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  ^The Daily Telegraph^
  WAR BOOKS

  THE FLEETS AT WAR




  ^The Daily Telegraph^
  WAR BOOKS

  CLOTH 1/- NET.

  ~VOL. I. (3rd Enormous Edition.)~
  _HOW THE WAR BEGAN_
  _By W. L. COURTNEY, LL.D., and J. M. KENNEDY_
  Is Britain’s justification before the Bar of History.

  ~VOL. II.~
  _THE FLEETS AT WAR_
  _By ARCHIBALD HURD_,
  The key book to the understanding of the NAVAL situation

  ~VOL. III.~
  _THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN_
  _By GEORGE HOOPER_
  The key book to the MILITARY situation.

  ~VOL. IV.~
  _THE CAMPAIGN ROUND
  LIEGE_

  ¶ Describes in wonderful detail the heroic defence of Liege, and shows
  how the gallant army of Belgium has upset and altered the whole plan
  of advance as devised by the Kaiser and his War Council.


[Illustration: _Photo: Speaight, Ltd._

=ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE.=

Supreme Admiral, British Home Fleet.]




  THE FLEETS AT
  WAR

  BY
  ARCHIBALD HURD

  Author of “Command of the Sea,” “Naval Efficiency,” “German Sea Power:
  Its Rise, Progress, and Economic Basis” (part author), etc.

  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
  LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
  MCMXIV




PREFACE


It is hoped that this volume will prove of permanent value as presenting
a conspectus of the great navies engaged in war when hostilities opened,
and in particular of the events of singular significance in the naval
contest between Great Britain and Germany which occurred in the years
immediately preceding the war.

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Mr. H. C. Bywater for valuable
assistance in preparing this volume.

  A. H.




CONTENTS


  CHAPTER                                                      PAGE

  INTRODUCTION--THE OPENING PHASE                                 9

     I. THE RELATIVE STANDING OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS   49

    II. THE BRITISH NAVY                                         54

   III. THE GERMAN NAVY                                         101

    IV. ADMIRAL JELLICOE                                        131

     V. OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE BRITISH NAVY                    137

    VI. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN FLEET              141

   VII. OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE FOREIGN NAVIES                  147

  VIII. GERMAN NAVAL BASES                                      151

    IX. THE KIEL CANAL                                          161

     X. THE GREAT FLEETS ENGAGED: TABULAR STATEMENT             168


[Illustration: Map of North Sea.]




INTRODUCTION

THE OPENING PHASE


PEACEFUL VICTORIES OF BRITISH SEA POWER

The declaration of war against Germany, followed as it was by similar
action against Austria-Hungary, was preceded by a sequence of events so
remarkable in their character that if any British writer had made any
such forecast in times of peace he would have been written down as a
romantic optimist.

Owing to a series of fortunate circumstances, the British Fleet--our
main line of defence and offence--was fully mobilised for war on the
morning before the day--August 4th at 11 p.m.--when war was declared by
this country, and we were enabled to enter upon the supreme contest in
our history with a sense of confidence which was communicated to all the
peoples of the British Empire. This feeling of assurance and courage
furnished the best possible augury for the future.

Within a fortnight of diplomatic relations being broken off with
Germany, and less than a week after Austria-Hungary by her acts had
declared her community of interest with her ally, the British Navy,
without firing a gun or sending a single torpedo hissing through the
water, had achieved four victories.

  (1) Germany’s elaborate scheme to produce a feeling of panic in this
  country--hence the army of spies, who took advantage of our open
  hospitality, using the telephone and providing themselves with bombs
  and arms, had failed.

  (2) Germany’s over-sea commerce was strangled.

  (3) British trade on the seas began to resume its normal course owing
  to the growing confidence of shipowners and shippers.

  (4) The British Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service,
  had been transported to the Continent under a guarantee of safety
  given by the British Fleet.

These successes were due to the influence of sea-power. Confidence in
the Navy, its ships and men, and a belief in the competency of Mr.
Winston Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg and the other Sea
Lords, and the War Staff, steadied the nerve of the nation when it
received the first shock. Apparently the crisis developed so swiftly
that there was no time for effective co-operation between the German
spies. All the mischievous stories of British reverses which were
clumsily put in circulation in the early period of hostilities were
tracked down; for once truth was nearly as swift as rumour, though the
latter was the result of an elaborately organised scheme for throwing
the British people off their mental balance. It was conjectured that if
a feeling of panic could be created in this country, a frightened nation
would bring pressure to bear on the naval and military authorities and
our strategic plans ashore and afloat would be interfered with. A
democracy in a state of panic cannot make war. The carefully-laid scheme
miscarried. Never was a nation more self-possessed. It had faith in its
Fleet.

In the history of sea power, there is nothing comparable with the
strangulation of German oversea shipping in all the seas of the world.
It followed almost instantly on the declaration of war. There were over
2,000 German steamers, of nearly 5,000,000 tons gross, afloat when
hostilities opened. The German sailing ships--mostly of small
size--numbered 2,700. These vessels were distributed over the seas far
and wide. Some--scores of them, in fact--were captured, others ran for
neutral ports, the sailings of others were cancelled, and the heart of
the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating. What must have been
the feelings of Herr Ballin and the other pioneers as they contemplated
the ruin, at least temporary ruin, of years of splendid enterprise? The
strategical advantages enjoyed by England in a war against Germany,
lying as she does like a bunker across Germany’s approach to the oversea
world, had never been understood by the mass of Germans, nor by their
statesmen. Shipowners had some conception of what would happen, but even
they did not anticipate that in less than a week the great engine of
commercial activity oversea would be brought to a standstill.

By its prompt action on the eve of war in instituting a system of
Government insurance of war risks, Mr. Asquith’s administration checked
any indication of panic among those responsible for our sea affairs. The
maintenance of our oversea commerce on the outbreak of hostilities had
been the subject of enquiry by a sub-committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence. When war was inevitable, the Government produced this
report, and relying on our sea power, immediately carried into effect
the far-reaching and statesmanlike recommendations which had been made,
for the State itself bearing 80 per cent. of the cost of insurance of
hull and cargoes due to capture by the enemies. Thus at the moment of
severest strain--the outbreak of war--traders recognised that in
carrying on their normal trading operations overseas they had behind
them the wholehearted support of the British Government, the power of a
supreme fleet, and the guarantee of all the accumulated wealth of the
richest country in the world. None of the dismal forebodings which had
been indulged in during peace were realised. Traders were convinced by
the drastic action of the Government and by the ubiquitous pressure of
British sea power on all the trade routes that, though some losses might
be suffered owing to the action of German cruisers and converted
merchantmen, the danger was of so restricted a character and had been so
admirably covered by the Government’s insurance scheme that they could
“carry on” in calm courage and thus contribute to the success of British
arms. Navies and armies must accept defeat if they have not behind them
a civil population freed from fear of starvation.

Even more remarkable, perhaps, than either of these victories of British
sea power was the safe transportation to the Continent of the
Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service. Within a fortnight
of the declaration of war, while we had suffered from no threat of
invasion or even of such raids on the coast as had been considered
probable incidents in the early stage of war, the spearhead of the
British Army had been thrust into the Continent of Europe.

It is often the obvious which passes without recognition. The official
intelligence that the Expeditionary Force had reached the Continent
fired the imagination of Englishmen, and they felt no little pride that
at so early a stage in the war the British Army--the only long-service
army in the world--should have been able to take its stand beside the
devoted defenders of France and Belgium.

It is, of course, obvious that the army of an island kingdom cannot
leave its base except it receive a guarantee of safe transport from the
Navy. The British Army, whether it fights in India, in Egypt, or in
South Africa, must always be carried on the back of the British Navy.
If during the years of peaceful dalliance and fearful anticipation it
had been suggested that, in face of an unconquered German fleet, we
could throw an immense body of men on the Continent, and complete the
operation within ten days or so from the declaration of war, the
statement would have been regarded as a gross exaggeration. This was the
amazing achievement. It reflected credit on the military machinery; but
let it not be forgotten that all the labours of the General Staff at the
War Office would have been of no avail unless, on the day before the
declaration of war, the whole mobilised Navy had been able to take the
sea in defence of British interests afloat.

We do well not to ignore these obvious facts, because they are
fundamental. The Navy must always be the lifeline of the Expeditionary
Force, ensuring to it reinforcements, stores, and everything necessary
to enable it to carry out its high purpose. That the Admiralty, with the
approval of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, felt itself justified in giving
the military authorities a certificate of safe transport before the
command of the sea had been secured indicated high confidence that when
the German fleet did come forth to accept battle the issue would be in
no doubt, though victory might have to be purchased at a high price.

Nor was this all. Thanks to the ubiquitous operations of the British
Navy, the Government was able to move two divisions of troops from
India, and to accept all the offers of military aid which were
immediately made by the Dominions. It was realised in a flash by all
the scattered people of the Empire that the Fleet, with its tentacles in
every sea, maintains the Empire in unity: when “the earth was full of
anger,” the seas were full of British ships of war.

  [Illustration]

  _H.M.S. King George V._

  _Photo: Cribb, Southsea._

  =KING GEORGE V CLASS.=

  KING GEORGE V, CENTURION, AUDACIOUS, AJAX.

  Displacement: 23,000 tons.

  Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 5.

  [Illustration]

  Astern fire:  Broadside:  Ahead fire:
  4 13·5in.     10 13·5in.  4 13·5in.

It was in these circumstances that the war opened. Every incident tended
to remind the people of the British Isles and the subjects of the King
who live in the far-flung Dominions and those who reside in the
scattered Crown Colonies and Dependencies of the essential truth
contained in the phrases which had come so trippingly to the lips in
days of peace. Men recognised that the statement of our dependence upon
the sea as set forth in the Articles of War was a declaration of policy
which we had done well not to ignore:

  “It is upon the Navy that, under the good Providence of God, the
  wealth, prosperity and peace of these islands and of the Empire do
  mainly depend.”

How true these words rang when, in defence of our honour, we had to take
up the gage thrown down by the Power which claimed supremacy as a
military Power and aspired to primacy as a naval Power. Those who turned
to Mr. Arnold White’s admirable monograph on “The Navy and Its Story,”
must admit that this writer, in picturesque phrase, had set forth
fundamental facts:

  “Since the first mariner risked his life in a canoe and travelled
  coastwise for his pleasure or his business, Britain has acquired half
  the seaborne traffic of the world. She relies on her Navy to fill the
  grocer’s shop, to bring flour and corn to our great cities and to keep
  any possible enemy at a distance. So successfully has the British Navy
  done its work that many generations of Englishmen have grown up
  without hearing the sound of a gun fired in anger. Every other nation
  in Europe has heard the tramp of foreign soldiery in the lifetime of
  men still living and felt the pain and shame of invasion.

  “Five times in the history of England the British Navy has stood
  between the would-be master of Europe and the attainment of his
  ambition. Charlemagne, Charles V., Philip II. of Spain, Louis XIV. of
  France, and Napoleon--all aspired to universal dominion. Each of these
  Sovereigns in turn was checked in his soaring plans by British sea
  power.”

When the British peoples awoke to the fact that they owed it to
themselves and their past to join in humbling another tyrant, they
gained confidence in the task which confronted them from the glorious
record of the past achievements of those who, relying upon command of
the sea, had crushed in the dust the mightiest rulers that had ever
tried to impose their yoke on humanity.

  [Illustration]

  _H.M.S. Orion._

  _Photo: Sport & General._

  =ORION CLASS.=

  ORION, CONQUEROR, MONARCH, THUNDERER.

  Displacement: 22,500 tons.

  Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 3.

  [Illustration]

  Astern fire:  Broadside:   Ahead fire:
  4 13·5in.     10 13·5in.   4 13·5in.

In a spirit of calmness, patience and courage the British people took up
the task which their sense of honour forced upon them all
unwillingly. Glancing back over the record of naval progress during the
earlier years of the twentieth century we cannot fail to recognise that,
in spite of many cross currents and eddies of public opinion, fate had
been preparing the British peoples, all unconsciously, for the
arbitrament of a war on the issue of which would depend all the
interests, tangible and intangible, of the four hundred and forty
million subjects of the King--their freedom, their rights to self
government, their world-wide trade, and that atmosphere which
distinguishes the British Empire from every other empire which has ever
existed. In the years of peace men had often asked themselves whether a
new crisis would produce the men of destiny to defend the traditions we
had inherited from our forefathers. While peace still reigned, they
little realised that the men of destiny were quietly, but persistently,
working out our salvation. When the hour struck England was fully
prepared, confident in her sea power, to take up the gage in defence of
all the democracies of the world against the tyrant Power which sought
to impose the iron caste of militarism and materialism upon nations that
had outgrown mediæval conditions.

If we would realise the bearing of British naval policy in the years
which preceded the outbreak of war, we shall do well to cast aside all
party bias and personal animosities and study the sequence of events
after the manner of the historian who collates the material to his hand,
analyses it without fear or favour, and sets down his conclusions in
all faithfulness. Pursuing this course we are carried back to the year
1897. Since the German Emperor had ascended the throne in 1888, he had
endeavoured to communicate to his subjects the essential truths as to
the influence of sea power upon history which he had read in Admiral
Mahan’s early books. His educational campaign was a failure. In spite of
all the efforts of Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine, the
Reichstag refused to vote increased supplies to the Navy. At last, when
he had been finally repulsed, first by the Budget Committee and then by
the Reichstag itself, Admiral von Hollmann retired admitting defeat.
The Emperor found a successor in a naval officer who, then unknown, was
in a few years to change radically the opinion of Germans on the value
of a fleet. Born on March 19th, 1849, at Custrin, and the son of a
judge, Alfred Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards
at the Naval Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much
attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly
responsible for the torpedo organisation and the tactical use of
torpedoes in the German Navy--a work which British officers regard with
admiration.[1] Subsequently he became Inspector of her Torpedo Service,
and was the first Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was
appointed Chief of the Staff at the naval station in the Baltic and of
the Supreme Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of
his sea career, Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is
regarded as an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for
German naval tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted
to the rank of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. In 1896
and 1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and immediately
after became Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office. In the
following year he was made a Minister of State and Naval Secretary, and
in 1901 received the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the
use of the honorific prefix “Von.”

  [1] German Sea Power: Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis, by
  Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (London: John Murray 1913).

With the advent of this sailor-statesman to the Marineamt, the whole
course of German naval policy changed, and in 1898 the first German Navy
Act was passed authorising a navy on a standard which far exceeded
anything hitherto attained. It provided for the following ships:

  THE BATTLE FLEET

  19 battleships (2 as material reserve).
   8 armoured coast defence vessels.
   6 large cruisers.
  16 small cruisers.

  FOREIGN SERVICE FLEET

  LARGE CRUISERS

  For East Africa                    2
  For Central and South America      1
  Material reserve                   3
                                    --
      Total                          6

  SMALL CRUISERS

  For East Asia                      3
  For Central and South America      3
  For East Africa                    2
  For the South Seas                 2
  Material reserve                   4
                                    --
      Total                         14

  1 Station ship.

This dramatic departure in German naval policy aroused hardly a ripple
of interest in England. Then occurred the South African War, the seizure
of the “Bundesrat,” and other incidents which were utilised by the
German Emperor, the Marine Minister, and the official Press Bureau, with
its wide extending agencies for inflaming public opinion throughout the
German Empire against the British Navy. The ground having been well
prepared, in 1900 the naval measure of 1898, which was to have covered
a period of six years, was superseded by another Navy Act, practically
doubling the establishment of ships and men. This is not the time, nor
does space permit, to trace the evolution of German naval policy during
subsequent years or to analyse the successive Navy Acts which were
passed as political circumstances favoured further expansion. The
story--and it is a fascinating narrative in the light of after
events--may be read elsewhere. The fact to be noted is that the British
peoples generally viewed the early indications of German naval policy
without suspicion or distrust. Most men found it impossible to believe
that any Power could hope to challenge the naval supremacy which had
been won at such great sacrifice at the Battle of Trafalgar, and which
the British people had continued to enjoy virtually without challenge
throughout the nineteenth century.

Happily, the hour when preparations had to be made, if made at all, to
maintain in face of any rivalry our sea command, produced the man. In
the autumn of 1901 Lord Selborne, then First Lord of the Admiralty, paid
a special visit