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THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE







1915

Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
12, Downing Street, London, S.W.




CONTENTS.


                                                                   PAGE.

  Serbia's Position                                                    3

  Russia's Position                                                    6

  Germany's Position                                                   6

  Italy's Position                                                     8

  Germany's Selected Moment                                            8

  Peace Thwarted by Germany                                           10

      I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian
         Ultimatum                                                    11
     II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary
         and Serbia                                                   11
    III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers                       12
     IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between
         Russia and Austria-Hungary                                   13
      V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary     14
     VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace                              15

  German Militarism Wins                                              17

  How France Came In                                                  19

  How Great Britain Came In                                           19

  War with Austria                                                    22

  Japan's Ultimatum to Germany                                        22

  Allies' Declaration of Common Policy                                23

  Turkey Joins Germany                                                24

  More German Intrigues                                               26
    The Near East                                                     26
    The Far East                                                      27
    West Africa                                                       28
    South Africa                                                      28

  How the Germans Make War                                            29

  Germany's Attempted Bribery                                         36


  APPENDIXES.

  A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian
     Ultimatum                                                        40

  B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary                               46

  C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium                                48

  D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas                            52

  E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on
     England                                                          52

  F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War            55




THE GREAT WAR.




SERBIA'S POSITION.


On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess
were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian
subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had
been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was
an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial"
investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the
Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually
conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on
July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were
the chief terms[2]:--

     "The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
     their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
     declaration:--

     "'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
     against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the
     final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
     territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
     consequences of these criminal proceedings.

     "'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
     functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."

     "The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:

     "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
     of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
     is directed against its territorial integrity;...

     "To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
     as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
     instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
     propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

     "To remove from the military service, and from the administration
     in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
     against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
     Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
     communicating to the Royal Government;

     "To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
     movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
     Monarchy;

     "To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
     the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
     relating thereto."

In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which
was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at
Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense
such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words,
Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all
these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6
p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the
specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of
Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary
for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an
explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the
participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial
proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany
not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so
drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature
of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same
evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general
mobilisation.

An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an
hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented
itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna
through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed
on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the
British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a
pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the
Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the
Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there
were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be
expected to accept."[5]

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at
peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable
settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain
asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that
Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of
conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself
ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria
and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade
were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet
Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
expired.

The British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true
object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--

     "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
     beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
     gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
     here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
     under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
     Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
     with Serbian rule."[6]

So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan
settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as
1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan
peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest
right down to the Aegean Sea.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.

[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.

[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the
Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--

    "Serbia... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria
    should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war
    where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant,
    brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their
    efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the
    officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to
    dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.
    Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?
    Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to
    this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your
    Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I
    think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
    French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am
    sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another
    gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult
    situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a
    great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the
    field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by
    the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."

[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.

[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.

[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.




RUSSIA'S POSITION.


Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23,
1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that
any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be
regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like
the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great
War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the
Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being
in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated,
then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a
question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the
deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the
Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in
danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey
said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a
commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
retested during the last decade.




GERMANY'S POSITION.


Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book
which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case
prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--

     "=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary)... asked for
     our opinion. With all our heart we were able to... assure him
     (Austria) that any action considered necessary... would meet with
     our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
     attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
     the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
     accordance with our duties as allies. We could not... advise our
     ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity,
     nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
     all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
     continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
     Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
     gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
     under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
     untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=

     "=A morally weakened Austria... would be no longer an ally on whom
     we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
     able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
     Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=

     "_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
     action towards Serbia.=_"

Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that
the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the
following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to
Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--

     "=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
     counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=

     "=But mobilisation means war.=

     "=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
     mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="

Here, then, we have the plain admission:--

     That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
     France.

     That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
     calculated extent of starting a great European war.

     That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
     "could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
     Italy in this Official document.


FOOTNOTES:

[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und
Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)

[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons.
Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:--

    "Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the
    Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the
    success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
    depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
    completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
    might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
    consequently that of Germany.

    "I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
    that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if
    Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
    being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
    army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
    the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not
    constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"




ITALY'S POSITION.


Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above
machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she
had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar
enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian
Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San
Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with
the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval
of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence
identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present
Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to
be a _casus foederis_ under the Triple Alliance--which is purely a
treaty of defence--involving Italy's military assistance on the side of
Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti)
replied[10]:--

     "If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus
     foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
     on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
     as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
     declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
     Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."

Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her
neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed
with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained
neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the
aggressors--not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the
subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the
fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led
Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th,
1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.


FOOTNOTES:

[9] See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.

[10] Cd. 7860.

[11] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 152.




GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.


The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at
her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or
unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, _Germany and the
Next Great War_: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us
as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary
and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of
success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to
Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and
Austria chose their moment well.

     (1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
     Belgrade.

     (2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
     Ministers were away electioneering.

     (3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
     Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
     the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
     consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
     (Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for