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 THE GERMAN FLEET

 _BEING THE COMPANION VOLUME TO "THE FLEETS AT WAR"
 AND "FROM HELIGOLAND TO KEELING ISLAND."_

 BY
 ARCHIBALD HURD

 AUTHOR (JOINT) OF "GERMAN SEA-POWER, ITS RISE, PROGRESS
 AND ECONOMIC BASIS."

 HODDER AND STOUGHTON
 LONDON      NEW YORK      TORONTO
 MCMXV




CONTENTS


 CHAPTER                                                   PAGE

   INTRODUCTION                                              7

   I. PAST ASCENDENCY                                       19

  II. THE FIRST GERMAN FLEET                                26

 III. GERMANY'S FLEET IN THE LAST CENTURY                   51

  IV. BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE GERMAN NAVY                  80

   V. THE GERMAN NAVY ACTS                                  93

  VI. GERMAN SHIPS, OFFICERS, AND MEN                      142

 VII. WILLIAM II. AND HIS NAVAL MINISTER                   155

 APPENDIX I.--GERMANY'S NAVAL POLICY                       183

 APPENDIX II.--BRITISH AND GERMAN SHIP-BUILDING
 PROGRAMMES                                                189




INTRODUCTION


In the history of nations there is probably no chapter more fascinating
and arresting than that which records the rise and fall and subsequent
resurrection of German sea-power.

In our insular pride, conscious of our glorious naval heritage, we are
apt to forget that Germany had a maritime past, and that long before
the German Empire existed the German people attained pre-eminence in
oversea commerce and created for its protection fleets which exercised
commanding influence in northern waters.

It is an error, therefore, to regard Germany as an up-start naval
Power. The creation of her modern navy represented the revival
of ancient hopes and aspirations. To those ambitions, in their
unaggressive form, her neighbours would have taken little exception;
Germany had become a great commercial Power with colonies overseas, and
it was natural that she should desire to possess a navy corresponding
to her growing maritime interests and the place which she had already
won for herself in the sun.

The more closely the history of German sea-power is studied the more
apparent it must become, that it was not so much Germany's Navy
Acts, as the propaganda by which they were supported and the new and
aggressive spirit which her naval organisation brought into maritime
affairs that caused uneasiness throughout the world and eventually
created that feeling of antagonism which found expression after the
opening of war in August, 1914.

In the early part of 1913 I wrote, in collaboration with a friend who
possessed intimate knowledge of the foundations and the strength of the
German Empire, a history of the German naval movement,[1] particular
emphasis being laid on its economic basis. In the preparation of
the present volume I have drawn upon this former work. It has been
impossible, however, in the necessarily limited compass of one of
the _Daily Telegraph_ War Books, to deal with the economic basis
upon which the German Navy has been created. I believe that the
chapters in "German Sea-Power" with reference to this aspect of German
progress--for which my collaborator was responsible and of which,
therefore, I can speak without reserve--still constitute a unique
presentation of the condition of Germany on the eve of the outbreak of
war.

Much misconception exists as to the staying power of Germany. The
German Empire as an economic unit is not of mushroom growth. Those
readers who are sufficiently interested in the subject of the basis
of German vitality, will realise vividly by reference to "German
Sea-Power" the deep and well-laid foundations upon which not only the
German Navy, but the German Empire rest.

Whether this history should be regarded as the romance of the German
Navy or the tragedy of the German Navy must for the present remain an
open question. In everyday life many romances culminate in tragedy,
and the course of events in the present war suggest that the time may
be at hand when the German people will realise the series of errors
committed by their rulers in the upbuilding of German sea-power. Within
the past fifteen years it is calculated that about £300,000,000 has
been spent in the maintenance and expansion of the German Fleet, the
improvement of its bases, and the enlargement of the Kiel Canal. Much
of this money has been raised by loans. Those loans are still unpaid;
it was believed by a large section of the German people that Great
Britain, hampered by party politics and effete in all warlike pursuits,
would, after defeat, repay them. That hope must now be dead.

The German people, as the memorandum which accompanied the Navy Act
of 1900 reveals, were led to anticipate that the Fleet, created by
the sacrifice of so much treasure, would not only guarantee their
shores against aggression, but would give absolute protection to their
maritime and colonial interests, and would, eventually, pay for itself.
The time will come when they will recognise that from the first they
have been hoodwinked and deceived by those in authority over them. It
may be that German statesmen, and the Emperor himself, were themselves
deceived by the very brilliance of the dreams of world power which they
entertained and by the conception which they had formed of the lack of
virility, sagacity and prescience of those responsible for the fortunes
of other countries, and of Great Britain in particular.

German Navy Acts were passed in full confidence that during the period
when they were being carried into effect the rest of the world would
stand still, lost in admiration of Germany's culture and Germany's
power. The mass of the German people were unwilling converts to the
new gospel. They had to be convinced of the wisdom of the new policy.
For this purpose a Press Bureau was established. Throughout the
German States this organisation fostered, through the official and
semi-official Press, feelings of antagonism and hatred towards other
countries, and towards England and the United States especially,
because these two countries were Germany's most serious rivals in the
commercial markets of the world, and also possessed sea-power superior
to her own.

It is interesting to recall in proof of this dual aim of German policy
the remarks of von Edelsheim, a member of the German General Staff, in
a pamphlet entitled "Operationen Ubersee."[2]

The author, after first pointing out the possibility of invading
England, turned his attention to the United States.[3] His remarks are
so interesting in view of the activity of German agents on the other
side of the Atlantic after the outbreak of war, that it is perhaps
excusable to quote at some length this explanation by a member of the
German General Staff of how the German Fleet was to be used against the
United States as an extension of the power of the huge German Army.

 "The possibility must be taken into account that the fleet of the
 United States will at first not venture into battle, but that it will
 withdraw into fortified harbours, in order to wait for a favourable
 opportunity of achieving minor successes. Therefore it is clear that
 naval action alone will not be decisive against the United States, but
 that combined action of army and navy will be required. Considering
 the great extent of the United States, the conquest of the country
 by an army of invasion is not possible. But there is every reason
 to believe that victorious enterprises on the Atlantic coast, and
 the conquest of the most important arteries through which imports
 and exports pass, will create such an unbearable state of affairs in
 the whole country that the Government will readily offer acceptable
 conditions in order to obtain peace.

 "If Germany begins preparing a fleet of transports and troops for
 landing purposes at the moment when the battle fleet steams out of our
 harbours, we may conclude that operations on the American soil can
 begin after about four weeks, and it cannot be doubted that the United
 States will not be able to oppose to us within that time an army
 equivalent to our own.

 "At present the regular army of the United States amounts to 65,000
 men, of whom only 30,000 could be disposed of. Of these at least
 10,000 are required for watching the Indian territories and for
 guarding the fortifications on the sea coast. Therefore only about
 20,000 men of the regular army are ready for war. Besides, about
 100,000 militia are in existence, of whom the larger part did not come
 up when they were called out during the last war. Lastly, the militia
 is not efficient; it is partly armed with muzzle-loaders, and its
 training is worse than its armament.

 "As an operation by surprise against America is impossible, on account
 of the length of time during which transports are on the way, only
 the landing can be affected by surprise. Nevertheless, stress must be
 laid on the fact that the rapidity of the invasion will considerably
 facilitate victory against the United States, owing to the absence of
 methodical preparation for mobilization, owing to the inexperience of
 the personnel, and owing to the weakness of the regular army.

 "In order to occupy permanently a considerable part of the United
 States, and to protect our lines of operation so as to enable us to
 fight successfully against all the forces which that country, in
 the course of time, can oppose to us, considerable forces would be
 required. Such an operation would be greatly hampered by the fact
 that it would require a second passage of the transport fleet in
 order to ship the necessary troops that long distance. However, it
 seems questionable whether it would be advantageous to occupy a great
 stretch of country for a considerable time. The Americans will not
 feel inclined to conclude peace because one or two provinces are
 occupied by an army of invasion, but because of the enormous, material
 losses which the whole country will suffer if the Atlantic harbour
 towns, in which the threads of the whole prosperity of the United
 States are concentrated, are torn away from them one after the other.

 "Therefore the task of the fleet would be to undertake a series of
 large landing operations, through which we are able to take several
 of these important and wealthy towns within a brief space of time. By
 interrupting their communications, by destroying all buildings serving
 the State commerce and the defence, by taking away all material for
 war and transport, and, lastly, by levying heavy contributions, we
 should be able to inflict damage on the United States.

 "For such enterprises a smaller military force will suffice.
 Nevertheless, the American defence will find it difficult to undertake
 a successful enterprise against that kind of warfare. Though an
 extremely well-developed railway system enables them to concentrate
 troops within a short time on the different points on the coast, the
 concentration of the troops and the time which is lost until it is
 recognised which of the many threatened points of landing will really
 be utilised will, as a rule, make it possible for the army of invasion
 to carry out its operation with success under the co-operation of
 the fleet at the point chosen. The corps landed can either take
 the offensive against gathering hostile forces or withdraw to the
 transports in order to land at another place."

These declarations of German naval and military policy are of interest
as illustrating the character of the propaganda by which the naval
movement was encouraged. _The Navy was to give world-wide length of
reach to the supreme German Army, and enable Germany to dictate peace
to each and every nation, however distantly situated._ An appeal was
made to the lowest instincts of the German people. They were counselled
to create a great naval force on the understanding that the money
expended would by aggressive wars be repaid with interest and that,
as a result of combined naval and military operations, they would
extend the world power of the German Empire, and incidentally promote
Germany's maritime interests in all the oceans of the world.

Those who were responsible for the inflammatory speeches and articles
by which the interest of the German people in the naval movement was
excited, forgot the influence which these ebullitions would have upon
the policy of other Powers and upon their defensive preparations.
It was only after hostilities had broken out that the German people
realised what small results all their sacrifices had produced. By
the words, more than the acts, of those responsible for German naval
policy, the other Powers of the world had been forced to expand and
reorganise their naval forces. Germany had at great cost won for
herself the position of second greatest naval Power in the world, but
in doing so she had unconsciously forced up the strength of the British
Fleet and dragged in her path the United States, France, Italy, Japan,
Russia, and to a limited extent, but only to a limited extent, her
ally, Austria-Hungary. During the years of agitation the other Powers
of the world had not stood still, as it was assumed in Germany they
would do. First, the British people increased their naval expenditure
and more ships were built and more officers and men were entered; and
then the German Navy Act of 1912 was passed.

It had been the practice of the naval Powers to keep about one-half
only of their ships in full sea-going commission. The armed peace,
before Germany began to give expression to her maritime ambitions, was
a yoke which rested easily upon the navies of the world. As a British
naval officer has remarked:--

 "Up to the end of the last century our Navy enjoyed a peace
 routine. We maintained squadrons all over the world, and the pick
 of our personnel was to be found anywhere but in home waters. The
 Mediterranean claimed the pick of both our ships and men. Here naval
 life was one long holiday. The routine was to lay in harbour for nine
 months out of the year. About July the whole fleet would congregate at
 Malta for the summer's cruise. Sometimes it would be east of Malta,
 taking in the Grecian Archipelago and the Holy Land; at others it
 would be west, visiting the French and Italian ports, paying a visit
 to the Rock, and then home to Malta for another long rest.

 "Preparation for war was never thought of. Why should it be? The
 French Navy had no aggressive designs, and was much below our own,
 both in material strength and in personnel, while the Russian Navy
 was partly confined in the Black Sea, the other part being in the
 Baltic. And so we, both officers and men, set out to have a good time.
 Our ships were kept up to yacht-like perfection as regards their
 paintwork, while their bright work shone like gold, and the road to
 promotion lay not through professional efficiency, but the state of
 cleanliness and splendour of one's ship. All kinds of drills and
 evolutions were devised, not because of their war value, but because
 they had a competitive value, and so ship could be pitted against ship
 and an element of sport introduced.

 "There was nothing really wrong in all this. The British Navy was
 there to maintain for us our title of 'Mistress of the Seas,' and as
 no other nation apparently wished to challenge our title, there was
 nothing to do but pass away the time as pleasantly as possible; when
 the Navy was called on to perform any task it carried it through with
 vigour, valour, and efficiency, and immediately settled down again."[4]

This regime came to an end soon after Grand Admiral von Tirpitz
became German Naval Secretary towards the end of the nineteenth
century. He set the navies of the world a new model. He determined to
take advantage of the easy-going spirit which animated the pleasant
relations then existing between the great fleets. There was to be
nothing pleasant about the German Fleet. It was to be a strenuous agent
of Germany's aggressive aims. In the organisation of German sea-power
new principles found expression. In home waters and abroad the German
Navy was always ready instantly for war. The screw was applied
gradually stage by stage. Under the German Navy Act of 1912 this
aggressive sea policy found its ultimate expression: it was proposed
to keep always on a war footing nearly four-fifths of the ships in
northern waters, while at the same time the squadrons abroad were to
be greatly increased in strength. Happily, owing to Lord Fisher's
foresight and strategical ability, the British Navy was enabled step by
step to respond to each and every measure taken by Germany. He created
for us a Grand Fleet and when hostilities broke out that fleet took up
its war stations and denied to the main forces of Germany the use of
any and every sea.

German policy operated as a tonic, though not to the same extent, on
the other great fleets of the world. In the summer of 1914 Germany
discovered that every anticipation upon which her foreign, naval
and military policies had been based had been falsified by events.
In particular, in adding to her strength at sea and on land, she
had rendered herself weak by creating enemies east and west. Her
navy, which was to have engaged in a victorious campaign against the
greatest naval power of the world in isolation--the rest of the world
watching the inevitable downfall of the Mistress of the Seas with
approval--found arrayed against it not the British fleet only, but the
fleets of France and Russia in Europe and the Navy of Japan in the Far
East.

In studying, therefore, the history of the naval development of
Germany, and contrasting the high hopes which inspired the naval
movement with the events which occurred on the outbreak of war, and in
subsequent months, one is led to wonder whether, after all, the romance
of the German Navy will not be regarded in the future, by the German
people at least, rather as a great and costly tragedy.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: "German Sea-Power, Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis,"
by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (1913, London, John Murray, 10s.
6d.).]

[Footnote 2: "Modern Germany" (Smith Elder, 1912).]

[Footnote 3: Germans always assumed that they could attack the United
States without intervention on our part, just as they assumed that
they could engage in war with us without becoming involved with the
United States. They believed that Germany would fight both countries in
turn--and victoriously.]

[Footnote 4: "The British Navy from Within" by "Ex-Royal Navy" (Hodder
& Stoughton).]




THE GERMAN FLEET




CHAPTER I

Past Ascendency


Like the foundations of the Empire in 1870, the formation of