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THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS
VOL. II.


THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

by

ALFRED WILLIAM BENN


  Εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων
  τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δὲ οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα καὶ πῶς ἂν
  καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει
                                                            PLOTINUS

  Quamquam ab his philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas
  habemus: sed tamen est aliquid quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis
                                                              CICERO


In Two Volumes

VOL. II.






London
Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1 Paternoster Square
1882

(The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved)




                               CONTENTS

                                  OF

                          THE SECOND VOLUME.


                              CHAPTER I.

                              THE STOICS                      pages 1-52

I. Why the systems of Plato and Aristotle failed to secure a hold
on contemporary thought, 1—Fate of the schools which they founded,
2—Revival of earlier philosophies and especially of naturalism,
3—Antisthenes and the Cynics, 4—Restoration of naturalism to its former
dignity, 6.

II. Zeno and Crates, 7—Establishment of the Stoic school, 8—Cleanthes
and Chrysippus, 9—Encyclopaedic character of the Stoic teaching, 9—The
great place which it gave to physical science, 10—Heracleitean reaction
against the dualism of Aristotle, 11—Determinism and materialism of the
Stoics, 12—Their concessions to the popular religion, 14.

III. The Stoic theory of cognition purely empirical, 15—Development of
formal logic, 16—New importance attributed to judgment as distinguished
from conception, 16—The idea of law, 17—Consistency as the principle
of the Stoic ethics, 18—Meaning of the precept, Follow Nature,
19—Distinction between pleasure and self-interest as moral standards,
20—Absolute sufficiency of virtue for happiness, 21—The Stoics wrong
from an individual, right from a social point of view, 22—Theory
of the passions, 23—Necessity of volition and freedom of judgment,
24—Difficulties involved in an appeal to purpose in creation, 24.

IV. The Stoic paradoxes follow logically from the absolute distinction
between right and wrong, 25—Attempt at a compromise with the ordinary
morality by the doctrines (i.) of preference and objection, 26—(ii.) of
permissible feeling, 27—(iii.) of progress from folly to wisdom, 27—and
(iv.) of imperfect duties, 27—Cicero’s _De Officiis_, 28—Examples of
Stoic casuistry, 29—Justification of suicide, 30.

V. Three great contributions made by the Stoics to ethical speculation,
(i.) The inwardness of virtue, including the notion of conscience,
31—Prevalent misconception with regard to the Erinyes, 32—(ii.) The
individualisation of duty, 33—Process by which this idea was evolved,
35—Its influence on the Romans of the empire, 36—(iii.) The idea of
humanity, 36—Its connexion with the idea of Nature, 37—Utilitarianism
of the Stoics, 38.

VI. The philanthropic tendencies of Stoicism partly neutralised by
its extreme individualism, 40—Conservatism of Marcus Aurelius, 41—The
Stoics at once unpitying and forgiving, 42—Humility produced by their
doctrine of universal depravity, 42—It is not in the power of others to
injure us, 43—The Stoic satirists and Roman society, 44.

VII. The idea of Nature and the unity of mankind, 44—The dynamism of
Heracleitus dissociated from the teleology of Socrates, 46—Standpoint
of Marcus Aurelius, 46—Tendency to extricate morality from its external
support, 47—Modern attacks on Nature, 48—Evolution as an ethical
sanction, 49—The vicious circle of evolutionist ethics, 50—The idea of
humanity created and maintained by the idea of a cosmos, 51—The prayer
of Cleanthes, 52.


                              CHAPTER II.

                        EPICURUS AND LUCRETIUS              pages 53-119

I. Stationary character of Epicureanism, 53—Prevalent tendency to
exaggerate its scientific value, 55—Opposition or indifference of
Epicurus to the science of his time, 57.

II. Life of Epicurus, 58—His philosophy essentially practical, 59—The
relation of pleasure to virtue: Aristippus, 60—Pessimism of Hêgêsias,
61—Hedonism of Plato’s _Protagoras_, 61—The Epicurean definition of
pleasure, 62—Reaction of Plato’s idealism on Epicurus, 63—He accepts
the negative definition of pleasure, 64—Inconsistency involved in his
admissions, 65.

III. Deduction of the particular virtues: Temperance, 66—Points of
contact with Cynicism, 66—Evils bred by excessive frugality, 67—Sexual
passion discouraged by Epicureanism, 67—Comparative indulgence shown
to pity and grief, 68—Fortitude inculcated by minimising the evils of
pain, 69—Justice as a regard for the general interest, 70—The motives
for abstaining from aggression purely selfish, 70—Indifference of the
Epicureans to political duties, 73—Success of Epicureanism in promoting
disinterested friendship, 74.

IV. Motives which led Epicurus to include physics in his teaching,
75—His attacks on supernaturalism directed less against the old
Polytheism than against the religious movement whence Catholicism
sprang, 76—Justification of the tone taken by Lucretius, 78—Plato and
Hildebrand, 78—Concessions made by Epicurus to the religious reaction,
80—His criticism of the Stoic theology, 81.

V. Why Epicurus adopted the atomic theory, 82—Doctrine of infinite
combinations, 83—Limited number of chances required by the modern
theory of evolution, 84—Objections to which Democritus had laid
himself open, 85—They are not satisfactorily met by Epicurus, 85—One
naturalistic theory as good as another, 87—except the conclusions of
astronomy, which are false, 87.

VI. Materialism and the denial of a future life, 88—Epicurus tries to
argue away the dread of death, 89—His enterprise inconsistent with
human nature, 90—The belief in future torments is the dread of death
under another form, 92—How the prospect of death adds to our enjoyment
of life, 93—Its stimulating effect on the energies, 94—The love of life
gives meaning and merit to courage, 95.

VII. The Epicurean theory of sensation and cognition, 95—Negative
character of the whole system, 98—Theory of human history: the doctrine
of progressive civilisation much older than Epicurus, 98—Opposition
between humanism and naturalism on this point, 99—Passage from a drama
of Euphorion, 99.

VIII. Lucretius: his want of philosophic originality, 100—His alleged
improvements on the doctrine of Epicurus examined, 101—His unreserved
acceptance of the Epicurean ethics, 103—In what the difference
between Lucretius and Epicurus consists, 103—Roman enthusiasm for
physical science, 104—Sympathy of Lucretius with early Greek thought,
105—The true heroine of the _De Rerum Naturâ_, 105—Exhibition of life
in all its forms, 106—Venus as the beginning and end of existence,
106—Elucidation of the atomic theory by vital phenomena, 107—Imperfect
apprehension of law: the _foedera Naturai_ and the _foedera fati_,
108—Assimilation of the great cosmic changes to organic processes,
110—False beliefs considered as necessary products of human nature,
111—and consequently as fit subjects for poetic treatment, 112—High
artistic value of the _De Rerum Naturâ_, 113—Comparison between
Lucretius and Dante, 113.

IX. Merits and defects of Epicurus: his revival of atomism and
rejection of supernaturalism, 114—His theory of ethics, 115—His
contributions to the science of human nature, 116—His eminence as
a professor of the art of happiness, 116—His influence on modern
philosophy greatly exaggerated by M. Guyau, 117—Unique combination of
circ