THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no: 564/11
Not reportable

In the matter between:

SUSANNA MAGDALENA PIENAAR

Appellant

and

THE STATE
Respondent

Neutral citation:
Pienaar v S (564/11) [2012] ZASCA 60 (2 April 2012)

Coram:

MTHIYANE DP, CLOETE, MHLANTLA, LEACH JJA

and NDITA AJA

Heard:

15 February 2012

Delivered:

2 April 2012

Summary:
Sentence – fraud – lengthy custodial sentence imposed
disturbingly inappropriate – misdirection – sentence reduced from five years to
four months imprisonment.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from:  South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (Legodi J, Jooste
AJ sitting as court of appeal):
1. The appeal against sentence succeeds.
2. The order of the court below is set aside and the following order is
substituted:
a) The appeal against sentence succeeds to the extent set out below.
b) The sentence imposed by the magistrate is altered to read
‘four months’ imprisonment on all counts taken together for the purposes of
sentence.’
c) In terms of s 282 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the sentence is
antedated to 6 September 2006, being the date on which the
magistrate imposed sentence.
______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

CLOETE JA and NDITA AJA (MTHIYANE, MHLANTLA and LEACH JJA
concurring)

[1] This appeal is against sentence only. The appellant pleaded guilty and
was convicted of 42 counts of fraud by the Benoni regional court. She was
sentenced as follows: counts 1 to 20, six months imprisonment on each count,
and the sentences in count 11 to 20 were ordered to run concurrently with the
sentences in counts 1 to 10;  counts 21 to 42, one month imprisonment in
respect of each count wholly suspended for a period of five years on certain
conditions. Effectively the appellant was to serve a total of five years
imprisonment. On appeal to the high court (Legodi J, Jooste AJ concurring),
the appeal was dismissed. The appeal is before us with the leave of the court
below.

[2] The crisp issue before us is whether in the circumstances of this case
the trial court misdirected itself in imposing a lengthy custodial sentence on a

first offender who had pleaded guilty to fraud involving actual loss in the
amount of R2900.

[3] The plea explanation given by the appellant and accepted by the State
was to the following effect: The appellant was employed by Atlas Finance, a
business that lends money to the public, as the manager of its Benoni branch.
By virtue of this position, the appellant became fully conversant with the
procedures for the granting of loans and recovery of money. During the
aforementioned period of employment, the appellant uplifted names of the
company’s existing clients from the database and issued 42 fictitious loan
accounts amounting to R115 000 against such clients. Subsequent to the
creation of the loans, the appellant made entries in the computer system
reflecting fictitious repayments by the clients in whose names the loans were
recorded. No amounts of money left Atlas Finance and no amounts were
repaid to it. The purpose of this exercise was to misrepresent to Atlas Finance
that the appellant had reached her collection target for a given month so that
she would be paid an incentive bonus. A sum total of R2900 was, as a result of
the fraudulent conduct alluded to, paid out to the appellant. The actual
prejudice suffered by the company is therefore limited to that amount.

[4] The State, in aggravation of sentence led the evidence of Mr Timothy
Ray of Atlas Finance. Mr Ray gave a detailed account of the appellant’s modus
operandi in simulating the transactions referred to in the charge sheet.
Significantly, the witness testified that the company suffered loss in the
estimated amount of R110 000 as he alleged it had actually paid out the
moneys for the fictitious loans. The magistrate sought clarity on this point and
posed the following question:
“The accused, Ms Pienaar has pleaded guilty to 42 counts and let me basically tell
you what she pleaded guilty to. Firstly that she in fact engage in a fictional
transactions with existing clients, but her plea states that there were no monies that
left nor came into the business. In other words once cheque vouchers were issued,
this was then faxed to head office that no monies then left, that is how it balanced out,
no monies left, payments came in. Payments in the sense of fictitious or fictitious
receipts were brought into the business. According to the plea she accepts that the

clients had been prejudice because they were in all probability handed over sitting
with judgments. And that she prejudiced Atlas Finance in so far as an amount of R
2900. 00 because that is what she would have collected in the period March 2003 to
October 2004 as being the incentive bonus that she would have received. Now I hear
from you that that is actually not the case as far as you are concerned monies did
leave. --- Yes.”
Mr Ray, in his evidence, mentioned that further investigations of each of the
loans revealed that loss estimated at R300 000 was attributable to the
appellant’s modus operandi. In order to avoid detection of the fraud, the
appellant, according to Mr Ray, changed the addresses of the purported loan
applicants in the database. The effect of such alterations was that when the
emoluments attachment orders were issued by the court, they were made out
to the wrong companies. In addition, the appellant would endorse on the
warrants of execution that they should not be sent to the sheriff (‘NTS’) as the
debtors were untraceable.

[5] The aggravating evidence of Mr Ray referred to in the preceding
paragraphs was contrary to the express terms of the appellant’s plea and
should not have been admitted: cf S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) paras
26 and 27.

[6] There are several misdirections that appear from the judgment of the
trial court on sentence. First, it relied on the evidence of Mr Ray that the
appellant utilised her knowledge and authority as a manager when she
endorsed on execution warrants the acronym NTS, signifying that such should
not be sent to the sheriff as the debtors were untraceable. Secondly, the
prejudice suffered by the persons in whose names the loans were created in
the form of listing in credit bureaus, is pure conjecture as no such evidence
was tendered during the proceedings. In the same vein, the State did not
tender any evidence to the effect that were it not for the appellant’s persistent
and fraudulent cover, the criminal act may have been detected and halted
much earlier. Again, this is speculation. Thirdly, there is not a shred of
evidence that the appellant forged the signatures of the purported applicants’
as stated in the judgment of the trial court. It is furthermore disturbing that the

trial court further speculated that ‘it may happen’ that the appellant
experimented with ways and means in order to avoid detection, and when it
appeared that her scheme was not uncovered, she continued with it. Similarly,
no admissible evidence was led with regards to the negative impact of the
fraud on the complainant’s business. In the result the following statement by
the magistrate constitutes a gross misdirection:
‘Such conduct would have spread within the community with vulpine affidity  [sic] this
invariably creates mistrust from the part of society towards Atlas Finance thereby
affecting the continuance and prosperity of his business. Human nature is such that
society will distrust this business and steer away from it although the perpetrator have
been brought to book.’
In fact the judgment on sentence is replete with speculative utterances ranging
from the manner in which the offence was committed to its impact on the
complainant and community.

[7] It is therefore quite extraordinary that the high court concluded that:
‘The trial court in its judgment fully justified regarding jail term as against any form of
sentence. As I said the judgment is well motivated and I can find no basis for
interference based on misdirection.’

[8] Counsel for the appellant, in a nutshell, contended that the sentence
was disturbingly inappropriate and shocking when regard is had to all the
circumstances in this case. Counsel for the State had correctly conceded when
the appeal was heard before the high court that the sentence proceedings
were vitiated by irregularities and that the sentence was disturbingly
inappropriate and ought to be set aside. This concession was brushed aside by
the court below, which said (after the passage quoted in para 7 above):
‘Whilst on this point, counsel for the respondent felt that the jail term of five years was
according to her sense of justice shocking. She however could not specifically state
the grounds which render the sentence shocking.’

[9] The trial court, in our view, over-emphasized the seriousness of the
offence. Although it was entitled to take notice of the prevalence and increase
of white-collar crime and have regard to it when imposing sentence, we agree
that the sentence imposed by it is disturbingly inappropriate and unbalanced.

Whilst the offences committed by the appellant involve dishonesty, it should be
borne in mind that the loss to which she pleaded guilty is R2900 the total of the
amounts she received as performance bonuses.

[10] The magistrate in justifying the imposition of a lengthy term of
imprisonment referred to S v Blank 1995 (1) SACR 62 SCA, wherein this court
confirmed a sentence of eight years’ direct imprisonment in respect of a
conviction for 48 counts of fraud. Whilst it must be acknowledged that a
succession of punishments imposed for a particular type of crime is a useful
guide to a court dealing with such a crime, each case should dealt upon its
own facts.1 The reliance on the Blank case is clearly misguided as there are
substantial differences between the present case and the facts of the former. In
the Blank matter the amount involved was R9,75 million and the stockbroking
fraud scheme was on a very large scale.

[11] We now consider what sentence would be appropriate in this case. The
appellant was at the time of sentence on 15 August 2006, 45 years old. She is
a first offender. The appellant has three major children, two of whom are self-
supporting. One of the major children is staying with her and suffers from a
medical condition known as biolapsy, which renders him/her aggressive and in
need of constant attention. However, despite the medical challenge, the child is
employed by a dentist on a part-time basis. After leaving Atlas Finance, the
appellant found employment at Platinum Document Solution as a sales
executive. She is engaged to be married and lives with her fiancé.

[12] On the other hand, there are aggravating factors. The frauds were
committed by the appellant against her employer, and she was a senior
employee in a position of trust. The frauds were also committed over a period
of some eighteen months. The appellant expressed no remorse and there has
been no offer to repay her employer.

1 R v Karg 1961 (1) SA 231 (A) at 236G-H

[13] Taking all the relevant factors into account, we would have imposed a
non-custodial sentence on the appellant.  The appellant had, throughout the
proceedings until conviction, been on bail. Her bail was revoked after
conviction on 15 August 2006. She was sentenced on 6 September 2006. In
an appeal to the high court, bail was granted on 19 January 2007. All in all, she
has been in custody for five months and approximately two weeks. We are of
the view that the sentence this court should impose on the appellant should not
be more than the period she has already been in custody. In terms of s 282 of
Criminal Procedure Act, a sentence of imprisonment substituted on appeal can
only be backdated to the date on which the sentence was originally imposed.
That means to avoid the appellant having to return to jail, the sentence should
be altered to one of four months’ imprisonment. We again emphasize that but
for the fact that the appellant has already served that sentence, we would have
substituted it with a non-custodial sentence.

[14] In the result, the following order is made:
1.  The appeal against sentence succeeds.
2. The order of the court below is set aside and the following order is
substituted:
a) The appeal against sentence succeeds to the extent set out below.
b) The sentence imposed by the magistrate is altered to read
‘four months imprisonment on all counts taken together for the purposes of
sentence.’
c) In terms of s 282 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the sentence is
antedated to 6 September 2006, being the date that the magistrate
imposed sentence.

___________________
T D C CLOETE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

___________________
T NDITA
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

APPEARANCES:
FOR APPELLANT:
H L Alberts
Instructed by:

Justice Centre, Pretoria;

Justice Centre, Bloemfontein.

FOR RESPONDENT:
E O Mnguni
Instructed by:

Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria;

Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
2 April 2011
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does not
form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
* * *
SUSANNA MAGDALENA PIENAAR  V THE STATE

Today, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) set aside the effective sentence of five years’
imprisonment imposed upon Susanna Magdalena Pienaar and replaced it with a sentence of
four months imprisonment.

Ms Pienaar was convicted by the Benoni Regional Court on forty-two counts of fraud. The
facts giving rise to the conviction were, broadly stated as follows: The appellant was
employed by Atlas Finance, a business that lends money to the public, as a manager. Whilst
so employed, she uplifted names of the company’s existing clients from its database and
issued 42 fictitious loans accounts amounting to a sum of R115 000 against such clients. Out
of these transactions the benefit she received was an amount of R2900 for meeting her
collection target. She admitted creating the false loans and repayments.

The sentence imposed by the trial was attacked mainly on the ground that it was excessive
when one considered that the actual loss to the company was R2900, despite an officer of
Atlas Finance testifying that the loss exceeded by far, the amount admitted by the appellant.

According to the SCA, the trial court should not have allowed and relied on the evidence
proving amounts in excess of the facts admitted by the appellant and accepted by the State.
Furthermore, the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court are nothing more than
sheer speculation, such amounts to gross misdirection. The State conceded the misdirection,
and admitted that the sentence was disturbingly inappropriate. As the sentence imposed by
the trial court was manifestly severe, it followed that it had to be set aside.