Foreign volunteers in the Rhodesian Security Forces

The Rhodesian government actively recruited white personnel from other countries from the mid-1970s to address manpower shortages in the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Rhodesian Bush War. It is estimated that between 800 and 2,000 foreign volunteers enlisted, with the exact number not being known. Many of the volunteers were from the United Kingdom and United States, with some being combat veterans. They generally served alongside Rhodesian personnel, though a separate unit made up of Frenchmen was formed. The volunteers were often labelled as mercenaries by opponents of the Rhodesian regime, though the Rhodesian government did not regard or pay them as such.

The volunteers had a range of motivations. These included opposition to governments led by black people, anti-communism, a desire for adventure and economic hardship. The volunteers generally joined the Rhodesian Security Forces after seeing advertisements or after being contacted by recruiters. The Rhodesian government regarded the volunteers as unreliable and they often received a hostile response from members of the units they were posted to. This contributed to high desertion rates. The remaining volunteers were dismissed from the security forces in 1980 following the end of the war and Rhodesia's transition to Zimbabwe.

In many countries it was illegal to serve with the Rhodesian Security Forces due to the sanctions that had been imposed on Rhodesia or prohibitions against mercenary activity. The governments of the United Kingdom, United States and several other countries were unable to prevent their citizens fighting for Rhodesia due to difficulties enforcing the relevant laws. The nationalist groups who opposed the Rhodesian government believed that the presence of volunteers indicated that western governments supported the regime. Historians have published little on the volunteers, with coverage largely forming part of works on broader issues. The volunteers are celebrated by far right and white supremacist groups who admire Rhodesia.

## Background

### Political situation

Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing British colony located in southern Africa whose economy and government was dominated by the small white minority of its population. Unlike neighbouring South Africa, whose white minority were mainly Afrikaners, white Southern Rhodesians predominately spoke English and had a similar culture to those in other English-speaking countries. From 1962 the Southern Rhodesian government was led by the Rhodesian Front political party. This party was deeply committed to maintaining the white minority's status, with this motivating a decision to declare independence from the United Kingdom rather than submit to a transition to majority rule. Accordingly, the government issued Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom in November 1965, with the colony becoming Rhodesia. UDI was illegal under British law, and was regarded as such by almost all other countries and the United Nations. Britain and the United Nations Security Council imposed wide-ranging trade and other sanctions on Rhodesia with the objective of forcing it to return to its previous status. The scope of these sanctions was increased over time, and included restrictions on support for the Rhodesian military. No country ever officially recognised Rhodesia's independence. South Africa and Portugal provided Rhodesia with assistance, and it was able to evade the sanctions and covertly trade with many countries.

The Rhodesian Front's ideology held that the end of colonial rule in Africa and the development of African nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s had been the result of international communism aided by a policy of appeasement towards African nationalists by the United Kingdom and other western countries. The party believed that Rhodesia needed to take a stand against the perceived communist threat to protect western civilisation in Africa. The academic Michael Evans has written that "the Front’s world-struggle ideology was based on a conspiratorial interpretation of modern politics that emphasised virulent forms of Anglophobia, anti-communism, anti-internationalism, and anti-liberalism". He also noted that the party drew on the ideas and language used by the contemporary radical right movement in the United States to justify UDI. The historian Donal Lowry has endorsed Evans' views, noting also that "the Rhodesia Front sought to combine the notion that Rhodesia embodied the best of true Britishness, the notion that white Rhodesians were ‘the sort of people who once made the “Great" of Britain’, while turning to America as the only remaining champion of the ‘Free World’. It took pains to not be seen as racially or politically extreme, and the party's rhetoric was focused on the need to combat the perceived communist threat rather than the goal of sustaining racial superiority.

### Rhodesian Bush War

UDI and Rhodesia's racial inequalities led to the Rhodesian Bush War. The resistance to the Rhodesian regime was dominated by two black nationalist movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The ZANU was supported by China and the ZAPU by the Soviet Union, both of which were communist countries. The two movements espoused Marxist beliefs and were regarded as communists by the Rhodesian government. However, they and their guerrilla armies were motivated mainly by nationalism and a desire to end discriminatory practices and establish majority rule in Rhodesia.

Guerrilla activities began in 1966, and mainly involved small groups operating in northern areas of Rhodesia. Until the early 1970s the Rhodesian Security Forces had little difficulty in defeating the guerrillas. Rhodesia's security situation deteriorated during the mid-1970s when the nationalists were able to establish bases in Mozambique as Portuguese rule faltered and finally ended in 1975. This led to a rapid growth in the insurgency which the security forces were unable to contain. The Rhodesians' brutal counterinsurgency tactics also proved counter-productive. By 1979 the Rhodesian government was facing defeat and the war was costing 2,000 lives each month. This led to a negotiated conclusion to the war that involved a transition to majority rule and the establishment of Zimbabwe in 1980.

There was considerable sympathy for Rhodesia and its war effort among conservatives in western countries, and especially those who believed in white supremacy. These conservatives often saw UDI as a brave rebellion that sought to hold back what they saw as the harmful effects of rule by black people. The Rhodesian government's racial policies were perceived by many western conservatives to be a form of well meaning paternalism and meritocracy, and considered more acceptable than the apartheid system in South Africa. The cultural similarities between white Rhodesians and the citizens of other anglosphere countries helped win support for the Rhodesian cause in Australia, the United Kingdom and United States, with the country being seen as more akin to the west than South Africa. The Rhodesian government also attracted support from the far right in western countries due to a perception that it was seeking to prevent communists from taking over the country. As the military situation for Rhodesia worsened over the 1970s, many believers in white supremacy in the west saw the white Rhodesians as martyrs.

### Rhodesian Security Forces

The Rhodesian Security Forces were considerably expanded over the war. At the time of UDI, the Rhodesian Army had a strength of over 18,400, including 15,000 reservists, the Rhodesian Air Force had a small but modern fleet of combat aircraft and the paramilitary British South Africa Police (BSAP) included 7,000 full time and 25,000 reserve personnel. The way in which the Army structured its branches into administrative corps was similar to that of the British Army, and many of its officers had received training in the United Kingdom. As the war continued, additional army and police units were raised. In April 1979, 60,000 members of the military and police were on active duty to protect that month's Rhodesian general election.

The Rhodesian government had a strong preference for white military personnel. The Army's regular units, which were manned mainly by white soldiers who had volunteered or been conscripted and were liable for full-time service, were the most powerful element of the security forces. They included the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS), Grey's Scouts and Armoured Car Regiment whose members were mainly white. The Rhodesian African Rifles and Selous Scouts were also regular units which mainly comprised black soldiers led by white officers. These units were used as a strategic reserve that responded to the guerrilla activities. The Army also included the Rhodesia Regiment and Rhodesian Defence Regiment which were manned by white part-time reservists. As the war continued, increasing numbers of black soldiers were enlisted into the Army. The Guard Force (most of whose members were black) and the Security Force Auxiliaries, which was almost entirely manned by black personnel, augmented the Rhodesian Security Forces from 1975 and 1978 respectively but were not militarily effective.

The expansion of the security forces, increasing battle casualties and a decline in the white population due to high rates of emigration led to serious shortages of white personnel that greatly hindered the Rhodesian war effort. The Rhodesian government attempted several strategies to address these shortages. It sought to attract more white immigrants to the country, but from 1973 onwards the white population decreased. The number of white conscripts in the security forces was also increased by considerably expanding the age groups of men who were required to serve and the periods of active duty reservists needed to undertake.

## Recruitment

### Recruitment processes

Another strategy used to address white manpower shortages was seeking volunteers from outside the country, which the Rhodesian government began doing in 1973. Men with previous military experience, and especially service in wars, were preferred. It was expected that most of the volunteers for the security forces would not settle in Rhodesia.

From the mid-1970s the Rhodesian government began placing advertisements seeking volunteers in the international media. Due to the sanctions against Rhodesia, these ads were generally lodged via front organisations and were vague about the country the volunteers would serve in. The Rhodesian government openly advertised in the American Soldier of Fortune magazine during 1975. This magazine had been established that year to promote mercenary opportunities, and provided a positive portrayal of the lifestyle available to mercenaries. Its editor was a strong supporter of the white Rhodesian cause and wanted to encourage Americans to fight for Rhodesia. Advertisements were also placed in other American magazines, including Shotgun News and Shooting Times. Some ads described service in Rhodesia as "fun". The ads and other coverage of Rhodesia in Soldier of Fortune led to a "steady stream of volunteers".

The Rhodesian Security Forces' recruitment staff responded to people who wrote letters of inquiry after reading the advertisements. These letters were closely scrutinised, as many of the men who had written them were considered "obviously nuts" by the Rhodesian Army's recruitment officer Major Nick Lamprecht. Those who were considered potentially suitable were sent information packs, and asked to supply documentation to support their application; preference was given to applicants who provided notarized documents in their response. Successful applicants were then offered a rank in the security forces. The Rhodesian government paid the airfares of volunteers who were unable to afford to travel until 1977. Other volunteers were expected to pay their own way. Most volunteers enlisted in the Rhodesian Army, but some joined the British South Africa Police.

In addition to using advertisements, Rhodesian recruitment teams, including some led by Lamprecht, visited several countries. Rhodesian officers also sought to use their networks in other militaries to attract volunteers. Organisations representing veterans were another method used to contact potential recruits. In 1976 some current and former British soldiers were sent unsolicited leaflets that encouraged them to enlist in the Rhodesian Army and explained its conditions of service. Rhodesian recruitment leaflets were also circulated within British Army barracks that year.

Several individuals and companies recruited United States citizens to fight in Rhodesia. These organisations provided recruits for the security forces as well as for private industry, including farms, mines and timber companies. Some of the Americans volunteered to work as security guards on farms in Rhodesia as this offered the opportunity to fight communists while receiving higher pay than that offered by the security forces. News reports in the mid to late 1970s alleged that several individuals sought to recruit volunteers for Rhodesia in the United Kingdom and Europe, including by placing advertisements in newspapers and writing to former British military personnel. The Rhodesian Minister of Defence denied in 1975 that his government had anything to do with these efforts.

Most of the foreigners who volunteered to fight for Rhodesia did so individually. An exception was a group of almost 200 French military personnel who enlisted together in late 1976. Sources differ on whether these men were paratroopers or members of the French Foreign Legion. They were recruited by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) from a French military base in Djibouti. The French troops were being withdrawn from Djibouti upon that country's independence, and French intelligence agents helped facilitate their recruitment by the Rhodesian Army. The CIO regarded this as a success, but all other elements of the Rhodesian government were sceptical. Small numbers of black ex-Flechas from Mozambique were also accepted after the end of Portuguese rule in that country; they were paid less than white soldiers.

The Rhodesian government did not accept all offers of volunteers. In 1976 former Portuguese officials offered 2,000 white soldiers who had served with the UNITA nationalist movement in Angola until that country's independence. This proposal was quickly dismissed as the Rhodesians did not see how they could arm or use large numbers of non-English speakers. A proposal by the mercenary Mike Hoare to establish an international brigade modelled on the French Foreign Legion was also rejected. In 1977 the pretender to the Albanian throne, Leka I, asked the Rhodesian government to train a battalion of Albanians that he hoped to recruit. He offered Rhodesia the services of these men after they completed training, though he intended to eventually use them to retake Albania. The Rhodesian government did not formally reply.

### Volunteers' motivations

Foreign volunteers for the Rhodesian Security Forces were generally motivated by personal political and ideological beliefs or a desire for adventure. The academic Luise White has written that they were commonly opposed to the establishment of governments run by black people and did not have any particular commitment to Rhodesia itself. Similarly, Kyle Burke has noted that American volunteers were at least partially motivated by racist and paternalistic views; some stated that sustaining white rule would lead to better outcomes for Rhodesia's black population. Anti-communism was also a key motivator, with many volunteers wanting to stop the further spread of this ideology in Africa. Some American volunteers were attracted by a belief that the war in Rhodesia was comparable to that which had been fought on the American frontier. White has observed that the volunteers were typically more willing to fight and even die for the Rhodesian Front's ideology than for Rhodesia itself. Economic factors also influenced some of the volunteers, as they believed that the Rhodesian Security Forces offered better career prospects than those available in their home country. Other volunteers enlisted seeking an adventure.

The Rhodesian Special Branch sought to vet all of the foreign volunteers for security risks. This proved impossible due to the large numbers and difficulty of checking their backgrounds. Some of the volunteers were later identified as agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The British intelligence agencies also infiltrated agents into the Rhodesian Security Forces.

### Numbers of volunteers

As historians have found it difficult to access Rhodesian records, it is not known exactly how many foreigners volunteered for the Rhodesian Security Forces. The high proportion of white Rhodesians who were born outside the country or held citizenship of another country also complicates the matter. As a result, there are a range of estimates of the numbers of foreigners who travelled to Rhodesia to serve with the security forces. White has noted that it is unclear whether some of these estimates are for the entire Bush War, or only for a few years.

Several estimates were published during the war or as part of subsequent news reports. A British deserter from the Rhodesian military claimed in 1976 that 2,000 of the 6,000 regular soldiers in the Rhodesian Army were British and another 100 Americans. The American journalist Robin Wright and South African journalist Paul Smurthwaite have separately reported that there were 1,000 foreigners in the Rhodesian military. The filmmaker Michael Raeburn wrote in 1978 that there were between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign volunteers in Rhodesia. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) estimated in November 1978 that there were approximately 800 foreigners serving in Rhodesia, of whom around half were British and most of the others American.

Historians have provided a range of estimates. Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock wrote in 1993 that foreign volunteers represented only a "tiny minority" of the Rhodesian military in 1972, with 90 per cent of recruits being Rhodesians and most of the remainder permanent residents of the country. The ethnographic and historical researcher Henrik Ellert noted in 1989 that there were 1,500 volunteers present in Rhodesia during 1977–78. Military historians Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin stated as part of a 2010 work that the number was likely around 1,400, but have noted that estimates from other experts range as high as 2,000. Correlates of War project members Jeffrey S. Dixon and Meredith Reid Sarkees wrote in 2015 that the peak number of foreign volunteers was 1,500. While not providing any estimates of his own, Hugh Pattenden observed in 2021 that other historians' assessments show that the numbers of volunteers in Rhodesia increased during the 1970s and that Britons were a "significant minority within the Rhodesian military". The academics Jacob Ware and John Campbell stated in 2022 that people from more than fifteen countries had volunteered to fight for Rhodesia, including "several hundred" Americans.

The historian Luise White has provided differing estimates. She noted in 2004 that "the figure most sources cite is 1,500 foreign soldiers, of whom perhaps 400 were American", though the Rhodesian Army put the number at 1,000 including 100 Americans. In 2021 White wrote that the numbers of foreign volunteers may have been small, and the ex-Rhodesian generals she had interviewed "scoffed at me when I asked if there were fifteen hundred foreigners in the Rhodesian Army". In this work she estimated that around 100 Americans served with the Rhodesian Security Forces between 1976 and 1980. White has written that British citizens made up the majority of the foreign volunteers who served with the Rhodesian Security Forces. Most of the other volunteers were from the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Europe. Many of the Europeans had previously served with the French Foreign Legion.

South Africans also took part in the war. Thousands of South African Police (SAP) and South African Defence Force (SADF) personnel were deployed to Rhodesia by the South African government to serve in or alongside the Rhodesian Security Forces. Elements of these deployments were covert. Some of the SAP officers who were integrated into the Rhodesian Security Forces were falsely portrayed as volunteers by the South African government. In 1979 the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government proposed that the SADF personnel who were attached to the country's security forces wear Zimbabwe Rhodesian uniforms. Some conscripted SADF personnel were posted to the Rhodesian Army and required to fight wearing Rhodesian uniforms. By the end of the war there were around 6,000 SADF personnel in Rhodesia.

## Conditions and service

Foreign volunteers who were accepted were required to swear an oath of loyalty to Rhodesia, and the Rhodesian government considered them to be members of the security forces rather than mercenaries. They enlisted for a period of three years, which was the same as white Rhodesians who joined up on a full-time basis. The volunteers also received the same pay as white Rhodesians, between \$US 4,000 and \$US 7,000 annually. These pay rates were lower than those in some other armies; for instance, they were around half the levels in the United States Army and between 50 and 60 per cent of the Australian Army's pay scale. Rhodesian recruiters told prospective Australian recruits that the cost of living was much lower in Rhodesia. Foreign volunteers were also offered land if they settled in Rhodesia after completing their service with the security forces.

All foreign volunteers were required to complete basic training upon arrival in Rhodesia, even if they had prior military experience. Those who failed this training had to leave the country, with their airfare home being paid by the Rhodesian government. Foreign volunteers who openly expressed extreme racial views were deported. For instance, the American neo-Nazi Harold Covington claimed to have served in the Rhodesian Army before being deported due to his racism.

After completing training, many of the volunteers were assigned to the all-white RLI and particularly its 3 Commando sub-unit. In 1979, the military historian John Keegan noted that foreigners made up between a quarter and a third of the strength of the RLI. Neil Grant gave a lower figure in 2015, stating that over 10 per cent of the unit were foreign volunteers. He also wrote that these men were from 38 different nationalities. The RLI was a key element of Rhodesia's strategic reserve, and was frequently deployed against guerrilla forces. Other volunteers were posted to a range of units, including protection companies mainly made up of black soldiers and the largely white Grey's Scouts and Rhodesian Armoured Corps. Most of the volunteers served under Rhodesian officers. Those who were combat veterans resented being placed under the command of younger and less experienced Rhodesians.

The volunteers typically found conditions in Rhodesia to be tough. Those who had joined up expecting a good lifestyle were rapidly disappointed. Many of the volunteers were frustrated that they were paid only in Rhodesian dollars, as foreign banks would not process this currency and the Rhodesian government allowed no more than R\$1,500 to be converted to other currencies.

The large group of Frenchmen who enlisted together were used to form 7 Independent Company. This unit performed poorly, and committed atrocities that included raping women during operations. Most of its members left Rhodesia after the company was withdrawn from operations to be retrained, though some settled in Rhodesia. Two of the former French volunteers who remained in Zimbabwe after the war were sentenced to death for murdering a café owner during a robbery in 1982, and were executed the next year.

Despite the Rhodesian government's claim that it did not recruit mercenaries, the British mercenary Peter McAleese was accepted into the Rhodesian Army during 1976. McAleese had previously led a group of British mercenaries in Angola, and was posted to the elite SAS after completing training. The Guardian reported in 1979 that "his presence is a source of embarrassment to the regime which has always insisted that it does not want foreign mercenaries".

## Rhodesian responses

Despite its need for foreign volunteers, the Rhodesian government was uncomfortable with them. There were concerns that many of the volunteers were motivated more by a desire to fight in a war than a commitment to Rhodesia. The need for non-Rhodesians to sustain the country's independence was also considered problematic. The Rhodesian military rarely discussed the foreign volunteers with journalists and never released figures on the number who had enlisted.

The Rhodesian Army regarded the volunteers as disloyal and undisciplined. It accepted them largely due to necessity, and did not consider them to be more skilful than Rhodesian soldiers. Foreign volunteers typically received a hostile reception from their Rhodesian comrades as they were often regarded as adventurers with little commitment to the country.

American and Australian volunteers who had fought in the Vietnam War were generally well regarded by Rhodesian soldiers, and were often posted to the elite SAS and Selous Scouts. These volunteers may have encouraged the Rhodesian Security Forces to use the 'body count' of guerrillas killed as a measure of success, with this having been a key metric in Vietnam. The Rhodesian military also adopted some of the terminology used by Americans in Vietnam, such as referring to guerrillas as 'gooks' and labelling one of their supply lines the 'Ho Chi Minh trail'. It is not known how many Vietnam veterans fought in Rhodesia.

The Canadian spree killer Mathew Lamb was able to join the Rhodesian Army in 1974 after being released from a mental institution. He had previously been rejected by the Israel Defense Forces. The Rhodesian Army only learnt of Lamb's history after his death during an operation in 1976. The revelations about Lamb's history led to concerns in Rhodesia about the quality of the foreign volunteers.

## Nationalist and foreign responses

### Nationalists

The nationalist groups that were fighting the Rhodesian regime and many progressive groups worldwide considered the volunteers to be mercenaries. White notes that this was "not because of how they were paid for fighting but because of why they were fighting", with it being argued that the volunteers had involved themselves in a war that was not theirs. Opponents of the regime frequently highlighted the issue of 'mercenaries' fighting for Rhodesia, and claimed that they were often mentally unstable and had little regard for civilian casualties. Rhodesia attempted to counter the "mercenary" claim by processing the volunteers through the Department of Immigration and framing them as prospective Rhodesian citizens, though few ever applied for citizenship.

The nationalists argued in their propaganda that the Rhodesian regime's need for foreign volunteers illustrated its political and military weaknesses. Both the main nationalist groups believed that the volunteers' presence indicated that western governments supported the Rhodesian regime. The ZAPU argued that the failure of the British and US governments to stop the flow of volunteers was a barrier to reaching a negotiated settlement with the Rhodesian government, and demanded in 1977 that this be halted.

From the mid-1970s several African governments criticised western governments, and especially Britain, for not stopping the flow of volunteers to Rhodesia. In 1977 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) member countries adopted a Convention on Mercenaries that aimed to ban this form of military activity. The OAU Council of Ministers discussed the presence of mercenaries in Rhodesia and Namibia at its 1979 meeting, and issued a statement condemning "certain non-African states" from failing to prevent their citizens from fighting for Rhodesia. Several African newspapers also published articles and editorials criticising western governments over this issue; some of these articles included incorrect claims, such as assertions that entire planeloads of British volunteers were travelling to Rhodesia and that the British government was facilitating their recruitment. Many Africans believed that the inaction of the western governments demonstrated their lack of commitment to combating white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.

### British government

The British government was opposed to its citizens fighting for Rhodesia. The sanctions it imposed following UDI banned efforts to entice British citizens to live or work in Rhodesia. British citizens were also prohibited from joining the Rhodesian Security Forces under the terms of an embargo enacted in 1968, with those who did so potentially facing fines or imprisonment. The prohibition proved difficult to enforce, as it was not possible to prevent Britons leaving the country. It was also unclear whether serving in the Rhodesian military was illegal under laws that prohibited service in foreign militaries as the British did not recognise Rhodesia's independence. Various approaches were considered to develop legislation to ban recruitment by the Rhodesian Security Forces during the late 1970s, but none eventuated. The FCO advised anyone who sought information about fighting for Rhodesia that doing so was illegal, but did not explain why. The FCO asked the British military to warn servicemen against enlisting with the Rhodesian Security Forces, but it declined to do so as a mercenary was not illegal. The military took steps to prevent material encouraging enlistment with Rhodesia from being circulated in its bases and service newspapers, however. Several Labour Party members of parliament raised concerns about British citizens fighting for Rhodesia in parliament and directly with the FCO. No Conservative Party politicians raised similar concerns. Margaret Thatcher and several other prominent Conservative politicians had reservations about legislation that was proposed in 1976 to ban mercenary activity on the grounds that it could prohibit British citizens from fighting for worthy causes.

In 1977 the British government provided a lukewarm response to an American proposal that the United Nations Security Council adopt a resolution requiring UN members to prevent their citizens from serving in the Rhodesian military. The British noted that such a resolution might prove impractical as many Rhodesians held dual citizenship. Due to the difficulty of drafting legislation that could effectively ban Britons from serving with Rhodesia or enforcing the measures that were brought in, there is no record of any British citizens being punished for serving with the Rhodesian Security Forces during the war. Those who did so received amnesties as part of the British government measures associated to end of the conflict. The historian Hugh Patterson noted that while there was considerable support among British conservatives for Rhodesia, the relatively small numbers of volunteers from the country indicates that "very few men were actually willing to put their futures on the line for the Smith [Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith] regime".

### Other foreign governments

The United States' Neutrality Act of 1794 prohibits American citizens from enlisting with foreign militaries or working as mercenaries for other governments. This law can only be enforced within the United States, meaning that American citizens who enlisted to fight for Rhodesia while overseas could not be prosecuted. The United States government did little to slow the flow of volunteers to Rhodesia. There is evidence that the Departments of Justice and State tacitly encouraged Americans to volunteer for Rhodesia as part of efforts to prevent the country collapsing before a negotiated solution to the war could be finalised. The Carter administration considered taking steps to stop Americans serving in Rhodesia, but this did not result in any policy changes. The activities of Americans in Rhodesia were widely publicised in the United States, leading to protests. The American volunteers were generally regarded in the United States as mercenaries. Many of the Americans wrongly believed that their government opposed their presence in Rhodesia, with articles in Soldier of Fortune and works by the author Robin Moore also claiming this.

The legality of volunteering for the Rhodesian Security Forces varied between other countries. Doing so was illegal under laws banning mercenary activity in Israel, West Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The Australian parliament passed legislation banning Australians from serving with Rhodesia in 1978. The Portuguese government banned Rhodesian recruitment in the late 1970s, but was unable to enforce the legislation. Canada had similar laws to the UK, and France and New Zealand were unable to prevent their citizens from travelling to Rhodesia to fight.

## Desertion by the volunteers

Many of the foreign volunteers deserted before the end of their periods of enlistment. The difficult conditions in the security forces due to the war contributed to this; in 1979 a Soldier of Fortune writer claimed that approximately 80 per cent of the Americans who had volunteered for Rhodesia over the previous two years had deserted after finding the "routine too rough". Some other volunteers left as a result of to the hostile reception they received from the Rhodesians they served alongside. Foreign soldiers who served in the RLI complained about being treated poorly, and the desertion rate among foreigners serving in the SAS was particularly high.

A lack of commitment to the Rhodesian cause also contributed to desertions. Some American deserters decided that Rhodesia was doomed and not worth risking their lives for, including after they were made to feel unwelcome. Conversely, an American volunteer deserted after five months in 1976 and considered joining the guerrillas after developing a belief that the Rhodesian Army was "completely racist". Several other volunteers left as they wanted to fight in more intense wars. Pattenden has observed that desertion was the most obvious downside the Rhodesian government faced from recruiting foreign volunteers, as they had "less stake in the future of Rhodesia than local whites".

## Removal of the volunteers

Many of the foreign volunteers opposed the March 1978 Internal Settlement, under which the white Rhodesian government agreed to cede power to moderate black leaders. These volunteers felt that Ian Smith had betrayed white Rhodesians by signing this agreement. They also feared for their lives due to a perception that a black majority government would place them on trial for murder and other crimes.

Under the terms of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement that ended the war the British government resumed control over Rhodesia in December 1979, with the country temporarily reverting to the colony of Southern Rhodesia until elections could be held. On 21 December that year the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 460 that, among other things, called for the British authorities to expel all "mercenaries" and South African forces from Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations General Assembly had adopted a similar motion several days earlier at the behest of several countries in southern Africa. In January 1980 the British Lord Privy Seal, Ian Gilmour, stated that the British government had committed during the negotiations that led to the Lancaster House Agreement to not remove foreigners from the Rhodesian military prior to the election.

The ZANU won the February 1980 Southern Rhodesian general election. The new Prime Minister Robert Mugabe directed shortly after the election that "mercenaries" be dismissed as they were among the "irregular features of the present Army" and were "not needed". All other white military personnel, other than members of the Selous Scouts unit that had a reputation for atrocities, were given an assurance that they would not be required to leave the military.

## Literature and historiography

A range of works have provided positive portrayals of the foreign volunteers. Soldier of Fortune ran large numbers of articles on foreigners in the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Bush War; each edition published between 1975 and 1980 included at least one article on the subject. These articles frequently highlighted the experiences of Americans who were fighting in Rhodesia. The articles in Soldier of Fortune reflected Rhodesian government propaganda, as they claimed that the country was a western democracy, the war was being fought against communism and did not discuss the oppression of Rhodesia's black majority. Robin Moore included profiles of twelve volunteers as part of a non-fiction book he wrote in 1976 that argued that the Rhodesian government was not racist and sanctions against it should be lifted. He also wrote the novel Crippled Eagles which was based on the experiences of American volunteers. It was finished in 1980 and published in 1991. Stephen Jeffreys' 1980 play 'The Jubilee Too' included a British volunteer who had returned from Rhodesia as one of its characters.

Few works by historians have been published on the volunteers who served with the Rhodesian Security Forces. As of 2021, the literature largely comprises brief discussions of the topic as part of books and academic journal articles on broader issues. Ware and Campbell wrote in 2022 that the foreign volunteers had little influence on the war, and the pressure from western governments on the Rhodesian government to agree to a transition to majority rule was of greater importance. They observed that the volunteers "failed in their efforts to protect the white regime, but not before they supported and contributed to a conflict that lasted fifteen years and claimed tens of thousands of lives".

Modern white supremacist and far-right groups continue to provide a positive portrayal of white rule in Rhodesia. The foreign volunteers who fought for the country are celebrated by these groups. The academic Kyle Burke has written that some anti-government paramilitary forces in the United States draw inspiration from the volunteers, and cite them as an example when encouraging violence against African Americans.

## See also

- List of foreign volunteers
- Mercenaries in Africa after 1960

Non-Rhodesian army recruits from 1973 to 1980


Banksia ilicifolia

Banksia ilicifolia, commonly known as holly-leaved banksia, is a tree in the family Proteaceae. Endemic to southwest Western Australia, it belongs to Banksia subg. Isostylis, a subgenus of three closely related Banksia species with inflorescences that are dome-shaped heads rather than characteristic Banksia flower spikes. It is generally a tree up to 10 metres (33 ft) tall with a columnar or irregular habit. Both the scientific and common names arise from the similarity of its foliage to that of the English holly Ilex aquifolium; the glossy green leaves generally have very prickly serrated margins, although some plants lack toothed leaves. The inflorescences are initially yellow but become red-tinged with maturity; this acts as a signal to alert birds that the flowers have opened and nectar is available.

Robert Brown described Banksia ilicifolia in 1810. Although Banksia ilicifolia is variable in growth form, with low coastal shrubby forms on the south coast near Albany, there are no recognised varieties as such. Distributed broadly, the species is restricted to sandy soils. Unlike its close relatives which are killed by fire and repopulate from seed, Banksia ilicifolia regenerates after bushfire by regrowing from epicormic buds under its bark. It is rarely cultivated.

## Description

Banksia ilicifolia is a variable species. It usually grows as an erect tree up to 10 metres (33 ft) in height, but some populations along the south coast consist of small trees or even spreading shrubs. It is generally a 5 metres (16 ft) high small tree in the Margaret River region. The leaves arising from many short branchlets make a dense foliage close to the trunk and branches.

Banksia ilicifolia has a stout trunk up to 50 cm (19.5 in) in diameter, and rough, fibrous, grey bark which is up to 2 cm (1 in) thick. New growth takes place mainly in summer. Young branchlets are covered in hair which they lose after two or three years. Leaves grow on stems less than two years of age, and are arranged in a scattered pattern along the stems although crowded at the apices (branchlet tips). Resembling those of holly, its leaves are a dark shiny green colour, and variously obovate (egg-shaped), elliptic, truncate or undulate (wavy) in shape, and 3–10 cm (1–4 in) long. Generally serrated, the leaf edges have up to 14 prickly "teeth" separated by broad v- to u-shaped sinuses along each side, although some leaves have margins lacking teeth. The leaves sit atop petioles 0.3–1 cm (0.12–0.39 in) in length. The upper and undersurface of the leaves are initially covered in fine hairs but become smooth with maturity. Flowering takes place from late winter to early summer. The inflorescences are dome-shaped flower heads rather than spikes as many other banksias, and arise from stems that are around a year old. No lateral branchlets grow outwards from the node where the flower head arises. The flower heads measure 7–9 cm (3–3.5 in) in diameter, and bear 60 to 100 individual flowers. The inflorescences pass through three colour phases, being initially yellow, then pink, then finally red, before falling away from the head. One to three follicles develop from fertilised flowers, and remain embedded in the woody base of the flower head. Each follicle bears one or two seeds.

The cotyledon leaves are a dull green with no visible nerves or markings. Transversely elliptic in shape, they measure 8 to 13 mm long by 12 to 18 mm wide and range from convex to concave. The pointed spreading auricles are 1.5 mm long. The cotyledon leaves sit atop the stout hypocotyl, which is green and smooth. The seedling leaves are crowded above the cotyledons. Resembling those of B. coccinea, they are lined with triangular lobes or "teeth" (with a u- or v-shaped sinus) and obovate to broadly lanceolate in shape. The first set of leaves measure 1 to 2.5 cm (0.39 to 0.98 in) in length and around 1 cm (0.5 in) in width, with three or four lobes in each margin. Both upper and lower seedling leaf surfaces are covered in spreading hairs, as is the seedling stem. Juvenile leaves are obovate to truncate or mucronate with triangular lobes and measure 4 to 10 cm (1.5 to 4 in) long by 1.5 to 3.5 cm (0.59 to 1.38 in) wide. These lobes are smaller toward the petiole and apex of the leaf.

In the Margaret River region, Banksia ilicifolia has been confused with Banksia sessilis var. cordata as both have prickly foliage and domed flowerheads. However, the former grows on deep sand while the latter grows on grey sand over limestone ridges. The embedded follicles of B. ilicifolia compared with the loose ones of B. sessilis are another distinguishing feature.

## Taxonomy

Specimens of B. ilicifolia were first collected by Scottish surgeon Archibald Menzies during the visit of the Vancouver Expedition to King George Sound in September and October 1791, but this collection did not result in the description of the species. It was next collected by Robert Brown in December 1801, during the visit of HMS Investigator to King George Sound. The species was also drawn by the expedition's botanical artist Ferdinand Bauer. Like nearly all of Bauer's field drawings of Proteaceae, the original field sketch of B. ilicifolia was destroyed in a Hofburg fire in 1945. A painting based on the drawing survives, however, at the Natural History Museum in London.

Brown eventually published the species in his 1810 work On the natural order of plants called Proteaceae. The specific name is derived from the Latin words ilex "holly" and folium "leaf", hence "holly-leaved". In 1810, Brown published Prodromus Florae Novae Hollandiae et Insulae Van Diemen in which he arranged the genus into two unranked groups. B. ilicifolia was placed alone in Isostylis because of its unusual dome-shaped inflorescences. All other species were placed in Banksia verae, the "true banksias", because they have the elongate flower spike then considered characteristic of Banksia.

The shrubby, coastal ecotype was published as a separate species Banksia aquifolium by John Lindley in his 1840 A Sketch of the Vegetation of the Swan River Colony, but this is now regarded as a taxonomic synonym of B. ilicifolia. A specimen collected by Ludwig Preiss on 13 April 1839 from coastal sands in Perth was described as Banksia ilicifolia var integrifolia in Bentham's Flora Australiensis in 1870, but has not been recognised since. B. ilicifolia is variable in form, although the variations are not consistent enough to warrant recognising infraspecific taxa. Adult leaf margins can be entire or serrate (like holly), and can both be present on the one plant. Populations from the south coast have larger flowers and leaves, but some trees in the north of the range also have large flowers and leaves.

In 1891, Otto Kuntze, in his Revisio Generum Plantarum, rejected the generic name Banksia L.f., on the grounds that the name Banksia had previously been published in 1776 as Banksia J.R.Forst & G.Forst, referring to the genus now known as Pimelea. Kuntze proposed Sirmuellera as an alternative, referring to this species as Sirmuellera candolleana. This application of the principle of priority was largely ignored by Kuntze's contemporaries, and Banksia L.f. was formally conserved and Sirmuellera rejected in 1940.

### Infrageneric placement

The unranked group Isostylis, with its one species, was reclassified as a section in the 1856 arrangement of Carl Meissner, and 1870 arrangement of George Bentham. In his 1981 revision of the genus, Alex George reclassified the group as a subgenus—Banksia subg. Isostylis—defined by the dome-shaped flower heads, with B. ilicifolia joined by newly described species B. cuneata and later B. oligantha. Banksia ilicifolia is the only common member of that subgenus; the two other species are rare and threatened, and are protected under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Relationships between B. ilicifolia and the other members of B. subg. Isostylis still remain unclear. Although DNA studies found B. cuneata to be the most basal of the three species, a 2004 study of genetic divergence within the subgenus yielded both other possibilities: some analyses suggested B. ilicifolia as basal, while others suggested B. oligantha. Biogeographical factors suggest that B. ilicifolia would be the most basal of the three species: it occurs in the High Rainfall Zone where relictual species are most common, whereas the others are restricted to the Transitional Rainfall Zone, where more recently evolved species are most common.

A 1996 cladistic analysis of the genus by botanists Kevin Thiele and Pauline Ladiges assumed the status B. subg. Isostylis as a subgenus and earliest offshoot within Banksia, so George's placement of B. ilicifolia was retained in their arrangement. The placement of B. ilicifolia was unchanged in George's 1999 arrangement, and can be summarised as follows:

Banksia

: B. subg. Banksia (3 sections, 11 series, 73 species, 11 subspecies, 14 varieties)

: B. subg. Isostylis

: : B. ilicifolia

: : B. oligantha

: : B. cuneata

Since 1998, American botanist Austin Mast and co-authors have been publishing results of ongoing cladistic analyses of DNA sequence data for Banksia and Dryandra. Their analyses suggest a phylogeny that differs greatly from George's taxonomic arrangement. Banksia ilicifolia and B. oligantha form a clade, that is they are each other's closest relative, with Banksia cuneata resolving as the next closest relative, suggesting a monophyletic B. subg. Isostylis; but the clade appears fairly derived (that it, it evolved relatively recently), suggesting that B. subg. Isostylis may not merit subgeneric rank. Early in 2007, Mast and Thiele rearranged the genus Banksia by merging Dryandra into it, and published B. subg. Spathulatae for the taxa having spoon-shaped cotyledons; thus B. subg. Banksia was redefined as encompassing taxa lacking spoon-shaped cotyledons. They foreshadowed publishing a full arrangement once DNA sampling of Dryandra was complete; in the meantime, if Mast and Thiele's nomenclatural changes are taken as an interim arrangement, then B. ilicifolia is placed in B. subg. Banksia.

## Distribution and habitat

A relatively common species, the holly-leaved banksia is widely distributed within south west Western Australia. It occurs within 70 km (43 mi) of the coast, from Mount Lesueur to Augusta, and then east to the Cordinup River east of Albany. In the Margaret River region, it grows on yellow sand plains behind the Leeuwin-Naturaliste Ridge. Almost all occurrences are to the west (seaward) side of the Darling Scarp, although there are two outlying populations – one near Collie east of Bunbury and the other in the Tonbridge-Lake Muir area near Manjimup. Along the south coast, there is one inland population at Sheepwash Nature Reserve near Narrikup northwest of Albany. The annual rainfall over its distribution ranges from 600 to 1,100 mm (24 to 43 in).

Banksia ilicifolia grows exclusively on sandy soils; its range ends where heavy soils are evident. It especially favours low-lying areas. It generally grows in open woodland alongside such trees as jarrah (Eucalyptus marginata), candlestick banksia (Banksia attenuata), firewood banksia (B. menziesii) and Western Australian Christmas tree (Nuytsia floribunda). Along the south coast, it grows in heath, sometimes forming stands with bull banksia (B. grandis).

The holly-leaved banksia gives its name to the Banksia ilicifolia woodlands ('community type 22'), a possibly threatened ecological community found in the Bassendean and Spearwood systems in the central Swan Coastal Plain north of Rockingham. These are low-lying areas which are seasonally waterlogged. The habitat is open woodland and with an open understorey, and such trees as B. ilicifolia, B. attenuata and stout paperbark (Melaleuca preissiana).

Banksia ilicifolia is a component of the critically endangered Assemblage of Tumulus Springs (organic mound springs) of the Swan Coastal Plain community north of Perth, which is characterised by a permanently moist peaty soil. The dominant trees include M. preissiana, swamp banksia (B. littoralis) and flooded gum (Eucalyptus rudis), with understorey ferns such as bracken (Pteridium esculentum) and Cyclosorus interruptus, and shrubs swamp peppermint (Taxandria linearifolia) and Astartea fascicularis.

## Ecology

Banksia ilicifolia has been recorded as a source of nectar for the honey possum (Tarsipes rostratus) in winter to early summer (May to December), from field studies in the Scott National Park, replaced by Adenanthos meisneri in the summer. Several honeyeater species visit and pollinate Banksia ilicifolia. The western spinebill (Acanthorhynchus superciliosus) in particular prefers this species over other banksias.

A field study carried out at Jandakot Airport south of Perth and published in 1988 found that birds and insects overwhelmingly preferred visiting yellow-coloured flowerheads. The species recorded include several species of honeyeater, including the red wattlebird (Anthochaera carunculata), western wattlebird (A. lunulata), western spinebill, brown honeyeater (Lichmera indistincta), New Holland honeyeater (Phylidonyris novaehollandiae), white-cheeked honeyeater (P. nigra), singing honeyeater, (Lichenostomus virescens), as well as the twenty-eight parrot (Barnardius zonarius semitorquatus) two species of native bee of the genus Leioproctus, a beetle of the genus Liparetrus, and ant species Iridomyrmex conifer. The yellow flowerheads are also the ones that bear the most nectar, and are greatly preferred by red wattlebirds.

An analysis of the invertebrate population in the canopy of Banksia woodland found that mites and ticks (Acari), beetles (Coleoptera) and ants, bees and wasps (Hymenoptera) predominated overall, with the three orders also common on B. ilicifolia, although outnumbered by thrips (Thysanoptera). More arthropods on B. ilicifolia might be related to a higher nutrient (potassium) level in the leaves. Lower overall numbers of invertebrates on Banksia species were thought to be related to the presence of insectivorous birds.

Hand-pollination experiments on wild populations near Perth showed that Banksia ilicifolia is self-compatible, although progeny produced have less vigour and seed production is reduced. Further experiments show that seedlings of outcrossing with plants greater than 30 kilometres (19 mi) apart are more vigorous and adaptable, suggesting that plants breeding within small fragmented populations are subject to reduced vigour and genetic inbreeding.

Banksia ilicifolia regenerates after bushfire by regrowing from epicormic shoots under its bark. Follicles open and release seeds after several years. It is weakly serotinous, like eight other Banksia species, all of which tend to occur in Western Australia's southwestern corner. The other two species of the subgenus Isostylis are killed by fire and regenerate by seed.

All banksias have developed proteoid or cluster roots in response to the nutrient-poor conditions of Australian soils (particularly lacking in phosphorus). The plant develops masses of fine lateral roots which form a mat-like structure underneath the soil surface. These enable it to extract nutrients as efficiently possible out of the soil. A study of three co-occurring species in Banksia woodland in southwestern Australia—Banksia menziesii, B. attenuata and B. ilicifolia—found that all three develop fresh roots in September after winter rainfall, and that the bacteria populations associated with the root systems of B. menziesii differ from the other two, and that they also change depending on the age of the roots. Along with its shallow lateral roots, Banksia ilicifolia sinks one or more deep taproots seeking the water table. It is an obligate phreatophyte, that is, it is reliant upon accessing groundwater for its survival; it is more closely tied to the water table than the co-occurring B. menziesii and B. attenuata, and must remain in areas where the depth of the water table is less than 8 m (26 ft) below the surface. Recent falls of the water table on the Swan Coastal Plain from use of the Gnangara Mound aquifer for Perth's water supply combined with years of below average rainfall have seen the population and vigour or Banksia ilicifolia fall considerably (more so than other banksia species) since the mid-1960s.

Like many Western Australian banksias, Banksia ilicifolia has been shown to be highly sensitive to dieback from the soil-borne water mould Phytophthora cinnamomi. A study of Banksia attenuata woodland 400 km (250 mi) southeast of Perth across 16 years and following a wave of P. cinnamomi infestation showed that B. ilicifolia populations were present but significantly reduced in diseased areas. Specimens in coastal dune vegetation were reported killed by Armillaria luteobubalina, with mycelial sheaths of the fungus beneath the bark of the root collar.

## Cultivation

Rarely cultivated, Banksia ilicifolia requires a sunny position and sandy well-drained soil to do well. A slow-growing plant, it takes up to ten years to flower from seed. The glossy green foliage and long flowering period, combined with prominently displayed flowers give it horticultural potential, although its prickly foliage makes fallen leaves a problem if planted near lawns or walkways. Seeds do not require any treatment, and take 22 to 41 days to germinate. Difficulties in collection and low seed set make seed relatively expensive. Seeds are often eaten by insects before they can be collected.

Tree in the family Proteaceae endemic to southwest Western Australia

Taxa named by Robert Brown (botanist, born 1773)


2010 Sibu by-election

The Sibu by-election, 2010 was a by-election for the seat of Sibu in the Parliament of Malaysia. The Sarawak-based seat fell vacant after the death of its incumbent member, Robert Lau Hoi Chew, from liver cancer on 9 April 2010. The seat was defended for the Barisan Nasional coalition government by Robert Lau Hui Yew of the Sarawak United Peoples' Party (SUPP), while Sarawak State Assemblyman Wong Ho Leng contested the poll for the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Pakatan Rakyat opposition coalition. Wong won the election by 398 votes, wresting the seat from the Barisan Nasional.

At the time of the election there were 54,695 registered voters, a majority of whom were ethnic Chinese. In the previous general election in 2008, the incumbent, Hoi Chew retained the seat with a 3,235-vote majority against Wong Ho Leng, and Lim Chin Chuang of the People's Justice Party. The Sibu seat had been last won by the DAP in 1982, but had since been won continuously by the SUPP.

In this election, known as the "Battle of the Mighty Rejang", the government and opposition went head-to-head on a number of local issues concerning Sarawak, including poverty, education and development.

## Background and history

The Sibu constituency has been dominated by the contest between the SUPP and the DAP for approximately three decades. The DAP won the seat in the 1982 general election when Ling Sie Ming defeated Wong Soon Kai by 141 votes, causing Sibu to become the first DAP-held parliamentary seat in Sarawak. The DAP lost the seat in the 1986 election to the Barisan Nasional, and in the 1990 election won the seat through Robert Lau Hoi Chew. Lau held the seat until his death from liver cancer on 9 April 2010. His winning margin in the 2008 election had been 3,235 votes.

Despite Lau's dominance of the federal seat from 1990, the SUPP were shocked in the 1996 state election when two of its State Assembly seats within Sibu town — Pelawan and Bukit Assek — fell to the DAP. The Bukit Assek loss saw the defeat of its president and the then Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak, Wong Soon Kai. The defeat spelled the end of Wong's political career and the election of the DAP's Wong Ho Leng to the Sarawak State Assembly. Wong Ho Leng subsequently lost the Bukit Assek seat in the 2001 state election, but regained it in 2006.

At the time of the by-election, 66.7% of the seat's 54,695 registered voters were ethnic Chinese; the rest of the population being Malays or indigenous Sarawakians. Christians make up 53 per cent of the electorate while the rest include Muslims, Buddhists and other religions. The seat was largely urban.

## Nomination of candidates

The by-election was triggered by the death of Sibu's incumbent Member of Parliament, Robert Lau Hoi Chew on 9 April 2010. The Election Commission subsequently set down the by-election for 16 May 2010, with candidate nominations to occur on 8 May. Within a few days, the Sibu branch of SUPP recommended Robert Lau Hui Yew to contest the by-election for the governing Barisan Nasional coalition. Hui Yew was the second cousin of Hoi Chew and the son of Lau Swee Nguong, chairman of the KTS Group of companies. On 14 April, the opposition has decided that a DAP candidate should contest the by-election. Opposition Leader and People's Justice Party (PKR) adviser Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim scheduled a visit to Sibu on 18 April. On the same day, Sarawak Pakatan Rakyat was formed as an opposition coalition composed of the DAP, PKR, and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) — all members of the national Pakatan Rakyat coalition — and the local Sarawak National Party. The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin visited Sibu on 19 April, expressing confidence that the voters were leaning towards supporting Barisan Nasional.

While SUPP's candidate was confirmed only a few days after Hoi Chew's death, the DAP delayed announcing its candidate until 27 April. SUPP alleged the delay was due to a split in the DAP; however, the DAP insisted the delay was a calculated political strategy. On 27 April, the Sarawak Pakatan Rakyat announced Wong Ho Leng, state chairman of the DAP and State Assemblyman for Bukit Assek, as its candidate. Wong had earlier indicated his reluctance to stand in the by-election, suggesting that the party consider the opportunity to field a younger candidate.

Robert Lau Hui Yew and Wong Ho Leng were joined by an independent candidate, Narawi Haron. A businessman and former member of the Army, Narawi had been a candidate for the seat in the 1995 election. Narawi's campaign was dismissed by the SUPP as inconsequential, while the DAP admitted that a potential split of votes between the DAP and Narawi could hurt its chances.

## Election campaign issues

The by-election was widely known as the "Battle of the Mighty Rejang" and was seen as a litmus test for the popularity of the opposition Pakatan Rakyat and governing Barisan Nasional coalitions on a including land rights, poverty, native displacement and unemployment in Sarawak.

One of the main issues during the election was the ban of the use of the word 'Allah' in Christian publications. However, the Sarawak police has banned political parties from using the issue during campaigning in the by-election as it was deemed to be a sensitive issue. Sarawak's Officer in Charge of Criminal Investigations, Huzir Mohamed, threatened to prosecute offenders of the ban under the Sedition Act or the Internal Security Act (ISA).

### Barisan Nasional

The Barisan Nasional did not initially release a policy manifesto for the by-election, but sought support on the basis of its claim to have caused Sibu's economic growth and development. Nevertheless, late in the campaign, the BN-SUPP candidate, Robert Lau Hui Yew, himself released a manifesto in which, according to Bernama, he mentioned that he would prioritise "getting more investment, job creation, skills training for single parents to increase their income, install more CCTVs in town to improve security and reduce street crimes rates as well as to transform Sibu into a 'wireless' township."

During the campaign period, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak had distributed RM18 million to 60 Chinese aided primary schools, five independent Chinese secondary schools and two missionary schools in Sibu. Najib said that the Barisan Nasional government would continue to do more for Chinese education in the country, saying that "the Barisan government is a true friend of Chinese education," when addressing more than 3,000 Chinese educationists. Besides that, some 246 families living in an under-developed region in Sungai Igan within the constituency had received a total of RM147,600 as a one-off allocation from the Federal Government. Four Methodist churches in town had been given special grants totalling RM1.75 million from the BN federal government in the final hours of the by-election campaign.

The SUPP attacked the DAP on the basis of its coalition with the Islamist PAS, arguing that "A vote for Rocket is a vote for Islamic State". Lim Kit Siang, the parliamentary leader of the DAP, said that the issue was a "killer weapon" which could "finish off" the chances of DAP's candidate winning by frightening off the Chinese and non-Muslim voters in Sibu as it did during the 1999 Malaysian General Election where both Karpal Singh and Lim himself lost their parliamentary seats. The SUPP also claimed that if the DAP was to be voted in kampua noodles could no longer be sold as they were mixed with pork lard; a reference to PAS's policy to establish Malaysia as an Islamic state.

Abdul Taib Mahmud, the BN chief minister of Sarawak, revised new land renewal rates which took effect on June 1. He said that the Sarawak new land rates is the cheapest in Malaysia as compared to other states. In accordance with opposition proposal for the unconditioned, automatic renewal of land leases, he also challenged the opposition-led state governments to announce new land rates lower than the current one announced by himself, without risking the income of the state governments.

Najib Tun Razak, the Prime Minister and leader of BN, promised voters in Rejang Park, a DAP stronghold, 5 million ringgit to alleviate floods if SUPP’s Robert Lau Hui Yew won the seat, stating at an election appearance: "Do we have a deal or not? We do! You want the RM5 million, I want Robert Lau to win.”

### Democratic Action Party

The DAP set out a seven-point manifesto with the theme "Sibu Jom Ubah" or "Sibu4change" for the by-election campaign and on the top of it is solving the town's flood woes in two years when the party and its coalition becomes the government at the federal and state levels. Another point in the manifesto stated that DAP would provide all Sarawakians aged above 60 a minimum of RM100 per annum as a gift for their contributions to the state. A minimum wage of RM750 per month for workers in the peninsula and RM830 for workers in Sarawak will be introduced and on education, DAP promised that all schools would be given allocations according to their needs as practised in Penang, Selangor and Kelantan. The three other points in the manifesto concerned oil royalty, land reform, and competency, accountability and transparency in governance.

The DAP also focused on landholding issues. Chong Chieng Jen, the director of the DAP's by-election campaign, pointed out that those who decided not to renew their 60-year land leases would have their land returned to the government without compensation, and that even if the government approved requests to have leases renewed, landholders would have to pay large premiums. Chong said that the DAP on the other hand wanted the current state land code to be amended to allow for the automatic and unconditional renewal of all leased land for a period of 99 years.

On the ban of using the "Allah" issue during campaigns, the DAP had gone against it and had gone ahead with the issue in its campaign. Wong Ho Leng, the DAP election candidate, said that the facts must be made known to the public. Wong also promised that if elected, he would call upon the Prime Minister and Home Minister to immediately cease the legal dispute with the Christian churches over these matters to protect the freedom of religion in Malaysia for non-Muslims. The DAP has also challenge candidate Robert Lau to make his stand about the ban on non-Muslims using the word "Allah" with DAP MP Teresa Kok stating that "If Robert Lau intends to be a Member of Parliament that speaks up for a Christian-majority constituency, Sibu, then he has the moral duty to declare his stand on this thorny issue, so that the voters in Sibu can decide whether they can count on him to speak up on this issue," Another issue that was brought up during the by-election was the decision of the Home Ministry to destroy the 5,000 copies of Indonesian Bibles confiscated.

On SUPP's questioning DAP's association with PAS despite having different ideology, the DAP defended itself by stating that PAS has been steadfast in the rights to freedom of religion of non-Muslims and this can be seen through PAS being able to declare that there is absolutely nothing in the Quran which forbids the use of the term "Allah" in Christian publications.

The DAP sought to pressure Robert Lau Hui Yew over the government's proposed Goods and Services Tax, arguing that the tax would increase prices for consumers in one of Malaysia's poorest states. The DAP, through its leader Lim Kit Siang also pressured Hui Yew to speak up against the government's education policy, claiming that Hui Yew's choice to have his children educated overseas demonstrated his lack of confidence in Malaysian education. On education, the DAP also criticised SUPP's involvement in the sale of the Laila Taib College, previously known as United College Sarawak, to the Yayasan Sarawak (Sarawak Foundation) for the price of one ringgit, when the local Chinese population had donated money to fund the college's building.

## Results

The election was won by Wong Ho Leng by a margin of 398 votes over Robert Lau Hui Yew. The result was seen as a surprise win for the DAP and the opposition, as it ended a run of by-election defeats for the Pakatan Rakyat parties and boosted the DAP ahead of the state elections due to be held in Sarawak in 2011. The victorious Wong claimed his election was a "miracle". 37,919 out of 54,695 registered voters cast a ballot, signifying a 70% turnout. There were 395 spoilt votes.

### Postal votes controversy

The announcement of the result was marred by a two-hour-long delay because of arguments over the discrepancies of the postal votes by Pakatan Rakyat election agents. Of the 2,827 ballot papers issued for postal votes, BN won 2,323 votes (82.2%), DAP won 70 (2.4%), the independent won 36 (1.2%) while 208 (7.3%) were considered spoilt.

Pahang PKR secretariat director Zaidi Ahmad, who was appointed by the party as the team leader in charge of monitoring the postal votes during the polls, mentioned that the DAP would not have won if the 208 postal votes were not declared spoilt and the 170 ballot papers for what he claimed were "phantom postal voters" were returned and added to the tally.

Zaidi had claimed that the forms state the names, identification numbers and information about the voters and are supposed to be signed by the voters themselves as well as their witnesses. However, the election agents noticed that the same witness would sign differently on different forms. On some forms, the voters themselves did not even sign them. Zaidi concluded by saying that it meant that others had signed on their behalf. He added that only after persistent complaints from the PR's election agents, Election Commission officials agreed to consider 208 ballot papers from the postal votes as spoilt votes. He also said that they have found at least between 700 and 800 more postal votes that had discrepancies but the EC disallowed these from being considered as spoilt. Zaidi finally claimed that if the by-election had truly been run properly, DAP could have won with a much bigger majority as if at least 700 more postal votes were rejected as spoilt, DAP could have won the polls with a majority of a little over 1,000.

As a result, the Election Commission would review the postal voting system where EC chairman Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Mohd Yusof said they would study the proposal to call for an early voting session for army personnel, policemen and EC staff instead of posting votes. Nevertheless, the Youth wing of PAS have demanded for the postal votes to be abolished altogether as it claims that the postal votes are no longer relevant and is prone to abuse and exploitation by the government to their benefit.

## Aftermath

With the win of the DAP's candidate, there were various responses from the community. While there is fear by the local Chinese community leaders that BN's defeat in Sibu would affect the town's growth, others like the opposition take it as a good omen as BN can no longer take Sarawak as its "fixed-deposit" in terms of parliamentary seats and neglect the state's development. Chua Soi Lek of the Malaysian Chinese Association, a member of the BN, said that the government could no longer hide from the fact that there were issues plaguing the Chinese community and that it can no longer be swept under the carpet following the losing of Chinese-majority polling centres in the by-election.

Lim Kit Siang of the DAP mentioned that the party's win in Sibu renews Pakatan Rakyat's Putrajaya dream, referring to PR's ambition to form the Federal government in the next 13th general election. However, political scientists mentioned that PR would have a tough time getting support from rural areas, referring to the DAP's dismal performance in rural polling centres. Nevertheless, encouraged by the strong support from the urban Chinese community in the Sibu by-election, DAP is now aiming to win the four other Chinese-majority parliamentary seats (namely the Sarikei, Miri, Stampin and Lanang seats) and seven other State constituencies held by SUPP in Sarawak.

Abdul Taib Mahmud, the BN Chief Minister of Sarawak, said that the BN lost mainly due to the influx of PR campaigners from Peninsular Malaysia. Abang Johari Openg, Sarawak state Minister for Housing and Urban Development, blamed the "provocative tactics" allegedly employed by Pakatan Rakyat leaders for causing the defeat of the SUPP candidate, referring to the raising of the 'Allah' issue. President of Parti Rakyat Sarawak (a component party of BN in Sarawak) and state Minister of Land Development James Masing had warned Peninsular Malaysia-based opposition parties to refrain from practising "rowdy" politics in Sarawak saying that it might break down social order in the country, citing the May 13 incident where a racial riot occurred when BN lost its two-thirds supermajority in parliament during the 1969 Malaysian general election.

As for the SUPP, its president George Chan Hong Nam who congratulated its winning candidate Wong immediately after the election result was announced, said that his party was completely overwhelmed by DAP's streetfighter style of politics and said, "these outsiders with their street culture have come to spoil the good nature of Sarawakians," and that "SUPP would do all it could to ensure that the "outsiders" do not gain a foothold here". Wong Soon Koh, the SUPP state assemblyman for the Bawang Assan state seat within Sibu and a minister in the Sarawak state cabinet, claimed that the DAP was now extremely rich and could fly over campaigners from Peninsula Malaysia to Sibu for the by-election. Soon Koh's remarks came under fire by Chong Chieng Jen of the DAP where he defended the party by saying that nearly all DAP campaigners including Members of Parliament, state assemblymen or ordinary members, took care of their own expenses and stayed either with party members in Sibu or in low-budget hotels to save expenses. Chong also said that unlike BN leaders, they do not fly first class, nor stay at five-star hotels which are paid for by the federal or state government under the pretext of carrying out their government duties while on the other hand obviously campaigning for the SUPP candidate.

Ibrahim Ali, the president of Malay rights group Perkasa labelled the Chinese in Sibu as ungrateful for not voting for the BN. He claimed that the Chinese in Sibu had not appreciated the development projects and financial allocations offered by BN while the Bumiputera had to endure and compromise with the wish of Chinese community. His statement however, was met with strong opposition from the local community, including the Bumiputera community, and he was dubbed as 'ignoramus' upon his statement.

Nevertheless, the losing candidate, Lau Hui Yew, pledged that he will continue to serve the people as a councilor of Sibu Municipal Council (SMC) and as a party leader. On the other hand, Muhyiddin Yassin, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia and BN's campaign director in Sibu, said that the BN will keep all promises and commitments made during the by-election even though the party lost the by-election.

## See also

- Members of the 12th Malaysian Parliament from Sarawak

2010 by-election in Sibu, Malaysia