THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case Nos: 20043/2014 & 229/2014

In the matter between:

DENISE CINDY-LEE JANSEN                                     FIRST APPELLANT

MARCO RUDOLF BARNARD                                SECOND APPELLANT

and

THE STATE                                                                               RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Jansen v The State (20043/14 & 229/14) [2015] ZASCA 151
(2 October 2015)

Coram:
Maya DP, Theron and Mathopo JJA

Heard:

9 September 2015

Delivered:
2 October 2015

Summary: Criminal Procedure ─ Plea and sentence agreements in terms of s
105A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ─ trial court erred in imposing
a sentence contrary to that contained in the plea agreements without advising
the State and the accused that it was of the opinion that the proposed sentence
was unjust as contemplated in s 105A(9) of the Act.

___________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Webster J
sitting as court of first instance):

1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The convictions and sentences are set aside.
3. The matter is remitted to the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria for
trial de novo before another judge.

JUDGMENT

Mathopo JA (Maya DP and Theron JA concurring):

[1] The question for determination in this appeal is whether a trial court may
deviate from a plea and sentence agreement presented to it in terms of s 105A of
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the Act), without advising the parties
that it was of the opinion that the proposed sentence is unjust.

[2] In the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Webster J), the first
appellant, Ms Denise Cindy-Lee Jansen (Ms Jansen), pleaded guilty to charges
of murder and child abuse in terms of s 305(3)(A) read with ss 1 and 305(6) of
the Children‟s Act 38 of 2005, the Children‟s Act (child abuse or neglect). The
second appellant, Mr Marco Rudolf Barnard (Mr Barnard), pleaded guilty to
culpable homicide. These pleas were in terms of their plea and sentence
agreements concluded with the State (the agreements). Attached to the
agreements were the plea explanations which fully set out the factual and legal

bases of the said pleas. Other documents forming part of the agreements were
the post mortem report and relevant information relating to the appellants‟
mitigating and aggravating factors.

[3] It is necessary to briefly set out the relevant background, which was
undisputed, leading to the charges being preferred against the appellants. On 4
March 2014 the appellants, who lived together as husband and wife and were
legally represented, were arraigned in the high court, inter alia, on the charges
mentioned above. They were alleged to have assaulted Ms Jansen‟s two minor
children from a previous relationship, five year old Anthony Jansen (deceased)
and his older brother Stefan Erasmus, on numerous occasions, and subsequently
causing Antony‟s death. The assaults were, inter alia, committed by hitting the
children with various objects including a belt, wooden stick, by burning them
with cigarettes. They were also alleged to have failed to provide them with
proper food and medical care. The deceased had also been locked indoors for
prolonged periods.

[4] In terms of the agreement, Ms Jansen agreed to be sentenced to 18 years‟
imprisonment for count 1 (murder) and 3 years‟ imprisonment in respect of
count 2 (child abuse). The sentences would be served concurrently with the
result that she would serve an effective sentence of 18 years‟ imprisonment.
Barnard agreed to be sentenced to 12 years‟ imprisonment for culpable
homicide, conditionally suspended for five years.

[5] At the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor, acting in terms of s
105A(4)(a),1 informed the judge that the State and the defence had concluded

1 Section 105A(4)(a) reads:
„The prosecutor shall, before the accused is required to plead, inform the court that an agreement contemplated
in subsection (1) has been entered into and the court shall then─
(i) Require the accused to confirm that such an agreement has been entered into; and

plea and sentence agreements. The prosecutor advised the court that the formal
requirements placed upon the State in terms of the Act, had been complied with.
These requirements included consultation with the investigating officer and the
family of the deceased and the protection of the appellants‟ constitutional rights
to a fair trial. In particular, he advised the court that the appellants‟ rights to
remain silent, to be presumed innocent and not give incriminating evidence
were safeguarded.

[6] The prosecutor then read the contents of the agreements into the record.
Thereafter, the charges were put to each appellant. The prosecutor explained to
the court that four of the charges against the first appellant were being
withdrawn with the result that she was only facing the charges of murder and
child abuse. The court was advised that the State only intended proceeding with
the charge of child abuse against the second appellant. The court then put
questions to the appellants in order to ascertain whether they understood the
charges against them and the contents of the agreements and that they had
entered into the agreements freely and voluntarily. After confirming their pleas,
the trial judge handed down a brief judgment in terms of which he convicted the
appellants in accordance with the agreements.

[7] Counsel for the State and the appellants addressed the court in respect of
sentence. They both submitted that the sentences proposed in the agreements
were just and urged the court to impose such sentences. It appears from the
record that the judge indicated he needed time to consider an appropriate
sentence as „this is a very serious offence and one which has resulted in the loss
of a very young life‟. The matter was adjourned, at the instance of the judge, to
6 March 2014.

(ii) Satisfy itself that the requirements of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (iii) have been complied with.‟

[8] On 6 March 2014, the court delivered its judgment on sentence. In this
judgment the court had regard to the nature of the offences, stating that these
crimes would „shock society‟. The court also noted the purpose of sentence and
that „the court has to determine what the appropriate sentence is‟. The court
expressed the view that it „is as a rule not bound by‟ pleas and sentence
agreements and:
„In determining an appropriate sentence the court has to take into account . . . the personal
circumstances of the accused. The court must take into account the gravity of the sentence
and interests of society. The court is of the considered view that the agreed sentence will be
considered as being extremely light by the majority of the members of society.‟

[9] Contrary to the sentences proposed in the agreements the trial court
imposed the following sentences on Ms Jansen:
Counts 1 and 2 were taken together for purposes of sentence. She was sentenced
to fifteen (15) years imprisonment of which three (3) years are suspended for a
period of five (5) years on condition that she is not convicted of a crime of
which violence is an element.
Mr Barnard was sentenced to fifteen (15) years imprisonment of which three (3)
years were suspended for a period of five (5) years on condition that he is not
convicted of a crime of which violence is an element.

[10] The sentences imposed by the trial judge differed materially from those
proposed by the parties. Ms Jansen would receive an effective six years‟
imprisonment less than what was proposed. On the other hand, Mr Barnard
would receive an effective sentence of two years‟ imprisonment more than what
was proposed in the agreement.

[11] Dissatisfied with this, the appellants applied for leave to appeal from the
trial judge. The State also applied for the reservation of a question of law in
terms of s 319 of the Act in the following terms:
„Was it permissible for the trial court, in dealing with a section 105A of Act 51 of 1997 plea
and sentence agreement, to proceed to impose sentences differing from the sentences
proposed by the prosecution and the defence in the written agreement, without informing the
prosecution and the defence that the court is of the view that the proposed sentence is unjust
as contemplated in section 105A(9)(a) of Act 51 of 1997.‟

[12] The trial judge granted leave to appeal to this court and reserved the
question of law for decision on appeal. The present appeal is in essence
confined to the question of law thus reserved.

[13] Before us it was contended on behalf of both sides that the trial court
committed a number of fundamental irregularities. He failed to comply with the
provisions of s 105A(9)(a) by not informing the parties that he was of the view
that the sentence agreements were unjust, and neglected to inform them of the
sentences which he considered just.

[14] Counsel for the State submitted that the trial court should first have
determined whether the sentences they proposed were just before convicting the
appellants. Failure to do so, so it was argued, resulted in the parties not being
able to exercise their options in terms of s 105A(9)(b).

[15] The parties differed only in respect of the remedy which this court should
grant. The State contended that we have enough material before us to impose
sentence. It was argued, inter alia, that the appellants would be prejudiced if the
matter starts de novo whilst the appellants sought a remittal of the matter to the
trial court to afford them an opportunity to commence proceedings de novo.

[16] The purpose of the plea bargaining process is to afford the parties, in
advance, an opportunity to make an informed decision regarding whether to
agree to and abide by the agreement. This process entails consultation with all
the people involved in the offence, the accused, the complainant, the victim and
stakeholders which the prosecution deem relevant for the proper determination
of the sentence. Evidently, once plea negotiations are entered into and, in the
spirit of transparency, the accused will make his defence known to the State
which will, in turn, make available the contents of its dockets to the accused. In
that way both parties will have a fair idea of each other‟s case. The negotiations
are conducted in the spirit of give and take the accused will make certain
concessions and if the State is satisfied with his explanation, it will then accept
the negotiated plea on the basis of the available facts. There is no doubt that a
properly negotiated plea will yield a result which is transparent to all the
stakeholders and one that is in the interests of justice.

[17] It is in the interests of justice that the plea bargaining mechanism
contemplated in s 105A(1) should be encouraged. See S v Esterhuizen &
others.2 In S v Saasin & others3 Majiedt J had occasion to pronounce on the
purpose of this legislation. He said:
„This particular provision has as its objective victim participation in the plea bargaining
process. To my mind this is an absolutely essential cog in the machinery of plea bargaining
and plea agreements ─ it lends legitimacy and credibility to the process. As Du Toit et al,
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, correctly observe at 15-11, it not only
accommodates the personal interests of the victim, but also serves the broader interests of the
criminal justice system and society. The following view expressed by Bekker in 1996 CILSA
168 at 209 is apposite:
“The other interests advanced by giving the victim a right to participate in the plea bargain
are society‟s interests. Society benefits from victim participation in plea bargains in two
ways. The first is that according to the victim the right to participate will result in more

2 S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T).
3 S v Saasin & others [2003] ZANCHC 44 para 11.4.

information being provided to the decision-maker. The second benefit which accrues to
society from victim participation in plea bargains is that it promotes the effective functioning
of the criminal justice system. The theory is that if victims are not consulted regarding the
plea bargain and so feel irrelevant and alienated, they will not cooperate in reporting and
prosecuting a crime. As a result, the system, which is dependent on them, functions less
effectively. Therefore, making victims feel their contribution is critical, regardless of its
actual value, will motivate the victim to continue to report crime and cooperate in its
investigation and prosecution.”
Affording victims a say in the plea bargaining process furthermore enhances transparency
and lends credence to the adage that justice must manifestly be seen to be done.‟

[18] Where a court is of the opinion that the sentence is unjust, ss 9(a) and (b)
of the Act are triggered. The provision of s 105A(9)(a)-(d) of the Act read as
follows:
„9(a) If the court is of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, the court shall inform
the prosecutor and the accused of the sentence which it considers just.
(b) Upon being informed of the sentence which the court considers just, the prosecutor and
the accused may─

(i) abide by the agreement with reference to the charge and inform the court that,
subject to the right to lead evidence and to present argument relevant to sentencing,
the court may proceed with the imposition of sentence; or

(ii) withdraw from the agreement.
(c) If the prosecutor and the accused abide by the agreement as contemplated in paragraph
(b)(i), the court shall convict the accused of the offence charged and impose the sentence
which it considers just.
(d) If the prosecutor or the accused withdraws from the argument as contemplated in
paragraph (b)(ii), the trial shall start de novo before presiding officer: Provided that the
accused may waive his or her right to be tried before another presiding officer.‟

[19] Under this provision the parties have an election. The court must first
inform the prosecutor and the accused of the sentence that it considers just.
Upon being informed of the sentence which the court considers just, both

parties may decide to abide by the agreement subject to the right to lead
evidence and to present argument relevant to sentencing or withdraw from the
agreement. If both parties decide to abide by the agreement after being advised
by the trial court that it intends imposing a different sentence to the one agreed
upon, the court will be at large to impose a sentence which it considers just. In
that event the parties cannot then complain that they have been prejudiced
because they would have been given adequate notice. As soon as the trial judge
formed the view that the sentences proposed in the plea agreements were unjust,
he should have so informed the parties and also of the sentence he considered
just, at the outset of the trial. This would have afforded them an opportunity to
consider their options. This is especially so because after convicting them, there
is nothing that they could do save to appeal the decision. They were thus denied
the option of making an informed choice.

[20] This approach is clearly contrary to the objectives of the Act. In S v
Solomons4 para 11, Moosa J held as follows:
„The purpose of making such information known is to enable the parties to make an informed
choice whether to abide by the plea-bargaining process or to resile therefrom. The failure on
the part of the presiding officer to do so, in my view, constituted non-compliance with the
peremptory provisions of subsection 105A(9)(a).‟
For all the abovementioned reasons the appeal must be upheld and the answer to
the question of law is that the high court was wrong as indicated above.

[21] The question that I now turn to, as mentioned in para 15 above, is
whether the above misdirection constituted vitiating irregularity warranting that
this court should set aside the proceedings and order a retrial or implement the
original agreement between the parties. Counsel for the State urged us to follow
the latter course. He submitted that a retrial would prejudice the appellants as

4 S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) para 11.

they would lose their privileges as sentenced prisoners. Furthermore, that the
family of the deceased would also be prejudiced because they would have to
attend the new proceedings. In the alternative he argued that since the appellants
are only attacking the sentences imposed, this court can invoke the provisions of
s 322(1) of the Act5 and substitute the order of the high court on appeal for the
plea and sentence agreements. I do not agree.

[22] The provisions of s 105A(6)(a) of the Act are clear and peremptory. The
section states that the court shall question the accused to establish whether:
„(i) he or she confirms the terms of the agreement and the admissions made by him or her in
the agreement;
(ii) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, he or she admits the allegations in the
charge to which he or she has agreed to plead guilty; and
(iii) the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in his or her sound and sober
senses and without having been unduly influenced.‟
A trial court is best suited to determine whether or not an accused admits the
correctness of the charge and any allegations contained therein. This process
includes ensuring that the accused understands the charge he is facing and that
he entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily whilst in his sound and
sober senses. This obviously necessitates the leading of evidence which cannot
be done by the appellate court. Accordingly the submission that remitting the
matter to the high court will cause delay and prejudice to the appellants and

5 It provides:
„322 Powers of court of appeal
(1) In the case of an appeal against a conviction or of any question of law reserved, the court of appeal may-
(a) allow the appeal if it thinks that the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong
decision of any question of law or that on any ground there was a failure of justice; or
(b) give such judgment as ought to have been given at the trial or impose such punishment as ought to have been
imposed at the trial; or
(c) make such other order as justice may require: Provided that, notwithstanding that the court of appeal is of
opinion that any point raised might be decided in favour of the accused, no conviction or sentence shall be
set aside or altered by reason of any irregularity or defect in the record or proceedings, unless it appears to the
court of appeal that a failure of justice has in fact resulted from such irregularity or defect.‟

family members cannot prevail. The matter should be remitted to the trial court
de novo before another presiding officer.

[23] I therefore make the following order:
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The convictions and sentences are set aside.
3. The matter is remitted to the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria for
trial de novo before another judge.

______________

R S Mathopo
Judge of Appeal

Appearances
For Appellant:
L A van Wyk

Instructed by:
Combrink Kgatshe Inc, Rustenburg
Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

P W Coetzer
Instructed by:
Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria
Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

2 October 2015

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

Jansen v The State (20043/14 & 229/14) [2015] ZASCA 151 (2 October 2015)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today handed down judgment in a criminal appeal regarding
plea and sentence agreements concluded in terms of s 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (the Act).

Ms Denise Cindy-Lee Jansen (Ms Jansen) and Mr Marco Rudolf Barnard (Mr Barnard) the first and
second appellants respectively, who had lived together as husband and wife entered into a plea and
sentence agreement in terms of which they pleaded guilty to charges of: murder, child abuse (Ms
Jansen) and culpable homicide (Mr Barnard). These charges related to numerous incidents of child
abuse and assaults on Ms Jansen’s two minor children and for causing the death of one of them.

In terms of the agreement presented at the trial, Ms Jansen agreed to be sentenced to 18 years’
imprisonment for murder and 3 years’ imprisonment for two counts of charges of child abuse to be
served concurrently for an effective imprisonment term of 18 years; whilst Mr Barnard agreed to be
sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for culpable homicide, two years of which were suspended for a
period of 5 years on condition that he is not found guilty of committing an offence in which violence is
an element during the period of suspension – for an effective imprisonment term of ten years.

The trial court (Webster J of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria)  imposed different
sentences to those agreed to by the appellants and State in the plea and sentence agreement without
advising the parties that the agreed sentence was unjust as contemplated in s 105A of the Act. The
appellants applied for leave to appeal against sentence and the State requested the court to reserve
the question of law – whether it is permissible for the trial court to impose sentences differing from
those proposed in the plea and sentence agreement without informing the prosecution and defence if
the court was of the view that the proposed sentence is unjust in terms of s 105A(9)(a) of the Act.

On appeal, it was contended that the trial judge inter alia failed to inform the parties that he
considered the sentence to be unjust and neglected to afford them the opportunity to exercise their
options in terms of s 105A(9)(a)-(b) of the Act.

The SCA held the trial court must first consider the agreed sentence prior to convicting an accused
person and that this process entails an examination of the indictment, the accused’s right to be
presumed innocent, and the right to remain silent and not to give self-incriminatory evidence – all of
which are constitutional rights that afford the accused the right to withdraw from the agreement
should he or she wish to do so without any adverse inference or finding against him or her. The Court
held that it is also the duty of the trial court to satisfy itself that there was compliance with the
requirements of s 105A(1)(a) of the Act.

The SCA further held that where a court is not satisfied about the justness of the sentence
subsec (9)(b)(i) of the Act triggers in. However before invoking the provisions of this subsection, the
parties must first be afforded an opportunity to withdraw from the agreements. If both parties decide
to abide by the agreement despite being advised by the trial court that it intends imposing a different
sentence to the one agreed upon, then the court will be at large to impose a sentence which it
considers just. As soon as the trial judge formed the view that the sentences proposed in the plea
agreement were unjust, he should have so informed the parties at the outset of the trial. This would
have afforded them an opportunity to consider their options, importantly whether they wished to
withdraw from or continue with the agreement. This is especially so because after convicting them,
there is nothing that they could do save to appeal the decision. The SCA found that the appellants
were thus denied their fundamental right to be heard.

The SCA held that The provisions of s 105A(6)(a) of the Act are clear and peremptory. Only a trial
court can determine whether or not an accused admits the correctness of the charge and any
allegations contained therein. For these reasons, the matter should be remitted to the trial court for
hearing afresh before another judge.

The SCA accordingly set aside that convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court and remitted
that matter to the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria for a trial afresh.

--- ends ---