



Produced by Brian Coe, Graeme Mackreth and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive)







[Illustration: ThePocketBooks]

[Illustration: ThePocketBooks]




 THE GERMAN FLEET

 _BEING THE COMPANION VOLUME TO "THE FLEETS AT WAR"
 AND "FROM HELIGOLAND TO KEELING ISLAND."_

 BY
 ARCHIBALD HURD

 AUTHOR (JOINT) OF "GERMAN SEA-POWER, ITS RISE, PROGRESS
 AND ECONOMIC BASIS."

 HODDER AND STOUGHTON
 LONDON      NEW YORK      TORONTO
 MCMXV




CONTENTS


 CHAPTER                                                   PAGE

   INTRODUCTION                                              7

   I. PAST ASCENDENCY                                       19

  II. THE FIRST GERMAN FLEET                                26

 III. GERMANY'S FLEET IN THE LAST CENTURY                   51

  IV. BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE GERMAN NAVY                  80

   V. THE GERMAN NAVY ACTS                                  93

  VI. GERMAN SHIPS, OFFICERS, AND MEN                      142

 VII. WILLIAM II. AND HIS NAVAL MINISTER                   155

 APPENDIX I.--GERMANY'S NAVAL POLICY                       183

 APPENDIX II.--BRITISH AND GERMAN SHIP-BUILDING
 PROGRAMMES                                                189




INTRODUCTION


In the history of nations there is probably no chapter more fascinating
and arresting than that which records the rise and fall and subsequent
resurrection of German sea-power.

In our insular pride, conscious of our glorious naval heritage, we are
apt to forget that Germany had a maritime past, and that long before
the German Empire existed the German people attained pre-eminence in
oversea commerce and created for its protection fleets which exercised
commanding influence in northern waters.

It is an error, therefore, to regard Germany as an up-start naval
Power. The creation of her modern navy represented the revival
of ancient hopes and aspirations. To those ambitions, in their
unaggressive form, her neighbours would have taken little exception;
Germany had become a great commercial Power with colonies overseas, and
it was natural that she should desire to possess a navy corresponding
to her growing maritime interests and the place which she had already
won for herself in the sun.

The more closely the history of German sea-power is studied the more
apparent it must become, that it was not so much Germany's Navy
Acts, as the propaganda by which they were supported and the new and
aggressive spirit which her naval organisation brought into maritime
affairs that caused uneasiness throughout the world and eventually
created that feeling of antagonism which found expression after the
opening of war in August, 1914.

In the early part of 1913 I wrote, in collaboration with a friend who
possessed intimate knowledge of the foundations and the strength of the
German Empire, a history of the German naval movement,[1] particular
emphasis being laid on its economic basis. In the preparation of
the present volume I have drawn upon this former work. It has been
impossible, however, in the necessarily limited compass of one of
the _Daily Telegraph_ War Books, to deal with the economic basis
upon which the German Navy has been created. I believe that the
chapters in "German Sea-Power" with reference to this aspect of German
progress--for which my collaborator was responsible and of which,
therefore, I can speak without reserve--still constitute a unique
presentation of the condition of Germany on the eve of the outbreak of
war.

Much misconception exists as to the staying power of Germany. The
German Empire as an economic unit is not of mushroom growth. Those
readers who are sufficiently interested in the subject of the basis
of German vitality, will realise vividly by reference to "German
Sea-Power" the deep and well-laid foundations upon which not only the
German Navy, but the German Empire rest.

Whether this history should be regarded as the romance of the German
Navy or the tragedy of the German Navy must for the present remain an
open question. In everyday life many romances culminate in tragedy,
and the course of events in the present war suggest that the time may
be at hand when the German people will realise the series of errors
committed by their rulers in the upbuilding of German sea-power. Within
the past fifteen years it is calculated that about £300,000,000 has
been spent in the maintenance and expansion of the German Fleet, the
improvement of its bases, and the enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Much
of this money has been raised by loans. Those loans are still unpaid;
it was believed by a large section of the German people that Great
Britain, hampered by party politics and effete in all warlike pursuits,
would, after defeat, repay them. That hope must now be dead.

The German people, as the memorandum which accompanied the Navy Act
of 1900 reveals, were led to anticipate that the Fleet, created by
the sacrifice of so much treasure, would not only guarantee their
shores against aggression, but would give absolute protection to their
maritime and colonial interests, and would, eventually, pay for itself.
The time will come when they will recognise that from the first they
have been hoodwinked and deceived by those in authority over them. It
may be that German statesmen, and the Emperor himself, were themselves
deceived by the very brilliance of the dreams of world power which they
entertained and by the conception which they had formed of the lack of
virility, sagacity and prescience of those responsible for the fortunes
of other countries, and of Great Britain in particular.

German Navy Acts were passed in full confidence that during the period
when they were being carried into effect the rest of the world would
stand still, lost in admiration of Germany's culture and Germany's
power. The mass of the German people were unwilling converts to the
new gospel. They had to be convinced of the wisdom of the new policy.
For this purpose a Press Bureau was established. Throughout the
German States this organisation fostered, through the official and
semi-official Press, feelings of antagonism and hatred towards other
countries, and towards England and the United States especially,
because these two countries were Germany's most serious rivals in the
commercial markets of the world, and also possessed sea-power superior
to her own.

It is interesting to recall in proof of this dual aim of German policy
the remarks of von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff, in
a pamphlet entitled "Operationen Ubersee."[2]

The author, after first pointing out the possibility of invading
England, turned his attention to the United States.[3] His remarks are
so interesting in view of the activity of German agents on the other
side of the Atlantic after the outbreak of war, that it is perhaps
excusable to quote at some length this explanation by a member of the
German General Staff of how the German Fleet was to be used against the
United States as an extension of the power of the huge German Army.

 "The possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the
 United States will at first not venture into battle, but that it will
 withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable
 opportunity of achieving minor successes. Therefore it is clear that
 naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but
 that combined action of army and navy will be required. Considering
 the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country
 by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason
 to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and
 the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports
 and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in
 the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable
 conditions in order to obtain peace.

 "If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for
 landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our
 harbours, we may conclude that operations on the American soil can
 begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United
 States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army
 equivalent to our own.

 "At present the regular army of the United States amounts to 65,000
 men, of whom only 30,000 could be disposed of. Of these at least
 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories and for
 guarding the fortifications on the sea coast. Therefore only about
 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about
 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come
 up when they were called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia
 is not efficient; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its
 training is worse than its armament.

 "As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account
 of the length of time during which transports are on the way, only
 the landing can be affected by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be
 laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably
 facilitate victory against the United States, owing to the absence of
 methodical preparation for mobilization, owing to the inexperience of
 the personnel, and owing to the weakness of the regular army.

 "In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United
 States, and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to
 fight successfully against all the forces which that country, in
 the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be
 required. Such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact
 that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in
 order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. However, it
 seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great
 stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not
 feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are
 occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous, material
 losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbour
 towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United
 States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

 "Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of
 large landing operations, through which we are able to take several
 of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By
 interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving
 the State commerce and the defence, by taking away all material for
 war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we
 should be able to inflict damage on the United States.

 "For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice.
 Nevertheless, the American defence will find it difficult to undertake
 a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. Though an
 extremely well-developed railway system enables them to concentrate
 troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the
 concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is
 recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really
 be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion
 to carry out its operation with success under the co-operation of
 the fleet at the point chosen. The corps landed can either take
 the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the
 transports in order to land at another place."

These declarations of German naval and military policy are of interest
as illustrating the character of the propaganda by which the naval
movement was encouraged. _The Navy was to give world-wide length of
reach to the supreme German Army, and enable Germany to dictate peace
to each and every nation, however distantly situated._ An appeal was
made to the lowest instincts of the German people. They were counselled
to create a great naval force on the understanding that the money
expended would by aggressive wars be repaid with interest and that,
as a result of combined naval and military operations, they would
extend the world power of the German Empire, and incidentally promote
Germany's maritime interests in all the oceans of the world.

Those who were responsible for the inflammatory speeches and articles
by which the interest of the German people in the naval movement was
excited, forgot the influence which these ebullitions would have upon
the policy of other Powers and upon their defensive preparations.
It was only after hostilities had broken out that the German people
realised what small results all their sacrifices had produced. By
the words, more than the acts, of those responsible for German naval
policy, the other Powers of the world had been forced to expand and
reorganise their naval forces. Germany had at great cost won for
herself the position of second greatest naval Power in the world, but
in doing so she had unconsciously forced up the strength of the British
Fleet and dragged in her path the United States, France, Italy, Japan,
Russia, and to a limited extent, but only to a limited extent, her
ally, Austria-Hungary. During the years of agitation the other Powers
of the world had not stood still, as it was assumed in Germany they
would do. First, the British people increased their naval expenditure
and more ships were built and more officers and men were entered; and
then the German Navy Act of 1912 was passed.

It had been the practice of the naval Powers to keep about one-half
only of their ships in full sea-going commission. The armed peace,
before Germany began to give expression to her maritime ambitions, was
a yoke which rested easily upon the navies of the world. As a British
naval officer has remarked:--

 "Up to the end of the last century our Navy enjoyed a peace
 routine. We maintained squadrons all over the world, and the pick
 of our personnel was to be found anywhere but in home waters. The
 Mediterranean claimed the pick of both our ships and men. Here naval
 life was one long holiday. The routine was to lay in harbour for nine
 months out of the year. About July the whole fleet would congregate at
 Malta for the summer's cruise. Sometimes it would be east of Malta,
 taking in the Grecian Archipelago and the Holy Land; at others it
 would be west, visiting the French and Italian ports, paying a visit
 to the Rock, and then home to Malta for another long rest.

 "Preparation for war was never thought of. Why should it be? The
 French Navy had no aggressive designs, and was much below our own,
 both in material strength and in personnel, while the Russian Navy
 was partly confined in the Black Sea, the other part being in the
 Baltic. And so we, both officers and men, set out to have a good time.
 Our ships were kept up to yacht-like perfection as regards their
 paintwork, while their bright work shone like gold, and the road to
 promotion lay not through professional efficiency, but the state of
 cleanliness and splendour of one's ship. All kinds of drills and
 evolutions were devised, not because of their war value, but because
 they had a competitive value, and so ship could be pitted against ship
 and an element of sport introduced.

 "There was nothing really wrong in all this. The British Navy was
 there to maintain for us our title of 'Mistress of the Seas,' and as
 no other nation apparently wished to challenge our title, there was
 nothing to do but pass away the time as pleasantly as possible; when
 the Navy was called on to perform any task it carried it through with
 vigour, valour, and efficiency, and immediately settled down again."[4]

This regime came to an end soon after Grand Admiral von Tirpitz
became German Naval Secretary towards the end of the nineteenth
century. He set the navies of the world a new model. He determined to
take advantage of the easy-going spirit which animated the pleasant
relations then existing between the great fleets. There was to be
nothing pleasant about the German Fleet. It was to be a strenuous agent
of Germany's aggressive aims. In the organisation of German sea-power
new principles found expression. In home waters and abroad the German
Navy was always ready instantly for war. The screw was applied
gradually stage by stage. Under the German Navy Act of 1912 this
aggressive sea policy found its ultimate expression: it was proposed
to keep always on a war footing nearly four-fifths of the ships in
northern waters, while at the same time the squadrons abroad were to
be greatly increased in strength. Happily, owing to Lord Fisher's
foresight and strategical ability, the British Navy was enabled step by
step to respond to each and every measure taken by Germany. He created
for us a Grand Fleet and when hostilities broke out that fleet took up
its war stations and denied to the main forces of Germany the use of
any and every sea.

German policy operated as a tonic, though not to the same extent, on
the other great fleets of the world. In the summer of 1914 Germany
discovered that every anticipation upon which her foreign, naval
and military policies had been based had been falsified by events.
In particular, in adding to her strength at sea and on land, she
had rendered herself weak by creating enemies east and west. Her
navy, which was to have engaged in a victorious campaign against the
greatest naval power of the world in isolation--the rest of the world
watching the inevitable downfall of the Mistress of the Seas with
approval--found arrayed against it not the British fleet only, but the
fleets of France and Russia in Europe and the Navy of Japan in the Far
East.

In studying, therefore, the history of the naval development of
Germany, and contrasting the high hopes which inspired the naval
movement with the events which occurred on the outbreak of war, and in
subsequent months, one is led to wonder whether, after all, the romance
of the German Navy will not be regarded in the future, by the German
people at least, rather as a great and costly tragedy.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: "German Sea-Power, Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis,"
by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (1913, London, John Murray, 10s.
6d.).]

[Footnote 2: "Modern Germany" (Smith Elder, 1912).]

[Footnote 3: Germans always assumed that they could attack the United
States without intervention on our part, just as they assumed that
they could engage in war with us without becoming involved with the
United States. They believed that Germany would fight both countries in
turn--and victoriously.]

[Footnote 4: "The British Navy from Within" by "Ex-Royal Navy" (Hodder
& Stoughton).]




THE GERMAN FLEET




CHAPTER I

Past Ascendency


Like the foundations of the Empire in 1870, the formation of the modern
German Fleet is the result of a movement that had its origin among
the people and not among the Princes of the country. And this naval
movement sprang up and reached its greatest vigour in those sea-board
districts that still sedulously keep alive the splendid tradition of
the Hanseatic League, which, as the strongest maritime Power of its
day, for centuries almost monopolized the trade of Northern and Western
Europe, and with the word "sterling," a corruption of "Easterling,"
the name popularly given to its members, has left on Great Britain
the indelible stamp of its former mercantile domination. For the coin
of the Hanse towns, by reason of its unimpeachable quality, was once
universally sought after in England, and thus became the standard of
monetary excellence.

The memories of the Hansa are the "historical foundation" on which
have been based Germany's claims to a leading place among the maritime
nations, and they have played a prominent part in every agitation
for the increase of her fleet. Why, it was asked, should she not
again assume upon the seas that dominating position which she once
undoubtedly held? Why, with her expanding population, trade, and
wealth, should she not reclaim that maritime ascendency which she
forfeited to Holland in the seventeenth century, and which a hundred
years later passed to Great Britain? Why should she not realize that
dream which was in the mind of Friedrich List when he wrote: "How easy
it would have been for the Hanse towns, in the epoch of their rule over
the sea, to attain national unity through the instrumentality of the
imperial power, to unite the whole littoral from Dunkirk to Riga under
one nationality, and thus to win and maintain for the German nation
supremacy in industry, trade, and sea-power!"

It is, moreover, not without significance that the Hansa itself was, in
a sense, democratic, and that, at a time when Germany, as a national
unit, was rendered impotent in the world by her superabundance of
Princes, her citizens were able, on their own initiative, and by their
own energies, to assert their power and capacity as a maritime people.

The story of the Hansa is full of strange anomalies and antitheses.
Historians differ by centuries as to the date at which the existence of
the League commenced, and just as it never had a definite beginning,
so it has never had a formal end, for to this day two of the Hanse
towns--Hamburg and Bremen--have certain institutions in common, such
as their supreme law courts and their diplomatic representation in
Prussia. For hundreds of years the Confederation acted, and was treated
by foreign Governments, as an independent State and a great Power,
but its composition was never certain and always fluctuating. From
first to last the names of no fewer than ninety cities and towns
were entered upon its rolls, but it is impossible to say of each of
them how often and when it joined or left the League. Foreign rulers,
and especially the English monarchs, made repeated attempts to obtain
from the Hansa an official list of its members, but compliance with
their demands was systematically evaded on one pretext or another. The
League's policy was, as far as possible, to assert the claims of its
members, and to disown responsibility for those made against them. This
policy is pretty clearly expressed in the following answer returned
by the League in 1473 to complaints put forward on behalf of English
merchantmen who had suffered through the depredations of the Dantzic
privateer or pirate, Paul Beneke: "The towns of the Hansa are a corpus
in the possession of the privileges they hold in any realms, lands, or
lordships, and when their privileges are infringed, they are accustomed
to meet and consult, and then to issue for all of them ordinances
against all goods from the countries in which their privileges have
been infringed, that they shall not be suffered in the commonalty of
towns. But they were not making war against England; only some of the
towns of the Hansa, which had been injured by England, had determined
upon it at their own venture, win or lose, which did not take place
in the name of the Hanse commonalty." The theory of the Federation
was, in fact, that it existed for the purpose only of taking, and
not of giving, and it refused to imply a corporate responsibility by
publishing its membership rolls.

It is impossible, in the space available, to tell in any detail the
fascinating story of the rise of the Hansa to the position of a great
power, with its guild halls and factories in foreign lands, of which
the oldest and most important was the Steelyard, in London. The history
of this institution is believed to go back to the latter days of the
Roman occupation. When the Hanseatic League was at the height of its
power--from the last quarter of the fourteenth to the first half of
the sixteenth centuries, the Steelyard, in London, closely resembled a
state within a larger state. It occupied a site now covered by Cannon
Street Station, extending from Thames Street to the river, and bounded
to the east and west respectively by All Hallows and Cousins Lane.
The Steelyard had something of the appearance of a fortress and was
stoutly defended against attack. The community within its precincts was
governed with monastic severity. Their affairs were administered by
an alderman with the assistance of two adjuncts and nine counsellers
who took part in all the State and civic pageants of London as a
Corporation.

This great German commercial institution on British soil, and the other
houses established in other countries, reflected the great power which
was wielded by the Hanseatic League in commerce. These German traders,
however, realised that their increasing trade on the seas required
adequate defence. Mainly at the instigation of the merchants of Lübeck,
a considerable navy was created, this German city being dependent for
its prosperity mainly upon the herring fishing and curing industries
of Europe. In process of time the Germans succeeded in driving away
English, French and Spanish rivals, and created a great monopoly of
the herring fisheries of northern Europe, from which they drew immense
wealth and on which depended a number of other industries.

It was mainly for the protection of the Sound herrings that the Hansa
undertook against the Scandinavian States the numerous campaigns by
which it won the keys of the Baltic. The war which culminated with
the peace of Spralsunde in 1370 raised the League to the rank of a
first-class sea Power. Encouraged by its success in crushing and
humiliating Denmark, the Hansa had little hesitation in measuring
itself against England. The towns became associated through the
Victualling Brothers with an active form of corsair warfare on English
shipping.

By its triumph over the Danes, the Hansa secured a practical monopoly
of the shipping and trade of the Baltic and North Sea, which it held
almost unimpaired for nearly two hundred years. In the words of Gustav
Wasa, "the three good (Scandinavian) Crowns remained small wares of
the Hansa up to the sixteenth century," and as long as this was so
the commercial and maritime supremacy of the League was practically
unchallengeable. The manner in which the Easterlings availed themselves
of the ascendency they had now acquired is a classic example of the
ruthless and unscrupulous exploitation of political power for the
purposes of purely material gain, for they were actuated by no national
or ideal aims, but solely by the desire to enrich themselves. Favoured
by the confusion and chaos prevailing in the lands of their potential
rivals, they became the exclusive brokers through whose mediation the
spices of the Orient, the wines of France, the cloth of Flanders, the
tin, wool, hides, and tallow of England, were exchanged for the dried
cod of Norway, the ores of Sweden, the wheat of Prussia, the honey and
wax of Poland, the furs of Russia, and the myriads of herrings which
every summer were caught in the Sound, and salted and packed on the
coast of Scania. What they aimed at, and what for long years they
substantially obtained, was the disappearance of all flags but their
own from the North Sea and the Baltic. Moreover, a great part of the
carrying trade between England and France also fell to their lot.

The conditions were such as rendered warlike operations between
England and the Teutonic order inevitable. It is impossible to trace
in any detail the guerilla tactics which were adopted on both sides.
It is only necessary for our present purpose to convey some idea of
the sea power which the Hansa exercised in order that we may better
understand the ambitions of Germany to which the Emperor William the
Second and Grand Admiral von Tirpitz gave expression in the early years
of the twentieth century. At the outset of its career, its warships
were manned by the burghers themselves, but as the fleet increased
in size--it was quadrupled during the first half of the fifteenth
century--recourse to mercenaries became more and more general. The
commanders of the ships were invariably citizens of the towns which had
equipped them, and were frequently members of the governing council,
while the admiral of a fleet was always a councillor, and usually
a burgomaster. The officers of the land forces, which were raised
as occasion demanded, were principally drawn from the impoverished
nobility, whose members welcomed any opportunity of repairing their
shattered fortunes by martial adventure. Of the naval resources of the
League, some idea can be formed from the fact that, in the war against
the Scandinavian Kingdoms in 1426, it sent out a fleet of 260 ships,
manned by 12,000 sailors and fighting men. For the exhausting, if not
inglorious, seven years' war against Gustav Wasa's successor, Lübeck
alone fitted out 18 men-of-war, of which one, the _Adler_, carried 400
sailors, 500 fighting men, and 150 "constables." Her armament consisted
of 8 carthouns, 6 demi-carthouns, 26 culverins, and many smaller pieces
of ordnance. Among her munitions were 6,000 cannon-balls and 300
hundredweight of powder.




CHAPTER II

The First German Fleet


In one of the window niches on the ground floor of the Military Museum
(Zeughaus) at Berlin lies an old and dilapidated 8-pounder gun. In its
deep and disfiguring coat of rust it is an inconspicuous object, and,
amid that rich and varied collection of artillery from all the ages,
the eye of the casual visitor will not rest upon it for more than a
disparaging moment. And yet few of the treasures of the museum have a
more interesting history to tell, for it is the sole remaining relic
of the first serious experiment in naval and colonial policy ever made
by a German ruler. On an elevation rising from the beach of Cape Three
Points, on the Gold Coast, now British territory, are still to be seen
the crumbling ruins of the fort of Gross-Friedrichsburg, built there
by the Elector of Brandenburg in 1681, and when the German corvette
_Sophie_ visited the spot, with pious purpose, in 1884, this corroded
gun was unearthed from beneath the weeds and brushwood that have
overgrown the decayed ramparts.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, has been exemplary for many of
his successors. Frederick the Great rightly considered him the most
able of the previous Princes of the house of Hohenzollern, while the
present German Emperor has made a special cult of his memory, and
assuredly had a symbolic intention when he appeared at a fancy-dress
ball disguised as the first of his ancestors who equipped a fleet and
founded a colony.

When Frederick William was called to the Brandenburg throne in 1641
at the age of twenty, Germany was still in the throes of the Thirty
Years' War, and no part of the Empire had suffered more than his
Electorate from the consequences of that unspeakable calamity. Of all
the causes which have contributed to impede the normal development
of the painstaking and industrious German race, none had so malign
an influence as that stupendous conflict. It not merely delayed
civilization, but over vast tracts of country positively exterminated
it. At the close of the war many once flourishing towns had absolutely
disappeared from the face of the earth, and where formerly a numerous
peasantry had tilled its fertile fields a howling wilderness extended
in all directions as far as the eye could reach. In North Germany
to-day an apparently purposeless pond, or a detached clump of venerable
trees, still shows where once a village stood, and bears mute witness
to the ruthless barbarity with which the religious partition of Central
Europe was brought about.

When an end was put to the bloodshed and rapine by the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), the population of Germany had been reduced to one
half--in some districts to one tenth--of its former dimensions. Many
portions of the Empire are even to-day not so thickly inhabited as they
were before the war. Industry and commerce had migrated to England,
France, and Holland; and Leipzig and Frankfort were the only German
towns that had retained any trade worthy of mention. The Hansa, with
its fleets of warships and merchantmen, was but a memory of the past.
Königsberg had no longer a ship of its own; the trade of Dantzig and
Stettin was almost entirely carried in foreign bottoms; and even
Hamburg, which directly had been but comparatively little touched by
the thirty years of chaos and turmoil, and had benefited from its
exceptional connection with England, was left commercially crippled.
At a Hanse Parliament held in 1630, only Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen
were represented. Germany had been so drained of money that barter had
generally taken the place of purchase by coin; wages were paid in the
products of labour, grain, ore, and manufactured goods, and even state
officials in some cases received their salaries in kind.

Even before the war broke out, Brandenburg, a country of barren soil
and few natural resources, had stood far below the rest of Germany
both materially and intellectually. In 1600 the twin towns, Berlin
and Cöln, which faced one another from opposite banks of the Spree,
and have since been merged to form the colossal capital of the new
Empire, contained together no more than 14,000 souls. Brandenburg and
Frankfort-on-Oder each had a population of 10,000. Only two other
towns, Stendal and Salzwedel, could boast more than 5,000 inhabitants.
And it was of the mere ruins of this country that Frederick William
formed the foundation-stone of the Prussian Kingdom and of the German
Empire of to-day.

If the Thirty Years' War had produced any form of national
consolidation, if it had increased the authority of the Empire or
