McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet in Australian service

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) operated McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft between 1984 and 2021. The Australian Government purchased 75 A and B variants of the F/A-18 in 1981 to replace the RAAF's Dassault Mirage III fighters. The Hornets entered service with the RAAF between 1984 and 1990. Four Hornets were destroyed in flying accidents during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

RAAF Hornets were first sent on a combat deployment as part of the Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the invasion, 14 Hornets flew patrols over Iraq, as well as close air support sorties to assist coalition ground forces. RAAF F/A-18s also provided security for the American air base at Diego Garcia between late 2001 and early 2002, and have protected a number of high-profile events in Australia. Between 2015 and 2017 a detachment of Hornets was deployed to the Middle East and struck ISIL targets as part of Operation Okra.

Commencing in 1999, the RAAF put its Hornets through a series of upgrades to improve their effectiveness. However, the aircraft became increasingly difficult to operate and were at risk of being outclassed by the fighters and air-defence systems operated by other countries. Under current Australian Government planning they will be replaced by 72 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighters. The Australian Government has offered the Hornets for sale once they are no longer needed by the RAAF, and finalised a deal to sell 25 to Canada in early 2019. Eight F/A-18s will be preserved for historical purposes in Australia and the remainder may be sold to an American air combat training company.

## Selection

The RAAF began the initial stages of finding a replacement for its Dassault Mirage III fighters in 1968. The service issued an Air Staff Requirement for new fighter aircraft in December 1971, which received a larger than expected number of proposals from manufacturers. At that time the RAAF expected to start phasing out the Mirage IIIs in 1980. In 1973, a team of RAAF personnel inspected the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, Northrop YF-17, Saab 37 Viggen and Dassault Mirage F1 programs, but recommended that any decisions about a suitable replacement be delayed so that several new fighters that were expected to soon become available could also be considered. In August 1974 the Australian Government decided to defer the fighter replacement project and extend the Mirage IIIs' operational life into the 1980s. One of the four Mirage III-equipped squadrons was also disbanded at this time.

Work on the Mirage replacement program resumed in 1975, and the Tactical Fighter Project Office was established in 1976 to manage the process of selecting the RAAF's next fighter. A request for proposals was issued in November that year and attracted eleven responses. By March 1977 the office had chosen to focus on the F-15 Eagle, General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, Dassault Mirage 2000 and Panavia Tornado, as well as the McDonnell Douglas F-18A and F-18L; the F-18A was a carrier-based fighter developed from the YF-17 for the United States Navy, and the F-18L was a land-based variant of this design. The Grumman F-14 Tomcat was also considered by the project office, but was regarded as unsuitable and never placed on the official shortlist. In November 1978, the F-15 and Tornado were removed from the list of aircraft being considered. The Tornado was excluded as it was principally a strike aircraft and had limited air-to-air capability. While the F-15 was an impressive aircraft that met or exceeded almost all of the RAAF's requirements, it was believed that the air force did not need a fighter with such advanced capabilities and that introducing it into service could destabilise Australia's region.

Further evaluation of the remaining aircraft took place during 1979. Wing Commander (and later Air Vice-Marshal) Bob Richardson test-flew a Mirage 2000 in April 1979, and reported that while the aircraft had excellent aerodynamic characteristics, its avionics, radar, fuel system, cockpit and weapons capability were inferior to those of US designs. Richardson also test-flew a YF-17 that was being used as a demonstrator for the F-18L in mid-1979, and was impressed by its capabilities. No F-18Ls had been ordered at this time, and the RAAF did not want to take on the risk of being the lead customer for the design. At about the same time, the RAAF rejected an offer of F-14 Tomcats that had been originally ordered by the Iranian Government but not delivered as a result of the revolution in that country. While the Tomcats were made available at a greatly reduced price, the air force judged that these aircraft were too large and complex for its requirements.

With the Mirage 2000 and F-18L rejected, the RAAF was faced with a choice between the F-16 and F-18A. Richardson and several other RAAF pilots tested United States Air Force (USAF) F-16Bs in 1979 and 1980, and reported that the aircraft had excellent performance but could be difficult to control at times. The evaluation team was also concerned about the reliability of the F-16's engine and regarded the aircraft as technologically immature. It was also noted that the aircraft's radar was inferior to that of the F-18A, and that F-16s could not fire the beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles and long-range anti-shipping missiles that the F-18A was capable of operating. In contrast, the evaluation team was impressed by the F-18A, and regarded it as being a more robust and survivable aircraft as it had been designed to operate from aircraft carriers; these features were important for operations from bare bases in northern Australia. Richardson and three other RAAF pilots test-flew F-18As, and reported that the aircraft handled well, but had some deficiencies with its flight control system and engines; these were not seen as major flaws by the evaluation team. The F-18A's twin engines were considered to be its main advantage over the single-engined F-16, as research conducted by the evaluation team found that the attrition rate for single-engined fighters was twice that for aircraft with two engines. Overall, the RAAF judged that both the F-16 and F-18A were too immature for a decision to be made in 1980 as had been originally planned, and recommended to the Government that this be deferred by a year.

The Government accepted the RAAF's recommendation, and delayed its decision on a Mirage III replacement until late 1981. This gave General Dynamics an opportunity to offer the improved F-16C to the RAAF. The capability of these aircraft was closer to that of the F-18 as they were equipped with BVR missiles. Richardson and another RAAF pilot test-flew F-16Cs in May 1981. The F-18 design was also improved during 1981, and was redesignated the F/A-18. When RAAF test pilots flew these aircraft during 1981, they found that the deficiencies they had detected in 1980 were now addressed. Overall, the RAAF concluded that while both aircraft met its requirements and the F-16 was less expensive, the F/A-18 was the superior design as it was more technologically mature, easier to maintain during operational deployments, and likely to have a much lower attrition rate. The Government accepted this advice, and announced on 20 October 1981 that 75 F/A-18s would be ordered. As part of this announcement, Minister for Defence Jim Killen acknowledged that the F-16 would have been seven percent cheaper to purchase, but stated that the F/A-18's lower running costs and expected attrition rate greatly reduced the difference between the lifetime cost of the two designs.

Instead of directly ordering the aircraft from McDonnell Douglas, the Australian Government purchased its F/A-18s through the US Government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Ordering the aircraft via the US Government allowed the RAAF to take advantage of the superior purchasing power of the US military, and reduced the service's project management requirements. This led to a complicated arrangement whereby the aircraft were ordered by the US Government, delivered to the US Navy, and then transferred to the RAAF once initial flight testing had taken place. The process functioned smoothly and was cost effective.

## Production

The RAAF's order of 75 Hornets comprised 57 single-seat A variant fighters and 18 two-seat B variant operational training aircraft. It was planned that each of the three fighter squadrons and the single operational conversion unit that were to operate the F/A-18 would be allocated 16 aircraft, of which 12 were expected to be operational at any time while the other four were undergoing maintenance. The remaining eleven Hornets were labelled the "half-life attrition buy" and would replace the aircraft that were expected to have been lost by 2000; as it happened, this greatly exceeded the RAAF's actual losses. Deliveries were planned to start in late 1984 and be completed in 1990. The total cost of the F/A-18 program, including the aircraft, spare parts, other equipment and modifications to the RAAF's fighter bases, was calculated as  billion in August 1981, but was rapidly revised upwards due to the depreciation of the Australian dollar at this time.

The Australian Hornets were very similar to the standard US Navy variants, but incorporated a number of minor modifications. These included the addition of an instrument landing system/VHF omnidirectional range (ILS/VOR) system, a high-frequency radio, a different ejection seat harness and the deletion of all equipment used only to launch the aircraft from catapults. In addition, two of the Australian aircraft were fitted with flight-test instrumentation so that they could be used as part of trials.

The Government sought to use the Mirage III replacement program as a means to increase the capabilities of Australia's manufacturing industry. Accordingly, it was decided to build the aircraft in Australia, though it was recognised that this would lead to higher costs than if the fighters were purchased directly from the United States. While the first four RAAF Hornets were built in the United States, the remainder were assembled at the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) plant at Avalon Airport in Victoria, and their engines were produced by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation at Fishermans Bend in Melbourne. Another twelve Australian companies were involved in other stages of the project. These firms were sub-contracted to McDonnell Douglas and the other major US companies that produced components for the F/A-18, and had to comply with the requirements of the FMS program. The Australian Government hoped that Singapore and New Zealand would purchase Australian-built Hornets, but this did not eventuate. The Canadian Government expressed interest in purchasing 25 Australian-built F/A-18As in 1988 in order to increase its force of these aircraft after they had ceased to be manufactured in the United States, but this did not lead to any sales.

The Australian Hornets began to roll off the production lines in 1984. The first two aircraft (serial numbers A21-101 and A21-102) were entirely built at McDonnell Douglas's factory in St. Louis, and were handed over to the RAAF on 29 October 1984. These aircraft remained in the United States until May 1985 for training and trials purposes. The next two Australian Hornets (A21-103 and A21-104) were also built at St. Louis, but were then disassembled and flown to Avalon in June 1984 on board a USAF Lockheed C-5 Galaxy. The aircraft were then reassembled, and A21-103 was rolled out at a ceremony attended by Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal David Evans, on 16 November. However, the aircraft's initial test flight was delayed until 26 February 1985 by a demarcation dispute over which category of pilot was permitted to fly the aircraft.

In order to meet production targets, GAF was required to complete 1.5 Hornets per month. Production fell behind schedule during the first half of 1987, however, as a result of inefficiencies at the company's factory and industrial relations problems. GAF was able to accelerate production later in the year, though some components that were planned to be manufactured in Australia were purchased from companies in the United States instead. The final cost of the Hornet project was  billion; after adjusting for the depreciation of the Australian dollar this was \$186 million less than the initial estimate.

The RAAF began to accept Hornets into service in 1985. A21-103 was formally delivered on 4 May of that year. Two weeks later, A21-101 and 102 were flown from Naval Air Station Lemoore in California to RAAF Base Williamtown in New South Wales between 16 and 17 May 1985. This ferry flight was conducted as a non-stop journey, and USAF McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender tankers refuelled each of the Hornets 15 times as they crossed the Pacific. As of 2005 this remained the longest single flight to have been undertaken by F/A-18s. Despite the delays to production in 1987, the final Australian Hornet (A21-57) was delivered on schedule at a ceremony held in Canberra on 16 May 1990. The F/A-18As were allocated serial numbers A21-1 through to A21-57 and the F/A-18Bs were allocated A21-101 to A21-118.

A major capital works program was also undertaken to prepare RAAF bases for the Hornets. Over \$150 million was spent upgrading the runways, hangars and maintenance facilities at RAAF Base Williamtown, which has been the main F/A-18 base throughout the aircraft's service. The pre-existing airfield at RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory was also developed into a major air base between 1985 and 1988 at a cost of \$215 million, so that it could accommodate No. 75 Squadron. Until this time the squadron had been stationed at RAAF Base Darwin which, due to its location on Australia's north coast, was vulnerable to damage from cyclones and difficult to defend during wartime.

Owing to concerns over the airworthiness of the RAAF's General Dynamics F-111 bombers and delays to the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II program, the Australian Government ordered 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets in 2006. This design is significantly different from the original (or "classic") Hornet. The RAAF's first Super Hornets entered service in 2010 and deliveries were completed the next year. In 2013 the Australian Government ordered 12 Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare variants of the Super Hornet, and all were delivered to the RAAF between 2015 and 2017.

## Maintenance and upgrades

Maintenance of the RAAF's Hornets is carried out by both air force personnel and civilian contractors. Until the early 1990s, all routine servicing and a significant proportion of intensive "deeper maintenance" was undertaken by the air force. However, the share of intensive maintenance tasks outsourced to the private sector was increased during the 1990s under the RAAF-wide Commercial Support Program. Under current arrangements, the four Hornet-equipped units undertake all routine servicing and some of the more complex deeper maintenance tasks. The remainder of the deeper maintenance work, as well as all major refurbishments and upgrade projects, are carried out by commercial firms. BAE Systems has been the lead contractor for Hornet deeper maintenance since 2003, and Boeing Australia has also provided maintenance services for the aircraft since it won a contract to do so in 2010. In August 2017, Boeing's contract was extended until the planned retirement of the Hornets in 2021, with the company also gaining responsibility for integrating weapons onto the type. This change was made to free up RAAF personnel for activities associated with introducing the F-35 into service.

The RAAF's Hornet fleet received few modifications until the late 1990s. During this period, the AN/AAS-38 "Nite Hawk" targeting pod was the only new system fitted to the aircraft. Australia also managed to break the codes which prevented modifications to the Hornet's radar software after the US Government refused to share them. This enabled the software to be adjusted so that all of the aircraft operated by Australia's neighbours could be designated as hostile. In his final address to Parliament, former Minister for Defence Kim Beazley stated that he had raised access to the radar system repeatedly with the US Government during the 1980s, and "in the end, we spied on them and we extracted the codes ourselves".

Several Asian countries introduced Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters into service during the 1990s, raising concerns that the RAAF's aircraft would be outclassed. The air force considered replacing the Hornet with the Eurofighter Typhoon or Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, but concluded that both aircraft were technologically immature. As a result, it was decided to upgrade the Hornets.

The Hornet Upgrade Program (HUG) began in 1999, and had three main phases. In Phase 1, which ran from mid-2000 through 2002, the Hornets' computer systems, navigation system and radio were replaced. The aircraft were also fitted to operate the ASRAAM air-to-air missile; these weapons replaced the AIM-9 Sidewinder. HUG Phase 2 comprised four sub-elements and sought to improve the Hornets' combat performance. During Phase 2.1 the APG-65 radar was replaced with the improved AN/APG-73, and the aircraft were fitted with a secure voice encryption communications system and various updates to their computer systems. In HUG Phase 2.2, the most important element of the program, the Hornets were fitted with a Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, equipment needed to share data through the Link 16 network, a new countermeasures dispensing system and several upgrades to their cockpit displays. All of the Hornets were upgraded to this standard between January 2005 and December 2006. In Phase 2.3, an improved Electronic Counter Measures system was fitted to the Hornets; the AN/ALR-2002 was originally selected, but proved unsuccessful. It was replaced by the ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver in late 2006. As of early 2012, 14 Hornets had been fitted with the system and the remainder were scheduled to receive it by the end of the year. During HUG Phase 2.4 the Hornets were modified to be able to use the AN/AAQ-28(v) "LITENING" targeting pod and 37 of these systems were purchased; this phase was completed in 2007.

The third stage of the Hornet Upgrade Program sought to rectify airframe damage. HUG Phase 3.1 involved minor structural work to all aircraft as they passed through other phases of the program. The centre fuselages of the ten Hornets assessed as suffering the greatest amount of structural damage were replaced in HUG Phase 3.2. It was originally intended that all the RAAF's Hornets would receive new centre fuselages, but the scope of this phase of the program was reduced after it was found that the number of man-hours needed to upgrade each aircraft was much greater than originally estimated. The ten aircraft were upgraded at an L-3 Communications facility in Canada, and all were returned to service by June 2010.

The long-running HUG process complicated the RAAF's management of its fleet of F/A-18s. At any one time, the capabilities of individual aircraft differed considerably depending on their upgrades. Accordingly, the long-standing arrangement where aircraft were almost permanently assigned to each squadron was replaced by a system where they were pooled. Attempts to allocate Hornets with similar levels of modifications from the common pool to each squadron were not successful.

## Armament

The RAAF's Hornets have been fitted with several different types of air-to-air weapons. The aircraft are equipped with an internal M61A1 cannon for use against air and ground targets; 578 rounds can be carried for this weapon. During the initial years of the Hornets' service, the aircraft were equipped with AIM-9M Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missiles and AIM-7M Sparrow medium-range air-to-air missiles. The Sparrows were replaced by the AIM-120 AMRAAM in 2002, and in 2004 the Sidewinders were replaced by ASRAAMs. The older missiles are occasionally used in training exercises, however.

A variety of unguided and guided weapons can also be used against ground targets. The Hornets carry Mark 82, Mark 83 and Mark 84 bombs, as well as GBU-10, GBU-12 and GBU-16 Paveway II laser-guided bombs. In addition, the aircraft have operated bombs fitted with JDAM guidance kits since 2008. The long-ranged JDAM-ER variant of these bombs were ordered in 2011 and entered service in 2015. During exercises the Hornets carry BDU-33 and BDU-57 LGTR training bombs. Since November 2011, the RAAF's Hornets have also been equipped with AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles. The F/A-18s' main weapon in the maritime strike role is the Harpoon anti-ship missile; the RAAF initially operated the Block IC variant of this missile, but purchased Block II variants in 2003. In addition to these weapons, the Hornets can also be fitted with 330-US-gallon (1,200 L) drop tanks to extend their range.

## Operational history

### Introduction into service

Four RAAF units converted to the Hornet between 1985 and 1988. The first 14 Hornets were allocated to No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) at RAAF Base Williamtown, and were used to train the pilots and instructors needed to convert the RAAF's three fighter squadrons to the aircraft. 2OCU's first Hornet operational conversion course began on 19 August 1985. In addition to the unit's training activities, 2OCU aircraft travelled widely around Australia and South East Asia during 1985 and 1986 to showcase the new aircraft. No. 3 Squadron was the first fighter unit to convert from the Mirage III, and became operational with the Hornet in August 1986. It was followed by No. 77 Squadron in June 1987 and No. 75 Squadron in May 1988. No. 81 Wing, whose headquarters is located at Williamtown, has commanded these four units since they converted to the F/A-18. As of 2012, 2OCU, No. 3 and No. 77 Squadrons are stationed at Williamtown and No. 75 Squadron is located at Tindal. In addition, two Hornets are allocated to the Aircraft Research and Development Unit at RAAF Base Edinburgh in South Australia.

The RAAF's Mirage III pilots generally found the process of converting to the Hornet to be straightforward. While the F/A-18 was considered to be easier to fly, its more sophisticated avionics and weapons systems required improved cockpit workload management skills. The Hornets have also proven to be mechanically reliable and easy to maintain, though shortages of spare parts reduced availability rates during the early years of their service with the RAAF. The updates installed as part of the HUG process have further simplified maintenance procedures. In recent years, however, the aging aircraft have required much more servicing than was the case in the past.

To extend the Hornets' range, four of the RAAF's six Boeing 707 transport aircraft were converted to tankers in the early 1990s; the first Boeing 707 tanker entered service in 1990. The tankers were operated by No. 33 Squadron and supported the Hornet units until the 707s were retired in 2008. These aircraft were replaced with KC-30A tanker-transports in 2011.

The RAAF has at times suffered from shortfalls of Hornet-qualified pilots. The service began to experience shortages of F/A-18 and F-111 fast-jet pilots in the mid-1980s due to competition from commercial airlines and relatively low recruitment rates. By June 1999 the three operational Hornet-equipped squadrons had only 40 pilots, which was fewer than the number of aircraft allocated to these units. The RAAF claimed that the squadrons were able to meet their readiness targets, however. To overcome this shortfall, the RAAF gave its fast-jet units a higher priority for aircrew, implemented measures to reduce separation rates, and recruited pilots from other countries. These reforms coincided with reduced demand for civil pilots following the 11 September attacks, and by late 2003 the RAAF's fast-jet units were at near full strength. A 2010 article in the magazine Australian Aviation stated that No. 3 Squadron typically had "about 18 pilots on strength" at any point in time. At this time the total strength of the squadron, including air and ground crew, was around 300 personnel.

### Training

As the Hornets are multi-role fighters, their pilots practise a wide range of tasks during peacetime training. Each year the three Hornet squadrons rotate between four-month training blocks focused on air-to-air combat, air-to-ground tactics and Australian Defence Force support tasks. The units undertake the air-to-air and air-to-ground blocks before assuming responsibility for Australian Defence Force support (which involves operating with the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy). No. 81 Wing's headquarters oversees this training program and monitors adherence to common standards and procedures. Training sorties may include such tasks as defending air bases, infrastructure and shipping from enemy aircraft, attacking naval and ground targets, and practising in-flight refuelling. More unusual tasks such as dropping naval mines have also been practised at times. Major exercises often involve other RAAF units and aircraft, as well as units from the Army and Navy and contingents from other countries.

As part of their regular training activities, F/A-18 Hornets operate in different parts of Australia and the Asia-Pacific region. Regular deployments are made to Singapore and RMAF Butterworth in Malaysia as part of Integrated Air Defence System exercises. In addition, RAAF F/A-18s have participated in exercises in the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. These deployments have seen Australian fighter squadrons range as far afield as Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska, where they took part in Red Flag – Alaska exercises in 2008 and 2011.

Four of the RAAF's Hornets were destroyed in flying accidents during the late 1980s and early 1990s. A21-104 was the first aircraft to be lost when it crashed at Great Palm Island in Queensland on 18 November 1987; its pilot was killed. The next loss occurred on 2 August 1990 when two No. 75 Squadron Hornets (A21-29 and A21-42) collided. A21-42 crashed, killing the unit's commanding officer; the other aircraft was damaged but managed to return to base. On 5 June 1991 A21-41 crashed 100 kilometres (62 mi) north-east of Weipa, Queensland, killing its pilot. A21-106 was the fourth aircraft to be lost when it crashed inland from Shoalwater Bay in Queensland on 19 May 1992 – its pilot and a passenger from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation died. As of September 2017, all of the remaining 71 F/A-18s were still in service. Aviation writer Nigel Pittaway has noted that the type has "enjoyed an exemplary safety record during its RAAF service", especially when compared to the loss of 41 of the RAAF's 116 Mirages due to accidents. Similarly, Andrew McLaughlin noted in 2019 that the loss of four Hornets to this time was "a remarkable endorsement of the aircraft's rugged design and systems redundancy" given that the RAAF had projected that eleven would have been destroyed by 2004 when the aircraft were first acquired.

### Deployments

In late 1990, consideration was given to deploying a squadron of F/A-18s to the Middle East as part of an expanded Australian contribution to the Gulf War. The Department of Defence opposed dispatching the aircraft on the grounds that doing so would greatly strain the fighter force in Australia, and this option was not adopted by the government. As a result, the Hornets' only role in the war was to support the training of the Royal Australian Navy warships which were sent to the Gulf by conducting mock attacks on the vessels as they sailed from Sydney to Perth.

During late 1999, No. 75 Squadron was placed on alert to provide close air support and air defence for the international forces deployed to East Timor as part of INTERFET. While Indonesian forces posed a potential threat to this force, no fighting eventuated and the Hornets were not required.

The first operational deployment of RAAF Hornets took place in 2001. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Australian Government agreed to deploy F/A-18s to protect the major USAF air base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which was being used to mount operations in Afghanistan. Four No. 77 Squadron Hornets and 70 personnel departed for the island on 9 November. No. 3 Squadron pilots and ground crew relieved the No. 77 Squadron personnel in early February 2002. RAAF Hornets were not assigned to the War in Afghanistan as at the time they were less capable than other available coalition aircraft. While the F/A-18s were occasionally scrambled in response to reports of aircraft near the base, no threat developed. The detachment returned to Australia on 21 May 2002.

No. 75 Squadron formed part of the Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The squadron began initial planning for this deployment in December 2002, and intensive training was undertaken from January 2003. To improve the unit's readiness, air and ground crew as well as aircraft were also posted to No. 75 Squadron from other units. The Australian Government announced on 1 February that it would begin deploying RAAF aircraft, including a squadron of F/A-18s, to the Middle East. No. 75 Squadron departed from Tindal on 13 February, and arrived at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on the 16th of the month. The 14 F/A-18A Hornets selected for this deployment had received the HUG 2.1 package of upgrades and recently completed major servicing. These upgrades allowed the F/A-18s to operate alongside other coalition aircraft. In addition to No. 75 Squadron, several experienced Hornet pilots were also posted to the USAF Combined Air and Space Operations Center in the Middle East to provide advice on how to make the best use of the squadron.

The Australian Hornets saw combat in several roles during the Iraq War. Following the outbreak of war on 20 March, No. 75 Squadron was initially used to escort high-value Coalition aircraft, such as tankers and airborne early warning and control aircraft. As it rapidly became clear that the Iraqi Air Force posed no threat, from 21 March No. 75 Squadron also began to conduct air interdiction sorties against Iraqi forces. These sorties were initially flown in support of the United States Army's V Corps, but the squadron was rarely assigned any targets to attack. As a result, the Australian commanders in the Middle East had No. 75 Squadron reassigned to support the United States Marine Corps' I Marine Expeditionary Force. At this time the squadron also began flying close air support sorties. During the first two weeks of the war the squadron typically flew twelve sorties per day. To avoid pilot fatigue, additional aircrew were posted to the Middle East from Australia. The number of sorties dropped to between six and ten per day from 5 April onwards as the American forces closed on Baghdad and few targets remained in southern Iraq. On 12 April, No. 75 Squadron supported elements of the Special Air Service Regiment and 4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, which occupied Al Asad Airbase. During the last weeks of the war the squadron continued to fly sorties across western, central and southern Iraq to support British and American forces. In several of the squadron's operations in the final week of the war, the Hornets made low altitude and high speed passes over Iraqi positions to encourage their defenders to surrender. No. 75 Squadron conducted its final combat sorties on 27 April. During the war the squadron flew 350 combat missions (including 670 individual sorties) and dropped 122 laser-guided bombs. No. 75 Squadron did not suffer any casualties, and all 14 Hornets returned to Tindal on 14 May 2003.

RAAF Hornets have also provided air defence for several high-profile events in Australia since the 11 September attacks. In 2002, Hornets patrolled over the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) at Coolum Beach, Queensland; this was the first time RAAF aircraft had flown air defence sorties over Australia since World War II. On 22 and 23 October that year a detachment of Hornets patrolled over Canberra during US President George W. Bush's visit to the city. A detachment of aircraft from No. 77 Squadron was deployed to RAAF Base East Sale in March 2006 to protect the Commonwealth Games, which were being held in Melbourne. In September 2007, Hornets patrolled over Sydney during the APEC leaders meeting there. Eight Hornets were also deployed from Williamtown to RAAF Base Pearce in October 2011 to protect the CHOGM meeting in nearby Perth. On 16 and 17 November that year, Hornets operated over Canberra and Darwin while President Barack Obama was present.

In March 2015, six F/A-18As from No. 75 Squadron were deployed to the Middle East as part of Operation Okra, replacing a detachment of Super Hornets. No. 81 Wing's involvement in Operation Okra concluded in May 2017, with No. 1 Squadron resuming responsibility for this task. By this time all of the wing's three squadrons had completed at least one rotation to the Middle East: No. 3 Squadron was deployed once, and the other two squadrons conducted two deployments. The squadrons used a common 'pool' of aircraft during these deployments, with either six or seven Hornets being stationed in the Middle East at any time. The aircraft were typically deployed for eight months before rotating back to Australia when becoming due for major servicing. Members of the three Hornet-equipped squadrons served five or six-month rotations, and ground crew from 2OCU and No. 81 Wing's workshops were also deployed to fill specialist roles. The Hornets attacked ISIL personnel and facilities in both Iraq and Syria, including in support of Iraqi forces engaged in the Battle of Mosul. Overall, No. 81 Wing conducted 1,973 sorties over Iraq and Syria during which 1,961 munitions were released. Despite the age of the aircraft and the harsh environmental conditions in the Middle East, the detachment sustained a very high serviceability rate.

### Retirement

While the Hornet Upgrade Program was successful, it was expected that the aircraft would become increasingly expensive to operate as they aged, and improvements to the fighter aircraft and air defences operated by other countries would reduce their combat effectiveness. The Australian Government decided to replace the RAAF's F/A-18 Hornets with Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighters, with this process commencing in 2018. The acquisition process is designated Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B, and will involve the purchase of 72 F-35A fighters to equip three squadrons and an operational training unit. All of the F/A-18A and Bs were scheduled to be retired by 2022. The RAAF's Hornet sustainability planning was designed to allow the type to be retained in service for longer if the F-35 program experienced further delays.

No. 3 Squadron was the first Hornet unit to be reequipped, and ceased operating the type in December 2017. It began to transition to the F-35 in early 2018. The squadron's Hornets and most of its personnel were transferred to No. 77 Squadron, which was expanded from two to three flights as part of this change. 2OCU completed its final Hornet conversion training course in 2019, and ceased flying the type in December that year. No. 77 Squadron ceased Hornet operations in December 2020. As of May 2020, No. 75 Squadron was to begin converting to the F-35 in January 2022.

The RAAF implemented several measures to keep the Hornets in service until the F-35As were ready. These included a structural refurbishment program, increased monitoring of fatigue-related issues as well as repainting the aircraft and frequently washing them to reduce the risks posed by corrosion. In 2015 the Defence Science and Technology Group revised the fatigue damage algorithm used for determining the Hornets' structural condition which found that the airframes were less fatigued than previously believed, and so able to remain in service for a longer period than planned if necessary. This finding was accepted by the Directorate General Technical Airworthiness – Australian Defence Force. As of September 2017, none of the RAAF Hornets were subject to flying restrictions due to airframe fatigue. However, the cost of maintaining the aging aircraft in service was increasing. A 2017 article by Canadian defence analyst Christopher Cowan and Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Dr. Andrew Davies stated that the RAAF "has done an excellent job managing its Hornet fleet", with each aircraft having a unique plan to minimise airframe fatigue. At this time each of the Hornets had, on average, been flown for 4,200 hours, as compared to the nominal fatigue life of 6,000 hours for the type. In August 2019, the Hornet fleet passed the milestone of having flown 400,000 hours. At this time, several Hornets had been retired from service after becoming due for major servicing periods.

The Hornet was officially retired from RAAF service on 29 November 2021. A ceremony to mark the occasion took place that day at RAAF Base Williamtown. The fleet had been flown for almost 408,000 hours.

## Disposal

The Australian Government is planning to sell the Hornets and associated spare parts after the type is retired from RAAF service. In August 2017, the Canadian Government initiated discussions to purchase a number of Australian F/A-18s to augment the Royal Canadian Air Force's fleet of similar McDonnell Douglas CF-18 Hornets in the event that a planned purchase of Super Hornets was cancelled as the result of a trade dispute. A Canadian delegation also visited Australia that month to inspect RAAF Hornets. The Canadian Government lodged a formal expression of interest to purchase Australian F/A-18s on 29 September 2017.

On 13 December 2017, Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne confirmed the sale of 18 F/A-18 Hornets and associated spare parts to Canada. The Canadian Government announced at the same time that it had cancelled its plans to acquire Super Hornets. The Australian aircraft are being acquired to enable the RCAF to continue to meet its international commitments until a new fighter type is ordered and enters service. In June 2018, the Canadian Government requested a further seven Australian Hornets. These additional aircraft will be used as a source of spare parts. The sale of the 25 Hornets was finalised in early 2019, with the purchase price being  million. Of these aircraft, 18 will be issued to operational units and the remainder used for trials purposes and as a source of spare parts. After they arrive in Canada, the aircraft will be fitted with different ejection seats and software so that they are identical to CF-18s.

Deliveries of ex-RAAF Hornets to Canada began in February 2019. Two of the aircraft were flown to CFB Cold Lake by Australian pilots in mid-February, and handed over after they had formed part of the RAAF contingent at a Red Flag exercise in the United States. At this time, deliveries of the other 23 Hornets were scheduled to be completed in 2021. However, this schedule is dependent on progress with introducing the F-35 into Australian service. At least one other Hornet was handed over to Canada during 2019. In August 2020 it was reported that 18 ex-Australian aircraft would be among 36 RCAF Hornets to be placed through a modernisation program. The upgrades will include the installation of a AN/APG-79 active electronically scanned array radar and equipping the aircraft with AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons.

In March 2020 the Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price announced that up to 46 ex-RAAF Hornets, as well as the entire associated spare parts and test equipment inventory, would be sold to the American company Air USA. This company provides air combat training to the US Government. Journalist Nigel Pittaway noted that if all of these aircraft are sold it would mean that none of the Hornets are preserved in Australian museums after the type leaves RAAF service. In May, the Department of Defence stated that the numbers which would be sold to Canada and Air USA had not yet been finalised. As of November 2021 it was not clear if the deal to sell Hornets to Air USA would proceed. The aircraft had still not been transferred in February 2023, but it was reported that the contract remained in place and Department of Defence still intended to deliver them. By this time Air USA had been rebranded as RAVN Aerospace.

In March 2023 Australian Financial Review correspondent Aaron Patrick wrote that the sale "appears to have fallen through" and called for the Hornets to be transferred to Ukraine as part of Australia's assistance to the country following the Russian invasion during 2022. It was reported in April 2023 that the Department of Defence had repeatedly refused to comment on the status of the sale to RAVN Aerospace. In May 2023 Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Malcom Davis stated that the Australian Hornets were stored at Andersen Air Force Base on the American island of Guam, and appeared to be in poor condition. Davis considers the aircraft to be too outdated to be suitable for Ukraine, and noted that the country has not requested them from Australia. In June the Australian Financial Review reported that the Australian Government was discussing donating the Hornets to Ukraine with the Ukrainian and United States governments. The US Government was reported to be supportive of this transfer. The story also stated that multiple experts considered the aircraft to be suitable for Ukraine and that they were being stored at RAAF Base Williamtown. ABC News reported also in June that the arrangement would require RAVN Aerospace to on-sell the aircraft to Ukraine, with the company being willing to do so. If the Hornets are provided to Ukraine it will be the largest-ever transfer of Australian military equipment to another country.

## Preservation

In May 2020, the Department of Defence announced that six F/A-18As (A21-22, -23, -29, -32, -40 and -43) and two F/A-18Bs (A21-101 and -103) would be preserved in Australia. Two of these aircraft were earmarked for static preservation at the Australian War Memorial. All eight Hornets were prepared for museum display by Boeing Defence Australia over a two year period ending in May 2023.

History of the F/A-18 fighter
aircraft used by Australia

Aircraft in Royal Australian Air Force service


Arrest and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem

On 2 November 1963, Ngô Đình Diệm, the president of South Vietnam, was arrested and assassinated in a successful CIA-backed coup d'état led by General Dương Văn Minh. The coup was the culmination of nine years of autocratic and nepotistic family rule in the country. Discontent with the Diệm regime had been simmering below the surface and culminated with mass Buddhist protests against longstanding religious discrimination after the government shooting of protesters who defied a ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) had launched a bloody overnight siege on Gia Long Palace in Saigon. When rebel forces entered the palace, Diệm and his adviser and younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu were not present, having escaped to a loyalist shelter in Cholon. The brothers had kept in communication with the rebels through a direct link from the shelter to the palace, and misled them into believing that they were still in the palace. The Ngô brothers soon agreed to surrender and were promised safe exile; after being arrested, they were instead executed in the back of an armoured personnel carrier by ARVN officers on the journey back to military headquarters near Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base. While no formal inquiry was conducted, the responsibility for the deaths of the Ngô brothers is commonly placed on Minh's bodyguard, Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung and on Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa, both of whom guarded the brothers during the trip. Minh's army colleagues and US officials in Saigon agreed that Minh ordered the executions. They postulated various motives, including that the brothers had embarrassed Minh by fleeing the Gia Long Palace, and that the brothers were killed to prevent a later political comeback. The generals initially attempted to cover up the execution by suggesting that the brothers had committed suicide, but this was contradicted when photos of the Ngôs' corpses surfaced in the media.

## Background

Diệm's political career began in July 1954, when he was appointed the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam by former Emperor Bảo Đại, who was Head of State. At the time, Vietnam had been partitioned at the Geneva Conference after the defeat of the French Union forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, with the State of Vietnam ruling the country south of the 17th parallel north. The partition was intended to be temporary, with national elections scheduled for 1956 to create a government of a reunified nation. In the meantime, Diệm and Bảo Đại were locked in a power struggle. Bảo Đại disliked Diệm but selected him in the hope that he would attract American aid. The issue was brought to a head when Diệm scheduled a referendum for October 1955 on whether South Vietnam should become a republic. Diệm won the rigged referendum and proclaimed himself the President of the newly created Republic of Vietnam.

Diệm refused to hold the reunification elections, on the basis that the State of Vietnam was not a signatory to the Geneva Accords. He then proceeded to strengthen his autocratic and nepotistic rule over the country. A constitution was written by a rubber stamp legislature which gave Diệm the power to create laws by decree and arbitrarily give himself emergency powers. Dissidents, both communist and nationalist, were jailed and executed in the thousands and elections were routinely rigged. Opposition candidates were threatened with being charged for conspiring with the Viet Cong, which carried the death penalty, and in many areas, large numbers of ARVN troops were sent to stuff ballot boxes.

Diệm kept the control of the nation firmly within the hands of his brothers and their in-laws and promotions in the ARVN were given on the basis of religion and loyalty rather than merit. Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to depose Diệm. In 1960 the uprising of the paratroopers was suppressed. Diem was trapped in his palace, but he managed to buy time with promises of negotiations and concessions until two ARVN divisions arrived in the capital and put down the rebellion. In 1962 two pilots of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force dropped bombs on the presidential palace, but Diem was not injured in the explosions. South Vietnam's Buddhist majority had long been discontented with Diệm's strong favoritism towards Catholics. Public servants and army officers had long been promoted on the basis of religious preference, and government contracts, US economic assistance, business favors and tax concessions were preferentially given to Catholics. The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and its holdings were exempt from land reform. In the countryside, Catholics were de facto exempt from performing corvée labour. Discontent with Diệm and Nhu exploded into mass protest during the summer of 1963 when nine Buddhists died at the hand of Diệm's army and police on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha.

In May 1963, a law against the flying of religious flags was selectively invoked; the Buddhist flag was banned from display on Vesak while the Vatican flag was displayed to celebrate the anniversary of the consecration of Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục, Diệm's elder brother. The Buddhists defied the ban and a protest was ended when government forces opened fire. With Diệm remaining intransigent in the face of escalating Buddhist demands for religious equality, sections of society began calling for his removal from power. The key turning point came shortly after midnight on 21 August, when Nhu's Special Forces raided and vandalised Buddhist pagodas across the country, arresting thousands of monks and causing a death toll estimated to be in the hundreds. Numerous coup plans had been explored by the army before, but the plotters intensified their activities with increased confidence after the administration of US President John F. Kennedy authorised the US embassy to explore the possibility of a leadership change.

## Surrender and debate

At 13:30 on 1 November, Generals Dương Văn Minh and Trần Văn Đôn, respectively the Presidential Military Adviser and Army Chief of Staff, led a coup against Diệm. The rebels had carefully devised plans to neutralise loyalist officers to prevent them from saving Diệm. Unknown to Diệm, General Đính, the supposed loyalist who commanded the ARVN III Corps that surrounded the Saigon area, had allied himself with the plotters of the coup. The second of Diệm's most trusted loyalist generals was Huỳnh Văn Cao, who commanded the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta. Diệm and Nhu were aware of the coup plan, and Nhu responded by planning a counter-coup, which he called Operation Bravo. This plan involved Đính and Colonel Tung, the loyalist commander of the Special Forces, staging a phony rebellion before their forces crushed the "uprising" to reaffirm the power of the Ngô family. Unaware that Đính was plotting against him, Nhu allowed Đính to organise troops as he saw fit, and Đính transferred the command of the 7th Division based at Mỹ Tho from Cao's IV Corps to his own III Corps. This allowed Colonel Nguyễn Hữu Có, Đính's deputy, to take command of the 7th Division. The transfer allowed the rebels to completely encircle the capital and denied Cao the opportunity of storming Saigon and protecting Diệm, as he had done during the previous coup attempt in 1960. Minh and Đôn had invited senior Saigon based officers to a meeting at the headquarters of the Joint General Staff (JGS), on the pretext of routine business. Instead, they announced that a coup was underway, with only a few, including Tung, refusing to join. Tung was later forced at gunpoint to order his loyalist Special Forces to surrender. The coup went smoothly as the rebels quickly captured all key installations in Saigon and sealed incoming roads to prevent loyalist forces from entering. This left only the Presidential Guard to defend Gia Long Palace. The rebels attacked government and loyalist army buildings but delayed the attack on the palace, hoping that Diệm would resign and accept the offer of safe passage and exile. Diệm refused, vowing to reassert his control. After sunset, the 5th Division of Colonel Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, who later became the nation's president, led an assault on Gia Long Palace and it fell by daybreak.

In the early morning of 2 November, Diệm agreed to surrender. The ARVN officers had intended to exile Diệm and Nhu, having promised the Ngô brothers safe passage out of the country. At 06:00, just before dawn, the officers held a meeting at JGS headquarters to discuss the fate of the Ngô brothers. According to Lucien Conein, the US Army and CIA officer who was the American liaison with the coup, most of the officers, including Minh, wanted Diệm to have an "honorable retirement" from office, followed by exile. Not all of the senior officers attended the meeting, with some having already left to make arrangements for the arrival of Diệm and Nhu at JGS headquarters. General Lê, a former police chief under Diệm in the mid-1950s, strongly lobbied for Diệm's execution. There was no formal vote taken at the meeting, and Lê attracted only minority support. One general was reported to have said "To kill weeds, you must pull them up at the roots". Conein reported that the generals had never indicated that assassination was in their minds, since an orderly transition of power was a high priority in achieving their ultimate aim of gaining international recognition.

Minh and Đôn asked Conein to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country. Two days earlier, US Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., had alerted Washington that such a request was likely and recommended Saigon as the departure point. This request put the Kennedy administration in a difficult position, as the provision of an airplane would publicly tie it to the coup. When Conein telephoned David Smith, the acting chief of the Saigon CIA station, there was a ten-minute delay. The US government would not allow the aircraft to land in any country, unless that state was willing to grant asylum to Diệm. The United States did not want Diệm and Nhu to form a government in exile and wanted them far away from Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman had written in August that "under no circumstances should the Ngô brothers be permitted to remain in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam because of the plots they will mount to try to regain power. If the generals decide to exile Diệm, he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia." He further went on to anticipate what he termed a "Götterdämmerung in the palace".

> We should encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and destroy the palace if necessary to gain victory. Unconditional surrender should be the terms for the Ngô family since it will otherwise seek to outmaneuver both the coups forces and the US. If the family is taken alive, the Ngô brothers should be banished to France or any other country willing to receive them. Diệm should be treated as the generals wish.

After surrendering, Diệm called Lodge by telephone for the last time. Lodge did not report the conversation to Washington, so it was widely assumed that the pair last spoke on the previous afternoon when the coup was just starting. However, after Lodge died in 1985, his aide, Colonel Mike Dunn said that Lodge and Diệm spoke for the last time around 07:00 on 2 November moments after Diệm surrendered. When Diệm called, Lodge "put [him] on hold" and then walked away. Upon his return, the ambassador offered Diệm and Nhu asylum, but would not arrange for transportation to the Philippines until the next day. This contradicted his earlier offer of asylum the previous day when he implored Diệm to not resist the coup. Dunn offered to personally go to the brothers' hideout to escort him so that the generals could not kill him, but Lodge refused, saying, "We just can't get that involved." Dunn said, "I was really astonished that we didn't do more for them." Having refused to help the brothers to leave the country safely, Lodge later said after they had been shot, "What would we have done with them if they had lived? Every Colonel Blimp in the world would have made use of them."

Dunn also claimed that Lodge put Diệm on hold in order to inform Conein where the Ngô brothers were so the generals could capture them. When confronted about Dunn's claim by a historian, Conein denied the account. It was also revealed that Conein had phoned the embassy early on the same morning to inquire about the generals' request for a plane to transport Diệm and Nhu out of Saigon. One of Lodge's staff told Conein that the plane would have to go directly to the faraway asylum-offering country, so that the brothers could not disembark at a nearby stopover country and stay there to foment a counter-coup. Conein was told that the nearest plane that was capable of such a long range flight was in Guam, and it would take 24 hours to make the necessary arrangements. Minh was astounded and told Conein that the generals could not hold Diệm for that period. Conein did not suspect a deliberate delay by the American embassy. In contrast, a US Senate investigative commission in the early 1970s raised a provocative thought: "One wonders what became of the US military aircraft that had been dispatched to stand by for Lodge's departure, scheduled for the previous day." The historian Mark Moyar suspected that Lodge could have flown Diệm to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, which was under American jurisdiction, before taking him to the final destination. Moyar speculated that "when Lodge had offered the jet the day before, he had done it to induce Diệm to give up at a time when the outcome of the insurrection was very much in doubt. Now that the coup clearly had succeeded, Lodge no longer needed to offer such an incentive."

## Intended arrest at Gia Long Palace

In the meantime, Minh left the JGS headquarters and traveled to Gia Long Palace in a sedan with his aide and bodyguard, Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung. Minh arrived at the palace at 08:00 in full military ceremonial uniform to supervise the arrest of Diệm and Nhu. Minh had also dispatched an M113 armored personnel carrier and four jeeps to Gia Long Palace to transport an arrested Diệm and Nhu back to JGS headquarters for official surrender. While Minh was on the way to supervise the takeover of the palace, Generals Đôn, Trần Thiện Khiêm and Lê Văn Kim prepared the army headquarters for Diệm's arrival and a ceremonial handover of power to the junta. Diệm's pictures were taken down and his statue was covered up. A large table covered with green felt was brought in with the intention of seating Diệm for the handover to Minh and Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, who was to become the civilian Prime Minister. In a nationally televised event witnessed by international media, Diệm would "ask" the generals that he and his brother be granted exile and asylum in a foreign country, which would be granted. The brothers were then to be held in a secure place at JGS headquarters while awaiting deportation.

## Diệm's escape

Minh instead arrived to find that the brothers were not in the palace. In anticipation of a coup, they had ordered the construction of three separate tunnels leading from Gia Long to remote areas outside the palace. Around 20:00 on the night of the coup, with only the Presidential Guard to defend them against mutinous infantry and armor units, Diệm and Nhu hurriedly packed American banknotes into a briefcase. They escaped through one of the tunnels with two loyalists: Air Force Lieutenant Ðỗ Thơ, Diệm's aide-de-camp, who happened to be a nephew of Colonel Đỗ Mậu, the director of military security and a participant in the coup plot, and Xuân Vy, head of Nhu's Republican Youth. After the coup, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam General Paul Harkins, inspected the tunnel and noted that it "was so far down that I didn't want to go down to walk up the thing". The brothers emerged in a wooded area in a park near the Cercle Sportif (), the city's upper class sporting club, where they were picked up by a waiting Land Rover. Ellen Hammer disputes the tunnel escape, asserting that the Ngo brothers simply walked out of the building, which was not yet under siege. Hammer asserts that they walked past the tennis courts and left the palace grounds through a small gate at Le Thanh Ton Street and entered the car. The loyalists traveled through narrow back streets in order to evade rebel checkpoints and changed vehicles to a black Citroën sedan. After leaving the palace, Nhu was reported to have suggested to Diệm that the brothers split up, arguing that this would enhance their chances of survival. Nhu proposed that one of them travel to the Mekong Delta to join Cao's IV Corps, while the other would travel to the II Corps of General Nguyễn Khánh in the Central Highlands. Nhu felt the rebel generals would not dare to kill one of them while the other was free, in case the surviving brother were to regain power. According to one account, Diệm was reported to have turned down Nhu, reasoning that "You cannot leave alone. They hate you too much; they will kill you. Stay with me and I will protect you." Another story holds that Diệm said "We have always been together during these last years. How could we separate during these last years? How could we separate in this critical hour?" Nhu agreed to remain with his brother.

The loyalists reached the home of Ma Tuyen in the Chinese business district of Cholon. Ma Tuyen was a Chinese merchant and friend who was reported to be Nhu's main contact with the Chinese syndicates which controlled the opium trade. The brothers sought asylum from the embassy of the Republic of China, but were turned down and stayed in Ma Tuyen's house as they appealed to ARVN loyalists and attempted to negotiate with the coup leaders. Nhu's secret agents had fitted the home with a direct phone line to the palace, so the insurgent generals believed that the brothers were still besieged inside Gia Long. Neither the rebels nor the loyalist Presidential Guard had any idea that at 21:00 they were about to fight for an empty building. Minh was reported to be mortified when he realised that Diệm and Nhu had escaped during the night.

## Arrest in Cholon

After Minh had ordered the rebels to search the areas known to have been frequented by the Ngo family, Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo was informed by a captured Presidential Guard officer that the brothers had escaped through the tunnels to a refuge in Cholon. Thảo was told by Khiêm, his superior, to locate Diệm and prevent him from being killed. When Thảo arrived at Ma Tuyen's house, he phoned his superiors. Diệm and Nhu overheard him and Thơ drove them to the nearby Catholic church of St. Francis Xavier (), which they had frequented over the years. Lieutenant Thơ died a few months later in a plane crash, but his diary was not found until 1970. Thơ recorded Diệm's words as they left the house of Ma Tuyen as being "I don't know whether I will live or die and I don't care, but tell Nguyễn Khánh that I have great affection for him and he should avenge me". Soon after the early morning Mass was celebrated for All Souls' Day (the Catholic day of the dead) and after the congregation had left the building, the Ngô brothers walked through the shady courtyard and into the church wearing dark grey suits. It was speculated that they were recognised by an informant as they walked through the yard. Inside the church, the brothers prayed and received Communion.

A few minutes later, just after 10:00, an armoured personnel carrier and two jeeps entered the narrow alcove housing the church building. Lieutenant Thơ, who had earlier urged Diệm to surrender, saying that he was sure that his uncle Đỗ Mậu, along with Đính and Khiêm, would guarantee their safety, wrote in his diary later "I consider myself responsible for having led them to their death".

## Convoy to JGS headquarters

The convoy was led by General Mai Hữu Xuân and consisted of Colonels Nguyễn Văn Quan and Dương Ngọc Lắm. Quan was the deputy of Minh and Lắm was the Commander of the Civil Guard. Lắm had joined the coup once a rebel victory seemed assured. Two further officers made up the convoy: Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa and Captain Nhung, Minh's bodyguard.

Diệm requested that the convoy stop at the palace so that he could gather personal items before being exiled. Xuân turned him down, clinically stating that his orders were to take Diệm and Nhu directly to JGS headquarters. Nhu expressed disgust that they were to be transported in an APC, asking, "You use such a vehicle to drive the president?" Lắm assured them that the armour was for their own protection. Xuân said that it was selected to protect them from "extremists". Xuân ordered the brothers' hands be tied behind their backs before shoving them into the carrier. One officer asked to shoot Nhu, but Xuân turned him down.

## Assassination

After the arrest, Nhung and Nghĩa sat with the brothers in the APC, and the convoy departed for Tân Sơn Nhất. Before the convoy had departed for the church, Minh was reported to have gestured to Nhung with two fingers. This was taken to be an order to kill both brothers. The convoy stopped at a railroad crossing on the return trip, where by all accounts the brothers were assassinated. An investigation by Đôn determined that Nghĩa had shot the brothers at point-blank range with a semi-automatic firearm and that Nhung sprayed them with bullets before repeatedly stabbing the bodies with a knife.

Nghĩa gave his account of what occurred during the journey back to the military headquarters: "As we rode back to the Joint General Staff headquarters, Diệm sat silently, but Nhu and the captain [Nhung] began to insult each other. I don't know who started it. The name-calling grew passionate. The captain had hated Nhu before. Now he was charged with emotion." Nghĩa said that when the convoy reached a train crossing, "[Nhung] lunged at Nhu with a bayonet and stabbed him again and again, maybe fifteen or twenty times. Still in a rage, he turned to Diệm, took out his revolver and shot him in the head. Then he looked back at Nhu, who was lying on the floor, twitching. He put a bullet into his head too. Neither Diệm nor Nhu ever defended themselves. Their hands were tied."

## Attempted cover-up

When the corpses arrived at JGS headquarters, the generals were shocked. Although they despised and had no sympathy for Nhu, they still respected Diệm. One general broke down and wept while Minh's assistant, Colonel Nguyễn Văn Quan, collapsed on a table. General Đính later declared, "I couldn't sleep that night". Đôn maintained that the generals were "truly grievous" over the deaths, maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give Diệm a safe exile. Đôn charged Nhu with convincing Diệm to reject the offer. Lodge later concluded, "Once again, brother Nhu proves to be the evil genius in Diệm's life."

### ARVN reaction

Đôn ordered another general to tell reporters that the Ngô brothers had died in an accident. He went to confront Minh in his office.

- Đôn: Why are they dead?
- Minh: And what does it matter that they are dead?

At this time, Xuân walked into Minh's office through the open door, unaware of Đôn's presence. Xuân snapped to attention and stated, "Mission accomplished." Shortly after midnight on 2 November 1963 in Washington, D.C. the CIA sent word to the White House that Diệm and Nhu were dead, allegedly by suicide. Vietnam Radio had announced their deaths by poison, and that they had committed suicide while prisoners in an APC transporting them to Tân Sơn Nhứt. Unclear and contradictory stories abounded. General Harkins reported that the suicides had occurred either by gunshot or by a grenade wrestled from the belt of an ARVN officer who was standing guard. Minh tried to explain the discrepancy, saying "Due to an inadvertence, there was a gun inside the vehicle. It was with this gun that they committed suicide."

### US reaction

Kennedy learned of the deaths on the following morning when National Security Council staffer Michael Forrestal rushed into the cabinet room with a telegram reporting the Ngô brothers' alleged suicides. According to General Maxwell Taylor, "Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before." Kennedy had planned that Diệm would be safely exiled and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. recalled that Kennedy was "somber and shaken". Kennedy later penned a memo, lamenting that the assassination was "particularly abhorrent" and blaming himself for approving Cable 243, which had authorised Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu's attacks on the Buddhist pagodas. Forrestal said that "It shook him personally ... bothered him as a moral and religious matter. It shook his confidence, I think, in the kind of advice he was getting about South Vietnam." When Kennedy was consoled by a friend who told him he need not feel sorry for the Ngô brothers on the grounds of despotism, Kennedy replied "No. They were in a difficult position. They did the best they could for their country."

Kennedy's reaction did not draw sympathy from his entire administration. Some believed that he should not have supported the coup and that as coups were uncontrollable, assassination was always a possibility. Kennedy was skeptical about the story and suspected that a double assassination had taken place. He reasoned the devoutly Catholic Ngô brothers would not have taken their own lives, but Roger Hilsman rationalised the possibility of suicide by asserting that Diệm and Nhu would have interpreted the coup as Armageddon. US officials soon became aware of the true reasons for the deaths of Diệm and Nhu. Lucien Conein had left the rebel headquarters as the generals were preparing to bring in the Ngô brothers for the press conference which announced the handover of power. Upon returning to his residence, Conein received a phone call from Saigon's CIA station that ordered him to report to the embassy. The embassy informed Conein that Kennedy had instructed him to find Diệm. Conein returned to Tân Sơn Nhứt at around 10:30. The following conversation was reported:

- Conein: Where were Diem and Nhu?
- Minh: They committed suicide. They were in the Catholic Church at Cholon, and they committed suicide.
- C: Look, you're a Buddhist, I'm a Catholic. If they committed suicide at that church and the priest holds mass tonight, that story won't hold water. Where are they?
- M: Their bodies are behind General Staff Headquarters. Do you want to see them?
- C: No.
- M: Why not?
- C: Well, if by chance one of a million of the people believe you that they committed suicide in church and I see that they have not committed suicide and I know differently, then if it ever leaks out, I am in trouble.

Conein knew that if he saw the execution wounds, he would not be able to deny that Diem and Nhu had been assassinated. Conein refused to see the proof, realising that having such knowledge would compromise his cover and his safety. He returned to the embassy and submitted his report to Washington. The CIA in Saigon later secured a set of photos of the brothers that left no doubt that they had been executed. The photos were taken at about 10:00 on 2 November and showed the dead brothers covered in blood on the floor of an APC. They were dressed in the robes of Roman Catholic priests with their hands tied behind their backs. Their faces were bloodied and bruised and they had been repeatedly stabbed. The images appeared to be genuine, discrediting the generals' claims that the brothers had committed suicide. The pictures were distributed around the world, having been sold to media outlets in Saigon. The caption below a picture published in Time read "'Suicide' with no hands."

## Media reaction

After the deaths, the military junta asserted that the Ngô brothers had committed suicide. On 6 November, Information Minister Trần Tự Oai declared at a news conference that Diệm and Nhu had died through "accidental suicide" after a firearm discharged when Nhu had tried to seize it from the arresting officer. This drew immediate skepticism from David Halberstam of The New York Times, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam reporting. Halberstam wrote to the US Department of State that "extremely reliable private military sources" had confirmed that the brothers were ordered to be executed upon their return to military headquarters. Neil Sheehan of UPI reported a similar account based on what he described as "highly reliable sources". Father Leger of Saint Francis Xavier Catholic Church asserted that the Ngô brothers were kneeling inside the building when soldiers burst in, took them outside and into the APC. Lodge had been informed by "an unimpeachable source" that both brothers were shot in the nape of the neck and that Diệm's body bore the signs of a beating.

## Impact and aftermath

Once the news of the cause of death of the Ngo brothers began to become public, the United States became concerned at their association with the new junta and their actions during the coup. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk directed Lodge to question Minh about the killings. Lodge cabled back, initially backing the false story disseminated by the generals, saying that their story was plausible because of the supposedly loaded pistol being left on the floor of the vehicle. Rusk was worried about the public relations implications the bloody photographs of the brothers would generate. Lodge showed no alarm in public, congratulating Đôn on the "masterful performance" of the coup and promising diplomatic recognition. Đôn's assertion that the assassinations were unplanned proved sufficient for Lodge, who told the State Department that "I am sure assassination was not at their direction." Minh and Đôn reiterated their position in a meeting with Conein and Lodge on the following day. Several members of the Kennedy administration were appalled by the killings. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs W. Averell Harriman declared that "it was a great shock to everybody that they were killed." He postulated that it was an accident and speculated that Nhu may have caused it by insulting the officers who were supervising him. Embassy official Rufus Phillips, who was the US adviser to Nhu's Strategic Hamlet Program, said that "I wanted to sit down and cry", citing the killings as a key factor in the future leadership troubles which beset South Vietnam.

According to historian Howard Jones, the fact "that the killings failed to make the brothers into martyrs constituted a vivid testimonial to the depth of popular hatred they had aroused." The assassinations caused a split within the coup leadership, turning the initial harmony among the generals into discord, and further abroad repulsed American and world opinion, exploding the myth that this new regime would constitute a distinct improvement over their predecessors, and ultimately convinced Washington that even though the leaders' names had changed in Saigon, the situation remained the same. The criticism of the killings further caused the officers to distrust and battle one another for positions in the new government. Đôn expressed his abhorrence at the assassinations by caustically remarking that he had organised the armoured car in an effort to protect Diệm and Nhu. Khanh claimed that the only condition he had put on joining the conspiracy was that Diem would not be killed. According to Jones, "when decisions regarding postcoup affairs took priority, resentment over the killings meshed with the visceral competition over government posts to disassemble the new regime before it fully took form."

## Culpability debate

The responsibility for the assassinations was generally placed on Minh. Conein asserted that "I have it on very good authority of very many people, that Big Minh gave the order", as did William Colby, the director of the CIA's Far Eastern division. Đôn was equally emphatic, saying "I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Dương Văn Minh and by him alone." Lodge thought that Xuân was also partly culpable asserting that "Diệm and Nhu had been assassinated, if not by Xuân personally, at least at his direction."

Minh placed the blame for the assassinations on Thiệu, after the latter became president. In 1971, Minh claimed that Thiệu was responsible for the deaths by hesitating and delaying the attack by his Fifth Division on Gia Long Palace. Đôn was reported to have pressured Thieu during the night, asking him on the phone "Why are you so slow in doing it? Do you need more troops? If you do, ask Đính to send more troops – and do it quickly because after taking the palace you will be made a general." Thiệu stridently denied responsibility and issued a statement which Minh did not publicly rebut: "Dương Văn Minh has to assume entire responsibility for the death of Ngô Đình Diệm."

During the presidency of Richard Nixon, a US government investigation was initiated into American involvement in the assassinations. Nixon was a political foe of Kennedy, having narrowly lost to him in the 1960 Presidential election. Nixon ordered an investigation under E. Howard Hunt into the murders, convinced Kennedy must have secretly ordered the killings but the inquiry was unable to find any such secret order.

## Motivation

Conein asserted that Minh's humiliation by Diệm and Nhu was a major motivation for ordering their executions. Conein reasoned that Diệm and Nhu were doomed once they escaped from Gia Long Palace, instead of surrendering there and accepting the offer of safe exile. Having successfully stormed the palace, Minh had presumed that the brothers would be inside, and arrived at the presidential residence in full ceremonial military uniform "with a sedan and everything else." Conein described Minh as a "very proud man" who had lost face at turning up at the palace for his moment of glory, only to find an empty building. More than a decade after the coup, Conein claimed Diệm and Nhu would not have been killed if they had been in the palace, because there were too many people present.

One Vietnamese Diệm loyalist asked friends in the CIA why an assassination had taken place, reasoning that if Diem was deemed to be inefficient, his deposal would suffice. The CIA employees responded that "They had to kill him. Otherwise his supporters would gradually rally and organise and there would be civil war." Some months after the event, Minh was reported to have privately told an American that "We had no alternative. They had to be killed. Diệm could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple, gullible people in the countryside, especially the Catholics and the refugees. We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power."

Trần Văn Hương, a civilian opposition politician who was jailed in 1960 for signing the Caravelle Manifesto that criticised Diệm, and later briefly served as Prime Minister, gave a scathing analysis of the generals' action. He stated that "The top generals who decided to murder Diệm and his brother were scared to death. The generals knew very well that having no talent, no moral virtues, no political support whatsoever, they could not prevent a spectacular comeback of the president and Mr. Nhu if they were alive."

## Burials of Diệm and Nhu

At around 16:00 on 2 November, the bodies of Diệm and Nhu were identified by the wife of former Cabinet minister Trần Trùng Dung. The corpses were taken to St. Paul's Catholic Hospital, where a French doctor made a formal statement of death without conducting an autopsy. The original death certificate did not describe Diệm as Head of State but as "Chief of Province", a post he had held four decades earlier under the French colonial administration. Nhu was described as "Chief of Library Service", a post which he held in the 1940s. This was interpreted as a Vietnamese way of expressing contempt for the two despised leaders. Their place of burial was never disclosed by the junta and rumours regarding it persist to the current day. The speculated burial places include a military prison, a local cemetery, the grounds of the JGS headquarters and there are reports of cremation as well. Nobody was ever prosecuted for the killings.

## Memorial services

The government did not approve a public memorial service for the deaths of Diệm and Nhu until 1968. In 1971, several thousand mourners gathered at Diệm's purported gravesite. Catholic prayers were given in Latin. Banners proclaimed Diệm as a saviour of the south, with some mourners having walked into Saigon from villages outside the capital carrying portraits of Diệm. Madame Thiệu, the First Lady, was seen weeping at a requiem mass at Saigon's basilica. Several cabinet members were also at the grave and a eulogy was given by a general of the ARVN. According to the eulogy, Diệm died because he had resisted the domination of foreigners and their plans to bring great numbers of troops to Vietnam and widen a war which would have destroyed the country. Thiệu sponsored the services, and it was widely seen as a means of associating himself with Diệm's personal characteristics. Diệm frequently refused to follow American advice and was known for his personal integrity, in contrast to Thiệu, who was infamous for corruption and regarded as being too close to the Americans. However, Thiệu's attempts to associate himself with Diệm's relative independence from United States influence was not successful. According to General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "there was the memory of Diệm to haunt those of us who were aware of the circumstances of his downfall. By our complicity, we Americans were responsible for the plight in which the South Vietnamese found themselves".

1963 murder of the President of South Vietnam during a military coup