Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)

Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) 

Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) 

On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)

In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.

Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)

Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)
Disable or Modify Tools
source_name: mitre-attack  url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001  external_id: T1562.001     source_name: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369  description:  Guillaume Lovet and Alex Kong. (2023, March 9). Analysis of FG-IR-22-369. Retrieved May 15, 2023.  url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis     source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation  description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.  url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem     source_name: OutFlank System Calls  description: de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.  url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/     source_name: disable_win_evt_logging  description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.  url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25     source_name: chasing_avaddon_ransomware  description: Hernandez, A. S. Tarter, P. Ocamp, E. J. (2022, January 19). One Source to Rule Them All: Chasing AVADDON Ransomware. Retrieved January 26, 2022.  url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware     source_name: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike  description: Hurley, S. (2021, December 7). Critical Hit: How DoppelPaymer Hunts and Kills Windows Processes. Retrieved January 26, 2022.  url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/     source_name: avoslocker_ransomware  description: Lakshmanan, R. (2022, May 2). AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Using New Trick to Disable Antivirus Protection. Retrieved May 17, 2022.  url: https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html     source_name: dharma_ransomware  description: Loui, E. Scheuerman, K. et al. (2020, April 16). Targeted Dharma Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques. Retrieved January 26, 2022.  url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/     source_name: MDSec System Calls  description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.  url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/     source_name: SCADAfence_ransomware  description: Shaked, O. (2020, January 20). Anatomy of a Targeted Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2022.  url: https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf     source_name: demystifying_ryuk  description: Tran, T. (2020, November 24). Demystifying Ransomware Attacks Against Microsoft Defender Solution. Retrieved January 26, 2022.  url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947     