



Produced by Ted Garvin, David King, and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team





A SELECTION

FROM THE

DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

WITH

THE ENCHEIRIDION


TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE LONG




CONTENTS.


EPICTETUS (BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE)

A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL




EPICTETUS.


Very little is known of the life of Epictetus. It is said that he was a
native of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a town between the Maeander and a
branch of the Maeander named the Lycus. Hierapolis is mentioned in the
epistle of Paul to the people of Colossae (Coloss. iv., 13); from which
it has been concluded that there was a Christian church in Hierapolis in
the time of the apostle. The date of the birth of Epictetus is unknown.
The only recorded fact of his early life is that he was a slave in Rome,
and his master was Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the Emperor
Nero. There is a story that the master broke his slave's leg by
torturing him; but it is better to trust to the evidence of Simplicius,
the commentator on the Encheiridion, or Manual, who says that Epictetus
was weak in body and lame from an early age. It is not said how he
became a slave; but it has been asserted in modern times that the
parents sold the child. I have not, however, found any authority for
this statement.

It may be supposed that the young slave showed intelligence, for his
master sent or permitted him to attend the lectures of C. Musonius
Rufus, an eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange that such a
master should have wished to have his slave made into a philosopher; but
Garnier, the author of a "Memoire sur les Ouvrages d'Epictete," explains
this matter very well in a communication to Schweighaeuser. Garnier
says: "Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phrygia of poor parents, was
indebted apparently for the advantages of a good education to the whim,
which was common at the end of the Republic and under the first
emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon among their numerous slaves
grammarians, poets, rhetoricians, and philosophers, in the same way as
rich financiers in these later ages have been led to form at a great
cost rich and numerous libraries. This supposition is the only one which
can explain to us how a wretched child, born as poor as Irus, had
received a good education, and how a rigid Stoic was the slave of
Epaphroditus, one of the officers of the imperial guard. For we cannot
suspect that it was through predilection for the Stoic doctrine, and for
his own use, that the confidant and the minister of the debaucheries of
Nero would have desired to possess such a slave."

Some writers assume that Epictetus was manumitted by his master, but I
can find no evidence for this statement. Epaphroditus accompanied Nero
when he fled from Rome before his enemies, and he aided the miserable
tyrant in killing himself. Domitian (Sueton., Domit. 14), afterwards put
Epaphroditus to death for this service to Nero. We may conclude that
Epictetus in some way obtained his freedom, and that he began to teach
at Rome; but after the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by
Domitian, A.D. 89, he retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by
Augustus to commemorate the victory at Actium. Epictetus opened a school
or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he taught till he was an old man.
The time of his death is unknown. Epictetus was never married, as we
learn from Lucian (Demonax, c. 55, torn, ii., ed. Hemsterh., p. 393).
When Epictetus was finding fault with Demonax, and advising him to take
a wife and beget children, for this also, as Epictetus said, was a
philosopher's duty, to leave in place of himself another in the
universe, Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering: Give me then,
Epictetus, one of your own daughters. Simplicius says (Comment., c. 46,
p. 432, ed. Schweigh.) that Epictetus lived alone a long time. At last
he took a woman into his house as a nurse for a child, which one of
Epictetus' friends was going to expose on account of his poverty, but
Epictetus took the child and brought it up.

Epictetus wrote nothing; and all that we have under his name was written
by an affectionate pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander
the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing the philosopher's
discourses ("Epistle of Arrian to Lucius Gellius," p. i). These
Discourses formed eight books, but only four are extant under the title
of [Greek: Epichtaeton diatribai]. Simplicius, in his commentary on the
[Greek: Egcheiridion] or Manual, states that this work also was put
together by Arrian, who selected from the discourses of Epictetus what
he considered to be most useful, and most necessary, and most adapted to
move men's minds. Simplicius also says that the contents of the
Encheiridion are found nearly altogether and in the same words in
various parts of the Discourses. Arrian also wrote a work on the life
and death of Epictetus. The events of the philosopher's studious life
were probably not many nor remarkable; but we should have been glad if
this work had been preserved, which told, as Simplicius says, what kind
of man Epictetus was.

Photius (Biblioth., 58) mentions among Arrian's works "Conversations
with Epictetus," [Greek: Homiliai Epichtaeton], in twelve books. Upton
thinks that this work is only another name for the Discourses, and that
Photius has made the mistake of taking the Conversations to be a
different work from the Discourses. Yet Photius has enumerated eight
books of the Discourses and twelve books of the Conversations.
Schweighaeuser observes that Photius had not seen these works of Arrian
on Epictetus, for so he concludes from the brief notice of these works
by Photius. The fact is that Photius does not say that he had read these
books, as he generally does when he is speaking of the books which he
enumerates in his Bibliotheca. The conclusion is that we are not certain
that there was a work of Arrian entitled "The Conversations of
Epictetus."

Upton remarks in a note on iii., 23 (p. 184, Trans.), that "there are
many passages in these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather
confused on account of the small questions, and because the matter is
not expanded by oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes."
The discourses of Epictetus, it is supposed, were spoken extempore, and
so one thing after another would come into the thoughts of the speaker
(Wolf). Schweighaeuser also observes in a note (ii., 336 of his edition)
that the connection of the discourse is sometimes obscure through the
omission of some words which are necessary to indicate the connection of
the thoughts. The reader then will find that he cannot always understand
Epictetus, if he does not read him very carefully, and some passages
more than once. He must also think and reflect, or he will miss the
meaning. I do not say that the book is worth all this trouble. Every man
must judge for himself. But I should not have translated the book, if I
had not thought it worth study; and I think that all books of this kind
require careful reading, if they are worth reading at all.

G.L.




A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.


OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER AND NOT IN OUR POWER.--Of all the
faculties (except that which I shall soon mention), you will find not
one which is capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, not
capable either of approving or disapproving. How far does the grammatic
art possess the contemplating power? As far as forming a judgment about
what is written and spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about
melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By no means. But
when you must write something to your friend, grammar will tell you what
words you should write; but whether you should write or not, grammar
will not tell you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but
whether you should sing at the present time and play on the lute, or do
neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then will tell you? That
which contemplates both itself and all other things. And what is this
faculty? The rational faculty; for this is the only faculty that we have
received which examines itself, what it is, and what power it has, and
what is the value of this gift, and examines all other faculties: for
what else is there which tells us that golden things are beautiful, for
they do not say so themselves? Evidently it is the faculty which is
capable of judging of appearances. What else judges of music, grammar,
and the other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occasions
for using them? Nothing else.

What then should a man have in readiness in such circumstances? What
else than this? What is mine, and what is not mine; and what is
permitted to me, and what is not permitted to me. I must die. Must I
then die lamenting? I must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I
must go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going with smiles
and cheerfulness and contentment? Tell me the secret which you possess.
I will not, for this is in my power. But I will put you in chains. Man,
what are you talking about? Me, in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my
will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you into prison.
My poor body, you mean. I will cut your head off. When then have I told
you that my head alone cannot be cut off? These are the things which
philosophers should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which
they should exercise themselves.

What then did Agrippinus say? He said, "I am not a hindrance to myself."
When it was reported to him that his trial was going on in the Senate,
he said: "I hope it may turn out well; but it is the fifth hour of the
day"--this was the time when he was used to exercise himself and then
take the cold bath,--"let us go and take our exercise." After he had
taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, "You have been condemned."
"To banishment," he replies, "or to death?" "To banishment." "What about
my property?" "It is not taken from you." "Let us go to Aricia then," he
said, "and dine."

       *       *       *       *       *

HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER CHARACTER.--To the
rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is
rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. How is that?
See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned that
whipping is consistent with reason. To hang yourself is not intolerable.
When then you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang
yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is
pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the
contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

Only consider at what price you sell your own will: if for no other
reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But
that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as
are like him. Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great
number of us like him? Is it true then that all horses become swift,
that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then, since I am
naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains? I hope not.
Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this
is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect
my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property;
nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair
of reaching the highest degree.

       *       *       *       *       *

HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF
ALL MEN TO THE REST.--If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine
as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an especial manner, and
that God is the father both of men and of gods, I suppose that he would
never have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the
emperor) should adopt you, no one could endure your arrogance; and if
you know that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do
not so; but since these two things are mingled in the generation of man,
body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common
with the gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and
mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy. Since then it is
of necessity that every man uses everything according to the opinion
which he has about it, those, the few, who think that they are formed
for fidelity and modesty and a sure use of appearances have no mean or
ignoble thoughts about themselves; but with the many it is quite the
contrary. For they say, What am I? A poor, miserable man, with my
wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed; but you possess something
better than your bit of flesh. Why then do you neglect that which is
better, and why do you attach yourself to this?

Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining to it become
like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mischievous; some become like
lions, savage and bestial and untamed; but the greater part of us become
foxes, and other worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and
malignant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and meaner animal?
See then and take care that you do not become some one of these
miserable things.

       *       *       *       *       *

OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT.--He who is making progress, having learned
from philosophers that desire means the desire of good things, and
aversion means aversion from bad things; having learned too that
happiness and tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by
not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which
he would avoid; such a man takes from himself desire altogether and
confers it, but he