THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No: 20732/14

In the matter between

Reportable

RAYMOND DANIEL DE VILLIERS

APPELLANT

and

THE STATE

FIRST RESPONDENT

REGIONAL MAGISTRATE D M SOOMAROO        SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation:  De Villiers v The State & another (20732/14) [2016]
ZASCA 38 (24 March 2016)

Coram:
Majiedt JA and Fourie and Baartman AJJA

Heard:
9 March 2016

Delivered:
24 March 2016

Summary:
Review – a high court of two judges sitting as a review court is a
court of first instance as contemplated in s 16(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013 – that court is thus empowered to grant leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal in terms of s 16(1)(a)(ii) – duress allegedly exerted
by legal representatives on appellant to plead guilty to theft not borne out by
the facts.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Free State Division, Bloemfontein (Ebrahim J and Reinders
AJ sitting as court of first instance):

The appeal is dismissed.
______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

Majiedt JA ( Fourie and Baartman AJJA concurring):

[1] This is an appeal against the dismissal of a review application brought
by the appellant, Mr Raymond Daniel de Villiers, in the Free State Division,
Bloemfontein (Ebrahim J and Reinders AJ). The appellant had sought the
review and setting aside of his conviction of theft (pursuant to a plea of guilty)
and the sentence of seven years’ imprisonment with three years conditionally
suspended imposed by the second respondent, Regional Magistrate D M
Soomaroo. The State was cited as the first respondent.

[2] Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by the court below. As the
appellant’s attorneys were unsure of whether that court had the power to
grant leave, they directed a written enquiry to the registrar of this Court
concerning the correct procedure to be adopted. On the registrar’s advice, the
appellant filed a petition to this Court for leave to appeal. That petition is
standing over pending the hearing of this matter. As a result of the dual
approach pursued by the appellant, the parties had been requested to
address as a preliminary aspect whether the court below had ‘the requisite
power to grant leave to appeal to this court, in view of the provisions

contained in s 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act’.  Both counsel filed helpful
supplementary heads of argument for which we are grateful.

[3] It is plain that a division of the high court which sits on review with two
judges presiding, is a court of first instance as contemplated in s 16(1)(a) of
the Superior Courts Act (the Act) and that leave has therefore been properly
granted in this instance in terms of s 16(1)(a)(ii). The relevant part of that
section reads as follows:
'16 Appeals generally
(1) Subject to section 15(1), the Constitution and any other law-
(a) An appeal against any decision of a Division as a court of first instance lies, upon
leave having been granted –
(i)
. . .
(ii)
If the court consisted of more than one judge, to the Supreme Court of
Appeal.’
The review before us is regulated by Uniform rule 53. It is not regulated by the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA) or by any other criminal
procedural law as envisaged in s 1 of the Act, and sections 16 and 17 of the
Act therefore apply in this case. In the premises the matter is properly before
us on appeal. The petition was therefore unnecessary and should be
regarded as superfluous. I discuss next the merits.

[4] The appellant, who is an accountant, was arraigned in the regional
court initially with two other co-accused on the following charges –
(a)
count 1 – fraud in the sum of R950 000;
(b)
in the alternative, theft in the sum of R950 000;
(c)
as a second alternative to the main count, a contravention of the
provisions contained in s 7, read with ss 1, 8 and 36 of the Financial
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002;
(d)
count 2 – a contravention of the provisions contained in s 2, read with
ss 1 and 10 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of
2001 (the Funds Act);
(e)
count 3 – a contravention of the provisions contained in s 4(1), read
with ss 1 and 10 of the Funds Act;

(f)
count 4 – a contravention of the provisions contained in s 4(4), read
with ss 1 and 10 of the Funds Act.

[5] The appellant pleaded guilty to theft, the first alternative charge to
count 1. He was represented by an attorney, Mr Kramer, and an advocate, Mr
Nel. After his written plea explanation in terms of s 112(2) of the CPA was
read into the record by his counsel, the appellant confirmed to the regional
magistrate that the plea and explanation were correct. In the plea explanation
itself the appellant stated that the instruction given to his legal representatives
to plead guilty to theft was given without anyone having unduly influenced him
in that regard and was made freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of the
implications thereof. After the imposition of sentence, the appellant sought
leave to appeal against his sentence only, but this was refused by the regional
magistrate. The appellant appointed a new legal team and, on their advice, he
applied for leave to appeal against his conviction, but this too was
unsuccessful in the regional court. A subsequent petition to the court below
for leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence met with a similar fate.
On petition to this Court the appellant was granted leave on 7 January 2013 to
appeal against his sentence to the court below, but leave was refused in
respect of his conviction. The appeal against sentence is still pending,
awaiting the outcome of this review application, which was issued on 5 March
2013.

[6] The review is sought on the basis of an alleged irregularity ex facie
curiae which vitiated the entire proceedings in the regional court as, so it is
contended, it infringed the appellant’s fair trial rights under the Constitution. In
essence the main trust of the appellant’s argument was that he had pleaded
guilty under duress, his previous legal team having cajoled him into tendering
such a plea. He avers that he never intended to plead guilty, because he was
not guilty of fraud or theft. A brief synopsis of the factual backdrop is
necessary for a proper understanding of the issues. The common cause facts
are as follows.

[7] The appellant administered the deceased estate of a Mr P J Wiese at
the request of the deceased’s spouse, Ms A Wiese. On his advice, Ms Wiese
made out a cheque in the sum of R950 000 to the Taakmeesters Trust (the
Trust), which was controlled by the appellant and which was described by him
in his plea explanation as his ‘alter ego’. There is a dispute as to what exactly
Ms Wiese’s mandate to the appellant was in respect of this money, an aspect
to which I shall revert presently. The appellant utilised the money to provide
bridging finance to various entities not connected at all to the estate, including
some in which the appellant had an interest. Save for a payment of R50 000
made by the Trust to Ms Wiese, no repayment was made before the Trust
was sequestrated. Criminal charges were laid against the appellant after Ms
Wiese obtained legal advice from a firm of attorneys.

[8] The appellant’s plea explanation is broadly consonant with these
common cause facts. He admitted that:
(a)
the Trust had received a cheque in the amount of R950 000 from the
estate late P J Wiese made out to the Trust;
(b)
these moneys had to be invested in a money market account by the
Trust for the benefit of the estate;
(c)
the moneys had not been invested as agreed, but had been utilised to
make payments to various entities and persons.

[9] The appellant’s case is that in his own mind he had not committed any
offence or, at least, the offences of fraud or theft (there is some vacillation on
his part on this aspect) and he had never intended to plead guilty.
Representations were made by his legal team to the Director of Public
Prosecutions (the DPP) to accept a plea on a lesser charge, namely the
statutory offence in count 3, and for a non-custodial sentence to be agreed
upon. These representations were clearly made to secure a plea agreement
with the State in terms of s 105A of the CPA. The DPP, however, declined to
enter into a plea agreement on these terms and the plea of guilty on theft
eventually followed. The record reflects that there were numerous
adjournments in the matter, some of them for the purpose of the

representations to the DPP to be finalised and at least one other for the
finalisation of the plea of guilty.

[10] According to the appellant, his counsel, Mr Nel, had requested him
after their first consultation to carefully read through the police docket,
particularly Ms Wiese’s statement, and to prepare a written memorandum in
response thereto. The appellant complied and handed the memo to Mr Nel
and a copy to Mr Kramer. In the answering papers inexplicably neither Mr
Kramer nor Mr Nel (in a cryptic confirmatory affidavit) makes any mention at
all of these written instructions, and its contents therefore stand
uncontroverted. This is a lamentable state of affairs, particularly because the
appellant’s case largely rests upon this memorandum furnished to his legal
representatives. It was forcefully contended that the written instructions
corroborated the appellant’s version regarding duress. This problem arose
because Mr Kramer did not in his answering affidavit deal seriatim with the
allegations made by the appellant in his founding affidavit. It seems to me that
Mr Kramer’s affidavit, although filed as an answering affidavit by the first
respondent, had not been drafted as an answer in response to each and
every material allegation contained in the founding affidavit. Mr Kramer was in
all likelihood simply asked to furnish an affidavit setting out his version of the
events. I shall revert to this conundrum presently.

[11] The crucial events underpinning the alleged duress occurred, on the
appellant’s version, on the morning of 11 August 2011, just before he
tendered his plea of guilty in court. He avers that Mr Nel had conveyed to him
that in the event of a conviction of theft of more than R500 000, the regional
magistrate was statutorily compelled to consider imposing a minimum
sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. This, the appellant said, was conveyed
to him against the backdrop of the State having refused the offer made on his
behalf in the course of the plea negotiations and of the prosecutor having
insisted on a guilty plea on at least one of the counts. The offer, according to
the appellant, was not the one alluded to in para 9 above, but a proposal
made by his legal representatives to the State that the charges be withdrawn
in exchange for which the appellant would reimburse Ms Wiese. To this end,

he says, his legal team had requested him to draw up an amortisation table
reflecting the proposed repayment terms. He claims that Ms Wiese had
accepted the repayment terms reflected in the amortisation table which had
been sent to her attorneys. His impression was that Mr Nel was concerned
that the minimum sentence would be imposed upon conviction following a
plea of not guilty. Mr Nel referred to the fact that the appellant was facing a
sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, that he had a wife and children and that
it was not worth going on trial in the face of all these risks. Mr Kramer
informed the appellant that he had an 80/20 per cent prospect of receiving a
non-custodial sentence (‘‘n buite straf’). The appellant averred that as a
consequence of these warnings by his legal representatives, he reluctantly
mandated them to pursue further plea negotiations with the State. He says
that he never stole any money and that he intended to reimburse Ms Wiese.

[12] The first respondent’s case is that it had been presented with a written
plea explanation which, on the face of it, appeared to be in order and in which
the appellant admitted all the material elements of the crime of theft. And the
factual matrix underpinning the plea as set out in the s 112(2) statement
accorded with the State’s case. There was nothing in the preceding objective
facts which suggested that the plea had not been made freely and voluntarily.
The State also alluded to several aspects which contradicted the appellant’s
claim of duress or which seriously impugned his credibility, amongst others
the long delay in raising the duress, the proceedings in facie curiae, the
underlying rationale for the representations to the DPP and the import of Ms
Wiese’s statement.

[13] The court below dismissed the review application on the following
broad grounds:
(a)
there was no acceptable explanation for the unreasonable delay of 18
months between the plea of guilty and the launching of the review
application;
(b)
in pursuing leave to appeal against conviction to its ultimate
(unsuccessful)  conclusion, the appellant had exhausted his remedies
inasmuch as once a prospective appeal on the merits had been

considered and dismissed, the proceedings could not be reopened by
way of a review of the proceedings in the trial court;

(c)
on all the objective facts and surrounding circumstances the appellant
had failed to establish that he had pleaded guilty to theft under duress.

[14] It is expedient to discuss (a) and (b) above together since they are
interlinked. It is trite that a review application must be brought within a
reasonable time.1 While it is so that there has been a long delay here, given
the outcome of this appeal I am prepared to accept, as was contended on
behalf of the appellant, that the delay was largely caused by the change of the
appellant’s legal team and by the bringing of the applications for leave to
appeal against conviction. As far as the latter is concerned, I am of the view
that the appellant had not, on the facts of this case, been precluded from
bringing a review application after his unsuccessful pursuit of leave to appeal
against his conviction. It is not as if he is seeking the proverbial second bite at
the cherry. Or, in civil law parlance, it cannot be said that the matter is res
judicata.

[15] The court below placed reliance for its finding on this aspect on R v D,2
R v Parmanand3 and Coopers South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Schädlingsbekämfung MBH.4 But one must be careful in seeking support
from these decisions. They are in my view distinguishable on the facts and in
any event do not establish as law that there is an absolute bar against a
review application being brought after unsuccessfully pursuing leave to appeal
against conviction. In R v D, the provincial division had dismissed an appeal
against convictions and sentences. Leave to appeal to this Court was
thereafter sought, but before the provincial division could hear that
application, the appellants applied in that court for the setting aside of their

1 Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 (1) SA 13 (A) at
39A-D.
2 R v D & another 1953 (4) SA 384 (A).
3 R v Parmanand 1954 (3) SA 833 (A).
4 Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämfung MBH
1976 (3) SA 352 (A).

convictions and sentences and for the remittal of the case to the magistrate to
enable them to adduce further evidence. This Court held that the provincial
division was correct to refuse the application for the setting aside and remittal.
It held (per Centlivres CJ):
‘The decision of that Division in which it dismissed the appeal was a final decision
and could not be re-opened, except, possibly, on the ground that it had been
obtained by fraud.’5
The facts here are clearly different and this case concerns an alleged
improperly obtained plea of guilty.

[16] Parmanand concerned the exercise of a court’s review powers on
appeal. This court held that ‘where there is only an appeal before the Court
and it appears that there might be relief open to the appellant by way of
review, it would not be proper for the Court to dismiss the appeal and
consequently confirm the conviction, thus making it impossible for the
appellant, in view of the law as laid down in R v D, to get relief thereafter by
way of review’.6 As can be seen, Parmanand follows R v D which, as I have
stated, is distinguishable.

[17] This principle was confirmed in Coopers that a court ought ‘first to
consider the appeal aimed at a review of the proceedings and, thereafter, in
the event of its dismissal, to consider the appeal on the merits’.7 Importantly,
Wessels JA cautioned that, absent any argument on the point, he was
hesitant ‘to decide definitively that in law, in such a case as the present, that is
the correct and only course to adopt’.8 (My emphasis.) The learned Judge
was, however, satisfied that that was the correct course to follow in that
particular case. The court thus declined to decide the appeal on the merits
and instead exercised its power of remittal under s 22 of the now repealed
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, after it had found that the Commissioner of
Patents had in patent infringement proceedings misdirected itself in the

5 R v D, above, at 390E-F.
6 Per Greenberg JA in R v Parmanand, above, at 838D-E.
7 Per Wessels JA in Coopers South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Schädlingsbekämfung, above at 369E-F.
8 Ibid.

exercise of its discretion in excluding certain expert evidence altogether. The
reservation expressed by Wessels JA is to my mind indicative thereof that in
our law there is no absolute bar against a review application being brought
after an unsuccessful pursuit of leave to appeal against conviction. Every
case must be decided on its own facts.

[18] The present case differs in my view materially from the three cases
above. In this instance there is an allegation that the guilty plea was
improperly obtained, thus vitiating the proceedings in its entirety. There has
been a gross violation of the appellant’s constitutional fair trial rights, so it is
contended. As I have said, the appellant is not seeking a second bite at the
cherry. No court has as yet considered the correctness of the proceedings as
opposed to the correctness of the conviction. I am therefore of the view that
the court below erred in holding that the pursuit of the leave to appeal against
conviction precluded the appellant from seeking the review and setting aside
of the proceedings in the regional court. But, as I will presently demonstrate,
the appellant’s conduct of the case has other consequences adverse to his
review application. I turn to the substantive merits of the review.

[19] It is axiomatic that an accused person’s constitutional right to
representation by a legal practitioner would be rendered meaningless by
incompetent representation or, as is alleged in this case, a complete failure to
execute the accused’s mandate and instead compelling the accused to act
against his or her will in a criminal trial.9 It is equally well established that a
legal representative never assumes total control of a case, to the complete
exclusion of the accused. An accused person always retains a measure of
control over his or her case and, to that end, furnishes the legal
representatives with instructions. As Van Blerk JA expressed, it in a separate
concurring judgment, in R v Matonsi: ‘. . . die klient dra nie volkome
seggenskap oor sy saak onherroeplik aan sy advokaat oor nie’.10 While the

9 See generally: S v Tandwa & others (538/06) [2007] ZASCA 34; 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA)
para 7 and S v Dalindyebo (090/2015) [2015] ZASCA 144; [2015] 4 All SA 689 (SCA) paras
22 and 23.
10‘… the client does not irrevocably hand over complete control over his case to his counsel.’
R v Matonsi 1958 (2) SA 450 (A) at 458A-B. (My translation.)

legal representative assumes control over the conduct of the case, that
control is always confined to the parameters of the client’s instructions. The
other side of the coin is that, in the event of an irresolvable conflict between
the execution of a client’s mandate and the legal representative’s control of
the case, the legal representative must withdraw or the client must terminate
his or her mandate where such an impasse arises. An accused person cannot
simply remain supine until after conviction.11

[20] The ultimate choice of whether or not to plead guilty is that of the
accused. In R v Turner12 the court of appeal had to consider a similar situation
to the present one. There the appellant had changed his plea of not guilty to
one of guilty to the theft of his own car from the owners of a garage who had a
lien over it. His counsel had advised him in the course of the trial to change
his plea to one of guilty as that might result in a non-custodial sentence.
Counsel’s advice further was that a not guilty plea and an attack on the police
officers which accused them of complete fabrications (as was the appellant’s
instructions) might, on the other hand, have resulted in the appellant’s
previous convictions being placed before the jury and the appellant then ran
the risk of going to prison. The appellant was, however, repeatedly assured
that the final choice whether to plead guilty was his. This advice was given by
counsel after he had been to see the trial judge in chambers. In giving the
advice, counsel did not say anything to disabuse the appellant of the
impression, which the appellant later confirmed he had formed, that counsel
was repeating the trial judge’s views. The court of appeal held that counsel
had, on the evidence before the court not exceeded his duty in advising the
appellant to plead guilty. The fact that the appellant might have thought that
his counsel’s views were that of the judge, however, amounted to the
appellant not truly having a free choice in retracting his plea of not guilty and
the guilty plea should thus be treated as a nullity. In making these findings
Lord Parker CJ said:

11 R v Matonsi, above, at 457E-F; S v Louw (70/88) [1990] ZASCA 43; 1990 (3) SA 116 (A) at
124G-H.
12 R v Turner [1970] 2 All ER 281 (CA).

‘It is perfectly right that counsel should be able to do it [present advice] in strong
terms, provided always that it is made clear that the ultimate choice and a free choice
is in the accused person.’13

[21] Appellant’s counsel placed strong reliance on this dictum in Turner. We
were also referred to the practice direction of the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division) in England issued by the Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, which reads as
follows:
'45. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SENTENCE
45.1 An advocate must be free to do what is his duty, namely to give
the accused the best advice he can and, if need be, in strong terms. It
will often include advice that a guilty plea, showing an element of
remorse, is a mitigating factor which may well enable the Court to give
a lesser sentence than would otherwise be the case. The advocate
will, of course, emphasize that the accused must not plead guilty
unless he has committed the acts constituting the offence(s)
charged.
45.2 The accused, having considered the advocate’s advice, must
have complete freedom of choice whether to plead guilty or not
guilty…
(own emphasis)’.

[22] Courts in the United States of America require that an accused
person’s awareness of the constitutional rights waived by a plea of guilty, the
accused’s understanding of the nature of the charge as well as the
consequences of the plea of guilty, have to appear on the trial record.14 The
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, requires that
defence counsel ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty is
ultimately made by the accused.15 A plea of guilty is only valid if made as a

13 R v Turner, above, at 284; see also: R v Hall [1968] 2 All ER 1009 at 1011 (QB); Pretorius v
Director of Public Prosecutions & another 2011 (1) SACR 54 (KZP) paras 28 and 29.
14 R J Bacigal and M K Tate Criminal Law and Procedure: An Overview 4 ed (2013) at 296.
15 American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice 4 - 5.2(a)(i) (2d ed 1980).

free and informed choice ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.16

[23] It was contended on behalf of the appellant that Messrs Kramer and
Nel failed in their duty to advise the appellant that he had the ultimate choice
whether or not to plead guilty and that in the event of an impasse they should
have withdrawn. The facts of this case, however, do not support these
submissions. The various unsuccessful applications for leave to appeal
against the conviction were all premised on the fact that the plea was freely
and voluntarily made without any undue influence. The primary contention in
those applications was that the plea explanation did not encompass all the
material elements of the crime of theft. In particular, it was submitted that the
appellant had not admitted that he had intended to permanently deprive Ms
Wiese of her money. In these circumstances it does not behove the appellant
to argue, as was done before us, that the admission as to voluntariness
cannot be taken into account in these proceedings. The appellant’s pursuit of
leave to appeal on this basis places him in an untenable position in this review
application. It is self-evident that the same plea cannot be voluntary for
purposes of one application but alleged to have been made under duress for
purposes of another application. The ineluctable conclusion which follows that
the plea was not made under duress is buttressed by other facts.

[24] First, the plea explanation itself bears out that it had been made freely
and voluntarily. The relevant parts read as follows:
‘3. Ek is op hoogte met die beweringe wat in die klagstaat ten aansien van die
onderskeie aanklagtes my ten laste gelê word en na samesprekings tussen
myself en my regsverteenwoordigers het ek opdrag aan hulle gegee om ten
aansien van die eerste alternatief tot aanklag 1 [theft] ‘n pleit van skuldig aan die
Hof te bied.
4. Hierdie opdrag is gegee sonder dat ek deur enigiemand daartoe
onbehoorlik beïnvloed is en het dit vrywillig en ongedwonge geskied, met
die volle besef van die gevolge daaraan verbonde.’17

16 Brady v United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970) at 748.

The appellant confirmed to the court that the plea explanation, as read into
the record, was true and correct in all respects. A period of approximately
three and a half months elapsed before sentence was imposed and no
mention whatsoever was made of the alleged duress. As stated, applications
for leave to appeal in the regional court, the court below and in this Court
followed which were all premised on a free and voluntary plea. It was only
when these proceedings were launched on 5 March 2013, after the petition to
this Court had succeeded only on leave to appeal against sentence, that the
first allegation of duress saw the light of day. The conclusion is unavoidable
that the appellant had hedged his bets on a successful appeal against
conviction and, only once he had reached the end of that highly speculative
road, he cried ‘duress’. This fallback position of claiming duress is, as I have
said, completely at variance with and destructive of his earlier position in the
leave to appeal applications.

[25] Second, the unsuccessful representations to the DPP were aimed at
securing a plea agreement on the following terms: the appellant would plead
guilty on count three (a contravention of s 4(1), read with ss 1 and 10 of the
Funds Act) in exchange for a non-custodial sentence. As counsel for the first
respondent correctly pointed out, the actus reus in that statutory offence is
exactly the same as the one underpinning the theft charge to which the
appellant had pleaded guilty. It entails the unlawful investment of moneys
entrusted to the appellant in a manner contrary to the mandate of the owner of
that moneys. And the factual basis of the guilty plea on that aspect accorded
with the allegations on oath made by the complainant, Ms Wiese. She stated
in her affidavit to the police that she had agreed to the appellant’s proposal
that the money be invested in a money market account with a higher interest
rate. It had thus always been the appellant’s intention to plead guilty to an
offence relating to the unlawful investment of trust moneys.

17 ‘3. I am conversant with the allegations in the charge sheet with regard to the various
charges against me and after deliberations between myself and my legal representatives I
have instructed them to tender a plea of guilty to the court on the first alternative to count 1.
4. This instruction has been given without me having been unduly influenced by anyone to do
so and it has been done freely and voluntarily with full understanding of the consequences
thereof.’ (my translation.)

[26] While it is true that the appellant pertinently declared in his written
instructions to counsel that he never had any intention to steal any money,
that declared intent is at odds with the admission by the appellant that he had
invested money contrary to his mandate from Ms Wiese. It can reasonably be
inferred that, in the face of the State’s case, in particular the sworn statement
of Ms Wiese, counsel had explained to the appellant that, ultimately, his
actions constituted the crime of theft. And the inherent probabilities
overwhelmingly favour the State’s version that the appellant had voluntarily
furnished instructions for a plea of guilty on theft. As I have said, the inference
is overwhelming that he only cried foul when he realised that he faced
imprisonment notwithstanding his plea of guilty. The court below correctly
preferred the version propounded mainly by Kramer and Nel on behalf of the
first respondent over that of the appellant.

[27] When one considers all these facts, coupled with the fact that the
appellant is an accountant, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellant had,
on the advice of his attorney and counsel, on his own volition and out of his
own free will pleaded guilty to theft. I am satisfied on the facts before us that
the appellant had taken an informed decision on the advice of his legal
representatives, to plead guilty. In so doing he had waived his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent, as well as the right to
adduce and challenge evidence.18 The appeal is devoid of any merit.

[28] The appeal is dismissed.

________________________

S A MAJIEDT

JUDGE OF APPEAL

18 S 35(3)(h) and (i) of the Constitution.

APPEARANCES

For Appellant:
D F Dörfling SC
Instructed by:

Du Plessis & Associates, Johannesburg

Martins Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:
J Swanepoel
Instructed by:

Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
IA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN COURT OF APPEAL
24 March 2016

STATUS: Immediate

DE VILLIERS v THE STATE (20732/14)

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and
does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today dismissed on appeal against the
dismissal of a review application by 2 Judges of the Free State Division of the High
Court (Bloemfontein), sitting as a review court. The SCA held that such a court is a
court of first instance as contemplated in s 16(a) of the Superior Courts Act and is
thus competent to grant leave to appeal to the SCA in terms of s 16(1)(a)(ii). On the
merits, the SCA held that the common cause and proved facts did not bear out the
appellant’s claim that he had pleaded guilty under duress in the regional court to
theft. It was the appellant’s case that his attorney and advocate had exerted
pressure on him to plead guilty against his will.

The appellant, a qualified accountant, acted as financial advisor to Ms A Wiese. In
that capacity he administered the deceased estate of Ms Wiese’s late husband. On
the appellant’s advice Ms Wiese had made out a cheque in the sum of R950 000 to
a trust operated by the appellant, known as the Taakmeesters Trust. According to
her, the appellant was mandated to invest this money in a money market account
where, as the appellant had advised her, the money would accrue more interest. On
the admitted facts the appellant had failed to execute his mandate and had instead
advanced money as bridging finance to various entities, including some in which he
had an interest. Save for an amount of R50 000, no money was ever repaid to Ms
Wiese before the Trust was sequestrated.

The SCA upheld the high court’s finding that on all the evidence the appellant had
pleaded guilty of his own volition and without any undue influence. The appeal was
consequently dismissed.

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