WAR, VOL. I (OF 2)***


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THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE
JAPANESE WAR


[Illustration: _General Kuropatkin._]



THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND
THE JAPANESE WAR,

Being Historical and Critical Comments on
the Military Policy and Power of Russia
and on the Campaign in the Far East,

by

GENERAL KUROPATKIN.

Translated by

Captain A. B. Lindsay,
2nd King Edward’S Own Gurkha Rifles
Translator of “The Battle of Tsu-Shima”;
“The Truth about Port Arthur,” etc.

Edited by
Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E.,
Author of “The Defence of Duffer’S Drift”;
and Editor of “The Truth about Port Arthur.”

With Maps and Illustrations

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. I.






New York
E. P. Dutton and Company
1909

Printed in Great Britain




                         TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE


“The General stands higher than any other Russian officer, not only in
Russian opinion, but in that of professional soldiers all the world
over, and if any human agency can change the deplorable situation
to Russia’s advantage, Kuropatkin may be the man to do it.”[1] This
sentence, written by the military correspondent of the _Times_ in
February, 1904, well expresses the sentiment that predominated when
General Kuropatkin’s appointment to command the Russian army in
Manchuria was announced.

“It may be that a military genius would have overcome the moral and
physical difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff,
a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a Bilderling
were unable to do so,”[2] were the words used by the General himself
two years later when reporting to his Sovereign.

Though these two quotations epitomize the _raison d’être_ and
tendency of this book, they by no means afford a complete description
of its scope. Were it nothing but an _apologia_, not even the former
reputation and position of its author would save it from the neglect
which invariably awaits the excuses of the man who has failed. But it
is no mere _apologia_. For, apart from its tone of disappointment,
apart from the dominant note of failure which is current throughout,
and the explanations and reasons repeated on almost every page, the
work is one long-continued protest. It is a protest from first to last
that the war was not—as far as Russia was concerned—fought to anything
like a finish; that it was brought to a premature conclusion; that
peace was declared at the moment when victory lay within Russia’s
grasp, when her strength was at its greatest, and that of her enemy
had begun to ebb. Whether true or otherwise, this view should not be
rejected without consideration as the natural cry of an unsuccessful
party. These pages give food for thought; they, moreover, contain much
that has hitherto rested in obscurity with regard to the attitude of
the Russian War Ministry, its efforts to prevent the war, its general
policy, and other matters.

The author endeavours to drive home his protest by marshalling an array
of facts, and by analogy from the military history of his country for
more than two centuries. Whether he proves his case is for the reader
to judge. Be that as it may, his book must claim attention as being the
absolute opinion of the one man on the Russian side best qualified to
throw light upon the causes and course of the greatest world-disturbing
international struggle that has taken place for more than a third of a
century. It has also a sentimental interest in that it is the utterance
of one who, after a long and meritorious career in his country’s
service, and after holding the highest appointments his profession
offered, has failed and retired discredited into the depths of the
country. Whether he will reappear in public life or not is unknown; but
when his distinguished services for Russia are called to mind, and a
few of the stupendous difficulties with which he had to contend in this
last campaign are realized, it is impossible to withhold sympathy.

The son of a Russian provincial official, Alexei Nicolaevitch
Kuropatkin was born on March 17, 1845. After being educated in the
cadet corps and the Pavlovsk War School, he was, at the age of
eighteen, posted as a Lieutenant to the 1st Turkestan Rifle Battalion,
with which he saw active service in Central Asia. Having passed
with success through the Staff College, and being graded as Staff
Captain, he in 1874 accompanied a French expedition into the Sahara.
In 1876 he took part in the Central Asian Campaign of that year,
being on Skobeleff’s staff, winning many laurels, and being wounded.
During the Turkish War of 1877–78 he was Chief of the Staff, and was
again wounded. In the Akhal Tekhe Expedition of 1880–81 he once more
distinguished himself, commanding the Turkestan Rifle Brigade, and
being twice wounded at the storming of Geok-Tepe. From 1883–90 he
was General in Charge of strategical questions on the great General
Staff. In 1890 he reached the rank of Lieutenant-General, and from
that year till 1898 did valuable service as Commander-in-Chief of the
Trans-Caspian Military District. In 1898 he received his portfolio as
Minister of War, which position he filled until February 20, 1904,
when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army of
Operations (having been promoted to General of Infantry in 1900). On
March 27, 1904, he reached Liao-yang to take up his duties, and after
several battles, in which the Russians were almost invariably defeated,
he was, in March, 1905, superseded in the chief command by General
Linievitch. Henceforward he continued to serve on in a subordinate
position in command of the 1st Army until the end of the war. After
peace was concluded, he remained in Manchuria superintending the
demobilization of the Russian forces, proceeding, on the completion of
this duty, to his country seat in Russia, where he has since remained
in retirement. It was during his stay in Manchuria, after hostilities
had ceased, and later at his home, that he wrote this book, with the
assistance acknowledged by him in the introduction. Its publication in
Russia was suppressed almost as soon as the book appeared, and it is
believed that the subject-matter of this translation was never printed
in Russia. Of the four volumes of the original work, the fourth has
alone been translated, and is now presented to the British public in
these pages.[3]

Among the many facts presented to us by the author there are some which
call for special reference. The first point to claim our attention
is the fact that though General Kuropatkin was Commander-in-Chief of
an army engaged in active operations in the field, he was for a long
time not supreme. Indeed, from the day he arrived at Liao-yang until
October 25, 1904, he was subordinate to an officer not actually at the
front, being appointed as _assistant_ (the italics are ours) to the
Viceroy—Admiral Alexeieff—whose headquarters were at Harbin. Curiously
enough, General Kuropatkin says very little upon this subject. He
merely points out that he was really in supreme command only for four
and a half months of the war—between Admiral Alexeieff’s departure and
his own supersession by General Linievitch—and incidentally mentions
various actions and orders of the Viceroy which forced him to act
against his own judgment. How detrimental such control must have been
to the conduct of operations needs no emphasis. It is not within the
scope of this preface to attempt criticism or justification of the
Russian strategy or conduct of the war—be it that of General Kuropatkin
or another—but such a vicious system of command may account for much
that has hitherto appeared inexplicable. Other points which stand out
are: the absolute unreadiness of Russia, the causes which led her into
hostilities in spite of this unreadiness, the overwhelming nature of
the advantage gained by Japan with the command of the sea, the drag
upon Russia’s strategy constituted by the fortress of Port Arthur, and
the fear of complications on the western frontier, which forced her
to retain her best troops in Europe. The handicap that her inferior
railway communications were to her arms is obvious, and less remarkable
than the immense improvement in them effected during the course of
hostilities.

Of the author’s opinions, that of most interest to his own countrymen
is probably the one we have already mentioned—that the war was, for
Russia, prematurely concluded. To us, however, the value attached by
him to a “national” war as opposed to an “army” war is instructive
while the forethought and care with which the possible price of Empire
in the twentieth century was worked out by the Russian War Ministry
is enlightening, for who has estimated the probable cost in blood and
treasure of the expansion or maintenance of the British Empire during
the next hundred years? His views also as to the correct policy to be
pursued by Russia on the Afghan and Persian frontiers, and generally
with regard to Great Britain in India and the Middle East, are
certainly important.

One last point, and one which is much to the credit of General
Kuropatkin, is that he was able to follow where he had once led,
and after having been in supreme command, was content to accept a
subordinate position, and do his duty in it, rather than return to
Russia before the war was over. It is refreshing to find no word of
repining over his supersession, nor any direct or indirect complaint of
his treatment by his Sovereign.

These pages are an exact translation of the portion of the work
comprised within them. The only liberty that has been taken with the
original is that some of the frequent repetitions—of which the author
is a past master—and certain passages which are nothing but long
lists of names and places, have been eliminated. There is still much
repetition in the translation, but this has been allowed to remain, in
order that the English version might adhere as closely as possible to
the shape of the original. As the translation had to be made mostly
from a faint carbon copy of typescript, the work was attended with
considerable difficulties. The many faults in style and arrangement
can perhaps be explained by the fact that the original had evidently
not been corrected in proof by the author. The fact, also, that no
copies of the maps referred to by the writer (if such exist) have been
available has added very much to the difficulty of the cartography
of this translation. As the Russian system of transliterating the
place-names in Manchuria differs considerably from that used by the
English, French, German, or Japanese, it has been impossible without
large-scale Russian maps to identify every village or locality
mentioned in the narrative. Those that have been fixed are shown on
the maps that have been prepared, and in all cases, whether a place
has been located or not, the name has—as far as possible—been spelled
according to “Wade’s System of Transliteration.”[4] By this means it
is hoped that, when better English maps become available, some of the
places not at present identifiable may be located. The large map is
a reprint of that issued with vol. ii. of the “Official History of
the Russo-Japanese War,” and has been used by the permission of the
Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. A list of the most important
actions, showing their names spelled according to the Russian and
English methods, has been added.

In order to elucidate certain references to the Russian troops and to
the mobilization of the military districts, it may not be out of place
to give briefly the system of mobilization which existed in Russia
in 1904. The law of universal military service has existed in that
country for many years, and when war broke out with Japan recruits
were enlisted from the age of twenty for twenty-three years’ service
in the army, of which five were passed in the regular army, thirteen
in the reserve, and five in the militia. The period in the reserve
was divided into two “categories.” The 1st Category comprised those
recently passed into the reserve, and the 2nd the older men. If a
“general” mobilization were ordered, the 1st Category reservists of
all districts were the first to be summoned to rejoin the colours.
In case of a “partial” mobilization, however, the mobilization was
by districts instead of categories, and in such a case men of both
categories were to be ordered up from certain districts. The latter
was the system employed in the war against Japan. The authorities,
for reasons explained in the book, hesitated to employ the system of
general mobilization, and so denude European Russia of all the 1st
Category reservists. They therefore drew largely on the older men.
The unfortunate results of this action are made clear by General
Kuropatkin. Again, as regards the troops sent from European Russia, a
distinction must be made between “reinforcements” and “drafts.” The
former term has been used to signify formed units sent to the front;
the latter term is applied to bodies of men despatched to make good the
wastage as required.

                                                 A. B. L.
                                                 E. D. S.

  LONDON,
    _March 1, 1909_.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] “The War in the Far East, 1904-1905,” by the Military Correspondent
of the _Times_. John Murray.

[2] P. 68, Volume II., of this book.

[3] With a small portion of the third volume in Chapter XIII.

[4] As adopted in the “Official History of the Russo-Japanese War,” now
being published by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial
Defence.




                         AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION


In the first three volumes[5] of my work accounts are given of the
three principal battles of the war—Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, and Mukden.
Though compiled from the best information obtainable, it is impossible
for such a book to be entirely free from inaccuracies; for not only
is our knowledge of what was done by the Japanese extremely limited,
but it is derived from unofficial sources. At the time these volumes
were written, moreover, there were few reports available from our own
individual corps and armies, and what we had were sketchy in character.
The most complete information, on the whole, was that given in the
regimental reports, upon which we almost entirely depended; but even
these were far from perfect. Commanding officers naturally have a soft
spot in their hearts for their own troops, and the separate narratives
gave very different accounts of what was done by units of one and
the same division or army corps. Great importance has therefore been
attached to such documents as copies of written orders for operations,
dispositions and marches, casualty lists, and ammunition returns. Not
that the latter could be accepted without careful scrutiny, as the
ammunition lost on the march was often included in the total rounds
fired. But, in spite of the admitted incompleteness and the partiality
of the sources of information, the facts narrated in my first three
volumes present ample material whereby to gauge the _moral_, the
tactical fitness, and the armament of our troops—in short, to judge of
the readiness of our army for war.

The account of the battle of Liao-yang was written in Manchuria by
Colonel Ilinski, of the General Staff, who was then on my staff,
and was sent in November, 1904, to headquarters in St. Petersburg.
This narrative, supplemented by additional material from the pen
of the author, forms the first volume. The second, “The Battle of
the Sha Ho,” was drawn up under my guidance in Manchuria by Colonel
Bolkhovitinoff, of the General Staff. The third, “The Battle of
Mukden,” and the fourth, “The Summary of the War,” I wrote myself,
the former in Manchuria and the latter at my country home. For the
collection of material, the compilation of statistics, and most
of the cartography for the third volume, I am indebted to Colonel
Sivers and Lieutenant-Colonel Havrilits, of the General Staff, whilst
Lieutenant-Colonel Krimoff, of the same branch, has undertaken this
work for the fourth volume. Without the