THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 802/2010

In the matter between:

HANS GUNTER PONELAT
Appellant

and

ERICA SCHREPFER
Respondent

Neutral citation:
Ponelat v Schrepfer (802/10) [2011] ZASCA 167
(29 September 2011)

Coram:
Heher, Maya, Malan, Majiedt JJA and Meer AJA

Heard:
31 August 2011

Delivered:
29 September 2011

Summary:
Contract – whether tacit contract of universal
partnership can be inferred from proven facts –
existence of tacit universal partnership confirmed.

________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Eastern Circuit Local Division of the High Court
(Moosa J sitting as court of first instance):
1.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2.
The order of the court below is replaced by the following:
‘(A) In respect of the first claim:
(1)
It is declared that a universal partnership existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff had a 35 per cent and the
defendant a 65 per cent share in such partnership;
(2)
It is declared that the said partnership was dissolved with effect
from 1 April 2005;
(3)
Failing agreement between the parties within a period of two
months (or such longer period as the parties may in writing agree upon)
on the net benefit accruing to the plaintiff from the partnership and the
manner and date of delivery or payment of such benefit to the plaintiff-
(i)
It is ordered that a liquidator be appointed to liquidate the
said partnership;
(ii)
Unless the parties agree in writing on the appointment of a
liquidator, the liquidator shall be appointed at the request of
either of the parties by the Chairperson of the Law Society of
the Cape of Good Hope;
(iii)
The parties shall within one month of the appointment of the
liquidator deliver to the liquidator and to each other a
statement of his or her assets and liabilities as at 1 April
2005 duly supported by such available documents and

records as are necessary to establish the extent of such assets
and liabilities;
(iv)
The liquidator may call on either of the parties either mero
motu or at the request of one of them to deliver further
documents or records to the liquidator and the other party;
(v)
The liquidator shall determine a date for the debatement of
the statements referred to in paragraph (iii) and shall preside
over such debatement;
(vi)
The liquidator shall within one month of the conclusion of
the debatement make an award in writing determining the
assets and liabilities of the partnership and dividing the nett
assets by awarding 35 per cent to the plaintiff and 65 per
cent to the defendant;
(vii)
The parties shall give effect to any award made by the
liquidator within such period as he may direct in writing.
(viii)
The costs of the liquidator shall be borne by the parties in
proportion to their shares in the partnership estate.
(4)
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit.
(B)
In respect of the second claim:
The plaintiff’s second claim is dismissed with costs.’
___________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________

MEER AJA (HEHER, MAYA, MALAN and MAJIEDT JJA
concurring)
[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of Moosa J sitting as court of
first instance in the Eastern Circuit Local Division of the High Court in

terms of which the court found that a tacit universal partnership
agreement existed between the parties and made an order for its division.
The appeal is with leave of the court a quo.

[2] The respondent as plaintiff in the court a quo instituted action
against the appellant as defendant, seeking relief in respect of two claims.
It is convenient to refer to the parties as they were in the court a quo.
The first claim sought a declaration that a universal partnership existed
between the parties, an order confirming the dissolution of such
partnership and the appointment of a liquidator. The first claim was
premised on an oral agreement, alternatively on an implied and/or tacit
agreement based on the conduct of the parties. Alternatively, the plaintiff
sought an order for maintenance at the rate of R12 000 per month until
her death, re-marriage or permanent cohabitation with a partner.
The second claim, as a separate and not alternative claim was for
damages in the amount of R100 000 for iniuria arising from the
defendant’s alleged breach of promise to marry the plaintiff.

[3] The defendant opposed the action and in his plea denied that a
universal partnership existed between himself and the plaintiff or that the
plaintiff was entitled to maintenance. In respect of the second claim he
denied that he had promised to marry the plaintiff. He further pleaded that
an agreement of engagement as postulated in the second claim, was
destructive of the first claim and the existence of a universal partnership.

[4] At the trial the plaintiff and two witnesses testified on her behalf.
The defendant closed his case without testifying. The court a quo found
that a tacit universal partnership existed between the parties, the
plaintiff’s share therein being 35 per cent and that of the defendant, 65

per cent. The partnership was found to have commenced on 4 March
1989 and to have terminated on 1 April 2005. The alternative claim for
maintenance and the second claim for damages based on a breach of
promise were dismissed with costs. It is against the finding of a tacit
universal partnership that the defendant appeals. The paramount issue
which arises on appeal therefore is whether a tacit universal partnership
agreement existed between the parties.

[5] The evidence of the plaintiff was as follows: The defendant, born
in 1938, and the plaintiff, born in 1945, formed a romantic relationship
during 1988. The plaintiff worked as a freelance beautician at the time
and the defendant owned a successful electrical business which he had
built up with his late wife. In March 1989 the defendant invited the
plaintiff to move in permanently with him as his life partner. He promised
to support her and also look after her 16 year old son. He expressed a
desire to marry her but explained that he could not do so at that stage
because the will of his deceased wife stipulated that if he remarried
within ten years of her death he would forfeit a share of his inheritance to
his sons. He promised to marry the plaintiff when the ten year period
expired. The plaintiff moved into the defendant’s home in Benoni where
they lived together as man and wife, sharing a joint household. The
defendant informed the plaintiff, ‘what is mine is yours’. This statement
was repeated several times during the duration of the relationship. As the
defendant gave no evidence it is not possible to determine his
understanding of these words.

[6] Prior to the move the plaintiff had at the defendant’s request sold
her furniture and effects and the proceeds of approximately R10 000 were
made available to the joint household, as were the proceeds from the sale

of her car. The plaintiff continued working as a freelance beautician and
contributed her earnings, on average R2 000 per month, towards their
joint expenses. However at the defendant’s request the plaintiff stopped
working soon after they began living together. The defendant’s domestic
worker was discharged and the plaintiff took over all household
responsibilities and domestic chores, a task she continued for the 16 years
that the parties lived together. In August 1989 the defendant agreed that
the plaintiff could go back to work, which she did as a personal assistant,
earning a salary of R2 500 per month. Her income once again went
towards their joint expenses.

[7] In March 1994 the parties became engaged to marry and the
defendant presented the plaintiff with an engagement ring. The defendant
had described their relationship by the German terms ‘Lebensgefährte’ or
‘Lebensgenosse’ which denoted that they would give each other love and
companionship as partners for life. The plaintiff described the defendant
as her protector and provider.

[8] According to the plaintiff the defendant’s electrical business was
his contribution to the universal partnership which she alleged came into
existence between them. The defendant had initially rented the business
premises but had later purchased the property on the plaintiff’s advice
that it would be more beneficial to own than rent the property. The
defendant also owned the property in which they lived. The properties
were registered in the name of a company, Ponelat Properties (Pty) Ltd,
of which the defendant was the sole shareholder and director. Although
the plaintiff was not active in the defendant’s business, she assisted with
the administration after hours, and during lunch times when required. She
also helped out when the defendant’s secretary was absent or on leave.  In

addition she provided for the defendant’s needs and comfort, entertained
guests and business associates and served as his confidante and advisor.

[9] The plaintiff stopped working in 1998 at the defendant’s request.
He wanted her to retire with him to live on a farm in Plettenberg Bay. The
plaintiff’s salary had by then increased to R5 600 per month which she
continued to contribute towards joint expenses. She also had between
R2 000 and R3 000 in her bank account and an amount of R100 000 had
accrued to her provident fund. The defendant purchased a farm in
Plettenberg Bay for R790 000, which was registered in the name of
Ponelat Properties and he moved there in 1998. The plaintiff joined him
in 1999 after she had arranged for the rental of the business premises and
negotiated the sale of the house in Benoni. The house was sold for
R480 000 at a profit and the proceeds went towards funding the purchase
of the farm. Upon moving to Plettenberg Bay the defendant asked the
plaintiff to close her bank account as he would provide for her. She
trusted him and did so.

[10] In Plettenberg Bay the plaintiff was actively involved in improving
and running the farm. She assisted with the construction of two self-
contained apartments to generate additional income. She designed and
furnished these, supervised the workmen and purchased the material.
Thereafter the plaintiff managed the apartments as tourist accommodation
and generated income for the joint household. The witness, Lorraine
Gregory, who stayed on the farm with her family as a paying guest,
testified about the plaintiff’s accomplishments as a hostess.

[11] On the farm the plaintiff also assisted in rearing and feeding cows
and calves and with the felling of trees which netted approximately

R70 000. In addition she performed the administrative, book-keeping and
clerical tasks and supervised the employees, negotiating agreements and
overseeing disputes. She corresponded and negotiated with SARS and the
Department of Labour in connection with farming operations and
negotiated
leases
with
prospective
tenants.
Documentary
and
photographic evidence of the aforementioned activities were furnished.
The plaintiff’s testimony about her involvement on the farm was
corroborated by her son Guido.

[12] In June 2000 the defendant applied in the names of the parties for
membership to a retirement village. The plaintiff was referred to as the
defendant’s spouse in the application. In August 2003 the farm was sold
for R3 500 000. According to the plaintiff due to her intervention and
advice the farm was sold for R500 000 more than the defendant was
prepared to accept. The defendant thereafter bought a house in
Plettenberg Bay for R1 500 000 to which the parties relocated. A flat was
built, which together with a pre-existing flat, improved the property. The
plaintiff was actively involved in the renovations and refurbishings. The
bigger apartment was let out to generate income. The plaintiff continued
to perform the administrative functions as before.

[13] Of the proceeds from the sale of the farm, the defendant invested
R1,2 million in an Old Mutual Insurance policy held by the parties. The
policy provided for one lump sum payment, and the proceeds thereof
were payable to the survivor on the death of one of the parties. An
amount of R600 000 of the proceeds of the sale of the farm was paid to
the defendant’s son for his involvement on the farm. The plaintiff noted
that she did not get her share for improving the farm, pointing out that the

value of both the farm and the house subsequently purchased had been
increased by the contribution of her skills, labour and expertise.

[14] During 2004 the plaintiff began to feel financially insecure about
her future after the defendant experienced certain life threatening
incidents. She asked the defendant for written confirmation that she was
entitled to a half share of the partnership estate. Her attorney received a
letter from the defendant’s attorney dated 26 October 2004, which stated
as follows:
“On condition that your client remains living with our client under the present
circumstances, she will benefit from his deceased estate in the event of our client’s
death namely:
1.
Our client has left in his Last Will and Testament to your client the following
namely:

1.1
One-third of the balance of his current account with Nedbank;
1.2
One-third of the balance of his Old Mutual Investment in units trusts
held with Old Mutual currently;
1.3
His Mercedes Benz C220 diesel motor vehicle, registration number CX
39794, engine number 64696330177608 current value R300 000-00
(three hundred thousand rand);
1.4
One-sixth un-divided share in his immovable property known as Erf
929, Bitou Municipality, Plettenberg Bay;
1.5
The right of occupation in respect of flat number one of the said Erf
929, aforesaid, free of charge, after our client’s death until the sale of
the property or her death or her marriage which ever is the sooner;
1.6
All the above uses awarded to your client is subject thereto that she
remains living with our client until his death, failing to do so, the
awards made as set out hereinabove become nil and void.
In addition as an alternative to the above, should your client wish to separate from our
client, our client is prepared to award to your client the following on a contractual
basis namely:

1.
R100 000-00 (one hundred thousand rand) cash payment with
immediate effect;
2.
A further R100 000-00 (one hundred thousand rand) payable over 60
(sixty) consecutive months, following the month after the first
R100 000-00 as aforesaid has been paid.
There are various reasons and circumstances that [are] not set out in this letter,
referring to the first 10 (ten) years that our respective clients have spent together and
the later 6 (six) years which they have spent together in Plettenberg Bay, during
which respective periods of time, our client has financially maintained your client
with all her needs, despite the fact that she was at one stage earning a salary of
approximately R6 000-00 (six thousand rand) per month, and [is] currently receiving
interest of R1 000-00 (one thousand rand) per month. Her personal needs, includes
medical aid and personal requirements not to mention herein.
Our client is then prepared to enter into an agreement with your client along these
lines, and await your response thereto.
Please note that there is no obligation on our client to do so, but he is prepared to do
so in the circumstances.’
The plaintiff did not accept the offer as contained in the letter.

[15] The relationship between the parties came to an end on 1 April
2005. The plaintiff initially moved out of the common home into the
bachelor flat on the premises and thereafter into a flat of her own for
which the defendant paid a deposit. The defendant gave her R1 500 a
month until February 2007. The plaintiff had very little to show in the
form of assets on the termination of the relationship. She was entitled to
R1 300 a month from her retirement annuity and 400 Swiss francs from a
Swiss pension. A trade reference given by the defendant to the plaintiff as
an employee after the termination of their relationship corroborates the
evidence of the plaintiff that she served as a freelance hostess, entrusted
with the task of ensuring that the accommodation for tourists was in good
condition and that their needs were taken care of. He describes her as

honest, reliable, hard working and a gracious host. No adverse inference
against the plaintiff can be drawn from the fact that she was described as
an employee in this reference. She typed it on the defendant’s
instructions.

[16] During cross-examination the plaintiff emphasised that her
contribution to the partnership went beyond that of the ordinary
housewife, asserting that an ordinary housewife has a domestic helper
and an ordinary housewife is not a secretary. She emphasised moreover
that if the defendant only wanted to give her a roof over her head he
could have given her a cottage next door, instead of making her give up
her life to move in with him, promising what was his was hers, and
promising to marry her. She was adamant that had they married it would
have been in community of property.

[17] The credibility of the plaintiff was challenged when she was cross-
examined about notice of motion proceedings instituted and subsequently
abandoned by her, in which she had claimed the same relief as in the
action proceedings, and the various amendments which were sought and
effected to her particulars of claim in the latter proceedings. Counsel for
the defendant submitted in this context that the plaintiff’s particulars of
claim had undergone a metamorphosis like the claim of the defendant in
the case, McDonald v Young 292/10 [2011] ZASCA 31 heard recently by
this court. The comparison is misplaced. In McDonald the appellant
sought the confirmation of a joint venture agreement, alternatively the
payment of maintenance. This court noted that there were a number of
unsatisfactory aspects in the appellant’s testimony and referred to how his
claim had developed over time. His testimony in the magistrates’ court
that at the time the parties met to settle their dispute, he did not have a

claim, was in stark contrast to his later testimony in the high court that his
claim at that meeting was inter alia for his share in the disputed property.
Thereafter a letter from the appellant’s attorney stated that a universal
partnership had existed between the parties. In comparison, the testimony
of the plaintiff in this matter was not characterised by similar
unsatisfactory aspects, and her claim did not develop during her evidence.

[18] The
plaintiff’s
pleaded
version,
notwithstanding
various
amendments to her particulars of claim, and her testimony that a universal
partnership agreement was concluded, remained unchanged. Unlike the
defendant in McDonald, the plaintiff did not contradict herself and her
evidence withstood extensive cross-examination. The amendments to her
particulars of claim were precipitated, inter alia, by exceptions taken by
the defendant and cannot be said to illustrate her developing a claim over
time. The plaintiff’s evidence on the facts was either common cause or
largely unchallenged. By choosing not to testify in the face of her
evidence, the defendant took the risk of the issue being determined on the
plaintiff’s evidence. The trial court correctly in my view found the
plaintiff to be a credible witness.

[19] The essentials of a universal partnership were succinctly
summarised in the passages of the judgment of the trial court quoted
hereunder:
‘The essentials of a special contract of partnership were confirmed in the case of
Pezzuto v Dreyer 1992 (3) SA 379 (A) at 390, as follows:
“Our courts have accepted Pothier’s formulation of such essentials as a
correct statement of the law (Joubert v Tarry & Co 1915 TPD 277 at 280-1;
Bester v Van Niekerk 1960 (2) SA 779 (A) at 783H-784A; Purdon v Muller
1961 (2) SA 211 (A) at 218 B-D). The three essentials are (1) that each of the
partners bring something into the partnership, whether it be money, labour or

skill; (2) that the business should be carried on for the joint benefit of the
parties; and (3) that the object should be to make a profit (Pothier: A Treatise
on the Contract of Partnership (Tudor’s translation) 1.3.8). A fourth
requirement mentioned by Pothier is that the contract should be a legitimate
one.”
The essentialia of the partnership set out above applies equally to a universal
partnership. In this regard see Muhlmann v Muhlmann 1981 (4) SA 632 (W);
V(aka L) v De Wet NO 1953 (1) SA 612 (O) at 615; Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 (1) SA
952 (C) at 956 and Schaeffer: Butterworths Family Law: Cohabitation at page 3). The
contract of partnership may not necessarily be expressed. It could be tacit or implied
from the facts, provided they admit of no other conclusion than that the parties
intended to create a partnership (Festus v Worcester Municipality 1945 CPD 186
(C)). Our courts have recognised that a universal partnership, also known as domestic
partnership, can come into existence between spouses and co-habitees where they
agree to pool their resources (Muhlmann v Muhlmann 1984 (3) SA 102 (A);
Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1989 (1) SA 67 (A); Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 451 (T) and
V(aka L) v De Wet (supra).’

[20] A universal partnership in which the ‘parties agree to put in
common all their property, both present and future’, is known as
universum bonorum (see Isaacs v Isaacs 1949 (1) SA 952 (C ) at 955,
citing Pothier’s translation), which in Sepheri v Scanlan 2008 (1) SA 322
at 338C-D was described as effectively a community of property.  In
Mühlmann v Mühlmann 1984 (3) SA 102 (A) at 124C-D the approach as
to whether a tacit agreement can be held to have been concluded was said
to be, ‘whether it was more probable than not that a tacit agreement had
been reached’.  It was also stated that a court must be careful to ensure
that there is an animus contrahendi and that the conduct from which a
contract is sought to be inferred is not simply that which reflects what is
ordinarily to be expected of a wife in a given situation. See Mühlmann v

Mühlmann supra at 123H-I; Mühlmann v Mühlmann 1981 (4) SA 632
(W) at 634F-H.

[21] Counsel for the defendant argued that the existence of a promise to
marry was an express agreement which was destructive of a tacit
universal partnership. The defendant appeared to rely on the McDonald
case for this submission too. Once again the comparison is misplaced. In
McDonald this court found that a reliance on a tacit agreement regarding
maintenance could not be sustained as such was inconsistent with the
appellant’s evidence that there was an express agreement in respect of
certain property, the aim of which was to ensure that the appellant was
financially independent and would not have to rely on the respondent for
support. The evidence was clearly contradictory on these two aspects.
The same cannot be said about the evidence of the plaintiff concerning
the promise to marry and the tacit universal partnership agreement.

[22] It is apparent from the case law that a universal partnership can
exist in a marriage as was the case in Mühlmann supra and Fink v Fink
1945 WLD 226. It does not follow then that a universal partnership
cannot exist between parties who are engaged to be married. A universal
partnership exists if the necessary requirements for its existence are met,
and this is regardless of whether the parties are married, engaged or
cohabiting. See V(aka L) v De Wet NO at 614B-E, 615F-616A. The
evidence is clear that the respondent wanted (and, after throwing herself
at the mercy of the appellant, needed) immediate security and that the
respondent, aware of that need, voluntarily committed himself to satisfy
it.

[23] The evidence suggests that from the nature of the discussions
between the parties prior to their cohabiting and their intent during their
16 years together, they had the requisite animus contrahendi to form a
universal partnership. The plaintiff came into the relationship on the basis
that the defendant would give her what was his and she would give him
what was hers, (a stronger statement of the creation of a communal estate
it would be hard to imagine). There was the promise of security. And
during their 16 years together the parties did pool their assets and
resources. The plaintiff contributed all she had financially and physically,
the proceeds of the sale of her assets, her salary, time, energy, labour,
skills and expertise. Using an analogy from the Appellate Division
decision in Mühlmann referred to at paragraph 20 above, regarding the
conduct ordinarily expected from a wife, it can be said that plaintiff’s
conduct was not simply that which is ordinarily to be expected of a
cohabitee. The defendant contributed his business, financed the various
properties and provided financial security. The pooling of their resources,
their joint investment of R1,2 million in the form of the Old Mutual
policy and the plaintiff’s entitlement to the proceeds thereof in the event
of the defendant’s death, their working together to secure their retirement
and increase their income are all indicators of the existence of a universal
partnership. So too the appellant’s offer to the plaintiff, in the letter of 26
October 2004, of effectively a fair portion of his estate.

[24] In my opinion the essentials of a contract of universal partnership
have been established. Each party brought something into the partnership,
the partnership was carried on for their joint benefit and the object was to
make a profit.1 The activities engaged in by the parties were for their joint

1 A pure pecuniary profit motive is not required. The achievement of another material gain, such as the
joint exercise for the saving of costs will suffice. See Ally v Dinath 1984 (2) SA 439 (T) at 455A-C.

benefit and they increased their assets. This being so I am in agreement
with the court a quo that it was more probable than not that a tacit
universal partnership agreement existed between the parties. The
universal partnership came into being in March 1989 and was terminated
on 1 April 2005.

[25] There was no appeal against the trial court’s adjudcation of the
respective interests of the parties in the partnership. The distribution of 35
per cent/ 65per cent, which I believe in all the circumstances to have been
fair and equitable, remains.

[26] The order of the court a quo does not make provision for the
appointment of a liquidator to liquidate the estate of the partnership. It is
therefore necessary to amend the order to provide for such appointment.

[27] I accordingly grant the following order:
1.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2.
The order of the court below is replaced by the following:
‘(A) In respect of the first claim:
(1)
It is declared that a universal partnership existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff had a 35 per cent and the
defendant a 65 per cent share in such partnership;
(2)
It is declared that the said partnership was dissolved with effect
from 1 April 2005;
(3)
Failing agreement between the parties within a period of two
months (or such longer period as the parties may in writing agree upon)
on the net benefit accruing to the plaintiff from the partnership and the
manner and date of delivery or payment of such benefit to the plaintiff-

(i)
It is ordered that a liquidator be appointed to liquidate the
said partnership;
(ii)
Unless the parties agree in writing on the appointment of a
liquidator, the liquidator shall be appointed at the request of
either of the parties by the Chairperson of the Law Society of
the Cape of Good Hope;
(iii)
The parties shall within one month of the appointment of the
liquidator deliver to the liquidator and to each other a
statement of his or her assets and liabilities as at 1 April
2005 duly supported by such available documents and
records as are necessary to establish the extent of such assets
and liabilities;
(iv)
The liquidator may call on either of the parties either mero
motu or at the request of one of them to deliver further
documents or records to the liquidator and the other party;
(v)
The liquidator shall determine a date for the debatement of
the statements referred to in paragraph (iii) and shall preside
over such debatement;
(vi)
The liquidator shall within one month of the conclusion of
the debatement make an award in writing determining the
assets and liabilities of the partnership and dividing the nett
assets by awarding 35 per cent to the plaintiff and 65 per
cent to the defendant;
(vii)
The parties shall give effect to any award made by the
liquidator within such period as he may direct in writing.
(viii)
The costs of the liquidator shall be borne by the parties in
proportion to their shares in the partnership estate.
(4)
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit.

(B)
In respect of the second claim:
The plaintiff’s second claim is dismissed with costs.’

_______________________
Y S MEER
Acting Judge of Appeal

APPEARANCES:

For appellant:
P E Jooste

T Zietsman

Instructed by:

Jordaan & Pretorius Attorneys c/o J C van der Berg
Attorney, George

Rosendorff Reitz Barry, Bloemfontein

For respondent:
De Waal Nigrini

Gaby Damalis

Instructed by:

Schwarz-North Attorneys c/o Millers Inc, George

Honey & Partners, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

29 September 2011

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form
part of the judgment.

Ponelat v Schrepfer (802/2010) [2011] ZASCA 167 (29 September 2011).

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against an order of
the Eastern Circuit Local Division High Court. That court found that a tacit
universal partnership existed between the appellant, Hans Gunter Ponelat
and the respondent, Erica Schrepfer.

From 1989 until 2005 the appellant and respondent lived together as man and
wife sharing a joint household, first in Benoni and then in Plettenberg Bay. In
the course of their relationship the respondent contributed all she had to the
joint household financially and physically, the proceeds of the sale of her
assets, her salary, time, energy, labour, skills and expertise. The appellant
contributed his electrical business, financed the various properties owned by
the parties and provided financial security for them. The respondent also
assisted with the administration of the appellant’s business, and provided for
his needs and comfort. After they moved to Plettenburg Bay the respondent
assisted with administration on the farm and in providing accommodation for
tourists.

The relationship between the parties came to an end on 01 April 2005, where
after the respondent moved into a flat of her own. The question before the

court on appeal was whether a tacit universal partnership could be inferred
from the proven facts.

The SCA held that the nature of the discussions between the parties prior to
their cohabitating and their intent during their years together, indicated that
they had the requisite animus contrahendi to form a universal partnership.
The essentials of a contract of universal partnership had been established as
each party brought something into the partnership, the partnership was
carried on for their joint benefit and the object was to make a profit. The SCA
accordingly concurred with the trial court’s decision that a universal
partnership came into being in March 1989 and was terminated on 01 April
2005.