



Produced by Al Haines.





                                  THE
                               PAN-GERMAN
                               PROGRAMME

                                  THE
                    PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS
                                AND THE
                     MANIFESTO OF THE INTELLECTUALS


                      _Translated from the German_


                        With an Introduction by

                              EDWYN BEVAN



                   LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
                 RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1
                                  1918




                      *THE PAN-GERMAN PROGRAMME.*



                            *INTRODUCTORY.*


The two documents presented in this pamphlet are the fullest statement
of the programme of the Pan-German party in Germany.  They were both
drawn up in the earlier months of 1915.  After the series of rapid
German successes in the West, with which the war opened, had seemed to
come to a check, and month after month went by without the expected
advance on Paris being resumed, it was felt to be necessary that the
German people should get some more precise idea of what it was fighting
for, what it had to obtain before it could consider that the war had
attained its end.

In March, 1915, the rumour got about that the German Government was
contemplating a peace of compromise, and Pan-German circles took alarm.
Pan-Germanism was not strong in the working class and many of the
Radical Intellectuals disapproved of it.  But it was very strong among
the country landowners, _i.e._ the class called _Junkers_, and the rich
manufacturers, especially the great ironmasters of the
Rhenish-Westphalian country, who wanted to get hold of the French
iron-districts of Briey and Longwy.  These interests were organised in a
number of powerful Associations.

If there was danger of the Government under Bethmann Hollweg's direction
weakening, it appeared necessary that pressure should be brought to bear
upon it in time.  Five Associations in March drew up a Memorandum to be
presented privately to the Chancellor.  They were afterwards joined by a
sixth, and the Memorandum in its final form was laid before the
Chancellor on May 20, 1915.  This is the first of the two documents here
translated.

The second is the so-called "Manifesto of the Intellectuals."  It was
read on June 20, 1915, to a great gathering of professors, diplomats,
and high Government officials in the Artists' Hall (_Kuenstlerhaus_) in
Berlin.  It was not published, but circulated as a "strictly
confidential manuscript," and was submitted to the Chancellor on July 8.
When 1341 signatures had been appended to it the Government stepped in
and forbade further canvassing.  It is therefore claimed that the 1341
do not represent the amount of the support which the manifesto would
have got in the country had it been allowed free course.

The Intellectuals' Manifesto has a more extensive programme than that of
the Six Associations.  It includes, not only the demands of the
Associations, but the scheme commonly designated by the term
_Mittel-Europa_, with its appendix, the control of the Turkish Empire by
Germany, implying a great belt of German power across the world from the
North Sea to the Persian Gulf--about which the Six Associations said
nothing.  Again, whereas the Six Associations say only in general terms
that they demand the possession of "a colonial empire adequate to
satisfy Germany's manifold economic interests," the Intellectuals state
more specifically that this means an empire in Central Africa, and
more--endorsing, therefore, the scheme labelled _Mittel-Afrika_.

These two documents will always be two of the most important documents
of the Great War for students of history.  Although they were not
published in Germany till long after they had begun to circulate
privately, their contents became rapidly known and they became main
objects of attack for Radical and Socialist circles.  Much has happened
since they were drawn up.  It has become clear to a much larger number
of people in Germany that such schemes are unrealisable.

In July, 1917, the majority of the Reichstag passed a resolution in
favour of a peace on the basis of the _status quo ante_.  But we should
guard against the error of supposing that, because the largest body of
opinion in the country last summer was against annexations, all danger
from German ambitions has passed away.  We must take into account two
things:

(1) The Pan-German opinion, even if that of a minority, is that of a
very strong and desperately energetic minority.  It has recently taken
body in the _Vaterlandspartei_, which may be rendered "National Party."
It carries on a vigorous propaganda backed by vast funds, and has on its
side many men of influence upon the Government.  It shows what the
majority of the Germans would desire, if weakness on our side gave them
any hope of getting it.  And hopes seem to have risen again since the
collapse of Russia and the repulse of Italy. The Reichstag majority
which passed the "peace resolution" last July seems no longer solid.  It
is highly improbable that the majority of the Reichstag would now demand
a peace "without annexations."

(2) Even those who oppose the Pan-Germans and stand for a "peace without
annexations" cherish the design of laying a foundation for German power
within the sphere of Germany and its allies, upon which _later on_ a
more ambitious structure of power could be reared.  The trouble with
"these gentlemen of the _Vaterlandspartei_," one Socialist writer
explained, was not that they asked for too much but that they asked for
it all at once.  If Germany could strengthen its grip upon Central
Europe, Bulgaria, and the restored Turkish Empire, one of the great
schemes contained in the Intellectuals' Manifesto could be realised
_without annexations_.  It may be that when the German Government
ultimately state their minimum requirements they will seem modest,
compared with the Pan-German programme.  Even so they will require
careful scrutiny lest there should be more in them of the Pan-German
spirit than appears on the outside, more than is compatible with the
safety of the world.


EDWYN BEVAN,
       _January_, 1918.




                                  *I.*

                *THE PETITION OF THE SIX ASSOCIATIONS.*


The following is the full text of the Petitions addressed to the German
Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, and to the Governments of the
various Federated States of the German Empire, on March 10 and May 20,
1915, by the League of Agriculturists (_Bund der Landwirte_), the German
Peasants' League (_Deutscher Bauernbund_), the Christian German
Peasants' Unions (_die christlichen deutschen Bauernvereine_), the
Central Association of German Manufacturers (_Centralverband deutscher
Industrieller_), the Manufacturers' League (_Bund der Industriellen_)
and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the German Empire
(_Reichsdeutscher Mittelstandsverband_):--


Together with the whole German people, those occupied in business
pursuits, whether in agriculture or manufacture, in handicrafts or
trade, are determined to endure to the end, notwithstanding every
sacrifice, in this struggle for life and death which has been forced
upon Germany, in order that Germany may emerge stronger in its external
relations, assured of a lasting peace, and thus also assured of further
national, economic, and cultural development at home.

Since the whole German people recognises these aims as its own, and has
given tangible proof of its willingness to make sacrifices for their
achievement, the rumours recently circulating in town and country were
bound to be most disquieting.  These rumours (confirmed, apparently, by
certain announcements in the Press) were to the effect that preliminary
steps were being taken to prepare the way for peace negotiations, and,
in particular, for a separate peace with England, based on certain
English wishes and demands.

Hence universal satisfaction has been caused by the declaration of the
_Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, that no competent judge would dream
of sacrificing Germany's favourable military position in order to
conclude a premature peace with any one of her enemies.

Even if the military situation were more unfavourable, or more doubtful,
this ought to make no difference to our determination--unless, indeed,
we are to lose sight of the aims in home and foreign policy which His
Majesty the Emperor has himself proclaimed.  These aims can only be
attained by achieving a peace which will bring us better security for
our frontiers in East and West, an extension of the foundations of our
sea power, and the possibility of an unchecked and strong development of
our economic resources; in short, those extensions of power, alike in
politics, in the army, in the navy, and in our economic life, which will
guarantee to us a stronger position in the world.

Any peace which does not bring us these results will make a speedy
renewal of the struggle inevitable under circumstances essentially less
favourable to Germany. Therefore no premature peace!  For from a
premature peace we could not hope for a sufficient prize of victory.

But also no half-hearted peace, no peace which does not include complete
political exploitation of those ultimate military successes which we
expect to obtain!

For it must be realised that, not only the security of our future
international position, but also our power to utilise the present
self-sacrificing spirit of the German people for the settlement of those
questions of domestic policy, which will arise on the return of peace,
both equally presuppose the complete exploitation of our military
position so as to increase Germany's power abroad.  Assuredly our people
would understand any concessions which were wrung from them by a
military situation so desperate as to oppose insuperable obstacles to
any resistance, however determined and however self-sacrificing; but
they would not tolerate any weak concessions at the conclusion of peace
which were not justified and necessitated by the military situation.
Concessions of this kind would be fraught with the most fatal
consequences for the domestic peace of our Fatherland, since they might
lead to the same result as a premature withdrawal from the conflict, and
our soldiers would discover, on returning home, that the only reward for
their splendid endurance was a crushing burden of taxation. Hundreds of
thousands have given their lives: the prize of victory must correspond
to the sacrifice.

_The following Memorandum was drawn up on March_ 10 _of this year_ and
addressed to your Excellency by the League of Agriculturists, the German
Peasants' League, the Central Association of German Manufacturers, the
Manufacturers' League, and the League of Middle-Class Citizens in the
German Empire.  The Memorandum, to which the Christian German Peasants'
Unions, who are also signatories to the present Petition, have given
their adhesion, explains in detail the requirements which--the necessary
military successes being assumed--must in the opinion of the undersigned
Associations be fulfilled, in order to secure for Germany that
political, military, and economic position which would enable her to
look forward with confidence to all possibilities of the future.

The Memorandum was as follows:

    The undersigned Corporations have carefully considered what
    measures are required to give practical effect to the formula,
    which has so often been heard during the last few months, viz.,
    that this war must be followed by an honourable peace,
    corresponding to the sacrifices which have been made and
    containing in itself a guarantee for its continuance.

    In answering this question, it must never be forgotten that our
    enemies continue to announce that Germany is to be annihilated
    and struck out of the rank of the Great Powers.  Against such
    aims treaties will afford us no protection; for treaties, when
    the fitting moment comes, would once more be trodden under foot.
    We can only look for safety in a serious economic and military
    weakening of our enemies, sufficient to ensure peace for as long
    a time as can be foreseen.

    We must demand a colonial Empire adequate to satisfy Germany's
    manifold economic interests, we must safeguard our future policy
    in matters of customs and commerce, and we must secure a war
    indemnity to be paid in a form suitable to our requirements: but
    our chief end in the struggle which has been forced upon us is,
    in our opinion, to strengthen and improve the foundations on
    which Germany's position in Europe rests, in the following
    directions:

    In order to provide the necessary security for our influence at
    sea and in order to secure our future military and economic
    position as against England, _Belgium_, owing to the close
    connexion of Belgian territory (which is economically of such
    importance) with our main manufacturing districts, must be
    subjected to German Imperial legislation, both in military and
    tariff matters, and also in regard to currency, banking, and
    postal arrangements. Railways and canals must be incorporated in
    our transport system.  In general, the government and
    administration of the country must be so managed that _the
    inhabitants obtain no influence on the political fortunes of the
    German Empire_; there must be separation of the Walloon and of
    the predominantly Flemish territory, and _all economic and
    industrial undertakings and real estate, which are so vital for
    the government of the country, must be transferred into German
    hands_.

    We must consider the question of _French_ territory from the
    same point of view, _i.e._ so far as it affects our position
    towards England.  Hence we must regard it as a matter of vital
    importance, in the interests of our future influence at sea,
    that _we should hold the French coastal districts from the
    Belgian frontier approximately as far as the Somme_. and thus
    secure access to the Atlantic Ocean. _The Hinterland, which must
    be acquired with them_, must be so delimited as to secure to us
    the complete economic and strategic exploitation of those
    Channel-ports which we gain.  Any further acquisitions of French
    territory, apart from the necessary annexation of the iron-ore
    district of Briey, must be determined solely by military and
    strategic considerations.  After the experiences of this war, it
    may be regarded as self-evident that we cannot in the future
    leave our frontiers at the mercy of hostile invasion by allowing
    our opponents to retain those fortified positions which threaten
    us, in particular Verdun and Belfort and the Western <DW72>s of
    the Vosges which lie between them. _The acquisition of the line
   