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Cliodynamics: Mathematizing History
By Anatoly Karlin AK | Published: http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2009/12/04/cliodynamics/
One of the most interesting emerging sciences today, in my opinion, is cliodynamics. Their practitioners attempt to come to with mathematical models of history to explain "big history" – things like the rise of empires, social discontent, civil wars, and state collapse. To the casual observer history may appear to be chaotic and fathomless, devoid of any overreaching pattern or logic, and consequently the future is even more so (because "the past is all we have").
This state of affairs, however, is slowly ebbing away. Of course, from the earliest times, civilizational theorists like Ibn Khaldun, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee dreamed of rationalizing history, and their efforts were expounded upon by thinkers like Nikolai Kondratiev, Fernand Braudel, Joseph Schumpeter, and Heinz von Foerster. However, it is only with the most recent crop of pioneers like Andrei Korotayev, Sergey Nefedov, and Peter Turchin that a true, rigorous mathematized history is coming into being – a discipline recently christened cliodynamics.
As an introduction to this fascinating area of research, I will summarize, review, and run an active commentary on one of the most comprehensive and theoretical books on cliodynamics: Introduction to Social Macrodynamics by Korotayev et al (it's quite rare, as there's only a single copy of it in the entire UC library system). The key insight is that world demographic / economic history can be modeled to a high degree of accuracy by just three basic trends: hyperbolic / exponential, cyclical, and stochastic*.
Korotayev, Andrei & Artemy Malkov , Daria Khaltourina – Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends (2006)
Category: cliodynamics, world systems; Rating: 5*/5
Summary: Andrei Korotayev (wiki); review @ cliodynamics.ru; a similar text íà ðóññêîì.
Introduction: Millennial Trends
Full version of Introduction: Millennial Trends (DOC).
In 1960, von Foerster showed that the world's population at any given time between 1-1958 CE could be approximated by the simple equation below, where N is the population, t is time, C is a constant, and t(0) is a "doomsday" when the population becomes infinite (worked out to be 13 November, 2026).
(1) N(t) = C / ( t(0) – t )
According to Korotayev et al, this simple formula of hyperbolic explains 99%+ of the micro-variation in world population from 1000 to 1970. Furthermore, a quadratic-hyperbolic equation of the same type accurately represents the increase in the GDP. Why?
He discusses the work of Michael Kremer, who attempted to build a model by making the Malthusian assumption that "population is limited by the available technology, so that the growth rate of population is proportional to the growth rate of technology", and the "Kuznetsian" assumption that "high population spurs technological change because it increases the number of potential inventors".
(2) G = r*T*N^a
(3) dT/dt = b*N*T
Above, G is gross output, T is technology, N is population, and a, b, and r are parameters. Note that dT, change in technology, is dependent on both N (indicates potential number of inventors) and T (a wider technological base enabled more inventions to be made on its basis). Solving this system of equations results in hyperbolic population growth, illustrated by the following loop: population growth → more potential inventors → faster tech growth → faster growth of Earth's carrying capacity → faster population growth.
Korotayev then counters arguments dismissing such theories as "demographic adventures of physicists" that have no validity because the world system was not integrated until relatively recently. However, that is only if you use Wallerstein's "bulk-good" criterion. If one instead uses the softer "information-network" criterion, noting that there is evidence for the "systematic spread of major innovations… throughout the North African – Eurasian Oikumene for a few millennia BCE" – and bearing in mind that this emerging belt of cultures of similar technological complexity contained the vast majority of the global human population since the Neolithic Revolution – then this can be interpreted as "a tangible result of the World System's functioning".
Then Korotayev et al present their own model that describes not only the hyperbolic world population growth, but also the macrodynamics of global GDP in the world system until 1973.
(4) G = k1*T*N^a
(5) dN/dt = k2*S*N
(6) dT/dt = k3*N*T
Above, T is technology, N is population, S is surplus per person (and S = g – m, where g is production per person and m is the subsistence level required for zero population growth), and k1, k2, k3, and a are parameters. This can be simplified to:
(7) dN/dt = a*S*N
(8) dS/dt = b*N*S
(9) G = m*N + S*N
As S should be proportional to N in the long run, S = k*N. Replace.
(10) dN/dt = k*a*N^2
Recall that solving this differential equation gives us hyperbolic growth (1).
(11) N(t) = C / ( t(0) – t )
Furthermore, replacing N(t) above with S = k*N gives (12), allowing us to work out the "surplus world product" S*N (13).
(12) S = k*C / ( t(0) – t )
(13) S*N = k*C^2 / ( t(0) – t )^2
Hence in the long-run, this suggests that global GDP growth can be approximated by a quadratic hyperbola. Other indices that can be described by these or similar models include literacy, urbanization, etc.
One finding is that after 1973, there world GDP growth rate itself falls (rather than just a slowing of the growth of the GDP growth rate, as predicted by the original model): the explanation is, "the literate population is more inclined to direct a larger share of its GDP to resource restoration and to prefer resource economizing strategies than is the illiterate one, which, on the one hand, paves the way towards a sustainable-development society, but, on the other hand, slows down the economic growth rate". To take this into account, they build a modified model, according to which, "the World System's divergence from the blow-up regime would stabilize the world population, the world GDP… technological growth, however, will continue, though in exponential rather than hyperbolic form".**
The consequences for the future are that though GDP growth will reach an asymptote, technological improvements will continue raising the standard of living due to the "Nordhaus effect" (e.g. combine Moore's Law – exponentially cheapening computing power, with the growing penetration of ever more physical goods by IT).
"It appears important to stress that the present-day decrease of the World System's growth rates differs radically from the decreases that inhered in oscillations of the past… it is a phase transition to a new development regime that differs radically from the ones typical of all previous history". As evidence, unlike in all past eras, the slowing of the world population growth rate after the 1960's did not occur against a backdrop of catastrophically falling living standards (famine, plague, wars, etc); to the contrary, the causes are the fall in fertility due to social security, more literacy, family planning, etc. Similarly, the decrease in the urbanization and literacy growth rates is not associated this time by the onset of Malthusian problems, but is set against continuing high economic growth and the "closeness of the saturation level".
(AK: This rosy-tinged analysis is persuasive and somewhat rigorous, but there is a gaping hole – they used only "technology" as a proxy for the carrying capacity. However, as Limits to Growth teaches us, part of what technology did is open up a windfall of energy resources – high-grade oil, coal, and natural gas – that have been used to fuel much of the post-1800 growth in carrying capacity (disguised as "technology" in this model), yet whose gains are not permanent because of their unsustainable exploitation. Furthermore, the modern technological base is underpinned by the material base, and cannot survive without it – you can't have semiconductor factories without reliable electricity supplies – and generally speaking, the more complex the technology, the greater the material base that is needed to sustain it (this may constitute an ultimate limit on technological expansion). This major factor is also neglected in Korotayev's millennial model. As such, the conclusion that the world has truly and permanently reached a sustainable-development regime does not follow. This is not to say that it is without merit, however – it's just that it needs to be integrated with the work done by the Limits to Growth / peak oil / climate modelers.)
Chapter 1: Secular Cycles
Korotayev et al conclude that these millennial models are only useful on the millennial scale (duh!), and that typical agrarian political-demographic cycles follow Malthusian dynamics because in the shorter term, population tends to growth much more rapidly than technology / carrying capacity, which led to a plateauing of the population, growing stress due to repeated perturbations, and an eventual tipping point over into collapse / dieoff.
The basic logic of these models is as follows. After the population reaches the ceiling of the carrying capacity of land, its growth rate declines toward near-zero values. The system experiences significant stress with decline in the living standards of the common population, increasing the severity of famines, growing rebellions, etc. As has been shown by Nefedov, most complex agrarian systems had considerable reserves for stability, however, within 50–150 years these reserves were usually exhausted and the system experienced a demographic collapse (a Malthusian catastrophe), when increasingly severe famines, epidemics, increasing internal warfare and other disasters led to a considerable decline of population. As a result of this collapse, free resources became available, per capita production and consumption considerably increased, the population growth resumed and a new sociodemographic cycle started.
He notes that newer models are far more complex and predict the dynamics of variables such as elite overproduction, class struggle, urbanization, and wealth inequality with a surprisingly high degree of accuracy (e.g. see A Model of Demographic Cycles in a Traditional Society: The Case of Ancient China by Nefedov). Korotayev et al then list three major approaches to modeling agrarian political-demographic cycles: Turchin (2003), Chu & Lee (1994), and Nefedov (1999-2004).
1. Turchin has constructed an elegant "fiscal-demographic" model, in which the state plays a positive role by by a) maintaining armed order against banditry and lawlessness, and b) doing works such as roads, canals, irrigations systems, flood control, etc, – both of which increase the effective carrying capacity. However, as demographic growth brings the population to the carrying capacity of the land (in practice, the population plateaus somewhat below it due to elite predation), surpluses diminish. So do the state's revenues, since the state taxes surpluses; meanwhile, expenditures keep on rising (because of the reasons identified by Tainter). Eventually, there sets in a fiscal crisis and the state must tax the future to pay for the present by drawing down the surpluses accumulated in better days; when those surpluses run out, the state can no longer function and collapses, which leads to a radical decline of the carrying capacity and population as the land falls into anarchy and irrigation and transport infrastructure decays. Applied to Russia, as I wrote in Russia's Sisyphean Loop:
For the Empire is, at root, a social preservation mechanism to allow Russians to enjoy the benefits of sustained socio-political complexity – internal peace, a degree of security from foreign marauders, a large contiguous market space permitting economies of scale and autonomous economic development, and the aesthetic trappings of imperial splendor.
… once [crises] occur – given the amount of stress holding the system together – they tend to be extremely catastrophic… the real Russia outside the Kremlin crumbles reverts back to its natural state – the natural state, an anarchic state of stasis, decentralized Chaos; abandoning its cities, laws, and other accoutrements of civilization for the primeval mysticism of its endless plains, dark forests and Slavic skies.
2. The Chu and Lee model consists of rulers (including soldiers), peasants (grow food), and bandits (steal food). The peasants support the rulers to fight the bandits, while there is a constant flux between the peasants and bandits whose magnitude depends on the caloric & survivability payoffs to belonging in each respective class. However, it's not a fully-formed model as its main function is to fill in the gaps in the historical record, by plugging in already-known historical data on warfare and climatic factors; they neglected to associate crop production with climatic variability (colder winters result in lesser crop yields) and the role of the state in food distribution (which staved off collapse for some time and was historically significant in China).
3. Nefedov has integrated stochasticity into his models, in which random climatic effects produce different year-to-year crop yields. One result is that as carrying capacity is reached, surpluses vanish and the effects of good and bad years play an increasingly important role – i.e. a closed system under stress suffers increasingly from perturbations. One bad year can lead to a critical number of people leaving the farms for the cities or banditry, initiating a cascading collapse. However, he neglects the "direct role of rebellion and internal warfare on cycle behavior", so as the model is purely economic, each demographic collapse is, implausibly, immediately followed by a new rise.
The ultimate aim of Korotayev et al is to integrate the positive features of all three models (Chapter 3), but for now the take a closer look at the political-demographic history of China, the pre-industrial civilization that maintained the best records.
Chapter 2: Historical Population Dynamics in China – Some Observations
This chapter is available in Russian – Èñòîðè÷åñêàÿ ìàêðîäèíàìèêà Êèòàÿ.
Below is a graph of China's population on a millennial scale. Note the magnitude and cyclical nature of its demographic collapses. Note also that such cycles are far from unique to Chinese civilization (see collapse of the Roman Empire), and reflect for a minute, even, on the profound difference between the modern world of permanent growth, and the pre-industrial, "Malthusian" world.
Since it would be futile to repeat the fine details of every political-demographic cycle in China's, I will instead just list the main points.
The cycles tend to be ones of a fast rise in population, when surpluses are high and people are prosperous. It plateaus and stagnates when the population reaches the carrying capacity, when there is overpopulation, much lowered consumption, increasing debilitation of state power, and rising social inequality and urbanization.
Sometimes, such as in the middle Sung period, population stress did not lead to a collapse, but instead to a "radical rise of the carrying capacity of the land" through administrative and technological innovations. This increased the permanent ceiling of Chinese carrying capacity from 60mn to around 120mn souls, and in doing so alleviated the population stress until the early 12th century (AK: e.g. in Early Modern Britain, the problem of deforestation was solved by coal). At that point, China may have once again solved its problems, even escaping from its Malthusian trap (AK: some historians have noted that it had many of the prerequisites for an industrial revolution). That was not to be, as "the Sung cycle was interrupted quite artificially by exogenous forces, namely, by the Jurchen and finally Mongol conquests".
The Yuan dynasty would not reach the highs of the Sung because of the general bleakness of the 14th century – the end of the Medieval Warm Period, unprecedented floods and droughts in China, etc, which lowered the carrying capacity to a critical level. The resulting famines and rebellions led to the demographic collapse of the 1350's, as well as the de facto collapse of the state, as China transitioned to warlordism.
Carrying-capacity innovations under the Ming did not, eventually, outrun population growth, and it collapsed during the turmoil of the transition to the Qing dynasty. The innovations accelerated throughout the 18th century (e.g. New World crops, land reclamation, intensification of farming). Indications of subsistence stress as China entered the 19th century were a) declining life expectancies, b) rising staple prices, and c) a huge increase in female infanticide rates in the first half of the 18th century. By 1850, China was again under very severe subsistence stress and the state grew impotent just as Europeans began to encroach on the Celestial Empire.
Huang 2002: 528-9, worthy of quotation in extenso. "Recent research in Chinese legal history suggests that the same subsistence pressures behind female infanticide led to widespread selling of women and girls… Another related social phenomenon was the rise of an unmarried "rogue male" population, a result of both poverty (because the men could not afford to get married) and of the imbalance in sex ratios that followed from female infanticide. Recent research shows that this symptom of the mounting social crisis led, among other things, to large changes in Qing legislation vis-à-vis illicit sex… Even more telling, perhaps, is the host of new legislation targeting specifically the 'baresticks' single males (guanggun) and related 'criminal sticks' of bandits (guntu, feitu), clearly a major social problem in the eyes of the authorities of the time". See Diagram V.13. (AK: Interestingly, China's one-child policy, by artificially restricting fertility in order to ward off a "Maoist dynasty" Malthusian crisis, has led to many of the same problems in the past two decades).
Speaking of which… China had further dips in its population after during perturbations in the 1850's (the millenarian Taiping Rebellion), the 1930's (Japanese occupation), and 1959-62 (the Great Leap Forward), each progressively smaller than the last in its relative magnitude. For instance, the latter just formed a short plateau.
Korotayev et al conclude the chapter by running statistical tests on China's historical population figures from 57-2003. In contrast to linear regression (R^2 = 0.398) and exponential regression (R^2 = 0.685), the simple hyperbolic growth model described in "Introduction: Millennial Trends" produces an almost perfect fit with the observed data (R^2 = 0.968). So in the very, very long-term, the effects of China's secular cycles are swamped by the millennial trend of hyperbolic growth.
Finally, the authors describe in-depth the general pre-industrial Chinese demographic cycle. Below is a functional scheme I've reproduced from the book (click to enlarge).
The main points are:
Fast population growth until it nears the carrying capacity, then a long period (100 years+) of a very slow and unsteady growth rate, accompanied by increasingly significant, but non-critical fluctuations in annual population growth due to climatic stochasticity (positive growth in good years, negative growth – along with dearth, minor epidemics, uprisings, etc – in bad years). These fluctuations get worse with time as the state's counter-crisis potential degrades due to the drawdown of previously accumulated surpluses.
According to Nefedov's model and historical evidence, the fastest growth of cities occurred during the last phases of demographic cycles, as peasants were driven off the land and there appeared greater demand for city-made goods from the increasingly affluent landowners (who could charge exorbitant rates on their tenants). Furthermore, some peasants are drawn into debt bondage because the landowner had previously given them food at a time of dearth. Other peasants turn to banditry.
Re-"elite overproduction → over-staffing of the state apparatus → decreasing ability of the state to provide relief during famines". The system of state relief had been very effective earlier, e.g. in 1743-44 a state effort to prevent starvation in the drought-stricken North China core was successful. However: "By Chia-ch'ing times (1796-1820) this vast grain administration had been corrupted by the accumulation of superfluous personnel at all levels, and by the customary fees payable every time grain changed hands or passed an inspection point… The grain transport stations served as one of the focal points for patronage in official circles. Hundreds of expectant officials clustered at these points, salaried as deputies (ch'ai-wei or ts'ao-wei) of the central government. As the numbers of personnel in the grain tribute administration grew and as costs rose through the 18th century, the fees payable for each grain junk increased [from 130-200 taels per boat in 1732, to 300 taels in 1800, and to 700-800 taels by 1821]". Similarly, the Yellow River Conservancy, whose task it was to prevent floods, degenerated into hedonistic corruption in the early 19th century; only 10% of its earmarked funds being spent legitimately.
So what you have is an increasingly exploited peasantry, a growing (and volatile) urban artisan class – e.g., the sans-culottes of the French Revolution, and more banditry. The bandits create a climate of fear in the countryside and force more outmigration into the cities, and the abandonment of some lands. At the same time, state power – military and administrative – is on the wane, displaced by corruption. The effects of perturbations are magnified due to the system's loss of resiliency. There eventually comes a critical tipping point after which there is a cascading collapse that involves a population dieoff, the fall of centralized power, and a prolonged period of internal warfare.
Fast population growth does not resume immediately after collapse because things first need to settle down.
(AK: Pause for a moment… do you think this demographic cycle applies to modern China, or another country you can name, or even the world in general? If so, which stage are we at? And can you associate the stages of the above demographic cycle with the stages of the psycho-spiritual "Malthusian Loop" within the Belief Matrix?
In my Facebook Note, Musings on the decline and fall of civilizations, I draw a link between the fast population increase / abundance of the "rise" period, and the concept of the "Golden Age" common to all civilizations. Also ventures a theory as to why cities (hedonism, conspicuous consumption, etc) have such a poor reputation as a harbinger of collapse… because they are, it's just that the anti-poshlost preachers haven't identified the right cause (i.e. overpopulation, not "moral decadence" per se).
Furthermore, a tentative explanation of the reason for differential Chinese – European technological growth rates (compare and contrast with Jared Diamond's explanation):
Incidentally, a possible reason why Western Europe emerged as the world's economic hegemon by the 19th century, instead of China, a civilization that at prior times had been significantly more advanced. But in China, the depth of the Malthusian collapses was deeper and more regular (once every 300 years, typically) than in W. Europe… Once the Yangtze / Yellow River irrigation systems failed, tens of millions of peasants were doomed; nothing on an equivalent scale in Europe, which is geographically and politically fragmented into many chunks and nowhere has anywhere near the same reliance on vulnerable hydraulic works for the maintenance of complex civilization (control over water was at the heart of "Oriental despotism" (Wittfogel); the Chinese word "zhi" means both "to regulate water" and "to rule").
This theory that the reason China began to lag behind Western Europe technologically was because of its more frequent collapses / destructions of knowledge should be explored further.
Finally, about the nature of perturbations in a closed system under increasing stress… That is our world in the coming decades: even as Limits to Growth manifest themselves, there will be more (and greater) shocks of a climatic, terrorist, and military nature. The stochasticity will increase in amplitude even as the System becomes more fragile. As a result, polities will increase the level of legitimization and coercion, i.e. they will become more authoritarian.)
Chapter 3: A New Model of Pre-Industrial Political-Demographic Cycles
To address the shortcomings of other models and taking into account what happens in typical pre-industrial demographic cycles, Korotayev with Natalia Komarova construct their own model that includes the following three main elements:
(1) The Malthusian-type economic model, with elements of the state as tax collector (and counter-famine reservoir sponsor), and fluctuating annual harvest yields; this describes the logistic shape of population growth. It explains well the upward curve in the demographic cycle and saturation when the carrying capacity of land is reached. (2) Banditry and the rise of internal warfare in time of need are the main mechanism of demographic collapse. Personal decisions of peasants to leave their land and become warriors / bandits / rebels are influenced by economic factors. (3) The inertia of warfare (which manifests itself in the fear factor and the destruction of infrastructure) is responsible for a slow initial growth and the phenomenon of the "intercycle".
Reproducing the model in detail will take up too much space, so just the main conclusions: "the main parameters affecting the period of the cycle are a) the annual proportions of resources accumulated for counter-famine reserves, b) the peasant-bandit transformation rate, and c) the magnitude of the climatic fluctuations. Hence, the lengths of cycles – and this is historically corroborated – is increased along with the growth of the counter-famine (more reserves) and law-enforcement (repress banditry) subsystems.
Chapter 4: Secular Cycles & Millennial Trends
Full version of Chapter 4: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends.
The chapter begins by modeling the role of warfare, and challenges recent anthropological findings that denser populations do not necessarily lead to more warfare.
First, this is explained by the fact that it's not a simple relation, but more of a predator-prey cycle described by a Volterra-Lotka equation. When warfare breaks out in a time of stress it leads to the immediate reduction of the carrying capacity and demographic collapse; however, warfare simmers on well into the post-collapse phase because groups continue to retaliate against each other.
Second, the methodology is flawed because it treats all wars the same, whereas in fact they tend to be far less devastating for bigger polities than for small ones. This is because bigger polities have armies that are more professional, and the length of their "bleeding borders" relative to total territory, is much smaller than for territorially small chiefdoms, for whom even low-intensity wars are demographically devastating. As such, more politically complex polities fight wars more frequently more frequently than smaller ones, but tend to be far less damaged by them.
Imperial expansions in territory coincide with periods of fast population growth and high per capita surpluses; later on, shrinking surpluses decimate the tax base and even defense proves increasingly hard ("imperial overstretch"). This correlation is very strong.
Now Korotayev et al combine their model from the last chapter with Kremer's equation for technological growth (see the Introduction):
dT/dt = a*N*T
They also model a "Boserupian" effect, in which "relative overpopulation creates additional stimuli to generate and apply carrying-capacity-of-land-raising innovations".
Indeed, if land shortage is absent, such stimuli are relatively weak, whereas in conditions of relative overpopulation the introduction of such innovations becomes literally a "question of life and death" for a major part of the population, and the intensity of the generation and diffusion of the carrying capacity enhancing innovations significantly increases.
Finally, they make the size of the harvest dependent not only on climatic fluctuations, but also on the level of technology.
Harvesti = H0*random numberi*Ti.
Running this model with some reasonable parameters produces the following diagram, which reproduces not only the cyclical, but also the hyperbolic macrodynamics.
Note that it also describes the lengthening of growth phases detected in Chapter 2 for historical population dynamics in China, which was not described by our simple cyclical model. The mechanism that produces this lengthening in the model (and apparently in reality) is as follows: the later cycles are characterized by a higher technology, and, thus, higher carrying capacity and population, which, according to Kremer's technological development equation embedded into our model, produces higher rates of technological (and, thus, carrying capacity) growth. Thus, with every new cycle it takes the population more and more time to approach the carrying capacity ceiling to a critical extent; finally it "fails" to do so, the technological growth rates begin to exceed systematically the population growth rates, and population escapes from the "Malthusian trap" (see Diagram 4.26):
MAFR = "minimum annual food ration, an amount of food that is barely sufficient to support one person forone year".
AK: some confirmation for my rough explanation of why Chinese technological growth rate fell below Europe's prior to the Industrial Revolution (see end of Chapter 2 in this post).
Of special importance is that our numerical investigation indicates that with shorter average period of cycles a system experiences a slower technological growth, and it takes a system longer to escape from the "Malthusian trap" than with a longer average cycle period.
Finally, they also add in an equation for literacy:
li+1 = li*b*dFi*li*(1 – li)
Which has the following effect on population growth:
Ni+1 = Ni*(1 + α × dF')*(1 – l) – dRi – rob*Ni*Ri
And all added together, it produces the following stunning reproduction of China's population dynamics from ancient past to today.
Of course, these models can be only regarded as first steps towards the development of effective models describing both secular cycles and millennial upward trend dynamics.
The Meaning of Cliodynamics
Turchin, Peter & Sergey Nefedov – Secular Cycles (2008)
Category: cliodynamics, world systems; Rating: 5/5
Summary: Read the whole book (PDF) or in chapters
This is a free online, quasi-popular book about eight different pre-industrial secular cycles (including Tudor England, the Roman Empire, Muscovy, and the Romanov Empire). Knowing the facts of history and the proximate causes of Revolutions – Lenin's charisma, Tsarist incompetence, the collapse of morale and of the railway system, etc – is all well and good, but an entirely different perspective is opened up when looking at late Tsarist Russia through a Malthusian / cliodynamic prism. The interpretation shifts to one of how late imperial Russia was under a panoply of Malthusian pressure, and that the additional stresses and perturbations of WW1 "tipped" the system over into a state of collapsed anarchy – ushering in the vacuum that enabled Lenin to make his "Event".
Finally, my reply to someone who sent me a message suggesting that cliodynamics may "make old school idiographic history redundant".
I don't think these trends will make idiographic history redundant, because there are many elements that are irreducible to mathematical analysis; furthermore, a major and inevitable weakness of cliodynamics is our lack of numbers for much of pre-mass literacy history. To the contrary, I think cliodynamics will end up complementing the "old school" rather than displacing it.
* Note that the null symbol ∅ – the logo of this site – can be said to represent both the exponential (a straight line on the logarithmic), which strives to break out of the cycle of repetition / Malthusian collapse / eternal return; whereas the circle, representing the cyclical, seeks to stifle any accumulative initiative that leads to exponential growth.
This makes it into a very universal symbol, in a sense. Back to its definition, it implies a profound nothingness (Void) – but all possible mathematical objects and their unions exist in the Void, including Reality. From What Might Be Is:
In a sense, the Void [nothingness] fulfills all the criteria of God. Null and unity, it transcends the human imagination, for human minds are finite in scope. It sidesteps the 'who created the creator?" paradox, for it is. And was, and will be, though being outside Time, its directionality is meaningless. It is zero and infinity of cardinal infinity. What might be, is. All possible computations, exist, and are their own simulacra.
Yet at the ultimate scale, the cyclical is always dominant. No end to the loop.
Looking at this from the simple computational view, the state of the cellular automaton at the time of the Big Bang is perfect order. The immediate next state begins the transition to chaos with loss of entropy in the seething plasma of exotic particles. This mass cools down and forms itself into stars and planets. On some a localized growth in ordered complexity occurs, in contrast to the sea of randomness all around them, and perhaps culminating in the saturation of the whole cellular automaton. With time the delicate balance of order and randomness that is the intelligent universe will struggle to preserve itself against the crushing order of fire or the encroaching chaos of ice. In the former case, the loss in entropy will reverse and the universe will start contracting into the Big Crunch, with computation (and simulation of other worlds) soaring until the omega point is reached, closing the loop of existence. In the latter case, computation will slow down due to the unrelenting loss in entropy but will continue for a much longer time – until the last particles disintegrate, if reversible computing is perfected and utilized. Whether the universe dies by ice or fire, the end state reverts back to perfect order – and presumably, a new Big Bang and identical iteration, since all cellular automata will loop when they return to a state in which they once existed.
** Ray Kurzweil, one of the high priest of the singularitarian movement, extends Moore's observations, to also model technological growth (computing power, to be precise) as double exponential, or even hyperbolic. See Appendix: The Law of Accelerating Returns Revisited,
On the other hand, Joseph Tainter noted that in many areas the rate of technological innovation is actually slowing down. This is an argument, mentioned above, that Kremer's assumption that the rate of technological growth is linearly dependent on the product of the population and the size of the already-existing technological base is too simplistic.
These observations are supported by Planck's Principle of Increasing Effort – "with every advance [in science] the difficulty of the task is increased" (i.e. you're now unlikely to make new discoveries by flying a kite in a thunderstorm). Furthermore, "Exponential growth in size and costliness of science, in fact, is necessary simply to maintain a constant rate of progress", and according to Rescher, "In natural science we are involved in a technological arms race: with every 'victory over nature' the difficulty of achieving the breakthroughs which lie ahead is increased".


New clues offer more questions than answers.
Earlier this week, we reported on an endlessly creepy puzzle video that was confounding and unsettling everyone who watched it. In the days since, the story has grown far stranger—but the identity of the person responsible for the threatening messages remains as clouded as ever.
The video, which spread quickly across YouTube and was allegedly discovered on a DVD on a park bench in Spain, contains a seemingly endless number of puzzles, both obvious and obscure. Numerous interested parties have been working to unearth the mysteries held within, and several bits of new information have emerged.
Perhaps most disturbing revelation of all is that the Morse code puzzle, which was translated into "RED LIPSLIKE TENTH," has been discovered to be an anagram of "KILL THE PRESIDENT." This, coupled with the previously discovered hidden GPS coordinates of the White House, paints a vivid threat.
The disturbing video clip hid images in its audio track that could only be decoded with advanced software. The photos, which included a woman being strangled, a disemboweled body, and other graphic scenes, have been traced to various sources on the Internet.
One of the embedded photos is from a horror movie called The Bunny Game, another is from a German film called Slasher, and a third is an actual crime-scene photo showing a victim of Albert DeSalvo, better known as the Boston Strangler. While all of the photos are disturbing, none of them originated with the video itself. This should offer a bit of relief to those theorizing that the clip came from a serial killer showcasing his crimes.
Another lead also failed to pan out when one Parker Wright, whose name was on one of the accounts that uploaded the video, was mistaken for another Parker Wright.
Amateur sleuths had closely watched the Twitter account of Parker J. Wright, expecting it to yield new information. The Daily Dot reached out to him to see if he was involved in the video, but he was just as disturbed by it as everyone else and promptly denied any association with it or its creators.
@MikeWehner A bunch of people are tweeting me about it. No I was not involved in that video in any way.
Not all leads have led to dead ends. Some serious digging brought confirmation of the location where the video was shot. The derelict building shown in the video is the Zofiówka Sanatorium located in Otwock, Poland. The now-abandoned building was once a mental-health facility.
Photoblogger Miniwycieczki captured an image in 2013 from a room in the facility that looks almost identical to the images seen in the video.
A more recent photo, which Szary Burek captured in April 2015, also shows the room, and this time it includes all of the subtle details visible in the video clip, including the graffiti that appears as the video progresses.
There's little doubt that this is the building in the video. Given that it is abandoned, it's impossible to know who might have decided to use it as a backdrop for their unsettling puzzle.
The dates of the photos confirm that the video was created sometime between November 2013 and April 2015. The video was first seen online on May 9, 2015.
The tech blog that most recently acquired the video, GadgetZZ, said that the disc it received came from Poland, but the uploader of the original YouTube copy, AETBX, maintained that it was found on a park bench in Spain.
Hundreds of people continue to investigate new leads and post their findings on Reddit.
Update 11:03am CT, Oct. 22: Twitter user @Exen visited the Polish hospital where the video is believed to have been shot and sent the Daily Dot photos from the expedition.


text:
According to the Detroit Bureau, the Auto Insurance Center (AIC) has released a report claiming that, in general, the states with the least restrictive driving laws concerning teen driving, seat belts, and speeding experience more traffic fatalities each year than states which impose more stringent laws. This direct correlation between lax driving laws and traffic fatalities should be of particular interest to residents of South Carolina as our roads are twice as fatal as the nationwide average. While not all car accidents can be avoided, perhaps studies such as the one discussed below will shed light on ways in which traffic safety within our state can be improved.
Auto Insurance Center Reports that Strict Driving Laws Can Reduce Traffic Fatalities
The Auto Insurance Center's recent traffic fatalities report looked at various state laws relating to teen driving, seat belts, and speeding. By ranking each state's laws on a scale ranging from least restrictive to severe the study was able to determine that there is a direct correlation between traffic fatalities and lax driving laws in these three categories. The Detroit Bureau reported on some of the study's key findings, including those outlined below.
Teen Driving Laws
According to the Auto Insurance Center's report, the top five states for teen crash fatalities all place either little or mild restrictions on teen driving privileges. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) believes that these states could greatly lower their statistics by implementing stringent rules on graduated licenses. The NHTSA estimates that states that adopt graduated driver licensing programs can reduce traffic fatalities caused by 16 and 17-year-olds drivers by 20 to 50 percent.
South Carolina has already implemented a graduated driver licensing program in order to help reduce teen car accidents within the state. The graduated driver licensing program requires teens to obtain their driver's license in stages based on age and experience requirements. Detailed information about South Carolina's graduated driver's license program is provided on the DMV's website, but the general age requirements in South Carolina are as follows:
15 years old: Eligible for learner's permit.
15 years and 180 days old: Eligible for provisional license.
16 years old: Eligible for special restricted license.
17 years old: Eligible for regular driver's license.
Seat Belt Laws
The AIC's study also shows a correlation between restrain-related crash fatalities and states that impose lax penalties on drivers who fail to buckle up. The study reports that the top 15 states for restrain-related fatalities are the same states that impose the lowest penalties on drivers who don't buckle up. However, the AIC also notes that there is a "rural factor" at play here. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, people who live in rural areas are 10 percent less likely to use seat belts than those who live in a suburb or a city. The rural factor may weaken the correlation between restraint-related fatalities and a state's penalty system for failing to wear a seatbelt, but the AIC maintains that the correlation still exists.
In South Carolina, both drivers and passengers are required to wear seatbelts when driving on any public street or highway within the state. While there are a few exceptions to this law, for example, mail carriers and people with a physician's note, almost everyone is required to buckle up. Failing to follow South Carolina's safety belt law can result in a fine of up to $25.
Speeding Laws
Lastly, the Auto Insurance Center's study reports that there is also a correlation between states that have lenient speeding laws and high rates of speeding-related car accident fatalities. For example, the study notes that South Carolina imposes only mildly restrictive speeding laws and has the third highest rate of speeding-related car crash fatalities out of the 50 states. Fines for speeding in South Carolina vary depending on the situation, but apart from being required to pay a fine, drivers who are caught speeding may also be required to pay surcharges, attend educational courses, and may even have their driver's license suspended or revoked.
Combined Factors Make Roads in South Carolina Twice as Fatal as Nationwide Average
There are undoubtedly many factors that have an effect on traffic fatality rates within South Carolina and while passing more stringent teen driving laws, safety belt laws, and speeding laws may help the situation, that may not be enough – South Carolina has such a long way to go. According to the State, South Carolina's roads were twice as deadly in 2015 than roads in the rest of the country. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that nationwide traffic deaths were up 7.7 percent in 2015, however, in South Carolina traffic deaths within the state increased by a whopping 16 percent. This trend is certainly not encouraging.
Why are the roads in South Carolina so dangerous? The State asked this question of various traffic safety officials and their aggregate response blamed a combination of rural roads, more vehicles being registered within the state, cheap gas, and distracted drivers. Officials also noted that the top five reasons for fatalities on South Carolina roadways are:
Speeding,
Not wearing seat belts,
Drunk driving,
Failing to yield to oncoming vehicles, and
Pedestrians in the road
Regardless of the cause, car accidents can be devastating. If you or a loved one has been involved in a car accident and believes that the other driver was at fault, you may be legally entitled to compensation for your loss. The Elrod Pope Law Firm's dedicated car accident attorneys in Rock Hill, SC would be happy to sit down with you to discuss your legal options. Contact us today to schedule a free consultation.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Exporting & Recruitment
Tagged: exporting, exports, international, International recruitment, recruitment
Last week UK Trade & Investment held its 6th Export Week. This was met by a raft of research further putting international trade on the agenda. A study by KPMG among small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) found over a third have no plans to export. Many argued that regulation and a lack of understanding of overseas markets are major barriers.
In contrast a study by Barclays shows that 65% of SMEs set up during the recession began exporting in their first year, recognising that they cannot rely on the UK alone for growth. More data still from Jobs Outlook suggests 16% of employers plan to expand into the European Union in the next two years and 31% of organisations in the UK could have an international presence.
Whatever way the numbers stack up, there's no doubt that if the UK business community is to realise the government's ambition and double exports to reach a £1 trillion by 2020, companies are going to have to up their exporting game.
Exporting – Recruitment's Role
Many are already doing this. We're seeing unprecedented demand for our international recruitment service, with clients looking for senior managers – hand-picked for their knowledge of overseas markets – to fast track their export plans.
As the Guardian recently reported, investing in international talent has been a key plank in the successful export strategy of Manchester based Faith Products. Among its 40 employees Faith Products has recruited experts with years of experience of overseas markets. It sees their knowledge as critical to its international expansion plans. As a result the company now sells its Faith in Nature brand in highly competitive markets such as America, Scandinavia and East Asia.
While the percentages of companies likely to export may be up for debate, the experience of businesses like Faith Products make one thing abundantly clear. Companies that want to build an overseas business will find it a whole lot easier if they have the right senior people with the right international experience in place.
If you are looking for help with international recruitment call us on +44 (0)1962 438 568, email info@NorrieJohnstonRecruitment.com or to brief us online, simply complete our client enquiry form.
International Recruitment? Talk to the Global Search Specialists
The Art of International Business


methinks the girl might have to be selective about that otherwise she won't get any sleep at all....especially for example, if it's a young, cheap charlie monger that wants to get his money's worth (or opportunity value if free) such that the poor girl will get pounded with multiple pops throughout the night.
If you are a monger it works best if you are a night owl. Sleep during the hot part of the day when there's not much action.. Many non working expats/tourists around.


Unfortunately, insurance companies take advantage of clients who are not represented by counsel. In fact, once a client hires an attorney, the case may get assigned to a different adjuster. Additionally, insurance companies will not help you find the right doctors. They may even deny your claim despite your injuries.
The attorneys of The Accident Guys are here to prevent the insurance companies from taking advantage of you. Our office offers a no commitment, free consultation. This allows you to give us a call to hear how we can help you with your case. If there is no recovery, you do not owe us a penny for our time or have to reimburse us for any costs. Our job is to remove all the insurance related stress off your shoulders so you can focus on everything else in life.
Please call us now. You have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
"From my first phone call up until my case was closed, Omid and his staff showed nothing but the utmost support and professionalism."


text:
Venus-Pluto: A Deadly Affair
August 1, 2011 August 22, 2020 astrologyplace
For some light reading, I delved into the book: True Crimes of Passion – When Love Hurts. It contains real life stories of jealousy, betrayal, and emotional drama. Browsing through the deadly affairs, there is one particularly interesting story about the manipulative and seductive Pamela Smart who was a school teacher. Pamela Smart began a fling with one of the boys at the school where she worked in order to get back at her cheating husband and never expected to fall in love with a 16-year-old boy.
When she did, she conspired with her lover to remove the man who stood in the way of their future together. At first, her lover Flynn was shocked by her plan, but his older lover was persuasive and soon he had agreed to a murder plot. Flynn and two friends entered the house of Greg Smart and shot him in the head. The youths quickly made the scene look like a badly botched burglary.
Astrologically, the school teacher has the Venus conjunct Pluto aspect, and boy is this known for its fatalistic tendencies in love. For further examples see below:
Glenn close, the actress who starred in Fatal Attraction (Venus opposite Pluto).
The author David M. Buss had written a book titled: The Dangerous Passion: Why Jealousy is As Necessary As Love and Sex (Venus Trine Pluto)
Rebecca Schaeffer – Murdered by Robert John Bardo, an obsessed fan who had been stalking her for three years (Venus conjunct Pluto).
Ryan Jenkins – a man who murdered his girlfriend and committed suicide; he had been previously charged with battery constituting domestic violence (Venus opposite Pluto).
Ricardo Marto also killed his girlfriend and the young girl's mother was about to send her off to a center for women suffering domestic violence, just five days before she was murdered (Venus conjunct Pluto in Scorpio).
These are extreme examples and plenty of Venus-Pluto people do not have relationships this intense. Not everybody with Venus-Pluto is presented with this kind of fate and the themes are purely amplified.
Venus-Pluto relationships force us to face our deepest feelings of lovability, desirability, and self-worth. Venus is a planet that plays a significant role in all of our relationships.
The intensity of the feelings involved with this contact requires depth. Many people with Venus in aspect to Pluto express an all or nothing philosophy toward love.
Pamela Smart manipulated her young lover into murdering her husband to prove the depth of feeling.
"Smart was accused of seducing 15-year-old William "Billy" Flynn and threatening to leave him unless he killed her husband."
'Til death do us part' is a saying many an astrologer has hung on Venus-Pluto's bedpost, and in the cases above, it's true . If we place Venus-Pluto in the context of a fictional love story, it would feature a strong silent lover, and contain dangerous passions. It could be a secret love affair or an obsessive romance. It may be a story filled with intensity, force, and great passion – anything darkly erotic and forbidden.
The Venus-Pluto relationship is complicated and consumed with feeling. If we feel passionate about someone, there is always the danger, though, of getting badly burned. The shame of rejection involved in such a complex relationship, the deep feelings of not being lovable are extreme and difficult to accept. Venus-Pluto aspects are famed for fatal attractions and sexual magnetism. Many of these people can, indeed, be very seductive, but it's the feeling tone and the ownership of someone on a soul-level which is desired.
Venus-Pluto aspects need to love very deeply, and there has to be a powerful emotional feeling in the relationship. Anyone who truly and deeply loves another is likely to feel jealous at times. Modern astrologers believe that Venus-Pluto has a hard time controlling their passions, but they can be locked down in a simmering melting pot of unexpressed love and desire. However, this serves to only intensify and when desire and love surface, it can get very hot and dangerous.
Venus-Pluto will not tolerate a superficial relationship, he/she will need to explore love all the way to its limits, and this can make for a very emotional, stormy, and intense relationship. The individual merges with partners on a very profound level, but the negative characteristics of such a relationship involve jealousy, suspicion, and paranoia. Under the surface of these relationships, it is not very civilized. If the type suffers betrayal he/she knows how to wound and make a painful and devastating emotional impact on a lover. The key issues of the survival of the bond are usually dominant, and it is more dangerous when one partner does not realize the feelings that the relationship stirs up.
Outside it may look like a very difficult relationship, but he/she would rather deal with the real issues that others deny or avoid. The Venus-Pluto relationship has a high tolerance for emotional pain, and it won't quit lightly. However, with Pluto involved he/she has likely had to face the darker side of love.
Venus-Neptune: This Drunk Love Can't Be good for Your Liver!
December 8, 2020 astrologyplace
Venus-Neptune: I Feel Like Fucking Cinderella at Midnight!
August 6, 2020 September 4, 2020 astrologyplace
Previous: Venus-Neptune Aspects: The Trouble with Aphrodite
Next: Neptune in 3rd House
Cancer and the Water Signs 6 years ago
Scary, Scary Pluto 4 years ago
Movements in the Heavens: Minor Transits 5 years ago
Pluto: Fritz Brunhubner 5 years ago
Mercury Sextile Uranus 5 years ago
Pluto in the 8th House – Psycho? 5 years ago
Neptune in the 11th House 7 years ago
Aspects in Astrology 11 years ago
Moon in the 7th House 10 years ago
That's a Funny, Dad 1 year ago


Cuban Link Chain – Which Gold Color Should You Choose?
If you want some great-looking and rugged jewelry, you can't go wrong with a quality-made Cuban link chain. You can wear them anywhere and never take them off if you like. You won't have to worry about problems like staining or dislocation when you have high-quality gold. However, you'll need to decide on a color. Should you choose white gold, silver, rose gold, or yellow gold? Here is information to help you decide.
Yellow gold is the standard for gold chains. If you can't make up your mind, yellow is the most popular color. It's perfect if you are going for a "classic look." Yellow looks good on everyone, but it's well-suited for men with darker skin tones.
White gold has different alloys than yellow gold. Yellow gold may contain copper and zinc, but white gold usually has a metal like palladium, nickel, or manganese. Some people need to be careful with white gold jewelry, due to nickel allergies. If you are allergic to nickel, white gold may irritate the skin. If you're not sure and you are prone to allergic reactions, you may want to stick with the classic yellow gold for your Cuban link chain.
Copper is what gives rose gold its reddish appearance. In fact, by controlling the percentage of copper, you can give rose gold a more reddish or pinkish hue. Rose gold may also contain silver or zinc, but it usually doesn't have nickel alloy.
Silver is a good option if you like white gold and want a lower price. Sterling silver has a lot of silver content and some copper. However, it's important to check the alloy content if you have allergies. No matter what color Cuban link chain you choose, you'll save money and hassles with a trusted online jeweler.


We are delighted to offer the famous Mpow Grip Magnetic Universal Car Mount Phone Holder for Windshield & Dashboard, iPhone 7/7 Plus/6 Plus/6S/6, Android Smartphones, etc.
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For this price, the Mpow Grip Magnetic Universal Car Mount Phone Holder for Windshield & Dashboard, iPhone 7/7 Plus/6 Plus/6S/6, Android Smartphones, etc comes widely recommended and is a popular choice amongst most people. Mpow have included some nice touches and this results in good value for money.


text:
Q: Save Image From ImagePicker Locally as a Memory(cache) I want to save an Image from ImagePicker  as a Memory but error Occured . Can you Please help me with this function and if another function needed to load image please Mentioned it below.
Uint8List? memoryImage;
  Future getImage() async {

     final picker = ImagePicker();
          final image = await picker.getImage(source: ImageSource.camera);

          if (image == null) return;
          final Directory directory = await getApplicationDocumentsDirectory();
          final path=directory.path;
          final Filename=basename(image.path);
          File file = File('$directory/$Filename.jpg');
        final bytes = await file.readAsBytes();
        final byte1=  file.writeAsBytes(bytes);

    setState(() {
      memoryImage = byte1 as Uint8List?;
    });

  }

A: With this line you can write image bytes as a file.
File imageFile = await File(fileSavePath).writeAsBytes(imageBytes);

To access the Uint8List from the file you need to use
Uint8List memoryImage = File(imagePath).readAsBytesSync();

Or
Uint8List memoryImage = await File(imagePath).readAsBytes();

here the problem in your code is you are assigning file to a Uint8List. That's the error I guess

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
History of the Loss of Vietnam ( , ) was a Văn ngôn book written by Phan Bội Châu, the leading Vietnamese anti-colonial revolutionary of the early 20th century, in 1905 while he was in Japan.

It was published by Liang Qichao, a leading Chinese nationalist revolutionary scholar then in Japan, who assisted Chau during his time attempting to drum up support for Vietnamese independence in China. The book was intended for distribution mainly in China and abroad, but also for smuggling into Vietnam to rally people to the cause of Vietnamese independence. The book helped popularize the word "Vietnam."  At the time, the country was generally called "Annam."

The book negatively assessed the response of the Nguyen dynasty in the 19th century to the colonial challenges facing Vietnam and the failure to modernise, with the Nguyễn instead turning to ultra-orthodox conservative Confucianism. The book presents strident and emotive memorials to the key figures of the Cần Vương (Protect the King) movement of the late 1880s and early 1890s, led by mandarins such as Tôn Thất Thuyết and Phan Đình Phùng, who led guerrillas against the French. The Cần Vương attempted to overthrow the French rule and establish the boy emperor Hàm Nghi as ruler of an independent Vietnam. History analyzed French social and economic policies in Vietnam, which it regards as oppression. In the book, Chau argues for the establishment of a nationwide pro-independence front with seven factions or interested groups with a specific motivation to fight the French colonial authorities.

The book was written in a style that differed from the prevailing writing technique and structure of the scholar gentry of the time. Chau eschewed this traditional style to write in a direct, ordinary prose style, especially in his analytical and argumentative sections.

The book was distributed in China at least five times, and the first two printings were incorporated into Liang's periodical magazine Hsin-min ts'ung-pao. The book was accompanied by a foreword by Liang, which was used to draw similarities between the situation facing Vietnam and China with respect to foreign domination. The book created a reaction in China, sparking follow-up essays by Chinese writers who were taken aback by the Chau's description of the life that faced Vietnamese people under French rule. It generated gloomy pieces by Chinese writers who predicted that their nation would suffer a similar fate if they failed to modernise. One such Chinese response later became a teaching text at the Tonkin Free School in Hanoi, a school run by Chau's contemporaries to promote the independence movement. However, Chau did not receive much of a reaction in terms of aid towards his independence efforts, since the book mainly had the effect of worrying Chinese about their own future. History had a much better reception among readers in Vietnam. Chau left Japan for the first time in August 1905, carrying fifty copies of the book that were distributed throughout Vietnam, of which further copies were made inside the country.

Notes

References

1905 books
Phan Bội Châu
Vietnamese history texts

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Saint Charles, VA (View All Cities)
36.82, -83.06
ZIP (~3 mile radius)
Saint Charles, VA
ZIP code 24282 is located in southwest Virginia and covers a slightly less than average land area compared to other ZIP codes in the United States. It also has a slightly less than average population density.
The people living in ZIP code 24282 are primarily white. The number of people in their late 20s to early 40s is extremely large while the number of middle aged adults is extremely large. There are also a large number of single parents and a small number of families. The percentage of children under 18 living in the 24282 ZIP code is slightly higher than average compared to other areas of the country.
For more information, see St. Charles, VA households.
Male 18 17 24 29 23 24 12 26 23 30 29 30 27 14 15 15 4 0
Female 20 20 28 27 13 21 20 29 28 17 23 33 26 17 18 8 11 8
Total 38 37 52 56 36 45 32 55 51 47 52 63 53 31 33 23 15 8
Under 5 18 20 38
75-79 15 8 23
80-84 4 11 15
85 Plus 0 8 8
Owner 0 14 42 44 70 37 28 5
Renter 8 10 16 13 8 5 3 0
Total 8 24 58 57 78 42 31 5
Male 2 3 4 4 2 6 4 2 3 8 3 3 2 8 6 9 7 2 5 6
Female 2 3 6 2 3 4 6 4 3 8 8 3 5 4 6 8 5 3 5 0
Total 4 6 10 6 5 10 10 6 6 16 11 6 7 12 12 17 12 5 10 6
The majority of household are owned or have a mortgage. Homes in ZIP code 24282 were primarily built in 1939 or earlier. Looking at 24282 real estate data, the median home value of $47,400 is low compared to the rest of the country. It is also slightly less than average compared to nearby ZIP codes. 24282 could be an area to look for cheap housing compared to surrounding areas. Rentals in 24282 are most commonly 3+ bedrooms. The rent for 3+ bedrooms is normally $500-$749/month including utilities. 2 bedrooms are also common and rent for $300-$499/month. Prices for rental property include ZIP code 24282 apartments, townhouses, and homes that are primary residences.
As with most parts of the country, vehicles are the most common form of transportation to places of employment. Pedestrians and cyclists beware. The area has some of lowest percentages of commutes without a vehicle in the country. In most parts of the country, the majority of commuters get to work in under half an hour. Most commuters in 24282 can expect to fall in that range. It is much more common for employees to have to travel over 45 minutes to their place of employment than most parts of country which could indicate bad traffic or that people typically live far from where they work.
The percentage of people that did not graduate high school is among the highest in the nation. A very small percentage of people in the area attended and graduated college.
Schools in ZIP Code 24282
ZIP Code 24282 is in the Lee County Public Schools. There are 1 different elementary schools and high schools with mailing addresses in ZIP code 24282.
Download a List of High Schools
Download a List of Elementary Schools
St. Charles Elementary
St. Charles, VA 24282
Grade Level: Primary/Elementary
District: Lee County Public Schools
Dryden, VA
Keokee, VA
Pennington Gap, VA
Cawood, KY
Evarts, KY
Closplint, KY


text:
El archipiélago de Hawái consta de 137 islas, situadas en el océano Pacífico a gran distancia de cualquiera otra tierra. Los polinesios llegaron a estas islas entre hace mil y dos mil años y en 1778 el Capitán James Cook y su tripulación se convirtieron en los primeros europeos en visitar Hawái (a las que llamaron Islas Sándwich). El arte creado en estas islas puede clasificarse en varias categorías: arte anterior a la llegada de Cook; arte producido por los occidentales al poco tiempo de llegar a las islas; y arte producido por hawaianos incorporando ideas y materiales occidentales. Pueden encontrarse colecciones públicas de arte hawaiano en el Museo de Arte de Honolulu, el Bishop Museum (Honolulu), el Museo de Arte del Estado de Hawái y la Universidad de Gotinga, en Alemania.

En 1967, Hawái se convirtió en el primer estado de los Estados Unidos en aprobar una Ley de tanto por ciento para el arte (Percent for Art law). La Ley del arte en los edificios del Estado (Art in State Buildings law) estableció el Programa de arte en espacios públicos (Art in Public Places Program) y destinó el uno por ciento del presupuesto de construcción de nuevas escuelas públicas y de edificios estatales a la adquisición de obras de arte, ya fuera mediante encargo o mediante compra de piezas ya existentes.

El arte anterior a la llegada de James Cook

El arte desarrollado con anterioridad a la llegada de James Cook es muy similar al arte de otras islas del Pacífico. Este arte incluye tallas de madera, trabajos con plumas, petroglifos, tela de corteza (llamado kapa en hawaiiano y tapa en otros lugares del Pacífico) y tatuajes. Los hawaianos nativos no conocieron ni el metal ni los tejidos de tela. La producción de estas formas de arte continuó después de la llegada de Cook. Algunos artesanos aún practican estas manifestaciones artísticas hawaianas tradicionales, tanto para vender a los turistas como para preservar la cultura nativa.

El arte producido por visitantes
Algunos de los primeros occidentales que visitaron Hawái eran artistas, tanto profesionales como aficionados. Muchos de los barcos de exploradores llevaban como parte de su tribulación a artistas profesionales para reproducir y dejar constancia de sus descubrimientos. Estos artistas hicieron bocetos y dibujaron a las personas y los paisajes de Hawái utilizando materiales y conceptos importados. En este grupo de artistas se incluyen Alfred Thomas Agate (estadounidense, 1812-1849), Mabel Álvarez (estadounidense de origen español, 1891-1985), Auguste Borget (francés, 1809-1877), George Henry Burgess (inglés, 1831-1905), Jean Charlot (francés, 1898-1979), Nicholas Chevalier (1828-1902), Louis Choris (germano–ucraniano, 1795-1828), Ernest William Christmas (australiano, 1863- 1918), Amelia R. Coats (estadounidense), Constance Fredericka Gordon Cumming (escocesa, 1837-1924), Robert Dampier (inglés, 1800-1874), Stanislas-Henri-Benoit Darondeau (francés, 1807-1841), John La Farge (estadounidense, 1835-1910), Ejler Andreas Jorgensen (danés, 1838-1876), Georgia O'Keeffe (estadounidense, 1887-1986), Roi George Partridge (estadounidense, 1888-1984), Ambrose McCarthy Patterson (australiano, 1877-1967), Enoch Wood Perry, Jr. (estadounidense, 1831-1915), James Gay Sawkins (británico, 1806-1878), Eduardo Lefebvre Scovell (inglés, 1864-1918), Joseph Henry Sharp (americano, 1859-1953), John Mix Stanley (estadounidense, 1814-1872), Joseph Dwight Strong (estadounidense, 1852-1899), Augustus Vincent Tack (estadounidense, 1870-1949), Adrien Taunay el joven (francés, 1803-1828), Jules Tavernier (francés, 1844-1889), William Pinkney Toler (estadounidense, 1826-1899), Hubert Vos (neerlandés, 1855-1935), Lionel Walden (estadounidense, 1861-1933), John Webber (anglosuizo, 1752-1793) y Theodore Wores (estadounidense, 1859-1939). Fueron especialmente populares las escenas nocturnas de volcanes en erupción, dando lugar a La Escuela del Volcán.

El arte producido por hawaianos y residentes permanentes
Las obras de arte producidas por nativos hawaianos y por residentes permanentes que incorporan ideas y materiales occidentales incluyen pinturas sobre lienzo y edredones. Pueden versar sobre temas claramente hawaianos o sobre otros tan diversos como sus respectivos lugares de origen. La mayoría del arte actualmente producido en Hawái corresponde a esta tercera categoría. Los principales artistas pertenecientes a esta categoría incluyen al escultor Satoru Abe (Hawái, 1926-), al tallador en madera Fritz Abplanalp (Suiza, 1907-1982), al escultor Bumpei Akaji (Hawái, 1921-2002), a Charles W. Bartlett (San Francisco,1860-1940), a la escultora Marguerite Louis Blasingame (Hawái, 1906-1947), al escultor Edward M. Brownlee (Oregón, 1929-), a Isami Doi (Hawái, 1903-1965), a Paul Emmert (Suiza, 1826-1867), a Robert Lee Eskridge (Pensilvania, 1891-1975), a la ceramista Sally Fletcher-Murchison (Hawái, 1933-), a Cornelia MacIntyre Foley (Hawái 1909-), a Juliette May Fraser (Hawái, 1887-1983), a Charles Furneaux (Boston, 1835-1913), Hon Chew Hee (Hawái, 1906-1993), a D. Howard Hitchcock (Hawái, 1861-1943), a Ogura Yonesuke Itoh (Japón, 1870-1940), a la Princesa Victoria Ka'iulani (Hawái, 1875-1899), a Herb Kawainui Kane (Minnesota, 1928-), a John Melville Kelly (California, 1877-1962), a la escultora Kate Kelly (1882-1964), a Keichi Kimura (Hawái, 1914-1988), a Sueko Matsueda Kimura (Hawái, a 1912-), a John Ingvard Kjargaard (Dinamarca, 1902), a Alan Leitner (California, 1947-), a Huc-Mazelet Luquiens (Massachusetts, 1881-1961), a Genevieve Springston Lynch (Oregón, 1891-1960), a Alexander Samuel MacLeod (Canadá, 1888-1956), a Arman Tatéos Manookian (Constantinopla, 1904-1931), a Joseph Nawahi (Hawái, 1842-1896), a Ben Norris (California, 1910-2006), a Louis Pohl (Cincinnati, 1915-1999), a Shirley Ximena Hopper Russell (Los Ángeles, 1886-1985), al escultor Mamoru Sato (Texas,1937-), a Tadashi Sato (Hawái, 1954-2005), a Lloyd Sexton, Jr. (Hawái, 1912-1990), a Alice Louise Judd Simpich (Hawái, 1918-2006), al ceramista Toshiko Takaezu (Hawái, 1922-2011), a Reuben Tam (Hawái,1916-1991), a Masami Teraoka (Japón, 1936-), al pintor John Paul Thomas (Alabama, 1927-2001), a Madge Tennent (Inglaterra, 1889-1972), a William Twigg-Smith (Nueva Zelanda, 1883-1950), a John Chin Young (Hawái, 1909-1997), al escultor Jerry Vasconcellos (Hawái, 1948 -) o al fotógrafo artístico Kim Taylor Reece (1949-).

Selección de obras de arte hawaiano

Referencias

 Arkinstall, Patricia Lorraine, A study of bark cloth from Hawaii, Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, An exploration of the regional development of distinctive styles of bark cloth and its relationship to other cultural factors, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966
 Blackburn, Mark, Hawaiiana, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA, 1996,
 Brigham, William Tufts, Ka hana kapa, making of bark-cloth in Hawaii, Honolulu, Bishop Museum Press, 1911
 Clarke, Joan and Diane Dods, Artists/Hawaii, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1996
 Congdon-Martin, Douglas, Aloha Spirit, Hawaiian Art and Popular Design, Schiffer Publishing, Atglen, PA, 1998
 Cox, J. Halley and William H. Davenport, Hawaiian Sculpture, University of Hawaii Press, 1988
 Department of Education, State of Hawaii, Artists of Hawaii, Honolulu, Department of Education, State of Hawaii, 1985
 Forbes, David W., Encounters with Paradise, Views of Hawaii and its People, 1778-1941, Honolulu Academy of Arts, 1992
 Forbes, David W., He Makana, The Gertrude Mary Joan Damon Haig Collection of Hawaiian Art, Paintings and Prints, Hawaii State Foundation of Culture and the Arts, 2013
 Forbes, David W., Paintings, Prints, and Drawings of Hawaii From the Sam and Mary Cooke Collection, University of Hawaii Press, 2016,
 Haar, Francis and Neogy, Prithwish, Artists of Hawaii: Nineteen Painters and Sculptors, University of Hawaii Press, 1974
 Honolulu Academy of Arts, Selected works, Honolulu, Hawaii: Honolulu Academy of Arts, 1990
 Kaeppler, Adrienne Lois, The fabrics of Hawaii (bark cloth), Leigh-on-Sea, F. Lewis, 1975
 Morse, Marcia, Honolulu Printmakers 75th Anniversary: A Tradition of Gift Prints, Honolulu Academy of Arts, 2003,
 Papanikolas, Theresa and DeSoto Brown, Art Deco Hawai'i, Honolulu, Hawaii: Honolulu Museum of Art, 2014,
 Radford, Georgia and Warren Radford, Sculpture in the Sun, Hawaii's Art for Open Spaces, University of Hawaii Press, 1978
 Sandulli, Justin M., Troubled Paradise: Madge Tennent at a Hawaiian Crossroads, Durham, NC: Duke University, 2016
 Serrao, Poakalani, The Hawaiian quilt, A spiritual experience, Reflection on its history, heritage, designing, quilting methods and patterns, Honolulu, Mutual Pub., 1997
 Severson, Don R., Finding Paradise, Island Art in Private Collections, University of Hawaii Press, 2002
 Yoshihara, Lisa A., Collective Visions, 1967-1997, An Exhibition Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the State Foundation on Culture and the Arts, Art in Public Places Program, Presented at the Honolulu Academy of Arts, September 3-October 12, 1997, Honolulu, State Foundation on Culture and the Arts, 1997

Enlaces externos

 Public Art in Public Places Project - Hawai'I
 Honolulu Museum of Art
 Bishop Museum
 Kapa Hawaii(The Art of Native Hawaiian Kapa)
 Cook-Foster Collection at Georg-August University in Göttingen, Germany
 Traditional Hawaiian Tattoos and Arts
 Kapa Connection
 Hawaii's Percent for Art law

Hawái