The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Biodiversity by Justin Garson download in ePub, pdf, iPad

After all, ethicists are making claims about how they think the world ought to be. Such allegations began to emerge in Mill's lifetime, shortly after the publication of Utilitarianism, and persisted for well over a century, though the tide has been turning in recent discussions. Thus, our obligations to the biotic community may require the culling of rabbits, but may not require the culling of humans. However, the effects of environmental ethics will not be limited to influencing and informing business ethics alone, but will undoubtedly feed into and merge with more mainstream ethical thinking.

Indeed, it may even be in the interests of big business to be active in this way, given the power of consumers. However, the critical moral thinking underpins and informs the more intuitive moral thinking. People sometimes have irrational preferences. In this way, we can adjudicate clashes of interest, based on our community commitments. For example, the Kyoto Protocol might be regarded as the first real global attempt to deal with the problem of climate change.

This involves reexamining who we are as human beings and our place within the natural world. In addition, many thinkers would argue that rationalist thought is not the enemy, but instead the best hope for securing proper concern for the environment and for women. Yet the alleged fallacies in the proof continue to attract scholarly attention in journal articles and book chapters.

Clearly, the principles as stated by Naess and Sessions are too vague to offer any real guide for action. Recognizing our wider Self thus involves identifying ourselves with all other life forms on the planet. By this I mean the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences. Many environmental ethicists disagree, and are convinced that the boundaries of our ethical concern need to be pushed back further. This communitarian proposal certainly seems a way out of the dilemma.

This is because we are part of a tight-knit human community, but only a very loose human-rabbit community. Of course, some have questioned whether sentiment and feelings are suitable foundations for an environmental ethic. For example, weak individuals and weak species are often killed, eaten and out-competed in an ecosystem.

For example, many of us will be familiar with the problems rabbits have caused to ecosystems in Australia. This unfolding process will not just occur of its own accord, according to Bookchin, rather, human beings must facilitate it. Such thinkers have claimed that ethics must be extended beyond humanity, and that moral standing should be accorded to the non-human natural world. For Bookchin, environmental problems are directly related to social problems.