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Stanisław II August  (also Stanisław August Poniatowski;  born Stanisław Antoni Poniatowski;  17 January 1732 – 12 February 1798) was the last King and Grand Duke of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (1764–95). He remains a controversial figure in Polish history. Recognized as a great patron of the arts and sciences. Initiatior and firm supporter of progressive reforms, he is also remembered as the last king of the Commonwealth whose election was marred by Russian involvement.  Main criticism resonates around being the one who failed to stand against the partitions, and in the end to prevent the destruction of Poland.

Arriving at the Russian imperial court in Saint Petersburg in 1755, he became romantically involved with the twenty-six-year-old Catherine Alexeievna (the future Empress Catherine the Great, reigned 1762–1796), three years his senior. With her support, in 1764 he was elected king of Poland. Against expectations, he attempted to reform and strengthen the ailing Commonwealth. His efforts met with external opposition from Prussia, Russia and Austria, all interested in keeping the Commonwealth weak; and from internal conservative interests, which saw reforms as threatening their traditional liberties and prerogatives.

The defining crisis of his early reign, the War of the Bar Confederation (1768–1772), led to the First Partition of Poland (1772). The latter part of his reign saw reforms wrought by the Great Sejm (1788–1792) and the Constitution of 3 May 1791. These reforms were overthrown by the 1792 Targowica Confederation and by the War in Defense of the Constitution, leading directly to the Second Partition of Poland (1793), the Kościuszko Uprising (1794) and the final Third Partition of Poland (1795), marking the end of the Commonwealth. Stripped of all meaningful power, Poniatowski abdicated in November 1795 and spent the last years of his life in semi-captivity in Saint Petersburg.

A Polish noble of the Ciołek coat of arms and a member of the Poniatowski family, he was the son of Count Stanisław Poniatowski, Castellan of Kraków, and Princess Konstancja Czartoryska; brother of Michał Jerzy Poniatowski (1736–94), Primate of Poland; and uncle to Prince Józef Poniatowski, (1763–1813).

Royal titles

The English translation of the Polish text of the 1791 Constitution gives his title as: Stanisław August, by the grace of God and the will of the people, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania and Duke of Ruthenia, Prussia, Masovia, Samogitia, Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Podlasie, Livonia, Smolensk, Severia and Chernihiv.

Life

Youth

Stanisław August Poniatowski was born on 17 January 1732 in Wołczyn, then located in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and now part of Belarus, to Stanisław Poniatowski and Konstancja née Czartoryska. The Poniatowski family of the Ciołek coat of arms was among the highest of the Polish nobility (szlachta). He spent the first few years of his childhood in Gdańsk; afterward, his family moved to Warsaw. He was educated by his mother, then by private tutors, including Russian ambassador Herman Karl von Keyserling. He did not have many friends in his teenage years; instead, he developed a fondness for books, which continued throughout his life. He made his first foreign voyage in 1748, when he accompanied the Russian army as it advanced to Germany. During that trip he visited Aachen and the Netherlands. Later that year he returned to the Commonwealth, stopping in Dresden.

Political career

Poniatowski spent the following year as an apprentice in the chancellery of Michał Fryderyk Czartoryski, then the Deputy Chancellor of Lithuania. In 1750, he traveled to Berlin. There he met the British diplomat Charles Hanbury Williams, who became his mentor and friend. In 1751, Poniatowski was elected to the Treasury Tribunal in Radom, where he served as a commissioner the following year. He spent most of January 1752 at the Austrian court in Vienna. Later that year, after serving at a Radom Tribunal and meeting with King Augustus III of Poland, he was a sejm (Polish parliament) deputy. During that Sejm his father acquired for him the title of starost of Przemyśl. In March 1753 he left on another foreign trip, this time through Hungary to Vienna, where he met Williams again. He spent more time in the Netherlands, where he met many key members of that country's political and economical sphere. By late August he arrived in Paris, where he again entered the high social circles. In February 1754 he left Paris and traveled to England, where he spent the next few months. There he befriended Charles Yorke, future Lord Chancellor of Great Britain. He returned to the Commonwealth later that year, this time not participating in the Sejm, as his parents wanted to keep him out of the political drama surrounding the Ostrogski family's fee tail (Ordynacja Ostrogska). Next year he received a title of stolnik of Lithuania.

Ultimately, Poniatowski owed his career to his family connections with the powerful Czartoryski family and their political faction, known as Familia, to whom he grew closer. It was the Familia who sent him in 1755 to Saint Petersburg in the service of Williams, who had been named British ambassador to Russia.

In Saint Petersburg, Poniatowski met the 26-year-old Catherine Alexeievna (the future empress Catherine the Great). The two became lovers. Whatever his feelings for Catherine, it is likely Poniatowski also saw an opportunity to use the relationship for his own benefit, using her influence to bolster his career.

Poniatowski had to leave St. Petersburg in July 1756 due to court intrigue. Through the combined influence of Catherine, Russian empress Elizabeth and chancellor Bestuzhev-Ryumin, Poniatowski rejoined the Russian court as ambassador of Saxony the following January.  In St. Petersburg, he became the source of more intrigue between various European governments, some supporting his appointment, others demanding his withdrawal. Eventually, he left the Russian capital on 14 August 1758.

Poniatowski attended the Sejms of 1758, 1760 and 1762. He continued his involvement with the Familia, and supported a pro-Russian and anti-Prussian stance in Polish politics. His father died in 1762, leaving him a moderate inheritance. In 1762, when Catherine ascended to the Russian throne, she sent him several letters professing her support for his ascension to the Polish throne, but asking him to stay away from St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, Poniatowski hoped that Catherine would consider marriage, an idea that was seen as plausible by some international observers. He was involved with the unrealized plans of the Familia for a coup d'état against Augustus III. In August 1763, however, Catherine advised him and the Familia that she would not support a coup as long as Augustus III were alive.

King

Years of hope

Upon the death of Poland's King Augustus III in October 1763, negotiations began concerning the election of the new king. Catherine threw her support behind Poniatowski. The Russians spent about 2.5m rubles supporting his election, Poniatowski's supporters and opponents engaged in some military posturing and even minor clashes, and in the end, the Russian army was deployed only a few miles from the election sejm, which met at Wola near Warsaw. In the end, there were no other serious contenders, and during the convocation sejm on 7 September 1764, the 32-year-old Poniatowski was elected king, with 5,584 votes. He swore the pacta conventa on 13 November, and the formal coronation took place in Warsaw on 25 November. The new King's uncles in the Familia would have preferred another nephew on the throne, Prince Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski, characterized by one of his contemporaries as débauché, sinon dévoyé (debauched if not depraved), but Czartoryski had declined to seek the office.

Stanisław August, as he now styled himself, combining the names of his two immediate royal predecessors, began his rule with rough support within the nation; particularly, the lower nobility was favorable towards him. In his first years, he attempted to introduce a number of reforms. He founded the Knights School, and began to form a diplomatic service, with semi-permanent diplomatic representatives throughout Europe, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. On 7 May 1765, Poniatowski established the Order of the Knights of Saint Stanislaus, Bishop and Martyr, in honor of Poland's and his own patron saint, as Poland's second order of chivalry, to reward Poles for noteworthy service to the king. Together with the Familia he tried to reform the ineffective government, reducing the powers of the hetmans (Commonwealth's top military commanders) and treasurers, moving them to commissions elected by the Sejm and responsible to the king. In his memoirs, Poniatowski called this period the "years of hope." The Familia, which was interested in strengthening the power of their own faction, was dissatisfied with his conciliatory policy as he reached out to many former opponents of their policies. This uneasy alliance between Poniatowski and the Familia continued for most of the first decade of his rule. One of the points of contention between Poniatowski and the Familia concerned the rights of the religious minorities in Poland; whereas Poniatowski reluctantly supported a policy of religious tolerance, the Familia was opposed to it. The growing rift between Poniatowski and the Familia was exploited by the Russians, who used this issue as a pretext to intervene in the Commonwealth's internal politics and destabilize the country. Catherine had no desire to see Poniatowski's reform succeed; she had supported his ascent to the throne to ensure that the Commonwealth would remain a weak state under Russian control, and his attempts to reform the state's ailing machinery were a threat to the status quo.

Bar Confederation and First Partition of Poland

Matters came to a head in 1766. During the Sejm in October of that year, Poniatowski attempted to push a radical reform, restricting the disastrous liberum veto policy. He was opposed by conservatives such as Michał Wielhorski, who were supported by the Prussian and Russian ambassadors, who threatened war if the reform was passed. The dissidents, supported by the Russians, formed a confederation, the Radom Confederation. Abandoned by the Familia, Poniatowski's reforms failed to pass at the Repnin Sejm, named after Russian ambassador Nicholas Repnin, who promised to guarantee the Golden Liberties of the Polish nobility, enshrined in the Cardinal Laws, with all the might of the Russian Empire.

Although it had abandoned the cause of Poniatowski's reforms, the Familia did not receive the support it expected from the Russians, who continued to press for the dissidents' rights. Meanwhile, some factions now rallied under the banner of the Bar Confederation, aimed against the dissidents, Poniatowski and the Russians. After an unsuccessful attempt to find allies in Western Europe (France, England and Austria), Poniatowski and the Familia had no choice but to rely more heavily on the Russian Empire, which treated Poland as a protectorate. In the War of the Bar Confederation (1768–1772), Poniatowski supported the Russian army's repression of the Bar Confederation. In 1770, the Council of the Bar Confederation proclaimed him dethroned. The following year, he was kidnapped by Bar Confederate sympathizers and briefly held prisoner outside of Warsaw, but managed to escape. Faced with the weakness of Poland and continuing chaos, Austria, Russia and Prussia decided to intervene militarily, in exchange for significant territorial concessions from the Commonwealth – a decision they made without consulting Poniatowski or other Polish parties.

Although Poniatowski protested the First Partition of the Commonwealth (1772), he was powerless to do anything about it. He considered abdication, but decided against it. During the Partition Sejm of 1773–1775, in which Russia was represented by ambassador Otto von Stackelberg, with no help forthcoming from abroad and the armies of the partitioning powers occupying Warsaw to compel the Sejm by force of arms, no alternative was available save submission to their will. Eventually Poniatowski and the Sejm acceded to the partition treaty; at the same time, several other reforms were passed. The Cardinal Laws were confirmed and guaranteed by the partitioning powers. Royal power was restricted, as the king lost the power to give out titles, and positions of military officers, ministers and senators, the starostwo territories, and Crown lands would be awarded through an auction. The Sejm also created two notable institutions: the Permanent Council, a main governmental body in continuous operation, and the Commission of National Education. The partitioners intended the Council to be easier to control than the unruly Sejms, and indeed it remained under the influence of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, it was a significant improvement in the Commonwealth governance. The new legislation was guaranteed by the Russian Empire, giving it another excuse to interfere in Commonwealth politics if the legislation it favored was changed.

The political scene in the aftermath of the Partition Sejm saw the rise of a conservative faction which was opposed to the Permanent Council, seeing it as a threat to their Golden Freedoms. This faction was supported by the Czartoryski family, but not by Poniatowski, who proved to be quite adept at making the Council follow his wishes; this marked the formation of new anti-royal and pro-royal factions in Polish politics. The royal faction was made up primarily of people indebted to the king, who planned to build their careers on service to him; few were privy to his plans for reforms, which were kept hidden from the conservative opposition and Russia. Poniatowski scored a political victory during the Sejm of 1776, which further strengthened the Council. Chancellor Andrzej Zamoyski was tasked with the codification of the Polish law, a project that became known as the Zamoyski Code. Russia supported some, but not all, of the 1776 reforms, and to prevent Poniatowski from growing too powerful, it supported the opposition during the Sejm of 1778. This marked the end of Poniatowski's reforms, as he found himself without sufficient support to carry them through.

Great Sejm and Constitution of 3 May 1791

In the 1780s, Catherine slightly favored Poniatowski over the opposition, but did not support any of his plans for significant reforms. Despite repeated attempts, Poniatowski failed to confederate the sejms, which would have made them immune to liberum veto. Thus, although he had a majority in the Sejms, Poniatowski was unable to pass even the smallest reform. The Zamoyski Code was rejected by the Sejm of 1780, and opposition attacks on the king dominated the Sejms of 1782 and 1786.

Reforms became possible again in the late 1780s. In the context of the wars being waged against the Ottoman Empire by both the Austrian Empire and the Russian Empire, Poniatowski tried to draw Poland into the Austro-Russian alliance, seeing a war with the Ottomans as an opportunity to strengthen the Commonwealth. Catherine gave permission for the next Sejm to be confederated, as she considered some form of limited military alliance with Poland against the Ottomans might be useful.

The Polish-Russian alliance was not implemented, as in the end the only acceptable compromise proved unattractive to both sides. However, in the ensuing Four-Year Sejm of 1788–92 (known as the Great Sejm), Poniatowski threw his lot with the reformers associated with the Patriotic Party of Stanisław Małachowski, Ignacy Potocki and Hugo Kołłątaj, and co-authored the Constitution of 3 May 1791. The Constitution introduced sweeping reforms. According to Jacek Jędruch, the constitution, in the liberality of its provisions, "fell somewhere below the French, above the Canadian, and left the Prussian far behind", but was "no match for the American Constitution". George Sanford notes that the Constitution gave Poland "a constitutional monarchy close to the English model of the time." Poniatowski himself described it, according to a contemporary account, as "founded principally on those of England and the United States of America, but avoiding the faults and errors of both, and adapted as much as possible to the local and particular circumstances of the country." The Constitution of 3 May remained to the end a work in progress. A new civil and criminal code (tentatively called the Stanisław August Code) was in the works. Poniatowski also planned a reform improving the situation of the Polish Jews.

In foreign policy, spurned by Russia, Poland turned to another potential ally, the Triple Alliance, represented on the Polish diplomatic scene primarily by the Kingdom of Prussia, which led to the formation of the ultimately futile Polish–Prussian alliance. The pro-Prussian shift was not supported by Poniatowski, who nevertheless acceded to the decision of the majority of Sejm deputies. The passing of the Constitution of 3 May, although officially applauded by Frederick William II of Prussia, who sent a congratulatory note to Warsaw, caused further worry in Prussia. The contacts of Polish reformers with the revolutionary French National Assembly were seen by Poland's neighbors as evidence of a conspiracy and a threat to their absolute monarchies. Prussian statesman Ewald von Hertzberg expressed the fears of European conservatives: "The Poles have given the coup de grâce to the Prussian monarchy by voting a constitution", elaborating that a strong Commonwealth would likely demand the return of the lands Prussia acquired in the First Partition; a similar sentiment was later expressed by Prussian Foreign Minister Friedrich Wilhelm von Schulenburg-Kehnert. Russia's wars with the Ottomans and Sweden having ended, Catherine was furious over the adoption of the Constitution, which threatened Russian influence in Poland. One of Russia's chief foreign policy authors, Alexander Bezborodko, upon learning of the Constitution, commented that "the worst possible news have arrived from Warsaw: the Polish king has become almost sovereign."

War in Defense of the Constitution and end of the Commonwealth

Shortly thereafter, conservative Polish nobility formed the Targowica Confederation to overthrow the Constitution, which they saw as a threat to the traditional freedoms and privileges they enjoyed. The confederates aligned themselves with Russia's Catherine the Great, and the Russian army entered Poland, marking the start of the Polish–Russian War of 1792, also known as the War in Defense of the Constitution. The Sejm voted to increase the Polish Army to 100,000 men, but due to insufficient time and funds this number was never achieved. Poniatowski and the reformers could field only a 37,000-man army, many of them untested recruits. This army, under the command of the King's nephew Józef Poniatowski and Tadeusz Kościuszko, managed to defeat the Russians or fight them to a draw on several occasions. Following the victorious Battle of Zieleńce, in which Polish forces were commanded by his nephew, the king founded a new order, the Order of Virtuti Militari, to reward Poles for exceptional military leadership and courage in combat.

Despite Polish requests, Prussia refused to honor its alliance obligations. In the end, the numerical superiority of the Russians was too great, and defeat looked inevitable. Poniatowski's attempts at negotiations with Russia proved futile. In July 1792, when Warsaw was threatened with siege by the Russians, the king came to believe that surrender was the only alternative to total defeat. Having received assurances from Russian ambassador Yakov Bulgakov that no territorial changes would occur, a cabinet of ministers called the Guard of Laws (or Guardians of Law, ) voted eight to four in favor of surrender. On 24 July 1792, Poniatowski joined the Targowica Confederation. The Polish Army disintegrated. Many reform leaders, believing their cause lost, went into self-exile, although they hoped that Poniatowski would be able to negotiate an acceptable compromise with the Russians, as he had done in the past. Poniatowski had not saved the Commonwealth, however. He and the reformers had lost much of their influence, both within the country and with Catherine. Neither were the Targowica Confederates victorious. To their surprise, there ensued the Second Partition of Poland. With the new deputies bribed or intimidated by the Russian troops, the Grodno Sejm took place. On 23 November 1793, it annulled all acts of the Great Sejm, including the Constitution. Faced with his powerlessness, Poniatowski once again considered abdication; in the meantime he tried to salvage whatever reforms he could.

Final years

Poniatowski's plans were ruined by the Kościuszko Uprising. The king did not encourage it, but once it began he supported it, seeing no other honorable option. Its defeat marked the end of the Commonwealth. Poniatowski tried to govern the country in the brief period after the defeat of the Uprising, but on 2 December 1794, Catherine demanded that he leave Warsaw, a request to which he acceded on 7 January 1795, leaving the capital under Russian military escort and settling briefly in Grodno. On 24 October 1795, the act of the final, Third Partition of Poland was signed; one month and one day later, on 25 November, Poniatowski signed his abdication. Catherine died on 17 November 1796, succeeded by Paul I of Russia. On 15 February 1797, Poniatowski left for Saint Petersburg, Russia. He hoped to be allowed to travel abroad, but was not able to secure permission to do so. A virtual prisoner in St. Petersburg's Marble Palace, he subsisted on a pension granted to him by Catherine. Despite financial troubles, he still supported some of his former allies, and he tried to represent the Polish case at the Russian court. He also worked on his memoirs.

Poniatowski died after a stroke on 12 February 1798. Paul I sponsored a royal state funeral, and on 3 March he was buried at the Catholic Church of St. Catherine in St. Petersburg. In 1938, when the Soviet Union planned to demolish the Church, his remains were transferred to the Second Polish Republic, and put in a church at Wołczyn, his birthplace. This was done in secret, and it caused a controversy in Poland when the issue became known. In the 1990, due to poor state of the Wołoczyn Church (then in Belarus), his body was transferred to Poland once more, to St. John's Cathedral in Warsaw, where, on 3 May 1791, he had celebrated the adoption of the Constitution he had co-authored and endorsed. A final funeral ceremony was held on 14 February 1995.

Legacy

Patron of culture

Poniatowski may have been the most important patron of the arts of the Polish Enlightenment. His political goals included the overthrow of the myth of the Golden Freedoms and the reform of the backwards culture of sarmatism, and many of his artistic projects aimed to eradicate the negative qualities he associated with them. The "Thursday Dinners" he hosted were considered the most brilliant social functions in the Polish capital.

He founded the Warsaw National Theatre, the first Polish public theatre, and sponsored many of its expenses, actors and an associated ballet school. He remodeled the Ujazdów Castle and the Royal Castle in Warsaw, and erected the elegant Royal Baths in Warsaw's most romantic park. He was deeply involved with the details of the architectural projects, and his eclectic style became known as the Stanisław August style, a term coined by Polish art historian Władysław Tatarkiewicz. His chief architects included Domenico Merlini and Jan Kamsetzer. He was also a patron of numerous painters, many of them on personal retainer. They included Poles Anna Rajecka, Franciszek Smuglewicz, Jan Bogumił Plersch, Józef Wall and Zygmunt Vogel, as well as foreign painters, namely Marceli Bacciarelli, Bernardo Canalatto, Jean Pillement, Louis Marteau and Per Krafft the Elder. His retinue of sculptors was led by Andrzej Le Brun, and included Giacomo Monaldi, Franciszek Pinck and Tommaso Righi. Jan Filip Holzhaeusser was his court engraver and designer of many commemorative medals. According to a 1795 inventory, his art collection, spread throughout numerous buildings, contained 2,889 pieces, including ones by Rembrandt, Rubens, van Dyck and others. His plan to create a large painting gallery in Warsaw was interrupted by the dismembering of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth; nonetheless, most of the paintings he ordered can now be seen at the Dulwich Picture Gallery in London. Poniatowski also planned to fund an Academy of Fine Arts, but this dream was also never realized.

Poniatowski accomplished much in the realm of education and literature. He established the School of Chivalry (also called the "Corps of Cadets"), which functioned from 1765 to 1794 and whose alumni included Tadeusz Kościuszko; he supported the creation of the Commission of National Education, considered to be the world's first Ministry of Education. In 1765 he helped found the Monitor, one of the first Polish newspapers and the leading periodical of the Polish Enlightenment. He sponsored many articles that appeared in the Monitor (and perhaps even wrote some himself). Writers and poets who received his patronage included Stanisław Trembecki, Franciszek Salezy Jezierski, Franciszek Bohomolec and Franciszek Zabłocki. He also supported publishers, including Piotr Świtkowski, and library owners such as Józef Lex.

He supported the development of the sciences, particularly cartography; he hired a personal cartographer (Karol de Perthees) even before his election as king. A plan he initiated to map the entire territory of the Commonwealth, however, was never finished. At the Royal Castle in Warsaw, he organized an astronomical observatory and supported astronomers Jan Śniadecki and Marcin Odlanicki Poczobutt. He also sponsored historical studies, including the collection, cataloging and copying of historical manuscripts. He encouraged publications of biographies of famous Polish historical figures, and sponsored their paintings and sculptures.

For his contributions to the arts and sciences, Poniatowski was awarded membership in 1766 to the Royal Society, where he was the first royal member outside the British royalty. In 1778, he was awarded membership to the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences, and in 1791 to the Berlin Academy of Sciences.

He also supported the development of industry and manufacturing, fields in which the Commonwealth lagged behind most of Western Europe. Among the endeavors in which he invested were the manufacture of cannons and firearms and the mining industry.

Poniatowski himself left several literary works: his memoirs, some political brochures and recorded speeches from the Sejm. He was considered a great orator and a skilled conversationalist.

Conflicting assessments

King Stanisław August remains a controversial figure. In Polish historiography and popular works, he has been criticized or marginalized by Szymon Askenazy, Joachim Lelewel, Jerzy Łojek (whom Andrzej Zahorski describes as Poniatowski's most vocal critic among modern historians), Tadeusz Korzon, Karol Zyszewski and Krystyna Zienkowska, whereas more neutral or positive views have been expressed by Paweł Jasienica, Walerian Kalinka, Władysław Konopczyński, Stanisław Mackiewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski and Stanisław Wasylewski.

When elected to the throne, he was seen by many as a simple "instrument for displacing the somnolent Saxons from the throne of Poland", yet as Norman Davies notes, "he turned out to be an ardent patriot, and a convinced reformer." Still, according to many, his reforms did not go far enough, leading to accusations that he was being overly cautious, even indecisive, a fault to which he himself admitted. His decision to rely on Russia has been often criticized. Poniatowski saw Russia as a "lesser evil" – willing to support the independence of a weak Poland within the Russian sphere of influence; however in the end Russia chose to support the partitions of Poland rather than reform. He was accused by others of weakness and subservience, even of treason, especially in the years following the Second Partition; during the Kościuszko Uprising, some rumors claimed that Polish Jacobins were planning a coup d'état and his assassination. Another line of criticism alleged poor financial planning on his part. Poniatowski had little personal wealth; most of his income came from royal lands and monopolies. His patronage of the arts and sciences was a major drain on his treasury; he also supported numerous public initiatives, and attempted to use the royal treasury to cover the country's expenses when tax revenue was insufficient. The Sejm promised to compensate him several times, with little practical effect. Nonetheless the accusation of being a spendthrift was frequently levied at him by his contemporary critics.

Andrzej Zahorski dedicated a book to the discussion of Poniatowski, The Dispute over Stanisław August (Spór o Stanisława Augusta, Warsaw, 1988). He notes that the discourse concerning Poniatowski is significantly colored by the fact that he was the last king of Poland – the king who failed to save the country. This failure, and his prominent position, made him a convenient scapegoat for many. Zahorski argues that Poniatowski made an error by joining the Targowica Confederation; he wanted to preserve the Polish state, but it was too late for that – he only succeeded in damaging his reputation for centuries to come.

Remembrance

Poniatowski has been the subject of numerous biographies and many works of art. Voltaire, who saw Poniatowski as a model reformist, modeled King Teucer in his drama Les Lois de Minos (1772) after him. At least 58 contemporary poems were dedicated to him or praised him. Since then, he has been a major character in many works of Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, in the Rok 1794 trilogy by Władysław Stanisław Reymont, in the novels of Tadeusz Łopalewski, and in the dramas of Ignacy Grabowski, Tadeusz Miciński, Roman Bradstaetter and Bogdan Śmigielski. He is discussed in Luise Mühlbach's novel Joseph II and His Court,  and appears in Jane Porter's Thaddeus of Warsaw.  

On screen he has been played by Wieńczysław Gliński in the 1976 3 Maja directed by Grzegorz Królikiewicz.  He will appear in an upcoming Russian TV series. 

He has been a subject of numerous portraits, medals and coins. Poniatowski is prominent figure in Jan Matejko's 1891 painting, Constitution of 3 May 1791. Matejko also portrayed him on another large painting, Rejtan, and in his series of portraits of Polish monarchs. His bust was unveiled in Łazienki in 1992. Numerous cities in Poland have streets named after him, including Warsaw and Kraków.

Family

Poniatowski was the son of Stanisław Poniatowski (1676–1762) and Princess Konstancja Czartoryska (1700–1759); brother of Michał Jerzy Poniatowski (1736–94), Kazimierz Poniatowski (1721–1800), Andrzej Poniatowski, (1734–1773); and uncle to Józef Poniatowski (1763–1813).

He never married. In his youth, he had loved his cousin Elżbieta Czartoryska, but her father August Aleksander Czartoryski disapproved because he did not think him influential or rich enough. When this was no longer an issue, she was already married. His pacta conventa specified that he should marry a Polish noblewoman, although he himself always hoped to marry into some royal family. Upon his accession to the throne, he had hopes of marrying Catherine II, writing to her on 2 November 1763 in a moment of doubt, "If I desired the throne, it was because I saw you on it." When she made it clear through his envoy Rzewuski that she would not marry him, there were hopes of an Austrian archduchess. 

A few historians believe that he later undertook a secret marriage to Elżbieta Szydłowska. However, according to Wirydianna Fiszerowa, a contemporary who knew them both, this rumour only spread after the death of Poniatowski, was generally disbelieved, and moreover, was circulated by Elżbieta herself, so the marriage is considered by most to be unlikely. 

He had several notable lovers, two of whom bore him children. Magdalena Agnieszka Sapieżyna (Lubomirska) (1739–1780) bore Konstancja Żwanowa (1768–1810) and Michał Cichocki (1770–1828). Elżbieta Szydłowska (1748–1810) bore him Stanisław Konopnicy-Grabowski (1780–1845), Michał Grabowski (1773–1812), Kazimierz Grabowski (1770-?), Konstancja Grabowska and Izabela Grabowska (1776–1858). It is also very likely that Anna Petrovna (1757–1758), Catherine the Great's second child, was his daughter.

Ancestors

Issue A nation state is a type of state that conjoins the political entity of a state to the cultural entity of a nation, from which it aims to derive its political legitimacy to rule and potentially its status as a sovereign state if one accepts the declarative theory of statehood as opposed to the constitutive theory.Such a definition is a working one: "All attempts to develop terminological consensus around "nation" resulted in failure", concludes . Walker Connor, in [] discusses the impressions surrounding the characters of "nation", "(sovereign) state", "nation state", and "nationalism". Connor, who gave the term "ethnonationalism" wide currency, also discusses the tendency to confuse nation and state and the treatment of all states as if nation states. In Globalization and Belonging, Sheila L. Crouche discusses "The Definitional Dilemma" (pp. 85ff). 
A state is specifically a political and geopolitical entity, whilst a nation is a cultural and ethnic one. The term "nation state" implies that the two coincide, in that a state has chosen to adopt and endorse a specific cultural group as associated with it. "Nation state" formation can take place at different times in different parts of the world.

The concept of a nation state can be compared and contrasted with that of the multinational state, city state,    empire, confederation, and other state formations with which it may overlap. The key distinction is the identification of a people with a polity in the "nation state."

History and origins 

The origins and early history of nation states are disputed. A major theoretical question is: "Which came first, the nation or the nation state?" Scholars such as Steven Weber, David Woodward, and Jeremy Black   have advanced the hypothesis that the nation state didn't arise out of political ingenuity or an unknown undetermined source, nor was it an accident of history or political invention; but is an inadvertent byproduct of 15th-century intellectual discoveries in political economy, capitalism, mercantilism, political geography, and geography   combined together with cartography   and advances in map-making technologies.   It was with these intellectual discoveries and technological advances that the nation state arose. For others, the nation existed first, then nationalist movements arose for sovereignty, and the nation state was created to meet that demand. Some "modernization theories" of nationalism see it as a product of government policies to unify and modernize an already existing state. Most theories see the nation state as a 19th-century European phenomenon, facilitated by developments such as state-mandated education, mass literacy and mass media. However, historians also note the early emergence of a relatively unified state and identity in Portugal and the Dutch Republic.

In France, Eric Hobsbawm argues, the French state preceded the formation of the French people. Hobsbawm considers that the state made the French nation, not French nationalism, which emerged at the end of the 19th century, the time of the Dreyfus Affair. At the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French people spoke some French, and 12-13% spoke it "fairly", according to Hobsbawm.

During the Italian unification, the number of people speaking the Italian language was even lower. The French state promoted the unification of various dialects and languages into the French language. The introduction of conscription and the Third Republic's 1880s laws on public instruction, facilitated the creation of a national identity, under this theory.

Some nation states, such as Germany or Italy, came into existence at least partly as a result of political campaigns by nationalists, during the 19th century. In both cases, the territory was previously divided among other states, some of them very small. The sense of common identity was at first a cultural movement, such as in the Völkisch movement in German-speaking states, which rapidly acquired a political significance. In these cases, the nationalist sentiment and the nationalist movement clearly precede the unification of the German and Italian nation states.

Historians Hans Kohn, Liah Greenfeld, Philip White and others have classified nations such as Germany or Italy, where cultural unification preceded state unification, as ethnic nations or ethnic nationalities. However, 'state-driven' national unifications, such as in France, England or China, are more likely to flourish in multiethnic societies, producing a traditional national heritage of civic nations, or territory-based nationalities.    Some authors deconstruct the distinction between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism because of the ambiguity of the concepts. They argue that the paradigmatic case of Ernest Renan is an idealisation and it should be interpreted within the German tradition and not in opposition to it. For example, they argue that the arguments used by Renan at the conference What is a nation? are not consistent with his thinking. This alleged civic conception of the nation would be determined only by the case of the loss gives Alsace and Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. 

The idea of a nation state was and is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, often called the "Westphalian system" in reference to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The balance of power, which characterized that system, depended on its effectiveness upon clearly defined, centrally controlled, independent entities, whether empires or nation states, which recognize each other's sovereignty and territory. The Westphalian system did not create the nation state, but the nation state meets the criteria for its component states (by assuming that there is no disputed territory).

The nation state received a philosophical underpinning in the era of Romanticism, at first as the 'natural' expression of the individual peoples (romantic nationalism: see Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conception of the Volk, later opposed by Ernest Renan). The increasing emphasis during the 19th century on the ethnic and racial origins of the nation, led to a redefinition of the nation state in these terms. Racism, which in Boulainvilliers's theories was inherently antipatriotic and antinationalist, joined itself with colonialist imperialism and "continental imperialism", most notably in pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic movements. 

The relation between racism and ethnic nationalism reached its height in the 20th century fascism and Nazism. The specific combination of 'nation' ('people') and 'state' expressed in such terms as the Völkische Staat and implemented in laws such as the 1935 Nuremberg laws made fascist states such as early Nazi Germany qualitatively different from non-fascist nation states. Minorities were not considered part of the people (Volk), and were consequently denied to have an authentic or legitimate role in such a state. In Germany, neither Jews nor the Roma were considered part of the people, and were specifically targeted for persecution. German nationality law defined 'German' on the basis of German ancestry, excluding all non-Germans from the people.

In recent years, a nation state's claim to absolute sovereignty within its borders has been much criticized. A global political system based on international agreements and supra-national blocs characterized the post-war era. Non-state actors, such as international corporations and non-governmental organizations, are widely seen as eroding the economic and political power of nation states, potentially leading to their eventual disappearance.

Before the nation state 

In Europe, during the 18th century, the classic non-national states were the multiethnic empires, the Austrian Empire, Kingdom of France, Kingdom of Hungary,  the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire and smaller nations at what would now be called sub-state level. The multi-ethnic empire was a monarchy ruled by a king, emperor or sultan. The population belonged to many ethnic groups, and they spoke many languages. The empire was dominated by one ethnic group, and their language was usually the language of public administration. The ruling dynasty was usually, but not always, from that group.

This type of state is not specifically European: such empires existed on all continents, except Australasia and Antarctica. Some of the smaller European states were not so ethnically diverse, but were also dynastic states, ruled by a royal house. Their territory could expand by royal intermarriage or merge with another state when the dynasty merged. In some parts of Europe, notably Germany, very small territorial units existed. They were recognised by their neighbours as independent, and had their own government and laws. Some were ruled by princes or other hereditary rulers, some were governed by bishops or abbots. Because they were so small, however, they had no separate language or culture: the inhabitants shared the language of the surrounding region.

In some cases these states were simply overthrown by nationalist uprisings in the 19th century. Liberal ideas of free trade played a role in German unification, which was preceded by a customs union, the Zollverein. However, the Austro-Prussian War, and the German alliances in the Franco-Prussian War, were decisive in the unification. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire broke up after the First World War, and the Russian Empire became the Soviet Union after the Russian Civil War.

A few of the smaller states survived: the independent principalities of Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and the republic of San Marino. (Vatican City is a special case. All of the larger Papal State save the Vatican itself was occupied and absorbed by Italy by 1870.  The resulting Roman Question, was resolved with the rise of the modern state under the 1929 Lateran treaties between Italy and the Holy See.)

Characteristics 

 
"Legitimate states that govern effectively and dynamic industrial economies are widely regarded today as the defining characteristics of a modern nation-state." 

Nation states have their own characteristics, differing from those of the pre-national states. For a start, they have a different attitude to their territory when compared with dynastic monarchies: it is semisacred and nontransferable. No nation would swap territory with other states simply, for example, because the king's daughter married. They have a different type of border, in principle defined only by the area of settlement of the national group, although many nation states also sought natural borders (rivers, mountain ranges). They are constantly changing in population size and power because of the limited restrictions of their borders.

The most noticeable characteristic is the degree to which nation states use the state as an instrument of national unity, in economic, social and cultural life.

The nation state promoted economic unity, by abolishing internal customs and tolls. In Germany, that process, the creation of the Zollverein, preceded formal national unity. Nation states typically have a policy to create and maintain a national transportation infrastructure, facilitating trade and travel. In 19th-century Europe, the expansion of the rail transport networks was at first largely a matter for private railway companies, but gradually came under control of the national governments. The French rail network, with its main lines radiating from Paris to all corners of France, is often seen as a reflection of the centralised French nation state, which directed its construction. Nation states continue to build, for instance, specifically national motorway networks. Specifically transnational infrastructure programmes, such as the Trans-European Networks, are a recent innovation.

The nation states typically had a more centralised and uniform public administration than its imperial predecessors: they were smaller, and the population less diverse. (The internal diversity of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was very great.) After the 19th-century triumph of the nation state in Europe, regional identity was subordinate to national identity, in regions such as Alsace-Lorraine, Catalonia, Brittany and Corsica. In many cases, the regional administration was also subordinated to central (national) government. This process was partially reversed from the 1970s onward, with the introduction of various forms of regional autonomy, in formerly centralised states such as France.

The most obvious impact of the nation state, as compared to its non-national predecessors, is the creation of a uniform national culture, through state policy. The model of the nation state implies that its population constitutes a nation, united by a common descent, a common language and many forms of shared culture. When the implied unity was absent, the nation state often tried to create it. It promoted a uniform national language, through language policy. The creation of national systems of compulsory primary education and a relatively uniform curriculum in secondary schools, was the most effective instrument in the spread of the national languages. The schools also taught the national history, often in a propagandistic and mythologised version, and (especially during conflicts) some nation states still teach this kind of history. 

Language and cultural policy was sometimes negative, aimed at the suppression of non-national elements. Language prohibitions were sometimes used to accelerate the adoption of national languages and the decline of minority languages (see examples: Anglicisation, Czechization, Francisation, Italianization, Germanisation, Magyarisation, Polonisation, Russification, Serbization, Slovakisation).

In some cases, these policies triggered bitter conflicts and further ethnic separatism. But where it worked, the cultural uniformity and homogeneity of the population increased. Conversely, the cultural divergence at the border became sharper: in theory, a uniform French identity extends from the Atlantic coast to the Rhine, and on the other bank of the Rhine, a uniform German identity begins. To enforce that model, both sides have divergent language policy and educational systems, although the linguistic boundary is in fact well inside France, and the Alsace region changed hands four times between 1870 and 1945.

In practice 

In some cases, the geographic boundaries of an ethnic population and a political state largely coincide. In these cases, there is little immigration or emigration, few members of ethnic minorities, and few members of the "home" ethnicity living in other countries.

Examples of nation states where ethnic groups make up more than 95% of the population include the following:
* Albania: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Albanian at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
* Armenia: The vast majority of Armenia's population consists of ethnic Armenians at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
* Bangladesh: The vast majority ethnic group of Bangladesh are the Bengali people, comprising 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of mostly Bihari migrants and indigenous tribal groups. Therefore, Bangladeshi society is to a great extent linguistically and culturally homogeneous, with very small populations of foreign expatriates and workers, although there is a substantial number of Bengali workers living abroad.
* Egypt: The vast majority of Egypt's population consists of ethnic Egyptians at about 99% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Egyptian identity is closely tied to the geography of Egypt and its long history; its development over the centuries saw overlapping or conflicting ideologies. Though today an Arabic-speaking people, that aspect constitutes for Egyptians a cultural dimension of their identity, not a necessary attribute of or prop for their national political being. Today most Egyptians see themselves, their history, culture and language (the Egyptian variant of Arabic) as specifically Egyptian and at the same time as part of the Arab world.
* Estonia: Defined as a nation state in its 1920 constitution, up until the period of Soviet colonialisation, Estonia was historically a very homogenous state with 88.2% of residents being Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Germans and 0.4% Jews according to the 1934 census.  As a result of Soviet policies the demographic situation significantly changed with the arrival of Russian speaking settlers. Today Estonians form 69%, Russians 25.4%, Ukrainians 2.04% and Belarusians 1.1% of the population(2012).  A significant proportion of the inhabitants (84.1%) are citizens of Estonia, around 7.3% are citizens of Russia and 7.0% as yet undefined citizenship (2010).
* Hungary: The Hungarians (or Magyar) people consist of about 95% of the population, with a small Roma and German minority: see Demographics of Hungary.
* Iceland: Although the inhabitants are ethnically related to other Scandinavian groups, the national culture and language are found only in Iceland. There are no cross-border minorities as the nearest land is too far away: see Demographics of Iceland

* Japan: Japan is also traditionally seen as an example of a nation state and also the largest of the nation states, with population in excess of 120 million. It should be noted that Japan has a small number of minorities such as Ryūkyū peoples, Koreans and Chinese, and on the northern island of Hokkaidō, the indigenous Ainu minority. However, they are either numerically insignificant (Ainu), their difference is not as pronounced (though Ryukyuan culture is closely related to Japanese culture, it is nonetheless distinctive in that it historically received much more influence from China and has separate political and nonpolitical and religious traditions) or well assimilated (Zainichi population is collapsing due to assimilation/naturalisation).
* Lebanon: The Arabic-speaking Lebanese consist at about 95% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities, as well as refugees or asylum seekers. Modern Lebanese identity is closely tied to the geography of Lebanon and its history. Although they are now an Arabic-speaking people and ethnically homogeneous, its identity oversees overlapping or conflicting ideologies between its Phoenician heritage and Arab heritage. While many Lebanese regard themselves as Arab, other Lebanese regard themselves, their history, and their culture as Phoenician and not Arab, while still other Lebanese regard themselves as both.
* Lesotho: Lesotho's ethno-linguistic structure consists almost entirely of the Basotho (singular Mosotho), a Bantu-speaking people; about 99.7% of the population are Basotho.
* Maldives: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Dhivehi at about 98% of the population, with the remainder consisting of foreign workers; there are no indigenous ethnic minorities.
* Malta: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Maltese at about 95.3% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.
* Mongolia: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Mongol at about 95.0% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few ethnic minorities included in Kazakhs.
* North and South Korea are among the most ethnically and linguistically homogeneous in the world. Particularly in reclusive North Korea, there are very few ethnic minority groups and expatriate foreigners.
* Poland: After World War II, with the genocide of the Jews by the invading German Nazis during the Holocaust, the expulsion of Germans after World War II and the loss of eastern territories (Kresy), 96.7% of the people of Poland claim Polish nationality, while 97.8% declare that they speak Polish at home (Census 2002).
* Several Polynesian countries such as Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, etc.
* Portugal: Although surrounded by other lands and people, the Portuguese nation has occupied the same territory since the romanization or latinization of the native population during the Roman era. The modern Portuguese nation is a very old amalgam of formerly distinct historical populations that passed through and settled in the territory of modern Portugal: native Iberian peoples, Celts, ancient Mediterraneans (Greeks, Phoenicians, Romans, Jews), invading Germanic peoples like the Suebi and the Visigoths, and Muslim Arabs and Berbers. Most Berber/Arab people and the Jews were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista and the repopulation by Christians.
* San Marino: The Sammarinese make up about 97% of the population and all speak Italian and are ethnically and linguisticially identical to Italians. San Marino is a landlocked enclave, completely surrounded by Italy. The state has a population of approximately 30,000, including 1,000 foreigners, most of whom are Italians.
* Swaziland: The vast majority of the population is ethnically Swazi at about 98.6% of the population, with the remainder consisting of a few small ethnic minorities.

The notion of a unifying "national identity" also extends to countries that host multiple ethnic or language groups, such as India and China. For example, Switzerland is constitutionally a confederation of cantons, and has four official languages, but it has also a 'Swiss' national identity, a national history and a classic national hero, Wilhelm Tell. 

Innumerable conflicts have arisen where political boundaries did not correspond with ethnic or cultural boundaries.

After World War II in the Josip Broz Tito era, nationalism was appealed to for uniting South Slav peoples. Later in the 20th century, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaders appealed to ancient ethnic feuds or tensions that ignited conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians, eventually breaking up the long collaboration of peoples and ethnic cleansing was carried out in the Balkans, resulting in the destruction of the formerly socialist republic and produced the civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–95, resulted in mass population displacements and segregation that radically altered what was once a highly diverse and intermixed ethnic makeup of the region. These conflicts were largely about creating a new political framework of states, each of which would be ethnically and politically homogeneous. Serbians, Croatians and Bosnians insisted they were ethnically distinct although many communities had a long history of intermarriage. Presently Slovenia (89% Slovene), Croatia (90,4% Croat)  and Serbia (83% Serb) could be classified as nation states per se, whereas Macedonia (66% Macedonian), Montenegro (42% Montenegrin) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (47% Bosniak) are multinational states.

Belgium is a classic example of a state that is not a nation state. The state was formed by secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, whose neutrality and integrity was protected by the Treaty of London 1839; thus it served as a buffer state after the Napoleonitic Wars between the European powers France, Prussia (after 1871 the German Empire) and the United Kingdom  until World War I, when its neutrality was breached by the Germans. Currently, Belgium is divided between the Flemings in the north and the French-speaking or the German-speaking population in the south. The Flemish population in the north speaks Dutch, the Walloon population in the south speaks French and/or German. The Brussels population speaks French and/or Dutch.

The Flemish identity is also cultural, and there is a strong separatist movement espoused by the political parties, the right-wing Vlaams Belang and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie. The Francophone Walloon identity of Belgium is linguistically distinct and regionalist. There is also unitary Belgian nationalism, several versions of a Greater Netherlands ideal, and a German-speaking community of Belgium annexed from Germany in 1920, and re-annexed by Germany in 1940–1944. However these ideologies are all very marginal and politically insignificant during elections.

China covers a large geographic area and uses the concept of "Zhonghua minzu" or Chinese nationality, in the sense of ethnic groups, but it also officially recognizes the majority Han ethnic group which accounts for over 90% of the population, and no fewer than 55 ethnic national minorities.

According to Philip G. Roeder, Moldova is an example of a Soviet era "segment-state" (Moldavian SSR), where the "nation-state project of the segment-state trumped the nation-state project of prior statehood. In Moldova, despite strong agitation from university faculty and students for reunification with Romania, the nation-state project forged within the Moldavian SSR trumped the project for a return to the interwar nation-state project of Greater Romania."  See Controversy over linguistic and ethnic identity in Moldova for further details.

Exceptional cases 

United Kingdom 

The United Kingdom is an unusual example of a nation state, due to its claimed "countries within a country" status. The United Kingdom, which is formed by the union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, is a unitary state formed initially by the merger of two independent kingdoms, the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland, but the Treaty of Union (1707) that set out the agreed terms has ensured the continuation of distinct features of each state, including separate legal systems and separate national churches.

In 2003, the British Government described the United Kingdom as "countries within a country".  While the Office for National Statistics and others describe the United Kingdom as a "nation state",   others, including a then Prime Minister, describe it as a "multinational state",    and the term Home Nations is used to describe the four national teams that represent the four nations of the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales). 

Kingdom of the Netherlands 

A similar unusual example is the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As of 10 October 2010, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four countries: 
* Netherlands proper
* Aruba
* Curaçao
* Sint Maarten

Each is expressly designated as a land in Dutch law by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  Unlike the German Länder and the Austrian Bundesländer, landen is consistently translated as "countries" by the Dutch government. 

Israel 

Israel was founded as a Jewish state in 1948. Its "Basic Laws" describe it as both a Jewish and a democratic state. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 75.7% of Israel's population is Jewish.  Arabs, who make up 20.4% of the population, are the largest ethnic minority in Israel. Israel also has very small communities of Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, Samaritans, and persons of some Jewish heritage. There are also some non-Jewish spouses of Israeli Jews. However, these communities are very small, and usually number only in the hundreds or thousands.

Pakistan 

Pakistan, even being an ethnically diverse country and officially a federation, is regarded as a nation state  due to its ideological basis on which it was given independence from British India as a separate nation rather than as part of a unified India. Different ethnic groups in Pakistan are strongly bonded by their common Muslim identity, common cultural and social values, common historical heritage, a national Lingua franca (Urdu) and joint political, strategic and economic interests. 

Minorities 

The most obvious deviation from the ideal of 'one nation, one state', is the presence of minorities, especially ethnic minorities, which are clearly not members of the majority nation. An ethnic nationalist definition of a nation is necessarily exclusive: ethnic nations typically do not have open membership. In most cases, there is a clear idea that surrounding nations are different, and that includes members of those nations who live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Historical examples of groups, who have been specifically singled out as outsiders, are the Roma and Jews in Europe.

Negative responses to minorities within the nation state have ranged from cultural assimilation enforced by the state, to expulsion, persecution, violence, and extermination. The assimilation policies are usually enforced by the state, but violence against minorities is not always state initiated: it can occur in the form of mob violence such as lynching or pogroms. Nation states are responsible for some of the worst historical examples of violence against minorities: minorities not considered part of the nation.

However, many nation states accept specific minorities as being part of the nation, and the term national minority is often used in this sense. The Sorbs in Germany are an example: for centuries they have lived in German-speaking states, surrounded by a much larger ethnic German population, and they have no other historical territory. They are now generally considered to be part of the German nation and are accepted as such by the Federal Republic of Germany, which constitutionally guarantees their cultural rights. Of the thousands of ethnic and cultural minorities in nation states across the world, only a few have this level of acceptance and protection.

Multiculturalism is an official policy in many states, establishing the ideal of peaceful existence among multiple ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Many nations have laws protecting minority rights.

When national boundaries that do not match ethnic boundaries are drawn, such as in the Balkans and Central Asia, ethnic tension, massacres and even genocide, sometimes has occurred historically (see Bosnian genocide and 2010 ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan).

Irredentism 

 

Ideally, the border of a nation state extends far enough to include all the members of the nation, and all of the national homeland. Again, in practice some of them always live on the 'wrong side' of the border. Part of the national homeland may be there too, and it may be governed by the 'wrong' nation. The response to the non-inclusion of territory and population may take the form of irredentism: demands to annex unredeemed territory and incorporate it into the nation state.

Irredentist claims are usually based on the fact that an identifiable part of the national group lives across the border. However, they can include claims to territory where no members of that nation live at present, because they lived there in the past, the national language is spoken in that region, the national culture has influenced it, geographical unity with the existing territory, or a wide variety of other reasons. Past grievances are usually involved and can cause revanchism.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish irredentism from pan-nationalism, since both claim that all members of an ethnic and cultural nation belong in one specific state. Pan-nationalism is less likely to specify the nation ethnically. For instance, variants of Pan-Germanism have different ideas about what constituted Greater Germany, including the confusing term Grossdeutschland, which, in fact, implied the inclusion of huge Slavic minorities from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Typically, irredentist demands are at first made by members of non-state nationalist movements. When they are adopted by a state, they typically result in tensions, and actual attempts at annexation are always considered a casus belli, a cause for war. In many cases, such claims result in long-term hostile relations between neighbouring states. Irredentist movements typically circulate maps of the claimed national territory, the greater nation state. That territory, which is often much larger than the existing state, plays a central role in their propaganda.

Irredentism should not be confused with claims to overseas colonies, which are not generally considered part of the national homeland. Some French overseas colonies would be an exception: French rule in Algeria unsuccessfully treated the colony as a département of France.

Future 

It has been speculated by both proponents of globalization and various science fiction writers that the concept of a nation state may disappear with the ever-increasingly interconnected nature of the world.  Such ideas are sometimes expressed around concepts of a world government. Another possibility is a societal collapse and move into communal anarchy or zero world government, in which nation states no longer exist and government is done on the local level based on a global ethic of human rights.

This falls into line with the concept of internationalism, which states that sovereignty is an outdated concept and a barrier to achieving peace and harmony in the world, thus also stating that nation states are also a similar outdated concept.

Globalization especially has helped to bring about the discussion about the disappearance of nation states, as global trade and the rise of the concepts of a 'global citizen' and a common identity have helped to reduce differences and 'distances' between individual nation states, especially with regards to the internet. 

Clash of civilizations 

The theory of the clash of civilizations lies in direct contrast to cosmopolitan theories about an ever more-connected world that no longer requires nation states. According to political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post–Cold War world.

The theory was originally formulated in a 1992 lecture  at the American Enterprise Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?",  in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post–Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economics had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post–Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, argued that the world had reached a Hegelian "end of history".

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had reverted only to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines.

As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.

In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Sandra Joireman suggests that Huntington may be characterised as a neo-primordialist, as, while he sees people as having strong ties to their ethnicity, he does not believe that these ties have always existed. 

Historiography 

Historians often look to the past to find the origins of a particular nation state. Indeed, they often put so much emphasis on the importance of the nation state in modern times, that they distort the history of earlier periods in order to emphasize the question of origins. Lansing and English argue that much of the medieval history of Europe was structured to follow the historical winners—especially the nation states that emerged around Paris and London. Important developments that did not directly lead to a nation state get neglected, they argue:
one effect of this approach has been to privilege historical winners, aspects of medieval Europe that became important in later centuries, above all the nation state.... Arguably the liveliest cultural innovation in the 13th century was Mediterranean, centered on Frederick II's polyglot court and administration in Palermo....Sicily and the Italian South in later centuries suffered a long slide into overtaxed poverty and marginality. Textbook narratives therefore focus not on medieval Palermo, with its Muslim and Jewish bureaucracies and Arabic-speaking monarch, but on the historical winners, Paris and London.
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