U.S. Route 60 in Oklahoma

U.S. Route 60 (US-60) is a transcontinental U.S. highway extending from near Brenda, Arizona to Virginia Beach, Virginia on the Atlantic Ocean. Along the way, 352.39 miles (567.12 km) of the route lies within the state of Oklahoma. The highway crosses into the state from Texas west of Arnett and serves many towns and cities in the northern part of the state, including Arnett, Seiling, Fairview, Enid, Ponca City, Pawhuska, Bartlesville, and Vinita. US-60 exits Oklahoma near Seneca, Missouri. In Oklahoma, US-60 has three business routes, serving Tonkawa, Ponca City, and Seneca. The first 60.2 miles (96.9 km) of the route, from the Texas line to Seiling, is also designated as State Highway 51 (SH-51).

US-60, as originally designated, did not enter Oklahoma. Instead, it ended in Springfield, Missouri, continuing east from there. AASHO approved an extension of US-60 on May 29, 1930, which extended it west through Oklahoma to Amarillo, Texas. US-60's extension displaced US-164 in its entirety; that designation was then retired.

## Route description

US-60 enters Oklahoma in Ellis County, just east of Higgins, Texas. SH-51 begins at the state line concurrent with US-60, and will remain so for the next 60.2 miles (96.9 km). The highways head due east from the state line for seven miles (11 km) before coming to an intersection with US-283. US-283 follows US-60 and SH-51 into Arnett, where they serve as the southern terminus for SH-46. East of Arnett, US-283 splits off to the south. US-60/SH-51 continue east through the unincorporated location of Harmon and on into Dewey County.

In the northwest part of Dewey County, US-60/SH-51 pass through Vici, where they share a brief concurrency with SH-34. The highways continue east for 11 miles (18 km) to Cestos, another unincorporated place, and proceed for eight miles (13 km) to a junction with US-183. US-60/SH-51 then enter the city of Seiling, where the two routes part ways. SH-51 turns southeast along eastbound US-270, southbound US-281, and southbound SH-3; US-60 instead follows westbound US-270, northbound US-281, and northbound SH-3. The four routes pass through downtown Seiling. On the north side of town, US-270 and SH-3 continue to the northwest, while US-60 and US-281 take a more northerly tack that will take them towards Major County.

US-60 and US-281 cross the North Canadian River into Major County north of Seiling. They split at unincorporated Chester, five miles (8.0 km) north of Seiling; US-281 continues north toward Waynoka, while US-60 turns east. US-60 then passes through a series of unincorporated locations: Orion, Bado, Dane, and Cedar Springs. The highway next enters Fairview, the county seat. On the south side of town, US-60 and SH-58 join in a concurrency and head north. In downtown Fairview, SH-58 leaves the concurrency but SH-8 joins US-60 as it continues north out of town. Six miles (9.7 km) north of Fairview, US-60 and SH-8 meet US-412 at unincorporated Orienta; US-412 joins the concurrency. The three highways cross the Cimarron River together before SH-8 splits off to the north towards Cleo Springs. US-60 and US-412 continue to the east, meeting up with SH-58 again on the north edge of Ringwood. The two US highways pass through Meno before coming to the Major–Garfield County line.

Soon after entering Garfield County, US-60/US-412 run through Lahoma. Three miles (4.8 km) east of there, they share a brief concurrency with SH-132. The two highways enter the county seat of Garfield County, the city of Enid, along Owen K. Garriott Road, named in honor of the astronaut. In downtown Enid, US-60 turns off of Garriott and onto Van Buren Street, leaving US-412 and joining US-81 instead. The two routes proceed north towards a junction with US-64, which joins the other US routes to form a three-way concurrency—a wrong-way concurrency, as US-60 eastbound is also US-64 westbound and vice versa. The routes straddle the line between Enid and North Enid and serve as the eastern terminus of SH-45. All three highways then exit Enid, and continue north to leave Garfield County as well.

Upon leaving Garfield County, US-60/US-64/US-81 enter Grant County. Fourteen miles (23 km) north of Enid, the three routes come to a T junction; US-64 turns west here, while US-60 and US-81 head east. After four miles (6.4 km), the highways come to the town of Pond Creek; here US-81 splits off towards the county seat of Medford and on to Kansas. US-60 continues east, crossing the Salt Fork of the Arkansas River and briefly concurring with SH-74 to the west of Lamont, where the two part ways.

Kay County is the next county US-60 passes through, and the first settlement US-60 comes to is the city of Tonkawa. Here, US-60 has an interchange with one of the two interstate highways it will meet in Oklahoma, Interstate 35 (I-35) at exit 214. East of I-35, US-60 begins a concurrency with US-77; this interchange is also the western terminus of US-60 Business, which serves downtown Tonkawa. US-177 joins the concurrency at the next interchange, which is also the other end of the Tonkawa business loop. Further east is an interchange with SH-156, the northern terminus of that route. US-60/US-77/US-177 then reach the outskirts of Ponca City, Kay County's largest city. Ponca City, too, has a business loop from US-60, which begins at the next interchange east. The three U.S. routes mostly bypass the city to the south, only actually entering the city limits at its far southern extent. In Ponca City, US-60 Business reunites with mainline US-60 and ends. This intersection is also where the three-way concurrency between the U.S. routes breaks; US-77 heads north along US-60 Business, deeper into Ponca City, US-177 heads south toward Stillwater, and US-60 heads east to cross the Arkansas River.

Upon crossing the Arkansas, US-60 enters Osage County and the Osage Nation reservation, which is coterminous with the county. US-60 does not have another junction with a state highway for 21 miles (34 km), when it comes to an intersection with SH-11 and SH-18 southeast of Burbank. SH-11 splits away from SH-18 to follow US-60 instead. From the SH-18 junction, the highways' next state highway junction lies 20 miles (32 km) further east, in Pawhuska, the county seat. Here, US-60 and SH-11 come to a T intersection with SH-99; eastbound SH-11 heads south along SH-99 while US-60 heads north. North of Pawhuska, US-60 splits off to the east once again, as SH-99 continues north to the Kansas line. US-60 serves as the northern terminus of a spur route to Osage Hills State Park; this route, while state maintained and numbered as SH-35, does not bear any conventional state highway signage.

US-60 next comes to a junction with SH-123 as it enters Bartlesville. The SH-123 junction lies a few feet into Washington County; south of the junction, US-60 and SH-123 form a concurrency, and the two routes curve slightly to the west and straddle the Washington–Osage county line. After only 0.2 miles (0.32 km), US-60 turns to the east along Adams Boulevard, splitting away from SH-123, and fully enters Washington County. US-60 runs through downtown Bartlesville on Adams, then bridges the Caney River. The highway continues to an interchange with US-75. At this interchange, US-60 turns south and overlaps US-75 before splitting off to the east once again, leaving Bartlesville and, soon, Washington County behind.

Next along US-60's route is Nowata County, and the county seat of the same name, 17 miles (27 km) east of Bartlesville. In Nowata, the route uses a series of local streets to pass through town, following, from west to east, Davis Avenue, Pecan Street, Delaware Avenue, and Pine Street before turning onto Cherokee Avenue. It intersects with US-169 Alternate at Maple Street, then with US-169 itself at Ash Street. In the east part of Nowata, US-60 transitions from Cherokee Avenue to Fairview Avenue, which it remains on as it exits town. Three miles (4.8 km) east of Nowata, the highway passes through unincorporated Coodys Bluff, where it crosses the Verdigris River. five miles (8.0 km) east of Coody's Bluff, the highway junctions with SH-28. US-60 continues into Craig County, leaving Nowata County.

US-60's first highway junction in Craig County is at the eastern terminus of SH-66 east of the incorporated location of White Oak. US-60 then proceeds east, joining with US-69 as the two head into Vinita, the county seat. In Vinita, the highways serve as the southern terminus of the northern SH-2. Just outside Vinita, US-60 has its first interchange with I-44, which is also carrying the Will Rogers Turnpike at this point (this is US-69's second I-44 junction; it previously intersected I-44 near Big Cabin). Four miles (6.4 km) east of the I-44 junction, US-60/US-69 serve as the northern terminus of SH-82. East of here, the two US highways clip the corner of Delaware County; while in Delaware County, they meet SH-85 at is northern terminus.

Ottawa County is the final Oklahoma county that both US-60 and US-69 will pass through. The two routes first pass through the town of Afton. The first highway junction in the county is with US-59, which concurs with the other two highways. Less than a mile north of the US-59 junction, the three highways pass through a cloverleaf interchange; proceeding north through this interchange places a motorist on US-59/US-69 bound for Miami, heading west leads to the toll booth for I-44, and turning east puts the motorist on US-60 eastbound. US-60, now with no other highways concurrent with it, will parallel the BNSF rail line for the remainder of its time in Oklahoma. The next town the route passes through is Fairland; here, it has a brief concurrency with SH-125. US-60 crosses the Neosho River (also known as the Grand River) into Twin Bridges State Park. Within the park, the highway serves as the southern terminus of SH-137. US-60 crosses the Spring River to exit the park. Northeast of Wyandotte, US-60 has a brief concurrency with SH-10. As it approaches the state line, US-60 Business splits from US-60, serving Seneca, Missouri. US-60 then leaves Oklahoma, continuing into Newton County, Missouri.

## History

US-60 as designated in the original U.S. highway system had a western terminus in Springfield, Missouri. On May 29, 1930, AASHO approved an extension westward to Amarillo, Texas, bringing the route through Oklahoma for the first time. From west to east, US-60 displaced US-164 (from Amarillo to Enid, its entire length), SH-11 (from Ponca City to Pawhuska), and SH-25 (from Pawhuska to Vinita). The section of highway between what was then US-59/US-66/US-69 (now only US-59/US-69) north of Afton and Seneca, Missouri was purpose-built as US-60.

The first two changes to US-60 in Oklahoma after its inception occurred in the northeastern part of the state. The highway's routing through Bartlesville was changed on September 15, 1936. On October 22, 1936, a section of US-60 and SH-48 (the precursor to SH-99 in that area) in Osage County north of Pawhuska was abandoned in favor of a new alignment that led to a new grade separation.

At the request of the Ponca City Chamber of Commerce, the Oklahoma Highway Commission approved several changes to the highway marking in the vicinity of that city. Both US-77 and US-60 had a bypass route marked around town as a "Belt Line", while city routes (the precursor to business routes) were marked through town. The US-60 Belt Line approximated the route of present-day US-60 Business, while the US-60 City Route penetrated further into downtown Ponca City. These routes were established on September 9, 1938.

US-60 would be realigned through many of the towns it served in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The highway was adjusted through Fairland to use Connor Avenue, a shorter, straighter route through town; this change was approved on July 11, 1949. The highway's route through Nowata was altered next, on November 13, 1950. Previously, US-60 followed Delaware Avenue to Oak Street, where it turned south, before turning back to the east on Cherokee Avenue; after the change, it turns south on Pine Street and joins Cherokee Avenue further west. On the same date, the highway was realigned through Bartlesville. The US-60 system through Ponca City was next to be reworked, on July 14, 1952. The previous US-60 and US-77 Belt Line routes and City Routes were removed in favor of a new US-60 route bypassing the city to the south on Harding Avenue and proceeding east across a new Arkansas River bridge—the present day route. Further west, US-60 and US-177 were realigned in Tonkawa on May 4, 1953, replacing an alternate US-60/US-177 that previously paralleled the main highway there.

The mid-1950s saw two alterations of US-60 in rural areas. The first concerned the section of US-60 between then-US-59/US-66/US-69 and Fairland. Previously, US-60 diverged from the other three U.S. routes further north and headed due east towards Fairview. The new (present-day) alignment of US-60, approved December 17, 1956, instead diverged at an interchange also serving the Will Rogers Turnpike, then headed northeast to Fairland. After realignment, the route was 1.4 miles (2.3 km) shorter than before. The next change occurred on April 23, 1957, in Major County, northeast of Orienta. Here, the highway was realigned due to a new bridge over the Cimarron River; the old highway was turned over to Major County to maintain.

On July 17, 1958, the Highway Commission approved a reroute of US-60 and US-81 through Enid. Rather than passing through the north half of the city on Grand Avenue and North Enid Boulevard as the two routes did previously, they now proceeded north along Van Buren Avenue. The next changes to the route occurred in Osage County. A 3.1-mile (5.0 km) segment of US-60/SH-11 west of Pawhuska with many curves was replaced with a newer, straighter alignment on October 6, 1958, with the old highway segment being transferred to the county. Further straightening of the route, further west, was approved on April 3, 1961.

The easternmost stretch of US-60 in Oklahoma was revised in 1965. Previously, US-60 passed directly through Seneca, Missouri. In 1965, the Oklahoma and Missouri Departments of Highways submitted a request to reroute US-60 to the south, and to redesignate a portion of old US-60 serving Seneca, as well as a segment of Missouri Route 43 connecting to the new US-60, as US-60 Business. The remainder of the bypassed portion of US-60 in Missouri, east of Route 43, was to be abandoned. This request was approved by the Oklahoma Highway Commission on March 1, submitted to AASHO on May 5, and approved by AASHO on July 12.

Two realignments to US-60 occurred on March 6, 1967. First, a portion of US-60 west of Nowata was straightened. Second, a segment of US-60/SH-11 east of Burbank was rerouted to the south on a straighter alignment; this new alignment also removed a concurrency with SH-18. On April 3, 1967, the Oklahoma Highway Commission approved a realignment of a short segment of US-60/US-64/US-81 north of Enid in Garfield and Grant Counties. AASHO received applications for both the Burbank and Enid-area relocations on April 24 and approved both of them at the organization's June 20 meeting.

On July 14, 1969, US-60/US-77/US-177 west of Ponca City was moved to a new alignment, and a section of temporary highway linking the new road to the old road continuing west toward Tonkawa had the three U.S. designations applied to it. AASHO received the application for this move on August 25, and it was approved on October 26. Further west, the Oklahoma Department of Highways constructed a section of highway bypassing Tonkawa to the north and east. The Highway Commission approved moving US-60 to this highway and designating the old highway as US-60 Business on August 9, 1971. AASHO received an application for this change on October 8 of that year and approved it on December 4. The section of highway between the Tonkawa bypass and the Ponca City bypass was upgraded next; this road was designated as US-60/US-77/US-177 on November 7, 1974. This change was submitted to AASHO, now renamed to AASHTO, on April 29, 1975, received on May 1, and approved on June 17.

On January 6, 1986, the Oklahoma State Transportation Commission (which had replaced the Highway Commission) approved rerouting US-60/SH-11 on the east side of Pawhuska. While the two highways still passed through Pawhuska from west to east, after turning north, the new route bypassed much of the city. The application for this alteration was submitted to AASHTO on September 22, received the same day, and approved on November 8.

The next change to US-60 did not take place until the 21st century. On March 19, 2001, 0.73 miles (1.17 km) US-60 and SH-51 west of Arnett were moved slightly to connect to a new bridge. Because ODOT demolished the old highway rather than turning it over to Ellis County, this change did not require approval from the Highway Commission. Finally, on October 4, 2004, the Transportation Commission approved the realignment of US-60, US-412, and SH-8 at their junction near Orienta. No further changes to the route are on record.

## Junction list

Section of U.S. Highway in Oklahoma, United States

Transportation in Craig County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Delaware County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Dewey County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Ellis County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Garfield County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Grant County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Major County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Nowata County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Osage County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Ottawa County, Oklahoma

Transportation in Washington County, Oklahoma


On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work, also known as the "Juche speech", was a speech delivered on 28 December 1955 by Kim Il Sung. The address mentioned his Juche ideology by name for the first time. It is considered one of Kim's most important works and a "watershed moment" in North Korean history. Views differ if the speech used the term juche to launch an ideology or more conservatively to assert that the Korean people were the subject of the revolution. The former believes that Juche, as a distinct ideology, was developed by Hwang Jang-yop on his re-discovery of the speech. The speech was published for the first time in 1960 and in many subsequent, heavily edited revisions since.

Details on when Kim Il Sung delivered the speech and where remain unclear or have been backdated. The speech was delivered against a backdrop of factional strife within the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in reaction to the Korean War, de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, the Soviet–Yugoslav thaw, and economic reconstruction. Kim criticizes Soviet Korean propaganda workers of "dogmatism" and "formalism" by citing Soviet practices they had naively adopted to Korean conditions. Most of the speech is not about Juche, but about ways to win South Koreans' hearts and minds through propaganda.

## Background

North Korea's defeat in the Korean War and the subsequent political turmoil within the WPK laid the groundwork for the speech. The death of Stalin and the ongoing de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union also had an impact. Moreover, the Soviet–Yugoslav thaw marked an opportunity to re-define North Korea's relationship with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Kim believed North Korea had to signal its political independence from the Soviet Union since its reconstruction was based on Soviet aid. In other words, North Korea wanted Soviet aid but not the terms that came with it. For example, one Soviet condition was implementing a North Korean New Course policy to favour light industry and consumer goods over heavy industry. These terms conflicted with Kim's focus on heavy industry and the goal of turning North Korea into a self-reliant and independent economy. Kim's primary adversaries, the Soviet Koreans, were inspired by the new policies emanating from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Koreans sought to strengthen their position by aligning themselves with the Yan'an faction.

This factional struggle took place within the cultural establishment in the early 1950s. Pak Hon-yong, representing the party's domestic faction, as well as leading Soviet Koreans, appointed like-minded officials to cultural posts and discarded those sympathetic to Kim Il Sung. Prominent domestic faction writers such as Im Hwa [ko], Kim Nam-chon [ko], and Yi Tae-jun [ko] were thus placed under the patronage of the Soviet Koreans. Kim sought to avoid open confrontation with the Soviet Koreans since it would offend the Soviet Union. Instead, he chose to launch a campaign on the literary front against those writers. After these intermediaries were purged, Kim began focusing on the Soviet Korean opposition more generally. Their association with the purged writers disparaged the Soviet Koreans.

## Setting

The exact time and setting of the speech are not known, but there are two distinct possibilities. The first theory is that the speech – subtitled "Speech to Party Propagandists and Agitators, December 28, 1955" – was delivered on that date to a small audience of propaganda workers. The second possibility is that the event was a meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK that same week.

It is a possibility that the writer Han Sorya influenced Kim Il Sung to wage his campaign against propaganda workers with a Soviet Korean background. On 27 December, one day before Kim Il Sung's speech, the party convened a propaganda conference in which Han delivered the opening remarks. Although Kim's speech of the following day references some of it, the speech of Han has not been made public. However, we do know that Han criticised Soviet Korean propaganda work. Specifically, Han believed that Rodong Sinmun's editors were ignoring the role of early Korean communists in the founding of the North Korean party–state. According to Dongseo University professor B. R. Myers, Kim Il Sung's speech likely took place at a small follow-up event of propagandists. Downplaying the importance of the event in the subtitle of the speech would have served no conceivable purpose. Kim's speech credits Han for uncovering "big ideological errors" on the literary front, and promotes him to the leadership of the literary establishment.

Kookmin University professor Andrei Lankov and Korea University professor Balázs Szalontai, on the other hand, conclude that the event including Kim's speech must have been a meeting of the central committee of the party. There was an extended meeting of the Standing Committee of the WPK along with a great number of guests totalling more than 420 participants around that date. Kim's speech might have been the concluding speech of the event.

## Speech

### Criticism of factionalism

By "dogmatism" Kim meant the rigid application of Soviet practices to Korean conditions. As such, Kim's use of the term was influenced by the Chinese communists. Likewise, "formalism" had meant an emphasis on the Soviet form of communism at the expense of the actual substance of revolution that needs to take local conditions into account. According to Suh, the speech is anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese. Kim lists Soviet practices that he finds unsuited to Korea. He believed that printing tables of contents at the back instead of the front of books, copying headlines from Pravda, publishing pictures of Siberia and hanging pictures of prominent Russian authors in public places were naive adoptions of Soviet practices. In contrast, Kim calls for adopting the Chinese rectification campaign to Korea. James F. Person calls this an attempt to abandon sadae ('serving the great') attitude (sadaejuui) and to "decolonize the Korean mind". In this sense the speech was grounded on traditional Marxist–Leninist thinking of the time, and the terms were used similarly in the Soviet Union to criticize Stalinism. However, despite the title only the speech's first half deals with juche, dogmatism, and formalism. The other half is on encouraging an uprising in South Korea.

When Kim delivered the speech his most acute concern was how to neutralise the Soviet Koreans and the Yan'an faction. Having been at first reluctant to take sides publicly, Kim felt vulnerable to critique by opponents after he had mismanaged the country's economy. To rebuild the country after the Korean War, Kim had decided on an economic policy of favoring heavy over light industry. The results were not good, with both heavy industry and agriculture in stagnation. An alternative, light industry driven policy, appeared and was associated with the Soviet Koreans. Thus, the speech specifically criticizes leading Soviet Koreans, and criticized by name Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung-yop, domestic faction members that were purged at this point. Kim accused factionalists of wanting to bring the South Korean writer Yi Kwang-su, who had notoriously collaborated with the Japanese during World War II, to North Korea. While this plan materialized during the Korean War, it was foiled by Yi's death on his way to the North. Kim's main focus, however, was on still active officials, including Chŏng Sang-chin, Pak Yong-bin, Ki Sok-bok, Chong Yul, Chon Tong-hyok, and Pak Chang-ok.

Kim faulted the propaganda workers for supporting de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union. Besides, by criticizing these workers, Kim had a convenient pretext to attack his opponents elsewhere. The speech was followed by the August Faction Incident of 1956 and a purge of opponents, which Kim legitimized through the juche concept.

### Juche

The December speech is the first published mention of juche by Kim. In a speech in April that same year, he had talked about "subjective capability" but used a word other than juche. In later editions of that speech, the word has been replaced with juche (chuch'ejŏk).

Myers calls the wording of the title – "establishing juche in ideological work" – clumsy. The Korean word juche literally means 'subject', in the philosophical sense of an active subject. Therefore, it is not logical to say that a subject is established when it should be what establishes something in the first place. Myers offers two explanations for the choice of phrasing. First, it might have been employed by Kim Chang-man [ko], who had talked about juche even before Kim Il Sung, and either wrote the 1955 speech or at least gave Kim Il Sung material to do so. Second, Kim might have opted for "establishing juche" as a code word to present his covert point that North Korea was moving toward more political independence instead of using a more forthright but provocative wording like "Koreanization of communism". As Myers points out, the title does not posit establishing juche as more important than the other two tasks (eliminating dogmatism and formalism). Neither does it claim that juche is an overarching ideology. Rather, Myers contend that Kim considered it as a part of the ongoing ideological work.

The key passage in the speech is:

> What is the subject [juche] in our party's ideological work? What are we doing? We are engaged in Korea's revolution and not some other country's. Precisely this Korean revolution is the subject [juche] of our party's ideological work, all of which must therefore be made to serve its interests. Whether we research the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese revolution, or the general principles of Marxism–Leninism, it is all in order to carry out or own revolution correctly.

While some scholars contend that the speech was a bold declaration of nationalism or political independence, Myers considers the rhetoric something not out of the ordinary in Eastern Bloc countries at the time. John Gittings goes further, questioning the passage's authenticity, saying that it "reads as if has been inserted later into the original text" of the speech. In the speech, Kim then goes back and forth:

> By saying that the subject [juche] is missing from our party's ideological work, I do not mean, of course, that we did not carry out a revolution, or that our revolutionary work was carried out by some passer-by. But the subject [juche] has not been firmly established in ideological work, for which reason dogmatist and formalist errors have been made, doing much harm to our revolutionary cause.

This, concludes Myers, can be summed as: "the subject—the Korean revolution, as distinct from other revolutions—has not established itself clearly in ideological work." In a similar vein, Kim continues:

> Marxism–Leninism is not a dogma. It is a guide to action and a creative theory. So only when it is applied creatively to suit the specific conditions of each country can it display its indestructible vitality.

This passage contains a specific paraphrase of Lenin and Engels that was not considered provocative back then: "Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action".

North Korean historiography has subsequently backdated the origin of the Juche ideology to Kim Il Sung's guerrilla days in the 1930s. In his memoir, With the Century, Kim seeks to clear up the discrepancy between the purported 1930s origin and 1955 first mention. Kim writes that his 1930s speeches only contained an "element" of the Juche idea, but that 1955 marked "the period of postwar socialist construction, when we particularly stressed the task of the sentimentalism of [juche]". Kim Sung-chull notes how Kim does not deny that 1955 was the first appearance of the word, saying that the 1992 autobiography ended the debate on the origin of juche.

### Propaganda work

Most of the speech is about ways to win the hearts and minds of South Koreans through propaganda. Much of the criticism is presented, according to Myers, in a rambling fashion, suggesting that Kim either went off script or was speaking from sparse notes. Myers notes that "[f]or what it's worth, the 1980 edition of the speech includes a photograph of what is purportedly a page from Kim's handwritten notes; they are jottings of phrases and keywords, studded with Chinese characters so as to appear more authentic". Similarly, a picture of Kim writing the speech was published, but according to Myers "there is no reason to believe the caption's claim that it was this very speech".

The content of this part of the speech makes clear Kim's intention to destroy the South Korean state. Kim says historians should study Korean resistance movements like the Gwangju Student Independence Movement and the June 10th Movement. This largely did not happen as the focus of North Korean historiography gravitated toward studying only Kim Il Sung's exaggerated role in the liberation of Korea.

## Aftermath and significance

The speech was not published immediately. Some references to it were made in contemporary press, but these mentions were vague. It was, however, distributed to party members. It was not published until 1960 in the fourth volume of Kim's Selected Works (sŏnjip) in Korean. In advertisements for the volume in the magazine Kulloja, seven individual works were highlighted in chronological order and the Juche speech came last, suggesting that it was not considered that important at the time.

The term began to appear untranslated and capitalized (Juche) in English scholarly texts in the 1960s. According to Myers, this result of lazy (non-)translation made juche "jump out" from text and seem like an original idea instead of the ordinary word it was.

The speech is often considered a "watershed moment" in North Korean history. For example, University of Hawaii professor Dae-Sook Suh calls it "perhaps the most important speech" that Kim made. Conventionally, it is seen to have launched the Juche ideology. Those who disagree with this interpretation include Myers. Similarly, Alzo David-West calls Juche in 1955 merely a political slogan, not an ideology. According to David-West, the speech did not so much launch a new ideology as it espoused the return to an old one, that of national Stalinism. The "speech prioritized North Korean national interests apropos of the Stalinist policy of socialism in one country on North Korean terms." Myers points to the scarcity of material on Juche in Kim's writings until the 1960s as a sign of the ideology's insignificance. According to Suh, this can be explained by a tactical position. Kim could not press on with Juche when he still had not decisively taken sides in the Sino-Soviet split. After he started supporting China, and the Soviets retaliated, Kim could talk about Juche again. Consequentially, North Korean propagandists had to develop Juche into a full-fledged ideology. In particular, Western academics credit Hwang Jang-yop with re-discovering the 1955 speech and expanding upon its conception of Juche. Kim's first subsequent speech to elucidate on the ideological content of Juche was not until 1965. According to Lankov, only this "can be seen as the first Juche speech", adding that "the 1955 statement used the word in a different meaning". Kim Jong Il, who had studied under Hwang at Kim Il Sung University, soon became the chief official ideologue of Juche and the ideology was coupled with dynastic succession.

According to Myers, the significance of the 1955 speech has only been applied retrospectively and erroneously. It did not deviate from the official Marxist–Leninist line, nor did it assert the two key features that are now commonly associated with Juche: self-reliance and nationalism. Myers thinks the speech represents a call for the creative appliance of Marxism–Leninism that was common in the Eastern Bloc at the time. David-West disagrees with Myers and thinks that Myers has reached his findings by a formalist reading of the speech (here understood as an "empirical mode of literary analysis [that] essentially takes form for content and appearance for reality").

The speech was followed up with purges and industrial programs culminating in the Chollima Movement. This leads David-West to conclude that Kim wanted to pursue rather than discard Stalinism and that the speech was a reaction to de-Stalinization. He further believed it "an emergency writ of mandamus, commanding the party and government not to abandon the autarkic economic policies and political program upon which the DPRK regime was founded in 1948."

The speech has been republished several times. According to Suh, there is only "slight editing" from the early versions, but Myers considers versions after 1960 "bowdlerized" and has identified numerous changes. The favorable mention of the Chinese rectification campaign was removed from subsequent revisions. Names of writers Pak Yon-am, Chong Ta-san, Ri Ki-yong, and Han Sorya were also omitted.

## See also

- Propaganda in North Korea

1955 work by Kim Il-sung


History of Solidarity

Solidarity (Polish: „Solidarność”, pronounced ), a Polish non-governmental trade union, was founded on August 14, 1980, at the Lenin Shipyards (now Gdańsk Shipyards) by Lech Wałęsa and others. In the early 1980s, it became the first independent labor union in a Soviet-bloc country. Solidarity gave rise to a broad, non-violent, anti-Communist social movement that, at its height, claimed some 9.4 million members. It is considered to have contributed greatly to the Fall of Communism.

The People's Republic of Poland attempted to destroy the union by instituting martial law in 1981, followed by several years of political repression but in the end was forced into negotiation. The Roundtable Talks between the Communist government and the Solidarity-led opposition resulted in semi-free elections of 1989. By the end of August 1989, a Solidarity-led coalition government had been formed, and Wałęsa was elected president in December 1990. This was soon followed by the dismantling of the Communist governmental system and by Poland's transformation into a modern democratic state. Solidarity's early survival represented a break in the hard-line stance of the Communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), and was an unprecedented event; not only for the People's Republic of Poland—a satellite of the Soviet Union ruled by a one-party Communist state—but for the whole of the Eastern Bloc. Solidarity's example led to the spread of anti-Communist ideas and movements throughout the Eastern Bloc, weakening Communist governments. This process later culminated in the Revolutions of 1989.

In the 1990s, Solidarity's influence on politics of Poland waned. A political arm of the Solidarity movement, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), was founded in 1996 and would win the 1997 Polish parliamentary election, only to lose the subsequent 2001 Polish parliamentary election. Thereafter, Solidarity had little influence as a political party, though it became the largest trade union in Poland.

## Pre-1980 roots (1970s)

In the 1970s and 1980s, the initial success of Solidarity in particular, and of dissident movements in general, was fed by a deepening crisis within Soviet-influenced societies. There was declining morale and worsening economic conditions (a shortage economy). After a brief boom period, from 1975 the policies of the Polish government, led by Party First Secretary Edward Gierek, precipitated a slide into increasing depression, as foreign debt mounted. In June 1976, the first workers' strikes took place, involving violent incidents at factories in Płock, Radom and Ursus. When these incidents were quelled by the government, the worker's movement received support from intellectual dissidents, many of them associated with the Committee for Defense of the Workers (Polish: Komitet Obrony Robotników, abbreviated KOR), formed in 1976. The following year, KOR was renamed the Committee for Social Self-defence (KSS-KOR).

On October 16, 1978, the Bishop of Kraków, Karol Wojtyła, was elected Pope John Paul II. A year later, during his first pilgrimage to Poland, his masses were attended by hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. The Pope called for the respecting of national and religious traditions and advocated for freedom and human rights, while denouncing violence. To many Poles, he represented a spiritual and moral force that could be set against brute material forces, he was a bellwether of change, and became an important symbol—and supporter—of changes to come.

## Early strikes (1980)

Strikes did not occur merely due to problems that had emerged shortly before the labor unrest, but due to governmental and economic difficulties spanning more than a decade. In July 1980, Edward Gierek's government, facing economic crisis, decided to raise prices while slowing the growth of wages. At once there ensued a wave of strikes and factory occupations, with the biggest strikes taking place in the area of Lublin. The first strike started on July 8, 1980 in the State Aviation Works in Świdnik. Although the strike movement had no coordinating center, the workers had developed an information network to spread news of their struggle. A "dissident" group, the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), which had originally been set up in 1976 to organize aid for victimized workers, attracted small groups of working-class militants in major industrial centers. At the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the firing of Anna Walentynowicz, a popular crane operator and activist, galvanized the outraged workers into action.

On August 14, the shipyard workers began their strike, organized by the Free Trade Unions of the Coast (Wolne Związki Zawodowe Wybrzeża). The workers were led by electrician Lech Wałęsa, a former shipyard worker who had been dismissed in 1976, and who arrived at the shipyard late in the morning of August 14. The strike committee demanded the rehiring of Walentynowicz and Wałęsa, as well as the according of respect to workers' rights and other social concerns. In addition, they called for the raising of a monument to the shipyard workers who had been killed in 1970 and for the legalization of independent trade unions. The workers may have timed the strike to coincide with the nearby Intervision Song Contest, which many international journalists attended.

The Polish government enforced censorship, and official media said little about the "sporadic labor disturbances in Gdańsk"; as a further precaution, all phone connections between the coast and the rest of Poland were soon cut. Nonetheless, the government failed to contain the information: a spreading wave of samizdats (Polish: bibuła), including Robotnik (The Worker), and grapevine gossip, along with Radio Free Europe broadcasts that penetrated the Iron Curtain, ensured that the ideas of the emerging Solidarity movement quickly spread.

On August 16, delegations from other strike committees arrived at the shipyard. Delegates (Bogdan Lis, Andrzej Gwiazda and others) together with shipyard strikers agreed to create an Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, or MKS). On August 17 a priest, Henryk Jankowski, performed a mass outside the shipyard's gate, at which 21 demands of the MKS were put forward. The list went beyond purely local matters, beginning with a demand for new, independent trade unions and going on to call for a relaxation of the censorship, a right to strike, new rights for the Church, the freeing of political prisoners, and improvements in the national health service.

Next day, a delegation of KOR intelligentsia, including Tadeusz Mazowiecki, arrived to offer their assistance with negotiations. A bibuła news-sheet, Solidarność, produced on the shipyard's printing press with KOR assistance, reached a daily print run of 30,000 copies. Meanwhile, Jacek Kaczmarski's protest song, Mury (Walls), gained popularity with the workers.

On August 18, the Szczecin Shipyard joined the strike, under the leadership of Marian Jurczyk. A tidal wave of strikes swept the coast, closing ports and bringing the economy to a halt. With KOR assistance and support from many intellectuals, workers occupying factories, mines and shipyards across Poland joined forces. Within days, over 200 factories and enterprises had joined the strike committee. By August 21, most of Poland was affected by the strikes, from coastal shipyards to the mines of the Upper Silesian Industrial Area (in Upper Silesia, the city of Jastrzębie-Zdrój became center of the strikes, with a separate committee organized there, see Jastrzębie-Zdrój 1980 strikes). More and more new unions were formed, and joined the federation. In September 1980 in Prudnik, over 1500 workers of ZPB "Frotex" along with other factories and firefighters from Prudnik's fire brigade went on the biggest anti-Communist strike in Opole Voivodeship.

Thanks to popular support within Poland, as well as to international support and media coverage, the Gdańsk workers held out until the government gave in to their demands. On August 21 a Governmental Commission (Komisja Rządowa) including Mieczysław Jagielski arrived in Gdańsk, and another one with Kazimierz Barcikowski was dispatched to Szczecin. On August 30 and 31, and on September 3, representatives of the workers and the government signed an agreement ratifying many of the workers' demands, including the right to strike. This agreement came to be known as the August or Gdańsk agreement (Porozumienia sierpniowe). Other agreements were signed in Szczecin (the Szczecin Agreement of August 30), and Jastrzębie-Zdrój on September 3. It was called the Jastrzębie Agreement [pl] (Porozumienia jastrzebskie) and as such is regarded as part of the Gdańsk agreement. Though concerned with labor-union matters, the agreement enabled citizens to introduce democratic changes within the Communist political structure and was regarded as a first step toward dismantling the Party's monopoly of power. The workers' main concerns were the establishment of a labor union independent of Communist-party control, and recognition of a legal right to strike. Workers' needs would now receive clear representation. Another consequence of the Gdańsk Agreement was the replacement, in September 1980, of Edward Gierek by Stanisław Kania as Party First Secretary.

## First Solidarity (1980–1981)

Encouraged by the success of the August strikes, on September 17 workers' representatives, including Lech Wałęsa, formed a nationwide labor union, Solidarity (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy (NSZZ) "Solidarność"). It was the first independent labor union in a Soviet-bloc country. Its name was suggested by Karol Modzelewski, and its famous logo was conceived by Jerzy Janiszewski, designer of many Solidarity-related posters. The new union's supreme powers were vested in a legislative body, the Convention of Delegates (Zjazd Delegatów). The executive branch was the National Coordinating Commission (Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza), later renamed the National Commission (Komisja Krajowa). The Union had a regional structure, comprising 38 regions (region) and two districts (okręg). On December 16, 1980, the Monument to Fallen Shipyard Workers was unveiled in Gdańsk, and on June 28, 1981, another monument was unveiled in Poznan, which commemorated the Poznań 1956 protests. On January 15, 1981, a Solidarity delegation, including Lech Wałęsa, met in Rome with Pope John Paul II. From September 5 to 10, and from September 26 to October 7, Solidarity's first national congress was held in Hala Olivia, Gdańsk, and Lech Wałęsa was elected its president. Last accord of the congress was adoption of republican program "Self-governing Republic".

Meanwhile, Solidarity had been transforming itself from a trade union into a social movement or more specifically, a revolutionary movement. Over the 500 days following the Gdańsk Agreement, 9–10 million workers, intellectuals and students joined it or its suborganizations, such as the Independent Student Union (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, created in September 1980), the Independent Farmers' Trade Union (NSZZ Rolników Indywidualnych "Solidarność" or Rural Solidarity, created in May 1981) and the Independent Craftsmen's Trade Union. It was the only time in recorded history that a quarter of a country's population (some 80% of the total Polish work force) had voluntarily joined a single organization. "History has taught us that there is no bread without freedom," the Solidarity program stated a year later. "What we had in mind was not only bread, butter and sausages, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions, and the repair of the republic." Tygodnik Solidarność, a Solidarity-published newspaper, was started in April 1981.

Using strikes and other protest actions, Solidarity sought to force a change in government policies. In some cases, as in Bielsko-Biała, Solidarity managed to force corrupt officials of the government to lose their jobs. At the same time, it was careful never to use force or violence, so as to avoid giving the government any excuse to bring security forces into play. After 27 Bydgoszcz Solidarity members, including Jan Rulewski, were beaten up on March 19, a four-hour warning strike on March 27, involving around twelve million people, paralyzed the country. This was the largest strike in the history of the Eastern bloc, and it forced the government to promise an investigation into the beatings. This concession, and Wałęsa's agreement to defer further strikes, proved a setback to the movement, as the euphoria that had swept Polish society subsided. Nonetheless the Polish Communist party—the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR)—had lost its total control over society.

Yet while Solidarity was ready to take up negotiations with the government, the Polish Communists were unsure what to do, as they issued empty declarations and bided their time. Against the background of a deteriorating Communist shortage economy and unwillingness to negotiate seriously with Solidarity, it became increasingly clear that the Communist government would eventually have to suppress the Solidarity movement as the only way out of the impasse, or face a truly revolutionary situation. The atmosphere was increasingly tense, with various local chapters conducting a growing number of uncoordinated strikes as well as street protests, such as the Summer 1981 hunger demonstrations in Poland, in response to the worsening economic situation. On December 3, 1981, Solidarity announced that a 24-hour strike would be held if the government were granted additional powers to suppress dissent, and that a general strike would be declared if those powers were used.

## Martial law (1981–1983)

After the Gdańsk Agreement, the Polish government was under increasing pressure from the Soviet Union to take action and strengthen its position. Stanisław Kania was viewed by Moscow as too independent, and on October 18, 1981, the Party Central Committee put him in the minority. Kania lost his post as First Secretary, and was replaced by Prime Minister (and Minister of Defence) Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, who adopted a strong-arm policy.

On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski began a crack-down on Solidarity, declaring martial law and creating a Military Council of National Salvation (Wojskowa Rada Ocalenia Narodowego, or WRON). Solidarity's leaders, gathered at Gdańsk, were arrested and isolated in facilities guarded by the Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa or SB), and some 5,000 Solidarity supporters were arrested in the middle of the night. Censorship was expanded, and military forces appeared on the streets. A couple of hundred strikes and occupations occurred, chiefly at the largest plants and at several Silesian coal mines, but were broken by ZOMO paramilitary riot police. One of the largest demonstrations, on December 16, 1981, took place at the Wujek Coal Mine, where government forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing 9 and seriously injuring 22. The next day, during protests at Gdańsk, government forces again fired at demonstrators, killing 1 and injuring 2. By December 28, 1981, strikes had ceased, and Solidarity appeared crippled. The last strike in the 1981 Poland, which ended on December 28, took place in the Piast Coal Mine in the Upper Silesian town of Bieruń. It was the longest underground strike in the history of Poland, lasting 14 days. Some 2000 miners began it on December 14, going 650 meters underground. Out of the initial 2000, half remained until the last day. Starving, they gave up after military authorities promised they would not be prosecuted. On October 8, 1982, Solidarity was banned.

The range of support for the Solidarity was unique: no other movement in the world was supported by Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, Santiago Carrillo, Enrico Berlinguer, Pope John Paul II, Elizabeth II, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Benn, Polish Legion of American Veterans, Polish government-in-exile, Communist Polish Defectors, East Bloc Defectors, peace campaigners, NATO Spokesman, United Nations Spokesmen, Christians, Western Communists, Conservatives, Liberals, Socialists. The international community outside the Iron Curtain condemned Jaruzelski's actions and declared support for Solidarity; dedicated organizations were formed for that purpose (like Polish Solidarity Campaign in Great Britain). US President Ronald Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Poland, which eventually would force the Polish government into liberalizing its policies. Meanwhile, the CIA together with the Catholic Church and various Western trade unions such as the AFL–CIO provided funds, equipment and advice to the Solidarity underground. The political alliance of Reagan and the Pope would prove important to the future of Solidarity. The Polish public also supported what was left of Solidarity; a major medium for demonstrating support of Solidarity became masses held by priests such as Jerzy Popiełuszko.

Besides the Communist authorities, Solidarity was also opposed by some of the Polish (émigré) radical right, believing Solidarity or KOR to be disguised communist groups, dominated by Jewish Trotskyite Zionists.

In July 1983, martial law was formally lifted, though many heightened controls on civil liberties and political life, as well as food rationing, remained in place through the mid-to-late 1980s.

## Underground Solidarity (1982–1988)

Almost immediately after the legal Solidarity leadership had been arrested, underground structures began to arise. On April 12, 1982, Radio Solidarity began broadcasting. On April 22, Zbigniew Bujak, Bogdan Lis, Władysław Frasyniuk and Władysław Hardek created an Interim Coordinating Commission (Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna) to serve as an underground leadership for Solidarity. On May 6 another underground Solidarity organization, an NSSZ "S" Regional Coordinating Commission (Regionalna Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ "S"), was created by Bogdan Borusewicz, Aleksander Hall, Stanisław Jarosz, Bogdan Lis and Marian Świtek. June 1982 saw the creation of a Fighting Solidarity (Solidarność Walcząca) organization.

Throughout the mid-1980s, Solidarity persevered as an exclusively underground organization. Its activists were dogged by the Security Service (SB), but managed to strike back: on May 1, 1982, a series of anti-government protests brought out thousands of participants—several dozen thousand in Kraków, Warsaw and Gdańsk. On May 3 more protests took place, during celebrations of the Constitution of May 3, 1791. On that day, Communist secret services killed four demonstrators – three in Warsaw and one in Wrocław. Another wave of demonstrations occurred on August 31, 1982, on the second anniversary of the Gdańsk Agreement (see August 31, 1982 demonstrations in Poland). Altogether, on that day six demonstrators were killed – three in Lubin, one in Kielce, one in Wrocław and one in Gdańsk. Another person was killed on the next day, during a demonstration in Częstochowa. Further strikes occurred at Gdańsk and Nowa Huta between October 11 and 13. In Nowa Huta, a 20-year-old student Bogdan Wlosik was shot by a secret service officer.

On November 14, 1982, Wałęsa was released. However, on December 9 the SB carried out a large anti-Solidarity operation, brutally beating and arresting over 10,000 activists. On December 27 Solidarity's assets were transferred by the authorities to a pro-government trade union, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, or OPZZ). Yet Solidarity was far from broken: by early 1983 the underground had over 70,000 members, whose activities included publishing over 500 underground newspapers. In the first half of 1983 street protests were frequent; on May 1, two persons were killed in Kraków and one in Wrocław. Two days later, two additional demonstrators were killed in Warsaw.

On July 22, 1983, martial law was lifted, and amnesty was granted to many imprisoned Solidarity members, who were released. On October 5, Wałęsa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Polish government, however, refused to issue him a passport to travel to Oslo; Wałęsa's prize was accepted on his behalf by his wife. It later transpired that the SB had prepared bogus documents, accusing Wałęsa of immoral and illegal activities that had been given to the Nobel committee in an attempt to derail his nomination.

On October 19, 1984 a popular pro-Solidarity priest, Jerzy Popiełuszko was killed. As the facts emerged, thousands of people declared their solidarity with the deceased priest by attending his funeral, held on November 3, 1984. The government attempted to smooth over the situation by releasing thousands of political prisoners; a year later, however, there followed a new wave of arrests. Frasyniuk, Lis and Adam Michnik, members of the "S" underground, were brutally beaten and arrested on February 13, 1985, starved, tortured, interrogated, placed on a trial, and sentenced to several years' imprisonment for committing several acts of terror against Polish state and its people.

## Second Solidarity (1988–1989)

On March 11, 1985, power in the Soviet Union was assumed by Mikhail Gorbachev. The worsening economic situation in the entire Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union, together with other factors, forced Gorbachev to carry out a number of reforms, not only in the field of economics (uskoreniye) but in the political and social realms (glasnost and perestroika). Gorbachev's policies soon caused a corresponding shift in the policies of Soviet satellites, including the People's Republic of Poland.

On September 11, 1986, 225 Polish political prisoners were released—the last of those connected with Solidarity, and arrested during the previous years. Following amnesty on September 30, Wałęsa created the first public, legal Solidarity entity since the declaration of martial law—the Temporary Council of NSZZ Solidarność (Polish: Tymczasowa Rada NSZZ Solidarność)—with Bogdan Borusewicz, Zbigniew Bujak, Władysław Frasyniuk, Tadeusz Janusz Jedynak, Bogdan Lis, Janusz Pałubicki and Józef Pinior. Soon afterwards, the new Council was – exceptionally – admitted to both the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour. Many local Solidarity chapters now broke their cover throughout Poland, and on the National Executive Committee of NSZZ Solidarność [pl] (Polish: Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza NSZZ Solidarność) was created. Nonetheless, Solidarity members and activists continued to be persecuted and discriminated, if less so than during the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, a rift between Wałęsa's faction and a more radical Fighting Solidarity grew as the former wanted to negotiate with the government, while the latter planned for an anti-Communist revolution.

By 1988, Poland's economy was in worse condition than it had been eight years earlier. International sanctions, combined with the government's unwillingness to introduce reforms, intensified the old problems. Inefficient government-run planned-economy enterprises wasted labor and resources, producing substandard goods for which there was little demand. Polish exports were low, both because of the sanctions and because the goods were as unattractive abroad as they were at home. Foreign debt and inflation mounted. There were no funds to modernize factories, and the promised "market socialism" materialized as a shortage economy characterized by long queues and empty shelves. Reforms introduced by Jaruzelski and Mieczysław Rakowski came too little and too late, especially as changes in the Soviet Union had bolstered the public's expectation that change must come, and the Soviets ceased their efforts to prop up Poland's failing regime.

In February 1988, the government hiked food prices by 40%. On April 21, a new wave of strikes hit the country. On May 2, workers at the Gdańsk Shipyard went on strike. That strike was broken by the government between May 5 and 10, but only temporarily: on August 15, a new strike took place at the "July Manifesto" mine in Jastrzębie-Zdrój. By August 20 the strike had spread to many other mines, and on August 22 the Gdańsk Shipyard joined the strike. Poland's Communist government then decided to negotiate.

On August 26, Czesław Kiszczak, the Minister of Internal Affairs, declared on television that the government was willing to negotiate, and five days later he met with Wałęsa. The strikes ended the following day, and on November 30, during a televised debate between Wałęsa and Alfred Miodowicz (leader of the pro-government trade union, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, or OPZZ), Wałęsa scored a public-relations victory.

On December 18, a hundred-member Citizens' Committee (Polish: Komitet Obywatelski) was formed within Solidarity. It comprised several sections, each responsible for presenting a specific aspect of opposition demands to the government. Wałęsa and the majority of Solidarity leaders supported negotiation, while a minority wanted an anti-Communist revolution. Under Wałęsa's leadership, Solidarity decided to pursue a peaceful solution, and the pro-violence faction never attained any substantial power, nor did it take any action.

On January 27, 1989, in a meeting between Wałęsa and Kiszczak, a list was drawn up of members of the main negotiating teams. The conference that began on February 6 would be known as the Polish Round Table Talks. The 56 participants included 20 from "S", 6 from OPZZ, 14 from the PZPR, 14 "independent authorities", and two priests. The Polish Round Table Talks took place in Warsaw from February 6 to April 4, 1989. The Communists, led by General Jaruzelski, hoped to co-opt prominent opposition leaders into the ruling group without making major changes in the structure of political power. Solidarity, while hopeful, did not anticipate major changes. In fact, the talks would radically alter the shape of the Polish government and society.

On April 17, 1989, Solidarity was legalized, and its membership soon reached 1.5 million. The Solidarity Citizens' Committee (Komitet Obywatelski "Solidarność") was given permission to field candidates in the upcoming elections. Election law allowed Solidarity to put forward candidates for only 35% of the seats in the Sejm, but there were no restrictions in regard to Senat candidates. Agitation and propaganda continued legally up to election day. Despite its shortage of resources, Solidarity managed to carry on an electoral campaign. On May 8, the first issue of a new pro-Solidarity newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (The Election Gazette), was published. Posters of Wałęsa supporting various candidates, appeared throughout the country.

Pre-election public-opinion polls had promised victory to the Communists. Thus the total defeat of the PZPR and its satellite parties came as a surprise to all involved: after the first round of elections, it became evident that Solidarity had fared extremely well, capturing 160 of 161 contested Sejm seats, and 92 of 100 Senate seats. After the second round, it had won virtually every seat—all 161 in the Sejm, and 99 in the Senate.

These elections, in which anti-Communist candidates won a striking victory, inaugurated a series of peaceful anti-Communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe that eventually culminated in the Fall of Communism.

The new Contract Sejm, named for the agreement that had been reached by the Communist party and the Solidarity movement during the Polish Round Table Talks, would be dominated by Solidarity. As agreed beforehand, Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected president; however, the Communist candidate for Prime Minister, Czesław Kiszczak, who replaced Mieczysław Rakowski, failed to gain enough support to form a government.

On June 23, a Solidarity Citizens' Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parliamentarny "Solidarność") was formed, led by Bronisław Geremek. It formed a coalition with two ex-satellite parties of the PZPR — United People's Party and Democratic Party — which had now chosen to "rebel" against the PZPR, which found itself in the minority. On August 24, the Sejm elected Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity representative, to be Prime Minister of Poland. Not only was he a first non-Communist Polish Prime Minister since 1945, he became the first non-Communist prime minister in Eastern Europe for nearly 40 years. In his speech he talked about the "thick line" (Polish: Gruba kreska) which would separate his government from the Communist past By the end of August 1989, a Solidarity-led coalition government had been formed.

## Party and trade union (1989–2020)

The fall of the Communist regime marked a new chapter in the history of Poland and in the history of Solidarity. Having defeated the Communist government, Solidarity found itself in a role it was much less prepared for — that of a political party — and soon began to lose popularity. Conflicts among Solidarity factions intensified. Wałęsa was elected Solidarity chairman, but support for him could be seen to be crumbling. One of his main opponents, Władysław Frasyniuk, withdrew from elections altogether. In September 1990, Wałęsa declared that Gazeta Wyborcza had no right to use the Solidarity logo. Later that month, Wałęsa announced his intent to run for president of Poland. In December 1990, he was elected president. He resigned his Solidarity post and became the first president of Poland ever to be elected by popular vote.

In February 1991, Marian Krzaklewski was elected the leader of Solidarity. President Wałęsa's vision and that of the new Solidarity leadership were diverging. Far from supporting Wałęsa, Solidarity was becoming increasingly critical of the government, and decided to create its own political party for action in the upcoming 1991 parliamentary elections.

The 1991 elections were characterized by a large number of competing parties, many claiming the legacy of anti-Communism, and the Solidarity party garnered only 5% of the votes. On January 13, 1992, Solidarity declared its first strike against the democratically elected government: a one-hour strike against a proposal to raise energy prices. Another, two-hour strike took place on December 14. On May 19, 1993, Solidarity deputies proposed a no-confidence motion—which passed—against the government of Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka. President Wałęsa declined to accept the prime minister's resignation, and dismissed the parliament. It was in the ensuing 1993 parliamentary elections that it became evident how much Solidarity's support had eroded in the previous three years. Even though some Solidarity deputies sought to assume a more left-wing stance and to distance themselves from the right-wing government, Solidarity remained identified in the public mind with that government. Hence it suffered from the growing disillusionment of the populace, as the transition from a Communist to a capitalist system failed to generate instant wealth and raise Poland's living standards to those in the West, and the government's financial "shock therapy" (the Balcerowicz Plan) generated much opposition.

In the elections, Solidarity received only 4.9% of the votes, 0.1% less than the 5% required in order to enter parliament (Solidarity still had nine senators, two fewer than in the previous Senate). The victorious party was the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej or SLD), a post-Communist left-wing party.

Solidarity now joined forces with its erstwhile enemy, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), and some protests were organized by both trade unions. The following year, Solidarity organized many strikes over the state of the Polish mining industry. In 1995, a demonstration before the Polish parliament was broken up by the police (now again known as policja) using batons and water cannons. Nonetheless, Solidarity decided to support Wałęsa in the 1995 Polish presidential election. In a second major defeat for the Polish right wing, the elections were won by an SLD candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who received 51.72% of votes. A Solidarity call for new elections went unheeded, but the Sejm still managed to pass a resolution condemning the 1981 martial law (despite the SLD voting against). Meanwhile, the left-wing OPZZ trade union had acquired 2.5 million members, twice as many as the contemporary Solidarity (with 1.3 million).

In June 1996, Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) was founded as a coalition of over 30 parties, uniting liberal, conservative and Christian-democratic forces. As the public became disillusioned with the SLD and its allies, AWS was victorious in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Jerzy Buzek became the new prime minister; however, controversies over domestic reforms, Poland's 1999 entry into NATO, and the accession process to the European Union, combined with AWS*' fights with its political allies (the Freedom Union—Unia Wolności) and infighting within AWS itself, as well as corruption, eventually resulted in the loss of much public support. AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski lost the 2000 presidential election, and in the 2001 parliamentary elections AWS* failed to elect a single deputy to the parliament. After this debacle, Krzaklewski was replaced by Janusz Śniadek (in 2002) but the union decided to distance itself from politics.

In 2006, Solidarity had some 1.5 million members making it the largest trade union in Poland. Its mission statement declares that Solidarity, "basing its activities on Christian ethics and Catholic social teachings, works to protect workers' interests and to fulfill their material, social and cultural aspirations."

The European Solidarity Centre, a museum and library devoted to the history of Solidarity and other opposition movements of the Eastern Bloc, opened in Gdańsk on August 31, 2014. In 2020, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Solidarity movement many important landmarks around the world were lit up in white and red colours including the Niagara Falls, Christ the Redeemer Statue, Széchenyi Chain Bridge in Budapest, Wrigley Building in Chicago, Qutb Minar in New Delhi with posters and Solidarity logos being displayed in cities such as Berlin, Dublin, NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgrade and Santa Monica in California.

## See also

History of the Polish trade union


United Air Lines Flight 736

United Air Lines Flight 736 was a scheduled transcontinental passenger service flown daily by United Airlines between Los Angeles and New York City. On April 21, 1958, the airliner assigned to the flight, a Douglas DC-7 with 47 on board, was flying over Clark County, Nevada in clear weather when it was involved in a daytime mid-air collision with a United States Air Force fighter jet crewed by two pilots. Both aircraft fell out of control from 21,000 feet (6,400 m) and crashed into unpopulated desert terrain southwest of Las Vegas, leaving no survivors. The loss of Flight 736, one of a series of 1950s mid-air collisions involving passenger aircraft in American skies, helped usher-in widespread improvements in air traffic control within the United States, and led to a sweeping reorganization of federal government aviation authorities.

Among the DC-7 passengers were a group of military personnel and civilian contractors involved with sensitive Department of Defense weapons systems. Their deaths triggered new rules prohibiting similar groups engaged in critical projects from flying aboard the same aircraft.

The official investigation report cited cockpit visibility limitations and high closure speeds as contributing to the accident. While the report did not assign blame for the collision to either flight crew, it faulted military and civilian aviation authorities for not reducing well-known collision risks that had existed for over a year within the confines of airways, even after numerous complaints from airline crews.

A series of lawsuits were filed following the collision. In one case a judge stated the Air Force pilots did not use "ordinary care" in operation of the fighter jet, and should have yielded the right of way to the DC-7 airliner, despite the investigation assigning no blame to either flight crew for the collision. The judge also criticized the Air Force for not coordinating their training flights with civilian traffic, and for failing to schedule their flights to minimize traffic congestion. In another case, a settlement was reached where the U.S. Government paid United Airlines \$1.45 million in compensation.

## Events leading to the accident

The Flight 736 aircraft was a four-engined DC-7 propliner that entered the United Airlines fleet in early 1957, registered as N6328C. On April 21, 1958, it departed Los Angeles International Airport at 7:37 a.m. on a scheduled transcontinental flight to New York City, with stopovers in Denver, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C. The flight crew were Captain Duane Mason Ward, age 44, First Officer Arlin Edward Sommers, 36, and Flight Engineer Charles E. Woods, 43. Of the 42 passengers on the flight, seven were military personnel and 35 were civilians.

Soon after taking off, the airliner was directed about 50 miles (43 nmi; 80 km) east through controlled airspace to a waypoint over Ontario, California, where a turn to the northeast towards Las Vegas allowed it to merge with the "Victor 8" airway. The United Airlines crew–using radio call sign "United 7-3-6"–flew the DC-7 under instrument flight rules (IFR), controlled by Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) ground stations, at an authorized cruise altitude of 21,000 feet toward the first stopover at Denver.

Approximately eight minutes after the DC-7 departed Los Angeles, a U.S. Air Force F-100F-5-NA Super Sabre jet fighter, serial number 56–3755, took off from Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas at 7:45 a.m. on a training flight with two pilots on board. In the front seat of the tandem cockpit was flight instructor and safety pilot Captain Thomas Norman Coryell, 28. Behind him was his trainee, First Lieutenant Jerald Duane Moran (misnamed Gerald in early reports), 23. As part of his IFR training, Moran would spend the flight under a sliding hood that blocked his view outside the aircraft, but allowed him to see his instrument panel. The purpose of the hood was to force the trainee pilot to fly using instruments alone, simulating flight in darkness or in clouds which can deprive a pilot of external visual clues.

The duties of the front-seat pilot were to maintain a lookout for other aircraft while instructing and monitoring the performance of the trainee in the rear seat. The F-100F had dual pilot controls that allowed the instructor at any time to take over flying the jet. Part of the training flight involved a descent and approach to Nellis Air Force Base from an altitude of 28,000 feet (8,500 m), with an extended speed brake, under simulated instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The descent was to follow a "teardrop pattern," with the Las Vegas commercial radio station KRAM as the navigational fix, a process the Air Force called the "KRAM procedure."

`The prescribed descent angle for the KRAM procedure was about five degrees.`

At about 8:14 a.m. CAA controllers received a routine position report from Flight 736 while it was flying over a navigational radio beacon east of Daggett, California; the report estimated an 8:31 a.m. arrival time over McCarran Field near Las Vegas. At 8:28 a.m. the F-100F crew requested and received clearance from the military controller at Nellis Air Force Base to begin a procedural "jet penetration" descent to 14,000 feet (4,300 m). As the fighter descended in a southerly direction, the airliner was approaching Las Vegas air space at about 312 knots (359 mph; 578 km/h) on a north-northeasterly heading of 23 degrees, flying straight and level within the confines of its designated "Victor 8" airway. The CAA stations controlling the airliner were unaware of the fighter jet; the Air Force controller at Nellis Air Force Base directing the jet was unaware of the airliner.

## Collision

At 8:30 a.m., in clear weather with excellent visibility of over 35 miles (30 nmi; 56 km), the flight paths of the two aircraft intersected about 9 miles (7.8 nmi; 14 km) southwest of Las Vegas. The converging aircraft collided nearly head-on at an altitude of 21,000 feet (6,400 m) at an estimated closure speed of 665 knots (765 mph; 1,232 km/h).

The descending Air Force jet, flying at 444 knots (511 mph; 822 km/h), had sliced through the airliner's right wing with its own right wing, immediately sending both aircraft out of control. At the moment of collision the F-100F was in a 90 degree bank to the left at a down angle of approximately 15 to 17 degrees. One eyewitness to the collision said the wings of the F-100F "dipped" about two seconds before the collision; another eyewitness said that just before the impact, the fighter "swooped down." The witness descriptions and the extreme 90 degree bank of the fighter jet—far more than the 30 degrees outlined in the KRAM procedure—indicate an unsuccessful last-second evasive action by the Air Force crew.

Moments after the two planes collided, the only mayday distress call radioed by the United Airlines crew was heard at 8:30 a.m. plus 20 seconds. The message as recorded by a ground station was "United 736, Mayday, mid-air collision, over Las Vegas." The crippled airliner—now missing about eight feet (2.4 m) of its right wing—trailed black smoke and flames as it spiraled earthward in an unrecoverable spin. The high aerodynamic forces resulting from the spin exceeded the DC-7's stress limits, causing the engines to be wrenched from their mounts, and seconds later the remainder of the aircraft began breaking apart. The airliner and its associated debris fell onto a then-empty patch of desert outside the town of Arden, in what is now the unincorporated town of Enterprise, about 2.6 miles (2.3 nmi; 4.2 km) northeast of the estimated collision location. The nearly vertical descent and subsequent explosion made the crash unsurvivable.

The fighter jet—its right wing and right tailplane torn away by the collision—left a trail of fragments as it arced steeply downward, rolling as it fell. One of the Air Force pilots called out an unrecorded mayday message that was eventually determined to be "Mayday, Mayday, this is seven-five-five, we're bailing out". The out-of-control jet crashed into a hilly area of uninhabited desert, 5.4 miles (4.7 nmi; 8.7 km) SSW of the DC-7 crash site. At least one of the Air Force pilots was still in the jet when it hit the ground, but contemporary news reports differ on whether the other pilot attempted an unsuccessful low-altitude ejection, or stayed with the jet all the way to the ground. Witnesses reported seeing a parachute drifting away from the falling F-100F, leading to the hope that a pilot had ejected, but when the parachute was located it was determined to be a detached drag parachute that normally would be used to help the fighter slow down shortly after landing.

## Investigations

At the request of the local sheriff and United Airlines, the Federal Bureau of Investigation sent fingerprint experts to help identify the human remains. Among the dead were 13 civilian and military managers, engineers and technicians assigned to the American ballistic missile program. Five of that group were civilian contractors attached to the missile program at Norton Air Force Base; they were en route to conferences at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command at Offutt Air Force Base. Articles in the Las Vegas Review-Journal commemorating the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the crash reported the FBI search went beyond fingerprint matching for identification; the agents were also looking for any surviving sensitive papers relating to national security the group of military contractors had carried on board in handcuffed briefcases. The same reports also said the crash prompted the military and defense industry to adopt rules to keep groups of technical people involved in the same critical project from traveling together on the same plane.

Investigators from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) conducted an accident analysis, and four months after the collision released a report on August 19, 1958. The report ruled out the weather conditions and the airworthiness of the two planes as factors in the collision. The report stated the probable cause was the high rate of near head-on closure, and that at high altitude, there were human and cockpit limitations involved. The CAB investigation concluded a metal frame support on the F-100's canopy seriously interfered with the Air Force instructor pilot's ability to see the oncoming DC-7, while a supporting pillar on the DC-7's windshield could have prevented the United Airlines captain from sighting the fighter until it was too late to react; however, the report noted the view of the fighter from the airliner's copilot position was not obstructed by any supporting pillar.

The CAB report did not assign blame to either flight crew for the accident, but faulted authorities at the CAA and Nellis Air Force Base for failing to take measures to reduce a known collision exposure; training exercises were allowed to be conducted for more than a year prior to the collision within the confines of several airways, even after numerous near-misses with military jets had been reported by airline crews. The CAB acknowledged that the Air Force, following the accident, took numerous steps to reduce the collision exposure on the airway structure in the Las Vegas area. The report also stated the CAA started a civil-military coordination program, including a review of jet penetrations on a national scale.

## Legacy

From June 1956 to May 1958—beginning with the high-profile Grand Canyon disaster and concluding with the loss of Capital Airlines Flight 300—in just under two years a total of 245 military and civilian people died in a series of five major United States mid-air collisions involving at least one passenger transport aircraft. After each collision more momentum would build to improve the way commercial and military flights were controlled in the United States, with pressure building from the public, the media, and from concerned airline pilots who openly talked about how maneuvering military jets would fly into busy civilian airways without warning.

In an editorial published just after the collision, Aviation Week magazine called the loss of Flight 736 "another ghastly exclamation point in the sad story of how the speed and numbers of modern aircraft have badly outrun the mechanical and administrative machinery of air traffic control." The editorial also reminded the reader that a series of Aviation Week editorials in late 1955 warned of the consequences of the failure to take drastic and immediate action.

Coincidently, the Flight 736 disaster occurred as a CAB hearing on the feasibility of expanding controlled airways was underway in Washington, D.C., and it had a major impact on the hearing proceedings. The collision happened at 11:30 a.m. Eastern time, and early word about the extent of the disaster spread while the hearing was on a lunch break. Only 15 minutes after the hearing deliberations resumed in the afternoon, the CAB approved—on an experimental basis—an already-discussed proposal barring all aircraft lacking specific clearance from entering specifically set-aside airspace.

` All aircraft operating in the designated space would have to be equipped for instrument flight operations.`

According to the CAB there had been 159 mid-air collisions in the years 1947–1957, and 971 near-misses in 1957 alone. The increased speed of aircraft and higher air traffic density made it harder to give pilots enough time to spot each other during flights. Therefore, the CAB said, "it is essential that positive control be extended to altitudes at 35,000 feet (11,000 m) and on additional routes as rapidly as practical." At the time such control only existed between 17,000 and 22,000 feet (5,200 and 6,700 m) on certain transcontinental airways.

The April 28, 1958 issue of Aviation Week reported the CAB admitted it would be "several years, at least" before an all-weather control plan could be implemented, and quoted the head of the CAB's Bureau of Safety as saying the "lack of men, money and machines" stood in the way of implementing a workable control system, nation-wide.

Following the loss of the two airliners in the April and May 1958 collisions, a congressional committee from the U.S. House of Representatives—concerned about the lack of coordination between civil and military air traffic controllers—imposed a 60-day deadline on the CAB and the Air Force to establish new control procedures. The committee also said that eventually a single civil agency should be given the power to regulate all air space for all types of aircraft. Furthermore, the committee stated military flying should be controlled in the vicinity of airways not only in instrument weather, but also in visual conditions.

Four months after the loss of Flight 736, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was signed into law. The act dissolved the CAA and created the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, later renamed Federal Aviation Administration). The FAA was given unprecedented and total authority over the control of American air space, including military activity, and as procedures and air traffic control facilities were modernized, airborne collisions eventually decreased in frequency. The Las Vegas Review-Journal in a 50th anniversary article said the act "specifically referenced the crash of United 736 in ordering the creation of the FAA."

Improved air traffic control procedures did not prevent United Airlines from suffering its third mid-air collision in the space of four years—each time with no survivors from the planes involved—when a United Douglas DC-8 jetliner and a TWA Super Constellation propliner collided over New York City in late 1960. Counting the 134 who died in that collision, the three collisions involving United Airlines in 1956, 1958, and 1960 resulted in 311 deaths.

The destruction of the F-100F in the Flight 736 collision meant it joined a long list of other F-100 crashes; almost 25 percent of the supersonic fighters were lost to accidents. In particular, 1958 was the most costly year, with 47 F-100 pilots killed and 116 of the fighters destroyed, a loss rate averaging almost one every three days.

## Legal aftermath

Following the Flight 736 collision, 48 lawsuits seeking damages—spread across twelve U.S. District Courts—were eventually brought against United Airlines, the U.S. Government, or both. In one lawsuit filed in September 1958, United Air Lines used the Federal Tort Claims Act to seek damages against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The airline alleged that the United States through its agents in the United States Air Force negligently operated the F-100. The airline initially sought damages of US\$3.57 million, then increased the amount to \$3.94 million. The United States filed a counterclaim of \$6.19 million. The court eventually found neither crew was negligent for a failure to see and avoid each other, but held the United States was liable because of other negligence. The case was settled in December 1962 when the United States agreed to pay the airline \$1.45 million.

In a judgment in January 1964, surviving relatives of two of the United Airlines crew were awarded a total of \$343,200 from the government, with U.S. District Court Judge Olin Hatfield Chilson finding the Air Force pilots did not use "ordinary care" in operation of the fighter jet. Chilson also criticized the Air Force for not coordinating instrument training flights with civilian instrument flight rules traffic, and for failing to schedule flights to minimize traffic congestion. The government appealed, and the relatives cross-appealed to have their damage awards increased, but the earlier 1964 judgment was affirmed in September 1965.

## Crash sites

The 49 lives lost in this mid-air collision made it the deadliest aviation incident in the history of the Las Vegas region, but the area has experienced two other major airliner crashes. Movie star Carole Lombard and 21 others died in the mountainside crash of Transcontinental & Western Air (TWA) Flight 3 in 1942, about 16 miles (26 km) WSW of where United Airlines Flight 736 crashed. In 1964, 29 people died when Bonanza Air Lines Flight 114 flew into a hilltop 5 miles (4 nmi; 8 km) SW of the Flight 736 impact site, close to where the F-100F crashed six years earlier.

At both of those rugged, mountainous sites, salvage efforts removed the more accessible wreckage, but scattered portions of the TWA Douglas DC-3 and Bonanza Air Lines Fairchild F-27 were left behind, including the DC-3's radial engines. The United Airlines DC-7 crash site, however, had been cleared of all but the smallest artifacts due to its generally flat terrain. In 1958 the site was unpopulated desert a mile or more from the nearest paved road, but starting around 1999 it became threatened by encroaching development. Today the spot where the DC-7 crashed is adjacent to the neighborhood of Southern Highlands near the intersection of Decatur Boulevard and Cactus Avenue, amid commercial development. A small engraved metal cross placed in the sandy soil in 1999 by the son of a victim remained the only sign of the loss of United Airlines Flight 736, but preliminary efforts were in motion to encourage public officials to build a permanent memorial to those who died.

`A brief video produced by the Las Vegas Review-Journal in April 2018 says the site where Flight 736 impacted is now beneath a parking lot, but the metal cross was still standing nearby on a low hill that remained undeveloped. `

## See also

- 1958 in aviation
- Aviation accidents and incidents
- List of accidents and incidents on commercial aircraft
- List of accidents and incidents involving military aircraft (1955–1959) – includes eight U.S. military mid-air collisions in 1958
- Separation (aeronautics) – the concept for keeping aircraft safe distances apart

1958 mid-air collision over Nevada, USA

Accidents and incidents involving United States Air Force aircraft

Accidents and incidents involving the Douglas DC-7

Airliner accidents and incidents in Nevada

Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in 1958

Mid-air collisions involving military aircraft