text:
Enriqueta Martí i Ripollés (1868 – 12 May 1913) was a Spanish child serial killer, kidnapper, prostitute and procuress of children. She was called "The Vampire of carrer Ponent", "The Vampire of Barcelona" and "The Vampire of the Raval" in the press.

Some researchers have, however, asserted that she was not a killer of children, but rather a person with mental disorders who can only be proven reliably to have abducted one young girl, Teresita Guitart. They also contend that the black legend that is attributed to her could not be demonstrated.

Early life
Enriqueta Martí was born in Sant Feliu de Llobregat in 1868. As a young woman, Martí moved from her hometown to Barcelona where she worked as a maidservant and nanny; she soon turned to prostitution, and worked in a high-class brothel. In 1895 she married a painter named Juan Pujaló, but the marriage failed. According to Pujaló, Martí's affairs with other men, her unpredictable character, and her continuous visits to houses of ill repute caused the separation. The pair reconciled and separated approximately six times. At the time of Martí's detention in 1912, the couple had been separated for five years, and had no children.

Black legend
In 1909 Martí opened her own brothel, which attracted some of the more affluent in Barcelona. Some of them had unusual desires which she accommodated for a premium. Some expressed a desire for children. To accommodate them, she dressed as a pauper during the day and frequented the poorer parts of the city. When she came across unaccompanied children she abducted them to prostitute them in her brothel. She begged and joined bread queues at the monasteries to find the most abandoned looking children. By night she attended the El Liceu, the Casino de la Arrabassada, and other places where the wealthy of Barcelona gathered likely offering her services as a procurer of children.

At the same time as she was prostituting children, she was also practicing as a witch-doctor. She claimed drinking the blood of children could cure tuberculosis, and offered creams and elixirs that could stop ageing and prolong life.  The ingredients she used to make her remedies came from the remains of the children that she was killing, who ranged from 5 up to 15 years of age. She used the fat, blood, hair, and bones.  For this reason, she did not have problems disposing of her victims. Martí offered salves, ointments, filters, poultices, and potions, especially to treat tuberculosis, which was highly feared at the time, and various other incurable diseases. The wealthy paid large sums of money for these remedies.

During the Tragic Week of 1909, she was arrested at her flat on Barcelona's carrer Minerva, along with a young man from a wealthy family,  and accused of running a brothel that offered sexual services from children. Thanks to her contacts with Barcelona's high society using her services, she was never tried.

Over the next three years many more children disappeared, but as they were from poor families police investigations into their disappearance were minimal.

It is suspected that she kidnapped a large number of children over a span of twenty years. She was finally arrested in a flat in El Raval; more evidence was found in flats in Barcelona where she had lived previously.

Forensic experts managed to differentiate a total of twelve children with what little evidence they were able to recover. In spite of suspicions, and because Martí did not tally her activities, experts are unsure if she was Spain's deadliest killer. It is clear that she acted for many years in Barcelona. The public suspected that someone was kidnapping babies, and many children disappeared without a trace causing dread among the population.

29 carrer Ponent

On February 10, 1912, she kidnapped her last victim: Teresita Guitart Congost. For two weeks the city looked for her and there was great public indignation since the authorities had been extremely passive regarding the missing children. A suspicious neighbor, Claudia Elías, found Congost's trail. On February 17, Elías saw a girl with cropped hair looking from a casement window of a first floor flat at number 29 carrer Ponent  (now Carrer de Joaquin Costa). Elías had never seen the girl. She asked her neighbor if the girl was hers but the neighbor, who was Martí, closed the window without saying a word. Elías shared this, as well as her suspicions that the little girl was Congost, with a mattress-maker down the street. She also told him of the strange life that her neighbor was leading. The mattress-maker informed a municipal agent, Jose Asens of Elías' suspicions and he, in turn, communicated this to the chief of the Ribot brigade.

On February 27, saying there had been a complaint about chickens in the flat, two Ribot agents went to look for Martí. They found her in the court of calle de Ferlandina, informed her of the accusation, then escorted her to her flat. She proved to be surprised but did not object. When the policemen entered, two girls were found in the flat. One of them was Teresita Guitard Congost, the other a girl called Angelita. After making a statement, Congost was returned to her parents. She explained how Martí took her by the hand promising her candies, covered her with a black rag, and forced her to the flat. Martí cut Congost's hair and changed her name to Felicidad, telling the child she no longer had parents and was to call her "mama" from then on. Martí fed the girl potatoes and stale bread and preferred to pinch rather than beat the child. She was prohibited from going to the windows and balconies as well as several rooms in the flat.

Congost told authorities that Martí was in the habit of leaving them alone and that one day they risked exploring the rooms that Martí forbade them from entering. They found a sack with girl's clothes covered in blood and a boning knife also covered with blood. Congost never left the flat during her captivity.

Angelita's declaration was more frightening. Before Congost arrived at the flat, there was a five-year-old boy called Pepito. Angelita said that she secretly saw Martí, who she was calling "mom", kill him on the kitchen table. Angelita's identity was more difficult to pinpoint as she did not know her real surname but confirmed Martí's claim that her father was called Juan. Martí maintained that Angelita was her daughter by her estranged husband Juan Pujaló. He appeared before a judge and declared that he had not lived with Martí for years, that they had not had children, and that he did not know where Angelita came from. Eventually, Martí claimed that she had taken the girl as a newborn from her sister-in-law having told her that the girl was stillborn. Enriqueta Martí Ripollés was detained and jailed in the Reina Amalia prison.

During the second inspection of the flat, detectives found the sack with the bloody clothing and the knife. They also found another sack with dirty clothes and at least thirty small human bones. These bones showed evidence of being exposed to fire. Investigators found a lounge sumptuously decorated with a cupboard with nice clothes for a boy and girl. This lounge contrasted with the rest of the flat which was austere and smelled badly. In another locked room they found the horror that Martí was hiding. In it, there were fifty pitchers, jars, and washbowls, with preserved human remains: greasy lard, coagulated blood, children's hair, skeletons of hands, powdered bones, and pots with the potions, ointments, and salves already prepared for sale.

Investigators also went to two more flats where Martí had lived: a flat in the carrer Tallers, a third in carrer Picalqués, and a little house in carrer Jocs Florals, in Sants. In both of them they found false walls and human remains in the walls and ceilings. In the garden of the house on carrer Jocs Florals, they found the skull of a three-year-old child, and a series of bones that corresponded to 3, 6 and 8-year-old children. Some remains still had pieces of clothes whose condition indicated that Martí had habitually kidnapped children of impoverished families with insufficient means to look for their missing children. Further investigation revealed more housing in Sant Feliu de Llobregat, property of Martí's family. Here they found remains of children in vases and jars as well as books of remedies.

In Martí's flat they found curious things: an ancient book with parchment covers, a book of notes where she had written recipes and potions in elegant calligraphy, a package of letters and notes written in coded language, and a list with names of families and important figures in Barcelona. The list was very controversial since the public believed that it was a list of Enriqueta's rich clients and that, because of their wealth, they would not pay for their crimes of paedophilia or of buying human remains to treat their health. Police tried to stop the list from leaking, but rumors abounded that it was a client list of doctors, politicians, businessmen and bankers. With events of the Tragic Week in their minds, and fearing riots, authorities calmed the public with newspaper articles explaining that the list contained the names of people that Martí had begged from, and that they had been swindled by the lies and requests of the murderer.

Martí was imprisoned in the Reina Amàlia jail to await trial. She tried to commit suicide by slashing her wrists with a wooden knife. Public indignation exploded because the people wanted her to face trial and execution by the garrote. Prison authorities made it known in the press that measures had been taken to ensure that Martí would not be able to kill herself.

Martí was never tried for her crimes. She died a year and three months after her arrest at the hands of her prison mates. Her companions killed her by lynching her on one of the prison patios on May 12, 1913. Some believe the inmates were paid by Marti's wealthy clients so the details of her crimes were not revealed in a public trial. However, her death certificate gave uterine cancer as her cause of death. The untimely death robbed authorities of the opportunity to completely expose all of her secrets. She was buried secretly in a common grave in the Cementerio del Sudoeste, situated on the mountain of Montjuïc in Barcelona.

Declarations and testimonies
Martí  was interrogated about the presence of Teresita Guitart in her house and explained that she had found the girl, lost and hungry, the day before in the Ronda de Sant Pau. Claudia Elías denied this because she had seen the girl in her flat several days before the arrest.

Martí was also questioned about the presence of bones, human remains, creams, potions, poultices, ointments, blood bottles, as well as the boning knife. Interrogators asked if she had subjected the bones to be burned or cooked, as forensics suggested. Martí claimed that she studied human anatomy, but under pressure from the interrogators she confessed that she was a healer and used children as raw material for the production of her remedies. She claimed to be an expert, and knew how to make the best remedies and preparations that were highly sought after by wealthy people of good social position.

During interrogation she disclosed the locations of her other flats (carrer Tallers, carrer Picalqués, Jocs Florals and her home in Sant Feliu de Llobregat), and told investigators where to look inside them. She was already known for, and confessed to, her services as a procurer for pedophiles, but out of anger at the fate that awaited her, did not name a single customer.

Investigators knew of the existence of the little boy known as "Pepito" from the testimony of Angelita and Claudia Elias. Martí claimed Pepito had been entrusted to her by a family that could not care for him. When asked for his whereabouts, she said that he had gone to the country because he had become ill, the same excuse she had used with her inquiring neighbor, Claudia Elías. Overwhelming evidence, and Angelita's testimony shattered this excuse. She was unable to refute bloody clothes in a sack, the knife, and some remnants of fresh fat, blood, and bones. These remains were those of Pepito. Nor could she identify the family that had entrusted her with the child, making it clear that the boy was another kidnapped child.

An Aragonese woman from Alcañiz recognized her as the kidnapper of her infant son, some six years earlier, in 1906. Martí displayed an extraordinary kindness to the exhausted and hungry woman after a very long journey from their land and was allowed to hold the child. Using an excuse, she moved away from the mother then disappeared. The unfortunate mother never found her son nor came to know what she did with him. It is suspected that she used the baby to manufacture her remedies.

Martí confessed that she had prostituted a girl of seventeen years in a brothel on carrer Sabadell, and had also performed abortions, but she never confessed to killing anyone.

Counter theories
For his book Barcelona 1912 (published 2014), Barcelona writer Jordi Corominas conducted an exhaustive investigation into the life of Enriqueta Martí. Reviewing the journalistic chronicles that were published at the time, he warned that many articles were based on the rough information that was available in the first days, but there was no subsequent investigative follow-ups. In the opinion of Corominas, Martí was in fact a woman devastated by the death of a child,  barely ten months old, from malnutrition. In the words of Corominas: "Distressed by that situation, she kidnapped Tereseta." Maybe to find a company for Angeleta, the other girl she cared for, in the flat she shared with her grandfather. She did not have an analytical or criminal mind. Today, she would have received psychiatric care."

The facet of Enriqueta Martí as serial killer would be, for Corominas, part of an unfounded black legend to cover cases of sexual scandals involving minors by the upper classes of society and the kidnapping of children for the cure of conditions afflicting the upper classes of the time. in his words: "Enriqueta was not a murderer but rather a paradigm of a poor and desperate Barcelona that was not the one that used to go out in the media ... Many of those who came back to explain the case just read the reviews of those first days, but they stopped investigating the last traces of the story." In his book, Corominas explains that the remains of blood found in her house belonged to Enriqueta, who suffered from cancer of the uterus that caused her vaginal haemorrhages. On the other hand, the skeletal remains found were not shown to be of recently murdered children, according to Corominas they were probably extracted from some cemetery and used as magical amulets, and others were animals used for cooking, chicken and pork bones. He also considers that the existence of the "ointments" with which Enriqueta sold as medicinal remedies were not proof.

Historian Elsa Plaza spent seven years studying the case of Enriqueta Martí and has written a book, El Cielo Bajo Los Pies (The Sky Underfoot), which brings to light information about the woman herself. Plaza explains that since 1912 Barcelona has referred to Martí as a serial killer though: "Enriqueta was never formally charged with murder nor was any corpse of a child found in her home." She often went begging with other women's children because there was a network of women who helped each other. It was eventually shown that Angelita was truly her niece by her estranged husband's sister, María Pujaló. Martí's story has generally been told by men. Nobody thought that blood found in her flat could belong to Martí herself; she was shown to be dying of uterine cancer and often bled heavily. Most newspapers at the time claimed Martí was the woman who had kidnapped about 40 children from the Fifth District. When the bones found in one of Martí's houses (in carrer Picalquers) were determined to be from multiple animals instead of from children, the assembled journalists almost attacked the doctor who made the announcement. Martí's case was fodder for nascent tabloid journalism; she became the ideal scapegoat to blame for the missing children.

Shortly before Martí's arrest, police had closed a brothel in carrer Botella that prostituted children. The fine for raping a boy or a girl was fifty pesetas; a worker earned four pesetas a day. The owner was apprehended, but not the customers. In addition, Barcelona was a major producer and exporter of pornography, exporting films and pictures to the rest of Europe and to the Americas.

Plaza explains that the entire trial was staged: "They wanted to cover the misery and exploitation. The point of all was the discovery of a child brothel in carrer Botella. It is true that children disappeared. Some were sent to France, where they were exploited in glass factories outside Paris", she explains. The stolen (or sold by their parents to ease economic hardship) children were useful for: begging, illegal adoptions, child abuse, or exploitation in factories where the hard work was crippling. "We can suspect that some girls were victims of international trafficking for prostitution. Here there are not many papers on the subject, but there are in Latin America. Girls were sent to New York, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. In 1903, the board against white slavery was created and chaired by the Infanta Isabel," Plaza notes. When Enriqueta Martí died at dawn May 13, 1913, she was attended by two inmates who asked if they could attend to the body.

Works about Enriqueta Martí

Literature
 Los diarios de Enriqueta Martí by Pierrot is a novel that centers on a few supposed diaries that Enriqueta Martí wrote before beginning her murderous career. Illustrated by the author.
 El misterio de la calle Poniente is a novel by Fernando Gómez. In February, 1912 the disappearance of a three-year-old girl shocked Barcelona. The investigation and, later discoveries, revealed to the public a series of macabre murders that shook a city that was recovering from the Tragic Week. The book details many prominent figures who helped to shape the story; individuals of flesh and blood, many of them incapable of being the protagonists of their own story. They converge to outline faithfully the authentic face of the merciless Enriqueta Martí, who begs by day, dresses as a marquise by night, and knows the power from the darkest side. The fresh blood is her valued goods, the children her suppliers, and a sick middle class her clients.
 El Cielo Bajo los Pies is a non-fiction book by Elsa Plaza. In a case that shocked Barcelona in 1912. Enriqueta Martí, called by the derisive names "The Vampiress of Barcelona" and "The Bad Woman", was besieged by all kinds of rumors from the moment police arrested her, accusing her of making children disappear with the most aberrant intentions, from turning them into objects of pleasure for the wealthy, to making cosmetics and salves to prolong life. Martí is presented as a likely scapegoat and a number of destitute families are accused of selling their children, albeit out of economic desperation.
 Barcelona Shadows, a novel by Marc Pastor. "Pastor's humble but effective storytelling innovation is to have Death narrate the story…  It sounds gimmicky, but in Pastor's able hands (neatly translated by Mara Faye Lethem) it adds a fateful dimension… Pastor is also skilled at creating brief, crisp scenes that get into the minds not only of his detective but of two captive little girls, and other characters as well. He's grittily insightful into the psychology of a city under stress… [a] dark, fast-moving tale." — Blogcritics
 La vampira del carrer ponent o els misteris de Barcelona by Josep Arias Velasco.

Theatre
 La Vampira del Raval (The Vampire of the Raval) a 2013 musical by Albert Guinovart won the Max Awards for the Performing Arts (Los Premios Max de las Artes Escénicas, Spanish) for his musical score of this piece.

Films
 In the Spanish film "Diamond Flash" (2011), directed by Carlos Vermut, the character of Enriqueta is inspired by Enriqueta Martí. In the film, Enriqueta controls an organization that is dedicated to the kidnapping of children.
 "The Barcelona Vampiress" or "La vampira de Barcelona" (2020), directed by Lluís Danés. In early 20th century Barcelona, little Teresa goes missing shocking the country. When police start investigating Enriqueta Martí, the "Vampiress of Raval", they cover a much more sinister affair.

Television
 In episodes 20 and 35 of the first season of Cuarto Milenio, broadcast in 2006, the theme of the so-called vampiresa was discussed.
 The figure was characterized in the Spanish TV series El ministerio del tiempo (episode Separadas por el tiempo played by Maria Rodriguez) as a former servant of one of the protagonists who was dismissed for theft and inadvertently discovers through time travel that she will become a serial killer who exploits children, and tries to avoid her destiny by escaping into other periods in history. Eventually, her younger self offers to not change history any more than she already has and agrees to become the woman history says she was  on condition that she be allowed to die a more painless death than what was previously described in jail

See also
List of serial killers by country
List of serial killers by number of victims

References

Bibliography

External links
enriquetamarti.wordpress.com. Blog in Catalan with photos and press articles.

1868 births
1912 deaths
Burials at Montjuïc Cemetery
Child prostitution
Child sexual abuse in Spain
People from Sant Feliu de Llobregat
People murdered in Spain
Prisoners murdered in custody
Prisoners who died in Spanish detention
Serial killers murdered in prison custody
Spanish brothel owners and madams
Spanish female serial killers
Spanish murder victims
Spanish murderers of children
Spanish people who died in prison custody
Spanish pimps
Spanish prostitutes

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


HMS CATTISTOCK, a member of the 'Hunt' Class minehunters was seen back on the Clyde this morning. Attached to the Second Mine Counter Measures Squadron, she is based at Portsmouth where she has recently undergone maintenance. Following a period of sea training, she is shortly due to be deployed to the Northern Arabian Gulf.
I hear that there is going to be a number of navy ships visiting Faslane this weekend,have you heard anything yourself?
Five minesweepers of the NATO Mine Countermeasures Force are due on Saturday, with HMS ROEBUCK for support.
I posted these movements on the AIS Liverpool site.


text:
Young Children Are More Generous When Others Are Aware of Their Actions
Kristin L. Leimgruber ,
* E-mail: Kristin.Leimgruber@yale.edu
Affiliation Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Alex Shaw,
Laurie R. Santos,
Kristina R. Olson
Kristin L. Leimgruber,
Kristin L. Leimgruber Alex Shaw Laurie R. Santos Kristina R. Olson
Adults frequently employ reputation-enhancing strategies when engaging in prosocial acts, behaving more generously when their actions are likely to be witnessed by others and even more so when the extent of their generosity is made public. This study examined the developmental origins of sensitivity to cues associated with reputationally motivated prosociality by presenting five-year-olds with the option to provide one or four stickers to a familiar peer recipient at no cost to themselves. We systematically manipulated the recipient's knowledge of the actor's choices in two different ways: (1) occluding the recipient's view of both the actor and the allocation options and (2) presenting allocations in opaque containers whose contents were visible only to the actor. Children were consistently generous only when the recipient was fully aware of the donation options; in all cases in which the recipient was not aware of the donation options, children were strikingly ungenerous. These results demonstrate that five-year-olds exhibit "strategic prosociality," behaving differentially generous as a function of the amount of information available to the recipient about their actions. These findings suggest that long before they develop a rich understanding of the social significance of reputation or are conscious of complex strategic reasoning, children behave more generously when the details of their prosocial actions are available to others.
Citation: Leimgruber KL, Shaw A, Santos LR, Olson KR (2012) Young Children Are More Generous When Others Are Aware of Their Actions. PLoS ONE 7(10): e48292. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048292
Editor: James Kilner, University College London, United Kingdom
Received: March 5, 2012; Accepted: September 28, 2012; Published: October 31, 2012
Copyright: © 2012 Leimgruber et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was supported in part by a grant from the University of Chicago's ARETE Initiative/A New Science of Virtue Program (#39174-13) and Yale University. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. No additional external funding was received for this study.
Human adults are unique in that they perform what appears to be an inordinate amount of generous behavior [1]–[4]; even more remarkably, empirical evidence indicates that hints of these prosocial tendencies are present even early in development. Research shows that infants as young as eight months of age willingly share toys with family members, peers, and complete strangers [5]–[7]. At 14 months of age, children will help an adult experimenter complete a goal [8] and will even take a cost to help others by the time they are 20 months of age [9]. Finally, between the ages of two and four, children begin to share resources with others voluntarily [10], even when those resources are easily monopolizable [11]–[12].
Why do children show prosocial behavior from such an early age? To date, prosocial behavior in children has primarily been explained in terms of intrinsic motivations such as empathy, other-regarding preferences, or a desire for fair outcomes (e.g., [8], [10], [13]–[21]). Under this view, children want to help others because they are motivated by that person's need (see review: [22]). Other psychologists have suggested that prosocial behavior in infants and young children may also be driven by other motivations, such as wanting to prove oneself to be a useful and cooperative in-group member–i.e. wanting to present oneself favorably to others [23]. While a good deal of research has been done to investigate the role of intrinsic motivations on prosocial behavior in children, much less has been done to address the latter- what role, if any, do self-presentational motivations play in encouraging prosocial actions in young children? Unfortunately, because much of the research on prosocial behavior has been conducted using methods where a beneficiary and/or parent is present and aware of the child's actions (e.g., [21], [24]), previous work cannot determine what role, if any, concerns with self-presentation may play in guiding this behavior.
To answer this question, it may be helpful to look at the factors associated with self-presentational motivations and prosocial behavior in adults in an effort to track the developmental trajectory of these tendencies. Recent research suggests that, at least for adults, prosocial actions stem in part from an implicit evolutionarily selfish motivation–to promote one's reputation [25]–[31]. For the purposes of this paper, reputation is defined as information-based inferences about an agent's character that may serve to inform others of the general nature of his/her possible actions in the future, thus leading to possible future reciprocation or punishment. This is reputation in its most basic instantiation, and research suggests that even young infants respond differently to agents who have good and bad reputations [32]–[33]. Although they may not be aware of it, adults appear to be selective about the situations in which they choose to act prosocially. Specifically, adults often maximize their performance of generous acts in situations in which there is an audience present to witness their actions [34]–[43].
Although the presence of an audience clearly affects people's decisions about when to act prosocially, it is not clear that adults realize the extent to which audiences influence their behavior. Indeed, research suggests that people's prosocial tendencies are impacted by audience cues that are even incidentally presented. Merely exposing people to eyespots or other subtle audience cues can increase prosociality in adults [44]–[47] (but see also [48]–[50]), even though people may not consciously realize their behavior is being influenced by these cues. The tendency to act more prosocially in the presence of subtle environmental cues that could possibly be perceived as an audience suggests that our reputational motivations may draw on the simplest and most evolutionarily old of cognitive mechanisms [51]. Indeed, these sorts of audience-dependent changes in behavior have been observed in other less cognitively-sophisticated species ranging from cleaner wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus) [52] to brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) [53]. Overall, such cues– which we will refer to here as audience cues– appear to be extremely important in determining the extent of people's prosocial behavior across a number of situations, although it is not clear that people are consciously considering their reputations in cases in which they are affected by these cues.
In addition to being sensitive to whether an audience is present, adults' generosity also seems to be affected by a second set of cues: those related to the amount of information other parties have regarding the presence, absence, or degree of a prosocial action [54]. For example, consider a case in which a man is deciding how much to give to charity in the presence of an audience that will not know any details about the amount of money given. While the presence of audience cues would likely prompt him to make a donation, his reputation would not be further enhanced by performing an exceedingly generous action because the audience members would not know the full extent of his generosity. What is needed to maximize the impact of his generosity is the presence of a second set of reputationally relevant cues–which we will refer to as transparency cues– signals that indicate that people know which kind of action has occurred. As with audience cues, there is much work suggesting that adults are more generous when the specifics of their generosity are made available to others [35], [55]. For example, Andreoni and Petrie found a strong positive relationship between the amount of information made public about donor activity and the amount of money that was actually donated [35]. Conversely, in situations where recipients of generosity have limited information regarding the extent of an individual's donation, people often behave in surprisingly ungenerous ways [56], [57]. Specifically, when the recipient of a donation is unaware of the details surrounding a possible act of generosity, people tend to act in ways that best serve their personal interest rather than that of the recipient. As in the case of audience cues, it is not clear that people are consciously thinking about reputation and intentionally changing their level of generosity in the face of transparency cues. Instead, people likely respond to transparency cues implicitly, using cognitive mechanisms developed over evolutionary time for the purpose of maximizing reputation.
Although there is reason to suspect that audience cues are conceptually distinct from transparency cues, both types of cues are often inextricably linked in real world situations. Indeed, the presence of transparency cues in non-experimental situations is often contingent on the fact that there is an audience likely to become aware of one's actions. However, it should be noted that the two sets of cues are in no way mutually exclusive. As noted above, people are sensitive to audience cues (eyespots) in the absence of any true agents gathering information [46]. Additionally, even in the absence of any audience cues (when making a decision in a room by oneself) people are sensitive to whether other agents will be able to discover an ungenerous act [56].
Given that adults clearly modify their behavior in response to both audience and transparency cues, is it possible that young children do the same? Existing developmental literature suggests that children's behavior more generally is influenced by the presence or opinions of others (see [58] for review). For example, around age three, children begin to engage in deceptive behavior (e.g., lying) to spare the feelings of others [59]–[63] and to cover their own indiscretions [64]–[68]. By the time children reach the age of five, they are able to understand the ways in which second-hand information like gossip can influence reputation [69]. Interestingly, it is not until later that children explicitly understand why people would want to present themselves to others in a specific way [70], are able to infer audience preferences on their own [71]–[73], and start to become skeptical about other people's self-serving presentation biases [74]–[76]. Indeed, it is not until eight years of age that children begin to fully understand that other people may have self-presentational motives that affect the way they behave in the presence of others [77]. Overall, this pattern suggests that young children are sensitive to the opinions of others and modify their behavior accordingly long before they begin to grasp the concept of active reputation-management. As a result, it is possible that children's own prosocial behavior may also be sensitive to audience and transparency cues years before they possess explicit knowledge of the social function of, and possibility for, strategic reputation management in others.
While evidence strongly suggests that children's behavior is generally influenced by a desire to make a good impression in the eyes of others (e.g. [58]), no research to date has systematically addressed the role that audience and transparency cues play in mediating children's prosocial tendencies. In fact, previous research looking at children's prosocial tendencies has used a wide variety of methodologies with differing degrees of audience and transparency cues, making it difficult to compare across studies. For example, prosocial testing paradigms in children range from those in which children's actions are anonymous even to experimenters [78], [79] to situations in which both the subject and the recipient of the prosocial act are present and fully aware of one another's actions [80]–[82]. Furthermore, even when audience and transparency cues are experimentally manipulated, they are often confounded with other factors such as the in-group/out-group status of the recipient [12], [83]–[85], making the effects of these cues virtually indistinguishable from other factors. Overall, most authors fail to discuss or account for audience or transparency effects when interpreting levels of prosociality (but see: [86], [87]); as a result, there is still much to learn regarding whether young children's prosocial decisions are sensitive to these cues.
The current study aimed to address this gap in the literature by directly testing the extent to which children's prosocial behavior is affected by audience and transparency cues using a no cost allocation task. We did this by independently manipulating the visibility of the recipient (varying whether the recipient was occluded by a large opaque screen) and the transparency of the allocations to the recipient (presenting the allocations in either opaque containers or transparent containers). We chose to test five-year-olds because previous research has shown that children at this age can successfully represent the goals and beliefs of others (for review see [88]) and thus we knew that children of this age could understand what the recipient knew about different kinds of actions. Our question, then, was whether five year-olds' decisions about whether to be generous would be sensitive to the amount of information available to the recipient. We tested pairs of children who were classmates and, thus, likely to interact with one another in the future. Given the notion that reputational motivations are strongly influenced by the likelihood for future reciprocation or punishment, pairing children with possible future collaborators was the truest way to test for such reputational concerns.
Overall, the logic behind the current study is as follows: if, in fact, prosocial behavior in children is largely intrinsically motivated, our subjects should act generously, regardless of if the recipient is aware of their actions. However, if children's prosocial behavior is sensitive to extrinsic social factors, we should see variation in their allocation decisions relative to the different conditions. Specifically, if children are sensitive to audience cues, then five year-olds should act more generously on the allocation task when the recipient is visible than when the recipient is not. Additionally, if children are sensitive to the transparency of their actions when making prosocial decisions, then they should behave more generously when allocations are presented in transparent containers than when they are presented in opaque containers. Furthermore, if children's prosocial decisions in this task are driven largely by extrinsic social factors, then our participants should act neutrally or even ungenerously when the recipient does not have knowledge about their actions. Overall, by manipulating both the visibility of the recipient as well as the information available to the recipient, we were able to gain insight into the ways in which audience and transparency cues influence children's prosociality as well as the extent to which children's prosociality is impacted by extrinsic factors.
The treatment of participants in studies described in this paper was in accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological Association. Participants' parents provided written informed consent and all procedures were approved by the Human Research Protection Program at Yale University.
We divided our participants into two separate roles: actors (who determined the allocations distributed) and recipients (who simply received the chosen allocations). Actors were 32 (16 female and 16 male, M = 64.88 months; SD = 3.09) five year-old children from preschools in the New England area; each actor was paired with another child (18 female and 14 male, M = 64.59 months, SD = 7.83), who was designated the recipient. In total, 16 actors participated in the visible condition (9 female and 7 male, M = 64.37 months, SD = 2.51) and 16 actors participated in the occluded condition (7 female and 9 male, M = 65.40 months, SD = 3.59). During the course of the experiment, the actor made all decisions regarding allocations, while the recipient merely watched and collected whatever resources the actor gave to her. Each child participated in only one session and the children never switched roles (i.e. the recipient never became the actor); both children were made aware of the fact that they would never switch roles, thus eliminating possible confounds associated with concerns about direct reciprocity within the experiment. Interaction between the participants was limited as they were instructed not to talk to one another. All children were paired with individuals from the same classroom and, therefore, were familiar with one another prior to testing.
Materials and Procedure
We constructed a testing apparatus that allowed the actor to choose between two allocation distributions; each distribution included an allocation for the actor and an allocation for the recipient (see Figure 1). In designing our apparatus, we took into consideration other devices that had previously been successful in testing children's allocation decisions (e.g., [10], [89]). During test sessions, the apparatus was situated on a table between the actor and the recipient. The apparatus had two bars on its front that corresponded to the two distributions that sat in wells on the top of the apparatus. The actor always sat on the side with the bars while the recipient sat on the other side of the apparatus, directly across from the actor. By pulling the bar on her left, the actor could simultaneously distribute the left-side allocation distribution to herself and the recipient, with each child receiving the allocation directly in front of her. Conversely by pulling the bar on the right, the actor could deliver the right-side distribution. After allocations were delivered, both children placed their allocations, with assistance from the experimenters, in separate opaque cloth bags before the beginning of the next trial.
Figure 1. A view of the experimental set-up taken from the actor's side of the apparatus.
The actor was able to pull one of the two bars in order to deliver the allocations displayed on the top of the apparatus. Trial pictured is in the visible condition with opaque containers.
Both individuals were trained on the mechanics of the apparatus using differently colored "bouncy balls" and their understanding of the apparatus was confirmed through probe questions (e.g. "Pull the bar that gives the other girl a purple ball"; "What color ball will you get if you pull the left side?"). Overall, children seemed to find the apparatus quite intuitive and learned how to operate it almost immediately upon interacting with it. Testing commenced once both participants demonstrated an understanding of the outcomes associated with both sides of the apparatus; the training usually lasted about five minutes.
Allocations were distributed inside of plastic containers that were either opaque plastic or transparent plastic. When the containers were opaque, the allocations inside could not be seen, but when the containers were transparent the contents were visible. Children received different numbers of small stickers (either one sticker or four stickers) as allocations, and were told that each sticker was worth a point that they could cash in at the end of the test for a final grand prize. The grand prize for all participants was a large sticker of their choice; this served to eliminate possible social repercussions associated with one child getting an obviously superior prize than the other once they returned to class.
Each test session consisted of 16 trials. Two experimenters ran each session. The first experimenter presented the allocation options to the actor while the second experimenter sat next to the recipient and ensured that she paid attention throughout the session. During each trial, the first experimenter presented each container individually by showing the actor the contents and then allowing her to track the placement of the container in one of the four wells on top of the apparatus. The experimenter presented opaque containers in such a way that the actor, but not the recipient, could see the contents. Once the actor was aware of the container's contents, the experimenter closed the container and placed it in the appropriate location. The order in which the containers were presented was randomized. Once all the containers were in place, the actor had a chance to pull one of the two bars in order to deliver either the left or right distribution. As soon as the actor committed to a distribution and pulled a bar, the experimenter removed the remaining two containers to eliminate additional pulling. Each test session consisted of eight trials using the opaque containers and eight trials using the transparent containers; blocks of opaque/transparent containers were broken up into alternating groups of four trials. Subjects were assigned to one of six different counterbalanced distribution orders.
To ensure that the actor's choices were motivated by the recipient's allocation and not their own, the actor's allocation was constant within trials; actors always received the same number of stickers regardless of which distribution they chose. Research shows that young children often tend to act in ways that maximize their own self-interest when presented with sharing tasks in which they stand to gain from not acting prosocially [12], [83], [90]. For this reason we opted for a straightforward allocation task in which the actor's own allocation options were equal within each trial.
While the allocation options for the actor were kept constant within trials, the allocation options for the recipient were varied. Each trial consisted of one of four different conditions, with each kind of trial presented four times during the test session (twice in opaque containers and twice in transparent containers). For simplicity, distributions will be denoted as a pair, with the actor's allocation denoted first and the recipient's allocation second. For example, if the actor chose a distribution in which she got one sticker and the recipient got four stickers, this will be represented as (1,4).
Precautions were taken to eliminate social cueing from the recipient, assure that the actor's choices could not be seen in the relevant conditions, and minimize the possibility for conflict or punishment once the children returned to the classroom. First, participants were told the experiment was a "quiet game" and asked not to communicate with one another during the duration of the test session; this eliminated any verbal and non-verbal cuing that took place and freed the actor from having to answer questions about her allocation choices. Second, both children were asked to place their allocations into separate, opaque cloth bags after each trial to minimize distractions and also to reduce the ability of the recipient to directly compare her own allocation to the one received by the actor. At the end of the test session, children were taken to opposite ends of the testing room with different experimenters to count their stickers. All participants were told they had "just enough sticker points to get a big sticker," which removed any evidence of inequity that may have occurred during the experiment. Taken together, these precautions reduced extraneous social factors that may have caused the actor to behave in a more prosocial manner for reasons other than those for which we were testing.
Finally, to examine the influence of audience cues on allocation decisions, we varied the visibility of the recipient between subjects. Half of our actors were tested in a visible condition, in which the actor and recipient were able to maintain visual contact throughout the test session. The other half of actors were tested in an occluded condition, in which a large, opaque piece of foam-board was placed into the apparatus on the end closest to the recipient, eliminating the recipient's visual access to the actor and the allocation options for the duration of the test session.
Each test session consisted of eight critical trials and eight non-critical trials that were presented in a counterbalanced order; as a result, there is no reason to believe that participation in non-critical trials influenced children's behavior in critical trials. Critical trials were the focus of data analysis, as they were the only trials in which the actor had a choice between a more and less generous allocation for the recipient. Non-critical trials were included in test sessions to ensure that the recipient received a mix of one and four sticker allocations, and therefore, was less able to deduce what the actor's options had been on any given trial.
Critical trials were comprised of two types of choices: High Value Choice trials and Low Value Choice trials. In High Value Choice trials, the actor received a high-value allocation (four stickers) for herself and chose between an allocation of four stickers (4,4) or one sticker (4,1) for the recipient; the (4,4) distribution was the prosocial (more generous) choice. The actor received two High Value Choice trials in opaque containers and two high value choice trials in transparent containers over the course of the test session. In Low Value Choice trials, the actor received a low-value allocation (1 sticker) for herself and chose between an allocation of four stickers (1,4) or one sticker (1,1) for the recipient; the (1,4) distribution was the prosocial (more generous) choice. The actor received two Low Value Choice trials in opaque containers and two low value choice trials in transparent containers over the course of the test session.
Non-critical trials were also comprised of two different types of choices: All Equal trials and Unequal Identical trials. In All Equal trials, both the actor and recipient received the same allocation and that allocation was equal; the actor had the choice between distributions of either (1,1) vs. (1,1) or (4,4) vs. (4,4). The actor received one (1,1) trial and one (4,4) trial in opaque containers and one (1,1) trial and one (4,4) trial in transparent containers over the course of the test session. In Unequal Identical trials, the actor received either one sticker or four stickers and the recipient received the oppositely valued allocation. Specifically, the actor always received one sticker while the recipient always received four stickers, (1,4) vs. (1,4), or vice versa (4,1) vs. (4,1). The actor received one (1,4) trial and one (4,1) trial in opaque containers and one (1,4) trial and one (4,1) trial in transparent containers over the course of the test session.
Preliminary tests showed no significant effects for or interactions with gender so the authors collapsed across these groups for the remainder of the analyses; all ps>.10. Within each test session, the actor had eight critical trials: four were high-value choices (two trials in transparent containers, two trials in opaque containers) and four were low-value choices (two trials in transparent containers, two trials in opaque containers). We were interested in how often the actor chose the prosocial option (four stickers) over the antisocial option (one sticker).
A mixed-model repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with visibility (recipient visible, recipient occluded) as a between-subjects factor and actor's personal allocation (one sticker, four stickers) and container opacity (transparent, opaque) as within-subjects factors (Figure 2). We found a main effect of recipient visibility, indicating that actors were more prosocial when the recipient was visible (M = 48%) than when the recipient was occluded from view (M = 22%), F(1, 30) = 15.32, p<.001, suggesting that the lack of a visible audience led to more ungenerous behavior in this task. In addition, we observed a main effect of opacity; actors were significantly more ungenerous when allocations were presented in opaque containers (M = 22%), than when they were presented in transparent containers (M = 48%), F(1,30) = 18.77, p<.001, suggesting that the amount of information available to the recipient regarding the allocation options also played a role in children's allocation decisions. Lastly, the main effect of the actor's own allocation value shows no overall significant difference in prosocial behavior regardless of whether the actor received four stickers (M = 38%) or one sticker (M = 33%), F(1,30) = 0.72, p = .402.
Figure 2. Main Findings.
Mean proportion of prosocial giving (distributing four stickers rather than one sticker to the recipient) by visibility (visible versus occluded), container opacity (opaque versus transparent), and actor's allocation value (one sticker versus four stickers).
Furthermore, the interaction between actor-recipient visibility and container opacity was nearing significance, F(1,30) = 3.18, p = .085. Paired t-tests indicate that children in visible condition were more generous when the containers were transparent (M = 67%) than when the containers were opaque (M = 30%), t(1,15) = 3.77, p = .002. Similarly, children in the occluded condition were more generous when the containers were transparent (M = 30%) than when they were opaque (M = 14%), t(1,15) = 2.18, p = .046.
We next examined whether allocations in each of these four primary conditions differed from chance using one-sample t-tests. Actors distributed allocations more generously than would be expected by chance (50%) on trials in which the recipient was visible and the allocations were presented in clear containers (M = 67%), t(1,15) = 2.20, p = .044. In contrast, actors selected ungenerous options more often than expected by chance (50%) when the recipient was visible and allocations were in opaque containers (M = 30%), t(1,15) = 3.11, p = .007, when the recipient was occluded from view but allocations were in transparent containers (M = 30%), t(1,15) = 3.11, p = .007, and when the recipient was occluded from view and allocations were opaque containers (M = 14%), t(1,15) = 7.90, p<.001.
No interactions involving the actor's personal allocation (1 vs. 4 stickers) approached significance, all ps>.30. However, for exploratory purposes, supplemental one-sample t-tests were performed to examine whether children were systematically more or less generous than chance in each of the eight critical trial types. In the most open condition- the case where the containers were transparent and the recipient was visible- actors were more likely than chance to provide four stickers (the generous option) to the recipient when they received four stickers themselves (M = 72%), t(15) = 2.41, p = .029, but not when they received only one sticker (M = 63%), t(15) = 1.29, p = .216. In contrast, when the recipient was visible but allocations were presented in opaque containers (and, thus, hidden from the recipient's view) actors were significantly more likely to give only one sticker (the ungenerous option); this was true regardless of whether the actor received four stickers (M = 31%), t(15) = 3.00, p = .009, or one sticker (M = 28%), t(15) = 2.41, p = .029, themselves.
When visibility between the actor and the recipient was occluded and, thus, the recipient could not see either the actor or the allocation distributions, overall rates of generosity were very low. When allocations were presented in transparent containers, actors were significantly more likely than chance to distribute one sticker to the recipient when they received one sticker (M = 25%), t(15) = 2.74, p = .015, but not when they received four stickers, (M = 34%), t(15) = 1.78, p = .096, themselves. Additionally, when visibility between the actor and the recipient was occluded and allocations were presented in opaque containers, rates of giving four stickers were the lowest (and therefore rates of giving one sticker were the highest) and therefore most different from chance; this was true when actors received four stickers (M = 13%), t(15) = 6.71, p<.001, or one sticker (M = 16%), t(15) = 4.57, p<.001, themselves. Finally, the fact that children behaved in patterns that differed significantly from chance for all but one of these conditions suggests that confusion about the experimental paradigm and the apparatus can be ruled out as possible explanations for our pattern of results.
The present results provide evidence that five-year-old children's generosity is heavily influenced both by the presence of a visible audience and by the transparency of their actions. Although our participants donated allocations generously when the recipient was visible and the allocation options were transparent, children became systematically less generous if one or both of these factors were absent. Overall, actors were consistently more generous when the recipient was visible than when she was occluded from view, suggesting the important role audience cues play in children's prosocial behavior. However, even when actors could see the recipient, children were systematically less generous when the allocations were presented in opaque containers than when the allocations were presented in transparent containers, that is, when the recipient was unaware of the actor's allocation options. This suggests that children's prosocial decisions are indeed motived by extrinsic factors and that the transparency of their actions strongly influences decisions regarding when to act prosocially, even in the presence of an audience.
One striking aspect of our results is that children were considerably ungenerous in our task. Indeed, children only showed consistently prosocial behavior in our study in the condition when they could see the recipient and their allocations were fully visible; in all other conditions, children were statistically ungenerous, giving the recipient the smaller amount of stickers. It is worth noting that this level of prosociality is lower than what one might have initially expected based on previous developmental work testing children's sharing and allocation of resources, (e.g., [78], [79], [83]–[85], [87], [91]). Such previous work has generally reported that children behave rather generously, however it is hard to decipher the role that audience and transparency cues may have played in previous studies. As such, previous studies that observe high levels of generosity may have inadvertently included the same audience and transparency cues that we observe contribute to high rates of prosociality. Therefore, it is difficult to make direct comparisons between levels of generosity observed in our study and those reported in previous research. However, given the strong influence audience and transparency effects had on prosocial behavior in our study, it is our hope that researchers will take these factors into account much more often when designing studies examining prosocial behavior in the future.
One additional explanation for the low rates of giving we observed in our study is that children may have been unintentionally primed to think of our experiment as a competition. When describing our study to children, we referred to our allocation task as a "game" and told children that they could use their accrued stickers as tokens to get a prize. Thinking about our task as a game in which tokens were going toward a prize may have put children in a competitive mindset, thus making them want to try to accrue more tokens than the recipient. Indeed, even adults will work harder for a prize in cases where they stand to get relatively more tokens, even if (as in our task) the tokens cannot be kept and are used to get a pre-determined prize [92]. We also know from previous work that being placed in a competitive mindset causes children to place a larger value on getting more than others (see for example, [93]). It is possible, then, that children behaved more ungenerously on our task because they thought the game was a competitive one.
The potential for children to have construed our task in a competitive framework highlights another potential framing of our results. We initially interpreted our findings as showing evidence that children exhibit more generosity when transparency and audience cues are present. However, our results are also consistent with the possibility that transparency and audience cues work the opposite way– rather than increasing children's generosity, such cues might instead inhibit children's ungenerous behavior.
Under either framing of the results, the upshot is the same: children modify their behavior in response to the presence of audience and transparency cues. When audience and transparency cues were present, children were substantially more willing to give resources to another recipient. Competitive motives may have reduced children's overall rates of generosity in our study, but children restricted these competitive impulses in cases where the recipient could see them and when the recipient would know if she was given less. We further found that both the presence of an audience and transparency cues independently influenced children's behavior. Based only on the present results, it is difficult to know whether children acted more generously in the presence of audience and transparency cues, or whether they inhibited their ungenerous tendencies in the presence of such cues.
Our results also leave open the question of why children exhibit more generous behavior in the presence of audience and transparency cues. One possibility is that children behave more generously because seeing the recipient allows them to have more empathy for that individual [44], [45]. Another possibility is that children dislike experiencing a negative response when the recipient receives bad payoffs [94]; under this view, children would be more generous when they can see the recipient because they are trying to avoid feeling bad because they have had to witness another individual's negative reactions. However, the fact that children in our study acted ungenerously even when they could see the recipient's reaction when allocations were presented in opaque containers suggests that neither of these explanations can account entirely for our results. Given that we cannot unequivocally rule out either of these possible explanations, further research is needed to fully elucidate the mechanisms by which audience and transparency cues affect children's generosity.
Overall, our results illustrate that children's prosocial decisions are sensitive to both audience and transparency cues years before children seem to have an explicit understanding of the concept of reputation (for a review see [58]), and that prosocial motivations in young children are not influenced solely by intrinsic motivations. While existing evidence shows that children do not begin to understand self-promotional reputation enhancement until around eight years of age [71], [72], [77], our findings reveal that children as young as five years of age behave in ways consistent with adult patterns of prosociality in response to audience and transparency cues. As a result, our findings suggest that the sensitivity to audience and transparency cues that are thought to be key to reputation enhancing prosociality in adults may have deeper developmental roots than researchers have previously suspected.
The authors would like to thank Nina Slywotzky and Anna Merrill for their help with data collection, and Jane Widness for her help editing the manuscript.
Conceived and designed the experiments: KL AS LRS KRO. Performed the experiments: KL. Analyzed the data: KL KRO. Wrote the paper: KL.
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Prosocial behavior
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Teamwork is better than Individuality, Why is it So?
How can a team render a better quality work efficiently? A team consists of different individuals bearing versatile thoughts. If one lags behind and renders a poor quality task, the other teammate will automatically try and improve it into a better one. But if you are the only person handling all the important works having no associate to guide you through the tough times, you will surely be in some serious mess.
You might end up being in unavoidable predicaments in your workplace when you are working alone. So how can you save yourself from such critical moments? Hiring a team having experts coming from different niche can be your saviour. There might be situations when you cannot handle the work pressure. Here is the need of a team who will hold your back even at the toughest times.
A business sphere automatically attracts a lot of pressure. But it becomes difficult for an entrepreneur to cop-up with all the tasks without taking any help. Can a team be trusted with the task of work management? A great team can excel in the managing your entire official works as the task gets divided between the different members of the group and thus you can obtain the best finished outputs.
Sometimes you end up landing in such a situation when you cannot take the best decision for your company. Then who will guide you in making the appropriate decision? The proficient individuals of your team can help you to find a way out of your trouble. As they are professional, they can perfectly help you in taking the decision that will benefit your company. Thus, teamwork should be always preferred over individuality.
If you still struggling to choose between teamwork and individuality, then refer to the upper mentioned points. So have you now made up your mind for hiring a team?


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Oromia
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By Oromsis
Columbia Protest
Jawar's Corner
About Hamba
Analysis • Ethiopia
Ethiopia will soon have a new prime minister. Here are the candidates.
by OPride Staff
Written by OPride Staff
(OPride) — The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is expected to name a new prime minister early next week. The 180-member EPRDF Council has been meeting since March 20. Five days into the meeting, the party's leaders continue to dance around the Big elephant in the room, according to inside sources. No discussion has apparently taken place on who should lead the party and the country out of the current chaos. No votes have been taken. The dominant Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) keeps coming up with one diversionary agenda after another. And the focus has been on sowing discord, undermining, and destroying key reformist leaders of the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO).
Key issues discussed this week per sources: Whether to expel the MPs who voted against or did not cast vote for the disputed emergency decree; democratic centralism and the loyalty of OPDO to EPRDF's revolutionary democracy program; OPDO's open campaign for the PM position, and how to deal with the ongoing crisis in the country.
So who are the candidates? What are their chances? Here is a slightly edited refresher, originally published on March 4.
The succession battle in Ethiopia is entering its last phase. There are three front-runners: One is Demeke Mekonnen, the current deputy PM and chairman of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). The second candidate is Shiferaw Shigute, who earlier last month replaced Hailemariam as chairman of Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The two will face off against Dr. Abiy Ahmed, the chairman of OPDO.
(ANDM, OPDO, SEPDM and TPLF together makeup the EPRDF coalition, in power since 1991.)
The jostling for control and subtle campaigns are unusual and visible but don't expect a fair and transparent election. In theory, the next leader will be chosen by the 180-member EPRDF Council, made up of 45 members each from the four coalition partners. In reality, the candidate that TPLF's 45 members vote for will eventually be coronated. TPLF is widely expected to sit out the contest. However, earlier this month, citing unnamed sources, a local newspaper reported all the four chairmen of EPRDF parties are in the running for the office of the prime minister. This adds Debretsion Gebremichael to the mix. The scandal-tainted TPLF chief and former deputy PM is one of the hardliners fighting to restore the party's one-time unquestioned hegemony.
Of the four EPRDF member parties' bosses, Debretsion has the least chance of becoming prime minister. In fact, his elevation would not only be blatantly tone-deaf but it would pose an existential threat to the country's future that is no less dire than an outright military coup.
Demeke Mekonnen
Demeke is loathed even within his own party and among the Amhara people. He was widely expected to lose his chairmanship when the party's central committee met last month. But he somehow survived and promises of the premiership by the TPLF may have a lot to do with it. He is part of the executive leadership that was blamed for incompetence and dereliction of duty. Along with Hailemariam, he took responsibility for the current crisis facing the country. He has been a cabinet minister since 2008. Simply put: As the party promises deep reform, Demeke is not a change agent or a reformist by any stretch of the imagination.
Shiferaw Shigute
Shiferaw is the head of the EPRDF Secretariat. Under his watch, the ruling party nearly splintered, corruption, brinkmanship and TPLF's factionalism run rampant and the former is now on the verge of disbanding. Hailemariam, whose six-year tenure was rocked by endless crises, is Shiferaw's comrade and until last month SEPDM's chair. If Shiferaw gets the top post, as it is now rumored, it would very simply be because of his loyalty to the TPLF brass and robber barons fighting to maintain the status quo. But elevating another nominal figure, with no real constituency, would make little logical or strategic sense. He lacks the charisma, oratory and gravitas to inspire confidence, gain popular legitimacy and unify the party, much less kick-starting a national reconciliation. Unlike Hailemariam, Shiferaw doesn't even enjoy the support of his own people—the Sidama, the largest of the close to 60 ethnic groups in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples region. He has long been dogged by charges of corruption.
Dr. Abiy Ahmed
In the eyes of many Ethiopia watchers and the majority Oromo people, Abiy Ahmed is the clear choice to lead the country out of the current abyss. Oromia has been the epicenter of the protest movement. Over the past year, Abiy and his colleagues in the OPDO, particularly the regional president Lemma Megersa —who remains the overwhelming national favorite despite bowing out of the race—have embraced most of the protesters' demands, thereby positioning the party as a champion of political and economic reforms.
Abiy has been accused of character flaws but he could take some of the lessons from Oromia to the federal apparatus. His elevation would also satisfy Oromo's long quest for a political power commensurate with their size and contributions. But Abiy, who two weeks ago emerged as a clear frontrunner, has apparently drawn the ire of TPLF bosses and their military-intelligence complex. His chances now appear in jeopardy.
A dark horse TPLF candidate?
There are other dangers lurking ahead. First, if the recent dramatic "nay" vote in parliament, abstention and the strategic absence of nearly 100 MPs for the parliamentary session is any indication, the EPRDF-controlled parliament is due for yet another showdown—over who should be coronated as the country's next leader and whether that leader would be subordinate to the country's powerful military chief of staff and security head, both hardline Tigrayans.
Even if a TPLF candidate sails through parliament via yet another episode of vote rigging, such a candidate is likely to receive a frosty reception and will remain an ineffective lame duck until the next elections in 2020. A scenario where TPLF elbows through an unpopular dark horse, for example, an OPDO old-guard or an ambitious technocrat with no legitimacy on the streets, does not portend well for EPRDF and more importantly for Ethiopia. In fact, that may well become the last straw which breaks the camel's back and could actually end with EPRDF's dissolution.
Already, TPLF honchos and their cronies — facing an inevitable decline and a creeping realization of their waning influence — are said to be considering a scenario where the federation will be dissolved and key leaders of "Lemma's OPDO," including Abiy, which according to insiders are described by TPLF hardliners as "the party of anarchy," will be purged or jailed. In fact, increasing assertiveness by OPDO has moved so-called TPLF moderates into the fold of hardline elements. TPLF, without any exception and internal dissent, is fully resolved to liquidate the challenge from both the reformist wing of OPDO and the youth protesters that have demanded reform since 2014. That prospect, scary to even contemplate, would end with a bloody civil war. The stakes have never been higher.
Abiy Ahmed ANDM Demeke Mekonnen EPRDF Ethiopia OPDO Shiferaw Shigute TPLF
Kan Maqaadhaaf kaayame tare; Maaltu Itti Aana?
A sequel to Ethiopian journalist Eskinder Nega's inmate letter
OPride Staff
Collaborative stories written or reported by OPride staff and contributors.
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Is the surge in OPDO's popularity in Ethiopia an accident or a generational...
Eerie calm hangs over Ambo a day after security forces killed Oromo protesters
Ethiopia's ruling party, EPRDF, opts for more authoritarianism to tackle...
Ethiopians and Eritreans express elation, hope after historical restoration of...
Ethiopia's embattled PM Hailemariam Desalegn quits. RIP Meles Zenawi
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Ethiopia's state of emergency extended by "popular demand"
The case against WHO director-general candidate Tedros Adhanom
Alem says:
Dear Opride,
One thing about Tigray Front is that it knows no shame.
It won't surprise me if a Tigray Front were to become the new
prime minister. First, let us not make a big deal of the matter.
It is the same Tigray Front masquerading as Eprdf running the show
by bullying, bribing, or blackmailing. Second, this is not a democratic
system whereby the elected has any legitimacy or power
to plan and implement its vision for the country.
The questions we need to ask are the following:
1/ Can the new prime minister chose his own cabinet (and fire
the current set of "special advisers" (all Tigray Front who have
remained in power even though Hailemariam is out)?
2/ Can the new prime minister allocate resources in proportion
to population size (in the order of Oromo, Amhara, Southern States, and Tigray)?
Here is something that I need to underline. Oromo and Amhara qeerroo have to continue with the struggle and not wait in the hope that Tigray Front will change.
Tigray Front will not change, period. As you indicated Tigray Front is using the closed door meeting to intimidate and divide Oromo and Amhara groups. It already has the compliant Southern party in its orbit by swapping the servile Hailemariam for servile Shigute. By leaking info about Demeke as the next prime minister, it is dividing Amhara party. Remember also the Tigrayan Workineh is the dark horse in Oromo party. There you go. Tigray Party will decide who will be the next pm.
Can you believe how shameless Tigray Front is? They publicly state that they are entitled to EQUAL seats in parliament and exec committee (45 of 180; 9 of 36) because they fought the Derg? Hence, to accuse them of looting and killing is taken
as ingratitude. Listen to Sebhat Nega. Sebhat has no portfolio whatsoever but he actually runs foreign affairs. He is director of Peace and Security Institute out of Addis Ababa University; all staff are members of Tigray Front. The so-called Institute
in fact confers PhDs. And recently, a Tigray Front member was installed as president of AAU. Workineh, who can't speak proper English (with a quickie PhD from South Africa) is a housekeeper as Sebhat and his cadres run the show of a nation. Can you believe this is happening in the 21st century Ethiopia?
As I said above, the only recourse is for the struggle to continue. Those abroad should take the role of enabling those on the home front, and NOT try to remote control events. Leadership should come from below. Leadership from above is thoroughly corrupted. Abiy and Lemma are hamstrung from the get-go and any hope of Abiy
becoming effective is ignoring the reality on the ground.
Think about this. Thirteen unarmed and unprotesting citizens are murdered in Moyale. Tigray Front quickly makes a statement that this was by "mistake." Taye, Oromo party member condemns the act and demands investigation. Next thing he is jailed. Think again what a fascist group is in power. Taye should be released immediately and the ruling party apologize. I can go on but you get the point.
Balageru says:
The gangs whose already put us (Ethiopians) in this situations are in a meeting to elect a leader for 100 million people. That is an insult for all of us. Having saying that Demake should face trial for the crimes he had committed against the state and it's people.
Shiferaw Shigute should face trial for ethnic cleansing and hate crime he had committed when he was the president of South against the Amharas.
Dr. Abiy looks a guy of the future and will correct the historical in justice against Oromos & works for all Ethiopians & give the dying beast a life line at least for the next two years 2012 (the next election).
As I understand it, the Ethiopian people are simply tired of the same government ruling 4 some 27 years or so. I'm not good with words, but is the word 'dictatorship? May be so. I think, they don't want none of these people mentioned on this article. They just need CHANGE. And that's not something odd or strange to want, that's just NATURAL. Even though very unlikely, or even impossible, but that was what the Ethiopian people deserve from their government at this time.
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After anti-wall website launches on the border, Texas Farm Bureau fires off cease-and-desist letter
A new website created to stir up opposition to President Trump's border wall has already caused one organization to threaten legal action. The website's creators said that means their message is getting heard.
by Julián Aguilar May 21, 2018 5 PM
The border fence sits atop a levee on the periphery of the Lower Rio Grande Valley National Wildlife Refuge in Hidalgo County in February 2017. Callie Richmond for The Texas Tribune
A group of Texans that has opened up a new front in the battle against President Donald Trump's proposed wall on the southern border have already prompted one interest group to threaten legal action, accusing the coalition of misleading people about eminent domain issues.
But the organizers of defendtx.org said they welcomed the response as a sign that their mission — to call out what they say is hypocrisy over the issue of property rights — is gaining steam.
The Texas Farm Bureau on Thursday sent the website's administrators a cease-and-desist letter after it featured a photo of a former farm bureau president and quoted him railing against the government's efforts to seize private land — the quote from former Farm Bureau president Kenneth Dierschke is more than 10 years old and was in response to former Gov. Rick Perry's trans-Texas corridor project.
That proposed $175 billion dollar project aimed to build more than 4,000 miles of toll roads, rail lines and utility lines across the state, but it was never realized after concerns were raised over tolling, funding and land acquisition, among other things.
Bureau spokesman Gene Hall said the likeness and quote were used without permission.
"It was done with reckless disregard of fact, and it had a message pointed at the current governor of Texas," Hall said. "It's an 11-year old quote and it has no meaning of this discussion."
The image and quote was eventually pulled from the website, but defendtx.org's organizers have linked to a blog archive where Dierschke's comments were first reported.
In its letter, the farm bureau gave the website's administrators 10 days to respond in writing. When asked if pulling the bureau information from the site was sufficient, Hall said the letter "speaks for itself."
"We requested a response in writing to remove all references to the out of context quote from former TFB President Kenneth Dierschke from the Defend Texas website and all other uses," he said.
Hall said his organization was watching the border situation closely.
"We're not a single issue organization, and policy developed by members doesn't specifically address the wall," he said. "We are for comprehensive immigration reform that includes a guest-worker program. We are concerned about the eminent domain proceedings and we are going to be watching that closely."
Mariana T. Wright, the executive director of the National Butterfly Center in Mission and a defendtx.org administrator, said words aren't enough.
"Concern without action is useless," she said. "We want a public outcry, we want everyone in a position of public responsibility or authority in Texas to stand up and demand alternative solutions and demand that the federal government deal with comprehensive immigration reform."
Disclosure: The Texas Farm Bureau has been a financial supporter of The Texas Tribune, a nonprofit, nonpartisan news organization that is funded in part by donations from members, foundations and corporate sponsors. Financial supporters play no role in the Tribune's journalism. Find a complete list of them here.
El Paso Border Patrol sector kicks off construction of Trump's wall on border
The Taking: How the federal government abused its power to seize property for a border fence


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The Seviqc Brežice logo was created in the autumn of 1996 by designer Jure Jančič.
The coat of arms of Seviqc Brežice was designed in February 2013. It includes the coats of arms of all historical countries in today's territory of the Republic of Slovenia. With this we wanted to emphasize the national importance of the festival and our ambition to sovereignly represent Slovenia on the international cultural map. The coat of arms of Seviqc Brežice includes nine coats of arms of the countries (from left to right, from top to bottom): Istria, Styria, Gorica (Gorizia, Görz), Trst (Trieste, Triest), Carniola, Slovenska Marka, Zala, Carinthia, Železna. The design of the coat of arms was set by Klemen Ramovš, the individual coats of arms were designed into a common coat of arms of Slovenian historical lands by the herald Aleksander Hribovšek, and finally in connection with the name and the Festival Lady by David Hosta.


Famous quotes by Conan O'Brien - Quoteopia!
I have an abacus at home.
Every comedian dreams of hosting 'The Tonight Show' and, for seven months, I got to. I did it my way, with people I love, and I do not regret a second.
During last night's debate, John Kerry and John Edwards were so friendly to each other some political experts think that they may end up running together. In fact Kerry and Edwards were so friendly, President Bush accused them of planning a gay marriage.


You can now donate to Kawartha Trans Canada Trail online using the CanadaHelps.org website. CanadaHelps is a safe and secure way to donate to the charity of your choosing online. Through CanadaHelps, you decide how much to give, when to give, how often to give, and who gets your personal information.
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The second Saturday of the month at Sally O'Briens in Somerville, MA in the heart of Union Square at 6 PM is a very special time. Tom Hagerty's Big Band performs and the crowd is ready. Originals and Covers fill the air with the dance floor packed and the fans singing along with each tune. The majority are regulars here to see a band that they all know they are so fortunate to see. It's reminiscent of Billy Joels song The Piano Man when the crowd says, "Man, what are you doing here?" Tom Hagerty's Big Band is made up of some really great musicians. It is a joy to watch them master their craft. CATCH THEM. You'll be happy you did.


Dianne Emley is a Los Angeles Times bestselling author and has received critical acclaim for her Detective Nan Vining Novels, Iris Thorne Mysteries, and The Night Visitor, a stand-alone paranormal mystery. She's also published short fiction for anthologies including Literary Pasadena. Her books have been translated into six languages.