text:
06TOKYO1842
Embassy Tokyo
DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/06/06
Tags: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
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P 060752Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8168
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 5539
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8696
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5534
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 6717
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1544
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7725
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9658
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001842
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/06/06
(1) Jiji kokkoku column - contenders to succeed Koizumi voice
protest against Chinese President Hu's remarks
(2) US force realignment following a wild path (Part 3):
Supporters turned into opponents because of the government's lack
of advance consultation
(3) Foreign Minister Aso aims to create economy-oriented country;
Says he is responsible for dissolving income disparity
(4) LDP reacts against New Komeito's initiative in revising the
Basic Education Law; Description of "patriotism" unclear
(5) Light and shadow - Reality of five years of Koizumi politics;
Intergenerational gaps in pension benefits blocking mutual
(6) Use of space: Private sector at moment of truth
(7) Half of 12-member prion panel resigns
ASAHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged)
By Shinya Minamishima; Hideto Fujiwara in Beijing
"I am willing to hold top-level talks if the Japanese leader does
not visit Yasukuni Shrine." This remark by Chinese President Hu
Jintao urging the contenders to succeed Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi not to pay homage to the shrine is causing ripples across
the country. Improving relations with China will be one of the
campaign issues in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
presidential race. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda
has shifted his emphasis to Asia diplomacy. But the so-called
post-Koizumi candidates and other Japanese leaders are assuming a
tougher stand toward China in reaction to that country's repeated
criticism of shrine visits. At one point China appeared to be
avoiding mentioning the Yasukuni issue, so why has it now turned
around?
"It gave me the impression that he has become much more
flexible," Hidenao Nakagawa, chair of the LDP Policy Research
Council, said to an Asahi Shimbun reporter. Saying, "I can
understand his personal feeling," Nakagawa on the surface has
taken Hu's recent remarks as showing a certain level of
understanding toward the prime minister's "private visit to the
shrine."
Assuming Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe will replace Koizumi,
Nakagawa is working hard to pave the way for the successor to
Koizumi to repair relations with China. He therefore wants to
take Hu's remarks as positively as possible, but in his heart he
appears to have mixed feelings.
An aide to Nakagawa argued: "None of the so-called post-Koizumi
candidates can declare, 'I won't visit Yasukuni.' (Hu's) remarks
TOKYO 00001842  002 OF 011
will have the opposite effect. President Hu has made a mistake."
It was not long before the opposite effect emerged. Reacting to
Fu's remarks, Abe told a press conference on April 3: "I can't
accept (President Hu's assertions)." Foreign Minister Aso as well
used strong language in criticizing (China) at a press briefing
yesterday: "(China's) approach is beyond our understanding."
Finance Minister Tanigaki also stated, "It's important for us to
be able to have discussion if a dispute arises. Refusing to meet
is a problem."
How to mend fences with China will be a key campaign issue in the
presidential race. But declaring "I won't visit the shrine" in
response to Hu's statement could be viewed as giving in to
pressure from China. Workable options for improving relations
with China seem limited.
Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai)
Chairman Kakutaro Kitashiro told a press conference yesterday:
"Stopping the shrine visits would become even more difficult once
this turns into a political issue. People would question whether
the person avoided making shrine visits in response to China's
call. I think it is regrettable that President Hu made such
remarks."
One Japanese lawmaker who had been present in the meeting
(between Hu and the heads of seven Japanese groups) explained:
"President Hu would like to somehow improve relations with Japan.
But he is in a situation that requires him to mention (the
Yasukuni issue). I think it is regrettable to see the Japanese
government and influential lawmakers critically comment on his
words."
Main points from President Hu's remarks
China-Japan relations have been faced with a difficult situation
in recent years, which is something I do not want to see. Neither
China nor the Japanese people are responsible for that. The cause
lies with a few Japanese leaders who have repeatedly visited
Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Class-A war criminals. I am ready
to hold top-level talks if Japanese leaders stop visiting the
shine. I regard shrine visits by representatives of the Japanese
government as part of government policy. I can understand
personal feelings, but I hope to see the sentiments of a victim
nation respected.
China intended to highlight friendship but changed its mind after
much debate due to Koizumi's statement just before Hu's speech
"President Hu made clear the Chinese government's stance on
progress in China-Japan relations," the Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Liu Jianchao said at a regular press briefing on
April 4 in referrence to the president's meeting with the heads
of seven Japan-China friendship organizations.
Chinese officials had continued discussions until just before the
meeting about whether to bring up the Yasukuni issue in Hu's
speech.
At the beginning, officials well-versed in relations with Japan
had been drafting Hu's speech in a way to highlight friendship
and exchange but not to mention the Yasukuni issue.
However, the draft encountered a number of objections while being
circulated from the Foreign Ministry to influential officials,
including State Councilor for Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan, with
one official arguing: "The Yasukuni issue can't be avoided, for
it is the major sticking point in China-Japan relations in the
political area. This is a fundamental principle." In addition to
this, Prime Minister Koizumi's remarks made at a press conference
on March 27, in which he said, "I can't understand why they
assert they can't hold high-level talks because of my visits to
Yasukuni Shrine," made it definite that the Yasukuni issue should
be referred to in Hu's speech.
Many working-level Chinese officials knowledgeable about Japanese
public opinion were strongly concerned that a reference to the
Yasukuni issue would incur a backlash from the Japanese side. But
this concern never reached the high-level officials. "Even in
Japan, it would be impossible for junior officials to advise
their seniors," a researcher of Japan-China relations remarked.
The Chinese leadership tried to show its people its willingness
to improve relations with Japan. The Chinese Communist Party's
paper, the People's Daily, reported on the meeting between
President Hu and the heads of seven Japanese groups top on the
front page, giving the headline "Talks wrapped up in friendly
atmosphere."
In the same meeting, Hu also stated, "The Japanese people are not
to be blamed for the worsened China-Japan relations," and "China
hopes they will help China to move forward," in signaling his
message to the Japanese public, but this message became less
noticeable owing to his mention of the Yasukuni issue, some
Chinese officials pointed out regretfully.
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 26) (Abridged)
Foreign Minister Taro Aso toured a US base in Kanagawa Prefecture
on December 16, 2005. The foreign minister later called on Zama
Mayor Katsuji Hoshino at the municipal government office.
When the topic turned to the proposed relocation of the US Army
1st Corps headquarters to Camp Zama straddling Zama and
Sagamihara, Hoshino said, "We will consider it if we can get 1
trillion yen in return." This enormous amount of money reflected
Hoshino's determination to reject the transfer.
Hoshino is a conservative local politician. He often took part in
events to promote friendship between the US base and local
communities. He was regarded as tolerant of the relocation plan.
Camp Zama covers an area of 62 hectares. Of it, only one-seventh
goes into Zama, which has not suffered any visible damage from
the base.
But the city was turned upside down by a US force realignment
interim report that specified the transfer of the US Army 1st
Corps to Camp Zama.
On March 11, over 1,000 residents staged a protest around Camp
Zama. Hoshino became the city's first mayor to lead such a
demonstration, according to the city's liaison division.
Protests stem from local distrust of the way the government has
handled the US force realignment issue. Hoshino had repeatedly
asked the government if a new Army command would be established
at Camp Zama more than a year before the interim report was
produced. In response, the government always said, "We haven't
discussed anything specific." Hoshino was fed up with the
government's response.
"If the government had consulted with local authorities
beforehand, things would not have been tangled to this extent," a
person close to Hoshino said. The government has offered vague
explanations to Zama since Tokyo and Washington produced the
interim report last October.
In stationing Self-Defense Force troops at Camp Zama in 1971,
Zama Town (currently Zama City) and the Yokohama District Defense
Facilities Administration Bureau chief signed a memorandum of
understanding vowing to make maximum efforts to reduce the base.
A local resident curtly said, "The relocation of the 1st Corps
command to Camp Zama runs counter to the MOU." But the government
has simply reiterated, "We will make ardent efforts based on the
spirit of the MOU."
Some city officials have begun indicating that the city should
start thinking of how to settle the issue. But Hoshimo has been
urging the government to present a concrete philosophy and vision
not to make US bases permanent fixtures in Japan.
Zama is not the only municipality that is reacting furiously to
the planned US force realignment, abandoning its receptiveness.
Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, conducted a plebiscite on March 12
in which 43,000 residents -- over 50% of all voters -- said "no"
to the transfer of a carrier-borne aircraft unit from the Atsugi
base to the air station in the city.
Reportedly, local concerns about night landing practice (NLP)
affected voting.
In September 2000, bad weather around Iwojima forced the US Navy
to conduct NLP at the Iwakuni base.
The Iwakuni municipal office received over 140 complaints about
the two days of NLP that produced deafening noise.
The government explained that when the runway is moved 1
kilometer further offshore in fiscal 2008, noise would be reduced
to one-third of the current level, adding that NLP would be
carried out on Iwojima. But local residents are still
apprehensive. Iwakuni City Assemblyman Jungen Tamura said, "If
pressed hard by the US military, the central government may allow
it to conduct NLP at the Iwakuni base."
The government's explanations to base-hosting municipalities have
clearly been insufficient. "The responsibility for national
security rests exclusively with the central government," a
Defense Agency official noted. Many agency officials also believe
that there is no need to obtain local consent. Their arrogance
has turned even those who were receptive of base issues into
opponents.
ASAHI (Page 4) (Excerpts)
Reporters asked Foreign Minister Abe about differences in the
policy stances of Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, a rival of
his in the race to succeed Prime Minister Koizumi, and himself.
Aso replied in his usual rough language: "Differences between Abe
and me? I suppose we are different in our economic policies." In
view of the fact that the remark was made shortly after he
returned home, after fulfilling a major diplomatic role in a
strategic dialogue with his US and Australian counterparts in
Sydney, Australia, this was a well-calculated reply intended to
demonstrate that he is an economic expert.
He made a speech titled "Creating a New Era" in Sapporo on April
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 04/06/06
TOKYO 00001842 002 OF 011
1. The speech lasted for more than an hour, and he devoted a
large part of it to economic issues.
He noted, "We must create a small but strong government." He thus
added his own view to the ongoing argument calling for a small
government in order to indicate that he is not a mere successor
to the Koizumi administration.
His slogan for the LDP presidential election is: "I will boost
Japanese companies' international competitiveness by promoting
market liberalization." He has tackled deregulation as the LDP
Policy Research Council chairman and the internal affairs
minister under the Koizumi administration. Looking back on his
efforts, Aso contributed an article to the community magazine of
Iizuka, Fukuoka Prefecture, his home constituency, in which he
wrote: "The average annual income of taxi drivers has fallen due
to deregulation. However, whether this is bad or not depends on
your attitude, because middle-aged persons have been employed as
taxi drivers because of deregulation. Actual income disparities
and a sense of income disparity sound similar but are not the
same."
As a politician, he is determined to dissolve the growing
national sentiment concerning income disparities, rather than
making an issue of the disparity itself.
Becomes corporate president at age of 32; Experiences successes
and failures
Since the Meiji era, it had been said that the Aso family was one
of three leading families in Chikuho, Fukuoka Prefecture.
In 1966, he entered Aso Industry, run by his father. Japan's
energy policy at the time was at a turning point. The company was
about to shift its mainstay product from coal to cement. Looking
back on his first day at the company, he wrote in the company's
business history book: "I thought there was a funeral that day."
Several years later, he was engaging in labor negotiations with
quick-tempered trade union members as a representative of the
company. In 1973, he assumed the company presidency. He then
launched new ventures, as his character did not allow him just to
remain a keeper of what he inherited from his father.
Foreseeing the arrival of the age of eating out, he opened a
Chinese fast-food restaurant, but this business did not go well.
He also established a company that undertook accounting for
corporate clients. It was a unique business at the time. He also
succeeded in expanding hospitals and supermarkets. He is
confident that he managed the member firms of the group well,
while being buffeted by the nation's energy policy.
He has a strong belief that companies that did not rely on the
government have survived the long economic slump following the
bursting of the economic bubble. He advocates the importance of
deregulation, because he has confidence he obtained as a
corporate manger.
His foreign policy also different from Abe's
Aso, a determined advocate of deregulation, is aiming to create
an economy-oriented country governed by a new economic policy
that goes beyond what was done by his grandfather (the late Prime
Minister Shigeru Yoshida).
The key element in his policy is realism. He is regarded as a
hard-liner on China in terms of diplomacy, the area of his
responsibility. At the same time, he also plays up the need for
Japan to contribute to the development of that nation as an
economic power.
Regarding Yasukuni Shrine, during a commercial TV program he was
asked which he thinks has more weight - national interests or his
own sentiment. He stressed his differences with Prime Minister
Koizumi, noting, "It is only natural for any lawmaker to give
priority to national interests." During an NHK program the same
day, he was asked whether he had decided not to visit Yasukuni
Shrine if he became prime minister. He replied, "Of course not. I
will not reveal every single decision of mine."
Aso has begun clarifying his differences from Abe not only in
economic policy terms but also in foreign policy terms.
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
A ruling camp study panel on a revision of the Basic Education
Law, chaired by Tadamori Oshima, will today begin discussion on
how to describe the word "patriotism" in the revised law, a main
issue in constitutional reform. The discussion in the ruling camp
will reach a crucial point. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
lawmakers are unhappy with and critical about the "closed-door
negotiations" that have been conducted under the New Komeito's
initiative.
In a joint meeting yesterday of the LDP's Education, Culture,
Sports, Science, and Technology Division and the Research
Commission on the Education System, participants made the
following comments:
"It is a problem that (the contents of discussions and what was
agreed in the ruling bloc) have yet to be revealed. We therefore
cannot conduct any debate on the issue."
"I want to see a convincing decision, not a sneaky one."
Chairman Oshima said, "I want to work out the matter before the
cherry blossoms are scattered." However, the course of action is
unclear.
The study panel conducted discussions behind closed doors and has
not disclosed the agenda. The panel reported verbally to relevant
LDP divisions. The Basic Education Law, which the Education
Ministry characterizes as the foundation of all education laws,
will be revised for the first time since its establishment 59
years ago. However, there are few members in the ruling camp who
know about specific parts that should be revised and how
descriptions in clauses should changed.
Regarding a reference to patriotism, the LDP has proposed that it
be described as "love of country," while the New Komeito has
insisted that it be expressed "cherishing the country." The two
parties have stood their ground. As a compromise, an idea has
emerged for describing patriotism as spirit of loving and
cherishing the country. In a meeting on March 28 of its education
panel, the New Komeito confirmed its opposition to the LDP's idea
that patriotism be described as love of country. Given the
situation, it is difficult to foresee how the matter will be
resolved.
A source familiar with the LDP said, "There were many cases in
which the LDP was forced to accept the New Komeito's view" in the
discussions so far. The New Komeito's views are reflected in the
contents of an agreement. One example is that the expression
"cultivation of a religious sentiment" would not be stipulated in
a revised law.
House of Representatives member Tetsuo Saito, a study panel
member, said: "Non-denominational religious education is
impossible. Some have noted that extensive religious education is
difficult." The New Komeito's view was accepted.
In recent years, there have been cases of schools removing
temples and shrines from school outings and not having students
say "itadakimasu" prior to lunch in the view that such actions
are religious. These excessive cases would not be affected by
revisions to the law.
At the same time, it has been decided that the present clause
stipulating that "education will not be subjected to improper
control" will be retained in the new law. This clause has been
applied in lawsuits against hoisting of the national flag and
singing of the national anthem. In a House of Councillors Budget
Committee session on March 23, Social Democratic Party head
Mizuho Fukushima claimed that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's
action of sending employees to schools to check whether the
schools have students sing the anthem was "improper control." In
March last year, Ehime Gov. Moriyuki Kato, who had praised a
history textbook for junior high schools formulated by Fusosha
Publishing Company, was accused of violating the Basic Education
Law, which prohibits unjustified involvement in education.
In the LDP there remains strong criticism about the improper
control clause. This clause, however, will be retained in keeping
with the New Komeito's wishes.
Some LDP lawmakers are unhappy with the situation, with one
lawmaker saying, "We should reconsider the purpose of revising
the education law."
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Excerpts)
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has addressed the reform of the
nation's social security system, taking up a different theme
every year. The security system includes pension, nursing, and
medical programs.
The Koizumi administration, based on the view that income earners
should pay their due burden, raised the percentage of medical
costs borne by high-income elderly patients to 30%, the same
level as that for the younger generation. The administration also
carried out systemic reforms, including a significant reduction
in the amount of deductions for public pensions. As a result, the
intergenerational gaps in pension benefits were narrowed from a
short-term perspective.
When it comes to lifetime burdens and benefits, however, wide
discrepancies remain between the elderly and younger generations.
Tokyo Gakugei University Professor Wataru Suzuki last year
released a report on intergenerational discrepancies in the ratio
of total pension, nursing, and medical insurance premiums and
benefits to lifetime earnings. The report noted that under the
current social security system, the burden imposed on subscribers
born in 1960 or after outweighs benefits. The report also
specified that the wide intergenerational gaps were attributed
mainly to the pension system.
In the case of those who earn 300 million yen over their lives,
there is a maximum differential of about 80 million yen between
subscribers born in 1940 and those born in 2005.
The pension reform in 2004 narrowed this gap by nearly 10 million
yen, but this does not help much. Although Prime Minister Koizumi
has advocated overall reform of the social security system, he
remains unable to dramatically correct such differentials in
pension burdens between different generations.
Under the social security system, premiums paid by young
subscribers are used to finance pension payments for elderly
subscribers. The spirit of mutual assistance is indispensable
here. But younger persons who will not be able to receive
benefits equivalent to the total amount of premiums they pay are
increasingly dissatisfied with the wide disparities. They
naturally distrust the current pension system.
MAINICHI (Page 13) (Full)
Japan has embarked on a quasi-zenith satellite (QZS) project
without the private sector's hand for now. All eyes were on the
QZS project-a Japanese version of the global positioning system
(GPS)-as Japan's first attempt to deliver dual-purpose satellites
for governmental and commercial use. The private sector, however,
has now given up on its part in the project due to the slim
chance of commercialization. In April, the government fully
privatized the H-2A rocket-Japan's mainstay launch vehicle-for
commercial satellite delivery missions. The private sector's
participation in space development is now at a moment of truth.
Japan plans to orbit three QZS skybirds designed to pass over its
archipelago for positioning, telecommunications, and
broadcasting. The first QZS payload delivery has now been set for
FY2008, with the other two orbiters in later fiscal years. Car
navigation systems currently use US-launched GPS satellites, and
cellphones use stationary satellites. They are easily susceptible
to interference from mountains and buildings. The QZS, however,
passes almost right over Japan and can retain its precision.
The QZS project was, first and foremost, an unprecedented joint
venture between the government and the private sector. The
private sector estimated the economic side effects at
approximately 21 trillion yen. In the areas of telecommunications
and broadcasting services, however, one segment broadcasting, or
"One Seg" for short, a new type of digital terrestrial
broadcasting for mobile phones and car navigation equipment,
there are now services using infrastructure on the ground.
Additionally, the government has yet to designate any of its
ministries or agencies for official jurisdiction over the
prospective providers of QZS-based positioning services. This
also discouraged the private sector from taking part in the QZS
project. In the end, a government panel recommended that the
government to go it alone for the time being. The government has
therefore decided to launch a satellite of lower precision in
fiscal 2009.
In the meantime, the government has transferred its H-2A delivery
of commercial satellites from Rocket System Corp. (RSC), a
national policy concern made up of space-related manufacturers,
to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). However, the H-2A is
costly. US and European rivals have successfully returned many
launch vehicles to flight. Japan, given its low rate of
successful liftoffs, can hardly expect to make it in the
international market.
In 2002, the private sector set up a new company, Advanced Space
Business Corporation (ASBC), to undertake commercial satellite
delivery services. "We had plans to participate from the stage of
developing systems," says Hisanobu Takayama, strategic planning
chief at ASBC. "But," he added, "we'd like to commercialize
satellite use now."
Atsushi Ishizuka, who oversees a division for cooperation among
industry, academia, and the government at the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA), is sending out information to push for
the private sector's entry into the space business. "Technology
alone is not good enough to make it in the business," Ishizuka
noted. He went on: "There are also some cases of companies
entering the market without sufficient analysis. It's important
to grasp customer needs."
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 24) (Slightly abridged)
Half of the 12-member prion panel has resigned amid Japan's
second ban on US beef imports following the discovery of a recent
ineligible shipment. The research group of the Food Safety
Commission (FSC) is tasked with assessing the safety of US beef.
Tokyo Medical College Professor Kiyotoshi Kaneko is one of the
six who resigned. He explained why he left the panel.
"On the assumption that specified risk materials (SRM) have been
satisfactorily removed in the US, the panel had not conducted
full deliberations. The report presented by the US, based on this
premise, inserted this passage that 'it is difficult to evaluate
the scientific equivalency of risk between Japan and the US.' I
felt helpless, since such risks have not been assessed in a
strict manner."
Tokyo University Professor Emeritus Kazuya Yamanouchi, who was
also a panel member, commented:
"I was not asked to stay on, so it is not correct to say that I
voluntarily resigned. . . . Our panel was told to discuss
measures to ease the nation's blanket-testing system on the day
before Japan and the US set conditions for Japan to ease its
requirements at their working-level talks. There must have been
some political pressure applied in the process of discussing US
beef imports."
Regarding the resignation drama, a responsible official of the
FSC said: "No term limit had been set for panel members, but the
FSC decided in a meeting in March to reelect members for the
prion research panel on April 1. The term of office for its new
members has also been set at two years from this April. In
addition, the age limit for members is now 70. Excluding those
who had indicated a willingness to resign, the FSC asked all
other members if they intended to stay on." The official added:
"We do not take the view that "the members who quit were all
dissatisfied with the deliberations. Not all the remaining
members are supportive of the idea of resuming US beef imports.
It is wrong to think that the conclusion was set in advance
before the start of deliberations."
The FSC is an independent body set up in the Cabinet Office in
July 2003 in the wake of the outbreak of BSE with the aim of
restoring consumers' trust in food. Some observers have pointed
out that political pressure is behind panel deliberations, one
quipping: "The conclusion has already been reached."
In a press conference yesterday, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo
Abe dismissed the allegation that there was political
intervention in the recent resignations of six panel members. But
Aoyama Gakuin University Professor Shinichi Fukuoka said:
"Although I do not know the reason why the members resigned, the
deliberation process at the council was quite political."
Professor Fukuoka explained:
"When a cow infected with BSE was found in the US in late 2003,
the FSC examined the nation's domestic safety measures to prevent
BSE, though it had received no request from anywhere. In such
discussions, the panel set the condition for resuming US beef
imports of allowing beef from cattle 20 months of age or younger.
It is suspected that there was political intervention by the
bureaucracy. . . . Although the panel is an independent body, its
nature is much the same as other advisory panels'. It is possible
for the government to adopt its policy measures even without
receiving a report of recommendations from the expert panel, but
it just wants approval from experts. It is desirable to include
consumers among panel members, but consumers' views have always
been discounted."
A university professor who once served as member of a government
advisory panel commented:
"Recent councils are better than past ones owing to such
requirements as disclosing proceedings in principle. But
depending on the contents of statements, members might be pressed
to take responsibility. Some sensible members might have judged
it better to resign after saying what they should say if it is
true that a conclusion has already been set."
SCHIEFFER


Kennywood announced Tuesday that it is adding a Thomas the Tank Engine themed area to the park. It will include five new rides including a Thomas train ride, a stage show and special themed play and entertainment areas and a store.
Read more from The Akron Beacon-Journal.


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Read my essay Type III reflections: the 'making of' to learn about my process for making this comic. I also discuss my research into the Mount St. Helens ecosystem recovery, as well as the concepts of 'industrial ecology' and 'Type III industrial systems' that I mentioned in the comic.
Trees build themselves from the carbon, hydrogen and oxygen of thin air. Can we learn to copy their engineering secrets?
Humanity's attitude toward nature. How did we get here? Where can we go from here?
Interesting parallel between the natural and industrial system! :)I'd just like to add that the Type III states in natural systems are not designed for indefinite occupation of land but are actually part of a cyclical process of succession over the longer term. As the Type III state is the most fragile stage of the cycle and takes the longest amount to time to form, people tend to place greater value on Type III environments. However, overvaluation of the Type III stage versus the importance of natural timescales for succession between each stage have led to human interference to artificially maintain the Type III state of some natural systems with negative environmental consequences (e.g. the 'smokey bear' policy in the USA - http://www.personal.psu.edu/agl/Law%20review%20fire-oak.pdf). A key problem in natural systems is, therefore, not the need to maintain Type III states indefinitely but the blockages that human activities are putting in place that prevent the transition from Type II to Type III states.
Hope, vision, and a map charting a direction to sustainable human being.Thank you Stuart.
kloe
I am a huge fan of your work, they inspire me so much. I love the way you interweave scientific facts with the human society, it is truly amazing.
The Great Disruption (moving to Canberra) - Stuart McMillen blog
[...] has been to communicate issues which are on the fringes of popular understanding. Examples include the linear nature of our economy, the efficient way nature builds itself, and the dangers of unchecked [...]
Gareth Kane
Brilliant - as an industrial ecologist, I love this!
Thin Air reflections - Stuart McMillen blog
[...] its sister comic, Type III, Thin Air ends without a specific 'message' or conclusion. The simple reason for this [...]
Type III reflections - Stuart McMillen blog
[...] Type III is about the other story of Mount St. Helens. Usually seen only as an force of destruction, I tried to show the flip side of the coin. In the comic, I recast the iconic volcano as a shining example of nature's versatility, creativity and resilience. [...]
Awesome! Reppin' work man ill add your site to my news feed :)
Excellent Comic, I will do some advertisement in a social network ;)
great work stu, i'd love to see this as a backdrop in the council marquee for the next greenheart fair... make it happen stu, make it happengreg
Jessie Henshaw
Thanks for the great depiction of natural succession, as a path of ecosystem learning. There's another key piece of science for it, that can help guide a Type II to Type III transition for an economy. It's that the resources used in *every phase*, for building the next, is the system's own surplus products. For economy's that's its $savings accounts people accumulate, that are used to pay for the resources invested in building the next form of the system, its creative cycle. Today $savings are managed only by maximizing the rate of growing $savings, and as a Type III system their purpose of $savings would change from multiplying themselves to securing the economy's health, and relationships with the other communities it relies on. So, $savings would stop being invested for wealth as that undermines the whole, and is then largely used like endowments, for other values needed for securing the whole.A full model is: "Adopt natural system principles to keep economies profitable at their limits" http://www.synapse9.com/signals/2012/05/10/natural-principles-to-stay-profitable-at-limits/
Melissa Sterry
Absolutely brilliant! I will be citing this work in my research for The Bionic City - http://www.scoop.it/t/the-bionic-city - as this comic strip has succinctly summarized one of the key principles my hypothesis embeds. Exciting work Stuart, it's made my day! Will ping it to a few folks I think will be excited about it too, inc the Earth2Hub.com crew.
The ecological portions of this were painful to read. That view of succession is considered quaint and outdated by much of the scientific community.
This is the coolest comic I've seen. Just a great look at ecosytems that either we create by design or by default. Inspirational, beautiful and directional.
The best comic about industry and ecosystems you'll ever read | Grist
[...] comic form they become accessible and charming (I like the dismayed squirrel on page 22). I promise reading the comic will be more fun than reading my last paragraph. [...]
Your style reminds me of Scott McCloud, very direct and and interesting. Keep up the good work, Stuart!
Nice analogy there Stuart -really liked this one; it's a complex topic for a cartoon to tackle! Interesting to muse on what a 'Type 3' *modern* human civilisation would look like... actually...I think we have already been a type 3, the Australian aborigines' traditional way of life would probably fit the bill, and I'm thinking back to the 'conserver' society my grandmother inhabited, before the advent of the mass-production and consumption we have nowadays -nothing was wasted or thrown out, everything was conserved and reused because to replace it was unaffordable. We can still go back to that way of living if there is the will...but our economies are dependent on the cycle of consumption, and 'consumer confidence'... what would happen if we stopped spending, consuming (and wasting, prompting the need for more consumtion)?. Recession! Let us know what a type 3 modern human civilisation looks like!

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
White Paper: Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
The Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper summarizes the key elements of that directive.
As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping cap also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:
1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support�both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.
-- To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.
-- To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.
-- The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However1 as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm.
-- The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less like it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.
-- The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities.
5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations.
-- The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.
-- The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and ins tructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive. the Congress and the American Public on peace operations.
-- The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people
Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy
The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy1
Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats.
When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars1 unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use. UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement.
Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a force multiplier in our efforts to promote peace and stability.
During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the new strategic environment such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.
Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace.
UN peace operations have served important U.S. national interests. In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador , the UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in Cyprus has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region. UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors.
Need for Reform
While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost. Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would improve efficiency and effectiveness. fully independent office of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S. assessment rate should reduced to 25 per cent.
Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.
Role in U.S. Foreign Policy
UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.
While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.
In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed 4n proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.
It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.
I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations
i. Voting for Peace Operations
The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations.
The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:
-- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
-- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
-- International aggression, or;
-- Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
-- Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
-- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
-- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
-- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
-- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
-- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
-- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.
ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations
The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operati6n. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:
-- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
-- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
-- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
-- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
-- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
-- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.
Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:
-- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
-- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
-- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.
Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
II. The Role of Regional Organizations
In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.
When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.
With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a threat to international peace and security, clear objectives, etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and established UNSC criteria.
III. Reducing Costs
Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995.
The Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. particular, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a number of finance and budget management refor ms, including:
-- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping;
-- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;
-- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
-- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to $500 million, using voluntary contributions;
-- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
-- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
-- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.
Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.
IV. Strengthening the UN
If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference.
A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to create:
-- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operations;
-- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;
-- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
-- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price and availability data and to order materiel from participating states;
--Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
-- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training.
B. To eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized, the UN should establish:
-- a rapidly deolovable headquarters team, a initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions;
-- of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
-- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
-- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments.
C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.
D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is Prepared to undertake the following. primarily on a reimbursable basis:
-- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
-- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods;
-- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially available systems and software;
-- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
-- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U .S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those capabilities, if asked by the UN;
-- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
-- offer to help create and establish a training program, participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities for training purposes.
V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces
A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.
B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.
C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.
Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander cannot. change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.
D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.
There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence will continue to be worked out "on the ground" before the orders are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground.
E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities.
VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations
Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.
The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force. These missions have been considerably more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt.
It is no longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear military perspective to bear, particularly on those missions that are likely to involve the use of force or the participation of U.S. combat units. Thus, the Department of Defense should join the Department of State in assuming both policy and funding responsibility for appropriate peace operations. We call this policy "shared responsibility."
A. Shared Responsibility: DOD will assume new responsibilities for managing and funding those UN peace operations that are likely to involve combat and all operations in which U.S. combat units are participating. The military requirements of these operations demand DOD's leadership in coordinating U.S. oversight and management. Professional military judgment increases the prospects of success of such operations. Moreover, with policy management responsibility comes funding responsibility.
DOD will pay the UN assessment for those traditional UN peacekeeping missions (so called "Chapter VI" operations, because they operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) in which U.S. combat units are participating, e.g. Macedonia. DOD will also pay the UN assessment for all UN peace enforcement missions (so called "Chapter VII" operations), e.g. Bosnia and Somalia. State will continue to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no U.S. combat units participating, e.g. Golan Heights, El Salvador, Cambodia.
When U.S. military personnel, goods or services are used for UN peace operations, DOD will receive direct and full reimbursement; reimbursement can only be waived in exceptional circumstances, and only by the President.
Our Shared Responsibility policy states: "Unless the President determines otherwise, at the request of one of the Principals:
-- The State Department will have lead responsibility 2 for the oversight and management of those traditional peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the existing State Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account, and;
-- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units and for all peace enforcement (Chapter VII) peace operations. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the establishment of a new account within DOD established to pay UN assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations."
The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with that operation.
Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.
In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities. NSC facilitates interagency coordination.
B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An import ant advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to U.S. military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S. will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions of troops, good and services. The U.S. will first apply reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances.
C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.
D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.
VII. Congress and the American People
To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.
Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:
-- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
-- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
-- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
-- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
-- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.
Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states-crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBUCATION 10161
1For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.
2 Lead responsibility refers to the coordination of interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an on-going peace operation. The lead agency will chair the interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions.
National Security Council Documents
WhitePaper: Managing Complex Contingency Operations
White Paper: Clinton Administration's Policy; Critical Infrastructure Protection
NSC Historical List of Policy Documents
NS Strategy Report: Preface
International Crime Control Strategy
NSC Historical List of Meetings with Agenda Topics
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text:
The Last Verista
A Scream of Consciousness
Speaking out for Tradition
Richard Tucker Day August 28, 2014
Tomorrow, New York City celebrates and pays tribute to the great American tenor, Richard Tucker. Amidst all of the chaos surrounding opera in New York City in recent weeks, it is seemingly appropriate to publicize a true celebration of artistry and the genre as it ought to be considered.
Many of you have asked why I've not commented or posted about the ongoings at the Met and the closing of a few European houses and the truth is that 1. I refuse to join this fabricated bandwagon that opera is dying and that there are no big voices left, that tradition is dead, that opera needs to be modernized, etc…
2. Ive decided to fight back this notion by studying my own singing intently and completely focusing on tradition, perfecting my technique, and following the influence of those great singers who came before me in hope of reversing the notion that bel canto is dead.
3. Ive centered on my studio of 35 wonderful young talents, all big voices focused on line, phrasing, text, delivery, content and complete avoidance of the plethora of uncontrolled vibrato that seems to inhabit the stage today. For those interested in hearing our traditional army of singers, stay tuned for our upcoming presentation in Toronto, Ontario in the late fall. Im so thrilled for these amazing singers and more than thrilled to present them as guardians of tradition and this art.
Finally, I feel that the times are changing. We need to get back to the opera house, back in the seats to hear LIVE singing and singers need to give audiences a reason better than looking beautiful to fill those seats. Audiences havent gone anywhere but the greats have…so lets really give em something to talk about. VOCE VOCE VOCE!!
I will have more to say in upcoming weeks and some performance announcements too but I cannot close without paying remembrance to the great Licia Albanese who passed away earlier this month. She was a beacon of tradition and truth, a guiding artist and soprano of the highest esteem. May her voice and memory remain fervent in our hearts always. Riposa in pace grande Licia!
Screaming Out!
on August 27, 2014 at 5:41 pm Comments (3)
Tags: licia albanese, Opera, Richard Tucker, Sopranos, The Vetere Studio, tradition
Happy 100th Birthday to American Tenor Richard Tucker
The Magnificent Richard Tucker
Richard Tucker was unquestionably America's greatest tenor. As with many of his contemporaries, the Second World War gave him the opportunity to establish himself in this country, and for the next quarter of a century, no one surpassed this native son in terms of voice, commitment, integrity, and devotion to the lyric art. His standing in his community, both civic and devotional, equaled his renown in the world of music, and his standards are the level by which all are now judged.
Deeply religious, Richard Tucker brought the same compelling feeling to all of his efforts – be they his 724 performances with the Metropolitan Opera in New York and on tour; his extensive catalogue of recordings – classical, popular, religious; his never ending work on behalf of Israel, or his knowledge of himself and his place as a model citizen, artist, and ideal for succeeding generations of singers and Americans, both here and abroad.
He was more than a great singer; he was a great man.
– Merle Hubbard
His wife accompanied him to every operatic performance he gave and would always wait in the wings, and accompany him back to his dressing room.
When he died, a funeral service was held for him on the stage of the Metropolitan Opera House. The service ended with the stage bare, except for Tucker's coffin, as the curtain came down on him for the final time.
August 28, 2013 – Richard Tucker Day
On Wednesday August 28, we will be celebrating Richard Tucker's 100th Birthday and Mayor Michael Bloomberg has designated it Richard Tucker Day. There will be several events celebrating the event but the highlights of the days will be a very distinguished afternoon panel discussion about Richard Tucker and his legacy at Julliard and an evening concert at the Naumburg Bandshell in Central Park. All events are free and open to the public.
At 4:00pm at the The Julliard School's Peter Jay Sharp Theater, Renée Fleming will lead a discussion featuring Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a life-long Richard Tucker fan and opera enthusiast, tenor Neil Shicoff, who was born in New York and the son of a cantor, Barry Tucker and other distinguished guests. The entrance to the Peter Jay Sharp Theater is at 155 W. 65th Street. No tickets are required. Entrance to the event is general seating and open to all.
At 7:30pm at the Naumburg Bandshell in Central Park, there will be a free concert featuring several Richard Tucker Grant and Award winners, including Ailyn Peréz, Jamie Barton, Erin Morley, Wendy Bryn Harmer, Brandon Cedel, Stephen Costello and Paul Appleby and others. Brian Zeger will be the pianist. The Naumburg Bandshell can be reached from either side of the park entering at 72nd Street. The concert is general seating.
Both events are free and open to the public.
Other events on Richard Tucker Day will include an Ariathon in Richard Tucker Park (at Broadway and 65th Street) beginning at 2 PM featuring Richard Tucker recordings, a special Richard Tucker Reuben at Junior's of Brooklyn, and the voice of Richard Tucker being played all day on WQXR and in live performances on Sirius Radio's Metropolitan Opera station.
Please join us to celebrate Richard Tucker Day in New York City.
Tags: Free Concert in Central Park celebrating Richard Tucker's 100th birthday, Metropolitan Opera, Richard Tucker, Richard Tucker 100th Birthday, Richard Tucker Day in New York City
The Last Verista's "Pick of the Week" on Met Opera Radio for January 25-29, 2012: Giordano's "Andrea Chenier" with Richard Tucker and Zinka Milanov
Richard Tucker as Chenier
6:00am Wagner: Parsifal 4/14/1979-Levine; Vickers, Ludwig, Weikl, Talvela, Shinall, Plishka
12:00pm: Verdi: Don Carlo
11/11/1950-Stiedry; Björling, Rigal, Merrill, Barbieri, Siepi, Hines
Fedora Barbieri as Princess Eboli
3:00pm: R. Strauss: Der Rosenkavalier
1/29/2000-Levine; Graham, Fleming, Hawlata, Murphy, Ketelsen
7:30pm: Various: The Enchanted Island (LIVE FROM THE MET) Christie; Daniels, DiDonato, Domingo, de Niese, Pisaroni, Oropesa, Costanzo
The Met's "Enchanted Island"
12:00am: Rossini: Il Barbiere di Siviglia
4/7/1973-Levine; Prey, Horne, Di Giuseppe, Corena, Tozzi
6:00am: R. Strauss: Ariadne auf Naxos 4/14/2001-Levine; Voigt, Margison, Petrova, Mentzer, Brendel, Oswald
9:00am: Handel: Giulio Cesare
4/17/1999-Nelson; Larmore, McNair, Blythe, Daniels, Asawa
Jennifer Larmore as Giulio Cesare
12:00pm: Verdi: La Traviata
4/21/1962-Strasfogel; Moffo, Morell, Sereni
3:00pm: Mozart: Don Giovanni
12/24/1994-Hager; Morris, Sweet, Olsen, Schuman, Perry, Hong, D'Arcangelo
6:00pm: Berg: Lulu
4/2/1988-Levine; Malfitano, Mazura, Troyanos, Hamilton, Foldi
9:10pm: Verdi: I Lombardi
1/15/1994-Levine; Flanigan, Pavarotti, Beccaria, Plishka
12:00am: Giordano: Andrea Chenier
12/28/1957-Cleva; Tucker, Milanov, Warren, Elias, Lipton, Amparan
The magnificent Zinka Milanov
6:00am: Rossini: Il Barbiere di Siviglia
9:00am: Puccini: Madama Butterfly
1/8/1994-Fulton; Soviero, Leech, Deng, Allen, Anthony, Courtney, Schaldenbrand, Hoffman, Aceto
12:00pm: Verdi: Simon Boccanegra
12/29/1984-Levine; Milnes, Tomowa-Sintow, Moldoveanu, Plishka, Clark
3:00pm: Tchaikovsky: Eugene Onegin
2/24/2007-Gergiev; Hvorostovsky, Fleming, Vargas, Zaremba, Aleksashkin
6:00pm: Wagner: Götterdämmerung (SEASON PREMIERE – LIVE FROM THE MET)
Luisi; Voigt, Morris, König, Meier, Harmer, Paterson, Owens
Deborah Voigt in Gotterdammerung
12:00am: R. Strauss: Der Rosenkavalier
6:00 AM ET Donizetti: Lucia di Lammermoor 2/19/1966-Varviso; Peters, Kónya, Guarrera, Díaz, Nagy, Ordassy, Marek
9:00am: Mozart: Don Giovanni
1:00pm: Puccini: Tosca (LIVE FROM THE MET) Franck; Racette, Álvarez, Morris
6:00pm: Giordano: Andrea Chenier
9:00pm: Handel: Giulio Cesare
12:00am: Verdi: Don Carlo
6:00am: Verdi: La Traviata 4/21/1962-Strasfogel; Moffo, Morell, Sereni
9:00am: Berg: Lulu
12:00pm: Verdi: I Lombardi
3:00pm: Wagner: Parsifal
4/14/1979-Levine; Vickers, Ludwig, Weikl, Talvela, Shinall, Plishka
9:00pm: The Met on Record: Mozart: Così fan tutte (1952)
Stiedry; Steber, Tucker, Guarrera, Thebom, Peters, Alvary
12:00am: R. Strauss: Ariadne auf Naxos
4/14/2001-Levine; Voigt, Margison, Petrova, Mentzer, Brendel, Oswald
Milanov's Farewell at the Met
on January 25, 2012 at 6:27 pm Comments (2)
Tags: Deborah Voigt, Fedora Barbieri, Gotterdammerung at the Met, Jennifer Larmore Giulio Cesare, Leonard Warren, Met Opera Radio, Metropolitan Opera, Richard Tucker, The Enchanted Island, The Last Verista's Pick of the Week on Met Opera Radio for January 25-29, Zinka Milanov
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text:
"'On'" (estilizado em maiúsculas) é uma música gravada pela boygroup sul-coreana BTS. Foi lançado em 21 de fevereiro de 2020, como o segundo single do quarto álbum da banda em idioma coreano Map of the Soul: 7, Uma versão com a cantora australiana Sia também foi lançada e está disponível no digital e streaming versão do álbum.

Histórico e lançamento
Em 7 de janeiro de 2020, o BTS anunciou seu quarto álbum de estúdio em coreano, Map of the Soul: 7. No dia seguinte, o grupo compartilhou um mapa de "retorno" revelando uma programação dividida em quatro fases, com dois solteiros. O primeiro deles, "Black Swan" foi lançado em 17 de janeiro de 2020. Exatamente um mês depois, o grupo lançou a tracklist do álbum, revelando "On" como o primeiro single do álbum e um remix da música com a cantora australiana Sia. De acordo com Big Hit, o grupo organizou a colaboração. "On" e o remix com Sia foram disponibilizados para download e streaming de música em vários locais no dia 21 de fevereiro de 2020, através do Big Hit. A tracklist do quarto álbum de estúdio japonês do BTS, Map of the Soul: 7 ~ The Journey ~, foi publicada em 8 de maio e incluía uma versão japonesa de "On". A faixa foi disponibilizada digitalmente simultaneamente ao álbum em 14 de julho de 2020, através de Big Hit, Def Jam e Virgin.

Canções de BTS
Singles de 2020
Canções de 2020

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Today Eckler's Corvette shows you how to install hood windows or wing vents!
Besides looking awesome in chrome or black powder coat frames with contrasting or matching stainless steel and black mesh screens, these Wing Vents move a lot of hot air out of the engine bay. Wing Vents give a great stand-alone look. And they are a great compliment to the Power Portal Hood Window. NOTE: Some cars have extensive under hood ribbing for air slap (Fiberglass and Carbon Fiber hoods tend to require a very little.) Check your car prior to purchasing our Wing Vents for fit and location.


Arden's Miscellany > Prints & Posters > "Rasputin" Prints, Posters, etc.
A "mad monk," a mystic, or just misunderstood: It's hard to say what Rasputin was exactly, aside from unnerving! From my original painting "Rasputin."


The Greenvity GV7011 is a 2.4GHz Zigbee transceiver, Homeplug Greenphy modem and ethernet 10/100 all in one chip. This device has a really neat feature that it can act as a bridge from Zigbee to GreenPhy in either direction. The key point is that NO Zigbee software stack is needed. In home and building automation systems you can link Zigbee networks on each floor of a building together using powerline. This is a neat low cost way to implement a repeater.


Opinion article by Nikesh Patel, Head of Investment Strategy UK at Kempen Capital Management.
Many investment managers believe that you should avoid home bias when managing long term investments. Concentrating too much on your domestic market can leave you exposed to the changing fortunes of local economies. But here, Nikesh Patel, Head of Investment Strategy at UK Kempen Capital Management, argues that the unique nature of the UK's capital markets means that pension funds are rightly showing more UK bias in their portfolios.


The NWSR1590TB Boutique Walk-in Shower Enclosure from Matki Showering is at the forefront of contemporary styling, beautifully combining a sleek design with a hard wearing construction and generous showering space.
Complete with a high-lustre Aluminium frame with a Celtic silver finish and an acrylic filled Synthastone shower tray, this stunning Matki shower enclosure is as hard wearing as it is stylish.
The glass shower panels recess into the shower tray without silicon for a watertight seal and sleek minimalist look.


It was a cold start to this Friday morning in South Mississippi. Our low at WLOX was 34, but Leakesville recorded a low of 27. We are going to see plenty of sunshine today and into the weekend. The temperatures will gradually rise back into the normal range by the end of the weekend.
We are going to see a slight warm-up back to average over the next day or so. We are watching a storm system with the potential for some winter weather next week. There are still a lot of questions like: will be enough moisture left and will the air be cold enough to support a change from rain to sleet and/or snow. We'll be keeping track and keeping you updated.
Carrie Duncan grew up in Starkville, where she went to high school and college. Throughout her career, she has worked hurricanes and other tropical weather.
Coastal Mississippi is in for a stormy afternoon, evening, and night with widespread showers and thunderstorms around.
It was chilly this morning, but plenty of sunshine is expected today. Highs will reach the low 70s. It may be breezy at times with winds from the northwest.