child with
attention and learning difficulties, and then left.

[21] The appellants – the governing body and the school – applied to the South
Gauteng High Court for declaratory and interdictory relief aimed at the department’s
decision to override the school’s admission policy on capacity, the withdrawal of Ms
Drysdale’s admission function, and the forced admission of the child. In the interests
of the child the appellants commendably abandoned the relief concerning her
admission.

[22] Save for the relief pertaining to the withdrawal of Ms Drysdale’s admission
function, which the court (Mbha J) granted,2 the application was dismissed. With the
leave of the high court the appellants now appeal that order. The respondents do not
cross-appeal the order that the withdrawal of Ms Drysdale’s admission function ‘was
not exercised bona fide and is set aside.’

[23] After leave was granted there was a new development. On 9 May 2012 the
MEC amended the regulations on the admissions of learners to public schools in
Gauteng.3 Regulation 8, as amended, now provides that the HoD – not the governing
body – shall determine the capacity of a school.4 The respondents contended that this
regulation rendered the appeal moot.

2 ‘1. Section 5(5) of the South African Schools Act No 84 of 1996, does not appropriate to a school
governing body the unqualified power to determine a public school’s admission policy.
2. The power to determine the maximum capacity of a public school in Gauteng Province vests in the
Gauteng Department of Education and not in the school governing body.
3. The Gauteng Department of Education has the power to intervene with the school governing body’s
power to determine the admission policy of a public school.
4. The Member of the Executive for Education, Gauteng Province, is the ultimate arbiter whether or not
a learner should be admitted to a public school.
5. The application in respect of prayers 2 to 7, 9 and 10 of the Notice of Motion is dismissed.
6. The application succeeds in respect of prayer 8 of the Notice of Motion.
7. Each party shall pay their own costs.’
3 GN 1160, PG 127, 9 May 2012.
4‘8 Declaring schools full
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of the admission policy of a school, or the provisions of any national
or provincial delegated legislation or any determination made in terms thereof, for the purpose of
placing learners whose applications for admission have not been accepted at any school in the public
schooling system, until such time as norms and standards contemplated in section 5A(2)(b) of the
South African Schools Act are in force the objective entry level learner enrolment capacity of a school
shall be determined by the Head of Department.’

[24] Courts will generally decline to entertain litigation in which there is no live or
existing controversy. That is principally for the benefit of the court so as to avoid it
being called to pronounce upon abstract propositions of law that would amount to no
more than advisory opinions. The principle so far as appeals are concerned is
captured in s 21A of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, which allows an appeal to be
dismissed on the ground alone that the judgment or order sought will have no practical
effect or result.

[25] The lawfulness or otherwise of the HoD’s conduct is certainly a live issue. It
also cannot be said that our decision on the matter will have no practical effect. The
submission that the new regulation has overtaken events assumes that the regulation
is valid – which is not before us to decide – but the proper meaning of the Schools Act
is relevant to deciding that question. Moreover, our decision will indeed have a
practical effect so far as Ms Drysdale, who has an interest in the appeal, is concerned.
We were informed from the bar that she was subjected to disciplinary sanctions for not
complying with the HoD’s instruction. That instruction, as will emerge later in this
judgment, was unlawful. She was given a final warning and had a month’s salary
deducted.

[26] I turn, then, to the structure of governance in public schools.

[27] The first democratically elected Parliament passed the Act soon after the
Constitution was adopted. Its objective, according to the long title, was to ‘[t]o provide
for a uniform system for the organisation, governance and funding of public schools’.
The preamble records that schools would henceforth be governed democratically with
learners, parents and educators assuming this responsibility in partnership with the
State. Public school governance, in the words of the Education White Paper which
preceded the Act, would become part of the country’s new structure of democratic
governance.5 It would represent a radical departure from the model of the authoritarian
control of education of the pre-constitutional era.

5The Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (Education White Paper 2), GN 130, February
1996 (Organisation, Governance and Funding White Paper) para 3.17.

[28] The governance of public schools is now vested in their governing bodies
whose functions, obligations and rights are prescribed.6 Their membership in primary
schools is elected from the learners’ parents, educators and staff members.7 They
may co-opt other members to assist in discharging their functions.8 The principal
serves ex officio on the governing body as a representative of the HoD9 and must
assist the governing body to perform its functions and responsibilities.10 It is implicit in
this that the principal is obliged to implement the policies lawfully determined by the
governing body within its sphere of authority.

[29] A governing body stands in a position of trust towards the school.11 It promotes
the school’s best interests and strives to ensure its development by providing quality
education to the learners.12 Implicit in this model of governance is an acceptance on
the lawmaker’s part that the state cannot provide all the resources for the proper
functioning of a high quality schooling system. So governing bodies are enjoined to
‘take all reasonable measures within [their] means to supplement the resources
supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided by the
school . . .’13

[30] Governing bodies thus have a mandate – indeed, an obligation – to raise
additional funds through the active involvement of the parents, who in return for their
financial contributions are given a direct and meaningful say in school governance and
the employment of school funds.14 Governing bodies set their own school fees and
prepare budgets for approval by the general meeting.15 It is in pursuance of that
injunction that Rivonia Primary School’s governing body has been able to reduce its
learner-educator ratio by building extra classrooms and employing additional
educators.

6 Section 16(1).
7 Section 23(2).
8 Section 23(6).
9 Section 16A(1).
10 Section 16A(3).
11 Section 16(2).
12 Section 20(1).
13 Section 36(1).
14 P J Visser ‘Some Thoughts on Legality and Legal Reform in the Public School Sector’ (2006) 2 TSAR
359 at 360.
15 Section 39.

[31] Section 20(1) details a long list of functions that the governing body performs.
In addition to these the Act explicitly makes language policy,16 religious policy
observance17 and admissions policy18 – the subject of the present dispute – the
responsibility of the governing body.

[32] While school governance is the responsibility of the governing body, the
professional management of the school is undertaken by the principal under the
authority of the HoD.19 In undertaking the professional management of a school a
principal must carry out several duties, including implementing educational
programmes and curriculum activities, managing educators and support staff,20
maintaining the discipline of educators, support staff and learners, and, importantly,
implementing policies and legislative prescriptions.21

[33] Admission to public schools is thus under the control of their governing bodies,
which both devise and implement their admission policies. The HoD is responsible for
the administration of the admission process. The Act specifies that applications for the
admission of learners are made to the department in the manner that the HoD
determines.22 In practice, as happened in this case, the HoD delegates the
administration of this function to principals.23 The HoD, acting through the principal, is
thus responsible both for professional management, and for the administration of
admission, which must necessarily be administered in accordance with the governing
body’s admission policy.

[34] Before I consider the central issue in this appeal – whether a governing body
has the authority to determine school capacity as an incident of admission policy, and
if so whether a provincial authority may override this determination – it must be borne
in mind from what I have said thus far that the structure of the Act and its underlying
philosophy places the governance of the school in the hands of the local community

16 Section 6(2).
17 Section 7.
18 Section 5(5).
19 Section 16(3). Minister of Education, Western Cape v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School 2006
(1) SA 1 (SCA) para 5; The Head of Department: Department of Education, Free State Province v
Welkom High School & Harmony High School [2012] ZASCA 150 (28 September 2012) para 11.
20 Section 16A(ii).
21 Sections 16A2(vi) and 16A2(e).
22 Section 5(7).
23 Section 16A2(iv).

through the governing body, while officials of the department are responsible for
professional management and for the administration of admissions. These functions
are distinct and a failure to see them as such will compromise the objectives of Act
and be at odds with its scheme.

[35] That does not mean, however, that the authority of a governing body to govern
a school is absolute.  The White Paper foresaw that governing bodies might exceed,
or fail to exercise, their powers, and envisaged an oversight role for the provincial
government, which it explained thus:
‘The province would need to reserve the right to intervene to ensure that law and policy were
being upheld, and in particular that funds were properly administered and accounted for.
There would need to be provision for the provincial authority to withdraw certain
responsibilities from a governing body at its own request, or in the event of seriously
unsatisfactory performance.’24

[36] That was embodied in s 22(1) of the Act, which authorises the HoD, on
reasonable grounds, to withdraw any one or more of the functions of a governing
body, but only after informing the governing body of his intentions and the reason
therefor, granting the governing body a reasonable opportunity to make
representations, and giving due consideration to those representations. Any person
aggrieved by a decision of the HoD may appeal to the MEC. But the HoD is only able
to take action under this section if the governing body performs the function allocated
to it or exercises any power conferred on it unreasonably, unconstitutionally or
otherwise unlawfully. He may also intervene under s 25(1) if he determines on
reasonable grounds that the governing body has ceased to perform any function, in
which case he may appoint other persons to perform the function.25 These powers
may be exercised in addition to his right to institute review proceedings against the
governing body. It was not contended that any of these provisions gave him the
authority to override the principal’s decision and to admit the child.

[37] I turn, then, to the main issue raised by this appeal, which is the authority to
determine the capacity of a school. I have pointed out that s 5(5) of the Act expressly

24 Organisation, Governance and Funding White Paper para 3.20.
25 Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (2) SA 415
(CC) paras 72, 81 and generally at paras 82-85.

provides that the admission policy of a school is determined by its governing body.
That must necessarily include the determination of its capacity, which is central to
admission to the school and forward planning, and particularly the determination of its
budget. Any doubt on that score is removed by s 5A, which allows the Minister of
Education to prescribe minimum and uniform norms and standards for ‘the capacity of
a school in respect of the number of learners a school can admit’. The factors to be
taken account of in setting those norms and standards are set out in s 5A(2)(b), and
include the number of teachers and the class size; the quality of performance of a
school; the curriculum and extra-curricular choices; the classroom size and the
utilisation of available classrooms. In terms of s 5A(3) – a critical section – a governing
body must, when compiling its admission policy, comply with these norms and
standards. In the event that the school has an existing policy, it must, in terms of
s 5A(4), within a period of 12 months after the Minister has prescribed the norms and
standards, review its admission policy to ensure its consistency. That the governing
body is enjoined to compile and review its admission policy in accordance with such
norms and standards makes it clear beyond doubt that the admission policy
contemplated by the Act includes the capacity of the school.

[38] Equally clear is the role the Act gives to the provincial authorities – in s 58C – to
ensure compliance with such norms and standards.26 Section 58C(2) imposes an
obligation on an MEC to ensure that a school’s admission policy, which I have said
includes its capacity, accords with national norms and standards. Sections 58C(5) and
(6) set out the duties of the HoD in respect of the determination of infrastructure and
capacity at public schools to ensure compliance with norms and standards. Once the
HoD communicates this determination to the school27 the governing body is able to
take the necessary steps to prepare its budget and fulfil its responsibility to
supplement the school’s resources.28

[39] Thus each of the partners in this tri-partite arrangement – the governing body,
the Minister and the provincial authorities – has defined responsibilities.29 Where the
Minister has determined national norms and standards after consulting the Council of

26 Section 58C inserted by s 11 of Act 31 of 2007.
27 Section 58C6(b).
28 Section 36(1).
29 Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (2) SA 415
(CC) para 56.

Ministers, the governing body must ensure that its admission policy accords with such
norms and standards. (The Minister has not prescribed norms and standards for the
capacity of schools.) In this regard it is accountable to the MEC. The HoD, in turn,
must account to the MEC for ensuring that the norms and standards are met.30

[40] While governing bodies are charged with determining their admission policies,
including the capacity of the school, they do not have a free hand in doing so. The Act
specifies that a school’s admission policy may not be unfairly discriminatory,31 may not
require an admission-test to be administered to a learner32 and may not refuse
admission to a learner because the parent has not paid or is unable to pay the school
fees.33 And as I observed earlier, a governing body must necessarily act reasonably
and rationally when determining its capacity.

[41] Notwithstanding those clear provisions of the Act, the respondents contend that
the provincial government has the final say on the capacity of a school, and is entitled
to override the capacity set by the governing body. They find the source of that alleged
power in ss 3(3) and 3(4). Section 3(3) obliges the MEC to ‘ensure that there are
enough school places so that every child who lives in his or her province can attend
school . . .’. Section 3(4) obliges the MEC, if he or she cannot comply with
subsection (3) because of a lack of capacity existing at the time of commencement of
the Act, to ‘take steps to remedy such lack of capacity as soon as possible’ and to
‘make an annual report to the Minister on the progress achieved in doing so’.

[42] The respondents rely in addition on s 39(2) of the Constitution34, which calls for
the courts to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when
interpreting statutes, which, they submit ‘compels’ us to interpret the provisions in this
manner so as to give effect to the constitutional rights to equality35 and to basic

30 Section 58C(e).
31 Section 5(1).
32 Section 5(2).
33 Section 5(3)(a).
34 Section 39(2) provides: 39 Interpretation of Bill of Rights
‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court,
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
35 Section 9 of the Constitution.

education.36 In this contention they are supported by the amici curiae, Equal Education
and the Centre for Child Law. The high court accepted these contentions.

[43] A plain reading of ss 3(3) and 3(4) makes it clear that they are concerned with
the MEC’s obligation to ensure that infrastructure is provided for compulsory
attendance of all children in the province between the ages of seven and 15 years of
age as envisaged by s 3(1).37 To this end these provisions require the MEC to
determine the infrastructural shortcomings that impede the fulfilment of this objective
and to report annually to the Minister on any remedial steps being taken to remedy
these problems.  They plainly have no relation to the governance of a school.

[44] A contextual reading of these provisions lends further support to this
interpretation. Section 3(1) imposes a duty on every parent to ensure a child’s
attendance at school. A parent who fails to comply with this duty is liable, under s 3(6),
to prosecution. Where the reasons for a child’s absence from school are unknown,
s 3(5) imposes a duty on the HoD to investigate the circumstances of the child’s
absence and to take the necessary remedial steps, including issuing a written notice
to the parent to comply. No mention is made of any duty on a school regarding the
compulsory attendance of children. Quite simply there is no hint in the text of s 3 that
suggests that its purpose is to deal with any issue concerning the admission policy of
a school, much less to override it.

[45] Properly understood, s 3 deals with compulsory attendance and the provision of
infrastructure for this purpose, and s 5 with admissions. Neither section qualifies or
limits the other. There is simply no room in their language to support any other

36Section 29 of the Constitution provides:
‘(1) Everyone has the right–
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively
available and accessible.’
37 Section 3, under the heading ‘Compulsory attendance’, provides:
‘(1) Subject to this Act and any applicable provincial law, every parent must cause every learner for
whom he or she is responsible to attend a school from the first school day of the year in which such
learner reaches the age of seven years until the last school day of the year in which such learner
reaches the age of fifteen years or the ninth grade, whichever occurs first.’

interpretation. The submission of the respondents that the Bill of Rights compels their
interpretation requires us to ignore the language to achieve what they believe would
be a socially desirable result – giving them the power to override the policies of
governing bodies to advance the objectives of the Constitution. The lawmaker chose
to give the power over admission policy to governing bodies so as to promote
democratic school governance. And it limited the provincial education department’s
role to the ‘minimum required for legal accountability’.38 I find nothing constitutionally
offensive about this choice.

[46] The facts of the case show how misplaced the respondents’ reliance on ss 3(3)
and 3(4) is. The parent of the child and the department were not faced with the
problem that the child would not be able to attend a school or be denied the right to
receive a basic education – she had already been admitted to another school. Nor
was the child’s right to equality at issue. On the contrary had the school succumbed to
the department’s pressure to admit the child while others were awaiting their turn on
the waiting list ahead of her, it would have unfairly given her preference over those
children.

[47] The facts also show that the department accepted the school’s admission
policy in March 2010 and received the updated policy in line with reg 2(3).39 Both
policies appear to have been carefully considered: they demonstrate that the
governing body had determined the school’s capacity rationally after considering a
range of factors relating to its available facilities and programmes. The first policy
determined the capacity at 770 learners, and the second at 840. Included among the
policy objectives are to ensure that the admission of learners is done in a ‘fair,
practical and transparent manner’ and that ‘no learner will be unfairly discriminated
against’.

[48] Once having determined its admission policy it remains for the governing body
to apply that policy. It is within the power of a governing body to apply its policy flexibly
to meet the exigencies of a particular case – indeed, in this case the admission policy
of Rivonia Primary School expressly reserved its right to exceed its capacity – and it

38 See Organisation, Governance and Funding White Paper para 3.17.
39 Regulation 2(3) provides that the governing body must make a copy of the admission policy of the
school available to the Head of Department for certification.

must naturally exercise that power when the occasion demands. Just as it must act
rationally and reasonably when determining its policy so it must act rationally and
reasonably in its application.

[49] Counsel for the respondents contended that because the school was able to
reduce its learner-educator ratio, this imposed an obligation on it to admit the child,
failing which the MEC had the duty to override the school’s refusal to do so. But as I
have said the school has been able to improve its learner-educator ratio in the lower
grades by investing substantial funds for which the parents have themselves paid. I
agree with the appellants’ contention that it is perverse for the department to use this
fact to compel the school to accept more children. Were the department to be correct
that would operate as a disincentive for parents to contribute by way of fees and
fundraising to improve the quality of education of their schools, and would be at odds
with their obligation under s 36(1) to supplement resources supplied by the State,
according to their means.

[50] Once Rivonia Primary School’s governing body lawfully adopted its admission
policy, then subject to what I have said above regarding the HoD’s authority to
intervene where this power is exercised unreasonably, unconstitutionally, or otherwise
unlawfully, it bound the MEC and the HoD. They could not ignore it much less override
it, no matter how well meaning. The HoD was quite entitled to ask the governing body
to exercise the discretion embodied in the policy to exceed its capacity, so as to
accommodate a learner who had not been placed, and the governing body would be
obliged to consider such a request on reasonable and rational grounds. If the
governing body or the principal on its behalf exercised that discretion on an incorrect
basis and refused to admit the child, the Act and the regulations provided a safety
valve. Section 5(9) read with reg 14 allowed an appeal to the MEC for the child who
had been refused permission and reg 13(1)(a) gave the HoD, before the appeal, the
authority to set aside the decision of the principal. But all that ought to have been done
in accordance with the policy. That is not what occurred in this case. On the contrary,
the HoD first issued an unlawful instruction to the principal to admit the child. Then the
officials of the department were told that the governing body would shortly be meeting
to consider the case, but far from awaiting its decision they proceeded to deposit the
child nonetheless.

[51] The high court, as I mentioned earlier, relied on reg 13(1)(a), as the immediate
source of the HoD’s authority to compel the school to enrol the child. But the
regulation gives the HoD no such power; it would be ultra vires if it purported to do so
because it would be contrary to the statute. This much is trite. Regulation 13(1)(a)
simply allows the HoD ‘to confirm or set aside’ a principal’s decision to refuse
admission to a learner. That decision is one made under the school’s admission policy
and the decision to confirm it or set it aside is likewise made under that policy. In any
event, it is clear that on the facts of this case, the HoD did not purport to set aside Ms
Drysdale’s decision.

[52] It would not be out of place to observe that I find the approach of Mr Ngobeni
and the department’s officials in this case most disturbing. There was not one bit of
evidence to suggest that the school has ever refused admission to a child – including
this child who happens to be black – on the grounds of race or has unfairly
discriminated against any child on this basis. Counsel for the respondents quite
properly accepted this much during the hearing. The school’s refusal to admit the
learner in this case had nothing to do with her race or her background. It came about
solely because her application was far down the waiting list. The department’s stated
policy itself expressly requires admission to follow the chronological sequence of
applications and the mother in this case was obliged to stand in line, just as the
parents of the other learners who had submitted late applications had to do. She was
not entitled to preferential treatment, from the school or the department.

[53] But instead of treating this matter as an ordinary dispute relating to the
application of the school’s admission policy the department opprobriously invoked the
ugly spectre of race to obfuscate its unlawful conduct: In his answering affidavit,
Mr Davids stigmatises the school as being in a ‘peculiarly privileged position that can
primarily be linked to the historical disparities in the resourcing of public education
under Apartheid’. It draws a learner enrolment, he continues, that remains
disproportionately ‘white’ when compared to the overall demographic profile of the
province. This theme is pursued in counsel’s heads of argument to make the case that
s 39(2) of the Constitution compels an interpretation that disallows ‘privileged
governing bodies in historically white areas to entrench racially discriminatory

privileges bequeathed by Apartheid’.40 The facts simply do not sustain the suggestion
that that occurred in this case, and an admission policy that did that would be
unlawful.

[54] To conclude, governing bodies are enjoined to determine school policies,
including their capacity, while provincial departments are responsible for the
professional management of schools and administration of admission. These functions
must not be conflated. The determination of capacity must comply with national norms
and standards set by the Minister and must be determined on reasonable and rational
grounds. Just as a governing body may determine the school’s capacity, so too does it
have a discretion to exceed that capacity if the circumstances require, and that
discretion must also be exercised on rational and reasonable grounds. But it is not
open to the HoD summarily to override that authority as occurred in this case.

[55] I mentioned earlier that Ms Drysdale was sanctioned for failing to comply with
the HoD’s unlawful instruction. Although the sanctions imposed on Ms Drysdale are
not before us, I am confident that the department is sufficiently gracious to withdraw
these sanctions in the light of this judgment.

[56] In the high court the parties had agreed that no costs order would be made. In
the result the appeal is upheld with costs, such costs to be paid by the first, second
and third respondents. The order of the high court is, save for paras 6 and 7 thereof,
set aside and the following order substituted in its place:
‘It is declared that the instruction given to the principal of the Rivonia Primary School
to admit the learner contrary to the school’s admission policy, and the placing of the
learner in the school, were unlawful.’

_________________
A CACHALIA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

40 The Heads of Argument were drawn by Mr Berger’s predecessor, who was not available to argue the
matter.

APPEARANCES

For first and second Appellants:
G C Pretorius SC (with him A Kemack SC)

Instructed by:

Shepstone & Wylie, Johannesburg

Webbers, Bloemfontein

For first, second and third Respondents:
D I Berger SC (with him Ms N Mji)

Instructed by:

The State Attorney, Johannesburg

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein

Further Interested Parties:

S Budlender (with him J Brickhill)

Instructed by:

Mdlulwa Nkhuhlu Inc, Johannesburg

Centre for Child Law, Pretoria

Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
30 November 2012
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE RIVONIA PRIMARY SCHOOL & ANOTHER
v
MEC FOR EDUCATION: GAUTENG PROVINCE & OTHERS

The Supreme Court of Appeal today held unanimously that the governing body of a
public school – not the provincial education authorities – has the authority to
determine the number of children that a school may admit as an incident of its
admission policy. And further that a provincial government has no authority to
override the school’s policy. The SCA therefore upheld an appeal by the School
Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School against a judgment of the South
Gauteng High Court judgment on 7 December 2011 that came to the contrary
conclusion. The SCA ordered the Gauteng MEC for Education, the Head of the
Gauteng Education Department (HoD) and the District Director of Johannesburg
East, the respondents, to pay the costs of the appeal.

The dispute arose after the school principal, Ms Carol Drysdale, had refused to
admit a child to Grade 1 because the school had reached its capacity, which the
governing body had set in its admission policy.

The learner’s mother had submitted a late application and was placed on a waiting
list along with other late applications. She was placed at number 14 on the waiting
list. The child’s mother was aggrieved at the decision and exerted pressure on the
officials of the department to admit her child. The head of the Gauteng Education
department, Mr Boy Ngobeni, instructed Ms Drysdale to admit the child early in
February 2011 after the school year was already well underway. A few days later
the child was brought to the school by her mother and accompanied by officials
from the department. They asked Ms Drysdale and the chairman of the governing
body, Mr Paul Lategan, to admit the child. Ms Drysdale and Mr Lategan asked for
time so that they could meet with the governing body urgently to resolve the
dispute. The officials, however, insisted that the school admit the child immediately.
They produced a letter from Mr Ngobeni withdrawing Ms Drysdale’s responsibility
to admit learners. And then proceeded to the Grade 1 classrooms where they
deposited the child in one of them.

The main issue in the appeal was whether the South African Schools Act 84 of
1996 gave the primary responsibility for determining the school’s capacity, as part
of its admission policy, to the governing body or the provincial government. Put
another way it had to decide whether the provincial government had the authority
to override a school admission policy that had been adopted lawfully.

The SCA said that the provincial government had made much of the fact that the
school was located in an affluent, historically white suburb and had benefitted from
Apartheid. This was done to justify the argument that the MEC and the HoD ought
to have the power to override the policy to ensure that schools in historically white
areas do not entrench racially discriminatory privileges bequeathed by Apartheid.
But the facts showed that these assertions were not relevant to deciding the issue

of whether the Schools Act gave the provincial authorities the power to override the
admission policy of the governing body. The SCA held that on a plain reading of
the relevant provisions of the Schools Act, no such power existed. It said further
that the provincial government could not insist that the child was admitted contrary
to the policy of the school governing body and ahead of other children on the
waiting list.

The SCA also said that the HoD’s decision to withdraw Ms Drysdale’s admission
function was unlawful, and that it was confident that the sanction which had been
imposed on her recently arising from a disciplinary hearing would be reviewed in
the light of this judgment.