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WAR PAPER No. 17.

MICHIGAN COMMANDERY,

LOYAL LEGION.




  THE BATTLE of ALLATOONA.

  OCTOBER 5th, 1864.


  A PAPER READ BEFORE THE
  MICHIGAN COMMANDERY
  OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION OF THE U. S.


  BY
  WILLIAM LUDLOW,
  _Major Corps of Engineers; Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel U. S. A._


  AT
  DETROIT, APRIL, 2D, 1891.
  DETROIT, MICH.:


  WINN & HAMMOND, PRINTERS AND BINDERS.
  1891.




ALLATOONA.


_Companions and Gentlemen:_

It appears strange to me that an action which all who mention it--and they
are many--agree in characterizing as one of the most brilliant exploits of
a war as thickset with deeds of gallantry as a rose bush with its
blossoms, should not long since have had its adequate historian and
monographer.

The contest was so famous, the issue so glorious, the recollection of the
day still must be so vivid in the minds of the survivors, that I could not
anticipate any lack of material wherefrom to procure data to formulate a
reasonably satisfactory narrative of such a gallant feat of arms, and in
such detail as to give it life and color. But of all the war papers that
have been written on affairs great and small, none that I know has had
Allatoona for its special subject, and from the sources of information at
my command, I have found it quite impracticable to construct an account
that is not in some respect at variance with others made by authority. The
official reports, while giving the general features, of necessity exclude
most of the minor but equally interesting details, and the omissions,
inaccuracies and discrepancies, not important in some particulars and
material in others, for the purposes, at least, of a fully detailed and
authenticated narrative, cannot at this time be corrected. And even the
numbers engaged on each side, and of those who fell as victims, are not
known with certainty.

This paper, therefore, can pretend to be no more than an outline sketch,
which an abler hand must put itself to filling out and completing. When
the war records shall have been made fully public, as they will be
presently, and at least all the official material be available, the
historian of Allatoona, by extended research and correspondence with
survivors, should address himself to the task of preparing an
authoritative narration in order to preserve to posterity the record of a
memorable and typically American event.

For an event it was; a vital one, as it would appear, to the full success
of Sherman's campaign, and with the "March to the Sea" hung in the balance
and awaiting the issue.

       *       *       *       *       *

The importance of a given moment in the world's history is not of
necessity to be estimated by the numbers occupying the stage at the time,
nor even with the degree of activity or turmoil with which their parts are
playing.

Much labor is wasted in the lives of men, and mountains of effort result
often in mere noise or discomfiture, making no real history. The center of
gravity of two worlds may be an immaterial point, and the earth itself
revolves upon a slender axis. So a turning point of history may be
concentrated upon a comparatively narrow field, while the reverberation of
its potency shall resound forever, as the silent nod of Jove lets loose
the thunders of Olympus to shake the earth and change the fate of nations.

Some preliminary remarks are in order, explanatory of the general
situation and its relation to the Battle of Allatoona.


THE GENERAL SITUATION.

It was the fall of '64. The fiery comet of secession that, blazing out in
'61, for three long years had scorched the firmament, spreading death and
pestilence over all the land, was waning in its course; doomed presently
to disappear forever in Chaos, but emitting malignant emanations to its
latest spark. The structure of the Confederate Government, practically a
military despotism, founded on the enforced servitude and sale of human
beings, reared and upheld by the lives, the fortunes, and the constrained
or misguided energies of a deluded and chivalrous people, to feed the vain
ambition of an oligarchy, was toppling to the ruin that six months later
overwhelmed it. Great was to be the fall thereof, and not even to-day is
the atmosphere fully cleared of the dust of its destruction.

Two famous, and as the outcome proved, morally conclusive campaigns had
been fought and closed.

In the East, Grant, moving against Richmond through the wilderness and
swamps of Virginia, all the long summer had been dealing trip-hammer
blows, as deadly and sickening to his foe as the stroke of the axe in the
shambles, and at length resting from the slaughter, lay before Petersburg
and astride the James; feeling out with his left to cut Lee's lines of
communication to the South and West, and pressing him close that he should
not detach any of his force to act against Sherman.

In the West, Sherman, starting from Chattanooga, with an antagonist the
wariest, wisest and most skillful captain of the rebel host to oppose him,
had overreached his foe at every point, and stretching out his sinewy arm,
had seized in a relentless grasp the "Gate City" of the South; and
electrified the country with the exultant shout, "Atlanta is ours and
fairly won;" opening wide the door into the hollow trunk of the
Confederacy and exposing its emptiness.

Of this campaign Halleck wrote: "I do not hesitate to say that it has been
the most brilliant of the war," and Grant himself, with that mutual
magnanimity that characterized the two great friends and competitors for
fame, declared to Sherman, "You have accomplished the most gigantic
undertaking given to any general in this war, and with a skill and ability
that will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequalled."

But much remained.

The dragon of rebellion, though sorely smitten, still lay writhing and
would not die until his time was fully come.

Lee, sullen and desperate, lay within the still invincible intrenchments
of Richmond, nursing his wounds, but with power able yet to strike a heavy
blow, and gathering his remaining strength for the final effort.

Sherman's antagonists, though demoralized and bewildered, were still
unconquered; and forced out from Atlanta, filled the open country with an
angry buzzing, as of an overturned hive. To add to their discomfiture, the
astute Johnston, the most intellectual soldier of the Confederacy, whose
stubborn dispute of every inch of territory, perfect skill in defending
his successive positions, and marvelous success in withdrawing without
loss at the latest moment, displayed a capacity second only to that of his
opponent, and whose patient policy of drawing Sherman after him, to a
constantly increasing distance from his base, without himself risking the
disaster of a defeat, was, as history has proved, the last crutch of the
Rebellion,--had been plucked from his command by the narrow-minded
Confederate President and replaced by Hood, whose fighting qualities had
been proved on many a field of battle, but who otherwise lacked every
requisite for leadership in such a contest.

But a thousand long miles still separated Atlanta from Richmond; and these
must be traversed before that proximate conjunction of forces could take
place that was needed to give rebellion its _coup de grace_, and to tear
forever from the free sky of America the fluttering and ragged emblem of a
maleficent and arrogant domination.

Sherman, in Atlanta, was resting, granting well-earned furloughs to his
veterans, recruiting his ranks, guarding from the cavalry, who swarmed in
his rear and sought to break it, the extended line--over 250 miles--of
railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga, and thence to Atlanta, upon which
he depended for his supplies, and incessantly planning his next move,
which he had already determined would be to the Sea, with Savannah as an
intermediate base for the farther march to the rear of Lee's Army, and a
conjunction with Grant;--upon whom, in his correspondence, he repeatedly
urged assent to his proposal, and suggested the capture of Savannah by the
Eastern forces in advance of his own arrival there.

The Washington authorities, always timorous and vacillating, were not yet
brought to assent to this superb strategic project, based upon the
military theorem, "An Army operating offensively must maintain the
offensive," and constructed with Sherman's solid judgment that he must go
onward, since to withdraw would be to lose all the _morale_ of his success
up to that point.

Even Grant, with all his confidence in and reliance upon Sherman,
expressed unwillingness that he should embark upon it while Hood's Army
was still undestroyed.

Meanwhile, Sherman, in full conviction that the necessity would presently
be demonstrated, was watching Hood, who lay some thirty miles to the
Southeast of Atlanta, and whose intentions he could not even guess
at,--and with tremendous energy was endeavoring to accumulate supplies in
excess of daily needs, in order that when the time was ripe he should be
ready to start.


GRAND TACTICS.

On his zigzag way South, early in June, with Atlanta as his then objective
point, Sherman, with that wonderful mental vision of the whole horizon
that characterized him, seeking for a depot where supplies could safely be
accumulated, near enough at hand to be of ready access, but sufficiently
removed from the scene of actual conflict to be secure from casual attack,
had selected the famous Allatoona Pass, and directed that it be "prepared
for defense as a secondary base."

The place was well chosen.

The diminishing extension of the Great Smoky Mountains stretches across
the Northern end of Georgia, from Northeast to Southwest.

The Range is traversed at Allatoona Pass by the Etowah River, flowing West
and North to unite at Rome, thirty miles distant, with the Oostenaula and
form the Coosa. The railway, coming down from Kingston,--whence a branch
ran Westward to Rome,--and crossing the Etowah, winds Southeasterly among
the hills, and at Allatoona station, about four miles from the river,
penetrates a minor ridge and emerges from a cut some sixty-five feet in
depth. It was at this point--referred to by Sherman as a "Natural
Fortress"--that the "secondary base" was established, and the surplus
supplies were accumulated.

The advantages for defence were admirable. The entire region is hilly and
heavily timbered, rolling off to the Southward to a less rugged country,
and from the Heights of Allatoona looking Southeasterly, down the line of
railway towards Atlanta, are visible ten to fifteen miles away, the noble,
isolated masses of Kenesaw, Lost Mountain and Pine Mountain, which,
raising their wooded crests high above the neighboring forest, command a
wide prospect towards every quarter. The narrow ridge cut by the railway
is abruptly terminated to the Northeast by the valley of Allatoona Creek,
crooking among the hills to join the Etowah, and its <DW72>s facing
Northwest and Southeast are steep and difficult. Towards the West and
Southwest the descent is more gradual, and a country road follows the
rolling crest of the ridge along which from the Westward the main attack
was ultimately to be made.

The storehouses for the supplies stood near the railway station and were
fully commanded from the dominant elevations rising immediately behind
them. Upon these elevations the defensive works were located by Colonel
Poe, the Chief Engineer of Sherman's army. Their plan was in conformity
with the requirements of the ground and of the service to be expected of
them, and while the actual construction by the troops left somewhat to be
desired, and could have been bettered had Poe been able to supervise the
completion of his work, when it came to the test, well did they serve
their purpose. The main features were two Redoubts, about 1000 feet apart
at easy supporting distance, one on each side of the railway cut, with
ditches and outlying intrenchments near at hand covering the approaches,
and overlooking the storehouses for the defence of which they were built.

       *       *       *       *       *

Near the close of September, Sherman, in Atlanta, was roused by
indications of activity on the part of Hood, who had sent his cavalry
North across the Chattahooche and into Tennessee, and had moved his
infantry to a more Westerly camp; thus leaving the Savannah road open to
Sherman, had he seen fit to take it.

Habitually sensitive as to his railway base, Sherman surmised that Hood's
intention was to move round him to threaten his rear. September 24th he
telegraphed Howard, "I have no doubt Hood has resolved to throw himself on
our flanks to prevent our accumulating stores, etc.," and September 25th
to Halleck, "Hood seems to be moving as it were to the Alabama line,
leaving open to me the road to Macon as also to Augusta, but his cavalry
is busy on our roads."

He therefore reinforced the detachments guarding the numerous railway
stations and bridges, sent a division of the 4th corps and one of the 14th
Northward to strengthen Chattanooga, and put Thomas in command there, and
thence back to Nashville to guard against Forrest, the noted rebel cavalry
leader, who was ravaging Tennessee and capturing gunboats with horsemen.

Corse's division of the 15th corps was sent to occupy Rome on the extreme
Western flank, with instructions to complete the defensive works and hold
it against all comers; meanwhile observing closely any movement of the
enemy in his vicinity.

A glance at the map is desirable for the better understanding of the
immediately ensuing events.

From Atlanta to Allatoona, near the railway crossing of the Etowah, is, as
the crow flies, 32 miles Northwest by West. From Allatoona to Rome is 30
miles W. N. W. Thirteen miles from Allatoona towards Atlanta is Kenesaw,
the railway sweeping round its North and East flanks. Fifteen miles West
by South from Kenesaw, and the same distance Southwest from Allatoona,
is Dallas, in the vicinity of New Hope Church, where had been three days
of heavy fighting late in May. Rome again is equi-distant from Dallas and
from Allatoona 30 miles. The central position of Allatoona is evident; and
it will also be seen that a force at Dallas occupied, in a sense, a
strategic point, whence a rapid movement could be made either upon
Allatoona or Rome, with the West and Southwest to fall back upon in case
of need.


[Illustration: ALLATOONA AND VICINITY.]


By October 1st, the ambiguity as to Hood's plans was in part relieved. It
was at least certain that he had crossed from the South to the North bank
of the Chattahooche, although it was impossible to surmise whether he
intended to make a direct attack on the railroad or to undertake an
invasion of Tennessee from the Westward. In any case it behooved Sherman
to bestir himself, and promptly, too. It was absolutely necessary to keep
Hood's army off the railroad, so long as the question of cutting loose for
Savannah remained undecided, and at Allatoona was stored an accumulation
of nearly three millions of rations of bread, the loss of which, with the
railway endangered, would be a serious blow, and one possibly fatal to
Sherman's cherished project. Leaving, therefore, the 20th corps in
Atlanta, to hold it and to guard the bridges across the Chattahooche above
and below the railway bridge, Sherman put the rest of his forces in rapid
motion Northward towards Kenesaw, 20 miles distant, and October 1st
telegraphed Corse at Rome that Hood was across the river and might attack
the road at Allatoona or near Cassville, on the North side of the Etowah,
about midway between Rome and Allatoona. If Hood went to Cassville, Corse
was to remain at Rome and hold it fast; if to Allatoona, Corse was to move
down at once and occupy Allatoona, joining forces with troops in the
vicinity for its defence, while Sherman co-operated from the South.
Repeated dispatches were sent to Allatoona, directing the commanding
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, to hold the place at all
hazards, and that relief would be speedy. These have been paraphrased into
"Hold the Fort, for I am coming," which, set to an inspiring air, caught
the ear of the country, and is still in active service.

Sherman crossed the Chattahooche October 3rd and 4th, and finding his
wires cut North of Marietta, signaled to the station on Kenesaw and thence
to Allatoona, over the heads of the enemy, a dispatch to be telegraphed to
Corse at Rome to move at once with all speed and with his entire command
to the relief of Allatoona. Sherman himself reached Kenesaw early on the
morning of the 5th, and from the summit, to use his own language, "had a
superb view of the vast panorama to the North and West. To the Southwest,
about Dallas and Lost Mountain, could be seen the smoke of camp fires
indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line
of railroad from Big Shanty up to Allatoona (full fifteen miles), was
plainly marked by the fires of the burning railroad. We could plainly see
the smoke of battle about Allatoona and hear the faint reverberation of
the cannon."

The fact was disclosed that Hood lay in force near Dallas, 15 miles to the
West and South of Kenesaw, and had detached a heavy column Eastward to
destroy the railroad and capture the scattered garrisons including the
all-important post of Allatoona.

About 8:30 a. m. Allatoona signalled Kenesaw, "Corse is here with one
brigade; where is Sherman?" As received at Kenes