Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. 

Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. [Resource Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496)).(Citation: Cado Security Denonia) Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation)

Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. [Event Triggered Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546)), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created.(Citation: Backdooring an AWS account) Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.(Citation: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration)(Citation: Microsoft DART Case Report 001)
Serverless Execution
source_name: mitre-attack  url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648  external_id: T1648     source_name: Microsoft DART Case Report 001  description: Berk Veral. (2020, March 9). Real-life cybercrime stories from DART, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team. Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/09/real-life-cybercrime-stories-dart-microsoft-detection-and-response-team     source_name: Backdooring an AWS account  description: Daniel Grzelak. (2016, July 9). Backdooring an AWS account. Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://medium.com/daniel-grzelak/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9     source_name: Varonis Power Automate Data Exfiltration  description: Eric Saraga. (2022, February 2). Using Power Automate for Covert Data Exfiltration in Microsoft 365. Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://www.varonis.com/blog/power-automate-data-exfiltration     source_name: Cado Security Denonia  description: Matt Muir. (2022, April 6). Cado Discovers Denonia: The First Malware Specifically Targeting Lambda. Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://www.cadosecurity.com/cado-discovers-denonia-the-first-malware-specifically-targeting-lambda/     source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation  description: Rhino Security Labs. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/     source_name: Rhingo Security Labs GCP Privilege Escalation  description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). Privilege Escalation in Google Cloud Platform – Part 1 (IAM). Retrieved May 27, 2022.  url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/     