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Military Order
OF THE
Loyal Legion of the United States

COMMANDERY OF THE
STATE OF MISSOURI

The Battle of Spring Hill, Tennessee.

PREPARED BY
Companion Captain John K. Shellenberger

READ AFTER THE
STATED MEETING
HELD FEBRUARY
2d, 1907




PREFACE.


More than twenty-five years have passed since I began to collect the
materials from which this pamphlet has been evolved. As a substantial
basis, to begin with, I was an eye-witness of all the fighting in the
vicinity of Spring Hill, that amounted to anything, from the time
Forrest attacked the 64th Ohio on the skirmish line until Cleburne's
Division recoiled from the fire of the battery posted at the village.

Since I began collecting I have neglected no opportunity to increase my
stock of information by conversation, reading or correspondence. I have
twice revisited the battlefield. I have the Government volume containing
the official reports, all of which I have carefully studied. Among my
correspondents, on the Union side, have been Generals Stanley, Wilson,
Opdycke, Lane and Bradley, besides many others of lesser rank. I am as
confident, from their letters, that my paper would have the approval of
those named, who are now dead, as I am sure it has the approval of
General Wilson, to whom a manuscript copy was submitted for criticism.

Among other Confederates, I wrote to General S.D. Lee, who referred me
to Judge J.P. Young, of Memphis Tennessee, with the statement that he
had exhausted the subject on the Confederate side. He was present at
Spring Hill as a boy soldier in Forrest's cavalry, and for years has
been engaged in writing a history of the Confederate Army of Tennessee,
to which he has given an enormous amount of careful research. To him I
am indebted for much of the most valuable part of my information
concerning the Confederate troops. From the materials thus gathered I
have tried to give, within the compass of a Loyal Legion paper, a clear
and truthful account of the affair just as it happened. That opinions
will differ, is shown by the fact that Judge Young holds General Brown
responsible for the Confederate failure, while I believe that Cheatham,
Stewart and Bate were all greater sinners than Brown. He was acting
under the eye of Cheatham, who could easily have forced an attack by
Brown's Division if he had been equal to the occasion.

By a curious coincidence General Lee was present as the guest of the
Missouri Commandery at the meeting when the paper was read, and, in
commenting on it, General Lee stated that I had told the truth about as
it had occurred. The deductions made from the facts stated are my own.




THE BATTLE OF SPRING HILL.


It may be fairly claimed that the success of General Sherman's famous
March to the Sea hung on the issue of a minor battle fought at Spring
Hill, in Middle Tennessee, the evening of November 29th, 1864, when
Sherman and his army were hundreds of miles away in the heart of
Georgia. It will be remembered that when Sherman started from Atlanta
for Savannah his old antagonist, General Hood, was at Florence, Alabama,
refitting his army to the limit of the waning resources of the
Confederacy, for an aggressive campaign into Tennessee. If Hood's
campaign had proved successful Sherman's unopposed march through Georgia
would have been derided as a crazy freak, and, no doubt, the old charge
of insanity would have been revived against him. By how narrow a margin
Hood missed a brilliant success, a truthful account of the Spring Hill
affair will disclose. Much has been written by interested generals of
both sides, and by their partisan friends, to mislead as to the real
situation. With no personal friendships or enmities to subserve, it is
the intention of this paper to tell the truth without any regard to its
effect on the reputation of any general, Federal or Confederate.

The Administration gave a reluctant consent to Sherman's plan on the
condition that he would leave with General Thomas, commanding in
Tennessee, a force strong enough to defeat Hood. On paper Thomas had
plenty of men, but Sherman had taken his pick of infantry, cavalry,
artillery and transportation, leaving the odds and ends with Thomas,
consisting largely of post troops garrisoning towns; bridge guards in
block-houses along the railroads; new regiments recruited by the payment
of the big bounties that produced the infamous tribe of bounty jumpers;
<DW64> regiments never yet tested in battle; green drafted men assigned
to some of the old, depleted regiments in such large numbers as to
change their veteran character; dismounted cavalrymen sent back to get
horses, and convalescents and furloughed men belonging to the army with
Sherman who had come up too late to join their commands, organized into
temporary companies and regiments.

Moreover, Thomas' forces were scattered from East Tennessee to Central
Missouri, where General A.J. Smith, with two divisions of the
Sixteenth corps, was marching for St. Louis to take steamboats to join
Thomas at Nashville. The only force available for immediate field
service consisted of the Fourth and the Twenty-third corps, the two
weakest corps of Sherman's army, which he had sent back to Thomas. These
two corps, temporarily commanded by General Schofield, were thrown well
forward towards Florence to delay Hood long enough for Thomas to
concentrate and organize from his widely scattered resources a force
strong enough to give battle to Hood.

Passing over all prior operations we will take up the situation as it
was the morning of November 29th. General Schofield had then well in
hand on the north bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia, Tennessee, the
divisions of Kimball, Wagner and Wood, composing the Fourth corps, and
of Cox and Ruger, of the Twenty-third corps, Ruger's lacking one brigade
on detached service. Across the river were two divisions of General S.
D. Lee's corps of Hood's Army. The preceding evening Hood, himself, with
the corps of Cheatham and Stewart, and Johnson's division of Lee's
corps, had moved up the river five and one-half miles to Davis' ford,
where he was laying his pontoons preparatory to crossing. His plan was
to detain Schofield at the river by feinting with two divisions while he
would lead seven divisions past the left flank and plant them across
Schofield's line of retreat at Spring Hill, twelve miles north of Duck
River. As Hood greatly outnumbered Schofield, his plan contemplated the
destruction of Schofield's army.

During the evening of the 28th General Wilson, commanding our cavalry,
had learned enough of Hood's movement to divine its purpose. In view of
its vital importance, to insure a delivery, he sent a message in
triplicate, each courier riding by a separate road, informing Schofield
of what Hood was doing, and advising and urging him to get back to
Spring Hill with all his army by 10 o'clock, the 29th. General Wilson
has stated that his couriers all got through, the one riding by the
shortest road reaching Schofield's headquarters at 3 a.m. of the 29th.

From the reports sent him by Wilson, General Thomas at Nashville had
also correctly divined Hood's intention, and in a dispatch dated at
3:30 a.m., of the 29th--but by the neglect of the night operator not
transmitted until 6 o'clock, when the day operator came on duty--he
ordered Schofield to fall back to Franklin, leaving a sufficient force
at Spring Hill to delay Hood until he was securely posted at Franklin.

I was commanding Company B, 64th Ohio Regiment, Bradley's brigade,
Wagner's division. The brigade was under arms that morning by 4 o'clock,
and had orders to be ready to march on a moment's notice. It is assumed
that all the rest of the army received the same orders, and that this
action was taken on account of the information brought by Wilson's
courier at 3 o'clock. But nothing was done until 8 o'clock, when the
movements began which disposed of our army as follows:

Wagner's division was sent to Spring Hill to guard the reserve artillery
and the wagon trains, all ordered to Spring Hill, from any raid by
Hood's cavalry. General Stanley, the corps commander, went with Wagner.
Cox's division was posted along the river, and was engaged all day in
skirmishing with the two divisions under Lee, which kept up a noisy
demonstration of forcing a crossing. Ruger's two brigades were posted
four miles north of Duck river, where the pike to Spring Hill crosses
Rutherford's creek, to hold that crossing. The divisions of Kimball and
Wood were aligned between Cox and Ruger, facing up the river towards
Hood's crossing. At 9 o'clock Post's brigade, of Wood's division, was
sent up the river to reconnoiter, and before 11 o'clock Post had reached
a position where he could see Hood's column marching towards Spring
Hill, and repeatedly reported that fact.

Nevertheless none of the four divisions near Duck river were started for
Spring Hill until after 4 o'clock, when Schofield had heard from Stanley
that Hood was attacking at Spring Hill.

After the campaign Schofield claimed that its success was due to his
intimate knowledge of Hood's character, gained while they were
classmates at West Point, which enabled him to foresee what Hood would
do under any given conditions, and then make the best dispositions for
defeating him. When, two months later, Schofield was in Washington,
where they knew nothing about the details of the campaign, he so
successfully impressed his claim on the Administration that he was given
the same promotion with which General Sheridan had been rewarded for the
victory at Winchester, jumping at one bound from the rank of captain to
that of brigadier-general in the regular army. But it is plain that
after five hours' of deliberation that morning Schofield had reached a
wrong conclusion as to Hood's intention, for if "Actions speak louder
than words," there can be no question that Schofield's dispositions were
made under the conviction that Hood would march down the river, after
crossing, to clear the way for Lee to cross. And so deeply infatuated
was he with this self-imposed delusion that, disregarding the order of
Thomas and the advice of Wilson, he cherished it for about five hours
after Post had reported that Hood was marching towards Spring Hill.

Wagner's advance, double-quicking through Spring Hill at noon, and
deploying just beyond on a run, interposed barely in time to head off
the advance of Hood's cavalry, Wagner arriving by the Columbia pike from
the southwest and the cavalry by the Mount Carmel road from the east.
General Forrest, commanding Hood's cavalry, had used his superior
numbers so skillfully as to push back Wilson with our cavalry just north
of Mount Carmel, which is five miles east of Spring Hill, before noon.
Leaving one brigade to watch Wilson, Forrest then crossed over to Spring
Hill with all the rest of his three divisions of cavalry. If Wagner had
arrived a few minutes later he would have found Forrest in possession at
Spring Hill.

General Cox, in his book on this campaign, claims that General Wilson
committed a grave error in not crossing over to Spring Hill, in advance
of Forrest, with all our cavalry. But in justice to Wilson it must be
remembered that at Mount Carmel he acted under the belief that Schofield
was following the advice he had given early that morning. If Schofield
had been at Spring Hill at 10 o'clock, as Wilson had advised, with all
his infantry, what reason could there have been for the cavalry joining
him there?

When Bradley's brigade, the rear of Wagner's column, was nearing Spring
Hill some of the cavalry approached the pike through the fields to
reconnoiter, and the 64th Ohio was sent to drive them away. With the
right wing deployed as skirmishers and the left wing in reserve, the
regiment advanced steadily, driving before it the cavalry, without
replying to the harmless long-range fire they kept up with their
carbines, but always galloping away before we could get within effective
range. About a mile east of the pike we crossed the Rally Hill road.
This was the road by which Hood's infantry column approached. It there
runs north nearly parallel with the pike to a point 500 yards east of
Spring Hill, where it turns west to enter the village. Leaving one of
the reserve companies to watch the road, the rest of the regiment kept
on in pursuit of the cavalry until our skirmishers were abreast of the
Caldwell house, about 800 yards east of the road, when a halt was
called. A few minutes later, at 2:30 o'clock, the left of our skirmish
line, north of the Caldwell house, was attacked by a line of battle in
front while the cavalry worked around our left flank. At the time we
believed the battle line to be a part of Hood's infantry, and in a
letter from General Bradley he states that it caused great consternation
at headquarters in Spring Hill when Major Coulter, of the 64th, came
galloping back with the information that the regiment was fighting with
infantry. But investigation has disclosed that the battle line was
composed of mounted infantry belonging to Forrest's command. They were
armed with Enfield rifles, and always fought on foot like ordinary
infantry, using their horses for traveling rapidly from place to place.

The four reserve companies were thrown in on a run at the point of
contact, but our line was soon forced to fall back by the cavalry
turning our left flank, where they cut off and captured three of our
skirmishers. One of the three was badly wounded that evening in trying
to escape, a bullet entering from behind and passing through his mouth
in a way to knock out nearly one-half of all his teeth. We found him in
a hospital at Spring Hill when passing through in pursuit of Hood's army
after the victory at Nashville. In relating his experience he stated
that when they were captured they were taken before some general, name
unknown to him, who questioned them closely as to what force was holding
Spring Hill. The general was probably Forrest, for he was personally
directing the attack on the 64th, but may have been Hood himself, for he
was on the Rally Hill road, less than a mile away, soon after the men
were captured. They all declared that they knew the Fourth corps was at
Spring Hill, and they believed all the rest of the army. Their
declaration must have carried greater weight on account of their own
faith in what they were telling, for at that time the whole regiment
believed that all the rest of the army had followed to Spring Hill close
on the heels of Wagner's division.

Eventually the 64th was driven back across the Rally Hill road, where a
last stand was made in a large woods covering a broad ridge abutting on
the road about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Spring Hill. While
in these woods, occurred a bit of exciting personal experience. A
bullet, coming from the right, passed through my overcoat, buttoned up
to my chin, in a way to take along the top button of my blouse
underneath the coat. That big brass button struck me a stinging blow on
the point of the left collar-bone, and, clasping both hands to the spot,
I commenced feeling for the hole with my finger tips, fully convinced
that a bullet coming from the front had gone through me there and had
inflicted a serious and possibly a mortal wound. It was not until I had
opened the coat for a closer investigation that I found I was worse
scared than hurt. Some of the enemy had secured a position on our right
flank, where they opened an enfilading fire, and it was one of their
bullets that had hit me. To get out of that fire the regiment fell back
towards the interior of the woods, where it was so close to our main
line that it was called in.

It was then about 3:30 o'clock, and by that time the situation of our
army had become so critical that nothing short of the grossest
blundering on the part of the enemy could save it from a great disaster,
and there was a fine possibility for destroying it.

Wagner's division had so much property to protect that it was stretched
out on a line extending from the railway station, nearly a mile
northwest of Spring Hill, where two trains of cars were standing on the
track, around by the north, east and south, to the Columbia pike on the
southwest. Behind this long line the village streets and the adjacent
fields were crammed with nearly everything on wheels belonging to our
army--ambulances, artillery carriages and army wagons to the number of
about 800 vehicles. The nearest support was Ruger's two brigades, eight
miles away, and it was about an hour later before Ruger had started for
Spring Hill. Opdycke's brigade was covering the railway station and the
Franklin pike on the north, and Lane's brigade the Mount Carmel road on
the east. They had a connected line, but it was so long that much of it
consisted of skirmishers only. They had in their front detachments of
Forrest's cavalry feeling along their line for an opening to get at the
trains. Bradley's brigade occupied an advanced, detached position, on
the ridge to the southeast that has been mentioned, to cover the
approach by the Rally Hill road. There was a gap of half a mile between
Lane's right in front of Spring Hill and Bradley's left, out on the
ridge. Bradley had in his immediate front the main body of Forrest's
three divisions of cavalry and the three divisions of infantry composing
Cheatham's corps, while four more divisions of infantry were within easy
supporting distance. In brief, ten of the twelve divisions, cavalry
included, composing Hood's army, were in front of Spring Hill, and at 4
o'clock Hood was attacking with his infantry Wagner's lone division,
guarding all our trains, while Schofield was still waiting for Hood at
Duck river with four divisions from eight to twelve miles away. If
Wagner's division had been wiped out, a very easy possibility for the
overwhelming numbers confronting it while stretched out on a line about
three miles long, without any breastworks, the rich prize of our
ambulance train, six batteries of artillery, and all our wagons with
their loads of supplies would have fallen into Hood's hands, and the
retreat of the four divisions would have been squarely cut off, while
having a short supply of artillery and no food or ammunition except what
the men were carrying in their haversacks and cartridge boxes. The
escape of our army from this deadly peril was largely due to the great
skill with which General Stanley handled the situation at Spring Hill,
but manifestly no amount of skill on the part of Stanley could have
saved us, where the disadvantages were so great, if the enemy had
improved with a very ordinary degree of vigor and intelligence the
opportunity opened to them by Schofield's delusion as to Hood's
intention. General Hood rode with the advance of his column until after
it had crossed Rutherford's creek, two and one-half miles south of
Spring Hill. It was then about 3 o'clock. There was no bridge, and his
men had to wade the creek, which caused some delay. A short distance
north of the crossing Hood met Forrest, and got his report of the
situation at Spring Hill as he had developed it during the three hours
preceding. He had met with resistance on so long a line that no doubt he
greatly overestimated the force holding Spring Hill, and such an
estimate would agree with the story told by the captured 64th men.

On the other hand, a courier had arrived with a report from Lee that
Schofield's main body was still in his front at Duck river, and Lee's
report was confirmed by the sounds of the heavy cannonading that had
been coming from his direction. These reports disclosed that a part of
Schofield's army was at Spring Hill and a part at Duck river, but they
conflicted as to which position was held by his main body. In the
uncertainty thus arising Hood decided, as his dispositions clearly show,
that his first move must be to plant Cheatham's corps on the pike
between those two parts. Developments would then determine his next
move. Cleburne's division was the first to cross the creek, and marching
up the road until his advance was close to the woods where Forrest's men
were fighting with the 64th Ohio, Cleburne halted and formed his battle
line along the road facing west towards the Columbia pike. If the
intention had been to make a direct attack, his line would have formed
facing north towards our line in the woods, where its position had been
developed by Forrest. The intention unquestionably was for Cleburne,
avoiding any encounter with our line in the woods, first to cross over
to the pike and then change direction and advance on Spring Hill astride
the pike, while Bate's division, following Cleburne's, received orders
as reported by Bate, to cross to the pike and then sweep down the pike
towards Columbia. Hood himself gave the orders to Cleburne and Bate, and
then established his headquarters at the Thompson farm house, near by,
about 500 yards west of the Rally Hill road, and nearly two miles south
of Spring Hill, where he remained till next morning. To save time
Cleburne started for the pike as soon as he was ready, and Bate, then
forming on Cleburne's left, followed as soon as his formation was
completed.

While Cleburne and Bate were moving out, General Cheatham was at the
crossing hurrying over Brown's division. When Brown got over he could
support either Cleburne or Bate, as developments might dictate. Uncandid
statements have been made that Cheatham's divisions were moved around in
a disjointed manner and without any plan. There was not only a logical
plan but a successful plan, if it had been carried out, in the orders
given to Cheatham's divisions. The other four divisions were halted
south of Rutherford's creek, and fronted into line facing west towards
the Columbia pike. This proves that it was then Hood's belief that
Schofield's main body was still at Duck river. If it should march up the
pike and attack Bate, the four divisions would be on its flank. If it
should attempt to reach the fortifications at Murfreesboro by cutting
across the country south of Spring Hill the four divisions would be in a
position to intercept it.

General Bradley had four regiments in line in the woods on the ridge,
with the left towards the Rally Hill road and the right trending away
towards the pike. They faced in a southeasterly direction. To cover more
ground there were short gaps between the regiments. The 65th Ohio was
the right regiment of the four, and to the right rear of the 65th was a
gap of a couple hundred yards extending out into cleared land, where the
42d Illinois was posted, refused as to the 65th and facing south to
cover that flank. To the front, right and rear of the 42d was a broad
expanse of rolling fields extending on the right to the pike, about
1,000 yards away, where two guns were posted to sweep the fields in
front of the 42d with their fire. To the left of the 42d an extension of
the woods ran out into the fields and concealed the 42d from Cleburne
until he had advanced almost abreast of its position. When the 64th came
off the skirmish line it was sent to the support of the 42d. The 36th
Illinois, Opdycke's only reserve, was hurried across on double-quick
from the other side of Spring Hill to support the two guns at the pike.
As many guns of the reserve artillery as could be utilized were placed
in battery around the southeasterly skirt of the village, looking
towards Bradley's position. Bradley's men very hastily had constructed
weak barricades of rails or anything else they could lay their hands on.
The 42d had such protection as was afforded by a rail fence.

Shortly before 4 o'clock, having completed his formation, Cleburne
started to march across to the pike. His division consisted of four
brigades, but one was on detached duty, and he had three in
line--Lowrey's on his right, then Govan's, then Granbury's. First
crossing a field in his front, Lowrey entered the extension of the woods
that has been mentioned, and on emerging on the other side his right
came in view within easy range of the 42d, and that regiment opened an
enfilading fire, Lowrey's line being then almost perpendicular to the
line of the 42d. It was this accident of Lowrey's right passing within
range of the 42d that led to the failure of Hood's plan, which, up to
that minute, had been a great success. When the 42d opened fire the two
guns at the pike also opened, their fire crossing that of the 42d, and
the 64th, running forward and intermingling ranks with the 42d, poured
in their fire. When our fire had thus developed our position, out in
those wide fields they could see just what we had. They pulled down the
rims of their old hats over their eyes, bent their heads to the storm of
missiles pouring upon them, changed direction to their right on
double-quick in a manner that excited our admiration, and a little later
a long line came sweeping through the wide gap between the right of the
42d and the pike, and swinging in towards our rear. Our line stood firm,
holding back the enemy in front until the flank movement had progressed
so far as to make it a question of legs to escape capture when the
regimental commanders gave the reluctant order to fall back. The contact
was then so close that as the men on our right were running past the
line closing in on them they were called on with loud oaths, charging
them with a Yankee canine descent, to halt and surrender; and, not
heeding the call, some of them were shot down with the muzzles of the
muskets almost touching their bodies. By the recession of the two
regiments on the flank the rear of the four regiments in the woods
became exposed. They were attacked at the same time by Forrest in front,
and by Cleburne on their right and rear, and were speedily dislodged.
The attack was pressed with so much vigor that in a few minutes after
the 42d had opened fire Bradley's entire brigade was in rapid retreat
towards Spring Hill, with Cleburne in close pursuit, and pouring in a
hot fire. In falling back we had to cross the valley of a small stream,
and I never think of our strenuous exertions to get out of a
destructive cross-fire, while running down the easy <DW72> leading to the
stream, without recalling the story of the officer who called to a
soldier making the best time he could to get out of a hot fire: "Stop,
my man! What are you running for?"

"Because I have no wings to fly with," called back the soldier over his
shoulder while increasing his efforts to make better time.

As we descended into the valley we uncovered our pursuers to the fire of
the battery at the village, which opened with shrapnel shells, firing
over our heads. General Stanley, who was in the battery, reported that
not less than eight guns opened fire. As soon as Cleburne encountered
that fire he hastily drew back over the ridge, out of sight. All pursuit
with its accompanying direct and cross-fire having thus ceased,
Bradley's men stopped running and walked on back to the vicinity of the
battery where a new line was formed without trouble or confusion. When
coming down the <DW72> towards the stream Major Coulter, whose horse had
been killed, was running a few feet in front of me, and I was just
speculating whether my short legs could keep up with his long ones, when
he called back over his shoulder: "Rally at this fence," meaning a rail
fence we were approaching. I had a poor opinion of the fence as a place
to attempt a rally, for we would still be exposed to a cross-fire, but
wishing to obey orders I made for the strongest looking fence corner in
my front, and, jumping over and stopping behind it, looked around to see
if any concerted effort would be made to reform behind the fence. In my
brief halt there I had some opportunity to observe the effect of our
artillery fire on the enemy. I saw by the smoke where a number of our
shells exploded, and they all seemed too high in the air and too far to
the rear, for I could not see any men knocked down by them. No doubt the
fear of killing some of our own men caused our gunners to aim high, and
it is probable that the noise made by so many guns and exploding shells
had more to do with stopping the enemy than the execution that was done.
Their after-actions showed that they believed Bradley's brigade to have
been an outpost; that our main line was where the battery was posted,
and that so much artillery must have a correspondingly strong infantry
support.

General Bradley reported a loss of 198 men in his brigade, nearly all of
it falling on the three regiments on the exposed flank, the other three
regiments falling back with light loss because their position had become
untenable. He was disabled with a wound, and Colonel Conrad, of the
15th Missouri, then assumed command of the brigade. By the casualties in
the 65th Ohio the command of that regiment devolved upon the adjutant,
Brewer Smith, a boy only 19 years old, and possibly the youngest officer
to succeed to the command of a regiment throughout the war.

A regiment of the 23d corps which had come to Spring Hill as a train
guard, and was placed in support of the battery at the village, has
persistently claimed that the salvation of our army was due to the
heroic stand it made after all of Wagner's division had run away. In a
historical sketch of the regiment occurs this statement:

"At Spring Hill the regiment had another opportunity to show its pluck.
A division that had been sent forward in charge of the trains was drawn
up to resist any attack the rebels might make while the regiment, being
with the headquarters train, was ordered to support a battery so placed
as to sweep an open field in front of the troops. The enemy, emerging
from the woods, marched steadily up to the National lines, when the
entire division broke and ran." That is pretty strong language in view
of the battle record of Wagner's division, for of the four brigades out
of all the brigades serving in all the Western armies, given prominent
mention by Colonel Fox in his book on regimental losses as famous
fighting brigades, two, Opdycke's and Bradley's, belonged to Wagner's
division, to say nothing of the very awkward fact that the brigades of
Opdycke and Lane were on the other side of Spring Hill, out of sight of
Cleburne's attack, but it is seriously so stated--"the entire division
broke and ran, leaving the regiment and the battery to resist the
attack. Fixing bayonets the men awaited the onset. As soon as the enemy
came within range they poured a well-directed fire into their ranks
which, being seconded by the battery, caused them to waver. Portions of
the retreating division having rallied, the rebels were compelled to
betake themselves to the woods."

And in a paper on this campaign by a captain of the regiment, he relates
how the officers of the regiment tried to stop the flying troops, and
taunted their officers with the bad example they were setting their men;
how the regiment opened a rapid, withering fire from a little parapet of
cartridges which the officers, breaking open boxes of ammunition, had
built in front of the men, and how their fire proved so destructive at
that close range that it stopped Cheatham's men who then fell back and
commenced building breastworks. In calling them Cheatham's men, did the
captain wish to insinuate that Cheatham's whole corps was charging on
the regiment? He uses the words "withering," "destructive," and "that
close range," in a way to raise the inference that the contact was very
close. The actual distance was shrapnel-shell range, for the battery
stopped Cleburne with those missiles before he had crossed the little
stream more than 1,000 yards away, so that instead of a cool regiment of
exceptional staying qualities delivering a destructive fire at very
close range, as pictured by the captain, the truth discloses a highly
excited, not to say a badly scared regiment, wasting ammunition at too
long range to do any damage. That this was the truth is proved by the
very significant fact, not deemed worthy of mention in either of the
accounts quoted, that the regiment did not lose a single man killed or
wounded; not one, and it was not protected by breastworks. With
impressive mystery the captain describes the regiment as what was left
of it after the way it had been cut up in the Atlantic campaign, with
the same artful vagueness used in the matter