text:
Hugo Kerkau (* 31. Dezember 1874 in Hamburg, Deutschland; † 15. April 1918 in Berlin) war ein professioneller, deutscher Karambolagespieler in den Disziplinen Freie Partie und Cadre.

Karriere
Eher durch Zufall entdeckte Kerkau bei einem Sonntagsausflug seine Begabung für Billard. Es stellte sich heraus, dass er ein mathematisches Genie war und so erlernte er das Spiel innerhalb weniger Jahre bis zum Weltmeistertitel. Anfang der 1890er-Jahre wurde man in Billardkreisen auf den jungen Spieler aus Hamburg aufmerksam. Die "alten Meister" mussten all ihre Kunst und Können aufbieten, um den Emporkömmling niederzuhalten. Er war einer von drei Brüdern, Egon, Paul und Hugo, denen es das Billardspiel angetan hatte. Sie waren schon in jungen Jahren von der Hansestadt nach Berlin gekommen, wo der Vater als Restaurateur arbeitete. Er war ein ehemaliger Unteroffizier aus dem Reiterregiment der Garde.

Ein Berliner Ökonom beobachtete Hugo Kerkau beim Spiel und erkannte sofort sein Potential. Mit ihm und seinem Bruder Paul gründete er das "Café Kerkau" im "Equitable-Palast" an der Friedrichstraße, inklusive der "Hugo Kerkau's Billardacademie". Täglich war Kerkau zwischen vier und fünf, und zwischen neun und zehn Uhr beim Spiel zu beobachten.

Zusammen mit seinem Bruder Paul war er Teilhaber der "Kerkau-Palast-Gesellschaft".
Zwischen zwei Partien erfuhr er 1914, dass er Millionär sei, nur ein paar Jahre später, 1918, gegen Ende des Krieges erfuhr er, wieder zwischen zwei Partien, dass er aufgrund der Inflation alles verloren hätte und der "Kerkau-Palast" pleite sei. Er nahm es kaum zur Kenntnis, vorher wie nachher wohnte er in einer kleinen Zwei-Zimmer-Wohnung hinterm Halleschen Tor. Dort feilte er an seinem Spiel, theoretisch, mit Zeichnungen und Kugelkurven auf Papierflächen. Er verdiente weiterhin sein Geld mit Privatunterricht und starb noch im Jahr seiner Pleite verarmt mit nur 43 Jahren.

Am 3. April 1897 stellte er in London bei einem Schaukampf einen Rekord von 4.285 Karambolagen auf. Im August war er auf Amerika-Tournee, spielte Match auf 5.000 Punkte gegen McLaughlin in "Daly's Academy" in New York, kurz vor seiner Rückreise nach Berlin. Im Frühjahr 1902 forderte Kerkau den US-Profispieler Jacob Schaefer senior zu einem Match in der Freien Partie auf. Es ging um die damals unglaublich hohe Summe von 20.000 RM. Die US-Spieler hatten das Spiel schon 20 Jahre zuvor eingestellt und sich auf Cadre oder Dreiband eingestellt. So schlug Schaefer ihm Cadre auf 3.000 Punkte mit 800 Punkten Vorgabe vor. Das Spiel sollte in Berlin stattfinden. Aufgrund Schaefers schlechter körperlicher Verfassung kam es jedoch nicht dazu.

Café Kerkau
Das Eckhaus stand an der Friedrichstraße 59/60, Ecke Leipziger Straße () (Berlin-Mitte) und wurde 1887–89 im Auftrag der New Yorker Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft "The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States" (heute: AXA Equitable Holdings) vom Architekten Carl Schäfer als "Equitable-Palast" errichtet. Im ersten und zweiten Geschoss war das "Café Kerkau" zu Hause. Der erste Stock besaß einen Damen-Salon und einen Lesesaal. Hier wurde auch zum Tanz aufgespielt. Der Billardsaal war mit 24 Tischen ausgestattet, daher der Beiname "Billard-Palace", und Kerkau betrieb dort seine "Internationale Billard Academie". Kerkau war neben dem Billard auch Schachliebhaber und so kam es, dass seit 1901 die 1827 gegründete "Berliner Schachgesellschaft" dort ihren Sitz hatte. Regelmäßige Besucher waren auch Emanuel Lasker und sein Bruder Bertold. Kerkau war mit dem Café so erfolgreich, dass er sich 1910 mit dem Kerkau-Palast ein eigenes Haus bauen ließ. Nach seinem Weggang hieß die Lokalität dann "Café Zielka Equitable". 1926 übernahm Giovanni Eftimiades das Geschäft und ließ es umfangreich im orientalischen Stil umbauen, unter anderem führte eine Rolltreppe vom Straßenniveau auf die oberen Etagen, er nannte es "Moka Efti".

Kerkau-Palast
Den "Kerkau-Palast" in der Behrenstraße 48 () (Berlin-Mitte) ließ Hugo Kerkau 1910 von Sanmicheli Wolkenstein erbauen, ein neues Haus, extra für seine Zwecke ausgelegt. Der "Kerkau-Palast" war mit drei Stockwerken sogar noch größer als das "Café Kerkau". Hugo hatte nicht weniger als 48 Billardtische aufstellen lassen. Auch hier wurde ausgiebig Schach gespielt. Schon im Eröffnungsjahr war der Palast vom 8. November bis 8. Dezember 1910 Schauplatz der Weltmeisterschaft zwischen Lasker und Dawid Janowski gewesen. Auch traten zeitgenössische Musikergrößen wie Gabriel Formiggini und sein Salon-Orchester dort auf. 1912 kaufte Josef König den Kerkau-Palast und für ein paar Jahre war er das Vereinslokal des Berliner Schachverein 1876. 1920 stellte König seine Räumlichkeiten für ein Internationales Schachturnier zur Verfügung, Sieger wurde Gyula Breyer. Im Januar 1921 wurde der Kerkau-Palast geschlossen.

Veröffentlichungen

Weblinks

  (spanisch)

 Turnierankündigung gegen den niederländischen Meister P. de Crauw vom 29. bis 31. August 1912 im Café du Passage in Amsterdam De Telegraaf vom 29. August 1912
 Club der vergessenen Weltmeister von Ralph Eckert (PDF; 1,8 MB)

Einzelnachweise

Karambolagespieler (Deutschland)
Weltmeister (Karambolage)
Unternehmer (Deutschland)
Deutscher
Geboren 1874
Gestorben 1918
Mann


The features and controls of the configuration pages for the Host and Forwarding Firewall rulesets have a similar interface structure. The main rules section in these pages displays the access or application rules depending on the selected ruleset in the left menu. You can view, create, copy, paste, clone, and edit your access rules on this page.
The Forwarding Firewall ruleset contains all forwarding access and application rules and provides access to the access and application rule configuration dialog. To open the Forwarding Firewall ruleset, go to CONFIGURATION > Configuration Tree > Box > Virtual Servers > your virtual server > Assigned Services > Firewall > Forwarding Rules.
In the main rules table, you can view and edit the settings for your access or application rules. See below for icon descriptions.
Use these icons to create, edit, and otherwise manipulate the access or application rules in the main ruleset. See below for icon descriptions.
This ruleset cannot be deleted, although additional rulesets can be created. See below for icon descriptions.
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This column shows when the rule was last used and how often. E.g.: 5 days (1234) – The rule matched certain traffic 5 days ago and matched 1234 times total.
The Usage field is only filled with information in the read-only version of the ruleset. Go to FIREWALL > Forwarding Rules.
The Main Rules tab section allows you to create additional rule lists.
For more information on the functionalities of the Forwarding Firewall ruleset, see Forwarding Firewall.
The host access ruleset contains default rules that fit most applications and services that are handled by the Barracuda NextGen Firewall F-Series. Changing the host access ruleset should only be done by an expert administrator because changes can affect the behavior of your system. For help with changing default host access rules, contact Barracuda Networks Technical Support.
You can view the host access ruleset on the Host Firewall - Rules page. To open this page, go to Config > Box > Infrastructure Services > Host access rules.
Configuration Menu – The left navigation pane of the page provides you with menu sections to configure your access rules.
Inbound – Shows all inbound Host access rules.
Inbound-User – (Bound to the Inbound set) Shows a subset of inbound Host access rules.
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The Usage field is only filled with information in the read-only version of the ruleset. Go to FIREWALL > Host Rules.
For more information on the functionalities of the host access ruleset, see Host Firewall.


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text:
The United States Census of 1810 was the third Census in the United States. It was done on August 6, 1810. It showed that 7,239,881 people were living in the United States. 1,191,362 of the total were slaves.
The 1810 Census included one new state: Louisiana. The original census returns for the District of Columbia, Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee were lost or destroyed over the years.[1]
↑ Dollarhide, William (2001). The Census Book: A Genealogists Guide to Federal Census Facts, Schedules and Indexes. North Salt Lake, Utah: HeritageQuest. p. 8. |access-date= requires |url= (help)
United States Population Censuses
USDA Census of Agriculture
Retrieved from "https://simple.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=1810_United_States_Census&oldid=5010899"
1810s in the United States
United States Census
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This page was last changed on 12 February 2015, at 18:24.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
The authors of What is Exhibition Design? state:
"The primary role of an exhibition designer is to tell a story… all exhibitions have one thing in common; they all tell a story. Storytelling is the central craft of the exhibition designer…"
I question this insistence on narrative as the fundamental building block of exhibition design. Two initial points:
Is storytelling a necessary component of experience and exhibition design? Is narrative a specifically human construct or do all entities in some way tell stories? What is storytelling? If it's an account of causality, then narrative is potentially inherent in all objects. Humans unwittingly create narratives out of everything; does an exhibition designer really need to intervene? Too often objects are used in the service of narrative; mere props in the human comedy. The story should serve the object, not the other way around. Not only does exhibition design qua narrative undermine the objects on display, it undermines the viewing subjects as well by controlling their approach to, and perspective on, the objects. If control is the goal, then narrative is the way to go. But, if we take the history of the formation of museums into consideration, we understand that it is high-time to move beyond the conception of the exhibition as a means for educating and civilizing the unruly masses.
Objects are too complex for narrative. No exhibition can adequately display an object, a collection of objects, or a history of objects in all its complexity. According to the Wikipedia entry on narrative fallacy, we have a " human propensity to simplify data through a predilection for compact stories over complex data sets. It is easier for the human mind to remember and make decisions on the basis of stories with meaning than to remember strings of data." The richness of an object used in an exhibition is at risk of being delimited by its subordination to an overarching narrative structure. How does one design an exhibition that will be memorable for humans yet doesn't undermine the objects on display?
Without narrative, where does the exhibition designer begin? With the objects, naturally.
— Jared Nielsen


text:
The Europe of Elites: A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's Political and Economic Elites
Heinrich Best, György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli
Series Editors' Foreword
1 Introduction: European integration as an elite project
2 Europe à la carte? European citizenship and its dimensions from the perspective of national elites
3 Ready to run Europe? Perspectives of a supranational career among EU national elites
4 National elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making
5 The other side of European identity: elite perceptions of threats to a cohesive Europe
6 Elites' views on European institutions: national experiences sifted through ideological orientations
7 Patterns of regional diversity in political elites' attitudes
8 The elites–masses gap in European integration
9 Party elites and the domestic discourse on the EU
10 Elite foundations of European integration: a causal analysis
11 Elites of Europe and the Europe of elites: a conclusion
12 Appendix. Surveying elites: information on the study design and field report of the IntUne elite survey
National elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making
(p.67) 4 National elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making
The Europe of Elites
José Real-Dato
Borbála Göncz
György Lengyel
The chapter focuses on the preferences of national elites towards the Europeanization of specific policy areas as an expression of the multidimensional nature of the forces and conflicts behind the process of European integration. The analysis tests the most important hypotheses considered in the European integration literature, taking into account individual elite characteristics and country-specific contextual factors. Results confirm that explanatory patterns differ depending on the type of policy area. For example, preferences toward Europeanization are stronger in those areas dealing with transnational problems, and on whether opinions refer to the current situation or in the mid-term––elites in the later case being more favourable to Europeanization. Preferences also differ among types of elites, whereby economic elites are more pro-European, and according to country; elites of former state socialist and more Eurosceptic countries, such as Denmark and the United Kingdom, are less likely to approve of delegating national authority to the EU.
Keywords: political elites, economic elites, Europeanization, EU policy making, European political space, European integration, European Union
European integration can be described as a process of reallocation of policy-making competencies between member states and supranational institutions. Since the Treaty of Rome, and following subsequent treaties and reforms, decision-making processes in many policy areas have moved from the traditional state sovereignty to intergovernmental and supranational arenas (Börzel 2005; Wessels and Kielhorn 1999; Schmitter 1996). Nevertheless, research on citizens' attitudes towards the Europeanization of specific policy areas has been less frequent than that concerning general support for European integration. Only recently has research on this topic been undertaken, mostly interested in explaining the factors determining public opinion towards the Europeanization of specific policy domains (i.e. Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Vössing 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the structure of the European political space according to specific policy preferences (Gabel and Anderson 2002), and on the role of the outputs of Europeanized policies in fostering a European identity (Kritzinger 2005).
There are fewer studies on elites' preferences concerning the Europeanization of specific policy domains, mainly as a consequence of the scarcity of data.1 Some exceptions are Wessels and Kielhorn (1999), who analysed the (p.68) driving forces behind the Europeanization of national policy competencies, and the differences in preferences among policy areas and countries, and types of elites; and Hooghe (2003), who compared public and political elites' preferences on policy Europeanization, and attempted to explain the variation and underpinning logic.
In this chapter, we follow the line of these previous works, believing that the study of specific policy preferences has the virtue of providing 'a more fine-grained measure' (Hooghe 2003: 283) of national elites' views of the European integration process. The reasons behind national elites' support of the transfer of former national (sub-national) powers to supranational institutions where their influence on decision making is lower or uncertain constitute a major puzzle when studying European integration. Besides this, it is useful to explore whether patterns of support differ according to policy area. These differences can be seen as an expression of the multidimensional nature of the forces and conflicts behind the process of European integration. In this respect, this chapter aims to contribute to the debate on the configuration of the European political space of contestation (Gabel and Anderson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Hix 1999).
The elite survey of the IntUne project provides the necessary data with which to explore these questions. In addition, compared to previous studies, it adds new value in three aspects. First, it allows us to compare the views of political elites (national MPs) with those of economic elites, an aspect not dealt with by previous works, and where difference in preferences over Europeanization between the two types of elites would suggest the impact of political authority. Second, we are able to contrast attitudes in the short term with those in the long term in order to look for different time frames concerning the support of policy-making Europeanization. Finally, it enables us to explain patterns of support using not only individual but also country-level variables.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First we offer a description of national elites' preferences concerning the Europeanization of a number of policy areas covered by the IntUne elite survey. Then, in order to account for such preferences, we review the main theories explaining support of policy-making Europeanization and set a number of propositions, which are subsequently tested and discussed in the corresponding sections. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the main findings in our analysis.
(p.69) 4.2 Descriptive Analysis of Policy-Making Preferences
In this section we briefly examine our dependent variables. Two types of questions in the IntUne elite survey refer to preferences concerning the Europeanization of policy making; one relates to the preferred level of policy making, ranging from the sub-national level to the full allocation of decision-making authority to European Union institutions, with regard to a number of policy areas: namely, unemployment, immigration, environment, fighting crime, health care, and taxation. The second type of question examined relates to the agreement with the full long term (within ten years) Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy. Despite some limitations, the catalogue of variables covers the spectrum of activities performed by contemporary states—basic sovereignty and security functions (foreign policy, fighting crime, and immigration), economic regulation and distribution (taxation), welfare (health care, social security, and unemployment), and activities concerning post-materialist values (environment). Thus, the preferences of national elites in each of these policy areas may be used as a proxy for the preferences of national elites on each of those general fields of public activity.
Figure 4.1. Preferred level of government in policy areas (political and economic elites) (valid percentages)
Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: Environment = 1988; Immigration = 1992; Fight against crime = 1990; Taxation = 1988; Fighting unemployment = 1987; Health care = 1989.
(p.70)
Table 4.1. Factor analysis of level of policy-making variables
Political elites
Economic elites
Fighting unemployment
Immigration policy
Fight against crime
Explained variance
KMO (sig.)
Note: method of extraction: principal axis factoring; method of rotation: oblimin for the whole sample (factors are correlated); varimax for subsamples (factors are uncorrelated).
In order to have a more parsimonious view of the preferred level of authority over policy making, we have recoded the variables and regrouped the original categories, which comprised different combinations of national, regional, and European levels of government, into three categories: (1) authority only at national or sub-national level, (2) shared authority between national/sub-national and EU levels, and (3) full authority at the supranational/EU level (Figure 4.1).2
Looking at the distribution of preferences along these categories, there seems to be an underlying pattern regarding levels of government preferences depending on policy area: national and sub-national levels are clearly preferred in health care, unemployment, and taxation. In contrast, participants clearly show a preference for the Europeanization of environment and immigration policies. Finally, despite the fact that 40.6 per cent prefers the fight against crime to remain under national and/or sub-national authority, the proportion of those preferring shared or full Europeanized control shows that there is a general feeling about the importance of the EU level of government in dealing with this policy area. These results are very much in line with Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999: 177) hypothesis that the level of Europeanization of a policy area depends on the cross-border character of the problem it addresses—more globalized problems, such as environmental issues and immigration, are more acceptable as areas to be dealt with at the EU level. We examine this in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
Factor analysis (Table 4.1.) confirms this underlying pattern regarding levels of government preferences depending on policy area both on the whole sample and by type of elite. Although the factor solutions are not quite robust, (p.71) factor loadings reveal the same underlying structure. In the first factor, environment policy has the highest loadings, followed by immigration policy, and finally fighting crime. Policies with high loadings on the second factor are health care, taxation, and unemployment.
These patterns of policy-making preferences fit into Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999) 'globalization of problems' hypothesis, and more specifically into the sub-hypothesis about the 'cross-border' (transnational) character of problems. Respondents favour Europeanization where a policy is related to a problem requiring cooperation between countries. This is clearly the case with environment and immigration, to which Wessels and Kielhorn also attribute a high cross-border nature (1999: 178). Regarding the fight against crime, recent developments in economic globalization, technologies, and the growing phenomenon of organized crime crossing the borders of member states (profiting from freedom of circulation within the EU) have clearly raised awareness of the need for a more coordinated, even common, approach.
Wessels and Kielhorn also expected that a convergence of problems between countries (what they term problem 'load') (1999: 177–8) would lead to a stronger desire for higher Europeanization, although to a lesser extent than in the case of cross-border problems. Our cross-sectional elite data only allows us to state that significant differences in terms of readiness for the Europeanization of problem solving still exist across countries. Furthermore, preferences for the Europeanization of tackling unemployment––one of the policy areas to which Wessels and Kielhorn attributed a high degree of convergence across countries (1999: 178)––are lower than those concerning taxation, a policy area which allegedly has a low 'load'.
This general pattern of differential preferences between policies concerning transnational problems and the other policy areas is generally reproduced within the countries, although there are variations concerning the intensity of preferences according to policy area (Table 4.2). However, in all countries, the percentages of those who favour some kind of Europeanization (full or shared) in policy areas of 'transnational' nature are always higher than those in any of the other policy fields. The only exception is the strong support in France for the Europeanization of taxation, which is even higher than for fighting crime.
Along with these general patterns, there are differences among countries, as can be seen in Table 4.2. For instance, elites in two Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania, seem to be more zealous concerning national sovereignty in all policy areas, while French national elites tend to have a more pro-EU standing. Nevertheless, apart from these outstanding cases, there is much variation between countries according to policy area, which suggests that a more sophisticated analysis is needed to shed light on underlying patterns.
Concerning the type of elite, Figure 4.2 shows how economic elites are on the whole slightly more pro-European than political ones in all policy areas (p.72)
Table 4.2. Preferred level of government in policy areas (valid percentages by country)
Fight crime
N/S
Lithunia
Note: N/S = 'Subnational and national level'; S = 'Shared powers between subnational/European or national/European levels or the three of them'; EU = 'European level'.
(p.73) .
Figure 4.2. Preferred level of government in policy areas by type of elite (valid percentages)
Figure 4.3. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years (valid percentages)
Note: the valid number of cases (N) by variables are: unified tax system = 1992; Common Social Security = 1995; single foreign policy = 1998.
Table 4.3. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by country (valid percentages)
Unified tax system for Europe
Common system of social security
Single foreign policy
Somewhat in favour
Strongly in favour
(p.75) except for tackling unemployment. However, differences between the two elite groups are only statistically significant in the case of taxation, health care, and environmental policy making
With regard to the second type of question (those referring to the preferences of elites concerning the Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy within the next ten years), the majority of respondents favour Europeanization in all three policy areas (Figure 4.3). The Europeanization of foreign policy obtains the greatest support among European elites, while the level of consensus on the policy areas of taxation and social security are somewhat lower.
In all, the general pattern seen for short-term preferences in relation to the Europeanization of policy areas is repeated on the long term within countries, and variation between countries is also found (Table 4.3). Here, the case of the United Kingdom is particularly interesting, in that both types of national elites (p.76)
Figure 4.4. Preferences on the Europeanization of three policy areas in 10 years by type of elite (valid percentages)
(political and economic) are overwhelmingly against the full Europeanization of social security and taxation, and although somewhat less vehement in their rejection, they are still the elites most against a single foreign policy.
Concerning the type of elite––as with short-term preferences––economic elites are more in favour of the Europeanization within a ten-year term of foreign policy and taxation (Figure 4.4). In contrast, they show a less favourable attitude towards social security, where political elites have a more positive stance. Again, there are differences across countries and between elite groups across the three policy areas, but less so than for short-term preferences.
4.3 Theories Explaining National Elites' Policy-Making Preferences
The literature on European integration has identified a number of drivers accounting for the process. First, there is the hypothesis that the Europeanization of policy making can be explained as a result of functional needs: policy making should be transferred to the European Union in the hope that it contributes to better problem solving or that the subsequent economies of scale produce more efficient results (Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht 2001). This is the rationale behind the functionalist theory of European integration, and it is consistent with the globalization of problems perspective. Similarly, there is the argument that economic internationalization is a driver for European integration. International economic interdependence undermines national governments' ability to control economic actors and transactions in their own territory (Schmidt 2002: 18), so that it is logical for national elites (mostly economic elites) to favour Europeanization 'in order to have the same conditions of market participation with respect to the structure of regulation, incentives, and the like' (Wessels and Kielhorn 1999: 184), and that this should be mainly in policies directly affecting a country's economic performance.
An alternative driver to explain policy-making preferences––and one that may be considered to be closely related to the functional explanation––is the instrumental-evaluative argument taken from public opinion research (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993), which is based on the reasoning that people support Europeanization if they can derive direct benefits from the EU. Concerning elites, it is plausible to think that they are more homogeneous as a group than the general public, and that their usually more affluent position makes direct material benefits less important. However, it is possible to apply a 'sociotropic' extension of this utilitarian argument in their case (Hooghe and Marks 2005)––elites may (p.77) evaluate Europeanization of policy making based on the effect they perceive it may have on their countries' welfare, rather than on their own per se. This evaluative judgement may also be extended to the perception of the functioning of European institutions compared to national ones (Rohrschneider 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).
Political attitudes play an important role in shaping the degree of support for the European Union, and perhaps one of the most important attitudes with regard to EU integration is that of ideology. Certainly, the relationship between ideology and positions taken on EU integration has been widely discussed and is part of the debate about the configuration of the European political space (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Gabel and Anderson 2002). According to Marks and Steenbergen, four basic standpoints have been distinguished regarding ideology—interpreted in the sense of left–right positioning, ideology is irrelevant to understand anti- or pro-integration positions (a position shared by realist, intergovernmentalist, and neo-functionalist theories on EU integration). In this way, elites' preferences on Europeanization should not be influenced by their ideological positions. A second stance is that ideology and integration collapse in one dimension (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), that is, the politization of the European integration debate implies that actors take the dimensions of national debate to the European level. In this case, variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy areas would be explained by ideological positions. According to the third approach, the European space is formed by two basic unrelated dimensions (Hix and Lord 1997). Thus, domestic conflict over socio-economic issues cannot be extrapolated to the European level, where the dominant dimension is that of national sovereignty, ranging from independence to integration. The ideology dimension would express a cleavage between functional groups, while the national sovereignty dimension involves a cleavage between territorial groups (Marks and Steenbergen 2002: 884). Thus, ideology would not explain variation in preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Finally, Hooghe and Marks (1999) propose a fourth vision of the European political space. They identify two dimensions: the first runs along the ideological spectrum (left–right), ranging from social democracy to market liberalism; and the second refers to European integration, ranging from nationalism to supranationalism. According to the authors, these dimensions are related, collapsing into a diagonal dimension with its extremes lying between regulated capitalism (encompassing centre-leftist and pro-supranational positions) and neo-liberalism (combining rightist views and an acceptance of European integration limited to minimal regulation––economic and monetary––that allows markets to work more efficiently).
(p.78) When dealing with political ideology it is also important to take into account the extremeness of ideological positions' (Aspinwall 2002). Thus, centrist voters would tend to be more open to international interdependence and support European integration on an instrumentalist basis while extreme voters are more likely to reject the idea of the EU, but for different reasons: extreme left-wing voters see the EU as too much in favour of a liberal free market, while extreme right-wing voters reject the supranational character of the EU.
Along with ideology, identity also arises as a factor to be taken into account in explaining attitudes towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2008; Risse 2006; Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer 2004; Carey 2002; Diez-Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Identity issues have gained strength as a defining axis of political conflict, forming a 'new politics' dimension along with other issues (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards 2006). To be more precise, the post-functionalist view claims that identification with territorial communities (national or sub-national) plays a decisive role in issues where economic implications are unclear and where there are strong communal implications (Hooghe and Marks 2008: 13). However, it is not the degree of territorial attachment that is important, but the exclusiveness of the attachment, i.e. the extent to which national or sub-national identities are viewed to be incompatible with European identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005). In this respect, exclusive attachment to national or sub-national territorial levels would be a factor fostering positions against Europeanization. Nevertheless, the proponents of this idea argue that elites' preferences are not greatly influenced by identification (Hooghe and Marks 2008).
Finally, in explaining elites' preferences on Europeanization it is also necessary to consider the effect of country-specific institutional and socio-economic configurations, and their mediating influence on other explanatory variables (Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). For example, Vössing (2005) shows how public opinion on EU policy making depends significantly on nationality, behind which are a number of institutional elements that may influence policy positions. For example, Wessels and Kielhorn (1999) have argued that political elites in corporatist countries are not likely to favour Europeanization in policies directly affecting organized interests, because such a process would undermine their position in internal policy making. Besides, and related to the above-mentioned globalization hypothesis, these authors test the influence of a country's degree of economic internationalization on the level of national elites' support for policy-making Europeanization. (p.79)
Table 4.4. Theoretical propositions and variables in analysis
Theoretical arguments
Control variables: Gender (male) and age (centred to the overall mean)a
Difference between type of elites
Factors explaining political elites' support to Europeanization of policy making differ from those of economic elites
Evaluative-pragmatic (outputs)
A positive evaluation of the effect of the European Union in one's country has a positive influence over preferences on Europeanization of policy making
Country has benefited from EU membership (dummy)
Evaluative-pragmatic (institutions)
Elites favour Europeanization of policy making to a greater extent if they trust EU institutions highly
Trust on EU institutions (Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers) (average 0–10 scale)
Ideology (functionalist)
Left–right positions have no significant impact on preferences on Europeanization of policy making
Left (dummy) ideology scale 0 ≤ x 〈 4;
Right (dummy) ideology scale 6 〈 x ≤ 10;
Centre (Ideology scale 4 ≤ x ≤ 6) as category of referenceb
Ideology (Tsebelis)
Left–right positions have a significant effect on preferences on Europeanization of policy making in all policy areas
Ideology (Hix and Lord)
Left–right positions have no significant effect in those policy areas which are more directly related to the country's sovereignty functions
Ideology (Hooghe and Marks)
Neoliberal/regulatory capitalism explains preferences on Europeanization of policy making Left–right positions are secondary
The EU main goal should be to promote: economic competitiveness (dummy) (alternative answer: better social security and both)
Ideology (extremeness)
Individuals with more extremist positions are more against policy-making Europeanization than those with moderate positions
Absolute distance from ideological centre (5)
Individuals who identify exclusively with national or sub‐national levels are less favourable to Europeanization of policy making in areas with unclear economic implication and/or strong communal implications
Exclusive identification with country (dummy)
Exclusive identification with regionc
Trust in national institutions (country level)
Individuals' preferences on Europeanization of policy making are negatively related to the country's level of trust in national political institutions
Country average of economic elites' average trust on national institutions (national parliament and government, and regional or local government) (0–10 scale)
Evaluative-instrumentalist: economic benefits (country level)
Individuals in countries that are net beneficiaries in the EU will have more favourable positions towards Europeanization of policy making
Operating Budgetary Balance (OBB) as a percentage of GNI in 2007d
Functionalism: economic globalization (country level)
Individuals in countries with a high degree of international economic dependency will have more favourable positions towards Europeanization of policy making
Index of trade integration of goods and services as a percentage of GDPe
Corporatism (country level)
Individuals in countries with strong and centralized economic interest organizations are less favourable to Europeanization in areas directly related to welfare or economic policy
Centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining indexf
Year of EU membership:
(founding members as category of reference)
Notes: a This variable has been centred to the sample mean in order to offer a clearer interpretation.
b We prefer to measure ideology in three categories 'left', 'centre', and 'right' (the latter as a category of reference) rather than using the 0–10 scale measurement, as we do not assume that ideology exerts a linear influence on the explained variables (that is, an individual is not more or less pro-EU whether his/her ideological self-positioning is 1 or 3.5). Besides, it allows us to better assess the specific behaviour within these ideological groups. However, due to the asymmetric distribution of cases (most of them concentrated on the centre-left of the ideological spectrum) we also included the pure ideological scale as a contrast. Results did not show any difference.
c These variables have been calculated as follows: [Attachment to territorial level (0–3)––Attachment to Europe (0–3)]. After obtaining results, a dummy variable was constructed at any territorial level, with 1 = results 〉 0 and 0 = rest of results.
d Operative Budgetary Balance (OBB) is defined as the difference between allocated operating expenditure––i.e. excluding administration––to EU member states and their own resources payments, excluding traditional own resources (European Commission 2008: 80), see 〈Shttp://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/fin_reports/fin_report_07_en.pdf〉 (accessed 22 April 2010).
e Average of imports and exports of the items, goods, and services of the balance of payments divided by GDP. If the index increases over time it means that the country/zone is becoming more integrated within the international economy. Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab%20=%20table&init%20=%201&plugin%20=%201&language%20=%20en&pcode%20=%20tsier120〉 (accessed 9 November 2009).
f Source: AIAS (2009). For details on the elaboration of the index, see Visser (2009).
(p.80) From the different theoretical arguments set out in this section, we have determined a number of propositions displayed in Table 4.4, where variables used in the analysis are shown. Also, a number of control variables have been included for gender, age, and the year the respondent's country joined the European Community/European Union.
(p.81) 4.4 Models and Results
In this section we test the previous propositions. We have run separate models for political and economic elites in order to see whether the factors explaining preferences on Europeanization of policy making differ along type of elites. Besides, differences between countries found in descriptive analysis suggest that variations at this higher level of aggregation may influence lower level (individual) positions. Statistically, an adequate treatment of such kind of data requires a multilevel approach (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Previous studies applying this modelling technique (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) have shown that the multilevel character of attitudes towards the EU should not be ignored––higher levels of analysis, typically country-level and party-level data accounted for 14–20 per cent of the variance in EU support in those models.
4.4.1 Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Transnational Policy Areas
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the multilevel multinomial logistic models for short-term policy-making preferences by type of elite. Here, we will address how they confirm the different theoretical arguments and propositions considered above. Concerning what have been called 'transnational' policy issues (environment, immigration, and fighting crime), different patterns explaining the focus of attitudes emerge.
With respect to political elites' individual characteristics, instrumental‐evaluative arguments (trust in EU institutions) are relevant for explaining preferences for full Europeanization against keeping control over these policy areas at the national/sub-national level. However, the significance of these arguments disappears when considering members of political elites with more moderate preferences (sharing powers between EU and national/regional authorities), where ideology factors are more important. Nevertheless, patterns differ according to policy area. Left–right positions are significant in the case of environmental and fighting crime policies, with leftist positions more prone to support an intermediate Europeanization of these areas. The neoliberal/regulatory dimension, on the other hand, is significant for explaining preferences for control over policies related to immigration and fighting crime. Members of national political elites who think the EU's main goal should be exclusively to promote economic competitiveness are less likely to delegate authority to the EU level in these areas. Finally, political elites' preferences concerning environment policy are also significantly influenced by their exclusive identification with their regions–– (p.82)
Table 4.5. Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: 'transnational' issues
Fighting crime
Level 1 units
Condition number
Log likelihood
−1042.320
−481.976
Cat: Shared
0.019*
−0.947***
Benefited EU
Trust EU institutions
−0.580*
EU more competitive
Exclusive national
Exclusive regional
Trust national institutions
OBB 2007 per
Trade integration
Bargaining centralized
EU member 73–81
Cat: EU level
−0.787**
Level 2 variance (standardized estimate)
Note: multilevel multinomial logistic regression. Category of reference: 'National/subnational level'. Robust standard errors.
* p ≤ 0.05;
** p ≤ 0.01;
*** p ≤ 0.005.
(p.83) (p.84)
Table 4.6. Preferences on policy-making Europeanization: 'non-transnational' issues
EU member_86–95
(p.85) (p.86) exclusive identities would reinforce attitudes towards keeping environmental issues in national hands.
Concerning the influence of contextual (country) variables on political elites' attitudes, there is a significant negative effect in the case of interviewees from former state socialist countries concerning the full Europeanization of environment and immigration policies, and for the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Greece in the case of immigration policy. These models also provide further evidence for the globalization hypothesis, as political elites in countries with a greater level of international embeddedness are more favourable to the full Europeanization of national immigration policy. Another contextual variable––a country's average level of trust in national political institutions––is significant, but only for intermediate Europeanization preferences. Here, results confirm the instrumentalist proposition, in that political elites in countries with a lower average level of trust in national political institutions are more favourable towards some kind of Europeanization in these transnational policy areas.
For economic elites, preferring shared authority over national/regional control in transnational policy issues has more to do with national contexts than with individual level variables. The only individual level variable having a significant effect is that of gender on environmental policy, where women are more favourable towards Europeanization. Individual level characteristics, however, are important in explaining strong preferences for full Europeanization (transferring all powers to the EU) in transnational policy issues. More specifically, ideology has a significant effect in the case of environmental policy––members of the economic elite who position themselves on the political left are less likely to favour full Europeanization; while exclusive regional identity seems to foster a preference to keep the fight against crime at national or sub-national level.
Some contextual variables also have significant effects. Regarding preferences on shared powers over policy making, there is evidence to support functionalist-pragmatic arguments. Thus, for environmental policy, economic elites in countries with higher trade integration are more likely to favour shared competencies between national/regional levels and the EU. In the case of immigration policy, in countries with higher trust in national political institutions, economic elites are less prone to support intermediate Europeanization. However, in this policy area, the higher the degree of corporatism (centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining) the higher the preference for keeping control over it in national or sub-national hands. For those members of the national economic elite preferring a full transfer of powers to the EU, country-level variables are significant for environment and immigration policy. In both cases, a country's average level of trust in national institutions has a negative, significant effect, while the degree of trade (p.87) integration of the country increases the likelihood for preferring full Europeanization against exclusive national/regional authority. Top business leaders in countries joining the European Economic Community or the EU in 1986–1995 (Spain, Portugal, and Austria), however, are more likely to prefer complete Europeanization of immigration policy compared to those in founding member states. In contrast, economic elites in former state socialist countries are significantly less likely to delegate environmental and immigration policy to the EU level.
4.4.2 Short-Term Policy-Making Preferences: Non-Transnational Policy Areas
In the case of policy areas dealing with problems without a direct cross-border nature (fighting unemployment, taxation, and health care; see Table 4.6) again, patterns between political and economic elites differ. For political elites, in the case of preferences for shared powers, apart from the significant negative effect of being male on health care policy, ideology is the only significant explanatory factor at the individual level. For the three policy areas, preferences for an intermediate Europeanization are significantly related to the dimension of 'neo-liberalism–regulation'. Being a member of political elites and believing that the EU should promote economic competitiveness means that supporting the Europeanization of the two policies usually classified as 'social' (fighting unemployment and health care), and the intervention of EU decision making into national/regional taxation policy, is less likely. However, this ideological axis does not overrule the traditional 'left–right' dimension in the case of unemployment and taxation policies, where MPs with leftist self-positioning are more likely to support shared powers. Both 'competitive/regulative' and 'left–right' variables are also significant in the part of the model related to full Europeanization preferences in case of taxation policy. For the other policy areas, only in the case of health care we find two individual variables with a significant effect––exclusive regional identity and evaluation of the benefits of the EU for the respondent's country. In the latter case, the direction of the effect is not as expected theoretically in that the likelihood of preferring full Europeanization of health care policy is lower for those members of the political elite who evaluate the EU positively. It is also interesting that no individual level variable accounts for this group's preferences to transfer all the powers to the EU level in the case of policies to fight unemployment.
With respect to country level variables, a country's average level of trust in national institutions again has a negative, significant effect on preferences in taxation and health care issues, where the preference is for intermediate Europeanization. Furthermore, political elites in former state socialist countries are also less likely to favour mixed powers in these areas. In the (p.88) case of those showing a preference for full Europeanization, in the issues of taxation and health care we find for the first time a significant effect of objective economic benefits received from the EU (measured through the OBB), which runs in the expected direction––more benefits would support a greater desire for Europeanization. Besides, MPs in former state socialist countries and those entering the EEC between 1973 and 1981 are less likely to support full EU Europeanization in these areas against keeping authority for policy making exclusively in national/regional hands than founding members.
For economic elites, only models for preferences regarding fighting unemployment and taxation could be computed. In the case of fighting unemployment, only ideology (self-positioning on the left) has a significant, positive effect in explaining preferences on shared powers as opposed to exclusive power for country/regional government. Trust in European institutions at the individual level has a significant effect on preferences on taxation issues––more trust would mean more support for exclusive EU-level authority in this matter. At the country level, being a top business leader in a former state socialist country has a negative effect on a preference for full Europeanization in taxation, while political elites have also a significant preference against transferring decision making to the EU level in health care and social security.
4.4.3 Long-Term Policy-Making Preferences
Table 4.7 includes the results of the multilevel logistic regression models for long-term (ten years) preferences on the complete Europeanization of taxation, social security, and foreign policy.3 Out of these areas, only taxation can be compared with short-term preferences––taking into account the differences in operationalization of variables, while social security only allows an indirect comparison with social policies included in the previous models.
In the case of taxation, ideology continues to be a key explanatory factor of political elites' long-term preferences. Those with self-positioning on the right and who consider the EU's main goal to be the promotion of economic competitiveness are less likely to favour the Europeanization of this policy area in the long term. Individual evaluation of EU institutions and the benefits they offer to respondents' countries also have a significant positive effect. The same patterns concerning individual level variables are again found for the social (p.89) security model, where both the traditional and the neo-liberal–regulation axes are also at work in the same expected direction; the instrumental-evaluative judgements also play a significant role in this model. Institutional and performance evaluation are also significant factors accounting for preferences on the establishment of a single foreign policy. In addition, this is the only policy area where exclusive national identity has a significant effect––in the expected direction: members of the political elite who identify exclusively with their country are also less likely to support full Europeanization in this policy area.
Concerning country-level variables, it appears from models in Table 4.7 that political elites in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU are most likely to favour Europeanization in the long term for all three policy areas. Also, a higher degree of trade integration (that is, a higher exposure to external economic forces) has a positive significant effect on political elites' preferences on the Europeanization of foreign policy. Furthermore, just as in the case of short-term policy preferences, political elites in former state socialist countries are systematically less likely to favour Europeanization of the three policy areas. The same applies in the case of taxation and foreign policy for countries joining the EEC between 1973 and 1981.
With respect to economic elites' long term policy-making preferences, evaluative-pragmatic factors have a positive significant effect in all policy areas. This is most true for trust in EU institutions, while subjective evaluation of benefits is significant only in the case of social security. However, ideology has a significant effect on the long-term policy-making preferences of this area. Here, we find both traditional left–right and neo-liberal–regulation dimensions working in the expected directions. Finally, regarding country-level variables, members of the economic elite in countries with positive OBB are significantly more likely to support the Europeanization of social security and foreign policy within the next ten years. As in other models, however, respondents in former state socialist countries are less prone to support Europeanization in taxation and social security.
As we have shown, the factors behind national elites' policy preferences present a complex picture, with no uniform pattern along policy areas or type of elite being evident. In this section, however, we will summarize our findings and try to relate them to previous theoretical suggestions.
The first thing that appears is that both pragmatic and ideological factors are key to understanding political (and, sometimes economic) elites' preferences. Ideology is present as a key factor in explaining political elites' preferences on shared authority between national/sub-national and European levels in the (p.90)
Table 4.7. Preferences on Europeanization of policy areas in 10 years
Cat: In favour
Level 2 variance (standardized deviation)
Note: Multilevel logistic regression. Category of reference: 'Not in favour'. Robust standard errors.
(p.91) short term, as well as their long-term preferences for taxation and social security. In this respect, results do not show a clear dominance of a particular view of the ideological space. In immigration and health care, the 'Hooghe-Marksian' view dominates, while in environment the traditional 'left–right' axis is the important dimension. However, in most of the areas both dimensions are significant simultaneously. Explaining why these patterns appear would require an in-depth investigation into the particular characteristics of each policy area, and this is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Pragmatic-evaluative arguments seem to hold for political elites in the case of strong pro-Europeanization preferences (transnational policy areas and health care policy). Trust in EU institutions, and lack of trust in national institutions, are driving forces of preferences concerning full Europeanization of transnational policy areas. It is also interesting that, in these cases, ideology is not significant, which allows us to conclude that strong Europeanization preferences in the short term are less dependent on the political-ideological debate. In the long term, however, pragmatic-evaluative and ideological arguments are both confirmed in the case of political elites' preferences over taxation and social security.
Such a mix does not occur in the case of long-term preferences over foreign policy. Related to the discussion of the role of ideology in defining the political space, power over foreign policy is seen as a major state sovereignty function. In this way, and given that it is the only policy area where ideology is not significant at all in explaining political elites' preferences (as opposed to exclusive national identity, which is), it could be taken to confirm the Hix-Lord's intergovernmentalist hypothesis.
In contrast to political elites' preferences, those of economic elites are much less influenced by ideological considerations. For this group, ideology is only significant in explaining short-term preferences for full Europeanization concerning environmental policy, shared Europeanization in unemployment policy, and long-term preferences concerning social security. In turn, pragmatic-evaluative arguments are only confirmed for long-term preferences. In general, the evident explanatory paucity of individual level variables in the models for economic elites, particularly in the short term, clearly raises the question of whether there are other variables, not included in our analysis, which account for variation in preferences.
Our analysis also shows the non-significance of ideological extremism, the low importance of exclusive territorial identity––with the exception of environment, health care, and foreign policy. Extremism's lack of impact may be related to the fact that we investigated only elite groups. However, results do not suggest that extremist elite members are unable to influence policy preferences of the public.
(p.92) Concerning contextual (country-level) factors, the significant effect in some models of a country's average level of trust in national political institutions is of particular interest. This partially confirms the Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) hypothesis on the inverse relationship between levels of trust in national and European institutions. Economic globalization arguments also make sense in the case of economic elites where policy issues have a clear transnational nature (environment and immigration), also confirming partially Wessels and Kielhorn's (1999) cross-border hypothesis (see above). In contrast, these authors' arguments about the possible role of the internal structure of interest intermediation are solely confirmed for economic elites and in case of immigration policy. Some models reflect a significant effect of the objective benefit countries receive from their membership in the EU. Regarding short-term preferences, this variable is more important for economic elites, while in the long term it also has a significant effect on political elites' preferences. Finally, our analyses also confirm that the contextual variables of former state socialist states and, to a lesser extent, of those who joined the ECC between 1973 and 1981 (particularly the United Kingdom and Denmark) have negative influence over the supranational policy preferences of these countries' elites.
The analysis in the previous pages has shown the complexity inherent to national elites' preferences on the Europeanization of policy making. Nevertheless, some broad patterns emerge within such complexity. First, preferences differ depending on whether they are projected in the short or long term. In the long term, national elites tend to be more pro-European––considered as a whole, the absolute majority support the idea of single foreign policy, while a relative majority also support the unification of taxation and the social security system. In the short term, however, the picture is slightly different. Thus, those who prefer taxation to be dealt with at the European level (even if authority on this area is shared with national/regional institutions) are a minority. The same occurs with unemployment and health care policies. In this respect, we find the second general pattern: positions in the short term referring to what have been called 'transnational' policy issues (namely environment, immigration, and crime) are more pro-European than in the rest of the policy areas. These short-term patterns are in accordance with previous research findings concerning the globalization of social problems and with a functional approach, which takes into account their cross-border character.
A third general pattern is that economic elites are more open to Europeanization than their political counterparts in most policy domains––fighting unemployment and social security are the exceptions.
(p.93) Finally, the three previous general patterns vary along countries and country groups. Thus, in general terms, former state socialist elites––similarly to the Eurosceptic elites of the United Kingdom and Denmark––are less likely to approve of delegating national authority to the EU.
This chapter has also aimed to shed light on the reasons for these regularities. Statistical models show no uniform explanatory pattern along time span, type of policy issue, or type of elite. However, some interesting facts have been detected. Results indicate that political elites' views are affected by ideological explanatory factors in all policy areas but foreign policy, which seems to adjust to a more pragmatic, intergovernmental logic. However, we have not found a predominance of a particular view of the ideological space in the remaining policy areas. Besides, ideology is mostly important when referring to mild (shared) positions over Europeanization. We have also found room for a significant impact of pragmatic-evaluative factors in political elites' attitudes. Individual trust in European institutions and/or the average level of trust in national institutions are significant explanatory factors of strong preferences concerning Europeanization of transnational policy issues.
With respect to economic elites, it is more difficult to find significant variables explaining preferences at the individual level, which suggests that further research is needed to identify other factors that could account for this group's specific preferences concerning the Europeanization of policy making.
Finally, explanatory models have also shown the importance of contextual/country-level factors. Along with others, they clarified––in line with the descriptive findings––the significant negative impact of former state socialist countries on the support for supranational policy solutions.
(1) The survey among members of national parliaments conducted in 1996 in eleven EU countries within the umbrella of the Political Representation in Europe research project included a question of whether a number of policy areas (seventeen) should be decided at the national or at the European level ('European Study of Members of Parliament 1996' Core questionnaire 〈http://www.wzb.eu/~wessels/Downloads/Quest&Codebooks/CORE-MNP1.pdf〉 (accessed 18 December 2011)). Similarly, the survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe also in 1996 on behalf of the European Commission among several groups of national elites ('top decision makers') in the fifteen member states (Spence 1997) included a question on fourteen policy areas, where respondents had to choose on a ten-point scale whether each policy area should be dealt with 'exclusively at the national or regional level' or 'exclusively at the European level'.
(2) We have also considered as missing values the 'none of them' responses.
(3) For the dependent variable, it would be more appropriate to use ordinal logistic regression. However, our data did not adjust to the parallel regression assumption, so for reasons of simplicity we opted to dichotomize the dependent variable. Thus, the 'In favour' category includes former 'Strongly in favour' and 'Somewhat in favour' categories, while the category 'Not in favour' refers to the rest of the responses.


States will have far more latitude to bypass parts of the Affordable Care Act thanks to a new policy change from the Trump administration, marking a significant shift in the types of marketplace coverage available to Americans.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) unveiled a controversial policy last month that expanded what's permissible under §1332 waivers, which states can submit to be exempt from certain requirements under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
In a speech to conservative lawmakers Thursday, CMS Administrator Seema Verma followed up on this guidance by announcing four "waiver concepts," specific examples of actions states can do to restructure marketplace plans.
Namely, Verma said, states can: (1) create and contribute to accounts for consumers' premium and out-of-pocket expenses, (2) restructure subsidy eligibility, (3) redefine what plans qualify for subsidies and (4) implement high-risk pools.
Although the new policy would not allow states to waive preexisting condition protections under the ACA, it would allow states to let consumers use subsidies to purchase short-term limited duration (STLD) plans or associated health plans (AHPs) that aren't required to cover preexisting conditions.
Strategies like these, Verma said, promote "consumer engagement, personal freedom and choice, spending smarter, price transparency, portability, and controls over premium growth."
"What's not to like?" she added.
Verma contrasted the new ACA innovation waiver guidelines with those of the Obama administration, which she alleged made it "impossible to put forward creative ideas" amid rising premium prices.
"No one should have been surprised when the president charted a different course," she said, fighting back against allegations that the Trump administration has deliberately weakened the ACA.
"The specific examples laid out today show how state governments can work with HHS to create more choices and greater flexibility in their health insurance markets, helping to bring down costs and expand access to care," echoed Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar in a statement.
Preexisting condition protections are the public's greatest healthcare concern, as reflected in this year's midterm elections. And in this politically charged announcement, Verma was adamant that the guidance will not lead to fewer protections for people with preexisting conditions.
"You cannot waive any of the preexisting conditions protections. Those cannot be waived at the federal level or the state level," she said on a subsequent press call.
However, when the guidance was released, policy experts said they expected the opposite, especially because the new guidance includes STLD plans and AHPs as coverage even though they provide fewer benefits.
Critics also suspected changing subsidy regulations could make plans less affordable—and consequently, reduce coverage—among lower-income groups.
There are also concerns the administration side-stepped traditional rule-making that could invalidate the new guidance. A report from the USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy says the guidance contains policy that should be classified as a "legislative rule" requiring it to follow the notice and comment rule-making process.
"There are serious questions about whether the policy articulated in the guidance is a permissible interpretation of the underlying statute, but, at the very least, it is likely invalid for the agency to attempt to make this policy without a full rule-making process," Brookings fellow and former CMS official Christen Linke Young wrote Wednesday.


My Midlife Creativities: Signs of Life, Does the Tooth Fairy come if your tooth's been pulled?
Signs of Life, Does the Tooth Fairy come if your tooth's been pulled?
Does the Tooth Fairy come if your tooth has been pulled by a dentist?
...and took some extra measures, just in case.
So, does the Tooth Fairy come if your tooth has been pulled?
YES she does, sweet baby, yes she does.
i have fond memories about the tooth fairy. love the little notes.


There are four key elements to a great cup of tea. The amount of tea, the amount and quality of water, water temperature, and steeping time. We recommend 2 teaspoons of Blue Mountain Tea Co loose leaf tea per 12 ounce cup.
Depending on the blend of tea, depicts which water temperature and for how long to steep the tea for.
For example, when brewing a cup of Black Tea, you will steep for 3 minutes, using water which is 195F/90C.


text:
Drzewce – nazwa wsi pojawia się w dokumentach z 1380 jako Drzewcza wieś położona 4 km północny wschód od Wąwolnicy.

Wieś położona historyczne w  powiecie lubelskim parafii Wąwolnica.

Opis granic topografia
 1409 w działach  między braćmi przyrodnimi ("uterini"): Grotowi przypada część w Drzewczy posiadana przez nich z pierwotnego dziedzictwa oraz część kupiona za pieniądze, położona po prawej stronie idąc z Drzewczy do Piotrowic, z rzeką [Podleśną] płynącą przez środek wsi, oraz część przed i za posiadłością zwaną Maciejowskie. Grot może brać ziemię z obu części wsi do stawów istniejących i w przyszłości urządzanych. Z kolei Jasicy część zakupiona w Drzewczy idąc do Piotrowic po lewej stronie oraz wieś  Boguchwałowice.
 Kmiecie Jasicy i ich bydło mogą korzystać z wody w wymienionych stawach.
 1469 wytyczono granice z Boguchwałowicami i Opatkowicami.

Kalendarium wieku XV
Wieś stanowi własność szlachecką. W roku 1380 Drzewce występują w kluczu dóbr Bochotnickich.

 1381  sąd kasztelański lubelski zaświadcza, że Wojciech z Drzewcza wraz z synowcami Leonardem, Stanisławem, Marcinem wolni są od jurysdykcji kasztelańskiej. Zapisem tym posługiwać się będą w przyszłości sukcesorzy.
 1409  Jan z Drzewczy. Tenże zastawia swą część macierzystą w Drzewczy z tej strony Soczewek ["Soczewky"] Jankowi ze Strzelc za 4 grzywny.
 1409-20 dziedzicem był Jasica z Drzewczy.
 1409-27 występuje w zapisach Katarzyna żona Jasicy.
 1420  Katarzyna z Świeprawic odstępuje  córce Święchnie swoje wiano w Drzewczy, Święchna zaś sprzedaje część w Drzewczy za 10 grzywien Marcinowi z Bronic
 1409-31 w działach Grot z Drzewczy herbu Jastrzębiec.
 1409-20 w działach Wojciech
 1409-27 w działach Maciej
 1409-30 w działach Marcin
 1417-45 w działach Marcin Jardzacz, Jardzak.
 1411  Adam syn Mikołaja z Drzewca zapisany na Uniwersytet Krakowski (Ind.)
 1414-28 w działach Klemens.
 1417-30 w działach Imram
 1417 tenże Imram kupuje część w Drzewczy od Dziersława z Świeprawic za 18 grzywien.
 1417-29 w działach Mikołaj.
 1417-9 w działach Wichna
 1418 w działach Anastazja.
 1418-26 w działach Stanisław.
 1418 w działach występują Abram i Leonard.
 1418-29 Borsza.
 1421 tenże Borsza udowadnia świadkami, że nie podlega jurysdykcji kasztelańskiej.
 1428-9 Świętochna Borszowa.
 1418-43 Bogusław-Bogusz.
 1419 w działach występuje Stefan.
 1429 pojawia się w księgach ziemskich Lenczy! i Piotr.
 1441-57 Grot Jasica (wymieniony pod rokiem 1409).
 1449 tenże z synem Wincentym na mocy przedłożonego dokumentu Piotra ze Szczekocin kasztelana lubelskiego (1375-84) wykazują, że są zwolnieni są od jurysdykcji kasztelańskiej
 1441-2 Mikołaj.
 1443 ponownie Mikołaj s. Marcina Jardzaka.
 1443-9 występują w działach Helena  Małgorzata  pod datą 1443 także Jan.
 1443-62 występuje Piotr.
 1446-77 Piotr Wyszkowic zwany Wyszek.
 1443 Jakub.
 1449-54 Jakub Borszyc
 1449 tenże, wraz z bratem Stanisławem, przedkłada dokument Jana Szczekockiego kasztelana lubelskiego (1410-33), na mocy którego zwolnieni są od jurysdykcji kasztelańskiej.
 1449-71 Stanisław Borszyc alias Borsza
 1451 Stanisław z Drzewca alias z Witoszyna, syn Świętochny.
 1446-9 w działach występuje Marcin Prusek.
 1447-50 Marcin.
 1448-9 podano, że Wawrzyniec syn Grzegorza zapisany był na Uniwersytet Krakowski (Ind).
 1448-66 Wyszko.
 1449-56 Imram
 1449 Maciej syn Imrama.
 1449 Imram z synem Maciejem zwolnieni są od jurysdykcji kasztelana, w działach zapisano ponadto Dorotę żonę Macieja, Jachnę siostrę Imrama i Zbychnę.
 1449-77 w działach Wincenty syn Grota
 1449 Jan Brzuszkowic.
 1451 Świętochna
 1456 Klemens.
 1457 Paweł syn Grota zapisany na Uniwersytet Krakowski (Ind),
 1461-9 tenże Paweł został bakałarzem sztuk wyzwolonych.
 1458 Wichna i Dorota Coczloua!.
 1461 Stanisław syn Grota.
 1462-74 Jakub syn Imrama.
 1462-9 Jan Borsza, Borszyc.
 1466 pojawia się  Jan ale nie Jan Borsza.
 1462-9 Wojciech syn Imrama.
 1462 Brygida córka Bogusza.
 1464 Jadwiga siostra Wincentego, żona Stanisława z Osiemborowa  (pow. warecki).
 1468-77 Jan Lyenczycz, Lyenczy, Lyensky z Drzewczy.
 1469-74 Paweł syn Marcina Pruska.
 1470 Mikołaj syn zmarłego Marcina Pruska.
 1470 Jan Pruskowic (Prusek).
 1471 Jakub, Wojciech, Jan, Mikołaj, synowie zmarłego Imrama.
 1470-80 Długosz podaje że dziedzicami byli Wincenty, Piotr i Paweł bakałarz herbu Jastrzębiec, oraz Jan Borsza Imramowicz herbu Nałęcz 6 folwarków (DLB II 569).
 1497 Jan Olbracht nadaje Pawłowi z Chotczy chorążemu lub. dobra Jana Borszy z Drzewczy i Witoszyna, skonfiskowane za niestawienie się na wyprawę.
 1456 w Acta Officialia Lublinensis zapisano, że uprawia się tu tatarkę.
 1531-3 z ksiąg poborowych wiadomo, że pobór z części Katarzyny Drzewieckiej 2 łanów kmiecych z części Sulimy 2, lub 1 łan kmiecy.Szlachta bez kmieci: Mikołaj Nakonieczka 1/2, lub 1/4 łana, Abraham Borsza 1/2 łana, Stanisław Imram 1/2 łana Stanisław Borsza 1/2 łana, Marcin Borsza 1/4 łana Feliks i Jan Borsza 1/4 łana, Aleksy Borsza 1/2 łana, Wojciech Imram 1/4 łana, Kanimir Niebrzegowski 1/2 łana, Stanisław Niebrzegowski 1/2 łana.
 1533 Andrzej Lenczy 1/4 łana (Rejestr Poborowy).

Dziesięciny
 1450 Kazimierz Jagiellończyk postanawia, aby szlachta ze wsi Piotrowice, Bronice, Boguchwałowice odnosiła placki wielkanocne do święcenia plebanowi wąwolnickiemu do Drzewczy.
 1456 dziesięcinę dowożą plebanowi wąwolnickiemu
 1470-80 dziesięcinę z całej wsi wartości do 15 grzywien dowożą plebanowi wąwolnickiemu (Długosz L.B. t.II s.569).
 1529 dziesięcina jak wyżej opisano w wynmiarze 11 grzywien (Liber Retaxationum 440).

Badania archeologiczne
Badania archeologiczne prowadzone ne terenie wsi wykazały wczesnośredniowieczną jamę zasobowa, co potwierdza istnienie osadnictwa na tym terenie we wczesnym średniowieczu.

Przypisy

Bibliografia

Bibliografia archiwalna, w formie papierowej, pergaminy
 TA - Teki Archiwalne VII, Warszawa 1961, Najstarsze zapiski ziemskie lubelskie z r. 1409, wyd. L. Białkowski.
 ZL - Acta terrestia Lublinensia, rps w Archiwum Państwowym w Lublinie.
 ZDM -
 KL - fragmenty ksiąg sądowych kasztelana lubelskiego w Archiwum Państwowym w Lublinie.
 OL - Acta officialatus Lublinensis, według kartoteki w Pracowni Słownika historyczno-geograficznego Małopolski w średniowieczu, Kraków.
 MS - Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria, t. I-V/l, wyd. T. Wierzbowski, W. 1905-1919; t. V/2, wyd. J. Płocha, A. Rybarski, I. Sułkowska, W. 1961.
 SP - Starodawne Prawa Polskiego Pomniki, poniżej dane bibliograficzne tomów wykorzystanych w Materiałach.

Drzewce (województwo lubelskie)
Kalendaria włości dziesięcinnych klasztoru łysogórskiego

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
The Colossus (1808-12) by Goya
Meaning and Interpretation of Spanish Mythological Painting
MAIN A-Z INDEX
The Colossus
By Francisco de Goya.
Regarded as one of the
Greatest Modern Paintings
of the nineteenth century.
The Colossus (1808-12) (El Coloso)
• Description
• Analysis
• Controversy
• Explanation of Other Spanish Paintings
Name: The Colossus (1808-12)
Artist: Goya (1746-1828)
Genre: Mythological painting
Movement: Romanticism
Location: Prado Museum, Madrid
For an explanation of other pictures from the nineteenth century, see: Analysis of Modern Paintings (1800-2000).
For analysis of artworks
by nineteenth century
Romantic artists like
Francisco de Goya, see:
How to Appreciate Paintings.
Analysis of The Colossus by Goya
The leading representative of Spanish painting from the late-18th and early-19th century, Francisco de Goya excelled at etching and engraving as well as painting and tapestry art (cartoons), becoming the leading artist at the Bourbon royal court of Charles IV. Despite his royal patronage, Goya was never a committed monarchist. Indeed, it is often said that El Greco was the artist of the Church, Velazquez the artist of the Court, and Goya the artist of the People. Moreover, his avant-garde tendencies make him one of the first modern artists in Europe, and he inspired numerous other modernists, notably Manet (1832-83) and Picasso (1881-1973). Goya derived his livelihood from portrait art, becoming one of the best portrait artists of the Spanish school. This eventually led to his appointment in 1799 as Primer Pintor de Camara, the highest position available to a court painter. He also produced some outstanding altarpiece art and a number of popular religious paintings, as part of his official duties. However, about 1793, he suffered a personality-changing illness, which left him completely deaf, and prone to the darkest moods, even paranoia. All this began to be reflected in a form of dark Romanticism, as illustrated by a set of 80 aquatints called "Caprices" (1797-99), a set of 82 engravings entitled "Disasters of War" (1810-19), and 14 mural paintings known as the "Black Paintings" (1819-23). Executed in parallel to his official works for the Crown, these artworks were never meant for public display. Instead, they constituted his private thoughts on the absurdities and horrors of the day. This brooding Romanticism was exacerbated by the Peninsular War, when French armies under Joseph I (Napoleon Bonaparte's brother) occupied Spain, triggering an ongoing series of atrocities.
The Colossus (known in Spanish as El Coloso or El Gigante), one of Goya's great masterpieces of history painting, is a perfect example of his romantic imagination. Against a lowering sky stands an absolutely colossal man. Dark and bearded, muscular and well proportioned, his fists raised in a threatening manner, he is naked with his back to us. He appears to be striding away from us towards the front left of the picture. A range of hills is level with his upper thighs, giving us an idea of how massive he is, as do the low clouds, around his thighs and buttocks. Interestingly, he appears to have his eyes closed. If so, he may symbolize the idea of blind violence.
Detail from the valley of The Colossus by Goya
Between us and the giant is a broad valley which is the scene of a mass exodus of stampeding wagons, carts, oxen, mules and horses. This mass of people and livestock are fleeing in panic, towards us (to the left), and away from the huge figure on the horizon. In the extreme left-hand corner, a man on a galloping horse is disappearing off the edge of the painting while a dog races to keep up with its master; behind it, another rider is falling off his horse. Further back a white-haired mule stobbornly stands still, waiting to be told what to do. (Some experts believe this animal symbolizes incomprehension of the horrors of war.) Meanwhile, a herd of bulls is stampeding out of the valley to the right, creating further tension in the foreground.
The dramatic impact of The Colossus lies in its fundamental uncertainty. We have absolutely no idea if the giant has harmed anyone or anything. It is not necessary for him to have done so to create this terrified exodus. Here is this hostile being of unimaginable size, who at any moment could swing around and crush people, wagons and animals with his massive limbs. This titanic human is a terror from the depths of the unconscious.
The painting technique used by Goya in Colossus is similar to that used in his "Black Paintings" - the murals on the walls of his house, Quinta del Sordo - although art historians have refuted the idea that it was part of that particular series. But the painting is definitely stylistically similar to the "Black Paintings": the colour black predominates, plus, the touches of colour are minimal and are applied with a spatula.
The main source of inspiration for The Colossus is the "Pyrenean Prophecy", a poem by Juan Bautista Arriaza (1770-1837), published in Patriotic Poems (1810), with which many Spaniards, including Goya, would have been familiar. The poem depicts the Spanish people as a giant arising from the Pyrenees in order to combat the Napoleonic invasion of 1808. In addition, X-ray analysis of the giant has suggested that the figure is similar to the Farnese Hercules painted by Zurbaran (1598-1664) in The Labours of Hercules series (1634, Buen Retiro Palace, Madrid).
In 1812, never having been exhibited, the picture became the property of Goya's son, Javier Goya (c.1784-1854). It was later owned by Pedro Fernandez Duran, who donated his art collection to Madrid's Prado Museum, where it has been displayed since 1931.
In June 2008, Manuela Mena, the Chief Curator of 18th-Century painting at the Prado Museum, Madrid, made the astonishing announcement - based on controversial research - that The Colossus was the work of the painter Asensio Julia, a friend and collaborator of Francisco Goya.
In March 2009, Goya experts Nigel Glendinning and Jesusa Vega published an article in the academic journal Goya under the title: "A failed attempt to delist The Colossus by the Prado Museum?" In it they questioned the methodology and arguments of Mena's report.
In July 2009, Spanish university researchers and numerous Goya specialists signed a declaration in support of Nigel Glendinning and attributed The Colossus to Goya. In the same year several other scholars, restorers and former directors of the Prado Museum indicated that they disagreed with Mena's hypothesis.
In 2012, Goya expert Jesusa Vega wrote an article entitled: "The Colossus is by Francisco de Goya", in which she rejects the basic principle that initially undermined Goya's authorship of the painting. In addition, she demonstrated that other studies carried out by the Prado have all shown that the picture was painted by Goya himself; these studies included analyses of colour pigments and binders, as well as analysis of the painterly techniques used and the composition of the painting, along with comparisons with "Black Paintings".
Explanation of Other Spanish Paintings
• The Third of May 1808 (1814) (El tres de mayo de 1808) by Goya
Prado Museum, Madrid.
• Saturn Devouring his Son (1819-23) (Saturno devorando a su hijo) by Goya
• Les Demoiselles d'Avignon (1907) by Picasso
Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), New York.
• Guernica (1937) by Picasso.
Reina Sofia, Madrid.
• Weeping Woman (1937) by Picasso
Tate Collection, London.
• Las Meninas (1656) ('the ladies-in-waiting') by Velazquez
Museo del Prado, Madrid.
• For the meaning of other 19th century Spanish paintings, see: Homepage.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ART EDUCATION
© visual-arts-cork.com. All rights reserved.


The most successful social media brands in 2013 are jointly worth nearly $200 billion with a growth of 59%.
The number of Chinese internet users has increased by 2100% since 2000.
What are the main reasons for people to go online first? 42% first research about the products or the company.
Analysis helps you keep track of the status of your online reputation.


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Adds a little savory flavor to a sweet batter. Serve with coffee or tea.
Add the vanilla and egg and beat well.
In a separate bowl mix the flour, baking soda, cream of tartar and salt.
Add the flour mixture to the sugar and egg and mix well.
Transfer to a sheet of plastic wrap and roll into a log.
Slice log into 1/4 inch slices.
Place on cookie sheet and bake at 350 for 8 to 10 minutes.
You can use any sugar cookie recipe for this. Works well with lavender flowers too.


TODAY (UNDERLINE) IS THE DAY!!! Hope everyone gets their copy and HAPPY HALLOWEEN!!!
Well...Willow magically burned Warren up - perhaps an illusion and she sent him away, while still burning. Leap of faith here on this one.
I really hope mine comes in the post today as play.com are usually good at shipping products in a couple of days of it being in the warehouse!!! If it comes tomorrow it will be the perfect start to the weekend. I will be able to read, the long way home in one huge sitting, also looking out for any edits they've made, such as willows blue eyes!!!
Im new to the whole comics thing. So i'm guessing that the paper in the TPB is of higher quality? Also is there like an introduction by Joss or ANY special features? Dark Horse have changed the date on their site to 31st so either they have sold like bunnies you know or there wasn't enough printed.
TPBs are generally printed on better quality paper and almost always have an introduction of some kind. They also often have special features like sketches and a cover gallery including all variant covers.
I got this today and was happy to see that a few changes had been made throughout the arc. I'm not to happy that the Warren thing hadn't been cleared as on other pages, text had been added, such as the xander complimenting rosenberg. Annoyed that that horrible buffy logo was left on the last panel of the arc as i hated that and that there weren't any features. Love the high quality and jo chen cover art between pages though!!!
Text had been added? I didnt know about added text?
just on the panel where xander says, 'the indescribable rosenberg' and all of the zombies are saying may i have this dance, instead of the one that says it to the slayer. Joss couldve wormed his way out of this problem and added a better story that fit with continuity. Also notice on the warren flashback, willows hair is now black.
So does the TPB have the variant covers that Georges did?
From what I'm reading, it seems like there're a lot of mess-ups that Scott isn't going back and looking well enough at to have edited the first time. That is what an editor does, right?
There are defo some spelling errors, such as buffy saying to ethan, 'you are a chaos worshipping sourcerer who takes none count it none of my subconsious'. It is supposed to be in not it. Also they sorted out the problem with renees feather earing changing ear throughout the scene with xander at the beginning. OMG we should so make a game out of theis. SPOT THE DIFFERENCE!!!
So how much text is actually added?
Only that page, but i thought that joss could've maybe changed the warren thing to make sure it made more sense and fit in with continuity. A lot of changes have been made to the book though.
Oh right OK. I'll have a look at it when I'm next in my local comic shop, probably picking up Issue #8.
I noticed that they changed Willow's hair to black in the flashback when she killed Warren. That was my favourite change. They spelt "sorcerer" right. So I'm not sure what you mean.
They do have Georges variant covers too. At the back.
Am getting this for Christmas!
I got the hard cover today in the mail. It is Beautiful!!!! I love it!
I would love it if they made a Hard cover for each TPB that comes out...but I'm sure that won't happen.
How'd you get it? Buy it off of TFAW when they had their limited time thing? Please tell me its not available for purchase anywhere else!


text:
Global Poverty, Greece, International Monetary Fund, Pakistan, Portugal, Ukraine
11 Facts About the International Monetary Fund
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in combination with the World Bank, is the world's largest public lender today.
Key Facts About the International Monetary Fund
In the 1930's the world was overtaken with financial turmoil from the Great Depression. Markets all over the world collapsed and countries closed their doors to foreign imports. The IMF was conceived in July 1944 at the United Nations Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire, to protect the world from a similar blow and hasten financial recovery in war-torn nations.
The Fund was created to act as a credit union and watch over the values of the world's currency, while facilitating International Trade, promote employment and sustainable growth and help to reduce global poverty. Its main aim is to maintain economic stability and help countries complete financial transactions.
The three main responsibilities of the IMF are: Surveillance — specifically to monitor the economic and financial policies of its members; financial assistance through loans to its members experiencing balance of payments issues; and technical assistance to help members design and implement economic policies that foster stability and growth.
Primary aims of the IMF: Promote international monetary cooperation, facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, promote exchange stability, assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments and make resources available to members experiencing balance of payment difficulties.
The IMF is accountable to 189 member countries. Its Headquarters is located in Washington D.C.
A country's voting power is based on the size of its economy and the amount of the quota it pays when it joins the IMF. The U.S. has the largest share of votes (approximately 17 percent). Decisions require a supermajority– 85 percent of votes.
The IMF advocates currency devaluation for governments of poor nations with struggling economies.
The largest borrowers of the IMF are Portugal, Greece, Ukraine, and Pakistan. The largest number of IMF loans have gone to the African Continent.
The U.S. contributes about 20 percent of the total annual IMF Budget. The largest member of the IMF is the U.S. while the smallest member is Tuvalu.
The fiscal year for the IMF begins on May 1 and ends on April 30.
The head of the IMF staff is the Managing Director. The Managing Director also acts as Chairman of the Executive Board and serves a five-year term. The present Managing Director is Christine Lagarde of France. The Executive Board Members monitor the day to day work with the guidance of the International Monetary and Financial Committee.
Studies show that contrary to the criticism of the IMF, it fulfills its functions of promoting exchange rate stability and helping its members correct macroeconomic imbalances.
– Aishwarya Bansal
https://borgenproject.org/wp-content/uploads/logo.jpg 0 0 Borgen Project https://borgenproject.org/wp-content/uploads/logo.jpg Borgen Project2017-06-22 07:30:252020-04-22 21:46:0811 Facts About the International Monetary Fund
Prevention of Waterborne Diseases in Developing CountriesA Long Way to Go for Health Care in Developing Countries


Most Small Organisations start off with acute requirement of cash flows. And presences of middlemen in all businesses are one of the strongest reasons for payments getting delayed. Now if we were to think that how can we build technology that can improve the way businesses are conducted can't it be a revolutionary measure?
After years of observations people have realised that it is us people because of whom the delay is happening. If instead of people we bring in technology to control the transaction, we can solve the problems of cash flow and removing the middlemen form all transactions.
In Indian Economy we have also observed that middlemen are the people responsible for corruptions. Most government schemes do not reach people properly, because of the presence of middle men in transactions relating to implementation of scheme. Hence along with businesses it is very important and urgent to implement blockchain technology for all government spending, but that being a separate topic, let's cover it in some other blog.
Let's here first understand what blockchain is and why should small businesses adopt blockchain.
I am sure most people reading this article know what is Google sheets. Traditionally before google sheets, let's say someone wrote some data in an excel sheet and somebody else wants to update it from a different location. Then this sheet had to be closed first and then sent to somebody else. The first user is locked out of the sheet till the second person is appending the file. The file is then received back by the first person and then he can check it again.
Now as each block is referring itself to a previous block, preparing a chain like structure.
2. How would we transfer money and provide services.
A. The buyer and seller who might or might not trust each other and completely dependent on the system to check whether the services are upto the mark, and the money is already committed and locked by the system hence there is no chance of fraudulent transactions.
B. There is no mediation such as a bank or a payment gateway which charges money such as 2-4% of the transaction costs.
C. The transactions are immediate, hence there is no delay. And above all of that the system is completely free. Imagine how much value blockchain can generate by removing the middleman completely.
How can a small businesses benefit from blockchain technologies?
The day you start accepting money in any cryptocurrency built over blockchain technology, your monetary exchange becomes easier. Both ends receiving as well as taking money becomes easier. If you use blockchain technology for getting money from your customers and [providing to your suppliers, it also creates transparency and is easier to account for.
There is no middle man who takes 5-7 working days to transfer the money into your account. As we hadstarted, cash liquidity is what ruins a lot of businesses. Blockchain technology can become the solution for it. There would be nobody in between except an algorithm that demands no money or time to complete a transaction.
execute. The frauds of buyer not paying would reduce.
As all of these transactions are stored as blocks within a system you can check anybody's transactions. Not their bank accounts, but the transactions they have committed. This helps us do common identity verification and understand who do we wish to work with and who we do not wish to work with.


There aren't enough food, service, value or atmosphere ratings for Shreedevi Restaurant, India yet. Be one of the first to write a review!
Delicious Andhra style food is served here. We tried the Andhra Chilly chicken (spicy), it was amazing. They served us on a plantain leaf. For the type of ambience, the place seems a bit costly. I would go to this place again.
Get quick answers from Shreedevi Restaurant staff and past visitors.