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Q: Decrypt 3DES DUKPT per the ANSI X9.24 part 1 standard I have a Magtek uDynamo and am trying to decrypt track 1. I have read the below and understand a little bit but don't know how to actually decrypt the data. The vendor said to use the ANSI test key to decrypt but I can't find anything on that. I have the KSN, session, and serial numbers. I have also tried some Java code I found, but it doesn't seem to work. It returns null or possibly I'm putting in the wrong BDK. I'm just using the serial number for that which I read somewhere. I'm doing this on Android. Preferably I would like code that runs on  the server not on the device so it goes encrypted across the line along with HTTPS.
How ciphertext was generated in card reader using DUKPT encryption?
3DES-DUKPT (CBC) decryption confirmation
https://github.com/yinheli/dukpt/blob/master/src/main/java/com/yinheli/tool/DukptDecrypt.java
Update
I'm looking to decrypt 3DES DUKPT per the ANSI X9.24 part 1 standard
I'm using this https://github.com/camcima/dukpt-php/tree/e8fceb4df8757e7e097c435221b4e93e097d3c9f
I had to update the files and make sure I got the most recent phpseclib and it runs but the data comes out like C��� ������4A�fr���( Wb������f�7z�n:�w�9��,��f7�,m=�z�CRW�
I must be missing something. I've tried different modes and I'm trying to look for encoding. Please let me know if you have a solution or ideas. Also their test data does work so I'm not sure what the difference is between mine and theirs
Code I'm running index.php in the root:
include 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DUKPT\DerivedKey;
use DUKPT\KeySerialNumber;
use DUKPT\Utility;

$encryptedHexData = 'de8bfe769dca885cf3cc312135fe2cccfacf176235f4bdee773d1865334315ed2aefcab613f1884b5d63051703d5a0e2bd5d1988eeabe641bd5d1988eeabe641';
$ksn = '00000232100117e00027';
$bdk = '0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210';

$key = new KeySerialNumber($ksn);
$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculateDataEncryptionRequestKey($key, $bdk);
$actual = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::removePadding(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true)));

echo $encryptionKey.'
';

echo $actual.'

';

A: With a proper BDK and KSN all you need to do now is try the different modes.
Right now you are using DerivedKey::calculateDataEncryptionRequestKey($key, $bdk);
You need to try the other modes to figure out which one your device is using. Here is the code I used to find the correct result for my device.
include 'vendor/autoload.php';

use DUKPT\DerivedKey;
use DUKPT\KeySerialNumber;
use DUKPT\Utility;

$encryptedHexData = 'C25C1D1197D31CAA87285D59A892047426D9182EC11353C051ADD6D0F072A6CB3436560B3071FC1FD11D9F7E74886742D9BEE0CFD1EA1064C213BB55278B2F12';
$ksn = 'FFFF9876543210E00008';
$bdk = '0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210';

$key = new KeySerialNumber($ksn);

$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculatePinEncryptionKey($key, $bdk);
$decryptedOutput = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true));
echo '

Pin Encryption Key: '.$encryptionKey;
echo '
Decrypted Output: '.$decryptedOutput;

$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculateMacRequestKey($key, $bdk);
$decryptedOutput = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true));
echo '

Mac Request Key: '.$encryptionKey;
echo '
Decrypted Output: '.$decryptedOutput;

$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculateMacResponseKey($key, $bdk);
$decryptedOutput = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true));
echo '

Mac Response Key: '.$encryptionKey;
echo '
Decrypted Output: '.$decryptedOutput;

$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculateDataEncryptionRequestKey($key, $bdk);
$decryptedOutput = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true));
echo '

Data Encryption Request Key: '.$encryptionKey;
echo '
Decrypted Output: '.$decryptedOutput;

$encryptionKey = DerivedKey::calculateDataEncryptionResponseKey($key, $bdk);
$decryptedOutput = Utility::hex2bin(Utility::tripleDesDecrypt($encryptedHexData, $encryptionKey, true));
echo '

Data Encryption Response Key: '.$encryptionKey;
echo '
Decrypted Output: '.$decryptedOutput;

So for this BDK and KSN the below is the resulting output.
Pin Encryption Key: 27F66D5244FF621EAA6F6120EDEB427F
Decrypted Output: %B5452300551227189^HOGAN/PAUL ^08043210000000725000000?

Mac Request Key: 27F66D5244FF9DE1AA6F6120EDEBBD80
Decrypted Output: W����U�P�TfB/`����þ&��f��3y;�U�Zy��UK�[��s�;�>�[�b

Mac Response Key: 27F66D52BBFF62E1AA6F612012EB4280
Decrypted Output: b�K2a�S0��9�Mb-����*L�J���� ��s�\���H�����=���e�]�,���Hwq�

Data Encryption Request Key: C39B2778B058AC376FB18DC906F75CBA
Decrypted Output: RA]�ԅⱰQ���'v}b��h��St�����?� lu/�ٵ�P��!���6�� �

Data Encryption Response Key: 846E267CB822197406DA2B161191C6E4
Decrypted Output: ��,�B^FZ�� ςs�c���*E�4��0��ǂ}����6`-P�b�ʞ̳aصĬ�&���+��


text:
Why can't kids just be kids?
Dan Flynn | October 18, 2016
Taxpayers could be getting more than they bargained for with the Victorian Government sexualising children through its $21.8 million Respectful Relationships program, according to the Australian Christian Lobby.
The classroom videos linked to and approved by the new Respectful Relationships program discussed on ABC's Q&A program last night assume under-age students will be engaging in sexual activity and exploring all its possibilities.
ACL Victorian Director Dan Flynn said that the program purports to teach students how to make good relationship choices, but instead through the Practical Guide to Love, Sex and Relationships, developed by La Trobe University's Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society (ARCSHS), it normalises sexual behaviours for students from the age of 13.
The La Trobe centre was also behind the controversial Safe School program which teaches students that gender is fluid.
"The link between the early sexualisation of children and 'grooming' practiced by paedophiles, which seeks to normalise sex for children, is of concern to many Australian parents," Mr Flynn said.
Ironically, in the midst of such disturbingly sexually explicit imagery, one of the videos acknowledges that 'it is illegal in Australia to show a person under the age of 16 an indecent object or film'.
"The appearance of content in the classroom that most parents would banish from TV and computer screens at home, is therefore concerning," Mr Flynn said.
"The inclusion of such material in the regular high school curriculum assumes a level of sexual interest and activity which is inconsistent with the age of their intended audience."
These videos even acknowledge this, saying:
"And, of course, not everyone is interested in sex. If this is you, we're sorry you have to listen to this crap. But you do."
After extensively surveying potential problems of STIs and pregnancy, in an up-beat style with lots of swearing, the presenters conclude:
"You could always not have sex, ever." To which the other replies "Don't be stupid!"
The Minister for Education James Merlino said last week,
"This is about teaching our kids to treat everyone with respect and dignity so we can start the cultural change we need in our society to end the scourge of family violence."
Mr. Flynn has today urged the Education Minister to immediately remove the links to the explicit ARCSHS videos if it is going to have any credibility in developing a culture of respect for women.
education media

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


As part of our outreach to the Akron area our church is sponsoring 3 new Signs of the Times Boxes with free copies of the message filled Signs of the Times Magazine. Additionally, each magazine has a tear-out signup card for the Discover Bible School Lessons. We invite you to visit these boxes and see what they look like in person and pause there to pray for the individuals that pickup these magazines, that their hearts may be touched by the gospel filled articles in these magazines.
the Radio Shack store, S. Arlington Street and the Family Dollar, South Arlington Street. Please pray for us as we begin this ministry.
You can read Signs of the times online at http://www.signstimes.com/.
Join the Akron Area Interfaith Council for the 2012 Walk To Stop Hunger on May 6, 2012. Registration is at 2:00 pm and the walk begins at 3:00 pm. The walk will begin and end at the Unitarian Universalist Church at 3300 Morewood Road. The walk will be 2 1/2 miles and will follow Morewood Road and West Market Street.
After the walk there will be a hot soup. 100 percent of donations go to the Akron-Canton Regional Foodbank. Non-perishable foods will also be collected at registration. For more information, please visit www.aaichungerwalk.org, email info@aaichungerwalk.org, or call 330.329.5132.
The signs of the times suggest that we're very near to the return of Jesus Christ. Deciphering Bible prophecy will help to bring meaning to current events. Come join us for a series of meetings, beginning on September the 30th, on understanding Bible prophecies and designed to give you a hope and peace about the unknown future.
The Prophecies Decoded Bible seminar will be simulcasted at the Akron First Seventh-day Adventist church from Nashville, Tennessee. Meetings will be held each Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday & Saturday evening at 7:30pm, running from September the 30th to October the 29th. Please visit http://akronadventist.com/prophecies-decoded/ for more information.
This coming weekend, September the 9th and 10th our church will be hosting a Discover Bible School Rally featuring radio and tv host Lonnie Melashenko. Lonnie will lead us out in two powerful days of study with an easy‐to‐use Bible marking plan to place a wealth of Bible knowledge at our fingertips. The meetings are designed to illustrate the important truths for the end‐time and help to transform your own Bible into a virtual encyclopedia of biblical information.
International speaker, E. Lonnie Melashenko, former Director‐Speaker of The Voice of Prophecy radio program (1989‐2008), brings 42 years of ministry into focus having served as pastor, evangelist, seminar speaker, author, gospel recording artist and radio‐TV host. Presently he serves at Kettering Health Network (Dayton, OH) as Vice President for Spiritual Services and Missions. You can find out more information about Lonne by going to this link at the Voice of Prophecy's website.
The series will be hosted by the Akron First Seventh-day Adventist Church. For location information and directions please see our Visitors page. Child care and a free lunch on Saturday afternoon will be provided.
A free New King James Version Andrews Study Bible (12,000 study notes, maps & much, much more) will be give to all participants. Learn more about this exciting and dynamic Bible to help study God's word here.
The Adventist church has numerous television ministries in North America continue to proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ. These programs and channels are available online through each ministries website or can be watched through various television channels. Some of these ministries are listed below along with where they can be watched in Northeast Ohio. May they be a blessing to you.
Hope TV is the official television channel of the Adventist church. It is available on DirecTV (Ch. 368) and streaming at hopetv.org or through your iPhone.
Note: To receive the Hope Channel on DirecTV you can use any receiver, but your dish must have 3 or 5 LNBFs (the electronic "eyes" on the arm in front of the dish). Hope Channel is not transmitted on the main DirecTV satellite, but is carried on a side satellite. This means that if you have DirecTV service with a small 18″ dish and single LNBF you must upgrade your system. DirecTV offers this upgrade to existing customers for around $50.
Breath of Life targets an urban audience and can can be found on the Discovery Channel or Hope Channel on Sunday at 7 AM and on the Word Network Sunday at 1:30 PM. These stations can be found on Time Warner Akron & Canton and on DirectTV.
Faith for Today's Lifestyle Magazine centers on discussions around with health, spiritual and moral issues. Faith for Today airs on the Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN), locally on WDLI Channel 17 on Thursdays at 1:30 PM.
All children in kindergarten through the sixth grade are welcome to come join us at "Saddle Ridge Ranch" for a great time for Vacation Bible School. The fun runs from July the 19th to July the 23rd from 6:00 – 8:00 PM each evening at the Akron First Seventh-day Adventist Church.
Besides the local hometown campmeeting in Wooster, Ohio on June 18th and 19th (More information here) there were be several other hometown campmeetings scattered throught Ohio over the next several months. More information about each event is listed below.
Dave Weigley, President, Columbia Union, Philip Samaan, Professor of Religion at Southern Adventist University, and Richard O'Ffill, Author and Speaker.
Adventist Book Center will be on-site and free primitive camping will be available on the banks of Big Walnut Creek.
Find out more on Columbus Eastwood's Facebook page or at their church website.
Camp Meeting and Vacation Bible School programs will run each evening from 6:30 – 8:30 pm. Each day an expert will lead in discussing a special topic, including health, finances and parenting.
We invite you to attend the second annual Hometown Camp Meeting in Wooster, Ohio at the Ohio Agricultural Research & Development Center (OARDC) Secrest Amphitheater. You will be blessed as you come to worship God under the pines and to enjoy God's nature and beauty all around you. We pray you will enjoy the songs we sing together, the sharing of God's word and the beauty you will drink in as you walk the grounds of the OARDC. In the sharing of the word throughout the weekend Chaplain Clive Wilson will share with us what it means to have a personal encounter with Jesus on a daily basis and to have God's power in our lives as we journey with Him.
There will also be a special prayer walk that will be available to you starting Friday evening. You will journey with Jesus on this special walk and we pray the Holy Spirit will speak to your heart and draw you to a closer walk with Jesus. Listen for that still small voice as Jesus speaks His love to you in a special way. Paul Muniz will be presenting messages in Spanish for the Hispanic group this year. We are so excited to be able to include our brothers and sisters in Christ. We look forward to having you with us.
There will be a children's morning program on June 19, 2010 @ 10:30 a.m. located at the OARDC. Directions will be given upon arrival. There will also be a puppet show in the afternoon for all to enjoy. Friday evening all ages meet together at the OARDC.
Young adults will meet at the Wooster Seventh-day Adventist Church at 445 North Bever Street, Wooster, OH 44691 in the fellowship hall. There will be a shuttle bus to transport them to the OARDC for meal time. Friday evening ALL ages will meet together at the OARDC.
As you arrive at the OARDC you will follow black arrows to the Amphitheater. There will be parking attendants to direct you for parking. If you are physically challenged there will be a golf cart to transport you down to the amphitheater. Bring a blanket for sitting on the grass if you wish, or bring your favorite lawn chair for greater comfort. If you have any questions please feel free to call. Look forward to seeing you there.
Chaplain Clive was born in the quaint town of Bedford, United Kingdom and is the youngest of six children. Presently Clive joyfully serves as the Campus Chaplain for Kettering College of Medical Arts in Kettering, Ohio, where as an assistant professor, he also teaches classes in religion and theology at the undergraduate level. Clive is also responsible, along with a team of talented student leaders, for the spiritual programming on the college campus. Clive also works alongside the pastoral team at the Kettering Seventh day Adventist church, (the college church), teaching and speaking there regularly.
Clive is married to the beautiful and super talented Geeta (nee Patel) Wilson, and together they have four handsome sons: Premkush, Rishi, Kishi and Khushi.
laws of God. Recently he was partnered with his wife Esperanza; together they work to bring souls to Jesus' precinct of love, power and hope.
Esperanza Alvarez-Muniz, a former teacher, completed her master in Divinity from Andrews University in 2007, where she currently serves as a Dean of women. She has been very active in youth ministries for the past twenty years and envisions empowering young people to have a cool and personal relationship with Jesus.
Pastors Paul and Esperanza Muniz are determined to share the love for their Savior, with people of all walks of life encouraging them to "taste the Lord for and see that the Lord is good" (Ps. 34:8). Through their precinct ministry of love, power and hope they are committed to teach, train, and empower this generation to strive and shine for Christ.
A full gospel concert will be given Saturday night at 6:30 p.m. in the OARDC Amphitheater by The Gospel Echoes Quartet. We look forward to sharing in song and praise to our heavenly Father during this special time together.
If you are looking for a lively group on Sabbath morning, look no further than the Kindergarten Sabbath School room. We generally have anywhere from four to eight 4 & 5 year-olds in attendance, and are pleased to now have several children from the Spanish church attending on a regular basis. Despite the language and cultural differences, all of our members have a common bond: unlimited energy! Whether they are singing, praying, learning about God through Nature Time, or listening intently to one of the exciting Bible stories, these kids do it with enthusiasm. As you can see, rarely can we get them stand still for a picture!
Our lessons for the month of April focus on the life of Jacob. It is so encouraging to hear them ask "what happens next?" when we end each week's story. God is blessing our class, and we are so thankful for each of our Kindergarteners. If anyone is able to play the piano for our song service, please let Dave or Michele Keyes know!
Join us for the Firestone Park Community Christmas Concert featuring the combined choirs of eight churches in the Firestone Park area in addition to a children's choir, orchestra and hand bells. The concert is free of charge and will be held on December the 5th at 7:00 PM at the Akron First Seventh-day Adventist Church.
Particpating churches include the Akron Chinese Christian Church, Akron First Seveth-day Adventist Church, Antioch Baptist Church, Community Fellowship Chapel, Firestone Park United Methodist Church, Firestone Park Presbyterian Church, Saint John The Baptist Catholic Church, and Saint Paul's Catholic Church.


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Home » News » Venezuela: Claims of Fraud in a controversial vote
Venezuela: Claims of Fraud in a controversial vote
August 7, 2017 by News Desk
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Paula Osorio member of l"association Dialogo por Venezuela explains why opposition thinks there was a fraud in the venezuelan"s constitutional assembly vote
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Navarro: More in and out of WH than a brothel
Venezuela: Why dissent in the army could spell disaster


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World's first sustainable town
by September 7, 2016 September 19, 2016 Leave a CommentWorld's first sustainable townNews
LUJAYN HAWARI
Tropical agriculture farm-to-table culinary program. Source: Kate Stewart, The Sign Post
The world's first environmentally sustainable town, Kalu Yala, is being built in the Republic of Panama.
Located in the Tres Brazos Valley outside of Panama City and only 45 minutes from Panama's International Airport, the town is a model for the world on how to live smarter.
In an article by Matt Petronzio on Mashable.com, Kalu Yala's CEO Jimmy Stice, says he was just 12 years old when he was playing Sim City and dreaming of the perfect place to live.
Stice says people growing in the same demographic limits "the future potential of each individual who's born into these communities, which means we're limiting our entire society's potential."
As a result, Stice wanted to a create a more dynamic and interactive place that made people happy, Petranzio says in his article.
The Kalu Yala project invites young innovators, students, and professionals from around the world to work together, using their knowledge and skills, in the search for the best practices in sustainability and quality living.
The project is looking for innovators, students, and professionals from a wide range of study areas, including architecture, design, biology, environmentalism, health, outdoor recreation, business, education, media, and even language.
"Environmental sustainability is usually overlooked in terms of architecture and engineering which is extremely risky and terrible considering that architecture is in fact one of the main reasons as to why we do have problems in our atmosphere and ecosystem" architecture student, Dalia Fay says.
"Exploring architecture not only for housing but to save the world is necessary" she says.
Students are given the opportunity to apply their studies in the real world and be a part of Kalu Yala's first civic institution, the research and development team.
The project is also a launchpad for new businesses, whereby an incubator and funding ramp have been built to cater exclusively to young and local entrepreneurs.
It's goal is to transcend traditional real estate by bringing people together, and giving them part ownership of where they live.
Environmentally sustainable practices of Kalu Yala include open-air housing, off-the-grid energy using solar battery packs, and tropical agriculture to decrease the need for imported food.
"Kalu Yala is really trying to become the hub for sustainability in the tropics, and a tropical laboratory to experiment and develop products that can be exported…around the world" Stice says.
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The importance of acknowledgement and appreciation - 'Make way for everyone's talent'
The aim of the new academic programme focusing on acknowledgement and appreciation? Briefly put: more opportunities and appreciation for the unique talents embodied by academics. This new approach is intended to ultimately result in lower work pressure in the knowledge sector.
Research achievements and academic publications are still the main standards for acknowledgement and appreciation in the academic world. According to Kim Huijpen, the VSNU's Acknowledgement and Appreciation programme manager, however, academic careers are still far too 'one size fits all' as a result. 'You do a PhD, start out as a researcher, apply for funding and in this manner slowly scale the academic ladder. Universities and research funders primarily look at publications, particularly ones in high-impact journals. There is not much latitude to take another route. In addition, the strong emphasis on publications in many cases leads to work pressure that is pretty high.'
Multi-coloured spectrum
Huijpen considers this a pity. 'The academic spectrum has far more colours than this. Universities and research institutes are not just intended for teaching and research, but also to maintain connections with the society around us. Leadership is another issue that often takes a back seat in academia. The same goes for patient care in university medical centres.'
In November 2019, the VSNU and other parties in the knowledge sector published a position paper entitled Ruimte voor ieders talent (Opportunity for everyone's talent). In it, the authors make the case for wider acknowledgement and appreciation of the work of academics, with less emphasis on numbers of publications and more on the other domains in which they operate (such as teaching and valorisation).
'The academic spectrum has many more colours than just teaching or research.'
Better opportunities
According to Huijpen, it is important to ensure a more pleasant working environment, without the stress of excessive pressure to publish. 'To that end, we want to create better opportunities, for example for open access publications, as well as for open science, where society is more involved in research. Greater appreciation of team achievements is also important to us.'
Ultimately, academics need to have more say about their careers, Huijpen explains. 'That means that they will be able to focus more on teaching, if that's what they want, or on a role as manager or supervisor, or on working together with the business world or in patient care. And then they need to receive appreciation for this too.'
Getting started with committies
By now, all of the research universities and other research centres have set up special committees to deal with this theme. 'What we want in particular is for the movement to be formed and fed by academics themselves, and that they themselves set the tone in the debate about acknowledgement and appreciation. The fact that people are unable to meet one another in person due to the coronavirus crisis is of course an obstacle in this regard.
Luckily, we are seeing online consultation taking place, with many committees indicating that they would like to continue their work, despite the current circumstances. This goes to show that this is a popular topic in academia in the Netherlands.'
'We're not looking for exceptionally multi-talented individuals, but are looking to allow everyone to make the most of their talents.'
Multi-talented individuals
Yet the question also remains whether acknowledging and showing appreciation of others in some other way will not ultimately lead to even greater work pressure. Does this mean that, in the future, academics will need to be talented in multiple areas in order to receive sufficient acknowledgement? Certainly not, Huijpen clarifies. 'We're not looking for exceptionally multi-talented individuals, but are looking to allow everyone to make the most of their talents.'
HR instruments for acknowledgement and appreciation
The role of HR departments in all this will primarily be to put it on the agenda. 'I think it's an HR department's duty to bring academics together so they can engage in debate. Another important duty is tending to the administrative instruments. What do assessment forms, job vacancy postings and other HR instruments currently look like? What do they say? How should they be changed? Take, for example, the H index. Is it still being inquired about? HR instruments can have a really strong influence and help maintain a certain culture as a result.'
'The result of the debate will differ from university to university, discipline to discipline and department to department.'
No strict recipe
At UMC Utrecht, the debate about acknowledgement and appreciation already began in earnest a few years ago, Huijpen tells us. 'There too, discussion included the topic of whether, for example, the H index was still a suitable means of measurement. It is good to realise that there is no strict new recipe for this, and that the result will differ from university to university, discipline to discipline and department to department. The mission of a department concerned with biotechnology will of course differ from that of a cultural anthropology department, so this will require other performance indicators as well.'
A great deal of enthusiasm
All things considered, Huijpen sees that there is a great deal of enthusiasm to take on this topic. But first things first, she emphasises. 'Before we take concrete steps in adjusting instruments, that mutual debate needs to take place. Only then will we be able to achieve this strong shift in culture. And then we will really be able to actually introduce a new manner of acknowledgement and showing appreciation, ultimately resulting in lower work pressure.'
Text written by: Joost Peters| The Sofokles Online Magazine can be found here|


text:
You are here: Home / Tour Operators / Bain Capital Expected to Sell Major Tour Operator Next Month
Bain Capital Expected to Sell Major Tour Operator Next Month
November 9, 2016 by Tom Berrigan
Boston-based venture capital firm Bain Capital Private Equity is expected to complete the sale of its Apple Leisure Group, which includes Apple Vacations, one of the largest tour operators in the U.S., by Christmas. This is the report from the Latin American news portal, REPORTUR.
Based near Philadelphia, the Apple Leisure Group also includes the tour operator Travel Impressions (which sells and markets a wide range of U.S. product) as well as AMR Resorts, CheapCaribbean.com and several other unites.
When Apple Leisure Group, which some estimates have pegged as worth $1.5 billion, announced late last June that it was looking for a corporate suitor, a Reuters report suggested that there was interest in the company from Chinese investors, including the conglomerate HNA Group—it is headquartered in Haiku, China—which has been on an acquisition spree during the past year of travel-related properties.
It was in 2001 that Alejandro Zozaya, Apple Leisure Group's CEO, founded the resort sales, marketing, and brand management company, AMResorts. A decade later, Zozaya helped create Apple Leisure Group by making tour operator, Apple Vacations, a sister company of AMResorts.
Bain Capital acquired a majority stake in Apple Leisure Group in late 2012, which then acquired online leisure wholesaler CheapCaribbean and B2B tour operator Travel Impressions from American Express, in 2013.
Since the announcement last June that Bain was pursuing the sale of Apple Leisure Group, there has been very little reported on the matter. Proposals are being screened by Credit Suisse, which is assisting Bain Capital with the process.
Based in Boston, Bain was co-founded in 1984 by Mitt Romney, a one-time governor of Massachusetts (2003-2007) and the Republican Party's candidate for U.S. president in 2012. He left Bain Capital in 2002.
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text:
Orchestina furcillata is een spinnensoort in de taxonomische indeling van de Dwergcelspinnen (Oonopidae).

Het dier behoort tot het geslacht Orchestina. De wetenschappelijke naam van de soort werd voor het eerst geldig gepubliceerd in 2008 door Jörg Wunderlich.

Gnoomspinnen

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Works by Richard Pettigrew
( view other items matching `Richard Pettigrew`, view all matches )
Disambiguations Disambiguations:
Richard Pettigrew [75] Richard G. Pettigrew [3]
Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.details
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...) of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. (shrink)
Bayesian Reasoning, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
Chance-Credence Principles in Philosophy of Probability
Conditionalization in Philosophy of Probability
Epistemic Value in Epistemology
Indifference Principles in Philosophy of Probability
Scoring Rules in Philosophy of Probability
$28.95 new $41.85 used Amazon page
An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.details
Updating Principles in Philosophy of Probability
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent's possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she attempts (...) to follow Accuracy, and we show that the only inaccuracy measures that do not give rise to such dilemmas are the quadratic inaccuracy measures. In the sequel, we derive the main tenets of Bayesianism from the relevant mathematical versions of Accuracy to which this characterization of the legitimate inaccuracy measures gives rise, but we also show that Jeffrey conditionalization has to be replaced by a different method of update in order for Accuracy to be satisfied. (shrink)
Degrees of Belief in Philosophy of Probability
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
In Bayesian epistemology, the problem of the priors is this: How should we set our credences (or degrees of belief) in the absence of evidence? That is, how should we set our prior or initial credences, the credences with which we begin our credal life? David Lewis liked to call an agent at the beginning of her credal journey a superbaby. The problem of the priors asks for the norms that govern these superbabies. -/- The Principle of Indifference gives a (...) very restrictive answer. It demands that such an agent divide her credences equally over all possibilities. That is, according to the Principle of Indifference, only one initial credence function is permissible, namely, the uniform distribution. In this paper, we offer a novel argument for the Principle of Indifference. I call it the Argument from Accuracy. (shrink)
Prior Probabilities in Philosophy of Probability
Probabilistic Principles, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent's possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism (...) follow from the norm, while the characteristic claim of the Objectivist Bayesian follows from the norm along with an extra assumption. Finally, we consider Richard Jeffrey's proposed generalization of conditionalization. We show not only that his rule cannot be derived from the norm, unless the requirement of Rigidity is imposed from the start, but further that the norm reveals it to be illegitimate. We end by deriving an alternative updating rule for those cases in which Jeffrey's is usually supposed to apply. (shrink)
Formal Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology
Transformative Experience and Decision Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):766-774.details
This paper is part of a book symposium for L. A. Paul (2014) Transformative Experience (OUP).
Decision-Theoretic Frameworks, Misc in Philosophy of Action
Pratical Reason, Misc in Philosophy of Action
Utility in Philosophy of Action
Choosing for Changing Selves.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives. Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.
Decision Theory and Ethics in Philosophy of Action
Normative and Descriptive Decision Theory in Philosophy of Action
The Self, Misc in Metaphysics
Topics in Decision Theory, Misc in Philosophy of Action
Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
In 'A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism', Jim Joyce attempts to 'depragmatize' de Finetti's prevision argument for the claim that our partial beliefs ought to satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. In this paper, I adapt Joyce's argument to give a non-pragmatic vindication of various versions of David Lewis' Principal Principle, such as the version based on Isaac Levi's account of admissibility, Michael Thau and Ned Hall's New Principle, and Jenann Ismael's Generalized Principal Principle. Joyce enumerates properties that must be had (...) by any measure of the distance from a set of partial beliefs to the set of truth values; he shows that, on any such measure, and for any set of partial beliefs that violates the probability axioms, there is a set that satisfies those axioms that is closer to every possible set of truth values. I replace truth values by objective chances in his argument; I show that for any set of partial beliefs that violates the probability axioms or a version of the Principal Principle, there is a set that satisfies them that is closer to every possible set of objective chances. (shrink)
Chance and Objective Probability, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
Humeanism and Nonhumeanism about Chance in Philosophy of Probability
What is Justified Credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman, 1979, 2008) and indicator reliabilism (Alston, 1988, 2005). Existing accounts of reliabilism about justified credence comes in the same two varieties: Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes a version of process reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers a version of indicator reliabilism. As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it (...) is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts explains how justification is connected to anything of epistemic value. We will call this the Connection Problem. I begin by describing Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn's reliabilism and Tang's. Thus, I reach the top of the same mountain as well. (shrink)
Epistemological Theories, Misc in Epistemology
Reliabilism about Justification in Epistemology
Social Epistemology in Epistemology
The Generality Problem for Reliabilism in Epistemology
A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce's argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that (...) paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce's assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms. (shrink)
On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
to appear in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6 We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And (...) how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular group in question? According to the credal judgment aggregation principle, Linear Pooling, the credence function of a group should be a weighted average or linear pool of the credence functions of the individuals in the group. In this paper, I give an argument for Linear Pooling based on considerations of accuracy. And I respond to two standard objections to the aggregation principle. (shrink)
Judgment Aggregation in Social and Political Philosophy
Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
Our beliefs come in degrees. I'm 70% confident it will rain tomorrow, and 0.001% sure my lottery ticket will win. What's more, we think these degrees of belief should abide by certain principles if they are to be rational. For instance, you shouldn't believe that a person's taller than 6ft more strongly than you believe that they're taller than 5ft, since the former entails the latter. In Dutch Book arguments, we try to establish the principles of rationality for degrees of (...) belief by appealing to their role in guiding decisions. In particular, we show that degrees of belief that don't satisfy the principles will always guide action in some way that is bad or undesirable. In this Element, we present Dutch Book arguments for the principles of Probabilism, Conditionalization, and the Reflection Principle, among others, and we formulate and consider the most serious objections to them. (shrink)
Betting Interpretations and Dutch Books in Philosophy of Probability
What is conditionalization, and why should we do it?Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3427-3463.details
Conditionalization is one of the central norms of Bayesian epistemology. But there are a number of competing formulations, and a number of arguments that purport to establish it. In this paper, I explore which formulations of the norm are supported by which arguments. In their standard formulations, each of the arguments I consider here depends on the same assumption, which I call Deterministic Updating. I will investigate whether it is possible to amend these arguments so that they no longer depend (...) on it. As I show, whether this is possible depends on the formulation of the norm under consideration. (shrink)
On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I (...) suggest two responses to Hedden's objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second, I suggest that even the proponent of the Expected Utility Objection should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted version of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument. (shrink)
Philosophy of Probability, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
Subjective Probability, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Hacking :311–325, 1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes: an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time; (...) an account of how we reduce our logical ignorance by learning logical facts and how we should update our credences in response to such evidence; and an account of when logical ignorance is irrational and when it isn't. At the end, I explain why the requirement of logical omniscience remains true of ideal agents with no computational, processing, or storage limitations. (shrink)
Epistemology of Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic
The Problem of Old Evidence in Philosophy of Probability
The Dutch Book Argument.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
Beliefs come in different strengths. An agent's credence in a proposition is a measure of the strength of her belief in that proposition. Various norms for credences have been proposed. Traditionally, philosophers have tried to argue for these norms by showing that any agent who violates them will be lead by her credences to make bad decisions. In this article, we survey a new strategy for justifying these norms. The strategy begins by identifying an epistemic utility function and a decision-theoretic (...) norm; we then show that the decision-theoretic norm applied to the epistemic utility function yields the norm for credences that we wish to justify. We survey results already obtained using this strategy, and we suggest directions for future research. (shrink)
Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.James Ladyman, Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):162-186.details
Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be 'factorized' into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new and surprising facts are (...) proved; for instance, that weak dis- cernibility corresponds to discernibility in a language with constants for every object, and that weak discernibility is the most discerning nontrivial discernibility relation. (shrink)
Identity of Indiscernibles in Metaphysics
Identity, Misc in Metaphysics
Logic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works in Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Mathematical Structuralism in Philosophy of Mathematics
Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism.Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):267-283.details
If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such 'foreign' properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction meant to purge mathematical objects of all 'foreign' properties. One form is inspired by Frege; the other (...) by Dedekind. We argue that both face problems. (shrink)
Numbers in Philosophy of Mathematics
We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular (...) group in question? According to the credal judgement aggregation principle, linear pooling, the credence function of a group should be a weighted average or linear pool of the credence functions of the individuals in the group. In this chapter, I give an argument for linear pooling based on considerations of accuracy. And I respond to two standard objections to the aggregation principle. (shrink)
Epistemology of Disagreement in Epistemology
Risk, Rationality and Expected Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.details
There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak's risk-weighted expected utility theory. I (...) will show that the orthodoxy can be made to accommodate all of the preferences that Buchak's theory can accommodate. (shrink)
Preferences in Decision Theory in Philosophy of Action
Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis's version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...) argument, depending on how you understand the status of these conditions. Reading 1: The correct account of admissibility is determined independently of these two principles, and yet these two principles follow from that correct account. Reading 2: The correct account of admissibility is determined in part by these two principles, so that the principles follow from that account but only because the correct account is constrained so that it must satisfy them. HLWW show that given an account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. I argue that on either reading of the argument, it fails. First, I argue that there is a plausible account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 are false. That defeats Reading 1. Next, I argue that the intuitions that lead us to assent to Condition 2 also lead us to assent to other very closely related principles that are inconsistent with Condition 2. This, I claim, casts doubt on the reliability of those intuitions, and thus removes our justification for Condition 2. This defeats Reading 2 of the HLWW argument. Thus, the argument fails. 1Introduction 2Introducing the Principal Principle 3Introducing the Principle of Indifference 4The HLWW Argument 4.1Reading 1: Admissibility justifies Conditions 1 and 2 4.2Reading 2: Conditions 1 and 2 constrain admissibility 5Conclusion. (shrink)
The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
(This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...) a measure of the strength of my belief in it; it represents my level of confidence in it. These are the states of mind we report when we say things like 'I'm 20% confident I switch off the gas before I left' or 'I'm 99.9% confident that it is raining outside'. -/- There are laws that govern these credences. For instance, I shouldn't be more confident that sea levels will rise by over 2 metres in the next 100 years than I am that they'll rise by over 1 metre, since the latter is true if the former is. This book is about a particular way we might try to establish these laws of credence: the Dutch Book arguments (For briefer overviews of these arguments, see Alan Hájek's entry in the Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice and Susan Vineberg's entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia.) -/- We begin, in Chapter 2, with the standard formulation of the various Dutch Book arguments that we'll consider: arguments for Probabilism, Countable Additivity, Regularity, and the Principal Principle. In Chapter 3, we subject this standard formulation to rigorous stress-testing, and make some small adjustments so that it can withstand various objections. What we are left with is still recognisably the orthodox Dutch Book argument. In Chapter 4, we set out the Dutch Strategy argument for Conditionalization. In Chapters 5 and 6, we consider two objections to Dutch Book arguments that cannot be addressed by making small adjustments. Instead, we must completely redesign those arguments, replacing them with ones that share a general approach but few specific details. In Chapter 7, we consider a further objection to which I do not have a response. In Chapter 8, we'll ask what happens to the Dutch Book arguments if we change certain features of the basic framework in which we've been working: first, we ask how Dutch Book arguments fare when we consider credences in self-locating propositions, such as It is Monday; second, we lift the assumption that the background logic is classical and explore Dutch Book arguments for non-classical logics; third, we lift the assumption that an agent's credal state can be represented by a single assignment of numerical values to the propositions she considers. In Chapter 9, we present the mathematical results that underpin these arguments. (shrink)
Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.details
In "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism", Jim Joyce argues that our credences should obey the axioms of the probability calculus by showing that, if they don't, there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than ours. But it seems that accuracy is not the only goal of credences: there is also the goal of matching one's credences to one's evidence. I will consider four ways in which we might make this latter goal precise: on the first, (...) the norms to which this goal gives rise act as 'side constraints' on our choice of credences; on the second, matching credences to evidence is a goal that is weighed against accuracy to give the overall cognitive value of credences; on the third, as on the second, proximity to the evidential goal and proximity to the goal of accuracy are both sources of value, but this time they are incomparable; on the fourth, the evidential goal is not an independent goal at all, but rather a byproduct of the goal of accuracy. All but the fourth way of making the evidential goal precise are pluralist about credal virtue: there is the virtue of being accurate and there is the virtue of matching the evidence and neither reduces to the other. The fourth way is monist about credal virtue: there is just the virtue of being accurate. The pluralist positions lead to problems for Joyce's argument; the monist position avoids them. I endorse the latter. (shrink)
Evidence, Misc in Epistemology
Evidentialism in Epistemology
The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne, on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she's also got credences in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe's credences are all very accurate. Each of Daphne's credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe's or Daphne's? It is clear that this question is analogous (...) to a question that has exercised ethicists over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a population consisting of some number of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against another population consisting of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just worth living? This is the question that occasions population ethics. In this paper, I go in search of the correct population ethics for credal states. (shrink)
Ethics of Belief in Epistemology
Population Ethics in Value Theory, Miscellaneous
Jamesian Epistemology Formalised: An Explication of 'the Will to Believe'.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus (...) answers a question left open in Pettigrew. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the 'name' part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. '@free.kindle.com' emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. '@kindle.com' emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF 'THE WILL TO BELIEVE'Volume 13, Issue 3Richard PettigrewDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF 'THE WILL TO BELIEVE'Volume 13, Issue 3Richard PettigrewDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. JAMESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FORMALISED: AN EXPLICATION OF 'THE WILL TO BELIEVE'Volume 13, Issue 3Richard PettigrewDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.44Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)
Epistemic Norms in Epistemology
Category Theory as an Autonomous Foundation.Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):227-254.details
Does category theory provide a foundation for mathematics that is autonomous with respect to the orthodox foundation in a set theory such as ZFC? We distinguish three types of autonomy: logical, conceptual, and justificatory. Focusing on a categorical theory of sets, we argue that a strong case can be made for its logical and conceptual autonomy. Its justificatory autonomy turns on whether the objects of a foundation for mathematics should be specified only up to isomorphism, as is customary in other (...) branches of contemporary mathematics. If such a specification suffices, then a category-theoretical approach will be highly appropriate. But if sets have a richer `nature' than is preserved under isomorphism, then such an approach will be inadequate. (shrink)
Category Theory in Philosophy of Mathematics
Ontology of Sets in Philosophy of Mathematics
Set Theory as a Foundation, Misc in Philosophy of Mathematics
The Nature of Sets, Misc in Philosophy of Mathematics
Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.details
Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
The short abstract: Epistemic utility theory + permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk => permissivism about rational credences. The longer abstract: I argue that epistemic rationality is permissive. More specifically, I argue for two claims. First, a radical version of interpersonal permissivism about rational credence: for many bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of credal states for which there is some individual who might rationally adopt that state in response to that evidence. Second, a slightly less radical version (...) of intrapersonal permissivism about rational credence: for many bodies of evidence and for many individuals, there is a narrower but still wide range of credal states that the individual might rationally adopt in response to that evidence. My argument proceeds from two premises: (1) epistemic utility theory; and (2) permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk. Epistemic utility theory says this: What it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you got to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you cared only for their purely epistemic value. So, to say which credences it is epistemically rational for you to have, we must say how you should measure purely epistemic value, and which decision rule it is appropriate for you to use when you face the hypothetical choice between the possible credences you might adopt. Permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk says that rationality permits many different attitudes to epistemic risk. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way that you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule that you use to pick your credences. I explore what happens if we encode our attitudes to epistemic risk in our epistemic decision rule. The result is the interpersonal and intrapersonal permissivism described above: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of priors; given most bodies of evidence you might acquire, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit. The essay ends by considering a range of objections to the sort of permissivism for which I've argued. (shrink)
Rational Requirements in Epistemology
Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic attitudes (...) have different epistemic value depending on how accurately they represent the world. We then use the principles of decision theory to determine which of the putative logic-rationality bridge principles we can derive from considerations of epistemic utility. (shrink)
Illness as Transformative Experience.Havi Carel, Richard Pettigrew & Ian James Kidd - 2017 - The Lancet 388:1152-1153..details
We propose that certain forms of chronic illness can be transformative experiences, in the sense described by L.A. Paul.
Illness in Philosophy of Science, Misc
Deference Done Right.Richard Pettigrew & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-19.details
There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds (...) of epistemic experts mentioned above. Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of the options face insuperable difficulties. The third, on the other hand, fares well|at least when it is applied in a particular way. (shrink)
Direct Inference Principles in Philosophy of Probability
The Reflection Principle in Philosophy of Probability
Accuracy and the Credence-Belief Connection.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-20.details
Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence is its accuracy. It then shows that, however we measure accuracy, any non-probabilistic credences are accuracy-dominated: that is, there are alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than them. It follows that non-probabilistic credences are irrational. In this (...) paper, I identify and explore a lacuna in this argument. I grant that, if the only doxastic attitudes are credal attitudes, the argument succeeds. But many philosophers say that, alongside credences, there are other doxastic attitudes, such as full beliefs. What's more, those philosophers typically claim, these other doxastic attitudes are closely connected to credences, either as a matter of necessity or normatively. Now, since full beliefs are also doxastic attitudes, it seems that, like credences, the sole source of epistemic value for them is their accuracy. Thus, if we wish to measure the epistemic value of an agent's total doxastic state, we must include not only the accuracy of her credences, but also the accuracy of her full beliefs. However, if this is the case, there is a problem for the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. For all the argument says, there might be non-probabilistic credences such that there is no total doxastic state that accuracy-dominates the total doxastic state to which those credences belong. (shrink)
On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol.6. Oxford University Press.details
Collective Epistemology in Epistemology
Formal Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology
Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology
II—Pluralism About Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
With his Humean thesis on belief, Leitgeb seeks to say how beliefs and credences ought to interact with one another. To argue for this thesis, he enumerates the roles beliefs must play and the properties they must have if they are to play them, together with norms that beliefs and credences intuitively must satisfy. He then argues that beliefs can play these roles and satisfy these norms if, and only if, they are related to credences in the way set out (...) in the Humean thesis. I begin by raising questions about the roles that Leitgeb takes beliefs to play and the properties he thinks they must have if they are to play them successfully. After that, I question the assumption that, if there are categorical doxastic states at all, then there is just one kind of them—to wit, beliefs—such that the states of that kind must play all of these roles and conform to all of these norms. Instead, I will suggest, if there are categorical doxastic states, there may be many different kinds of such state such that, for each kind, the states of that type play some of the roles Leitgeb takes belief to play and each of which satisfies some of the norms he lists. As I will argue, the usual reasons for positing categorical doxastic states alongside credences all tell equally in favour of accepting a plurality of kinds of them. This is the thesis I dub pluralism about belief states. (shrink)
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, Additivity, and Strict Propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming Additivity.
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.details
In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis's version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...) argument, depending on how you understand the status of these conditions. Reading 1: The correct account of admissibility is determined independently of these two principles, and yet these two principles follow from that correct account. Reading 2: The correct account of admissibility is determined in part by these two principles, so that the principles follow from that account but only because the correct account is constrained so that it must satisfy them. HLWWshow that, given an account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. I argue that, on either reading of the argument, it fails. First, I argue that there is a plausible account of admissibility on which Conditions 1 and 2 are false. That defeats reading 1. Next, I argue that the intuitions that lead us to assent to Condition 2 also lead us to assent to other very closely related principles that are inconsistent with Condition 2. This, I claim, casts doubt on the reliability of those intuitions, and thus removes our justification for Condition 2. This defeats the second reading of the HLWW argument. Thus, the argument fails. (shrink)
Logical Probability in Philosophy of Probability
Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):761-774.details
Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is deter...
Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics.Richard Pettigrew - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):310-332.details
Philosophers of mathematics agree that the only interpretation of arithmetic that takes that discourse at 'face value' is one on which the expressions 'N', '0', '1', '+', and 'x' are treated as proper names. I argue that the interpretation on which these expressions are treated as akin to free variables has an equal claim to be the default interpretation of arithmetic. I show that no purely syntactic test can distinguish proper names from free variables, and I observe that any semantic (...) test that can must beg the question. I draw the same conclusion concerning areas of mathematics beyond arithmetic. This paper is a greatly extended version of my response to Stewart Shapiro's paper in the conference 'Structuralism in physics and mathematics' held in Bristol on 2–3 December, 2006. (shrink)
Syntactic Categories in Philosophy of Language
What We Talk About When We Talk About Numbers.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 169 (12):1437-1456.details
In this paper, I describe and motivate a new species of mathematical structuralism, which I call Instrumental Nominalism about Set-Theoretic Structuralism. As the name suggests, this approach takes standard Set-Theoretic Structuralism of the sort championed by Bourbaki and removes its ontological commitments by taking an instrumental nominalist approach to that ontology of the sort described by Joseph Melia and Gideon Rosen. I argue that this avoids all of the problems that plague other versions of structuralism.
Indispensability Arguments in Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics
Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle.Alexander Bird & Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha :80–86, 2013) and Greco :169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.
Transformative Experience, by L. A. Paul.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):927-935.details
What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):177-196.details
A chance-credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non-modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance-credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's New Principle (...) (NP); the second is Ismael's General Recipe (IP). Thus, the question arises: Should we adopt NP or IP or both? In this paper, I argue that IP has unacceptable consequences when coupled with reductionism, so we must accept NP alone. (shrink)
Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry.Richard Pettigrew - 2009 - Phronesis 54 (3):239-260.details
I offer a new interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of geometry, which he presents in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 3. On my interpretation, Aristotle holds that the points, lines, planes, and solids of geometry belong to the sensible realm, but not in a straightforward way. Rather, by considering Aristotle's second attempt to solve Zeno's Runner Paradox in Book VIII of the Physics , I explain how such objects exist in the sensibles in a special way. I conclude by considering the (...) passages that lead Jonathan Lear to his fictionalist reading of Met . M3,1 and I argue that Aristotle is here describing useful heuristics for the teaching of geometry; he is not pronouncing on the meaning of mathematical talk. (shrink)
Aristotle in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Aristotle: Metaphysics in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Geometry in Philosophy of Mathematics
Mathematical Nominalism in Philosophy of Mathematics
Aggregating Incoherent Agents Who Disagree.Richard Pettigrew - unknowndetails
In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and (...) then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And when do these different procedures agree with one another? In this paper, we focus particularly on the final question. (shrink)
Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.details
In the philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments aim to show that we are justified in believing that abstract mathematical objects exist. I wish to defend a particular objection to such arguments that has become increasingly popular recently. It is called instrumental nominalism. I consider the recent versions of this view and conclude that it has yet to be given an adequate formulation. I provide such a formulation and show that it can be used to answer the indispensability arguments. -/- There (...) are two main indispensability arguments in the literature, though one has received nearly all of the attention. They correspond to two ways in which we use mathematics in science and in everyday life. We use mathematical language to help us describe non-mathematical reality; and we use mathematical reasoning to help us perform inferences concerning non-mathematical reality using only a feasible amount of cognitive power. The former use is the starting point of the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument ([Quine, 1980a], [Quine, 1980b], [Quine, 1981a], [Quine, 1981b], [Putnam, 1979a], [Putnam, 1979b]); the latter provides the basis for Ketland's more recent argument ([Ketland, 2005]). I begin by considering the Quine-Putnam argument and introduce instrumental nominalism to defuse it. Then I show that Ketland's argument can be defused in a similar way. (shrink)
Mathematical Fictionalism in Philosophy of Mathematics
Quantified Modal Logic in Logic and Philosophy of Logic
The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.) - 2019 - PhilPapers Foundation.details
In formal epistemology, we use mathematical methods to explore the questions of epistemology and rational choice. What can we know? What should we believe and how strongly? How should we act based on our beliefs and values? We begin by modelling phenomena like knowledge, belief, and desire using mathematical machinery, just as a biologist might model the fluctuations of a pair of competing populations, or a physicist might model the turbulence of a fluid passing through a small aperture. Then, we (...) explore, discover, and justify the laws governing those phenomena, using the precision that mathematical machinery affords. For example, we might represent a person by the strengths of their beliefs, and we might measure these using real numbers, which we call credences. Having done this, we might ask what the norms are that govern that person when we represent them in that way. How should those credences hang together? How should the credences change in response to evidence? And how should those credences guide the person's actions? This is the approach of the first six chapters of this handbook. In the second half, we consider different representations—the set of propositions a person believes; their ranking of propositions by their plausibility. And in each case we ask again what the norms are that govern a person so represented. Or, we might represent them as having both credences and full beliefs, and then ask how those two representations should interact with one another. This handbook is incomplete, as such ventures often are. Formal epistemology is a much wider topic than we present here. One omission, for instance, is social epistemology, where we consider not only individual believers but also the epistemic aspects of their place in a social world. Michael Caie's entry on doxastic logic touches on one part of this topic, but there is much more. Relatedly, there is no entry on epistemic logic, nor any on knowledge more generally. There are still more gaps. These omissions should not be taken as ideological choices. This material is missing, not because it is any less valuable or interesting, but because we v failed to secure it in time. Rather than delay publication further, we chose to go ahead with what is already a substantial collection. We anticipate a further volume in the future that will cover more ground. Why an open access handbook on this topic? A number of reasons. The topics covered here are large and complex and need the space allowed by the sort of 50 page treatment that many of the authors give. We also wanted to show that, using free and open software, one can overcome a major hurdle facing open access publishing, even on topics with complex typesetting needs. With the right software, one can produce attractive, clear publications at reasonably low cost. Indeed this handbook was created on a budget of exactly £0 (≈ $0). Our thanks to PhilPapers for serving as publisher, and to the authors: we are enormously grateful for the effort they put into their entries. (shrink)
An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Proceedings of EPSA: Amsterdam '09. Springer. pp. 287--301.details
Beliefs come in different strengths. What are the norms that govern these strengths of belief? Let an agent's belief function at a particular time be the function that assigns, to each of the propositions about which she has an opinion, the strength of her belief in that proposition at that time. Traditionally, philosophers have claimed that an agent's belief function at any time ought to be a probability function (Probabilism), and that she ought to update her belief function upon obtaining (...) new evidence by conditionalizing on that evidence (Conditionalization). Until recently, the central arguments for these claims have been pragmatic. But these putative justifications fail to identify what is epistemically irrational about violating Probabilism or Conditionalization. A new approach, which I will call epistemic utility theory, attempts to remedy this. It treats beliefs as epistemic acts; and it appeals to the notion of an epistemic utility function, which measures of how epistemically valuable a particular belief function is for a particular way the world might be. It then formulates fundamental epistemic norms that are analogous to the fundamental practical norms that underlie decision theory. I survey the results obtained so far in this young research project, and present a sustained critique of certain assumptions that have been made by a number of philosophers working in this area. (shrink)
Decision Theory and Hypothesis Testing in Philosophy of Action
Précis and Replies to Contributors for Book Symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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Manor Park NursIng Home Green Street, Holt,Wrexham LL13 9JFProperty HIghlIghtsNeara sleepy vIllage called Holt.DIrectIons:From Wrexham look for the A534 to NantwIch known as the Holt road.
Neara sleepy vIllage called Holt.
DIrectIons:From Wrexham look for the A534 to NantwIch known as the Holt road. AfterleavIng Wrexham you wIll pass the Wrexham Golf Course follow thIs road for 31/2mIle and you wIll reach the left turn to Holt vIllage. On enterIng the vIllageyou wIll pass BellIs Brothers garden centre. ContInue along the maIn roadpassed the vIllage square wIth the War memorIal, and on reachIng the Peal OBells pub on the rIght- hand sIde wIth the church dIrectly behInd It. ThevIllage Green wIll be on your left-hand sIde and Manor Park dIrectly behInd It.
Property advert Ref 4184336 - Is a property advert for marketing purposes only, the information has been supplied by the owner, estate agent or property portal and The House Shop makes no warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of the information. Furthermore we have no control over the adverts content. This property advertisement does not constitute property particulars. Please contact the advertiser to obtain any information regarding The Energy Performance Certificate regarding homes in England and Wales or Home Report for residential property in Scotland.


they are interested in meeting the set back requirements. Typical setback requirements are 20' front and 20' back yard setback from property line. However, you must indentify the zoning and based on the County municipal code for that zoning designation it will dictate the set back requrements.
Electrical may also pose an issue, but this can be resolve by scheduling a meeting with Southern CA Edison Planning Department on site to review the site constraints and the proximity of eletrical poles. These three issues, water, sewer and electrical could make a project economically unfeasible.
Finally, you need to prepare a county of Riverside Mobil Home installation application and provide all the required documentation. You can also contact us at FDC & Associates at (909) 881-6542 and we will glad to help you along this complex permitting process.


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Locusts swarming through Western Australia's Pilbara and Kimberley regions are considered the highest in decades
Photo cms.ausgeo.bauer-media.net.au
Locusts swarming through Western Australia's Pilbara and Kimberley regions are costing pastoralists thousands of dollars in lost pasture and control efforts.
The warm and wet summer in the north provided a perfect breeding ground for the yellow-winged locust.
Pastoralists believed locust numbers had not been so high for decades.
Bettini Beef Pastoral Group general manager Mark Bettini said in his 30 years in the Pilbara, the worst locust plague he had seen was in 1998 at De Grey Station, 100 kilometres east of Port Hedland. "Last year they were pretty bad, I'd say as bad as this year - but this year they've done more damage because we haven't had the follow-up rain.
"In some years they'll hatch out, but you'll get a big wind or a cyclone or a really big weather event which will probably kill a few and thin the numbers out a bit but that just hasn't happened this year, so they've had a good go."
The exact cost for landholders is hard to estimate, but it is likely to be in the tens of thousands.
"You'd have to think that (the cost) would be somewhere in that vicinity, because we did have a fair bit of grass before they came in some areas, and in some areas there's just stalks left," Mr Bettini said. "The cows aren't going to put on the condition that they normally would have so we'll have to change our management."
Once locusts grow wings, numbers are very difficult to control.
Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development entomologist Svetlana Micic said pastoralists should assess the cost the insects were having before they considered chemical controls. "Once the locusts are winged and flying, the only effective control mechanism is to aerially spray them," Ms Micic said.
"But when you do spray you do need to bare in mind that you can have re-invasion."
For Mr Bettini, it was not worth the outlay.
"You could go and spend thousands of dollars a hectare trying to spray them, but are you going to make that money back? Probably not," he said.
In the meantime, Mr Bettini said he would consider ways to make money back from the locust plague.


Everyone falls victim to stress at some point. There's always something difficult going on in life: money, relationships, health, work, parenting, home ownership, vehicle repairs, flight delays, technological issues, legal situations and personal problems. You can't control what happens in life, but outside of solving the causes of stress, you can control your reaction to it by practicing self-care.
One of the best ways to take care of yourself is through exercise. Exercise is not only good for your physical health, but it also benefits your mental health by releasing endorphins that elevate your mood. You'll feet fitter, more confident, more energetic, stronger and able to take on anything that comes your way. An added bonus is that you can get into great physical shape, and you'll sleep better at night.
Varying your exercise routine will prevent boredom and adaptation. When you do the same workout every day, it eventually becomes less effective. To make sure your body isn't adapting to the exercise, challenge yourself by switching up your program or hitting the gym and using a variety of machines. If getting to the gym regularly is difficult for you, you can set up a home gym in a garage space, spare room, or basement. A home gym could include a weight bench or cardio machine such as an elliptical, bike or treadmill. For inexpensive alternatives, fill your gym with weights, resistance bands, stability ball, kettlebell, medicine ball, and yoga mat.
It's not only about exercise. Balance your fitness routine with overall self-care by making it a holistic practice. Incorporate a healthy, nutritious diet that's heavy on vegetables and lean protein into your fitness program. Getting fit doesn't have to be about vanity, but improving your eating habits as you exercise will keep you in your best physical -- and mental -- health. In fact, your gut health is partially responsible for your mood. To keep your microbiome in check, consider adding probiotics to your diet. You can get them naturally from foods like yogurt and kefir, or you can take probiotic supplements.
Sleep is another big factor in caring for your wellness. As much as we need to consume and expend energy for survival, we also need to rest and recharge. Sleep is where that happens. Getting enough sleep will ensure that you're able to recover from the day and prepare for the next. It gives your body a chance to relax and your brain a chance to reset. Make sure to get enough sleep each night, even if that means sacrificing a half hour of Netflix. If you have trouble falling asleep at night, try changing your diet or exercising more during the day. You might find it easier to sleep when everything is working smoothly on the inside.
Stress and sleep go hand in hand. When you're under stress, it's more difficult to sleep. When you're not getting enough sleep, you'll feel more stressed. Manage your stress so you can get more sleep, and vice versa. Big stressors in life can't always be avoided, but a positive attitude and the implementation of stress-reduction techniques can help mitigate the effects of stress. Yoga, meditation and getting out into nature have positive impact on your stress levels. So will a spinach, apple and avocado smoothie.
The reason self-care is so important is that it positively affects your stress levels, which in turn affect your mental health. Stress can lead to depression and anxiety if it's not managed well. It has effects on cognitive changes, moods, coping strategies and irritability. These problems can show up everywhere in your life, which can then make you even more stressed. Thus, the cycle continues.
Care for yourself by treating your health right and keeping your mind calm. If you care about your wellness, then there's no place for stress and unchecked anger. There is plenty of room for healthy habits including eating clean, exercising and getting enough sleep. There's even more room for playtime and enjoyment, too. Self-care isn't only about what you need, but it's also about what you want.


In some of their performances it becomes also a trio adding the live video manipulations of Sara Picco.
After recording in 2013 the first album for objet-a label entitled " Prelogical Institutions", they have published another album entitled "Avoiding the Sun" recorded in Berlin in 2016.
The project CUPIS is based on organic/repetitive musical images and on a reflection over the electroacoustic possibilities of instruments with the aim of creating a sort of "fata morgana" or mirages where the sound sources would often be difficultly individuated.
in 2014 Cupis has created the music of the live performance "Contro l'architettura", created and based on the same book by the Italian anthropologist Franco La Cecla. In the same year they have composed the soundtrack for the documentary "Palermo/ Tunis a/r" by Rosario Riginella and also presented many performances mostly in Berlin (Spektrum, Sameheads, Bauchund,Loophole, Sowieso) adding some guests as the mexican vibraphonist Emilio Gordoa, the Irish songwriter Kevyn Ryan and many others.
In 2016 Cupis has been touring Japan and gave a masterclass for the sound art department at Chukyo University Toyota Campus Nagoya directed by Carl Stone. During the Japan tour they have hosted some artists as Keiko Higuchi, Maki Hachiya, Soon Kim, Masaharu Showji.
In Japan they have created the music for a piece of the japanese dancer Yu Kimura whose premiere has been performed in May at Kid Ailack Arts Space in Tokyo.


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Ronald Claude pleads guilty, gets 20-year prison sentence for Little Woods killing
District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro's office on Monday (Feb. 3) announced it has secured a guilty plea and 20-year state prison sentence for a gunman who fatally shot a Little Woods man during a disputed drug deal in 2015.
Ronald "Money" Claude averted his scheduled second-degree murder trial by pleading guilty Jan. 30 to an amended charge of manslaughter, in connection with the killing of 61-year-old Wesley Nelson (pictured at left). Nelson was found dead outside his home, in the intersection of Venice Boulevard and Wales Street, by a relative leaving for work at 6 a.m. on July 31, 2015. Claude also pleaded guilty as charged to being a felon in possession of a firearm at the time of the slaying.
The sentencing of Claude, 36, was left to the discretion of Criminal District Judge Paul Bonin. The judge imposed a 20-year prison term for each offense Monday, and ordered they be served concurrently to each other.
New Orleans police determined that Nelson had visited a corner store early on the morning of his death, then got into a car with four other people who drove him back to his house. Witnesses said a dispute erupted inside the car over a proposed marijuana purchase, and that Claude shot Nelson in the head before dumping his body in the street.
Relatives said Nelson was suffering from emphysema and late-stage prostate cancer and was too weak to have posed a threat to anyone in the car.
The car's other occupants eventually were indicted in October 2018 as co-conspirators in the murder. But the second-degree murder charges against Hakeema Camp, Tatiyana Johnson and Sheldon Williams were amended in the past five days to single counts of accessory after the fact to second-degree murder.
Camp and Williams pleaded guilty to their revised charges last Friday, and on Monday received sentences of one year in prison (suspended) and one year of probation. Johnson pleaded guilty Monday pursuant to Article 893 (expungeable felony). She was placed on probation for one year with Bonin deferring imposition of her sentence until a later date.
Assistant District Attorney Michael Trummel prosecuted the case.