MASKELL***


Transcribed from the 1850 William Pickering edition by David Price, email
ccx074@pglaf.org

                        [Picture: Pamphlet cover]





                                 A LETTER
                                  TO THE
                        REV. WILLIAM MASKELL, A.M.


                                    BY

                    THE REV. MAYOW WYNELL MAYOW, A.M.
                    VICAR OF MARKET LAVINGTON, WILTS,
                AND LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

                                * * * * *

           HOW FAR THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
              COMMITS THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND BY ITS DECISION,
                         EVEN ALLOWING IT TO HAVE
                          JURISDICTION IN POINTS
                               OF DOCTRINE.

                                * * * * *

                             Second Edition.

                                * * * * *

                                 LONDON:
                            WILLIAM PICKERING.
                                  1850.

                                * * * * *

MY DEAR MASKELL,

IN these “last days,” in which “perilous times” have “come,” it seems a
duty, to be somewhat less nice and scrupulous as to any charge of
presumption or lack of modesty to which a man may lay himself open by
making known his thoughts upon the great matters which now agitate us,
than would be the case at another time.  One whose name will add no
weight to any thing he may say, might well shrink under ordinary
circumstances from commenting upon your recent letter, and appear, even
to himself, over-bold in supposing he can add any thing to the views
therein expounded.  But the very pain with which we approach these topics
is some warrant to express our thoughts; inasmuch as it is, I think,
something of a guarantee that whatever is said, will be, at any rate, not
said lightly.  Most heartily do I desire to adopt and echo your words
“that the enquiry on which we are all engaged is far too great to admit
of any personal consideration; and our aim is not to win a victory, or to
prove that we ourselves are in the right, but to discover the truth, and
point it out to others.”

If then I imagine a line of argument tending to elucidate this truth, has
been partially overlooked in the expression of your views, I trust I
shall stand excused, both by yourself and any others who may read this
letter, from the charge of a too great boldness in writing it.  The
crisis and exigence of the time is, as it appears to me, too great to
allow us to stand upon niceties, or permit any thing to be kept back
which may even by possibility be found of service in indicating the line
of duty.

Let me, however, here say in the very outset, I am not by any means about
to attempt an answer to your letter; a task for which I am, in the first
place, not qualified, and in the second place, not disposed.  I feel the
difficulties you bring forward too much myself to be prepared to ignore
them, though I will not say I go with you in the whole of the positions
you are concerned to establish.  But it is _became_ I feel the pressure
of many of them so strongly; _because_, much as the names of Mr. Keble
and of many who take the same line of argument with him, are to be
revered, nevertheless, I am at a loss to make up my mind that they have
established an unassailable position in denying the competency and
authority of the court of the Committee of Privy Council, that I am the
more anxious to say a few words upon one point which appears to me to
have escaped your notice.

Let me come at once to this point: and to do so I cannot, perhaps,
proceed more conveniently than by making a quotation from your letter.
At page 54, you say:—“No doubt this court,” (The Judicial Committee of
Privy Council,) “nor any other court cannot make canons: but, as has been
before said, this is a question, not of new canons and formularies, but
of the right construction of old ones.  Now, in such a cause, either the
court of the Judicial Committee has authority or it has not:...  If
then the decision of the court is to be listened to at all, it is not
easy to discover how one will be able to draw distinctions, and place
limitations upon the extent to which it reaches.  _There seems to be no
middle way between accepting and acting upon it_, _and repudiating it
altogether as if it had never existed_.  I mean, repudiating it in every
other respect than in the one point, comparatively unimportant and
trivial, of the institution of a certain person to a certain benefice.”

You say, it is not easy to discover a middle way.  I would hope, though
not _easy_, it may be _not impossible_.

Let me however here, and in the first place, clear myself from any
suspicion