WAR, VOL. I (OF 2)***


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THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE
JAPANESE WAR


[Illustration: _General Kuropatkin._]



THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND
THE JAPANESE WAR,

Being Historical and Critical Comments on
the Military Policy and Power of Russia
and on the Campaign in the Far East,

by

GENERAL KUROPATKIN.

Translated by

Captain A. B. Lindsay,
2nd King Edward’S Own Gurkha Rifles
Translator of “The Battle of Tsu-Shima”;
“The Truth about Port Arthur,” etc.

Edited by
Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E.,
Author of “The Defence of Duffer’S Drift”;
and Editor of “The Truth about Port Arthur.”

With Maps and Illustrations

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. I.






New York
E. P. Dutton and Company
1909

Printed in Great Britain




                         TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE


“The General stands higher than any other Russian officer, not only in
Russian opinion, but in that of professional soldiers all the world
over, and if any human agency can change the deplorable situation
to Russia’s advantage, Kuropatkin may be the man to do it.”[1] This
sentence, written by the military correspondent of the _Times_ in
February, 1904, well expresses the sentiment that predominated when
General Kuropatkin’s appointment to command the Russian army in
Manchuria was announced.

“It may be that a military genius would have overcome the moral and
physical difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff,
a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a Bilderling
were unable to do so,”[2] were the words used by the General himself
two years later when reporting to his Sovereign.

Though these two quotations epitomize the _raison d’être_ and
tendency of this book, they by no means afford a complete description
of its scope. Were it nothing but an _apologia_, not even the former
reputation and position of its author would save it from the neglect
which invariably awaits the excuses of the man who has failed. But it
is no mere _apologia_. For, apart from its tone of disappointment,
apart from the dominant note of failure which is current throughout,
and the explanations and reasons repeated on almost every page, the
work is one long-continued protest. It is a protest from first to last
that the war was not—as far as Russia was concerned—fought to anything
like a finish; that it was brought to a premature conclusion; that
peace was declared at the moment when victory lay within Russia’s
grasp, when her strength was at its greatest, and that of her enemy
had begun to ebb. Whether true or otherwise, this view should not be
rejected without consideration as the natural cry of an unsuccessful
party. These pages give food for thought; they, moreover, contain much
that has hitherto rested in obscurity with regard to the attitude of
the Russian War Ministry, its efforts to prevent the war, its general
policy, and other matters.

The author endeavours to drive home his protest by marshalling an array
of facts, and by analogy from the military history of his country for
more than two centuries. Whether he proves his case is for the reader
to judge. Be that as it may, his book must claim attention as being the
absolute opinion of the one man on the Russian side best qualified to
throw light upon the causes and course of the greatest world-disturbing
international struggle that has taken place for more than a third of a
century. It has also a sentimental interest in that it is the utterance
of one who, after a long and meritorious career in his country’s
service, and after holding the highest appointments his profession
offered, has failed and retired discredited into the depths of the
country. Whether he will reappear in public life or not is unknown; but
when his distinguished services for Russia are called to mind, and a
few of the stupendous difficulties with which he had to contend in this
last campaign are realized, it is impossible to withhold sympathy.

The son of a Russian provincial official, Alexei Nicolaevitch
Kuropatkin was born on March 17, 1845. After being educated in the
cadet corps and the Pavlovsk War School, he was, at the age of
eighteen, posted as a Lieutenant to the 1st Turkestan Rifle Battalion,
with which he saw active service in Central Asia. Having passed
with success through the Staff College, and being graded as Staff
Captain, he in 1874 accompanied a French expedition into the Sahara.
In 1876 he took part in the Central Asian Campaign of that year,
being on Skobeleff’s staff, winning many laurels, and being wounded.
During the Turkish War of 1877–78 he was Chief of the Staff, and was
again wounded. In the Akhal Tekhe Expedition of 1880–81 he once more
distinguished himself, commanding the Turkestan Rifle Brigade, and
being twice wounded at the storming of Geok-Tepe. From 1883–90 he
was General in Charge of strategical questions on the great General
Staff. In 1890 he reached the rank of Lieutenant-General, and from
that year till 1898 did valuable service as Commander-in-Chief of the
Trans-Caspian Military District. In 1898 he received his portfolio as
Minister of War, which position he filled until February 20, 1904,
when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army of
Operations (