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A Theologico-Political Treatise

Part IV of IV - Chapters XVI to XX

by Baruch Spinoza




TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [16:x].
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[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - Of the Foundations of a State;
   of the Natural and  Civil Rights of Individuals;
   and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power.

[16:1]  In Nature right co-extensive with power.

[16:2]  This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature.

[16:3]  How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible.

[16:4]  Subjects not slaves.

[16:5]  Definition of private civil right - and wrong.

[16:6]  Of alliance.

[16:7]  Of treason.

[16:8]  In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law.

[16:9]  Civil government not inconsistent with religion.



[17:0]  CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that no one can or need
   transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the
   Hebrew Republic, as it was during  the lifetime of Moses,
   and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy;
   and of its Excellence. Lastly, of the Causes why the
   Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have
   continued without Dissension.

[17:1]  The absolute theory, of Sovereignty ideal - No one can
        in fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power.
        Evidence of this.

[17:2]  The greatest danger in all States from within,
        not without.

[17:3]  Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus.

[17:4]  Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy.

[17:5]  Then to subjection to Moses.

[17:6]  Then to a Theocracy with the power divided
        between the high priest and the captains.

[17:7]  The tribes confederate states.

[17:8]  Restraints on the civil power.

[17:9]  Restraints on the people.

[17:A]  Causes of decay involved in the constitution
        of the Levitical priesthood.



[18:0]  CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews and
   their History certain Lessons are deduced.

[18:1]  The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable,
        yet lessons may be derived from its history.

[18:2]  As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics
        to ecclesiastics - the danger of identifying
        religion with dogma.

[18:3]  The necessity of keeping all judicial power with
        the sovereign - the danger  of changes in the
        form of a State.

[18:4]  This last danger illustrated from the history of
        England - of Rome.

[18:5]  And of Holland.



[19:0] CHAPTER XIX -  It is shown that the Right
   over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the
   Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of
   Religion should be in accordance with Public
   Peace, if we would worship God aright.

[19:1]  Difference between external and inward religion.

[19:2]  Positive law established only by agreement.

[19:3]  Piety furthered by peace and obedience.

[19:4]  Position of the Apostles exceptional.

[19:5]  Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew,
        suffer from disputes between the civil
        and ecclesiastical powers.

[19:6]  Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers.



[20:0]  CHAPTER XX -  That in a Free State every man
may Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks.

[20:1]  The mind not subject to State authority.

[20:2]  Therefore in general language should not be.

[20:3]  A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion
        to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in
        accordance  with the law, deserves well of the State.

[20:4]  That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from
        the history of Amsterdam.

[20:5]  Danger to the State of withholding it. -
        Submission of the Author to the
        judgment of his country's rulers.



[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.





[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE
NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE
RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.

(1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and to
show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. (2) It is
now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and
discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. (3) For the due
consideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a State,
first turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and
afterwards to religion and the state as a whole.

(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those natural
laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so
as to live and act in a given way. (5) For instance, fishes are naturally
conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore
fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural
right. [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has
sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other words, her right is
co-extensive with her power. (7) The power of nature is the power of God,
which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature
is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it
follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in
other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his
power as it has been conditioned. (8) Now it is the sovereign law and right
of nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is,
without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and
right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according
to its natural conditions. (9) We do not here acknowledge any
difference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor
between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor
between fools, madmen, and sane men. (10) Whatsoever an individual does by
the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it
acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. [16:2] (11)
Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the sway
of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the
habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as
sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.

(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason
dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant
and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to
live according to the laws of desire. (13) This is identical with the
teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law - that is, so
long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is
no sin.

(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by
sound reason, but by desire and power. (15) All are not naturally
conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on
the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the
right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their
life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. (16)
Nevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve
themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. (17) Nature
has given them no other guide, and has denied them the present power of
living according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by
the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws
of the nature of a lion.

(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway
of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or
impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take
for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any
other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders
the accomplishment of his purpose.

(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of
nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only
prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not
forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of
the means suggested by desire.

(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of
human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her
limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of
nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone
that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular
way. (21) If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,
or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely
ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also
because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our
human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in
respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to
the laws of our reason.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live
according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they
have men's true good for their object. (23) Moreover, everyone wishes to
live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be
quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's
claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one
who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit,
and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3] (24) When we
reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live
most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that
men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and
well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally
belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned
by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the
whole body. (25) This end they will be unable to attain if desire be
their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different
direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they
will be guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to
repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any
desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as
they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as
their own.

(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and
established, we will now inquire.

(27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects
anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a
greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an
evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater
good. (28) That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks
the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. (29) I say
advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not
necessarily follow that he judges right. (30) This law is so deeply
implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths
and axioms.

(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one
can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things
[Endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under
the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32) An example
will make the matter clearer. (33) Suppose that a robber forces me to
promise that I will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. (34) It is
plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with
my power) that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by
assenting to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend
to accept his conditions. (35) Or again, suppose I have genuinely promised
someone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any
nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be
kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and
right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete right to break my
compact, and act as if my promise had never been uttered. (36) I say that I
should have perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true
and evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I
had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, I should be in
fear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive
to avoid by every means in my power.

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its
utility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) It is, therefore,
foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also
endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for
the violator more harm than good. (39) This consideration should have very
great weight in forming a state. (40) However, if all men could be easily
led by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a
state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone
would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief
good, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. (41) However, it
is far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason
alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition,
envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place
therein. (42) Hence, though men make - promises with all the appearances of
good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can
absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind
it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his
compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the
fear of some greater evil.

(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual
is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in
so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the
Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,
wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will
retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will;
otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he
will be bound unwillingly to obey him.

(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of
natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if
each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the
latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to
obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body politic of this
kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields
all its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any
laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of
things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all
their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) For if
they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken
precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,
and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining
the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign
power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and
necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and
will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a
primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.

(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion
and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
