`

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: 303/2020

In the matter between:

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
de FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION
APPELLANT

and

KGOPOTSO LESLIE SEDIBE

FIRST RESPONDENT

SOUTH AFRICAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION               SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral citation:
Federation Internationale de Football Association v Kgopotso
Leslie Sedibe & Another (303/2020) [2021] ZASCA 113 (08 September 2021)

Coram:
NAVSA ADP, MBHA, MOCUMIE, GORVEN AND MABINDLA-
BOQWANA JJA

Heard:
23 August 2021

Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email. It has been published on the
Supreme Court of Appeal website and released to SAFLII. The date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be handed down on 08
September 2021.

Summary:
Practice and procedure – attachment to found jurisdiction –
property attached in relation to an envisaged review of an administrative body taken
in Switzerland – attachment not permissible if claim is not a claim sounding in money
nor an action in rem for movables – lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by attachment.
___________________________________________________________________

ORDER
___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court of South Africa, (Vorster AJ,
sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
The order of the high court is set aside and substituted as follows:
‘1. The order of Van der Westhuizen J dated 22 August 2018 is set aside.
2. The first respondent is to pay the costs of the application.’
___________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________

Navsa ADP (Mbha, Mocumie, Gorven and Mabindla-Boqwana JJA concurring):

[1] The central question in this appeal is whether the first respondent, Mr Kgopotso
Leslie Sedibe (Sedibe), a former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the second
respondent, the South African Football Association (SAFA), was entitled to an order
granted by the high court, attaching all the trademarks of the appellant, the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), to found jurisdiction in order to review a
decision by the Adjudicatory Chamber of its Ethics Committee, suspending him from

participating in football for a period of five years and ordering him to pay a substantial
fine, following findings of match-fixing against him by FIFA. The short answer is no.
The reasons are provided later in this judgment. Coupled to the aforesaid attachment
order was an order granting Sedibe leave to institute the envisaged review
proceedings by way of edictal citation, which could only have been granted on the
basis that the high court had jurisdiction by virtue of the attachment. The detailed
background culminating in the present appeal appears immediately hereafter.

[2] This is an appeal against a decision of the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Pretoria (Vorster AJ), in terms of which an application by FIFA, to set aside an order
granted against it ex parte at the instance of Sedibe, was dismissed with costs. The
appeal is before us with the leave of this Court. FIFA is the body responsible for
regulating football throughout the world. It is an association registered in the
Commercial Register of the Canton of Zurich (Switzerland), in accordance with Article
60 of the Swiss Civil Code, with its headquarters at FIFA-Strasse 20, Zurich,
Switzerland. Sedibe is a South African citizen, residing in Johannesburg. SAFA, cited
as the second respondent in the high court, is an association incorporated in
accordance with the laws of South Africa and is responsible for regulating football
locally. It was cited for such interest as it might have, with no substantive relief sought
against it. SAFA did not participate in the proceedings in the high court or in the present
appeal. The background culminating in the appeal is set out hereafter.

[3] Sedibe, at  some time in the past, also practiced as an attorney. During August
2018, professedly intending to launch an application for the review and setting aside
of the aforesaid decision by the Adjudicatory Chamber of FIFA’s Ethics Committee,

Sedibe approached the high court for the orders set out below. From his answering
affidavit filed in the high court, in response to FIFA’s application, it appears that this
sanction followed on charges of match-fixing of friendly matches played during the
run-up to the 2010 World Cup. The decision was taken more than five years ago on 2
March 2016 and was communicated to Sedibe on 11 March 2016. Subsequently,
Sedibe, during July 2018, approached the high court, ex parte, and was granted orders
in the following terms:
‘1. PART A
1.1. Leave is hereby granted to the Applicant to institute review proceedings against the First
Respondent by way of edictal citation wherein the relief referred to in the document annexed
to the notice of motion marked "X" will, inter alia, be claimed.
1.2. The Applicant is authorized to serve this application upon the First Respondent in Zurich,
Switzerland, at its business address being FIFA Strasse 20, Zurich, Switzerland and by email
at its email address being Gianni.infantino@fifa.org; fatma.samoura@fifa.org: secretariat-
adjudicatory-chambers@fifa.org; and octavian.bivolaru@fifa.org.
1.3. The First Respondent is granted a period of 30 days from date hereof to serve and file its
notice of intention to oppose the application for review as set out in the founding affidavit, to
be supplemented if need be.
1.4. The cost of the Ex-Parte application be costs in the main application.
2. PART B
2.1. The Applicant is authorized to attach the trademarks owned, and/or in which the First
Respondent has a beneficial interest, and all trademarks controlled by the First Respondent
in terms of the Section 41(2) of the Trademarks Act No. 194 of 1993 of the Republic of South
Africa, in order to enable the Applicant to launch review proceedings as more fully referred to
in the founding affidavit delivered by the Applicant;
2.2. The Sheriff of this Court is authorized to attach and cause to be attached all of the First
Respondent’s trademarks in the Republic of South Africa, wherever same may be found, and

to seize such trademarks and/or endorse the trademarks in accordance with the Section 41(2)
of the Trademarks Act No. 194 of 1993, in order to enable the Applicant to launch an
application for the review of the decision taken by the First Respondent against the Applicant,
and whereby an order was made against the Applicant for his suspension for a period of 5
years, as well as a fine sounding in money;
2.3. The costs of Part B of this application shall be costs in the cause of the review application.’

[4] The orders were granted by the high court (Van Der Westhuizen J), on 22
August 2018, more than two years after the decision by FIFA. Peculiarly, in terms of
the order under Part A, although a time of 30 days was afforded to FIFA, from the date
of the order, to serve and file its notice of intention to oppose the application for review,
no time had been set for the review application to be launched by Sedibe. Copies of
the orders granted by the high court were subsequently sent to FIFA by email. The
email included a draft review application, which, on Sedibe’s own version, was
incomplete as he sought further information from SAFA, which he was adamant was
not provided. It is the communication of the orders by email that caused FIFA to launch
an application in the high court seeking to have the orders set aside. That application
by FIFA to set aside the order granted ex parte was dismissed with costs. The bases
for FIFA’s application, gleaned from its founding affidavit in the high court, are dealt
with in the paragraphs that follow.

[5] First, FIFA contended that the order by the high court authorising service on it
by email was unlawful. In that regard it pointed out that in terms of the laws of
Switzerland, where its headquarters are located, international service of court process
can only be effected by Swiss Government officials. In this regard, reliance was placed
on the Guidelines of the Federal Office of Justice on International Judicial Assistance

in Civil Matters, page 2, para I.B (3rd ed) 2003, updated in January 2013. It was pointed
out that in certain circumstances international service of process in Switzerland without
interposing Swiss authorities may constitute a criminal offence in terms of the Swiss
Criminal Code.

[6] FIFA submitted further, that South African Courts have no jurisdiction over FIFA
to set aside decisions taken in Switzerland by its internal disciplinary bodies that are
domiciled in Switzerland and are subject to judicial control by Swiss Courts. Sedibe,
so FIFA asserted, had a right of appeal to the FIFA Appeals Committee, located in
Zurich, Switzerland. Thereafter, there was a right of appeal to the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, located in Lausanne, Switzerland. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of
South Africa, so it was submitted, could not be cured by an attachment to found
jurisdiction. FIFA went on to state that South African Courts have never recognised
the attachment of assets to found jurisdiction in relation to an application for review of
decisions taken outside of South Africa by foreign adjudicatory tribunals.

[7] Furthermore, so it was claimed on behalf of FIFA, since the repeal of
s 19(1)(c)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 and its replacement with s 21(3) of
the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (Superior Courts Act), the high court no longer has
any power to attach property to found jurisdiction over a foreign respondent, as
opposed to attaching property to confirm jurisdiction where there is a jurisdictional link
between the case and the high court and the high court hearing it. Consequently, and
concomitantly, so FIFA submitted, s 41(2) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (Trade
Marks Act) should be treated as having been tacitly amended by s 21(3) of the
Superior Courts Act so that it no longer provides for attachments of trade marks to

found jurisdiction. This is especially so since continuing to permit such attachments
would amount to arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of s 25(1) of the
Constitution. Thus, FIFA objected to the jurisdiction of South African Courts and
insisted that there were no grounds on which our courts could exercise jurisdiction.

[8] Moreover, according to FIFA, a binding arbitration clause in the FIFA
regulations, meant that Sedibe was obliged to follow the arbitration provisions.
Consequently, a judgment by a South African Court would not be capable of
enforcement in Switzerland. It would only be executable in the event that service had
been effected by a Swiss Authority.

[9] Additionally, it was contended on behalf of FIFA, that the order obtained ex
parte by Sedibe was liable to be set aside on the basis that, in any event, the founding
affidavit in the review application had not been served on it. All that FIFA received was
a draft affidavit, which Sedibe alleged would give a good idea of the basis of his review
application. The attachments referred to in the draft were not sent to FIFA. For all
these reasons, FIFA stated that it was entitled to have the order set aside.

[10] In opposing the application by FIFA, Sedibe noted that in all matters relating to
edictal citation, and in relation to orders of attachment to found jurisdiction, it has
always been high court practice to grants such orders ex parte. The following part of
Sedibe’s answering affidavit bears repeating:
‘It cannot be disputed that this Honourable Court granted the ex parte Order for the sole
purpose of enabling me to launch review proceedings against an administrative or quasi-

judicial decision . . . taken by the applicant’s Adjudicatory Chamber on 2 March 2016.’ (My
emphasis.)

[11] In relation to not serving the review application in finalised form, Sedibe stated
that he was still awaiting a host of documents that he had sought from SAFA, as well
as FIFA’s reasons for the decision he sought to have reviewed.

[12] In respect of FIFA’s complaint that service by email was in contravention of
Swiss law, which requires service of judicial process by court recognised officials,
instead of by way of email as authorised by Van der Westhuizen J, Sedibe contended
as follows. First, FIFA did not, for that assertion, rely on an expert in Swiss law.
Second, that, in any event, his attorney is taking steps to ensure that the ex parte
application would be served officially.

[13] Dealing with FIFA’s claim that instead of seeking to review a decision taken in
Switzerland, he ought to have followed the internal appeals procedure outlined above,
Sedibe stated that he could not do so because SAFA and FIFA had denied him access
to information and confiscated his laptop, which were essential to an internal appeal.
He pointed out that the internal appeal had to be launched within 3 days, which, in the
prevailing circumstances, effectively precluded him from prosecuting it. In his view,
this amounted to a negation by FIFA of the audi alteram partem principle.

[14] Sedibe rejected the contention made on behalf of FIFA that s 21(3) of the
Superior Courts Act tacitly repealed the Trade Marks Act. He pointed out that our
courts routinely grant an incola leave to attach assets to found jurisdiction and that this

is to enable the institution of an action ‘at home’. This is done in terms of the common
law, supplemented by legislation. Sedibe claimed that the review application he
intended instituting was directed, inter alia, at setting aside the FIFA sanctions
described earlier, including the payment of a fine, and additionally, the costs of the
hearing by the Ethics Committee. He also envisaged instituting a damages claim
against FIFA for tarnishing his reputation. He denied that the attachment of FIFA’s
trademarks constituted an arbitrary deprivation of property, since FIFA retained
ownership, subject to temporary control and custody by the Sheriff.

[15] Sedibe responded to the contention made on behalf of FIFA that there was no
basis at all for a South African Court to exercise jurisdiction. He described how FIFA
had delegated a certain Mr Eaton to investigate the match-fixing charges against him
and to conduct the enquiry in South Africa. According to Sedibe, the investigation was
conducted in violation of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law, on which
FIFA presently relied.

[16] Sedibe claimed that he was not given a proper hearing in relation to the charges
against him, more particularly, as indicated earlier, he had been denied access to
critical information, including information on his laptop. This was vigorously denied by
FIFA in its replying affidavit. Sedibe alleged that Eaton had relied principally on
evidence obtained from SAFA officials, who sought to exonerate themselves by
implicating him. This, he said, occurred at a time after he had already resigned from
SAFA. Sedibe complained that Eaton had released a preliminary report without
affording him an opportunity to respond. Eaton had recommended that Sedibe be
investigated by the South African Police. The National Prosecuting Authority however

had declined to prosecute. It is unnecessary and beyond the scope of the present
appeal to engage in a discussion of a dispute in relation to the propriety of FIFA’s
disciplinary process.

[17] Sedibe said FIFA’s Ethics Committee, inexplicably, had not conducted a full
enquiry in South Africa even though all the acts complained of had taken place in
South Africa. Sedibe contended that FIFA, sitting in Switzerland, had no jurisdiction to
try him and that it wrongly relied on Eaton’s findings of wrongdoing on his part.

[18] In respect of the envisaged review application, Sedibe reiterated that the orders
obtained by him, ex parte, were in contemplation of the application for a review of the
Ethics Committee’s findings and that he intended launching it as soon as possible. It
is necessary to record that more than five years after the decision in question and
more than three years after the order granted ex parte, the review application by
Sedibe has not yet been launched.

[19] Sedibe complained that an undertaking by Eaton, that he would be afforded an
opportunity to be heard, was reneged upon. The charges were never formally put to
him and the first time he saw details about them was when he saw the final report
prepared by investigators of FIFA’s Adjudicatory Chamber.

[20] Sedibe rejected the contention made on behalf of FIFA that South African
Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of its adjudicatory processes. He denied that he
was bound to follow the arbitration route, as provided for in the FIFA agreement,
particularly as he had raised fundamental irregularities in the adjudication process. He

contended vigorously that international agreements such as the one relied on by FIFA
could not detract from the Constitution of South Africa, which guaranteed him certain
fundamental rights, including the right to challenge the decision in court. In relation to
the ex parte order, he pointed out that FIFA was permitted an opportunity to show
cause why the relief sought by him, ex parte should not  be granted.

[21] I now turn to deal with the decision of the high court. Vorster AJ handed down
a judgment that comprised slightly less than three pages. The high court took the view
that although Sedibe sought to review a decision of FIFA’s Ethics Committee, it was
clear that he also intended to ‘claim the fine he had to pay and the costs he had to pay
. . . and further elaborated that he intended to claim damages . . .’. This part of the
judgment related to the contention by FIFA that an attachment to found jurisdiction
could only be authorised in relation to a claim sounding in money. Additionally, he went
on to state the following:
‘It is clear to me that Sedibe not only seeks a review of the various decisions. He mentioned
in his founding affidavit also damages. Logically the damages claim will follow the successful
review as the causa for the damages must be the irregular decisions he wants to be reviewed
and set aside.’
Vorster AJ concluded as follows:
‘. . . I find that the review process that Sedibe is in the process of instituting does include as a
consequence thereof a possible monetary claim or claims as stated above. Therefore the ex
parte application and order to authorise the attachment is not irregular as argued and I find no
reason to set it aside.’ (My emphasis.)
It is against those conclusions and the resultant order that the present appeal is
directed.

[22] It is true that in the ex parte application, Sedibe stated that he had instituted
defamation actions against certain individuals who had maligned him. However, the
ex parte approach to the court for the attachment order was never on the basis that it
was sought in relation to any such action. Furthermore, given the vigorous and
determined challenge by Sedibe to the FIFA decision, it is self-evident that the fine
imposed was not paid. Before us counsel on his behalf conceded as much. Of course,
the fine would be nullified were the review application to be successful. But the order
for attachment was never sought for the purpose of recovering the fine, more
especially since it had not been paid and its recovery was not the basis for the
attachment order sought.

[23] An action for damages based on defamation or the like was never the basis for
the attachment order sought and obtained by Sedibe. The high court’s speculation
concerning a possible monetary claim in the future is just that – speculation. If a costs
order ultimately redounded to the benefit of Sedibe in the review application, assuming
it were viable, and it remained unsatisfied and if FIFA refused to pay and Sedibe
sought to institute an action to recover it and if it were to be considered by a court to
be justified, then the argument for an attachment might be advanced.  There are too
many ifs, buts and maybes that pose an insurmountable obstacle. The framing of the
second paragraph of Part B of the notice of motion in the ex parte application, tagging
on the fine as part of the decision sought to be overturned on review, was clearly
designed to pre-empt FIFA’s argument that because the litigation envisaged by Sedibe
was not one that sounded in money an attachment was thus unwarranted.

[24] The principles in relation to the attachment of property to found or confirm
jurisdiction are well-settled. The purpose of an attachment ad fundandam
jurisdictionem is two-fold. First, it is to found or create jurisdiction where no other
ground of jurisdiction exists at all. Second, it is to provide an asset in respect of which
execution can be levied in the event of a judgment in favour of a plaintiff.1

[25] The purpose of an attachment ad confirmandam jurisdictionem is to strengthen
or confirm a jurisdiction that already exists.2 There too, the object of the attachment is
to provide an asset on which execution can be levied in total or partial satisfaction of
a plaintiff’s judgment.3

[26] It is important to appreciate that the privilege afforded incola plaintiffs to attach
the property of peregrini defendants arose from considerations of commercial
convenience.4 As indicated above, attachments to found or confirm jurisdiction are
associated with the principle of effectiveness. In Thermo Radiant, this Court said the
following:
‘It appears to me therefore, that in the law of Holland already one of the purposes of the
attachment of property to found jurisdiction was to enable the incola to execute on that

1 See Van Loggerenberg et al Erasmus Superior Court Practice (Erasmus) at A2-107 and the many
cases cited there, including Thermo Radiant Oven Sales (Pty)Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1969(2)
SA 295 (A) at 305C-308F and more lately, Tsung v Industrial Development Corporation of SA Ltd 2006
(4) SA 177 (SCA).
2 See Thermo Radiant Ovens fn 1 above at 300C-D and Simon NO v Air Operations of Europe AB 1999
(1) SA 217 (SCA) at 230 D-E and the discussion in Erasmus at A2-108
3 See Tsung fn 1 above at 181A and Erasmus fn 1 at A-2 108.
4 See Wessels Roman Dutch Law at 678 et seq and Van Leeuwen Roman Dutch Law vol II at 696-7.

property after judgment. In other words, the attachment of property served to found jurisdiction
and thereby enabled the Court to pronounce a not altogether ineffective judgment.’
The authorities point out that this principle has been eroded by the long-standing
practice of our courts to permit the attachment of property, the value of which does not
bear a realistic comparison to that claimed in the litigation. However, the property
attached must at least have a saleable value.5

[27] It is clear that the right of an incola to attach the property of a peregrinus to
found or confirm jurisdiction does not apply to all cases but is limited to (a) actions in
personam in contract, quasi contract, delict, quasi-delict or other like causes to give,
do or make good something for an opponent, that is, in cases sounding in money and
(b) actions in rem for movables.6 After all, the rationale for an attachment is to ensure
that the creditor’s claim can be satisfied, either partially or altogether. In Ex Parte Hay
Management Consultants (Pty) Ltd,7 the court held, in relation to the interdict sought
in that case against a peregrinus, preventing it from committing delicts outside the
country, that it had no control over that defendant nor over the cessation of the acts in
question and could not entertain an application for an interdict against it. It is thus
hardly surprising that one cannot find authority and we were referred to none, where
an attachment was justified in relation to an administrative decision of the kind in
question.

5 See Thermo Radiant Ovens fn 1 at 306H-307A.
6 See Erasmus fn 1 above at A2-109.
7 Ex Parte Hay Management Consultants (Pty) Ltd [2000] 2 All SA 592 (W); 2000 (3) SA 501 (W) at 507
F-I.

[28] It is to be noted that legislation in respect of attachments of property, whether
in the form of the Superior Courts Act or the Trade Marks Act, must be read with the
principles of the common law.8

[29] Faced with the authorities referred to in the preceding paragraphs, it is no
wonder that there was an attempt to contort the relief sought against FIFA as one
sounding in money, by reference to the fine that was not paid and a costs order,
payment of which might or might not eventuate. That was not what was being claimed
in the review litigation.

[30] FIFA’s complaint about the method of service authorised by Van der
Westhuizen J, namely that it was in contravention of Swiss law, appears justified and
the assertion that it was not confirmed by an expert in Swiss law is unpersuasive in
that the provisions of Swiss law referred to were not contested. However, having
regard to the conclusions reached above, which are dispositive of the appeal, it is not
necessary to come to a definitive finding in that regard. In light of the conclusions
reached above, none of the other points raised on behalf of FIFA, referred to earlier in
this judgment require consideration.

[31] In Sedibe’s opposing affidavit, his heads of argument and in argument on his
behalf before us, there was an impassioned plea for the Court to appreciate that a
South African citizen was at the mercy of a global giant in the form of FIFA and was

8 See Erasmus fn 1 above at A2-107.

being denied his rights. That, with reference to a footballing metaphor, ought to be
seen as a call for a hometown decision. In this case, the away side is entitled to a win.

[32] Van der Westhuizen J and Vorster AJ ought to have considered that the
application for an order to authorise service in the manner sought was unfounded, as
was the application for attachment for want of jurisdiction. For the reasons  aforesaid
the appeal must succeed.

[33] The following order is made:
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
The order of the high court is set aside and substituted as follows:
‘1. The order of Van der Westhuizen J dated 22 August 2018 is set aside.
2. The first respondent is to pay the costs of the application’.

____________________
M S NAVSA
ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT

APPEARANCES:

For appellant:

M Chaskalson SC, with C Robertson
Instructed by:

Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, Sandton
Webbers Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For first respondent:

G Meyer
Instructed by:

Fluxmans Inc Attorneys, Johannesburg
Lovius Block Inc, Bloemfontein.
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
MEDIA SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:

8 SEPTEMBER 2021
Status:
Immediate
The following summary is for the benefit of the media in the reporting of this case and does not form part of
the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Federation Internationale de Football Association v Kgopotso Leslie Sedibe & Another
(303/2020) [2021] ZASCA 113 (08 September 2021)
Today the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment upholding, with costs, an appeal
against a decision of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the high court).
The issue before the SCA was whether the first respondent, Mr Kgopotso Leslie Sedibe (Sedibe), was
entitled to the order granted by the high court, attaching all the trademarks of the appellant, the
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), to found jurisdiction in order to review a
decision by FIFA’s Adjudicatory Chamber of its Ethics Committee.
Sedibe, a former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the second respondent, the South African Football
Association (SAFA), was suspended from participating in football for a period of five years and ordered
to pay a substantial fine, following findings of match-fixing against him by FIFA. During August 2018,
professedly intending to launch an application for the review and setting aside of the aforesaid decision
by the Adjudicatory Chamber of FIFA’s Ethics Committee, Sedibe approached the high court for, and
was granted, an order attaching all the trademarks of FIFA to found jurisdiction in order to review the
decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber of its Ethics Committee. The high court also granted an order
authorising Sedibe to serve the review application upon FIFA, at its business address in Switzerland by
email at its email addresses.
FIFA submitted that South African Courts have no jurisdiction over FIFA to set aside decisions taken in
Switzerland by its internal disciplinary bodies that are domiciled in Switzerland and are subject to judicial
control by Swiss Courts. FIFA contended that South African Courts have never recognised the
attachment of assets to found jurisdiction in relation to an application for review of decisions taken
outside of South Africa by foreign adjudicatory tribunals. Furthermore, FIFA contended that the order
by the high court, authorising service on it by email, was unlawful. In that regard, it pointed out that in
terms of the laws of Switzerland, where its headquarters are located, international service of court
process can only be effected by Swiss Government officials.
In respect of the issue of attachment, the SCA held that it was clear that the right of an incola to attach
the property of a peregrinus to found or confirm jurisdiction does not apply to all cases but is limited to:
(a) actions in personam in contract, quasi contract, delict, quasi-delict or other like causes to give, do
or make good on something for an opponent, that is, in cases sounding in money; and (b) actions in
rem for movables. The SCA held further that there was no authority that justified attachment in relation
to an administrative decision of the kind in question. Furthermore, the SCA held that FIFA’s complaint
about the method of service authorised by Van der Westhuizen J, namely that it was in contravention
of Swiss law, appears justified and that the provisions of Swiss law referred to were not contested.
~~~~ends~~~~