THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case Nos: 657/2022 and 694/2022
In the matter between:
KURT ROBERT KNOOP NO                                         FIRST APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd)
JOHAN LOUIS KLOPPER NO                                  SECOND APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd)
KGASHANE CHRISTOPHER MONYELA NO            THIRD APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd)
JUANITO MARTIN DAMONS NO                              FOURTH APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd)
OPTIMUM COAL MINE (PTY) LTD                             FIFTH APPELLANT
(in business rescue)
KURT ROBERT KNOOP NO                                         SIXTH APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd)
JOHAN LOUIS KLOPPER NO                                SEVENTH APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner
of Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd)
TEGETA EXPLORATION AND RESOURCES       EIGHTH APPELLANT
(PTY) LTD

(in business rescue)
KURT ROBERT KNOOP NO                                       NINTH APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner of
Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Ltd)
KGASHANE CHRISTOPHER MONYELA NO           TENTH APPELLANT
(in his capacity as business rescue practitioner of
Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Ltd)
OPTIMUM COAL TERMINAL (PTY) LTD      ELEVENTH APPELLANT
(in business rescue)
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS           TWELTH APPELLANT
TEMPLAR CAPITAL LTD                             THIRTEENTH APPELLANT
LIBERTY COAL (PTY) LTD                          FOURTEENTH APPELLANT
and

NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC                                      RESPONDENT
PROSECUTIONS

Neutral citation: Knoop NO and Others v National Director of Public
Prosecutions (Case nos 657/2022 and 694/2022) [2023]
ZASCA 141 (30 October 2023)
Coram:
MOCUMIE, MEYER and MATOJANE JJA and KATHREE-
SETILOANE and KEIGHTLEY AJJA
Heard:

22 August 2023
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties’ legal representatives via e-mail, publication on the Supreme Court
of Appeal website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down are
deemed to be 30 October 2023 at 11h00.

Summary: Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA) – asset
forfeiture – preservation of property order – Companies Act 71 0f 2008
(Companies Act) – business rescue – preservation of property order granted
after adoption of business rescue plan under Chapter 6 of the Companies Act –
whether a preservation order under s 26 of POCA is appealable – whether this
Court’s decisions in Phillips and Others v National Director of Public
Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA) and Singh v National Director of Public
Prosecution 2007 (2) SACR 326 (SCA) are definitive on the issue of the
appealability of a preservation order.

________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Fourie and
Mbongwe JJ, sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is struck from the roll with costs including the costs of two counsel,
such costs to be borne jointly and severally by the first to eleventh, twelfth and
thirteenth, and fourteenth appellants respectively.

________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
Keightley AJA (Mocumie, Meyer and Matojane JJA and Kathree-Setiloane
AJA concurring)

[1] This is an appeal against the grant of a preservation of property order (the
preservation order) by the Gauteng Division of the High Court (the high court)
on 23 March 2022 under s 38 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of
1998 (POCA) on application by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (the
NDPP).1 The preservation order appointed a curator bonis2 with designated
powers in respect of the affected property. The property identified in the
preservation order is:
(a)
all shares held in Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd (OCM);

1 The high court delivered a consolidated judgment in respect of two preservation applications by the NDPP under
case numbers 62604/2021 and 62601/2021. The applications were heard together. Separate preservation orders
were granted in respect of each application. This appeal is against the order granted in respect of case number
62604/2021 only.
2 In terms of s 42 of POCA.

(b)
the business of OCM as defined in the business rescue plan adopted by the
creditors of OCM in September 2020 including, but not limited to, the assets
listed in the business rescue plan; and
(c)
all shares held in Optimum Coal Terminal (OCT).

[2] The shares in question are held by Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty)
Ltd (Tegeta). OCM, OCT and Tegeta are all in business rescue. The first to fourth
appellants are the appointed business rescue practitioners of OCM. The sixth and
seventh appellants are the appointed business rescue practitioners of Tegeta, and
the ninth and tenth appellants are the appointed business rescue practitioners of
OCT. They share a common stance in the appeal. Consequently, I refer to them
simply as ‘the business rescue practitioners’, unless there is a need to be more
specific.

[3] OCM and OCT are linked companies as defined in the Companies Act 71
of 2008 (Companies Act). OCM is a coal mine which historically has mined and
exported coal. OCT has a shareholding in the Richards Bay Coal Terminal that
entitles it to export coal. This provides the avenue for OCM’s coal exports.

[4] A business rescue plan for OCM was approved by the majority of creditors
prior to the application for a preservation order. It contemplates the disposal of
the business of OCM to Liberty Coal (Pty) Ltd (Liberty), which is the fourteenth
appellant. Liberty is a subsidiary of Templar Capital Limited (Templar), the
thirteenth appellant. OCM’s business rescue practitioners have recognised
Templar as the single largest creditor of OCM. Both Liberty and Templar are
controlled by Daniel McGowan (Mr McGowan). Templar’s claims against OCM
have their origin in the claims of another entity of which Mr McGowan is a
director, namely Centaur Ventures Limited (CVL). Templar took cession of
CVL’s claims against OCM. The business rescue plan provides that these claims

will be converted to equity in Liberty. Liberty and Templar thus have an interest
in the business rescue plan being put into effect.

[5] The twelfth respondent is the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). It
is an ‘affected person’ in the business rescue and is entitled to participate in any
related court proceedings. NUM voted in favour of the business rescue plan. Its
view is that the plan offers its members who are employees of OCM their only
hope of being paid the outstanding remuneration due to them, and the opportunity
for re-employment at the mine as envisaged in the business rescue plan.

[6] The preservation order prohibits:
‘All persons . . . other than as required and permitted by (the preservation order) from removing,
taking possession of or control over, dissipating, interfering with, diminishing the value of,
pledging or otherwise hypothecating, attaching or selling in execution or dealing in any other
manner with any of the property unless they obtain the prior written consent of the curator
bonis appointed under (the) order.’

[7] This prohibition is subject to a proviso which permits the business rescue
practitioners to enter into and perform individual transactions with a value of less
than R50 000 in the ordinary course of OCM’s business. There is a further proviso
recording that the prohibition against dealing with the property does not:
‘Prevent the disposal of the business of OCM under circumstances where the curator bonis and
the business rescue practitioners have agreed to do so in writing, or if there is no agreement,
with the prior obtained leave of the Court, pursuant to a business rescue plan adopted after (the)
order by the creditors of OCM under Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, in which event the net
proceeds of such disposal of the business shall be property preserved under (the) order.’

[8] Save for the latter proviso, the preservation order expressly operates ‘as a
power of attorney for the curator bonis to deal with the property as if he himself
is its owner or holder’. This includes the curator bonis having the power and
authority to act as shareholder of the affected shares. The order retains for the

business rescue practitioners control of OCM’s business, subject to the express
powers of the curator bonis. In an attempt to harmonise the tension between the
powers, authority and obligations of the curator bonis under the preservation
order, and those of the business rescue practitioners under the Companies Act,
the preservation order directs that:
(a)
They (the curator bonis and the business rescue practitioners) shall co-
operate with each other in good faith and shall use their best endeavours to
attempt to find a purchaser for the business of OCM at fair value with the aim of
disposing of the business pursuant to a new business rescue plan.
(b)
In the event of the current business rescue practitioners being removed, the
curator bonis will have the power to appoint their replacement.

[9] Despite these provisions, the immediate effect of the preservation order
was to put a hold on the business rescue practitioners giving effect to the business
rescue plan, which had an implementation deadline of 28 March 2022. Hence the
opposition to the order by not only the business rescue practitioners, but also by
other parties whose interests are affected, namely Liberty, Templar and NUM.

[10] One of the main bones of contention for the appellants is that the
preservation order impermissibly interferes with the statutory powers and
obligations of the business rescue practitioners as prescribed under the
Companies Act. It does so, according to the appellants, by making the business
rescue practitioners subject to the oversight of the curator bonis insofar as the
affected property is concerned. They contend that the preservation order is
incompetent as it seeks to establish an unlawful state-controlled business rescue
process, which does not serve the objects of forfeiture under POCA.

[11] The NDPP disputes this. She argues that the preservation order, and the
forfeiture of property order that is pending, are competent and necessary to serve

the purposes of POCA. According to the NDPP, the asset forfeiture proceedings
in this case form part of her broader obligation to deal with the consequences of
what has become known as State Capture. The NDPP points to the Public
Protector of South Africa’s State of Capture Report,3 which found evidence of
irregular conduct by a wide range of state officials. This conduct included the
facilitation of the ‘Optimum acquisition’ by the Gupta family. It involved the
acquisition by them, through Tegeta, of the shares in OCM and OCT, as well as
the business of OCM through which coal was mined and exported. The State
Capture Commission that followed, supported the findings of widespread
criminality directly linked to the acquisition of Optimum.

[12] The NDPP explains that the preservation order, and the pending forfeiture
order associated with it, are directed at recovering the proceeds of crime linked
to the corrupt scheme that culminated in the acquisition of Optimum by the Gupta
family. The NDPP’s case is that the targeted assets are the proceeds, as well as
instrumentalities of the crimes of fraud, theft and money laundering. If the
business rescue plan is permitted to be put into effect, it will facilitate further
money laundering. This is because Templar’s claims are themselves tainted.

[13] The NDPP adduces evidence that she says demonstrates that the funds
underlying the CVL claims were advanced by a Gupta family company, Griffin
Line General Trading LLC, and were the proceeds of crime. In other words, the
NDPP’s case is that Templar acquired a tainted claim through cession, and that
taint persists. The current business rescue plan if put into effect would allow
Templar, which is controlled by Mr McGowan, to use the tainted CVL claims to
acquire a benefit ultimately for Mr McGowan. It is for this reason, according to
the NDPP, that effect cannot be given to the present business rescue plan.

3 State of Capture, Report No 6 of 2016/17, dated 14 October 2016.

[14] However, the NDPP contends that this does not mean that an alternative
business rescue plan, excluding Templar and Liberty, should not be pursued, with
the curator and the business rescue practitioners working together as provided for
under the preservation order. In that event, the proceeds from any new acquisition
of OCM’s business will, after the satisfaction of lawful creditors’ claims, be
forfeited to the state. This is assuming, of course, that the pending forfeiture
application is resolved in favour of the NDPP. The purpose of the preservation
order is thus to preserve the assets of OCM and OCT in the interim.

[15] As noted earlier, OCM, OCT and Tegeta were already in business rescue
when the preservation application was instituted. The application was preceded
by an investigation launched by the Investigating Directorate of the National
Prosecuting Authority into offences perpetrated against Transnet SOC Ltd and
Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd during the period covered by the State Capture
Commission. The preservation application is supported by a detailed affidavit by
Sibusiso Tshikovhi (Mr Tshikovhi) who was involved in the investigation.

[16] In advance of launching the preservation application the NDPP wrote to
the legal representatives of the business rescue practitioners on 26 November
2021, and furnished them with an early draft of Mr Tshikovhi’s affidavit. The
affidavit included evidence relied on by the NDPP to show that the Tegeta shares
in OCM and OCT and the business of OCM were acquired with the proceeds of
crime. It also included evidence that the CVL claims (on which Templar’s claims
were founded) were tainted. The NDPP urged the business rescue practitioners to
have regard to the evidence and the alleged criminal conduct that would be
perpetrated if the business rescue plan was put into effect. The NDPP also sought

the business rescue practitioners’ consent under s 1334 of the Companies Act for
the institution of the preservation application.

[17] The business rescue practitioners were not swayed by the NDPP’s letter,
and elected to proceed with the implementation of the business rescue plan. In
addition, they refused the requested consent under s 133. Their response
prompted the NDPP to launch the preservation application on an urgent, or more
accurately a semi-urgent, basis as the deadline for the implementation of the
business rescue plan was 28 March 2021. The NDPP also sought the requisite
leave of the high court under s 133(1)(b) of the Companies Act to bring the
application.  Importantly, although s 38 of POCA permits the NDPP to apply ex
parte for a preservation of property order, she proceeded on notice to the business
rescue practitioners.

[18] The business rescue practitioners opposed the relief on several grounds
including the lack of urgency in the application; the non-joinder of the creditors
of OCM and OCT and other interested parties; the failure of the NDPP to obtain
prior leave of the court under s 133 to institute the preservation application; the
NDPP’s failure to make out a case for the preservation of the shares of OCM’s
business; and the legal incompetence of the relief sought on the basis that it would
result in an irreconcilable conflict with the business rescue provisions of the
Companies Act. The defences were all dismissed by the court a quo. It
subsequently granted leave to appeal to this Court. On appeal the business rescue
practitioners persisted with the defences raised before the court a quo.

4 Section 133 imposes a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue. It
provides, in relevant part:
‘(1) During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement action against the company,
or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced with in
any forum, except-
(a) with the written consent of the practitioner;
(b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court considers suitable; . . .’

[19] NUM contends in the appeal that the court a quo erred in granting the
preservation order in that no prima facie case was made out to preserve the
business of OCM. Further, that the court a quo failed to undertake a
proportionality inquiry before granting the preservation order. It ought properly
to have found that the preservation of the property is not reasonable and justifiable
as required by s 36 of the Constitution. A further ground of appeal is that the court
erred by ignoring the fact that the NDPP had used preservation of property
proceedings for an ulterior purpose, namely to scupper business rescue. NUM
also contends that the relief sought was ultra vires the Companies Act and POCA.
Finally, NUM takes issue with the costs ordered against it, placing reliance on the
principles laid down in Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and
Others.5

[20] As for Liberty and Templar, the court a quo granted their application for
leave to intervene in the main application, and to appeal its judgment and order
in that application. Their appeal is directed at certain paragraphs of the
preservation order. Essentially, like the other appellants, their complaint is that
the court a quo erred in preserving the business of OCM. Further, they submit
that the court a quo did not have the power to authorise the adoption of a new
business rescue plan. Nor could it properly authorise the curator bonis to appoint
new business rescue practitioners in the event that the current practitioners resign.

[21] Despite the wide-ranging defences raised by the appellants, this appeal
turns on a preliminary point: whether a preservation order granted under
Chapter 6 of POCA is appealable. This question was raised by the NDPP in
opposing an application by NUM for condonation for the late filing of its heads
of argument in the appeal. This Court issued a directive requesting the parties to

5 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10)
BCLR 1014 (CC) para 43.

submit written submissions on the question of appealability, particularly in light
of this Court’s judgments in DRDGold Limited and Another v Nkala and Others6
(DRDGold) and TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld
Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd and Others7 (TWK Holdings). In their submissions
all the appellants contend that the order is appealable; the NDPP contends it is
not.

[22]  TWK Holdings8 reconfirms the test for appealability set out in Zweni v
Minister of Law and Order9 (Zweni), namely that an appealable decision has three
attributes: (a) it is final in effect and not susceptible of alteration by the court of
first instance; (b) it is definitive of the rights of the parties; and (c) it has the effect
of disposing of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings.10 TWK Holdings finds, despite other judgments to the contrary, that
the interests of justice do not provide a self-standing ground of appealability in
this Court outside the scope of Zweni. While the Zweni test is not immutable,11
TWK Holdings emphasises that any deviations from the Zweni test must ‘be
clearly defined and justified to provide ascertainable standards consistent with
the rule of law’.12 This is necessary to prevent piecemeal appeals.13 The latter
finding is consistent with what this Court has previously stated: when a decision
sought to be appealed against does not dispose of all the issues, it must, if
permitted, lead to a just and reasonably prompt resolution of the real issue
between the parties.14

6 DRDGold Limited and Another v Nkala and Others [2023] ZASCA 9; 2023 (3) SA 461 (SCA).
7 TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd and Others [2023] ZASCA 63;
2023 (5) SA 163 (SCA).
8 Ibid para 21.
9 Zweni v Minister of Law and Order [1992] ZASCA 197; 1993 (1) SA 523 (A).
10 Ibid para 8.
11 Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service [1996] ZASCA 2; 1996 (3) SA 1 (SCA)
para 13; Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA) para 19.
12  TWK Holdings fn 7 para 30.
13 Ibid para 21.
14  DRDGold fn 6 para 28.

[23] The business rescue practitioners advance three reasons for why the
preservation order is appealable. The first is that this Court’s judgments in
Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions15 (Phillips) and
Singh v National Director of Public Prosecutions16 (Singh) are definitive of the
issue. The second is that the preservation order satisfies the Zweni test and the
third is that the issue of the competence of the order, discussed earlier, renders it
appealable.

[24] Are Phillips and Singh definitive? Phillips involved a restraint order
granted under s 26, which is in Chapter 5 of POCA. This Court found that
although a restraint order is only of interim operation, and it has no definitive or
dispositive effect as envisaged in Zweni, it is unalterable by the court that granted
it.17 The effect of a restraint order is that a defendant is stripped of the restrained
assets and any control or use of them pending the conclusion of the related
criminal trial. The Court concluded: ‘[t]hat unalterable situation is . . . final in the
sense required by the case law for appealability’.18

[25] As in this appeal, Singh involved a preservation order granted under s 38
of POCA. The NDPP in that case conceded on appeal that the preservation order
was appealable. The Court noted that the concession arose from its finding in
Phillips and commented that it was rightly made in that: ‘the grant of a
preservation order is “final” in the sense required for appealability – in the case
of both restraint and preservation orders the court making the order may only
rescind or vary it in accordance with the provisions of POCA’.19 The Court
ventured no further reasoning on the issue, and it rested there.

15 Phillips fn 11.
16 Singh v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2007] ZASCA 82; [2007] 3 All SA 510 (SCA); 2007 (2)
SACR 326 (SCA).
17 Phillips para 20.
18 Ibid para 22.
19 Singh para 10.

[26] The pronouncement in Singh (for this is essentially what it amounted to)
rests on the assumption that there is material parity between restraint orders under
Chapter 5 and preservation orders under Chapter 6 of POCA. It is so that they
share common features. However, a closer examination of the legislative scheme
underpinning each Chapter demonstrates that there are substantive differences in
the remedies established under each.

[27] The Chapter 5 asset forfeiture regime, with which this Court was concerned
in Phillips, is often referred to as ‘criminal asset forfeiture’. Although POCA
expressly provides that Chapter 5 proceedings are civil in nature,20 asset forfeiture
under Chapter 5 is inextricably linked to criminal proceedings against the
defendant. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to ensure that criminals disgorge the
benefit they have derived from the offences of which they are convicted, or
related criminal activities. This is achieved by the convicting court making a
confiscation order post-conviction.21 A confiscation order is a civil judgment for
payment to the state of an amount of money in addition to the criminal sentence
imposed, rather than for the confiscation of a specific object.22

[28] As in most cases there is likely to be a delay between the institution of
criminal proceedings, the conviction of the defendant and the imposition of a
confiscation order, POCA provides a mechanism to preserve property in the

20 Section 13(1) of POCA provides:
‘For the purposes of this Chapter proceedings on application for a confiscation order or a restraint order are civil
proceedings, and are not criminal proceedings.’
21 Section 18(1) provides that:
‘Whenever a defendant is convicted of an offence the court convicting the defendant may, on the application of
the public prosecutor, enquire into any benefit which the defendant may have derived from-
(a) that offence;
(b) any other offence of which the defendant has been convicted at the same trial; and
(c) any criminal activity which the court finds to be sufficiently related to those offences,
and, if the court finds that the defendant has so benefited, the court may, in addition to any punishment which it
may impose in respect of the offence, make an order against the defendant for the payment to the State of any
amount it considers appropriate and the court may make any further orders as it may deem fit to ensure the
effectiveness and fairness of that order.’
22 S v Shaik and Others [2008] ZACC 7; 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC); 2008 (2) SACR 165 (CC); 2008 (8) BCLR 834
(CC) para 24.

interim in the form of a restraint order under s 26. A restraint order acts as a form
of security for the eventual satisfaction of any confiscation order that may be
granted post-conviction.23 It is not restricted to property actually tainted by the
defendant’s alleged criminality. A restraint order may be made in respect of
realisable property, which is defined as ‘any property held by the defendant
concerned’,24 meaning that even lawfully-acquired property may be subject to
restraint.

[29] The high court, rather than the relevant criminal court, has the power to
grant a restraint order, on application by the NDPP ex parte. The order prohibits
any person, subject to any conditions and exceptions specified by the court, from
dealing in any manner with any affected property.25 POCA expressly envisages a
two-stage, rule nisi procedure for the grant of a restraint order, with a provisional,
ex parte order, preceding the final grant or discharge of the provisional order on
a designated return day.26

[30] At the same time as granting a restraint order the high court may appoint a
curator bonis with powers to receive on surrender, and take care of and administer
the property subject to restraint.27 The court has unrestricted powers to vary or
rescind the appointment and terms of appointment of a curator bonis.28 However,
it may only vary a restraint order if the operation of the order will deprive the
applicant of the means to provide for her reasonable living expenses and cause

23 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Wood and Others [2022] ZAGPJHC 272; [2022] 3 All SA 179 (GJ);
2022 (2) SACR 245 (GJ) para 30.
24 Section 14(1).
25 Section 26(1).
26 Section 26(3)(a) provides:
‘A court to which an application is made in terms of subsection (1) may make a provisional restraint order having
immediate effect and may simultaneously grant a rule nisi calling upon the defendant upon a day mentioned in
the rule to appear and to show cause why the restraint order should not be made final.’
27 Section 28(1).
28 Section 28(2).

undue hardship, and that hardship outweighs the risk of dissipation of the
property.29

[31] It was in large measure these features of a restraint order that led this Court
in Phillips to conclude that despite being only of temporary duration, that is,
pending the outcome of any conviction and confiscation proceedings, a restraint
order establishes an unalterable situation, rendering it final and appealable. The
appellants contend, as Singh appeared to accept, that because a preservation of
property order shares these features, it too should be regarded as final and
appealable.

[32] Broadly speaking asset forfeiture proceedings under Chapter 6 of POCA
share a similar objective to that of criminal asset forfeiture under Chapter 5. They
are aimed at depriving persons of their criminal proceeds or of property used as
instrumentalities of designated offences. The end goal of Chapter 6 proceedings
is the grant of a forfeiture order over specified property.30 A preservation of
property order is aimed at preserving affected property pending the outcome of a
forfeiture application instituted under s 48. To this extent a preservation order
may be likened to a restraint order.

[33] However, there are significant conceptual and procedural differences
between the two forfeiture regimes. As the Constitutional Court explained in
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and
Others,31 while under Chapter 5 the confiscation machinery can only be invoked
when a defendant is convicted: ‘Chapter 6 . . . provides for forfeiture of the
proceeds of and instrumentalities used in crime, but is not conviction based; it

29 Section 26(10).
30 Under s 50.
31 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others [2003] ZACC 4; 2003 (4)
SA 1 (CC); 2003 (1) SACR 561; 2003 (5) BCLR 476; 2003 (4) SA 1 (CC) (Mohamed) para 16.

may be invoked even when there is no prosecution’. The proceedings are in rem,32
aimed at the property itself: a preservation order is granted if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the property is either the proceeds or an instrumentality
of an offence.33

[34] Thus, Chapter 6 proceeds from the fiction that the property concerned is
condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate.34 It is the property,
rather than the person, that bears the taint of criminality.35 This explains why
although, as with restraint applications, POCA provides expressly for the NDPP
to apply ex parte for a preservation of property order, no express provision is
made for that order to be granted in the form of a rule nisi with a return day. This
is not to say that a court cannot grant a preservation of property order in the form
of a rule nisi. The point is that the legislative scheme does not pre-suppose that
this should be the default position.

[35] This is an important distinction between restraint and preservation orders.
Whereas the legislative scheme under Chapter 5 envisages that affected persons
should be given an opportunity to oppose the grant of a restraint order on the
return day before it is made final, the legislative scheme under Chapter 6
deliberately postpones the right to oppose until after a preservation order is
granted, and the proceedings move to the forfeiture stage. This is expressed in
s 39(1), which directs the NDPP, as soon as practically possible after the grant of
a preservation order, to give notice of the order to ‘all persons known to (her) to

32 Mohunram and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2007] ZACC 4; 2007 (4) SA
222 (CC); 2007 (6) BCLR 575 (CC); 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC) para 118.
33 Section 38(2) provides:
‘The High Court shall make an order referred to in subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the property concerned-
(a) is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1;
(b) is the proceeds of unlawful activities; or
(c) is property associated with terrorist and related activities.’
34 Brooks and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] ZASCA 42; 2017 (1) SACR 701 (SCA);
[2017] 2 All SA 690 (SCA) para 16.
35 De Vries v The State [2011] ZASCA 162; 2012 (1) SACR 186 (SCA); [2012] All SA 13 (SCA) para 4.

have an interest in the property subject to the order’ and to publish a notice of the
order in the Government Gazette.

[36] Within 14 days of receiving notice, or of publication in the Gazette, any
person with an interest in the property may enter an appearance by giving notice
of her intention to oppose the forfeiture application that is intended subsequently
to be instituted.36 A person with an interest in the property may indicate either
that they will oppose the grant of a forfeiture order, or that they will seek to have
their interests in the property excluded from the operation of any forfeiture order
that is granted.37 As this Court has noted, this scheme ensures that prior to the
granting of a forfeiture order (but after the preservation order), people with an
interest in the property would have been given sufficient opportunity to do what
they deem necessary to protect their interests, should they wish to do so.38

[37] The procedure encapsulated in s 38(1) read with s 39 is unique to forfeiture
under Chapter 6 of POCA. This procedure deliberately positions the right to audi
alteram partem within the post-preservation order phase. That the legislative
scheme does not envisage, as a general principle, a route to opposition prior to
the grant of a preservation order, is a strong indicator that preservation orders are
not meant to be appealable.

[38] A further, important, indicator is that while express provision is made for
appeals in respect of other orders under Chapter 6, none is made for appeals
against preservation orders.39 In instances where an appeal may be instituted
against other orders, POCA makes it clear that the relevant preservation order

36 Section 39(3).
37 Section 39(5).
38 Ex Parte National Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] ZASCA 86; 2018 (2) SACR 176 (SCA) para 24.
39 The following sections recognise appeal procedures that may be instituted under Chapter 6:
(a) Section 46(4)(b) recognises that there may be an appeal in respect of the taxing of legal expenses
claimed by a person with an interest in the property.
(b) Section 47(4) recognises that there may be an appeal against a decision to vary or rescind an order.
(c) Section 55 recognises that there may be an appeal against the grant of a forfeiture order.

will be kept intact pending the outcome of the appeal.40 In addition, preservation
orders may only be varied or rescinded on the same limited grounds as restraint
orders.41 These features demonstrate the legislative objective of insulating
preservation orders from challenge pending the forfeiture process. This is because
of the indispensable role that a preservation order plays in securing proceeds and
instrumentalities of crime. That objective would be compromised if preservation
orders were susceptible to appeal.

[39] The Court in Phillips was not persuaded that this latter consideration meant
that a restraint order was not appealable. The appellants urge the same conclusion
in respect of preservation orders. However, what Phillips was not required to
consider, is the unique procedure governing preservation and forfeiture orders
outlined earlier. Nor did this Court’s pronouncement in Singh follow a considered
analysis of the Chapter 6 procedure. Further analysis is thus required.

[40] The Constitutional Court has recognised that the two-stage Chapter 6
proceedings are ‘complex and tightly intertwined, both as a matter of process and
substance’.42 A preservation and a forfeiture order share a distinct symbiotic
relationship not shared between restraint and confiscation orders. Without a
preservation order in place the NDPP cannot institute a forfeiture application.43
Conversely, if the NDPP does not institute that application within a period of
ninety days of publication of the notice of the preservation order, the preservation

40 Section 47(4) says that: ‘The noting of an appeal against a decision to vary or rescind (a preservation order or
an order appointing a curator bonis) shall suspend such a variation or rescission pending the outcome of the
appeal.’ In similar vein, s 55 provides: ‘A preservation of property order and any order authorising the seizure of
the property concerned or other ancillary order which is in force at the time of any decision regarding the making
of a forfeiture order under s 50(1) shall remain in force pending the outcome of any appeal against the decision
concerned.’
41 Section 47(a) permits a high court to vary or rescind a preservation order on application by a person affected if
the court is satisfied that the operation of the order will deprive the applicant of the means to provide for her
reasonable living expenses and cause undue hardship; and where that hardship outweighs to risk that the property
may be dissipated in some manner.
42 Mohamed fn 31 para 22.
43 Section 48(1) states that: ‘If a preservation of property order is in force the National Director may apply to a
High Court for an order forfeiting to the State all or any of the property that is subject to the preservation of
property order.’

order expires.44 This has the consequence that a new preservation order would
have to be sought should the NDPP wish to pursue forfeiture. By comparison, a
confiscation order under Chapter 5 may be sought with or without a restraint order
in place.

[41] A further feature of their intertwined relationship is that the civil high court
presides over both the preservation and forfeiture stages under Chapter 6. In
contrast, the civil high court only presides over the restraint proceedings under
Chapter 5, confiscation proceedings being the preserve of the criminal court.
Importantly, at both preservation and forfeiture stage under Chapter 6 the court
is concerned with essentially the same questions: is the property the proceeds of
unlawful activities or an instrumentality of an offence? However, there are two
key distinctions: first, the standard of proof is lower (reasonable grounds to
believe) at the preservation stage, whereas it is higher (balance of probabilities)
at the forfeiture stage. Second, at forfeiture stage interested parties can oppose
the application. Under Chapter 5, once a final restraint order is granted, the civil
high court's involvement in the asset forfeiture process concludes.

[42] Inherent in Chapter 6 of POCA is the recognition that forfeiture should
proceed without undue delay. This explains the fourteen-day limit for a person to
enter an appearance after receipt of notice of the preservation order, as well as the
cut-off of ninety days for the institution of a forfeiture application. The aim is to
progress towards the forfeiture stage as soon as possible. In this, the scheme is
pragmatic and serves the interests of justice. It is at the forfeiture stage that a
person with an interest in the property has the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings to defend their interests. Thus, it is to their benefit that this
opportunity should not be delayed.

44 Section 40(a).

[43] On the other hand, a defendant in restraint proceedings under Chapter 5
does not have the in-built protection of a speedy resolution to the POCA
proceedings. Her rights in her property are put on hold subject to the vagaries of
the criminal justice system and, if convicted, the finalisation of the complex
confiscation45 and realisation procedures46 outlined in Chapter 5. It is in this
context that this Court expressed the concern in Phillips that, absent the avenue
of an appeal against a restraint order, a defendant subject to a restraint order is
left remediless.47 Its conclusion that a restraint order is intended to be appealable
because it is final in the Zweni sense, should be understood with reference to the
particular characteristics and consequences of Chapter 5 proceedings.

[44] When properly analysed, the time-sensitive, closely intertwined and
symbiotic relationship between the preservation and forfeiture stages of
proceedings under Chapter 6 leads to a different conclusion. Unlike restraint
proceedings, the preservation stage, which as a rule excludes opposition, is
plainly intended to be a short-term, stop-gap measure to secure tainted property
pending the determination of the main issue – the forfeiture application. This
demonstrates a deliberate legislative choice that runs counter to the notion that
preservation orders are intended to be appealable.

[45] The practical consequences of recognising preservation orders as being
appealable are also irreconcilable with this legislative scheme. With regard to the
time periods for processing opposed applications and those for processing
appeals, it is clear that in the ordinary course, an opposed forfeiture application
will be ripe for hearing long before a notional appeal against a preservation order
could ever be. Why would the stop-gap measure of a preservation order be
appealable, when a respondent, acting diligently, could obtain relief at the final,

45 In Part 2, ss 18-24.
46 In Part 4, s 30.
47 Phillips para 22.

forfeiture stage long before the finalisation of the appeal against the preservation
order? To suggest otherwise, would lead to the absurd situation that the appeal
against a preservation order would be rendered moot. This consideration does not
apply in the context of Chapter 5 proceedings, because the restraint and
confiscation stages do not share the same symbiotic relationship and are not time-
sensitive.

[46] There is an additional procedural concern. If a preservation order is final
and thus appealable in the Zweni sense, the effect of an application for leave to
appeal under s 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act 19 of 2013 (Superior Courts Act)
will be to suspend the operation and execution of the order unless the NDPP is
able to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that, she will suffer
irreparable harm unless the court orders otherwise and that the appellant will not
suffer such harm.48 Unless the NDPP meets this onus, an appeal against a
preservation order would effectively put an end to the entire forfeiture process.
Since there can be no forfeiture application in the absence of a preservation order,
the main objective of the asset forfeiture provisions of POCA would be rendered
nugatory. These were not considerations before this Court in Phillips, as that
judgment preceded the enactment of the Superior Courts Act.

[47] In sum, all of these factors lead, in my view, to the conclusion that unlike
the situation pertaining to restraint orders under Chapter 5, preservation orders
under Chapter 6 are not intended to be appealable. It follows that neither Phillips,
nor Singh, which gave no consideration to the scheme of Chapter 6 of POCA, is
determinative of the issue.

[48] Moreover, contrary to the submissions by the business rescue practitioners,
the preservation order does not meet the three requirements of the Zweni test. The

48 Section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act.

NDPP accepts that the order is final in the sense that it is not subject to alteration
by the same court that granted it. This is so because the scope for rescission and
variation of the preservation order per se is narrowly circumscribed.49 However,
it is clear from the above analysis of Chapter 6 proceedings that a preservation
order is not definitive of the rights of the parties, nor does it have the effect of
disposing of at least a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings. This Court in Phillips did not find these requirements to be
determinative of appealability in the context of restraint orders. However, they
are of material relevance in the context of preservation orders. The entire scheme
of Chapter 6 is geared towards the forfeiture stage (and not that of preservation)
as being the stage at which rights are definitively determined and the relief
claimed either granted or dismissed.

[49] Nor is the additional requirement laid down in Zweni met. An appeal
against the preservation order will not dispose of all the issues between the
parties, nor will it lead to a just and reasonably prompt resolution of the real issues
between them. As this case demonstrates, the issues on the merits are often
complex. Here, that complexity extends to the overlap between the asset
forfeiture and business rescue regimes. The appropriate stage for determination
of the issues is the forfeiture stage, when they are fleshed out in full, and can be
determined on the usual balance of probabilities standard. To permit an appeal
against the preservation order would lead to results against which this Court
warned in TWK Holdings:
‘As a general principle, the high court should bring finality to the matter before it, in the sense
laid down in Zweni. Only then should the matter be capable of being appealed to this Court. It
allows for the orderly use of the capacity of this Court to hear appeals that warrant its attention.
It prevents piecemeal appeals that are often costly and delay the resolution of matters before

49 It should be noted that the same does not apply to those parts of the preservation order appointing the curator
bonis and demarcating his powers. Under s 47(2) those orders may be varied or rescinded at any time on
application of an interested party.

the high court. It reinforces the duty of the high court to bring matters to an expeditious, and
final, conclusion. And it provides criteria so that litigants can determine, with tolerable
certainty, whether a matter is appealable. These are the hallmarks of what the rule of law
requires.’50

[50] These observations are particularly pertinent when considered in relation
to the appealability of preservation orders. This is so because the whole thrust of
the legislative scheme of Chapter 6 is directed at securing finality of the real
issues between the parties at the forfeiture stage as promptly as reasonably
possible. To permit appeals against preservation orders would fundamentally
undermine this deliberate legislative choice.

[51] It was submitted on behalf of the business rescue practitioners that the
appealability of the preservation order in this case should be considered
differently because the NDPP elected to go on notice rather than ex parte. It was
also submitted that consideration should be given to the fact that if the appeal
succeeded, this would bring finality to the matter, as the forfeiture application
would be invalid.

[52] The difficulty with these submissions is that the real inquiry is not whether
this preservation order is appealable. The real question is whether as a matter of
principle, preservation orders are appealable at all. That question goes to the DNA
of preservation orders under POCA. Either they are appealable because of their
particular statutory nature or they are not. This is what certainty and the rule of
law require. If they are not appealable, as I have found, then it makes no
difference how the NDPP elected to exercise the procedural choices she had
available to her. That she chose to proceed on notice, rather than ex parte is
neither here nor there. For the same reason it is also neither here nor there that a
successful appeal would bring finality. In any event, as TWK Holdings points out,

50 TWK Holdings para 21.

the utility of permitting an appeal cannot be assessed by recourse to its most
favourable outcome.51

[53] Lastly, the business rescue practitioners argue that the preservation order
is appealable as it is not a competent order due to the conflict between the
curator’s powers under POCA, and those of the business rescue practitioners
under the Companies Act. This contention is not sustainable as it is based on the
peculiarities of this case and this preservation order. I reiterate, the specific
circumstances of a particular case have no bearing on whether a preservation
order is appealable. This submission also overlooks the fact that under s 47(2),
orders pertaining to the appointment and powers of a curator bonis may be
rescinded or varied on application by an interested party.52 Quite simply, these
aspects of the preservation of property order are not final in any sense.

[54] I conclude that the preservation order is not appealable. The appeal was not
properly before the court and must be struck from the roll. Costs should follow
the cause, with provision made for the costs of two counsel.

[55] I make the following order:
The appeal is struck from the roll with costs including the costs of two counsel,
such costs to be borne jointly and severally by the first to eleventh, twelfth and
thirteenth, and fourteenth appellants respectively.

__________________
R M KEIGHTLEY
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL

51 Ibid para 39.
52 Section 47(2) permits any person affected by an order for the appointment of a curator bonis to apply for the
variation or rescission of the order, or of the terms of appointment of the curator bonis. The high court may so
order if it deems it necessary in the interests of justice.

Appearances:

For first to eleventh appellants: G D Wickens SC (with T Scott)
Instructed by:

Smit Sewgoolam Inc, Johannesburg

McIntyre Van Der Post, Bloemfontein

For twelfth appellant:

C H J Badenhorst SC (with M Desai)
Instructed by:

Ulrich Roux & Associates, Johannesburg

Symington De Kok, Bloemfontein

For thirteenth to fourteenth
appellants:

A Bham SC (with P Stais SC and J Brewer)
Instructed by:

Andersen, Johannesburg

Webbers Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For respondents:
M Chaskalson SC (with K Hofmeyr SC and
M Sibanda)
Instructed by:

Kunene Ramapala Inc, Pretoria

The State Attorney, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
30 October 2023
Status:
Immediate
The following summary is for the benefit of the media in the reporting of this case and does
not form part of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Knoop NO and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions (Case nos 657/2022 and
694/2022) [2023] ZASCA 141 (30 October 2023)
Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment striking, with costs, an
appeal against the decision of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria.
The facts of this matter were briefly as follows. The NDPP (the respondent in the appeal)
instituted an application at the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the high court)
for a preservation of property order in terms of s 38 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act
121 of 1998 (POCA). The intention of the order being to preserve certain property from being
disposed of pending the finalisation of a forfeiture of property order. The property in question
consisted of: (a) all shares held in Optimum Coal Mine (Pty) Ltd (OCM); (b) the business of
OCM as defined in the business rescue plan adopted by the creditors of OCM in September
2020 including, but not limited to, the assets listed in the business rescue plan; and (c) all shares
held in Optimum Coal Terminal (OCT). The shares in question were held by Tegeta
Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd (Tegeta). OCM, OCT and Tegeta were all under business
rescue. The Business Rescue Practitioners appointed for all three companies as well as NUM
(who were the representatives of the employees of OCM) were the appellants in this matter.
The reason for the NDPP’s application for a preservation order was based on the belief that the
property in question was acquired with the proceeds of crime and therefore should be forfeited
to the State. The high court ruled in favour of the NDPP’s application and granted the
preservation order.
Aggrieved by the decision of the high court, the Appellants, with leave from the court a quo,
brought the matter on appeal before this Court.
A preliminary issue for determination before this Court was whether a preservation order
granted under Chapter 6 of POCA was appealable. This Court issued a directive requesting the
parties to submit written submissions on the question of appealability. In their submissions all
the appellants contended that the order was appealable; whereas, the NDPP contended that it
was not.

The appellants argued that the previous decisions of this Court in Phillips v NDPP (2003 (6)
SA 447 (SCA)) (Phillips) and Singh v NDPP (2007 (2) SACR 326 (SCA)) (Singh) were
definitive on the issue. In Phillips, this Court found that a restraint order granted under
Chapter 5 of POCA was appealable. Singh involved a preservation order under Chapter 6. This
Court commented in its judgment in Singh that the NDPP had correctly conceded that the order
was appealable, following Phillips.
In its judgment today this Court rejected the submission that Phillips and Singh were
determinative on the issue of the appealability of a preservation of property order. The Court
identified material differences between restraint orders, under Chapter 5, which were
considered in Phillips, and preservation orders under Chapter 6. The procedure encapsulated
in s 38(1) read with s 39 was unique to the asset forfeiture regime under Chapter 6 of POCA.
It deliberately positions the right to audi alteram partem within the post-preservation order
phase. That the legislative scheme did not envisage, as a general principle, a route to opposition
prior to the grant of a preservation order. This, together with other features of Chapter 6
demonstrated the legislative objective of insulating preservation orders from challenge pending
the forfeiture process. This was because of the indispensable role that a preservation order
played in securing proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. That objective would be
compromised if preservation orders were susceptible to appeal. Furthermore, the Court held
that a preservation and a forfeiture order shared a distinct symbiotic relationship not shared by
restraint and confiscation orders under Chapter 5 of POCA. The Court in Singh had not given
consideration to the unique features of the asset forfeiture regime under Chapter 6 of POCA,
and was not determinative of the issue either. As such, the SCA found that preservation orders
under Chapter 6 were not intended to be appealable.
~~~~ends~~~~