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SOUND MIND;

OR,

_CONTRIBUTIONS_

TO THE

NATURAL HISTORY AND PHYSIOLOGY

OF THE

HUMAN INTELLECT.

By JOHN HASLAM, M.D.

LATE OF PEMBROKE HALL, CAMBRIDGE:
FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL MEDICAL, NATURAL HISTORY,
AND CHEMICAL SOCIETIES OF EDINBURGH.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN,
PATERNOSTER-ROW.
1819.


Printed by Strahan and Spottiswoode,
Printers-Street, London.




TO

SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH, M.P.

DEAR SIR,

The privilege of long acquaintance, and a sufficient experience of the
kindness of your disposition, might be an adequate inducement to
dedicate the following pages to your notice. To this offering, I am
however impelled by motives, which boast a higher descent, and more
enlightened character:--an admiration of your superior talents, and the
adaptation of those excellent endowments, to the advancement and
happiness of the human race,--and by which you have been enabled


     "The applause of listening senates to command."


The subjects to which I now solicit the permission of prefixing your
name, were once your favourite study; and I am induced to consider your
profound researches into the nature and constitution of the human
intellect, as the basis of that high reputation, you now so deservedly
maintain among the wise and dignified of your contemporaries.

     I am, Dear Sir,
       with respect, esteem,
         and the kindest feelings,
           Your very obedient servant,
                     JOHN HASLAM.




PREFACE.


The indulgence of the public has been already extended to several works
which I have submitted to its decision on the subject of INSANITY; and
the same favourable interpretation is now solicited for the present
performance,--which attempts the more difficult investigation of SOUND
MIND. In treating of Mental Derangement, I became very early sensible,
that a competent knowledge of the faculties and operations of the
Intellect in its healthy state, was indispensably necessary to him, who
professed to describe its disorders:--that in order to define the
aberrations, the standard should be fixed. There was indeed no lack of
theories and systems of Metaphysic; and although they essentially
differed, many possessed the highest reputation. Amidst this distraction
of conflicting opinions, which no mediator could adequately
reconcile,--without daring to contend with a host of discrepancies, or
presuming to demolish the lofty edifices which scholastic Pneumatology
had reared,--I determined to throw off the shackles of authority, and
think for myself. For it was evident, on the freehold ground of
literature, that there is "ample room and verge enough" for every man to
build his own tenement;--and the present construction is too lowly to
intercept another's prospect, and without those ornaments that might
provoke the jealousy, or challenge the rivalship of surrounding
inhabitants.

The mind of every rational person may be considered as an elaboratory,
wherein he may conduct psychological experiments:--he is enabled to
analyze his own acquirement,--and if he be sufficiently attentive, he
may note its formation and progress in his children:--and thus trace the
accumulation of knowledge, from the dawn of infancy to the meridian of
manhood. The prosecution of these means, according to my own views, will
qualify the diligent observer, to become the Natural Historian and
Physiologist of the Human Mind.

In the comparative survey of the capacities of Man, and the intelligence
of animals, the contrast has appeared so striking, that it was
impossible wholly to abstain from the inference of his future
destination:--notwithstanding very different conclusions had been
extorted by some modern physiologists. It has been often remarked, that
the practitioners of the healing art, have been very moderately
impressed with a solicitude for the future. This observation, in some
late instances, has been unhappily confirmed:--but it would be unjust to
visit the whole tribe with a sweeping and acrimonious censure, for the
transgressions of a few. The reproach has, however, long existed. The
venerable father of English poetry, in his description of the Doctor,
has passed a high and merited compliment to his learning; which at that
period was a heterogeneous compound of Greek, Latin, and Arabian lore,
mysteriously engrafted on Galenicals and Astrology:--yet with this
courteous concession to his professional science he could not refrain
from a dry and sarcastic memorandum, that


     "His study was but little in the Bible."


Throughout this inquiry, the province of the Theologian has never been
invaded:--it has been my humble toil to collect and concentrate the
scattered rays which emanate from natural reason,--a pale phosphoric
light, and "uneffectual" glow, compared with the splendid and animating
beams, which issue from the source of divine communication.

As the object of these contributions, has been principally to convey my
opinions, concerning the formation of the human mind, from the superior
capacities that man possesses, many subjects have been left untouched,
which, in similar works, urge an important claim to the attention of the
reader. Among these neglected articles, the IMAGINATION is the chief
omission:--of which many authors have treated so copiously, and so well.
According to my own views, the consideration of this faculty was not
essential to the outline that has been traced;--and it has been rather
deemed a graceful embellishment, than a constituent pillar of the
edifice of mind. This gay attirer of thought, that decks passion and
sentiment, is also the prolific parent of fiction;--and justly banished
from the retreats of sober demonstration.--To the science of
numbers,--to mathematical precision, and to the whole range of
experimental philosophy,--Imagination does not lend her glowing and
gaudy tints. No vestiges of her colouring can be discovered in Divine
ordinances, or in the systems of human jurisprudence:--neither in the
Ten Commandments nor in the Statutes at Large. Imagination may indeed
enliven the cold pages of historical narrative, and blend the "Utile
Dulci"--but even here she is a profane intruder: and a vigilant eye must
be directed, lest, in some unguarded moment, her seductive
blandishments should decoy the nakedness of truth. A sedate and
unambitious recorder of facts, does not presume to describe her regions,
or to enumerate her attributes. That delightful task must be performed
by her votaries,


     "The poet, the lunatic, and the lover;"


nor should the Orator be excluded from his fair participation and
kindred alliance with this airy and fascinating group.

If the present essay should conform to nature, and be founded in
truth,--should it assist the young inquirer, and more especially the
medical student,--for whom no compendium of the science of mind has been
hitherto prepared; my own expectations will be fully answered; and this
scantling may probably lead some more capable person to an extensive
investigation, enlarged comprehension, and luminous arrangement of the
phenomena of the human intellect.

JOHN HASLAM.

57. Frith-Street, Soho-Square,
1st November, 1819.




CONTENTS.

                                                          Page

Perception                                                   1

Memory                                                      16

On the intellectual superiority which man has
acquired by speech, and the possession of the
hand                                                        28

On the nature and composition of language, as
applied to the investigation of the phenomena
of mind                                                     59

On will or volition                                         74

On thought or reflection                                   110

On reason                                                  135

Instinct                                                   160

Conclusion                                                 182


_Works by the same Author._


  I. Observations on Madness and Melancholy.

 II. Illustrations of Madness.

III. On the Moral Management of the Insane.

 IV. Medical Jurisprudence, as it relates to Insanity.

  V. A Letter to the Governors of Bethlem Hospital.




SOUND MIND.




PERCEPTION.


The faculty of perceiving the objects which surround us, is an important
feature in the history of mind; but by what means or contrivance this is
effected, can only be known to the Supreme Being, who has thus been
pleased to endow us; and our utmost endeavours to detect the _modus
operandi_ will be puerile and unavailing.

The first operations of the infant are to educate its senses, in order
to become acquainted, through these organs, with surrounding objects.
This, in the human species, is a process of very slow attainment; and
our information concerning this subject, must be derived from
attentively watching the progress of the infant itself; as of these
early perceptions, for a reason which will be afterwards assigned, we
retain no distinct recollection.

For the manner in which we become acquainted with the objects in nature,
we have appropriated a term, which was probably supposed to be
explanatory of the process, by which we received our intelligence of
these phenomena, and have accordingly termed it _Perception_. The
intrinsic meaning of this word is the taking, seizing, or grasping, of
an object, from the Latin _Cum_ and _Capio_, and the same figure
pervades most of the European languages. This term may sufficiently
apply to the information we derive from the organ of touch; but it
affords no solution of that which we obtain through the medium of the
other senses, as sight, smell, and hearing. It has been the bane of
philosophy, and the great obstacle to its advancement, that we have
endeavoured to penetrate that which is inscrutable; and in this vain
pursuit, we have neglected to detect and cultivate that which is
obvious, and the legitimate province of our research.

These organs of sense are the instruments by which we obtain our
different perceptions; they are the tests by which we become acquainted
with the objects of nature.

When we view the newly-born infant, and consider its state for many
weeks after it has become a member of our community, we are then
enabled to form some opinion of the almost insensible gradations, by
which it acquires its perceptions. An enumeration of the progressive
steps of this tardy process is within the power of any patient and
accurate observer; but this detail does not constitute a part of the
plan which has been adopted.

It has been endeavoured by writers on this subject, to establish a
distinction between perception and sensation, and the reader for his
information may consult their works: they do not however appear to have
founded this distinction on any obvious difference, nor to have adduced
sufficient reasons for their separate establishment, as independent
properties of the nerves. To feel, to experience a sensation, or to
perceive, implies consciousness; it is that which is transmitted by the
nerves to the sensorium, either by the organs of sense, or by the
internal nerves; as pain, or feelings of which we are conscious.
Consciousness is the test, the evidence, the proof of sensation or
perception. This point has been adverted to, in order that terms should
not be multiplied without a distinct and essential difference of
meaning.

The five senses, together with some auxiliaries, which will be the
subjects of future notice, may be considered as the instruments or
agents, by which the edifice of mind is constructed. In the act of
perceiving by the different senses, there are some circumstances, which
are particularly deserving of attention. In order that perception may
fully and certainly take place, it is necessary that the person should
be undisturbed; he ought to be exempt from external intrusions, and
internal perturbation. During this process the respiration is in general
more slowly drawn, the body endeavours to maintain a perfect quietude,
and its position becomes fixed. When we perceive objects by the eye,
this organ becomes fixed and the lips are usually closed. During our
examinations by the touch, the eye is also fixed, the breathing is
suspended, and the lips brought into contact: the fingers are separated,
and their more delicately tangent surfaces applied to the object with
their utmost expansion. In the exercise of audible perception, the neck
is stretched forth, and the ear applied to the quarter from whence the
sound appears to issue; the mouth is partly open to conduct the
vibrations to the Eustachian tube. When we acquire intelligence by the
smell, the lips are very firmly closed, the nostrils become dilated, and
the inspiration of air through them is conducted by short and successive
inhalations. From the connection between the smell and organs of taste,
(and this association is more remarkable in some animals than in man,)
it is difficult to describe the process, which, however, principally
consists, when minutely tasting, in moving the tongue (the principal
discriminator) on the palate:--but when urged by strong appetite as in
the act of feeding, and when divested of the restraints which refined
society imposes; the nostrils are widely expanded, the eye is keenly
directed to the portion, and the hands are busily employed.

Experience has sufficiently informed us that the organs of sense must be
in a healthy state, in order to the due conveyance of perception. When
the function of any organ is altogether defective, as when a person is
born blind, he is cut off from all perception of light and of visible
objects. If by nature deaf, from the intonation of sounds; and many
unhappy instances of such connate defects abound among our species. In
one particular subject, both these defects existed from birth; so that
the sum of his intelligence was conveyed by the touch, smell, and
taste, or in other words, his mind was exclusively composed of the
perceptions he derived from these senses. This case will be more
particularly noticed in a subsequent chapter. The alterations which take
place in the state of our perceptions from a morbid cause, are generally
known. Thus a person labouring under a catarrh, will be unable to detect
the odours which certain substances communicate in a healthy condition
of his olfactory organ. In fever excited by a disordered stomach, the
taste will become vitiated, and the partial obstruction of the ear by
accumulated wax, will impress him with the bubbling of a pot, the
singing of birds, or the ringing of bells.

The same law that produces fatigue in a muscle from exertion, appears
to obtain in the organs of sense. If they be excited by their
appropriate stimuli too violently, or for a too long continuance,
fatigue or languor is produced, their percipience is diminished, or
confusedly conveyed; and they require a period of rest for their
refreshment.

As we advance in our enquiries into the nature of perception, it will be
evident that we cannot long continue to treat of it as a simple act, or
as a distinct faculty. The organs by which we obtain our different
perceptions are not insulated parts, but communicate with a substance,
termed the brain, and which is continued through the vertebral column.
The ultimate expansion of a nerve of sense, has been termed its sentient
or percipient extremity; and where it is united to the brain, its
sensorial insertion. If we were to divide the optic nerve where it
passes into the foramen, taking care to leave the apparatus of the eye
uninjured, the visual organ would be deprived of its function, and the
person or animal would be completely blind of that eye; so that a
communication with the brain is necessary for the purpose or act of
perception. As therefore the union of the nerve with the brain is
indispensably necessary for the purpose or act of perception, we are
naturally led to inquire into the properties of this substance, termed
the brain. Before we proceed to this part of the subject, it will be
proper to notice a fact which is of frequent occurrence. In amputations
of the thigh, at the moment the femoral nerve is divided, it often
occurs that a pain is distinctly felt in the toes; and after the limb
has been removed, even for many months, the same painful feeling of
these lost extremities is occasionally experienced. This circumstance
would render it probable that the larger branch of the nerve becomes
itself impregnated with the sensation it transmits: indeed it is a
continuation of the same substance, from its sentient extremity to its
sensorial insertion. This intimate union of nerve and brain may be
further illustrated: it has been already noticed, that a morbid state of
the organs of sense will convey inaccurate perceptions; and it is
equally certain, that disease of the brain, will excite phantasms, which
appear as realities to the sensitive organs.

As consciousness is implied, in order to constitute the act of
perception, it is of some importance to investigate the nature and
meaning of this term. The consciousness of _having experienced_ a
perception by any of the senses would be an act of memory:
consciousness, therefore, applies to the past; and it also accompanies
our prediction of the future. When a person is writing a letter, he is
at the time, conscious that his own hand is forming the characters; if
this letter be afterwards submitted to his inspection, he is conscious
that he wrote it; and if he be desired to write it over again, he is
conscious that it will bear, both to himself and others, the character
of his hand-writing. Consciousness, therefore, accompanies human action
through all its tenses: it is equivalent to the knowledge we possess of
our own personal identity, the evidence of mind, and therefore must
accompany every act of intelligence. Thus we are equally conscious that
we perceive, remember, think or reflect, and reason. As consciousness
must accompany every act of perception, it follows that we cannot be
impressed with more than one at the same instant; for it can never be
contended that we are able to experience two acts of consciousness at
the same moment. The very term two, implies repetition or succession,
and we could as well conceive the possibility of being, at the same
time, in two different places.

As far as we are warranted to infer from the evidences it affords, an
infant appears to possess no consciousness; but it may be considered of
early acquirement, and coeval with distinctness of perception.

These few preliminary remarks concerning perception have been submitted
to the notice of the reader, in order to advance to another subject. The
faculties which constitute mind are so blended, and dependant on each
other, that it would only hazard confusion to proceed. But this subject
will be resumed.[1]

FOOTNOTE:

[1] There exists already furnished, a considerable mass of facts,
dispersed in various works, which might be advantageously collected into
a volume in order to illustrate the phenomena and laws of perception,
and more especially to display the mutual assistance they afford to each
other, and the superior knowledge which we have derived from their
united co-operation.




MEMORY.


Allow a human being to be gifted with his five senses, exquisitely
attuned for the conveyance of those perceptions, which the separate
organs and common sensory are destined to receive: let him during fifty,
or as many thousand years, scent the most delicious perfumes,--convey to
his palate the flavour of the choicest viands,--to his eyes, present the
fairest prospects in nature,--impart to his ear the sweetest music, and
regale his touch with smoothness and warmth; moreover let him be
conscious of each individual perception he receives:--what would he be
at the expiration of this period, without recollection? He would be no
more than a sheet of white paper, that had been carried round the world
to receive, through the camera obscura, its most delightful views; or
the bare walls of Westminster Abbey, after the commemoration of Handel.
Perception and consciousness, therefore, although indispensable to the
building up of mind, are by themselves inefficient and useless without
the adjunct of memory.

The writers who have treated of the human faculties, have usually and
properly bestowed an elaborate investigation to the developement of this
interesting subject: indeed, when men first began to describe the
operations of their own minds, it might be expected that they would
treat copiously of its most important function; but the nature of this
endowment has received no elucidation from the aggregate of their
labours.

The term memory has been Anglicised from the Latin Memoria; yet we
possess two other words of similar meaning, and from their derivation,
in a certain degree, explanatory of this process; namely, to REMEMBER
and RECOLLECT. Thus if an individual have seen any particular animal,
and given sufficient attention to perceive accurately its construction,
so as to possess a complete perception of the different parts or
_members_ of which it is composed; he would, in the absence of the
animal, be enabled to remember it. If his hand had been duly educated he
might form its model, or chisel it from a block of marble; or on a
plain surface, according to the rules of art, might make a drawing of
the animal, and with such exactitude of its different _members_, that it
would appear to those who compared it with the original, that he
perfectly _re-membered_ it. To recollect is only a different figure for
the same process, and implies to re-gather or collect, those parts which
have been scattered in different directions.

The perceptions we obtain by our different senses are all capable of
being remembered, but in different ways. Those which we derive from
sight, may be communicated by the pictures of the objects, which become
the means of assisting our recollection, and thus form a durable record
of our visible perceptions; of course excepting motion, which pictures
cannot represent; but motion, or change of place, implies a succession
of perceptions. Yet this manner of record does not directly apply to the
other senses: we can exhibit no pictures of odours, tastes, the lowing
of a cow, the roaring of a lion, or the warbling of birds; much less do
hardness and softness admit of any picturesque representations as their
record. The memory of animals seems to be in the simple state: they
have, through their organs, different perceptions; and in many instances
these organs are more susceptible than those of the human subject. The
ear of some timid species is enabled to collect the feeblest vibrations
of sound, and which are inaudible to us. The eye of some birds can
tolerate an effulgence of light, that would dazzle and confuse our
vision; and others "do their errands," in a gloom where we could not
distinguish. In certain animals the smell is so acute, that it becomes a
sense of the highest importance for the purposes of their destination.
But animals are incapable of recording their perceptions by any signs or
tokens: they therefore possess no means of recalling them, and their
recollection can only be awaked from the recurrence of the object, by
which the perception was originally excited: whereas man, by the
possession of speech, and of the characters in which it is recorded, can
at all times revive his recollection of the past.

It is generally acknowledged that our memory is in proportion to the
distinctness of the perception, and also to the frequency of its
repetition.

The simple acts of perception and memory appear to be the same in man
and animals; and there are many facts which would induce us to suppose,
if these faculties be identical in their nature, that the endowment of
the latter is more excellent. This conjecture is hazarded from the
greater susceptibility of the organs of some animals, and from their
wonderful recollection of tracks which they have traversed. Among the
phenomena of memory there are two very curious occurrences, and for
which no adequate explanation has been hitherto afforded. Many of the
transactions of our early years appear to be wholly obliterated from our
recollection; they have never been presented as the subject of our
thoughts, but after the lapse of many years, have been accidentally
revived, by our being placed in the situation which originally gave them
birth. Although there are numerous instances on record, and some perhaps
familiar to every reader, I shall prefer the relation of one which came
under my immediate observation. About sixteen years ago, I attended a
lady at some distance from town, who was in the last stage of an
incurable disorder. A short time before her death, she requested that
her youngest child, a girl about four years of age, might be brought to
visit her, and which was accordingly complied with. The child remained
with her about three days. During the last summer some circumstances
led me to accompany this young lady to the same house. Of her visit when
a child she retained no trace of recollection, nor was the name of the
village even known to her. When arrived at the house, she had no memory
of its exterior; but on entering the room where her mother had been
confined, her eye anxiously traversed the apartment, and she said, "I
have been here before, the prospect from the window is quite familiar to
me, and I remember that in this part of the room there was a bed and a
sick lady, who kissed me and wept." On minute inquiry none of these
circumstances had ever occurred to her recollection during this long
interval, and in all probability they would never have recurred but for
the locality which revived them. In a work professedly the fabric of
fancy, but which is evidently a portrait from nature, and most highly
finished,--in the third volume of Guy Mannering, the reader may peruse a
similar but more interesting relation, where the return of Bertram to
the scenes of his childhood, awakens a train of reminiscences which
conduce to the developement of his history and legitimate claims.
According to my own interpretation, however wonderful these phenomena of
memory may appear, they merely afford examples of the simplest acts of
recollection, excited by the recurrence of the original objects, at a
period when language was little familiar: in the same manner as an
animal, at a distant time brought into its former haunts, would
remember the paths it had heretofore trodden.

But there are some facts in the history of recollection which do not
admit of any satisfactory solution. From these it appears, that persons
in their childhood have learned a language which, from the acquirement
and usage of another during many years, they have entirely forgotten; so
that when spoken by others, they have been wholly unable to understand
it: yet during the delirium of fever, or from inflammation of the brain
and its membranes, in consequence of external injury, the former and
forgotten language has been revived, and spoken with fluency: but after
a restoration to health no traces of its recollection have remained. A
remarkable case of this kind has been published by Mr. Abernethy; and a
similar instance is recorded of the lady of an ambassador. These few
preliminary observations have been submitted to the reader, in order to
introduce a principal part of the subject to his notice, to prevent
repetitions, and from the impossibility of considering the more curious
and important phenomena of perception and memory as simple and
unconnected endowments.




ON THE INTELLECTUAL SUPERIORITY WHICH MAN HAS ACQUIRED BY SPEECH, AND
THE POSSESSION OF THE HAND.


In our investigations of the nature and offices of the human mind, we
are immediately and forcibly struck with two important circumstances,
which appear to have contributed in an especial manner to the
superiority of man over all