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  GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS
  FOR
  ENGLISH READERS AND STUDENTS.

  EDITED BY
  GEORGE S. MORRIS.

  LEIBNIZ'S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING
  THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.




  LEIBNIZ'S
  NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE
  HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

  A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.

  By JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D.,

  ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
  MICHIGAN, AND PROFESSOR (ELECT) OF MENTAL AND
  MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY
  OF MINNESOTA

  CHICAGO:
  SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY
  1902


  Copyright, 1888,
  By S. C. Griggs and Company.




PREFACE.


The purpose of the series of which the present volume is one, is not,
as will be seen by reference to the statement in the initial volume,
to sum up _in toto_ the system of any philosopher, but to give a
"critical exposition" of some one masterpiece. In treating the
"Nouveaux Essais" of Leibniz, I have found myself obliged, at times,
to violate the letter of this expressed intention, in order to fulfil
its spirit. The "Nouveaux Essais," in spite of its being one of the
two most extended philosophical writings of Leibniz, is a compendium
of comments, rather than a connected argument or exposition. It has
all the suggestiveness and richness of a note-book, but with much also
of its fragmentariness. I have therefore been obliged to supplement my
account of it by constant references to the other writings of Leibniz,
and occasionally to take considerable liberty with the order of the
treatment of topics. Upon the whole, this book will be found, I hope,
to be a faithful reflex not only of Leibniz's thought, but also of his
discussions in the "Nouveaux Essais."

In the main, the course of philosophic thought since the time of
Leibniz has been such as to render almost self-evident his limitations,
and to suggest needed corrections and amplifications. Indeed, it is
much easier for those whose thoughts follow the turn that Kant has
given modern thinking to appreciate the defects of Leibniz than to
realize his greatness. I have endeavored, therefore, in the body
of the work, to identify my thought with that of Leibniz as much
as possible, to assume his standpoint and method, and, for the most
part, to confine express criticism upon his limitations to the final
chapter. In particular, I have attempted to bring out the relations
of philosophy to the growing science of his times, to state the
doctrine of pre-established harmony as he himself meant it, and to give
something like consistency and coherency to his doctrine of material
existence and of nature. This last task seemed especially to require
doing. I have also endeavored to keep in mind, throughout, Leibniz's
relations to Locke, and to show the "Nouveaux Essais" as typical of the
distinction between characteristic British and German thought.

    JOHN DEWEY.

_May_, 1888.




CONTENTS.


  CHAPTER I.

  The Man.

                                                                    PAGE

  His Parents                                                          1

  His Early Education                                                  2

  His University Training at Leipsic                                   4

  At Jena                                                              8

  At the University of Altdorf                                        10

  His Removal to Frankfurt                                            10

  His Mission to Paris                                                11

  Discovery of the Calculus                                           12

  Librarian at Hanover                                                13

  His Activities                                                      14

  His Philosophic Writings                                            15

  His Ecclesiastic and Academic Projects                              17

  His Later Years and Death                                           18


  CHAPTER II.

  Sources of his Philosophy.

  Character of the Epoch into which Leibniz was born                  20

  The Thought of the Unity of the World                               23

  The two Agencies which formed Leibniz's Philosophy                  24

  The Cartesian Influences                                            26

  Rationalistic Method                                                28

  Mechanical Explanation of Nature                                    30

  Application of Mathematics                                          32

  Idea of Evolution                                                   33

  Interpretation of these Ideas                                       35

  Idea of Activity or Entelechy                                       39

  Idea of Rationality                                                 40

  Idea of Organism                                                    42


  CHAPTER III.

  The Problem and its Solution.

  Unity of Leibniz's Thought                                          43

  Relation of Universal and Individual                                44

  Descartes' Treatment of this Question                               46

  Spinoza's Treatment of it                                           48

  Leibniz's Solution                                                  50

  All Unity is Spiritual                                              53

  And Active                                                          54

  Is a Representative Individual                                      56

  Contrast of Monad and Atom                                          58

  Pre-established Harmony reconciles Universal and Individual         59

  Meaning of this Doctrine                                            62


  CHAPTER IV.

  Locke and Leibniz.--Innate Ideas.

  Necessity of Preliminary Account of Leibniz's Philosophy            66

  Locke's Empiricism                                                  67

  Leibniz's Comments upon Locke                                       69

  The Controversies of Leibniz                                        72

  The Essay on the Human Understanding                                73

  Locke's Denial of Innate Ideas                                      75

  Depending upon

    (1) His Mechanical Conception of Innate Ideas                     77

  Leibniz undermines this by substituting an Organic Conception       80

  And upon

    (2) His Mechanical Conception of Consciousness                    84

  Leibniz refutes this by his Theory of Unconscious Intelligence      85


  CHAPTER V.

  Sensation and Experience.

  Importance of Doctrine regarding Sensation                          87

  The Two Elements of Locke's Notion of Sensation                     89

  Its Relation to the Object producing it: Primary and Secondary
  Qualities                                                           91

  Locke criticized as to his Account

    (1) Of the Production of Sensation                                92

    (2) Of its Function in Knowledge                                  95

  The Meaning of Physical Causation                                   97

  Bearing of this Doctrine upon Relation of Soul and Body             98

  Criticism of Locke's Dualism                                        98

  Leibniz's Monism                                                   101

  Summary of Discussion                                              103

  Leibniz on the Relation of Sensations to Objects
  occasioning them                                                   105

  Nature of Experience                                               106

  Distinction of Empirical from Rational Knowledge                   107


  CHAPTER VI.

  The Impulses and the Will.

  The Doctrine of Will depends upon that of Intelligence             109

  The Character of Impulse                                           111

  Of Desire                                                          112

  Half-Pains and Pleasures                                           113

  The Outcome of Desire                                              115

  Nature of Moral Action                                             117

  Of Freedom                                                         118

    (1) Freedom as Contingency                                       119

        Limitation of this Principle                                 121

    (2) Freedom as Spontaneity                                       123

        This Principle is too Broad to be a Moral Principle          125

    (3) True Freedom is Rational Action                              125

  Our Lack of Freedom is due to our Sensuous Nature                  128

  Innate Practical Principles                                        129

  Moral Science is Demonstrative                                     130


  CHAPTER VII.

  Matter and its Relation to Spirit.

  Locke's Account of Matter and Allied Ideas the Foundation of the
  Philosophy of Nature Characteristic of British Empiricism          132

  Space and Matter wholly Distinct Ideas                             134

  Leibniz gives Matter a Metaphysical Basis                          137

  Ordinary Misunderstanding of Leibniz's Ideas of Matter             138

  Matter is not composed of Monads                                   139

  Matter is the Passive or Conditioned Side of Monads                140

  Passivity equals "Confused Representations," _i. e._ Incomplete
  Development of Reason                                              144

  Matter is logically Necessary from Leibniz's Principles            145

  Bearing of Discussion upon Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony     146

  Summary                                                            147


  CHAPTER VIII.

  Material Phenomena and their Reality.

  What is the Connection between Matter as Metaphysical and as
  Physical?                                                          151

  The Latter is the "Image" of the Former                            151

  Leibniz's Reaction from Cartesian Theory                           152

  His Objections are (1) Physical and (2) Logical                    153

  (1) Motion is Source of Physical Qualities of Bodies               155

  Hence there are no Atoms                                           158

  Secondary Qualities as well as Primary depend upon Motion          160

  (2) What is the Subject to which the Quality of Extension
  belongs?                                                           161

  It is the Monad _as Passive_                                       162

  Space and Time connect the Spiritual and the Sensible              164

  Distinction between Space and Time, and Extension and Duration     166

  Space and Time are Relations                                       167

  Leibniz's Controversy with Clarke                                  168

  Leibniz denies that Space and Time are Absolute                    170

  What is the Reality of Sensible Phenomena?                         173

  It consists

    (1) In their Regularity                                          174

    (2) In their Dependence upon Intelligence and Will               175

  Leibniz and Berkeley                                               177


  CHAPTER IX.

  Some Fundamental Conceptions.

  Locke's Account of Substance as Static                             179

  The Distinction between Reality and Phenomena                      180

  Leibniz's Conception of Substance as Dynamic                       181

  His Specific Criticisms upon Locke                                 182

  The Categories of Identity and Difference Locke also explains in
  a Mechanical Way                                                   183

  Leibniz regards them as Internal and as Organic to each other      184

  Locke gives a Quantitative Notion of Infinity                      188

  And hence makes our Idea of it purely Negative                     189

  Leibniz denies that the True Notion of Infinity is Quantitative    189

  He also denies Locke's Account of the Origin of the Indefinite     192

  In General, Locke has a Mechanical Idea, Leibniz a Spiritual, of
  these Categories                                                   193


  CHAPTER X.

  The Nature and Extent of Knowledge.

  Locke's Definition and Classification of Knowledge                 196

  Leibniz's Criticism                                                197

  Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant regarding Knowledge of Objects         198

  The Degrees of Knowledge,--Intuitive, Demonstrative, and
  Sensitive                                                          199

  Locke's Contradictory Theories regarding the Origin of Knowledge   202

  Locke starts both with the Individual as given to Consciousness
  and with the Unrelated Sensation                                   204

  Either Theory makes Relations or "Universals" Unreal               205

  As to the Extent of Knowledge, that of Identity is Wide, but
  Trifling                                                           205

  That of Real Being includes God, Soul, and Matter, but only as to
  their Existence                                                    206

  And even this at the Expense of contradicting his Definition of
  Knowledge                                                          206

  Knowledge of Co-existence is either Trifling or Impossible         207

  Leibniz rests upon Distinction of Contingent and Rational Truth    209

  The Former may become the Latter, and is then Demonstrative        210

  The Means of this Transformation are Mathematics and
  Classification                                                     215

  There are Two Principles,--One of Contradiction                    217

  The Other of Sufficient Reason                                     218

  The Latter leads us to God as the Supreme Intelligence and the
  Final Condition of Contingent Fact                                 219

  The Four Stages of Knowledge                                       222


  CHAPTER XI.

  The Theology of Leibniz.

  Leibniz's Three Arguments for the Existence of God                 224

  The Value of the Ontological                                       225

  The Cosmological                                                   226

  The Teleological                                                   226

  The Attributes of God                                              227

  The Relation of God to the World, his Creating Activity            228

  Creation involves Wisdom and Goodness as well as Power             229

  The Relation of God to Intelligent Spirits: they form a Moral
  Community                                                          230

  Leibniz as the Founder of Modern German Ethical Systems            231

  The End of Morality is Happiness as Self-realization               232

  The Three Stages of Natural Right                                  234

  The Basis of Both Leibniz's Ethics and Political Philosophy is
  Man's Relation to God                                              236

  His Æsthetics have the Same Basis                                  237

  Man's Spirit as Architectonic                                      238


  CHAPTER XII.

  Criticism and Conclusion.

  Leibniz's Fundamental Contradiction is between his Method and his
  Subject Matter                                                     240

  The Use which Leibniz makes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
  reveals this Contradiction                                         242

  The Contradiction is between the Ideas of Formal and of Concrete
  Unity                                                              243

  From this Contradiction flow

    (1) The Contradiction in the Notion of Individuality             246

        Which becomes purely Negative                                247

        The Negative he interprets as merely Privative               249

    (2) The Contradiction in his Conception of God has the Same
    Source                                                           250

        He really has Three Definitions of God                       250

        One results in Atomism, another in Pantheism                 251

        The Third in a Conception of the Organic Harmony of the
        Infinite and Finite                                          252

    (3) The Contradiction between the Real and the Ideal in the
    Monads has the Same Source                                       253

    (4) As have also the Contradictions in the Treatment of the
    Relations of Matter and Spirit                                   254

    (5) And finally, his Original Contradiction leads to a
    Contradictory Treatment of Knowledge                             257

  Summary as to the Positive Value of Leibniz                        259

  The Influence of Leibniz's Philosophy                              261

  Especially upon Kant                                               262

  Kant claims to be the True Apologist for Leibniz                   263

    (1) As to the Doctrine of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction    263

        Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Distinction between
        Analytic and Synthetic Judgment                              266

    (2) As to the Relation of Monads and Matter                      268

        Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Relation of the
        Sensuous and Supersensuous                                   268

    (3) And finally, as to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony   269

        Which Kant transforms into Harmony between Understanding
        and Sense                                                    269

        And between the Categories of the Understanding and the
        Ideas of Reason                                              270

  Conclusion                                                         272




LEIBNIZ'S NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.




CHAPTER I.

THE MAN.


"He who knows me only by my writings does not know me," said
Leibniz. These words--true, indeed, of every writer, but true of
Leibniz in a way which gives a peculiar interest and charm to his
life--must be our excuse for prefacing what is to be said of his "New
Essays concerning the Human Understanding" with a brief biographical
sketch.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born in Leipzig June 21, 1646. His
father, who died when Leibniz was only six years old, was a professor
in the university and a notary of considerable practice. From him the
future philosopher seems to have derived his extraordinary industry
and love of detail. Such accounts as we have of him show no traces of
the wonderful intellectual genius of his son, but only a diligent,
plodding, faithful, and religious man, a thoroughly conscientious
husband, jurist, and professor. Nor in the lines of physical heredity
can we account for the unique career of Leibniz by his mother's
endowments. The fact, however, that she was patient in all trial,
living in peace with her neighbors, anxious for unity and concord with
all people, even with those not well disposed to her, throws great
light upon the fundamental trait of Leibniz's ethical nature. As in so
many cases, it is the inherited moral characteristics which form the
basis of the intellectual nature. The love of unity which was a moral
trait in Leibniz's mother became in him the hunger for a harmonious and
unified mental world; the father's devotion to detail showed itself
as the desire for knowledge as minute and comprehensive as it was
inter-related.

Left without his father, he was by the advice of a discerning friend
allowed free access to the library. Leibniz never ceased to count this
one of the greatest fortunes of his life. Writing in after years to a
friend, he says:--

"When I lost my father, and was left without any direction in my
studies, I had the luck to get at books in all languages, of all
religions, upon all sciences, and to read them without any regular
order, just as my own impulse led me. From this I obtained the great
advantage that I was freed from ordinary prejudices, and introduced to
many things of which I should otherwise never have thought."

In a philosophical essay, in which he describes himself under the name
of Gulielmus