THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: 20185/2014

In the matter between:
ETRACTION (PTY) LTD

APPELLANT
and
TYRECOR (PTY) LTD

RESPONDENT

Neutral Citation: Etraction (Pty) Ltd v Tyrecor (Pty) Ltd (20185/2014)
2015 ZASCA 78 (28 May 2015)
Coram:
MPATI P, BRAND, WALLIS and SALDULKER JJA and
MAYAT AJA
Heard:
20 May 2015
Delivered: 28 May 2015
Summary: Trade mark – infringement by use of identical mark –
defence of prior bona fide use – s 36(1) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of
1993 – requirement of continuous and bona fide use – requirements
for – partial expungement of registered mark in terms of s 27(1) of
the Act – purpose of registration to damage existing user’s trade not
to trade oneself – no bona fide intention to use as a mark in respect of
the goods in question.

ORDER

On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court (Salie-
Samuels AJ, sitting as court of first instance):
1 Save for paragraph 2 of this order the appeal is dismissed with costs,
such costs to include those consequent upon the employment of two
counsel where two counsel were employed.
2 The order granted in respect of the counter-application is amended to
read as follows:
„The counter application succeeds with costs and the Registrar is directed
in terms of section 24(1) of the Trade Marks Act, to expunge the word
„tires‟ from the Applicant‟s trade mark registration and to amend the
registration to read „ Vehicle components and Accessories: wheels and
rims, but not including tyres‟.

JUDGMENT

Wallis JA (Mpati P, Brand and Saldulker JJA and Mayat AJA
concurring)

[1] The Appellant, Etraction (Pty) Ltd (Etraction), conducts business
as a trader in wheels, tyres and related products. It is the registered
proprietor under the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 (the Act) of the trade
mark INFINITY, registration number 2008/08612, in class 12 in respect
of „vehicle components and accessories; wheels, tires,1 rims‟, dated 15

1 The registered mark uses the American spelling.

April 2008. The respondent, Tyrecor (Pty) Ltd is one of its competitors. It
imports into South Africa and sells tyres under the name „Infinity‟. The
present appeal arises out of proceedings brought by Etraction to interdict
Tyrecor from doing so. The application for an interdict before Salie-
Samuels AJ was unsuccessful and a counter-application by Tyrecor for
the expungement from the registered mark of the reference to „tires‟
succeeded. This appeal is with her leave.

[2] Tyrecor has been importing and selling tyres in South Africa under
the brand name Infinity since at least 2009. The evidence in regard to the
precise date when it commenced this business in its own right is
inconclusive. It was registered with SARS as an importer of tyres on
26 March 2008, but the earliest invoice reflecting the importation of tyres
by Tyrecor was dated 22 February 2009. Prior to that date another entity,
Falck Trading (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Tyrecor Holdings (Pty) Ltd,
and referred to hereafter as Falck), had, since 2006, imported and sold in
South Africa tyres bearing the Infinity mark. It made significant
purchases of tyres in October 2008, which suggests that Tyrecor had not
by that stage commenced importing and selling tyres. For present
purposes therefore it is safer and favourable to the appellant to accept
early 2009 as the date from which Tyrecor commenced business
operations. I proceed on the basis that prior to that date Falck was the
party importing and selling tyres in South Africa under the mark Infinity.

[3] Section 34(1)(a) of the Act provides that a registered mark is
infringed by the unauthorised use of an identical mark in the course of
trade in relation to goods or services in respect of which the mark is
registered. Etraction‟s trade mark, INFINITY, was registered with effect

from 15 April 2008. Having accepted that Tyrecor‟s business activities
commenced in early 2009, it follows that those activities have always
infringed the registered mark, because they involved the use, in the
course of trade and without authorisation, of an identical mark2 in relation
to tyres, which were goods in respect of which the mark was registered.
The outcome of the litigation therefore depended primarily upon the
validity of the registration of the mark in respect of tyres, which was
attacked under s 27(1) of the Act, and a defence of continuous and bona
fide prior usage by Falck, as Tyrecor‟s predecessor in title, that Tyrecor
invoked in terms of s 36(1) of the Act. These two defences were
inextricably linked and dependent upon the particular facts of the case. It
is therefore appropriate at the outset to deal with the facts.
The facts
[4] Etraction claimed that it had used the mark INFINITY consistently
since 1995. In considering this claim it is necessary to draw a distinction
between tyres, and the rims to which they are fitted to constitute the
wheels of motor vehicles.3 In the context of motor vehicles, wheels,
consisting of both rims and tyres, are necessary for the vehicle to operate,
but the rims and tyres may be sold either separately or together. Vehicles
come equipped with both, but there is a market for people to replace those
originally attached to their vehicles with different rims, or different tyres,
or both, either for the sake of appearance or because they are perceived to
enhance the vehicle‟s performance. People who purchase new rims for

2 It is not suggested that it makes any difference that the registered mark is in block capitals, as are the
depictions of the mark relied on by Etraction, whilst Tyrecor only capitalises the initial letter „I‟ in its
use of the mark „Infinity‟.
3 In the affidavits there was a measure of confusion in that „wheels‟ was sometimes used to refer to
rims and tyres, and sometimes to rims alone. In this judgment I will refer to rims and tyres as the
component elements of wheels, so that the latter expression will refer to a rim and a tyre in
combination.

their vehicles will usually, but not inevitably, also purchase new tyres.
When they purchase both together as a single unit this is referred to, in
the jargon of the trade, as purchasing a „combo‟.

[5] Etraction says that it started to use the mark INFINITY on rims in
1995. Annexed to the founding affidavit were extracts from catalogues
for 1996/7, 2000, 2001 and 2005/6, all showing various rims bearing the
mark either alone or in combination with something else, for example,
INFINITY II, INFINITY COBRA and INFINITY BRAVA. The form
that the mark took in each instance was a central decal on which was
printed the word INFINITY placed in the hub of the rim.

[6] In none of these examples was the mark INFINITY affixed to
tyres, nor did Etraction claim that it had ever used the mark on tyres as
opposed to rims. Instead it highlighted the fact that in one of the
advertisements for a „combo‟ the rim bore the mark INFINITY on which
basis it alleged that the mark had been used in relation to „combos‟. It
said that this had been a common feature of its trade over the years and
this trade had been very successful. Insofar as that was intended to
suggest use of the mark INFINITY in relation to tyres the claim was
negated by the fact that in the same advertisement for the „combo‟ the
tyre bore a separate mark of MRW (an acronym for Malas Racing
Wheels4), another registered mark of which Etraction is the registered
owner.

4 Etraction was formerly called Malas Car Sales & Spares (Pty) Ltd. The brochures and advertisements
annexed to the affidavits were all published under this name but, for the sake of simplicity and
convenience, I have used the current name throughout the judgment.

[7] Apart from the brochures annexed to the founding affidavit
Tyrecor annexed to its answering affidavit extracts from a trade magazine
for the tyre industry, entitled Southern Africa Treads, which contained
advertisements by Etraction. These were primarily advertisements for
tyres, not rims, and in none of them was the mark INFINITY used in
relation to tyres or mentioned at all, although the MRW mark appears on
depictions of tyres and is referred to in the text of the advertisements.
Various other marks not apparently owned by Etraction were used on
other tyres appearing in these advertisements.

[8] In summary therefore there was no evidence at all that Etraction
had ever made use of the mark INFINITY in relation to tyres although
there was some limited evidence of its use in relation to rims. Even there
it is unclear to what extent it was used. Other marks such as MRW and
JAZZ featured in the brochures and advertisements. There was no
evidence of the extent of sales of rims bearing the INFINITY mark or of
the amount spent on advertising or the share of the market claimed for
such rims.

[9] Against this, the mark Infinity has been in use in relation to tyres in
South Africa since at least 2006, initially by Falck and latterly by
Tyrecor. Falck obtained an import permit for a first shipment of 5000
tyres branded with the Infinity mark in 2006. In September 2006 it
obtained four further permits for the importation for exhibition purposes
of various types of tyres. In 2006 it exhibited tyres under this mark at two

different exhibitions. The one was the Electra Mining Expo and the other
the Tyre Expo Africa. In relation to the former there is a photograph of
the stand bearing on all four sides a very large board with the single word
„Infinity‟ and the symbol ® which is customarily used to indicate that the
word or words is a registered trade mark.5  In relation to the latter there is
an exhibitors‟ show guide that identifies the stand as being that of
„INFINITY TYRES‟ and refers to the brand Infinity. Again the symbol ®
was included whenever the mark was used and this has been a feature of
the use that Falck and Tyrecor have made of the Infinity mark. The show
guide refers to Infinity tyres having recently been launched at a German
trade show. That is consistent with the claim by Tyrecor that the mark is
an international one used on tyres by the Al Dobowi Group with which it
is engaged in this business in South Africa, that group being an indirect
shareholder in Tyrecor.

[10] Tyrecor furnished sales and advertising figures in respect of
Infinity tyres for the period from 2006 to 2011 showing a considerable
growth in sales and advertising expenditure during this period. Taking the
figures for 2006 and 2007 alone, on the basis that they were clearly prior
to the date of registration of Etraction‟s mark, these show sales of over
15000 units for nearly R10 million and advertising expenditure of about
R140 000. That is by no means insignificant. From 2008 onwards, sales
volumes have increased substantially and revenues in excess of R100
million have been generated. That there was awareness in the market
from 2006 onwards of the existence of Infinity tyres emanating from

5 Such use was a contravention of s 62(1) of the Act, but Etraction makes no point of that fact. Tyrecor
claims an international use of the mark, but there was no compliance with the provisions of s 62(2)(a)
or (b) of the Act.

Falck was acknowledged in the founding affidavit and could not be
gainsaid bearing in mind that Etraction was also an exhibitor at the Tyre
Expo Africa in 2006 with a stand relatively close to that of Infinity Tyres.
Vested rights
[11]  Section 36(1) of the Act protects continuous and bona fide prior
use of what would otherwise be an infringing mark. It provides that:
„Nothing in this Act shall allow the proprietor of a registered trade mark to interfere
with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or nearly
resembling it in respect of goods or services in relation to which that person or a
predecessor in title of his has made continuous and bona fide use of that trade mark
from a date anterior –
(a) to the use of the first mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods or services
by the proprietor or a predecessor in title …; or
(b) to the registration of the first mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or
services in the name of the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his;
whichever is the earlier …‟
The underlying purpose of this section is to prevent a proprietor of a trade
mark from exercising rights merely on the basis of priority of registration
and it preserves whatever common-law rights there may be antecedent to
the rights of the registered proprietor.6 A party relying on this defence
must establish bona fide and continuous use of the mark, either by itself
or by its predecessor in title, at a time prior to the use or registration of
the registered mark by the proprietor thereof, whichever is earlier. In this
case registration was the earlier date.

6 Nino's Coffee Bar & Restaurant CC v Nino's Italian Coffee & Sandwich Bar CC & another; Nino's
Italian Coffee & Sandwich Bar CC v Nino's Coffee Bar & Restaurant CC 1998 (3) SA 656 (C) para 63.

[12]  It follows that Tyrecor had to show that it, or its predecessor in
title, had made continuous and bona fide use of the trademark „Infinity‟
from a date prior to 15 April 2008, being the date of registration of
Etraction‟s trademark. On the facts as summarised in para 10 above there
can be no question but that the trademark Infinity was being used from
2006 on a continuous basis in relation to the sale of tyres in South Africa.
Nor can there be any question that the use was bona fide. In view of my
assumption that Tyrecor only commenced trading in tyres bearing the
„Infinity‟ mark at a date in early 2009 we are concerned with the use of
the mark by Falck.

[13] Falck used the trade mark Infinity in relation to tyres prior to
Tyrecor and prior to Etraction‟s registration of the mark. Two questions
must be addressed. The first is whether that use was of the character
specified in s 36(1). That requires some explanation in the light of what I
have said above about that use being in practical terms both continuous
from 2006 and bona fide. The argument on behalf of Etraction was that
mere use of this character does not suffice to entitle someone to claim the
protection of s 36(1). It submitted that the use had to be use as the
proprietor of the mark.7 As matters transpired that proposition lay at the
heart of the argument addressed to us albeit formulated in various guises.
The second question was whether Falck was Tyrecor‟s predecessor in
title. I will deal with each in turn.

7 „Proprietorship of the mark is required before the claim to a prior right will be accepted.‟ Appellant‟s
heads of argument para 26.

[14] Conceptually there was an immediate difficulty with the
submission that a party seeking the protection of s 36(1) must be the
proprietor of the disputed mark. As explained in Webster and Page:8
„Under the common law a trade mark cannot as such be the subject of proprietary
rights. One can only become the proprietor of the goodwill of the business in relation
to which the mark is used in consequence of the use which has been made of the
mark.‟
Unlike a registered trade mark, an unregistered mark is not itself an
incorporeal asset capable of being owned. It contributes to the goodwill
of a business by identifying a business, goods or services in the market
place with a particular source and, unlike a registered mark, it is
incapable of being alienated separately from the goodwill of that
business.9 Where someone else adopts the same or a confusingly similar
mark they seek thereby to represent that their business, goods or services
are from the same or a connected source. The action for passing-off is the
means that the law affords to protect against that type of
misrepresentation. In summary:
„A passing-off action is a remedy for the invasion of a right of property not in the
mark, name or get-up improperly used, but in the business or goodwill likely to be
injured by the misrepresentation made by passing-off one person's goods as the goods
of another. Goodwill, as the subject of proprietary rights, is incapable of subsisting by
itself. It has no independent existence apart from the business to which it is
attached.‟10

8 C E Webster and G E Morley Webster and Page South African Law of Trade Marks 4ed (looseleaf,
Issue 9) para 5.3 at 5-3.
9 Butterworths Publishers (Pty) Ltd v Jacobsens Group (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 588 (T); [2005]
ZAGPHC 42; paras 10-12.
10 Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor (t/a New Star Industrial Co) [1976] FSR 256 (PC) at 269
cited with approval in Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars (Pty) Ltd & another 1998
(3) SA 938 (SCA); [1998] ZASCA 44; paras 11 and 29. I have omitted the final sentence in the
quotation that said that goodwill has a locality. Although Harms JA quoted the advice of Lord Diplock
in Star Industrial with approval in Caterham, he rejected his view that the existence of a protectable

[15] Etraction‟s argument was therefore based on an incorrect premise.
While, for the purposes of registration of a mark, the Act makes use of
the concept of proprietorship in respect of an unregistered mark11 it is
clear that the word has a special meaning in that context.12 It is only on
registration that the applicant for registration becomes the proprietor of
the registered mark. It cannot therefore be the case that in order to enjoy
the protection afforded by s 36(1) it is necessary to show that the party
claiming protection owned the mark in issue. The endeavour by counsel
to bolster his argument in this regard by reference to s 27(1), to which I
will revert in due course when dealing with the expungement application,
and the cases that have said that bona fide use under s 36 bears the same
meaning as bona fide use under s 27(1), was likewise misplaced. The
reference in s 27(1)(a) to the proprietor of a mark is a reference to a
registered proprietor who is seeking to resist expungement, and does not
refer to an unregistered mark.

[16] The clear purpose of s 36(1) is to protect common law rights
arising from continuous and bona fide use of an unregistered trade mark
prior to either the use13 or registration14 of the mark in issue. Consistent
with that purpose, any person entitled to bring a passing off action based

reputation was dependent upon having customers within the jurisdiction of the court. He followed the
approach of Christopher Wadlow The Law of Passing-off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation
4ed (2011) paras 3-109 to 3-130 where the author suggested that common law jurisdictions no longer
take a „hard line‟ in regard to the need for there to be customers within the jurisdiction in order for
there to be passing-off and held that goodwill can be severed from reputation. However, it is debatable
whether Wadlow was correct in his analysis in the light of the recent decision and review of the
authorities on which he relied in Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC [2015]
UKSC 31. It may be that South Africa, and probably Australia, are now the only jurisdictions that do
not take a hard line.
11 Sections 10(3) and 18 of the Act.
12 Victoria's Secret Inc v Edgars Stores Ltd 1994 (3) SA 739 (A); [1994] ZASCA 43; at 744A-745B.
13 Section 36(1)(a) of the Act.
14 Section 36(1)(b) of the Act.

on the reputation they had acquired from the use of the unregistered mark
would be entitled to invoke s 36(1) against a claim for infringement by
the proprietor of a registered mark.

[17]  Perhaps anticipating this approach counsel for Etraction drew our
attention to the passage in Webster and Page15that reads:
„An agent or distributor who merely sells, or imports and sells, goods manufactured
by another without adding anything to the mark or get-up under which they are
produced, does not thereby acquire any goodwill in the name or get-up; for those
symbols thereby acquire a reputation as indicating that the goods emanate from the
particular manufacturing provenance and not that they were imported and/or
distributed by that particular agent.‟
Seizing on a statement that the mark Infinity was owned by a British
Virgin Islands registered company in the Al Dobowi group of companies
counsel submitted that Falck could not have acquired in its own right any
reputation or goodwill in Infinity tyres. Accordingly he submitted that it
would not have been open to Falck, prior to April 2008, to bring
proceedings to prevent another party from marketing tyres in South
Africa under the name Infinity. The argument was advanced
notwithstanding that such registration of a trade mark in a foreign
jurisdiction by a foreign company could not give rise to any rights as a
trade mark in South Africa in view of the principle of territoriality that
applies in respect of trade marks. 16

15 Para 15.8.1 (Issue 15) at 15-47.
16 See Victoria's Secret Inc v Edgars Stores Ltd 1994 (3) SA 739 (A) at 745E-747F and AM Moolla
Group Ltd & others v The Gap Inc & others 2005 (6) SA 568 (SCA); [2005] ZASCA 72; paras 9 and
10.

[18] In my view that argument must fail because it ignores the word
„merely‟ and the phrase „without adding anything to the mark‟ in the
quoted passage. It also ignores the passage that follows immediately
thereafter, which reads:
„On the other hand, it is possible for a distributor so to market the goods which he
distributes that the name or get-up under which they are sold acquires a reputation as
indicating that they emanate from him: in which case the goodwill adhering to that
name or get-up will vest in him. The enquiry as to which trade source the symbol has
come to indicate in the territory in question is in every case one of fact.‟

[19] If Tyrecor could show that Falck had acquired a sufficient
reputation for tyres sold under the mark Infinity17 among a substantial
number of actual or prospective purchasers, that would have entitled it to
bring passing off proceedings against anyone marketing tyres under that
or a confusingly similar name. For this purpose I assume that it would
have been possible for such marketing to take place, notwithstanding the
requirement that before any tyres can be marketed in this country they
must be homologated by the South African Bureau of Standards, which
would presumably avoid confusing similarities in tyre brand names.

[20]  The usual way in which to discharge the onus of proving such a
reputation is by way of proof of actual sales and advertising to establish
the requisite reputation. The evidence reflects sales in the period from

17 Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd v The Beauty Box (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) & another 1987 (2)
SA 600 (A); [1987] ZASCA 5; at 613F-G; Caterham Car Sales supra para 16.

2006 to April 2008 of over 15000 units for nearly R10 million and
advertising expenditure of about R140 000. The sales trajectory was
upwards. The product was being actively marketed at industry shows and
by approaches to potential customers, as demonstrated by an approach in
March 2008 by Mr de Villiers, who deposed to the opposing affidavit on
behalf of Tyrecor, to Mr Akram of Etraction with a view to supplying
Etraction with Infinity tyres. This evidence is uncontroverted. It sufficed
to establish that Infinity tyres had acquired a reputation in this country
capable of being protected by way of passing-off proceedings.

[21] The only remaining question is whether that reputation vested in
Falck. In my view it did and the characterisation of Falck as a mere
importer and distributor of tyres from another source was incorrect. Falck
was originally known as Tyrecor Holdings (Pty) Ltd and it was always
clearly associated with the Tyrecor group of companies in which Mr de
Villiers and his brother were the moving spirits. It was not an importer
and distributor in the sense of a retail outlet that imports and sells goods
bearing marks indicating that the goods have an origin other than that of
the retailer. Falck was the commercial vehicle through which the Al
Dobowi group, which markets tyres under the name Infinity on an
international basis, and the Tyrecor group undertook a joint venture to
market Infinity tyres in South Africa. Thus, the public presence of
„Infinity‟ tyres in this country at all times manifested itself solely through
the corporate vehicles associated with the Tyrecor group.

[22] Bearing in mind that any injury underpinning a passing-off action
would arise from a misrepresentation damaging the reputation  (and

consequent goodwill) in South Africa, as the place where the
misrepresentation was made,18 it seems logical that the joint venture
partners would have wished the reputation they were intent on building
for their brand of tyres to vest in the entity through which they were
carrying on the joint venture. There would be little point in trying to
separate that reputation from the broader goodwill attaching to Falck as a
business trading in tyres, a goodwill that would arise from the service
rendered by the staff of the business, the quality of its product, the
advertising and marketing that it undertook and the like. Lastly there is
the fact that the marketing of Infinity tyres, as is apparent from the
materials in the papers, always occurred in conjunction with the Tyrecor
name and the Tyrecor group. No doubt that was to take advantage of any
reputation that the De Villiers brothers had built up in South Africa in the
tyre business.

[23] Counsel did submit, albeit faintly, that Tyrecor was not the
successor in title of Falck. In the face of the undisputed evidence that a
decision was taken by the joint venture partners no longer to use Falck as
the commercial vehicle for their operations in South Africa, and
henceforth to conduct that business through Tyrecor, as indeed happened,
that was an optimistic submission. Such a rearrangement of business
affairs within a trading group or as between joint venture partners,
without the business itself changing, is by no means uncommon.19 I can
see no reason to doubt the correctness of Mr de Villiers‟ statement that
Tyrecor took over Falck‟s business in about March 2009. As already

18 Caterham Car Sales supra para 20.
19 It is a situation specifically contemplated in s 197 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.

pointed out that is consistent with the records in regard to the importation
of tyres and sales by Tyrecor. Counsel complained that there was no
proof that there had been compliance with the requirements of s 228 of
the Companies Act 61 of 1973, but I fail to see on what footing it would
be open to Etraction as a stranger to the relationship between Falck and
Tyrecor to complain of any such non-compliance. So long as the parties
to the transaction are content with what they have done and no-one
affected thereby and having a direct and substantial interest in the
transaction, such as a shareholder, creditor or the revenue authorities,
wishes to challenge its validity, it seems to me that it must stand on the
terms arranged by the parties to it.20

[24] I therefore hold that Tyrecor was the successor in title to Falck‟s
business of selling Infinity tyres in South Africa and was entitled to rely
on the latter‟s bona fide and continuous use of the mark Infinity to resist
Etraction‟s infringement claim. That relieves me of the necessity to
consider whether the use contemplated by s 36(1) is limited to such use as
would entitle the user to bring a passing-off action. I do not, however,
wish to foreclose the possibility that the section may have a broader reach
than that and may extend to any bona fide and continuous use irrespective
of whether it would give rise to a legal right capable of founding a
claim.21 There seems to me to be much to be said for the proposition that
any lawful use having the characteristics of being both continuous and

20 c/f Traub v Barclays National Bank Ltd; Kalk v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1983 (3) SA 619 (A) at
629-630.
21 Such as the example given in Jeremy Phillips Trade Mark Law para 8.50 at 232 of a company Rytz
Industriebau AG having used the same name for many years prior to the registration of the mark in
question and had incorporated the name in its registered domain name as rytz.ch. When Rytz Cie SA
was formed it registered a trademark and then claimed infringement. The court dismissed the claim on
the basis of prior usage. Rytz Cie SA v Rytz Industriebau AG [2001] ETMR 363 (Federal Civil Court,
Switzerland).

bona fide may found the defence. That is, after all, precisely what the
section says and I am not persuaded that the niceties of trade mark law
require a different construction. It seems to have been the approach in the
only case to which we were referred that dealt directly with a defence
under this section namely the case of Bosch.22 There, a firm of engineers,
named eponymously after its founder, had established a subsidiary
company undertaking work in regard to computer systems. In turn a
further subsidiary was established advising on information systems. All
the companies in the group used the name „Bosch‟ and a similar logo.
That use by the information services subsidiary was held to be sufficient
to justify the invocation of the s 36(1) defence, without there being any
finding that it was vested with a reputation for purposes of passing-off in
the mark „Bosch‟.

[25]  The appeal against the dismissal of Etraction‟s infringement claim
must therefore be dismissed. I turn then to consider the appeal against the
partial expungement order.
Expungement
[26] The high court ordered a partial expungement of Etraction‟s trade
mark by the exclusion from the scope of the registered trade mark of the
word „tires‟. In terms of s 27(1)(a) of the Act a registered trade mark may
be expunged if:
„… the trade mark was registered without any bona fide intention on the part of the
applicant for registration that it should be used in relation to those goods or services
by him or any person permitted to use the trade mark as contemplated by section 38,

22 Robert Bosch GmbH v Bosch Information Systems (Pty) Ltd & others 2000 BIP 286 (D).

and that there has in fact been no bona fide use of the trade mark in relation to those
goods or services by any proprietor thereof or any person so permitted for the time
being up to the date three months before the date of the application‟.
The section has two elements. A person invoking the section must prove
that the registration occurred without any bona fide intention to use the
mark and that there has in fact been no bona fide use of the registered
mark. For present purposes, only the first is relevant, because it is
common cause that Etraction has not made any use of the registered mark
INFINITY in respect of tyres.

[27] Whether Etraction had a bona fide intention to use the mark
INFINITY in relation to tyres is a question of fact. The background to its
registration of the mark is accordingly important. I have already outlined
the use it made from 1995 of that mark in relation to rims and the fact that
it has never used the mark in relation to tyres. On its own admission it
became aware in 2006 that tyres were being sold under the mark Infinity.
During the next two years it must have seen the advertisements for
Infinity tyres in trade magazines in which it also placed advertisements,
yet it was only in 2008 that it did anything about it. The circumstances in
which it did so are highly relevant to its bona fides.

[28] Etraction lodged its application for registration of the INFINITY
mark on 15 April 2008. Although it claimed in its affidavits to be a
neophyte in respect of trade mark applications, that was untruthful. It had
applied for two trade marks in August 1998 – interestingly enough not for
INFINITY – and these had been registered on 8 October 2002. On 12
March 2008, one month before it lodged the application in dispute, it

lodged ten other applications for registration of the trade marks Malas
and MRW. On 18 March 2008 it lodged further applications for the
marks Lexani and Asanti. The claim of ignorance can hardly be sustained
in the light of those facts.

[29]  On 17 and 18 March 2008 Mr de Villiers and Mr Pelser addressed
emails to Etraction offering to supply it with INFINITY tyres. The emails
enclosed photographs of the tyres that Tyrecor was offering to supply and
set out the prices at which it was offering the tyres. On 26 March 2008
Mr de Villiers sent an e-mail recording a meeting he had had with Mr
Tayob and Mr Akram. It read:
„I would once again like to thank you for affording me the time to meet with both of
you today to introduce our products. We are very proud of the INFINITY brand and
believe that we will be able to add value to your organization.
I sincerely hope that we can establish a beneficial relationship in the near future.
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require any additional information.‟

[30] Within three weeks after that meeting Etraction applied for
registration of the mark INFINITY in relation to tyres. It did not,
however, convey to Tyrecor that it objected to it using the mark nor did it
give any notice of its application to Tyrecor until it had secured
registration of the mark, which occurred on 19 May 2011. During the
three years between the date of its application and registration Tyrecor
continued to trade and built up its business in the sale of Infinity tyres
without any inkling that Etraction objected thereto or that it intended
itself to enter the market for tyres under that brand name. In 2011 its
turnover from this trade exceeded R100 million.

[31] It is impossible in those circumstances to come to any conclusion
other than that Etraction‟s purpose in seeking the registration of the
INFINITY mark in respect of tyres was to stultify Tyrecor‟s business.
There is not a jot or tittle of evidence to suggest that it genuinely intended
at any stage to trade in tyres under the Infinity mark. Nor can it be said
that the mark was registered in these broad terms as a defensive mark.
The coincidence in timing between Mr de Villiers‟ sales visit and the
application for registration of the INFINITY mark is indicative of an
attempt to harm the business of a successful competitor. No other
plausible explanation for this conduct has been proffered and the one that
was advanced, that Etraction was unfamiliar with trade marks, was
simply untrue.

[32] There have been a number of judgments of this court on what
constitutes bona fide use of a trade mark and I need quote only two. In
Rembrandt23 Steyn CJ said that use:
„…for an ulterior purpose, unassociated with a genuine intention of pursuing the
object for which the Act allows the registration of a trade mark and protects its use,
cannot pass as bona fide user.‟
Then Harms JA in The Gap,24 said:
„For present purposes, it suffices to say that “bona fide user”

“means a user by the proprietor of his registered trade mark in connection with
the particular goods in respect of which it is registered with the object or intention

23 Rembrandt Fabrikante en Handelaars (Edms) Bpk v Gulf Oil Corporation 1963 (3) SA 341 (A) at
351C-F.
24 AM Moolla Group Ltd v The Gap Inc supra para 42. The earlier authorities are collected in Arjo
Wiggins Ltd v Idem (Pty) Ltd & another 2002 (1) SA 591 (SCA); [2002] 2 All SA 147 (SCA); [2001]
ZASCA 109; in para [6]

primarily of protecting, facilitating, and furthering his trading in such goods, and not
for some other, ulterior object”.
This test is similar to that proposed in an opinion by the Advocate General in the
European Court of Justice in the Ansul case:

“When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had
to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether the commercial
exploitation of the mark is real, particularly whether such use is viewed as warranted
in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the
goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the
characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark.”‟

[33] In considering whether the proprietor of the mark bona fide
intended to use it in relation to the goods in respect of which it is
registered one examines the facts, as they appear from the course of
events leading up to the application for registration, to determine whether
there was a genuine intention to use the mark in the course of trade in
respect of those goods or whether the registration was intended for an
ulterior purpose. Etraction had used the mark Infinity to some degree in
respect of rims from 1995, but made no attempt to register a trade mark
or to assert any rights in respect of its use especially in respect of tyres.
From when Falck entered the market in 2006, until Mr de Villiers‟ fateful
attempt to sell Infinity tyres to Etraction in March 2008, it made no
complaint about the branding, nor did it ever suggest that this was an
infringement of its existing rights or would interfere with any planned
expansion of its commercial activities. Nothing in its conduct showed a
genuine intention to use the mark in relation to the sale of tyres. Its
registration of other house marks pointed in the opposite direction.

[34] There is no acceptable explanation for Etraction‟s decision a mere
three weeks after Mr de Villiers‟ attempt to sell it Infinity tyres to apply
for registration of the INFINITY trade mark. Can one infer an ulterior
motive from this? In my view one can. Surreptitiously seeking to register
a trade mark when one is aware of the fact that another person is using it
and with the intention of exploiting registration to disrupt their use or to
procure an undue advantage justifies the inference of ulterior motive.

[35] It seems to me that this case is similar, in regard to the conduct of
Etraction, to what occurred in the context of the registration of a domain
name in an arbitration involving Finter Bank25 in Switzerland. The bank
had existed for a number of years and held a registered mark „Finter”,
which was the name by which it was commonly known. It had also
registered a domain name „Finter.ch‟. When the system, of domain
registration was altered to give priority to domain names with suffixes
such as „org‟ or „com‟ Mr Olivieri registered two names „finter.org‟ and
„finter.com‟, claiming to have done so because his family dog was called
„Ruby der Finter‟. However, this was belied by his conduct, ten days after
receiving the domain registration, of trying to sell the two domain names
to the bank. The arbitrator dealt with whether he had acted in bad faith in
the following way:
„Although it is difficult to define in general terms a multi-facetted notion such as bad
faith, it should under Swiss law comprise two elements:
– the knowledge of given facts, in the present case the prior use by Complainant
of a trade name and a trademark …

25 Finter Bank Zurich v Gialuca Olivieri Case No D 2000-0091 (WIPO Arbitration and Mediation
Centre).

– the awareness to act against a rule of law.‟

[36] Following that approach Etraction acted with a knowledge of given
facts namely the extensive trade already built up in relation to Infinity
tyres. Second it acted for a purpose other than that for which trade mark
registration is permitted. Its conduct when it applied for registration can
only be described as underhand, I am satisfied that it did not have any
bona fide intention to use the mark in respect of tyres. In common
parlance its motive was to throw a spanner in the commercial works of
Tyrecor‟s successful trade in Infinity tyres.

[37] Accordingly the high court was correct to grant the order for the
expungement from Etraction‟s registration of the word „tires‟. However,
undaunted by this Etraction sought to argue that such a limited
expungement would not assist Tyrecor, because tyres are similar goods to
the goods in respect of which the registration would survive. Accordingly
it submitted that for it to continue to use the mark Infinity in respect of
tyres would infringe its trade mark in terms of s 34(1)(b) of the Act. For
my part I doubt that such an argument would or could succeed in the face
of a finding that tyres should not have been included in the registered
mark in the first instance. But to put the matter beyond doubt the terms of
registration of Etraction‟s mark should be further amended by the
insertion of a clear disclaimer that the registered mark does not include
tyres

[38] In the result the following order is made:

1 Save for paragraph 2 of this order the appeal is dismissed with costs,
such costs to include those consequent upon the employment of two
counsel where two counsel were employed.
2 The order granted in respect of the counter-application is amended to
read as follows:
„The counter application succeeds with costs and the Registrar is directed
in terms of section 24(1) of the Trade Marks Act, to expunge the word
„tires‟ from the Applicant‟s trade mark registration and to amend the
registration to read „ Vehicle components and Accessories: wheels and
rims, but not including tyres‟.

M J D WALLIS
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances

For appellant:
Mark Seale
Instructed by:
Brian Bacon Inc, Cape Town;
Webbers, Bloemfontein

For respondent:
R Michau SC (with him I Joubert)

Instructed by:
Hahn & Hahn Inc, Pretoria
Peyper Attorneys, Bloemfontein.
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa

MEDIA SUMMARY– JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF APPEAL
From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
28 May 2015
Status:
Immediate
Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the
media and does not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeal.
Etraction (Pty) Ltd v Tyrecor (Pty) Ltd
The SCA today dismissed an appeal in which the appellant
Etraction (Pty) Ltd, a dealer in tyres and wheels sought to enforce its
registered trade mark INFINITY against a competitor, Tyrecor (Pty) Ltd,
to prevent the latter from importing into South Africa and selling tyres
under the bran name Infinity. On the evidence Tyrecor’s predecessor in
title had been importing and selling tyres under the brand name Infinity
for more than two years prior to the registration of Etraction’s trade mark.
The court held that this constituted bona fide and continuous use of the
mark, which is protected in  terms of s 36(1) of the Trade Marks Act 194
of 1993.

The court also dismissed an appeal against the high court’s
decision to expunge the word ‘tires’ from Etraction’s registered mark. It
did so on the basis that in terms of s 27(1) of the Trade Marks Act
Etraction had not had a bona fide intention to use the mark INFINITY in
respect of tyres, but had caused the mark to be registered for the ulterior
purpose of disrupting Tyrecor’s established business.