The Impact of Global Economic Integration on Africa in the 21st Century

Has global economic integration in the 21 st century raised the hope of Africa beyond the traditional approach of providing aid to help her end poverty? Are there remarkable differences in the approaches of some regional economic blocs like BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and multilateral groups such as IMF, World Bank etc. towards Africa? What has been and should be the basis of bilateral or even, multilateral development relationships between these groups and Africa? To answer the questions, the study explores the philosophy behind the donor-recipient and equal partners’ approaches to development. It juxtaposes the depredatory effects of the socio-political and economic conditionality that the West has inflicted on Africa (ranging from integrated rural development in the 1970s, to policy reform in the 1980s, to governance in the 1990s, and respect for human rights in the 2000 (especially the gay rights movement and so on) and alternative models. The paper observes that the burden of foreign aid, loan agreement, economic and technical cooperation agreement, debt sustainability, etc. have deepened Africa’s vulnerability rather than brighten its prospects in a global market. By hinging its argument on the assumption that any global economic integration that imposes political and economic conditionality in exchange for aid is anti-development, this paper further submits that African countries should be free to negotiate their own pathway out of poverty as equal partners in development. Only by comparing and exchanging views, rather than tutorials, the more useful engagement between Africa and the rest of the world could become possible. It concludes that mutually–beneficial relations between Africa and economic cooperation blocs will become possible, but only if African governments can take hold of these opportunities in ways that will benefit their people. Africa governments should focus on win-win approach that is not about aid but business.

Has global economic integration in the 21 st century raised the hope of Africa beyond the traditional approach of providing aid to help her end poverty? Are there remarkable differences in the approaches of some regional economic blocs like BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and multilateral groups such as IMF, World Bank etc. towards Africa? What has been and should be the basis of bilateral or even, multilateral development relationships between these groups and Africa? To answer the questions, the study explores the philosophy behind the donor-recipient and equal partners' approaches to development. It juxtaposes the depredatory effects of the socio-political and economic conditionality that the West has inflicted on Africa (ranging from integrated rural development in the 1970s, to policy reform in the 1980s, to governance in the 1990s, and respect for human rights in the 2000 (especially the gay rights movement and so on) and alternative models. The paper observes that the burden of foreign aid, loan agreement, economic and technical cooperation agreement, debt sustainability, etc. have deepened Africa's vulnerability rather than brighten its prospects in a global market. By hinging its argument on the assumption that any global economic integration that imposes political and economic conditionality in exchange for aid is anti-development, this paper further submits that African countries should be free to negotiate their own pathway out of poverty as equal partners in development. Only by comparing and exchanging views, rather than tutorials, the more useful engagement between Africa and the rest of the world could become possible. It concludes that mutually-beneficial relations between Africa and economic cooperation blocs will become possible, but only if African governments can take

Introduction
The increasingly integrated global economy presents the 21 st century African states with both opportunities and complex challenges. Global economic integration is widely thought to improve the allocation of resources, promote technology transfer, and enhance living standards. But, at the same time, global economic integration has frequently been blamed for growing trade imbalances, increased financial market volatility, and less effective domestic macroeconomic policies. Indeed, the rapid opening up and integration of African countries into the world economy to a degree unprecedented in modern history has no doubt brought benefits in several areas, particularly through international trade and investment, even though their incidence varied among and within countries. But it is also true that rapid integration of African economies into the global economic system has also caused dislocations in the continent, particularly among the poor and unprivileged. Thus, the relevance of global economic integration is very persistent issue and recurrent decimal in the continent of Africa, specifically in view of political and economic backwardness. Africa is confronted with deeply rooted level of poverty, minimal share of world trade, and low pace of development in human capital and infrastructure as well as faces with excess of challenges from external pressures. Indeed, programmes for global economic integration have included co-operation in major sectors such as agriculture, transport, energy, and education; and aimed for the establishment of free trade areas, customs unions, and economic unions, and in a few cases for political federations. It is generally felt that progress made on the programmes has invariably been disappointing. Targets have not always been met considering the disparity in the development status of the countries of 'external initiators' of this integration agenda and African states.
To this end, ensuring that global economic integration succeeds in Africa is vital, not only because of the prospective and challenges mentioned above, but also because the polices that are required to ensure its fruitfulness are the same as those needed if Africa is to benefit from the process of globalization and integration in to the world economy. Of course, the conventional perspective is that global economic integration in Africa is needed, hoping that it will help in enhancing economic development and growth in the continent. However, there is an unconventional approach to the phenomenon of global economic integration vis-à-vis Africa's development. The unconventional perspective is hinged on the core-periphery relationship between the 'facilitators' of global economic integration and Africa.
Thus, this paper is centered around the contemporary or most recent perspectives on global economic integration initiatives and Africa's development crises. The paper is organized into five dimensional segments. The first segment is the introduction which x-rays the key or major components of the "generic" and unconventional explanations of global economic integration and development in the continent. The second part presents an overview of global economic integration initiatives or mechanisms in Africa. The third segment of this paper posits and elaborates on the global economic integration approaches towards Africa. The fourth part discusses the basis of bilateral or multilateral development relationships between global economic integration blocs and the 21 st Century Africa. The fifth section of this paper attempts an impact assessment of global economic integration on the 21 st Century African states. The last section is the conclusion.

Global Economic Integration Initiatives or Mechanisms in Africa: A Historical Overview
The integration of Africa into the global economic system is not a recent phenomenon. The phenomenon of global economic integration vis-à-vis Africa has commenced for a long time now, before, during and after colonial administration. Without mincing words, the history of global economic integration as it affects African continent can be calibrated into four epochal periods, viz: the period between the middle of the fifteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, the period between 1884 and 1960, the period between the beginning of its decolonization in the early 1960s and the end of the Cold War in 1991 and lastly the era of new globalization.
The first phase involved the early commercial integration of Africa through the Tran-Saharan trade and the pillage of Africa during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. The second phase took place during the period of direct colonial domination of Africa between 1884 and 1960. The third phase took place in the context of the Cold War. Most African states got independence during the cold war and were courted by both warring blocs in the Cold War. The fourth phase is the contemporary stage of new globalization in which capitalism and liberalization is the major pre-conditions for global integration. The integration of African economies into the global economic system has been a product of two major factors, viz: political exigencies and economic imperatives.
The post-cold war period has witnessed an acceleration of the globalization of production and trade. The official statistics would seem to suggest that Africa is a marginal player in this process. Indeed, from all available evidence, the share of Africa in global output, trade, and in international capital flows has declined in the last decade. But while these developments must necessarily be a cause for concern, Afro-pessimism, which has spawned in some quarters is not justified. Despite the hardships that many African countries face, the peoples of Africa have shown tremendous resilience, and have managed to carve out new strategies for their survival and livelihood. These need to be fully taken into account in all assessments of the region's future prospects.
The momentous political changes that have taken place in Africa since the late 1980s signal the dawn of a new era in African politics and provide a context which, if carefully nurtured, could be conducive to a new partnership between Africa and its development cooperation partners. The challenge ahead is for African countries to move beyond the formal structures of electoral democracy towards the construction of a just and sustainable social contract that takes full cognizance of the political and economic aspirations of all citizens. The impressive stride that has been made towards political liberalization and democracy by over thirty countries in the region in the last decade is indeed a cause for optimism about the future.
As to the economic prospects of the continent, a decade and a half of structural adjustment has unleashed changes in the economies of the continent, irrespective of whether the market reforms were successfully implemented or not. The economies of African countries are today much different than a decade back, with the state having withdrawn from the dominant place it traditionally occupied, and economic liberalization measures having been implemented in many countries. However, economic rationality must be balanced with the maximization of the welfare of the citizenry. The satisfaction of the formal conditions for a market economy is not a guarantee that socially sustainable growth will be delivered in the long-term. Markets can be "captured" and the benefits of economic growth could easily accrue to small elite, rather than being broadly shared. The new economic foundation on which Africa's development will be built should, therefore, take account of the requirements for growth, equity and transparency as part of a comprehensive package.

Global economic integration approaches towards Africa (donor-recipient and equal-partners approaches to development, win-win approach)
The quest for a new partnership between Africa and its development partners is occurring in a rapidly changing global and regional setting. A number of salient features of this changing setting stand out. On the global scene, the end of the cold war and the exigencies which it had spawned would, on the face of things at least, appear to have reduced the geo-political importance of Africa to the great powers. In the wake of the disappearance of the great East-West divide, new political and economic groupings are being created, with the Africa region seemingly being left out or left to its devises. Sweden itself has been affected by these changes, as it has now become a member of the European Union, with all of the attendant obligations and responsibilities which membership carries [1].
Modern development assistance programs emerged in the post-Second World War environment of decolonization and Cold War competition. The Western, or Northern, analysis of development assistance activities is conducted in the awkward space between the technical functions of development assistance as an instrument of market-oriented development theory and the reality of its inherently political origins and impetus. The current standards and norms to evaluate current donor activity arguably emerge from this Western tradition [2].
Regardless of emerging donor, it is important to note that much of this tradition is embedded within the official coordinating bodies and institutional arrangements of the traditional donors: the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional development banks. Although these agencies are far from absolute in their power to direct donor activity, and are not necessarily homogeneous in their views on development, they are instrumental in defining terms and concepts in development assistance, identifying best practices, and providing a framework within which bilateral donors can interact with a higher degree of synergy than if they had been left to their own devices [3].
It is increasingly recognized that trade liberalization is not sufficient to improve the development prospects of many low-income countries. According to Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier [4, p. 482], these countries need "not only technical assistance to trade, but, more generally, aid designed to reduce transactions costs of various kinds, many of them 'behind the border' and to alleviate the social cost of trade liberalization. " Generally speaking, the fact that international organization especially WTO give aid to trade to developing countries especially African countries, has been interrogated to be ostensibly done, given the dynamics and realities of donor-recipient relationship. However, more often than not WTO has reiterated that some of the challenges and current methods to identify the binding constraints hindering developing countries' capacity to benefit from trade expansion, and highlights some of the considerations that should be taken into account when donor-provided financial assistance -Aid for Trade-is used to tackle them [5].
Furthermore, most developing countries have benefited significantly from WTO Agreements and trade expansion. During the period 1990-2005, their total share in world exports of non-oil manufactures almost doubled from 21.5 percent to 40.2 percent, a remarkable achievement considering that world trade has been growing around three times faster than world output. However, some countries are failing to leverage trade for economic growth and poverty reduction [5].
Having said that, stakeholders from the aid originating regions that is donor regions, and also aid destination regions that is aid recipient's regions couple with cross-national stakeholder have pondered on demystifying the reasons behind the failed aids to trade which is affecting both the recipients and the givers. Thus, the Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS) was carried out, which assesses the overall competitiveness of a country's economy, identifies sectors of greatest export potential, outlines constraints to trade, and presents an Action Matrix. It provides the analytical foundation for policy recommendations and Trade Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building formulation for the country's integration into the multilateral trading system.

The Basis of Bilateral or Multilateral Development Relationships Between Global Economic Integration Blocs and the 21 st Century Africa
The historical origins of development assistance are remarkably similar among all donors-traditional and emerging. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa offer interesting insights into the evolution and motivations of the development assistance programs of emerging donors. Indeed, there is a degree of similarity among the countries in terms of evolution and motivation. There are also indications of important structural differences.
China had three initial motivations for providing assistance to other poor countries: fostering South-South solidarity, strengthening the non-aligned movement, and outmaneuvering politically and diplomatically the Nationalist government in Taiwan. There were clear ideological and political foundations for these motives, including mounting ambitious responses to the Soviet Union in Africa. Later on, however, and especially as China's industrial growth began to accelerate and the Cold War subside, commercial motivations gained strength as the Chinese government sought to secure access to natural resources. As China's global role expanded, so too did the reach and magnitude of its assistance.
India's venture into development assistance activities was arguably later, slower, and more accidental. The country's initial efforts were limited in scope and size, and were directed primarily toward India's immediate neighbors, who were considered to be in its sphere of influence and whose stability was important to India. As India began to grow more steadily, it made the transition from an aid recipient to a more significant donor with wider interests. Indeed, India came to see its receipt of assistance as antithetical to its vision of itself as an emerging, self-reliant nation with global ambitions and influence. Consequently, the country has been increasingly less welcome to offers of assistance -even in the face of humanitarian disasters. Ultimately, and in common with China, the Indian government has come to see its role as a donor as an important facet of its regional hegemony and as representative of its growing global political and commercial ambitions.
In contrast to China and India, Brazil's development assistance programs seemed to emerge more directly from its affinity with other less-developed countries and less from immediate political or diplomatic ambitions. Instead of being caught up in global and regional struggles over power and traditional left-right ideology, Brazil's policy seems to have reflected the wider debate between North and South that emerged in the context of the often acrimonious negotiations surrounding the new international economic order. Brazil's promotion of cooperation among developing countries was also a reflection of its commitment to the non-aligned movement and its periodic adoption of more protectionist and nationalist policies.
South Africa's development assistance efforts started as an instrument of economic control over the politically and economically unsustainable "homelands", which were established by the government to maintain its apartheid system. Rising international condemnation of the country's discriminatory political, social, and economic structure led the minority-rule government to use foreign aid to acquire a measure of diplomatic approbation from poor countries, especially African ones. With the end of apartheid, this development assistance program was gradually redirected toward a more collective vision of Africa and African development. Of considerable importance is the country's emphasis on democratization, good governance, conflict management, and regional integration. Even in the case of South Africa, however, there are hints that commercial interests have gradually crept into its development assistance agenda.
The four countries adopted a public face of development assistance programs that reflects each country's status as an emerging market. To varying degrees, these public statements of solidarity with the recipients of their assistance mask the same sort of hierarchical roles and mixed motivations that characterize traditional donor-recipient relationships. China emphasizes win-win cooperation, mutual support and respect, and non-interference in domestic affairs as key principles of its development assistance. Brazil, too, eschews the traditional language of donor and recipient, preferring instead the concept of horizontal cooperation. Finally, South Africa has been similarly careful to avoid any hint that its development assistance is an instrument of regional domination. As such, it also emphasizes its role as a partner in the larger program of African "renaissance. " While the same could not be said of India, India however see aids as a public way of asserting its independence both regionally and globally.
South Africa's programs arenot surprisingly -Afro-centric. The country is closely tied to its immediate neighbors through commercial and monetary links. Indeed, the bulk of South Africa's financial transfers are made through formal partnering arrangements in the South African Customs Union and the Common Monetary Area. Even excluding these statutory flows, the bulk of its assistance is directed toward members of the South African Development Community (SADC)although some of these countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), are not immediate neighbours.
Be that as it may, Africa's friends in business have friendlier relations with the small expatriate business community than it has been established in the aid industry. This may suggest that commercial relationships may be experienced as more equalor at least as more comfortablethan those between aid donor and recipient.
However, the concept of partnership has been central in EU-Africa relations from early on. The Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 between the European Economic Community and the ACP group, was founded on the principle of "equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence" [6]. It was hailed as a good example of partnership for agreements with developing countries, as it introduced the provision of development assistance decided upon by mutual agreement and without conditionalities, and granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP group [7]. In subsequent amendments economic and political conditionality was introduced, leading to the criticism that the partnership principle had been eroded [8]. The EU's insistence to replace non-reciprocal trade relations with Free Trade Agreements with the ACP countries was equally seen as a move away from partnership. With non-reciprocal trade preferences, ACP countries enjoyed access to EU markets without having to open their markets for EU products [6].
However, The abolishing of such preference was seen as primarily in the interest of the EU [9]. Nonetheless, the EU continued to use the language of partnership. In 2000, the Lomé Agreement was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which was based on the fundamental principle of "equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies" . Similarly, with the group of Mediterranean countries, the EU engaged in a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership via the Barcelona Process. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration established a "comprehensive partnership, through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership" [10]. The European Neighborhood Policy (2003) further built on the Barcelona Process and aimed to "work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of prosperity and values" [11]. Tellingly, the main financial instrument for the European Neighborhood Policy was called the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument.
Aid dependence historically permitted donors to shape the African development agenda. Africa is not only dependent on the flow of resources because they are such a large proportion of the total proportion of developing countries, as they have there less developed counterparts in Asia and Americas. However, Africa had little to give in return, and is dependent on the goodwill of aid donors, who could withdraw aid at any time. African recipients may well have had to work harder to keep donors engaged than those in countries or regions with more commercial potential or political significance. The donors stayed, and successive African governments tried to follow their general line. In relation to this, the economic justice principles on which Africa's war of independence had been fought are abandoned in order to embark on one of the earliest economic reform programmes of any developing country. Huge private foreign-funded organizations were permitted to channel foreign money and ideas directly towards organizing the poor. Therefore, every April, Foreign and Prime Ministers, and presidents of Africa alike show up in Paris to be chastised for their failures and to ask for more aid.
Be that as it may, aid is more important in Africa than before, but the goodwill of donor countries is still needed. In the classic client manner, Africa needs patronage in the international system, for favored trading or immigration status, for recognition, protection from more powerful neighbors and global north hegemons. This can be gained by participation in international organizations such as the Commonwealth, the WTO and the UN, or through careful international relations. Accepting aid may be part of the price of gaining donor countries' goodwill. But this also suggests that if the costs of aid are too highin terms of unpalatable conditions, administrative time and effort, and the discomfort of the personal experience of being a recipientaid can be declined or stalled.
So much for the larger context springs up a begging question; Has Africa learned anything from this brief glimpse of the real-life, personal relations between donors and recipients? It has put on the table the open secret that donor-recipient relations are difficult or hostile. This is because the receipt of aid is not just about being handed resources and a technical blueprint to guide their use; it also requires submission to outsiders, and to outsiders whose claims are often those of historical domination or superior economic power. Stripped bare, the position of recipient is a position of weakness, clung to for the longerterm protection afforded by the relationship. When aid donors ponder the difficulties of getting their programmes implemented, these may be useful things to keep in mind.
Moral dilemmas are central to the decision-making of thinking donors. Some try to see their responsibilities as being to the poor Africans, but they are ever further removed from any direct contact with this group. They also see that they can only fulfill these responsibilities by working directly with elites, a group with whom they have not to date had a warm relationship. There are powerful pressures in two directions. They are accountable to the taxpaying public at home, which entails close supervision of how aid is disbursed and spent. But more effective use of aid is also understood to require more national ownership of policymaking, more local control [12]. Accountability to the poor Africans must thus compete with accountability to taxpayers in donor countries.
Indeed, past evaluations of trade-related assistance show that lack of country ownership is an important factor of poor effectiveness [13]. This is not surprising given the potential of trade reforms to undermine the economic power of political elites and other vested interests. The issue is of course particularly relevant for aid-financed activities. In the absence of aid, the launch of reforms requires a modicum of political backing, particularly if they are politically and/or financially costly.
With aid, however, the issue of political commitment becomes critical. The incentive of officials in recipient governments is to maximize aid inflows, in order to maximize their budget. Many donor agencies reward meeting commitments and disbursements targets. Unsurprisingly, recipient countries attempt to formulate projects in ways that are compatible with the donor agencies targets, and attract maximum funding, independently of the real objectives. In the case of budget support and to a lesser extent SWAPs, the extra scope for fungibility means that the divergence of objectives does not necessarily reduce the effectiveness as measured by the recipient's set of objectives. For project aid, the result is too often very high transaction costs, with both parties unwilling to relinquish control and thus poor effectiveness.

Impact Assessment of Global Economic Integration on the 21 st Century African states
In the past decades, the economy has become so structurally interdependent that the term "Global" as distinct from "international" has been coined and become widely used. As globalization is often used synonymously with internationalization, the former implicitly goes deeper to emphasize the minimization of the roles of national actors and decreased in the relevance of national borders [14]. With the world becoming a global village or envis-aged to be a big customs union, global economic integration implies increased integration of world market for goods and services and capital, which is increasing the permeability of national borders to the flow of technologies, trade capital, information and ideas.
Be that as it may, academic studies had shown that international trade or economic globalization has the potential to lift developing nations out of poverty on a scale that could generate several times any conceivable benefits derived from direct monetary aid. The link between trade and economic growth operate through various channels, including changing the relative prices of tradable goods and the incentives for investment and innovation. Trade acts as a catalyst for economic growth by encouraging investment, efficiently allocating resources and opening markets for those goods that people can produce most competitively. Agriculture is vital in this process because it is the dominant industry in most developing countries including Africa; the rural poor make up of 75 percent of the total population in the developing world and suffer the most from deficiencies in capital and technology [15].
Furthermore, one of the few areas where progress in policy will help Africa reap gains from global trade or economic integration and enhance their potential for sustainable development includes: Agriculture. Agriculture is and has always been a fundamental sector and for many African nations, agriculture is an issue of life and death. Agriculture is critical to the successful development to the region. Ambitious liberalization in this sector can offer big potential gains for all countries. The eventual elimination of trade distorting measures which affects agriculture trade will be a tremendous boost for sustainable development. The World Bank has estimated that phasing out restrictions on agriculture could lead to higher income in developing countries including African countries of some $400 billion by 2015. The gains from these are several times larger than all the debt relief or aids granted to developing countries so far.
Furthermore is the textiles and clothing industry, this is another key sector where African countries have comparative advantage. The full integration of this sector into global economy has a huge potential for generating employment and foreign exchange for many African economies Tariff peaks and tariff escalation: After many rounds of trade negotiations, average tariffs on non-agricultural products have been significantly reduced. But relatively high tariff still remain on some products in which Africa is competitive and tariffs go up as the level of processing increases. Tariff escalation prevents Africa from moving away from dependence on a few commodities. Tariff peaks and tariff escalation must be brought down, if Africa countries are to be able to meaningfully gain from world merchandise trade. Transforming market access opportunities into concrete gains will also depend on the willingness of countries to implement reforms at home to enable their firms to take advantage of market openings abroad [16].
Generally speaking, there is strong evidence that open trade regimes (and more generally open economies) are associated with higher rates of economic growth. On average, open economies grew 3.5 percent annually versus closed economies, which grew at less than one percent annually [17]. Over time, the difference in these two growth rates on the level of incomes is stunning: at a one percent growth rate, it takes 62 years for income to double; at 35 percent income will increase 16 times in 62 years. Even a small annual difference in growth rate can be dramatic. International trade allows countries to specialize in activities where the hold a comparative advantage. Trade extends the market facing local producers, allowing them to take advantage of economies of scale. Trade reform encour-ages a more efficient allocation of resources and thereby raises incomes, since finding new and better ways of using land, labor and capital is vital to economic growth.
Global economic integration policy, through measures promoting liberalization and efficient regulation, is an efficiency promoting instrument with a dual function. Firstly, by promoting more efficient markets, it ensures better conditions for growth, employment and revenue distribution, which, in turn, helps domestic markets to grow and provide more opportunities for entrepreneurs. Secondly, by making industry more productive and promoting efficiency and access to more competitively priced inputs. It facilitates industry's access to international markets. However, the decline in world export of labor-intensive industrial and agricultural goods will have different implications for different countries, depending on their sectorial production and trade structure [18].
Moreover, greater openness and participation in competitive international trade have increased employment, primarily of skilled labor, in tradable goods sectors. With the expansion of these sectors, unskilled labor has found increased employment opportunities in the non-tradable sectors, such as construction and transportation. The expansion of merchandise trade may also have lessened migrationary pressures. On the other hand, the movement of labor across national boundaries has in many cases lessened production bottlenecks, raising the supply response of recipient economies, and increasing income in the supplying countries through worker remittances. Openness to foreign expertise and management techniques has also greatly improved production efficiency in many developing countries [19].
However, a kin look into the theory of comparative cost advantage or the theory of natural advantage as preached by global economic integration has been of somewhat of disadvantage to African countries, which since colonial period were ewers of gold, diamonds, zinc, irons and other natural resources, but yet have not industrialized but only export these natural resources to the global production, which maintained the colonial economy status quo. Evidences abound that Africa only contribute 3 percent of world global production, which mostly come in natural resources. It is on this note, the some other demerits of the encapsulation of African economy into the dynamics of global economic integration leaks. As explained in previous subsections of these attempt instruments of trade, aids, and capital flows in the vicissitude of global economic integration is strictly business, with each party striving to accrue the juiciest portion of the bargain.
To start with, it is important to note that globalization is not a zero-sum game -it is not necessary for some countries to lose in order that others may gain. But to take advantage of this trend, countries will have to position themselves properly through the right policies. Clearly, those economies that open themselves to trade and capital flows on a free and fair basis and are able to attract international capital will benefit the most from globalization. Open and integrated markets place a premium on good macroeconomic policies, and on the ability to respond quickly and appropriately to changes in the international environment.
The ability of investment capital to seek out the most efficient markets, and for producers and consumers to access the most competitive source, exposes and intensifies existing structural weaknesses in individual economies. Also, with the speedy flow of information, the margin of maneuver for domestic policy is much reduced, and policy mistakes are quickly punished. Indeed, increased capital mobility carries the risk of destabilizing flows and heightened exchange rate volatility, in cases where domestic macroeconomic policies are inappropriate. And finally, it is clear that countries that fail to participate in this trend toward integration run the risk of being left behind [19]. The foregoing espouses how African countries have been at the receiving end of global economic integration, due to the ubiquitous structural weakness in African economies, despite the positive prospects that lies within global economic integration.
The challenge facing the developing world, and African countries in particular, is to design public policies so as to maximize the potential benefits from globalization, and to minimize the downside risks of destabilization and/or marginalization. None of these policies is new, and most African countries have been implementing them for some time. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa has made substantial progress toward macroeconomic stability.

Conclusion
This interrogation suggested that donors are received as patrons in African nations, and also that they, perhaps unwillingly and unwittingly, reproduce these patterns of behavior in certain respects. With recipients of aid they behave as patrons more than they behave as partners. To answer the questions raised in the introduction, this suggests that the social relations and personal behavior of aid donors are not aligned with their official poverty reduction and development goals of these African nations and different international organizations fostering global economic integration, such as the IMF, Paris Club, the WTO, etc. Whether or not these social relations actually impede their official activities is too early to say, and may be a question for donors to address themselves.
If the aid relationship is one of patrons and clients, it is one in which the clients seem poised for exit. One of the solutions to assert a paradigm shift from the client-patron relationship to win-win conditions is that there should be a considerable level of assertiveness among African recipients and a new willingness and capacity to challenge the dominance of donor development agendas. This seems to confirm that at least within the domestic development policy arena, donor money carries less clout than before. A historical example was seen in India in 2003, the multiple time, resource and personal costs of receiving aid may come to outweigh its benefits. Economic growth and development have meant that the foreign policy interests of Africa now extend beyond attracting aid, to the serious global matters of expanding access for trade and markets for African labor.
It is expected that donors in Africa will acclimatize themselves to a weakened power of aid, which will make them adjust their strategies, behavior, and in effect objective of aid accordingly. It is in the increasing emphasis on the need for sweeping African governance reforms, an agenda for which broad and powerful political alliances are needed, that donors begin to realize the need to influence the policy and civil society elites. If they have less power, they could still advocate for pro-poor change. It is here that the coldness of donors towards domestic elites may become significant, as a barrier to exercising such influence.
Finally, African governments will need to actively encourage the participation of civil society in the debate on economic policy, and to seek the broad support of the population for the adjustment efforts. To this end, African governments will need to pursue a more active information policy, explaining the objectives of policies and soliciting the input of those whom the policies are intended to benefit.


Reducing Inequality Within and Among Countries: Realizing SDG 10—A Developmental Perspective

Respect for human rights is highly relevant for each person, everywhere. At the same time, a closer look is necessary on societies as a whole and their respective levels on inequality. Why? Growing inequality has significant impact on societies and has the potential to undermine democracy. For the first time ever, the global community has agreed upon the goal to reduce inequality within and among countries (SDG 10). This chapter aims to provide an overview of the reduction of inequality from a legal-developmental perspective, discussing the social, economic and ecologic dimension of inequality, the reason behind the highly complex SDG 10, its genesis, the long-standing idea of international solidarity, legal consequences, progress reporting on this SDG, Germany’s approach to implement SDG 10 and the road ahead.

A Dedicated SDG on Reducing Inequality: The Relevance of SDG 10
When the 17 SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development were formulated, the reduction of inequality was made a goal in its own right in SDG 10, which urges global community to "reduce inequality within and among countries". A highly difficult and complex goal with seven specific targets, it did, however, find agreement from the 193 UN member states in September 2015 when they endorsed the 2030 Agenda. This fact in itself is surprising and more than a milestone in international cooperation. Why? Because for the first time ever, the common task of reducing inequality within and among countries has been explicitly recognized by heads of states and government and even been combined with a clear timeframe (achievement by 2030). SDG 10, most interestingly, has ten targets and in them UN member states have found consensus on a broad range of topics relating to inequality, such as Targets 10.a to 10.c focus on the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries (SDG 10.a), on encouraging ODA and financial flows to States where the need is greatest (SDG 10.b) and on reducing to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances by 2030 (SDG 10.c).
This article aims to provide an overview of the reduction of inequality from a legal developmental perspective-the reason behind SDG 10, its genesis, the longstanding idea of international solidarity, legal consequences of SDG 10, progress reporting on this SDG, Germany's approach to implementing SDG 10 and, as a conclusion, the road ahead.

Scientific Research on Inequality: The Reason Behind SDG 10
There has been abundant research on inequality in recent decades-showing the harmful effects on human beings when inequality is (too) high within a country.
Inequality is seen as one as our most urgent social problems. A worldwide public debate about the 1% and the 99% arose in 2017 when Oxfam drew the following conclusion from the aid figures published by the OECD: just eight men (1%) owned the same wealth as the poorest half of the world. 1 The high level of attention this attracted ignited an intensive debate during the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017, with leaders from all countries focusing on this topic in numerous debates. A number of recent publications by distinguished economists tackle the topic at length. 2 And the public debate is continuing across the globe, Oxfam remains a strong opinion leader on this topic. 3 Inequality is-as has been recognized for poverty 4 -multidimensional in nature, including a social, an economic and an ecological dimension.

The Social Dimension of Inequality
As early as 2009, Wilkinson and Pickett 5 provided detailed evidence of the social dimension of inequality, revealing that substantial levels of inequality in income or revenue are indicators of basic problems within societies. The authors show the 'costs' of inequality‚ with costs being understood in a holistic way and including, for example, mental health and drug use, 6 physical health and life expectancy, 7 obesity, 8 educational performance, 9 teenage births, 10 and higher rates of crime, violence and anti-social behaviour. 11 This compelling data is drawn from studies undertaken in 25 developed countries. The source was the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank 2004, which looked initially at the richest 50 countries and subsequently excluded countries with no internationally comparable data on income inequality and those with populations with fewer than three million (in order to exclude tax havens). 12 Wilkinson/Pickett claim that the inclusion of poorer countries would have made little difference to their results, as studies of life expectancy, infant mortality and 1 Oxfam (2017 Alkire and Foster (2011). 5 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009 homicide in poorer countries show that greater equality is beneficial at all levels of economic development. 13 As this assumption is most persuasive due to the fact that development of societies can be compared on a worldwide scale, it shall be accepted for the purpose of this article.

The Economic Dimension of Inequality
Since humankind has existed, societies have been formed of individuals belonging to higher or lower classes, as reflected in their respective income or assets (inherited or earned by individual work). For more than a century, economists in what is referred to as the Western World declared that economic inequality is inevitable. The main reason given is the underlying assumption that a certain level of inequality is actually most desirable as it provides incentives for entrepreneurs, who invest their capital and knowhow in business, thus creating jobs and wealth for all members of societies.
Today, a more nuanced approach is gaining ground. The World Bank paved the way with its report on 'Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality', showcasing evidence that there are indeed policies that can help to lower inequality while at the same time boosting growth. 14 The 2018 World Inequality Report, coordinated by several famous economists such as Alvaredo, Piketty and Zucman, also sets a new and different tone, stating that if rising inequality is not properly monitored and addressed, it could lead to various types of political, economic and social catastrophe. 15 These economic experts clearly state that, as it will remain impossible to bring everyone into agreement regarding inequality and no single scientific truth exists about the level of inequality, societies have to decide themselves on the right mix of policies and institutions to achieve the level desired. 16 That decision will be different for a Scandinavian state, say, than for an East African state.
For a long time, societies have struggled to find their own ideal equilibrium. And for all countries worldwide, measuring inequality remains a huge task. Scientists have tried to solve this question with various indices (the most famous ones being Gini, Theil, Atkinson and Hoover). At the same time, data are not publicly released in many countries, and surveys tend to underestimate the income and wealth of the richest individuals. Tax havens on all continents and in the middle of oceans mean that some information is not made public.
The World Inequality Report 2018 has delivered some new findings: income inequality varies greatly across all world regions. It is lowest in Europe and highest in the Middle East. In recent decades, income inequality has increased in nearly all 13 Ibid., p. 281. 14 World Bank (2016), p. 152 et seq. 15 World Inequality Report (2018), Executive Summary, p. 4. 16 Ibid.,p. 4. countries, but at different speeds: since 1980, in North America, China, India and Russia, income inequality has increased rapidly, whereas in Europe it has increased only moderately. 17 What is most interesting about the World Inequality Report is the intention behind it. The authors aim to measure income and wealth inequality in a systematic and transparent manner, seeking 'to fill a democratic gap and to equip various actors of society with the necessary facts to engage in informed public debates on inequality'. 18 At the same time, it is no surprise that this increased interest in rising inequality has emerged along with globalization and the transparency of the fourth industrial revolution. One could question if this discussion would have been possible without the global agreement reached on SDG 10, evidencing the common ground on which all 193 states were able to agree when arriving at their consensus within the UN in 2015.

The Ecological Dimension of Inequality
In addition to the social and economic dimensions of inequality, there is a third dimension that is of the utmost importance: the ecological dimension. With the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, concluded in December 2015, state parties reached a major breakthrough on adaptation to climate change. The signatory states, having accepted these ambitious goals and targets, will now have to meet them and this will clearly impose strict constraints on enterprises and individuals, forcing many of us to change our comfortable ways. And yet the great majority of the world's population are already being confronted with the ecological dimension of inequality today to a brutal and life-threatening extent: both poor people in rural areas and also the urban poor living in (mega) cities. Threatened by drought, rising sea levels, hurricanes and landslides, poor people and poor countries are suffering most from the climate change, as its impacts affect them disproportionately due to their geographical location and their high socio-economic vulnerability. 19 Looking back, the global warming being experienced today is recognized to be the cumulative effect of the greenhouse gas emissions of the past 200 years. Most of these emissions occurred in the past in the industrialized centres of Western Europe, the USA and the former Soviet Union; it is only in recent decades that prospering Asian states have been emitting a significant proportion of those gases. 20 17 Ibid., p. 5. 18 Ibid., p. 4. 19 IPCC Working group II (2014). 20 Scholz (2020), p. 197.

The Genesis of SDG 10
When investigating the genesis of SDG 10, it is interesting to look back at the negotiations surrounding the post-2015 Agenda. The negotiations were a highly complex process, involving UN member states, UN agencies, funds and programs, civil society, the private sector and non-state actors. The outcome of these long and difficult negotiations was globally recognized as a major accomplishment, noted by the media in most countries and even inspiring Pope Francis to come to New York and address the General Assembly. 21 In January 2014, the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN organized a roundtable to discuss "The Threat of Growing Inequalities: Building More Just and Equitable Societies to Support Growth and Sustainable Development". The intention was to bring together academic knowledge on the impact of growing inequalities and present it to the diplomatic corps; the keynote speaker was the Nobel Laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz. 22 In his presentation, Stiglitz focused on the level and impact of inequality within the USA, where inequality had increased. Since 2009, he noted, 95% of all economic gains had gone to only the richest 1% of the population. At the same time, he pointed out, the enormous growth in inequality was not only the result of economic forces but also of politics and policies. His conclusion was to call for the SDGs to include a goal to reduce or eliminate inequality in its extreme forms. 23 Stiglitz' presentation has been described as an "eye-opener". The G77 countries-like others-became aware of and recognized inequality as a global problem. 24 Stiglitz' expertise was trusted, even if it the message was not really new. The academic community, 25 NGOs 26 and even the Pope 27 had, after all, already highlighted high levels of inequality within communities and the impact of it. But in those preparations for a post-2015 development agenda, the message finally got through to the relevant stakeholders. 21 Kamau et al. (2018), p. 92. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 94. 24 Ibid. 25 Stewart (2008), p. 3 et seq.; Piketty (2014). 26 Oxfam (2013). 27 Pope Francis on World Youth Day 2013, taking place in the Varginha slum of Rio de Janeiro.

The Idea of International Solidarity: Nothing New in International Cooperation and Development Policy
For decades, the idea and promise of international solidarity had been discussed intensively in international fora. It is remarkable, but at the same time not surprising, that after World War II states were eager to adopt legal texts and resolutions which explicitly enshrined this principle. However, the concept of solidarity already formed the underlying common ground for the UN Charter in 1945. Article 1 defines as the purpose of the UN, among other things, 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights' and 'to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or human character'. For Europe, the same concept of solidarity is found in the Treaty of Paris of 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, whose third recital in the preamble states 'recognising that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity'. The concept of solidarity was repeated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, stating in the seventh recital of the preamble 'intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity'. And this path was continued in 1992, when the Treaty on European Union was concluded in Maastricht between 12 EU member states, whose heads of state declared their desire 'to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions' (fourth recital of the preamble).
It is of interest that Europe, at an early stage, did not only strive for solidarity within its own boundaries, but also with regard to its overseas countries and territories (OCT). Robert Schuman declared in his speech on 9 May 1950, that Europe would, with increased resources, be able to pursue one of its essential tasks: the development of the African continent. Therefore, elements of the principle of solidarity can already be found in the Conventions of Yaoundé 28 and Lomé. 29 This idea of solidarity remained an underlying basis of the subsequent Lomé II to Lomé IV Conventions 30 as well as the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. 31 In preparing the 28 Yaoundé Convention of 1963 between six European states and 18 African states, 5th recital of the preamble ('résolus à poursuivre en commun leurs efforts en vue du progrès économique, social et culturel de leurs pays'). 29 Lomé I Convention, 1975 between 9 European and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, 2nd recital of the preamble ('anxious to establish, on the basis of complete equality between partners, close and continuing cooperation, in a spirit of international solidarity'). 30 David (2000), p. 11 et seq. 31 Cotonou Agreement 2000, see full text in the Supplement of the ACP-EU Courier, September 2000: Several recitals of the preamble, e.g. second recital: 'affirming their commitment to work together towards the achievement of the objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy', third recital 'asserting their resolve to make, through their cooperation, a significant contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States and to greater well-being of their population, . . . . In the Post-Cotonou Agreement, there is no doubt that this idea will be maintained, considering the history of the Agreements.
Interestingly, the enshrinement of the principle of solidarity took place at a time when decolonization was taking place through the declarations of independence of many colonies. The relationships between colonial powers and their former colonies were often marked by a mutual understanding that a strong bond of solidarity existed-going in both directions and with mutual expectations. That is one of the reasons why the idea of solidarity is inherent in many UN declarations of the 1970s and 1980s. However, it is not until the 1990s, in the UN Millennium Declaration, that the term 'solidarity' can be found in a universally agreed text. The UN Millennium Declaration understands solidarity as one of six fundamental values in international relations: 'Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least will deserve help from those who benefit most'.
Since 2005, the UN Human Rights Council has appointed an Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity. 32 That person is mandated to develop a draft declaration on the right of peoples and individuals to international solidarity; that draft was presented back in 2015. The draft declaration on the right to international solidarity takes into account the multitude of international and regional treaties and legal texts that express international solidarity and respect for human rights, stressing that 'international solidarity is a fundamental concept of mutually reinforcing relations among individuals, peoples and States, an essential element that underpins global partnerships, a key approach to peace, disarmament and poverty eradication, and an indispensable component of the efforts to realize all human rights, including the right to development, and internationally agreed development goals'. 33

SDG 10, A New Global Promise of Solidarity: Has It Had
Any Legal Consequences?
Coming back to the 2030 Agenda, with SDG 10 and the pledges to leave no one behind and to reach the furthest behind first, it is most relevant to understand the legal nature of this relevant UN resolution. Whereas international treaties are legally binding texts, a resolution does not have the same force. However, resolutions can effort to give the process of globalization a stronger social dimension', also in referring to the development targets and principles agreed in United Nations Conferences and the OECD Development Assistance Committee to reduce by one half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by the year 2015 (tenth recital). 32 The incumbent is Mr. Obiora C. Okafor from Nigeria (since 2017). 33 Fourteenth recital of the draft declaration on the right to international solidarity. also reflect and reinforce existing international law. Therefore, UN resolutions are often perceived as "soft law" as they largely reflect and reinforce existing international law. 34 There is a reason for this. Given the complex challenges involved, governments face huge difficulties or even real obstacles in concluding new comprehensive agreements, so in many cases it makes sense to resort to "soft" governance tools. And soft law norms have certain advantages, as they require neither parliamentary approval nor the long time periods of application that customary law is based on. 35 Taking these arguments into account, the legal character of the 2030 Agenda is of course "soft law" due to the format chosen. It is a UN resolution. But it is a special resolution: dense, intensive, showing consensus among signatory states and many stakeholders involved in the negotiations, providing a framework that can be used as a 'compass' by governments, economists, academia, NGOs, religious entities and many more. A global consensus on the relevance of people, peace, prosperity, planet and peace, promoting the underlying idea of sustainability in all aspects had never been achieved before 25 September 2015, showing the international ambition and the goals, simply "a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity". 36 And solidarity can come from many players: the 2030 Agenda asks for multi-stakeholder partnerships, encouraging effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships (SDG 17.17).

Progress Reporting on SDG 10
Not surprisingly, official progress reporting by the UN on SDG 10 is a challenging issue due to the complexity of the target. In its recent 2018 Sustainable Development Report, 37 the progress on SDG 10 is described only in the overview chapter, concentrating on SDG 10.1, 10.a, 10 b. and 10.c, i.e. those targets that can be measured more easily. On SDG 10.1 the report states that, between 2010 and 2016, in 60 out of 94 countries supplying data, the incomes of the poorest 40% of the population grew faster than those of the entire population. 38 More economic data provide information on the progress of SDG 10.a (products exported by LDCs to world markets), 10.b (financial flows to developing countries) and 10 c (transaction costs of remittances). 39 The previous reports have had a similar focus but dealt with the targets in their main chapters, in the 2016 report looking at progress on enhanced 34 Kaltenborn and Kuhn (2017) representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions (SDG 10.6). 40 If one consults the data published on the UNSTATS homepage, the same picture is to be found: SDG 10.1, 10.6, and 10.a. to 10.c are in the focus of interest. 41 UN Women, not surprisingly, puts the focus on gender aspects and underlines in its stock-taking report of progress towards SDG 10 that, at the national level, genderresponsive fiscal and social policies are needed to reduce income inequalities between women and men, which research shows is a key contributor to overall income inequality in society. 42 A recent study shows that inequality within a household, e.g. between women and men, is a strong contributing factor to overall income inequality in society. 43 We all are witnesses to the fact that in all countries women generally earn less than men, have access to fewer assets and consequently accumulate less wealth. Recent data reveals that across countries, women are more likely than men to be living on less than 50% of the median income. 44 Taking a look at the reports of UN member states to the annual High-level Political Forum (HLPF), an interesting picture can be seen. In the first round of reporting in 2016, the Synthesis Report was not yet structured to reflect the 17 SDGs (as later reports are). 45 This first ever HLPF asked countries delivering their Voluntary National Reports (VNR) to include a chapter on the principle and the theme of the HLPF in 2016: "ensuring that no one is left behind". The question of reducing inequality was-in a wider sense-discussed in this short chapter, which highlights such aspects as poverty reduction strategies, social policies and social protection. Several European member states, and also Samoa, highlighted the human rightsbased approach. 46 A different approach has been taken since the Synthesis Report of 2017. Now the 17 SDGs are shown in different chapters and discussed. Not surprisingly, the issues of social protection policies, social security systems, minimum social standards, human rights and combatting discrimination are again discussed, but also migration policy and enhanced representation and voice for developing countries. 47 Looking deeper into the experience of Germany (which was an early reporter in 2016), the German government has declared that wealth and income justice, equality and opportunities for participation for everyone are key prerequisites for unlocking 40 Ibid,d.,p. 59. 47 United Nations (2017b), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17109_Syn thesis_Report_VNRs_2017.pdf. every person's economic, social and educational potential. 48 According to OECD figures, Germany is among the countries in which government redistribution through taxes and social transfers has reduced income inequality to the greatest extent, lowering the poverty risk by 74%. 49 Four national challenges are mentioned: (1) improving educational equality by creating more opportunities for access and participation for all children and young people across all education sectors; (2) the introduction of a statutory minimum wage; (3) the draft legislation for amending the German Law on Temporary Employment in order to prevent the misuse of work and services contracts; (4) a National Action Plan to implement the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 50 In light of its global responsibility, Germany cites three challenges: (1) The German Government advocates for pro-active trade policies which lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, favoring non-discriminatory trade policy instruments which are conducive to development and mainstreaming of high environmental, labour, social and human rights standards in free trade agreements, trade policy transparency and the participation of civil society stakeholders; (2) the involvement of all social groups (participation); (3) the reform of the World Bank's weighted voting system, underlining that Germany advocates fairer distribution, with voting power being shifted from the industrialized countries to emerging and developing countries with the aim of narrowing inequalities. 51 Among UN staff, it is understood that reducing inequalities calls for system-wide engagement and must involve all UN entities. It is clearly a major task for the Division for Inclusive Social Development of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) to work on the reduction of inequalities, bringing together experts and facilitating dialogue. 52 For an overview of which UN entities are already working on the achievement of SDG 10, the Dalberg Report on "System-Wide Outline of Functions and Capacities of the UN Development System" 53 may be consulted.
And more in-depth analysis of efforts to reduce inequality is still to come. In 2019, SDG 10 will be the subject of an in-depth review by the High-level Political Forum. 54 In preparation of this event, the UN Division for Sustainable Development Goals is planning a number of expert meetings in order to track progress. In 2019, in accordance with the regular 4-year schedule for the composition of delegations, it is 48 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org, see states and Voluntary National Review of Germany (2016), p. 40. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 40 et seq. 52 See i.a. https://un.org/development/desa/dspd/2018-expert-group-meetings-and-panel-discus sions/inequality.html. 53 United Nations (2017c), https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/ sg-report-dalberg_unds-outline-of-functions-and-capacities_june-2017.pdf. 54 UN GA resolution 70/299, https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/299. the heads of state that will convene within the HLPF format. This will draw even greater attention to the session and the progress tracked.
Within Europe, the French Agency for Development has announced it will be staging an International Conference on Development on 7 December 2018, to which experts will be invited for further discussion of the subject (13th AFD International Conference on Development, "Inequalities and Social Cohesion"). 55 And the European Commission has recently announced that it will be tackling reducing inequality in its 2019 working programme and will make the topic a prominent focus of the European Development Days in June 2019.

Germany's Development Policy on SDG 10
Activities started quite early, with Germany lending its support to the idea of reducing inequality during the post-2015 negotiations, as it was clearly understood that the reduction of poverty and the reduction of inequality are inextricably linked. Once SDG 10 had come into being, the BMZ changed its organizational chart in early 2016 and renamed the division in charge of reduction of poverty the division for "reduction of poverty and inequality".
In September 2016, BMZ organized an International Expert Workshop on Inequalities entitled "Bridging the Gap: Approaches and Policies for Reducing Inequalities". About 80 practitioners and representatives of academia, governments and implementing agencies attended. These discussions led to the "Expert Key Findings on Reducing Inequalities", a two-pager summarizing the main points discussed. The viewpoints expressed are not necessarily shared by all participants nor do they reflect their official positions. 56 Three key messages emerged. Firstly, it was recognised that a strong correlation exists between inequality and conflict and that horizontal inequality threatens peace and stability. Secondly, different distributional outcomes in different countries show that policies matter; political will is the driving force for change, poor governance usually reinforces inequality. Thirdly, development cooperation should be aimed at improving international conditions that cause a rise in inequality within and between countries, i.e. in the areas of trade, taxation and migration. Some of the interesting conclusions to emerge from the workshop were that global rules and policies should be assessed in terms of their effects on inequality; education and health are key to reducing overall inequalities; and, lastly, no group should be left behind and no group should be too far ahead. 57 Through this workshop, Germany encouraged discussions among the participants on this highly complex topic. And reflections, scientific work, exchange of ideas and dialogue have continued intensively. In addition, a Regional Conference has been taken place in Cape Town (November 2018), tackling the issue of inequality in the southern African region.
Conceptual discussions are still ongoing within the Ministry. Preliminary findings can be summarized as follows: • Without a significant reduction of inequality, SDG 1 (End poverty in all its forms everywhere) will not be reached. • Inequality is a driving force for persons to leave their home countries.
• Inequality endangers social cohesion, boosts radicalization and conflict and may have negative effects on economic growth and development successes. • German development policy aims to look at both ends of the inequality challenge-the most vulnerable and the richest persons of each country-by improving equality of opportunity for all persons globally and enhancing the resilience of poor and vulnerable groups. • Six main approaches to solving these problems appear to be relevant: political participation and good governance; economic influence (participation) and establishing more just globalization; education and digitalization; gender equality; tax justice; social protection.
The Ministry is also working closely together with all interested stakeholders, creating multi-stakeholder partnerships (as requested by SDG 17.16), involving academia, practitioners and governments in order to exchange knowledge and best practices, an iterative process that has just started and is delivering results. Another interesting step within the Ministry has been the creation of a new fund in 2018, entitled "Seeking new waysthe Inequality Challenge". This fund promotes innovative approaches, methods and tools that focus on reducing inequality and on the poorest and most marginalised people and groups in partner countries of German bilateral development cooperation. It is being implemented by GIZ and has a volume of 1 million euros. The first ten projects have been chosen and will start soon. 58

The Road Ahead
To sum up: By adopting SDG 10, states have shown their political will and commitment to reduce inequality within and among countries. Each country can choose which path it wishes to take towards achieving this ambitious goal by 2030. Reducing inequality within a country can be approached in many ways, depending 58 See inequality-challenge.com. on the status quo. That first of all needs to be analysed. Societies suffering from excessive inequality will need to understand that the concentration of capital in the hands of very few people threatens the system in itself, as the various pieces of the puzzle no longer fit together and the consensus needed among the citizens of that society is not guaranteed.
All governments need to establish a framework recognising that all individuals in their countries have the right to enjoy a life in dignity. All human beings, from the moment they are born, need social protection, functioning health services, quality education, decent jobs, reliable institutions and access to modern forms of energy in a safe and healthy environment, as described in the 17 SDGs. Governments have to deliver on those promises for all citizens by guaranteeing minimum standards (e.g. at work, for health, infrastructure, education) and by avoiding a tax system that is seen to tax the average person less fairly than richer members of society. Citizens feel and understand differences in status if inequality among people rises far too mucheither through a failure to tax the richest, through bad governance or even corruption, or by guaranteeing privileges only to small parts of societies. And we continue to miss so many talents-clever girls and boys who despite coming from poor backgrounds are brilliant at school, not allowed to continue their education due to the lack of funds.
If individuals or entire groups feel they are excluded from a society, this personal stress causes adverse developments that have become all too familiar: radicalization, high migration numbers, health problems, brain drain, low levels of trust and less willingness to help others. Looked at in a different way: governments will have to realize that if capital is in the hands of very few people, the power this gives to them causes distortions, as governments feel in a weak position with respect to the power behind the capital. Strong lobbyists for the richer minority will favour legal frameworks that guarantee them exclusive advantages (e.g. via tax exemptions, avoiding taxes or subsidies). To a certain extent, governments do react in practice by endeavouring to reallocate, but there are limits. If these reallocations are seen to be unfair, societies face national battles on allocation, with each party stressing their own interests, thus generating high costs and weakening societies. 59 So structural justice in many societies is needed, promoted and implemented by the government and understood by the people. This is a conclusion that applies especially to Germany, which is, according to Fratzscher, 60 by a host of measures, one of the most unequal rich countries, if compared globally.
Solidarity among nations is nothing new, as shows the UN Charter of 1945 (Article 1) or-as a regional example-the history of European integration (both among EU member states and also with regard to the EU's relations to its OCTs or 59 Fratzscher (2016) developing countries under the umbrella of the Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou agreements). 61 Discussion on this highly controversial topic of reducing inequalities will go on, focusing on the role of governments, individuals, civil society and academia, trying to find ways of achieving a more sustainable and just world by combatting corruption and bad governance, asking for fair taxation for all citizens and establishing liveable societies on all continents. 62 And in order to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality, girls and boys, women and men. With a strong political will and enabling policies, inequality can and will be reduced-if governments have the political will. Having accepted and adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its SDG 10, 193 governments have declared that they have the political will to act accordingly. Development cooperation that puts much more focus on reducing inequality could ignite discussions on transforming these countries. At the same time, international guidance and the political will of the global community is indispensable. Closing international tax havens is one vital prerequisite for tackling inequality and poverty effectively. Tax evasion undermines the power of governments to provide basic social services including education and health.
In her foreword to Oxfam's report of 2019, Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Director-General of the World Health Organization and first female Prime Minister of Norway, states "Fighting inequality remains one of the world's most testing issues. Delivering universal public services is a tried and tested way to tackle it. We must now take action against extreme inequality to achieve a fairer, healthier and happier future for all, not just the few." 63 Time will tell if the appetite for such efforts exists.


IMPLICATION OF FARMING CULTURAL CHANGES ON FARMHOUSES IN NGADAS VILLAGE

People in Ngadas Village have enough time to live in their fields. Therefore, the community build farmhouses to help farming activities. However, as an agricultural landscape, cultivation in Ngadas Village has various dynamics. Changes that occur in the agricultural landscape can be traced through agricultural features formed by the type of agricultural land use. In addition, it can be traced through cultural features that are the result of interactions between human activities and the environment such as farmhouses. Therefore, this study aims to find out the implications of agricultural features on cultural features, especially space in farmhouses. The in-depth interview and observation methods were conducted to identify, then the data obtained were analysed by synchronous and diachronic methods. So, the changes that occur can be determined descriptively. The results of the study show that the culture of shifting cultivation that has become permanent causes the fields to develop along with the changes in the plants that have been planted, the addition of activities and intensity of plant management. More fixed location of the farm more developed and permanent farmhouses has been built. More activities carried out in the fields and the higher intensity of plant management, the wider and more space needed for the fields.

People in Ngadas Village have enough time to live in their fields. Therefore, community have been built houses to help their farming activities. However, as an agricultural landscape, cultivation in Ngadas Village has various dynamics. Dynamics can be interpreted as a continuous movement following changes in time (Quinn & Ciugudean, 2018). The time factor plays a role in the emergence of dynamics (Pfeuty, Kress, & Pain, 2018). Dynamics can also be interpreted as a process of change that is formed and influenced by the condition of the landscape in a long time (Jiang et al., 2018). This is also inseparable from the social and cultural history of Ngadas Village. Agricultural landscapes are often symbolized as cultural landscapes, which are usually defined as landscapes that are managed in traditional, local, and historical ways (van Berkel & Verburg, 2014).
Changes that occur in the agricultural landscape can be traced through agricultural features formed by the type of agricultural land use. In addition, it can be traced through cultural features that are the result of interactions between human activity and the environment, including agricultural related structures (e.g. barns, hedges, farmhouses), road lanes and transmission lines and signs such as boards or fences (Gao, Barbieri, & Valdivia, 2013).
This study aims to determine the implications of cultural change in farming on the farms in Ngadas Village. The study of changes or dynamics is useful in documenting traditional architecture, especially those related to the typical agricultural landscape. Research on farm houses and agricultural landscapes has actually been carried out by several previous researchers, but the majority are done abroad. Research on typology, for example, has been carried out by (Picuno, 2012), which is actually far different from this research. In Indonesia, farm houses that have been discussed quite a lot are Leuit, which incidentally is only one of the functions that are in the fields in Ngadas and its location is not a single unit with its agricultural landscape (Nopianti, 2016). With the benefits and renewal above, this research is very important to do.

METHODS
The study was conducted using qualitative methods. Data obtained were analyzed by synchronous and diachronic methods. So, the changes that occur can be determined descriptively. The research will be conducted in Ngadas Village, Poncokusumo District, Malang Regency ( Figure 1). Ngadas Village is located within Bromo Tengger Semeru National Park. Therefore, Ngadas Village is also referred to as an enclave village. But in this study only focus on agricultural landscape in Ngadas. The time of the study was start from January to June 2019. The stages of research are carried out in sequence in the following order:

a. Preparation
Preparation includes literature studies and field observations to determine research topics and loci.

b. Preliminary Research
Preliminary research is conducted to determine the research sample that will be used along with the approach with the parties who will be the subject of research.

c. Data Collection
Data collection is based on research needs and field conditions. Data collection can be in the form of images, graphics, visuals, or writing. The data collected in this study are:  The history of the culture of farming in Ngadas Village was explored through literature and in-interview  The data on the physical aspects of agricultural features in accordance with the history of the agricultural landscape in Ngadas Village was obtained through field observations, literature studies and in-interview  The data on the cultural aspects of the agricultural landscape are in the form of farmhouses in spatial aspects that can be identified through space organization, functions, relationships between spaces, and location and position (Febrianto et al., 2017). obtained through field observation, literature study and interview.  The selection of objects is done by accidental sampling.

d. Data Analysis
Data analysis is used to find research answers. Data analysis is performed on collected data. In this study, descriptive qualitative analysis was used. More specifically the analysis carried out is synchronous and diachronic analysis, so that the relationship of quality can be seen in line with the history of the Region.

e. Synthesis
Synthesis is the process of bringing together all the results of the analysis so that one finding that is valid and accountable can be found.

f. Conclusions
Conclusion is the final answer of the research and is the essence of the synthesis process.

A. History of Farming and Agricultural Features in Ngadas Village
In its history, it was mentioned that Ngadas was opened by Eyang Sedek around the 18th century as an effort to expand the influence of the kingdom of Mataram Islam, Kraton Kasunanan Surakarta (Agustapraja, 2017). But in its development, residents who later migrated into this village were the Tengger tribe who had previously lived in other villages around Mount Bromo. So that now almost 99% of the residents of Ngadas are the Tengger tribe (BBTNBTS, 2013).
Ngadas Village community was originally a shifting field farmer (BBTNBTS 2013) with the main agriculture which is corn (Figure 2). Corn as the main commodity and staple food of society then changed because of the new order green revolution of 1968 that replaced corn with a long harvest period of 10-12 months with plants that had high economic value.

B. Cultural Feature Identification
Cultural features are the artifacts of human culture, which is farmhouses (Gao et al., 2013;Pouta, Grammatikopoulou, Hurme, Soini, & Uusitalo, 2014). Through the results of independent interviews and observations, it was found that the houses in Ngadas Village were not originally houses with impermanent material, people used to call them sudung. Sudung only contains one space, which is a storage area for agricultural equipment and seeds. Based on the results of coginitive mapping in the community, the sudung illustration is shown in Figure 3. Sudung has only one space, namely storage space. Storage space is used to store fertilizer. Because there is only one room, there is no relationship between spaces. The location of sudung or fields is relatively flat land and is located in an affordable area from all corners of the field.
Meanwhile, existing farmhouses (Figure 4) developed from the 1960s with material that continued to changes. In the 90s, it is still using natural ingredients, now it has used other materials such as zinc, or brick on the walls. Farmhouses now have three space units, namely a place for storing agricultural tools and seeds, resting places and cage/stable. Storage space is used to store agricultural equipment and seeds ( Figure 5). The rest room is used for eating and drinking and gegenen activity during the rainy season ( Figure 6).  Every room in the farmhouse is an important unit in supporting agricultural activities. Due to the importance of agriculture as well, the orientation or direction of the farmhouse always faces the farmland and is located in a relatively flat or flat area.

C. Analysis Result
Through diachronic-synchronous analysis can clearly describe each detailed condition according to a certain time, obtained conditions such as in the chart below ( Figure 8).
The chart above shows that each time period the farming methods in Ngadas Village changed. It is in line with the changes of farmhouse's physical elements agricultural landscape cultural features in Ngadas. In the span of 1910-1968 the community still adopted a shifting cultivation and planting corn system. Corn is a non-intensive plant; therefore it is not difficult to be treated. Farmers do not need to be intense in the fields. The crops were brought to their homes, because basically the Tengger people had a pedharingan as a place to store their crops in their homes (Ayuninggar, Antariksa, & Wardhani, 2012). Then, in 1968Then, in -1982 with the green revolution and replacing plants into commercial plants, the maintenance activities were also more intensive. The community began to build farmhouses as a place to store agricultural tools and potatoes seed. Potato seeds need special temperatures so they cannot be stored anywhere. Therefore, the farmhouses play an important role in the regeneration of potato farming. The nursery itself is intended to reduce production costs considering potatoes are a large profits commodity (Anggiana & Bergas, 2014). Each potato harvest is left for a few kg to be used as seed during the next planting period. In the process of waiting for the replanting period, the potato seeds must be stored in the fields.
Gradually with the presence of land and the existence of protected forest boundaries in 1982 until now, the houses were made more permanent and had stable. The orientation of the farmhouses that remain facing the fields also aims to monitor the fields from disturbance. Safety factors are the main factors that take into consideration the orientation of the farmhouses. This is in accordance with basic human needs in the form of security in certain environment (Cheng & Kuo,

CONCLUSSION
The cultural change in farming the Ngadas Village community from shifting fields to sedentary agriculture has implications for the cultural features that exist in the Ngadas village agricultural landscape. The cultural feature in question is the physical aspect in the form of the cultural results of the Ngadas people in farming, which are farms. Initially, the community planted a shifting cultivation system with corn and cassava staple crops. In addition, corn plants do not need to require intensive care. So, farmers only need sudung which is fertilizer storage. Then, as the changing of farming methods by permanent agriculture and the replacement of plants into commercial crops, especially potatoes, make farmers build permanent houses with larger units of space to collect potato seeds that must be made by them. More intensive care also causes farmers to be longer in the fields and need a place to rest. Cultural features that are formed are increasingly becoming more permanent and develop into three space units namely storage, resting place, and cage/stable. So, changes in farming methods change the way plants are taken care of. So, it needs more supervision and maintenance. Farmers finally need space for agricultural equipment and rest room. In addition, shifting agriculture that turns into permanent agriculture makes farmers not reluctant to make a cage/stable because there is no longer any field displacement. Thus, the farmhouse which initially only had one unit of space developed into three units of space.