



Produced by Keith G Richardson




CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY:

EMBRACING A SERMON

ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION,

AND SEVERAL NUMBERS,

FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL.

BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D.

NEW-YORK,

PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON,

For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200
Mulberry-street.

_J. Collord, Printer_.

1835.




"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and
T. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern
District of New-York."




CONTENTS.

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Sermon on Predestination and Election

I. Reply to the Christian Spectator

II. A proposition to Calvinists

III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism

IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in
this country

V. Same subject continued

VI. Predestination

VII. Predestination, continued

VIII. Moral agency and accountability

IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued

X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions
of grace

XI. Same subject continued

XII. Objections to gracious ability answered

XIII. Regeneration

XIV. Regeneration, continued

XV. Regeneration, continued




ADVERTISEMENT.

The numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were
written at different times, and in some instances at quite distant
intervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an
apology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the
reader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be
found in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now
presented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the
same reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision,
as it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the
more set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally
thought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware
that the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the
whole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has
been able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If
the public have it, therefore, it must go "with all its imperfections on
its head." Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The
publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The
doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture,
although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found
defective.

It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election;
but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said
in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian
predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and
regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must
fall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire
question between us and the Calvinists.

W. Fisk.

_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835.




A DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.

Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ,
to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4,
5.

In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election
are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting
them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational
view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present
discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole
ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the
various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the
most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that
can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form
and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the
circumstances of the present congregation.

It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the
spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and
Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a
desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to
point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable
influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth
should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject,
nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these
views, we come to our subject, by examining,

I. Predestination in general;

II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of
election.

I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to
bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has
knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future
events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be
used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is
that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity,
respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and
creatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this
kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be
no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to
which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this
subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by
the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was
ordained by him." The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--"God did, from
all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck
defines predestination to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for
his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass." With these
definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the
Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of
predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have
objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings,
so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not
definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose
and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe,
with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the
physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all
the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that
it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human
will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us,
they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon
them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of
their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]

The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a
threefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a
plan--and Scripture testimony.

1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes
contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This,
however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is
self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations;
and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms,
they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct
operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind,
unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an
entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among
men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible
argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_
predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to
come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every
thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had
not so determined it." "God," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what
he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says,
"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he
has decreed they shall come to pass." But to this idea there are
insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the
Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential
to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make
a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection
of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him,
that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be,
under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd,
then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend
upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend
upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument,
that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought,
and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute
preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be
exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous
conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with
it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine
events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent
on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived,
independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the
effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of
those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will
not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous
to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this
conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us,
therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of
cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent
upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of
his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth
from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords
with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did
predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according
to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages
predestination and the decree of