THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case No: 183/10

In the matter between:

MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
Appellant

and

ROELOF PETRUS KRUGER
Respondent

Neutral citation: Minister of Safety and Security v Kruger (183/10)
[2011] ZASCA 7 (8 MARCH 2011)

Coram:
NUGENT, CACHALIA and SHONGWE JJA

Heard:
16 FEBRUARY 2011

Delivered:
8 MARCH 2011

Summary:
Unlawful arrest and detention – s 55(1) of the South
African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 – whether
exempts state from liability – defamation and injuria –
damages award.

_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (Tuchten AJ sitting
as court of first instance)

The award of damages for defamation and injuria is set aside and
replaced with an award of R20 000.  Save for that the appeal is dismissed
with costs.
_______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________________

NUGENT JA (CACHALIA and SHONGWE JJA concurring)

[1] Rayton is a small town of about 2 500 inhabitants. It is where Mr
Kruger (the respondent) conducts business repairing motor vehicles.
While at his premises Mr Kruger was arrested by the police under a
warrant that had been issued by a magistrate. He was driven to a police
station where he was incarcerated overnight. The following day he was
brought before a magistrate and released on bail. In due course the
Director of Public Prosecutions declined to prosecute.

[2] A reporter and a cameraman from e-tv – a national television
broadcaster – were present at the premises when the police arrived to
arrest Mr Kruger. They followed the police onto the premises and made a
video and audio recording of the arrest, and of Mr Kruger being led away
in handcuffs to the waiting police vehicle. That night a report of the arrest
– accompanied by visual images – was broadcast on one of its news
channels.

[3] Mr Kruger sued the Minister of Safety and Security (the appellant)
in the North Gauteng High Court for damages, first, for unlawful arrest
and detention, secondly, for infringement of his dignity, and thirdly, for
defamation. All the claims succeeded before Tuchten AJ. He awarded
damages of R50 000 for unlawful arrest and detention and of R300 000
for infringement of dignity and defamation combined. The Minister now
appeals with the leave of that court.

[4] The chronicle commences with a complaint that was made to the
police by Ms Mahlangu. She said that Mr Kruger had stolen a Mazda
motor vehicle from her by false pretences. A considerable part of the
evidence was taken up with that complaint. Mr Kruger said that he had
been given the vehicle in exchange for a Honda vehicle by agreement
with a friend of Ms Mahlangu who purported to be acting on her behalf.
The dispute on that issue is not material and I need say no more about it.

[5] The complaint was investigated by Sergeant Mavuso of the
organized crime unit on the instructions of Senior Superintendent
Ngwenya. The full extent of the investigation does not appear from the
evidence.  But what does appear is that Sergeant Mavuso discovered,
amongst other things, that the Honda vehicle that had been the subject of
the alleged exchange was registered in Swaziland, and he suspected that it
had been stolen in that country.

[6] Once his investigation was complete Sergeant Mavuso forwarded
the docket to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Some time later he was
informed by a member of that office that it had been decided to prosecute

Mr Kruger and Sergeant Mavuso was handed a warrant that had been
issued by a magistrate authorising his arrest.

[7] Section 43 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 authorises a
magistrate or justice of the peace to issue a warrant for the arrest of any
person upon the written application of a public prosecutor (amongst
others). The application must set out the offence alleged to have been
committed, it must contain certain jurisdictional allegations, and it must
state that from information taken upon oath there is a reasonable
suspicion that the person in respect of whom the warrant is applied for
has committed the alleged offence.

[8] In this case the application for the warrant, and the warrant itself,
were both embodied in a single-page standard-form. The application
recorded that Mr Kruger was suspected to have committed fraud and
forgery and uttering. The space provided in the standard-form warrant for
recording the offence was, however, left blank.

[9] At about 10h00 on 3 December 2003 Sergeant Mavuso and Senior
Superintendent Ngwenya arrived at the business premises of Mr Kruger
to effect his arrest. They were accompanied by eight other police officers.
At the premises with Mr Kruger were his parents, another relative, a
number of employees and two clients. Present outside the premises were
the cameraman and the reporter I referred to earlier.

[10] Sergeant Mavuso and Senior Superintendent Ngwenya entered the
premises and proceeded to Mr Kruger’s office. They were followed by
the cameraman who recorded the interior of the premises and the arrest,
which occurred in the office of Mr Kruger.  Mr Kruger was told by

Sergeant Mavuso that he was under arrest and Senior Superintendent
Ngwenya handcuffed his wrists behind his back. He was then led out to
the police vehicle and the events that I mentioned earlier ensued.

[11] The court below found that the warrant of arrest was invalid – and
thus that the arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful – because it
failed to reflect the offences in respect of which it was issued. That
finding was challenged only faintly before us. The terms in which a
warrant of arrest must be framed are not expressly stated in the Act but I
think it is implicit in ss 39(2) and 43(2) that it was intended that it should
reflect the offence in respect of which it has been issued. Section 39(2)
requires a person who effects an arrest without a warrant to inform the
arrested person of the cause of the arrest. Where the arrest is effected in
execution of a warrant the arrestor must, upon demand of the arrested
person, hand him or her a copy of the warrant. Quite clearly that
contemplates that the cause of the arrest will appear from the warrant.
Moreover, s 43(2) provides that a warrant of arrest must direct the arrest
of the person named in the warrant ‘in respect of the offence set out in the
warrant’. I think those two provisions make it abundantly clear that it was
considered by the draftsman to be self-evident that a warrant must
describe the offence and it was not considered necessary to express that in
terms. I also think that it must be taken to be axiomatic that a warrant that
is formally defective in a material respect – as the warrant was in this
case – is invalid.1

[12] Two submissions that were advanced on behalf of the Minister can
be disposed of briefly. It was submitted that in this case Mr Kruger would

1 Cf Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe (55/09) [2010] ZASCA 101; [2011] 1 All SA 260
(SCA).

have known the suspected offences for which he was being arrested
because they were described in the application for the warrant that
appeared immediately above the warrant on the single-page standard-
form. I do not think the submission has merit. If the statute required the
warrant to reflect the suspected offences and rendered it invalid if it did
not do so, as the statute does, then I think it follows that it is immaterial
that they are apparent from another source, even if that source is readily
to hand.2 As Cameron JA observed in Powell NO v Van der Merwe NO,3
albeit in relation to a warrant authorising search and seizure, the courts
examine the validity of such a warrant ‘with a jealous regard for the
liberty of the subject’, and in my view that must apply even more to
warrants that authorise the deprivation of personal freedom.

[13] It was also submitted that even if the warrant was invalid the arrest
was nonetheless lawful because the police had a reasonable suspicion that
offences had been committed. That was not pleaded in justification of the
arrest but counsel submitted that the issue was fully canvassed in the
evidence. I am not sure that the issue was indeed canvassed but in any
event on the evidence that is before us the submission must fail. Section
s 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act confers a discretion upon a
police officer to arrest upon reasonable suspicion that fraud or forgery
and uttering (amongst other offences) have been committed.  In this case
the police officers did not purport to exercise that discretion. On the
contrary, they purported to do no more than to execute the instruction
contained in the warrant.

2 Cf Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 159 in relation
to warrants authorising search and seizure.
3 2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) para 59.

[14] But the principal ground upon which the Minister sought to avoid
liability was in reliance upon s 55(1) of the South African Police Service
Act 68 of 1995, which exempts a police officer from liability for the
consequences of executing a defective warrant in certain circumstances. It
was submitted on behalf of the Minister that because the police officer is
exempted from liability it follows that the state cannot be vicariously
liable. Two decisions of the high courts stand in the way of that
submission and we were asked to overrule them.

[15] Section 55(1) of that Act provides as follows:
‘Any member who acts under a warrant or process which is bad in law on account of
a defect in the substance or form thereof shall, if he or she has no knowledge that such
warrant or process is bad in law and whether or not such defect is apparent from the
face of the warrant or process, be exempt from liability in respect of such act as if the
warrant or process were valid in law’.4

[16] The terms in which the submission on behalf of the Minister was
framed in the heads of argument points immediately to its fallacy. It is not
disputed that neither of the police officers was aware that the warrant was
bad in law and that they were thus exempted from liability under that
section. Reminding us that vicarious liability is a secondary liability
counsel for the Minister submitted that the effect of the exemption was
that the police officers ‘committed no delict’ and there is thus no room
for vicarious liability.

[17] That construction of the section is not correct. A police officer – or
anyone else for that matter – who deprives a person of his or her liberty
without legal justification commits a delict, and is ordinary liable for the

4 Section 331 of the Criminal Procedure Act is in identical terms except that it extends beyond police
officers.

damage that is caused by the delictual act.  The section does not purport
to render the act lawful.  In its terms it does no more than to relieve the
police officer of the consequences of the delictual act.  The act remains
unlawful and, in accordance with ordinary principles, the employer is
vicariously liable for its consequences.

[18] The same argument was advanced and rejected in Goldschagg v
Minister van Polisie.5 In that case the question arose under s 31(1) of the
Police Act 7 of 1958, which is in material respects the same as the
provision that is before us.6 Botha J summarily rejected an argument that
the effect of the section was that a police officer who executes a defective
warrant does not commit an unlawful act. The learned judge also found
that while the section exempted the police officer from the consequences
of the unlawful act it did not similarly exempt the state.7 (The decision
was reversed on appeal8 but the issue that is now before us was not
considered.)

[19] Thirion J reached the same conclusion in De Welzim v Regering
van KwaZulu9 in relation to s 34(2) of the KwaZulu Police Act 14 of

5 1979 (3) SA 1284 (T).
6 Section 31(1) reads as follows:
‘If any legal proceedings be brought against any member of the Force for any act done in obedience to
a warrant purporting to be issued by a magistrate or justice of the peace or other officer authorized by
law to issue warrants, that member shall not be liable for any irregularity in the issuing of the warrant
or for the want of jurisdiction in the person issuing the same, and upon producing the warrant
containing the signature of the person reputed to be a magistrate or justice of the peace or other such
officer as aforesaid, and upon proof that the acts complained of were done in obedience to the warrant,
judgment shall be given in favour of such member.’
7 The learned judge also inferred from the judgment of this court in Minister van die Suid Afrikaanse
Polisie v Kraatz 1973 (3) SA 490 (A) at 1302A-B that the trial court had supported that conclusion (the
issue was not dealt with on appeal). I have had the advantage of access to the judgment of the trial
court – which was not available to the learned judge – from which it appears that the point that is now
before us was not pertinently considered by that court.
8 Minister van Polisie v Goldschagg 1981 (1) SA 37 (A)
9 1990 (2) SA 915 (N).

1980.10 The learned judge said the following:
‘By ‘n beskouing van art 34(2) is dit duidelik dat dit nie die handeling van die lid van
die Mag verontskuldig nie. Dit verskaf nie ‘n skulduitsluitingsgrond nie en ook nie ‘n
regverdigingsgrond ten opsigte van die handeling nie. Dit stel slegs die lid vry van
aanspreeklikheid sonder dat dit die kwaliteit of onregmatigheid van die daad self raak.
Gevolglik beïnvloed dit nie die aanspreeklikheid van die KwaZulu Regering nie.’ 11

[20] I have no doubt that the decisions in Goldschagg and De Welzim
were correct. I need only add that the draftsman of s 55(1) must be
assumed to have known of those decisions when the section was drafted.
The repetition in s 55(1) of the material terms of the sections that were
there in issue itself indicates that the draftsman intended s 55(1) to bear
the construction that was adopted in those cases.12 In those circumstances
the finding by the court below that the Minister is liable for the
consequences of the unlawful arrest and detention cannot be faulted.

[21] I turn to the claims for injuria and defamation before returning to
the amount that was awarded in damages.

[22] The broadcast on the night of the arrest commenced with an
introduction by the presenter who said the following:
‘It could be the end of the road for a car theft syndicate operating between Swaziland
and South Africa. After a two year investigation, Mpumulanga police today arrested
the man believed to be the kingpin. Police say the cars are stolen in Swaziland and

10 Quoted in the judgment at 920F-H as follows:
‘’n Lid van die Mag wat ter goeder trou ‘n handeling verrig ooreenkomstig of in die tenuitvoerlegging
van ‘n bepaling wat ‘n verordening van ‘n bevoegde wetgewende gesag heet te wees is, ondanks enige
onreëlmatigheid in verband met die verordening van of gebrek in so ‘n bepaling of afwesigheid van
regsbevoegdheid van daardie wetgewende gesag, vry van aanspreeklikheid ten opsigte van die
verrigting van daardie handeling in dieselfde mate en onderworpe aan dieselfde voorwaardes asof
daardie onreëlmatigheid nie plaasgevind het of daardie gebrek of afwesigheid van regsbevoegdheid nie
bestaan het nie.’
11 At 923H-I.
12 LC Steyn: Die Uitleg van Wette (1981) by S I E Van Tonder assisted by N P Badenhorst, C N
Volschenk and J N Wepener 5ed p 132.

sold in South Africa. They believe government officials in both countries and a local
insurance company are also involved.’
The broadcast then switched to the reporter who opened her report as
follows:
‘It was not business as usual at this car repair workshop. The boss was arrested for
vehicle theft, fraud and forgery’.
The interior of the workshop was shown visually, followed by a visual
and audio recording of a short conversation between Senior
Superintendent Ngwenya and Mr Kruger immediately after his arrest, and
a visual showing of him being handcuffed. The recording went on to
show Mr Kruger being led away to the police vehicle with his hands
handcuffed behind his back. The reporter concluded her report as follows:
‘It is alleged that cars stolen in Swaziland are brought here for re-spraying and their
engine numbers are also changed. Police say they have identified three such vehicles
but believe there are others’.

[23] The visual images of Mr Kruger showed only his torso at the time
of his arrest, and his back as he was being led away. His name was not
mentioned in the course of the report. It is clear that only those who were
acquainted with Mr Kruger or his workshop would have been capable of
identifying him from the report.

[24] It was alleged by Mr Kruger that one or other police officer must
have informed the television team (or the television station) of the
anticipated arrest and to have done so with the intention that it should be
recorded and broadcast. His case was that the police officer concerned
thereby wrongfully ‘instigated’ the defamatory and injurious broadcast
and that the Minister is vicariously liable for such damage as the
broadcast caused.

[25] The claim is rather unusual but we are not called upon to deal with
its substance. The sole ground upon which the claim was resisted in the
court below and in this court was a denial that the police were responsible
for the presence of the television crew. We were told by counsel for the
Minister unequivocally that if we were to find that the presence of the
television team was indeed brought about by information provided by one
or other police officer – which was the finding of the court below – then
it was accepted that the Minister is liable for any damage that was caused
by the broadcast. We have accordingly approached the matter on that
basis but I must emphasise that we make no finding on other aspects of
the claim.

[26] I turn to that factual question. The television reporter, Ms Mabuse,
gave evidence. She said that she had no recollection of how they came to
be present at the scene but that it might have been on information
provided by the police. Only two other possibilities were suggested by
counsel for the Minister. One was that the television team happened upon
the scene fortuitously. The prospect that a television team from a national
broadcaster fortuitously happened to be outside a motor vehicle workshop
in Rayton at the time the police arrived is so remote as to be non-existent.
The second suggestion was that one or other member of the community
might have been the culprit.  It is most unlikely that members of the local
community would have known of the imminent arrest and least of all of
the nature of the investigation that the police had undertaken. I agree with
the court below that it is probable that one or other member of the police
informed e-tv of the anticipated arrest so that it could be given publicity.
That being so, on the approach that was adopted on behalf of the Minister
before us (and in the court below) the only remaining issue is to assess
the damages to be awarded for the consequences of the broadcast.

[27] It is trite that the determination of damages is within the discretion
of the trial court and will be interfered with only in the event of
misdirection. Misdirection might in some cases be apparent from the
reasoning of the court but in other cases it might be inferred from a
grossly excessive award.

[28] It has been said repeatedly that the assessment of awards of general
damages with reference to awards made in previous cases is fraught with
difficulty. They nonetheless provide a measure of guidance provided that
those difficulties are borne in mind. As Potgieter JA said in Protea
Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb, 13 after citing earlier decisions of this court:
‘The above quoted passages from decisions of this Court indicate that, to the limited
extent and subject to the qualifications therein set forth, the trial Court or the Court of
Appeal, as the case may be, may pay regard to comparable cases. It should be
emphasised, however, that this process of comparison does not take the form of a
meticulous examination of awards made in other cases in order to fix the amount of
compensation; nor should the process be allowed so to dominate the enquiry as to
become a fetter upon the Court’s general discretion in such matters. Comparable
cases, when available, should rather be used to afford some guidance, in a general
way, towards assisting the Court in arriving at an award which is not substantially out
of general accord with previous awards in broadly similar cases, regard being had to
all the factors which are considered to be relevant in the assessment of general
damages. At the same time it may be permissible, in an appropriate case, to test any
assessment arrived at upon this basis by reference to the general pattern of previous
awards in cases where the injuries and their sequelae may have been either more
serious or less than those in the case under consideration.’

[29] I turn first to the award for unlawful arrest and detention. An
appropriate award in a case of that kind – with reference to awards in

13 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) at 535H-536B.

some past cases – was considered most recently by this court in Seymour
v Minister of Safety and Security.14 In that case the plaintiff was
unlawfully arrested and detained for five days. One night was spent in a
police cell together with other inmates, and the remaining time was spent
in a hospital ward, to which the family of the plaintiff had free access. An
award of R500 000 was reduced on appeal to R90 000.

[30] On the face of it the arrest and detention in this case, by
comparison, might seem to warrant a substantially lower award, but there
is a materially aggravating factor. To be arrested, even lawfully, is
inherently humiliating. So much more so when a cameraman has grossly
invaded the privacy of the arrestee by entering upon his or her premises
without permission and thereupon recorded the arrest. In this case the
police permitted – indeed, they probably invited – all that to take place.
Given that aggravating factor I see no reason to conclude that the award
was excessive – and least of all that it was grossly excessive.  There was
no cross-appeal against the award.

[31] Before leaving this topic there is an observation that needs to be
made.  The police have a duty to carry out policing in the ordinary way.
They have no business setting out to turn an arrest into a showpiece.
Similar conduct, on that occasion by officials of the Competition
Commission who were executing a warrant for search and seizure,
evoked the censure of this court in Pretoria Portland Cement Co Ltd v
Competition Commission.15 When executing a warrant of arrest the police
are obliged to do so with due regard to the dignity and the privacy of the
person being arrested. The conduct of the police in permitting – indeed,

14 2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA).
15 2003 (2) SA 385 (SCA).

inviting – a cameraman to invade the premises of Mr Kruger in order to
witness the arrest warrants equal censure.

[32] While the award for unlawful arrest and detention cannot be
faulted, the same cannot be said for the award that was made for injuria
and defamation. Two factors that come to the fore in making an
assessment are the seriousness of the defamation and the extent of the
publication.

[33] In this case the substance of the defamation was that Mr Kruger
had been arrested on suspicion of having committed various offences. It
was pointed out by this court in Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd v
Suliman16 that to allege that a person has been arrested does not imply
that he or she is guilty, but it does imply that there is a reasonable
suspicion that he or she has committed the relevant offence, which is
itself defamatory.17 In that case the majority18 held that before the suspect
is brought before a court it is generally not in the public interest or of
public benefit that the identity of the arrested suspect should be disclosed,
even if the allegation is true.19 But once the suspect has been brought
before a court his or her identity may be published with impunity.20

[34] Although the truth of the allegation, by itself, provides no defence
to a claim for defamation, it seems to me that it must nonetheless be
relevant to the assessment of damages. For the action for defamation
protects reputation and it is difficult to see why a person should be

16 [2004] 3 All SA 137 (SCA).
17 Paras 31 and 78.
18 Marais, Scott and Mthiyane JJA, Ponnan AJA and I dissenting.
19 Para 47.
20 Para 47.

compensated for loss of reputation if the reputation is in truth not
deserved.21

[35] In this case the allegations made in the report were in some
respects materially untrue.  It is apparent from the application for the
warrant that Mr Kruger was not arrested on suspicion of ‘car theft’ but on
suspicion of fraud and forgery and uttering.  And as pointed out by the
court below, Sergeant Mavuso was not of the belief that Mr Kruger was
the ‘kingpin’ of a ‘car theft syndicate’, and there is no evidence that
anyone else in the police held that suspicion. Nonetheless, it is not
disputed that the police suspected on reasonable grounds that he had
committed fraud and forgery and uttering – which are themselves serious
offences of dishonesty.

[36] As for the breadth of the publication the identity of Mr Kruger is
likely to have reached a decidedly limited audience notwithstanding that
the broadcast was on national television. I have pointed out that his
identity would have been known only to those who were acquainted with
Mr Kruger or his business premises who would mainly have been the
inhabitants of Rayton.  Although the evidence establishes that news of the
arrest quickly spread throughout the town it is by no means clear that that
was in consequence of the broadcast.  Indeed, it is likely that news of the
event would have become the talk of a small town by word of mouth even
without the broadcast. Nonetheless I have accepted that the broadcast
reached at least some residents of Rayton and others who knew Mr
Kruger.

21 Cf Johnson v Rand Daily Mails 1928 AD 190 at 206.

[37] The plaintiff in Suliman was alleged to have been arrested on
suspicion of having been associated with the bombing of a nightclub – a
particularly heinous crime. His identity was made known and it was
published repeatedly in a newspaper that had a wide circulation in an area
in which the plaintiff was well known. He was awarded R50 000 for
defamation and injuria. In comparison to that award alone, the award of
R300 000 in the present case, in which both the nature of the defamation
and the breadth of publication was decidedly more limited, was in my
view grossly excessive, which points to misdirection. In the
circumstances we are at large to reassess the award. It was held in
Suliman that the injuria that is associated with defamation is a separate
wrong but in that case, as in the present, a combined award was made.  In
the light of the considerations above, and in particular the award in
Suliman, in my view the present wrongs are deserving of damages of no
more than R20 000.

[38] Counsel for the Minister informed us that even if the award is
reduced, Mr Kruger has nonetheless had substantial success, in that the
appeal was brought primarily to disturb the finding that the Minister is
not exempt from liability for wrongful arrest by reason of s 55(1), and
that Mr Kruger is entitled to his costs.

[39] Accordingly the award of damages for defamation and injuria is set
aside and replaced with an award of R20 000.  Save for that the appeal is
dismissed with costs.

_________________
R W NUGENT
JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

For appellant:
B R Tokota SC

M S Mphahlele

Instructed by:

State Attorney, Pretoria

State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For respondent:
J J S Prinsloo SC

Instructed by:

De Klerk & Marais Inc, Pretoria

Webbers, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
8 March 2011
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
* * *
MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY v R P KRUGER

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal by the Minister of Safety and
Security against a judgment of the high court awarding damages to Mr Kruger for
unlawful arrest and for defamation.

The claims arose from the arrest of Mr Kruger by police officers under a defective
warrant of arrest.  The arresting officers were accompanied by a television crew of e-tv
and a report of the arrest, with visual images, was broadcast that evening.

The Minister contended that the state was exempted from liability for the unlawful
arrest by s 55(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 but that
contention was rejected.  The SCA held that the section exempts the individual police
officer from liability but not the state.  It confirmed the damages awarded by the high
court in the sum of R50 000.

Mr Kruger had claimed that the police were responsible for the presence of the
television crew when the arrest was made and that the State was accordingly liable for
the damage caused by the consequent broadcast.  The Minister contended that the
evidence did not establish that the police had been responsible for their presence but
that was rejected by the SCA.  The SCA emphasised that that was the only ground
upon which the Minister contested the finding by the high court that the state was
liable for the consequent defamation, and that it made no further findings on the merits
of such a claim.  It found further that damages of R300 000 awarded by the high court
were grossly excessive and reduced the award to R20 000.