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  _A Battery at Close Quarters_

  _A Paper_

  READ BEFORE THE OHIO COMMANDERY
  OF THE LOYAL LEGION

  October 6, 1909


  BY
  HENRY M. NEIL
  Captain Twenty-second Ohio Battery


  COLUMBUS, OHIO
  1909



  THE CHAMPLIN PRESS
  COLUMBUS, OHIO




A BATTERY AT CLOSE QUARTERS.

BEING THE STORY OF THE ELEVENTH OHIO BATTERY AT IUKA AND CORINTH.


During the Civil War artillery projectiles were divided as to structure
into _solid_, _hollow_ and _case shot_. The solid shot were intended to
batter down walls or heavy obstructions. Hollow projectiles, called
shell and shrapnel, were for use against animate objects; to set fire to
buildings and destroy lighter obstructions. Under the head of case shot
we had grape and canister. Grape shot is no longer used; being
superseded by the machine gun. Canister is simply a sheet iron case
filled with bullets and is effective only at very short ranges.

The foremost European military writer, Hohenloe, states that in the
Franco-Prussian war, the batteries of the Prussian Guard expended about
twenty-five thousand shells and one canister, and that this one canister
was broken in transport.

In the official reports of the recent Russo-Japanese War we find that
the Arisaka gun, which was the Japanese field piece, has a range of
6,600 meters. The Russian field pieces were said to give good results at
8,000 meters, or five miles. The Japanese, and later the Russians, made
a great feature of indirect fire. Having located a mass of the enemy,
probably beyond two ranges of hills, they would stake out a line
indicating the direction, then secure the range by the use of shells
which gave out a yellowish vapor on bursting. This vapor being observed
and signaled by scouts also indicated the necessary angles of departure
from the line of stakes and enabled the artillerymen, miles away from
actual contact, to complacently try experiments in battle ballistics
with very little fear of being interrupted by an enemy.

The range of modern field artillery being officially reported at five
miles, permit me to take you back to a day, over forty-seven years ago,
when an Ohio battery, placed in the extreme front of battle, fought at
less than fifty yards.

The village of Iuka lies in the northeast corner of the State of
Mississippi. The neighboring country is broken and, in 1862, was covered
with forests. Northwesterly from Iuka lies the village of Burnsville and
further on the little city of Corinth, close to the Tennessee line. In
1862 Corinth possessed strategical advantages which caused it to become
a large supply depot for the Federal armies. South of Corinth and
southwest of Iuka, the town of Jacinto was located.

On the eighteenth of September, 1862, General Sterling Price lay at Iuka
with an army of about twenty thousand Confederates. General E. O. G.
Ord's force lay between Burnsville and Corinth and had just been
reinforced by Ross's division. Burnsville was seven miles from Iuka.
General Rosecrans lay at Jacinto, nineteen and one-half miles from Iuka.

General Grant, taking advantage of this situation, ordered a combined
attack by Ord and Rosecrans upon General Price. Under this order
Rosecrans moved from Jacinto at 3:00 A. M. September 19th, and was
within striking distance of Price's patrols by noon. Ord was to attack
from the west and draw Price in that direction while Rosecrans was to
move to the rebel rear by the Jacinto and Fulton roads and cut off their
retreat. Neither of these Union armies was powerful enough to make,
alone, a successful attack upon Price.

The strategical plan of attack above outlined was not carried out. Ord's
strategy never reached the domain of tactics, for he went into camp
seven miles west of Iuka and the head of Rosecrans' column was attacked
by the entire army of Price. It was with the head of this column that
the Eleventh Ohio Battery marched into the fight. Anticipating a
combined engagement the head of the column pushed its innocent way into
the maw of the entire rebel army. We had to fight first and think
afterward. Price had hours to choose his positions and, incidentally, he
chose our position also. We didn't have time to change it.

"Rapidity of movement and surprise are the life and soul of the
strategical offensive." That maxim reads well but, in practice, it is
important to provide against being surprised by the other fellow before
you spring your surprise on him.

For several miles in the afternoon of the 19