THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Case no 332/08

In the matter between:

ABSA BROKERS (PTY) LTD
Appellant

and

RMB FINANCIAL SERVICES
First Respondent
RMB ASSET MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
MOMENTUM DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
Third Respondent
MOMENTUM GROUP LTD
Fourth Respondent

Neutral citation:
Absa Brokers v RMB Financial Services and others
(332/08) [2009] ZASCA 83 (20 August 2009)

Coram:
NUGENT, MLAMBO, MHLANTLA, JJA, LEACH et
BOSIELO AJJA

Heard:
25 May 2009

Delivered:
20 August 2009

Summary:
Interpretation of section 2 of the Apportionment of
Damages Act 34 of 1956.

____________________________________________________________

ORDER
____________________________________________________________

On appeal from: High Court, Pretoria (Legodi J sitting as a court of first
instance).

(a)
Save as set out in paragraph (b) the appeal is dismissed with costs;

(b)
The order of the court below is varied by the addition of the
following sentence, the date referred to being a reference to the
date upon which this order was substituted for the order of the
court below:

‘The plaintiff is granted leave to amend its particulars of claim
within 21 days of the date of this order.’
___________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________

MHLANTLA JA et NUGENT JA (MLAMBO JA, LEACH et BOSIELO
AJJA concurring)

[1] This is an appeal against an order of the High Court, Pretoria
(Legodi J) upholding an exception. The issues between the parties will be
best understood against the background of the factual issues that follow.
An action was brought against the appellant by the Claasen Family Trust
(the Trust) for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained.
The Trust alleged that the appellant’s employee had convinced it to invest
an amount of R1 020 000 in an investment product known as ‘RMB

Guaranteed Cashflow Investment’ (the product) by representing that the
capital amount invested in the product would be guaranteed and refunded
at the end of the investment period. This however was not the case. As it
turned out, so it was alleged, the capital was placed at risk and could not
be repaid on maturity. The appellant settled the claim by paying the Trust
an amount of R585 686.56.

[2] The appellant, having settled the claim, instituted action in the
High Court, Pretoria against the four respondents in the proceedings that
are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were joint wrongdoers,
and sought to recover a contribution from one or more of the respondents.
The appellant pleaded that the first and second respondents had devised,
designed and developed the product and had furthermore utilized the
services of the third and fourth respondents to promote and market it to
members of the public, including its employees. The respondents are
alleged to have caused the appellant’s employee to make false or
incorrect representations about the true nature and characteristics of the
product to members of the public.

[3] The respondents excepted to the appellant’s particulars of claim on
the basis that no cause of action was disclosed. The court below upheld
the exception. This appeal is before us with the leave of that court.

[4] The appellant’s claim is founded upon s 2(12) read with s 2(6) of
the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956, which permits a joint
wrongdoer to recover a contribution from another joint wrongdoer in
certain circumstances. This appeal turns on the interpretation of s 2 of the
Act and, in particular, it raises the question whether the appellant was
obliged to give notice in terms of s 2(2), or obtain leave of the court in

terms of s 2(4), as a precondition to instituting action against the
respondents. It is convenient at this stage to set out the relevant
provisions of s 2.

[5] Section 2(1) is a guiding principle to have a unitary action. It
allows for an action to be instituted against joint wrongdoers in the
following terms:
'(1)
Where it is alleged that two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in
delict to a third person (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) for the same damage,
such persons (hereinafter referred to as joint wrongdoers) may be sued in the same
action’.
Section 2(2) allows for joint wrongdoers who have not been sued in an
action to be alerted to their potential liability, whether by the plaintiff or
by a defendant, so as to enable them to intervene in the proceedings, in
the following terms:
(2)
Notice of any action may at any time before the close of pleadings in that
action be given –
(a)
by the plaintiff;
(b)
by any joint wrongdoer who is sued in that action,
to any joint wrongdoer who is not sued in that action, and such joint wrongdoer may
thereupon intervene as a defendant in that action’.

[6] The Act recognises the potential prejudice to a joint wrongdoer
who is not joined in an action and in this regard s 2(4) provides a sanction
if the notice referred to in s 2(2) has not been given to a joint wrongdoer
as follows:
(4)(a) If a joint wrongdoer is not sued in an action instituted against another joint
wrongdoer and no notice is given to him in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (2),
the plaintiff shall not thereafter sue him except with the leave of the court on good
cause shown as to why notice was not given as aforesaid.

(b)
If no notice is under paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2) given to a joint
wrongdoer who is not sued by the plaintiff, no proceedings for a contribution shall be
instituted against him under subsection (6) or (7) by any joint wrongdoer except with
the leave of the court on good cause shown as to why notice was not given to him
under paragraph (b) of subsection (2)’.

[7] Provision is made for a contribution to be claimed by one joint
wrongdoer against another, so far as it is material to this appeal, by
s 2(12) read with s 2(6). The relevant portion of s 2(12) provides as
follows:
‘(12) If any joint wrongdoer agrees to pay to the plaintiff a sum of money in full
settlement of the plaintiff’s claim, the provisions of subsection (6) shall apply mutatis
mutandis as if judgment had been given by a competent court against such joint
wrongdoer …’.
Section 2(6) in turn, provides as follows:
‘If judgment is in any action given against any joint wrongdoer for the full amount of
the damage suffered by the plaintiff, the said joint wrongdoer may, if the judgment
debt has been paid in full, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (4),
recover from any joint wrongdoer a contribution in respect of his responsibility for
such damage of such amount as the court may deem just and equitable having regard
to the degree in which that other joint wrongdoer was at fault in relation to the
damage suffered by the plaintiff and to the damages awarded: …’.

[8] As appears from subsection (6), the right that is accorded to one
joint wrongdoer to recover a contribution from another is expressly stated
to be ‘subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (4)’. The
essence of the respondents’ exception was that the appellant had not
alleged that it had given them as defendants notice of the first action as
required by s 2(2) of the Act, nor had it obtained leave of the court in
terms of s 2(4), before the proceedings against them were instituted. They

thus contended that the appellant was precluded from instituting the
action.

[9] Before us counsel for the appellant disputed that construction of
the relevant subsections. Directing his argument to the phrase 'where it is
alleged' in s 2(1) he contended that the appellant was not obliged to give
notice to the respondents of the Trust’s action, nor to have the leave of
the court, since it had not been alleged in the Trust’s action that the
respondents were joint wrongdoers. In that regard he relied upon what
was said in Becker v Kellerman,1 which held that the phrase ‘where it is
alleged’ in s 2(1) must be interpreted as ‘where it is alleged in an action’.

[10] In that case Mashigo, an employee of Becker had caused damage
to Kellerman's motor vehicle in a road accident. Kellerman sued
Mashigo for damages caused in the collision.  Thereafter and without
notice or the leave of the court he instituted a claim for a contribution
against Becker, who had not caused the accident and was sued on the
basis of vicarious liability.  Becker raised a special plea that Kellerman
could not sue him because he had failed to give him notice in terms of
s 2(2) or obtain the leave of the court in terms of s 2(4).

[11] The court dismissed the special plea. Much of the judgment in that
case is taken up with the question whether a person who is vicariously
liable for the conduct of another is a joint wrongdoer for the purposes of
the Act. Having found that such a person is indeed a joint wrongdoer, the
court turned to the question

1 1971 (2) SA 172 (T) at 182H.

‘whether or not all joint wrongdoers who are in fact jointly or severally liable in delict
for the same damage, are joint wrongdoers for the purposes of subsections (2) and (4)
of section (2)’2 (our translation).
It held that Becker was not such a joint wrongdoer, with the result that
Kellerman was entitled to sue him without the leave of the court,
notwithstanding that Becker had not been given notice of the earlier
action.

[12] The reasoning of the court in Becker v Kellerman, as we
understand it, was that ‘joint wrongdoers’ as contemplated by the relevant
subsections were confined to persons who had been alleged to be joint
wrongdoers in the initial action. Absent such an allegation in the course
of the initial action, the person who was subsequently sued was not a
‘joint wrongdoer’ and did not fall within the terms of subsection (4)(a).
Because there had been no allegation in the action against the employee
that Becker was a joint wrongdoer, so the court held, he was not a ‘joint
wrongdoer’ as contemplated by subsection 4(a).3

[13] The court below sought to distinguish Becker v Kellerman but we
do not think this case is materially distinguishable. Quite clearly the
circumstances in which the issue arose in that case differ from those of
the present case. But if such an allegation is indeed a prerequisite to a
person being a ‘joint wrongdoer’ for purposes of subsection 4(a) – as was
found in Becker v Kellerman –  then it seems to us that that must apply as
much to subsection 4(b). And if that is so, it is fatal to the respondents’
case, because there is no suggestion that in the action by the Trust against
the appellant it was alleged by anyone that the respondents were joint

2 At 182B-C.
3 At 185A-C.

wrongdoers (and the case was argued on the basis that no such allegation
had been made).

[14] But we disagree with the construction that was placed upon the Act
in that case. In our view the court in Becker v Kellerman accorded undue
significance to the use of the word ‘alleged’ in s 2(1). To the extent that
the subsection defines ‘joint wrongdoers’, it defines the term to mean
‘two or more persons [who are] jointly or severally liable in delict to a
third person for the same damage’.4 We do not think that the phrase
‘where it is alleged’ purports to suggest that the term is confined to
persons who have been alleged at some time to be joint wrongdoers. The
purpose of the phrase is no more than procedural. Subsection (1) creates a
procedural framework for the initiation of the unitary process in which
the respective rights and obligations of the plaintiff and all concurrent
wrongdoers will be determined. It could hardly have been phrased so as
to refer to persons who are joint wrongdoers in fact when the very
question to be determined in the proceedings that it authorises is whether
or not they are indeed ‘joint wrongdoers’. References to ‘joint
wrongdoers’ in the remaining subsections are at times a reference to
persons who are alleged to be joint wrongdoers, and at other times a
reference to persons who are joint wrongdoers in fact, but that is again
dictated by the same procedural reasons.5  But we cannot agree that the
determination of whether a person is or is not a joint wrongdoer for
purposes of those subsections is whether or not an allegation to that effect
was made in the original action. That construction seems to us not only to

4 See McKerron The Law of Delict in South Africa 7ed 306.
5 Shield Insurance Co Ltd v Zervoudakis 1967 (4) SA 735 (ECD) 737H-738A; South African Railways
and Harbours v South African Stevedore Services Co Ltd 1983 (1) 1066 (A) at 1089H-1090A; Wapnick
v Durban City Garage 1984 (2) SA 414 (D) at 421D-422F.

strain the language but, as pointed out by the court below, it would also
lead to absurdities when applied to s 2 as a whole.

[15] We agree with the court below that the clear purpose of the Act is
to avoid a multiplicity of actions arising from a single loss-causing event.
The scheme of the Act contemplates a single determination of liability by
multiple wrongdoers and the apportionment of liability amongst them in
single proceedings. Thus a plaintiff who alleges that two or more persons
are liable for the damage that is in issue then he or she is permitted by
s 2(1) to sue them all in the same action. A defendant who alleges that
another person is also liable to the plaintiff is capable of joining him or
her in the proceedings under Rule 13 of the Uniform Rules. And if the
plaintiff and the defendant choose not to join that person in the action,
then that person must at least be given the opportunity to intervene by
being notified of the action. The clear purpose of subsections 4(a) and (b)
is to encourage the resolution of all claims in single proceedings by
barring further proceedings against parties who have not been given such
notice (except with the leave of the court).

[16] That seems to us to be the plain meaning of the language of the
various subsections. The language is also consistent with the manner in
which it was applied in South African Railways and Harbours v South
African Stevedore Services,6 where the phrase ‘joint wrongdoers’ was
used within the context of the Act in different senses, and in Wapnick v
Durban City Garage,7 as well as in Lincoln v Ramsaran.8  Both the latter
cases dealt with applications to the court for leave to institute action for a
contribution in terms of s 2(4) of the Act as no notice of the original

6 At 1089.
7 1984 (2) SA 414 (D).
8 1962 (3) SA 374 (N).

action had been given to the persons subsequently alleged to be joint
wrongdoers. No allegation in either matter had been made that the person
from whom the apportionment was sought was a joint wrongdoer. The
merits of each application were considered and the court held that leave
of the court had to be obtained before such wrongdoers could be sued
regardless of the fact that no allegation had been made in the original
action that they were joint wrongdoers. In the Lincoln case the application
was granted, whilst in Wapnick leave was refused as the applicant had
failed to show good cause.

[17] In our view the finding in Becker v Kellerman that the provisions
of subsection 4 apply only to a person who has been alleged in the
original proceedings to be a joint wrongdoer, is inconsistent with the
scheme of the Act and undermines the object and purpose thereof. The
conclusion is illogical and was in our respectful view erroneous. It
follows therefore that the reliance by the appellant on Becker v Kellerman
is misplaced. In the absence of notification to the respondents of the
earlier action, as required by subsection 2, and without the leave of the
court, the appellant was precluded by subsection 4(b) from instituting the
present action. In those circumstances the exception was correctly upheld.

[18] In so far as the form of the order issued by the court below is
concerned, it was accepted by counsel for all the parties that the appellant
ought to have been permitted to amend its particulars of claim to remedy
the defect if it is capable of doing so. The order will be amended
accordingly.

[19] In the result the following order is made:

(a)
Save as set out in paragraph (b) the appeal is dismissed with
costs.
(b)
The order of the court below is varied by the addition of the
following sentence, the date referred to being a reference to
the date upon which this order was substituted for the order
of the court below:
'The plaintiff is granted leave to amend its particulars of
claim within 21 days of the date of this order.'

___________________
N Z MHLANTLA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

__________________
R. W. NUGENT
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances:

For Appellant
J P Vorster SC

K W Lüderitz

Instructed by:

Gildenhuys Lessing Malatji, Pretoria

Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For First and Second
Respondents
M Du P van der Nest SC

DA Turner

Instructed by:

Deneys Reitz, Sandton, Johannesburg

Webbers, Bloemfontein

For Third and Fourth
Respondents
S Symon SC

Instructed by:

Keith Sutcliffe & Associates, Johannesburg

EG Cooper &Madjiet, Bloemfontein
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA SUMMARY – JUDGMENT DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

From:
The Registrar, Supreme Court of Appeal
Date:
20 August 2009
Status:
Immediate

Please note that the media summary is intended for the benefit of the media and does
not form part of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.

* * *
ABSA BROKERS (PTY) LTD v RMB FINANCIAL SERVICES & OTHERS

The Supreme Court of Appeal today dismissed an appeal against a judgment of the
Pretoria High Court upholding an exception that the appellant’s particulars of claim
disclosed no cause of action in terms of section 2 of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34
of 1956.

The appellant, having settled a claim in an initial action, instituted action against the
respondents, alleging that they were joint wrongdoers, and sought to recover a
contribution from one or more of the respondents. The essence of the respondents’
exception was that the appellant had not alleged that it had given them as respondents'
notice of the initial action as required by section 2(2) of the Act, nor had it obtained leave
of the court in terms of section 2(4) before the proceedings against them were instituted.
The respondents thus argued that the appellant was precluded from instituting the action.
The appellant contended that it was not obliged to give notice of the earlier action, nor
obtain leave of the court and in this regard relied on Becker v Kellerman 1971 (2) SA 172
(T).

The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the finding in Becker v Kellerman that the
provisions of subsection 4 applied only to a person who had been alleged in the original
proceedings to be a joint wrongdoer, was inconsistent with the scheme of the Act and
undermined the object and purpose thereof. The court accordingly held that in the absence
of notification to the respondents of the earlier action as required by subsection 2, and
without the leave of the court, the appellant was precluded by subsection 4(b) from
instituting the present action.