SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No: 132/11
Reportable

In the matter between:

COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE
Appellant

and

TRADEHOLD LTD
Respondent

Neutral citation:
Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Service v Tradehold Ltd (132/11) [2012] ZASCA
61 (8 MAY 2012)

Coram:
NUGENT, CACHALIA, MALAN, TSHIQI JJA
and BORUCHOWITZ AJA

Heard:
12 March 2012

Delivered:
8 May 2012

Summary:
Income tax – s 12 of Eighth Schedule of Act 58 of
1962 – deemed disposal of assets – Double Tax
Agreement between the Republic of South Africa
and Luxembourg – meaning of and effect – Article
13(4) – includes within its ambit capital gains
derived from the alienation of all property
including a deemed disposal of assets.

___________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________

On appeal from: The Tax Court, Cape Town (Griesel J):
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those of two counsel.

___________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________

BORUCHOWITZ
AJA
(NUGENT,
CACHALIA,
MALAN
and
TSHIQI JJA concurring)

[1] This is an appeal by the Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service from a decision of the Tax Court, Cape Town
(Griesel J). The respondent, Tradehold Limited (Tradehold), had
successfully appealed against an additional assessment raised by the
Commissioner based on a taxable capital gain which, according to the
Commissioner, arose from a deemed disposal by Tradehold of its shares
in Tradegro Holdings Limited, in terms of para 12(1) of the Eighth
Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act).

[2] Tradehold is an investment holding company, incorporated in
South Africa, with its registered office at 36 Stellenberg Road, Parow,
Industria, and is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. During the
tax year under consideration, being the year of assessment ended 28
February 2003, Tradehold’s only relevant asset was its 100 per cent
shareholding in Tradegro Holdings which, in turn, owned 100 per cent of

the shares in Tradegro Limited, a company incorporated in Guernsey
which owned approximately 65 per cent of the issued share capital in the
UK-based company, Brown & Jackson plc.

[3] On 2 July 2002, at a meeting of Tradehold’s board of directors in
Luxembourg, it was resolved that all further board meetings would be
held in that country. This had the effect that, as from 2 July 2002,
Tradehold became effectively managed in Luxembourg. It nevertheless
remained a ‘resident’ in the Republic notwithstanding the relocation of
the seat of its effective management to Luxembourg by reason of the
definition, at that time, of the term ‘resident’ in s 2 of the Act.1 This status
changed with effect from 26 February 2003, when the definition was
amended and Tradehold ceased to be a resident of the Republic.2

[4] Relying on the provisions of para 12 of the Eighth Schedule to the
Act, the Commissioner contended that when the respondent relocated its
seat of effective management to Luxembourg on 2 July 2002, or when it
ceased to be a resident of the Republic on 26 February 2003, it was
deemed to have disposed of its only relevant asset, namely its 100 per
cent shareholding in Tradegro Holdings, resulting in a capital gain being

1Prior to its amendment and during the period 2 July 2002 to 25 February 2003, the term ‘resident’ was
defined as follows in s 1 of the Act.
‘Section 1
“Resident” means any –
(a) natural person who is –
…
(b) person (other than a natural person) which is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic
or which has its place of effective management in the Republic (but excluding any international
headquarter company)…’
2The amendment on 26 February 2003 added the following words to the definition of ‘resident’: ‘[B]ut
does not include any person who is deemed to be exclusively a resident of another country for purposes
of the application of any agreement entered into between Governments of the Republic and that other
country for the avoidance of double taxation.’

realised in the 2003 year of assessment in an amount of R405 039 083.
This tax is colloquially referred to as an ‘exit tax’.

[5] Paragraph 12 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act, insofar as it is
relevant, reads:
‘12 Events treated as disposals and acquisitions – (1) Where an event described in
subparagraph (2) occurs, a person will be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as
having disposed of an asset described in that subparagraph for proceeds equal to the
market value of the asset at the time of the event and to have immediately reacquired
the asset at an expenditure equal to that market value, which expenditure must be
treated as an amount of expenditure actually incurred and paid for the purposes of
paragraph 20(1)(a).
(2) Subparagraph (1) applies, in the case of –
(a) a person who ceases to be a resident, or a resident who is as a result of the
application of any agreement entered into by the Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation treated as not being a resident, in respect of all assets of that person other
than assets in the Republic listed in paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) and (ii);
(b) an asset of a person who is not a resident, which asset –
(i) becomes an asset of that person’s permanent establishment in the Republic
otherwise than by way of acquisition; or
(ii) ceases to be an asset of that person’s permanent establishment in the Republic
otherwise than by way of a disposal contemplated in paragraph 11…’

[6] Paragraph 12 must be read with para 2 of the Eighth Schedule
which provides:
‘Application. – (1)
Subject to paragraph 97, this Schedule applies to the disposal
on or after valuation date of –
(a) any asset of a resident; and
(b) the following assets of a person who is not a resident, namely –
(i) immovable property situated in the Republic held by that person or any interest or
right of whatsoever nature of that person to or in immovable property situated in the
Republic; or

(ii) any asset which is attributable to a permanent establishment of that person in the
Republic.’

[7] Para 12(1) speaks of a person being ‘treated as having disposed of
an asset’. This is a deeming provision. A deemed disposal of assets,
except those listed in subsection 2(1)(b)(i) and(ii), is triggered under para
12 when a company ceases to be a resident of the Republic or is treated as
not being a resident as a result of the application of a double tax
agreement.

[8] On appeal to the Tax Court it was contended by the respondent that
if there was a deemed disposal of the investment by Tradehold during the
2003 year of assessment, the capital gain that resulted from that disposal
was not taxable in South Africa but in Luxembourg. The reason therefore
was that at the time the capital gain arose the respondent was deemed to
be a resident of Luxembourg in terms of Art 4(3) of the Double Tax
Agreement (DTA) entered into between South Africa and the
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 6 December 2000,
which became applicable to South Africa in respect of the years of
assessment beginning on or after 1 January 2001.3 In terms of Art 4(3) the
deemed place of residence of a company is the place where its effective
management is situated.

3Article 4 insofar as it is relevant provides as follows:
‘1. For the purposes of this Convention the term “resident of a Contracting State” means:
(a) in Luxembourg, any person who, under the laws of Luxembourg, is liable to tax therein by reason
of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, but this term
does not include any person who is liable to tax in Luxembourg in respect only of income from sources
in Luxembourg or capital situated therein;
(b) in South Africa, any individual who is ordinarily resident in South Africa and any other person
which has its place of effective management in South Africa; and
(c) . . .  Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 an individual is a resident of both Contracting
States, then his status shall be determined as follows:
2. Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an individual is a resident of
both Contracting States, then it shall be deemed to be a resident of the State in which its place of
effective management is situated.’

[9] Article 13(4) of the DTA provides as follows:4
‘Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1,
2 and 3, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a
resident.’

[10] The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the
reference in Art 13(4) of the DTA to gains from the alienation of property
did not include a deemed disposal of property as contemplated in para
12(2)(a) of the Schedule. The Tax Court’s reasons are to be found in the
following passages in the judgment:
‘In terms of para 2(1)(a) of the Schedule, capital gains tax becomes payable in respect
of “the disposal of any asset of a resident”.  Subparagraphs 12(1) and (2) of the
Schedule provide that upon an event occurring in terms of those provisions ‘a person
will be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as having disposed of an asset’.  I am
unable to see any reason why a deemed disposal of property should not be treated as
an alienation of property for purposes of article 13(4) of the DTA.  I agree in this
regard with counsel for the appellant, who argued that it would be absurd if a taxpayer
were to be protected in terms of art 13(4) from liability for tax resulting from a gain
from an actual alienation of property, but not from a deemed alienation of property.
It was contended on behalf of the Commissioner that if the appellant was correct in
this regard, it would mean that the deemed disposal provisions of para 12 would never
apply if a party were to migrate to a country which is party to a DTA. However, the

4The full text of Article13 reads:
‘Capital Gains
1. Gains derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of immovable property
referred to in Article 6 and situated in other Contracting States may be taxed in that other State.
2. Gains from the alienation of movable property forming part of the business property of a
permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State
or of movable property pertaining to a fixed base available to a resident of a Contracting State in the
other Contracting State for the purpose of performing independent personal services, including such
gains from the alienation of such a permanent establishment (alone or with the whole enterprise) or of
such fixed base, may be taxed in that other State.
Gains of an enterprise of a Contracting State from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in
international traffic or movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships or aircraft, shall be
taxable only in that State.
4. Gains from the alienation of any property other than that referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, shall
be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident.’

same might be said in respect of an actual disposal of an asset which falls within
article 13(4), but this is not a reason for concluding that the article would not apply in
that instance.’

[11] The Commissioner’s principal submission is that a deemed
disposal provided for in para 12 of the Eighth Schedule is not an
‘alienation’ as contemplated in Art 13(4) of the DTA. It was submitted
that something that is deemed to have occurred has not actually occurred
and thus a deemed disposal of an asset is notionally different from an
alienation thereof. In support of this submission the Commissioner
invoked the following dictum of Cave J in R v Norfolk County Council
(1891) 60 LJ QB 379 at 380:
‘Generally speaking when you talk of a thing being deemed to be something, you do
not mean to say that it is that which it is deemed to be.  It is rather an admission that it
is not what it is deemed to be and that, notwithstanding, it is not that particular thing,
nevertheless it is deemed to be that thing.’

[12] Reference was also made to New Union Goldfields Limited v
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1950 (3) SA 392 (A) at 407A where
Van den Heever JA remarked:
‘I exclude from consideration all the deeming clauses contained in the Act and those
connected with them; for once the Legislature “deems”, it departs from reality.’

[13] Citing a dictum from Cronje NO v Paul Els Investments (Pty) Ltd
1982 (2) SA 179 (T), it was contended for the Commissioner that the
term ‘alienation’ as used in the DTA bears the same meaning as it does in
the domestic law, namely, the action of transferring ownership to another.
In Cronje, Ackermann J, considering the term in a different context came
to the conclusion (at 188A) that ‘die woord “alienation” ‘n beperkte
betekenis het, naamlik die handeling waardeur eiendomsreg oorgedra

word’. Reliance was also placed by the Commissioner on a definition to
similar effect in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. For these
reasons, it was submitted, Tradehold was not protected in terms of Art
13(4) from liability for tax resulting from a deemed alienation of its
assets.

[14] The following further arguments were advanced. It was argued that
if Art 13(4) indeed applied, it would mean that the ‘exit tax’ could only
be levied in the event of a South African taxpayer emigrating to a country
which has not entered into a DTA with the Republic containing a
provision similar to Art 13(4), which could never have been the intention
of the legislature. Moreover, the disposal of an asset contained in subpara
12(1) of the Schedule, is stated to apply ‘for purposes of this Schedule’
and therefore could not have had any effect on the DTA or have resulted
in ‘the alienation of property’ as contemplated in Art 13(4) In the
alternative and on the assumption that the exit tax could be levied it was
contended that Tradehold’s investment would have been attributable to a
permanent establishment and therefore formed part of the assets excluded
by para 2(1)(b)(ii) of the Eighth Schedule

[15] The DTA is one of many double tax agreements entered into
between South Africa and other countries. Its principal objectives are the
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion. The
enabling legislation is s 108 (1) of the Act, which reads:
‘108 Prevention of or relief from, double taxation
(1)
The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the government of
any other country, whereby arrangements are made with such government with a view
to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the
Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or
gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering of reciprocal

assistance in the administration of and the collection of taxes under the said laws of
the Republic and of such other country.
(2)
As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement, as
contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the arrangements thereby made shall
be notified by publication in the Gazette and the arrangements so notified shall
thereupon have effect as if enacted in this Act.’

[16] Once brought into operation a double tax agreement has the effect
of law. Its legal effect was described by Corbett JA in SIR v Downing
1975 (4) SA 518 (A) at 523A:
‘[A]s long as the convention is in operation, its provisions, so far as they relate to
immunity, exemption or relief in respect of income tax in the Republic, have effect as
if enacted in Act 58 of 1962 (see s 108(2)).’

[17] Double tax agreements effectively allocate taxing rights between
the contracting states where broadly similar taxes are involved in both
countries. They achieve the objective of s 108, generally, by stating in
which contracting state taxes of a particular kind may be levied or that
such taxes shall be taxable only in a particular contracting state or, in
some cases, by stating that a particular contracting state may not impose
the tax in specified circumstances. A double tax agreement thus modifies
the domestic law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to the
extent that there is any conflict.

[18] The DTA is based upon the Model Tax Convention on Income and
on Capital agreed to by the committee on Fiscal Affairs of the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), which has served as the basis for similar agreements that exist
between many countries. In interpreting its provisions one must therefore
not expect to find an exact correlation between the wording in the DTA

and that used in the domestic taxing statute. Inevitably, they use wording
of a wide nature, intended to encompass the various taxes generally found
in the OECD member countries. In addition, because the double tax
agreements are intended to encompass not only existing taxes, but also
taxes which may come into existence at later dates (see Art 2(2)), and
bearing in mind the complex nature of taxation in the various member
countries, inevitably the wording in the DTA cannot be expected to match
precisely that used in the domestic taxing statute. In SIR v Downing supra
Corbett JA remarked at 523C-D:
‘The convention makes liberal use of what has been termed “international tax
language” (see Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society,
1960 AC 459 at p 480).’

[19] It is to be observed that Art 3 groups together a number of general
definitions required for the interpretation of the terms used in the DTA.
Subarticle 2 provides for a general rule of interpretation for terms used in
the DTA that are not defined. ‘Alienation’ is not one of the defined terms
and thus Art 3(2) finds application. 5

[20] A helpful approach in dealing with the correlation between
domestic taxing legislation and a double tax agreement is to be found in
Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1959]
3 All ER 245. In the speech of  Lord Radcliffe (at 248) it was stated that
the first step in any interpretive inquiry is to ascertain where in the
scheme of the double tax agreement the relevant tax falls, and then to

5Art 3(2) reads: As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any
term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has at
that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any
meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under
other laws of that State.’

consider whether the tax can be imposed consistently with the obligations
undertaken thereunder.

[21] The need to interpret international treaties in a manner which gives
effect to the purpose of the treaty and which is congruent with the words
employed in the treaty is well established. See Pan American World
Airways Inc v SA Fire and Accident Insurance 1965 (3) SA 150 (A) at
167H; Potgieter v British Airways plc 2005 (3) SA 133 (C).

[22] The first step therefore is to determine into which Article of the
DTA the particular tax falls. Article 2 of the DTA specifies the taxes to
which it applies.6 With regard to the Republic, it is said to apply to ‘the
normal tax’, which includes tax on capital gains. It is plain that the parties
to the DTA intended that all taxes referred to in Art 2 would be dealt with
in one or other of the articles of the DTA.

[23] The crisp question that falls to be determined is whether the term
‘alienation’ as used in the DTA includes within its ambit gains arising
from a deemed (as opposed to actual) disposal of assets. As mentioned
above the term must be given a meaning that is congruent with the
language of the DTA having regard to its object and purpose.

6Article 2 provides as follows:
‘Taxes covered
1. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are :
(a) in Luxembourg
. . .
(b) in South Africa : (i)the normal tax; and
(ii) the secondary tax on companies
(herein after referred to as "South African tax").
2. The Convention shall apply also to any identical or substantially similar taxes which are imposed
after the date of signature of the Convention in addition to, or in place of, the existing taxes. The
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall notify each other of substantial changes which
have been made in their respective taxation laws.

[24] Article 13 is widely cast. It includes within its ambit capital gains
derived from the alienation of all property. It is reasonable to suppose that
the parties to the DTA were aware of the provisions of the Eighth
Schedule and must have intended Art 13 to apply to capital gains of the
kind provided in the Schedule. It is of significance that no distinction is
drawn in Art 13(4) between capital gains that arise from actual or deemed
alienations of property. There is moreover no reason in principle why the
parties to the DTA would have intended that Art 13 should apply only to
taxes on actual capital gains resulting from actual alienations of property.

[25] Having regard to the factors mentioned, I am of the view that the
term ‘alienation’ as it is used in the DTA is not restricted to actual
alienation. It is a neutral term having a broader meaning, comprehending
both actual and deemed disposals of assets giving rise to taxable capital
gains.

[26] Consequently, Art 13(4) of the DTA applies to capital gains that
arise from both actual and deemed alienations or disposals of property. It
follows therefore that from 2 July 2002, when Tradehold relocated its seat
of effective management to Luxembourg, the provisions of the DTA
became applicable and that country had exclusive taxing rights in respect
of all of Tradehold’s capital gains. This conclusion renders it unnecessary
to deal with the Commissioner’s other contentions.

[27] The Tax Court was thus correct in holding that the Commissioner
had incorrectly included a taxable gain resulting from the deemed
disposal of Tradehold’s investment in its income for the 2003 year of
assessment. Accordingly the appeal cannot succeed.

[28] The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those of two counsel.

____________________
P BORUCHOWITZ
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

APPELLANT:
PJJ Marais SC with HGA Snyman SC

Instructed by:

The State Attorney, Pretoria

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein

RESPONDENT:
PA Solomon SC with J Boltar

Instructed by:

Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, Cape Town

Matsepes Attorneys, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

8 May 2012

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does
not form part of the judgment.

Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd
(132/11) [2012] ZASCA (8 May 2012)

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) dismissed an appeal by the appellant
and upheld an order of The Tax Court, Cape Town.

The respondent, an investment holding company incorporated in South Africa and
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, successfully appealed to the Tax Court
against an additional assessment raised by the Commissioner based on a taxable
capital gain. The Commissioner averred that this tax arose as a result of a deemed
disposal by the respondent of its shares in Tradegro Holdings Ltd, a holding
company of the respondent, in terms of para 12(1) of the Eighth Schedule to the
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act).

In 2002, it was decided by the respondent’s board of directors that all further
meetings of the respondent, would be held in Luxembourg. This essentially entailed
that the respondent would be effectively managed in Luxembourg, the respondent
nevertheless remained a ‘resident’ of the Republic of South Africa, in terms of the
Act. Subsequently, the Act was amended in 2003 and the respondent ceased to be
a resident. The respondent’s only relevant asset was its 100 per cent shareholding
in Tradegro Holdings.

The Commissioner contended that when the appellant relocated its seat of effective
management to Luxembourg and when it ceased being a resident in terms of the
Act, it was deemed to have disposed of its only relevant asset, namely its 100 per
cent shareholding in Tradegro Holdings. This resulted in a capital gain being realised
in an amount of R405 039 083 during the 2003 financial year.

On appeal to the Tax Court, the respondent contended that if there was a deemed
disposal of the investment, the capital gain that resulted from that disposal was not
taxable in South Africa but in Luxembourg due to the fact that at the time the capital
gain arose, the respondent was deemed to be a resident of Luxembourg in terms of
Article 4(3) of the Double Tax Agreement (DTA) entered into between South Africa
and Luxembourg.

The issue before the SCA was whether the term ‘alienation’ as used in the  DTA,
included within its ambit gains arising from a deemed disposal of assets.

The SCA held that the term is widely cast and includes capital gains derived from
the alienation of all property, and does not have a restricted meaning. It
encompassed both actual and deemed disposals of assets giving rise to taxable
gains. The SCA however, held that when the respondent relocated its seat of
effective management to Luxembourg, and taking into account that the respondent
ceased being a resident of the Republic during the salient taxable year of the capital
gain, the provisions of the DTA became applicable and Luxembourg had exclusive
taxing rights in respect of the respondent’s capital gains. The appeal by the
Commissioner herefore fell to be dismissed.

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