THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 726 / 07

In the matter between:

ANTONIO CESAR ALVES DOS SANTOS                          First Appellant
SIKHOSIPHO DERICK MBATHA                                   Second Appellant

and

THE STATE                                                                               Respondent

Neutral citation:  Dos Santos and another v The State

(726/07) [2010] ZASCA 73 (27 MAY 2010)

BENCH:

CLOETE and PONNAN JJA and MAJIEDT AJA

HEARD:

3 MAY 2010
DELIVERED:
27 MAY 2010
CORRECTED:
SUMMARY: Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 – convictions of dealing in unpolished diamonds. Prevention
of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA) – pattern of racketeering – requires proof of a fact which a
conviction of the Diamonds Act does not – no improper splitting of charges. Evidence – admissibility of
seized items pursuant to an admittedly defective warrant – s 35(5) of the Constitution does not provide for
an automatic exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of an accused‟s rights – fairness requires that a
balance be struck – accomplices – exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace common sense –
circumstantial evidence -  not to be approached piece-meal. Sentence – grossly divergent sentences
between the two appellants – disturbingly inappropriate – warranting appellate interference.

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from:  Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (Le Grange AJ sitting as
court of first instance):

(1)(a)  The first appellant‟s convictions for contravening s 21 of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986 are altered to convictions for contravening s 20 of that Act.
(b)  Save as is set out in para 1(a), the first appellant‟s appeal is dismissed.
(2)(a) The second appellant‟s conviction for contravening s 21 of the Diamonds Act 56
of 1986 is altered to a conviction for contravening s 19 of that Act.
(b) Save as set out in para 2(a), the second appellant‟s appeal against his conviction
is dismissed.
(c) The appeal of the second appellant against sentence succeeds to the extent that
the sentence imposed on him is set aside and in its stead is substituted the
following:
„Accused number 6 is sentenced to pay a fine of R 20 000 or in default of
paying the fine to a term of imprisonment for a period of one year of which
R 10 000 or six months‟ imprisonment is suspended for a period of five
years on condition that he is not convicted of a contravention of sections
18, 19, 20 or 21 of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986, committed during the
period of suspension‟.

___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

PONNAN  JA  ( JA and AJA  concurring):

[1] Port Nolloth, notwithstanding its relatively small community of approximately
12 000 residents and some 220 businesses, has become, so the evidence suggests, a

hotbed of illicit diamond dealing and related activity. The reason is not hard to find - it is
its proximity to rich veins of alluvial diamonds, established diamond mines and mining
houses. It and other towns close to the Namibian border have witnessed a proliferation
of diamond dealing syndicates. Because of the corrupting and generally corrosive
influence that with time becomes all too pervasive in such communities, a task team of
the now disbanded Directorate of Special Operations commonly known as the
Scorpions, under one of its special investigators, Koos Jooste, was established. It was
not the only operation of its kind, nor was it the first. It followed the South African Police
Service (SAPS) operations such as Steenbra and Solitaire in that general geographical
area.

[2] For reasons that are not necessary to recount, the first appellant, Tony dos
Santos, became the focus of this particular task team. On 17 January 2003, the task
team sought and obtained from the judge designated in terms of s 31 of the Interception
and Monitoring Prohibition Act1 an order in terms of s 2(2) authorising a surveillance
operation of Tony's Auto Spares, a business enterprise managed and operated by the
first appellant in Port Nolloth. Given that the premises housing Tony's Auto Spares was
secured by a high perimeter wall and monitored by CCTV cameras, Jooste secreted a
pinhole camera in what came to be described in the evidence as the „buyer‟s room‟ of
the building. From it, video images and audio feed was transmitted by radio link, in real
time, to a house approximately one and a half kilometres away. There some members
of the task team in addition to recording what was being transmitted onto video tapes,
viewed the live feed on a monitor. Moreover, each of the monitoring crew maintained a
log in which they made contemporaneous notes of what they witnessed and heard as it
unfolded on the monitor in front of them.

[3] Unbeknown to the task team, the first appellant had also attracted the attention of
a unit of the SAPS. On 22 February 2003 that unit, armed with a search warrant that
had been issued by the Regional Court President of the Cape Regional Division the
previous day, conducted a search of Tony's Auto Spares and an adjoining residential
unit that was housed under the same roof. The SAPS seized 153 unpolished diamonds

1 Act 127 of 1992.

(including one partly polished diamond), cash to the value of R55 000.00 and diamond
dealing paraphernalia such as a diamond scale, loupe, tweezers and pieces of paper
with diagrammatic representations of diamonds and calculations on them. The first
appellant was arrested, charged and released on bail. By that stage the task team had
had the first appellant under close observation for approximately one month.

[4] On 25 June 2003, Jooste sought and obtained, in terms of s 29 of the National
Prosecuting Authority Act,2 a warrant authorising the search of Tony‟s Auto Spares and
the first appellant's home at Karee Avenue, Port Nolloth and the seizure of items
suspected of being connected to contraventions of inter alia the Diamonds Act3 and the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA).4 By 4 July 2003 Jooste had resolved given
the information that had been secured pursuant to the surveillance operation that the
time was ripe for him to execute the warrants. He thus deployed three units at
approximately 9pm to keep watch at Tony's Auto Spares, the first appellant's home, as
well as the local cemetery that the first appellant had taken to frequenting. Shortly
before midnight the first appellant was observed entering Tony‟s Auto Spares. All three
units descended on those premises. The warrant was served on the first appellant and
in his presence his business, the entire building housing Tony‟s Auto Spares and the
adjoining residential unit were searched. A video cassette recorder was employed to
record the search. The search proceeded into the early hours of the next morning.
Various items were seized and the first appellant was arrested and taken into custody.
The next afternoon the first appellant accompanied members of the investigating team
to his home, which, in his presence, was also searched. Once again various items were
seized. In total the second search yielded 24 unpolished diamonds and further diamond
dealing paraphernalia.

[5] The first appellant was the first of nine accused indicted in the Cape High Court
on a host of statutory contraventions. The broad hypothesis sought to be advanced by
the State was that each of the accused to different degrees were parties to a pattern of
racketeering activity. The alleged activity consisted in the planned, ongoing, continuous

2 Act 32 of 1998.
3 Act 56 of 1986.
4 Act 121 of 1998.

or repeated participation or involvement in contraventions of the Diamonds Act. In all,
the first appellant was charged with 61 counts of contravening the Diamonds Act, six
counts of contravening the Riotous Assemblies Act5 (conspiracy to commit a crime) and
two counts of contravening POCA (conducting or participating in racketeering activity or
managing an enterprise used for racketeering).

[6] The second appellant, Derek Mbatha, who had come to be identified in
consequence of the surveillance of the first appellant as one of the alleged role players
in the illicit diamond trafficking enterprise, was arrested approximately one year after the
first appellant on 3 June 2004. He was charged with three counts – one of contravening
the Diamonds Act (dealing in unpolished diamonds), one of contravening the Riotous
Assemblies Act (conspiracy to commit a crime) and one of contravening POCA
(conducting or participating in racketeering activity or managing an enterprise used for
racketeering).

[7] A protracted trial ensued. In all some 27 witnesses testified for the State. At the
close of the State case all of the accused bar the two appellants were found not guilty
and discharged. Neither of the appellants testified in their defence. At the conclusion of
the trial before Le Grange AJ (sitting with assessors) the first appellant was convicted
on five charges of dealing in unpolished diamonds in contravention of s 21(b) of the
Diamonds Act and one charge of conducting or participating in racketeering activity in
contravention of s 2(1)(e) of POCA. The second appellant was convicted on one count
of dealing in unpolished diamonds in contravention of s 21(a) of the Diamonds Act. On
the convictions in terms of the Diamonds Act: before us it was common cause that the
first appellant ought correctly to have been convicted under s 20 and the second
appellant under s 19. Nothing, however, turns on this. On the racketeering conviction
the first appellant was sentenced to a term of eight years‟ imprisonment and in respect
of the five contraventions of the Diamonds Act he was sentenced to 12 months‟
imprisonment on each count. Those latter sentences were ordered to run concurrently
with the first.  The first appellant's effective sentence was thus eight years‟
imprisonment. The second appellant was sentenced to a fine of R20 000 or

5 Act 17 of 1956.

imprisonment for a term of four years, half of which was conditionally suspended. The
appeal in each instance against the convictions and sentences is with the leave of the
court below.

[8] The cornerstone of the State case was the evidence of the brothers Basson –
Tim and Aubrey. Both were accomplices who were warned in terms of s 204 of the
Criminal Procedure Act6 (CPA). The former had been in the first appellant's employ for
some nine years prior to his arrest. On 24 January 2003, Tim contacted the first
appellant telephonically and informed him that his brothers Aubrey and Andre, who
were then employed by Alexkor mine, sought a meeting with him. The purpose of that
meeting, so Tim and Aubrey testified, was to enable them to dispose of certain
unpolished diamonds that they had smuggled from their place of employment, to the
first appellant. That meeting took place in the buyer‟s room of Tony's Auto Spares. In it,
the diamonds changed hands for R1 000.00.

[9] Two days later on 26 January 2003, as was their wont, the three brothers visited
the first appellant to view a rugby match on MNet. On that occasion, according to both
Tim and Aubrey, all three of them were schooled by the first appellant in the purchase of
unpolished diamonds. In the words of Aubrey: 'Dit was die Sondagnamiddag gewees. Ons het
weer gegaan na die kantoor wat die winkelgedeelte van die huis skei en ons het weer stelling ingeneem
by sy lessenaar. Wat daar gebeur het, mnr Dos Santos het aan ons 'n demonstrasie gedoen hoe om 'n
loop te hanteer. Hoe om – hoe jy die loop in jou regterkantste hand vashou, 'n ongeslypte diamant aan
jou linkerkantste hand en hoe jy die diamant dan bestudeer. Mnr Dos Santos het die demonstrasie
gedoen en daarna het ons drie broers dit ook daarna gedoen.

En hoe was dit aan u verduidelik om die loop te gebruik? --- Kan u weer die vraag stel?

U sê u was gewys om die loop te gebruik? --- Dis korrek, ja.

Kan u vir ons verduidelik hoe dit aan u getoon is of hoe gebruik 'n mens 'n loop? --- Die loop hou
jy aan jou regterkantste hand vas. Dan sit jy jou lang vinger sit jy deur die opening. Die vergrootglas van
die loop hou jy in jou wysvinger en jou duim vas. Dan bring jy hom naby aan jou oog. In jou linkerkanste
hand, jou wysvinger en jou duim het jy jou diamant. Dan bring jy jou diamant nader na die loop toe om 'n
beter view te kan kry van hom, dan rol jy die diamant om te kyk vir enige krake, spots, die kleur van die
diamant.

6 Act 51 0f 1977.

U Edele, ek sal nie nou daardie beeld toon nie, maar ek sal dit môre toon. Dit gaan 'n bietjie tyd
neem om dit te kry, want dis op dieselfde band. Wat het na die opleiding gebeur, mnr Basson? --- Mnr
Dos Santos het die diamantskaal sowel as die loop sowel as kontant aan my oorhandig omdat ek nou nie
oor die nodige finansies beskik om die diamante aan te koop nie, sowel as 'n tabel wat hy vir my geteken
het, wat ek moes gebruik het om – in die tabel is dit opgestel die rand, die hoeveelheid geld wat jy moet
betaal vir 'n diamant. Dan kyk jy vir die kleur van die diamante en die verskillende karate.

U sê mnr Dos Santos het geld aan u oorhandig? --- Dis korrek, ja.

Kan u onthou hoeveel aan u oorhandig was? --- Dit was 'n bedrag van R5 000.'

[10] A few days later, Aubrey used the scale and loupe and R1 000.00 of the first
appellant's R5 000.00 to purchase unpolished diamonds from certain persons in
Buffelsrivier, a few kilometres from his place of employment. On 29 January 2003,
together with his brother Andre and possibly Tim (of the latter Aubrey was not sure) he
called on the first appellant at Tony‟s Auto Spares. There he supplied the diamonds to
the first appellant. Early in February 2003 Aubrey once again purchased unpolished
diamonds from the same persons in Buffelsrivier. On 6 February 2003 he visited Tony's
Auto Spares and handed those unpolished diamonds (12 in all) to the first appellant.
Each of those three occasions testified to by Aubrey constituted a separate charge of
contravening the Diamonds Act on which the first appellant was ultimately convicted.

[11] Insofar as the second appellant is concerned, Tim testified that he (the second
appellant) came to see the first appellant during the course of Friday 21 February 2003.
Tim was told by the first appellant that the second appellant had to go and fetch
something from the mine and that Tim must give him some money for petrol. That Tim
did. After 10pm that evening, the first appellant called Tim on his cellular phone to tell
him that the second appellant was at Tony's Auto Spares and that he (Tim) must go
there to open the premises for the second appellant. Tim did as he was told and let the
second appellant onto the premises. When the first appellant arrived, the two appellants
made their way to the buyer‟s office, whence Tim heard the first appellant who was
speaking loudly say 'Dit is 'n 100 carat. Ek is ryk. Al die probleme is verby'. Later that
evening and after the second appellant had left, the first appellant invited Tim into his
office. There the first appellant placed a large unpolished diamond on the table, which
he informed Tim the second appellant had brought. Tim was asked to examine the

stone and to weigh it. The stone weighed 91 carats. That constituted the fourth charge
of contravening the Diamonds Act on which both appellants were convicted.

[12] In respect of the first appellant‟s fifth conviction of contravening the Diamonds
Act, Tim testified: 'Terwyl mnr Dos Santos in die selle was in Port Nolloth, het 'n ene John Legged
[that should have been Legget] besoek by die winkel afgelê en aan my gesê hy will mnr Dos Santos sien.
Ek het aan hom genoem ... (tussenbeide).
HOF:
Jammer, kan u die persoon se naam net herhaal, asseblief. --- John Legget.

John Legget? --- Ja, Edelagbare. Ek het aan hom genoem dat Tony nie hier is nie.  Die polisie
was die naweek by ons en hulle het hom gearresteer en hy het vir my gesê hy wil my privaat sien. Ek het
hom na die eerste kantoor gevat wat net naby die winkel is en daar binne met hom gepraat. Hy het aan
my gesê dat hy iets wil kom afsit by mnr Dos Santos. Ek het aan hom gesê ek sal hom help omdat mnr
Dos Santos in die selle is. My woorde aan hom was gewees, ons gaan nie loop lê terwyl mnr Dos Santos
in die selle is nie. Ons sal wys ons gaan voort. Ek sal hom help met die transaksie om vir mnr Dos Santos
te wys dat ons staan agter hom. Ek is na die binne kantoor en het van die toerusting daar gaan haal en
dit na die eerste kantoor gebring om John Legget se steen te weeg op die skaaltjie. Ek het die diamant by
hom gevat en dit op die diamantskaal geplaas en gesien dit weeg 2.77 karaat.  Ek het aan hom genoem
dat ek nie die volle bedrag kan betaal nie, omdat ek nie weet hoeveel ek hom moet gee nie en aan hom
genoem ek gee hom 'n deposito van R400. Ek sal hom R400 gee totdat mnr Dos Santos uit is  -  op borg
uit is en dan kan hy terugkom en sy verskil kom haal.  Hy het verstaan en ek het die geld aan hom
oorhandig.'
There can be little doubt that Tim acted as the first appellant‟s agent in respect of the
2.77 carat diamond purchased from Legget. That much emerges from the following
excerpt of his evidence:
'Op daai stadium was die winkel onveilig gewees en ek het geglo dat ek Tony se goed by my huis
moet bêre. Ek het ook John Legget se 2.77 karaat gevat en dit by my huis in die kluis toegesluit. Na Tony
op borg uit is, het ek aan hom gevra of ek dit moet gaan haal by my huis om dit vir hom te bring. Hy het
vir my gesê, nee, ek moet dit daar bêre. Dis veilig daar. Ons het nog altyd voortgegaan om kliënte te help
na-ure en ek het weer aan mnr Dos Santos gevra, moet ek daai goed gaan haal en dit vir hom bring,
want John Legget het nie sy geld gekry nie. Hy het gesê, nee, ons bêre dit daar. Die ander bly in sy ma
se tuin.'

[13] The Legget transaction was not an isolated one. According to Tim: „My dienspligte,
soos ek sê, het later verbeter in die winkel, deurdat ek van die kliente moes help in die winkel na-ure as
Tony nie daar was nie, met onwettighede en dan moes ek ook geld uitbetaal het of ek moes geld
weggeneem het.

…
Watter onwettighede? --- Dit was die aankoop van ongeslypte diamante.
Ken u „n ongeslypte diamante, mnr Basson? --- Dis reg, ja. Tony het my vertel of geleer wat is „n geslypte
diamante en wat is „n ongeslypte diamante.‟
Tim testified furthermore that there were other instances when he dealt, in the absence
of the first appellant, with potential sellers of unpolished diamonds. He explained:
'Verduidelik my die prosedure, mnr Basson, wat u sal volg as iemand – of toe u nou ongeslypte
diamant aankoop? --- Dit sou net gebeur as Tony nie in die plek is nie, wanneer die kliënte na my toe
gaan kom, dan gaan ek hulle help. Ek sal hulle in die eerste kantoor van die winkel los. Dan sal ek alleen
na Tony se kantoor beweeg en dan sal ek die diamante op die tafel plaas. Dan sal ek die papiertjie op die
tafel plaas. Ek sou die diamantskaaltjie vat. Dan sou ek dit op die lessenaar plaas, dit oopmaak. Ek sou
die diamant vat en dit op die skaaltjie plaas om te kyk hoeveel dit weeg. En dan sou ek die loop vat en dit
daardeur besigtig deur te kyk of daar enige spots of krake of onsuiwerhede daarin is.'

[14] Immediately after the sentencing of the appellants, the court below granted an
order in terms of s 35(1)(a) of the CPA declaring forfeit to the State the diamond dealing
paraphernalia that had been seized during the search of the first appellant's premises.
The State, moreover, gave notice of its intention to apply for a confiscation order against
the first appellant in terms of s 18 of POCA in the sum of R2 099 218.75, being the
value of the unpolished and polished diamonds seized from the appellant's premises, as
also the cash to the value of R55 000.00.

[15] Paragraph 4 of the draft confiscation order read:
'The commissioner of the South African Police Services, at his discretion and written authority, as
provided for in terms of section 3(1) of the Finance and Financial Adjustments Acts Consolidation Act 11
of 1977, is authorized to pay a reward of one third of the value of the unpolished diamonds seized by
members of the South African Police Services on 22 February 2003, i.e. one third of R1 897 605.00.'
That immediately prompted counsel for the first appellant to apply for a special entry to
be made in terms of s 317 of the CPA. Counsel motivated the application thus:
'I am caught at a disadvantage, M'Lord, because the defence was not informed that a reward to the tune
of R600 000 will be paid in return for information which apparently led to the prosecution in this matter
and we were not informed whether the person who provided this information would be a witness and we
were not told what this information would entail. Under the circumstances I am obliged to request that
Your Lordship authorizes that a special entry be made in the record with regard to this particular aspect.'

[16] Without immediately settling the terms of the special entry, Le Grange AJ
acceded to counsel‟s request. After certain skirmishes between the parties as to the
terms of the special entry the learned Judge eventually granted leave to the State as
also the appellants to adduce evidence to enable him to determine and state the facts
underpinning the special entry. Jooste testified for the State. None of the appellants did,
nor were any other witnesses called on their behalf. In essence the court held that
despite the evidence of Jooste which was not gainsaid by the appellants, it could not
find that the application for a special entry was frivolous or absurd or that granting it
would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. It accordingly made a special
entry in these terms:
'i).
Jacobus Hermanus van Wyk ("Van Wyk") and Willem ("Tim") Basson testified on behalf of the
State against the Accused prior to the conviction of Accused 1 and 6.
ii).
On 23 October 2004, Van Wyk, and Tim had a telephonic conversation during which Tim told Van
Wyk that he had been informed that a sum of R600 000 was available for information that would lead to
the conviction of the Accused.
iii).
As far as the Directorate of Special Operations ("DSO") is concerned, no reward will be paid to a
State witness in this matter.
iv).
The DSO and the Commissioner of the South African Police ("the Commissioner") agreed that
the Commissioner has a discretion to pay a reward of approximately R600 000 to State witnesses in this
matter.
v).
Prior to the conviction of Accused 1 and 6, Tim consulted with members of the South African
Police in the absence of members of the DSO.
vi).
The information referred to in paragraphs (ii) - (v) was only obtained by the accused and their
legal representatives after the conviction and sentence of accused 1 and 6.
vii).
The Accused were deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine the State witnesses in the
aforesaid regard.'

[17] Before us counsel conceded that the irregularity referred to in the special entry
was not of such a nature that it amounted without more to a failure of justice. Rather, so
the submission went, the possibility that Tim Basson may have been motivated by the
payment of a reward justified his evidence being approached with extreme caution. That
being so it is unnecessary for me to express any view on the correctness of the
procedure adopted in the court below in respect of the invocation of s 317 of the CPA by
counsel and the consideration given it by the court below. In my view, counsel was
amply justified in his submission that the evidence of the Bassons was deserving of

heightened scrutiny, for, as the following extract from the recorded transcript of Aubrey‟s
evidence makes plain, both were particularly dangerous witnesses.
'Daar was een keer 'n geval gewees wat ek 'n video-opname gemaak het in mnr Dos Santos se kantoor
met my persoonlike videokamera waar ek ongeslypte diamante afgeneem het.

Hoekom? --- Die rede hoekom ek dit gedoen het, daar is 'n ander Portugees in Port Nolloth
omdat my broer altyd na hom toe gegaan het as mnr Dos Santos daar was nie, het hy met die ongeslypte
diamante na die persoon toe gegaan en ons op 'n dag gaan geld leen ook by die persoon en hy het vir
ons gesê, soos hy vir my broer toe die vorige keer gesê het, onthou een ding, julle speel met vuur. Is 'n
gevaarlike game waarmee julle besig is. . . .

U sê u het 'n opname gemaak van ongeslypte diamante, waar het u die opname gemaak? --- Die
opname het ek gemaak in die kantoor wat op die video nou gewys was, die kamertjie van mnr Dos
Santos.

En die ongeslypte diamante wat u op band vasgelê het, waar het u dit gekry? --- Die ongeslypte
diamante was in die laai, my broer wat daar werk, het die diamante daar uitgehaal, dit was in 'n klein
swart potjie gewees en hy het dit uitgegooi en ek het dit opgeneem. . . .

Kan u vir ons sê wat dit is? --- Dit is een van die ongeslypte diamante wat ek met my persoonlike
videokamera afgeneem het.

Mnr Basson, terwyl ons kyk sien ons daar is sekere getalle of syfers op die TV of op die beeld,
kan jy dit vir ons verduidelik wat dit is? --- Dit is die datum wanneer die opname gemaak is en die tyd.

Wat sien ons nou, mnr Basson? --- Dit is die karaat hoeveel daardie diamant weeg wat op die
skaal is. Dit is nog van die diamante wat uit die swart potjie uitgekom het.

Wat gebeur nou, mnr Basson? --- Dit is nog diamante daardie en hulle was ook in daardie swart
houertjie gewees.

Behalwe om die diamante op te neem. M'Lord, that's just the footage. Daar is net een vraag, mnr
Basson, behalwe om die videoband op te neem, watter ander handelinge het u met die diamante gedoen
tydens daardie opneming van die videoband? --- As u net die vraag anders kan stel, ek verstaan hom nou
nie so mooi nie.

Julle het die diamante uit die pot geneem, julle het dit opgeneem op die videoband. --- Dit is
korrek.

Wat het toe met die diamante gebeur wanneer julle klaar was met die opneming? --- O, die
diamante is teruggesit in die pot en dit is my broer se werk, hy het gewerk met die diamante. Hy het dit
teruggesit in die pot en in die laai gebêre.'

[18] It follows that the cautionary rule relating to accomplices is applicable to the
evidence of the Bassons. That rule has been stated as follows by Holmes JA in S v
Hlapezula:7
'It is well settled that the testimony of an accomplice requires particular scrutiny because of the
cumulative effect of the following factors. First, he is a self-confessed criminal. Second, various
considerations may lead him falsely to implicate the accused, for example, a desire to shield a culprit or,
particularly where he has not been sentenced, the hope of clemency. Third, by reason of his inside
knowledge, he has a deceptive facility for convincing description – his only fiction being the substitution of
the accused for the culprit. Accordingly, even where sec. 257 of the Code has been satisfied, there has
grown up a cautionary rule of practice requiring (a) recognition by the trial Court of the foregoing dangers,
and (b) the safeguard of some factor reducing the risk of a wrong conviction, such as corroboration
implicating the accused in the commission of the offence, or the absence of gainsaying evidence from
him, or his mendacity as a witness, or the implication by the accomplice of someone near and dear to
him; see in particular R v Ncanana, 1948 (4) SA 399 (AD) at pp 405-6; R v Gumede, 1949 (3) SA 749
(AD) at p 758, R v Nqamtweni 1959 (1) SA 894 (AD) at pp 897G-898D. Satisfaction of the cautionary rule
does not necessarily warrant a conviction, for the ultimate requirement is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and this depends upon an appraisal of all the evidence and the degree of the safeguard aforementioned.'

[19] It must be emphasised that by corroboration is meant other evidence which
supports the evidence of the state witness and which renders the evidence of the
accused less probable on the issues in dispute (S v Gentle).8 And whilst I am inclined to
heed Counsel‟s note of caution that the evidence of the Bassons be treated with
extreme caution, it bears noting that corroboration is not the only safeguard that can
properly be employed to reduce the danger of convicting an innocent person. For,
ultimately what is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt and whether or not that
threshold has been passed by the State depends upon an appraisal of all of the
evidence.

[20] To the evidence of the Bassons, may be added the various items seized during
each search. On behalf of the appellants it has been submitted that the evidence
secured pursuant to the search falls to be excluded in terms of s 35(5) of the
Constitution. Section 35(5) provides:

7 1965 (4) SA 439 (A) at 440D-H.
8 2005 (1) SACR 420 (SCA) at 430j-431a.

'Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the
admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration
of justice.'
The learned trial judge concluded after an admissibility trial that the admission of the
evidence would not render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the
administration of justice.

[21] The warrant, so it was conceded by the State, suffered the technical defect that
the regional magistrate who issued it was not a magistrate as defined for the purposes
of s 21 of the CPA.9 The Constitution's specific exclusionary provision does not provide
for the automatic exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of an accused's
constitutional rights. Evidence falls to be excluded only if its admission would (a) render
the trial unfair or (b) be otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice. As to (a):
That provision resonates with Section 35(3) of the Constitution which guarantees every
accused person the right to a fair trial. That constitutional principle is underscored by the
philosophy that before persons are to be punished their guilt must first be established in
a fair trial.10 But as it was put in S v Jaipal11 'The right of an accused to a fair trial requires
fairness to the accused, as well as fairness to the public as represented by the State. It has to instil
confidence in the criminal justice system with the public, including those close to the accused, as well as
those distressed by the audacity and horror of crime.'
As to (b): This involves essentially a value judgment. In S v Mphala,12 Cloete J
formulated the approach to be adopted as follows:
'So far as the administration of justice is concerned, there must be a balance between, on the one hand,
respect (particularly by law enforcement agencies) for the Bill of Rights and, on the other, respect
(particularly by the man in the street) for the judicial process. Overemphasis of the former would lead to
acquittals on what would be perceived by the public as technicalities, whilst overemphasis of the latter
would lead at best to a dilution of the Bill of Rights and at worst to its provisions being negated.'

[22] The approach to an enquiry such as this is appositely captured in Key v Attorney-
General, Cape Provinicial Division,13 where Kriegler J held:

9 According to s 1 „magistrate includes an additional magistrate and an assistant magistrate but not a
regional magistrate‟.
10 Sanderson v A G Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 23.
11 2005 (4) SA 581 (CC) para 29.
12 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W) at 657G-H. Cited with approval by Scott JA in his minority judgment in S v
Pillay 2004 (2) SACR 419 (SCA) para 10.

'In any democratic criminal justice system there is a tension between, on the one hand, the public interest
in bringing criminals to book and, on the other, the equally great public interest in ensuring that justice is
manifestly done to all, even those suspected of conduct which would put them beyond the pale. To be
sure, a prominent feature of that tension is the universal and unceasing endeavour by international
human rights bodies, enlightened legislatures and courts to prevent or curtail excessive zeal by State
agencies in the prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. But none of that means sympathy for
crime and its perpetrators. Nor does it mean a predilection for technical niceties and ingenious legal
stratagems. What the Constitution demands is that the accused be given a fair trial. Ultimately, as was
held in Ferreira v Levin [1996 (1) SA 984 (CC], fairness is an issue which has to be decided upon the
facts of each case, and the trial Judge is the person best placed to take that decision. At times fairness
might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded. But there will also be times when
fairness will require that evidence, albeit obtained unconstitutionally, nevertheless be admitted.'

[23] Here the investigating team did not act in flagrant disregard of the first appellant's
constitutional rights. On the contrary, they sought judicial authority for their conduct.
That judicial imprimatur was an attempt to uphold the law in spirit and letter. None of
those executing the warrant knew that it suffered a defect. Eschewing the local
Magistrates' Court in favour of one located in Cape Town was designed to protect the
integrity of the investigation and to preserve the element of surprise, for, during
operation Solitaire an approach to the Port Nolloth Magistrates' Court had resulted in
the leaking of information. Significantly, Superintendent Bruwer testified:
'Nou sup Bruwer, u het getuig dat deel van u magte is dat u ook visenteringslasbriewe mag uitreik.
Verduidelik vir ons hoekom het u nie self hierdie visenteringslasbrief uitgereik nie en dit deurgestuur na
die Kaap toe? --- U Edele, ek het gevoel dat daar is genoeg tyd en dat 'n onafhanklike persoon buite die
polisie, dat 'n landdros die inligting voorgelê word en dat die landdros die visenteringslasbrief uitreik.'

[24] In those circumstances it is plain that the task team was not attempting to garner
any unfair advantage for themselves. Rather it plainly was an endeavour to protect the
interests of the first appellant. For that they should be commended, not penalised by
having the evidence that has been secured pursuant to that warrant excluded. To
exclude the evidence in those circumstances would not conduce to a fair trial. Nor for
that matter would it serve to advance the administration of justice. To exclude the
evidence simply because the wrong magistrate had been inadvertently approached

13 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC) para 13.

would run counter to the spirit and purport of the Constitution.  In my view, on the facts
of this case s 35(5) could hardly countenance the exclusion of the impugned evidence.
Accordingly the conclusion reached by the trial court on this score cannot be faulted.

[25] Reverting to the evidence of the Bassons: Notwithstanding their relationship of
employer and employee, Tim often accompanied the first appellant on his long personal
and business trips. The level of trust that the first appellant reposed in Tim is illustrated
by the fact that Tim often opened and closed the business premises and supervised the
conduct of the business in the first appellant's absence. To facilitate that arrangement,
the first appellant had leased premises for Tim to occupy across the street from Tony's
Auto Spares. The first appellant also paid for Tim's cellular phone. The location of the
leased premises was significant according to Tim, for it enabled him quick access to
Tony's Auto Spares whenever needed, which all too frequently was late in the evening
and way after the spare‟s shop had closed for business at 6pm. Moreover, both of the
Bassons, upon being arrested, intimated their desire to plead guilty to the charges and a
willingness to co-operate with the State. Each was convicted pursuant to this plea and
was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years which was conditionally
suspended for five years.

[26] The brothers corroborated each other in material respects (see S v Avon Bottle
Store (Pty) Ltd;14 S v Hlapezula15). Moreover each was supported by the surveillance
tapes, the incident register as confirmed by the evidence of the relevant member of the
task team who made the entries in question and the record from MTN confirming the
cellular telephone calls between Tim and the first appellant as testified to by the former.
The surveillance tapes were admittedly of a very poor quality. Notwithstanding its grainy
quality however, it afforded confirmation of the Bassons‟ presence in the buyer‟s room
on each occasion that they allegedly participated in an illicit diamond dealing transaction
as testified to by them. Importantly their account found support in the dates and times
on the surveillance tapes and the corresponding entries in the log.

14 1963 (2) SA 389 (A) at 393H.
15 1965 (4) SA 439 (A) at 440H.

[27]  The trial court, I should perhaps add, was alive to the dangers of accepting the
evidence of the Bassons absent corroborating evidence implicating the appellants (see
S v Scott-Crossley 2008 (1) SACR 223 (SCA) paras 7 and 8). It is so that the evidence
of the Bassons taken individually and cumulatively was not without blemish. But when
taken together with the other evidence to which I have alluded it has an unquestionable
ring of truth. I thus do not believe that those blemishes are such as to warrant either a
rejection of the evidence of either or to undermine reliance upon them. For, as Holmes
JA made plain (S v Artman16): „courts must guard against their reasoning tending to
become stifled by formalism. In other words, the exercise of caution must not be
allowed to displace the exercise of common sense‟.

[28] In respect of the first appellant there are as well the items seized during each
search. To recapitulate, those items included the unpolished and polished diamonds,
substantial sums of cash, the diamond dealing paraphernalia such as magnifying
glasses, diamond scales, diamond loupes and two other seemingly insignificant items
being recently torn pieces of paper with diagrammatic representations that were
recovered from the toilet system and other pieces of paper with diagrammatic
representations, and partially used 49% strength hydrofluoric acid. In so far as the
pieces of paper are concerned, whilst Superintendent Hamman, the handwriting expert,
could not say with any degree of certainty that the pieces of paper bore the first
appellant‟s handwriting he was willing to opine that it strongly resembled his
handwriting. The significance of those pieces of paper emerges from the following
evidence in cross examination of the expert gemmologist, Arthur Thomas: 'Now my
question to you, Mr Thomas, having analyzed what now transpires to be uncut diamonds that were
presented to you, would you be able to identify what purports to be a description of those two stones in
conjunction with the little sketch appended there?    --- What I see here, is something that we frequently
use in the trade, that I use myself. In other words, I take it that this stone was an octahegen. This little
sketch is typical of what we use.'
....
'Let's move on to the other stone? --- Here we see an octahegen with an intrusion indicated in the stone.
This appears to conform to stone B11, which to three decimal places weighed 1.736 carats.

16 1968 (3) SA 339 (A) at 341C.

And there's a possibility that this may be ... (intervention). --- I would put it as a strong possibility, not on
oath, but a strong possibility that this is the stone.'
And the evidence was that whilst hydrofluoric acid in that strength has other heavy
industrial uses, it is commonly used to clean unpolished diamonds.

[29] In respect of the second appellant and the transaction involving the 91 carat
diamond, it was put by counsel to one of the state witnesses on behalf of the first
appellant:
'Nou mnr Dos Santos sal met betrekking tot hierdie spesifieke transaksie kom getuig as hy moet en daar
sal ook eksterne bewys wees daarvan indien nodig, dat by hierdie spesifieke geleentheid mnr Mbatha by
hom kom geld leen het met die oog op 'n begrafnis wat moes plaasvind.'
Likewise the following was put on behalf of the second appellant:
'Mnr Jooste, beskuldigde nommer 6 [the second appellant] sal erken indien dit nodig is, dat hy wel daar
op die 21ste was, maar die doel was om geld te leen en nie diamant te verkoop nie? --- U Edele, dis die
eerste keer in my lewe wat ek sien iemand omhels iemand as hy geld geleen het, van blydskap.'
'Sal u sê dat daar is niks verkeerd om iemand te omhels as daai persoon aan my meegedeel het dat hy
net nou een van sy geliefdes verloor en dat môre is daar 'n begrafnisdiens? --- U Edele, dan gaan jy dit
met deernis doen. Jy gaan nie bly wees nie.

En dit is wat beskuldigde 6 kom sê indien nodig dat 'n stamlid, 'n vrou, is oorlede en die Saterdag
... (tussenbeide)
. . .
Dis 'n vrou wat 'n lid van die Zoeloe-stam is, wat oorlede is en die Saterdag is die begrafnisdiens. En hy
was eers Tony's Auto Spares toe na middag om geld te gaan leen, want hy wou skape gaan koop en
later Tony het hom gebel om te sê, het jy reg gekom met die skape. Toe sê hy, nee. En Tony het gesê,
hoekom nie. En hy het gesê, ek benodig geld. En toe het hy geld gaan leen.'

[30] It thus came to be undisputed that the second appellant was indeed at the first
appellant‟s premises at the time in question. The trial court concluded as presaged in
Jooste‟s evidence: 'Despite this poor quality, the video footage of the evening of 21 February 2003
when Accused no 6 [the second appellant] visited Accused no 1 [the first appellant] does not however
support the contention that this was an occasion where a bereavement was discussed since it was clear
to this Court that both accused were in a mood of ecstasy.  Both of them could hardly control their joy and
laughter and recorded them hugging each other. It is therefore highly improbable that Accused No 6 was
asking for financial assistance as a result of a bereavement.'

[31] The trial court has been criticised for what it is submitted is a contradictory
approach inasmuch as it refused to place any reliance on the tapes when it acquitted
the remaining accused at the conclusion of the state case in terms of s 174 of the CPA.
In my view the approach of the trial court is beyond reproach. Given the quality of the
tapes it was understandably reluctant, on the strength of them, to place the other
accused on their defence. It was thus unwilling to rely upon them as a source of
incriminating evidence. At the close of the defence case not only was the test different
but also the nature of the enquiry. At that stage the trial court was confronted with two
hypothetical postulates – one, advanced by the state, that the second appellant was
there to sell a 91 carat diamond and the other, advanced by the appellants, that he was
there to borrow money on account of a family bereavement.  The trial court concluded,
against the backdrop of the surveillance tapes, that the one advanced by the appellants
(in support of which neither appellant testified it must be added) was implausible and
therefore untenable. In that, the trial court, in my view, cannot be faulted.

[32] Tellingly, the one search yielded a 91 carat diamond. That in itself lends material
corroboration to Tim Basson‟s version. So do the surveillance tapes, incident register
and MTN records. But even if Tim were not to be relied on, there remains the evidence
of the gemmologist Thomas. Under cross examination by counsel for the second
appellant, he testified with reference to what he could see of the 91 carat diamond on
the surveillance tapes:
'That is real evidence. Now what I want to know is can you say with certainty that one of those objects on
the scale there, was the same size as that …? --- The object that was being handled was approximately
this size, yes.
The object that was being handled? --- The object that we saw being handled was approximately this
size.
Now can you just tell me when did you see an object being handled? --- I saw the scale brought out. I saw
the 50 carat correcting weight put into place, in order to calibrate the balance. Then the person picked up
an object and put it on the balance. That object, looking at his hands as he picked it up and put it on the
balance, was approximately this size. If I can explain that a little further, this is approximately the size of
the 50 carat metal calibrating weight that was used. He picked up the calibrating weight, put it onto the
balance, set the balance ... (intervention).'
...

'Now when you say that you saw him pick up something, are you referring to what you could see on the
scale or what you could see before that? --- He had it on a pad in front of him. They shook hands
(indistinct) a couple of times. The stone that had come out of the stone paper, was sitting on the pad in
front of him. He calibrated the scale. He picked up something off the pad that was approximately this size
and put it on the scale to weigh it.'

[33] In assessing circumstantial evidence one needs to be careful, as our courts have
repeatedly warned, not to approach such evidence upon a piecemeal basis and to
subject each individual piece of evidence to a consideration of whether it excludes the
reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation (S v Reddy).17 For as Davis AJA,
quoting with approval from Best on Evidence, reminded us in R v De Villiers:18
'Not to speak of greater numbers; even two articles of circumstantial evidence – though each taken by
itself weigh but as a feather – join them together, you will find them pressing on the delinquent with the
weight of a millstone. . . .  It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that, where a number of
independent circumstances point to the same conclusion the probability of the justness of that conclusion
is not the sum of the simple probabilities of those circumstances, but is the compound result of them.'

[34] Before us counsel sought to suggest that the evidence seized during the search
may have been planted by the investigating team. That as a possibility was not explored
before the trial court. In fact it was not even suggested to any of the state witnesses that
that may have occurred. A court, particularly one such as this on appeal, need hardly
concern itself with what at best for the first appellant would qualify as a remote
possibility. To do so would oblige the State during the trial to eliminate every
conceivable possibility that may depend upon "pure speculation" (S v Glegg).19 The fact
that a number of inferences can be drawn from a certain fact, taken in isolation, does
not mean that in every case the State, in order to discharge the onus which rests upon
it, is obliged, according to Diemont JA (S v Sauls):20 „to indulge in conjecture and find an
answer to every possible inference which ingenuity may suggest any more than the Court is called on to
seek speculative explanations for conduct which on the face of it is incriminating.‟

17 1996 (2) SACR 1 (A).
18 1944 (AD) 493 at 508.
19 1973 (1) SA 34 (A) at 38H.
20 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 182G-H.

[35] There was thus an entire body of evidence that operated against both appellants
to different degrees. All of that evidence certainly called for an answer, for in respect of
each a prima facie case had been established. Yet the appellants countered it with
nothing, preferring instead to shun the witness stand. That was the right that each had,
but its exercise is not without certain consequences. The choice of each to remain silent
in the face of evidence implicating them in criminal conduct is suggestive of the fact that
each had no answer to it. For if the evidence implicating the appellants was capable of
being neutralised by an honest rebuttal, it ought to have been.21 Weighing carefully the
cumulative effect of all of the circumstantial evidence together with the direct evidence,
the guilt of each appellant was so strong, that the learned Judge in the court below must
inevitably have convicted. It follows that save for correcting the five convictions in the
case of the first appellant to read s 20 instead of s 21, and in the case of the second
appellant the one conviction to read s 19 instead of s 21, each of the appellants was
correctly convicted on charges in terms of the Diamonds Act.

[36] There remains the conviction of the first appellant in terms of POCA. Section
2(1)(e) of POCA to the extent here relevant provides:
„Any person who –
. . .
(e)
whilst managing or employed by or associated with any “enterprise”, conducts or participates in
the conduct, directly or indirectly, of such enterprise's affairs through a “pattern of racketeering activity".'

In S v Eyssen,22 Cloete JA stated: 'The essence of the offence in subsec (e) is that the
accused must conduct (or participate in the conduct) of an enterprise's affairs. Actual
participation is required (although it may be direct or indirect). [The subsection] covers a
person who was managing, or employed by, or associated with the enterprise.
"Manage" is not defined and therefore bears its ordinary meaning, which in this context
is: "1 be in charge of; run. 2 supervise (staff). 3 be the manager of (a sports team or a
performer)." Thus for a conviction the state had to establish the existence of an
enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity and a link between them and the first
appellant.

21 S v Mavinini 2009 (1) SACR 523 (SCA) para 23; S v Thandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) para 53; S v
Chabalala (2003) (1) SACR 134 (SCA) para 21.
22 2009 (1) SACR 406 (SCA) para 5.

[37] It is a requirement of the subsection that the accused must participate in the
enterprise's affairs. The word „enterprise‟ is widely defined. As pointed out in Eyssen
(para 6) „it is difficult to envisage a wider definition‟. It is a further requirement that the
participation must be through a pattern of racketeering activity. 'Pattern of racketeering
activity' is defined to mean „the planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation
or involvement in any offence referred to in Schedule 1 and includes at least two
offences referred to in Schedule 1, of which one of the offences occurred after the
commencement of this Act and the last offence occurred within 10 years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of such prior offence referred to in
Schedule 1.‟ Once again the term is widely defined.  The participation must be by way
of ongoing, continuous or repeated participation or involvement (see Eyssen para 8 and
9).

[38] In the present case the evidence adduced by the state established that the first
appellant conducted an illegal diamond dealing enterprise. The affairs of the enterprise
entailed him purchasing unpolished diamonds from people who were not entitled to
possess them. All five of the offences of dealing in unpolished diamonds in
contravention of the Diamonds Act of which the first appellant was convicted,
constituted participation in such affairs. And all occurred after the commencement of
POCA. None of them was an unrelated instance of proscribed behaviour nor an
accidental coincidence with any of the others (see Eyssen para 8). On the contrary,
each of the five transactions was concluded in the same room, namely the buyer‟s room
of Tony‟s Auto Spares. Tony‟s Auto Spares, which at the very least was managed by
the first appellant, plainly had a legitimate as well as an illegitimate face. There were
repeated instances of participation by the first appellant, which save for the one
conviction involved personal participation on the part of the first appellant. In respect of
that one his employee Tim Basson acting as his agent procured the diamonds for him.
Moreover, according to Tim Basson, on diverse occasions he transported prospective
sellers on behalf of the first appellant, from the nearby Sizamele Township to Tony‟s
Auto Spares and back.  Significantly, it was never even put to either of the Bassons that

they had not received training at the hands of the first appellant nor been supplied with
money or diamond dealing paraphernalia by him.

[39] For a pattern of racketeering activity, POCA requires at least two offences
committed during the prescribed period. In this court, as indeed the one below, counsel
argued that the word „offence‟ in that context meant a prior conviction. Absent two prior
convictions, so the submission went, POCA could not be invoked. Underpinning that
submission is the contention that an accused person must first be tried and convicted of
the predicate offences (here the charges in terms of the Diamonds Act) before he/she
could be indicted on the racketeering charge in terms of POCA. Allied to that
submission is the argument that in this instance there has been an improper splitting of
charges resulting in an improper duplication of convictions.

[40] In my view, whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a court
are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion. Nor would it be
necessary, it seems to me, for the court to return a verdict of guilty in respect of the
predicate offences for the POCA racketeering charge to be sustained. It may well
suffice for the court to hold that the predicate charge has been proved without in fact
returning a guilty verdict. But that need not be decided here.

[41] In respect of a similarly worded provision in the American Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),23 United States courts have held that a criminal
defendant could properly be convicted of the predicate acts that form the pattern of
racketeering activity basic to the RICO charge, and later be prosecuted under RICO.24
On the other hand in United States v Brooklier,25 the appellants had pleaded guilty to a
RICO conspiracy charge, and were then indicted a few years later for a RICO violation.
One activity instrumental in the prior conspiracy charge supplied a basis for the

23  18 USC §1961 (5): 'A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity'.
24 United States v Harley 678 F.2d 961 (1982); United States v Martino 648 F.2d 367 (1981); United
States v Peacock 654 F.2d 339 (1981).
25 685 F.2d 1208 (1982).

substantive RICO charge. The appellants moved to dismiss the alleged activity from the
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. In denying the motion the Ninth Circuit stated
that if the appellants had not been indicted and convicted previously, the government
could have charged them with both the RICO conspiracy and the substantive RICO
offence, each based partly on the same extortion activity, in the same indictment. Thus,
since the offences were separate, the prior conviction did not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the substantive RICO violations based in part on the same activity.

[42] RICO has come to be described as a formidable tool in the US Government's
arsenal to wage war against crime. It has been pointed out that the relationship between
the RICO substantive and predicate offences is crucial to the application of the statute.
Because Congress expressed its intent that the two offences be treated separately
when it enacted RICO, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have rejected double
jeopardy attacks on RICO prosecutions. The reasoning appears to be that Congress
manifested its intention that RICO and its predicates be separate offences.26

[43]  Prosecutions under POCA as also the predicate offences would usually involve
considerable overlap in the evidence, especially where the enterprise exists as a
consequence of persons associating and committing acts making up a pattern of
racketeering activity. Such overlap does not in and of itself occasion an automatic
invocation of an improper splitting of charges or duplication of convictions. As should be
evident from a simple reading of the statute, a POCA conviction requires proof of a fact
which a conviction in terms of the Diamonds Act does not. I can conceive of no reason
in principle or logic why our approach should be any different to that adopted by our
American counterparts, for as Justice Frankfurter remarked in United States v
Dotterweich:27 '[T]he good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate
judgment of juries must be trusted. Our system of criminal justice necessarily depends on "conscience
and circumspection in prosecuting offenses". '

26 Karen J Ciupak 'RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict
Consistency Problems'  (1982) 58  Notre Dame Law Review 382.
27 320 U.S. 277 (1943).

[44] In a similar vein Navsa and Van Heerden JJA, writing for the majority in S v
Whitehead28 stated: 'There is no infallible formula to determine whether or not, in any particular case,
there has been a duplication of convictions. The various tests that have been formulated by our courts . . .
are not rules of law, nor are they exhaustive. They are simply useful practical guides and in the ultimate
instance, if these tests fail to provide a satisfactory answer, the matter is correctly left to the common
sense, wisdom, experience and sense of fairness of the court.'

[45] Whitehead recognised that a single act may have numerous criminally relevant
consequences and may give rise to numerous offences. Our legislature has chosen to
make the commission of two or more crimes within a specified period of time and within
the course of a particular type of enterprise independent criminal offences. Here the two
statutory offences are distinctly different. Since POCA substantive offences are not the
same as the predicate offences, the State is at liberty to prosecute them in separate
trials or in the same trial. It follows as well that there could be no bar to consecutive
sentences being imposed for the two different and distinct crimes as the one requires
proof of a fact which the other does not. Although a court in the exercise of its general
sentencing discretion may, with a view to ameliorating any undue harshness, order the
sentences to run concurrently.  Thus, by providing sufficient evidence of the five
predicate acts, the State has succeeded in proving the existence of the „racketeering
activity' as defined in POCA.

[46] Lastly, as to sentence:  Section 87(a) of the Diamonds Act provides:

'Any person who is convicted of an of

(a) in the case of an offence referred to in section 82(a) or (b), to a fine not exceeding R250 000, or
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or to both such fine and such
imprisonment'.
Section 82(a) refers inter alia to any person who contravenes sections 19(1), 20 and 21.
Thus notwithstanding the learned trial judge having misdirected himself by convicting
each appellant in terms of the wrong section of the Act, that misdirection does not vitiate

28 2008 (1) SACR 431 (SCA) para 35.

the sentence, for as the section makes plain the legislature intended a contravention of
each of those sections to be visited with the same maximum penalty.

[47] The question is thus whether it can be said that the trial court did not exercise its
judicial discretion properly. As to that, the sentence of the first appellant does not
appear to me to be startlingly inappropriate. The same, however, does not hold true of
the second appellant. It is so that the stone in question weighed 91 carats, which,
according to the state, he sold to the first appellant for R 14 000. Neither that in itself,
nor anything else on the record that I can find, can justify the grossly divergent
sentences between that imposed on the second appellant, a first offender, and that
imposed on the first (being 12 months imprisonment) in respect of the same transaction
in contravention of the Diamonds Act. Both appellants were associated to more or less
the same degree in the commission of the offence. If anything the first appellant‟s
conduct ought to have attracted greater opprobrium because he was the financier and
kingpin of this murky business. In those circumstances it has to be said that the
sentence of four years‟ imprisonment (albeit that it was coupled with a fine of R 20 000
and half of which was conditionally suspended) imposed on the second appellant is
disturbingly inappropriate and warrants appellate interference (S v Giannoulis).29 At the
very least it seems to me that the sentence imposed on the second appellant should be
equated to that imposed on the first. It follows that the sentence imposed by the trial
court on the second appellant falls to be set aside and in its stead I would substitute the
following:
„Accused number 6 is sentenced to pay a fine of R 20 000 or in default of paying the
fine to a term of imprisonment for a period of one year of which R 10 000 or six months
imprisonment is suspended for a period of five years on condition that he is not again
convicted of a contravention of sections 18, 19, 20 or 21 of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986, committed during the period of suspension‟.

[48] In the result:
(1)(a)  The first appellant‟s convictions for contravening s 21 of the Diamonds Act 56 of
1986 are altered to convictions for contravening s 20 of that Act.

29 1975 (4) SA 867 (A).

(b)  Save as is set out in para 1(a), the first appellant‟s appeal is dismissed.
(2)(a) The second appellant‟s conviction for contravening s 21 of the Diamonds Act 56
of 1986 is altered to a conviction for contravening s 19 of that Act.
(b) Save as set out in para 2(a), the second appellant‟s appeal against his conviction
is dismissed.
(c) The appeal of the second appellant against sentence succeeds to the extent that
the sentence imposed on him is set aside and in its stead is substituted the
following:
„Accused number 6 is sentenced to pay a fine of R 20 000 or in default of
paying the fine to a term of imprisonment for a period of one year of which
R 10 000 or six months‟ imprisonment is suspended for a period of five
years on condition that he is not convicted of a contravention of sections
18, 19, 20 or 21 of the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986, committed during the
period of suspension‟.

_________________
V M  PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For the 1st Appellant:

T Möller

Instructed by:

Van der Merwe & Robertson

c/o Oosthuizen Meyer De Waal

Cape Town

Symington & De Kok

Bloemfontein

For the 2nd Appellant

J L Vismer

Instructed by:

Legal Aid Board

Cape Town

Bloemfontein Justice Centre

Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

A M Breitenbach SC

H M Slingers

Instructed by:

The State Attorney

Cape Town

The State Attorney

Bloemfontein
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

27 May 2010

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form
part of the judgment.

Dos Santos and another v The State
(726/07) [2010] ZASCA 73 (27 May 2010)

Media Statement

Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered judgment in the appeals of Tony Dos
Santos and Derick Mbatha against their convictions and sentences by the Cape High Court.
Each had been convicted of dealing in unpolished diamonds in contravention of s 21 of the
Diamonds Act. In addition the former had been convicted of one count of racketeering in
terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA). The SCA found that each had been
convicted for contravening the wrong section of the Diamonds Act. It accordingly altered Mr
Dos Santos’ five convictions from that of contravening s 21 of the Act to convictions for
contravening s 20 and Mr Mbatha’s one conviction to that of contravening s 19. Mr Dos
Santos’ appeal against the effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment imposed upon him
by the High Court also failed. Mr Mbatha, who was sentenced by the high court to a fine of
R20 000 or imprisonment for a term of 4 years, half of which was conditionally suspended, did
succeed in his appeal against sentence to the limited extent that the term of imprisonment of
four years was set aside and in its stead was substituted a term of imprisonment for one year.

Mr Dos Santos lived in Port Nolloth, where he managed and operated a business enterprise
called Tony's Auto Spares. Port Nolloth, notwithstanding its relatively small community of
approximately 12 000 residents and some 220 businesses had become, so the evidence
suggested, a hotbed of illicit diamond dealing and related activity. Because of the corrupting
and generally corrosive influence that with time becomes all too pervasive in such
communities, a task team of the now disbanded Directorate of Special Operations commonly
known as the Scorpions, was established to counter the proliferation of diamond dealing
syndicates that had began flourish in that general geographical location. Mr Dos Santos had
become the focus of that particular task team. The task team had sought and obtained from
the Judge designated in terms of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, an order
authorising a surveillance operation at Tony's Auto Spares. The task team secreted a pinhole
camera in the building housing Tony's Auto Spares and from it video images and audio feed
was transmitted by radio link, in real time, to a house approximately one-and-half kilometres
away, where some members of the task team, in addition to recording what was being

transmitted onto video tapes, viewed the live feed on a monitor and maintained a log in which
they made contemporaneous notes of what they had witnessed and heard as it unfolded.
Unbeknown to the task team, Mr Dos Santos had also attracted the attention of a unit of the
SAPS. That unit, acting on a search warrant that had been issued by the Regional Court
President of the Cape Regional Division, conducted a search on 22 February 2003 of Tony's
Auto Spares and the adjoining residential unit that was housed under the same roof. During
the course of the evening of 4 July 2003 the task team armed with separate warrants
conducted a search of the same premises and on the next day, Mr Dos Santos' home which
was also situated in Port Nolloth. Both searches yielded in all some 177 unpolished diamonds
to the value of approximately R2m, cash to the tune of R55 000 and diamond dealing
paraphernalia such as loupes, scales, tweezers and pieces of paper with diagrammatic
representations of diamonds and calculations on them. Mr Mbatha, who had come to be
identified in consequence of the surveillance of the first appellant as one of the alleged role
players in the illicit diamond trafficking enterprise, was arrested approximately one year after
the first appellant on 3 June 2004.

The two appellants were indicted together with seven others in the Cape High Court on a host
of statutory convictions. The hypothesis advanced by the State was that each of the accused
to different degrees was a party to a pattern of racketeering activity. A protracted trial ensued
in the Cape High Court. In all some 27 witnesses testified for the State. The evidence
included the direct evidence of Tim Basson, who had been in Mr Dos Santos’ employ for
seven years prior to his arrest, and his brother Aubrey. Both of them testified about Mr Dos
Santos’ involvement in illicit diamond dealing. Each of the brothers Basson after having been
schooled by Mr Dos Santos had been involved in purchasing unpolished diamonds on his
behalf. Both had been convicted and sentenced in separate trials for their involvement in the
criminal enterprise. The high court, as also the SCA, recognised that as accomplices their
evidence had to be treated with caution but that the exercise of caution must not be allowed
to displace common sense. The Bassons corroborated each other. There was moreover other
evidence such as the items that were seized, the incident log, the video tapes and the
evidence of the various police officers and expert witnesses. On behalf of Dos Santos it was
submitted that the evidence secured pursuant to the warrant fell to be excluded in terms of s
35(5) of the Constitution. The argument was that the warrant suffered a technical defect in
that the regional magistrate who had issued it was not a magistrate as defined for that
purpose. The SCA held that the constitutional principle of a fair trial required fairness to an
accused as also to the public as represented by the State. In this case, so the SCA reasoned,
the investigating team did not act in flagrant disregard of Mr Dos Santos's constitutional
rights. On the contrary they sought judicial authority for their conduct. To exclude the
evidence, so the SCA reasoned, simply because the wrong magistrate had been inadvertently
approached would not conduce to a fair trial and would run counter to the spirit and purport of
the Constitution.

In the view of the SCA there was an entire body of evidence that operated against both
appellants. All of that evidence certainly called for an answer. Yet neither appellant testified or
called any evidence in his defence. The SCA accordingly concluded that the evidence was so
strong that the judge in the court below must inevitably have convicted the appellants of the
charges in terms of the Diamonds Act. In respect of the POCA conviction, the SCA found that
the evidence adduced by the State established that the first appellant had conducted an
illegal diamond dealing enterprise. Tony's Auto Spares which was managed by Mr Dos
Santos, and at which most of the illicit diamond transactions had occurred, had both a
legitimate as well as an illegitimate face. The SCA was thus satisfied that Mr Dos Santos was
correctly convicted on that charge as well. In reaching that conclusion, the SCA held that as
the POCA conviction required the satisfaction of an additional requirement, it did not
constitute an improper splitting of charges resulting in a duplication of convictions. Finally, in
respect of Mr Mbatha’s sentence the SCA held that the sentences imposed upon both
appellants was grossly divergent. The sentence imposed upon Mr Mbatha was thus
disturbingly inappropriate warranting appellate interference.

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