



Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Tony Towers and PG Distributed Proofreaders




THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY

By G. Lowes Dickinson



1916


CONTENTS

 1. INTRODUCTION
      Europe since the Fifteenth Century--Machiavellianism--Empire and the
      Balance of Power

 2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE
      Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14.

 3. GREAT BRITAIN
      The Policy of Great Britain--Essentially an Overseas Power

 4. FRANCE
      The Policy of France since 1870--Peace and Imperialism--Conflicting
      Elements

 5. RUSSIA
      The Policy of Russia--Especially towards Austria

 6. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
      The Policy of Austria-Hungary--Especially towards the Balkans

 7. GERMANY
      The Policy of Germany--From 1866 to the Decade 1890-1900--A Change

 8. OPINION IN GERMANY
      German "Romanticism"--New Ambitions.

 9. OPINION ABOUT GERMANY
      Bourdon--Beyens--Cambon--Summary

10. GERMAN POLICY FROM THE DECADE 1890-1900
      Relation to Great Britain--The Navy.

11. VAIN ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY
      Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration--Mutual Suspicion

12. EUROPE SINCE THE DECADE 1890-1900

13. GERMANY AND TURKEY
      The Bagdad Railway

14. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

15. MOROCCO

16. THE LAST YEARS
      Before the War--The Outbreak of War

17. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL
      The Pursuit of Power and Wealth

18. THE SETTLEMENT

19. THE CHANGE NEEDED
      Change of Outlook and Change of System--An International
      League--International Law and Control




THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY



1. _Introduction_.


In the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that
marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance
of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the
sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century. And it is symbolical
of all that was to follow that at that point stands, looking down the
vista of the centuries, the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli.
From that date onwards international policy has meant Machiavellianism.
Sometimes the masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici or Napoleon,
have avowed it; sometimes, like Frederick the Great, they have disclaimed
it. But always they have practised it. They could not, indeed, practise
anything else. For it is as true of an aggregation of States as of an
aggregation of individuals that, whatever moral sentiments may prevail, if
there is no common law and no common force the best intentions will be
defeated by lack of confidence and security. Mutual fear and mutual
suspicion, aggression masquerading as defence and defence masquerading as
aggression, will be the protagonists in the bloody drama; and there will
be, what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence of such a situation, a
chronic state of war, open or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent
war; and the more the States arm to prevent a conflict the more certainly
will it be provoked, since to one or another it will always seem a better
chance to have it now than to have it on worse conditions later. Some
one State at any moment may be the immediate offender; but the main and
permanent offence is common to all States. It is the anarchy which they
are all responsible for perpetuating.

While this anarchy continues the struggle between States will tend to
assume a certain stereotyped form. One will endeavour to acquire supremacy
over the others for motives at once of security and of domination, the
others will combine to defeat it, and history will turn upon the two poles
of empire and the balance of power. So it has been in Europe, and so it
will continue to be, until either empire is achieved, as once it