THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No:  64/10

In the matter between:

ELEFTERIOS POLONYFIS                                                                    Appellant

v

THE MINISTER OF POLICE                                                      First Respondent
INSPECTOR P I VAN RENSBURG NO                               Second Respondent
CONSTABLE J STRYDOM NO                                               Third Respondent
INSPECTOR BOOYSEN NO                                                 Fourth Respondent
CONSTABLE MOLELEKOA NO                                               Fifth Respondent
CONSTABLE MARKGRAAFF NO                                           Sixth Respondent
THE MAGISTRATE, COLESBERG NO                              Seventh Respondent
INSPECTOR MOUTON NO                                                      Eight Respondent
CONSTABLE PETERS NO                                                      Ninth Respondent
CONSTABLE MPHULANYAE NO                                          Tenth Respondent
INSPECTOR MATSHEBE NO                                           Eleventh Respondent
CONSTABLE BARNS NO                                                    Twelfth Respondent
THE MAGISTRATE, DE AAR NO                                   Thirteenth Respondent

Neutral citation:  Polonyfis v The Minister of Police (64/2010) [2011] ZASCA 26
(18 March 2011)

Coram:
Brand, Maya, Cachalia, Shongwe JJA and Petse AJA
Heard:
24 February 2011
Delivered:
18 March 2011

Summary:  Search and seizure under ss 20 and 21 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 discussed – The execution of a warrant will only be set aside if
there is an abuse of power or a ‘gross violation’ of a person’s rights.

________________________________________________________________

ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley (Lacock J sitting as court
of first instance).

The following order is made:

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________

CACHALIA JA (Brand, Maya, Shongwe JJA, Petse AJA concurring):

[1] This is an appeal against a judgment of Northern Cape High Court
(Lacock J) dismissing an application by the appellant for an order to set aside a
search warrant issued by a Colesberg magistrate.

[2] These are the facts. The appellant was the owner of a business that
operated under the name ‘The Entertainment Centre’ at premises in the sleepy
little Karoo town of Colesberg. It was the only business of its kind in the town. On
1 December 2006, at the request of members of the SAPS, the magistrate, who
is the seventh respondent, issued the search warrant – with which we are
concerned in this appeal – under s 21 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(the Act). The warrant reads as follows:

‘SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIEDIENS

VISENTERINGSLASBRIEF
Artikel 20, 21 en 25 van Strafproseswet, 1977 (Wet No 51 van 1977)

Aan:
Kst Strydom                          Kst Janse van Rensburg

Insp Booysen                        Kst Molelekoa

Kst Markgraaff

(Rang, naam en werksadres van lede wat deursoeking gaan uitvoer)

en enige ander lid van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens wat behulpsaam kan wees met
die visentering en beslaglegging.

Dit blyk aan my uit inligting onder eed, dat redelike gronde bestaan om te glo dat daar
binne
Die Landdrosdistrik van Colesberg voorwerpe is, soos wat in Aanhangsel “A” hierby
aangeheg, beskryf is, en wat –

*(a)
op redelike gronde vermoed word betrokke te wees by die vermeende pleging
van;
*(b)
tot bewus kan strek van die vermelde pleging van; of
*(c)
op redelike gronde vermoed word bestem te wees om gebruik te word by die
pleging van;

die misdryf(we), synde onwettige dobbelary onder Artikel 81(1)(a) van die Noord Kaap
dobbel en Wedren Wet 1996 (nr 5/1996) en dat ek redelike gronde het om te vermoed
dat hierdie voorwerpe


in besit, of onder die beheer van .............................................................................
……………………………………………………….(vermeld naam en persoon(e) is;

op of by ‘n perseel, te wete Kerkstraat Hall Entertainment Centre (beskryf
perseel)

U word hierby gemagtig om gedurende die dag/nag die geïdentifiseerde –

persoon(e) te visenteer

perseel te betree en te deursoek en om enige persoon(e) op of by daardie
perseel te visenteer,

en op die voorwerp(e) wat in Aanhangsel “A” beskryf is, beslag te lê, wat gedurende die
deursoeking gebind word en om daaroor te beskik ooreenkomstig artikel 30 van die
Strafproseswet.

Gegee onder my hand te Colesberg op hierdie dag van 1 Desember 2006 (jaar).

Volle name:  EDWARD WILLIAM SCHON

Ampstitel:     Magistrate/Landdros

Landdrosdistrik:  COLESBERG’

[3] The application for the warrant was supported by an affidavit, referred to in
the warrant as ‘Aanhangsel “A”’, which the investigating officer had deposed to.
The relevant portions of the affidavit read:
‘2.
Ek het gedurende 2006 op ‘n navraag gewerk ten opsigte van onwettige dobbel persele.
Inligting is ingesamel ten opsigte van die bedrywighede van die persele in die Bo-Karoo.

4.
Te Colesberg is Entertainment Centre geleë in die winkel sentrum Hall wat in Kerkstraat
is by die perseel is die modus operandi presies soos op De Aar. Die geld word by die
toonbank betaal en weer word speel munte wat die masjiene werk aan jou gegee indien
u enige wennings maak word die lesing neergeskryf en uitbetaal by die toonbank. Beskik
oor geen lisensie nie 38 masjiene.
5.
In (die) geval is aansoek gedoen vir 252A en sal van lokvinke gebruik gemaak word op
06/12/02 om dobbel te kan bewys op alle gelde en masjiene sal beslag gelê word.’

[4] The following day, on 2 December, the SAPS mounted an undercover
operation to gather evidence of suspected gambling. A SAPS member entered
the premises described in the warrant and exchanged a R10 and a R20 note at
the counter in return for which he was given 60 tokens. He used the tokens to
play on a machine known as a ‘one arm bandit’. The particular machine does not
pay out cash amounts but registers winnings as ‘credits’ that are redeemable for
cash. The member’s endeavours yielded 35 credits for which he was paid an
amount of R17.50 in cash. He then left the premises and reported to his
superiors.

[5] Armed with this information and the warrant, Inspector Booysen, who is
the fourth respondent and one of the officers mentioned in the warrant, entered
the premises later that day. He was accompanied by four other police officers,
the second, third, fifth and sixth respondents. He read the content of the warrant
to the manager and handed a copy of it – without the affidavit – to him. He then
proceeded to execute the warrant by seizing cash in an amount of R15 162.30,
gambling machines, a coin counting machine, a scale used for weighing tokens,
tokens each worth fifty cents, documents, receipt books, keys, ashtrays, chairs
and some other smaller items.

[6] While conducting the search, Booysen asked the manager for his
identification document. He answered that it was in his hotel room, which was

some distance from the premises. Booysen then escorted him there to find the
document. When they entered the room, Booysen noticed a black book. He
enquired from the manager what information it contained. The manager replied
that it contained telephone numbers. Booysen asked him who his employer was.
The manager was uncooperative and replied that he did not know. Booysen then
took possession of the book in the hope that he may be able to obtain the
employer’s contact details there. They then returned to the business premises
and found the appellant’s attorney standing outside with the other police officers.

[7] They entered the premises and Booysen exhibited the warrant to the
attorney – again without the affidavit. It bears mentioning that Booysen had the
affidavit in his possession throughout the search and seizure operation. The
police officers then left with the items that they had seized. The appellant initially
sought the return of all these items. The high court, by consent, granted an order
for the return of all the articles, except the money, tokens and gambling
machines. The appellant complains that the high court ought also to have
ordered that the remaining articles be returned.

[8] The appellant attacks the lawfulness of the search and seizure operation
on four grounds: first, because the warrant did not indicate which sub-section of s
20 of the Act was applicable to the search; secondly, for the reason that the
address of the premises to be searched was vaguely described in the warrant;
thirdly, that Booysen’s failure to exhibit the affidavit, when the warrant was
executed rendered the search unlawful, and finally, that the execution of the
warrant was unlawful because the SAPS seized some things that were not
mentioned in the warrant.

[9] Before I deal with each of these contentions it is worth referring to some of
the broad principles applicable to search and seizure warrants that Nugent JA
recently restated in Minister of Safety and Security v Van Der Merwe:1

1 [2010] ZASCA 101 (7 September 2010); 2011 (1) SACR 211 (SCA) paras 8-15.

‘From the earliest criminal codes – both in this country and abroad – statutory powers of
search and seizure have existed for the detection and prosecution of crime. Such
powers, to search and seize in relation to crime, are generally authorised in the following
way.

A court or judicial officer is empowered by the statute to authorise, first, a search
of premises, and secondly, the seizure of articles found in the course of that search, by
issuing a warrant to that effect. Most often, the power to issue such a warrant is
dependent upon it being shown, by information on oath, that it is suspected on,
reasonable grounds, that an article (or articles) connected with a suspected offence is to
be found on premises.

For a warrant to be justified, in such circumstances, the information that is placed
before the court or judicial officer will necessarily need to demonstrate, firstly, that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed; and secondly, that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that an article connected with the suspected
crime is to be found upon particular premises. In order to demonstrate the existence of
those jurisdictional facts, the “information on oath” will necessarily need to disclose the
nature of the offence that is suspected.

In some cases it will be known that a particular article exists that is connected
with the suspected crime. In those cases the purpose of the search will be to discover
the particular article, and the article will thus be capable of being described in specific
terms. In other cases it will not be known whether any particular article exists, but it can
be expected that an article or articles of a particular kind will exist if the offence was
committed. In such cases the purpose of the search will be to discover whether such
article or articles exist/s, and thus they or it will be capable of being described only by
reference to their genus. It is in relation to warrants of that kind that problems of validity
most often arise. It will be inherent in the nature of the authority to search that the
searcher might, in appropriate circumstances, be entitled to examine property that is not
itself connected with the crime – for example, the contents of a cupboard or a drawer, or
a collection of documents – to ascertain whether it contains or is the article that is being
sought.

The authority that is conferred by a warrant to conduct a search, and then to
seize what is found, makes material inroads upon rights that have always been
protected at common law – amongst which are rights to privacy and property and
personal integrity. In those circumstances – as demonstrated by the review of decided

cases by Cameron JA in Powell NO & others v Van der Merwe NO & others – the courts
in this country have always construed statutes that authorise the issue of warrants
strictly in favour of the minimum invasion of such rights – which is in accordance with a
general principle of our law to that effect. As the learned judge said in that case:
“Our law has a long history of scrutinising search warrants with rigour and exactitude –
indeed, with sometimes technical rigour and exactitude. The common-law rights so
protected are now enshrined, subject to reasonable limitation, in s 14 of the Constitution:
‘Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have –
(a) their person or their home searched;
(b) their property searched;
(c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.’ ”

A challenge to the validity of a warrant will thus call for scrutiny of the information
that was before the issuing officer, to determine, firstly, whether it sufficiently disclosed a
reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed; and secondly, whether it
authorises no more than is strictly permitted by the statute.

Questions that arise in relation to the second issue will generally fall into either of
two different categories. The first is whether the warrant is sufficiently clear as to the acts
that it permits. For, where the warrant is vague, it follows that it will not be possible to
demonstrate that it goes no further than is permitted by the statute. If a warrant is clear
in its terms, a second, and different, question might arise, which is whether the acts that
it permits go beyond what is permitted by the statute. If it does, then the warrant is often
said to be “overbroad” and will be invalid so far as it purports to authorise acts in excess
of what the statute permits. A warrant that is overbroad might, depending upon the
extent of its invalidity, be set aside in whole, or the bad might be severed from the good.

Needless to say, a warrant may be executed only in its terms. But it is important
to bear in mind that it is not open to a person affected by a search to resort to self-help
to prevent the execution of a warrant, even if he or she believes that its terms are being
exceeded – which is in accordance with ordinary principles of law. As Langa CJ pointed
out in Thint:
“While a searched person may in certain cases collaborate and aid the investigator . . .
the legislation envisages a unilateral exercise of power that is not dependent on such
collaboration.”

Thus it is ultimately the searcher who must decide whether an article or articles fall
within the terms of the warrant, though he or she does so at the risk that, if not, his or her
conduct might be found to have been unlawful.’ (Footnotes omitted.)

[10] Bearing these principles in mind I turn to consider the first of the
appellant’s complaints – that the warrant is invalid because the learned
magistrate failed to specify which sub-section of s 20 is applicable to the articles
that may be seized.2 I did not understand the appellant to contend that a warrant
would in and of itself be invalid if it purported to authorise the seizure of articles
under all three sub-sections. This must be so because the jurisdictional facts
necessary for the issue of a single warrant may be found in all three sub-
sections.3 In other words an article may be ‘concerned in the commission of an
offence’, ‘may afford evidence of the commission of an offence’ and also may ‘on
reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be used in the commission of an
offence’. Indeed this would frequently be the case – particularly because the
sections are couched in general terms and are almost impossible to delineate.

[11] The appellant’s real objection to the warrant is that the information that
was placed before the magistrate did not justify his using all three sub-sections.
Mr Jagga, who appeared for the appellant, contended that from the magistrate’s
reasons it is apparent that he only extended the warrant to cover all the sub-

2Section 20: ‘State may seize certain articles
The State may, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, seize anything (in this Chapter
referred to as an article)-
(a)     which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be concerned in the
commission or suspected commission of an offence, whether within the Republic or elsewhere;
(b)     which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission of an offence,
whether within the Republic or elsewhere; or
(c)     which is intended to be used or is on reasonable grounds believed to be intended to be
used in the commission of an offence.
3 To the extent that it may be suggested that two provincial divisions have held that it is not
permissible for a search warrant to be issued to cover the circumstances in all three sub-sections,
I respectfully disagree. See Fiona Henning v The Minister of Public Safety and Security Case No
22157/2003 paras 23 and 24; Sarel Blaauw v The Chairperson of the North West Gambling
Board & others Case No 940/04 paras 13 and 14.

sections so as to couch the warrant in terms that are as wide as possible. The
warrant was therefore over-broad, and for that reason invalid.

[12] The contention does not bear scrutiny. The magistrate stated his reasons
for issuing the warrant in the terms he did as follows:

‘7.1
Ek ontken dat ek nie my aandag aan die aangeleentheid spandeer het alvorens
ek die lasbrief onderteken en uitgereik het nie. Ek het juis nie enige van (a), (b) of
(c) deurgehaal nie, aangesien ek dit nodig gevind het om die bevoegdhede soos
in aldrie vervat, intakt te hou en nie die Polisie se magte onnodig te beperk nie.
7.2
Nadat ek die verklaring deurgelees het, was ek oortuig dat daar redelike gronde
bestaan om te glo dat daar ‘n misdryf op die perseel gepleeg word.
7.3
Dit was vir my duidelik dat die geld, masjiene en speelmunte kwalifiseer in terme
van (a), (b) en (c) en derhalwe het ek nie een van die drie deurgehaal nie.’

[13] It is clear that the authorisation was sought to search the premises and
seize articles that bear some relationship to illegal gambling on the premises. A
gambling machine, for example, which is one of the articles we are concerned
with in this case, may be concerned in the commission of the offence of illegal
gambling, afford evidence of the commission of that offence and reasonably be
used in the commission of further such offences. In other words the three sub-
sections would all apply. Similarly, as the magistrate said, money and tokens
could notionally also fall into all three categories. The magistrate, therefore,
correctly did not limit the warrant to only one of the sub-sections.

[14] I turn to the appellant’s second ground of attack; that the inaccurate
description of the address in the warrant rendered it invalid. The warrant
describes the premises as ‘Kerkstraat, Hall Entertainment Centre’. The correct
description of the premises and its address is, however, ‘The Entertainment
Center, shop 10, The Mall, 72 Church Street, Colesberg’. The affidavit prepared
for the purpose of obtaining the warrant contains the following description: ‘Te

Colesberg is Entertainment Centre geleë in die winkel sentrum Hall wat in
Kerkstraat is’. It appears that the word ‘Hall’ was erroneously used instead of ‘the
Mall’.

[15] Mr Jagga, submitted that the description of the property must be
ascertained only by reference to the warrant and not the affidavit, which, as I
have mentioned, was not attached to the warrant when it was executed. On this
basis it is contended that the description of the address on the face of the
warrant does not meet the strict requirements of the test that was adopted by
Gura AJ in Sarel Blaauw v The Chairperson of the North West Gambling Board &
others.4 There the court was persuaded, on the basis of Canadian authority,5 that
South African law requires a warrant:
‘(To) identify a physical location for the search to take place . . . The description of the
place to be searched should be precise enough to allow someone unfamiliar with the
investigation to identify the location to be searched from the warrant alone . . . the
address or described place must be particular and accurate. For example, if the warrant
outlines the wrong address, the search and seizure are viewed as warrantless.’
(Ellipses added.)

[16] For present purposes it is not necessary to consider this authority, except
to the limited extent that it is relevant in this case. The starting point must always
be to ask what the South African law is. For this we must look to s 21(2) of the
Act, which says that a warrant shall authorise a police official ‘to enter and search
any premises identified in the warrant’. The section means no more than that the
warrant should intelligibly describe the premises to be searched so that the
official who is authorised to conduct the search is able to identify it. Absolute
perfection in description is not required – not even in the United States where the
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment provides in terms that no warrant shall issue
except those ‘particularly describing the place to be searched’.6 US courts have

4 Case no 949/04 (BPD) para 16.
5 Scott C Hutchison et al Search and Seizure Law in Canada vol 2 at 16-30 and 16-31.
6 Wayne R LaFave & Jerold H Israel Criminal Procedure 1985 p 135.

thus held that ‘it is enough if the description is such that the officer with the
search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended’.7 In a similar vein, Canadian courts have emphasised that the
substance of the warrant must be looked at to give effect to it.8 Thus a technically
wrong address does not invalidate a warrant if it otherwise describes the
premises with sufficient particularity so that the police can ascertain and identify
the place to be searched.9

[17] Viewed in this light the warrant with which we are concerned – even
without the affidavit – met the requirements of s 21 of the Act. The ‘Entertainment
Centre’ was the only one of its kind on ‘Kerkstraat’ and in Colesberg. The police
officers executing the warrant knew the premises and were able to locate it
without any difficulty. I should add that, Sarel Blaauw, the case on which the
appellant relies, does not support him. There the learned judge correctly said that
if the description of the premises is not accurate, he would nevertheless uphold a
warrant if the search was conducted at the correct address.10 There is therefore
no substance in this contention.

[18] I turn to the appellant’s third complaint; that the absence of the affidavit
when the SAPS executed the warrant invalidated the search. As I understand the
complaint it is that because Booysen did not hand over the affidavit to the
manager when he gave him the warrant, the warrant was incomplete and for this
reason its execution was unlawful.

[19] Section 21(4) of the Act requires a police officer executing a warrant to
‘after such execution, upon demand of any person whose rights in respect of any
search or article seized under the warrant have been affected, hand him a copy
of the warrant’. The reason that the officer must, on demand hand a copy of the

7 Steele v United States No 1 267 US 498, 45 SCt 414, 69 LEd 757 (1925).
8 R v Silverstone 66 CCC (3 rd) 125 paras 61-64.
9 R c Charles 2010 QCCQ 9178 (Can LII) para 37.
10 n 4 para 17.

warrant, only after execution is, as Nugent JA points out in the passage quoted
above, because the search and seizure process is a unilateral exercise that is
not dependent upon the cooperation of the person who is in charge of the
property that is being searched. And it is for the officer conducting the search to
decide whether or not an item to be seized falls within the terms of the warrant.
After the search a copy of the warrant and any document referred to in it must –
on demand – be handed to the person in charge who may then decide whether
or not to challenge the validity of the warrant, either because it was unlawfully
issued or unlawfully executed.

[20] Inspector Booysen read the contents of the warrant to the manager and
handed a copy of it to him, albeit without the affidavit. The manager did not
‘demand’ a copy of the affidavit, even though the warrant referred to it. Neither
did the appellant’s attorney. They could have done so at any stage after the
execution of the search when they must have realised that they had not received
a copy of the affidavit. They elected not to do so for reasons only they are aware
of. Booysen says pertinently that it was an oversight on his part not to have
handed a copy of the document to the manager and that he would have handed
a copy to him if he had asked for it because he had the document in his
possession at the time of the search. There is therefore no merit in this complaint
either.

[21] I turn to the appellant’s fourth and final contention – that the manner of
execution of the warrant was unlawful because the executing officers seized not
only money, tokens, and machines, but they also took chairs, ashtrays and
documents of whatever nature, including documents from the manager’s hotel
room. The validity of the whole search was therefore tainted. For this rather novel
proposition Mr Jagga relied on this court’s judgment in Pretoria Portland Cement
Company Limited & another v The Competition Commission & others11 where the
court held that where the executing authority abuses its power in a manner that

11 2003 (2) SA 385 (SCA).

involves a gross violation of a person’s right to privacy the entire search and
seizure process may be set aside.12 The court qualified this by saying that an
unlawful execution will not by itself inevitably taint a warrant that is itself regular.13

[22] The search warrant authorised only the seizure of machines, money and
tokens. The SAPS, however, seized articles that the warrant did not mention.
And it was not able to justify the seizure of the other articles on any other ground.
The high court, therefore, correctly ordered the return of all those items not
mentioned in the warrant.

[23] But it does not mean that because the execution of the warrant went
beyond its strict terms that the entire search was tainted. I do not think that the
behaviour or conduct of the police amounted to, in Pretoria Portland’s
formulation, either an ‘abuse of power’ or ‘gross violation’ of the appellant’s
rights. The seizure simply went beyond the ambit of the warrant and the
appropriate remedy for this was, as the high court ordered, the return of those
articles that were seized but not authorised by the warrant.

[24] In my view, the court below correctly dismissed all the appellant’s
contentions. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

___________
A CACHALIA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

12 Ibid para 71 and 73.
13 Ibid para 73I-J.

APPEARANCES

APPELLANTS:

N Jagga
Instructed by Vardakos Attorneys, Vereeniging
Honey & Partners, Bloemfontein

RESPONDENT:

W Coetzee
(1st – 6th and 8th) Instructed by The State Attorney,
Kimberley
(7th) The Magistrate, Colesberg NO, Colesberg
(13th) The Magistrate, De Aar NO, De Aar
The State Attorney, Bloemfontein
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

18 March 2011

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form
part of the judgment.

Polonyfis v The Minister of Police
(64/2010) [2011] ZASCA 26 (18 March 2011)

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal against an order of
the Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley. The appellant, Mr Elefterios
Polonyfis, who owns ‘The Entertainment Centre’ in Colesberg, appealed
against the judgment of the high court in which its application to set aside a
search warrant was dismissed with costs. The warrant was issued by a
Colesberg magistrate since the police believed that illegal gambling was being
conducted on the premises.

The appellant attacked the lawfulness of the search and seizure operation on
four grounds, namely (1) the warrant did not indicate which sub-section of s
20 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was applicable; (2) the address
of the premises to be searched was vaguely described in the warrant; (3) that
the fourth respondent failed to exhibit an affidavit in support of the warrant;
and (4) that the execution of the warrant was unlawful because the South
African Police Service seized items that were not mentioned in the warrant.

It was held that all three sub-sections of s 20 of the act were applicable in this
case and that the magistrate correctly did not limit the warrant only to one
section.

The SCA held further that a technically wrong address does not invalidate a
warrant if it otherwise describes the premises with sufficient particularity so
that the police can ascertain and identify the place to be searched.

With regard to the appellant’s third argument the court found that the
appellant did not request a copy of the affidavit from the police. Had he done
so they would have indeed provided him with a copy.

The appellant further argued that the seizure of the ashtrays, chairs,
documents and other smaller items were not permitted by the warrant and
that this deemed the entire seizure invalid. The court found that although the
warrant only permitted the seizure of gambling machines, money and tokens
the execution of the warrant was not invalid because the search did not result
in a abuse of power or a ‘gross violation’ of the appellant’s rights. In any case,
the high court already ordered the return of the other items which were taken.

Therefore the SCA dismissed the appeal with costs.