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THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO


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THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO

by

JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, PH.D., LL.D.

Author of “Life of Andrew Jackson,” “A Short History
of the United States,” “The Middle Group
of American Historians,” “The
Federalist System,” etc.







New York
The Macmillan Company
1918
All rights reserved

Copyright, 1918
By the Macmillan Company

Set up and printed. Published April, 1918




PREFACE


This book was begun under the influence of the enthusiasm aroused by
President Wilson’s address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It was
then that he first gave definite utterance of his plan for a league,
or federation, of nations to establish a permanent peace. The idea
had long been before the world, but it was generally dismissed as too
impracticable for the support of serious minded men. By taking it
up the President brought it into the realm of the possible. In the
presence of the great world catastrophe that hung over us it seemed
well to dare much in order that we might avoid a repetition of existing
evils. And if the idea was worth trying, it was certainly worth a
careful examination in the light of history. It was with the hope of
making such a careful examination that I set to work on the line of
thought that has led to this book.

As my work has progressed the great drama has been unfolding itself
with terrible realism. New characters have come upon the stage,
characters not contemplated in the original cast of the play. At the
same time some of the old parts have undergone such changes that they
appear in new relations. I am not unmindful of the fact that events
now unforeseen may make other and radical changes in the _dramatis
personæ_ before this book is placed in the hand of the reader. But
always the great problem must be the same, the prevention of a return
to the present state of world madness. That end we must ever keep in
mind as we consider the arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency
discovered between the argument and the actual state of events will,
I hope, be treated with as much leniency as the transitions of the
situation seem to warrant.

As I write, many things indicate that the great conflict is approaching
dissolution. The exhaustion of the nations, the awakening voices of
the masses, the evident failure of militarism to lead Germany to world
empire, the rising spectre of the international solidarity of the
laborers, and many other portents seem to show that the world will soon
have to say “yes” or “no” to the plain question: “Shall we, or shall we
not, have a union of nations to promote permanent peace?”

The warning that they must answer the question is shouted to many
classes. Bankers are threatened with the repudiation of the securities
of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon see their vast gains
swallowed up in the destruction of the forms of credit which hitherto
have seemed most substantial, churches and every form of intellectual
life that should promote civilization may have their dearest ideals
swept away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the German autocracy
is fighting for its life against an infuriated and despairing
proletariat. Are not these dangers enough to make us ask if the old
menace shall continue?

It is not my purpose to answer all the questions I ask. It is
sufficient to unfold the situation and show how it has arisen out of
the past. If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, he will
have to consider the means of correcting them. No pleader can compel
the opinions of intelligent men and women. It is enough if he lays
the case before clear and conscientious minds in an impersonal way.
More than this he should not try to do: as much as this I have sought
to do. If the world really lost the fruits of its victory over a world
conqueror at Waterloo, it is for the citizen of today to say in what
way the lost fruits can be recovered.

Many friends have aided me in my efforts to present my views to the
public, and among them Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia
University, deserves special acknowledgment. I am also under
obligation to Dean Ada C. Comstock, of Smith College, for very careful
proofreading. But for the opinions here expressed and the errors which
may be discovered I alone am responsible.

            JOHN SPENCER BASSETT.

  Northampton, Massachusetts,
      February 5, 1918.




INTRODUCTION


The nations of Europe fought a great war to a finish a hundred and two
years ago, defeating a master leader of men and ending the ambitions
of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so well satisfied with
their achievement that they imagined that peace, won after many years
of suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sacrifices. To escape
impending subjugation seemed enough good fortune for the moment. They
forgot that it was a principle and not merely a man they had been
contending against, and when they had made sure that Napoleon was
beyond the possibility of a return to power, they thought the future
was secure. But the principle lived and has come to life again. It was
the inherent tendency to unification in government, a principle that
appeals to the national pride of most peoples when they find themselves
in a position to make it operate to the supposed advantage of their own
country. It has been seized upon by the Germans in our own generation,
to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it was to the Frenchmen of
the early nineteenth century. To conquer the world and win a place in
the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of the _Entente_ allies
succeed in defeating it in its present form, it is reasonably certain
that it will appear again to distress the future inhabitants of the
earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to bind it down by bonds which
cannot be broken.

This conviction has led to the suggestion that when Germany is beaten,
as she must be beaten, steps should be taken, not only to insure that
she shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other power coming
after her shall lay the foundations and form the ambition which will
again put the world to the necessity of fighting the present war
over again. When the North broke the bonds of slavery in the South
in 1865 it was filled with a firm determination that slavery should
stay broken. In the same way, when the nations shall have put down the
menace of world domination now rampant in Europe, they should make it
their first concern to devise a means by which the menace shall stay
broken.

To kill a principle demands a principle equally strong and inclusive.
No one nation can keep down war and subjugation; for it must be so
strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes itself a conqueror.
It would be as intolerable to Germany, for example, to be ruled
by the United States as it would be to the United States if they
were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that will satisfy all the
nations will be exercised by some organ of power in which all have
fair representation and in which no nation is able to do things which
stimulate jealousy and give grounds for the belief that some are being
exploited by others. This suggestion does not demand a well integrated
federal government for all the functions of the state but merely the
adoption of a system of coöperation with authority over the outbreak
of international war and strong enough to make its will obeyed. It is
federation for only one purpose and such a purpose as will never be
brought into vital action as long as the federated will is maintained
at such a point of strength and exercised with such a degree of
fairness that individual states will not question that will.

This principle of federated action for a specific purpose was adopted
by the United States in 1789, and though hailed by the practical
statesmen of Europe as an experiment, it has proved the happiest form
of government that has yet been established over a vast territory in
which are divergent economic and social interests. In it is much more
integration than would exist in a federated system to prevent war,
where the action of the central authority would be limited to one main
object. If it could be formed and put into operation by the present
generation, who know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre of
world conquest it might pass through the preliminary critical stages
of its existence successfully. At any rate, the world is full of the
feeling that such things may be possible, and it would be unwise to
dismiss the suggestion without giving it fair and full consideration.

The discussion brings up what seems to be a law of human activities,
that as the ages run and as men develop their minds they combine in
larger and larger units for carrying on the particular thing they are
interested in. And they make these combinations by force or through
mutual agreement. We have before us the consideration of the most
important form of this unifying process, the unification of nations,
which has generally come through force, but sometimes has come through
agreement.

In recent industrial history is a parallel process so well illustrating
the point at issue that I can not refrain from mentioning it. In his
book, _My Four Years in Germany_, Mr. James W. Gerard contrasts great
industrial combinations in the United States and Germany. In one
country are trusts, in the other great companies known as cartels.
The development of the trust we know well. It came out of a process
of competitive war. Some large manufacturer who possessed ability for
war, formed an initial group of manufacturers with the prospect of
controlling a large part of the market. He was careful to see that
his own group had the best possible organization, central control,
and a loyal body of subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his
smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven into surrender or
bankruptcy. It was a hard process, but it led to industrial unity with
its many advantages.

The cartel began with co-operation. All the persons or companies
manufacturing a given article were asked to unite in its creation. They
pooled their resources, adopted common buying and selling agencies,
and shared the returns amicably. They proved very profitable for the
shareholders, and they strengthened the national industry in its
competition against foreigners. In the United States the trust has been
unpopular, despite its many economic advantages. The reason is the
battle-like methods by which it destroyed its rivals. The result was
the enactment of laws to restrain its development, laws so contrary
to the trend of the times that they have been very tardily enforced.
The cartel, established with the co-operation of the whole group of
manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and obtained the approval of the
laws. It is not necessary to say which is the better of these two
methods of arriving at the same object.

Turning to the subject with which we are here chiefly concerned, it
is interesting to note that Germany has undertaken in the last years
to carry forward her world expansion by methods that are entirely
different. While she has federated in industrial life she appears in
her foreign relations as a true representative of the spirit that
built up the trusts. She means to unify her competitor states, not as
she has united her industries, but as the American trusts secured the
whole field of operations. First she forms a small group with herself
at the head. In the group are Germany, Austria, Turkey, and, later on,
Bulgaria. At this stage of her progress she has gone as far as the
Standard Oil Company had gone when Mr. Rockefeller had perfected the
idea of the “trust” in 1882. Her next step was to attack her rivals.
France she would crush at a blow, first lulling Great Britain to
inactivity by feigned friendship and the promise of gains in the Near
East. Then she would do what she would with Russia. With these two
nations disposed of, Britain, the unready, could be easily brought to
terms, and the United States would then be at her mercy. The mass of
German people had not, perhaps, reasoned the process out in this way;
but it was so easily seen that it could not have escaped the minds of
the leaders of the German military party. No trust builder ever made
fairer plans for the upbuilding of his enterprise than these gentlemen
made for putting through their combination, before which they saw in
their minds the states of the world toppling. So well were the plans
made and so efficient were the strokes that the utmost efforts of the
rest of the world