



Produced by Charles Aldarondo.  HTML version by Al Haines.









The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the
Importation of Foreign Corn; intended as an Appendix to
"Observations on the Corn Law"

by the Rev. T.R. Malthus,

Professor of History and Political Economy
in the East India College, Hertfordshire.



London: Printed for John Murray, Albermarle Street, and J. Johnson
and Co., St. Paul's Church Yard, 1815.






Grounds, &c.


The professed object of the Observations on the Corn Laws, which I
published in the spring of 1814, was to state with the strictest
impartiality the advantages and disadvantages which, in the actual
circumstances of our present situation, were likely to attend the
measures under consideration, respecting the trade in corn.

A fair review of both sides of the question, without any attempt to
conceal the peculiar evils, whether temporary or permanent, which
might belong to each, appeared to me of use, not only to assist in
forming an enlightened decision on the subject, but particularly to
prepare the public for the specific consequences which were to be
expected from that decision, on whatever side it might be made. Such
a preparation, from some quarter or other, seemed to be necessary,
to prevent those just discontents which would naturally have arisen,
if the measure adopted had been attended with results very different
from those which had been promised by its advocates, or contemplated
by the legislature.

With this object in view, it was neither necessary, nor desirable,
that I should myself express a decided opinion on the subject. It
would hardly, indeed, have been consistent with that character of
impartiality, which I wished to give to my statements, and in which
I have reason to believe I in some degree succeeded.(1*)

These previous statements, however, having been given, and having, I
hope, shewn that the decision, whenever it is made, must be a
compromise of contending advantages and disadvantages, I have no
objection now to state (without the least reserve), and I can truly
say, wit the most complete freedom from all interested motives, the
grounds of a deliberate, yet decided, opinion in favour of some
restrictions on the importation of foreign corn.

This opinion has been formed, as I wished the readers of the
Observations to form their opinions, by looking fairly at the
difficulties on both sides of the question; and without vainly
expecting to attain unmixed results, determining on which side there
is the greatest balance of good with the least alloy of evil. The
grounds on which the opinion so formed rests, are partly those which
were stated in the Observations, and partly, and indeed mainly, some
facts which have occurred during the last year, and which have
given, as I think, a decisive weight to the side of restrictions.

These additional facts are--

1st, The evidence, which has been laid before Parliament, relating
to the effects of the present prices of corn, together with the
experience of the present year.

2dly, The improved state of our exchanges, and the fall in the price
of bullion. And

3dly, and mainly, the actual laws respecting the exportation of corn
lately passed in France.

In the Observations on the corn laws, I endeavoured to shew that,
according to the general principles of supply and demand, a
considerable fall in the price of corn could not take place, without
throwing much poor lad out of cultivation, and effectually
preventing, for a considerable time, all further improvements in
agriculture, which have for their object an increase of produce.

The general principles, on which I calculated upon these
consequences, have been fully confirmed by the evidence brought
before the two houses of Parliament; and the effects of a
considerable fall in the price of corn, and of the expected
continuance of low prices, have shewn themselves in a very severe
shock to the cultivation of the country and a great loss of
agricultural capital.

Whatever may be said of the peculiar interests and natural
partialities of those who were called upon to give evidence upon
this occasion, it is impossible not to be convinced, by the whole
body of it taken together, that, during the last twenty years, and
particularly during the last seven, there has been a great increase
of capital laid out upon the land, and a great consequent extension
of cultivation and improvement; that the system of spirited
improvement and high farming, as it is technically called, has been
principally encouraged by the progressive rise of prices owing in a
considerable degree, to the difficulties thrown in the way of
importation of foreign corn by the war; that the rapid accumulation
of capital on the land, which it had occasioned, had so increased
our home growth of corn, that, notwithstanding a great increase of
population, we had become much less dependent upon foreign supplies
for our support; and that the land was still deficient in capital,
and would admit of the employment of such an addition to its present
amount, as would be competent to the full supply of a greatly
increased population: but that the fall of prices, which had lately
taken place, and the alarm of a still further fall, from continued
importation, had not only checked all progress of improvement, but
had already occasioned a considerable loss of agricultural advances;
and that a continuation of low prices would, in spite of a
diminution of rents, unquestionably destroy a great mass of farming
capital all over the country, and essentially diminish its
cultivation and produce.

It has been sometimes said, that the losses at present sustained by
farmers are merely the natural and necessary consequences of
overtrading, and that they must bear them as all other merchants do,
who have entered into unsuccessful speculations. But surely the
question is not, or at least ought not to be, about the losses and
profits of farmers, and the present condition of landholders
compared with the past. It may be necessary, perhaps, to make
inquiries of this kind, with a view to ulterior objects; but the
real question respects the great loss of national wealth, attributed
to a change in the spirit of our legislative enactments relating to
the admission of foreign corn.

We have certainly no right to accuse our farmers of rash speculation
for employing so large a capital in agriculture. The peace, it must
be allowed, was most unexpected; and if the war had continued, the
actual quantity of capital applied to the land, might have been as
necessary to save the country from extreme want in future, as it
obviously was in 1812, when, with the price of corn at above six
guineas a quarter, we could only import a little more than 100,000
quarters. If, from the very great extension of cultivation, during
the four or five preceding years, we had not obtained a very great
increase of average produce, the distresses of that year would have
assumed a most serious aspect.

There is certainly no one cause which can affect mercantile
concerns, at all comparable in the extent of its effects, to the
cause now operating upon agricultural capital. Individual losses
must have the same distressing consequences in both cases, and they
are often more complete, and the fall is greater, in the shocks of
commerce. But I doubt, whether in the most extensive mercantile
distress that ever took in this country, there was ever one fourth
of the property, or one tenth of the number of individuals
concerned, when compared with the effects of the present rapid fall
of raw produce, combined with the very scanty crop of last year.(2*)

Individual losses of course become national, according as they
affect a greater mass of the national capital, and a greater number
of individuals; and I think it must be allowed further, that no
loss, in proportion to its amount, affects the interest of the
nation so deeply, and vitally, and is so difficult to recover, as
the loss of agricultural capital and produce.

If it be the intention of the legislature fairly to look at the
evils, as well as the good, which belongs to both sides of the
question, it must be allowed, that the evidence laid before the two
houses of Parliament, and still more particularly the experience of
the last year, shew, that the immediate evils which are capable of
being remedied by a system of restrictions, are of no inconsiderable
magnitude.

2. In the Observations on the corn laws, I gave, as a reason for
some delay in coming to a final regulation respecting the price at
which foreign corn might be imported, the very uncertain state of
the currency. I observed, that three different importation prices
would be necessary, according as our currency should either rise to
the then price of bullion, should continue at the same nominal
value, or should take an intermediate position, founded on a fall in
the value of bullion, owing to the discontinuance of an
extraordinary demand for it, and a rise in the value of paper, owing
to the prospect of a return to payments in specie. In the course of
this last year, the state of our exchanges, and the fall in the
price of bullion, shew pretty clearly, that the intermediate
alteration which, I then contemplated, greater than in the case
first mentioned, and less than in the second, is the one which might
be adopted with a fair prospect of permanence; and that we should
not now proceed under the same uncertainty respecting the currency,
which we should have done, if we had adopted a final regulation in
the early part of last year.(3*) This intermediate alteration,
however, supposes a rise in the value of paper on a return to cash
payments, and some general fall of prices quite