THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 532/09

WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER ASSOCIATION

First Appellant
STEPHAN FRANCOIS SMUTS

Second Appellant
SPARKOR (PTY) LIMITED

Third Appellant
SOUTH AFRICAN SEA PRODUCTS LIMITED

Fourth Appellant

and

THE MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent
AND TOURISM
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL: MARINE AND

Second Respondent
COASTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
THE CHIEF DIRECTOR: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Third Respondent
(MARINE): MARINE AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND
TOURISM
FURTHER RESPONDENTS

Fourth to 1245th Respondents

__________________________________________________________________________________

Neutral citation: West Coast Rock Lobster Association v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism (532/09) [2010] ZASCA 114 (22 September 2010)

CORAM:
Navsa, Lewis, Ponnan and Mhlantla JJA and K Pillay AJA

HEARD:
31 August 2010
DELIVERED:
22 September 2010

SUMMARY:
Fishing rights in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 ─ dispute
involving access to West Coast Rock Lobster ─ unnecessary to answer questions concerning
Minister’s power of exemption in terms of s 81 of the Act ─ appeal fails at two related preliminary
levels ─ first, no practical effect ─ measures by Minister were regarded as interim ─ time and
circumstances have overtaken the relief sought in the high court ─ no indication that similar
facts would come before court in the future ─ second, nature and extent of declaratory order ─
order sought too wide ─ purports to bind category of persons not all of whom were before court
─ formulation not such as to deal with nub of complaint.

______________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from:
Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (Davis J sitting
as court of first instance).
The appeal is dismissed.
The appellants are ordered to pay the respondents’ costs, including the
costs attendant upon the employment of two counsel
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

NAVSA JA (LEWIS, PONNAN and MHLANTLA JJA and K PILLAY AJA
concurring)

[1] For a fortunate few, rock lobsters conjure up images of exotic cuisine.
For others, like communities who engage in subsistence fishing, they are a
means of survival and a modest source of income. In South Africa, West
Coast rock lobster (WCRL) is a scarce resource, with commercial entities,
subsistence and recreational fishers all competing for access to this rare
crustacean. Coastal fishing communities, including many previously
disadvantaged individuals, assert an entitlement to this scarce resource.
Established commercial fishing entities, on the other hand, are equally
insistent about maintaining their existing long-term fishing rights and
preventing any incursion from new competitors. The State, in its regulatory
role, has to achieve a balance between these competing interests. The
litigation leading up to this appeal was about whether the State legitimately
went about that task.

[2] The appellants had applied in the Cape High Court for an order
reviewing and setting aside decisions by the first three respondents granting
subsistence fishers generally, and the fourth to 1 245th respondents in
particular, rights to catch and sell WCRL. In addition, the appellants had

sought a declaratory order in the following terms:
‘[T]hat the First Respondent is precluded from using section 81 of the Marine Living
Resources Act 18 of 1998 in order to grant [subsistence] fishers generally, and the Fourth to
1 245th Respondents in particular, a right to catch and sell West Coast rock lobster for
commercial purposes.’

[3] The application was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two
counsel. This appeal is before us with the leave of this court.

[4] The first appellant, the West Coast Rock Lobster Association,
describes itself as a non-profit organisation whose members presently all hold
long-term fishing rights in terms of s 18(1) of the Marine Living Resources Act
18 of 1998 (the MLRA), to undertake commercial fishing for WCRL. The
second appellant, Stephan Francois Smuts, is the holder of long-term
commercial fishing rights in the WCRL Nearshore fishery. The third appellant
is Sahra Luyt, who also holds long-term commercial fishing rights in the
WCRL Nearshore fishery. The fourth appellant, Sparkor (Pty) Ltd, is a
company that holds long-term commercial fishing rights in the WCRL Offshore
fishery. The meaning of nearshore and offshore fishing rights will become
clear in due course.

[5] The first three respondents are the Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism (the Minister), his Deputy Director-General Marine and Coastal
Developments, and his Chief Director. The fourth to 1 245th respondents are
individuals to whom the Minister, purportedly in terms of s 81 of the MLRA,
either granted rights, or who have been identified as possible recipients of
rights to catch WCRL. The 134th respondent is Kenneth Blaauw, a
subsistence fisher, who was represented during the appeal and who, in turn,
came to be representative of the remaining respondents.

[6] Section 81 of the MLRA, under the heading ‘Exemptions’, provides:
‘(1)
If in the opinion of the Minister there are sound reasons for doing so, he or she may,
subject to the conditions that he or she may determine, in writing exempt any person or group
of persons or organ of state from a provision of this Act.

(2)
An exemption granted in terms of subsection (1) may at any time be cancelled or
amended by the Minister.’

[7] The decisions by the first three respondents sought to be impugned in
the court below, referred to in para 2, are no longer in issue because time and
circumstance have overtaken them. This appeal is against the refusal by the
court below to grant the declaratory order set out above. It was submitted on
behalf of the appellants, both in the court below and before us, that whilst the
power set out in s 81 may rightly be employed to exempt persons from
requirements such as having to lodge applications for fishing rights within a
prescribed time, or from having to pay fees for fishing permits it may not, as
happened in this case, be employed to grant fishing rights. The appellants
sought to persuade us that by resorting to s 81 of the MLRA, in the manner
more fully described later in this judgment, to grant rights to the fourth to 1
245th respondents to catch and sell WCRL, the Minister was subverting other
applicable provisions of the statute, more particularly those dealing with the
manner in which fishing rights are to be allocated.

[8] As will become apparent the appeal falls to be determined within a
narrow compass. The question whether a decision on the issues referred to in
the preceding paragraph will have any practical effect and the ambit of the
declaratory order are crucial in that regard and are aspects which I shall deal
with in due course. For the benefit of the reader, however, it is necessary to
first set out the background.

[9] The MLRA, which was promulgated on 21 May 1998 and came into
effect on 1 September 1998, signalled a new era in marine ecosystem
conservation. The preamble to the MLRA reads as follows:
‘To provide for the conservation of the marine ecosystem, the long-term sustainable utilisation
of marine living resources and the orderly access to exploitation, utilisation and protection of
certain marine living resources; and for these purposes to provide for the exercise of control
over marine living resources in a fair and equitable manner to the benefit of all the citizens of
South Africa; and to provide for matters connected therewith.’

[10] In line with the MLRA’s conservation objective s 18 prohibits
commercial or subsistence fishing unless ‘a right to undertake or engage in
such an activity . . . has been granted . . . by the Minister’. The relevant parts
of s 14(2) of the MLRA provide that the Minister ‘shall determine the portions
of the total allowable catch, . . . or a combination thereof, to be allocated in
any year to subsistence, recreational, local, commercial and foreign fishing,
respectively’.

[11] As set out in the judgment of the court below the total allowable catch
(the TAC) is the maximum quantity of fish that is legally available during each
fishing season for combined recreational, subsistence, commercial and
foreign fishing. It is one of the principal means by which the Minister ensures
that fish stocks are not over-exploited. It is within that TAC that fishing rights
granted by the Minister are exercised. Section 18(5) of the MLRA provides
that in granting fishing rights the Minister ‘shall . . . have particular regard to
the need to permit new entrants, particularly those from historically
disadvantaged sectors of society’.

[12] WCRL is but one of the many species of marine life requiring protection
and in respect of which the Minister grants fishing rights. WCRL and abalone
are very valuable and are naturally under intense pressure of over-
exploitation. The pressure arises not only from legitimate and regulated
fishing but also from unregulated illegal fishing operations and conservation
measures are self-evidently a national imperative.

[13] WCRL occurs inside the 200-metre depth contour from just north of
Walvis Bay in Namibia to East London in the Eastern Cape. Female size at
maturity ranges from approximately 57 mm carapace length (CL) to 66 mm
CL. Male lobsters attain a larger size and grow faster than females. As a
result of the size limit of 75 mm CL that is currently imposed on commercial
fishers, male lobsters make up virtually the whole of the catch. Commercial
exploitation of WCRL in South Africa occurs from the mouth of the Orange
River in the north-west to Danger Point in the Cape South Coast. Recreational

fishing covers the same area, but also extends further eastwards towards
Mossel Bay.

[14] Commercial fishing for WCRL dates back more than a century. Initially
there was very little regulation of the WCRL industry. Notwithstanding a
minimum size of 89 mm CL introduced in 1933 and a tail mass quota
limitation in 1946, catches in excess of 10 000 tons per annum were
maintained from 1950 to 1965 putting enormous strain on the resource and
endangering its long-term sustainability. Predictably, by the mid-1960’s WCRL
hauls had begun to decline appreciably. In response, tail mass production
quotas were reduced. In the 1970’s tail mass production quotas were
replaced by a whole lobster (landed mass) quota, in tandem with a TAC
limitation. Various other measures were also introduced, including the
introduction of area limitations, the stipulation of size limitations, the
establishment of a closed season and the banning of catches of berried or
soft-shelled WCRL. These measures combined to restore some balance to
the WCRL industry, and TAC stabilised at between 3 500 and 4 000 tons per
annum.

[15] In the 1990/1 season there was another notable decline in the somatic
growth rate of WCRL.1 There were fewer WCRL of legal size. Up until the mid
90s the commercial TAC was gradually reduced reaching as low as 1 500
tons in the 1995/6 season. There was a slow recovery of the resource up to
the 2004/5 season when the global TAC was 3 527 tons. Unfortunately, in
recent seasons, WCRL has been placed under renewed significant pressure.
The global TAC in the 2007/8 season was decreased to 2 571 tons. WCRL is
a slow-growing crustacean and due to the slow recruitment of the adult
population any recovery plan must be a long-term one.

[16] In his affidavit opposing the relief sought by the appellants in the court
below, the Minister explained that the short, medium and long-term fishing
rights allocation processes with which his department’s Marine and Coastal

1 This means the extent of the physical growth of the creature itself.

Development branch (MCM) had been involved over the past decade had
focused primarily on the interests of medium and large sized commercial
entities. The interests of surrounding coastal communities and subsistence
fishers and their access to the use of the marine living resources have hitherto
been neglected, notwithstanding the provisions of s 18(5) set out above.2 Only
in recent years have their interests received the necessary attention. The
dispute giving rise to the litigation that culminated in the present appeal arose
from that historical imbalance.

[17] The Minister described the problems attendant upon the allocation of
fishing rights to subsistence and smaller scale users of our country’s marine
living resources. Coastal communities have historically depended and relied
on fishing along the coast to earn a living. WCRL fishing, as indicated above,
is lucrative and the demand from this category of users far exceeds the
sustainability of the resources.  Although the number of participants in this
group is large the quantum of fish involved in their quota is relatively small
compared to that exploited by medium and large commercial enterprises. It
has been difficult to assess their impact on the resources they access, legally
and illegally.

[18] Government set in motion a process to develop a management policy
in order to deal with the growing clamour by subsistence users and small
commercial entities for access to a share of the TAC. This process has taken
longer than anticipated. According to the Minister this was due to a larger
group of fishers than initially anticipated having to be accommodated in the
consultation process.

[19] One of the issues facing government in its regulatory function is that it
has obligations towards coastal communities under international treaties,
principally the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Voluntary Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries adopted by the Food

2 Section 2(j) of the MLRA provides that the Minister and any organ of State ‘shall in
exercising any power under this Act have regard to . . . the need to restructure the fishing
industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the
fishing industry’.

and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations on 31 October 1995.
These instruments oblige the government of the Republic of South Africa to
heed the economic and socio-economic needs of coastal fishing
communities.3

[20] Problems hampering government in its attempts to accommodate
subsistence and small-scale fishers who were seeking access to WCRL are
largely due to its own making.  Around the beginning of the new millennium
the Ministry had phased out subsistence permits and restyled them as ‘limited
commercial rights’. In allocating these limited commercial rights the Minister
had failed to accommodate a large number of subsistence fishers from
coastal communities seeking access to the limited resource. The ‘limited
commercial rights’ that had been granted were part of a medium-term fishing
allocation of four-year duration.

[21] In 2005 the Minister invited applications for long-term fishing rights of
ten-year duration. The former full-term commercial rights, which catered for
medium and large scale commercial entities, were re-branded as ‘rights in the
off-shore fishery’ and comprised rights allocations greater that 1.5 tons. The
previous ‘limited commercial rights’ were now known as commercial ‘rights in
the near-shore fishery’ and accommodated 820 individuals who were
historically dependent on the resource. They ran relatively small-scale
commercial operations, in inshore areas using smaller boats and hoop-nets.
The changes brought about by renaming categories were changes in form
rather than substance. Thus, the Minister had committed himself to these
right-holders on a long-term basis and was still facing further calls by a large
number of individuals for inclusion in the near-shore fishery.

[22] As the calls by subsistence and small scale fishers for inclusion grew
ever louder, so too did the resistance by those already in possession of long-

3 Section 2(i) obliges the Minister and any organ of State, in exercising any power under the
MLRA to have regard to ‘any relevant obligation of the national government or the Republic in
terms of any international agreement or applicable rule of international law’.

term rights. The battle lines were drawn and tensions mounted. Consultations
with and representations to the Ministry followed.

[23] The consultation and policy development processes dragged on and
the pressure increased on the Minister to find a means to accommodate those
who had previously been excluded and who desperately sought access to the
resource. The Minister’s problems were compounded when a non-
governmental organisation, Masifundise, assisted subsistence fishers in the
Equality Court to seek relief against him, based on their alleged wrongful
exclusion from access to WCRL. The present appellants were not party to that
litigation.

[24] In May 2007 the Minister, in settlement of that litigation, and in
accordance with an agreement which was made an order of the Equality
Court, publicly announced ‘interim measures to accommodate fishers along
the Western and Southern Cape coastline’. In terms of that arrangement
Masifundise undertook to identify 1 000 bona fide ‘artisanal’ (subsistence)
fishers who were not holders of existing commercial fishing rights allocated in
terms of s 18 of the MLRA and who could ‘demonstrate both historical
dependence and reliance’. It was agreed that the names of those so identified
would be submitted to the Minister’s Department. Those who qualified would
be required to apply for a recreational fishing permit.4 The Minister, in turn,
after considering whether they met the criteria, would:
‘[B]y way of exemption, until 31 December 2007 or any earlier date identified herein, permit
the identified fishers to engage in fishing and to sell the lawfully caught catch under the
authority of the recreational permit the following: . . .
4.1
four West Coast rock lobster per day, every day of the week until 31 May 2007; . . .’.
In addition, the persons who qualified and who were holders of recreational
permits were granted the right to catch stipulated quantities of other species
of marine life until 30 September 2007.

4 Recreational fishing is defined in s 1 of the MLRA as ‘any fishing done for leisure or sport
and not for sale, barter, earnings or gain’. (My emphasis.)

[25] The order of the Equality Court records that ‘the exemption may be
renewed for a further stipulated period if necessary. . .’. The order of the
Equality Court is dated 2 May 2007 and, as can be seen from what is set out
in the preceding paragraph, the initial ‘interim’ right to fish for WCRL was for a
very limited duration.

[26] Following on the public announcement the first appellant and its
members, considering this exercise of the power of exemption as an abuse of
the provisions of the MLRA, engaged the Minister in correspondence and
discussions. That process dragged on for months during the latter half of 2007
and the beginning of 2008. When the Minister appeared bent on proceeding
with further interim measures in the same vein as referred to above, but for a
longer period the appellants resorted to the litigation in the court below in
March 2008.

[27] The Minister’s own scientific advice indicated that the further interim
measures he intended proceeding with would result in the TAC for WCRL
being exceeded and not being absorbed within the recreational catch, which
was the Minister’s objective. Nonetheless, the Minister took the view that
there were compelling reasons to proceed. The following part of the Minister’s
answering affidavit is significant:
‘[F]rom a humanitarian and socio-economic perspective understood in the context . . . of the
MLRA and the considerations that led to the settlement of  the Equality Court case, it was
very important that the affected group of fishers be accommodated, inter alia, with access to
WCRL. Time did not permit a process of rights allocations to them under s 18 coupled with a
possible re-allocation for commercial TAC under s 14. The development of the policy had
been held up longer than expected, not due to the fault of the interim relief fishers. Not
addressing their needs could, and probably would, cause very severe hardship for the interim
relief fishers. . . . In my opinion, these were sound reasons for addressing this issue by way of
exemptions under s 81.’

[28] The following statement by the Minister is of some importance:
‘To the extent that the small scale fishers would compete with the existing commercial rights
holders, I considered that their impact would probably be minimal and would in any event not
be in a market sector in which the large commercial interests participated meaningfully.’

[29] The court below (Davis J),5 in considering whether the Minister had
properly used the power of exemption provided for in s 81 of the Act, had
regard to the full bench decision in Laingville Fisheries (Pty) Ltd v The
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.6 In that case the power of
exemption provided for in s 81 of the MLRA was described as a ‘wide
discretion’ to exempt a person from any provision of the Act. The court below
concluded that there was no basis for a contention that the Minister may only
exempt a person from certain provisions of the Act but not others. Davis J
said the following (para 31):
‘No section remains untouchable or out of reach of the exemption power contained in section
81. That conclusion does not follow from the wording of the provision and the interpretation of
the provision by the Full Bench.’

[30] The learned judge went on to say (para 34):
‘In effect what happened was the following: The respondent fishers were exempted from the
provision that they would not undertake commercial fishing without having been granted a
right thereto by the first respondent. To the extent that the exemption letter constituted a
permit, they were also exempted from paying any fee for this permit.’

[31] The court below held that the Minister had acted rationally and that the
transformative agenda of the MLRA, of restructuring the fishing industry to
address the historical imbalances of the past, had rightly been taken into
account. Davis J described the Minister’s decision-making as follows:
‘That he did so in the fashion set out in the evidence is indicative of a decision maker having
to make a difficult decision in the allocation of limited resources but doing so in a fashion in
which he was cognisant of the competing interests which, in any event, may be intrinsic to
section 2 of the MLRA.’
He held that the Minister had acted intra vires in his application of s 81 and
went on to dismiss the application with costs.

[32] Subsequent to the judgment of the court below the respondents
approached the Equality Court once again and once more an order was made
by that court in accordance with an agreement reached with the Minister. That
order is dated 19 November 2008 (approximately six weeks after the

5 [2008] ZAWCHC 123 (7 October 2008).
6 [2008] ZAWCHC 28 (30 May 2008).

judgment of the court below). In terms of the order the Minister undertook to
finalise the policy development process by publication in the Government
Gazette by 31 July 2009. Furthermore, subsistence fishers who were
identified in the same way as before and who held recreational fishing permits
would, by way of exemption by the Minister, be granted the right to catch, inter
alia, 20 WCRL per person per week from 15 November 2008 to 15 April 2009
(on weekdays only).

[33] In refusing leave to appeal, Davis J thought it important that the
decision by the Minister was ‘buttressed’ by the two orders of the Equality
Court, which he reasoned it was not competent for him to overturn. In
addition, Davis J was not persuaded that another court would come to a
different conclusion on the interpretation and application of s 81 of the MLRA.

[34] The facts in Laingville, where applications for fishing rights were lodged
beyond a time deadline set by the Minister and where the court held that s 81
could be employed by him to exempt persons from that requirement, are of
course far removed from the facts of the present case.

[35] It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Minister could not
re-categorise subsistence fishers and pretend they were recreational fishers
in order to get around the seemingly already fully subscribed rights in the
subsistence sector. The appellants contended that by employing s 81 in the
manner referred to above, the Minister was subverting the very purpose of the
Act and that the granting of rights ought to be dealt with in terms of s 18 of the
MLRA.

[36] There is some force in the attack by the appellants on the Minister’s
application of s 81 of the MLRA. There is also the allied concern that
permitting such a wide power of exemption could result in the executive being
able to undo the structure, purpose and principles of the legislation. That
concern would have as a concomitant that the jurisdictional lines between the
various arms of government would be blurred. It was argued that the effect of
using an exemption provision in the manner resorted to by the Minister is to

subvert not only the definition of recreational fishing, referred to above, but
also s 20(1) of the MLRA which provides that ‘no person shall sell, barter or
trade any fish caught through recreational fishing’.

[37] On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that s
81 of the MLRA could rightly be used, as the Minister did in this case, to grant
fishing rights. It was contended that s 18 militated against the common-law
entitlement to retain a catch from the sea and that by granting an exemption in
terms of s 81 of the MLRA the Minister was restoring the common-law
position, thereby, in effect, granting the rights challenged by the appellants.
The counter-submission by the appellants in that regard was that the MLRA
now regulated the fishing industry and that its core provisions, in the interests
of conservation, had to be maintained and enforced.

[38] It is unnecessary to deal with all the submissions in this regard and to
decide that issue finally, because the appeal fails at two related fundamental
preliminary levels.

[39] Before dealing with them it is necessary to deal briefly with a
submission on behalf of the 134th respondent, namely, that the appellants
lacked locus standi. It was contended that the appellants have no direct and
substantial interest in the interim relief afforded to the subsistence fishers: a
mere financial or personal interest did not suffice and that the interest had to
be related to the relief sought by the appellants. They contend that the
appellants’ commercial rights were not infringed upon by the rights granted to
the subsistence fishers. I am willing to assume in favour of the appellants,
without deciding the matter finally, that they have the necessary locus standi. I
turn to deal with the two fundamental reasons why the appeal should fail.

[40] First, courts will not decide issues of academic interest only. In Radio
Pretoria v Chairman, Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
2005 (1) SA 47 (SCA) this court had regard to s 21A(1) of the Supreme Court

Act 59 of 1959 which provides:
‘(1) When at the hearing of any civil appeal to the Appellate Division or any Provincial or Local
Division of the Supreme Court the issues are of such a nature that the judgment or order
sought will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground
alone.’

[41] In that case this court was concerned about a proliferation of appeals
that had no prospect of being heard on the merits as the orders sought would
have had no practical effect and referred to Rand Water Board v Rotek
Industries (Pty) Ltd 2003 (4) SA 58 (SCA), at 63H-I, where the following was
said:
‘The present case is a good example of this Court’s experience in the recent past, including
unreported cases, that there is a growing misperception that there has been a relaxation or
dilution of the fundamental principle . . . that Courts will not make determinations that will have
no practical effect.’

[42] In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) the Constitutional Court said the following
(para 21, fn 18):
‘A case is moot and therefore not justifiable if it no longer presents an existing or live
controversy which should exist if the Court is to avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract
propositions of law.’

[43] As set out above, the time periods during which the Equality Court
orders operated have passed. The measures reflected therein were described
as ‘interim’ and it was always understood by all that a policy would some day
be finalised that would inform future conservation measures and the granting
of fishing rights in the future. The Equality Court orders certainly did not
operate at any time so as to prevent the court below from deciding the
dispute. The second Equality Court order, obtained pending an application for
leave to appeal, contemplated a date for finalisation of the new policy, namely
31 July 2009. That time too has come and gone. A further fishing season has
passed since then and we are unaware of how subsistence fishers were
accommodated therein, if at all. There is no indication on the record that the

interim measures contained in the Equality Court orders are to be repeated in
respect of the new fishing season that begins in November 2010.

[44] In Radio Pretoria, at para 40, this court said:
‘[T]here is no clear indication that another case on identical facts will surface in the future.’
The same applies here.

[45] It is true that this court said more than four decades ago, in Ex parte
Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A), that the absence of an existing dispute was not an
absolute bar to the grant of a declaratory order. What was required was that
there should be interested parties upon whom the declaratory order would be
binding. In considering whether to grant a declaratory order a court exercises
a discretion with due regard to the circumstances. The court must be satisfied
that the applicant has an interest in an existing, future or contingent right or
obligation. If the court is so satisfied it must consider whether or not the order
should be granted.7 In exercising its discretion the court may decline to deal
with the matter where there is no actual dispute.8 The court may decline to
grant a declaratory order if it regards the question raised before it as
hypothetical, abstract or academic. Where a court of first instance has
declined to make a declaratory order and it is held on appeal that that
decision is wrong the matter will usually be remitted to the lower court.

[46] All interested parties were not before the court below and there was no
indication on the record that a declaratory order, assuming it to be
enforceable in its proposed form, would have any practical effect. These
factors in themselves presented an insurmountable obstacle for the
appellants.

[47] Second, and as fundamentally fatal to the appellants’ case as the first,
is the nature and extent of the declaratory order sought in the court below. In
the light of the reasoning of the court below and its refusal to review and set

7 Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 (6) SA 205 (SCA)
at 213E-G.
8 Ex parte Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A) at 760B.

aside the Minister’s decision, it was unnecessary for it to go further and deal
specifically with the terms of the proposed declaratory order. The appellants
sought thereby to bar the Minister from using s 81 of the MLRA to grant
subsistence fishers a right to catch and sell WCRL for commercial purposes.

[48] It appears that insufficient thought was given to the wording of the
order sought. Subsistence fishers are entitled to engage in limited commercial
activity. A subsistence fisher is defined in s 1 of the MLRA:
‘[A] natural person who regularly catches fish for personal consumption or for the
consumption of his or her dependants, including one who engages from time to time in the
local sale or barter of excess catch, but does not include a person who engages on a
substantial scale in the sale of fish on a commercial basis.’

[49] The effect of granting the proposed order would be to bar subsistence
fishers as a class from activity they can lawfully engage in, albeit in a limited
manner, namely, the sale of a part of their catch. The order proposed does
not deal with the nub of the appellants’ complaint that subsistence fishers are
being dressed up by the Minister as recreational fishers, to get around the
already fully-subscribed subsistence quota. They point out that by definition
recreational fishers are precluded from selling any part of their catch. The
appellants contend, as I have said, that it is this unworkable fiction that is
subversive of the objectives and principles of the Act. The proposed
declaratory order does not address the appellants’ complaint.

[50] The problem is compounded for the appellants by the fact that the
proposed order is in substance a perpetual interdict purporting to prejudicially
affect a whole class of persons (subsistence fishers), including persons who
are not joined as parties to the litigation but who might have wanted to say
something in opposition to the relief sought. It is a fundamental principle that
all interested parties should be joined in an application that may affect their
rights. See in this regard Farlam, Van Loggerenberg and Fichardt Erasmus
Superior Court Practice at A1-33 and the authorities there cited.

[51] There might conceivably be circumstances in which subsistence fishers
could rightly be granted an exemption in terms of s 81, entitling them to sell
fish that they might otherwise have consumed. There may well be
permutations that do not readily suggest themselves to the parties presently
before us but which might occur to subsistence fishers who are not parties to
the present litigation. Granting the declaratory order in the terms sought would
be closing the door forever and a day to that possibility and would bind
persons who are strangers to the present dispute. A declaratory order cannot
affect the rights of persons who are not parties to the proceedings.9

[52] An attempt was made during the dying seconds of final submissions in
reply on behalf of the appellants to amend the terms of the declaratory order
to deal with the problems referred to in paras 47 to 49 above. Alas, it likewise
did not satisfactorily address the concerns alluded to and for the various
reasons set out above, that attempt too must fail.

[53] There is one remaining aspect. This court has recently seen a number
of cases in which10 jurisdictional questions have arisen in relation to Equality
Court matters. The dissonance in the interplay between the Equality Court
and high courts has been brought into sharp focus. In this case Davis J, sitting
as a high court judge, questioned whether he could validly cut across a
decision of the Equality Court in a case not involving all the parties before
him. Parties have sometimes resorted to parallel and cross-cutting litigation.
Legal uncertainty arises and litigation abounds, the antithesis of what was
intended by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act 4 of 2000.11 These are issues that should be of concern to the legislature
and other interested parties. The Registrar is therefore directed to bring this
judgment to the attention of the Chief State Law Advisor and the Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Development.

9 See SA Mutual Life Assurance Society v Durban City Council 1948 (1) SA 1 (N) and Farlam
et al op cit at A1-33 to A1-34.
10 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v George 2007 (3) SA 62 (SCA); Manong &
Associates (Pty) Ltd  v Department of Roads and Transport, Eastern Cape (No 1) 2009 (6)
SA 574 (SCA); Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport Eastern
Cape (No 2) 2009 (6) SA 589 (SCA).
11 See the remarks of this court in Manong (No 2) op cit para 53.

[54] In light of the conclusions set out above the following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed.
The appellants are ordered to pay the respondents’ costs, including the
costs attendant upon the employment of two counsel.

_________________
M S NAVSA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant:

S Burger SC

E Fagan SC

Instructed by

Webber Wentzel Cape Town

Matsepes Inc Bloemfontein

For first to third Respondent:
W R E Duminy SC

Instructed by

The State Attorney Cape Town

The State Attorney Bloemfontein

For 134th Respondent:

J J Gauntlett SC

F B Pelser

Instructed by

Legal Resources Centre Cape Town

Webbers Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
22 September 2010
Status:
Immediate
Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal

On 22 September 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down judgment in
West Coast Rock Lobster Association & others v The Minister of Environmental
Affairs & others dismissing an appeal against a refusal by the Cape High Court to
grant a declaratory order in terms of which the Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk would have been precluded from using s 81 of
the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 in order to grant subsistence fishers
generally and the fourth to 1 245th respondents in particular the right to catch and
sell West Coast Rock Lobster for commercial purposes. The appellants who are
established commercial fishers were ordered to pay the respondents’ costs including
the costs of two counsel.

The court expressed the view that there was some force in the attack by the
appellants on the Minister’s application of s 81 of the Act. It had been submitted that
the effect of using the power of exemption in terms of s 81 of the Act to grant
subsistence fishers the right to fish as ‘recreational fishers’ was to subvert not only
the definition of recreational fishing but also s 20(1) of the Act which provides that no
person shall sell, barter or trade any fish caught through recreational fishing.

It had been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the prohibition against
commercial fishing in terms of s 18 of the Act, unless one was in possession of a
permit by the Minister, militated against the common-law entitlement to retain a
catch from the sea and that by granting an exemption the Minister was restoring the
common-law position.

This court found it unnecessary to finally decide this issue because the appeal failed
at two fundamental preliminary levels. The measures by the Minister were regarded
as interim. They had been overtaken by time and circumstances. There was no
indication that similar facts would come before court in the future. Courts were
disinclined to grant orders that had no practical effect. For that reason alone the
appeal was destined to fail. There was a second reason why the appeal could not
succeed. The declaratory order sought was couched too widely purporting to bind an
entire category of fishers not all of whom were before court. In any event, the
declaratory order sought did not deal with the nub of the appellants’ complaint. The
appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

Finally, the court expressed concern about the dissonance in the interplay between
the Equality Court and the high court. It noted a number of cases that had come
before it in which jurisdictional questions were raised. In the present case the Cape
High Court questioned whether it could issue an order that cut across a decision of
the Equality Court. Parties some times resorted to parallel and cross-cutting
litigation. Legal uncertainty arose and litigation abounded which was the antithesis of
what was intended by the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. These were issues that should be of concern to the
legislature and other interested parties. The Registrar was directed to bring this
judgment to the attention of the Chief State Law Advisor and the Minister for Justice
and Constitutional Development.