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THE KNICKERBOCKER.

VOL. XXII. DECEMBER, 1843. No. 6.




MIND OR INSTINCT.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE MANIFESTATION OF MIND BY THE LOWER ORDERS OF
ANIMALS.

               'IN some are found
  Such teachable and apprehensive parts,
  That man's attainments in his own concerns,
  Matched with the expertness of the brutes in their's,
  Are ofttimes vanquished and thrown far behind.'

  COWPER.

OF THE REASON OR JUDGMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE CALLED INSTINCT.


A SURGEON of Leeds, (Eng.,) says BUFFON, found a
little spaniel who had been lamed. He carried the poor animal home,
bandaged up his leg, and, after two or three days, turned him out.
The dog returned to the surgeon's house every morning, till the leg
was perfectly well. At the end of several months, the spaniel again
presented himself, in company with another dog, who had also been
lamed; and he intimated, as well as piteous and intelligent looks could
intimate, that he desired the same kind assistance to be rendered to
his friend as had been bestowed upon himself. A similar circumstance is
stated to have occurred to MORANT, a celebrated French surgeon.

A fox, adds the same writer, having entered a hen-house through a small
aperture, which was the only opening, succeeded without disturbing
the family in destroying all the fowls, and in satiating his appetite
with part of them; but his voracity so enlarged his dimensions as to
prevent his egress. In the morning the farmer discovered the havoc of
the night, and the perpetrator himself sprawled out on the floor of the
coop, apparently dead from surfeit. He entered, and taking the creature
by the heels, carried him out and cast him beside the house. This was
no sooner done than the fox sprang up and bounded away with the speed
of a racer. This was communicated by the person.

A spaniel, OBSEND informs us, having discovered a mouse in a
shock of corn, jumped with his fore feet against it to frighten him
out; and then running quickly to the back side, succeeded in taking the
mouse as he attempted to escape.

BUFFON says: 'A number of beavers are employed together at
the foot of the tree in gnawing it down; and when this part of the
labor is accomplished, it becomes the business of others to sever the
branches, while a third party are engaged along the borders of the
river in cutting other trees, which though smaller than the first tree,
are yet as thick as the leg, if not the thigh, of a common-sized man.
These they carry with them by land to the brink of the river, and then
by water to the place allotted for their building; where sharpening
them at one end, and forming them into stakes, they fix them in the
ground, at a small distance from each other, and fill up the vacant
spaces with pliant branches. While some are thus employed in fixing
the stakes, others go in quest of clay, which they prepare for their
purpose with their tails and their feet. At the top of their <DW18>, or
mole, they form two or three openings. These they occasionally enlarge
or contract, as the river rises or falls. NOTE.--Should the
current be very gentle, the dam is carried nearly straight across;
but when the stream is swiftly flowing, it is uniformly made with a
considerable curve, having the convex part opposed to the current.

  'Ac veluti ingentem formicae farris acervum
  Cum populant, hyemis memores, tectoque reponunt:
  It nigrum campis agmen, praedamque per herbas
  Convectant calle augusto: pars grandia trudunt
  Obnixae frumenta humeris: pars agmina cogunt,
  Castigant que moras: opere omnis semita fervet.'

  AENEID, IV., 402.

  'In formica non modo sensus sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria.'--CIC.

 'Si quis comparet onera corporibus earum (formicarum) fateatur nullis
 portione. Vires esse majores. Gerunt ea morsu; majora aversae postremio
 pedibus moliuntur, humeris obnoxae. Est iis Reip ratio memoria cura.
 Semima arrosa condunt vie rursus in fruges exeant e terra. Majora
 ad introitum (cavernae) dividunt Madefacta imbre proferunt atque
 siccant.'--PLINY: lib. XI., cap. 30.

Many birds and other animals, BUFFON informs us, station a
watch, while they are feeding in the fields. Whenever marmots venture
abroad, one is placed as a sentinel, sitting on an elevated rock,
while the others amuse themselves in the fields below, or are engaged
in cutting grass and making it into hay for their future convenience;
and no sooner does their trusty sentinel perceive a man, an eagle, a
dog, or any other enemy approaching, than he gives notice to the rest
by a kind of whistle, and is himself the last that takes refuge in the
cell. It is asserted that when their hay is made, one of them lies upon
its back, permits the hay to be heaped between its paws, keeping them
upright to make greater room, and in this manner remaining still upon
its back, is dragged by the tail, hay and all, to their common retreat.

These instances could be multiplied indefinitely; but more than
sufficient have been cited. They prove in the first place, without need
of argument, that animals have a language by which they apprehend each
other. Concert of action and division of labor would be impossible
without it. They also exhibit the exercise of memory and abstraction;
and it now remains to ascertain whether their conduct was the result of
reason.

If a person should take a friend whose arm had been fractured to a
skilful surgeon who had before cured him of a similar wound, we should
infer the following course of reasoning: First, a comparison of facts,
to discover whether the injury in question was like the one he had
received; the ability of this surgeon over others in such cases; and
the presumption that the same skill and remedies will again produce
the same effects. These are the most obvious points. The dog, in the
cited case, had once been healed of a broken limb by a surgeon; and
having found a mate in a like situation, took him also to the same
surgeon. It is evident that his conduct was as wise as the man's. The
facts and actions in the two cases are parallel; and having seen that
animals obtain a perception of objects by the same agencies that man
does, it only remains to ascertain whether the intermediate reasoning
process between perception and action were essentially the same. Now,
we cannot prove directly that the mind of another passes through any
process whatever; because the proof of any process of our own mind
is consciousness, which cannot go beyond us; but we can infer the
train of reasoning in a given case with great correctness, taking
self-knowledge as a basis; and the similarity of conduct in another,
in view of premises, with what our own would have been. This is the
chief criterion by which much of our daily conduct is regulated, and
is the most substantial proof that can be reached. Hence, we can infer
with just as much certainty that the instinct of the dog passed through
the process mentioned, as that the mind of the man did in the case
supposed. We can also infer it with as much truth as that instinct is
susceptible of the process of memory, since the proof in both cases is
drawn from facts, and on the same principles.

Again: The beaver's dam is constructed at the very place a skilful
engineer would have selected for a similar purpose. This choice of one
place before another is necessarily founded on comparison, which is
a deliberative reasoning process. It is therefore inconsistent with
an impulse, which seems to be the action suggested, by instantaneous
perception and reasoning; a single, inflexible propulsion in one
direction; without a careful choice, and without deliberation: hence
the term impulsive cannot be applied to a large proportion of the
actions of animals; and having no reason for supposing the impulses of
animals supernatural, or unlike human impulses, the term itself should
be abandoned as vague and unmeaning. Gnawing the large tree upon the
inner side, that it might fall directly across the stream, also rises
above the utmost that we can understand by an inward persuasion; for
it is the incipient step, and has full relation to the subsequent work
of erecting a pier. We have seen that while one part are cutting down
the tree, another part go up the stream, cut smaller trees for stakes,
and draw them to the water's edge; while still a third division go in
quest of clay to prepare as a mortar. This completeness of plan, and
combination of means to execute it, is wholly inconsistent with the
common explanation of instinctive operations. Such exhibitions, as we
have already remarked, are simply the workings of a certain principle
they possess; performing for them the same office that mind does
for man; and the true direction of inquiry is to the nature of its
qualities. The actions themselves exhibit comparison, a knowledge of
the adaptation of means to an end, the combination of these means in
regular detail to effect the end, and the still higher intelligence
of future cause and effect, as evinced by the enlargement of the
water passage with the rise of the stream. These actions, then, being
ascertained to be uniformly the same in a great variety of cases, and
manifesting the operation of an intelligent principle in every act; and
being such as in man would have been in pursuance of the processes of
reason mentioned; we are clearly directed to the inference (indeed no
other rational one _can_ be made) that they compared the advantages of
different places, to enable them to select the best, having reference
to the construction of a dam; that they reasoned out the plan of this
dam and the adaptation of certain materials to its erection; that
they reflected upon the need of its convexity, the better to resist
the pressure of the stream, should it be rapid; that they considered
the advantages of a division of labor to expedite the work; that they
understood from experience, or arrived at the conclusion by reason,
that it was safer to discharge the surplus water at one opening well
guarded, than over the continuous edge of the dam; and finally they
had in view the uses and purpose of this dam from the beginning; and
the reasoning preparatory to each successive step was as exact and
efficient, with reference to the end designed and the means to be
employed, as _man's_ could have been; and was conducted in much, if not
exactly, the same manner; because we can conceive of but one way in
which an intelligent principle thinks.

To learn, we must derive an impression of the object or event by
the senses; and then interpret its meaning by a process of the
understanding. The domestic animals may be taught a variety of
performances, which if done by man we should not hesitate to pronounce
the result of reasoning. Ravens have been taught to sing a regular
piece, involving to a certain extent the same kind of apprehension,
as in instructing a child in music.[A] The parrot may be taught to
speak. Falcons have been learned to hunt, under the influence of
motives; a favorite dish being the reward of skilful services. The
elephant, the camel, and the horse, in adapting themselves to the wants
of man as beasts of burden, give constant proofs of intelligence and
deliberation. Some of the most stupid animals apparently, have been
taught a variety of feats under the stimulus of rewards, which raise
our astonishment at their shrewdness and ingenuity. Imitation, if
carefully considered, will be found impossible without the aid of a
thinking principle. We know, indeed, very little of any species but
our own. Their language is as vague to us as the guttural tongue of
the Indian; their movements are usually unmeaning, and all but their
general necessities, unknown; we are profoundly ignorant of every
thing but the most general manifestations of animal life; and at the
same time it must be admitted that they exhibit more intelligence in
adapting themselves to, and understanding us, than we do in suiting our
conduct to their apprehension.

[Footnote A: SOME animals are self-taught. The mocking-bird
whistles for the dog; Caesar starts up and runs to meet his master. He
squeaks out like a hurt chicken, and the hen hurries about with hanging
wings and bristling feathers, clucking to protect her injured brood.
The barking of the dog, the mewing of the cat, the creaking of the
passing wheel-barrow, follow with great truth and rapidity. He repeats
the tune taught him by his master, though of considerable length, fully
and faithfully. He runs over the quiverings of the Canary and the
clear whistlings of the Virginia nightingale, or red-bird, with such
superior execution and effect, that the mortified songsters feel their
own inferiority, and become silent, while he seems to triumph in their
defeat by redoubling his exertions.--WILSON.]

Many animals provide magazines, on which to subsist during the winter.
This appears to be the result of a long process of reasoning; of which
the impossibility of obtaining supplies during such period, the amount
necessary, the manner of bestowing it, and the kind of provision which
is not perishable, may be the most obvious. If all these points were
not heeded, the consequence would be fatal. To satisfy present hunger,
a simple impulse might be sufficient; but to anticipate distant wants,
the exercise of an intelligent principle is requisite. The ant, the
bee, the squirrel, the rat, and the beaver, are distinguished instances
of this forethought.

If the argument of PALEY is sound, that contrivance forms
design, and from design we infer intelligence, it applies with emphasis
to all constructed animal habitations. The nests of birds, the cells
of the bee, the spider's web, the mound of the ant, and the hills of
the termites, may be cited. Contrivance and construction seem to be
impossible without the constant exercise of a reflecting principle;
while economy of labor and time indicates the correctness with which
this principle directs the conduct.

Again: If the sentinel of a small party should discover an enemy
approaching, he would know, should they reach the encampment, that his
companions would be captured; but if he apprized them of the peril,
they might escape. This is simply ascertaining the relation of cause
and effect; on such conclusions he alarms his mates, and they retreat.
We know that many animals not only act the same in view of similar
premises, but deliberately prepare for the emergency, like a garrison,
by placing sentinels on the watch: now, since their actions are
uniformly the same in a great variety of cases, and exactly analogous
to the actions of men under similar motives, the same inference
results; that such actions in both cases were caused by a reflecting or
reasoning principle; and that this principle must perform its functions
in nearly if not exactly the same manner, in men and in different
animals, to produce such similar conduct. As instances, parrots, jays,
crows, ants, marmots, and the chamois, may be referred to.

The ancients attributed intelligence, in its purest sense, to many
animals, especially to the elephant and the horse. In one of the
passages quoted, PLINY, the naturalist, after describing
the ingenious method of the ants, in'shoving with their shoulders'
the larger bits of grain, says: 'There is in them in every deed,
reason, memory, and care;' the expression breaks out from him like
an irresistible conviction. VIRGIL also observes that they
are'mindful of the approaching winter;' and he refers to their
order, and division of labor. If inquiry should be directed to that
industry which accumulates not only beyond present, but even future
necessities, it could be accounted for on no other supposition, than as
a consequence of reasoning upon the necessity of preparing for the day
of need.

Let us turn for a moment to the fables of AESOP. It is
remarkable that these first attempts at moral philosophy should have
come down to us with such freshness as to be almost without the marks
of antiquity; and yet one of their most interesting features is the
correctness, so far as we know, with which animals have been invested
with their natural characteristics. We still ask

  'Astuta ingenuum vulpes imitata leonem?'

and are yet inclined to charge the raven with vanity for being cheated
of her meat, as represented in the fable, by the flattery of the fox.
We also admire the closing reproof: [Greek: Echeis