Identity Narratives in China and the EU’s Economic Diplomacy: Comparing the BRI and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the EU Connectivity Strategy for Asia represent China and the EU’s respective flagship initiatives of economic diplomacy in the twenty-first century and offer two separate blueprints for shaping the future of shared economic prosperity on the Eurasian continent. The basic understanding of external economic engagement in China and the EU is heavily marked by the respective actors’ identity narratives—that is, ‘ national rejuvenation’ and national interest in the case of China, and ‘reconciliation’ and the support for rules-based multilateralism in the case of the European Union. While China and the EU pursue similar objectives, it is more the political questions of how to guarantee a ‘level playing field’ and ‘shared benefits’ that cause uncertainty and tension between them.

the BRI is much more than an economic flagship project. It is an overall umbrella term for China's engagement with the outside world according to its strategic interests. While the official bedrock is infrastructure development, the initiative encompasses the flow of goods, financial capital and people-to-people exchanges, but also includes geopolitical, cultural and even security aspects, like the fight against terrorism.
The EU's Connectivity Strategy instead grew out of the ASEM Connectivity process. First published in September 2018 with a focus on its key principles, 'rules-based, sustainable and comprehensive', 3 it represents the EU's vision of Eurasian connectivity and is a reply directed at China's BRI.
Examining China and the EU's identity narratives will be a useful way to provide a better understanding of ideas and purpose associated with both initiatives. It may also be essential for avoiding misunderstandings and opening up ways of cooperation between them.
the ratIonale BehInd the BrI and the eu's connectIvIty strategy As two of the world's largest economies, China and the EU both understand that they depend on deeper international economic integration and connectivity to sustain economic growth into the future. The stalled Doha trade negotiations and doubts about the future of the WTO system, together with recent rounds of global protectionism and hitherto unprecedented levels of global public and private debt, have made the need for finding new strategies to secure growth more acute than ever.
The financial upheaval in connection with the aftermath of the US subprime crisis of 2008 and the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis not only dismantled the aura of economic superiority enjoyed by the advanced economies of the US and the EU, it also increased China's confidence in their own political and economic system, especially after the leadership change in 2012.
In the first half of the 2010s, Beijing saw itself confronted with sluggish international demand, alarming overcapacity in, among other sectors, the Chinese construction industry and insufficient domestic consumption. The need to help a more and more economically vulnerable China secure sources of economic growth into the future, together with increased re-centralisation of power under President Xi Jinping, presented the government with an opportunity to launch a new master narrative in support of its economic strategy abroad.
China's leadership had pronounced its 'Going-out' strategy 4 already in 1997 under President Jiang Zemin, but it was only after 2012, compounded by falling growth rates under what has been referred to as the 'new normal', that the time felt right to look overseas in a coordinated attempt at restoring profit rates of Chinese companies. With the confidence of being united under a resolute leader, President Xi Jinping, China announced its BRI in 2013, offering a powerful new narrative to reshape the economic balance of the Eurasian continent.
In the years after 2013, China's Overseas Direct Investments in Europe surged significantly. 5 Chinese companies were encouraged to invest abroad to seize strategic assets, acquire foreign technology through mergers and acquisitions, and take part in tenders overseas. On the diplomatic front, China consistently pushed for the inclusion of references to the BRI in bilateral contracts, as well as in directives of multilateral institutions like the UN. By enshrining the BRI in China's own Party constitution in 2017, its long-term significance as a major pillar of external engagement cannot be overstated. 6 In a bid to support funding for its initiative, aside from Chinese state-owned policy banks and the US$40 billion Silk Road Fund, China also created a new multilateral development institution in the form of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Comparisons have already been made by Beijing between the BRI and the US Marshall Plan, raising awareness of the high ambitions China has put behind the initiative.
The EU, on the other hand, did not feel any urgency to openly react to the BRI until more recently, but China's rhetoric and active engagement forced the EU to draft a strategy to engage with the BRI in a more coordinated fashion. The news of targeted tech-takeovers of European companies by Chinese companies in 2015 and 2016, together with 'promise fatigue' about China's economic reform process and restricted access to the Chinese market, also led to changes in the EU's perception of China as a reliable partner in building a multilateral system based on reciprocal market access and competitive neutrality. Against this backdrop the EU launched the Connectivity Strategy for Asia in September 2018, which tries to engage Eurasian connectivity in accordance with the EU's values and operating principles and is seeking closer coordination on Eurasian infrastructure investment with Japan. 7 Other consequences of the above-mentioned change of perception are ongoing adjustments in the EU's policies towards China, especially the establishment of a foreign direct investment screening mechanism and the heightened tenor of 'reciprocity' in EU-China relationships. In the EU's Strategic Outlook on China from March 2019, the EU for the first time referred to China as a 'systemic rival', marking a new level of sobering realism in EU-China relations. 8 closIng In on evolvIng chInese and european IdentItIes Identity can be seen as a foundational moment of collective distinctiveness and purpose. 9 It is also relational, which incorporates the dichotomy of the 'self' vis-à-vis the 'other' and affects actors' speech and actions. 10 This is also true for the European Union and China. Identity is in a sense a form of essentialisation of certain characteristics or events that form part of the history of a person, group, party, nation, etc.-an ephemeral and constantly evolving configuration. What it lacks in accuracy and objective truth, it makes up through emotive charge and its potential to coordinate and arouse individual or collective action. Identity or narrative construction is an essential part of nation building. States build identity around categories such as shared values or history, thereby creating expectations regarding the behaviour of individuals and groups. For this chapter, it is therefore useful to explore the most prominent official narratives that to this day shape perceptions of self and otherness in China and the EU, and analyse in what sense these narratives also form a part of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy.
In the case of China, it is recognised that its transformation from the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 to a modern nation state has been a painstaking and difficult process fraught by foreign incursions, war and rivalling ideologies. The official key narrative shaping Chinese identity and national consciousness is that China is heir to an ancient and rich civilisation, which perceived itself as the centre of the world, not as a nation among many. The contact with militarily superior foreign imperialist powers of the nineteenth century humiliated and degraded China, forcing it to agree to unequal treaties and granting extraterritorial privileges to foreigners on their own terms. China's quest for modernity starts with the desire to remove this stain of national humiliation inflicted at the hands of foreign powers. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged victorious from the Civil War and founded the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong in 1949, it set as its task to restore China's pre-eminent position among nations. China's rise however does not stop there. In the years after the death of Chairman Mao and with the beginning of economic reform and opening-up in 1979, supreme leader Deng Xiaoping brought China's economy back on track, growth was restored and China gradually created a more open and international image through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, China's core narrative of the need to avoid current and future humiliation by foreign powers by achieving national rejuvenation has not changed but is continually evolving. In 2013, China's President Xi Jinping coined the newest version of that narrative by proclaiming the 'Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation'. 11 What is at the core of national rejuvenation and avoiding humiliation is to increase China's national wealth and power. 12 The term fuqiang (wealth and power) is akin to 'national interest' in a Westphalian sense, and has become the single most coherent pursuit of Chinese political modernity. Also today, whenever its national interest is under perceived or real threat, China reflexively invokes the nefarious influence of 'foreign forces' 13 and the need to keep working on increasing its national strength as the only way to avoid future bullying by foreign powers.
While in China the defining awakening of national identity was linked to national humiliation, in Europe it is the experience of having been ravaged by two world wars, the exalting feeling of national independence, as well as the bitter realisation of guilt associated with the Holocaust and its colonial past.
If we further compare Chinese and European national identity, we see that both share a certain feeling of entitlement or exceptionalism. They see themselves as heirs to ancient civilisations and stress the exceptional contributions these cultures have left to humankind. For Europe, as a normative power, these contributions hail from the age of Enlightenment and the intellectual achievements attributed to it, as well as Europe's recent focus on 'universal values' such as societal justice, equality, etc.
Identity narratives do thus have a strong impact on how China and the EU see themselves today. Whereas the EU likes to present itself as a global role model in terms of responsive and responsible governance, China thinks of itself as reemerging power, which needs to develop further in order to avoid future humiliation. The EU's narrative of a responsible power that stands for universal norms and values does also pose an implicit threat to China's political system, at least in the eyes of part of the Chinese leadership. 'Universal values', in Chinese known as pushi jiazhi, 14 have been identified by the CCP as one of the most dangerous foreign ideological threats (Table 8.1).
When China announced the BRI in 2013, this event marked a decisive change in China's economic and geostrategic interactions with the world. It has been accompanied by a new assertiveness since President Xi came to power in 2012. This assertiveness is compounded by China's international achievements over the past decade, such as overtaking Germany and Japan as the world's export champion and becoming the second-largest economy in terms of GDP after the US. China's slowing but still competitive economic growth rate of over 6 per cent in early 2020 before Covid-19 hit the world, its success in poverty alleviation over the last decades, impressive infrastructure development and rapid industrialisation have all contributed to the awareness of being a rising economic power. Under President Xi, China felt prepared to eschew Deng Xiaoping's well-proven doctrine of 'avoiding the limelight and honing one's abilities' (taoguang yanghui) in favour of a more confident display of its new 'four confidences'-confidence in the way of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 15 its theories, 16 political system 17 and culture. 18 This new confidence has also meant China becoming more vocal about defending its national interests abroad and not shying away from using its economic and rhetorical muscle to pressure foreign companies or countries into submission in cases where they dare criticise official Chinese policy or otherwise 'hurt the feelings of the Chinese people'. 19 At the core, we see that national humiliation and rejuvenation in the case of China, and national reconciliation and a rules-based global order in the case of the EU, are still the defining hallmarks of their respective identities to this day. What will be the bearing of these narratives on China and the EU's economic diplomacy in the twenty-first century?
shared oBjectIves and separate narratIves of the BrI and the connectIvIty strategy The BRI and the Connectivity Strategy for Asia represent China and the EU's flagship initiatives for foreign economic engagement in the twenty-first century. Despite the many similarities they share in terms of boosting trade and investments, their respective objectives are also expressions of different identities, perspectives and national interests. According to Zou Lei's 'The Political Economy of China's Belt and Road Initiative', the BRI is a 'top level design of China's economic diplomacy in the new era, (and) reflects China's efforts to promote economic transformation and upgrade through strengthening international cooperation'. 20 It has further 'opened up new space for global economic growth, produced new platforms for international trade and investment and offered new ways for improving global economic governance'. 21 The EU's Connectivity Strategy, which was launched in September 2018, is much less ambitious and low profile compared to the diplomatic efforts connected to the BRI. The Connectivity Strategy has its sources in joint economic cooperation under the ASEM process, without the large political fanfare associated with the BRI. It instead aims at transforming Asian and European societies by delivering quality projects through comprehensive, sustainable and rules-based economic cooperation (Table 8.2). 22 In order to better illustrate these differences, this chapter will present here a comparison of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy according to several parameters.
First, in terms of geographic scope, the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy differ decisively. For the EU, with its strong multilateral tradition, the Connectivity Strategy includes the 30 European and 21 Asian partner countries of the ASEM process, and among others the ASEAN Plus Three, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, etc. The BRI incorporates 6 main economic corridors and stresses the priority of its immediate neighbourhood policy. 23 But in addition to that, the BRI is inherently open by design. It does not have any geographical or institutional limitations and was also mentioned in connection with the participation of African and Latin American countries. As stated by President Xi, every project that serves China's interest and helps to 'make friends' and improve people's life can be a part of the BRI. It is thus open to cooperation from all countries or multilateral institutions and is intended to provide a friendly narrative to mollify critics of China's economic rise and help promote its strategic interests. While its main focus is on connectivity as a means to sustain growth and improve livelihoods, it also includes This purported 'open design' or lack of precision regarding geographic reach and purpose of the BRI is to some extent deliberate. Ambiguity is not only an important part of the initiative itself, it is one of its key advantages. Vagueness or openness fit with China's doctrine of 'experimentalism', where the central government first pronounces a policy framework and then lets others try to look for ways towards its realisation. Successful examples are then scaled up and can become national policy. 24 In addition to being open in terms of participation, China also remains vague about the financial scale of the BRI and the timescale of its implementation, with estimates ranging from several hundred million to several trillion dollars in connectivity finance over the next few years. At the second BRI summit in April 2019, President Xi signalled both China's determination and openness about the financing of the BRI, while also confirming that China had signed new BRI-related deals worth US$64 billion: …we will continue to make good use of the Belt and Road Special Lending Scheme, the Silk Road Fund, and various special investment funds, develop Silk Road theme bonds, and support the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance in its operation. We welcome the participation of multilateral and national financial institutions in BRI investment and financing and encourage third-market cooperation. 25 Also, the EU is working hard on building financial leverage of the Connectivity Strategy and has increased its external action budget for 2021-2027 to €123 billion, of which €10 billion would go to Asia and the Pacific as part of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. An additional €60 billion euro is being included as investment framework for external action, such as connectivity projects in the EU neighbourhood, the Western Balkans, Africa, etc. 26 Second, regarding core principles, we see that there are a lot of synergies and co-dependencies between the initiatives. According to Zou Lei from the Shanghai Party Institute, the central principles of the BRI are openness for cooperation, market principle and shared benefits (win-win). 27 To these three, the often-cited principle of 'extensive consultation' would definitely have to be added. What Beijing means by this term is a reference to pragmatism and national interest, as well as to the importance of diplomacy in international relations to strike a balance of interests.
Whereas the EU tries to uphold the perception that it acts according to prescribed rules and universal principles, China, with its Westphalian understanding of statehood, acts more visibly on national interests. For the BRI this means that decision outcomes can be subject to diplomatic negotiations and power games among member states, which can define and redefine the rules under which the BRI as a multilateral institution is going to operate.
In official representations of the BRI, China is careful to curate a benevolent and multilateral image of the initiative. At a meeting of the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly, which is responsible for economic and financial affairs, President Xi reiterated: The Belt and Road Initiative focuses on development, emphasises the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, pursuits open, green and clean cooperation, and commits to high-standard cooperation to improve people's lives and promote sustainable development. 28 Strategically speaking, for China, multilateralism is a tool to work towards a multipolar world order, with China as one of the poles of power and a counterbalance to American hegemony. The EU on the other hand has been a reluctant political power that is still showing strong economic and political dependence on a US-led international alliance. The core principle of the EU's Connectivity Strategy, instead, is to promote rule-based, comprehensive and sustainable cooperation under a system of competitive neutrality. The EU's main concern is to work towards a multilateral and open trade system as a guarantee for future prosperity. The key question for the EU is to what extent can China become an ally?
Third, also in terms of priorities the two initiatives show significant synergies with their focus on infrastructure, transport, energy, digitalisation and people-to-people exchanges as central pillars for sustaining trade and prosperity throughout the twenty-first century. China's BRI has also flagged policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure and facilities, unimpeded trade and financial integration as additional priorities. 29 In terms of the influence of the two initiatives, it seems clear that the BRI, having been announced first, in 2013, has had more time to hone its narrative than the EU Connectivity Strategy. Additionally, in terms of the number of people reached, the Connectivity Strategy is currently no match for the BRI, in part because of the coherent diplomatic effort that the Chinese government has put into promoting their flagship initiative. For the EU, the launch of the Connectivity Strategy is still a reason to rejoice as the bloc has demonstrated its seriousness to engage with Transeurasian connectivity on its own terms, and not left the game to Beijing alone.

IdentIty narratIves and dIscourse power In economIc dIplomacy
China has been infatuated with Joseph Nye's theory of soft power for a long time. 30 Beijing came to agree that there exist other sources of national strength than crude military or financial power, and that they might have a bearing on helping it reach the ultimate goal of national rejuvenation. The ability to co-opt other groups and states by one's mere behaviour and have them identify with one's own narrative or cause is a key element of diplomacy, and an indispensable step towards becoming a global power. China can lay claim to its ancient sources of soft power in form of the 'lai hua narrative' (come to China and become sinified), the attraction of Confucian civilisation and the pre-eminent status of the Chinese emperor, which influenced other states or people through the attractiveness of China's superior culture and civilisation rather than brute force. Having understood the need to have China's official story heard across the globe, Chinese leaders have launched large-scale initiatives to increase China's international discourse power. A decade before the BRI, China launched its Confucius Institutes under then President Hu Jintao to spread the Chinese language and culture overseas. In 2013, with the BRI under President Xi Jinping, the focus shifted from cultural to economic diplomacy, but under the same principles. The BRI represents in its essence a grand strategy to increase China's 'discourse power' (huayu quan) 31 abroad, and to have its official voice heard. Its reference to the historic Silk Roads is of great benefit in this regard as it evokes positive associations and creates a sense of historic legitimacy in support of China's narrative.
But the question is, what does Beijing really stand for in the end? The EU and the US sometimes accuse China of not standing for any particular values, thereby calling into question its reliability as a partner. If we look at China's official utterances and actions, however, we see that this is not the case. Starting from China's reform and opening-up period under Deng Xiaoping, it has consistently projected its identity through its values and policies. These can be summed up in three points: (1) the right of sovereign states to a pragmatist and flexible foreign policy, (2) being a role model in terms of national rejuvenation and economic development for the Global South or other developing countries, and (3) straddling the twin objectives of preserving one's traditional culture and values together with rapid modernisation of the country.
The BRI and its narrative fit very well into this roster. Together with the AIIB, it presents one of the first multilateral global initiatives that originated in the 'Global South' or a 'developing country'. They thereby support China's stated aims of multipolarity and multilateralism in international relations and stand for a possible alternative to the hegemony of European and American financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF. Another source of legitimacy of the BRI certainly lies in China's impressive record in fighting poverty and driving rapid industrialisation over the past 40 years. This narrative is vital for selling the BRI to third countries that are eager to learn from China's experience and follow its path.
If we go back to what the EU and China stand for in terms of principles and values, the focus on non-interference and national sovereignty in a Westphalian sense is one of China's key characteristics. This point distinguishes it from the politics of universality of norms that are promoted by the European Union. In its understanding of international relations, China did not move very far from the five principles of peaceful coexistence dating from the 1950s, which are still relevant for it today. 32 Being aware that China has to show more than that to the international community if it wants to present itself as a positive actor in building a multilateral system of global governance, it skilfully created another narrative-President Xi Jinping's 'Community of shared future for mankind'. 33 This phrase has also been enshrined into the Party Constitution, and was adopted in a UN Security Resolution for the first time in 2017, marking a major diplomatic victory for China. The phrase sends a strong signal that China is seeking to be a responsible global power and is open to pursue common objectives that benefit the international community. It provides direction for China's participation in multilateral initiatives combating climate change, terrorism, disarmament, etc.
China's new confidence also marks its identity shift from a developing country to a developed nation, from imitation to innovation, from rule-taker to rule-maker, from reactive to proactive. The BRI is presented as a friendly win-win scheme of economic cooperation, but it can also be used as a transmission belt for China's state power.
changIng european perceptIons of chIna and the eu's responses to BrI-related concerns Are China and the EU's identity narratives compatible with one another or do they present an obstacle to closer cooperation? As mentioned above, for the EU, the biggest question is whether China can be a reliable ally in building a rules-based multilateral global order based on equitable participation and competitive neutrality, or whether China's different political system and Westphalian understanding of national interest will present a threat to a multilateral system?
China's references to market principles and shared benefits (win-win) in relation to the BRI do warrant closer scrutiny, as they have been at the centre of allegations accusing the BRI of promoting debt-trap diplomacy and favouritism for Chinese companies. Reports of China seizing strategic assets abroad dealt a blow to the win-win narrative of the BRI in 2018 and 2019. 34 China is aware of these criticisms, and has tried to adjust its policy accordingly, as evidenced by the 2nd BRI forum in April 2019 where it promised increased openness, environmental sustainability and a zero tolerance for corruption. In the forum's keynote address, President Xi said that China needs to be guided by a: people-centered approach, give priority to poverty alleviation and job creation to see that the joint pursuit of Belt and Road cooperation will deliver true benefits to the people of participating countries and contribute to their social and economic development.…We have also formulated the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road and published the Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative to provide guidance for BRI financing cooperation. 35 There is also concern among the EU that with the increased influence of the BRI and stronger economic dependency, China may be in a position to push its interests through economic coercion, which offers more subtle approaches to imposing one's will and extracting concessions from other countries. China's vocal responses and boycotts against foreign companies whose employees dared to criticise China's domestic policies are an eerie example of this. Due to the sheer size and attractiveness of the Chinese market, it seems that China's tactics of naming, publicly shaming and boycotting are very effective, and might lead to more companies prohibiting their employees commenting on sensitive topics.
For this reason, the question of China's participation in critical infrastructure projects like telecommunication networks has become a sensitive one for the EU. As a result, a final decision on the degree of involvement of Huawei in building the next generation of telecommunication infrastructure in the EU is still awaited at the time of writing.
Despite some backlash and criticisms, the BRI continues to make steady advances also in Europe. As of now, 14 out of 28 EU member states have already signed bilateral endorsements of the BRI, with Italy in 2019 being the first G7 nation to join the initiative. 36 China also started its own economic dialogue with the Central and Eastern European States (known as the 16+1), 37 promising much needed infrastructure investments. Recently, after harsh criticism from the EU, China seems to have toned down the initiative, despite many Central and Eastern European countries feeling positive about the dialogue forum itself.
The EU's main concerns about the BRI are related to economic vulnerability and dependence, but also to the question of how to ensure shared benefits and reciprocal relations. As put in a report by Bart Gaens for the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: China is investing strongly in integration towards the West, but a comparable flow from West to East is generally absent. Furthermore, China funded projects most often are tied with Chinese companies, and are much more to the benefit of China than of the local countries. Frequently lacking a transparent bidding process, they are generally less open to local or international companies. Importantly, China typically provides loans to countries rather than investments, which can have a profound impact on national debt, as in the case of Montenegro. 38 The EU has come to terms with the fact that China's new status in the world and economic overtures of win-win cooperation across the globe require some level of policy coordination on the part of the EU. In that regard, 2019 was an important year. In the new EU Strategic Outlook on China from April 2019, China was referred to for the first time as a systemic rival. The report further elaborated that The European Commission now regards China simultaneously as a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. 39 The launch of the Europa Connectivity Forum in Brussels in September 2019, jointly opened by EU President Jean-Claude Juncker and Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe, marks a decisive step towards advancing the EU's flagship connectivity strategy with Japan as its key partner in Asia. While China's BRI is still perceived as a major chance for reviving investment and growth, the EU seems to be more and more 'receptive to business complaints that China is buying up EU firms and their technologies while denying reciprocal access to Chinese markets'. 40 To further protect its economic interests, the EU also adopted a regulation on screening foreign direct investment from non-EU countries in March 2019, with the aim of protecting security and public order. 41 While the EU mandate for action is still small in that regard when compared to similar mechanisms in the US, Japan or China, it still marks an important step towards economic realism.

conclusIon
We have seen that both China and the EU present themselves as responsive and, to a varying degree, responsible international powers and proponents of a multilateral trading order, international trade and environmental sustainability. The BRI can make a contribution to both, to a multipolar and sinocentric world order, and to an alternative multilateral system next to the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO. One key thing the BRI achieved from the moment it was announced by the Chinese government was to spell the death sentence for traditional development finance as it has been practised by the advanced economies since the post-war era. The fact that a developing country like China launched a new multilateral investment initiative that was outside the established financial institutions simply obliterated the 'aid narrative' in economic development. What took its place was the 'business narrative', with 'connectivity' and 'infrastructure development' as the ways to achieve economic growth. A healthy level of competition between the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy will also mean that the solemnly stated aims of 'green, open and transparent' will be taken more seriously by both sides, which should be viewed as positive.
China and the EU have also shown that they take each other more and more seriously as partners, as evidenced by the appointment of a special envoy to Europe on the Chinese side. Pressure from the US-China trade war means that China is increasingly looking towards strengthening its ties with Europe: In Madrid and in Brussels this month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi characterised EU-China relations as standing at a new historical starting point. He added that for China, supporting European unity and prosperity was a strategic choice given the absence of geopolitical contradictions and conflicts of interest. 42 The question China has yet to answer, and which will be essential for gauging its reliability to other nations, is whether it would submit under international norms and rules that it itself has helped co-create? Will it allow rules to limit its radius of action or will its famous 'win-win' mean that China always wins twice? At the second international BRI forum, China showed that it can be responsive to international criticism and tried to perform adjustments to the BRI in 2019 in reaction to accusations of debt traps and seizures of strategic assets.
In addition, the Joint Statement of the 21 st EU-China summit in April 2019 gives cause for cautious optimism about future cooperation on Eurasian connectivity. With a bilateral trade volume of more than €500 billion a year and a joint belief in multilateral engagement, the EU and China know their partnership is too important to the world to not get it right. While the official objectives of the BRI and the Connectivity Strategy show many synergies and there is a healthy level of competition between them, it is rather the political question of how to guarantee 'reciprocity' and 'shared benefits' in a closer relationship with China that causes uncertainty and tension. In a pre covid-19 world, the year 2020 was seen as a critical juncture for the future of China-EU relations with two high-level meetings and a possible breakthrough in negotiations on the much-anticipated EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). While covid-19 and its wider impact have somewhat dampened these hopes, China and the EU should eventually realise that their respective connectivity agendas are best served by further strengthening mutual economic cooperation and assisting each other to make a speedy recovery from the crisis. Worsening geopolitical rivalry and lingering mutual mistrust will however not make this an easy task.


The church in Nigeria and political economy of youth unemployment : A pragmatic approach

Being young in Nigeria is very challenging. The youth unemployment rate in Nigeria, according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2018), currently stands at 23.1% in 2018 while the rate of underemployment is at 20.1%. This unemployment rate has been projected to hit 33.5% by 2020 (Carsten 2018; Premium Times 02 May 2019). For young people aged 15–35, the figures are grim: 55.4% of them are without work (Aljazeera 16 February 2019). Hence, young people, who are at the height of their potentials and talents, largely constitute the unemployed in Nigeria.

Introduction
Being young in Nigeria is very challenging. The youth unemployment rate in Nigeria, according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2018), currently stands at 23.1% in 2018 while the rate of underemployment is at 20.1%. This unemployment rate has been projected to hit 33.5% by 2020 (Carsten 2018; Premium Times 02 May 2019). For young people aged 15-35, the figures are grim: 55.4% of them are without work (Aljazeera 16 February 2019). Hence, young people, who are at the height of their potentials and talents, largely constitute the unemployed in Nigeria.
Consequently, youth unemployment is a major socio-economic and political problem in Nigeria because it involves the lack of resources and income, as well as an increase in criminalised and deviant behaviour especially in urban areas (Awognele & Iwuamadi 2010:2). It is also a moral problem because it is an aberration that emphasizes the social injustice that relegates the unemployed and highlights the inability and/or failure of the government to cater for the welfare of the citizenry. This means that the measures taken so far by the government have been inadequate to address the concerns of young people generally and youth unemployment in particular. Hence, the future of young people continues to be bleak.
In view of the above, the thrust of this study is that the Nigerian church has a role to play in the public space to buttress her concern for the holistic wellbeing of young people in the community. This is possible by the presence of the church that is felt in almost every nook or cranny of the society. In other words, the church is even closer to the people than the government in some places, giving her a central place in the lives and experiences of the people. In the light of the above, this research was undertaken with the aim of finding out if the church is doing enough in the social sphere or if the reality on the ground leaves more to be desired.
Nigeria has over 57% of its population as youths. The nation is rich in human and mineral resources, yet the level of youth unemployment continues to rise and to pose serious socioeconomic and political threats. The aim of this study was to highlight the strong link between the high level of youth unemployment and the rising tide of violence and criminalization of the public space in Nigeria. In other words, we argued that the youth routinely took out their frustrations in violent and criminal forms. The study was set in Aba, city of Abia state, which is arguably the largest commercial town in the south-east region of Nigeria. It is also synonymous with violent and criminal social breakdowns. This empirical study adopted a multi-phase sampling technique for the data collection procedure, including the distribution of questionnaires, extensive library research and personal observation. By implication, both primary and secondary sources were used. The results show that youth unemployment was on the increase and government efforts alone were inadequate to solve the problem. In conclusion, the all-hands-on-deck approach was advocated. This entailed that the visibility of the church at almost every level of community life, especially at the grass-root level must be used as a vital platform to reach the people. Thus, it was recommended that the church should actively tap into the multifarious professional capacities of her members and use them as resource persons to creatively tackle the problem of youth unemployment.

Contextualisation of terms
In this study, terms are given universal and contextual definitions and adapted to how they are applied to clarify the key concepts. The terms that require attention are: church, political economy, unemployment and youth.

Church:
The church is a community of Christian believers whose mandate is to be the sign of the reign of God among His people. It is a microcosm of the larger community and closely mirrors the society. The church is called to showcase and model the love of God toward society and its needs and problems.
Political Economy: Igwe (2007:333) posits that this term refers to the scientific study of the reciprocal influence of economics and politics because it inevitably involves 'attentions to relations of production and the iniquities and imbalances in the national and global distributions of economic and political power'. In this study it is used to include the economic and political factors that contribute to entrenching the problem of youth unemployment in Nigeria.

Unemployment:
As used in this study the term refers to the inability of a significant number of the productive labour force who are able and willing to work and to find jobs for a protracted period. The types of unemployment include seasonal, frictional, cyclical and structural unemployment (Adebayo 1999;Damachi 2001;Hollister & Goldstein 1994;Robert 1993;Sills 1995;Todaro 1992). Others are technological, residual and disguised unemployment.
Youth: There are various beacons that influence the definition of youth. These include age bracket, sociological and behavioural indices (Echebiri 2005:5;Weber 2015). The Nigerian youth charter defines youth as everyone within the 18-35 years bracket. In this study, they are aggregated within the 15-35 years bracket. This subset has the potential and capacity to stimulate economic growth, social progress and overall national development because they are the young, adventurous and energetic members of the society who are characteristically bold, resourceful, optimistic and fearless. The terms, 'young people' and 'youth' are used interchangeably.

Causes of youth unemployment in Nigeria
The causes of unemployment include: 1. Recession: When the economy is not growing and jobs are not being created, unemployment ensues and rises. A recessive economy is often caused by corruption and recklessness in public spending. For instance, Nigeria had economic recessions in the years 1991, 1995 and 2016 (Tijani 2017). However, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has confirmed that the 2016 economic recession was a full year recession, and the worst in the country's history since 1987. Combating recession is done through a prudent fiscal policy that includes incentives to invest and to spend money, including lower taxation and interest rates.
2. Over-Regulation: This is another cause of unemployment in Nigeria that results from too much paperwork involved in doing business and too many regulations that stifle job creation efforts, thereby hindering its expansion and ability to create more jobs. A good example of this is the current closure of the Nigerian borders, which continues to have a negative impact on businesses (see Rasheed 2020). Hence, it explains why unemployed people find it almost impossible to get work, especially among young people specified in the focus of this study. Characteristically, it leads to a two-tier economic system where those who are already employed have a job for life, and those who do not are unable to find one. By implication, there are too few jobs for the demand and the shortage leads to poverty and chronic unemployment. 3. Inadequate Skills: This occurs when the types of jobs in an area change and people without the right skills lose their jobs and are unable to find work because the new jobs are filled up with new people who possess the right skills. A technology shift that is structural in nature can cause this type of unemployment. It will constitute a wrong policy approach to keep the old jobs going because a lot of money will be wasted and the people will not be motivated to improve their situation. The right solution is to provide opportunities for training and re-training staff members. 4. Lack of Information: This occurs when people lack information about available jobs. Dissemination of information is fundamental in any market, including the job market. The obvious solution to this problem is to be able to bring information to the people who need it.
Other causes of youth unemployment in Nigeria, according to Ekwowusi (2002), include: [M]ismanagement of the economy, inefficiency of government, monumental corruption, plundering of national treasury, government over spending and over subsidy, executive robbery either by the stroke of the pen or barrel of the gun. (n.p.) Adebayo (1999) and Echebiri (2005) looked at it from the demand and supply angle. They argue that unemployment generally ensues whenever the supply of labour exceeds the demands for it at the prevailing wage rate and this is caused by rural-urban migration, which is better appreciated in the light of the data showing that by 2010 over 50% of young people in Africa will be residing in urban areas (Sarr 2000:34).
It is important to mention that the high level of corruption in Nigeria is another causative factor leading to youth unemployment.

The political economy of youth unemployment in Nigeria
Youth unemployment occasions a low rate of trading and industrial activity within the labour force. That is, the nation operates below its economic capacity and this directly impacts on families and livelihoods because young people who can scarcely meet their basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing tend to become dependants and/or engage in anti-social activities in order to meet these needs. This is expected in a social context that mirrors an absence of political will on the part of the leaders, absence of the culture of merit and flagrant corruption (Chigunta 2002;Onoge 2005;Ononogbu 2005). Little wonder what Achebe claimed 36 years ago that 'the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership' (Achebe 1983), and is still the case in 2019.
In spite of a decade in which some African economies have experienced relatively high rates of economic growth, and the fact that the 2008 global economic predicament had only taciturn effects on most African economies, in many parts of the sub-continent unemployment among young people are progressively seen as the hard core of the development challenge (Ighobor 2017;World Bank 2006, 2009. This is the human face of the phenomenon of 'jobless growth' among young people, and undermines any possibility of realizing the much heralded 'demographic dividend' (Eastwood & Lipton 2011;USAID 2012). Consequently, Bennell (2000) and Momoh (1998) argue that since the livelihood needs and expectations of young people are not being met, they now constitute a huge economic burden, a depleting agent and a liability instead of a resource for economic growth. For instance, the youth are at the heart of 90% -95% of violent conflicts in Nigeria (Omeje 2005:1). The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) (2008) and the Economic Report on Africa (2007:3-6) further reveal that young people who are able-bodied but unskilled, jobless and alienated, are often paid, armed and even drugged to foment trouble and create a state of anarchy in the polity in exchange for small amounts of money -together with the promise of recognition, loot and 'wives'. They survive by engaging in activities such as petty trading/hawking, casual work, stealing, pickpocketing, prostitution, touting and other illegal activities and account for the many vagrants in the society. Furthermore, A World Bank survey in 2011 showed that about 40% of those who join rebel movements in Africa say they were driven by a lack of jobs (Ighobor 2017).

Study area
This study was conducted in Aba, the major economic city in Abia State. Aba city lies along the west bank of the Aba River which is located in the south-eastern region of Nigeria. It is low-lying with a heavy rainfall of about 2400 mm/year and is especially intense between the months of April through October. Aba is a commercial city of international repute featuring a high concentration of small-scale industries and a number of sizable markets including the famous Ariaria International Market. Administratively, the city falls into two local government areas namely: Aba North and Aba South. Aba North has its headquarters at Eziukwu-Aba, while Aba South has its headquarters at Aba Town Hall. It is also a high residential area and host to a number of banks, industries and business enterprises which account for a large presence of young people. The 2006 population estimate for the city is 931 900 but according to the Nigerian Population Commission (2015), the last known population is 1 277 300; and if the population growth rate remains the same as it was between 2006-2015 (+5.57% per year), the population in 2019 can be estimated at 1 586 287, consisting of civil servants, traders, artisans and people engaged in various forms of services. There are also workers in the organized sector and vagrant youth. The study was carried out in Aba cosmopolitan area to purposefully include a cross-section of all perceivable social and economic segments of the city's population. Its advantage includes the fact that it combines high residential density, urban characteristics and a high population of young people in addition to a number of business interests.

Sample size
The sample was made up of 250 respondents. This cuts across students, clergy and lay workers, business men/women and traders, civil servants, self-employed and the unemployed. It excluded anyone who was not residing in the town. The youth were generally met either at home, on the street or in their respective places of work; others were met at the park. An Anglican, a Roman Catholic and a Pentecostal church (Redeemed Christian Church of God RCCG]) were sampled respectively. In all, 220 youth were randomly sampled. Ten leaders (clergy and lay workers) of the Roman Catholic, Protestant and Pentecostal Churches were sampled respectively bringing the number to 30 leaders of the church sampled in the town. Altogether, 250 questionnaires were distributed.

Sampling technique
A multi-phase sampling technique was used for the data collection procedure. This procedure included the distribution of questionnaires, extensive library research and personal observation. By implication, both primary and secondary sources were consulted in the course of the study. Data were analyzed using percentages and the analytical interpretative model was systematically used to explain the findings.

Instrument for the study, method of data collection and analysis
The instrument consists of four clusters: (1) general information which includes relevant socio-economic characteristics of respondents; urban residency status, unemployment/employment status, as well as job perceptions and preferences.
(2) Scale of incidence of youth unemployment.
(3) The link between youth unemployment and dysfunction. (4) Impact of government policies and projects on youth empowerment; and (5) perception of the effort of the church. The questionnaire was validated by a clergy and three scholars in the fields of religion, economics and sociology/anthropology. The questionnaire was also pre-tested in Nsukka town to certify the relevance of the items before they were taken to the field. Secondary data were collected from research reports and other published and internet materials.

Data presentation and analysis
Two hundred and fifty questionnaires were administered in the field but only 245 were validly filled out and returned. The response rate shows that 245 (98%) of the respondents duly filled and returned their questionnaires, while five (2%) were unable to return theirs. This high rate of returned questionnaires could be attributed to the intensified followup measures undertaken by the researcher. Consequently, the analysis will be based on the 245 validly completed forms.

Background variables
The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents will be presented and they include: age, gender, occupation and highest academic qualification.

Age of respondents
The age of the respondents ranged from 18 to 58 and above years. These were arranged into an interval of 10 years each.
The details show that out of the 245 respondents, the highest proportion of 91 (37.14%) fall within ages 28-37 years, closely followed by the 18-27 years range that has 77 (31.43%). Next is the 38-47 years group with 49 (20%), the 47-58 years range comes after them with 25 (10.20%) and the least is the 58 and above group with three (1.22%).
It, therefore, means that most of the respondents 217 (88.57%) are people within the age range of 18-47 years. It should, therefore, be noted that the larger number of respondents are within the youth stage which is very relevant to this study.

Distribution by gender
Questionnaires were distributed to both male and female respondents in the study area. The outcome shows that the number of males who participated in the survey were 142 which makes up about (57.96%) of the total respondents while females constituted 103 (42.04%). This implies that more males than females were available and participated at the time when the questionnaires were distributed.

Distribution by educational qualification
In this section, we were interested in finding out the highest educational qualification of the respondents.
The data indicated that the category with the highest frequency of 76 (31.02%) has obtained the West African Senior School Certificate Examination (WASSCE)/General Certificate Examination (GCE). This group is followed by those with a first degree 73 (29.80%) and diploma 72 (29.39%) respectively. Others include First School Leaving Certificate (FSLC) 21 (8.57%) and second degree 3 (1.22%).
Imperatively, all of the respondents 245 (100%) have obtained some level of formal education and we did not encounter anyone who did not have even the most basic education.
By implication, it can be taken at face value that all the respondents understood the issue at stake to some degree.

Distribution by occupation
The target was to find out the occupational status of the respondents. We found that 79 (32.24%) of the respondents were students at various levels of study. Civil servants constituted 50 (20.41%) and unemployed persons were 33 (13.47%). They are followed by people in different businesses and trade 32 (13.06%), the self-employed 28 (11.43%) and the clergy 23 (9.39%).
The fact that civil servants appear to be more than those in business and trade in a commercial city like Aba may not be unconnected with the fact that some business men/women and traders may have indicated that they are self-employed.

Substantive issues of the research
Consequent upon the restlessness and general dysfunction associated with the youth in recent times, youth unemployment has generated heated debate across the board in the society. The issues raised revolve around the causative factors, consequences and likely solutions to the problem. The bottom-line, however, remains that the youth are excluded from the machineries of social integration and development in Nigeria.
Based on the above premise, we will present and analyse data on the issue of youth unemployment and the role of the church based on the views of respondents on the scale of incidence of youth unemployment, the link between unemployment and dysfunction, impact of government policies and the perception of the effort of the church. With these research objectives as a guide, the respondents' reactions to the questions asked were analyzed allowing the respondents to state whether they 'strongly disagreed', 'disagreed', 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed'. We will find the interpretations below:

The scale of incidence of youth unemployment
A large number of the respondents, about 40.1% opined that they agreed that youth unemployment was a social problem that deserved attention. Another 25.4% strongly agreed. On the other hand, 20.3% disagreed that something needed to be done about it and 12.2% strongly felt that it was not a crucial socio-economic problem.
By implication, the larger proportion of the respondents was of the view that youth unemployment is a very serious socio-economic problem in Aba. This is consistent with extant literature on the issue (Awogbenle & Iwonmadu 2010;Echebiri 2005). The number of those who disagreed may result from the extended family system/communal lifestyle of the people which enables even adult dependants to be absorbed and supported by parents, siblings and other extended relatives is helping to cushion the impact of the problem among the people. This system tends to act as an insulator that shields people from stark realities so that an unemployed person may be well off on the patronage of other people. As such, he and/or she may not find anything wrong with not having a job when almost all he and/or she needs are met by other people. Another factor that could be responsible for this development is complacency among many young people to look for work after having faced repeated disappointment in the labour market. According to Ezemenaka (2018:112) this could explain the high and increasing levels of kidnapping for ransom and the number of criminalized and/or street youth in the city.

Link between unemployment and dysfunction
The data, 28.7% also supported the view that most of the respondents agreed that the level of youth unemployment in the city was directly proportional to the rate of youth dysfunction. However, 25.9% are of the opinion that the reverse is the case. This is again strongly contested by 23.5% of the respondents, while being strongly supported by 19.9%.
Again, we observe that the largest proportion of the respondents 28.7% was of the view that there is a link between youth unemployment and dysfunction in the city. This also agrees with relevant literature and data available (Olawale 2004:13;Omeje 2005:1). In all, 54.2% were in agreement while 43.8% disagreed that the link existed. It is important, therefore, to note that the difference between the opinions of respondents on the matter is not very wide. Again, could it be that the commercial nature of the city (i.e. almost everyone is ostensibly involved in something), gives the impression that the crime rate is unrelated to the unemployment level since everyone appears to be doing something to earn a living yet there is a recorded high and increasing rate of crime?

Impact of government policies on youth unemployment
The data also portrays that 32.2% of the respondents disagreed that there was any impact of government policy on youth unemployment. They are closely followed by the group that strongly disagrees 30.4%. However, 28.1% believe that they see the impact of government policies, while 7.3% strongly attest to the fact.
In this case, there is a resounding consonance with the views expressed by Achebe (1983), Chigunta (2002) and the International Labour Organization (ILO 2004). In concurrence too is the view of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), (2004) that: [T]he lack of detailed and empirical analyses on employment in national development policies may be attributed to the assumption that growth would automatically translate into more jobs, and to the lack of understanding of how the labour market works.
The importance of this observation is that there is a lacuna between government policies on paper and implementation. By extension, it stands to reason that the majority of people in the society feel that the government is merely scratching the surface of the problem.

Respondents' perception of the effort of the church
The survey data also portrays that 33.5% of the respondents agreed that the church was making some kind of effort in the social arena. This is followed by 30.1% who say that the impact of the church's effort in social action evangelism is yet to be felt. Then 18.2% strongly agree with the effort of the church, while 16.1% strongly disagree.
As is clear here, a larger number of people believe that the church is already doing something to step into the public space as against only being concerned with spiritual affairs. This category affirms that the church is not neglecting the socio-economic welfare of their members and the society. However, it is also clear that those who disagree with this position are equally not negligible. Hence, an additional survey will be needed to determine whether there is a correlation between the surveyed respondents opinions and active involvement in the church community. Onah, Okwuosa and Uroko (2018:3) articulate that the failure of the government to alleviate or eradicate poverty calls for all social actors to be involved in handling the issue.

Summary
The purpose of the study was to look into the problem of youth unemployment in Nigeria, with particular focus on Aba city in Abia state. Our specific concern in this regard was to determine the place of social service delivery in the evangelization effort of the church. This study therefore, was intended to appraise the role of the church in the Nigerian public space.
The target population comprised community residents in the city between ages 18 and above. A sample size of 250 respondents was selected through the cluster and simple random sampling techniques. A questionnaire instrument was adopted for the generation of data while tables, percentages and charts were used to present the data.

Major findings
The major findings of the study are as follows: 1. The data collected and analysed revealed that the majority of the respondents did not perceive youth unemployment to be a serious problem that required urgent attention. 2. It was also found that there is a high level of youth involvement in anti-social behavior in the city. 3. Many young people indicated an interest to be trained and/or acquire skills.
4. Our findings equally show that many respondents do not find much of a link between the level of youth unemployment and dysfunction in the society. 5. The data indicated that government policies do not have any direct, positive bearing on the lives of the people. 6. Government policies were found wanting mainly because the people were not integrated at the planning stage and the plans were not usually locality-specific. 7. We also found that a good number of the respondents believe that government is failing in its responsibility to provide social amenities and infrastructure for the people. 8. It does appear that one way or the other, the church is passively involved in the public space. 9. Our data also affirmed that some of the respondents were directly employed as teachers and health workers by the church. 10. Many of the respondents disagreed that the church should network with the government in any way. A good number believe that the politicians will corrupt the church leadership. 11. Almost all of the respondents agreed that getting involved in social action evangelism will not derail the church from its spiritual goals; rather it will boost its activities.

Recommendations
Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made: 1. Government should integrate the people through the church in the planning and execution of projects that are locality-specific and relevant. This appeared according to the respondents to be a major reason why the government's impact was said to be inadequate. This is in line with the arguments posed by Ekwosi (2002) and Echebiri (2005). 2. The findings of the study also reveal that the church would need to serve as a data resource base for the government and other non-governmental organizations that are interested in reaching the people. This recommendation is submitted on the strength of the fact that the church has a more visible presence than the government at the grass root level, and churches have also been involved in one way or the other, but will need a more consolidated effort that focuses on young people. 3. The church should set up skill(s) acquisition centres using its members in various professional fields as resource persons. This will serve to: (a) engage the youth productively and creatively; (b) give them an honest means of livelihood; and (c) afford the church a unique opportunity to witness to them. The church should treat youth unemployment in Nigeria as a crosscutting matter by looking at the responsibility of the different actors. 4. The power and the potential of young people should be tapped by churches in providing self employment opportunities as highlighted in the findings of this study. There is therefore an urgent need to create opportunities for youth, with tremendous potential impact.   Self-employed 28 11.43