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 _UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE DIFFUSION OF USEFUL
                              KNOWLEDGE._




                                  THE
                         GALLERY OF PORTRAITS:
                                  WITH
                                MEMOIRS.

                              VOLUME VII.


                                LONDON:
                  CHARLES KNIGHT, 22, LUDGATE-STREET.

                                 1837.

                  [PRICE ONE GUINEA, BOUND IN CLOTH.]




                                LONDON:

                  PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,

                         Duke-Street, Lambeth.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                       PORTRAITS AND BIOGRAPHIES
                       CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.


                                              Page.

                     1. Gustavus Adolphus         1

                     2. Marc Antonio Raimondi    10

                     3. Coke                     15

                     4. Gibbon                   25

                     5. Scaliger                 32

                     6. Penn                     39

                     7. De Thou                  49

                     8. Chatham                  55

                     9. Mozart                   66

                    10. Loyola                   73

                    11. Brindley                 81

                    12. Schiller                 87

                    13. Bentham                  97

                    14. Catherine II.           103

                    15. Defoe                   112

                    16. Hume                    121

                    17. De Witt                 129

                    18. Hampden                 137

                    19. Dr. Johnson             145

                    20. Jefferson               153

                    21. Wilberforce             162

                    22. Dr. Black               169

                    23. Bacon                   177

                    24. Sir Walter Scott        185

[Illustration:

  _Engraved by J. Posselwhite._

  GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

  _From a Print by Paul Pontius, after a Picture by Van Dyck._

  Under the Superintendence of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful
    Knowledge.

  _London, Published by Charles Knight & C^o. Ludgate Street._
]

[Illustration]




                            GUST. ADOLPHUS.


During the fourteenth, and the beginning of the fifteenth century,
Sweden, lying under vassalage to the crown of Denmark, suffered the
evils which commonly belong to that condition. Gustavus Vasa, after a
series of romantic adventures, established the independence of his
country, and was deservedly elected by the Swedish Diet, in 1523, to
wear its crown. The same kingdom to which he gave a place among free
states, his grandson, Gustavus Adolphus, raised from the obscurity of a
petty northern power, to rule in Germany, and to be the terror of the
Church of Rome.

The establishment of the Reformation was coeval with the independence of
Sweden; and a fundamental law forbade any future sovereign to alter the
national religion, or to admit Roman Catholics to offices of power and
trust. For infringing this principle, Sigismond, by election King of
Poland, the lineal successor of Gustavus Vasa, was set aside by the
Diet, and the crown was given to his father’s younger brother, Charles,
Duke of Sudermania. Charles died, and was succeeded by his son Gustavus
Adolphus, December 31, 1611; the high promise of whose youth induced the
States to abridge the period of minority, and admit him at once to the
exercise of regal power, though he had but just attained the age of
seventeen, being born December 9, 1594.

He had been trained up in the knowledge likely to be serviceable to a
king and a soldier. He spoke the Latin language, then a universal medium
of communication, with uncommon energy and precision; he conversed
fluently in French, Italian, and German; he had studied history,
political science, mathematics, and military tactics; and commencing
with the part of a musketeer, he had been made master, by practice, of
all the details of a soldier’s life. He was capable of very severe
application to abstruse study, and is said to have passed whole nights
in reading the military history of the ancients. He was of uncommon
stature and strength, and his constitution was early inured to labour
and endurance.

Gustavus’s situation, at his accession, was critical. The King of Poland
laid claim to his dominions, and Denmark and Muscovy were in arms
against him. The danger was most pressing on the side of Denmark; and
thither Gustavus’s first efforts were directed. But in Christian IV. he
had to contend with an able enemy, from whom he gained no advantage; and
after one unsuccessful campaign he accommodated the quarrel at the
expense of some concessions. In the war with Muscovy he was more
fortunate; and he reduced the Czar to purchase peace in 1617, by the
sacrifice of the provinces which border the Gulf of Finland and the
Baltic sea. During these years of warfare, Gustavus found leisure to
bestow attention upon internal improvements. He devoted much thought and
care upon strengthening the Swedish navy, esteeming that to be his
surest defence against invasion; he sought to encourage commerce; he
purified the administration of justice, by rendering judges less
dependant upon the crown, and by abridging the tediousness and expense
of lawsuits; and he laboured to devise means for increasing the revenue
by judicious arrangement, without adding to the burdens of the people.
Both in peace and war he received the most valuable assistance from his
zealous, faithful, and sagacious minister, the celebrated Oxenstiern.

In 1620 Gustavus travelled incognito through the chief towns of Germany.
At Berlin he formed acquaintance with Maria Eleonora, sister to the
Elector of Brandenburg, whom he espoused at Stockholm in November of the
same year. One daughter, the famous Christina, his successor, was the
offspring of this marriage.

The King of Poland’s enmity was not seconded by his ability. He
endeavoured in vain to shake the fidelity of Gustavus’s subjects, and he
tried the fortune of war with no better success. In the contests between
the cousins, which occurred in the first ten years of Gustavus’s reign,
the advantage was always on the side of Sweden. Gustavus was desirous of
peace, and forbore to press his superiority. But Sigismond’s hostility
was nourished and stimulated by the leading Catholic powers, Spain and
Austria; and he made so bad a return for this moderation, that in 1621
the war was renewed in a more determined manner, and in the course of
eight years Livonia, Courland, and Polish Prussia, were gradually
subjected to Sweden. During this time Gustavus was no careless spectator
of the Thirty Years’ War, which was raging in Germany. However well
inclined he might be to step forward as the defender of the Protestant
cause, he could not do so with effect while his exertions were demanded
in Poland; and though he made an offer of assistance to the Protestants
in 1626, it was clogged with conditions which induced them to decline
his proposals. But in 1629, under the mediation of France, he concluded
a truce for six years with Sigismond, retaining possession of the
conquered provinces; and being thus relieved from all fear of Poland,
and guaranteed against injury from Denmark by the interest of that
country in checking the progress of the Imperial arms, he found himself
qualified to take the decisive part which he had long desired in the
affairs of Germany. How far his determination was influenced by personal
and ambitious motives, how far it was due to patriotism and religious
zeal, it must be left to each inquirer to decide for himself. The crisis
was one of extreme importance: for the temporal rights of the whole
German empire were endangered by the inordinate and seemingly prosperous
ambition of the House of Austria; and the Protestant states in
particular had reason to apprehend the speedy destruction of their own,
and the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic church. And if the
influence of the Emperor, Ferdinand II., supported by the papal
hierarchy re-established in its great power and rich benefices through
the north of Germany, were suffered unchecked to extend itself to the
Baltic sea, the liberties of Sweden and Denmark, and the very existence
of the Reformation on the Continent, seemed to be involved in no remote
danger. To pull down the power of Ferdinand and the Catholic League thus
became of vital moment to the King of Sweden. But though the Protestant
princes were ready to invoke his assistance in secret complaints, none
of them dared to conclude an open treaty with a distant prince, and a
kingdom hitherto obscure, and thus to incur the resentment of the
Emperor, whose formidable armies, anxious above all things for the
renewal of war and rapine, were at hand. Moreover, the jealousy and
selfishness of the chiefs of the Protestant union formed a greater
obstacle to the King of Sweden’s views, than even the weakness of their
individual states. Unable, therefore, to obtain the cordial and willing
co-operation of those who were linked to him by the bond of a common
interest, Gustavus had only the alternative to abandon them to their
fate and share the dangers which he sought to obviate, or to take the
equivocal and rarely defensible step of occupying their territories and
compelling their assistance, an unsolicited, though an honourable and
friendly, ally. He chose the latter.

The shortest apology for this determination, which as a matter of policy
was opposed by Oxenstiern, may be found in the substance of the king’s
answer to that minister’s objections, as it is abridged by Schiller in
his History of the Thirty Years’ War. “If we wait for the enemy in
Sweden, in losing a battle, all is lost: all, on the contrary, is gained
if we obtain the first success in Germany. The sea is large, and we have
extensive coasts to watch. Should the enemy’s fleet escape us, or our
own be beaten, it is not possible for us to prevent a landing. We must
therefore use all our efforts for the preservation of Stralsund. So long
as this harbour shall be in our power Ave shall maintain the honour of
our flag in the Baltic, and shall be able to keep up a free intercourse
with Germany. But in order to defend Stralsund we must not shut
ourselves up in Sweden; but must pass over with an army into Pomerania.
Speak to me then no more of a defensive war, by which we shall lose our
most precious advantages. Sweden herself must not behold the standards
of the enemy; and, if we are vanquished in Germany, it will still be
time enough to have recourse to your plan.”

The army which Gustavus carried into Germany consisted only of 15,000
men; but it was formidable from its bravery, its high discipline, and
the reliance which the general and the troops felt upon each other. “All
excesses,” we quote from Schiller, “were punished in a severe manner;
but blasphemy, theft, gaming, and duelling, met with a more severe
chastisement. The Swedish articles of war prescribed moderation; there
was not to be seen in the Swedish camp, even in the tent of the king,
either gold or silver. The general’s eye watched carefully over the
manners of the soldiers, while it en-flamed their courage in battle.
Every regiment must each morning and evening form itself in a circle
round its chaplain, and, in the open air, address prayers to the
Almighty. In all this the legislator himself served as a model. An
unaffected and pure piety animated the courage of his great mind.
Equally free from that gross incredulity which leaves without restraint
the ferocious movements of the barbarian, and the grovelling bigotry of
a Ferdinand, who abased himself in the dust before the Divinity, and yet
disdainfully trampled on the necks of mankind, in the height of his good
fortune, Gustavus was always a man and a Christian; amid all his
devotion, the hero and the king. He supported all the hardships of war
like the lowest soldier in his army; his mind was serene in the midst of
the most furious battle; his genius pointed out the results to him
beforehand; everywhere present, he forgot death which surrounded him,
and he was always found where there was the greatest danger. His natural
valour made him too often lose sight of what was due to the general, and
this great king terminated his life as a common soldier. But the coward
as well as the brave followed such a leader to victory, and not any of
the heroical actions which his example had created ever escaped his
penetrating eye. The glory of their sovereign inflamed the entire
Swedish nation with a noble confidence; proud of his king, the peasant
of Finland and Gothland joyfully gave up what his poverty could afford;
the soldier willingly shed his blood; and that elevated sentiment which
the genius of this single man gave to the nation survived him a
considerable time.”

Gustavus took a solemn farewell of the States of the kingdom, May 20,
1630, presenting to them his daughter Christina, as his heir and
successor. Adverse winds delayed his departure, and it was not till the
24th of June that he reached the coast of Pomerania. He disembarked his
army on the islands of Wollin and Usedom, at the mouth of the Oder, and
having taken possession of the strong town of Stettin on the same river,
established a sure footing on the continent, and secured his means of
retreat and communication with Sweden. To this proceeding he gained a
reluctant consent from the Duke of Pomerania, who, though wearied and
disgusted with the ravages of the Imperial troops, was unwilling to
commit himself in defence of that which still appeared the weaker cause.
But having no force to prevent the hostile, if he refused to warrant the
friendly, occupation of his country, he made a virtue of necessity, and
allied himself closely with the Swede.

Gustavus’s progress at first produced no uneasiness at Vienna: the
courtiers called him the snow-king, and said in derision that he would
melt in his progress southward. But in the first campaign he nearly
cleared Pomerania of the Imperialists; and he was strengthened by the
accession of the Duke of Mecklenburg, who, having been despoiled of his
territories in favour of Wallenstein, now openly raised troops in
support of the King of Sweden. As winter approached, the Imperialists
negotiated for a suspension of arms; but Gustavus replied, “The Swedes
are soldiers in winter as well as summer, and are not disposed to make
the peaceable inhabitants of the country support any longer than
necessary the evils of war. The Imperialists may do as they choose, but
the Swedes do not intend to remain inactive.”

Meanwhile he met with cold support from the Protestant princes, in whose
cause he had taken arms. The chief of these was the Elector of Saxony,
who felt a jealousy, not unnatural, of the power and the ultimate views
of the King of Sweden, and was himself ambitious to play the first part
among the Protestants of Germany. Seeking to act independently, and to
hold the balance between Sweden and Austria, he invited the Protestant
States to a conference at Leipsic, February 6, 1613, at which it was
determined to demand from the Emperor the redress of grievances, and to
levy an army of 40,000 men, to give weight to their remonstrances. On
the 13th of January, Gustavus had concluded an alliance with France, by
the terms of which he was to maintain in Germany 30,000 men, France
furnishing a subsidy of 400,000 dollars yearly, to use his best
endeavours to reinstate those princes who had been expelled from their
dominions by the Emperor, or the Catholic League, and to restore the
empire to the condition in which it existed at the commencement of the
war. Richelieu tried to bring the princes who had joined in the
convention of Leipsic to accede to this alliance, but with very partial
success. A few promised to support the Swedes, when opportunity should
favour; but the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg kept aloof. During
these negotiations Gustavus made progress in Brandenburg. The memorable
siege and destruction of Magdeburg, May 10, by Tilly, for a time cast a
gloom over the Protestant cause. Gustavus has been censured, both as a
man and a soldier, for suffering that well-deserving and important place
to fall without risking a battle in its behalf. His defence rests upon
the interposed delays, and the insincerity of the Electors, which
involved him in the risk of total destruction if he advanced thus far
without having his retreat secured. But even this signal misfortune
proved finally serviceable to the Protestant cause. It induced Gustavus
to adopt a different tone with his brother-in-law of Brandenburg, who,
finding no alternative but a real union or an open rupture with Sweden,
wisely chose the former. The pride of success led the Imperial generals
into acts of insolence, which induced the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel,
first of the German princes, to conclude a close and hearty alliance
with Sweden, and left the Elector of Saxony no choice between entire
dependence on the already exasperated Emperor, and an effective support
of the only power that could protect him. Accordingly he formed a
junction with the Swedes, and the united forces joined battle with Tilly
not far from Leipsic, September 7, 1631. The opposing armies were nearly
equal in strength. The stress of the conflict fell on the right wing of
the Swedes, where the King commanded in person. The fiery Pappenheim led
seven impetuous charges of the whole Austrian cavalry against the
Swedish battalions without success, and, seven times repulsed, abandoned
the field with great loss. The Saxons on the left wing were broken by
Tilly. But the day was restored by a decisive movement of the Swedish
right wing upon Tilly’s flank, and the Imperialists dispersed in utter
confusion. Leipsic, Merseburg, and Halle speedily fell into the victor’s
hands; and no obstacle existed to check his advance even to the heart of
the Emperor’s hereditary dominions. This was a tempting prospect to an
ambitious man: but it would have abandoned Germany to Tilly, who was
already occupied in raising a fresh army; and the King of Sweden
determined to march towards Franconia and the Rhine, to encourage by his
presence the Protestants who wavered, and to cut the sinews of the
Catholic League, by occupying the territories, and diverting the
revenues of its princes. Bohemia lay open to the Elector of Saxony, and
he left it to that prince to divert the Emperor’s attention, by carrying
the war into that country.

From Leipsic, Gustavus pursued his triumphant way to the southward. The
rich bishopric of Wurtzburg fell into his hands, almost without
resistance. Nuremburg placed itself under his protection. The nobility
and citizens of Franconia declared in his favour as soon as they were
relieved from the presence of the Imperial troops, and when his drum
beat for recruits, crowds flocked to the Swedish standards. He pursued
his course along the Maine to Frankfort, which opened its gates, and
received a Swedish garrison; and being strengthened by the junction of
the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, with 10,000 men, he crossed the Rhine,
and, after a short siege, became master of Mentz by capitulation,
December 13, 1631. There he gave his troops a few weeks’ repose, being
himself busily engaged in diplomatic labours. Early in the following
year he completed the conquest of the Palatinate, and threatened to
carry the war into Alsace and Lorraine.

The advance of Tilly recalled the King of Sweden into Franconia, at the
head of 40,000 men. Tilly then retreated into Bavaria, closely followed
by the enemy, who passed the Danube at Donawerth, forced the passage of
the Lech, and carried the war into the yet uninjured plains of Bavaria.
The passage of this river in the face of the enemy, April 5, is regarded
as one of the King of Sweden’s most remarkable exploits. His old
antagonist Tilly received a mortal wound on this day. Munich, the
capital, and the greater part of the Electorate, yielded without
resistance.