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AN UNSINKABLE TITANIC

[Illustration: Photo by Brown Bros., New York

STOKE-HOLE OF A TRANSATLANTIC LINER]




  AN
  UNSINKABLE
  TITANIC

  EVERY SHIP
  ITS OWN LIFEBOAT

  BY
  J. BERNARD WALKER
  Editor of the Scientific American

  [Illustration]

  NEW YORK
  DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY
  1912


  COPYRIGHT, 1912, BY
  DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY

  Published, July, 1912

  THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
  RAHWAY, N. J.




                        To
  THE MEMORY OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE _TITANIC_,
                    JOHN BELL,
     AND HIS STAFF OF THIRTY-THREE ASSISTANTS,
      WHO STOOD AT THEIR POSTS IN THE ENGINE-
         AND BOILER-ROOMS TO THE VERY LAST,
            AND WENT DOWN WITH THE SHIP,
              THIS WORK IS DEDICATED




PREFACE


It is the object of this work to show that, in our eagerness to make the
ocean liner fast and luxurious, we have forgotten to make her safe.

The safest ocean liner was the _Great Eastern_; and she was built
over fifty years ago. Her designer aimed to make the ship practically
unsinkable--and he succeeded; for she passed through a more severe
ordeal than the _Titanic_, survived it, and came into port under her own
steam.

Since her day, the shipbuilder has eliminated all but one of the safety
devices which made the _Great Eastern_ a ship so difficult to sink.
Nobody, not even the shipbuilders themselves, seemed to realise what was
being done, until, suddenly, the world's finest vessel, in all the
pride of her maiden voyage, struck an iceberg and went to the bottom in
something over two and a half hours' time!

If we learn the lesson of this tragedy, we shall lose no time in getting
back to first principles. We shall reintroduce in all future passenger
ships those simple and effective elements of safety--the double
skin, the longitudinal bulkhead, and the watertight deck--which were
conspicuous in the _Great Eastern_, and which alone can render such a
ship as the _Titanic_ unsinkable.

       *       *       *       *       *

The author's acknowledgments are due to the "Scientific American" for
many of the photographs and line drawings reproduced in this volume;
to an article by Professor J. H. Biles, published in "Engineering," for
material relating to the Board of Trade stipulations as to bulkheads;
to Sir George C. V. Holmes and the Victoria and Albert Museum for data
regarding the _Great Eastern_, published in "Ancient and Modern Ships";
to Naval Constructor R. H. M. Robinson, U.S.N., for permission to
reproduce certain drawings from his work, "Naval Construction," and
to Naval Constructor Henry Williams, U.S.N., who courteously read the
proofs of this work and offered many valuable suggestions. The original
wash and line drawings are by Mr. C. McKnight Smith.

  J. B. W.

  NEW YORK, _June_, 1912.




CONTENTS


  CHAPTER                                      PAGE

  I.    INTRODUCTORY                              1

  II.   THE EVER-PRESENT DANGERS OF THE SEA      19

  III.  EVERY SHIP ITS OWN LIFEBOAT              35

  IV.   SAFETY LIES IN SUBDIVISION               51

  V.    THE UNSINKABLE _GREAT EASTERN_ OF
          1858                                   69

  VI.   THE SINKABLE _TITANIC_                   91

  VII.  HOW THE GREAT SHIP WENT DOWN            116

  VIII. WARSHIP PROTECTION AGAINST RAM,
          MINE, AND TORPEDO                     136

  IX.   WARSHIP PROTECTION AS APPLIED TO
          SOME OCEAN LINERS                     161

  X.    CONCLUSIONS                             179





ILLUSTRATIONS


  Stoke-Hole of a Transatlantic Liner         _Frontispiece_

                                                        PAGE
  Riveting the Outer Skin on the Frames of a
    65,000-Ton Ocean Liner                                 3

  Growth of the Transatlantic Steamer from 1840
    to 1912                                                7

  Receiving Submarine Signals on the Bridge               13

  Taking the Temperature of the Water                     17

  Fire-Drill on a German Liner: Stewards are Closing
    Door in Fire-Protection Bulkhead                      21

  Fire-Drill on a German Liner: Hose from Bellows
    Supplies Fresh Air to Man with Smoke Helmet           25

  Fire-Drill on a German Liner: Test of Fire-Mains
    is Made Every Time the Ship is in Port                29

  The 44,000-Ton, 25-1/2-Knot _Lusitania_                    37

  Provisioning the Boats During a Boat Drill              43

  Loading and Lowering Boats, Stowed Athwartships         43

  The Elaborate Installation of Telegraphs, Telephones,
    Voice-Tubes, etc., on the Bridge of an
    Ocean Liner                                           47

  Hydraulically-operated, Watertight Door in an
    Engine-Room Bulkhead                                  53

  Diagram Showing Protective Value of Transverse
    and Longitudinal Bulkheads, Watertight Decks,
    and Inner Skin                                        57

  Closing, from the Bridge, All Watertight Doors
    Throughout the Ship by Pulling a Lever                63

  _Great Eastern_, 1858; Most Completely Protected
    Passenger Ship Ever Built                             71

  Longitudinal Section and Plan of the _Great
    Eastern_, 1858                                        77

  Two Extremes in Protection, and a Compromise            83

  _Great Eastern_, Lying at Foot of Canal Street,
    North River, New York                                 87

  Fifty Years' Decline in Safety Construction             93

  _Olympic_, Sister to _Titanic_, reaching New York
    on Maiden Voyage                                      97

  The Framing and Some of the Deck Beams of the
    _Imperator_, as Seen from Inside the Bow,
    Before the Outside Plating is Riveted On             103

  How the Plating of the Inner Bottom of Such a
    Ship as the _Titanic_ May Be Carried up the
    Side Frames to Form an Inner Skin                    107

  Twenty of the Twenty-nine Boilers of the _Titanic_
    Assembled Ready for Placing in the Ship              111

  The Last Photograph of the _Titanic_, Taken as
    She was Leaving Southampton on Her Maiden
    Voyage                                               117

  Swimming Pool on the _Titanic_                         121

  The _Titanic_ Struck a Glancing Blow Against an
    Under-Water Shelf of the Iceberg, Opening up
    Five Compartments                                    125

  Comparison of Subdivision in Two Famous Ships          129

  The Vast Dining-Room of the _Titanic_                  133

  The United States Battleship _Kansas_                  137

  Plan and Longitudinal Section of the Battleship
    _Connecticut_                                        143

  Midship Section of a Battleship                        149

  Safety Lies in Subdivision                             155

  The 65,000-Ton, 23-Knot _Imperator_, Largest Ship
    Afloat                                               159

  Longitudinal Section and Plan of the _Imperator_       163

  The Rotor, or Rotating Element, of One of the
    Low-Pressure Turbines of the _Imperator_             167

  The 26,000-Ton, 23-1/2-Knot _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_,
    a Thoroughly Protected Ship                          171




CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY


Among the many questions which have arisen out of the loss of the
_Titanic_ there is one, which, in its importance as affecting the safety
of ocean travel, stands out preeminent:

"Why did this ship, the latest, the largest, and supposedly the safest
of ocean liners, go to the bottom so soon after collision with an
iceberg?"

The question is one to which, as yet, no answer that is perfectly clear
to the lay mind has been made. We know that the collision was the result
of daring navigation; that the wholesale loss of life was due to the
lack of lifeboats and the failure to fill completely the few that were
available; and that, had it not been for the amazing indifference or
stupidity of the captain of a nearby steamer, who failed to answer
the distress signals of the sinking vessel, the whole of the ship's
complement might have been saved.

But the ship itself--why did she so quickly go to the bottom after
meeting with an accident, which, in spite of its stupendous results,
must be reckoned as merely one among the many risks of transatlantic
travel?

So far as the loss of the ship itself was concerned, it is certain that
the stupefaction with which the news of her sinking was received was due
to the belief that her vast size was a guarantee against disaster--that
the ever-increasing dimensions of length, breadth, and tonnage had
conferred upon the modern ocean liner a certain immunity against the
dangers of travel by sea. The fetish of mere size seems, indeed, to have
affected even the officers in command of these modern leviathans.
Surely it must have thrown its spell over the captain of the ill-fated
_Titanic_, who, in spite of an oft-repeated warning that there was a
large field of ice ahead, followed the usual practice, if the night
is clear, and ran his ship at full speed into the zone of danger, as
though, forsooth, he expected the _Titanic_ to brush the ice floes
aside, and split asunder any iceberg that might stand in her way.

[Illustration: Courtesy of _Scientific American_

RIVETTING THE OUTER SKIN ON THE FRAMES OF A 65,000-TON OCEAN LINER]

Confidence in the indestructibility of the _Titanic_, moreover, was
stimulated by the fact that she was supposed to be the "last word" in
first-class steamship construction, the culmination of three-quarters
of a century of experience in building safe and stanch vessels. In the
official descriptions of the ship, widely distributed at the time of
her launching, the safety elements of her construction were freely dwelt
upon. This literature rang the changes on stout bulkheads, watertight
compartments, automatic, self-closing bulkhead doors, etc.,--and
honestly so. There is every reason to believe that the celebrated firm
who built the ship, renowned the world over for the high character of
their work; the powerful company whose flag she carried; aye, and even
her talented designer, who was the first to pronounce the _Titanic_ a
doomed vessel and went down with the ship, were united in the belief
that the size of the _Titanic_ and her construction were such that
she was unsinkable by any of the ordinary accidents to which the
transatlantic liner is liable.

How comes it, then, that this noble vessel lies to-day at the bottom of
the Atlantic in two thousand fathoms of water?

A review of the progress of those constructive arts which affect the
safety of human life seems to show that it needs the spur of great
disasters, such as this, to concentrate the attention of the engineer
and the architect upon the all-important question of safety. More
important than considerations of convenience, economy, speed of
construction, or even revenue-earning capacity, are those of the value
and sanctity of human life. Too frequently these considerations are
the last to receive attention. This is due less to indifference than
to inadvertence--a failure to remember that an accident which may be
insignificant in its effect on steel and stone, may be fatal to frail
flesh and blood. Furthermore, the monumental disasters, and particularly
those occurring in this age of great constructive works, are
frequently traceable to hidden or unsuspected causes, the existence and
potentialities of which are revealed only when the mischief has been
done. A faulty method of construction, containing in itself huge
possibilities of disaster, may be persisted in for years without
revealing its lurking menace. Here and there, now and then, some minor
mischance will direct the attention of the few to the peril; but the
excitement will be local and passing. It takes a "horror"--a "holocaust"
of human life, with all its attendant exploitation in the press and the
monthly magazine, to awaken a busy and preoccupied world to the danger
and beget those stringent laws and improved constructions which are the
earmarks of progress towards an ideal civilisation.

[Illustration: Courtesy of _Scientific American_.

Note how far the _Great Eastern_ was ahead of her time. She was not
exceeded until the advent of the _Oceanic_ in 1899.

GROWTH OF THE TRANSATLANTIC STEAMER FROM 1840 TO 1912]

Not many years ago, there was being erected across the St. Lawrence
River a huge bridge, with the largest single span in the world, which
it was believed would be not only the largest but the strongest and most
enduring structure of its kind in existence. It was being built under
the supervision of one of the leading bridge engineers of the world;
its design was of an approved type, which had long been standard in the
Western Hemisphere; and the steelwork was being fabricated in one of the
best equipped bridge works in the country. Nevertheless, when one great
cantilever was about completed, and before any live load had been
placed on it, the structure collapsed under its own weight. One of the
principal members--a massive steel column, five feet square and sixty
feet long--crumpled up as though it had been a boy's tin whistle, and
allowed the whole bridge to fall into the St. Lawrence, carrying eighty
men to their death! The disaster was traced to a very insignificant
cause--the failure of some small angle-bars, 3-1/2 inches in width, by
which the parts of the massive member were held in place. No engineer
had suspected that danger lurked in these little angle-bars. Had the
accident happened to a bridge of moderate size, the lessons of the
failure would have been noted by the engineers and contractors; it would
have formed the subject, possibly, of a paper before some engineering
society, and the warning would have had results merely local and
temporary. But the failure of this monumental structure, with a loss
of life so appalling, gave to the disaster a world-wide notoriety. It
became the subject of a searching enquiry by a highly expert board; the
unsuspected danger which lurked in the existing and generally approved
methods of building up massive steel columns was acknowledged; and safer
rules of construction were adopted.

It took the Baltimore conflagration to teach us the strong and weak
points of our much-vaunted systems of fireproof construction. Only
when San Francisco, after repeated warnings, had seen the whole of its
business section shaken down and ravaged by fire, did she set about the
construction of a city that would be proof against fire and earthquake.
It was the spectacle of maimed and dying passengers being slowly burned
to death in the wreckage of colliding wooden cars, that led to the
abolition of the heating stove and the oil lamp; and it was the risk of
fire, coupled with the shocking injuries due to splintering of wooden
cars, that brought in the era of the electrically lighted, strong, and
incombustible steel car.

The conditions attending the loss of the _Titanic_ were so heartrending,
and its appeal has been so world-wide, as to lead us to expect that the
tragedy will be preeminently fruitful in those reforms which, as we have
shown, usually follow a disaster of this magnitude. Had the ship been
less notable and the toll of human life less terrible, the disaster
might have failed to awaken that sense of distrust in present methods
which is at the root of all thorough-going reform. The measure of the
one compensation which can be recovered from this awful loss of life and
treasure, will depend upon the care with which its lessons are learned
and the fidelity with which they are carried out.

Unquestionably, public faith in the security of ocean travel has been
rudely shaken. The defects, however, which are directly answerable for
the sinking of this ship are fortunately of such a character that they
can be easily corrected; and if certain necessary and really very simple
changes in construction are made (and they can be made without any
burdensome increase in the cost) we do not hesitate to say that future
passenger travel on a first-class ocean-going steamship will be rendered
absolutely safe.

[Illustration: Small dial indicates whether signals come from port or
starboard.

RECEIVING SUBMARINE SIGNALS ON THE BRIDGE]

The duty of a passenger steamer, such as the _Titanic_, may be regarded
as threefold: She must stay afloat; she must provide a comfortable
home for a small townful of people; and she must carry them to their
destination with as much speed as is compatible with safety and comfort.
Evidently the first condition, as to safety, should be paramount. When
it has been determined to build a ship of a certain size and weight
(in the case of the _Titanic_ the weight was 60,000 tons, loaded) the
designer should be permitted to appropriate to the safety elements of
her construction every pound of steel that he may wish to employ. In
a vessel like the _Titanic_, which is to be entrusted with the care of
three or four thousand souls, he should be permitted to double-skin
the ship, and divide and subdivide the hull with bulkheads, until he is
satisfied that the vessel is unsinkable by any of the ordinary accidents
of the sea. When these demands have been met, he may pile deck upon deck
and crowd as big a boiler- and engine-plant into this unsinkable hull as
the balance of the weights at his disposal will allow.

Unfortunately the Board of Trade requirements under which the _Titanic