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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 515 › United States v. Aguilar
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995)
A conviction for obstruction of justice is improper when the false statement was not made to someone who was an agent of the court or grand jury.
Seeking post-conviction relief in the courtroom of Judge Weigel, union official Michael Tham enlisted the aid of Edward Solomon and Abraham Chalupowitz / Chapman because they knew Judge Aguilar, who was in the same courthouse. Aguilar asked Weigel to transfer the case to his docket, and Weigel later testified that Aguilar did not try to influence the outcome. As part of its investigation into Tham for a different matter, the FBI sought a wiretap from a third judge in the same courthouse, Judge Peckham, whom they told about meetings between Chapman and Aguilar. Peckham warned Aguilar about limiting his contact with Chapman because of his connection to the wiretap authorization, and Aguilar then told Chapman about it.
A new investigation arose into Tham's attempt to influence Weigel, during which Aguilar lied about his role in the investigation and his knowledge of the wiretap. He was later convicted of obstruction of justice for lying to the FBI, but the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the obstruction charge arising from his alleged influence on Weigel. Aguilar argued on appeal that he did not corruptly influence the investigation through his statements, and the grand jury had not authorized it.
William Hubbs Rehnquist (Author)
David H. Souter
Stephen G. Breyer
The broad statute under which Aguilar was charged, the Omnibus Clause of 18 U.S.C. Section 1503, has been restricted by court decisions to defendants who were aware or should have been aware that the specific court was administering justice and who were corruptly trying to obstruct it. An investigation that is independent of the authority of a court or grand jury falls within the exception for ancillary proceedings that do not give rise to a defendant's liability because they fail to meet the nexus requirement under the law. The nexus requirement is not met in this case, even though Aguilar made false statements, since the prosecution was unable to show that the investigator would have testified before a grand jury.
Stevens joined with respect to Part I. Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined with respect to all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II.
Concurrence/Dissent In Part
Antonin Scalia (Author)
Anthony M. Kennedy
Intent is not the same as a natural and probable consequence, which is the majority's interpretation of how "endeavor" in the statuet should be defined. The statute will be applied too narrowly under this interpretation, since the element will be met only when success is unnatural and improbable.
John Paul Stevens (Author)
The temporal limitations that the majority's interpretation imposes on a defendant's liability are not supported by the literal text of the statute.
Case Commentary
This case imposed limits on how broadly prosecutors could define the crime of obstruction of justice.
UNITED STATES v. AGUILAR
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Respondent Aguilar, a United States District Judge, was convicted of illegally disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c), even though the authorization for the particular wiretap had expired before the disclosure was made. Because he lied to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents during a grand jury investigation, he also was convicted of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice under § 1503. The Court of Appeals reversed both convictions, reasoning that Aguilar's conduct in each instance was not covered by the statutory language.
1. Uttering false statements to an investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury is not sufficient to make out a violation of § 1503's prohibition of "endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede ... the due administration of justice." The "nexus" requirement developed in recent Courts of Appeals decisions-whereby the accused's act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with grand jury or judicial proceedings-is a correct construction of § 1503's very broad language. Under that approach, the accused must take action with an intent to influence such proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority. Moreover, the endeavor must have the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice, see, e. g., United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695, and a person lacking knowledge that his actions are likely to affect a pending proceeding necessarily lacks the requisite intent to obstruct, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197,206-207. The Government did not show here that the FBI agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, that the grand jury had subpoenaed their testimony or otherwise directed them to appear, or that respondent knew that his false statements would be provided to the grand jury. Indeed, the evidence goes no further than showing that respondent testified falsely to an investigating agent. What use will be made of such testimony is so speculative that the testimony cannot be said to have the "natural and probable effect" of obstructing justice. Pp. 598-602.
2. Disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization expires violates § 2232(c), which provides criminal penalties for anyone who, "[1] having knowledge that a Federal ... officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization ... to intercept a wire ... communication, [2] in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, [3] gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person." Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, the statutory language does not require that the wiretap application or authorization be pending or in esse at the time of the disclosure. Such a narrow purpose is not evidenced by the term "such interception" in the statute's second clause, which merely establishes that the defendant must intend to obstruct the interception made pursuant to the application or authorization of which he has the knowledge required by the first clause. Similarly, the phrase "possible interception" in the third clause was not designed to limit the punishable offense to cases where the interception was factually "possible," but was intended to recognize the fact that at the time the prohibited notice was given it very likely could not be known whether or not there would be an interception. Moreover, without the word "possible," the statute would only prohibit giving notice of "the interception":
It would not reach the giving of notice of an application which has not yet resulted in an authorization or an authorization which has not yet resulted in an interception. Finally, the statute need not be read to exclude disclosures of expired wiretaps because of concern that a broader construction would run counter to the First Amendment. The Government's interest in nondisclosure by officials in sensitive confidential positions is quite sufficient to justify the construction of the statute as written, without any artificial narrowing because of First Amendment concerns. pp. 602-606.
21 F.3d 1475, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, in Part I of which STEVENS, J., joined, and in all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II of which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 606. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 609.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Harris, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Patty Merkamp Stemler.
Robert D. Luskin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joseph G. Davis and Paul B. Meltzer.*
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
A jury convicted United States District Judge Robert Aguilar of one count of illegally disclosing a wiretap in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c), and of one count of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice in violation of § 1503. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction under § 2232(c) but reversed the conviction under § 1503. After rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Federal Circuits over whether § 1503 punishes false statements made to potential grand jury witnesses, and to answer the important question whether disclosure of a wiretap after its authorization expires violates § 2232(c). 513 U. S. 1013 (1994).
Many facts remain disputed by the parties. Both parties appear to agree, however, that a motion for postconviction relief filed by one Michael Rudy Tham represents the starting point from which events bearing on this case unfolded. Tham was an officer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and was convicted of embezzling funds from the local affiliate of that organization. In July 1987, he filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to have his conviction set aside. The motion was assigned to Judge Stanley Weigel. Tham, seeking to enhance the odds that his petition would be granted, asked Edward Solomon and Abraham Chalupowitz, a.k.a. Abe Chapman, to assist him by capitalizing on their respective acquaintances with another judge in the Northern District of California, respondent Aguilar. Respondent knew Chapman as a distant relation by marriage and knew Solomon from law school. Solomon and Chapman met with
*Gerald B. Lefcourt filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
respondent to discuss Tham's case, as a result of which respondent spoke with Judge Weigel about the matter.
Independent of the embezzlement conviction, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified Tham as a suspect in an investigation of labor racketeering. On April 20, 1987, the FBI applied for authorization to install a wiretap on Tham's business phones. Chapman appeared on the application as a potential interceptee. Chief District Judge Robert Peckham authorized the wiretap. The 30-day wiretap expired by law on May 20, 1987, 18 U. s. C. § 2518(5), but Chief Judge Peckham maintained the secrecy of the wiretap under § 2518(8)(d) after a showing of good cause. During the course of the racketeering investigation, the FBI learned of the meetings between Chapman and respondent. The FBI informed Chief Judge Peckham, who, concerned with appearances of impropriety, advised respondent in August 1987 that Chapman might be connected with criminal elements because Chapman's name had appeared on a wiretap authorization.
Five months after respondent learned that Chapman had been named in a wiretap authorization, he noticed a man observing his home during a visit by Chapman. He alerted his nephew to this fact and conveyed the message (with an intent that his nephew relay the information to Chapman) that Chapman's phone was being wiretapped. Respondent apparently believed, in error, both that Chapman's phones were tapped in connection with the initial application and that the initial authorization was still in effect. Chief Judge Peckham had in fact authorized another wiretap on Tham's phones effective from October 1987 through the period in which respondent made the disclosure, but there is no suggestion in the record that the latter had any specific knowledge of this reauthorization.
At this point, respondent's involvement in the two separate Tham matters converged. Two months after the disclo-
sure to his nephew, a grand jury began to investigate an alleged conspiracy to influence the outcome of Tham's habeas case. Two FBI agents questioned respondent. During the interview, respondent lied about his participation in the Tham case and his knowledge of the wiretap. The grand jury returned an indictment; a jury convicted Aguilar of one count of disclosing a wiretap, 18 U. s. C. § 2232(c), and one count of endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice, § 1503. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the § 2232(c) conviction but reversed the § 1503 conviction.
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed both convictions for the reason that the conduct in each instance was not covered by the statutory language. 21 F.3d 1475 (1994). The court concluded that § 2232(c) requires the disclosure of a pending wiretap application or an authorization that had not expired because the purpose of the statute was to thwart interference with the "'possible interception'" of the wiretap of which the defendant had knowledge. Id., at 1480. Finding the interception in this case impossible once the authorization had expired, it held respondent's disclosure was not covered by the plain language of the statute. The Court of Appeals also found that respondent had not interfered with a pending judicial proceeding under § 1503. It first noted that the grand jury had not authorized or directed the FBI investigation. It then held that merely uttering false statements does not" 'corruptly influence'" within the meaning of the statute. Id., at 1485-1486. It drew this conclusion, in part, from 1988 amendments to § 1512, which added a prohibition on corrupt persuasion of witnesses. The court read the corrupt persuasion prohibited by § 1512 to require an active attempt to persuade a witness to tell a false story, and used the language in § 1512 as a guide to interpret the omnibus clause of § 1503 narrowly.
Section 1503 provides:
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1503 (emphasis added).
The statute is structured as follows: first it proscribes persons from endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede grand or petit jurors or court officers in the discharge of their duties; it then prohibits injuring grand or petit jurors in their person or property because of any verdict or indictment rendered by them; it then prohibits injury of any court officer, commissioner, or similar officer on account of the performance of his official duties; finally, the "Omnibus Clause" serves as a catchall, prohibiting persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. The latter clause, it can be seen, is far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute. Respondent
was charged with a violation of the Omnibus Clause, to wit: with "corruptly endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, and impede the ... grand jury investigation." App. 106.
The first case from this Court construing the predecessor statute to § 1503 was Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893). There we held that "a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it appears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court." Id., at 206. The Court reasoned that a person lacking knowledge of a pending proceeding necessarily lacked the evil intent to obstruct. Id., at 207. Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have likewise tended to place metes and bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provision. The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (CA9 1982) (citing cases). Some courts have phrased this showing as a "nexus" requirement-that the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (CAlO 1993); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (CA3 1975). In other words, the endeavor must have the "'natural and probable effect'" of interfering with the due administration of justice. Wood, supra, at 695; United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (CAll 1990); Walasek, supra, at 679. This is not to say that the defendant's actions need be successful; an "endeavor" suffices. United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 143 (1921). But as in Pettibone, if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.
Although respondent urges various broader grounds for affirmance,l we find it unnecessary to address them because we think the "nexus" requirement developed in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals is a correct construction of § 1503. We have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U. S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed," McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931). We do not believe that uttering false statements to an investigating agent-and that seems to be all that was proved here-who might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient to make out a violation of the catchall provision of § 1503.
The Government did not show here that the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents. The Government argues that respondent "understood that his false statements would be provided to the grand jury" and that he made the statements with the intent to thwart the grand jury investigation and not just the FBI investigation. Brief for United States 18. The Government supports its argument with a citation to the transcript of the recorded conversation between Aguilar and the FBI agent at the point where Aguilar asks whether he is a target of a grand jury investigation. The agent responded to the question by stating:
"[T]here is a Grand Jury meeting. Convening I guess that's the correct word. Urn some evidence will be heard I'm ... I'm sure on this issue." App. 86.
1 Respondent argues that the term "corruptly" is vague and overbroad as applied to the type of conduct at issue in this case and that Congress narrowed the scope of the Omnibus Clause when it expressly punished his conduct in 18 U. S. C. § 1512.
Because respondent knew of the pending proceeding, the Government therefore contends that Aguilar's statements are analogous to those made directly to the grand jury itself, in the form of false testimony or false documents.2
We think the transcript citation relied upon by the Government would not enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury, and that the evidence goes no further than showing that respondent testified falsely to an investigating agent. Such conduct, we believe, falls on the other side of the statutory line from that of one who delivers false documents or testimony to the grand jury itself. Conduct of the latter sort all but assures that the grand jury will consider the material in its deliberations. But what use will be made of false testimony given to an investigating agent who has not been subpoenaed or otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury is far more speculative. We think it cannot be said to have the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice.
JUSTICE SCALIA criticizes our treatment of the statutory language for reading the word "endeavor" out of it, inasmuch as it excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would "only unnaturally and improbably be successful." Post, at 612. This criticism is unwarranted. Our reading of the statute gives the term "endeavor" a useful function to fulfill: It makes conduct punishable where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some
2 See, e. g., United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1367-1368 (CA6 1994) (altered records and instructed co-worker to alter records subject to subpoena duces tecum); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976-982 (CA5 1989) (uttered false testimony to grand jury); United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 559 (CA7 1984) (created false meeting minutes and voluntarily delivered them to grand jury); United States v. Faudman, 640 F. 2d 20, 23 (CA6 1981) (falsified records, some of which had been sought by subpoena duces tecum); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679680 (CA3 1975) (falsified documents requested by subpoena duces tecum).
way. Were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does not transmit the defendant's version of the story, the defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed, justice. Under our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.
JUSTICE SCALIA also apparently believes that any act, done with the intent to "obstruct ... the due administration of justice," is sufficient to impose criminal liability. Under the dissent's theory, a man could be found guilty under § 1503 if he knew of a pending investigation and lied to his wife about his whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI agent might decide to interview her and that she might in turn be influenced in her statement to the agent by her husband's false account of his whereabouts. The intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but the man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute than we usually require in order to impose criminal liability.
Section 2232(c) prohibits the disclosure of information that
a wiretap has been sought or authorized. The statute reads:
"Whoever, having knowledge that a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer has been authorized or has applied for authorization under chapter 119 to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 2232(c).
This section is much more precisely targeted than is the catchall provision of § 1503 discussed above. The first clause defines the element of knowledge required for the act to be criminal: knowledge that an officer has been authorized or
has sought authorization to intercept a communication. The second clause defines the required intent with which the act be done: "in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception." The third clause defines the punishable act: "gives notice or attempts to give notice of the possible interception." Respondent persuaded the Court of Appeals to hold that the wiretap application or authorization must be pending or in esse at the time of the disclosure, but we do not believe any such requirement is to be found in the statutory language.
Respondent here urges the reasoning accepted by the Court of Appeals. "[T]he purpose of the statute is to prevent interference with 'possible interception.'" 21 F. 3d, at 1480. Once a wiretap has expired or been denied, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, there is no "'possible interception'" to disclose or attempt to disclose. Ibid. The narrow purpose of the statute is further evidenced by the statute's intent requirement, which limits punishable disclosures to those undertaken with the intent to interfere with" 'such interception'" of which the defendant "has knowledge." Ibid. Under the circumstances, the disclosure of an expired wiretap not only fails to violate the terms of the statute, it fails to implicate any interest protected by § 2232(c). Brief for Respondent 38.
But this argument, we think, fails in the face of the statutory language itself. The term "such interception" is part of the intent requirement in the second clause; the defendant must intend to obstruct the interception made pursuant to the application or authorization of which he has the knowledge required by the first clause. The phrase "possible interception" is found in the third clause, which describes the act which offends the statute. A defendant intending to disclose the existence of a pending application would ordinarily have no way of knowing whether the application or authorization had resulted in an interception, and that is doubtless why the third clause uses the term "possible" interception.
It was not intended to limit the offense to cases where the interception based upon the application or authorization was factually possible, but to recognize the fact that at the time the prohibited notice was given it very likely could not be known whether or not there would be an interception.
The Court of Appeals thought its result justified by its view that the aim of the statute was to prevent interference with "possible" interceptions, and that if an interception was not possible because the wiretap was no longer in place at the time of the disclosure, that interest was not threatened. But the statute is aimed at something more than the interference with interceptions; it is aimed at disclosure of wiretap orders or applications which may lead to interceptions. The offense is complete at the time the notice is given, when it often cannot be known whether any interception will take place.
JUSTICE STEVENS argues that § 2232(c) criminalizes disclosures of pending applications without a need to rely on the word" 'possible.'" Post, at 608. That is not so. The reference to pending applications occurs only in the clause specifying the knowledge element. The actus reus element must be independently satisfied. Without the word "possible," the statute would only prohibit giving notice of "the interception": It would not reach the giving of notice of an application which has not yet resulted in an authorization or an authorization which has not yet resulted in an interception. That Congress could have accomplished the same result by phrasing the statute differently-for instance, by repeating "'such interception'" in the third clause, ibid.-does not undercut the fact that the word "possible" is necessary in the statute as written to criminalize such behavior.3
3JUSTICE STEVENS also argues that our reading of the statute would achieve no temporal limitation on liability and could result in the "absurd" prosecution of a discloser 10 years after the wiretap expired. Post, at 608-609. Although we reserve the question for a case that presents it, we note that the wiretapping scheme as a whole suggests that a plausible
Acceptance of respondent's position would open the door to additional claims of "impossibility" other than the fact that the application or order was not pending at the time of the disclosure. Some sort of mechanical failure, or the departure of the person whose conversation was to be intercepted from the place at which the reception was authorized, are two which come to mind. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 333 (1966), we expressed reservations about the "continuing validity [of] the doctrine of 'impossibility,' with all its subtleties," in the law of criminal attempt, and we would require much more than the statutory language before us to believe that Congress intended to engraft it onto the language of § 2232(c).
Finally, respondent urges us to read the statute to exclude disclosures of expired wiretaps because of concern that a broader construction would run counter to the First Amendment. We see no necessity for such a restrictive construction of the statute. It is true that the Government may not generally restrict individuals from disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in the absence of a "state interest of the highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 103 (1979). But the statute here in question does not impose such a restriction generally, but only upon those who disclose wiretap information "in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent" the interception. Nor was the respondent simply a member of the general
temporal limit on liability for disclosure would be the point at which the authorizing judge notifies the interceptee and related parties of the existence of an application or authorization pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2518(8)(d). Such notification must occur "within a reasonable time" after denial of the application or termination of a wiretap, and may be postponed only upon a showing of "good cause." § 2518(8)(d). The parties did not brief this issue, and we need not decide it on these facts because respondent disclosed his knowledge of the wiretap application before Chief Judge Peckham notified the parties in May 1989. That notification issued two years after the FBI first applied for authorization and one year after the last authorized wiretap expired.
Opinion of STEVENS, J.
public who happened to lawfully acquire possession of information about the wiretap; he was a Federal District Court Judge who learned of a confidential wiretap application from the judge who had authorized the interception, and who wished to preserve the integrity of the court. Government officials in sensitive confidential positions may have special duties of nondisclosure. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(e) (prohibiting the disclosure of grand jury information). Likewise, protective orders may be imposed in connection with information acquired through civil discovery without violating the First Amendment. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 31 (1984). As to one who voluntarily assumed a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose restrictions on unwilling members of the public. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). In this case, Chief Judge Peckham postponed the notification of parties named in the application in order to maintain the secrecy of the wiretap. See 18 U. S. C. § 2518(1)(d). We think the Government's interest is quite sufficient to justify the construction of the statute as written, without any artificial narrowing because of First Amendment concerns.
Respondent raised below a challenge to the jury instructions, but the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to respondent's conviction under § 1503 and reverse with respect to respondent's conviction under § 2232(c). We remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the Court's disposition of the 18 U. S. C. § 1503 issue, and also with its rejection of the First
Amendment challenge to respondent's conviction for disclosing a wiretap application under § 2232(c), I believe the Court of Appeals correctly construed § 2232(c) to invalidate respondent's conviction under that statute.
When respondent was convicted of disclosing a 30-day wiretap authorization that had expired months before the disclosure, he was convicted of an attempt to do the impossible: interfere with a nonexistent wiretap. Traditionally, the law does not proscribe an attempt unless the defendant's intent is accompanied by "a dangerous probability that [the unlawful result] will happen." Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905) (Holmes, J.). Whether such a dangerous probability exists, of course, depends ultimately on what result we interpret the statute as having declared unlawful. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.3, pp. 44-45 (1986). In this case, there was no dangerous probability that respondent actually would reveal the existence of a wiretap or wiretap application because none existed to reveal. We should abjure a construction of a criminal statute that leads to criminalizing nothing more than an evil intent accompanied by a harmless act, particularly when, as here, the statutory language does not clearly extend liability so far. Cf. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 14-15 (1978).
Indeed, the text of § 2232(c) favors a reading that requires, as an essential element of the offense, the possibility of interference with an authorized interception. Both the second and third clauses of the statute support this straightforward interpretation. The second clause requires that the defendant intend to impede "such interception." That phrase refers to an interception that the defendant knows a federal officer "has been authorized or has applied for authorization" to make. After the authorization expires, no "such interception" can occur. Moreover, to infer that "such interception" includes any interception that might be made pursuant to any subsequent reauthorization severely undermines the
statute's knowledge requirement by making actual knowledge of an initial, limited authorization the linchpin of liability for disclosing later, entirely conjectural or nonexistent authorizations. That inference contradicts our usual practice of giving strict effect to scienter provisions. See, e. g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68-71 (1994).
The third clause of § 2232(c) describes the notice that a defendant must attempt to give a third person in order to violate the statute as notice of "the possible interception." The definite article necessarily refers to an interception that is "authorized" (or for which federal officers have applied for authorization) per the second clause, thereby imposing authorization as a requirement to satisfy the next word, "possible." I agree with the Court that interceptions prevented by mechanical failures or the departure of the suspect are "possible" within the meaning of the statute, see ante, at 603-604, as long as those interceptions, however unlikely, are legally "authorized." The wholly theoretical interception that respondent was convicted of attempting to impede was not authorized, nor had federal officers even sought authorization for it; therefore, it was not "possible" within the meaning of the statute.
The Court's attempt to explain the word "possible" as an assurance that the statute will cover interceptions that may or may not result from a pending application, see ante, at 604, is unpersuasive. Because the statute plainly criminalizes disclosures of pending applications, "possible" does not need to do the work the Court assigns it. The phrase "such interception," already used in the second clause, would do just as well. The function of "possible" must be to place some temporal limitation on potential liability under the statute. Under the Court's reasoning, respondent could be found guilty if he had disclosed a 10-year-old application or authorization. The word "possible," properly understood, would prevent such an absurd result by limiting liability to
interceptions that could actually be made pursuant to present or pending authorization.
As the Court notes in response to this opinion, see ibid., under its reading the third clause serves to define the actus reus element of the crime, just as Congress could have done by replacing the phrase "notice of the possible interception" with the unambiguous phrase "notice of such authorization or application." That unambiguous language, however, would not achieve the temporal limitation on liability that I believe Congress intended to achieve with the words "possible interception." The Court appears to acknowledge the need for such a limitation. See ante, at 604-605, n. 3. Rather than recognizing the limitation the statute contains, however, the Court hints that it might in some future case invent one. Limiting liability to the time before the authorizing judge announces the wiretap may well be "plausible," ibid., but no plausible basis exists for finding that limitation in the words of the statute. A wiser course than judicial legislation, I submit, is simply to adopt a literal, reasonable construction of the text that Congress drafted.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in its entirety.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all but Part I and the last paragraph of Part II of the Court's opinion. I would reverse the Court of Appeals, and would uphold respondent's conviction, on the count charging violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1503.
The "omnibus clause" of § 1503, under which respondent was charged, provides:
"Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
Opinion of SCALIA, J.
structs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
This makes criminal not just success in corruptly influencing the due administration of justice, but also the "endeavor" to do so. We have given this latter proscription, which respondent was specifically charged with violating, see App. 106-107, a generous reading: "The word of the section is 'endeavor,' and by using it the section got rid of the technicalities which might be urged as besetting the word 'attempt,' and it describes any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent." United States v. Russell, 255 U. S. 138, 143 (1921) (emphasis added) (interpreting substantially identical predecessor statute). Under this reading of the statute, it is even immaterial whether the endeavor to obstruct pending proceedings is possible of accomplishment. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 333 (1966), we dismissed out of hand the "impossibility" defense of a defendant who had sought to convey a bribe to a prospective juror through an intermediary who was secretly working for the Government. "Whatever continuing validity," we said, "the doctrine of 'impossibility' ... may continue to have in the law of criminal attempt, that body of law is inapplicable here." Ibid. (footnote omitted).l
Even read at its broadest, however, § 1503's prohibition of "endeavors" to impede justice is not without limits. To "endeavor" means to strive or work for a certain end. Webster's New International Dictionary 844 (2d ed. 1950); 1 New
1 This complete disavowal of the impossibility defense may be excessive.
As Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893), acknowledged, an endeavor to obstruct proceedings that did not exist would not violate the statute. "[O]bstruction can only arise when justice is being administered." Id., at 207. See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (CA5 1989) ("There are three core elements that the government must establish ... : (1) there must be a pending judicial proceeding").
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 816 (1993). Thus, § 1503 reaches only purposeful efforts to obstruct the due administration of justice, i. e., acts performed with that very object in mind. See, e. g., United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1370 (CA6 1994); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (CA9 1972). This limitation was clearly set forth in our first decision construing § 1503's predecessor statute, Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197 (1893), which held an indictment insufficient because it had failed to allege the intent to obstruct justice. That opinion rejected the Government's contention that the intent required to violate the statute could be found in "the intent to commit an unlawful act, in the doing of which justice was in fact obstructed"; to justify a conviction, it said, "the specific intent to violate the statute must exist." Id., at 207. Pettibone did acknowledge, however-and here is the point that is distorted to produce today's opinion-that the specific intent to obstruct justice could be found where the defendant intentionally committed a wrongful act that had obstruction of justice as its "natural and probable consequence." Ibid.
Today's "nexus" requirement sounds like this, but is in reality quite different. Instead of reaffirming that "natural and probable consequence" is one way of establishing intent, it substitutes '" "natural and probable effect"'" for intent, requiring that factor even when intent to obstruct justice is otherwise clear. See ante, at 599, quoting United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (CAlO 1993), which in turn quotes United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (CAll 1990).2
2 Thomas, which appears to be the origin of this doctrine, made precisely the same mistake the Court does. It cited and misapplied earlier Court of Appeals cases standing for the entirely different principle-flowing from our language in Pettibone-that to prove an "endeavor" to obstruct justice, "all the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme would [obstruct the due administration of justice]." United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (CAll 1984). See also United States v. Fields, 838 F.2d 1571, 1573 (CAll 1988). This
But while it is quite proper to derive an intent requirement from § 1503's use of the word "endeavor," it is quite impossible to derive a "natural and probable consequence" requirement. One would be "endeavoring" to obstruct justice if he intentionally set out to do it by means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful. As we said in Russell, "any effort or essay" corruptly to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice constitutes a forbidden endeavor, 255 U. S., at 143, even, as we held in Osborn, an effort that is incapable of having that effect, see 385 U. S., at 333.
The Court does not indicate where its "nexus" requirement is to be found in the words of the statute. Instead, it justifies its holding with the assertion that "[w]e have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that a fair warning should be given ... of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." Ante, at 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But "exercising restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute" (which is what the rule of lenity requires, see United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-348 (1971)) is quite different from importing extratextual requirements in order to limit the reach of a federal criminal statute, which is what the Court has done here. By limiting § 1503 to acts having the "natural and probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice, the Court effectively reads the word "endeavor," which we said in Russell embraced "any effort or essay" to obstruct justice, 255 U. S., at 143, out of the omnibus clause, leaving a prohibition of only actual obstruction and competent attempts.
does not impose a requirement of "natural and probable consequence," but approves a manner of proof of "intent." See, e. g., United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (CA4), cert. denied, 441 U. S. 963 (1979).
The Court apparently adds to its "natural and probable effect" requirement the requirement that the defendant know of that natural and probable effect. See ante, at 599 ("[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct"). Separate proof of such knowledge is not, I think, required for the orthodox use of the "natural and probable effect" rule discussed in Pettibone: Where the defendant intentionally commits a wrongful act that in fact has the "natural and probable consequence" of obstructing justice, "the unintended wrong may derive its character from the wrong that was intended." 148 U. S., at 207. Or, as we would put the point in modern times, the jury is entitled to presume that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
While inquiry into the state of the defendant's knowledge seems quite superfluous to the Court's opinion (since the act performed did not have the requisite "natural and probable effect" anyway), it is necessary to my disposition of the case. As I have said, I think an act committed with intent to obstruct is all that matters; and what one can fairly be thought to have intended depends in part upon what one can fairly be thought to have known. The critical point of knowledge at issue, in my view, is not whether "respondent knew that his false statement would be provided to the grand jury," ante, at 601 (emphasis added) (a heightened burden imposed by the Court's knowledge-of-natural-and-probable-effect requirement), but rather whether respondent knew-or indeed, even erroneously believed-that his false statement might be provided to the grand jury (which is all the knowledge needed to support the conclusion that the purpose of his lie was to mislead the jury). Applying the familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), to the proper question, I find that a rational juror could readily
have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent had corruptly endeavored to impede the due administration of justice, i. e., that he lied to the FBI agents intending to interfere with a grand jury investigation into his misdeeds.
Recorded conversations established that respondent knew a grand jury had been convened, App. 47; that he had been told he was a target of its investigation, id., at 68; and that he feared he would be unable to explain his actions if he were subpoenaed to testify, id., at 51. Respondent himself testified that, at least at the conclusion of the interview, it was his "impression" that his statements to the FBI agents would be reported to the grand jury. 9 Tr. 1360 (Aug. 14, 1990). The evidence further established that respondent made false statements to the FBI agents that minimized his involvement in the matters the grand jury was investigating. See App. 73, 76, 81, 83-84, 86. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, I am simply unable to conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent lied specifically because he thought the agents might convey what he said to the grand jury-which suffices to constitute a corrupt endeavor to impede the due administration of justice. In fact, I think it would be hard for a juror to conclude otherwise.
Since I find against respondent on the § 1503 count, I must consider several other grounds offered by respondent for affirming the Court of Appeals' setting aside of his conviction. First, invoking the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, he argues that, since all the rest of § 1503 refers only to actions directed at jurors and court officers,3 the omnibus clause can-
3 Those clauses provide:
''Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any
not apply to actions directed at witnesses. But the rule of ejusdem generis, which "limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified," Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128 (1936); accord, Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980), has no application here. Although something of a catchall, the omnibus clause is not a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable (e. g., "fishing rods, nets, hooks, bobbers, sinkers, and other equipment"). Rather, it is one of the several distinct and independent prohibitions contained in § 1503 that share only the word "Whoever," which begins the statute, and the penalty provision which ends it. Indeed, given the already broad terms of the other clauses in § 1503, to limit the omnibus clause in the manner respondent urges would render it superfluous. See United States v. Howard, 569
Respondent next contends that because Congress in 1982 enacted a different statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1512, dealing with witness tampering, and simultaneously removed from § 1503 the provisions it had previously contained specifically addressing efforts to influence or injure witnesses, see Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1249-1250, 1253, his witness-related conduct is no longer punishable under the omnibus clause of § 1503. The 1982 amendment, however, did nothing to alter the omnibus clause, which by its terms encompasses corrupt "endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1503.
justice." The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and § 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself. It hardly leads to the conclusion that § 1503 was, to the extent of the overlap, silently repealed. It is not unusual for a particular act to violate more than one criminal statute, see, e. g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342 (1911), and in such situations the Government may proceed under any statute that applies, see, e. g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1979); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. 43, 45-46 (1952). It is, moreover, "a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored." United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 164, 168 (1976); see also Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936).
Finally, respondent posits that the phrase "'corruptly ... endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede' may be unconstitutionally vague," in that it fails to provide sufficient notice that lying to potential grand jury witnesses in an effort to thwart a grand jury investigation is proscribed. Brief for Respondent 22, n. 13. Statutory language need not be colloquial, however, and the term "corruptly" in criminal laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes "[a]n act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others .... It includes bribery but is more comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly done though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by another." United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (CAlO) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 825 (1980). See also Ballentine's Law Dictionary 276 (3d ed. 1969); Black's Law Dictionary 345 (6th ed. 1990). As the District Court here instructed the jury:
"An act is done corruptly if it's done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method, with a hope or
expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or a benefit of another person." App. 117.
Moreover, in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible. Acts specifically intended to "influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice" are obviously wrongful, just as they are necessarily "corrupt." See Ogle, supra, at 239; United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 941 (CAD C) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (1990); United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 999 (CA5), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 834 (1985).
The "nexus" requirement that the Court today engrafts into § 1503 has no basis in the words Congress enacted. I would reverse that part of the Court of Appeals' judgment which set aside respondent's conviction under that statute.
Robert P. Aguilar
Chris Skelton Mountain View, CA


Ocatvia Yearwood and Najja Moon are the co-creators of Lunchbox Miami, a gathering for lesbian, bisexual and queer women.
Earlier this year, Octavia Yearwood was talking with her good friend Najja Moon about how hard it is to meet other lesbian women in South Florida.
"I was sitting on a stool, she was sitting on a swing chair and we were like, 'Yo, for real, where are all the lesbians in Miami?' "
Moon didn't quite have the answer, but she wanted to explore how to make those connections. Together, the women launched Lunchbox Miami, a monthly meet-up for lesbian, bisexual and queer women.
Through word-of-mouth and social media they're creating the space they found was missing inside Yearwood's Little Haiti apartment.
At the most recent gathering, the door opened around 7 p.m., and women continued to show up well into the night.
About eight women sat on floor playing Cards Against Humanity -- the card game that encourages highly inappropriate answers.
"This is how you know how weird somebody is, or not," said Yearwood.
Dana De Greff, 31, had a good laugh over some of the answers. This was her first time attending the meet-up.
"It's nice to have a space where I can be social with other queer individuals, and especially queer people of color, which is hard to find," she said, adding that as an introvert, these types of social connections can sometimes be a personal challenge.
The living room where women can play various card games is renamed "the social room" for the night.
An empty bedroom doubles as the "art room." Poems, doodles and collages decorate the walls.
"Ninety five percent of the work that is on the walls in this room is from queer and lesbian women," said Yearwood.
The women are offered sharpies, spray paint and chalk to leave their mark.
Tye Stephens, 33, drove down from West Palm Beach to hang out in the Little Haiti apartment.
"This is something new to us and I only say that because of the intimacy. You get around these women [and] they ain't trippin. We vibe easy," she said.
Over the course of the evening, nearly two dozen women showed up and many lamented the lack of permanent spaces for lesbian women to socialize. They noted even in the gay club scene, women are often relegated to a "special night" or a pop-up event.
Yearwood said this is exactly the type of conversation she hears when she informally surveys her friends about the social scene for lesbian women.
"Lesbians, unlike gay men most of the time, kind of get folded in. We are ambiguous sometimes to each other," she said.
The gathering's co-creator Najja Moon said this why she and Yearwood stepped up to create a social space. She's also happy that the night draws a diverse mix of women.
In just 20 years, the number of Americans over the age of 65 will increase by 100 percent. That's roughly 80 million Americans, and as the LGBT community ages alongside their heterosexual friends and neighbors, doctors focused on that population say LGBT persons face unique concerns when it comes to aging, and a host of health care disparities ranging from housing discrimination to social isolation.
The Pride Fund to End Gun Violence says it has raised $125,000 in the year after the Pulse mass shooting, the deadliest in modern American history.


text:
Office for Students registration
Degree Outcomes Statement
The University of Hertfordshire's Undergraduate Degree Classification methodology
The University's methodology for the Honours classification of its undergraduate awards is described in its 'University Policies and Regulations', in UPR AS14 (Structure and Assessment Regulations - Undergraduate and Taught Postgraduate Programmes), section D6. All staff and students are directed to this single source for confirmation of the methodology.
The University's methodology was approved by its Academic Board in 2012, a variant of a methodology first approved in 2007. All University of Hertfordshire Bachelor's Degrees with Honours are classified on the following basis:
1.1 A classification grade is calculated from:
the average numeric grade of the best 90 credits at Level 6 or higher; and
the average numeric grade of the best remaining 90 credits at Level 5 or higher; and
a combined average numeric grade, weighted 75% (i) and 25% (ii).
1.2 Honours classification is considered on the basis of this combined average numeric grade:
For a first class Honours award a candidate must achieve a combined average numeric grade of 69.50 or more;
For an upper second class Honours award a candidate must achieve a combined average numeric grade of 59.50 or more;
For a lower second class Honours award a candidate must achieve a combined average numeric grade of 49.50 or more;
For a third class Honours award a candidate must achieve a combined average numeric grade of 39.50 or more.
These classification requirements should be read in conjunction with UPR AS14, section D6, which describes further detail, for instance on how grades above 90 are capped for classification purposes, on how direct entrants to level 5 or 6 of programmes are classified, on the effect of failed and compensated modules on classification and on additional requirements imposed by Professional or Statutory-Regulatory Bodies. The equivalent Honours classification requirements for Integrated Master's Degrees are described in UPR AS14, section D6.2. The University also awards a Grade-Point Average (GPA) alongside Honours Degree classification, based upon Grade Points achieved in all modules that contribute credit towards the Degree, as described in UPR AS14, section D8.
The chosen methodology satisfies the following principles:
This single classification methodology is simple and transparent to all stakeholders;
Absolute classification boundaries, with no discretion to move them, ensures consistent practice across the University's examination boards;
The 'best 90' approach forgives a 'slip-up' in terms of unrepresentative performance in one or two modules, and so encourages students to attempt from their perspective more challenging (and therefore riskier) modules;
The credit requirements drive more even student effort across all level 5 and 6 modules.
This methodology, along with the principles governing the methodology, was developed and approved with the full engagement of the University's student representative body and in consultation with the University's external examiners.
University of Hertfordshire degree classification profile, 2014/15 to 2018/19
The University measures degree classification attainment in terms of the number of First Class Honours awards plus Upper Second Class Honours awards as a proportion of all Honours Degree awards (referred to in the HE sector as the proportion of 'Good' Honours awards). Degree attainment for University of Hertfordshire students over a five-year period is presented below, by student characteristics and in comparison to the UK HE sector:
UK HE sector
University of Hertfordshire (UH)
UH Full-time students
UH Part-time students
UH male students
UH female students
UH Home/EU students
UH overseas students
UH non-disabled students
UH disabled students
UH non-BAME students
UH BAME students
Variations in outcomes are multifactorial and as such more complex than simply considering individual student characteristics as set out in the table. Entry qualifications, fee status and socio-economic background are all factors affecting degree outcomes. A large proportion of the University's courses are accredited, approved or regulated by Professional, Statutory and Regulatory Bodies (PSRBs), and their constraints are also significant . Additionally, there are subject variations in degree outcomes across the UK HE sector and students entering with BTEC qualifications perform less well than A level students.
The University has in place a range of actions to address the Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) attainment gap, as identified in the University's Access and Participation Plan for 2020/21 to 2024/25.
There have been no significant changes to assessment and marking practices, which continue to be designed to ensure rigour and stretch and have resulted in consistently excellent employability outcomes for all University of Hertfordshire students.
To address the attainment gap between BAME and White students, learning and teaching has focussed on personalised learning, inclusive teaching practice and compassion-focussed pedagogy. The University values and celebrates the teaching expertise of staff and 81% of academic staff hold teaching fellowships with Advance HE (compared to a UK sector average of 47%). Despite reduced levels of entry qualification, 'good degree' outcomes and value-added scores have slightly improved. Strategic investment in the learning environment including significant investment in learning resources has resulted in a sustained improvement to NSS scores which are consistently above the sector average.
The University's Academic Standards and Audit Committee is responsible to the Academic Board for assessment policies and regulations relating to academic standards of all taught awards, including those delivered through partnership arrangements. The University has established Board of Examiners structures and processes (outlined in UPR AS14, section C), which ensures marking practices are followed and assessment regulations consistently applied. External examiner reports confirm that the university's processes for the determination of awards are sound and fairly conducted.
Following a consultation exercise with the University's external examiners for taught provision, this Degree Outcomes Statement was considered and approved by the Academic Standards and Audit Committee on 5 May 2020, by the Academic Board on 24 June 2020 and finally the Board of Governors on 14 July 2020. It will be reviewed by the Board of Governors on a five-yearly cycle.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Wow. I just did fifteen general non-structured searches to compare Microsoft's new search engine, Bing to Google and Yahoo!.
I must be like Woz, because after a full bout (fifteen rounds), while there was not a clear knockout, I have to say I'm amazed at how well Bing works. Noticeably better than Google for many queries, in fact.
I liked Bing's snippets much much more than Google's, but they should adopt Google's indentation policy for multiple results from the same site (that does cause re-ordering, but it's useful for me as a consumer). The Bing snippets would be even better if they highlighted the search terms!
In most cases, Bing had a noticeably better diversity of results. For those two reasons alone, I'm going to switch to Bing for the near term and see how I like it.
I'm not happy with either Bing's or Google's attempt to "facet" results (by clustering or what?). I'm very happy with how up-to-date both engines are (e.g. <French Open>) and how they present a few news headlines.
Yahoo! has the best followup and related query suggestions as you type, but the ones they present with results aren't as good as the live ones. Bing and Google take different approaches (related versus refinement), and both are OK, but not particularly insightful.
Google's spell checker seems awfully aggressive. And I'm feeling that they're being a little too agressive stemming (I need some good examples of this — none came to mind right away; but for example, "infinity" is a synonym for LaTeX's "infty" command, at least if you can go by highlighting!).
Google and Bing are both surprisingly up to date. I'd hate to have to solve the spidering and updating problem they face.
I like Bing's clean layout — Google's results feel cramped by comparison. Now that I look at it, Google's one-column layout feels very late 1990s, early 2000s. Bing's narrow left-hand column with types of news and related searches (for query refinement) seems cleaner than Google's approach, where you have to scroll down to related searches.
I really appreciate the big targets for the paging at the bottom of Bing (ditto Yahoo!); clearly Google's designers have never heard of Fitt's Law.
I'm really impressed with how fast Bing is. It's at least as responsive as Google if not more so. Let's see how that goes if it gets more popular.
tong zhang Everyone gets his current Rutgers home page and then publications. Yahoo! has lots of irrelevant results and Google lots of stale results (like his old IBM page).
little professor baseball This is a baseball simulation I wrote, and all three sites get its home page and the math/stats page right. Bing had more phrasally relevant results than Google later. Not enough diversity on Yahoo!'s results.
andrew mccallum's publications for some reason, Google's "spell check" wants to get rid of the possessive, which is silly — this is what you get for relying on query histories! Both Bing and Yahoo! seem more on target than Google.
eos 5d review These results are much better than the last time I checked. Different orderings, but all the sites seem to be taking care of the spam pretty well. Google had the only resonable query refinement suggestion, <eos 5d mark ii review> Bing suggested <Canon eos 5d>, which doesn't exactly help matters; we need followup terms that will discriminate, not ones that are related. Oddly, Yahoo!'s live suggestions are quite reasonable as are the related searches.
carpenter chu-carroll call routing I needed this search for the previous link! Why isn't the ACL archive better indexed? Bing at least gets both the journal paper and conference paper on the top page. Yahoo!'s clearly defeated here, for some reason going with the Singapore mirror of citeseer.
pittsburgh hamburger Bing's pushing Wendy's! The right answer is Tessaro's, the best burger I've ever had. Google lists it in the second hit. Yahoo! loves Burger King and McDonalds. WTF? But Yahoo! comes through with the Yelp! page for Tessaro's. Yahoo!'s suggestions were also good, citing city down to neighborhood.
arithmetic coding I like Bing the best, because my tutorial is ranked 5 and the home page for my implementation is in the top 10; it's 9 on Google and not on the first page from Yahoo! Everyone pushes Wikipedia to the top and Mark Nelson's great survey second. Good job.
definition of L0, L1, L2 L infinity norm The answers are pretty good for this tough query. For some reason, the last time I searched for this topic I couldn't find it.
spell chcker Bing and Yahoo!'s interfaces clearly let you know they're searching for <spell check> or <spell checker> as well, and let you easily restrict to the actual query; Google implicitly searches for <spell checker> but I don't see how to limit results to just what I typed. Bad Google.
gary king text company Let's say I forgot the company's funny name (Crimson Hexagon). Not much help from any of the search engine's here. At least that means there's still work to do.
david smith umass OK, so who's still using Yahoo!? Both Bing and Google get the two with UMass affiliations on their home page or LinkedIn, listing first the right David Smith's home page (nice photo, David).
boxing scoring decision The snippet of Bing's first hit explains the whole concept, which is way better than the other engines.
It's too close for me to call with just these 15 queries. But clearly Bing's a contender for general web search.
This entry was posted on June 2, 2009 at 2:21 pm and is filed under Carp's Blog, Reviews.	You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.
I'm also pleasantly surprised by its excellent responsiveness. Once upon a time, after seeing some positive relevance test results, I tried to use Yahoo Search as my default search engine. But the biggest annoying thing was the higher latency over Google. There's just such a strong feeling of 400ms vs 100ms latency.
As far as layout goes, Bing does kind of cheat in that its right column is free of ads, so there's room for those lovely longer-summaries-on-hover. Assuming they want to cram that space full of ads, like G and Y do, something's gonna give.
and also .. gary king has a text analytics company?? he did coauthor that neat paper on political event extraction, and i thought he and/or other harvard social scientists were doing some big blog crawling/mining work, but huh.
The big question now is whether Microsoft will take a big chunk out of Yahoo's paid search revenue, as mentioned here: Does Microsoft Big Change Paid Search.
Check out Dolores Labs' Evaluating Bing [vs. Google] with Mechanical Turk, which gave the edge to Google (though see my comments which question the accuracy of the study).
Here's one query Google won hands down: [Peter Jackson West Thompson]. I only went back to Google because the Bing results were so bad for this query.
There's all kinds of interference from the film director, footballer, and AP newswriter on Bing's results, which is what I'd expect. Google's results after the first two were all over the place (West Thompson lake at rank 3?).
I would like spell check on my bing bar.


Andrew Butcher's coaching career at Santa Barbara High has literally spanned generations. Here he watches Tess Emerson sign a letter of intent to play at Pepperdine in 2011. On the left is Tess' mom, Holly Ford Emerson, who was coached by Butcher before becoming an All-American at USC. On the right is Brad Emerson.
With high school athletic budgets getting leaner and coaches scrambling to raise money for their programs, Santa Barbara High is fortunate to have a dedicated guy like Andrew Butcher on its staff.
Butcher is the longtime girls basketball coach at Santa Barbara. In his 30-plus years at the helm, he?s sent numerous players off to college, including 21 to NCAA Division 1 schools. Year in and year out, his teams are title contenders in the Channel League and make the CIF playoffs.
Coach Andrew Butcher, aka "The Godfather" of local girls basketball.
Friend Aaron Solis of San Marcos calls him ?The Godfather? of local girls basketball.
Butcher is smart, innovative, witty, resourceful and, most of all, giving. He gives hours of his time throughout the year helping players to become better on and off the basketball court.
Those qualities also have been a blessing to the Santa Barbara High Athletic Department. Through Butcher?s vision, creativity, teaching and labor, the athletic department has collected much-needed funds, worn facilities have received a makeover and students have acquired vocational and life skills.
Presidio Sports is pleased to honor Butcher as the Sports Figure of the Month.
?Andrew Butcher is like gold, everything he touches turns to gold,? said an appreciative Santa Barbara High Principal John Becchio. ?He is just a real great spirit around here. He gets his mind on something and goes after it, and it?s always going to benefit the kids, no doubt about it.?
A major fundraiser for athletics at the school is the Saturday flea market at the Anapamu Street parking lot on campus. Butcher has been coordinator of the event for the past 16 years.
?It?s done real well for different teams,? he said. ?I?m a volunteer. I?ve never gotten paid, although they do allow me to buy lunch.?
The market is not exclusive to athletic fundraising. The library and the school band have run it to make money for activities.
?It goes to whoever runs it,? he said.
Butcher is a basketball junkie and a Don, and he cares deeply about his alma mater.
He?ll see something on campus that needs upgrading, devises a plan and executes it. And he gets good results, just like he does with his basketball team.
He had the idea of a concession stand for the visitors at Peabody Stadium and made it happen. He bought a used food truck, had it cleaned, painted and inspected and parked it at the north end of the stadium for football games. His basketball players worked the stand and the money collected went to the athletic department.
?It helped the visitors, helped the people at that end (of the stadium) and it made the athletic department a lot of money,? Butcher said. ?I know one game we grossed $1800 just out of the food truck. It was a big thing.
?There are benefits,? he added about having the extra concession stand. ?It makes the athletic department money if you have a better event. And, even if we don?t make money, it?s a better event.?
The venerable stadium also got a facelift, thanks to a project taken on by Butcher. He saw the need to organize the seating at the stadium, so he had large vinyl signs made to divide the student section from the reserved seating section. Signs also were made to show the location of the restrooms.
The 2012 Santa Barbara High basketball players take a team photo with former Dons greats (back row, L to R) Jamaal Wilkes, Don Ford, Victor Bartolome, and coach Jack Triguero. Butcher is standing back row, far left.
?The signs at the stadium were so rusted you couldn?t even read what they said,? he recalled.
His motivation was to make the stadium more inviting for fans.
?Since I went to school here, I want to keep things up,? he said. ?We want people to have something to look forward to again. When I was in grade school, it was a big deal to go to a Dons game.?
He said he wants his 11-year-old son to enjoy that same experience.
?We?ve tried to make it so it would be a better event for people when they come to a game,? he said of the changes at the stadium. ?I?m a basketball guy but football starts the year off and it can get momentum going for all the sports, so we?re trying to make it better.?
Butcher also made huge improvements below the stadium. He brought in a crew to gut and sterilize rooms under the concrete stands. There is now a usable weight room and a couple of silk screening workrooms, where the athletes make T-shirts for their teams and special events.
?My JV coach, Lucia Serrano, we both went here and we?re always finding flaws,? he said of their motivation behind all the work. ?The stadium is 90-something years old. We did a lot of cleanup on the graffiti, got rid of poles that had been there for decades for no reason. We refurbished the weight room under the stadium because it was full of, I?d would say, ?Big mice.? We didn?t have the kids involved in any of that removal. We got the place really usable and nice.?
Butcher also is good at finding bargains.
He found a deal on Craig's List for a couple silkscreen machines. The students learned how to operate them and make designed T-shirts for school teams and events like the Tournament of Champions Basketball Tournament and Think Pink Week.
Butcher said they were losing money on the shirts they gave out at the Tournament of Champions. ?The cost of the shirts killed us. You can get a blank T-Shirt for $1.50 and the ink is a nickel.?
His basketball players made the shirts for the ?Think Pink? breast cancer awareness sporting events on campus last season.
?We made a lot of money for the Cancer Society,? he said. ?It?s always fun trying new things and doing projects. We don?t do anything dangerous, we don?t do anything where the kids aren?t trained. We try to do it right.?
And the students have a good time doing it.
?They get a lot of different things besides basketball, so it?s kind of fun,? said Butcher.
?Andrew?s one of those guys who?s larger than life but quiet and reserved about it, humble as all could be,? said the principal. ?He puts good people around him. He takes some kind of project that no one else would see as anything good and he has a vision it would be great and he turns it into great. And he does that with the kids. He takes kids that have never played basketball and in four years they?re great.?
A lot of the development of those players starts on the outside courts at the school, below Anapamu Street. Butcher and his team tackled the project of upgrading the entire area. He found a deal on a used ?Sport Court" surface for one court, had another court resurfaced, put in new baskets, built benches and a wooden ball rack.
?It?s self interest,? he admitted. ?We needed a better facility outside. When we first went out there, I had the kids make a list of all the things they want. We?ve done just about all of them.
?We used to be in the gym one day in the fall and in the spring, so we?ve been working really hard on our outside courts,? he added. ?We have two full courts out there.?
When the work was being done, Butcher realized the previous courts were not of regulation width.
?We were training the players to run narrow,? he said, shaking his head. ?I could never understand when we got in the gym and I couldn?t get them to run wide. For nine months, we were running too narrow.?
The outdoor court improvements have been a benefit to the Dons basketball program and the entire community, as well. Every weekend there are pick-up games being played on the courts.
?I played out there on my 55th birthday a few months ago,? Butcher said. ?(My group) always play on the short courts and thank goodness because you don?t want to run that extra 10 to 20 feet, especially when we?re shooting about 20 percent in those games. You don?t want to run that extra 15 to 20 feet, but it makes a big difference for the kids in training.?
Butcher often shares the funds his program raises through the flea market.
?We?ve done a lot of good things with that money,? he said. ?We bought a floor-polishing machine that was over $3,000 for the gym. The head custodian had us buy it because the old one was wearing the gym floor out. We bought the head gardener a high-quality leaf blower and weed whacker. We bought them one of the garden carts a few years back. We?ve done a lot of things for them.
And there's basketball. Butcher may not have the tallest players but the players who suit up for the Dons are fundamentally sound, prepared, passionate and play hard.
?We do the basketball thing, too,? he said. ?We work really hard and we got good kids.?
On all the projects, Butcher said it?s about making money for the school, the curiosity of it and loyalty to his alma mater.
?The fundraising projects that no one wants to touch, Andrew Butcher will take it and turn it into something marvelous,? said Becchio. ?He has great vision of turning something mediocre into something great.?


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(WOMENSENEWS)–March has been a great month for women and water.
Let's keep it going as we approach World Water Day on March 22.
The huge news, of course, came when the United Nations announced that the world has met the Millennium Development Goal target to reduce by half the proportion of people worldwide living without access to safe drinking water.
Not only was this target met, it was met nearly four years ahead of schedule.
This is really a big splash for girls and women. It's often girls and women, after all, who fetch and pump the family's water and manage crops while lacking control over household resources. Girls and women are disproportionately burdened with chores and care-giving, illiteracy, hunger and poverty.
Access to safe drinking water can help ameliorate or overcome all these challenges.
While hailing this accomplishment, let's remember the Millennium Development Goal target to halve the proportion of people living without safe sanitation. This is the most off-track of all our poverty-reduction goals. The goal, to halve, by 2012, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation will not be met. By 2015, only 67 percent of the world will have access to improved sanitation facilities, not the stated goal of 75 percent of the population. Today, 63 percent of the global population use toilets and other improved sanitation facilities.
What's clean water if sanitation isn't there to keep it clean?
Fortunately, the U.S. Agency for International Development understands how these goals are twinned.
When the agency released its long-awaited policy on gender equality and female empowerment earlier this month, authors stressed the need for more gender equity in water and sanitation project.
It's a fantastic start, and great leadership. With Congressional support for improved equity in water and sanitation projects, we might just have even more to celebrate.
If you want to join in the fight for water and sanitation justice, I urge you to take a look at the Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act, which will prioritize expanded access to safe water and sanitation by being smarter about how we spend existing resources–and by emphasizing the needs of women and girls and the opportunities offered by greater equity.
Between now and World Water Day on March 22, we have the opportunity and obligation to make more noise about women and water.
Clean water depends on sanitation, and both depend on governments being willing to prioritize the needs of women and girls.
The Millennium Goal target, after all, is an incomplete milestone.
Nearly 800 million people still lack everyday access to safe drinking water. A further 2.5 billion don't have sanitation facilities; no latrine, let alone a toilet or sewers.
A reliable source of safe drinking water close to home can increase women's decision-making and negotiation power because they have time to contribute to household income instead of spending hours seeking water, which is often unsafe to drink anyway.
Programs done right can give women a decision-making voice in their communities, too, often for the first time, by ensuring their input is heard by water users committees that decide where to put water taps and how to maintain them.
This has the additional benefit that when women and girls no longer need to look for water, they can instead attend school, vocational training, or literacy programs. They can socialize and play with their kids. They can grow more food–and healthier food–if they have time, the health, and the skills to work and better manage water resources. Progress on access to safe drinking water opens many doors for women of all ages in communities worldwide.
The Millennium Development Goals targets are a global aggregate. They do not necessarily require public health officials to serve the most remote communities, the most marginalized populations, the sickest or most stigmatized.
When you overlay those issues with an understanding that gender-based discrimination is still rampant worldwide, it becomes even more certain that women and girls will benefit greatly when we now get down to the tough stuff.
Lisa Schechtman is head of policy and advocacy at WaterAid in America.
Thousands of women in the sprawling shantytowns outside of New Delhi face a long queue for a grimy toilet and dirty water. Even though the government recognizes women's special need for sanitation and water, no special provisions are made.


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Q: Adding time to a date timestamp based on user's selection I have a form where jQuery is already being used on page load to change a value to a timestamp with the following format: 20110424.  It's a hidden input field:
<input type="hidden" name="sub_enddate" value="1" />

Which when the page is run, the value of "1" gets changed to one month out.  If "2" is in the value, the value of 2 is replaced with "20110524" and so on.  It's using the following code to make this change: http://pastie.org/1708677
What I'm trying to do now is change the date value above based on select values a user chooses.  Here's the select options:
<select name="Membership Duration">
<option value="">Select A Membership Duration</option>
<option class="mos6" value="6 Months{p+220}">6 Month Membership</option>
<option class="mos3" value="3 Months{p+240}">3 Month Membership</option>
<option class="mos1" value="1 Months{p+260}">1 Month Membership</option>
</select>

As you can see, I've attached a class to each option in the select dropdowns (i.e. mos6).  What I'm attempting to do is change the value of the timestamp explained above based on what the user chooses.  For example, if the user chooses "3 Month Membership", since this option has a class of 3, the timestamp will be modified to reflect 3 months from today's date (so effectively adding 2 months onto the existing timestamp in the hidden input field above.  If "6 Month Membership" is chosen, the date will be modified to 6 months from today's date and so on.  If the hidden input field above is a bad idea and we should just create a timestamp instead based on the dropdown options, I'm cool with that.
Thanks!

A: I was able to track it down by asking a different question here: How to timestamp with jQuery based off user's selection

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


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Collaborate adds new Subaru Impreza models
Collaborate Corporation's (ASX: CL8) DriveMyCar division has developed a marketing package with Subaru (Australia) which will result in 101 Subaru Impreza 2017 model vehicles being added to its fleet.
This represents an increase of 20% based on existing fleet numbers and the addition of these vehicles equates to a value of $2.2 million. Under the company's business model, the vehicles will be available for both private rentals and UberX rentals.
In terms of CL8's overall operations, the company is focused on collaborative consumption, peer-to-peer or sharing economy businesses. This involves three core business segments being DriveMyCar.com.au, MyCaravan.com.au and Rentoid.com, with the latter being one of Australia's leading peer-to-peer 'rent anything' platforms.
The company last week secured an underwriting for nearly $1.3 million in its listed options, a development which is expected to address all of the company's short to mid-term funding needs.
This had a positive impact on the company's share price as it increased 12%. From an operational perspective, the deal with Subaru could also spark interest in the stock as it represents an endorsement of the group's relationship with one of Australia's high profile motor vehicle distributors.
Similar to other agreements negotiated by DriveMyCar, the marketing package is a win-win situation with the potential for thousands of Australians to experience and test drive the new Impreza in unique ways not previously utilised by other automotive manufacturers, effectively providing potential buyers with a 'try before you buy' opportunity.
The fact that Impreza vehicles will also be available for rental by UberX drivers will expand market coverage as both drivers and passengers examine the vehicle's features.
From a commercial perspective, this has the potential to generate significant income for DriveMyCar as the vehicles will be available for rental from March 1, 2017 in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane for a price of $199 per week, highly competitive with traditional car rental groups.
Highlighting the benefits of the Subaru agreement, CL8 chief executive Chris Noone said, "We are delighted to be expanding our relationship with Subaru ten-fold so soon after our engagement late last year when the initial agreement involved the deployment of 10 Subaru Levorg wagons".
Trevor Hoey: fnfeed.com
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As the snow continues to fall and we scramble to find those perfect holiday gifts, the Beloit Snappers are making your life a little bit easier with our holiday season specials.
This year, the Snappers are selling one-of-a-kind Snappers Scarves and Snappers Christmas Ornaments to get you in the holiday spirit. Not only that, but both of these items make perfect gifts for anyone.
Additionally, the Snappers are going to kick off the holiday season by participating in Hollidazzle on December 7th from 5-9 PM. We will be stationed in the Center for Entrepreneurship in Liberal Education at Beloit College, which is in downtown Beloit next to Suds O'Hanahan's.
At Hollidazzle, we will have a great selection of Snappers merchandise available and opportunities to purchase Season Tickets, Snappy's Kids Club memberships, and much more for the upcoming season.
Secondly, the Snappers are offering a limited time flex pack that you can buy online today. The Holiday Season Flex Pack includes 5 General Admission Tickets, a Christmas Ornament, and a Snappy's Kids Club Membership presented by Culver's. You can get all of this for just $50! But don't wait, as this is only a limited time offer until January 11.
Sales and deals are available through online purchases and in-store at The Shell gift shop at Pohlman Field. The Shell gift shop will be open on every day, including Sat., Dec 15 & Sun., Dec 16, from 9 AM - 5 PM. To visit our online store, please click here.
The Snappers are in full holiday mode as Snappy and his friends prepare for the upcoming holiday season. Make sure you don't miss out on these awesome events, deals, and packages because they won't be here for long.


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St Margaret's Church Choir
St Margaret`s Church has always benefited from a good musical tradition with currently a four part choir. They sing at the 10AM and 6:30PM services, other activities include participating in concerts and diocesan choir festivals and occasional visits to churches to sing evensong. In the past the choir has performed as a 'visiting choir' at Birmingham, Derby, Leicester and Southwark Cathedral.
The choir are also available to sing at weddings and funerals.
Friends of the Choir
The Friends of St Margaret's Choir was formed in 1985 to help preserve this tradition and to support and encourage music making in our church. We are one of the few churches to have a choir nowadays. The 'Friends' help the work of the Choir by raising funds to promote musical awareness and choral training, for new music, robes and other requirements. Outings for both choral and social events are planned each year which everyone is welcome to attend. A newsletter 'The Organ Pipe' keeps members informed of forthcoming events and other musical topics.
Membership of the 'Friends' is open to everyone in the church whether musical or not. Currently the membership is about 65 members. Contact Us to Find out about becoming a member or current opportunities to join St Margaret's Choir.
Contact Us About Choir Opportunities
St Margaret's Church – Olton Choir Facebook Page