THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF  SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case No 121/09

In the matter between:

SIBUSISO ERICK KHOZA

1st   Appellant
AUGUSTINUS KHOZA

2nd  Appellant
DANIEL LUCKY MAKGAKA

3rd   Appellant
EZEKIEL OMPHILE MAYELA

4th   Appellant
AUBREY MOCHAKA

5th   Appellant

and

THE STATE

Respondent

Neutral citation:  Khoza v The State (121/09) [2010] ZASCA 61 (1 April
2010)

Coram:
Heher, Mhlantla and Bosielo JJA
Heard:
17 February 2010
Delivered: 1 April  2010

Summary:
Criminal Procedure ─ fair trial ─ robbery with aggravating
circumstances ─ unlawful possession of machine guns and ammunition
─ manner in which trial was conducted ─ presiding judge not biased
against accused ─ no irregularity committed ─ no failure of justice
occurred ─ appellants' alibi defence correctly rejected ─ guilt of
appellants established beyond a reasonable doubt ─ convictions and
sentences confirmed.

ORDER
____________________________________________________________
On appeal from:  North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) (Els J sitting as a
court of first instance):
1.        The appeal against the convictions and sentences is dismissed.
2.
The legal representatives of the appellants are disallowed from
recovering any costs relating to:
(a)
the heads of argument in the appeal in so far as such exceeded 60
pages;
(b)
the application to amend the heads of argument;
(c)
the settling of the affidavits of the appellants (and any consultations
related thereto) filed in support of the application referred to in (b); and
(d)
the transcript of the argument before Sapire AJ.

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________
MHLANTLA JA (HEHER JA and BOSIELO JA concurring):

[1] The appellants were convicted in the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria on various charges. The first appellant was convicted of robbery
with aggravating circumstances and unlawful possession of machine
guns. He was sentenced to an effective term of 26 years' imprisonment.
The other appellants were, in addition to the above offences, convicted of
unlawful possession of ammunition and malicious injury to property. An
effective term of 35 years' imprisonment was imposed on each of them.

The appellants appeal to this court with the leave of Sapire AJ (the trial
judge having died) against their convictions and sentences. There is also
an application for leave to appeal against the refusal by the trial judge to
enter special entries in terms of s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (the Act).

[2] The issues to be determined on appeal are:
(a)
Whether the trial court erred in refusing the application to note the
special entries; and if so,
(b)
whether the convictions and sentences ought to be set aside on the
basis that the appellants' constitutional rights to a fair trial were
compromised by the manner in which the learned judge conducted the
proceedings; if not,
(c)
whether the State established the guilt of the appellants, and in
particular, the identity of the perpetrators of the offences beyond a
reasonable doubt; and
(d)
whether the judge committed any misdirection when he imposed
the sentences.

[3] In order to understand the issues it is necessary to set out an
exposition of the background facts. It is not in dispute that two cash-in-
transit heists occurred. The first one, (the Mooinooi incident) took place
at Majakaneng Bridge, Mooinooi, in the district of Brits on 11 November
2002 where members of the Fidelity Cash Management Services
('FCMS') were attacked by armed men. One of the employees was killed
and a substantial amount of money was stolen. The second incident, (the
Phokeng incident) occurred near Phokeng, Rustenburg on 18 November
2002 where an armoured vehicle was rammed from the rear by a BMW
motor vehicle. The robbers fled with approximately R200 000 in the

direction of Luka village, a suburb in the district of Phokeng which is
about seven kilometres from the scene of the robbery.

[4] The appellants and one Thabo David Nkosi were arrested as
suspects a few hours after the Phokeng robbery at various scenes at Luka.
According to the police, they were found in possession of many firearms
and a substantial amount of money. They were eventually charged on 20
counts in connection with these incidents. The trial commenced on 6
October 2005. The appellants pleaded not guilty and raised alibi defences.
In amplification thereof, they stated that the police had conspired against
them; that the police had released the actual robbers and stolen some of
the recovered money and then framed them by planting the firearms and
money on them.

[5] The State tendered evidence in respect of the commission of the
offences, the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused and the
discovery of the exhibits, that is, the firearms, money and stolen motor
vehicles. The accused testified in their own defence. After conviction and
sentence counsel for the third, fourth and fifth appellants lodged an
application for special entries to be made on the record on the ground that
the proceedings were irregular. This application was dismissed. I will
deal with this aspect later.

[6] The evidence adduced on behalf of the State was as follows. Mr
Sipho Hlope testified that on 11 November he was the driver of a cash
van in the Mooinooi matter. He and his passengers were attacked by
occupants in a white vehicle, a Honda, who shot at them. The bullets
struck their motor vehicle causing it to overturn. He further testified that a

second vehicle which had accompanied them was also attacked and one
of their colleagues was fatally injured.

[7] Captain Petrus Hara, of the Local Criminal Record Centre, Brits,
('LCRC'), who is employed as a draftsman, photographer and forensic
investigator testified in respect of the Mooinooi matter. His evidence
dealt with the collection of spent cartridges and their transfer to the
ballistics section for comparison with a firearm found in the house at
Luka, Phokeng. He took photographs of the scene and compiled a photo-
album which was handed in as exhibit D.

[8] Mr Stoop testified that he was employed by the FCMS. He was on
duty on 18 November and had been issued with a firearm, a .38. He and
his colleague had been collecting money from their clients. They were
travelling to Boshoek when a BMW vehicle collided with them from the
rear. Shots were fired and the armoured vehicle overturned. He lost his
firearm. He later saw a man with an AK firearm standing in front of a
combi. The robbers stole money from the vehicle and drove away in the
direction of Luka. He identified his firearm as exhibit 13.

[9] Inspector
Malebogo
Manere,
an
official
draftsman
and
photographer attached to the LCRC, Rustenburg testified in respect of the
Phokeng incident. He took photographs of the scene. He collected seven
spent cartridges and sent these for ballistics testing. He also took
photographs of the scene of the arrest at Luka and exhibits collected
there.

[10] Inspector Petrus Myburgh of the LCRC, Rustenburg testified about
the discovery of two motor vehicles, a Nissan van and a BMW as well as

the cash boxes found near these vehicles. These items were found
immediately after the robbery in the vicinity of the Phokeng scene. His
evidence prima facie indicated that the vehicles were stolen. Myburgh
further testified that he collected exhibits including two firearms at Luka.

[11] Mr Michael Kruger who was employed by FCMS, testified that
upon arrival at the Phokeng scene he recovered items belonging to his
employer. His evidence related to amounts stolen and recovered, the
firearm stolen during the Phokeng incident and to whom it had been
issued. He identified the revolver, exhibit 13, as well as certain cash
boxes and bags belonging to FCMS.

[12] Sergeant Petlele, who was attached to the Local Highway Patrol
Unit, testified that he and his colleague, Inspector Ntoagae reacted to
radio reports from a circling helicopter. They followed the direction of
the helicopter and were first on the scene at Luka. He arrested the first,
third, fourth and fifth appellants. He testified that the first appellant gave
him the name of the third appellant when asked to identify himself.
Petlele saw the fifth appellant rushing out of the main house at Luka to an
outside corrugated iron shack. He and Inspector Mosegu arrested that
appellant who was trying to kick his way out of the shack. They found
cash in his back pocket. He denied the appellant's version that he had
nothing to do with the charges and had been arrested for no apparent
reason in the surrounding area during a police swoop.

[13]  Petlele thereafter arrested the third appellant in the flatlet adjacent
to the main house under very suspicious circumstances. The appellant had
concealed himself under a bed and was not only lying on top of money
but some had been hidden in the front and in the legs of his trousers.

Assisted by Inspector Monageng and Inspector de Waal, he pulled the
appellant out of the room.  Petlele saw no-one planting money on the
third appellant.

[14] Petlele arrested the fourth appellant after receiving information
from members of the public. He and a colleague found the appellant on a
neighbouring premises in a long drop pit toilet kneeling behind the door.
A tracksuit top was immediately fished out of the toilet pit with ‘a lot of
money’ wrapped in it. At the time of his arrest, the appellant wore a T-
shirt and tracksuit trouser of the same colour and with the same
distinctive white stripe as on the tracksuit. He denied the appellant's
version that he was simply urinating and had no knowledge of the money
or the top. Petlele testified that the firearms were removed from the house
after the arrest of the appellants. He did not see anyone taking the
firearms into the house.

[15]  Inspector Mosegu testified that he was in the company of Insp More
and Petlele when the fifth appellant was arrested in the shack. He also
denied the appellant's version.

[16] Ms Moagi testified that she was inside the house when she saw an
unknown man. She locked the door and closed the window. Shortly
thereafter, she discovered that the door was open and noticed a takkie
track leading into the house. She surmised that the person must have
kicked the door open and entered. She could hear footsteps as if someone
was walking inside the ceiling. She called the police. Mr Nkosi, accused
5 was arrested by the police in the roof.

[17] Inspector De Waal, who was attached to the SAPS Dog Unit,
testified that on 18 November he and his partner Inspector Mogage
reacted to a radio alert from the helicopter and went to the scene at Luka.
They found several police officers including Petlele. Three suspects had
already been arrested. He went with Petlele to a certain house where they
found three persons, including the third appellant, hiding underneath a
bed. He had money hidden under his clothes and in his trouser legs.
When they took him outside to the other suspects and searched him, they
found more cash on him.

[18] After the arrest of the third appellant, De Waal joined Captain
Hechter and the team to search further. Bystanders pointed out a house to
which another suspect had allegedly gone. There, he assisted Hechter to
arrest the fifth accused who was hiding inside the ceiling in proximity to
money concealed in a peg bag and a pair of gloves. During cross-
examination De Waal denied an allegation that he had planted money on
any of the appellants and that he ever carried weapons into the house and
planted these on the appellants.

[19] Captain Hechter, who was with the Highway Patrol Unit,
corroborated De Waal's evidence in respect of the arrest of the fifth
accused. He was also present during the arrest of the fourth appellant,
who was found hiding inside the toilet. He was adamant that the appellant
never used the toilet. He corroborated Petlele's evidence in regard to the
fourth appellant's arrest, the discovery of the jacket and money in the
toilet pit and the fact that the jacket matched the pants worn by him. He
denied the planting of firearms on the scene or on the appellants.

[20] Inspector Monageng, who was attached to the Rustenburg CIS, was
in the company of Inspector Monamedi when they heard about the
robbery through radio control. Acting on information from members of
the public, he arrested the second appellant who was running in front of a
nearby house. Immediately after the arrest, he received a report from Mrs
Reetseng, the occupier of the house, that the suspect had in fact put a bag
into a tub containing clothes that she had been washing. He left the
second appellant with Monamedi to investigate. He retrieved the bag
which was soaked with water. He opened the bag in the presence of
Monamedi and the appellant and found that it contained cash.

[21] Monageng admitted making two statements on 2 December 2002
and 11 March 2004 respectively. These were admitted as exhibits S and T
respectively. According to him, reservist constable Moyo remained in the
car and was not involved in the arrest of the appellant.  He and Monamedi
had, before they heard about the robbery, by chance met Moyo and
offered him a lift to the police station. Soon thereafter, they received the
report about the robbery. He denied that Moyo had been involved or
knew of the planting of money or firearms even before the robbery at
Phokeng had happened.

[22]    Inspector Monageng was also involved in the arrest of the third
appellant. He corroborated the evidence of Petlele and De Waal.

[23]    Inspector Monamedi corroborated the evidence of Monageng with
regard to the arrest of the second appellant and the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the bag with money in the bath.

[24] Mrs Reetseng testified that she was at her home washing clothes in
a tub of water. She saw a man carrying a black bag running through her
yard. When she asked him why he was running, he replied that there was
shooting taking place. He disappeared behind her house. He appeared
later in the custody of the police but without the bag. She reported to the
police that the man had a bag and must have thrown it in the tub. The
police retrieved it. She was unable to identify the man. She corroborated
the evidence of Monageng and Monamedi about the arrest and the
discovery of the bag in a tub of water.

[25] Reservist constable Moyo testified that he was given a lift by
Monageng. En route they received a report about a robbery and
proceeded to the scene. He, however, remained in the vehicle throughout
and was not involved in the arrest and search of the suspects. He denied
the version of the third appellant. He knew nothing about the allegations
against him and denied ever meeting the appellant.

[26]   Inspector Ratseane, the investigating officer, testified to rebut the
allegations of corruption and embezzlement of cash by him or the other
officers. He denied being at the scene as he was on study leave.

[27] Inspector Blignaut, a ballistics expert made two statements:
exhibits W1, being the Mooinooi ballistic report and W2, the Phokeng
report. Blignaut identified exhibits 2, 8 and 10 fired at the Phokeng
incident as machine guns or rifles which had been found at the premises
at Luka. Exhibits 8 and 10 were also fired at the Mooinooi incident.

[28] I turn to deal with the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused.
As stated earlier, all denied committing the offences and raised alibi
defences.
[29]   The first appellant testified that he was a taxi owner. On 18
November he was approached by a friend Ndlazi, to transport him to
Rustenburg for a fee of R3000. He picked up Ndlazi and another
unknown man. During the journey more people boarded and eventually
the combi carried 15 passengers, all save for Ndlazi were unknown to
him. He could not say whether his co-accused were in the combi or not.
Nor did he pay attention to what they were carrying. At some stage
Ndlazi directed him to go to a certain township. Ndlazi and the group
alighted while he waited in the vehicle for Ndlazi. He was arrested by the
police. During cross-examination he conceded that his mandate grew as
they were travelling. He had never received his money from Ndlazi
despite the fact that he was on bail throughout the trial. His explanation
was that he could not trace Ndlazi. He further testified that he was not
assaulted by the police.

[30] The second appellant testified that he had gone to Luka to look for
a certain traditional healer's house. He enquired from one David about the
direction. Whilst walking together, they saw a helicopter hovering
overhead and the next moment David fled. He stood for a while under a
tree to establish what was happening.  Later he was approached by a
motor vehicle. Two persons emerged and pointed firearms at him. They
assaulted and arrested him. The police looked in vain for David. He heard
them placing something in the boot. He was taken to a place where he
met the other appellants for the first time that day. There he saw three
white men carrying bags and big firearms into the house. One of the

police officers placed cash in the trousers of the third appellant. The
police tortured him in the presence of Sergeant van der Merwe to sign a
document stating that one of the bags with money belonged to him. He
disputed the evidence of Mrs Reetseng.

[31] The third appellant, who stays in Rustenburg, testified that he went
to Luka on 18 November to visit his uncle Obed. They were in the
outside rooms chatting when Ndlazi and his builders arrived. He had
arranged with him to build a wall at his uncle's property. They had agreed
on a price of R4000 of which he had already paid Ndlazi a deposit of
R3000. They heard gun shots and ran inside the bedroom. They hid below
the windows to avoid being struck by stray bullets. The police came in
whilst they were lying down and arrested them. They were taken outside
where the third appellant met the other accused for the first time. While
lying on the ground, he saw three white policemen carrying firearms,
boxes and bags into the house. One of the policemen placed some of the
money in his trousers assisted by Petlele and an Indian policeman. He
was assaulted and ordered to sign a form which stated that the money had
been found on him. His cousin Itumeleng was also arrested.

[32] He testified that he met Moyo in the police cells and that Moyo had
told him that he had been present at the scene with Monageng; that Moyo
had seen two policemen placing money on him; that the police knew
about the Phokeng incident and had apprehended the actual robbers
earlier on the same day but released them and that the police had
appropriated the money recovered for themselves. According to the
appellant, Moyo refused to divulge the names of the policemen involved
for fear of reprisal. He requested the appellant not to divulge this
information to anyone as he, Moyo, would deny everything.

[33] During cross-examination the appellant changed his version.
Confronted by the absence of building materials at the scene, he said that
Ndlazi would not have commenced the building operations on that day as
he was still busy working elsewhere. He was, however, unable to explain
why Ndlazi had brought builders if no work was to be done. According to
him, three police officers entered the house twice, carrying three boxes, a
green box, a small green safe, 11 firearms and eight to ten bags. He
admitted that his cousin, Itumeleng, refused to testify on his behalf.

[34] The fourth appellant testified that on 18 November he left
Johannesburg for Rietspruit to meet a certain man known as Ramonso.
The appellant was selling his motor vehicle and Ramonso had arranged a
meeting with a prospective buyer. He did not find Ramonso but was
advised that he had gone to Mutaung General Dealer at Luka and would
wait for the appellant there. He proceeded to Luka.  On his way to the
store he needed to relieve himself and went into a certain house to use the
toilet. He was still busy urinating when the police arrived and arrested
him. He disputed the State's evidence of the finding of the jacket with
money in the toilet pit. He was taken to a certain house where he met the
other appellants for the first time. He was assaulted at the police station
and forced to sign a document admitting that money had been found on
him. He did not see any bags or firearms being carried into the house.
Ramonso and the person that had granted him permission to use the toilet
refused to testify on his behalf.

[35] Accused 5 did not lodge an appeal. He testified that he lived in
Mamelodi, Pretoria and had gone to Luka to buy a vehicle from a certain
Charles Molate. He was found by the police hiding in the ceiling of Ms

Moagi's house as he was afraid of being struck by stray bullets. He stated
that Hechter falsely implicated him and denied being in possession of the
peg bag.

[36] The fifth appellant testified that he operated a hair salon. On 18
November he left his home at Atteridgeville, Pretoria for Rustenburg by
taxi. He was on his way to Phokeng to meet one Christene to negotiate
the opening of a salon. Christene was, however, not home. He was
advised that she had gone to Luka and was provided with the address.  He
was walking along the road looking for it when he was stopped by two
men in a white vehicle. These people arrested him when he told them that
he stayed in Atteridgeville. He was taken to a house, where he met some
of his co-accused for the first time. He also saw the policemen carrying
bags and big firearms into the house and plant money on the third
appellant. He testified that he was taken to the police station with his co-
accused and that he was not assaulted. The police found an amount of
R60 in his possession which he acknowledged as his. They told him to
sign a document to that effect. He complied. He denied the charges
against him. During cross-examination he denied kicking his way out of
the shack or trying to escape. Christene was not prepared to testify on his
behalf.

[37] The trial judge found the appellants to be unsatisfactory witnesses.
He rejected their version on the basis that it was so improbable and
beyond belief that it could not reasonably be true when seen in the light
of the totality of the evidence. The judge concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to link the appellants to the Mooinooi incident and
the theft of the motor vehicles. They were all acquitted on the Mooinooi
charges. Regarding the Phokeng incident, the judge held that the

appellants had participated in the robbery and that they were in
possession of firearms and machine guns at the time. Regarding the first
appellant, whom the judge found to be the designated driver of the gang,
the judge held that he was aware of the presence of the machine guns. He
accordingly convicted the appellants in respect of the offences as
described in para 1 above.

[38] I propose to deal with the application for the special entries first. In
relation to each individual irregularity and the cumulative effect, the
appellants complained that they were deprived of a fair trial of which
protection both the common law and the constitution assured them.

[39] In deciding whether the appellants received a fair trial, each case
must be considered on its own facts. In Take and Save Trading CC &
others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd,1 Harms JA said:
'Everyone is entitled to a fair trial and that includes the right to a hearing before an
impartial adjudicator. This common-law right is now constitutionally entrenched.
Present a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judicial officer is duty bound to recuse
him or herself. The law in this regard is clear, having been the subject of recent
judgments of both this Court and the Constitutional Court, and does not require any
restatement. It is nevertheless convenient for present purposes to quote the following
extracts from a Constitutional Court judgment for purposes of emphasis and because
they are particularly germane to this case:
"The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to
persuasion by the evidence and submissions of counsel.
At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial Judge is a fundamental
prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or

1 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA) paras 2 – 4.

himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of the litigant for apprehending that
the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial."
That is one side of the coin. The other is this:
"A criminal trial is not a game where one side is entitled to claim the benefit of any
omission or mistake made by the other side, and a Judge's position in a criminal trial
is not merely that of an umpire to see that the rules of the game are observed by both
sides. A Judge is an administrator of justice, he is not merely a figure head, he has not
only to direct and control the proceedings according to recognised rules of procedure
but to see that justice is done." . . . .
Fairness of court proceedings requires of the trier to be actively involved in the
management of the trial, to control the proceedings, to ensure that public and private
resources are not wasted, to point out when evidence is irrelevant, and to refuse to
listen to irrelevant evidence. A supine approach towards litigation by judicial officers
is not justifiable either in terms of the fair trial requirement or in the context of
resources. . . .
A balancing act by the judicial officer is required because there is a thin dividing line
between managing a trial and getting involved in the fray. Should the line on occasion
be overstepped, it does not mean that a recusal has to follow or the proceedings have
to be set aside. If it is, the evidence can usually be reassessed on appeal, taking into
account the degree of the trial court's aberration. In any event, an appeal in medias res
in the event of a refusal to recuse, although legally permissible, is not available as a
matter of right and it is usually not the route to follow because the balance of
convenience more often than not requires that the case be brought to a conclusion at
the first level and the whole case then be appealed.'

[40]     I turn to consider the circumstances relating to the special entry in
this matter. Counsel for the appellant has provided 75 quotations from the
record which, he avers, support the contention that the trial judge behaved
in a biased, irregular and unfair manner during the trial. As indicated
above, the application for a special entry was launched after conviction
and sentence on behalf of the third, fourth and fifth appellants. The terms
of the entry were particularised as follows (I omit irrelevant material):

(a)
The court did not permit the third appellant to give evidence of all the
complaints which he had about the court's conduct of the trial. As a result of its ruling
the fourth and fifth appellants also did not give such evidence;
(b)
The court refused to allow full and/or reasonable cross-examination or unfairly
interrupted or curtailed cross-examination;
(c)
The court exceeded the limits of reasonable and fair questioning;
(d)
The court demonstrated bias in favour of the State;
(e)
The court unfairly harassed or adopted an unduly overbearing manner to
counsel for the defence in the presentation of his case;
(f)
The court unfairly and persistently allowed state counsel to put leading or
material questions to state witnesses and also did so himself;
(g)
The court failed to rule as inadmissible material documentary evidence
unfairly produced by the State during the trial;
(h)
The court unfairly prejudiced the case by describing the version which counsel
proposed to put to certain state witnesses;
(i)
The court did not permit proper re-examination of the accused.

[41] The trial judge did not deliver a considered judgment. According to
the record he said:
'One of the aspects mentioned is that I did not allow accused no 3 to give his
grievances. I put it to counsel more than once whether he wanted my recusal. Mr Paul
Shapiro [counsel for the accused concerned] refused to apply for my recusal, so it
therefore became irrelevant. Accordingly I find that this application is a misuse of
legal processes. I refuse to note a special entry as set out in exhibit CCC.'

[42] There is no dispute that objection was made to many of the
'irregularities' during the trial. On most occasions the objections were not
upheld. The record speaks for itself in this regard. Likewise the learned
judge invited counsel to bring an application for his recusal if his clients
were dissatisfied with his conduct of the trial. Counsel, however, declined
to do so. In many cases such as the present an election might fairly be

treated by the trial court or a court of appeal as dispositive of a right to
rely thereafter on irregularities. But in a long criminal trial for the
commencement of which the accused may have waited years, I think that
a court should be very slow to find that an election to pursue the trial to
its conclusion in the face of harassment or other unfair conduct of the
court, without applying for recusal, is consistent only with a waiver of the
rights of the accused to raise such irregularities by means of special entry
or in any other permissible form. Were it otherwise, the effect would be
to allow the unfairness to prevail in the face of a clear constitutional right
to the contrary. Moreover, if an irregularity of itself or cumulatively with
other irregularities, is such as to render the trial unfair it would, in my
view, be against public policy to uphold any election amounting to a
waiver of an accused's right to rely on such unfairness.

[43] That being so, and the trial in question possessing the
characteristics I have identified, I am of the view that the learned judge
should have looked beyond the refusal to apply for his recusal as a
ground to answer the application.

[44] The grounds open to a trial judge in refusing to note a special entry
are restricted: that the application is not made bona fide or that it is
frivolous or absurd or that the granting of the application would be an
abuse of the process of the court. There is a further ground not expressly
mentioned in s 317(1) but inherent in the section: when the irregularity
appears from the record itself the special entry procedure, whilst
convenient, may be unnecessary because of the wide powers of appeal
enjoyed by the SCA in terms of s 316 of the Act.2

2 S v Nkata  & others 1990 (4) SA 250 (A) at 256H.

[45] In an application for leave to appeal against the refusal to note a
special entry, it is necessary for an applicant to show a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal whether the irregularity appears ex facie the
record or not.3

[46] Even if the court considers that the trial of the appellants was
rendered unfair by the presence of an irregularity that is not enough to
vitiate the proceedings unless the irregularity is per se such as to have that
effect or there has been a failure of justice in that the evidence (and
credibility findings, if any) unaffected by the irregularity was insufficient
to prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4 In the last mentioned
regard, s 322(1) of the Act, it seems to me, provides a reasonable and
justifiable limitation on the constitutional right to a fair trial. No argument
was addressed to us on this matter but counsel did not submit otherwise.
The Constitutional Court has held that the meaning of the concept  'failure
of justice' in s 322(1), must be understood to raise the question whether
the alleged irregularity stated in the special entry has led to an unfair
trial.5
[47] I deal now with certain of the individual grounds of irregularity
which were raised in the application. It will be necessary in certain
instances to set out the relevant extract from the record:
(a)
The refusal to allow accused 3 to give evidence about his
complaints concerning the conduct of the trial judge.
The relevant passage appears towards the end of the evidence-in-chief of
the third appellant. For convenience of understanding I set it out in full:

3At 256I - 257C.
4At 257D-F.
5S v Jaipal 2005 (1) SACR 215 (CC) para 39.

'Examination by Mr Shapiro (continued): Right, now Mr Makgaba, there are certain
observations which you made to me and which you said you wish to place on record.
Can you do that now, please? ─ Well we heard here in court that the presiding officer,
the judge, provided the transcripts of the trial, we then made a request that
photocopies of the transcript be made available to our legal representative. We also
requested the legal representatives to make such transcripts available to us. From the
transcripts we observed that many issues came up, we realised that the judge who is
presiding over our case is siding with the prosecution, he is against us.
Court: Mr Shapiro, where is this going to? Are you lodging [indistinct].
Mr Shapiro: That is what they say.
Court: Are you lodging an application for my recusal?
Mr Shapiro: No, M'Lord, I am [intervenes].
Court: Then I am not prepared to listen to this any further. An issue lodge
[intervenes].
Mr Shapiro:
M'Lord, these people have given me . . . , they give me notes, I cannot
tell you, and they said they wanted to place it on record, I said to them there is a
special procedure which we can add on, we can make an entry if you want afterwards,
but they say they want to place it on record, it is this accused and there is another
accused, and they said they want to place this; these are these observations. I do not
know, M'Lord.
Court:  I am just asking you, you are not making an application for my recusal?
Mr Shapiro: No, certainly not.
Court: Thank you. Yes, then you can go on ─ There are some numerous examples
which I can quote to proof this point, but I will not be able to able to proof all of them.
At the beginning of the trial the judge asked  Mr Shapiro whether the defence case  is
. . .  whether the police knew about the robbery and whether they took the money and
the firearms and tried to dump them on the accused before court. Mr Shapiro
responded by saying that yes, that is the defence case, the judge says that does not

make sense. That was an indication to us that the judge has already decided on this
matter before it even started. We are not happy about that fact. In support of that fact,
the judge told Mr Shapiro on many occasions that "you are wasting my time" and he
mentioned or uttered those words on numerous occasions, and that happened each
time Mr Shapiro was cross-examining a witness who found it difficult to can answer
or respond to the question. The other reason was that the judge was also shouting and
he was also harsh. Besides that there are numerous other [indistinct] and I cannot
mention them all.
Is there anything else? – There are numerous other examples but I cannot mention
them all. Yes there is something else. Mr Shapiro complained that Mr De Meillon is
giving the statements to him, new statements as the case is proceeding and the judge
said there was nothing he can do. At the stage when Mr De Meillon wanted to give
Mr Shapiro new statements the judge interfered and said Mr De Meillon must first
give those statements to the court. I do not know for what reason must statements be
first given to the court before they are given to Mr Shapiro. Mr Shapiro must be the
first to see the statements before the court sees the statements, so that if there is a
mistake he can be in a position to can help the court. Another example in support of
that fact, when Mr Shapiro was questioning Mr Monageng about the arrest of accused
2, the court of the judge appeared to be impatient, at certain times Mr Shapiro
objected or complained about that.
[Court] Listen Mr Shapiro, if you are not going to apply for recusal [intervenes].
Mr Shapiro: I am not, M'Lord.
Court: I am going to stop this evidence at this point. If it is . . . . [intervenes].
Mr Shapiro: [indistinct] the accused, M'Lord.
Court:    Well, then I am not going to listen to this any further.
Mr Shapiro:   I want the matter to be absolutely clear.
Court:    Yes, Anything on the merits further, Mr Shapiro?'

[48] It appears that the learned judge properly allowed some leeway in
order to ensure that he understood the nature and direction of the
evidence. He was, in my view, right to rule against its continuation. The
evidence which an accused person may give during a trial may be
directed at the merits of the charge against him or her or towards
mitigation of sentence. In either event a judge has a duty to take any
evidence which bears on those issues and he or she will be wise to
exercise a measure of leniency in determining the proper limits. But if the
sole purpose is to draw attention to matters already apparent ex facie the
record such evidence is superfluous and irrelevant. If, in addition, the
merits of the defence are not implicated, then evidence is likewise,
irrelevant to the question which the court is required to judge. But if it
nevertheless needs to be said, the accused's evidence is neither the place
nor the time to say it, nor is it the correct means of placing it before the
court. If counsel deems a recusal application inappropriate, the procedure
for a special entry is open to him. All these considerations apply to the
first alleged irregularity. The refusal to allow the evidence of irregularity,
did not impinge on the fairness of the trial and no failure of justice flowed
from it.
(b)  The refusal to allow full or reasonable cross-examination; the unfair
interruption or curtailment of cross-examination.

[49]   The principles underpinning the freedom of cross-examination of
witnesses are well established.6 Counsel for the appellant submitted that
the learned judge:
(a)
Persistently and unfairly interrupted counsel's cross-examination;

6 See R v Amod & another 1958 (2) SA 658 (N) at 661.

(b)
often the interruptions were made in what can only be described,
with respect, as an 'extremely rude, confrontational and off-putting
manner';
(c)
'answered questions' put to State witnesses in cross-examination by
unfairly and irregularly interrupting cross-examination and by way of
'blatantly leading questions'.
[50] I readily accept that the record shows that the judge was on
occasion impatient and abrupt. But it is even clearer that he was closely
attentive to the questions put by counsel and determined to ensure that he
clearly understood the purpose. To this end, the judge asked questions in
clarification on frequent occasions. Many of the illustrations relied on by
counsel arise from such occasions. A quotation from counsel's heads of
argument will serve as an example of the pettiness and the irrelevance of
many such complaints.
'The eighth quotation revolves around the following: the second appellant's defence
was that he was standing under a tree alongside the road and the car in which the
witness who he believes arrested him was travelling, almost ran him over. The
following exchange in regard to this occurs:
Court – Is the tree in the gravel road?
Counsel – Yes.
Court – In the centre of the gravel road or where? Or next to the gravel road.
Counsel – It is alongside the gravel road, yes. He was standing under the tree.
Court – I understand that but I am asking you is your instructions that the tree is in the
gravel road?

Viiib – Given the previous answer by counsel to the court's question, with respect this
surely amounts to pure harassment.
lxa – The ninth quotation – counsel: Would you agree that there was a gravel road
running past the house?
lxb – Once again the court with respect unfairly interrupts the cross-examination.
Court – Let us put it this way, forget the gravel. Is there a road next to this house.
Counsel: M'Lord, he was going to answer me. I wanted that answer.
lxc – The learned judge with respect is unfairly undermining the cross-examination
and defeating its purpose.'

[51]   In this context the learned judge was inclined to make comments to
counsel such as 'You are really wasting my time' or similar expressions of
impatience. For example, counsel introduced two statements by Inspector
Monageng, exhibits S and T. He had initially stated that he had found
three suspects at the premises and arrested them. In the second statement
he changed the number to two. During the exchange the judge
commented that counsel was wasting his time:
'Mr Shapiro: Now let me ask you the question. When did you amend this affidavit by
changing three to two? ─ During the time whilst I was busy writing the statement.'
Mr Shapiro did not pursue this line of questioning but moved on to the
next aspect, after having sought that these statements be admitted. The
judge then said:
'Court:  You have now handed up exhibits S and T.
Mr Shapiro: Yes.
Court:  You did not ask the witness a single thing on exhibit T. You have asked him
some questions in respect of aspects which he did not testify to in his evidence-in-
chief as far as exhibit S is concerned. Why did you ask me to take these exhibits into
the record?

Mr Shapiro: Because in exhibit T there was a statement there that the, a suspect was
spotted by the helicopter and I was going to ask that and then I thought better of it.
Court: Please, Mr Shapiro, in future, do not overload the record with unnecessary
documentation. If there is no reason for handing in a statement, I do not want
statements handed in.'
The remark by the judge was, in my view, appropriate under the
circumstances.

[52] Counsel described such remarks as 'rude, off-putting, disconcerting
and blatantly unfair'. What must be borne in mind is that the counsel in
question has behind him many years in practice, he is no shrinking violet,
and the record provides no evidence that his cross-examination was
adversely affected or curtailed by the attitude of the court. In fairness to
the judge, he was also pushed to the limit by counsel's apparent lack of
insight into relevance and his failure to understand the operation of the
hearsay rule. The record indicates much jostling and repartee between the
judge and counsel. Although the judge may have been hasty and was
troubled by counsel's antics, he was very reasonable with him. The
judge's approach was to ensure that essential issues remained succinct.
Collateral or irrelevant issues were excluded and repetitive evidence was
curtailed.

[53] A further example of counsel's seeming obtuseness may be seen in
the following: in order to establish contradictions counsel made much in
cross-examination of statements of witnesses furnished by the
prosecution  (often with little regard to materiality). The judge told him to
hand the statements in without the necessity of reading each into the
record (a common and acceptable practice) and he said he would read
them himself. Later when counsel attempted to put in statements, the
judge said:

'No, no. In my court I do not take cognisance of statements not put to the witness and
which he has not had an opportunity to explain.'
Counsel’s response was that the court had told him that he did not need to
waste its time by reading it:
'You told me that specifically, you are going to take cognisance of what is in the
statement. The judge then said In future I want an explanation from you when you
want to put a statement to a witness on what basis you want to put the statement in.'

[54]    Counsel described this ruling as ‘blatantly unfair and irregular.’ I
consider it neither: it was a fair response to such obtuseness as counsel
plainly did not appreciate the elementary difference between the
unnecessary recitation of the full contents of a statement and the essential
requirement of taking up with a witness in cross-examination those
aspects of the statement upon which counsel would rely to criticise the
witness. The record shows that the judge never informed counsel that the
judge would himself seek out such contradictions.

[55]    Counsel cited as a further example of unfairness in interrupting his
cross-examination a question by the judge:
'Where are you going now?'
This was said to be 'restricting the latitude of cross-examination, securely
muzzling counsel', 'creating an atmosphere of friction', 'harassing counsel
and diverting counsel from the point he was pursuing'. This is all
posturing. The point of counsel’s questions (relating to the fact that the
helicopter landed in a large open field) was entirely obscure. The question
was reasonable. The reply (to the defence case) did not as the court
remarked, 'make sense' but counsel was nevertheless permitted to pursue
this line (without noticeable advantage to his clients) of questioning.

[56]    A further example of an objection of a different kind is as follows:
'The witness Petlele says: "The men referred to that entered into the shack were at
that stage uncontrollable."
Counsel:  You see according to the police they had enough weapons there to start a
small war and yet none of them seems to have fired any shots.'
At that stage the court interrupts the cross-examination to say
'Isn’t  that argument?'

[57]   Counsel described his approach as 'perfectly legitimate cross-
examination' and the defence was muzzled by the interruption. I have no
doubt the judge was right. There was no dispute that many firearms were
found at the scene but that none was fired. It was not appropriate for this
witness to speculate as to why that was so, but for counsel to raise at the
end of the trial if the evidence merited the drawing of an inference.
Counsel did not explain to this court what advantage he could have
obtained had the question been pursued. In fact counsel did not even
debate the validity of the judge’s question to him. Els J did not however
leave the matter there but asked the witness pertinently:
'Did they have any arms at that stage? Weapons?'
The reply was:
'No, they did not.'
This highlights the lack of substance in allowing the line of cross-
examination; the reply was also not in conflict with the evidence of any of
the accused.
(c)  Mr Shapiro was threatened by the judge

[58] Counsel for the defence put the proposition that State counsel was
involved in illegally paying witnesses to testify against the accused. This

was in terms of his instructions, albeit no evidence was tendered to
support such a proposition. The judge then said:
'You must not make insinuations unless you have a basis therefor, regardless what
your instructions are. Are you suggesting that Mr De Meillon is involved in this
conspiracy? Are you making that suggestion? I want that specifically put on record.
Are you suggesting Mr De Meillon is instigating witnesses to give false evidence so
that he could implicate the accused? Is that what you are saying?
Mr Shapiro: I am not going that far but I say I am . . . (intervenes)
Court: But that is what you insinuated Mr Shapiro, you insinuated by your questions
and it is a dangerous insinuation to make and I would suggest that Mr De Meillon
takes this matter further.'

[59] Counsel for the defence contended that the judge's conduct was
improper when he threatened him. This submission cannot in my view
prevail. Counsel for the appellant did not have a basis to put that
allegation. He did not have the facts from Itumeleng, said to be the
source, who refused to testify. The defence thus had no factual basis for
implicating and accusing counsel for the State of conspiracy. In the result,
the judge was justified to be upset with Mr Shapiro.

(d) The court failed to rule as inadmissible material documentary
evidence unfairly produced by the State during the trial.

[60]    The State produced statements of witnesses during the course of
the trial which had not previously been made available to the defence.
These included one by Petlele and two by a ballistics expert. Counsel
objected, for obvious and acceptable reasons his clients did not want to
delay the trial by further postponements. It is clear from the record that
the judge was not averse to accommodating counsel to a lesser extent. He
was however not prepared to exclude reliance on the evidence. The

interests of justice required a balance to be struck. Counsel, however,
made no attempt to compromise but simply applied for special entries to
be noted against reliance on the evidence. But the irregularity did not
reside in that ruling but rather in the failure to afford the defence adequate
chance to prepare (if such was the effect), an opportunity which the
defence did not itself seek.

[61]    I do not feel it necessary to multiply examples of the passages said
to evidence irregularities. I have read and considered every passage in the
context in which it appears together with counsel’s submissions. In many
instances the last-mentioned are backed up by affidavits of the appellants
who voice their shock, surprise, disgust, disillusionment and despair at
what they describe as rude, unfair, biased, aggressive and interventionist
behaviour of the trial judge. As is apparent from the few representative
examples to which I have referred, many of the ‘irregularities’ were not
such as to sustain the pejorative colour that counsel and the appellants
seek to attach to them. I am satisfied that the learned judge was not biased
against the accused nor was his conduct of the proceedings such as to
provoke a suspicion of bias. The record seen in its totality contains many
instances where counsel was given his head without interruption; when he
was interrupted or stopped, there were acceptable grounds for doing so.

[62] To the extent the judge expressed incredulity at the substance of
the defence, the comment was probably unnecessary but it was entirely
provisional in context, not unjustified and it was as well that counsel be
aware of the problem. When it came to the final assessment of the
probabilities the judge demonstrated an ability to conduct an objective
analysis which depended on the facts. That he applied his mind to the real
issues is borne out by the fact that in the end he acquitted the appellants

on the majority of the charges. He treated the first appellant differently
from the others. In my view, this is the hallmark of an open mind. It is
evident that the judge weighed and evaluated all the evidence. His
judgment, despite the problems alluded to, reflects a fair balance.
Nor do I find reason to uphold counsel’s contention that he was deterred
from pursuing relevant lines of cross-examination by any intervention
from the court. The judge’s brusqueness with counsel may have exceeded
what was strictly necessary on a few occasions, but I find nothing on the
record to suggest that his impatience reflected on the accused themselves
or the merits of their defence.

[63]     I will however assume, hypothetically, that the judge had not
interrupted counsel or cut short his cross-examination in any respect, and
that the witnesses had been left to their own devices rather than assisted
by leading questions. Would the outcome of the trial still have been the
same, ie, a finding beyond a reasonable doubt?

[64]    I have no doubt it would. The grossly improbable substance of the
overall defence would have been no wit altered or enhanced. The
individual lack of credibility attaching to each accused would have
remained. Nothing that counsel could or would have put to the witnesses
could have changed certain controlling realities: the presence of each in
the same place without an acceptable explanation for their association;
their close proximity to money and arms which three hours previously
were taken from or used in the Phokeng robbery; and the circumstances
of the arrest of each of the appellants. Unless there was a reasonable
possibility at the end of the case that the police had deliberately and
collusively framed the accused, a conviction inevitably had to follow. No
amount of unimpeded cross-examination of state witnesses, or indeed of

calling witnesses which the State left out of its selection would
realistically have conduced to that end.

[65] That being so, even allowing the existence of the irregularities
(other than bias which can be ruled out), no failure of justice occurred and
the reliance on the irregularities cannot succeed. It cannot be that the
appellants' contention is that the acquittals were unfair or resulted in a
failure of justice or were not according to law. The appeal based on the
alleged irregularities set forth in the special entry must fail. There is
accordingly no basis to set the proceedings of the court below aside.

[66] The next leg of the enquiry relates to the appeal against conviction
based on the merits. Counsel inter alia, submitted that the court a quo
misdirected itself when it failed to draw an adverse inference against the
State for not calling certain witnesses and for admitting hearsay evidence.
He also contended that the court had misdirected itself when evaluating
the evidence.

[67] In regard to the first ground, he submitted that Insp Ngquko should
have testified to rebut the allegations of conspiracy, despite the fact that
Itumeleng, the alleged source of such information, had refused to testify.
In my view, this contention is ill-founded. The questions that have to be
asked is what worth did this allegation carry if the source did not testify?
How does the evidence become admissible if Itumeleng does not testify?
The answer is obvious – no weight can be attached to such an allegation.
It is trite that the State or defence cannot be expected to rebut allegations
which have no basis. There was no need for Insp Ngquko to testify if
there was no evidence to rebut. Absent the evidence of Itumeleng, the
veracity of the allegations cannot be determined.

[68] Counsel submitted that More who had arrested the fifth appellant,
Supt Diale who took charge of the scene where the appellants were
arrested and Insp Mailate who had received the bag with money should
have testified to either rebut the allegations of conspiracy or corroborate
the evidence of other State witnesses.

[69] More did not feature on the list of witnesses and therefore the
defence could have called him if they wanted to. More was assisted by
Petlele and Mosengu and these witnesses testified about the fifth
appellant's arrest. It was therefore not necessary to call More to repeat the
evidence relating to the arrest of the appellant. It has to be borne in mind
that the State is entitled to decide which witnesses are necessary to be
called. An adverse inference can only be drawn if there is some reason to
believe that the witness who has not been called could contradict the
State's case in that regard. In this case the calling of additional witnesses
is undermined by the defence version. There is no possibility that the
witnesses who were not called would sustain the defence version.

[70] It was further submitted that the police officer depicted in exhibit H
at photo 49 should have testified to explain what he was doing when the
photograph was taken. In my view the failure of this officer to testify is
not fatal to the State case. It is obvious that he was merely illustrating the
presence of money in the pocket. The cash had been slightly pulled out of
the pocket to enable the photographer to take a photo thereof. That is not
uncommon conduct nor is it irregular. The failure to call the police officer
concerned does not warrant a finding of an adverse inference against the
State.

[71] Counsel further contended that the police had no information about
the whereabouts of the suspects save for the existence of a white combi.
He argued that the evidence of the officials in the helicopter was crucial
as any information recorded by the police on the ground from the
helicopter was hearsay. This submission is without substance. Petlele
testified that the helicopter led them to the white combi and that they
followed the direction of the helicopter. He never said that these officials
told him anything. He made his personal observations and effected the
arrests. Monageng also testified that the helicopter led them to the
accused. That in my view is not hearsay evidence. It is a fact and does not
prove the truth of whatever Monageng or Petlele was told from the air.

[72] In regard to the second ground, counsel submitted that the judge
misdirected himself when he readily accepted the evidence of the State
witnesses and  in particular, the evidence of  Moyo, Petlele, Monageng,
Mrs Reetseng and Blignaut and that he erred when he rejected the
appellants' version. The correct approach is to consider the evidence
holistically, weigh up all the elements which point towards the guilt of
the accused against all those which are indicative of his innocence, taking
proper account of inherent strengths and weaknesses, probabilities and
improbabilities on both sides and having done so, to decide whether the
balance weighs so heavily in favour of the State as to exclude any
reasonable doubt about an accused's guilt.7 The court must look at the
reliability and credibility of the witnesses and consider if any of them had
a motive to falsely implicate the appellants.

7 S v Chabalala  2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA) para 15.

[73] Counsel submitted that the judge should have been critical of
Moyo's motives when he attended court on numerous days when he was
not required to do so. There is nothing strange in Moyo's conduct. He had
not made a witness statement and was called without prior consultation
by the State to rebut the allegations. He denied any knowledge under oath
of the allegation of conspiracy. In the absence of a previous statement, it
is far-fetched to suggest that Moyo changed his version when he testified.

[74] In regard to Petlele it was contended that he supplemented his
statement and only mentioned the fact that some money was found in the
jacket pocket in the second statement. In S v Bruinders & 'n ander8 the
court held:
'In order to discredit a State witness on the basis of his affidavit, it was still necessary
that there had to be a material deviation by the witness from his affidavit, before any
negative inference could be drawn. The purpose of an affidavit was to obtain the
details of an offence, so that it could be decided whether a prosecution should be
instituted against the accused. It was not the purpose of such an affidavit to anticipate
the witness's evidence in court, and it was absurd to expect of a witness to furnish
precisely the same account in his statement as he would in his evidence in open court.'

[75] There is no material discrepancy between the two statements.
These are just statements made at different times. The court must
consider Petlele's independent observation. What matters is what he saw
at the scene and his reliability as a witness. Hechter corroborated Petlele's
evidence in regard to the discovery of the jacket. In my view no improper
motive can be attributed to Petlele for failing to mention this aspect in his
first statement. In regard to Monageng, counsel for the appellant argued
that Monageng never mentioned in his statement that the second appellant
was running. It later transpired that counsel was in fact misleading the

8 1998 (2) SACR 432 (E) at 434i-j. See also S v Mafaladiso & andere 2003 (1) SACR 583 (SCA).

court as the reading of the statement revealed that Monageng had in fact
mentioned this aspect.

[76] Counsel submitted that no reliance could be placed on Mrs
Reetseng’s testimony because she never saw the second appellant
dropping the bag in the water. I do not agree with this submission. Mrs
Reetseng was an independent witness who had seen the appellant
proceeding towards the bath carrying a bag. She later saw him in the
custody of the police without the bag. This was subsequently retrieved by
the police from the bath. Mrs Reetseng was washing the clothes and
never had a bag in her possession. The question to be asked is how the
bag ended up in the bath? What other inference could be drawn from the
facts but that it was put there by the second appellant when he realised
that the police were chasing him and that he did so to get rid of the
incriminating evidence.

[77] Counsel further argued that the evidence of Blignaut should have
been rejected as the seal in regard to the exhibits found at Luka and
Phokeng was unreadable. This argument has no merit and is rejected. It
has to be borne in mind that the purpose of the seal is to provide clear
evidence that the exhibits were not tampered with. The case reference
number (CAS) of the police station, on the other hand, identifies the place
where the exhibits came from and this was legible. The evidence of
Blignaut was that the bullets came from the guns used at the scene. In any
event the defence version was that they had no knowledge of the source
of the firearms as they had been planted on them.

[78]  In the result there is nothing exaggerated in the evidence of these
witnesses. No valid criticism can be levelled at them. The trial court did

not commit any misdirection when it accepted the evidence of the State
witnesses. There is accordingly no basis to reject same.

[79] Turning to the defence version, I am of the view that the alibi
defences were flawed and were correctly rejected. The first appellant had
not proffered an exculpatory explanation to the police at the time of his
arrest at Luka. It was submitted that the judge erred in drawing an adverse
inference against the first appellant for his failure to disclose an alibi prior
to the trial. The right to remain silent is a right that is constitutionally
protected. In S v Thebus & another,9 Goldstone J et O'Regan J:
'An accused person needs to understand the consequences of remaining silent. If the
warning does not inform the accused that remaining silent may have adverse
consequences for the accused, the right to silence as understood in our Constitution
will be breached.
Moreover, in many cases, the fact of the warning itself will render the silence by the
accused ambiguous. It will not be clear whether the accused remained silent because
he or she is relying on the right to remain silent, or for another reason, whether
legitimate or not. To the extent that the silence is ambiguous, of course, it will have
little value in the process of inferential reasoning, especially where the guilt must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'

[80] The argument does not take the appellant's case any further because
his alibi is patently false and highly improbable. He wishes the court to
believe that he went to Luka from Tsakane, Brakpan on business, yet
never received his fee of R3000 even after his release on bail.  It is highly
unlikely and improbable that a taxi owner would not ensure payment for
the trip and allow himself to be led around collecting unplanned for
passengers. He pretended not to know his co-accused, yet provided a false
name to Petlele upon his arrest, which turned out to be the third

9 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC) paras 87 - 88.

appellant's name. It is significant that he would have known the third
appellant's name when he had never met him before their arrest. The only
inference that can be drawn is that the first appellant was part of the
planning of the Phokeng robbery.

[81]  The third appellant's version about the building of the wall did not
make sense. Initially, these people had arrived to commence the building
operations. When confronted about the absence of building material, he
changed his version and stated that Ndlazi who co-incidentally had been
brought there by the first appellant, had come to discuss certain issues
with him. If he had come to discuss some issues, why would he bring ten
builders along? Furthermore he had paid Ndlazi who had 10 or more
builders a sum of R4000 from which Ndlazi would have to pay the first
appellant R3000. This would have left Ndlazi with a paltry R1000 for his
profit and to pay his workers.

[82] The other appellants went to Luka to meet certain persons. The
second appellant went to Luka to meet a traditional healer. The fourth
appellant also travelled from Johannesburg to meet Ramonso about a
possible sale of his vehicle. Ramonso decided not to wait for him but
went to Luka. The fifth appellant travelled from Pretoria to meet
Christene. She too did not to wait for him but went to Luka. Accused 5
also went to Luka to meet Charles to buy a vehicle. The meetings never
materialised.  All the appellants, for some strange reasons went to Luka
on the day of the incident. The question to be asked is was it a mere co-
incidence that the appellants happened to be there? In my view, it would
be a remarkable co-incidence if they were not involved in the robbery.
The linking of the second appellant to the wet bag with money is
conclusive evidence that he participated in the Phokeng robbery.

[83]    All the defence witnesses refused to testify and no explanation was
given therefor. One does not know what they would have told the court.
Would they have corroborated the appellants' version or given a totally
different version? One can only assume, in the absence of any other
explanation that they would not have supported the appellants.

[84] The defence version, in my view, does not make sense and is
highly improbable. There was no need for the police to seek other persons
to falsely accuse them of the robbery. They could have appropriated the
money and charged the real robbers. To plan and execute the framing of
innocent persons with cash and exhibits in broad daylight within three
hours of the robbery in Phokeng is if not impossible, at least unlikely in a
high degree. Not only would all the police participants, who came from
different units, have to agree, they would have had to plan and prepare for
a future uncertain event and be at the right place simultaneously when the
robbery and the arrests were carried out. Members of the public and
independent witnesses like Mrs Reetseng and Ms Moagi would have had
to be removed or convinced that what they witnessed was something else.
It is equally strange that the police who were, according to the appellants,
hell-bent on falsely implicating the appellants, treated the first and fifth
appellants differently from the others. They did not assault them nor did
they plant any money on them.

[85] In my view, there was overwhelming evidence against the
appellants in regard to the commission of the offences at Phokeng.
Their version is not supported by any objective facts and is highly
improbable. The proven facts lead to only one reasonable inference that
the appellants were involved in the armed robbery at Phokeng. They were

thus correctly convicted. It follows that the appeal against the convictions
must fail.

[86] It therefore remains for me to consider the appeal against sentence.
The imposition of sentence is a matter falling pre-eminently within the
judicial discretion of the trial court. The test for interference by an appeal
court is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is vitiated by
irregularity or misdirection or is disturbingly inappropriate.10 The trial
court imposed the following sentence in respect of the first appellant:
(a)
21 years' imprisonment for robbery; and
(b)
15 years' imprisonment for the unlawful possession of machine
guns.
The court took into account the cumulative effect of such sentences and
accordingly ordered a period of ten years to run concurrently with the
sentence in respect of the robbery charge. The effective sentence is thus
26 years' imprisonment.

[87] The other appellants were sentenced as follows:
(a)
The court treated the charges of robbery and malicious injury to
property as one and imposed a period of 23 years' imprisonment.
(b)
15 years' imprisonment in regard to the unlawful possession of
machine guns; and
(c)
5 years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of ammunition.
The court ordered a period of eight years in respect of the conviction for
unlawful possession of machine guns to run concurrently with the
sentence imposed for robbery. They were thus sentenced to an effective
term of 35 years' imprisonment.

10 Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 (1) SACR 243 (SCA)  para 10.

[88] Part II of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997 prescribes in the case of first offenders, a minimum sentence of 15
years' imprisonment for certain offences, inter alia, robbery with
aggravating circumstances and unlawful possession of machine guns or
rifles. A court may impose a lesser sentence if there are substantial and
compelling circumstances. The court a quo correctly found such
circumstances did not exist in this case. It further held that the minimum
sentence was, in view of the seriousness and aggravating nature of the
offences, too lenient and accordingly imposed the sentences referred to in
paras 86 and 87 above.

[89] Counsel submitted that the court a quo had misdirected itself and
that it did not pay due regard to the element of mercy and the
rehabilitative effect of the sentence and in the end imposed a sentence
that was excessive. This submission cannot prevail. This was an armed
robbery which was extremely dangerous. It involved a gang of robbers
using two automatic rifles and machine guns. They struck the armoured
vehicle from the rear and shots were fired causing the vehicle to overturn.
Their purpose was to bring the vehicle to a stop at all costs and they did
not care about the safety of the occupants. They cut the vehicle open and
fled with the money. These are aggravating factors which the trial court
took into account when considering the appropriate sentence.

[90] In the result I can find no misdirection by the trial court. The
sentences imposed are commensurate with the seriousness of the
offences, the circumstances of the appellants as well as the interests of
society. The court further took into account the cumulative effect of the
sentences and in the result ordered part of the sentence to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in respect of the robbery count.

There is accordingly no basis for this court to interfere.  In the result the
appeal against sentence also fails.

[91] It is necessary to refer to an aspect arising from the record on
appeal and in particular the heads of argument. There is a disturbing trend
concerning the heads of argument in this court. The provisions of rule
10(3) of this court provide:
'(a)
The heads of argument shall be clear, succinct and without unnecessary
elaboration;
(b)
The heads of argument shall not contain lengthy quotations from the record or
authorities.
(c)
References to authorities and the record shall not be general but to specific
pages and paragraphs.
(d)(i) The heads of argument of the appellant shall, if appropriate to the appeal, be
accompanied by a chronology table, duly cross-referenced, without argument.'

[92] In Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars (Pty)
Ltd11 Harms JA said:
'There also appears to be a misconception about the function and form of heads of
argument. The Rules of this Court require the filing of main heads of argument. The
operative words are "main", "heads" and "argument". "Main" refers to the most
important part of the argument. "Heads" means "points", not a dissertation. Lastly,
"argument" involves a process of reasoning which must be set out in the heads. A
recital of the facts and quotations from authorities do not amount to argument.'
There is no reason why the practice in criminal appeals should be treated
any differently.

[93] It has become an undesirable practice for the parties not to give due
consideration to the rule relating to the composition of the record on
appeal. The rule has been ignored in this case as voluminous heads of

11 1998 (3) SA 938 (SCA) para 37.

argument were filed. The appellants' heads of argument consist of three
volumes of 281 pages. We were also burdened with the notice of motion
and heads of argument in respect of the application for leave to appeal
before Sapire AJ, three volumes of supplementary heads of argument as
well as an application for an amendment of the heads of argument, all of
them unnecessary. The documents exceeded 900 pages. This court has
repeatedly admonished parties against the inclusion of unnecessary
documents in appeal records.

[94] Counsel for the appellant protested his ignorance when we raised
the issue and referred him to the relevant rule. That was an insufficient
response. In the circumstances, I intend making an appropriate costs order
to show our disapproval with this conduct.

[95] In the result the following order is made:
1.
The appeal against the convictions and sentences is dismissed.
2.
The legal representatives of the appellants are disallowed from
recovering any costs relating to:
(a)
the heads of argument in the appeal in so far as such exceeded 60
pages;
(b)
the application to amend the heads of argument;
(c)
the settling of the affidavits of the appellants (and any consultations
related thereto) filed in support of the application referred to in (b); and
(d)
the transcript of the argument before Sapire AJ.

_______________

N Z MHLANTLA

JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For Appellant:

P I Shapiro

P I Shapiro, Pretoria

Giorgi & Gerber Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For Respondent:

A R de Meillon

Director of Public Prosecutions,

Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal

Date:
1 April 2010

Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media
and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

MERVYN DE VOS v THE STATE

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) today upheld an appeal against two
convictions of attempted murder and an effective sentence of 10 years’
imprisonment that the Northern Cape High Court, sitting as a court of appeal,
had imposed on Mr Mervyn de Vos. The high court had upheld the convictions
by a regional magistrate but increased the sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment
he had imposed on the ground that the punishment was too lenient. De Vos
appealed to the SCA against his convictions.

The charges arose from an incident that happened in the early hours of
Sunday, 17 July 2005, at nightclub in Kimberly known as ‘Squeezas’, when
De Vos fired a single shot from his firearm. The shot struck Mr Gavin
Sylvester, who was employed as a ‘bouncer’ at the club, in the face –
permanently blinding him. The bullet struck Mr Samuel Serata in his right leg
after hitting Sylvester.

In a unanimous judgment the court upheld De Vos’s claim that he fired at
Sylvester, at close-range, in self-defence to ward off an attack by him.

The evidence showed that De Vos had been at the club earlier that evening
with his niece’s two sons. He had been forcefully thrown out of the club by two
bouncers Messrs John Masuku and Mr Isa Isak and felt very aggrieved by
what had happened. He thereafter went to the police to ask them to help him.
The police were not able to calm him down. As he left, he threatened to shoot
the bouncers who had treated him badly earlier.

He returned to the club with his firearm two hours later to collect the boys who
he had left at the club earlier. When he arrived there he was attacked by

Sylvester and Masuku with baseball bats. One struck him on the head and the
other on his left jaw, fracturing it. He fired a single shot which struck Sylvester.
He then got into his car and drove to the police station to report the incident.

The SCA found the evidence of the three bouncers, Sylvester, Isak and
Masuku, who had testified for the state, to have been doubtful. Their evidence
was that they had not been fighting with the appellant when he fired the shot.
The court found that their evidence was inconsistent with the serious injuries
De Vos had sustained resulting in his hospitalisation for 8 days. It held further
that the magistrate and the judges who considered his appeal in the high
court had paid insufficient attention to the circumstances under which De Vos
had been injured.