The new military policy of hemisphere defense enunciated in 1938 was
a reaction to the increasing offensive potentiality of military aircraft.
The continental United States could not at that time be invaded or seriously
threatened unless the attack was backed by land-based air power. Hostile
airplanes in significant numbers could not then be projected across the
oceans, but they could be launched from bases established in other parts
of the Western Hemisphere within striking distance of the United States
and its possessions. The basic mission of the armed forces under the hemisphere
defense policy was therefore to prevent the establishment of hostile air
bases in the Western Hemisphere. Since eastern Brazil seemed to offer the
most likely initial location for such bases, it became the focus of Army
plans and actions for hemisphere defense.

In the early summer of 1940 the quick defeat of France and seemingly
precarious position of Great Britain created an emergency that required
much closer military ties between the United States and the other New World
nations. Military collaboration with Canada evolved thereafter with a minimum
of friction into a close partnership. Since the Latin American nations
at that time had almost no military strength by

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modern standards, the United States had to assume almost complete responsibility
for defending them against external attack. At the same time it had to
avoid any infringement-real or imagined on Latin American sovereignty.
Aided by the trust inspired by the "Good Neighbor" policy of
preceding years, the United States persuaded most of these nations to accept
its pledges of armed support, and from June 1940 onward it entered into
military collaboration with them to an unprecedented degree. This collaboration
included a military association with Mexico almost as close as that with
Canada-in marked contrast with the hostile attitude of Mexico toward the
United States during World War I. The groundwork of successful collaboration
with the other New World nations allowed the United States Army to begin
to deploy its offensive strength overseas almost immediately after the
Japanese attack.

The opening chapters of the present volume (I-VII) are an introduction
to this story and to a sequel volume, Guarding the United States and
Its Outposts. These chapters trace the evolution of the policy of hemisphere
defense in the three years before Pearl Harbor, the gradual merging of
hemisphere defense into the broader national policy of opposing German
and Japanese aggression by all-out aid to peoples fighting the Axis, and
the quick transition to offensive plans and preparations in December 1941.
They describe the crises that faced or appeared to face the United States
in May 1940 and again in May 1941 (Chs. II, V), the nature of the German
and Japanese threats to the Western Hemisphere (Ch. III), and the preoccupation
of the United States with the perilous situation in the Atlantic and Europe
that blinded the nation to the menace of Japan in the Pacific until the
very eve of open conflict. The next three chapters (VIII-X) relate the
general plans and measures of the United States for defending Latin America
against attack from overseas and for collaborating with the other American
republics toward that end. The chapters which follow describe the specific
steps in collaboration with Brazil (XI-XII), Mexico (XIII), and Canada
(XIV-XV). The concluding chapter (XVI) is a summary and interpretation.

Key topics:
1. The background and development of war plans for defending the Western
Hemisphere (Chs. I-II, IV-VII).
2. The relationship of these hemisphere defense plans to broader war plans
(Chs. II, IV-VII).
3. The transition in national military policy from hemisphere to world
defense against aggression (Chs. I-VII).
4. The nature and extent of German and Japanese threats to the American
continents (Chs. III, V-VII).
5. Military negotiations and relationships of the United States with the
other American nations before and during World War II (Ch. VIII).
6. The supply of arms to Latin American nations (Chs. IX, XI-XIII).
7. Preparations for Army air operations in the Latin American area (Ch.
X).
8. The establishment and operations of U.S. Army forces in Brazil (Chs.
XI, XII).
9. Military cooperation and collaboration between the United States and
Mexico (Ch. XIII).
10. Military cooperation and collaboration between the United States and
Canada

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(Chs. XIV-XV; treated more fully in Military Relations Between the
United States and Canada: 1939-1945).
11. U.S. Army operations in northern Canada during World War II (Ch. XV).
12. Army-Navy joint action and relationships in support of hemisphere defense
clans and measures (Ch. I).
13. The interplay between military and political objectives in planning
and executing hemisphere defense measures (Ch. I).
14. The organization and strength of the United States Army, 1939-41 (Chs.
I-II, VI).
15. The military weakness of the United States during a period of rapid
mobilization (Chs. II, IV-VI).
16. Army plans for emergency expeditionary forces (Chs. I, II, IV-VII).
17. American entry into the Battle of the Atlantic (Chs. I, II, IV-VI).
18. American military policy and plans for action toward European possessions
under threat of hostile control (Chs. I, II, IV-VII).
19. The Destroyer-Base Agreement of 1940 (Ch. II).
20. Plans for military action in the Azores, Iceland, and other Atlantic
areas during 1940 and 1941 (Chs. IV-VII).