THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Case no: 486/09
In the matter between:

MUTUAL & FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD

Appellant

and

SMD TELECOMMUNICATIONS CC

Respondent

Neutral citation:
Mutual & Federal Insurance Company Ltd v SMD
Telecommunications CC (486/09) [2010] ZASCA 133
(1 October 2010)

Coram:
NAVSA, CLOETE, MHLANTLA, SHONGWE and TSHIQI
JJA

Heard:

19 August 2010

Delivered:

1 October 2010

Summary:
Insurance contract – Occurrence Clause covering bodily
injury caused ‘solely’ and ‘independently’ of any other
cause – Exception Clause excluding any pre-existing
death or infirmity.

______________________________________________________________

ORDER
______________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (Davis J sitting as
court of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
______________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________

TSHIQI JA (Navsa, Cloete, Mhlantla, Shongwe JJA concurring):

[1] On 1 July 2002, the appellant and the respondent concluded a contract
of insurance. The clauses relevant to the present dispute are the Occurrence
and Exception Clauses. In terms of the Occurrence Clause, the appellant
undertook to compensate the respondent in the event of disability or death of
one of its managerial staff, occurring as a result of ‘bodily injury caused solely
by violent, accidental, external and visible means which injury shall
independently of any other cause be the sole cause of any of the results’
(which included death). The Exception Clause specifically excluded cover for
‘any occurrence consequent upon any pre-existing physical defect or
infirmity’.

[2] On 10 October 2002 Mr Keith Compton-James (‘the deceased’), who
held the position of Chief Executive Officer of the respondent, sustained
orthopaedic injuries in a motor vehicle collision. On 18 May 2003, seven
months later, he died. His death was precipitated by a plaque rupture which
caused a myocardial infarction (a heart attack). It was not in dispute that the
deceased fell within the ambit of managerial staff as contemplated in the
contract.

[3] Before the collision, the deceased had a history of coronary problems.
In 1999 and 2001 he was diagnosed by a cardiologist, Dr Tyrell, to be
suffering from high blood pressure and presented with a cystolic murmur. He
had also presented clinical features of aortic stenosis (narrowing of the aortic
valve of the heart) together with a slightly leaking mitral valve and evidence of
left ventricular hypertrophy (the heart muscle was thicker than normal). He
was advised to change his lifestyle and to stop smoking and drinking. An
electrocardiogram and echogram indicated he had had a previous myocardial
infarction. On both occasions Dr Tyrell also noted that the deceased had
developed mild claudication (a narrowing of the arterial supply to the muscles
of the legs).

[4] On the day of the collision he was admitted to the Milnerton Medi Clinic
for trauma care and treatment. On 11 October 2002, he was taken to theatre
where a doctor carried out an open reduction and internal fixation of the right
femoral fracture and an open reduction and internal fixation of the distal left
femur and a patellectomy of the left knee were performed. He remained there
until 25 October 2002 when he was transferred to the Panorama
Rehabilitation Unit for after care. On 29 November 2002, it appeared that his
left knee had flared up and was painful. His doctor carried out an arthroscopy
and a wash out of turbid fluid of the left knee. He was taken back to the
Panorama Rehabilitation Unit.

[5] On 13 December 2002, he was discharged to his home. He walked
with the aid of a walking frame and at times required the use of a wheelchair.
While at home, it appeared that there was a wound on the left heel and toe.
He utilised the services of a nurse to change the dressings. It became
necessary for him to be referred to a vascular surgeon, who, on 15 January
2003, carried out a femero-popliteal bypass of the leg. He was discharged on
23 January 2003. On 27 January 2003 he commenced at his home with a
process of physiotherapy.

[6] On 30 January 2003 (more than three months later) the deceased was
readmitted to Panorama Rehabilitation Unit because it appeared that his

health condition had deteriorated. He could not get out of bed, his speech was
slurred and he looked pale and drawn. Dr Rossouw, a general practitioner,
was consulted. On 5 February 2003, Dr Rossouw referred him to Dr Du Toit, a
physician. After setting out the deceased’s condition and his prescribed
medication, he commented: ‘Ek mis iets hier ek hoop jy kan help’. In the
referral, Dr Rossouw also described the deceased’s condition as anaemic,
that he stammered, and that his C-Reactive Protein (CRP) which had been
226 had reduced rapidly to 195, after five days of anti-biotic treatment. His
sodium level was 120. (CRP is found in blood in small quantities and the
normal level is less than five mg per litre. It is an important measurement of
inflammation in the body.) On 6 February 2003 he was readmitted at
Panorama Hospital for treatment of sepsis that developed in relation to a plate
in the right hip by Dr Lategan.

[7] After a series of tests, Dr Du Toit determined that the deceased had
developed a methicillin resistant staphylococcal infection. He placed the
deceased on vancomissien and rifampesien, which are two powerful
antibiotics. On 18 February 2003 an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Lategan,
removed the hardware from the right hip because it was infected. The
deceased consulted Dr Du Toit again on 7 March 2003. Dr Du Toit noted that
the deceased’s condition had improved. He could walk with a frame, his CRP
had dropped to 40, his sodium level had improved and his blood pressure was
under control because he was taking a prescription drug called norvasc. On
14 April 2003, on a further visit to Dr Du Toit, he noted that the left knee was
sore, that the right hip had improved, that the CRP level had improved to 30,
and that his haemoglobin had improved from 9.1 to 11.4, but the sodium level
was still low at 114 ml per litre. On 15 April 2003, his physiotherapist
discontinued her sessions because she believed that no further improvement
appeared to be possible. At that stage he walked a maximum of
approximately 20 metres with a zimmer frame. He attended work on a daily
basis, but only for a few hours. He continued to attend work on a relatively
regular basis until 18 May 2003 when he was found dead, at home.

[8] During the deceased’s lifetime, the Insurance Company paid out an
amount to the respondent in respect of temporary disablement. Subsequent to
his death, the respondent lodged a claim arising out of the contract of
insurance. The appellant repudiated the claim and denied that the death fell
within the scope of the contract of insurance. The respondent instituted a
claim in the Western Cape High Court. That court (Davis J) held in favour of
the respondent. This appeal is directed, with leave of the court below, against
that finding.

[9] Put simply, having regard to the Occurrence Clause referred to in
paragraph 1 , the dispute between the parties in the court below and before
us can be telescoped as follows: The appellant contends that the deceased
was at high-risk before the collision, that he had already suffered a heart
attack in the past and had maintained a lifestyle that was not conducive to
good health and that the plaque rupture had occurred naturally because of
these factors and cannot be said to be due to the collision as required by the
Occurrence Clause. This, they submitted was especially so given the lapse of
approximately seven months from the time of the collision to the time of his
death. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the serious injuries
that were directly due to the collision were such that they developed
complications, including infection, and that this led to a marked deterioration
in his health and ultimately caused his death within the terms of the
Occurrence Clause.

[10] The divergence of views set out in the preceding paragraph, were
predicated on the views of the parties’ respective experts. The court below
favoured the views of Dr Tyrell, the deceased’s cardiologist, against the views
of Dr Mabin, a cardiologist who testified in support of the appellants’ case.

[11] At the outset it is necessary to consider the use of the words ‘bodily
injury’ in the Occurrence Clause. There is a long line of cases in which it has
been recognised that even if the loss is not felt as the immediate result of the
peril insured against, but occurs after a succession of other causes, the peril
remains the proximate cause of the loss, as long as there is no break in the

chain of causation. One such case is International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v
Bentley.1 In that case it was stated:
‘The enquiry as to factual causation is generally conducted by applying the so called
“but-for” test, which is designed to determine whether a postulated cause can be
identified as a causa sine qua non of the loss in question. In order to apply this test
one must make a hypothetical enquiry as to what probably would have happened but
for the wrongful conduct of the defendant. This enquiry may involve the mental
elimination of the wrongful conduct and the substitution of a hypothetical course of
lawful conduct and the posing of the question as to whether upon such an hypothesis
plaintiff’s loss would have ensued or not. If it would in any event have ensued, then
the wrongful conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff’s loss; aliter, if it would not so
have ensued. If the wrongful act is shown in this way not to be a causa sine qua non
of the loss suffered, then no legal liability can arise. On the other hand,
demonstration that the wrongful act was a causa sine qua non of the loss does not
necessarily result in legal liability. The second enquiry then arises, viz whether the
wrongful act is linked sufficiently closely or directly to the loss for legal liability to
ensue or whether, as it is said, the loss is too remote. This is basically a juridical
problem in the solution of which considerations of policy may play a part. This is
sometimes called “legal causation”.’

[12] Returning to the question of which of the two views referred to in
paragraph 10 above should win the day, it is necessary to consider the
evidence of Drs Tyrell and Mabin.

[13] According to Dr Tyrell, a person suffering from chronic vascular
disease has by definition widespread areas of plaque in arteries throughout
the body (atherosclerosis or, in common parlance, hardening of the arteries).
The most common arteries to be affected by plaque are those supplying the
lower limbs, heart and brain. Coronary heart disease is a condition
characterized by long periods of chronicity and stability, and also at times by
periods of instability and acute events, such as myocardial infarction. In cases
of myocardial infarction the event is caused by rupture of plaque in a coronary
artery, which then leads to the formation of thrombus (‘coronary thrombosis’),
which in turn causes occlusion of the artery and leads successively to

1 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700F-I

myocardial ischaemia (lack of blood supply to the heart muscle which also
implies shortage of oxygen) and infarction, and – in some cases – to
ventricular fibrillation and death. Dr Tyrell’s opinion was that a major event
such as the accident in which the deceased was seriously injured has a
number of significant patho-physiological consequences over and above the
injuries which a patient may sustain. These include the development of pro-
inflammatory and pro-thrombotic states in the body.

[14] Dr Tyrell referred to the fact that the deceased had evidence of
persistent infection and inflammation in the months before his death, and to
the fact that the deceased’s CRP level was significantly above normal over a
protracted period. In February 2003 the CRP level was measured as 97mg/l,
in March it was 38mg/l and in April (about four weeks before his death) it was
30mg/l. As I have said, the normal CRP level is less than five mg/l. He
regarded it as significant that the deceased not only suffered major trauma
resulting from the accident but also underwent multiple surgical procedures
and developed infection. According to Dr Tyrell, each of these consequences
of the accident (‘triggers’), by causing activation of pro-inflammatory and pro-
thrombotic pathways of themselves considerably increased the risk of plaque
rupture. He stated that in a vulnerable person such as the deceased (one
more pre-disposed to a heart attack than the average person), the
concurrence of these events greatly increased the risk of a heart attack.

[15] Dr Tyrell concluded that trauma, surgery, infection and inflammation
are well-known and potent triggers for plaque rupture, and thus heart attack –
and that it is beyond doubt that these triggers were directly attributable to the
accident because they rendered the chronic stable condition of the deceased
to become acute, unstable and lethal. He stated that although the death of the
deceased occurred some seven months after the motor vehicle accident, he
regarded the above multiple occurrences as various triggers of his cause of
death. He found it significant that as recently as four weeks before the
deceased’s death there were still signs of a systemic inflammatory state (as
shown by persistently high CRP levels) and concluded that it was probable
that this condition persisted up to the time of death. Dr Tyrell accordingly held

the opinion that the deceased’s death was a late or delayed consequence of
the accident and that the deceased would not have died in May 2003 if it had
not been for the motor vehicle accident.

[16] Dr Mabin’s opinion, on the other hand, was that the pre-existing health
complications of the deceased put him at a high risk of an ischaemic heart
attack at any time. In support of this he referred to the fact that the deceased
was already suffering from established atherosclerotic vascular disease at the
time of the accident. Further factors, so he stated, were the fact that in
October 2002 his disease had already manifested as a previous heart attack
and the fact that the deceased also had disease of the arteries in his legs. Dr
Mabin stated that the fact that the deceased died seven months after the
accident at a time when he was improving as indicated by his clinical state
and reduction in his CRP level, also indicates that the CRP and inflammation
reaction were unlikely to be directly responsible for his death. He regarded it
as an important factor that the deceased survived in February when his
condition of inflammation was acute, but died four months later when it was
described as chronic rather than acute – thus showing signs of improvement.
Dr Mabin stated that the release of pro-inflammatory chemicals that make the
blood more likely to clot, occurred in the acute phase after surgery and/or
trauma, either during the event or a day or two thereafter – hence his opinion
that death was more likely to have occurred during February, during the acute
phase and around the period of the last surgical intervention. He concluded
that the timing of death showed that the deceased was most likely to have
died from pre-existing ischaemic heart disease, and not from the
consequences of the accident. According to him the deceased had sufficient
evidence of serious pre-existing cardiac disease to have resulted in the
deceased dying at any time, irrespective of the accident – and that it cannot
therefore be said that the deceased would not have died but for the accident.

[17] The approach that is helpful in resolving the divergence between Dr
Tyrell and Dr Mabin is the approach adopted in Michael & another v Linksfield
Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd & another 2 where the court held:
‘In the course of the evidence counsel often asked the experts whether they thought
this or that conduct was reasonable or unreasonable, or even negligent. The learned
Judge was not misled by this into abdicating his decision-making duty. Nor, we are
sure, did counsel intend that that should happen…’ (para 34).
‘That being so, what is required in the evaluation of such evidence is to determine
whether and to what extent their opinions advanced are founded on logical
reasoning. That is the thrust of the decision of the House of Lords in the medical
negligence case of Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 (HL
(E)). With the relevant dicta in the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson we respectfully
agree. Summarised, they are to the following effect…’
‘The court is not bound to absolve a defendant from liability for allegedly negligent
medical treatment or diagnosis just because evidence of expert opinion, albeit
genuinely held, is that the treatment or diagnosis in issue accorded with sound
medical practice. The Court must be satisfied that such opinion has a logical basis, in
other words that the expert has considered comparative risks and benefits and has
reached “a defensible conclusion” (at 241G – 242B).
If a body of professional opinion overlooks an obvious risk which could have been
guarded against it will not be reasonable, even if almost universally held. (at 242H).’
(para 36-38).
‘…This essential difference between the scientific and the judicial measure of proof
was aptly highlighted by the House of Lords in the Scottish case of Dingley v The
Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 200 SC (HL) 77 and the warning given at 89D-E
that “(o)ne cannot entirely discount the risk that by immersing himself in every detail
and by looking deeply into the minds of the experts, a Judge may be seduced into a
position where he applies to the expert evidence the standards which the expert
himself will apply to the question whether a particular thesis has been proved or
disproved – instead of assessing, as a Judge must do, where the balance of
probabilities lies on a review of the whole of the evidence”.’ (para 40 F-H).

[18] Before I review the evidence and consider the probabilities in the
present enquiry, it is helpful to consider the decision of this court in Concord

2 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 34; para 36-38; para 40.

Insurance Co Ltd v Oelofsen NO.3 In that case the executrix in a deceased
estate instituted action for payment under a personal accident policy issued
by Concord. The policy had an Occurrence Clause which provided that
Concord would provide cover if during the period of insurance the insured
sustained ‘bodily injury which independently of any other cause results in the death’
of the insured. The Occurrence Clause is similar to the one in issue except
that the parties in Concord did not incorporate ‘sole cause’ in their policy.
Nothing turns on this omission because there is no difference between
‘independently of any other cause’ and ‘be the sole cause’. The use of both
terms in the clause is tautologous. The deceased was subsequently involved
in a motor vehicle accident from which he emerged apparently unscathed.
Within a few hours after the accident, he suffered a heart attack. He was
rushed to hospital where he was treated, but ventricular fibrillation developed
and he died later the same evening. The deceased had been suffering from a
coronary disease known as triple artery atherosclerosis for a period of about
two years before the accident and his condition was such that he might have
experienced a heart attack at any time.

[19] The medical experts in Concord were agreed that the immediate cause
of the fibrillation was myocardial ischaemia due to a constriction in the area
where the arteries had already been narrowed by sclerosis; they differed on
the probable cause of the constriction. Concord’s witness, Dr Baskind, was of
the view that it had occurred naturally in the progression of the disease and
was unrelated to the accident. The executrix, on behalf of the estate, called a
Professor Simson who testified that the constriction was probably caused by a
biological process whereby, due to the shock of the accident, the sympathetic
nervous system released chemical substances into the blood. The High Court
preferred Professor Simson’s view. On his evidence it was held ‘that the
ischaemia of the heart was caused by the stress of the collision coupled with the pre-
existing disease which together resulted in a vasoconstriction with the resultant chain
of events described above’.

3 1992 (4) SA 669 (A).

[20] In Concord, this court in considering the question of causation in
connection with the cover clause, found it significant that the insurance
contract did not contain an Exception Clause specifically excluding pre-
existing infirmities. The court reasoned as follows:
‘In the context of the cover clause it may similarly be said that the bodily injury
constituted the proximate cause of death but in view of the words “independently of
any other cause” this is plainly not enough. If the insured’s pre-existing condition was
a contributory “cause” within the intended meaning of this word, Concord must be
absolved…’ (at 673 G-H).
‘What must accordingly be decided in the present case is whether the parties, by
referring in the cover clause to “any other cause” of an insured’s death or
disablement, intended to include his infirmity.
That they could not possibly have attached a meaning to the word “cause” which
would embrace every conceivable sine qua non is clear. Mr Trengrove conceded that
such a construction would make a mockery of the agreement. The enquiry must
accordingly proceed on the basis that the word was used in a restricted sense. But
there is no express indication of the extend of the contemplated limitation nor can its
ambit be gauged by way of implication from the other terms. Why then should we
favour an interpretation which would specifically include the insured’s infirmity? To
this question Mr Trengrove supplied no answer. Not a word is said in the policy about
the insured’s state of health either at the time of his application for insurance nor at
any time thereafter and one is left with the firm impression that it is something which
simply did not concern the parties. Because it obviously affects the risk, an insured’s
state of health is commonly known to be of decisive importance to any life insurer.
Indeed one can almost describe it as standard practice for insurers to insert a
provision in a life policy whereby the application for insurance, containing the
applicant’s answers to searching questions regarding his medical history and the
state of his health, is incorporated in the policy. Moreover, it is not unusual for
accident policies to contain specific provisions excluding liability for the insured’s
death or disablement arising from or traceable to any physical defect or infirmity
existing prior to the accident. (Such a provision appeared for example in the policy
before the Court in Jason v Batten (1930) Ltd [1969] 1 L1 LR 281 (QB) – a case on
which Mr Trengrove relied but which is clearly distinguishable – and in a number of
other cases.) Bearing this in mind, the significance of the absence from the present
policy of any reference whatsoever to the insured’s state of health is patent. It is
difficult to accept, to say the least, that the parties meant to express in the simple

words “independently of any other cause” an intention similar in effect to the one
evinced by the elaborate provisions in the policies in cases like Jason v Batten.’ 4 (at
674 B-H).

[21] The essence of the distinction the court was referring to in the terms of
the contracts in Concord and Jason v Batten is that, in the latter case, the
policy contained an Exception Clause that specifically excluded the pre-
existing health condition of the insured. If the intention of the parties is to
exclude pre-existing infirmities, this should be unequivocally stated in the
insurance contract. The Exception Clause in Jason v Batten did so. It
provided that
‘No benefit shall be payable under this [p]olicy in respect of [d]eath, [i]njury or
[d]isablement directly or indirectly caused by or arising or resulting from or traceable
to –
…………………
(iii)
(a) ………………
(b) Any physical defect or infirmity which existed prior to an accident’.

[22] In Jason v Batten the court was impressed by the fact that Mr Jason
had not suffered from the thrombosis despite his matrimonial problems and
the stressful life he was leading. Because of these factors, the court found in
favour of Mr Jason, despite the Exception Clause. The court stated at page
288:
‘… and if there is not a casual connection with the accident it is a very remarkable
coincidence that the thrombosis should have occurred just when it did. But I also find
it established that he would have had a thrombosis quite soon even if the accident
had not occurred. Dr Gibson thought “he could have gone for five years without a
thrombosis”, but considering all the evidence, both about Mr Jason’s temperament
and the kind of life he led, I think that this is an outside figure and I find as a fact that
at the date of the accident his expectation (using that word in the sense in which it is
used in the phrase “expectation of life”) was of a coronary in three years’ time.’

4 At p 673 G-H; 674 B-H.

[23] Jason v Batten is distinguishable from Concord because the
agreement in Concord did not contain an Exception Clause. Because of the
similarity of the present case to Jason v Batten one would reasonably expect
we would follow the reasoning in that case. The problem for the appellant,
however, is that it did not plead the Exception Clause and no reliance can
therefore be placed on its terms. Having failed to place reliance on the
Exception Clause before or during the trial, the appellant is not able to do so
now nor can it seek an amendment on appeal. This is so because if the
clause had been pleaded, the onus would have been on the insurer5, during
the trial, to prove that the respondent’s occurrence fell within the terms of the
exception and the respondent would not be prejudiced because it would have
had an opportunity of rebutting this evidence. It will be recalled that during the
deceased’s lifetime, the appellant paid out a sum in respect of disability
without any reliance on the non-disclosure of the previous myocardial
infarction.

[24] The enquiry in this matter is two-fold. First, the insured would have to
prove on a balance of probabilities that the injury sustained in the accident
was the proximate cause of the deceased’s death and that his pre-existing
condition was not a contributory ‘cause’ within the intended meaning of this
word. The insured is greatly assisted in this task by the decision of this court
in Concord which construed a policy for practical purposes identical to the
present as not including a pre-existing condition. Once the causal nexus
between the accident and the death has been established, the onus would
then shift to the insurer to show on a balance of probabilities that the
proximate cause of the accident was excluded by the Exception Clause. In
this matter it will not be necessary to engage in the second enquiry, because
of the failure to place reliance on the Exception Clause.

[25] Both Dr Tyrell and Dr Mabin agreed that the mechanism of death and
the cause lay within the domain of cardiology. Both of them did not dispute

5 Agiakatsikas NO v Rotterdam Insurance Co Ltd 1959 (4) SA 726 (C); See also Rabinowitz &
another NNO v Ned-Equity Insurance Co Ltd & another 1980 (1) SA 403 (W); Aegis
Assuransie BPK v Van der Merwe 2001 (1) SA 1274 (T).

that the deceased’s health before the accident was stable. Their dispute was
in respect of the temporal relationship between the injury and the plaque
rupture, which was effectively linked to what appeared to be the deceased’s
improving medical status. According to Dr Mabin the risk of a triggering of a
heart attack was in the early phases of acute trauma, surgery and infection
but it diminished with time; whilst Dr Tyrell’s view was that the risk persisted
and was present even at the chronic phase. Dr Tyrell made reference to
medical journals to support his hypothesis. Dr Mabin noted these and could
not criticise nor disagree with them. He agreed that he participated in the
content of the journals as an editor. His reluctance to embrace Dr Tyrell’s
opinion and the proposals contained in the journals was based on the fact that
there was no clinical proof to support the hypothesis. His evidence on the
issue proceeded as follows:
‘Ja, look, I don’t think any of us dispute the pathogenesis of arterial inflammation,
plaque rupture etcetera. The question is what the triggers are, and its association
with generalised systemic infection. I think we accept that, in the early phases of
acute trauma, surgery, infection, there is a risk, and there is a risk of triggering a
heart attack. But not beyond that. I think it diminishes with time, but not beyond what
would be a few days. So in a chronic inflammatory state, [it] would imply a long,
protracted inflammatory state, and I don’t think it is well recognised.’
On being asked to comment directly on Dr Tyrell’s hypothesis, he stated:
‘I think had it happened in the acute immediate period, then I would accept that it’s an
attractive hypothesis, but not months after the event, and certainly not at the time that
he was improving. I just find it difficult to accept the relationship between the two.’
Under cross examination, Dr Mabin again conceded that he found the
hypothesis of Dr Tyrell attractive and stated:
‘It lends itself to logical thought in terms of pathogenesis, and I don’t think any of us
disagree with the pathogenesis. What we disagree with, is how protracted those
acute factors are in the chronic stage. And I’ve just been unable to find a causal
factor relating to chronic inflammation and acute myocardial infarction.’
On being questioned further, Dr Mabin appeared to embrace Dr Tyrell’s
opinion and was even constrained to concede that it may be more than just
hypothesis. This he did in the following responses to counsel:
“As far as acute events are concerned, is it generally accepted now that acute events
may lead to plaque rupture?

---You mean acute trauma?
Yes…(intervention)…And surgery?
Trauma or surgery---It can increase the likelihood of plaque rupture.
Is that more than just hypothesis?---I think that’s again epidemiological, and it’s well
known and well established in medicine that in the acute phase or major surgery, the
likelihood of an acute myocardial infarction in a patient at risk is increased.
So that’s more than just hypothesis---That is.’

[26] Dr Mabin was also constrained to concede that the deceased had a
further protracted difficult time after his initial surgery. Although he seemed
reluctant to agree that the other incidences of surgery or trauma could be
termed insults to the deceased’s body he was constrained to concede this
when they were tabulated. The importance of this concession is that
according to Dr Tyrell, it was the cumulative effect of these insults arising out
of the progressive series of surgical interventions which caused the trauma
that triggered the rupture. Dr Mabin accepted that Dr Tyrell’s hypothesis is
logical, but lacks medical data to prove it. He stated:
‘…I’ve analysed what’s happened and I’ve looked for medical data to support what
might have happened and the sequence of events and I must say I was in some way
almost disappointed not to be able to find the corroborative evidence that we are
looking for---It’s a logical hypothesis.’

[27] Clearly Dr Mabin was stating that the only reason why he was reluctant
to agree with Dr Tyrell was because of the absence of corroborative empirical
evidence to support what he himself regarded as a logical hypothesis. On the
probabilities, it can be safely concluded that the opinion of Dr Tyrell is logical,
was attractive to a fellow cardiologist and is supported by journal articles and
studies on closely related areas of cardiology. His opinion in line with Michael
v Linksfield was in my view correctly accepted by the court a quo.

[28] The respondent has therefore proved that the accident was the
proximate cause of the deceased’s death. It not being open to the appellant to
raise the Exception Clause, the appeal must fail.

[29] The remaining issue is the costs order made by the court a quo
pertaining to a postponement on 30 October 2007, after the appellant had
abandoned its special plea, and its objection to the respondent’s intention to
amend the particulars of claim so as to annex the correct pages of the
contract of insurance. The court exercised a narrow discretion in awarding
attorney and client costs against the appellant and there is no submission that
this discretion was not exercised judicially. The appellant must accordingly fail
on this aspect as well.6

[30] The appeal is dismissed with costs.

______________________
Z L L Tshiqi
Judge of Appeal

6 Naylor & another v Jansen 2007 (1) SA 16 (SCA) at 23F-24D and authorities referred to in
footnotes 15 to 23.

APPEARANCES
APPELLANT:

W R E DUMINY SC
Instructed by Mellows & De Swardt

Cape Town;

Symington & De Kok, Bloemfontein.

RESPONDENT:

D F IRISH SC

Instructed by Otto Krause Inc,

Cape Town;

Honey & Partners, Bloemfontein.
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

FROM

The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

DATE

1 October 2010

STATUS

Immediate

Please note that the media summary is for the benefit of the media and does not form
part of the judgment.

v
(486/09) [2010] ZASCA 133 (1 October 2010)

Media Statement

An appeal from the Western Cape High Court dealing with the interpretation of an Occurrence
and Exception Clause in an insurance contract has been dismissed. The respondent – SMD
Telecommunications CC (SMD) had concluded an insurance contract with Mutual and
Federal for cover for bodily injury or death caused solely by violent, accidental, external and
visible means independently of any other cause. The Exception Clause specifically excluded
cover for any occurrence consequent upon any pre-existing defect or infirmity.

Mr Compton-James, a CEO of SMD died 7 months after a motor vehicle accident. His death
was precipitated by a plaque rupture causing myocardial infarction. The SCA upheld the
decision of the Western Cape High Court and found that on a balance of probabilities, the
death was a delayed consequence of the accident and that he would not have died in May, if
it had not been for the motor vehicle accident. The Court further held that Mutual and Federal
could not rely on the Exception Clause because it had not been pleaded.

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