text:
Altruistic World Online Library
Board index ‹ Our Wild World ‹ Investigations of Government
The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Karen
Your relationship with government is simple: government knows everything about you, and you know nothing about government. In practice this means government can do whatever it wants to you before you know it's going to happen. Government policy makers think this is a good way of ensuring citizen compliance. Thus, all of these investigations are retrospective -- they look back at the squirrely shit that government has pulled, and occasionally wring their hands about trying to avoid it happening in the future. Not inspiring reading, but necessary if you are to face the cold reality that Big Brother is more than watching.
174 posts • Page 6 of 18 • 1 ... 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 ... 18
Re: The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, edited by Ka
by admin » Fri Oct 11, 2013 8:54 pm
MEMO 22
SECRET/NOFORN
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Detainee Interrogations (U)
(U) Establish a working group within the Department of Defense to assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the war on terrorism.
(U) The working group should consist of experts from your Office, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Military Departments, and the Joint Staff. The working group should address and make recommendations as warranted on the following issues:
(U) Legal considerations raised by interrogation of detainees held by U.S. Armed Forces.
(U) Policy considerations with respect to the choice of interrogation techniques, including:
(U) contribution to intelligence collection
(U) effect on treatment of captures US military personnel
(U) effect on detainee prosecutions
(U) historical role of US armed forces in conducting interrogations
(U) Recommendations for employment of particular interrogation techniques by DoD interrogators.
(U) You should report your assessment and recommendations to me within 15 days.
Classified by: Secretary Rumsfeld
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify on: 10 years
Declassify Under the Authority of Executive Order 12958
By Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense
By William P. Marriott, CAPT, USN
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER USSOUTHCOM
SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques (U)
(U) My December 2, 2002, approval of the use of all Category II techniques and one Category III technique during interrogations at Guantanamo is hereby rescinded. Should you determine that particular techniques in either of these categories are warranted in an individual case, you should forward that request to me. Such a request should include a thorough justification for the employment of those techniques and a detailed plan for the use of such techniques.
(U) In all interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment of detainees, regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed.
(U) Attached is a memo to the General Counsel setting in motion a study to be completed within 15 days. After my review, I will provide further guidance.
[Signed Donald Rumsfeld]
Unclassified When Attachment is Removed
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: Working Group to Assess Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (U)
(U) You are hereby designated as the Chair of an intradepartmental working group and my executive agent to prepare an assessment and recommendations for me that are responsive to the attached memorandum of the Secretary of Defense, "Detainee Interrogations," dated January 15, 2003. In carrying out these responsibilities, you should call upon the resources of the offices of those indicated as recipients of copies of this memorandum, including requesting their participation, or that of members of their staffs, in this working group.
(U) Please provide me with periodic updates as available. I expect your effort to address and provide recommendations, as warranted, pertaining to the issues set out in the Secretary's memorandum. Your analysis should take into account the various potential geographic locations where U.S. Armed Forces may hold detainees.
(U) You should provide your assessment and recommendations to me by January 29, 2003. I appreciate your willingness to assume this important responsibility.
William J. Haynes II
As stated.
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)
General Counsel of the Department of the Army
General Counsel of the Department of the Navy
Director of the Joint Staff
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine Corps
The Judge Advocate General of the Army
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Staff Judge Advocate for the Commandant of the Marine Corps
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations
Declassify on: 10 years.
II. International Law
(U) The following discussion addresses the requirements of international law, as it pertains to the Armed Forces of the United States, as interpreted by the United States. As will be apparent in other sections of this analysis, other nations and international bodies may take a more restrictive view, which may affect our policy analysis and thus is considered elsewhere.
A. The Geneva Conventions
(U) The laws of war contain obligations relevant to the issue of interrogation techniques and methods. It should be noted, however, that it is the position of the U.S. Government that none of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Third Geneva Convention) apply to al Qaida detainees because, inter alia, al Qaida is not a High Contracting Party to the Convention. [1] As to the Taliban, the U.S. Position is that the provisions of Geneva apply to our present conflict with the Taliban, but that Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. [2] The Department of Justice has opined that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Personnel in time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) does not apply to unlawful combatants.
B. The 1994 Convention Against Torture
(U) The United States' primary obligation concerning torture and related practices derives from the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (commonly referred to as "the Torture Convention"). The United States Ratified the Convention in 1994, but did so with a variety of Reservations and Understandings.
(U) Article 1 of the Convention defines the term "torture" for purpose of the treaty. The United States conditioned its ratification of the treaty on an understanding that:
…in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; (4) or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. [4]
(U) Article 2 of the Convention requires the Parties to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction". The U.S. Government believed existing state and federal criminal law was adequate to fulfill this obligation, and did not enact implementing legislation. Article 2 also provides that acts of torture cannot be justified on the grounds of exigent circumstances, such as state of war or public emergency, or on orders from a superior officer or public authority. [5] The United States did not have an Understanding or Reservation relating to this provision.
(U) Article 3 of the Convention contains an obligation not to expel, return, or extradite a person to another state where there are "substantial grounds" for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The U.S. understanding relating to this article is that it only applies "if it is more likely than not" that the person would be tortured.
(U) Under Article 5, the Parties are obligated to establish jurisdiction over acts of torture when committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state, or by its nationals wherever committed. The "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" under 18 U.S.C. § 7 satisfies the U.S. obligation to establish jurisdiction over torture committed in territory under U.S. jurisdiction or on board a U.S. registered ship or aircraft. However, the additional requirement of Article 5 concerning jurisdiction over acts or torture by U.S. nationals "wherever committed" needed legislative implementation. Chapter 113C of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides federal criminal jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act or attempted act of torture if the offender is a U.S. national. The statute defines "torture" consistent with the U.S. Understanding on Article 1 of the Torture Convention.
(U) The United States is obligated under Article 10 of the Convention to ensure that law enforcement and military personnel involved in interrogations are educated and informed regarding the prohibition against torture. Under Article 11, systematic reviews of interrogation rules, methods, and practices are also required.
(U) In addition to torture, the Convention prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment within territories under a Party's jurisdiction (Art 16). Primarily because the meaning of the term "degrading treatment" was vague and ambiguous, the United States imposed a Reservation on this article to the effect that it considers itself ******************* that such treatment or punishment means the cruel, unusual and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (see discussion infra, in the Domestic Law section),
(U) In sum, the obligations under the Torture Convention apply to the interrogation of unlawful combatant detainees, but the Torture Convention prohibits torture only as defined in the U.S. Understanding, and prohibits "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment" only to the extent of the U.S. Reservation relating to the U.S. Constitution.
(U) An additional treaty to which the United States is a party is the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, ratified by the United States in 1992. Article 7 of this treaty provides that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." The United States' ratification of the Covenant was subject to a Reservation that "the United States considers itself bound by Article 7 only to the extent that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment means the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States." Under this treaty, a "human Rights Committee" may, with the consent of the Party in question, consider allegations that such Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant. The United States has maintained consistently that the Covenant does not apply outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, and that it does not apply to operations of the military during an international armed conflict.
C. Customary International Law
(U) The Department of Justice has concluded that customary international law cannot bind the Executive Branch under the Constitution, because it is not a federal law. [6] In particular, the Department of Justice has opined that "under clear Supreme Court precedent, any presidential decision in the current conflict concerning the detention and trial of al-Qaida or Taliban militia prisoners would constitute a "controlling" Executive act that would immediately and completely override any customary international law". [7]
III. Domestic Law
A. Federal Criminal Law
1. Torture Statute
(U) 18 U.S.C. § 2340 defines as torture any "act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain…" The intent required is the intent to inflict severe physical or mental pain. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A requires that the offense occur "outside the United States". Jurisdiction over the offense extends to any national of the United States or any alleged offender present in the United States, and could, therefore, reach military members, civilian employees of the United States, or contractor employees. [8] The "United States" is defined to include all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States, including the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ) of the United States. SMTJ is a statutory creation [9] that extends the criminal jurisdiction of the United States for designated crimes to defined areas. [10] The effect is to grant federal court criminal jurisdiction for the specifically identified crimes.
(U) Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO) is included within the definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and accordingly, is within the United States for purposes of § 2340. Thus, the Torture Statute does not apply to the conduct of U.S. personnel at GTMO. That GTMO is within the SMTJ of the United States is manifested by the prosecution of civilian dependents and employees living in GTMO in Federal District Courts based on SMTJ jurisdiction and Department of Justice opinion [11] and the clear intention of Congress as reflected in the 2001 amendment to the SMTJ. The USA Patriot Act (2001) amended § 7 to add subsection 9, which provides:
"With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States as that term is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act—
(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of maintaining those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and
(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to supercede any treaty or international agreement with which this paragraph conflicts. This paragraph does not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in section 3261(a) of this title.
(U) Any person who commits an enumerated offense in a location that is considered within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction is subject tot the jurisdiction of the United States.
(U) For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that an interrogation done for official purposes is under "color of law" and that detainees are in DOD's custody or control.
(U) Although Section 2340 does not apply to interrogations at GTMO, it would apply to U.S. operations outside U.S. jurisdiction, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case involved. The following analysis is relevant to such activities.
(U) To convict a defendant of torture, the prosecution must establish that: (1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant acted under color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant's custody or physical control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering; and (5) that the act inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering. See also S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 6 (1990). ("For an act to be 'torture,' it must…cause severe pain and suffering, and be intended to cause severe pain and suffering.")
a. "Specifically Intended"
(U) To violate Section 2340A, the statute requires that severe pain and suffering must be inflicted with specific intent. See U.S.C. § 2340(1). In order for a defendant to have acted with specific intent, he must have expressly intended to achieve the forbidden act. See United States v. Carter, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000); Black's Law Dictionary at 814 (7th ed. 1999) (defining specific intent as "[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with"). For example, in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994), the statute at issue was construed to require that the defendant act with the "specific intent to commit the crime". (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the defendant had to act with the express "purpose to disobey the law" in order for the mens rea element to be satisfied. Ibid. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)
(U) Here, because Section 2340 requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to inflict severe pain, the infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise objective. If the statute had required only general intent, it would be sufficient to establish guilt by showing the defendant "possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime." Carter, 530 U.S. at 268. If the defendant acted knowing that severe pain or suffering was reasonably likely to result from his actions, but no more, he would have acted only with general intent. See id at 269 Black's Law Dictionary: 813 (7th ed. 1999) (explaining that general intent "usu[ally] takes the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that risk) or negligence ( involving blameworthy inadvertence)"). The Supreme Court has used the following example to illustrate the difference between these two mental states:
[A] person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money (satisfying "general intent"), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy "specific intent").
Carter, 530 U.S. at 268 (citing 1 W. Lafave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, at 315 (1986).
(U) As a theoretical matter, therefore, knowledge alone that a particular result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of murder, "the…common law of homicide distinguishes…between a person who knows that another person will be killed as a result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life[.]" United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980). "Put differently, the law distinguishes actions taken 'because of' a given end from actions taken 'in spite' of their unintended but foreseen consequences." Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1997). Thus, even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith. Instead, a defendant is guilty of torture only if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person within his custody or physical control. While as a theoretical matter such knowledge does not constitute specific intent, juries are permitted to infer from the factual circumstances that such intent is present. See, e.g., United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir, 2001); United States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000); Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1953). Therefore when a defendant knows that his actions will produce the prohibited result, a jury will in all likelihood conclude that the defendant acted with specific intent.
(U) Further, a showing that an individual acted with a good faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result that the law prohibits negates specific interest. See, e.g. South Atl. Lmtd. Ptrshp. Of Tenn v. Reise, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). Where a defendant acts in good faith, he acts with an honest belief that he has not engaged in the proscribed conduct. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991); United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 837 (4th Cir. 1994). For example, in the context of mail fraud, if an individual honestly believes that the material transmitted is truthful, he has not acted with the required intent to deceive or mislead. See e.g. United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928 939-40 (9th Cir. 1999). A good faith belief need not be a reasonable one. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202.
(U) Although a defendant theoretically could hold an unreasonable belief that his acts would not constitute the actions prohibited by the statute, even though they would as a certainty produce the prohibited effects, as a matter of practice in the federal criminal justice system, it is highly unlikely that a jury would acquit in such a situation. Where a defendant holds an unreasonable belief, he will confront the problem of providing to the jury that he actually held that belief. As the Supreme Court noted in Cheek, "the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury…will find that the government has carried its burden of providing knowledge". Id at 203-04. As explained above, a jury will be permitted to infer that the defendant held the requisite specific intent. As a matter of proof, therefore, a good faith defense will prove more compelling when a resonable basis exists for the defendant's belief.
b. "Severe Pain or Suffering"
(U) The key statutory phrase in the definition of torture is the statement that acts amount to torture if they cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering". In examining the meaning of a statute, its text must be the starting point. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) ("This Court has noted on numerous occasions that in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress…and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Section 2340 makes plain that the infliction of pain or suffering per sem whether it is physical or mental, is insufficient to amount to torture. Instead, the text provides that pain or suffering must be "severe." The statute does not, however, define the term "severe". "In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The dictionary defines "severe" as "[u]nsparing in exaction, punishment, or censure" or "[i]nflicting discomfort or pain hard to endure; sharp; afflictive; distressing; violent; extreme; as severe pain, anguish, torture". Webster's New International Dictionary 2295 (2d ed. 1935); see American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1653 (3d ed. 1992) ("extremely violent or grievous: severe pain") (emphasis in original); IX The Oxford English Diction"4TY 572 (1978) ("Of pain, suffering, loss or the like: Grievous, extreme" and "of circumstances…hard to sustain or endure"). Thus, the adjective "severe" conveys that the pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.
c. "Severe Mental Pain or Suffering"
(U) Section 2340 gives further guidance as to the meaning of "severe mental pain or suffering," as distinguished from severe physical pain and suffering. The statute defines "severe mental pain or suffering" as:
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from—
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
18 U.S.C.§ 2340(2). In order to prove "severe mental pain or suffering", the statute requires proof of "prolonged mental harm" that was caused by or resulted from one of four enumerated acts. We consider each of these elements.
i. "Prolonged Mental Harm"
(U) As an initial matter, Section 2340(2) requires that the severe mental pain must be evidenced by "prolonged mental harm". To prolong is to "lengthen in time" or to "extend the duration of, to draw out". Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1815 (1988); Webster's New International Dictionary 1980 (2d ed. 1935). Accordingly, "prolong" adds a temporal dimension to the harm to the individual, namely, that the harm must be one that is endured over some period of time. Put another way, the acts giving rise to the harm must cause some lasting, though not necessarily permanent, damage. For example, the mental strain experienced by an individual during a length and intense interrogation such as one that state or local police might conduct upon a criminal suspect, would not violate Section 2340(2). On the other hand, the development of a mental disorder such as posttraumatic stress disorder, which can last months or even years, or even chronic depression, which can also last for a considerable period of time is untreated, might satisfy the prolonged hard requirement. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 426, 439-45 (4th ed. 1994) ("DSM-IV"). See also Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 509 (1977) (noting that posttraumatic stress disorder is frequently found in torture victims); cf Sana Loue, Immigration Law and Health § 10:46 (2001) (recommending evaluating for post-traumatic stress disorder immigrant-client who has experienced torture). [12] By contrast to "severe pain" the phrase "prolonged mental harm" appears nowhere else in the U.S. Code nor does it appear in relevant medical literature or international human rights reports.
(U) Not only must the mental harm be prolonged to amount to severe mental pain and suffering, but also it must be caused by or result from one of the acts listed in the statute. In the absence of a catchall provision, the most natural reading of the predicate acts listed in Section 2340(2)(A)(D) is that Congress intended the list to be exhaustive. In other words, other acts not included within Section 2340(2)'s enumeration are not within the statutory prohibition. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("Expressio unius est exclusion alterius"); Norman Singer, 2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47, 23 (6th ed. 2000) ("[W]here a form of conduct the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.") (footnotes omitted). We conclude that torture within the meaning of the statute requires the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm by one of those acts listed in Section 2340(2).
(U) A defendant must specifically intend to cause prolonged mental harm for the defendant to have committed torture. It could be argued that a defendant needs to have specific intent only to commit the predicate acts that give rise to prolonged mental harm. Under that view, so long as the defendant specifically intended to, for example, threaten a victim with imminent death, he would have sufficient mens rea for a conviction. According to this view, it would be further necessary for a conviction to show only that the victim factually suffered prolonged mental harm, rather than that the defendant intended to cause it. We believe that this approach is contrary to the text of the statute. The statute requires that the defendant specifically intend to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Because that statute requires this mental state with respect to the infliction of severe mental pain and because is expressly defines severe mental pain in terms of prolonged mental harm, that mental state must be present with respect to prolonged mental harm. To read the statute otherwise would read the phrase "prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" out of the definition of "severe mental pain or suffering".
(U) A defendant could negate a showing of specific intent to cause severe mental pain or suffering by showing that he had acted in good faith that his conduct would not amount to the acts prohibited by the statute. Thus, if as defendant has a good faith belief that his actions will not result in prolonged mental harm, he lacks the mental state necessary for his actions to constitute torture. A defendant could show that he acted in good faith by taking such steps as surveying professional literature, consulting with experts, or reviewing evidence gained from past experience. See, e.g., Ratlzlaf, 510 U.S. at 142 n.10 (noting that where the statute required that the defendant act with the specific intent to violate the law, the specific intent element "might be negated by, e.g., proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel.") (citations omitted). All of these steps would allow that he had drawn on the relevant body of knowledge concerning the result proscribed by the statute, namely prolonged mental harm. Because the presence of good faith would negate the specific intent element of torture, good faith may be a complete defense to such a charge. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 130 F. 3d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Casperson, 773 f.2d 216, 222.23 (8th Cir. 1985).
ii. Harm Caused By Or Resulting From Predicate Acts
(U) Section 2340(2) sets forth four basic categories of predicate acts. The first category is the "intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering". The might at first appear superfluous because the statute already provides that the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering can amount to torture. This provision, however, actually captures the infliction of physical pain or suffering when the defendant inflicts physical pain or suffering with general intent rather than the specific intent that is required where severe physical pain or suffering alone is the basis for the charge. Hence, this subsection reaches the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering when it is only the means of causing prolonged mental harm. Or put another way, a defendant has committed torture when he intentionally inflicts severe physical pain or suffering with the specific intent of causing prolonged mental harm. As for the acts themselves, acts that cause "severe physical pain or suffering" can satisfy this provision.
(U) Additionally, the threat of inflicting such pain is a predicate act under the statute. A threat may be implicit or explicit. See, e.g., United States v. Sachdev, 279 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2002). In criminal law, courts generally determine whether and individual's word or actions constitute a threat by examining whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would conclude that a threat had been made. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that whether a statement constituted a threat against the president's life had to be determined in light of all the surrounding circumstances); Sachdev, 279 F.3d at 29 ("a reasonable person in defendant's position would perceive there to be a threat, explicit or implied, of physical injury"); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F2.d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1990) (to establish that a threat was made, the statement must be made "in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates a statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon [another individual]") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (perception of threat of imminent harm necessary to establish self-defense had to be "objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances"). Based on this common approach, we believe that the existence of a threat of severe pain or suffering should be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.
(U) Second, Section 2340(2)(B) provides that prolonged mental harm, constituting torture, can be caused by "the administration or application or threatened administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality". The statute provides no further definition of what constitutes a mind-altering substance. The phrase "mind-altering substances" is found nowhere else in the U.S. Code, nor is it found in dictionaries. It is, however, a commonly used synonym for drugs. See, e.g. United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir.) (referring to controlled substances as "mind-altering substance[s]"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 137 (2001); Hogue V. Johnson, 131 f.3d 466, 501 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to drugs and alcohol as "mind-altering substance[s]"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998). In addition, the phrase appears in a number of state statutes, and the context in which it appears confirms this understanding of the phrase. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3500 (c) (West Supp. 2000)("Psychotropic drugs also include mind-altering…drugs…"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260B.201(b) (West Supp. 2002) ("'chemical dependency treatment'" define as programs designed to "reduce[e] the risk of the use of alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances").
(U) This subparagraph, section 2340(2)(B), however, does not preclude any and all use of drugs. Instead, it prohibits the use of drugs that "disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality". To be sure, one could argue that this phrase applies only to "other procedures", not the application of mind-altering substances. We reject this interpretation because the terms of Section 2340(2) expressly indicate that the qualifying phrase applies to both "other procedures" and the "application of mind-altering substances". The word "other" modifies "procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses". As an adjective, "other" indicates that the term or phrase it modifies is the remainder of several things. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1986) (defining "other" as "being the one (as of two or more) remaining or not included"). Or put another way, "other" signals that the words to which it attaches are of the same kind, type, or class as the more specific item previously listed. Moreover, where a statute couple words or phrases together, it "denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same general sense." Norman Singer, 2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47:16 (6th ed. 2000); see also Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) ("that several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well."). Thus, the pairing of mind-altering substances with procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or personality and the use of "other" to modify "procedures" shows that the use of such substances must also cause a profound disruption of the senses or personality.
(U) For drugs or procedures to rise to the level of "disrupt[ing] profoundly the sense or personality", they must produce an extreme effect. And by requiring that they be "calculated" to produce such an effect, the statute requires that the defendant has consciously designed the acts to produce such an effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B). The word "disrupt" is defined as "to break asunder; to part forcibly; rend," imbuing the verb with a connotation of violence. Webster's New International Dictionary 753 (2d ed 1935); see Webster's Third new International Dictionary 656 (1986) (defining disrupt as "to break apart: Rupture" or "destroy the unity or wholeness of"); IV the Oxford English Dictionary 832 (1989) (defining disrupt as "[t]o break or burst asunder, to break in pieces; to separate forcibly"). Moreover, disruption of the senses or personality alone is insufficient to fall within the scope of this subsection; instead, that disruption must be profound. The word "profound" has a number of meanings, all of which convey a significant depth. Webster's New International Dictionary 1977 (2 ed. 1935 defines profound as: "Of very great depth; extending far below the surface or top; unfathomable[;]…[c]oming from, reaching to, or situated at a depth of more than ordinary depth; not superficial; deep-seated; chiefly with reference to the body; as a profound sigh, wounded, or pain[;]…[c]haracterized by intensity, as of feeling or quality; deeply felt or realized; as, profound respect, fear, or melancholy; hence, encompassing; thoroughgoing; complete; as, profound sleep, silence, or ignorance." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1812 (1986) ("having very great depth: extending far below the surface…not superficial"). Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1545 (2d ed. 1999) also defines profound as "originating in or penetrating to the depths of one's being" or "pervasive or intensive; thorough; complete" or "extending, situated, or originating far down, or far beneath the surface." By requiring that the procedures and the drugs create a profound disruption, the statute requires more than the acts "forcibly separate" or "rend" the senses or personality. Those acts must penetrate to the core of an individual's ability to perceive the world around him, substantially interfering with his cognitive abilities, or fundamentally alter his personality.
(U) The phrase "disrupt profoundly the senses or personality" is not used in mental health literature nor is it derived from elsewhere in U.S. law. Nonetheless, we think the following examples would constitute a profound disruption of the senses or personality. Such an effect might be seen in a drug-induced dementia. In such a state, the individual suffers from significant memory impairment, such as the inability to retain any new information or recall information about things previously of interest to the individual. See DSM-IV at 134. [13] This impairment is accompanied by one or more of the following: deterioration of language function, e.g., repeating sounds or words over and over again; impaired ability to execute simple motor activities, e.g., inability to dress or wave goodbye; "[in]ability to recognize [and identify] objects such as chairs or pencils" despite normal visual functioning, or "[d]isturbances in executive level functioning", i.e., serious impairment of abstract thinking. Id. At 134-35. Similarly, we think that the onset of "brief psychotic disorder" would satisfy this standard. See id. At 302-03. I this disorder, the individual suffers psychotic symptoms, including among other things, delusions, hallucinations, or even a catatonic state. This can last for one day or even one month. See id. We likewise think that the onset of obsessive-compulsive disorder behaviors would rise to this level. Obsessions are intrusive thoughts unrelated to reality. They are not simple worries, but are repeated doubts or even "aggressive or horrific impulses." See id. at 418. The DSM-IV further explains that compulsions include "repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking)" and that "[b ]y definition, [they] are either clearly excessive or are not connected in a realistic way with what they are designed to neutralize or prevent", See id. Such compulsions or obsessions must be "time-consuming", See id at 419. Moreover, we think that pushing someone to the brink of suicide (which could be evidenced by acts of self-mutilation), would be a sufficient disruption of the personality to constitute a "profound disruption" These examples, of course, are in no way intended to be an exhaustive list. Instead, they are merely intended to illustrate the sort of mental health effects that we believe would accompany an action severe enough to amount to one that "disrupt[s] profoundly the sense or the personality".
(U) The third predicate act listed in Section 2340 (2) is threatening an individual with "imminent death", 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C). The plain text makes clear that a threat of death alone is insufficient; the threat must indicate that death is "imminent". The "threat of imminent death" is found in the common law as an element of the defense of duress. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409. "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Common law cases and legislation generally define "imminence" as requiring that the threat be almost immediately forthcoming. 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7, at 655 (19860. By contrast, threats referring vaguely to things that might happen in the future do not satisfy this immediacy requirement. See United States v. Fiore, 178 F. 3rd 917, 923 (7th Cir. 1999). Such a threat fails to satisfy this requirement not because is it too remote in time but because there is a lack of certainty that it will occur. Indeed, timing is an indicator of certainty that the harm will be fall the defendant. Thus, a vague threat that someday the prisoner might be killed would not suffice. Instead, subjecting a prisoner to mock executions or playing Russian roulette with him would have sufficient immediacy to constitute a threat of imminent death. Additionally, as discussed earlier, we believe that the existence of a threat must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.
(U) Fourth, if the official threatens to do anything previously described to a third party, or commits such an act against a third party, that threat or action san serve as the necessary predicate for prolonged mental harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2)(D). The statute does not require any relationship between the prisoner and the third party.
2. Other Federal Crimes that Could Relate to Interrogation Techniques
(U) Through the SMTJ, the following federal crimes are generally applicable to actions by military or civilian personnel; murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111), manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112, assault (18 U.S.C. § 113), maiming (18 U.S.C. § 114), kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201). These, as well as war crimes (18 U.S.C. § 2441) [14] and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), are discussed below.
a. Assaults within maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 1139
(U) 18 U.S.C. § 113 proscribes assault within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Although section 113 does not define assault, courts have construed the term "assault" in accordance with that term's common law meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150F.3d 491,494 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Juvenile-Male, 930 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1991). At common law an assault is an attempted battery or an act that puts another person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. See e.g., United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2000). Section 113 reaches more than simple assault, sweeping within its ambit acts that would at common law constitute battery.
(U) 18 U.S.C § 113 proscribes several specific forms of assault. Certain variations require specific intent, to wit: assault with intent to commit murder (imprisonment for not more than twenty years); assault with intent to commit any felony (except murder and certain sexual offenses) (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than ten years); assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both). Other defined crimes require only general intent, it wit: assault by striking, beating, or wounding(fine and/or imprisonment for not more than six months); simple assault (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than six months), or if the victim of the assault is an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 1 year); assault resulting in serious bodily injury (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than ten years); assault resulting in serious bodily injury to an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years (fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 5 years). "Substantial bosily injury" means bodily injury which involves (A) temporary but substantial disfigurement; (B) extreme physical pain; (C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. "Bodily injury" means (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.
b. Maiming, 18 U.S.C. § 114
(U) Whoever with intent to torture (as defined in section 2340), maims, or disfigures, cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, or cuts out or disables the tongue, or puts out or destroys and eye, or cuts off or disables a limb or any member of another person' or whoever, and with like intent, throws or pours upon another person, any scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic substance shall be fines and/or imprisoned not more than twenty years. This is a specific intent crime.
c. Murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111
(U) Murder is the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or nay other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. If within the SMTJ, whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. Murder is a specific intent crime.
d. Manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1112
(U) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds: (A) voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion and (B) involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.
(U) If within the SMTJ whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined and/or imprisoned not more than ten years; whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be fined and/or imprisoned not more than six years. Manslaughter is a general intent crime. A death resulting from the exceptional interrogation techniques may subject the interrogator to a charge of manslaughter, most likely of the involuntary sort.
e. Interstate Stalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A
(U) 18 U.S.C. § 2261A provides that "[w]hoever…travels…within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States…with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury of that person." Thus there are three elements to a violation of 2261A: (1) defendant traveled in interstate commerce; (2) he did do with the intent to injure, harass, intimidate another person; (3) the person he intended to harass or injure was reasonably place in fear of death or serious bodily injury as a result of that travel. See United States v. Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir, 2002).
(U) The travel itself must have been undertaken with the specific intent to harass or intimidate another. Or put another way, at the time of the travel itself, the defendant must have engaged in that travel for the precise purpose of harassing another person. See Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d at 809 (the defendant "must have intended to harass or injure [the victim] at the time he crossed the state line").
(U) The third element is not fulfilled by the mere act of travel itself. See United States v. Crawford, No. 00-Cr-59-B-S, 2001 WL 185140 (D. Me. Jan. 26, 2991) ("A plain reading of the statute makes clear that the stature requires the actor to place the victim in reasonable fear, rather than, as Defendant would have it, that his travel place the victim in reasonable fear.").
(U) It is unlikely that this statute's purpose is aimed at interrogations.
f. Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 [15]
(U) Conspiracy to commit crime is a separate offense from crime that is the object of conspiracy. [16] Therefore, where someone is charged with conspiracy, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to violate the substantive statute. [17]
(U) As the Supreme Court most recently stated, "the essence of a conspiracy is 'an agreement to commit an unlawful act.'" United States v. Jimenez Recio, —S.Ct. -, 2003 WL 139612 at *— (Jan. 12, 2003) (quoting Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). Moreover, "[t]hat agreement is a 'distinct evil,' which 'may exist and be punished Whether or not the substantive crime ensues", Id at* (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997).
3. Legal doctrines under the Federal Criminal Law that could render specific conduct, otherwise criminal, not unlawful
(U) Generally, the following discussion identifies legal doctrines and defenses applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, and the decision process related to them. In practice, their efficacy as to any person or circumstances will be fact-dependent.
a. Commander-in-Chief Authority
(U) As the Supreme Court has recognized, and as we will explain further below, the President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority including in conducting operations against hostile forces. Because both "[t]he executive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President," the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is "the President alone who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations." Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1874) (emphasis added).
(U) In light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war, without a clear statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the President's ultimate authority in these areas. The Supreme Court has established a canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be constructed in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulties so long as a reasonable alternative construction is available, See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979) ) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe [a] statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.") this canon of construction applies especially where an act of Congress could be read to encroach upon powers constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch of government. See, e.g. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-1 (1992) (citation omitted) ("Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the [Administrative Procedure Act]. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended for the President's performance of this statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion."); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (19890 (construing Federal Advisory Committee Act not to apply to advice given by American Bar Association to the President on judicial nominations, to avoid potential constitutional question regarding encroachment on Presidential power to appoint judges).
(U) In the area of foreign affairs, and war powers in particular, the avoidance canon has special force. See, e.g., Dept of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."); Japan Whaling Ass 'n v. American Cemcean Socy, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (construing federal statutes to avoid curtailment of traditional presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs). It should not be lightly assumed that Congress has acted to interfere with the President's constitutionally superior position as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief in the area of military operations. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 529 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 1453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981). See also Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 (deference to Executive Branch is "especially" appropriate "in the area of national security").
(U) In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the conduct of operations during a war. The President's power to detain and interrogate enemy combatants arises out of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. A construction of Section 2340A that applied the provision to regulate the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief to determine the interrogation and treatment of enemy combatants would raise serious constitutional questions. Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield. Accordingly, we would construe Section 2340A to avoid this constitutional difficulty, and conclude it does not apply to the President's detention and interrogation of enemy combatants pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority.
(U) This approach is consistent with previous decisions of the DOJ involving the application of federal criminal law. For example, DOJ has previously construes the congressional contempt statute as inapplicable to executive branch officials who refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas because of an assertion of executive privilege. In a 1984 opinion, DOJ concluded that
if executive officials were subject to prosecution for criminal contempt whenever they carried out the President's claim of executive privilege, it would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional duties. Therefore, the separation of powers principles that underlie the doctrine of executive privilege also would preclude an application of the contempt of Congress to punish officials for aiding the President in asserting his constitutional privilege.
Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted A Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op O.L.C. 101, 143 (May 30, 1984). Likewise, if executive officials were subject to prosecution for conducting interrogations when they were carrying out the President's Commander-in-Chief powers, "it would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional duties." These constitutional principles preclude an application of Section 2340A to punish officials for aiding the President in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities. Id.
(U) It could be argued that Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2340A with full knowledge and consideration of the President's Commander-in-Chief power, and that Congress intended to restrict his discretion; however, the Department of Justice could not enforce Section 2340A against federal officials acting pursuant to the president's constitutional authority to wage a military campaign. Indeed, in a different context, DOJ has concluded that both courts and prosecutors should reject prosecutions that apply federal criminal laws to activity that is authorized pursuant to one of the President's constitutional powers. DOJ, for example, has previously concluded that Congress could not constitutionally extend the congressional contempt statute to executive branch officials who refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas because of an assertion of executive privilege. They opined that "courts…would surely conclude that a criminal prosecution for the exercise of a presumptively valid, constitutionally based privilege is not consistent with the Constitution." 8 Op O.L.C. at 141. Further, DOJ concluded that it could not bring a criminal prosecution against a defendant who had acted pursuant to an exercise of the President's constitutional power. "The President, through a United States Attorney, need not, indeed may not, prosecute criminally a subordinate for asserting on his behalf a claim of executive privilege. Nor could the Legislative Branch or the courts require or implement the prosecution of such an individual." Id. Although Congress may define federal crimes that the President, through the Take Care Clause, should prosecute, Congress cannot compel the President to prosecute outcomes taken pursuant to the President's own constitutional authority. If Congress could do so, it could control the President's authority through the manipulation of federal criminal law.
(U) There are even greater concerns with respect to prosecutions arising out of the exercise of the President's express authority as Commander-in-Chief than with prosecutions arising out of the assertion of executive privilege. In a series of opinions examining various legal questions arising after September 11, 2001, DOJ explained the scope of the President's Commander-in-Chief power. We briefly summarize the findings of those opinions here. The President's constitutional power to protect the security of the United States and the lives and safety of it's people must be understood in light of the Founder's intention to create a federal government "cloathed with all the powers requisite to the complete execution of It's trust." The Federalist No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). Foremost among the objectives committed to that trust by the Constitution is the security of the nation. As Hamilton explained in arguing for the Constitution's adoption, because "the circumstances which may affect the public safety" are not reducible within certain determinate limits,
it must be admitted, as necessary consequences, that there can be no limitations of that authority, which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.
Id. at 147-48. Within the limits that the Constitution itself imposes, the scope and distribution of the powers to protect national security must be construed to authorize the most efficacious defense of the nation and its interests in accordance "with the realistic purposes of the entire instrument." Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948).
(U) The text, structure, and history of the Constitution establish that the Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and therefore the power, to ensure the security of United States in situations of grave and unforeseen emergencies. The decision to deploy military force in the defense of the United States interests is expressly placed under Presidential Authority by the Vesting Clause, U.S. Const. Art I § 1, cl. 1, and by the Commander-in-Chief Clause, id., § 2, cl. 1. [18] DOJ has long understood the Commander-in-Chief Clause in particular as an affirmative grant of authority to the President. The Framers understood the Clause as investing the President with the fullest range of power understood at the time of the ratification of the Constitution as belonging to the military commander. In addition, the Structure of the Constitution demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the executive which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation unless expressly assigned in the Constitution to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II, Section 1 makes this clear by stating that the "executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." That sweeping grant vests in the President an unenumerated "executive power" and contrasts with the specific enumeration of the powers-those "herein" granted to Congress in Article I. The implications of constitutional text and structure are confirmed by the practical consideration that national security decisions require the unity in purpose and energy in action that characterize the Presidency rather than Congress. [19]
(U) As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Commander-in-Chief power and the President's obligation to protect the nation imply the ancillary powers necessary to their successful exercise. "The first of the enumerated powers of the President is that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. And of course, the grant of war power includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950). In wartime it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy. The President's complete discretion in exercising the Commander-in-Chief power has been recognized by the courts. In the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862), for example, the Court explained that whether the President, "in fulfilling his duties as Commander in Chief", had appropriately responded to the rebellion of the southern states was a question "to be decided by him" and which the Court could not question, but must leave to "the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted".
PART 2 OF 3 (MEMO 25 CONT'D.)
(U) One of the core functions of the Commander-in-Chief is that of capturing, detaining, and interrogating members of the enemy. It is well settled that the President may seize and detain enemy combatants, at least for the duration of the conflict, and the laws of war make clear that prisoners-may be interrogated for information concerning the enemy, its strength, and its plans. Numerous Presidents have ordered the capture, detention, and questioning of enemy combatants during virtually every major conflict in the Nation's history, including recent conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. Recognizing this authority, Congress has never attempted to restrict or interfere with the President's authority on this score.
(U) Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President. There can be little doubt that intelligence operations, such as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants and leaders, are both necessary and proper for the effective conduct of a military campaign. Indeed, such operations may be of more importance in a war with an international terrorist organization than one with conventional armed forces of a nation-state, due to the former's emphasis on secret operations and surprise attacks against civilians. It may be the case that only successful interrogations can provide the information necessary to prevent the success of covert terrorist attacks upon the United States and its citizens. Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategy or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the president to conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.
(U) As this authority is inherent in the President, exercise of it by subordinates would be best if it can be shown to have been derived from the President's authority through Presidential directive or other writing. [20]
b. Necessity
(U) The defense of necessity could be raised, under the current circumstances, to an allegation of a violation of a criminal statute. Often referred to as the "choice of evils" defense, necessity has been defined as follows:
conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
Model Penal Code 3.02. See also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott. I Substantive Criminal Law 5.4 at 627 (1986 &2002 app:)("LaFave & Scott"). Although there is no federal statute that generally establishes necessity or other justifications as defenses to federal criminal laws, the Supreme Court has recognized the defense. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (relying on LaFave & Scott and Model Penal Code definitions of necessity defense).
(U) The necessity defense may prove especially relevant in the current circumstances. As it has been described in the case law and literature, the purpose4 behind necessity is one of public policy. According to LaFave & Scott, "the law ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values, and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law." LaFave & Scott, at 629. In particular, the necessity defense can justify the intentional killing of one person to save two others because "it is better that two lives be saved and one lost than that two be lost and one saved" Id. or, put in the language of choice of evils, "the evil involved in violating the terms of the criminal law (…even taking another's life) may be less than that which would result from literal compliance with the law (…two lives lost)". Id.
(U) Additional elements of necessity defense are worth noting here. First, the defense is not limited to certain types of harms. Therefore, the harm inflicted by necessity may include intentional homicide, so long as the harm avoided is greater (i.e., preventing more deaths) Id. at 634. Second, it must actually be the defendant's intention to avoid the greater harm: intending to commit murder and then learning only later that the death had the fortuitous result of saving other lives will not support a necessity defense. Id. at 635. Third, if the defendant reasonably believes that the lesser harm as necessary, even if, unknown to him, it was not, he may still avail himself of the defense,. As LaFave and Scott explain, "if A kills B reasonably believing it to be necessary to save C and D, he is not guilty of murder eve though, unknown to A. C and D could have been rescued without the necessity of killing B," Id. Fourth, it is for the court, and not the defendant to judge whether the harm avoided outweighed the harm done. Id. at 636. Fifth, the defendant cannot rely upon the necessity defense if a third alternative that will cause less harm is open and known to him.
(U) Legal authorities identify an important exception to the necessity defense. The defense is available "only in situations wherein the legislature has not itself, in its criminal statute, made determination of values." Id. at 629. Thus, if Congress explicitly has made clear that violation of a statute cannot be outweighed by the harm avoided, courts cannot recognize the necessity defense. LaFave and Israel provide as an example an abortion statute that made clear that abortions even to save the life of the mother would still be a crime; in such cases the necessity defense would be unavailable. Id. at 630. Here, however, Congress has not explicitly made a determination of values vis-à-vis torture. In fact, Congress explicitly removed efforts to remove torture from the weighing of values permitted by the necessity defense. [21]
c. Self-Defense
(U) Even if a court were to find that necessity did not justify the violation of a criminal statue, the defendant could still appropriately raise a claim of self-defense. The right to self-defense, even when it involves deadly force, is deeply embedded in our law, both as to individuals and as to the nation as a whole. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained:
More than two centuries ago, Blackstone, best known of the expositors of the English common law taught that "all homicide is malicious, and of course amounts to murder, unless…excused on the account of accident or self preservation". Self-defense, as a doctrine legally exonerating the taking of human life, is as viable now as it was in Blackstone's time.
United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Self-defense is a common-law defense to federal criminal law offenses, and nothing in the text, structure or history of Section 2340A precludes its application to a charge of torture. In the absence of any textual provision to the contrary, we assume self-defense can be an appropriate defense to an allegation of torture.
(U) The doctrine of self-defense permits the use of force to prevent harm to another person. As LaFave and Scott explain, one is justified in using reasonable force in defense of another person, even a stranger, when he reasonably believes that the other is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger." Id. at 663-64. Ultimately, even deadly force is permissible, but "only when the attack of the adversary upon the other, person reasonably appears to the defender to be a deadly attack" Id. at 664. As with our discussion of necessity, we will review the significant elements of this defense. [22] According to LaFave and Scott, the elements of the defense of others are the same as those that apply to individual self-defense.
(U) First, self-defense requires that the use of force be necessary to avoid the danger of unlawful bodily harm. Id. at 649. a defender may justifiably use deadly force if he reasonably believes that the other person is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm upon another, and that it is necessary to use such force to prevent it. Id. at 652. Looked at from the opposite perspective, the defender may not use force when the force would be as equally effective at a later time and the defender suffers no harm or risk by waiting. See Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law defenses 131(c) at 77 (1984). If, however, other options permit the defender to retreat safely from confrontation without having to resort to deadly force, the use of force may not be necessary in the first place. LaFave and Scott at 659-60.
(U) Second, self-defense requires that the defendant's belief in the necessity of using force be reasonable. If a defendant honestly but unreasonably believed force was necessary, he will not be able to make out a successful claim of self-defense. Id. at 654. Conversely, if a defendant reasonably believed an attack was to occur, but the facts subsequently showed no attack was threatened, he may still raise self-defense. As LaFave and Scott explain, "one may be justified in shooting to death and adversary who, having threatened to kill him, reaches for his pocket as if for a gun, thou it later appears that he had no gun and that he was only reaching for his handkerchief." Id. Some authorities such as the Model Penal Code, even eliminate the reasonability element, and require only that the defender honestly believed regardless of its reasonableness - that the use of force was necessary.
(U) Third, many legal authorities include the requirement that a defender must reasonably believe that the unlawful violence is "imminent" before he can use force in his defense. It would be a mistake, however, to equate imminence necessarily with timing—that an attack is immediately about to occur. Rather, as the Model Penal Code explains, what is essential in that the defensive response must be "immediately necessary." Model Penal Code § 3.04(1). Indeed, imminence must be merely another way of expressing the requirement of necessity. Robinson at 78. LaFave and Scott , for example, believe that the imminence requirement makes sense as part of a necessity defense because if an attack is not immediately upon the defender, the defender may have other options available to avoid the attack that do not involve the use of force. LaFave and Scott at 656. If, however, the fact that the attack becomes certain and no other options remain the use of force may be justified. To use a well-known hypothetical, if A were to kidnap and confine B, and then tell B he would kill B one week later, B would be justified in using force in self-defense, even if the opportunity arose before the week had passed. Id. at 656; see also Robinson at § 131(c)(1) at 78. In this hypothetical, while the attack itself is not imminent, B's use of force becomes immediately necessary whenever he has an opportunity to save himself from A.
(U) Fourth, the amount of force should be proportional to the threat. As LaFave and Scott explain, "the amount of force which [the defender] may justifiably use must be reasonably related to the threatened harm which he seeks to avoid." LaFave and Scott at 651. thus, one may not use deadly force in response to a threat that does not rise to death or serious bodily harm. If such harm may result however, deadly force is appropriate.
(U) A claim by an individual of the defense of another would be supported by the fact that in this case, the nation itself is under attack and has the right to self-defense. This fact can bolster and support an individual claim of self-defense in a prosecution, according to the Supreme Court in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case, the State of California arrested and helf deputy U.S. Marshal Neagle for shooting and killing the assailant of Supreme Court Justice Field. In granting the writ of habeas corpus for Neagle's release, the Supreme Court did not rely alone upon marshal's right to defend another or his right to self-defense. Rather, the Court found that Neagle, as an agent of the United States and of the executive branch, was justified in the killing because in protecting Justice Field, he was acting pursuant to the executive branch's inherent constitutional authority to protect the United States government. Id. at 67 ("We cannot doubt the power of the president to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of the courts of the United States who, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened with a personal attack which may probably result in his death.") That authority derives, according to the Court, from the President's power under Article II to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. In other words, Neagle as a federal officer not only could raise self-defense or defense of another, but also could defend his actions on the ground that he was implementing the Executive Branch's authority to protect the United States government.
(U) If the right to defend the national government can be raised as a defense in an individual prosecution as Neagle suggests, then a government defendant, acting in his official capacity, should be able to argue that any conduct that arguably violated a criminal prohibition was undertaken pursuant to more than just individual self-defense or defense of another. In addition, the defendant could claim that he was fulfilling the Executive Branch's authority to protect the federal government, and the nation, from attack. The September 11 attacks have already triggered that authority, as recognized both under domestic and international law. Following the example of In re Neagle, we conclude that a government defendant may also argue that his conduct of an interrogation properly authorized, is justified on the basis of protecting the nation from attack.
(U) There can be little doubt that the nation's right to self-defense has been triggered under out law. The Constitution announces that one of its purposes is "to provide for the common defense." U.S. Const., Preamble. Article I, § 8 declares that Congress is to exercise its powers to "provide for the common defense." See also 2 Pub. Papers of Ronald Reagan 920,921 1988-89) (right to self-defense recognized by Article 61 of the U.N. Charter). The President has particular responsibility and power to take steps to defend the nation and its people. In re Neagle, 135 U.S at 64. See also U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall...protect [each of the States] against Invasion"). As Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, he may use the Armed Forces to protect the nation and its people. See, e.g., United States v. Verdug-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,273 (1990) Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876). As the Supreme Court observed in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), in response to an armed attack on the United States "the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ...without waiting for any special legislative authority." ld. at 668. The September 11 events were a direct attack on the United States, and as we have explained above, the President has authorized the use of military force with the support of Congress.[24]
(U) As DOJ has made clear in opinions involving the war on al Qaida, the nation's right to self-defense has been triggered by the events on September 11. If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in manner that might arguably violate criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaida terrorist network. In that case, DOJ believes that he could argue that the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions. This national and international version of the right to self-defense could supplement and bolster the government defendant's individual right.
d. Military Law Enforcement Actions
(U) Use of force in military law enforcement is authorized for (1) self-defense and defense of others against a hostile person when in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm by the hostile person; (2) to prevent the actual theft or or sabotage of assets vital to national security; (3) to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources that are inherently dangerous to others; (4) to prevent the commission of a serious crime that involves imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; (5) to prevent the destruction of vital public utilities or similar critical infrastructure; (6) for apprehension; and (7) to prevent escape. (DODD 5210.56 1 Nov 2001). These justifications contemplate the use of force against a person who has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a serious offense. Although we are not aware or any authority that applies these concepts in the interrogation context, the justified use of force in military law enforcement may provide useful comparisons to the use of force against a detainee to extract intelligence for the specific purpose of preventing a serious and imminent terrorist incident. However, we are unaware of any authority for the proposition. For an analogous discussion pertaining to the pending commission of a serious crime, see the "necessity" and "self-defense" discussions, supra.
e. Superior Orders
(U) Under both international law and U.S. law, an order to commit an obviously criminal act, such as the wanton killing of a noncombatant or the torture of a prisoner, is an unlawful order and will not relieve a subordinate of his responsibility to comply with the law of armed conflict. [25] Only if the individual did not know of the unlawfulness of an order, and he could not reasonably be expected under the circumstances to recognize the order as unlawful, will the defense of obedience of a superior order protect a subordinate from the consequences of violation of the law of armed conflict.[26]
(U) Under international law, the fact that a war crime is committed pursuant to the orders of a military or civilian superior does not by itself relieve the subordinate committing it from criminal responsibility under international law.[27] It may, however, be considered in mitigation of punishment.[28]
(U) For instance, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, art. 8, stated:
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.[29]
(U) Similarly, the Statute for the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provide (in articles 7(4) & 6(4), respectively) provide:
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in anticipation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
(U) As to the general attitude taken by military tribunals toward the plea of superior orders, the following statement is representative:
It cannot be questioned that acts done in time of war under the military authority of an enemy cannot involve and criminal liability on the part of officers or soldiers if the acts are not prohibited by the conventional or customary rules of war. Implicit obedience to orders of superior officers is almost indispensable to every military system. But this implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done pursuant to a superior's orders be murder, the production of the order will not make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify the crime. We are of this view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of the crime exists and the inferior [sic] will be protected. But the general rule is the members of the armed forces are bound to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot escape criminal liability obeying a command which violates international law and outrages fundamental concepts of justice.
The Hostage Case (United States v. Wilhelm List et. al.), 11 TWC 1236.
(U) The international Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared in its judgment that the test of responsibility for superior orders "is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible." [30]
(U) Domestically, the UCMJ discusses the defenses of superior order in The Manual Courts-Martial, which provides in R.C.M. 916(d), MCM 2002:
It is a defense to any offense that the accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused know the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the orders to be unlawful. An act performed pursuant to a lawful order is justified. An act performed pursuant to an unlawful order is excused unless the accused knew it to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have know the orders to be unlawful.
Inference of lawfulness. An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. [31]
(U) In sum, the defense of superior orders will generally be available for U.S. Armed Forces personnel engaged in exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be patently unlawful.
4. Lack of DOJ Representation for DOD Personnel Charged with a Criminal Offense
(U) DOJ representation of a defendant is generally not available in federal criminal proceedings, even when the defendant's actions occur within the scope of federal employment. [32]
B. Federal Civil Statutes
1. 28 U.S.C. 1350
(U) 28 U.S.C. 1350 extends the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts to "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States". [33] Section 1350 is a vehicle by which victims of torture and other human rights violations by their native government and its agents have sought judicial remedy for the wrongs they've suffered. However, all the decided cases we have found involve foreign nationals suing in U.S. District Courts for conduct by foreign actors/governments. [34] The District Court for the District of Columbia has determined that section 1350 actions, by the GTMO detainees, against the United States or its agents acting within the scope of employment fail. This is because (1) the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to such suits like those brought by the detainees, and (2) the Eisentrager doctrine barring habeas access also precludes other potential avenues of jurisdiction. [35] This of course leaves interrogators vulnerable in their individual capacity for conduct a court might find tortuous. Assuming a court would take jurisdiction over the matter and grant standing to the detainee, [36] it is possible that this statute would provide an avenue of relief for actions of the United States or its agents found to violate customary international law. The application of international law, specifically that which might be considered custom, is discussed supra in Section IV at "International Considerations that May Affect Policy Determinations";
2. Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA)
(U) In 1992, President Bush signed into law the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. [37] Appended to the U.S. Code as a note to section 1350, the TVPA specifically creates a cause of action for individuals (or their successors) who have been subjected to torture or extra-judicial killing by "an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture shall in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extra judicial in a civil action, be liable for damages…." (emphasis added) [38] It thus appears that the TVPS does not apply to the conduct of U.S. agents acting under the color of law.
C. Applicability of the United States Constitution
1. Applicability of the Constitution to aliens Outside the United States
(U) Nonresident enemy aliens do not enjoy constitutional rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States. [39] The courts have held that unlawful combatants do not gain constitutional rights upon transfer to GTMO as unlawful combatants merely because the U.S. exercises extensive dominion and control over GTMO. [40] Moreover, rights apply to aliens only on sovereign U.S. territory. (See discussion under "Jurisdiction of Federal Courts", infra.)
(U) Although U.S. constitutional rights do not apply to aliens at GTMO, the U.S. criminal laws do apply to acts committed there by virtue of GTMO's status as within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
2. The Constitution Defining U.S. Obligations Under International Law
(U) In the course of taking reservations to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United States determined that the Convention's prohibitions against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment applied only to the extent that such conduct was prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to our Constitution. [41] Consequently, analysis of these amendments is significant in determining the extent to which the United States is bound by the Convention. It should be clear, however, that aliens held at GTMO do not have constitutional rights under the 5th Amendment's Due Process clause or the 8th Amendment. See, Johnson v. Eisenberger, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) and Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
a. Eighth Amendment
(U) "An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this [Supreme] Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes" [42] The import of this holding is that, assuming a detainee could establish standing to challenge his treatment the claim would not lie under the 8th Amendment. Accordingly, it does not appear detainees could successfully pursue a claim regarding their pre-conviction treatment under the Eighth Amendment.
(U) The standards of the Eighth Amendment are relevant, however, due to the U.S. Reservation to the Torture Convention's definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Under "cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence, there are two lines of analysis: (1) conditions of confinement, and (2) excessive force. As a general matter, the excessive fore analysis applies to the official use of physical force, often in situations in which an inmate has attacked another inmate or a guard whereas the conditions of confinement analysis applies to such things as administrative segregation. Under the excessive force analysis, "a prisoner alleging excessive force must demonstrate that the defendant acted 'maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. McMillan; 503 U.S.. 1, at 7). Excessive force requires the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Whitney v. Albers, 475, U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
(U) A condition of confinement is not "cruel and unusual" unless it (1) is "sufficiently serious" to implicate constitutional protection, id. at 347, and (2) reflects "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's health or safety, Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The first element is objective, and inquires whether the challenged condition is cruel and unusual. The second, so-called "subjective" element requires examination of the actor's intent and inquires whether the challenged condition is imposed as punishment. Wilson v. Selter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) ("The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.").
(U) The Supreme Court has noted that "[n]o static 'test' can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 146 (citation omitted). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)(stating that the Eighth Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency"). Nevertheless, certain guidelines emerge from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
(U) The court has established that "only those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities' sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. It is not enough for a prisoner to show that he has been subjected to conditions that are merely "restrictive and even harsh," as such conditions are simply "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. See also Wilson at 349 ("the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons."). Rather, a prisoner must show that he has suffered a "serious deprivation of basic human needs," Id. at 347, such as "essential food, medical care, or sanitation," Id. At 348, See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (requiring "the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise"). "The Amendment also imposes [the duty on officials to] provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citations omitted). The Court has also articulated an alternative test inquiring whether an inmate was exposed to "a substantial risk or serious harm." Id. At 837. See also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001)("In order to sati8sfy the [objective] requirement, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.").
(U) The various conditions of confinement are not to be assessed under a totality of the circumstances approach. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that "each condition must be considered as part of the overall conditions challenged." Id. At 304 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), Instead the Court concluded that "Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation 'in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise - for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets." Id. At 304. As the Court further explained, "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivations of a single human need exists." Id. at 305.
(U) To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a prisoner must demonstrate "that the official was subjectively aware of that risk". Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 125 (1994). As the supreme Court further explained:
We hold…that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying any inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and regards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This standard requires greater culpability than mere negligence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) ("mere negligence would satisfy neither [the Whitely standard of malicious and sadistic infliction] nor the more lenient deliberate indifference standard") (internal quotation marks omitted).
(U) The second line of cases considers the use of force against prisoners. The situation often arises in cases addressing the use of force while quelling prison disturbances. In cases involving the excessive use of force the central question is whether the force was applied with good intentions in an attempt to restore order or maliciously and sadistically with the purpose of causing harm. [43] Malicious and sadistic use of force always violates contemporary standards of decency and would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. [44] The courts apply a subjective test when examining intent of the official. In determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including: (1) "the need for the application of force"; (2) "the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used"; (3) "the extent of injury inflicted"; (4) "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them"; and (5) "any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." [45] Great deference is given to the prison official in the carrying out of his duties. [46]
(U) One of the Supreme Court's most recent opinions on conditions of confinement — Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002) — illustrates the Court's focus on the necessity of the actions undertaken in response to a disturbance in determining the officer's subjective of mind. [47] In Hope, following an "exchange of vulgar remarks" between the inmate Hope and an officer, the two got into a "wrestling match". Id at 2512. Additional officers intervened and restrained Hope. See Id. These officers then took Hope back to prison. Once there, they required him to take off his shirt and then attached him to the hitching post, where he remained in the sun for the next seven hours. See Id. at 2512-13. During this time, Hope received no bathroom breaks. He was given water only once or twice and at least one guard taunted him about being thirsty. See Id. at 2513. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts Hope alleged stated an "obvious" Eighth Amendment violation. Id at 2514. The obviousness of this violation stemmed from the utter lack of necessity for the actions the guards undertook. The Court emphasized that "any safety concerns" arising from the scuffle between Hope and the officer "had long since abated by the time [Hope] was attached to the hitching post" and that there was a "clear lack of an emergency situation". Id. As a result, the Court found that "[t]his punitive treatment amount [ed] to [the] gratuitous infliction of 'wanton and unnecessary' pain that our precedent clearly prohibits." Id. at 2515. Thus, the necessity of the government action bears upon both the conditions of confinement analysis as well as the excessive force analysis.
(U) The government interest here is of the highest magnitude. The typical prison case, the protection of other inmates or officers, the protection of the inmate alleged to have suffered the cruel and unusual punishment, or even the maintenance of order in the prison provide valid government interests for various deprivations. See e.g. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 1971) ("protect[ing] inmates from self-inflicted injury, protect[ing] the general prison population and personnel from violate acts on his part, prevent[ing] escape" are all legitimate penological interests that would permit the imposition of solitary confinement); McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1978) (prevention if inmate suicide is a legitimate interest). If the protection of one person or even prison administration can be deemed to be valid governmental interests in such cases frequently permitted deprivations, it follows a fortiori that the interest of the United States here -- obtaining intelligence vital to the protection of untold thousands of American citizens -- can be no less valid. To be sure, no court has encountered the precise circumstances hereunder Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Nonetheless, it can be forcefully argued that there can be no more compelling government interest than that which is presented here. See Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002) ("The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. We have said that among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are totally without penological justification.")
b. Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment [48]
(U) "It is now the settled doctrine ... that the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just." [49 Due process is violated if a practice or rule "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." [50]
(U) Standing by itself, the phrase "due process" would seem to refer solely and simply to procedure, to process in court, and therefore to be so limited that "due process of law" would be what the legislative branch enacted it to be. But that is not the interpretation which has been placed on the term. "It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will." [51] With this viewpoint, the Supreme Court has carved out a role for the courts to judge the legislative and executive acts for their effect on the rights of the peoples.
(U) All persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to protections of Due Process, including corporations, aliens, and presumptively citizens seeking readmission to the United States. It is effective in the District of Columbia and in territories which are part of the United States, but does not apply of its own force to unincorporated territories. But, it does not reach enemy alien belligerents engaged in hostilities against the United States and/or tried by military tribunals outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. [52] The Eisentrager doctrine works to prevent access by enemy belligerents, captured and held abroad, to U.S. courts. Further, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Supreme Court held that aliens outside the United States did not have Fourth Amendment rights against the U.S. government. Indeed, in that case, the Court observed that extension of constitutional rights to aliens outside the United States would interfere with the military operations against the nation's enemies.
(U) Even if a Court were to find mistakenly that unlawful combatants at GTMO did have constitutional rights, it is unlikely that due process would pose any standards beyond those required by the Eighth Amendment. In 1972 the Supreme Court held that "[f]ederal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all persons, which include prisoners ..." [53] The Supreme Court's review of state criminal justice systems under the due process clause has never been subject to precise statement of metes? and bounds. In each case the Court asks whether the challenged practice or policy violates "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government". [54] The Court has generally treated challenges to prison conditions as a whole under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and challenges to particular incidents and practices under the due process clause as well as under more specific provisions, such as the First Amendment speech and religion clauses. [55]
(U) On the other hand, some conduct is so egregious that there is no justification. In Rochin v. California, the Supreme Court found that the State's actions in unlawfully entering the defendant's room, grappling with him to prevent him from swallowing the evidence, and then transporting him to the hospital to have his stomach pumped "shocked the conscience." The Court said of the police methods "they are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation". [61] Even though Rochin is about evidence seizure, the rationale for judicial intervention is the infringement of the process. Explaining the importance of due process the Court said "involuntary verbal confessions ... are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even [if true] ... Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct ... would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society." [62] Only interrogation techniques that "shock the conscience" would not be analyzed under the standard due process balancing test.
(U) The Fifth Amendment standards are also relevant due to the U.S. Reservations to the Torture Convention's definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
(U) Under the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, substantive due process protects an individual from "the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of any legitimate governmental objective." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Under substantive due process "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Id at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted). That conduct must "shock the conscience." See generally id; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).[63] By contrast to deprivations in procedural due process, which cannot occur so long as the government affords adequate processes government actions that "shock the conscience" are prohibited irrespective of the procedures the government may employ in undertaking those actions. See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 164 (1952).
(U) To shock the conscience, the conduct at issue must involve more than mere negligence by the government official. See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849. See also Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) ("Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.") (collecting cases). Instead, "[I]t is...behavior on the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a substantive due process claim: conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. In some circumstances, however, recklessness or gross negligence may suffice. See id. The requisite level of culpability is ultimately "not...subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory." Id. at 850. As the Court explained: "Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking." Id. Nonetheless, the Court opined that as a general matter such a standard would be appropriate where there is a real possibility for actual deliberation as opposed to those circumstances, such as responding to a prison riot, where quick decision must be made and a heightened level of culpability is thus more appropriate. See id. at 851-52.
(U) This standard appears to be an evolving one as the Court's most recent opinion regarding this standard emphasized that the conscience shocked as the "contemporary conscience." County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (emphasis added). The court explained that while a judgment of what shocks the conscience "may be informed by a history of liberty protection, it necessarily reflects a traditional understanding of executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to them." Id. Despite the evolving nature of the standard, the standard is objective rather than subjective. The Rochin Court cautioned that although "the gloss has ... has not been fixed" as to what substantive due process is, judges "may not drawn on "their" merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function... [T]hese limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process." Id. at 170. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1973) (reaffirming that the test is objective rather than subjective). As the Court further explained, the conduct at issue must "do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism' in order to violate due process. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
(U) The Supreme Court also clarified in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), that under substantive due process, "[t]here is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned." Id. at 674. And as Fourth Circuit has noted, it is a "principle...inherent in the Eight [Amendment] and [substantive due process" that "[n]ot ..every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033 ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights")." Riley v. Dorton, 155 F.3d 1159, 1167 (4th Cir. 1997) (qouting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Instead, "the [shock-the-conscience]... inquiry...[is] whether the force applied caused injury so severe, and was so disproportionate to the need presented and so inspired by malice or sadism...that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience." Webb b. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987). Examples of physical brutality that "shock the conscience" include: the rape of a plaintiff by uniformed officer, see Jones v. Wellham 104 F.3d 620 (4thCir. 1997); a police officer striking a plaintiff in retaliation for the plaintiff photographing the police officer, see Shillinford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981); police officer shot a fleeing suspect's legs without any probably cause other than the suspect's running and failing to stop, see Aldridge v. Mullins, 377 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) aff'd, 474 1189 (6th Cir. 1973). Moreover, beating or sufficiently threatening someone during the course of an interrogation can constitute conscience-shocking behavior. See Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90,91 (4th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff was beaten and threatened with further beating if he did not confess). By contrast, for example, actions such as verbal insults and an angry slap of "medium force" did not constitute behavior that "shocked the conscience." See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1168 n.4 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding claims that such behavior shocked the conscience "meritless"). We note, however, that courts have distinguished between the use of force in interrogations and the use of force in the prison or arrest settings. The Fifth Circuit has held that "the use of physical violence against a person who is in the presence of the police for custodial interrogation, who poses no threat to others, and who does not otherwise initiate action which would indicate to a reasonably prudent police officer that the use of force is justified, is a constitutional violation." Ware v. Reed,, 709 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 1983).
(U) Physical brutality is not the only conduct that may meet the shock-the-conscience standard. In Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that a certain psychologically-coercive interrogation techniques could constitute a violation of substantive due process. The interrogators techniques were "designed to instill stress, hopelessness, and fear, and to break [the suspect's] resistance." Id. at 1229. The officers planned to ignore any request for a lawyer and to ignore the suspect's right to remain silent, with the express purpose that any statements he might offer would help keep him from testifying in his own defense. See id. at 1249. It was this express purpose that the court found to be the "aggravating factor" that lead it to conclude that the conduct of the police "shocked the conscience." Id. at 1249. The court reasoned that while "it is a legitimate purpose of police investigation to gather evidence and muster information that will surround a guilty defendant and make it difficult if not impossible for him to escape justice[,]" "When the methods chosen to gather evidence and information are deliberately unlawful and flout the Constitution, the legitimacy is lost." Id. at 1250. In Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit found that severe mental distress inflicted on a suspect could be a basis for a substantive due process claim. See id. at 195. See also Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 771 (3d Cir. 1979) (claim of emotional harm could be the basis of a substantive due process claim). The Wilkins court found that under certain circumstances interrogating a suspect with a gun at his head could violate those rights. See 872 F.2d at 195. Whether it would rise to the level of violation depended upon whether the plaintiff was able to show "misconduct that a reasonable person would find so beyond the norm of proper police procedure as to shock the conscience, and that it is calculated to induce not merely momentary fear or anxiety, but severe mental suffering, in the plaintiff." Id. On the other hand, we note that merely deceiving the suspect does not shock the conscience, see, e.g., United States v. Byran, 145 F.3d 405 (1st Cir. 1998) (assuring defendant he was not in danger of prosecution did not shock the conscience) nor does the use of sympathy or friends as intermediaries, see, e.g., United States v. Sintob, 901 F.2d 779, 809 (9th Cir. 1990).
D. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
1. Jurisdiction to Consider Constitutional Claims
(U) The Federal habeas statue provides that courts may only grant the writ "within their respective jurisdictions." This has been interpreted to limit a court's subject matter jurisdiction over habeas cases to those in which a custodian lies within the jurisdiction. For U.S. citizens, habeas jurisdiction lies regardless of where the detention occurs. The habeas action must be brought in the district in which a custodian resides or, if all custodians are outside the United States, in the District of Columbia. For aliens, there is no habeas jurisdiction outside the sovereign territory of the United States. [64]
(U) As construed by the courts, habeas jurisdiction is coterminous with the reach of constitutional rights, although that result is a matter of statutory construction. Congress has the power to extend habeas jurisdiction beyond the reach of constitutional rights but may not place greater restrictions on it.
(U) In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the supreme court rules that enemy aliens, captured on the field of battle abroad by the U.S. Armed Forces, tried abroad for war crimes, and incarcerated abroad do not have access to the U.S. courts [65] over a habeas petition filed by German nationals seized by U.S. soldiers in China. Eisentrager considered habeas corpus petitions by German soldiers captured during WWII in China supporting the Japanese, convicted by Military Commission sitting in China, and incarcerated in Germany and concluded that United States courts lacked jurisdiction. [66]
(U) Recently, unlawful combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) have sought review in U.S. district court though the writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [67]
(U) Two courts have examined, and rejected, petitioners' claims that U.S. exclusive jurisdiction over GTMO results in a form of "de facto sovereignty" and, therefore, vests habeas jurisdiction in the federal courts.
2. Other Bases for Federal Jurisdiction
(U) In addition, one group of GTMO detainees has challenged confinement through the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction on those theories in each case to date. [68] Petitioners in Al Odah attempted to circumvent the territorial limitations of habeas by bringing their action under the APA and ATCA. The district court found that, although petitioners did not seek release from custody, their suit challenging conditions of confinement was, nonetheless, required to be brought under habeas.
(U) The court also held, in the alternative, that it lacked jurisdiction even if petitioners were not barred by the exclusive nature of habeas actions. The ATCA provides the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1350. The ATCA, although it provides federal jurisdiction over private suits, does not waive sovereign immunity for a suit against the United States. The courts have held that AOA's waiver of sovereign immunity for nonmonetary damages can theoretically be used to maintain an ATCA action against the United States. The Al Odah Court, however, found that the APA's exemption for "military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory" precluded the ATCA.
3. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(U) The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq, extends Federal criminal jurisdiction for serious Federal offenses committed outside the United States to civilian persons accompanying the Armed Forces (e.g., civilian employees and contractor employees), and to members of the Armed Forces who committed a criminal act while subject to the UCMJ but who are no longer subject to the UCMJ or who committed the offense with a defendant not subject to the UCMJ. The standard is that if the conduct by the individual would "constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." (emphasis added). In the absence of implementing regulations, the practical effect of MEJA is uncertain; however, MEJA remains Federal law.
E. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
(U) The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applies to United States Forces on active duty, at all times and in all places throughout the world. Members of the Reserve component and retired regular officers can, under certain circumstances, also be subject to the UCMJ, as can civilians accompanying the Armed Forces in time of war under certain circumstances. [69]
1. Offenses
(U) A number of UCMJ provisions potentially apply to service members involved in the interrogation and supervision of the interrogation of detainees. Most significant are the following: [70]
a. Cruelty, Oppression or Maltreatment, Art 93
(U) The elements of the offense are that the alleged victim was subject to the orders of the accused and that the accused was cruel toward, oppressed, or maltreated the victim. The cruelty, etc. need not be physical. Subject to the orders of, includes persons, subject to the UCMJ or not, who are by some reason of some duty are required to obey the lawful orders of the accused, even if not in the direct chain of command of the accused. "Cruel", "oppressed", and "maltreated" refer to unwarranted, harmful, abusive, rough or other unjustifiable treatment that, under all the circumstances, results in physical or mental pain or suffering and is unwarranted, unjustified and unnecessary for any lawful purpose. It is measured by an objective standard. MCM IV-25; MJB, Section 3-17-1.
b. Reckless Endangerment, Art 134
(U) The elements of the offense are that the accused engaged in wrongful conduct that was reckless or wanton and that the conduct was likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm. "[L]ikely to produce" means the natural or probable consequences of particular conduct. "[G]rievous bodily harm" includes injuries comparable to fractured or dislocated bones, serious damage to internal organs. MCM IV-119; MJB, Section 3-100A-1.
c. Assault, Art 128
(U) This article encompasses the following offenses:
(U) Simple assault — The elements are that the accused attempted or offered to do bodily harm to an individual and that such attempt or offer was done with unlawful force and violence. An act of force or violence is unlawful if done without legal justification or excuse and without the consent of the victim. The use of threatening words accompanied by a menacing act or gesture may constitute an assault. MCM IV-81; MJB, Section 3-54-1.
(U) Assault consummated by battery — An assault resulting in actual infliction of bodily harm is a batter. Bodily harm means any physical injury to or offensive touching, however slight. MCM IV-83; MJB, Section 3-54-1A.
(U) Aggravated (use of a dangerous weapon, means or force) — In addition to the elements of an assault, this offense requires that the means or force attempted or offered was used in a manner likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm. Any object, regardless of its normal use, could become a means likely to inflict grievous bodily harm depending on the manner in which it is actually used. MCM IV-84; MJB, Section 3-54-8.
(U) There are multiple instances in which authority and context permit touching — by police officers, prison guards, training NCOs, etc. — that would not be lawful under other circumstances. A central issue would be how clearly the limits of authority were defined and whether under the circumstances the individual exceeded the scope of that authority.
d. Involuntary Manslaughter, Art 119
(U) The elements of this offense are that acts or omissions constitution culpable negligence resulted in an unlawful killing. Culpable negligence contemplates a level of heedlessness in circumstances in which, when viewed in the light of human experience, might foreseeably result in death. MCM IV-64. Failure to assiduously follow protocols providing for the health and safety of detainees during interrogations of detainees, could amount to such culpable negligence, MJB, Section 3-44-2.
e. Unpremeditated Murder, Art 118
(U) The relevant elements of the offense are that the person is dead, his death resulted from the act or failure to act of the accused, that the killing was unlawful, without legal justification, and at that time the accused had the intent to inflict great bodily harm upon the person. MCM IV-118, MTB, Section 3-43-2.
f. Disobedience of Orders, Art 92
(U) This offense is committed when the accused, having a duty to do so, fails to obey lawful orders or regulations, MCM IV-23; MJB, Section 3-16. the duty to obey may extend to treaties and statuettes as well as regulations. The Convention against Torture and the general case law regarding cruel and unusual punishment may be relevant here as it is for Article 93, See generally, Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
g. Dereliction of Duty, Art 92
(U) A dereliction occurs when an individual knew or should have known of certain prescribed duties and either wilfully or through neglect was derelict in the performance of those duties. MCM IV-24; MJB, Section 3-16-4. Customs of the service as well as statues and treaties that have become the law of the land may create duties for purposes of this article.
h. Maiming, Art 124
(U) The elements of this offense are that the accused intentionally inflicted an injury on a person, and whether intended or not, that the injury seriously disfigured the person's body, destroyed or disabled an organ or member, or seriously diminished the person's physical vigor. MCM IV-77; MJB, Section 3-50-1.
2. Affirmative Defenses under the UCMJ (R.C.M. 916)
(U) In order for any use of force to be lawful, it must either be justified under the circumstances or an accepted affirmative defense is present to excuse the otherwise unlawful conduct. No case law was found that defines at what point force or violence becomes either lawful or unlawful during war. Each case is by its nature, dependent upon the factual circumstances surrounding the incident.
(U) Applying accepted rules for law of armed conflict, the use of force is only authorized when there is a mili5tary purpose and the force used is no greater than necessary to achieve the objective. The existence of war does not in and of itself justify all forms of assault. For instance, in United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A 534k, 48 C.M.R:19 (1973), the court recognized that "while it is lawful to kill an enemy in the heat and exercise of war, to kill such an enemy after he has laid down his arms…is murder." Further, the fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to an allegation of war crime, the fact that the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment. The thrust of these holdings is that even in war, limits to the use and extent of force apply.
a. Self-Defense
(U) for the right of self-defense to exist, the accused must have had a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous bodily harm was about to be inflicted on himself. The test is whether, under the same facts and circumstances, an ordinary prudent adult person faced with the same situation would have believed that there were grounds to fear immediate death or serious bodily harm (an objective test) and the person must have actually believed that the amount of force used was required to protect against death or serious bodily harm (a subjective test). Grievous bodily harm means serious bodily injury. It does not mean minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but does mean fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs or other serious bodily injuries. MJB, Section 5-2. (See also the discussion of "Self-Defense" under the discussion of Federal law, supra.)
b. Defense of another
(U) For this defense, the accused must have had a reasonable belief that harm was about to be inflicted and that the accused actually believed that force was necessary to protect that person. The accused must actually believe that the amount of force used was necessary to protect against the degree of harm threatened. MJB, Section 5-3-1.
c. Accident
(U) The defense arises when an accused is doing a lawful act in a lawful manner, free of any negligence, and unforeseeable or unintentional death or bodily harm occurs. MJB, Section 5-4.
d. Mistake of Fact
(U) If ignorance or mistake of a fact concerns an element of an offense involving specific intent, the ignorance or mistake need only exist in the mind of the accused, i.e., if the circumstances of an event were as the accused believed, there would be no offense. For crimes not involving specific intent, the ignorance or mistake must be both honest (actual) and reasonable. The majority of the crimes discussed above do not require specific intent. For instance, in the case of violations of general orders, knowledge is presumed. Most of the "mistakes" would likely be mistakes of law in that the accused would not believe that the conduct was unlawful. While mistakes of law are generally not a defense, unawareness of a law may be a defense to show the absence of a criminal state of mind when actual knowledge is not necessary to establish the offense. MJB, Section 5-11.
e. Coercion or duress
(U) It is defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused's participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the act. This apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. R.C.M. 916(h), MJB, Section 5-5.
(U) To establish a duress defense it must be shown that an accused's participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily harm if the accused did not commit the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. The Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Fleming, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957), that the defense of duress is available to an accused only if the commission of the crime charged resulted from reasonable fear of imminent death or grievous bodily harm to himself of his family. The risk of injury must continue throughout the criminal venture.
f. Obedience to Orders (MJB, Sections 5-8-1 and 5-8-2)
(U) The viability of obedience to orders as a defense turns on the directives and policy of the service member's Chain of Command. For example, when the interrogator at the direction of the command employs the use of physical force as an interrogation method, he/she would certainly raise the defense of obedience to orders. The question then becomes one of degree. While this may be a successful defense to simple assaults or batteries, it would unlikely be as successful to more serious charges such as maiming, manslaughter, and maiming. Within the middle of the spectrum lay those offenses for which the effectiveness of this defense becomes less clear. Those offenses would include conduct unbecoming an officer, reckless endangerment, cruelty, and negligent homicide.
(U) Obedience to orders provides a viable defense only to the extent that the accused acted under orders, and did not know (nor would a person of ordinary sense have known? The orders were unlawful. This the viability of this defense is key to the accused's (or a reasonable person's) knowledge of the lawfulness of the order. Common sense suggests that the more aggressive and physical the technique authorized (ordered) by the command, the more unlikely the reasonable belief that the order to employ such methods is lawful.
(U) In order for any use of force to be lawful, it must either (i) be justified under the circumstances or (ii) an accepted affirmative defense is present to excuse the otherwise unlawful conduct. No case law was found that defines at what point force or violence becomes either lawful or unlawful during war. Each case is by its nature, dependent upon the factual circumstances surrounding the incident.
(U) applying accepted rules for the law of armed conflict, the use of force is only authorized when there is a military purpose and the force used is no greater than necessary to achieve the objective. The existence of war does not in and of itself justify all forms of assault. For instance, in US v. Calley, the court recognized that "while it is lawful to kill an enemy in the heat and exercise of war, to kill such an enemy after he has laid down his arms…is murder." Further, the fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to an allegation of war crime, the fact that the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment." The thrust of these holdings is that even in war, limits to the use and extent of force apply.
g. Necessity
(U) Another common law affirmative defense is one of necessity. This defense is recognized by a number of states and is applicable when: 1) the harm must be committed under the pressure of physical or natural force, rather than human force; 2) the harm sought to be avoided is greater than (or at least equal to) that harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; 3) the actor reasonably believes at the moment that his act is necessary and is designed to avoid the greater harm; 4) the actor must be without fault in bringing about the situation; and 5) the harm threatened must be imminent, leaving no alternative by which to avoid the greater harm.
(U) However, military courts have treated the necessity defense with disfavor and in fact, some have refused to accept necessity as a permissible defense (the MCM does not list necessity as an affirmative defense under RCM 916). "The problem with the necessity defense is that it involves a weighing of evil inflicted against evil avoided and is, thereby, difficult to legislate." The courts also have been reluctant to embrace the defense due to a "fear that private moral codes will be substituted for legislative determination, resulting in a necessity exception that swallow's the rule of law." United States v. Rankins, 34 MJ 326 (CMA 1992).
(U) The effect of these cases is that the MCM recognizes that an accused may commit an illegal act in order to avoid the serious injury or death of the accused or an innocent person. However, military law limits this defense only when there is an imminent and continuing harm that requires immediate action to prevent. One the immediacy is gone, the defense will no longer apply. Ostensibly, the use of force to acquire information from an unlawful combatant, absent immediate and compelling circumstances, will not meet the elements established by the MCM and case law. (But see the necessity defense in the discussion of Federal law, supra.)
3. Legal doctrines could render specific conduct, otherwise criminal, not unlawful
See discussion of Commander-in-Chief authority, supra.
IV. Considerations Affecting Policy
A. Historical Role of U.S. Armed Forces
(U) The basic principles of interrogation doctrine, procedures, and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations from June 1945 through May 1987 were continued in Field Manual (FM) 30-15, Examination of Personnel and Documents. FM 30-15 set forth Army doctrine pertaining to the basic principles of intelligence interrogation and established the procedures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations of non-U.S. personnel. The other services report that they too apply the provisions of this Field Manual.
2. Interrogation Historical Overview
(U) FM 30-15 stated that the principles and techniques of interrogation discussed within the manual are to be used within the constraints established by humanitarian international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). The fundamental principle underlying Army doctrine concerning intelligence interrogations between 1045 and the issuance of current doctrine in 1987 (FM 34-52), is that the commander may utilize all available resources and lawful means in the accomplishment of his mission and for the protection and security of his unit. However, a strong caveat to this principle noted, "treaty commitments and policy of the United States, international agreements, international law, and the UCMJ require the conduct of military to conform with the law of war." FM30-15 also recognized that Army intelligence interrogations must conform to the "specific prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions established by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the handling and treatment of personnel captured or detained by military forces" (citing FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare).
(U) FM 30-15 also stated that "violations of the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of war normally constitutes a concurrent violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and will be prosecuted under that code." The manual advised Army personnel that it was "the direct responsibility of the Commander to insure that the law of war is respected in the conduct of warfare by forces in his command." This, the intelligence interrogation techniques outlined in FM 30-15 were based upon conduct sanctioned under international law and domestic U.S. law and as constrained within the UCMJ.
(U) Historically, the intelligence staff officer (G2/S2) was the primary Army staff officer responsible for all intelligence functions within the command structure. This responsibility included interrogation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), civilian internees, and other captured or detained persons. In conducting interrogations, the intelligence staff officer was responsible for insuring that the activities were executed in accordance with international and domestic U.S. law, United States Government policy, and the applicable regulations and field manuals regarding the treatment and handling of EPWs, civilian internees and other captured or detained persons. In the maintenance of interrogation collection, the intelligence staff officer was required to provide guidance and training to interrogators, assign collection requirements, promulgate regulations, directives, and field manuals regarding intelligence interrogation, and insure that interrogators were trained in international and domestic U.S. law and the applicable Army publications.
(U) FM 30-15 stated that intelligence interrogations are an art involving the questioning and examination of a source in order to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. Interrogations are of may types, such as the interview, a debriefing and an encitation. However, the FM made clear that the principles of objective, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security apply to all types of interrogations. The manual indicated that the goal is to collect usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner, promptly, while meeting the intelligence requirements of the command.
(U) FM 30-15 emphasized a prohibition on the use of force during interrogations. This prohibition included the actual use of force, mental torture, threats, and exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind. Interrogation doctrine, procedures, and techniques concerning the use of force are based upon prohibitions in international and domestic U.S. law, FM 30-15 stated that experience revealed that the use of force was unnecessary to gain cooperation and was a poor interrogation technique, given that its use produced unreliable information, damaged future interrogations, and induced those being interrogated to offer information viewed as expected in order to prevent the use of force. However, FM 30-15 stated that the prohibition on the use of force, mental or physical must not be confused with the use of psychological tools and deception techniques designed to induce a source into providing intelligence information.
(U) The Center for Military History has been requested to conduct a search of government databases, to include the Investigative Records Repository, for documentation concerning the historical participation of the U.S. Armed Forces in interrogations and any archival materials related to interrogation techniques. As of the writing of this analysis no reply has been received.
3. Current Doctrine
(U) In May 1987, the basic principles of current doctrine, procedures, and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations were promulgated in Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation. FM 34-52 provides general guidelines for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interrogation elements in Army intelligence units. It also outlines procedures for handling sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. Finally, FM 34-52 covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios, and their impact on interrogation operations, to include peacetime interrogation operations.
(U) Army interrogation doctrine today, and since 1945, places particular emphasis on the humane handling of captured personnel. Interrogators receive specific instruction by Army Judge Advocates on the requirements of international and domestic U.S. law, to include constraints established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (e.g. assault, cruelty and maltreatment, and communicating a threat).
(U) FM 34-52 adopted the principles and framework for conducting intelligence interrogations as stated in FM 30-15. FM 34-52 maintained the establ8ished Army doctrine that intelligence interrogations involve the art of questioning and examining a source in order to obtain the maximum amount of useable information,. FM 34-52 also reiterated Army doctrine that the principles of objective, initiative, accuracy, prohibition on the use of force, and security apply to all types of interrogations. The goal of intelligence interrogation under current doctrine is the same, the collection of usable and reliable information promptly and in a lawful manner, while meeting the intelligence requirements of the command.
(U) FM 34-52 and the curriculum at U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Hauchuca, continue to emphasize a prohibition on the use of force. As stated in its predecessor, FM 34-52 defines the use of force to include actual force, mental torture, threats, and exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind. The underlying basis for this prohibition is the proscriptions contained in international and domestic U.S. law. Current Army intelligence interrogation doctrine continues to view the use of force as unnecessary to gain the cooperation of captured personnel. Army interrogation experts view the use of force as an inferior technique that yields information of questionable quality. The primary concerns, in addition to the effect on information quality, are the adverse effect on future interrogations and the behavioral change on those being interrogated (offering particular information to avoid the use of force). However, the Army's doctrinal prohibition on the use of force does not proscribe legitimate psychological tools and deception techniques.
(U) FM 34-52 outlines procedures and approach techniques for conducting Army interrogations. While the approach techniques are varied, there are three common purposes: establish and maintain control over the source and the interrogation, establish and maintain rapport between the interrogator and the source, and manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses to gain willing cooperation. Approved techniques include: Direct Incentive; Emotional (Love & Hate); Increased Fear Up (Harsh & Mild); Decreased Fear Down; Pride and Ego (UP & Down); Futility Technique, We Know All; Establish Your Identity; Repetition, File and Dossier, and Mutt and Jeff (Friend and Foe). These techniques are discussed at greater length in Section V, infra.
B. Presidential and Secretary of Defense Directives
(U) The President's Military Order that addresses the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism, [71] provides inter alia, that any
[The rest of this document has not been released. -- Ed.]
[1 & 2] Footnotes 1 and 2 have been blocked out on the original document -- Ed.]
[3] (U) Article I provides: "For the purpose of this convention, the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him to an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consensus or acquiescence of a public official acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."
[4] (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2340 tracks this language. For a further discussion of the U.S. understandings and reservations, see the Initial Report of the U.S. to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, dated October 15, 1999.
[5] (U) But see discussion to the contrary at the Domestic Law section on the necessity defense.
[6] (U) Memorandum dated January 22, 2002, Re: Application of Treaties to al-Qaida and Taliban detainees at 32.
[8] (U) Section 2340A provides, "Whoever outside the Unites States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined or imprisoned…" (emphasis added).
[9] (U) 18 USC § 7, "Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" includes any lands under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States.
[10] (U) Several paragraphs of 18 USC § 7 are relevant to the issue at hand. Paragraph 7(3) provides: [SMTJ includes:] "Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place…" Paragraph 7(7) provides [SMTJ includes:] "Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation to an offense by or against a nation of the United States." Similarly, paragraphs 7(1) and 7(5) extend SMTJ jurisdiction to "the high seas, and other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States…" and to "any aircraft belonging in whole or in part in the United States… while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State".
[11] (U) 6 Op.OLC236 (1982). The issue was the status of GTMO for purposes of a statute banning slot-machines on "any land where the United States government exercises exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction".
[12] The DSM-IV explains that posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") is brought on by exposure to traumatic events, such as serious physical injury or witnessing the deaths of others and during those events the individual felt "intense fear" or "horror." Id at 424. Those suffering from this disorder re-experience the trauma through, inter alia, "recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event", "recurrent distressing dreams of the event", or "intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event," Id at 428. Additionally, a person with PTSD "[p]ersistently" avoids stimuli associated with the trauma, including avoiding conversations about the trauma, places that stimulate recollections about the trauma, and they experience a numbing of general responsiveness, such as a "restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have living feelings)", and "the feeling of detachment or estrangement from others." Ibid. Finally, an individual with PTSD has "[p]ersistent symptoms of increased arousal," as evidenced by "irritability or outbursts of anger", "hypervigilance", "exaggerate startle response", and difficulty sleeping or concentrating. Ibid.
[13] (U) Published by the American Psychiatric Association, and written as a collaboration of over a thousand psychiatrists, the DSM-IV is commonly used in U.S. courts as a source of information regarding mental health issues and is likely to be used in trial should charges be brought that allege this predicate act. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia', 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 n. 3 (2002); Kansas V. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867, 871 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359-60 (1997); McClean v. Merrifield, No. 00-CV-0120E (SC), 2002 WI 1477607 at #2n.7 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002); Peeples v. Coastal Office Prods., 203 F. Supp 2d 432, 439 (D. Md 2002); Lassiegne v. Taco Bell Corp., 202 F. Supp 2d 512, 519 (E.D. La. 2002).
[14] (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2441 criminalizes the commission of war crimes by U.S. national and members of the U.S. Armed Forces. Subsection (c) defines war crimes as (1) grave breaches of any of the Geneva Conventions: (2) conduct prohibited by the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907; or (3) conduct that constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Department of Justice has opined that this statute does not apply toward al-Qaida or Taliban operatives because the President has determined that they are not entitled to the protections of Geneva and Hague Regulations.
[15] (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States.
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
[16] (U) United States v. Rabbinowich, 238 US 78, 59, 35 S.Ct. 682, L. Ed 1211 (1915).
[17] (U) United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906 (2nd Cir, 1974), next denied 419 U.S. 904 (1974).
[18] (U) See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (President has authority to deploy United States armed forces "abroad or to any particular region"); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 Flow) 603, 614-15 (1950) ("As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in a manner he may deem most effective") Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 776 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (The inherent powers of the Commander-in-Chief "are clearly extensive."): Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 515-16 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes J.T., concurring) (President "may direct any revenue cutter to cruise in any water in order to perform any duty of the service"); Commonwealth Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971) (the President has "power as Commander-in-Chief to station forces abroad"); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 922 (C.C.B.D. Ohio (1863)(No. 16,816) (in acting "under his power where there is no express legislative declaration, the president is guided solely by his own judgment and discretion"); Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6,G (Dec. 4, 1992) (Barr, attorney General).
[19] (U) Judicial decisions since the beginning of the Republic confirm the President's constitutional power and duty to repel military action against the United States and to take measures to prevent the reoccurrence of an attack. As Justice Joseph Story said long ago, "[I]t may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summoning measures, which are not found in the text of the laws." The Apallon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362, 366-67 (1824). If the President is confronted with an unforeseen attack on the territory and people of the United States, or other immediate dangerous threat to American interests and security, it is his constitutional responsibility to respond to that threat with whatever means are necessary. See e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862)("If a war be made by invasion or a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force…without waiting for any special legislative authority."); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas; 1192, 1229-30 (C.C.D.N.Y., 1.-06)(No. 16,342)(Paterson, Circuit Justice) (regardless of statutory authorization, it is "the duty…of the executive magistrate - to repel an invading foe") see also 3 Story, Commentaries 6, 1485 ("[t]he command and application of the public force…to maintain peace, and to resist foreign invasion" are executive powers).
[20] (U) We note that this view is consistent with that of the Department of Justice.
[21] In the CAT, torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering "for such purposes of obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession." CAT art 1.1 One could argue that such a definition represented an attempt to indicate that the good of obtaining information—no matter what the circumstances—could not justify an act of torture. In other words, necessity would not be a defense. In enacting Section 2340, however, Congress removed the purpose element in the definition of torture, evidencing an intention to remove any fixing of values by statute. By leaving, Section 2340 silent as to the harm done by torture in comparison to other harms, Congress allowed the necessity defense to apply when appropriate.
Further, the CAT contains an additional provision that "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture," CAT art. 2.2 Aware of this provision of the treaty and of the definition of the necessity defense that allows the legislature to provide for an exception to the defense. See Model Penal Code 3,02(b), Congress did not incorporate CAT article 2.2 into Section 2-4. Given that Congress omitted CAT's effort to bar a necessity or wartime defense, Section 2340 could be read as permitting defense.
[22] (U) Early cases had suggested that in order to be eligible for defense of another, one should have some personal relationship with the one in need of protection. That view has been discarded. LaFave & Scott at 664.
[24] (U) While the President's constitutional determination alone is sufficient to justify the nation's resort to self-defense, it also bears noting that the right to self-defense is further recognized under international law. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter declares that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." The attacks of September 11, 2004, clearly constitute an armed attack against the United States, and indeed were the latest in a long history of al Qaida sponsored attacks against the United States. This conclusion was acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council on September 29, 2001, when it unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 explicitly "reaffirming the inherent right of individual and collective defense as recognized by the charter of the United Nations. This right of self-defense is a right to effective self-defense. In other words, the victim state has the right to use force against the aggressor who has initiated an "armed attack" until the threat was abated. The United States, through its military and intelligence personnel, has a right recognized by Article 51 to continue using force until such time as the threat posed by al Qaida and other terrorist groups connected to the September 11th attack is completely ended." Other treaties re-affirm the right of the United States to use force in its self-defense. See, e.g., Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, art. 3, Sept 2, 1947 T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S 77 (Rio Treaty); North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 3 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S 243.
[25] (U) See Section 6.1.4, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M 1997)
[26] (U) ld.
[27] (U) The International Criminal Court also takes this view. Article 33 of the Rome Statute, recognizes that: "1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Courst has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful."
[28] (U) ld., at §6.2.5.5.1.
[29] (U) See U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, at 1944-45, 255 (1946).
[30] (U) Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 at 224 (1947), excerpted in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1946-1947, at 260 (1948).
[31] (U) This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the confession of a crime. (Article 90, UCMJ).
[32] (U) 28 CFR 50.15 (a)(4)
[33] (U) 28 U.S.C § 1350, the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA).
[34] (U) See, for example, Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, No 93-9133. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Jan 10, 1996 In this case the 11th Circuit concluded, "the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law."
[35] (U) Al Odah v. United States, (D.D.C., 2002)
[36] (U) Filartiga v Pena-Irale, 630 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1980) 885, note I, "conduct of the type alleged here [torture] would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983, or undoubtedly the Constitution, if performed by a government official."
[37] (U) Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (note).
[38] (U) The definition of torture used in PL 102-256(a) "any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions) whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any king." This is similar but broader, than the definition in the Torture Statute. The definition of mental pain and suffering is the same as in the Torture Statute.
[39] (U) Eisenstrager 764.
[40] (U) Al Odah v. United States, (D.D.C., 2002).
[41] (U) Articles of ratification, 21 Oct 1994: "I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: (1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under article 16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment', means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Available at the UN documents site: http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/treaty12_asp.htm
[42] (U) Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). In Ingrahm, a case about corporal punishment in a public junior high school, the Court analyzed the claim under the 14th amendment's Due Process clause, concluding that the conduct did not violate the 14th amendment, even though it involved up to 10 whacks with a wooden paddle.
[43] (U) Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. (1986)
[44] (U) Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
[45] (U) Whitley at 321.
[47] (U) Although the officers' actions in Hope were undertaken in response to a scuffle between an inmate and a guard, the case is more properly thought of a "conditions of confinement" case rather than an "excessive force" case. By examining the officers' actions through the "deliberate indifference standard" the Court analyzed it as a "conditions of confinement" case. The deliberate indifference standard is inapplicable to claims of excessive force.
[48] (U) Because the Due Process considerations under the 5th and 14th amendments are the same for our purposes, this analysis considers them together.
[49] (U) Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
[50] (U) Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[51] (U) Marray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 59 U.S. (18 How) 272, 276 (1856).
[52] (U) Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Justices Rutledge and Murphy in the latter case argued that the due process clause applies to every human being, including enemy belligerents.
[53] (U) Cruz v. Belo, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972)
[54] (U) Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)
[55] By way of example, the courts have recognized several rights of prisoners. Prisoners have a right to be free of racial segregation in prisons, except for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). They have the right to petition for redress of grievances, which includes access to the courts for purposes of presenting their complains, Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Prisoners must have reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the law. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1978) and to bring actions in federal courts to recover for damages wrongfully done them by prison administrators, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). And they have a right, circumscribed by legitimate prison administration considerations, to fair and regular treatment during their incarceration.
[61] (U) Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
[62] (U) Id. at 174.
[63] (U) In the seminal case of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the police had some information that the defendant was selling drugs. Three officers went to and entered the defendant's home without a warrant and forced open the door to defendant's bedroom. Upon opening the door, the officers saw two pills and asked the defendant about them. The defendant promptly put them in his mouth. The officers "jumped upon him and attempted to extract the capsules." 342 U.S. at 166. The police tried to pull the pills out of his mouth but despite considerable struggle the defendant swallowed them. The police then took the defendant to a hospital where a doctor forced an ermetic solution into the defendant's stomach by sticking a tube down his throat and ito his stomach, which cause the defendant to vomit up the pills. The pills did in fact contain morphine. See id. The Court found that the actions of the police officers "shocked the conscience" and therefore violated Rochin's due process rights. Id at 170.
[64] (U) Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
[65] (U) Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). "We are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States." With those words, the Supreme Court held that: "a nonresident enemy alien has no access to our courts in wartime." Currently, the D.C. Circuit is considering the appeal of several detainees at GTMO in which action the District Court denied their writ of habeas corpus challenging their detention. Al Odah et. al. v. United States, Nos. 02-5251, 02-5284, and 02-5288 (D.C. Circ. 2002).
[66] (U) For a fuller discussion of Habeas Corpus law as it applies to Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, see memorandum, LCDR F. Greg Bowman of 29 Jan 02, subj: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND ITS EFFECTS OF AVAILABILITY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AT U.S. NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (on file).
[67] (U) Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal.), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
[68] (U) The ACTA and APA theories, rejected in the District Court for D.C., are awaiting review in the D.C. Circuit at this time in the Rasul and Al Odah cases.
[69] (U) Article 2 UCMJ; Rules for Courts-Martial, Rule 202, and Discussion.
[70] (U) The following are extracted from the Department of the army Pamphlet 27-9, Military Judges' Benchbook (MJB), which summarizes the requirements of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and case law applicable to trials by courts martial.
John C. Yoo Memo
Declassify under authority of Executive Order 1958
By Acting General Counsel, Department of Defense
By Daniel J. Dell'Orto
SECRET/NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED
Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States
You have asked our Office to examine the legal standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States. You have requested that we examine both domestic and international law that might be applicable to the conduct of those interrogations. [1]
In Part I, we conclude that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, do not extend to alien enemy combatants held abroad. In Part II, we examine federal criminal law. We explain that several canons of construction apply here. Those canons of construction indicate that federal criminal laws of general applicability do not apply to properly-authorized interrogations of enemy combatants, undertaken by military personnel in the course of an Armed conflict. Such criminal statutes, if they were misconstrued to apply to the interrogation of enemy combatants, would conflict with the Constitution's grant of the Commander in Chief power solely to the President.
Although we do not believe that these laws would apply to authorized military interrogations, we outline the various federal crimes that apply in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States: assault, 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2000); maiming, 18 U.S.C. § 114 (2000); and interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C, § 2261A (2000). In Part II.C., we address relevant criminal prohibitions that apply to conduct outside the jurisdiction of the United States: war crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000); and torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
In Part III, we examine the international law applicable to the conduct of interrogations. First, we examine the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 ("CAT") and conclude that U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations ensure that our international obligations mirror the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. Second, we address the U.S. obligation under CAT to undertake to prevent the commission of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." We conclude that based on its reservation, the United States' obligation extends only to conduct that is "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment or otherwise "shocks the conscience" under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Third, we examine the applicability of customary international law. We conclude that as an expression of state practice, customary international law cannot impose a standard that differs from U.S. obligations, under CAT, a recent multilateral treaty on the same subject. In any event, our previous opinions make clear that customary international law is not federal law and that the President is free to override it at his discretion.
In Part IV, we discuss defenses to an allegation that an interrogation method might violate any of the various criminal prohibitions discussed in Part II. We believe that necessity or self-defense could provide defenses to a prosecution.
I. U.S. Constitution
Two fundamental constitutional issues arise in regard to the conduct of interrogations of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. First, we discuss the constitutional foundations of the President's power, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, to conduct military operations during the current armed conflict. We explain that detaining and interrogating enemy combatants is an important element of the President's authority to successfully prosecute war. Second, we address whether restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights govern the interrogation of alien enemy combatants during armed conflict. Two constitutional provisions that might be thought to extend to interrogations -- the Fifth and Eighth Amendments -- do not apply here. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[n]o person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., amend V. [2] The Eighth Amendment bars the "inflict[ion]" of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const., amend. VIII. These provisions, however, do not regulate the interrogation of alien enemy combatants outside the United States during an international Armed conflict. This is clear as a matter of the text and purpose of the Amendments, as they have been interpreted by the federal courts. [3]
A. The President's Commander-in-Chief Authority
We begin by discussing the factual and legal context within which this question arises. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks marked a state of international armed conflict between the United States and the al Qaeda terrorist organization. Pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief power, as supported by an act of Congress, the President has ordered the Armed Forces to carry out military operations against al Qaeda, which includes the power both to kill and to capture members of the enemy. Interrogation arises as a necessary and legitimate element of the detention of al Qaeda and Taliban members during an armed conflict.
1. The War with al Qaeda
The situation in which these issues arise is unprecedented in recent American history. Four coordinated terrorist attacks, using hijacked commercial airliners as guided missiles, took place in rapid succession on the morning of September 11, 2001. These attacks were aimed at critical government buildings in the Nation's capital and landmark buildings. In its financial center, and achieved an unprecedented level of destruction. They caused thousands of deaths. Air traffic and communications within the United States were disrupted; national stock exchanges were shut for several days; and damage from the attack has been estimated to run into the tens of billions of dollars. Government leaders were dispersed to ensure continuity of government operations. These attacks are part of a violent campaign by the al Qaeda terrorist organization against the United States that is believed to include an unsuccessful attempt to destroy an airliner in December 2001; a suicide bombing attack in Yemen on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000; the bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania in 1998; a truck bomb attack on a U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996; an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in 1993; and the ambush of U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993.
The September 11, 2001 attacks triggered the Nation's right under domestic and international law to use force in self-defense. [4] In response, the Government has engaged in a broad effort at home and abroad to counter terrorism. Pursuant to his authorities as Commander in Chief, the President in October, 2001, ordered the Armed Forces to attack al Qaeda personnel and assets in Afghanistan, and the Taliban militia that harbored them. Although the breadth of that campaign has lessened, it is still ongoing. Congress has provided its support for the use of forces against those linked to the September 11 attacks, and has recognized the President's constitutional power to use force to prevent and deter future attacks both within and outside the United States. S. J. Res. 23, Pub. L. No.107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The Justice Department and the FBI have launched a sweeping investigation in response to the September 11 attacks, and Congress enacted legislation to expand the Justice Department's powers of surveillance against terrorists. See The USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Last year, Congress enacted the President's proposed new cabinet department for homeland security in order to implement a coordinated domestic program against terrorism. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
Leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban, with access to active terrorist cells and other resources, remain at large. It has been reported that they have regrouped and are communicating with their members. See. e.g., Cam Simpson, Al Qaeda Reorganized, German Official Says, Minister Fears Reprisals if USA attacks Iraq, Star-Ledger, Jan. 26, 2003, at 18. In his recent testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 11, 2003, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified that another al Qaeda attack was anticipated as early as mid-February. See Rowan Scarborough & Jerry Seper, Bin Laden Tape Vows Al Qaeda Will Aid Iraq; Says U.S. Bombing Nearly Killed Him, Wash. Times, Feb.. 12, 2003, at A1. It appears that al Qaeda continues to enjoy information and resources that allow it to organize and direct active hostile forces against this country, both domestically and abroad.
Given the ongoing threat of al Qaeda attacks, the capture and interrogation of al Qaeda operatives is imperative to our national security and defense. Because of the asymmetric nature of terrorist operations, information is perhaps the most critical weapon for defeating al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is not a nation-state, and has no single country or geographic area as its base of operations. It has no fixed, large-scale military or civilian infrastructure. It deploys personnel, material, and finances covertly and attacks without warning using unconventional weapons and methods. As the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent events demonstrate, it seeks to launch terror attacks against purely civilian targets within the United States, and seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction for such attacks. Because of the secret nature of al Qaeda's operations, obtaining advance information about the identity of al Qaeda operatives and their plans may prove to be the only way to prevent direct attacks on the United States. Interrogation of captured al Qaeda operatives could provide that information; indeed, in many cases interrogation may be the only method to obtain it. Given the massive destruction and loss of life caused by the September 11 attacks, it is reasonable to believe that information gained from al Qaeda personnel could prevent attacks of a similar (if not greater) magnitude from occurring in the United States.
2. Commander-in-Chief Authority
In a series of opinions examining various legal questions arising after September 11, we have explained the scope of the President's Commander-in-Chief power. [5] In those opinions, we explained that the text, structure and history of the Constitution establish that the Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and therefore the power, to protect the security of the United States. The decision to deploy military force in the defense of U.S. interests is expressly placed under Presidential authority by the Vesting Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1, and by the Commander-in-Chief Clause, id., § 2, cl. 1. [6] The Framers understood the Commander-in-Chief Clause to grant the President the fullest range of power recognized at the time of the ratification as belonging to the military commander. In addition, the structure of the Constitution demonstrates that any power traditionally understood as pertaining to the executive -- which includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation -- unless expressly assigned to Congress, is vested in the President. Article II, Section 1makes this clear by stating that the "executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." That sweeping grant vests in the President the "executive power" and contrasts with the specific enumeration of the powers -- those "herein" -- granted to Congress in Article I. Our reading of the constitutional text and structure are confirmed by historical practice, in which Presidents have ordered the use of military force more than 100 times without congressional authorization, and by the functional consideration that national security decisions require a unity in purpose and energy that characterizes the Presidency alone. [7]
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Commander-in-Chief power and the President's obligation to protect the nation imply the ancillary powers necessary to their successful exercise. "The first of the enumerated powers of the President is that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. And of course, the grantor war power includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950). In wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy. See, e.g., Flanigan Memorandum at 3; Memorandum for Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian Sanctuaries (May 22, 1970). [8] The President's complete discretion in exercising the Commander-in-Chief power has been recognized by the courts. In the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862), for example, the Court explained that whether the President "in fulfilling his duties as Commander in Chief" had appropriately responded to the rebellion of the southern states was a question "to be decided by him" and which the Court could not question, but must leave to "the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted." See also Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874) (by virtue of the Commander-in-Chief Clause, it is "the President alone[] who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations.").
One of the core functions of the Commander in Chief is that of capturing, detaining, and interrogating members of the enemy. See, e.g., Memorandum for William L. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The President's Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations at 3 (Mar. 13, 2002) ("Transfers Memorandum") ("the Commander-in-Chief Clause constitutes an independent grant of substantive authority to engage in the detention and transfer of prisoners captured in armed conflicts"). It is well settled that the President may seize and detain enemy combatants, at least for the duration of the conflict, and the laws of war make clear that prisoners may be interrogated for information concerning the enemy, its strength, and its plans. [9] Numerous Presidents have ordered the capture, detention, and questioning of enemy combatants during virtually every major conflict in the Nation's history, including recent conflicts such as the Gulf, Vietnam, and Korean wars. Recognizing this authority, Congress has never attempted to restrict or interfere with the President's authority on this score. Id.
C. Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
We conclude below that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is inapplicable to the conduct of interrogations of alien enemy combatants held outside the United States for two independent reasons. First, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply to the President's conduct of a war. Second, even if the Fifth Amendment applied to the conduct of war, the Fifth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially to aliens who have no connection to the United States. We address each of these reasons in turn.
First, the Fifth Amendment was not designed to restrict the unique war powers of the President as Commander in Chief. As long ago as 1865, Attorney General Speed explained the unquestioned rule that, as Commander in Chief, the President waging a war may authorize soldiers to engage in combat that could not be authorized as a part of the President's role in enforcing the laws. The strictures that bind the Executive in its role as a magistrate enforcing the civil laws have no place in constraining the President in waging war:
Soldiers regularly in the service have the license of the government to deprive men, the active enemies of the government, of their liberty and lives; their commission so to act is as perfect and legal as that of a judge to adjudicate. ... Wars never have been and never can be conducted upon the principle that an army is but a posse comitatis of a civil magistrate.
Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 301-02 (1865) (emphasis added); see also The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 252 (1873) ("it cannot be pretended that a United States soldier is guilty of murder if he kills a public enemy in battle, which would be the case if the municipal law was in force and applicable to an act committed under such circumstances"). As Attorney General Speed concluded, the Due Process Clause has no application to the conduct of a military campaign:
That portion of the Constitution which declares that 'no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law,' has such direct reference to, and connection with, trials for crime or criminal prosecutions that comment upon it would seem to be unnecessary. Trials for offences against the laws of war are not embraced or intended to be embraced in those provisions. ... The argument that flings around offenders against the laws of war, these guarantees of the Constitution would convict all the soldiers of our army of murder; no prisoners could be taken and held; the army could not move. The absurd consequences that would of necessity flow from such an argument show that it cannot be the true construction -- it cannot be what was intended by the framers of the instrument. One of the prime motives for the Union and a federal government was to confer the powers of war. If any provisions of the Constitution are so in conflict with the power to carry on war as to destroy and make it valueless, then the instrument, instead of being a great and wise one, is a miserable failure, a felo de se.
11 Op. Att'y Gen. at 313-14.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez; 494 U.S. 259 (1990), addressing the extra-territorial application of the Fourth Amendment is equally instructive as to why the Fifth Amendment cannot be construed to apply to the President's conduct of a war:
The United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country -- over 200 times in our history -- for the protection of American citizens or national security. ... Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest. Were respondent to prevail, aliens with no attachment to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters. ... [t]he Court of Appeals' global view of [the Fourth Amendment's] applicability would plunge [the political branches] into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad.
Id. at 273-74 (citations omitted). [10] If each time the President captured and detained enemy aliens outside the United States, those aliens could bring suit challenging the deprivation of their liberty, such a result would interfere with and undermine the President's capacity to protect the Nation and to respond to the exigencies of war. [11]
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply the Due Process Clause or even the Just Compensation Clause to executive and congressional actions taken in the direct prosecution of a war effort against enemies of the Nation. It has long been settled that nothing in the Fifth Amendment governs wartime actions to detain or deport alien enemies and to confiscate enemy property. As the Court has broadly stated in United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739,748 (1987), "in times of war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be dangerous" without violating the Due Process Clause. See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948). Similarly, as the Supreme Court has explained with respect to enemy property, "[b ]y exertion of the war power, and untrammeled by the due process or just compensation clause," Congress may "enact[] laws directing seizure, use, and disposition of property in this country belonging to subjects of the enemy." Cummings v. Deutsche Bank Und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937). These authorities of the federal government during armed conflict were recognized early in the Nation's history. Chief Justice Marshall concluded for the Court in 1814 that "war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found." Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122 (1814). See also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775 ("The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a 'declared war' exists."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952). As the Court explained in United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 11 (1926), Congress is "untrammeled and free to authorize the seizure, use or appropriation of [enemy] properties without any compensation. ... There is no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties." See also White v. Mechs. Sec. Corp" 269 U.S. 283, 301 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (when U.S. seizes property from an enemy it may "do with it what it liked").
The Supreme Court has also stated a general rule that, notwithstanding the compensation requirement for government takings of property under the Fifth Amendment, "the government cannot be charged for injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by military operations of armies in the field." United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887). For "[t]he terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that the United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of war. This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign." United States v. Caltex, Inc. (Philippines), 344 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1952). See also Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878). These cases and the untenable consequences for the President's conduct of a war that would result from the application of the Due Process Clause demonstrate its inapplicability during wartime -- whether to the conduct of interrogations or the detention of enemy aliens.
Second, even if the Fifth Amendment applied to enemy combatants in wartime, it is clear that that the Fifth Amendment does not operate outside the United States to regulate the Executive's conduct toward aliens. The Supreme Court has squarely held that the Fifth Amendment provides no rights to non-citizens who have no established connection to the country and who are held outside sovereign United States territory. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 ("[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States."). See also Zadrydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that certain constitutional protections[, such as the Fifth Amendment,] available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.") (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269; and Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784). As the Supreme Court explained in Eisentrager, construing the Fifth Amendment to apply to aliens who are outside the United States and have no connection to the United States:
would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and 'werewolves' could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view.
339 U.S. at 784. See also Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179 (2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 n.16 (D.D.C. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Eisentrager, Verdugo-Urquidez, and Zadrydas, and the District of Columbia Circuit in Harbury, have all held that there is no extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to aliens."). Indeed, in Harbury v. Deutch, the D.C. Circuit expressly considered a claim that various U.S. officials had participated in the torture of a non-U.S. citizen outside the sovereign territory of the United States during peacetime. See 233 F.3d at 604-05. The D.C. Circuit rejected the contention that the Due Process clause applied extraterritorially to a person in such circumstances. The court found Verdugo-Urquidez to be controlling on the question, and determined that the Supreme Court's rejection of the extraterritorial application the Fifth Amendment precluded any claim by an alien held outside the United States even when the conduct at issue had not occurred in wartime. See id. at 604 (finding that "the Supreme Court's extended and approving citation of Eisentrager [in Verdugo-Urquidez] suggests that its conclusions regarding the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment are not ... limited to wartime). We therefore believe that it is clear that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to alien enemy combatants held overseas.
D. Eighth Amendment
A second constitutional provision that might be thought relevant to interrogations is the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment, however, applies solely to those persons upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. As the Supreme Court has explained, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "was designed to protect those convicted of crimes;" Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). As a result, "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Id. at 671 n.40. The Eighth Amendment thus has no application to those individuals who have not been punished as part of a criminal proceeding. Irrespective of the fact that they have been detained by the government. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (holding that condition of confinement claims brought by pretrial detainee must be considered under the Fifth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment). The Eighth Amendment therefore cannot extend to the detention of wartime detainees, who have been captured pursuant to the President's power as Commander in Chief. See Transfers Memorandum at 2 (concluding that "the President has since the Founding era exercised exclusive and virtually unfettered control over the disposition of enemy soldiers and agents captured in time of war"). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003) (the President's powers as Commander in Chief "include the authority to detain those captured in Armed struggle").
The detention of enemy combatants can in no sense be deemed "punishment" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Unlike imprisonment pursuant to a criminal sanction, the detention of enemy combatants involves no sentence judicially imposed or legislatively required and those detained will be released at the end of the conflict. Indeed, it has long been established that "'[c]aptivity [in wartime] is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but 'merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal character.'" William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 788 (2d ed. 1920) (quoting British War Office, Manual of Military Law (1882)). Moreover, "[t]he object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy." In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950); Marco Sassoli & Antoine A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law 125 (1999) (the purpose of detaining enemy combatants "is not to punish them, but ... to hinder their direct participation in hostilities"). Detention also serves another vital military objective -- i.e., obtaining intelligence from captured combatants to aid in the prosecution of the war. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment has no application here.
II. Federal Criminal Law
A. Canons of Construction
We discuss below several canons of construction that indicate that ordinary federal criminal statutes do not apply to the properly- authorized interrogation of enemy combatants by the United States Armed Forces during an Armed conflict; [12] These canons include the avoidance of constitutional difficulties, inapplicability of general criminal statutes to the conduct of the military during war, inapplicability of general statutes to the sovereign, and the specific governs the general. The Criminal Division concurs in our conclusion that these canons of construction preclude the application of the assault, maiming, interstate stalking, and torture statutes to the military during the conduct of a war.
1. Interpretation to Avoid Constitutional Problems
As the Supreme Court has recognized, and as we will explain further below, the President enjoys complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority in conducting operations against hostile forces. Because both "[t]he executive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President," the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is "the President alone [] who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations." Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874) (emphasis added).
In light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war, in the absence of a clear statement from Congress otherwise, we will not read a criminal statute as infringing on the President's ultimate authority in these areas. We presume that Congress does not seek to provoke a constitutional confrontation with an equal, coordinate branch of government unless it has unambiguously indicated its intent to do so. The Supreme Court has recognized, and this Office has similarly adopted, a canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulties so long as a reasonable alternative construction is available. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Cory. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe [a] statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."). Cf. United States Assistance to Countries That Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148,149 (July 14, 1994) ("Shoot Down Opinion") (requiring "careful examination of each individual [criminal] statute" before concluding that generally applicable statute applied to the conduct of U.S. government officials). This canon of construction applies especially where an act of Congress could be read to encroach upon powers constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch of government. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (citation omitted) ("Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the [Administrative Procedure Act]. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion."); Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989) (construing Federal Advisory Committee Act not to apply to advice given by American Bar Association to the President on judicial nominations, to avoid potential constitutional question regarding encroachment on Presidential power to appoint judges).
In the area of foreign affairs and war powers in particular, the avoidance canon has special force. In contrast to the domestic realm, foreign affairs and war clearly place the President in the dominant constitutional position due to his authority as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive and his plenary control over diplomatic relations. There can be little doubt that the conduct of war is a matter that is fundamentally executive in nature, the power over which the Framers vested in a unitary executive. "The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength," Alexander Hamilton observed, "and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority." The Federalist No. 74, at 415. Thus, earlier in this current armed conflict against the al Qaeda terrorist network, we concluded that "[t]he power of the President is at its zenith under the Constitution when the President is directing military operations of the Armed forces." Flanigan Memorandum at 3. Correspondingly, during war Congress plays a reduced role in the war effort and the courts generally defer to executive decisions concerning the conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
Construing generally-applicable statutes so as not to apply to the conduct of military operations against the enemy during an armed conflict respects the Constitution's basic allocation of wartime authority. As our Office recently explained in rejecting the application of 18 U.S.C. § 2280, which prohibits the seizure of vessels, to conduct during the current war:
we have previously concluded that the President's authority in the areas of foreign relations and national security is very broad, and that in the absence of a clear statement in the text or context of a statutory prohibition to suggest that it was Congress's intent to circumscribe this authority, we do not believe that a statute should be interpreted to impose such a restriction on the President's constitutional powers.
High Seas Memorandum at 8 n.5. Federal courts similarly have agreed that federal statutes should not be read to interfere with the Executive Branch's control over foreign affairs unless Congress specifically and clearly seeks to do so. See. e.g., Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."); Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. American Cetacean Socy, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (construing federal statutes to avoid curtailment of traditional presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs). Courts will not lightly assume that Congress has acted to interfere with the President's constitutionally superior position as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in the area of military operations. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 529 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)). See also Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 (deference to executive branch is "especially" appropriate "in the area ... of ... national security").
In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to direct a military campaign against al Qaeda and its allies, general criminal laws must be construed as not applying to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. Congress cannot interfere with the President's exercise of his authority as Commander in Chief to control the conduct of operations during a war. See, e.g., Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Swift Justice Authorization Act (Apr. 8, 2002); Flanigan Memorandum at 6; Memorandum for Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Defense Authorization Act (Sept. 15, 1995). As we have discussed above, the President's power to detain and interrogate enemy combatants arises out of his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Any construction of criminal laws that regulated the President's authority as Commander in Chief to determine the interrogation and treatment of enemy combatants would raise serious constitutional questions whether Congress had intruded on the President's constitutional authority. Moreover, we do not believe that Congress enacted general criminal provisions such as the prohibitions against assault, maiming, interstate stalking, and torture pursuant to any express authority that would allow it to infringe on the President's constitutional control over the operation of the Armed Forces in wartime. In our view, Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield. In fact, the general applicability of these statutes belies any argument that these statutes apply to persons under the direction of the President in the conduct of war. [13]
To avoid this constitutional difficulty, therefore, we will construe potentially applicable criminal laws, reviewed in more detail below, not to apply to the President's detention and interrogation of enemy combatants pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. We believe that this approach fully respects Congress's authority. First, we will not read a statute to create constitutional problems because we assume that Congress fully respects the limits of its own constitutional authority and would not knowingly seek to upset the separation of powers. Second, we will not infer a congressional attempt to spark a constitutional confrontation with the executive branch in wartime unless Congress clearly and specifically seeks to do so.
2. Application of Laws of General Applicability to the Conduct of the Military During War
Not only do we construe statutes to avoid intruding upon the President's power as Commander in Chief, but we also apply a more specific and related canon to the conduct of war. As this Office has previously opined, unless "Congress by a clear and unequivocal statement declares otherwise" a criminal statute should not be construed to apply to the properly authorized acts of the military during armed conflict. Shoot Down Opinion, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 164. See Memorandum for Alan Kreczko, Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities at 3 (Oct 15, 1993) ("In the absence of a clear statement of [the] intent [to apply the statute to military personnel acting under the President as Commander in Chief], we do not believe that a statutory provision of this generality should be interpreted so to restrict the President's constitutional powers."); Application of the Neutrality Act to Official Government Activities, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58, 81 (1984) (concluding that in absence of a express statement, the Neutrality Act does not apply to U.S. "Government officials acting within the course and scope of their official duties," in light of the legislative history and historical practice that demonstrated a contrary intent). For many years, our Office has also applied this canon in several highly classified contexts that cannot be discussed in this memorandum.
This canon of construction is rooted in the absurdities that the application of such laws to the conduct of the military during a war would create. If those laws were construed to apply to the properly-authorized conduct of military personnel, the most essential tasks necessary to the conduct of war would become subject to prosecution. A soldier who shot an enemy combatant on the battlefield could become liable under the criminal laws for assault or murder; a pilot who bombed a military target in a city could be prosecuted for murder or destruction of property; a sailor who detained a suspected terrorist on the high seas might be subject to prosecution for kidnapping. As we noted in the Shoot Down Opinion, the application of such laws to the military during wartime "could [also] mean in some circumstances that military personnel would not be able to engage in reasonable self-defense without subjecting themselves to the risk of criminal prosecution." Id. at 164. The mere potential for prosecution could impair the military's completion of its duties during a war as military officials became concerned about their liability under the criminal laws. Such results are so ridiculous as to be untenable and must be rejected to allow the President and the Armed Forces to successfully conduct a war.
This canon of construction, of course, establishes only a presumption. While the federal criminal statutes of general applicability reviewed below do not overcome that presumption, in some cases it has been done. For example, it is clear that the War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, which we address below, is intended to apply to the conduct of the U.S. military. It expressly provides that the statute applies where the perpetrator of the crime "is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States" and the conduct it prohibits is conduct that occurs during war. Id. § 2441(b). That presumption has not, however, been overcome with respect to the assault, maiming, interstate stalking, or the torture statutes. We will not infer an intention by Congress to interfere with the conduct of military operations in an armed conflict without a clear statement otherwise.
3. Generally Applicable Statutes Are Not Construed to Apply to the Sovereign
It is also a canon of construction that laws of general applicability are not read to apply to the sovereign. In United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the Supreme Court explained its application: (1) where it "would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest," id. at 383; or (2) "where a reading which would include such officers would work obvious absurdity[,]" id. at 384. As the Court explained, "[a] classical instance" of the deprivation of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest "is the exemption of the state from the operation of general statutes of limitation." Id. at 383.
Here, the application of these statutes to the conduct of interrogations of unlawful combatants would deprive the sovereign of a recognized prerogative. Historically, nations have been free to treat unlawful combatants as they wish, and in the United States this power has been vested in the President through the Commander-in-Chief Clause. As one commentator has explained, unlawful belligerents are "more often than not treated as war or national criminals liable to be treated at will by the captor. There are almost no regulatory safeguards with respect to them and the captor owes no obligation towards them." R.C. Hingorani, Prisoners of War 18 (1982) (emphasis added). See Ingrid Detter, The Law of War 148 (2d ed. 2000) ("Unlawful combatants ... enjoy no protection under international law); William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 784 (2d ed. 1920) (unlawful belligerents are "[n]ot ... within the protection of the laws of war"); A. Berriedale Keith, 2 Wheaton's Elements of International Law 716 (6th ed. 1929) ("irregular bands of marauders are ... not entitled to the protection of the mitigated usages of war as practised by civilized nations"); L. Oppenheim, 2 International Law, § 254, at 454 (6th ed. 1944) ("Private individuals who take up arms and commit hostilities against the enemy do not enjoy the privileges of Armed forces, and the enemy has, according to a customary rule of International Law, the right to treat such individuals as war criminals." [14] The United States Supreme Court has recognized the important distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. As the Supreme Court unanimously stated 60 years ago, "[b ]y universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants." Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (emphasis added).
Under traditional practice as expressed in the customary laws of war, the treatment of unlawful belligerents is left to the sovereign's discretion. As one commentator has stated, the treatment of "unprivileged belligerents ... [is] left to the discretion of the belligerent threatened by their activities." Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 549 (1954). Under our Constitution, the sovereign right of the United States on the treatment of enemy combatants is reserved to the President as Commander-in-Chief. In light of the long history of discretion given to each nation to determine its treatment of unlawful combatants, to construe these statutes to regulate the conduct of the United States toward such combatants would interfere with a well-established prerogative of the sovereign. While the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364 ("GPW'), imposes restrictions on the interrogations of prisoners of war, it does not provide prisoner of war status to those who are unlawful combatants. See Treaties and Laws Memorandum at 8-9. Those restrictions therefore would not apply to the interrogations of unlawful belligerents such as al Qaeda or Taliban members.
The second exception recognized by the Supreme Court arises where the application of general laws to a government official would create absurd results, such as effectively preventing the official from carrying out his duties. In Nardone, the Supreme Court pointed to "the application of a speed law to a policeman pursuing a criminal or the driver of a fire engine responding to an alarm" as examples of such absurd results. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384. See also United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868) (holding that statute punishing obstruction of mail did not apply to an officer's temporary detention of mail caused by his arrest of the carrier for murder). In those situations and others, such as undercover investigations of narcotics trafficking, the government officer's conduct would constitute a literal violation of the law. And while "[g]overnment law enforcement efforts frequently require the literal violation of facially applicable statutes[,] ... courts have construed prohibitory laws as inapplicable when a public official is engaged in the performance of a necessary public duty." Memorandum for Maurice C. Inman, Jr., General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, from Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Visa Fraud, Investigation at 2 (Nov. 20, 1984). Indeed, to construe such statutes otherwise would undermine almost all undercover investigative efforts; See also id. For the reasons we explain above, the application of these general laws to the conduct of the military during the course of a war would create untenable results.
Like the canon of construction against the application of general criminal statutes to the conduct of the military during war, this canon of construction is not absolute. The rule excluding the sovereign is only one of construction. It may be overcome where the legislative history or obvious policies of the statute demonstrate that the sovereign and its officers should be included. With respect to assault, maiming; or interstate stalking, no such history or obvious legislative policy indicates an intention to regulate lawful military activities in an armed conflict. Although the torture statute, as we explain below, applies to persons acting under color of law, the legislative history indicates no intent to apply this to the conduct of military personnel. Indeed, as we explained in discussing the prerogative of the sovereign, it is well established that the sovereign retains the discretion to treat unlawful combatants as it sees fit.
4. Specific Governs the General
The canon of construction that specific statutes govern general statutes also counsels that generally applicable criminal statutes should not apply to the military's conduct of interrogations in the prosecution of a war. Where a specific statute or statutory scheme has been enacted, it and not a more general enactment will govern. See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987). Here, the UCMJ provides a detailed regulatory regime for the conduct of military personnel apart from the federal criminal code. Congress enacted the UCMJ pursuant to its constitutional authority "[t]o make Rules for the government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14. As the specific code of conduct, the UCMJ governs the conduct of the military during a war, not the general federal criminal laws.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act makes clear that it is the UCMJ -- not the criminal code -- that governs the conduct of the members of the Armed Forces. As explained above, 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d) ensures that the military punishes and disciplines its members. To be sure, section 3261(a)(1) provides that members of the Armed Forces may be punished for conduct that would constitute a felony if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. But section 3261(d) precludes the prosecution of such persons in an Article III court, with only two exceptions: (1) where an individual is no longer a member of the Armed Forces, though he was a member at the time of the offense the individual; and (2) where the member committed the offense with someone who was not a member of the Armed Forces.
It could be argued that Congress specifically enacted section 3261 to extend special maritime and territorial jurisdiction crimes to the members of the Armed Forces and those accompanying or employed by them. Such a contention would, however, be incorrect. Nothing in that provision, or its legislative history suggests an intention to impose general criminal liability on the military for properly-authorized acts undertaken in the prosecution of a war. Rather, the legislative history reveals a desire to ensure that when persons accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces, acting solely in their personal capacity, commits a felony, they can be punished for those crimes. [15] We therefore believe that this canon of construction as with the others outlined above, supports our conclusion that the statutes outlined in this opinion, with the exception of the war crimes statute, do not govern the properly authorized interrogation of enemy combatants during an armed conflict.
PART 2 OF 6 (JOHN C. YOO MEMO CONT'D.)
5. Application of the Canons of Construction
The assault, maiming, interstate stalking, and torture statutes discussed below are generally applicable criminal prohibitions, applying on their faces to "whoever" engages in the conduct they proscribe. 18 U.S.C. § 113; id. § 114; id. § 2261A; id. § 2340A. Each of the canons outlined above counsels against the application of these statutes to the conduct of the military during war. As we explained above, the application of these statutes to the President's conduct of the war would potentially infringe upon his power as Commander in Chief. Furthermore, the conduct at issue here -- interrogations -- is a core element of the military's ability to prosecute a war. As a general matter, we do not construe generally applicable criminal statutes to reach the conduct of the military during a war. Moreover, the application of these statutes to the conduct of the military during war would touch upon a prerogative of the sovereign, namely its discretion regarding the treatment of unlawful belligerents. [16] Congress has not provided a clear statement with respect to any of these statutes that would suggest that these canons of construction do not apply. Additionally, as we explained above, the UCMJ provides a pecific statutory scheme that governs the conduct of the military and as the more specific enactment it governs here.
To be sure, section 2340 applies to individuals who are acting "under color of law." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). As such, it applies to governmental actors and it could be argued that Congress enacted it with the intention of restricting the ability of the Armed Forces to interrogate enemy combatants during an armed conflict. We believe that these canons of construction nevertheless counsel against the application of this statute to the conduct of the military during the prosecution of a war. As we explained above, applying this statute to the President's conduct of the war would raise grave separation of powers concerns. Such a construction is unnecessary to give effect to the criminal prohibition. Though we believe that the statute would not apply to the conduct of the military during the prosecution of a war, it would reach the conduct of other governmental actors in peacetime. We further note that where Congress intends to apply statutes to the conduct of our military it has done so far more clearly than by requiring the individuals act "under color of law." For example, the War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 applies to the conduct "any member of the Armed Forces of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b). Moreover, here, it is the UCMJ, a specific statutory scheme, that governs the conduct of the Armed Forces rather than this general statute.
Even if these statutes were misconstrued to apply to persons acting at the direction of the President during the conduct of war, the Department of Justice could not enforce this law or any of the other criminal statutes applicable to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction against federal officials acting pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to direct a war. Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute, the Justice Department could not bring a prosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this context. This approach is consistent with previous decisions of our Office involving the application of federal criminal law. For example, we have previously construed the congressional contempt statute not to apply to executive branch officials who refuse to comply with congressional subpoenas because of an assertion of executive privilege. In a published 1984 opinion, we concluded:
[I]f executive officials were subject to prosecution for criminal contempt whenever they carried out the President's claim of executive privilege, it would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional duties. Therefore, the separation of powers principles that underlie the doctrine of executive privilege also would preclude an application of the contempt of Congress statute to punish officials for aiding the President in asserting his constitutional privilege.
Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted A Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 134 (1984). Cf. Shoot Down Memorandum at 163-64. And should the statute not be construed in this manner, our Office concluded that the Department of Justice could not enforce the statute against federal officials who properly execute the President's constitutional authority. "The President, through a United States Attorney, need not, indeed may not, prosecute criminally a subordinate for asserting on his behalf a claim of executive privilege. Nor could the Legislative Branch or the courts require or implement the prosecution of such an individual." 8 Op. O.L.C. at 141. We opined that "courts ... would surely conclude that a criminal prosecution for the exercise of a presumptively valid, constitutionally based privilege is not consistent with the Constitution." Id.
We have even greater concerns with respect to prosecutions arising out of the exercise of the President's express authority as Commander in Chief than we do with prosecutions arising out of the assertion of executive privilege. Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of enemy combatants would violate the Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President. There can be little doubt that intelligence operations, such as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants and leaders, are both necessary and proper for the effective conduct of a military campaign. Indeed, such operations may be of more importance in a war with an international terrorist organization than one with the conventional armed forces of a nation-state, due to the former's emphasis on covert operations and surprise attacks against civilians. It may be the case that only successful interrogations can provide the information necessary to prevent future attacks upon the United States and its citizens. Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so too are laws that would prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.
B. Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States
Before turning to the specific federal criminal statutes that may be relevant to the conduct of interrogations, we must examine whether these statutes apply. Federal criminal statutes generally do not apply within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). As noted above, this opinion addresses solely those alien enemy combatants held outside the United States. The application of federal criminal laws to the conduct of interrogations overseas is determined by the complex interaction of 18 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2000 & West Supp. 2002) and 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000), which is part of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2001). Section 7 defines the term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction," which we conclude includes permanent U.S. military bases outside the United States, like the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay ("GTMO"). Section 3261 defines military extraterritorial jurisdiction. We conclude that all persons who are neither members of the Armed Forces nor persons accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces are subject to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States when they are in locations that Section 7 defines as part of that jurisdiction. Members of the Armed Forces and persons accompanying or employed by them, however, are subject to a slightly different rule. Members of the Armed Forces are subject to military discipline under the UCMJ any place outside the United States for conduct that would constitute a felony if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Those accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces can be prosecuted in an Article III court for their conduct outside the United States that would constitute a felony offense if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Finally, members of the Armed Forces and those accompanying or employed by the military are punishable for misdemeanor offenses in an Article III court when they commit such offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
As a general matter, GTMO and other U.S. military bases outside the United States fall within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. [17] Section 7(9) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides, in relevant part, that the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States includes:
offenses committed by or against a national of the United States ... on the premises of United States ... military ... missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership.
18 U.S.C.A. § 7(9)(A). [18] By its terms, this section applies to GTMO and other U.S. military bases in foreign states, although no court has interpreted the scope of section 7(9)'s reach. [19]
Section 7(9) further provides that it "does not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in" 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a). Persons described in section 3261(a) are those "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States" or "member[s] of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice)," who engage in "conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States[.]" Id. The interaction of section 7(9) and section 3261(a) in effect differentiates between three classes of persons: (1) all persons who are neither members of the Armed Forces nor persons accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces; (2) members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ; (3) those persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces.
First, those persons who are neither members of the Armed Forces nor are employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces are subject to prosecution for violations of federal criminal law when they are at a location that is included within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Conversely, when the acts in question are committed outside of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, these individuals are not subject to those federal criminal laws. So, for example, a federal, non-military officer who is conducting interrogations in a foreign location, one that is not on a permanent U.S. military base or diplomatic establishment, would not be subject to the federal criminal laws applicable in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
The rules that apply to the second and third classes of persons are more complicated. Section 7(9), in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3261, provides that members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ are not within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction when they, while outside the United States, engage in conduct that would constitute a felony if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Section 3261(a) exempts such persons, however, only if their conduct constitutes a felony. If they were to commit a misdemeanor offense while stationed at GTMO, they would fall outside section 3261(a)'s exception and would be subject to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a). [20]
Section 7(9), in conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3261, likewise provides that those persons employed by or accompanying members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ are not within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States when they, while outside the United States, engage in conduct that would constitute a felony if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. [21] And, like members of the Armed Forces, if such persons commit a misdemeanor offense while in an area that falls within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, they are within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
Although these two classes of persons are not within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction when they engage in conduct that would constitute a felony if engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, they are in fact punishable for such conduct when they are outside the United States -- whether they are in an area that is otherwise part of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction or elsewhere outside the United States, such as in a foreign state. Section 3261(a) provides that when such persons are outside the United States and they engage in conduct that would be a felony if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, those persons "shall be punished as provided for that offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a). Section 3261(a) therefore gives extraterritorial effect to the criminal prohibitions applicable to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Thus, with respect to interrogations, members of the Armed Forces and those employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces will be subject to the felony criminal prohibitions that apply in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction irrespective of whether the interrogations occur at, for example, a U.S. military base or at the military facilities of a foreign state.
Although members of the Armed Forces are to be punished for conduct that would constitute a felony if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, they can only be prosecuted under the UCMJ for that conduct. Section 3261 prohibits the prosecution of members of the Armed Forces under the laws applicable to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. For persons who are members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ , section 3261(d) provides that "no prosecution may be commenced against" them "under section 3261(a)." 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d). [22] Section 3261(d) is subject to two exceptions. First, the bar on prosecutions applies only so long as the member continues to be subject to the UCMJ. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d)(1). Second, if "an indictment or information charges that the member committed the offense with one or more other defendants, at least one of whom is not subject" to the UCMJ, the bar does not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d)(2). In limited circumstances, namely in time of war, persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces are subject to the UCW. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (a)(11) (2000) (providing that "persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States" are subject to the UCMJ); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). [23] If the indictment charged that such persons committed the offense in wartime with members of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ, this bar on prosecution would not be removed for the member. The indictment would, for example, have to charge that the member of the Armed Forces committed the offense with, for example, a government official not subject to the UCMJ (and not physically accompanying the Armed Forces in the field) to survive.
2. Criminal statutes Applicable in the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States
Because the interaction of 18 U.S.C. § 7 and 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) renders the criminal statutes that apply in special maritime and territorial jurisdiction applicable to the conduct of members of the Armed Forces, and those accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces, we have examined below the criminal statutes that could conceivably cover interrogation conduct. Specifically, we have addressed: assault, 18 U.S.C. § 113; maiming, 18 U.S.C. § 114; and interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A. Of course, as we explained above, various canons of construction preclude the application of these laws to authorized military interrogations of alien enemy combatants during wartime.
a. Assault
Section 113 of Title 18 proscribes assault within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. [24] Although section 113 does not define assault, courts have construed the term "assault" in accordance with its common law meaning. See, e.g., United Stales v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d 491, 494 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Juvenile-Male, 930 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1991). At common law, an assault is an attempted battery or an act that puts another person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. See, e.g., United Stales v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64,68 (1st Cir. 2000). Section 113, as we explain below, sweeps more broadly than the common law definition of simple assault and sweeps within its ambit acts that would at common law constitute battery. We analyze below each form of assault section 113 proscribes.
First, we begin with the least serious form of assault: simple assault, which section 113(a)(5) proscribes. [25] This form of assault includes attempted battery. See, e.g., United States v. Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1976) [26] Courts have employed various formulations of what constitutes an attempted battery. By the far most common formulation is that attempted battery is "a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of another." United Slates v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082,1088 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1170 (2002). See United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Juvenile Male, 930 at 728 (same). An assault at common law does not require actual physical contact. If the defendant does make such contact, it does not preclude a charge of simple assault. See Dupree, 544 F.2d at 1052 ("[A]n assault is an attempted battery and proof of a battery will support conviction of assault"); Cf. Bayes, 210 F.3d at 69 ("in a prosecution for simple assault. .., it is sufficient to show that the defendant deliberately touched another in a patently offensive manner without justification or excuse"). The attempted battery form of assault is, like all other forms of attempt, a specific intent crime. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.16, at 312 (1986) ("LaFave & Scott"). Thus, the defendant must have specifically intended to commit a battery -- i.e., he must have specifically intended to "to cause physical injury to the victim." See id: Some courts construe that physical injury to extend to offensive touchings. An offensive touching can be anything from attempting to spit on someone to trying to touch someone's buttocks. See Bayes, 210 F.3d at 69; United States v. Frizzi,491 F.2d 1231, 1232 (1st. Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Whitefeather, 275 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2002) (urinating on victim was an offensive touching). And as one of the leading commentators explains, "[a]n attempt to commit any crime requires that the attempting party come pretty close to committing it." Wayne R. LaFave. Criminal Law, § 7.16, at 745 (3d ed. 2000) ("LaFave"). In the context of interrogations, if, for example, an interrogator attempted to slap the detainee, such an act would constitute simple assault. On the other hand, changing the detainee's environment such as by altering the lighting or temperature would not constitute simple assault.
Simple assault also includes the placement of another in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. To convict a defendant of this type of assault, the prosecution must establish that: (1) the defendant intended to cause apprehension of immediate bodily harm; (2) the victim actually experienced such apprehension; and (3) the defendant engaged in some conduct that reasonably arouses such apprehension. See, e.g., United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant's actions must actually cause victim apprehension); United States v. Sampson, No.00-50689, 2002 WL 1478552, at *2 (9th Cir. July 10, 2002) (where defendant's firing of a gun failed to frighten police officer because he had not heard the gun fire or seen the defendant fire the gun the defendant had not committed simple assault); LaFave, § 7.16, at 747. [27] In interrogating a detainee, if interrogators were to, for example, show a detainee a device for electrically shocking him and to threaten to use it should he refuse to divulge information, such an action would constitute this type of assault. In so doing, the interrogator would have intended to cause apprehension of immediate bodily harm, it would have been reasonable for the detainee to experience such apprehension, and more than likely he would have experienced such apprehension.
Second, section 113(a)(4) proscribes assault by "striking, beating, or wounding." [28] This crime requires only general intent. See, e.g., United States v. Felix, 996 F.2d 203, 207 (8th Cir. 1993) (general intent crime). Courts have construed this section to preclude essentially what at common law would have been simple battery. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 915 (10th Cir. 1997). By contrast to the simple assault section 113(a)(5) proscribes, this subsection requires that a defendant make physical contact with the victim. See Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d at 494; United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1242 n.26 (9th Cir. 1980). Notably, however, assault by striking, beating, or wounding "requires no particular degree of severity in the injury" to the victim. Felix, 996 F.2d at 207. See Chavez, 204 F.3d at 1317 (same). Because this section requires physical contact, interrogation methods that do not involve physical contact will not run afoul of this section.
Before turning to the remaining types of assault that section 113 proscribes, it bears noting that both simple assault and assault by striking, beating or wounding are punishable by a maximum sentence of six months' imprisonment, a fine, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5); id. § 113(a)(4). [29] Because the maximum sentence for each of these crimes is less than a year, charges brought against a member of the Armed Forces subject to the UCMJ or those employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces for either of these crimes would not bring that member within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a). As a result, a member of the Armed Forces engaging in such conduct at a military base, such as GTMO, would be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and could be prosecuted for this offense in an Article III court, subject, of course, to any defenses or any protections stemming from the exercise of the President's constitutional authority. If, however, members of the Armed Forces were engaging in such conduct on a foreign state's military base, they would not be covered by 3261(a) nor would they be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. The remaining types of assault prohibited under section 113(a) addressed below would, however, bring a member of the Armed Forces or someone employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces squarely within section 3261(a).
Section 113 proscribes assault resulting in "serious bodily injury" and assault resulting in "substantial bodily injury to an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years." 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6); id. § 113(a)(7). These crimes are general intent crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092, 1095 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1990); Felix, 996 F.2d at 207. To establish assault resulting in serious bodily injury, the prosecution must prove that the defendant "assault[ed] the victim and that the assault happen[ed] to result" in the necessary level of injury. United States v. Davis, 237 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2001). "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which involves ... a substantial risk of death; ... extreme physical pain; ... protracted and obvious disfigurement; or; ... protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(3) (2000); see id. § 113(b)(2) ("[T]he term 'serious bodily injury' has the meaning given that term in section 1365 of this title."). [30] By contrast, section 113(b)(1) defines "substantial bodily injury" as "bodily injury which involves ... a temporary or substantial disfigurement; or ... a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." Id. § 113(b)(1). Thus, an assault resulting in serious bodily injury requires a more severe injury, that in some instances may have a more lasting impact on the victim than that which might be considered "substantial bodily injury."
No court has definitively addressed the minimum thresholds of injury necessary to rise to the level of "substantial bodily injury" or "serious bodily injury," respectively. Nonetheless, reported opinions regarding these crimes offer some idea as to the severity and type of injuries that would be sufficient to establish violations of these subsections. With respect to substantial bodily injury, for example, a defendant was convicted of assault resulting in substantial bodily injury for injuries to the victim that included: fracturing the victim's skull, burning his face, and biting him, which left a human bite mark on the victim's leg. See United States v. Brown, 287 F.3d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 2002). And in In re Murphy, No. 98-M-168, 1998 WL 1179109 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 1998), the magistrate concluded that "a loss of consciousness and a two-day stay in the sick room could qualify as allegations of substantial bodily injury." Id. at *6. With respect to serious bodily injury, evidence establishing that the victim's cheekbone and eye socket were fractured, and a large laceration created, requiring the victim to undergo reconstructive surgery and leaving her suffering from a permanent disfigurement, established that she had suffered serious bodily injury. See United States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1992). With respect to "serious bodily injury," in United States v. Dennison, 937 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the infliction of seven lacerations over the victim's neck and chest that required extensive suturing and had produced scarring "involve[ing] a (substantial risk of ... protracted and obvious disfigurement."' Id. at 562. And in United States v. Brown, 276 F.3d 930 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 126 (2002), the Seventh Circuit concluded that the tearing of a muscle in the victim's calf and leg that required hospitalization and crutches did not constitute protracted loss or impairment of the function of the leg nor did it cause disfigurement within the meaning of section 1365(g). See id. at 931-32. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that because the victim had suffered from extreme pain for eight days due to the injuries sustained to his leg, he had suffered serious bodily injury. See id.
It bears emphasizing that for the purposes of sections 113(a)(6) and 113(a)(7) the concepts of serious bodily injury and substantial bodily injury include injury to an individual's mental faculties. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 1998); 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1)(B); id. § 1365(g)(3). We have not, however, found any reported cases in which a mental harm absent physical contact constituted assault. For example, in Lowe, the only reported case in which mental harm fulfilled the serious bodily injury requirement for the purposes of assault under this section, the defendant kidnapped and raped the victim and this physical brutality caused her mental harm. See id. at 48. We note that with the exception of the undefined reference to "mental faculties," all of the injuries described in the statute connote some (and more likely extensive) physical contact with the victim. In defining substantial bodily injury, for example, the statute speaks in terms of disfigurement, or loss of the function of some bodily member or organ. In the case of serious bodily injury, the statute reaches more serious injuries to include those injuries that bear a substantial risk of death, result in extreme physical pain, as well as protracted disfigurement or the impairment of a bodily member or organ. The "impairment" of one's "mental faculty" might be construed in light of the obvious physical contact required for all other injuries listed in the statute. Moreover, these crimes must be construed consistently with the common law definitions of assault and battery. Simple assault, as we explained above, is a specific intent crime and requires no physical contact. By contrast, battery is a general intent crime and requires physical contact. Courts have construed assault resulting in serious bodily harm to require only general intent, rendering it akin to battery in that regard and thereby suggesting that it too requires actual physical contact. Indeed, the only other general intent crime under section 113 is assault by striking, beating, or wounding. Courts have construed that form of assault to be the equivalent of simple battery, requiring actual physical contact as an element. Thus, given the requisite intent and remainder of the other injuries that constitute serious bodily injury or substantial bodily injury, we believe the better view of these forms of assault is that they require actual physical contact. Indeed, no court has found mental harm in the absence of physical contact sufficient to satisfy the requisite injury. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude with certainty that no court would make such a finding.
In the context of interrogations, we believe that interrogation methods that do not involve physical contact will not support a charge of assault resulting in substantial injury or assault resulting in serious bodily injury or substantial bodily injury. Moreover, even minimal physical contact, such as poking, slapping, or shoving the detainee, is unlikely to produce the injury necessary to establish either one of these types of assault.
Section 113(a)(3) prohibits "assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse." To establish this type of assault, the prosecution must prove that the defendant "(1) assaulted the victim (2) with a dangerous weapon (3) with the intent to do bodily harm." Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d at 494. See also United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1990) (to establish assault with a dangerous weapon, the prosecution must establish that the defendant acted with the specific intent to commit bodily harm). It does not, however, require the defendant to make physical contact with the victim. See Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d at 494; United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997). It is also therefore not necessary for the victim to have suffered actual bodily injury. See United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1056 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The government is required to present sufficient evidence only that the appellant assaulted the victim with an object capable of inflicting bodily injury, and not that the victim actually suffered bodily injury as a result of the assault.") (emphasis added).
Although the statutory text provides that this type of assault must be committed "without just cause or excuse," courts have held that the prosecution is not required to establish the absence of just cause or excuse. Instead, these are affirmative defenses for which the defendant bears the burden. See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Phillippi, 655 F.2d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 1981); Hockenberry v. United States, 422 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Peters, 476 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Wis. 1979). See also United States v. Jackson, No. 99-4388, 2000 WL 194284, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (following Guilbert). [31]
An item need not fall within the classic examples of dangerous weapons -- e.g., a knife or a gun -- to constitute a "dangerous weapon" for the purposes of section 113(a)(3). Instead, the touchstone for whether an object is a "dangerous weapon" is whether it has been used in a manner likely to cause serious injury. See Guilbert, 692 F.2d at 1343; United States v. LeCompte, 108 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bey, 667 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hat constitutes a dangerous weapon depends not on the nature of the object itself but on its capacity, given the manner of its use to endanger life or inflict great bodily harm.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also United States v. Riggins, 40 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Guilbert with approval). For example, courts have found that a telephone receiver and a broom handle can be, under certain circumstances, "dangerous weapons." See LeCompte, 108 F.3d at 952 (telephone receiver); Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d 491 (broom or mop handle). For that matter, a speeding car could constitute a dangerous weapon. See United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 209 n.1 (6th Cir. 1990). At a minimum, however, it requires that a defendant employ some object as a dangerous weapon. Ultimately, whether or not an item constitutes a dangerous weapon is a question of fact for a jury. See Riggins, 40 F.3d at 1057; Phelps, 168 F.3d at 1055. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, "[t)he test of whether a particular object was used as a dangerous weapon is not so mechanical that it can be readily reduced to a question of law. Rather, it must be left to the jury to determine whether, under the circumstances of each case, the defendant used some instrumentality, [or] object, ... to cause death or serious injury." United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 788 (4th Cir. 1995). [32]
Here, so long as the interrogation method does not involve a dangerous weapon, this type of assault has not been committed. Physical contact would be insufficient to demonstrate this type of assault. Methods of interrogation that involve alterations to the detainee's cell environment would not be problematic under this section, not only because no dangerous weapon would have been used, but also because such alterations are unlikely to involve the necessary intent to inflict bodily injury.
Finally, section 113 prohibits assault with intent to commit murder and assault with the intent to commit any other felony except murder or sexual abuse crimes. [33] 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(2). Both of these crimes are specific intent crimes -- the former requiring that the individual specifically intend to commit murder and the latter requiring the intent to commit a felony, such as maiming or torture. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 43 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (7th Cir. 1994). See also 18 U.S.C. § 114 (prohibiting maiming within the special maritime jurisdiction); id. § 2340A (prohibiting torture outside the United States). Although neither of these crimes requires actual physical contact with the victim, demonstrating the requisite intent may be more difficult to establish absent such contact. Here, as long as the interrogators do not intend to murder the detainee, they will not have run afoul of section 113(a)(1). Moreover, as to section 113(a)(2), the intent to torture appears to be the most relevant. As we will explain infra Part II.C.2, to satisfy this intent element, the interrogator would have to intend to cause other severe physical pain or suffering or to cause prolonged mental harm. Absent such intent, the interrogator would not have committed assault with intent to torture. We caution, however, that specific intent, as will be discussed in more detail in Part II.C.2., can be inferred from the factual circumstances. See also United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1994). [34]
b. Maiming
Another criminal statute applicable in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction is 18 U.S.C. § 114. Section 114 makes it a crime for an individual (1) "with the intent to torture (as defined in section 2340), maim, or disfigure" to (2) "cut[], bite[], or slit[] the nose, ear, or lip, or cut[] out or disable[] the tongue, or put[] out or destroy[] an eye, or cut[] off or disable[] a limb or any member of another person." 18 U.S.C. § 114, It further prohibits individuals from "throw[ing] or pour[ing] upon another person any scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic substance" with like intent. Id. [35]
The offense requires the specific intent to torture, maim or disfigure. See United States v. Chee, No.98-2038, 1999 WL 261017 at *3 (10th Cir. May 3, 1999) (maiming is a specific intent crime) (unpublished opinion); see also United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (where defendant inflicted "enough forceful blows to split open [the victim's] skull, shatter his eye socket, knock out three of his teeth, and break his jaw" requisite specific intent had been established.). Moreover, the defendant's method of maiming must be one of the types the statute specifies -- i.e., cutting, biting, slitting, cutting out, disabling, or putting out -- and the injury must be to a body part the statute specifies -- i.e., the nose, ear, lip, tongue, eye, or limb. See United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1973). Similarly, the second set of acts applies to a very narrow band of conduct. It applies only to the throwing or pouring of some sort of scalding, corrosive, or caustic substance. See id.
Here, so long as the interrogation methods under contemplation do not involve the acts enumerated in section 114, the conduct of those interrogations will not fall within the purview of this statute. Because the statute requires specific intent, i.e., the intent to maim, disfigure or torture, the absence of such intent is a complete defense to a charge of maiming.
c. Interstate Stalking
Section 2261A of Title 18 prohibits "[w]hoever ... travels in interstate or foreign commerce or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person." [36] Thus, there are three elements to a violation of section 2261A: (1) the defendant traveled in interstate or foreign commerce or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction; (2) he did so with the intent to injure, harass, intimidate another person; (3) the person he intended to harass or injure was reasonably placed in fear of death or serious bodily injury as a result of that travel. See United States v. Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2638 (2002).
To establish the first element, the prosecution need only show that the defendant engaged in interstate travel. Section 2261A also applies to "travel[] ... within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (emphasis added). See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H. Conf. Rep. No.104-724, at 793 (1996) (the statute was intended to apply to "any incident of stalking involving interstate movement or which occurs on federal property"). Thus, travel simply within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction satisfies this element. As a result, proof that an individual traveled within a military base in a foreign state would be sufficient to establish this element.
To establish the requisite intent, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant undertook the travel with the specific intent to harass or intimidate another. See Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d at 809 (the defendant "must have intended to harass or injure [the victim] at the time he crossed the state line"). Thus, for example, a member of the Armed Forces who traveled to a base solely pursuant to his orders to be stationed there, and subsequently came to be involved in the interrogation of operatives, would lack the requisite intent. He would have traveled for the purpose of complying with his orders but not for the purpose of harassment. Nevertheless, because travel within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction is also covered, the intent to travel within that base for the purpose of intimidating or harassing another person would satisfy the intent element.
In determining whether the third element has been demonstrated, a court will look to the defendant's entire course of conduct. See id. This third element is not fulfilled by the mere act of travel itself. See United States v. Crawford, No. 00-CR-59-B-S, 2001 WL 185140, at *2 (D. Me. Jan. 26, 2001) ("A plain reading of the statute makes clear that the statute requires the actor to place the victim in reasonable fear, rather than, as Defendant would have it, that his travel place the victim in reasonable fear."). Additionally, serious bodily injury has the same meaning as it does for assault resulting in serious bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 2266(6) (for the purposes of section 2261A "[t]he term 'serious bodily injury' has the meaning stated in [18 U.S.C. §] 2119(2)"); id. § 2119(2) ("serious bodily injury" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1365); id. § 113 (section 1365 defines "serious bodily injury" for the purposes of "assault resulting in serious bodily injury"). Thus, an individual must have a reasonable fear of death or a reasonable fear of "bodily injury which involves ... a substantial risk of death; ... extreme physical pain ... protracted and obvious disfigurement; or ... protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." Id. § 1365(g). [37]
C. Criminal Prohibitions Applicable to Conduct Occurring Outside the Jurisdiction of the United States
There are two criminal prohibitions that apply to the conduct of U.S. persons outside the United States: the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, and the prohibition against torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. We conclude that the War Crimes Act does not apply to the interrogation of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees because, as illegal belligerents, they do not qualify for the legal protections under the Geneva or Hague Conventions that section 2441 enforces. In regard to section 2340, we conclude that the statute, by its terms, does not apply to interrogations conducted within the territorial United States or on permanent military bases outside the territory of the United States. Nonetheless, we identify the relevant substantive standards regarding the prohibition on torture should interrogations occur outside that jurisdictional limit.
1. War Crimes
Section 2441 of Title 18 criminalizes the commission of war crimes by U.S. nationals and members of the U.S. Armed Forces. [38] It criminalizes such conduct whether it occurs inside or outside the United States, including conduct within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. See id. §2441(a). Subsection (c) of section 2441 defines "war crimes" as (1) grave breaches of any of the Geneva Conventions; (2) conduct prohibited by certain provisions of the Hague Convention IV, Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; [39] or (3) conduct that constitutes a violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. We have previously concluded that this statute does not apply to conduct toward the members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. See Treaties and Laws Memorandum at 8-9. We reached this conclusion because we found al Qaeda to be a non-governmental terrorist organization whose members are not legally entitled to the protections of GPW. Since its members cannot be considered to be POWs under the Convention, conduct toward members of al Qaeda could not constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. See 18 U.S.C. § 244I(c)(1). We further found that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions covers either traditional wars between state parties to the convention or non-international civil wars, but not an international conflict with a non-governmental terrorist organization. As a result, conduct toward members of al Qaeda could not constitute a violation of common Article 3, see Treaties and Law Memorandum at 9, and thus could not violate Section 2441(c)(3).
We also concluded that the President had reasonable grounds to find that the Taliban had failed to meet the requirements for POW status under GPW. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 at 3 (Feb. 7, 2002). On February 7. 2002, the President determined that these treaties did not protect either the Taliban or al Qaeda. See Statement by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0802 ... ainees.htm (Feb. 7, 2002). [40]
Thus, section 2441 is inapplicable to conduct toward members of the Taliban or al Qaeda. We further note that the Treaties and Law Memorandum is the Justice Department's binding interpretation of the War Crimes Act, and it will preclude any prosecution under it for conduct toward members of the Taliban and al Qaeda. See Letter for William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 14, 2002).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
Section 2340A of Title 18 makes it a criminal offense for any person "outside the United States [to] commit[] or attempt[] to commit torture". [41] The statute defines "the United States" as "all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States including any of the places described in" 18 U.S.C. § 5, [42] and 18 U.S.C.A. § 7. [43] 18 U.S.C. § 2340(3). [44] Therefore, to the extent that interrogations take place within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, such as at a U.S. military base in a foreign state, the interrogations are not subject to sections 2340-2340A. If, however, the interrogations take place outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction and are otherwise outside the United States, the torture statute applies. Thus, for example, interrogations conducted at GTMO would not be subject to this prohibition, but interrogations conducted at a non-U.S. base in Afghanistan would be subject to section 2340A. [45]
Moreover, we note that because the statute criminalizes conduct only when it is committed outside the United States -- which under section 2340(3) means it must be committed outside the special maritime jurisdiction -- the proviso contained in 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(9) excluding those persons covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) does not apply. As discussed above, this proviso excluding members of the Armed Forces, those employed by the Armed Forces or the Department of Defense, and those persons accompanying members of the Armed Forces or their employees applies only when their conduct is a felony if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See id. Here, the conduct under section 2340A is a felony only when committed outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Thus, so long as members of the Armed Forces and those accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces are in an area that 18 U.S.C. § 7 defines as part of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, they too are within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction for the purposes of the conduct section 2340A criminalizes. Accordingly, they are considered to be within the United States for purposes of that statute. The criminal prohibition against torture therefore would not apply to their conduct of interrogations at U.S. military bases located in a foreign state. If, however, such persons are involved in interrogations outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction and outside the United States, they are subject to the prohibition against torture as well as those criminal statutes applicable to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
Section 2340 defines the act of torture as an:
act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2340(1); see id. § 2340A. Thus, to establish the offense of torture, the prosecution must show that: (1) the torture occurred outside the United States; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was within the defendant's custody or physical control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering; and (5) that he act inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering. See also S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 6 (1990) ("For an act to be 'torture,' it must ... cause severe pain and suffering, and be intended to cause severe pain and suffering."). [46]
At the outset we note that no prosecutions have been brought under section 2340A. There is therefore no case law interpreting sections 2340-2340A. In light of this paucity of case law, we have discussed at length below the text of the statute, its legislative history, and the judicial interpretation of a closely related statute -- the Torture Victims Protection Act -- in order to provide guidance as to the meaning of the elements of torture.
a. "Specifically Intended"
To violate section 2340A, the statute requires that severe pain and suffering be inflicted with specific intent. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). For a defendant to act with specific intent, he must expressly intend to achieve the forbidden act. See United States v. Carter, 530 U.S., 255, 269 (2000); Black's Law Dictionary at 814 (7th ed. 1999) (defining specific intent as "[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.'). For example, in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994), the statute at issue was construed to require that the defendant act with the "specific intent to commit the crime." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, the defendant had to act with the express "purpose to disobey the law" for the mens rea element to be satisfied. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
Here, because section 2340 requires that a defendant act with the specific intent to inflict severe pain, the infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise objective. If the statute had required only general intent, it would be sufficient to establish guilt by showing that the defendant "possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime." Carter, 530 U.S. at 268. If the defendant acted knowing that severe pain or suffering was reasonably likely to result from his actions, but no more, he would have acted only with general intent. See id. at 269; Black's Law Dictionary 813 (7th ed. 1999) (explaining that general intent "usu[ally] takes the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that risk) or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence)"). The Supreme Court has used the following example to illustrate the difference between these two mental states:
[A] person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money (satisfying "general intent"), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy "specific intent").
Carter, 530 U.S.9.t 268 (citing 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, at 315 (1986)).
As a theoretical matter, therefore, knowledge alone that a particular result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of murder; "the ... common law of homicide distinguishes ... between a person who knows that another person will be killed as a result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life[.] United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980). "Put differently, the law distinguishes actions taken 'because of' a given end from actions taken 'in spite' of their unintended but foreseen consequences." Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1997). Thus, even if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite intent. While as a theoretical matter such knowledge does not constitute specific intent, juries are permitted to infer from the factual circumstances that such intent is present. See, e.g., United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Karro. 257 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1001); United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000); Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1953). Therefore, when a defendant knows that his actions will produce the prohibited result, a jury will in all likelihood conclude that the defendant acted with specific intent.
Further, an individual who acts with a good faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result that the law prohibits would not have the requisite intent. See, e.g., South Atl. Lmtd. Ptrshp. of Tenn. v. Reise, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). Where a defendant acts in good faith, he acts with an honest belief that he has not engaged in the proscribed conduct. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991); United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 837 (4th Cir. 1994). A good faith belief need not be a reasonable one. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202.
Although a defendant theoretically could hold an unreasonable belief that his acts would not constitute the actions the statute prohibits, even though they would as a certainty produce the prohibited effects, as a matter of practice it is highly unlikely that a jury would acquit in such a situation. Where a defendant holds an unreasonable belief, he will confront the problem of proving to the jury that he actually held that belief. As the Supreme Court noted in Cheek, "the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury ... will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving" intent. Id. at 203- 4. As we explained above, a jury will be permitted to infer that the defendant held the requisite specific intent. As a matter of proof, therefore, a good faith defense will prove more compelling when a reasonable basis exists for the defendant's belief.
b. "Severe Pain or Suffering"
The key statutory phrase in the definition of torture is the statement that acts amount to torture if they cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." In examining the meaning of a statute, its text must be the starting point. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). Section 2340 makes plain that the infliction of pain or suffering per se, whether it is physical or mental, is insufficient to amount to torture. Instead, the pain or suffering must be "severe." The statute does not, however, define the term "severe." "In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The dictionary defines "severe" as "[u]nsparing in exaction, punishment, or censure" or "[I]nflicting discomfort or pain hard to endure; sharp; afflictive; distressing; violent; extreme; as severe pain, anguish, torture." Webster's New International Dictionary 2295 (2d ed. 1935); see American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1653 (3d ed. 1992) ("extremely violent or grievous: severe pain") (emphasis in original); IX The Oxford English Dictionary 572 (1978) ("Of pain, suffering, loss, or the like: Grievous, extreme" and "of circumstances. ..: hard to sustain or endure"). Thus, the adjective "severe" conveys that the pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.
Congress's use of the phrase "severe pain" elsewhere in the U.S. Code can shed more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) ("[W]e construe [a statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law."). Significantly, the phrase "severe pain" appears in statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits. See. e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C § 1395w-22 (2000); id. § 1395x (2000); id. § 1395dd (2000); id. § 1396b (2000); id. § 1396u-2 (2000). These statutes define an emergency condition as one "manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attention to result in placing the health of the individual ... (i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." Id. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Although these statutes address a substantially different subject from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are likely to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate medical treatment. Such damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function. These statutes suggest that to constitute torture "severe pain" must rise to a similarly high level -- the level that would ordinarily be associated with a physical condition or injury sufficiently serious that it would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions. [47]
c. "Severe mental pain or suffering"
Section 2340 gives more express guidance as to the meaning of "severe mental pain or suffering." The statute defines "severe mental pain or suffering" as:
the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from --
18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). To prove "severe mental pain or suffering," the statute requires proof of "prolonged mental harm" that was caused by or resulted from one of four enumerated acts. We consider each of these elements.
i. "Prolonged Mental Harm"
As an initial matter, section 2340(2) requires that the severe mental pain must be evidenced by "prolonged mental harm." To prolong is to "lengthen in time" or to "extend the duration of, to drawout." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1815 (1988); Webster's New International Dictionary 1980 (2d ed. 1935). Accordingly, "prolong" adds a temporal dimension to the harm to the individual, namely, that the harm must be one that is endured over some period of time. Put another way, the acts giving rise to the harm must cause some lasting, though not necessarily permanent, damage. For example, the mental strain experienced by an individual during lengthy and intense questioning by law enforcement would not violate section 2340(2). On the other hand, the development of a mental disorder such as posttraumatic stress disorder, which can last months or even years, or even chronic depression, which also can last for a considerable period of time if untreated, might satisfy the prolonged harm requirement. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 426, 439-45 (4th ed. 1994) ("DSM-IV"). See also Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 509 (1997) (noting that posttraumatic stress disorder is frequently found in torture victims); cf. Sana Loue, Immigration Law and Health § 10:46 (2001) (recommending evaluating for post-traumatic stress disorder immigrant-client who has experienced torture). [48] By contrast to "severe pain," the phrase "prolonged mental harm" appears nowhere else in the U.S. Code nor does it appear in relevant medical literature or international human rights reports.
Not only must the mental harm be prolonged to amount to severe mental pain and suffering, but also it must be caused by or result from one of the acts listed in the statute. In the absence of a catchall provision, the most natural reading of the predicate acts listed in section 2340(2)(A)-(D) is that Congress intended it to be exhaustive. In other words, other acts not included within section 2340(2)'s enumeration are not within the statutory prohibition. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("Expressio unius est exclusio alterius."); Norman Singer, 2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.23 (6th ed. 2000) ("[W]here a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions.") (footnotes omitted). We conclude that torture within the meaning of the statute requires the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm by one of the acts listed in section 2340(2).
A defendant must specifically intend to cause prolonged mental harm for the defendant to have committed torture. It could be argued that a defendant needs to have specific intent only to commit the predicate acts that give rise to prolonged mental harm. Under that view, so long as the defendant specifically intended to, for example, threaten a victim with imminent death, he would have had sufficient mens rea for a conviction. According to this view, it would be necessary for a conviction to show only that the victim suffered prolonged mental harm, rather than that the defendant intended to cause it. We believe that this approach is contrary to the text of the statute. The statute requires that the defendant specifically intend to inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Because the statute requires this mental state with respect to the infliction of severe mental pain, and because it expressly defines severe mental pain in terms of prolonged mental harm, that mental state must be present with respect to prolonged mental harm. To read the statute otherwise would read the phrase "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from" out of the definition of "severe mental pain or suffering."
A defendant could negate a showing of specific intent to cause severe mental pain or suffering by showing that he had acted in good faith that his conduct would not amount to the acts prohibited by the statute. Thus, if a defendant has a good faith belief that his actions will not result in prolonged mental harm, he lacks the mental state necessary for his actions to constitute torture. A defendant could show that he acted in good faith by taking such steps as surveying professional literature, consulting with experts, or reviewing evidence gained from past experience. See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 142 n.10 (noting that where the statute required that the defendant act with the specific intent to violate the law, the specific intent element "might be negated by, e.g., proof that defendant relied in good faith on advice of counsel.") (citations omitted). All of these steps would show that he has drawn on the relevant body of knowledge concerning the result proscribed by the statute, namely prolonged mental harm. Because the presence of good faith would negate the specific intent element of torture, it is a complete defense to such a charge. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 130 F.3d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 222-23 (8th Cir.1985).
Section 2340(2) sets forth four basic categories of predicate acts. First on the list is the "intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering." This provision might at first appear superfluous because the statute already provides that the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering can amount to torture. This provision, however, actually captures the infliction of physical pain or suffering when the defendant inflicts physical pain or suffering with general intent rather than the specific intent that is required where severe physical pain or suffering alone is the basis for the charge. Hence, this subsection reaches the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering when it is but the means of causing prolonged mental harm. Or put another way, a defendant has committed torture when he intentionally inflicts severe physical pain or suffering with the specific intent of causing prolonged mental harm. As for the acts themselves, acts that cause "severe physical pain or suffering" can satisfy this provision.
Additionally, the threat of inflicting such pain is a predicate act under the statute. A threat may be implicit or explicit. See, e.g., United States v. Sachdev, 279 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2002). In criminal law, courts generally determine whether an individual's words or actions constitute a threat by examining whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would conclude that a threat had been made. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that whether a statement constituted a threat against the president's life had to be determined in light of all the surrounding circumstances); Sachdev, 279 F.3d at 29 ("a reasonable person in defendant's position would perceive there to be a threat, explicit, or implicit, of physical injury"); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1990) (to establish that a threat was made, the statement must be made "in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates a statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon [another individual]") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (perception of threat of imminent harm necessary to establish self-defense had to be "objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances"). Based on this common approach, we believe that the existence of a threat of severe pain or suffering should be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.
Second, section 2340(2)(B) provides that prolonged mental harm, constituting torture, can be caused by "the administration or application or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality." The statute provides no further definition of what constitutes a mind-altering substance. The phrase "mind-altering substances" is found nowhere else in the U.S. Code nor is it found in dictionaries. It is, however, a commonly used synonym for drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir.) (referring to controlled substances as "mind-altering substance[s]") cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 137 (2001); Rogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 501 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to drugs and alcohol as "mind-altering substance[s]"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998). In addition, the phrase appears in a number of state statutes, and the context in which it appears confirms this understanding of the phrase. See, e.g., Ca1. Penal Code § 3S00(c) (West Supp. 2000) ("Psychotropic drugs also include mind-altering ... drugs. ..."); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260B.201(b) (West Supp. 2002) ("'chemical dependency treatment'" define as programs designed to "reduc[e] the risk of the use of alcohol, drugs, or other mind-altering substances").
This subparagraph, however, does not preclude any and all use of drugs. Instead, it prohibits the use of drugs that "disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality." To be sure, one could argue that this phrase applies only to "other procedures," not the application of mind-altering substances. We reject this interpretation because the terms of section 2340(2) indicate that the qualifying phrase applies to both "other procedures" and the "application of mind-altering substances." The word "other" modifies "procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses." As an adjective, "other" indicates that the term or phrase it modifies is the remainder of several things. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1986) (defining "other" as "the one that remains of two or more") Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 835 (1985) (defining "other" as "being the one (as of two or more) remaining or not included"). Or put another way, "other" signals that the words to which it attaches are of the same kind, type, or class as the more specific item previously listed. Moreover, where statutes couple words or phrases together, it "denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same general sense." Norman Singer, 2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47:16 (6th ed. 2000); see also Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) ("That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well."). Thus, the pairing of mind-altering substances with procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality and the use of "other" to modify "procedures" shows that the use of such substances must also cause a profound disruption of the senses or personality.
For drugs or procedures to rise to the level of "disrupt[ing] profoundly the senses or personality," they must produce an extreme effect. And by requiring that they be "calculated" to produce such an effect, the statute requires that the defendant has consciously designed the acts to produce such an effect. 28 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B). The word "disrupt" is defined as "to break asunder; to part forcibly; rend," imbuing the verb with a connotation of violence. Webster's New International Dictionary 753 (2d ed. 1935); see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 656 (1986) (defining disrupt as "to break apart: Rupture" or "destroy the unity or wholeness of"); IV The Oxford English Dictionary 832 (1989) (defining disrupt as "[t]o break or burst asunder; to break in pieces; to separate forcibly"). Moreover, disruption of the senses or personality alone is insufficient to fall within the scope of this subsection; instead, that disruption must be profound. The word "profound" has a number of meanings, all of which convey a significant depth. Webster's New International Dictionary 1977 (2d ed. 1935) defines profound as: "Of very great depth; extending far below the surface or top; unfathomable[;] ... [c]oming from, reaching to, or situated at a depth or more than ordinary depth; not superficial; deep-seated; chiefly with reference to the body; as a profound sigh, wound, or pain[;] ... [c]haracterized by intensity, as of feeling or quality; deeply felt or realized; as, profound respect, fear, or melancholy; hence, encompassing; thoroughgoing; complete; as, profound sleep, silence, or ignorance." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1812 (1986) ("having very great depth: extending far below the surface ... not superficial"). Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1545 (2d ed. 1999) also defines profound as "originating in or penetrating to the depths of one's "being" or "pervasive or intense; thorough; complete" or "extending, situated, or originating far down, or far beneath the surface." By requiring that the procedures and the drugs create a profound disruption, the statute requires more than that the acts "forcibly separate" or "rend" the senses or personality. Those acts must penetrate to the core of an individual's ability to perceive the world around him, substantially interfering with his cognitive abilities, or fundamentally alter his personality.
The phrase "disrupt profoundly the senses or personality" is not used in mental health literature nor is it derived from elsewhere in U.S. law. Nonetheless, we think the following examples would constitute a profound disruption of the senses or personality. Such an effect might be seen in a drug-induced dementia. In such a state, the individual suffers from significant memory impairment, such as the inability to retain any new information or recall information about things previously of interest to the individual. See DSM-IV at 134. [49] This impairment is accompanied by one or more of the following: deterioration of language function, e.g., repeating sounds or words over and over again; impaired ability to execute simple motor activities, e.g., inability to dress or wave goodbye; "[in]ability to recognize [and identify] objects such as chairs or pencils" despite normal visual functioning; or "[d]isturbances in executive level functioning," i.e., serious impairment of abstract thinking. Id. at 134-35. Similarly, we think that the onset of "brief psychotic disorder" would satisfy this standard. See id. at 302-03. In this disorder, the individual suffers psychotic symptoms, including among other things, delusions, hallucinations, or even a catatonic state. This can last for one day or even one month. See id. We likewise think that the onset of obsessive-compulsive disorder behaviors would rise to this level. Obsessions are intrusive thoughts unrelated to reality. They are not simple worries, but are repeated doubts or even "aggressive or horrific impulses." See id. at 418. The DSM-IV further explains that compulsions include "repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking)" and that "by definition, [they] are either clearly excessive or are not connected in a realistic way with what they are designed to neutralize or prevent." See id. Such compulsions or obsessions must be "time-consuming." See id. at 419. Moreover, we think that pushing someone to the brink of suicide, particularly where the person comes from a culture with strong taboos against suicide, and it is evidenced by acts of self-mutilation, would be a sufficient disruption of the personality to constitute a "profound disruption." These examples, of course, are in no way intended to be exhaustive list. Instead, they are merely intended to illustrate the sort of mental health effects that we believe would accompany an action severe enough to amount to one that "disrupt[s] profoundly the senses or the personality."
The third predicate act listed in section 2340(2) is threatening a prisoner with "imminent death." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C). The plain text makes clear that a threat of death alone is insufficient; the threat must indicate that death is "imminent." The "threat of imminent death" is found in the common law as an element of the defense of duress. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409. "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably allows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Common law cases and legislation generally define imminence as requiring that the threat be almost immediately forthcoming. 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7, at 655 (1986). By contrast, threats referring vaguely to things that might happen in the future do not satisfy this immediacy requirement. See United States v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917, 923 (7th Cir. 1999). Such a threat fails to satisfy this requirement not because it is too remote in time but because there is a lack of certainty that it will occur. Indeed, timing is an indicator of certainty that the harm will befall the defendant. Thus, a vague threat that someday the prisoner might be killed would not suffice. Instead, subjecting a prisoner to mock executions or playing Russian roulette with him would have sufficient immediacy to constitute a threat of imminent death. Additionally, as discussed earlier, we believe that the existence of a threat must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.
Fourth, if the official threatens to do anything previously described to a third party, or commits such an act against a third party, that threat or action can serve as the necessary predicate for prolonged mental harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(D). The statute does not require any relationship between the prisoner and the third party.
d. Summary
Section 2340's definition of torture must be read as a sum of these component parts. See Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1989) (reading two provisions together to determine statute's meaning); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 405 (1988) (looking to "the language and design of the statute as a whole" to ascertain a statute's meaning). Each component of the definition emphasizes that torture is not the mere infliction of pain or suffering on another, but is instead a step well removed. The victim must experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury, so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result. If that pain or suffering is psychological, that suffering must result from one of the acts set forth in the statute. In addition, these acts must cause long-term mental harm. Indeed, this view of the criminal act of torture is consistent with the term's common meaning. Torture is generally understood to involve "intense pain" or "excruciating pain," or put another way, "extreme anguish of body or mind." Black's Law Dictionary 1498 (7th Ed. 1999); Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1999 (1999); Webster's New International Dictionary 2674 (2d ed. 1935). In short, reading the definition of torture as a whole, it is plain that the term encompasses only extreme acts.
e. Legislative History
The legislative history of sections 2340-2340A is scant. Neither the definition of torture nor these sections as a whole sparked any debate. Congress criminalized this conduct to fulfill U.S. obligations under CAT, which requires signatories to "ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law." CAT art. 4. Sections 2340-2340A appeared only in the Senate version of the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, and the conference bill adopted them without amendment. See H. R Conf. Rep. No. 103-482, at 229 (1994). The only light that the legislative history sheds reinforces what is obvious from the texts of section 2340 and CAT: Congress intended Section 2340's definition of torture to track the definition set forth in CAT, as elucidated by the United States' reservations, understandings, and declarations submitted as part of its ratification. See S. Rep. No.103-107, at 58 (1993) ("The definition of torture emanates directly from article 1 of the Convention."); id. at 58-59 ("The definition for 'severe mental pain and suffering' incorporates the understanding made by the Senate concerning this term.").
f. U.S. Judicial Interpretation
As previously noted, there are no reported cases of prosecutions under section 2340A. See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights through Domestic Litigation, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 401, 408 & n.29 (2001); Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 Harv. Int'l L.J. 141, 148-49 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. Chi. Legal F. 323,327-28. Nonetheless, we are not without guidance as to how United States courts would approach the question of what conduct constitutes torture. Civil suits filed under the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) which supplies a tort remedy for victims of torture, provide insight into what acts U.S. courts would conclude constitute torture under the criminal statute.
The TVPA contains a definition similar in some key respects to the one set forth in section 2340. Moreover, as with section 2340, Congress intended for the TVPA's definition of torture to follow closely the definition found in CAT. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 n.12 (D. Mass 1995) (noting that the definition of torture in the TVPA tracks the definitions in section 2340 and CAT). [50] The TVPA defines torture as:
(1) ... any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3(b). This definition differs from section 2340's definition in two respects. First, the TVPA definition contains an illustrative list of purposes for which such pain may have been inflicted. See id. Second, the TVPA includes the phrase "arising only, from or inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions"; by contrast, section 2340 refers only to pain or suffering "incidental to lawful sanctions." Id. Because the purpose of our analysis here is to ascertain acts that would cross the threshold of producing "severe physical or mental pain or suffering," the list of illustrative purposes for which it is inflicted generally would not affect this analysis. [51] Similarly, to the extent that the absence of the phrase "arising only from or inherent in" from section 2340 might affect the question of whether pain or suffering was part of lawful sanctions and thus not torture, the circumstances with which we are concerned here are solely that of interrogations, not the imposition of punishment subsequent to judgment. These differences between the TVPA and section 2340 are therefore not sufficiently significant to undermine the usefulness of TVPA cases here. [52]
In suits brought under the TVPA, courts have not engaged in any lengthy analysis of what acts constitute torture. In part, the absence of such analysis is due to the nature of the acts alleged. Almost all of the cases involve physical torture, some of which is of an especially cruel and even sadistic nature. Nonetheless, courts appear to look at the entire course of conduct rather than any one act, making it somewhat akin to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Because of this approach, it is difficult to take a specific act out of context and conclude that the act in isolation would constitute torture. Certain acts do, however, consistently reappear in these cases or are of such a barbaric nature, that it is likely a court would find that allegations of such treatment would constitute torture: (1) severe beatings using instruments such as iron barks, truncheons, and clubs; (2) threats of imminent death, such as mock executions; (3) threats of removing extremities; (4) burning, especially burning with cigarettes; (5) electric shocks to genitalia or threats to do so; (6) rape or sexual assault, or injury to an individual's sexual organs, or threatening to do any of these sorts of acts; and (7) forcing the prisoner to watch the torture of others. While we cannot say with certainty that acts falling short of these seven would not constitute torture under Section 2340, we believe that interrogation techniques would have to be similar to these acts in their extreme nature and in the type of harm caused to violate the law.
III. International Law
In this Part, we examine CAT. Additionally, we examine the applicability of customary international law to the conduct of interrogations. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the President can suspend or terminate any treaty or provision of a treaty. See generally Memorandum for John Bellinger, III, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Robert J, Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty (Nov. 15, 2001); Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Authority of the President to Denounce the ABM Treaty (Dec. 14, 2001). Any presidential decision to order interrogation methods that are inconsistent with CAT would amount to a suspension or termination of those treaty provisions. Moreover, as U.S. declarations during CAT's ratification make clear, the Convention is non-self-executing and therefore places no legal obligations under domestic law on the Executive Branch, nor can it create any cause of action in federal court. Letter for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 1 (July 22, 2002). Similarly, customary international law lacks domestic legal effect, and in any event can be overridden by the President at his discretion.
A. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT").
The most relevant international convention here is CAT. [53] The treaty's text and negotiating history establish that the definition of torture is limited only to the most egregious conduct. Further, because the United States' instrument of ratification defined torture in exactly the same manner as in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, the United States' treaty obligation is no different than the standard set by federal criminal law. With respect to CAT's provision concerning cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the United States' instrument of ratification defined that term as the cruel, unusual and inhuman treatment prohibited by the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We review the substantive standards established by those Amendments in order to fully identify the scope of the United States' CAT obligations.
1. CAT's Text
We begin our analysis with the treaty's text. See Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-35 (1991) ("When interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.) (quotation marks and citations omitted). CAT defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
Article 1 (1). Unlike section 2340, this definition includes a list of purposes for which pain and suffering cannot be inflicted. The prefatory phrase "such purposes as'' makes clear that this list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Severe pain or suffering need not be inflicted for those specific purposes to constitute torture. Instead, the perpetrator must simply have a purpose of the same kind. More importantly, as under section 2340, the pain and suffering must be severe to reach the threshold of torture. As with section 2340, the text of CAT makes clear that torture must be an extreme act.
CAT also distinguishes between torture and other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [54] Article 16 of CAT requires state parties to "undertake to prevent ... other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1." (Emphasis added). CAT thus establishes a category of acts that states should endeavor to prevent but need not criminalize. CAT reserves for torture alone the criminal penalties and the stigma attached to those penalties. In so doing, CAT makes clear that torture is at the farthest end of impermissible actions, and that it is distinct and separate from the lower level of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." This approach is in keeping with the earlier, but non-binding, U.N. Declaration on the Protection from Torture, which defines torture as "an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Declaration on Protection from Torture, UN Res. 3452, Art. 1(2) (Dec. 9, 1975).
2. Ratification History
Executive branch interpretation of CAT further supports our conclusion that the treaty prohibits only the most extreme forms of physical or mental harm. As we have previously noted, the "'division of treaty-making responsibility between the Senate and the President is essentially the reverse of the division of law-making authority, with the President being the draftsman of the treaty and the Senate holding the authority to grant or deny approval." Relevance of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11 Op. O.L.C. 28, 31 (1987) ("Sofaer Memorandum"). In his capacity as the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936), the President alone decides whether to initiate treaty discussions and he alone controls the course and substance of negotiations. The President conducts the day-to-day interpretation of a treaty and may terminate a treaty unilaterally. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707-08 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Courts accord the Executive Branch's interpretation the greatest weight in ascertaining a treaty's intent and meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) ("'the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight"') (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176; 184-85 (1982)); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the department of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913) ("A construction of a treaty by the political departments of the government, while not conclusive upon a court ..., is nevertheless of much weight.").
A review of the Executive branch's interpretation and understanding of CAT reveals that the United States understood that torture included only the most extreme forms of physical or mental harm. When it submitted the Convention to the Senate, the Reagan administration took the position that CAT reached only the most heinous acts. The Reagan administration included the following understanding:
The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be a deliberate and calculated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering.
S. Treaty Doc. No.100-20, at 4-5. Focusing on the treaty's requirement of "severity," the Reagan administration concluded, "[t]he extreme nature of torture is further emphasized in [this] requirement." S. Treaty Doc. No.100-20, at 3 (1988); S. Exec. Rep. No.101-30, at 13 (1990). The Reagan administration determined that CAT's definition of torture was consistent with "United States and international usage, [where it] is usually reserved for extreme deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beatings, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain." S. Exec. Rep; No.101-30, at 14 (1990).
Further, the Reagan administration clarified the distinction between torture and lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, the administration declared that article 1's definition of torture ought to be construed in light of article 16. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 3. "'Torture' is thus to be distinguished from lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, which are to be deplored and prevented, but are not so universally and categorically condemned as to warrant the severe legal consequences that the Convention provides in case of torture." Id, at 3. This distinction was "adopted in order to emphasize that torture is at the extreme end of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment." Id. at 3. Given this definition, "rough treatment as generally falls into the category of 'police brutality,' while deplorable, does not amount to 'torture.'" Id. at 4.
Although the Reagan administration relied on CAT's distinction between torture and "cruel, inhuman. or degrading treatment or punishment," it viewed the phrase "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" as vague and lacking in a universally accepted meaning. The vagueness of this phrase could even be construed to bar acts not prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. The Administration pointed to Case of X v. Federal Republic of Germany as the basis for this concern. In that case, the European Court of Human Rights determined that the prison officials' refusal to recognize a prisoner's sex change might constitute degrading treatment. See S. Treaty Doc. No.100-20, at 15 (citing European Commission on Human Rights, Dec. on Adm., Dec. 15, 1977, Case of X v. Federal Republic of Germany (No. 6694/74), 11 Dec. & Rep. 16)). As a result of this concern, the Administration added the following understanding to its proposed instrument of ratification:
The United States understands the term, 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as used in Article 16 of the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."
S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16. Under this understanding, treatment or punishment must rise to the level of action that U.S. courts have found to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution in order to constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. That which fails to rise to this level must fail, a fortiori, to constitute torture under section 2340 or CAT.
The Senate consented to the Convention during the first Bush administration. The Bush administration agreed with the Reagan administration's cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment understanding and upgraded it from an understanding to a reservation. The Senate consented to the reservation in consenting to CAT. Although using less vigorous rhetoric, the Bush administration joined the Reagan administration in interpreting torture as reaching only extreme acts. To ensure that the Convention's reach remained limited, the Bush administration submitted the following understanding:
The United States understands that in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental pain caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
S. Exec. Rep. No.101-30, at 36. This understanding accomplished two things. First, it ensured that the term "intentionally" would be understood as requiring specific intent. Second, it defined the amorphous concept of mental pain or suffering. In so doing, this understanding ensured that mental torture would rise to a severity seen in the context of physical torture. The Senate ratified CAT with this understanding, and Congress codified it in 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
To be sure, the Bush administration's language differs from the Reagan administration understanding. The Bush administration said that it had altered the CAT understanding in response to criticism that the Reagan administration's original formulation had raised the bar for the level of pain necessary to constitute torture. See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 9-10 (1990) ("1990 Hearing") (prepared statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State). While it is true that there are rhetorical differences, both administrations consistently emphasized the extreme acts required to constitute torture. As we have seen, the Bush understanding as codified in section 2340 reaches only extreme acts. The Reagan understanding, like the Bush understanding, declared that "intentionally" would be understood to require specific intent. Though the Reagan administration required that the "act be deliberate and calculated" and that it be inflicted with specific intent, in operation there is little difference between requiring specific intent alone and requiring that the act be deliberate and calculated. The Reagan administration's understanding also made express what is obvious from the plain text of CAT: torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Reagan administration's understanding that the pain be "excruciating and agonizing" does not substantively deviate from the Bush administration's view.
The Bush understanding simply took an amorphous concept -- excruciating and agonizing mental pain -- and gave it a more concrete form. Executive branch representations made to the Senate support our view that there was little difference between these two understandings. See 1990 Hearing, at 10 (prepared statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State) ("no higher standard was intended" by the Reagan administration understanding than was present in the Convention or the Bush understanding); id. at 13-14 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) ("In an effort to overcome this unacceptable element of vagueness [in the term "mental pain"], we have proposed an understanding which defines severe mental pain constituting torture with sufficient specificity ... to protect innocent persons and meet constitutional due process requirements.") Accordingly, we believe that the two definitions submitted by the Reagan and Bush administrations had the same purpose in terms of articulating a legal standard, namely, ensuring that the prohibition against torture reaches only the most extreme acts.
Executive branch representations made to the Senate confirm that the Bush administration maintained the view that torture encompassed only the most extreme acts. Although the ratification record, such as committee hearings, floor statements, and testimony, is generally not accorded great weight in interpreting treaties, authoritative statements made by representatives of the Executive Branch are accorded the most interpretive value. See Sofaer Memorandum at 35-36. Hence, the testimony of the executive branch witnesses defining torture, in addition to the reservations, understandings and declarations that were submitted to the Senate by the Executive branch, would carry the highest interpretive value of any of the statements in the ratification record. At the Senate hearing on CAT, Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, offered extensive testimony as to the meaning of torture. Echoing the analysis submitted by the Reagan administration, he testified that "[t] orture is understood to be that barbaric cruelty which lies at the top of the pyramid of human rights misconduct." 1990 Hearing at 16 (prepared statement of Mark Richard). He urther explained, "As applied to physical torture, there appears to be some degree of consensus that the concept involves conduct, the mere mention of which sends chills down one's spine[.]" Id. Richard gave the following examples of conduct satisfying this standard: "the needle under the fingernail, the application of electrical shock to the genital area, the piercing of eyeballs, etc." Id. In short, repeating virtually verbatim the terms used in the Reagan understanding, Richard explained that under the Bush administration's submissions with the treaty "the essence of torture" is treatment that inflicts "excruciating and agonizing physical pain." Id. (emphasis added).
As to mental torture, Richard testified that "no international consensus had emerged [as to] what degree of mental suffering is required to constitute torture[,]" but that it was nonetheless clear that severe mental pain or suffering "does not encompass the normal legal compulsions which are properly a part of the criminal justice system[:] interrogation, incarceration, prosecution, compelled testimony against a friend, etc. -- notwithstanding the fact that they may have the incidental effect of producing mental strain." Id. at 17. According to Richard, CAT was intended to "condemn as torture intentional acts such as those designed to damage and destroy the human personality." Id. at 14. This description of mental suffering emphasizes the requirement that any mental harm be of significant duration and supports our conclusion that mind-altering substances must have a profoundly disruptive effect to serve as a predicate act.
Apart from statements from Executive branch officials, the rest of a ratification record is of little weight in interpreting a treaty. See generally Sofaer Memorandum. Nonetheless, the Senate understanding of the definition of torture largely echoes the administrations' views. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on CAT opined: "[f]or an act to be 'torture' it must be an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment, cause severe pain and suffering and be intended to cause severe pain and suffering." S. Exec. Rep. No.101-30, at 6 (emphasis added). Moreover, like both the Reagan and Bush administrations, the Senate drew upon the distinction between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in reaching its view that torture was extreme. [55] Finally, concurring with the administration's concern that "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" could be construed to go beyond constitutional standards, the Senate supported the inclusion of the reservation establishing the Constitution as he baseline for determining whether conduct amounted to cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,192 (1990); S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 39.
3. Negotiating History
CAT's negotiating history also supports interpreting torture to include only the extreme acts defined in section 2340. The state parties endeavored to craft a definition that reflected the term's gravity. During the negotiations, state parties offered various formulations to the working group, which then proposed a definition. Almost all of these suggested definitions illustrate the consensus that torture is an extreme act designed to cause agonizing pain. For example, the United States proposed that torture be defined as "includ[ing] any act by which extremely severe pain or suffering ... is deliberately and maliciously inflicted on a person." J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 41 (1988) ("CAT Handbook"). The United Kingdom suggested that torture be defined even more narrowly as the "systematic and intentional infliction of extreme pain or suffering rather than intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering." Id. at 45 (emphasis in original). Ultimately, in choosing the phrase "severe pain," the parties concluded that this phrase "sufficient[ly] ... convey[ed] the idea that only acts of a certain gravity shall ... constitute torture." Id. at 117.
State parties were acutely aware of the distinction they drew between torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The state parties considered and rejected a proposal that would have defined torture merely as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. See id. at 42. Mirroring the U.N. Declaration on Protection From Torture, some state parties proposed the inclusion of a paragraph defining torture as "an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." See id. at 41; see also S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 2 (the U.N. Declaration on Protection from Torture (1975) served as "a point of departure for the drafting of [CAT]"). In the end, the parties concluded that the proposal was superfluous because Article 16 "impl[ies] that torture is the gravest form of such treatment or punishment." CAT Handbook at 80; see S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 13 ("The negotiating history indicates that [the phrase 'which do not amount to torture'] was adopted in order to emphasize that torture is at the extreme end of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and that Article I should be construed with this in mind.").
Additionally, the parties could not reach a consensus about the meaning of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." See CAT Handbook at 47. Without a consensus, the parties viewed the term as simply "'too vague to be included in a convention which was to form the basis for criminal legislation in the Contracting States."' Id. This view reaffirms the interpretation of CAT as purposely reserving criminal penalties for torture alone. [56]
4. U.S. Obligations Under CAT
a. Torture
Despite the apparent differences in language between the Convention and 18 U.S.C. § 2340, the U.S. obligations under both are identical. As discussed above, the first Bush administration proposed an understanding of torture that is identical to the definition of that term ound in section 2340. S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 36. The Senate approved CAT based on this understanding, and the United States included the understanding in its instrument of ratification. [57] As we explained above, the understanding codified at section 2340 accomplished two things. First, it made crystal clear that torture requires specific intent. Second, it added form and substance to the otherwise amorphous concept of mental pain or suffering. Because the understanding was included in the instrument of ratification, it defines the United States' obligation under CAT.
It is one of the basic principles of international law that a nation cannot be bound to a treaty without its consent. See Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28, 1951) ("Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion"). See also 1 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States pt. I, introductory note at 18 (1987) ("Restatement (Third)") ("Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by states which constitute the system."); Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 75 (2000) (a state can only be bound by a treaty to which it has consented to be bound). In other words, the United States is only bound by those obligations of the Torture Convention to which it knowingly agreed. The United States cannot be governed either by provisions of the Convention from which it withheld its consent, or by interpretations of the Convention with which it disagreed, just as it could not be governed by the Convention itself if it had refused to sign it.
This does not mean that in signing the Torture Convention, the United States bound itself to every single provision. Rather, under international law, a reservation made when ratifying a treaty validly alters or modifies the treaty obligation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980); Restatement (Third) at § 313. [58] The right to enter reservations applies to multilateral agreements just as to the more familiar context of bilateral agreements. Restatement (Third) at § 313. Under international law, therefore, the United States is bound only by the text of CAT as modified by the Bush administration's understanding. [59] As is obvious from its text, and as discussed at length above, Congress codified the understanding almost verbatim when it enacted section 2340. The United States' obligation under CAT is thus identical to the standard set by section 2340. Conduct that does not violate the latter does not violate the former. So long as the interrogation methods do not violate section 2340, they also do not violate our international obligations under CAT.
To be sure, the Vienna Convention on Treaties recognizes several exceptions to the power to make reservations. None of them, however, apply here. First, a reservation is valid and effective unless it purports to defeat the "object and purpose," of the treaty. Vienna Convention, art. 19. [60] International law provides little guidance regarding the meaning of the "object and purpose" test. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 399, 432-33 (2000) (explaining that "[n]either the Vienna Convention nor the [Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion] provides much guidance regarding the 'object and purpose' test" and that "there has been no subsequent judicial analysis of the test under either the Vienna Convention or customary international law, and no binding official determination that 'a reservation has ever violated the test."). Nonetheless, it is clear that here the United States did not defeat the object and purpose of the Convention. In fact, it enacted section 2340 to expand the prohibition on torture in its domestic criminal law. The United States could only have defeated the object and purpose of the Convention if it had narrowed the existing prohibitions on torture under its domestic law. Rather than defeat the object of CAT, the United States accepted its terms and attempted, through the Bush administration's understanding, to make clear the scope and meaning of the treaty's obligations.
Second, a treaty reservation will not be valid if the treaty itself prohibits states from taking reservations. CAT nowhere prohibits state parties from entering reservations. Two provisions of the Convention -- the competence of the Committee Against Torture in Article 28, and the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in Article 30 -- specifically note that nations may take reservations from their terms. The Convention, however, contains no provision that explicitly attempts to preclude states from exercising their basic right under international law to enter reservations to other provisions. Other treaties are quite clear when they attempt to prohibit any reservations. Without such a provision, we do not believe that CAT precludes reservations.
Third, in regard to multilateral agreements, a treaty reservation may not be valid if other parties object in a timely manner. Vienna Convention, art. 20. If another state does not object within a certain period of time, it is deemed to have acquiesced in the reservation. If another nation objects, then the provision of the treaty to which the reservation applies is not in force between the two nations, unless the objecting nation opposes entry into force of the treaty as whole between the two nations. Id. art. 21(3). See also Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 26 (May 28t 1951) (an objection "will only affect the relationship between the State making the reservation and the objecting State"). Here, no nation objected to the United States' further definition of torture. [61] Even if any nation had properly objected, that would mean only that there would be no provision prohibiting torture in effect between the United States and the objecting nation -- effectively mooting the question whether an interrogation method violates the Torture Convention.
We conclude that the Bush administration's understanding created a valid and effective reservation to CAT. Even if it were otherwise, there is no international court that could take issue with the United States' interpretation of the Convention. In an additional reservation, the United States refused to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ to adjudicate cases under the Convention. Although CAT creates a committee to monitor compliance, it can only conduct studies and has no enforcement powers.
Some may argue that permitting the assertion of justification defenses under domestic law, such as necessity or self-defense, would place the United States in violation of its international obligations. Such an argument would point to article 2(2) of CAT, which provides that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." We do not believe, however, that a treaty may eliminate the United States' right, under international law, to use necessary measures for its self-defense. The right of national self-defense is well established under international law. As we have explained elsewhere, it is a right that is inherent in international law and in the international system. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Authority of the President under Domestic and International Law to Use Force Against Iraq at 30 (Oct. 23, 2002) ("Iraq Memorandum"). And, as we explained above, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes and reaffirms this inherent right:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51; see also North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246 (agreeing that if an armed attack occurs against one of the parties, the others will exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51); Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, 62 Stat. 1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 93 (Rio Treaty) (same).
Although recognized by these agreements, the United States has long held the view that the right to self-defense is broader in scope, and could not be limited by these treaty provisions. Our Office has observed, for example, that Article 51 merely reaffirms a right that already existed independent of the Charter. As this Office explained forty years ago:
The concept of self-defense in international law of course justifies more than activity designed merely to resist an armed attack which is already in progress. Under international law every state has, in the words of Elihu Root, "the right ... to protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself."
Memorandum for the Attorney General, from Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Legality under International Law of Remedial Action Against Use of Cuba as a Missile Base by the Soviet Union at 2 (Aug. 30, 1962); cf. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827) ("the [domestic] power to provide for repelling invasions includes the power to provide against the attempt and danger of invasion"). We have opined that "it is likely that under international law no treaty could prevent a nation from taking steps to defend itself." High Seas Memorandum at 10. As Secretary of State Frank Kellogg explained, "The right of self-defense ... is inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Id. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the United States has consistently defended the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, even though the text of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter itself seems to permit the use of force only after an armed attack has occurred. We believe that Article 51 is only expressive of one element of the broader right to self-defense, and that it could not derogate from a nation's right to use force to prevent an imminent attack.
Thus, if interrogation methods were inconsistent with the United States' obligations under CAT, but were justified by necessity or self-defense, we would view these actions still as consistent ultimately with international law. Although these actions might violate CAT, they would still be in service of the more fundamental principle of self-defense that cannot be extinguished by CAT or any other treaty. Further, if the President ordered that conduct, such an order would amount to a suspension or termination of the Convention. In so doing, the President's order and the resulting conduct would not be a violation of international law because the United States would no longer be bound by the treaty.
The right to self-defense, of course, cannot be invoked in any and all circumstances. As this Office has recently explained, the use of force must meet two requirements to be legitimate. See Iraq Memorandum at 33. First, "the use of force must be necessary because the threat is imminent and thus pursuing peaceful alternatives is not an option." Id. "Second, the response must be proportionate to the threat[.]" Id. We further explained that to determine whether a threat is sufficiently imminent to make the use of force necessary, "[f]actors to be considered include: the probability of an attack -- the likelihood that this probability will increase, and therefore the need to take advantage of a window of opportunity; whether diplomatic alternatives are practical; and the magnitude of the harm that could result from the threat." Id. at 44.
b. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CAT provides that "[e]ach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture." Art. 16. [62] CAT does not require state parties to criminalize such conduct, nor does CAT (in contrast to the prohibition against torture) preclude its justification by exigent circumstances. Thus, the United States is within its international law obligations even if it uses interrogation methods that might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, so long as their use is justified by self-defense or necessity.
In its instrument of ratification to the Torture Convention, the United States expressly defined the term "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" for purposes of Article 16 of the Convention. The reservation limited "cruel and unusual or inhumane treatment or punishment" to the conduct prohibited under the Fifth, Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. This reservation cannot be said to defeat CAT's object and purpose. As with the U.S. definition of torture, it does not expand the right to engage in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Rather, the reservation merely reaffirmed the United States' consistent interpretation of this ambiguous term. [63] While several countries commented on this reservation, those objections, if valid, mean simply that Article 16 is not in force between the United States and the objecting states. [64] As to the remaining countries, this reservation is a binding obligation.
The U.S. reservation is important in light of the lack of international consensus regarding the meaning of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (sustaining earlier dismissal of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment because the court concluded that there was insufficient consensus defining the prohibited conduct). Cf Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J. concurring in the denial of cert.) (noting that international courts were not in agreement as to whether a lengthy delay between sentencing and execution constituted "cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and that every court of appeals to have addressed such a claim had rejected it). Indeed, the drafters of CAT expressly recognized the absence of any consensus as to what kind of treatment or punishment rose to the level of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." As noted above, it is precisely because this term had no coherent meaning under international law that the drafters chose not to require the criminalization of such conduct. See CAT Handbook at 47. Compare CAT, art. 4 ("Each State party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.") with id. art. 16 ("Each State party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, human, or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture. ..."). Given the wide-ranging nature of international decisions regarding this phrase, some international decisions might give the phrase almost limitless application. For example, in Iwanczuk v. Poland (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001), the European Court of Human Rights concluded that a strip search, undertaken because a prisoner had once been found with a knife, as well as certain humiliating remarks the guards allegedly made about the prisoner's body (which the government disputed), "amounted to degrading treatment. ..." Id. at ¶ 59. In reaching that conclusion, the court reasoned, "[I]t is sufficient if the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes." Id. at ¶ 51 (citations omitted). And in Ireland v. United Kingdom (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1977), a decision discussed in more detail below, the court concluded that actions that "arouse ... feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing [the prisoners] and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance" constitutes degrading treatment. Id. at ¶ 167. Under these decisions anything that a detainee finds humiliating or offensive, or anything geared toward reducing that person's moral or physical resistance to cooperating could constitute degrading treatment or punishment. These opinions would reach conduct far below the standard articulated in the U.S. reservation and would produce precisely the expansive and limitless results that the United States sought to avoid. Ultimately, as explained above, the United States is bound only by the treaty obligations to which it has consented. We explain below the substantive standards that this reservation to the definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment establishes. We address first the Eighth Amendment and then the standard established by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [65]
i. Eighth Amendment
Under the Supreme Court's "cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence, there are two lines of analysis that might be relevant to the conduct of interrogations: (1) when prison officials use excessive force; and (2) when prisoners challenge their conditions of confinement. As a general matter, the excessive force analysis often arises in situations in which an inmate has attacked another inmate or a guard. Under this analysis, "a prisoner alleging excessive force must demonstrate that the defendant acted 'maliciously and sadistically"' for the very purpose of causing harm. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,528 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Actions taken in "good-faith ... to maintain or restore discipline" do not constitute excessive force. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) ("[W]e think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine whether an official has met this standard, factors such as "the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,[] the extent of injury inflicted[,]" are to be considered as well as "the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Put another way, the actions must be necessary and proportional in light of the danger that reasonably appears to be posed. Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that deference must be accorded to the decisions of prison officials "taken in response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates" as well as "'to prophylactic or preventative measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of prison discipline." Id. at 322.
This standard appears to be most potentially applicable to interrogation techniques that may involve varying degrees of force. As is clear from above, the excessive force analysis turns on whether the official acted in good faith or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. For good faith to be found, the use of force should, among other things, be necessary. Here, depending upon the precise factual circumstances, such techniques may be necessary to ensure the protection of the government's interest here -- national security. As the Supreme Court recognized in Haig v. Agee, 435 U.S. 280 (1981), "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." Id. at 307 (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500- 509 (1964). In the typical excessive force case, the protection of other inmates and officers or the maintenance of order are valid government interests that may necessitate the use of force. If prison administration or the protection of one person can be deemed to be valid governmental interests necessitating the use of force, then the interest of the United States here -- obtaining intelligence vital to the protection of thousands of American citizens -- can be no less valid.
To be sure, no court has encountered the precise circumstances here. Nonetheless, Eighth Amendment cases most often concern instances in which the inmate is a threat to safety, and here force would be used to prevent a threat to the safety of the United States that went beyond a single inmate or a single prison. We believe it is beyond question that there can be no more compelling government interest than that which is presented here. Just as prison officials are given deference in their response to rioting inmates or prison discipline, so too must the Executive be given discretion in its decisions to respond to the grave threat to national security posed by the current conflict. Whether the use of more aggressive techniques that involve force is permissible will depend on the information that relevant officials have regarding the nature of the threat and the likelihood that the particular detainee has information relevant to that threat.
Whether the interrogators have acted in good faith would turn in part on the injury inflicted. For example, if the technique caused minimal or minor pain, it is less likely to be problematic under this standard. The use of force must also be proportional, i.e., there should also be some relationship between the technique used and the necessity of its use. So, if officials had credible threat information that a U.S. city was to be the target of a large-scale terrorist attack a month from now and the detainee was in a position to have information that could lead to the thwarting of that attack, physical contact such as shoving or slapping the detainee clearly would not be disproportionate to the threat posed. In such an instance, those conducting the interrogations would have acted in good faith rather than maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
We also note that the excessive force analysis might also apply to the use of threats. Some courts have held that threats can state an excessive force claim. For example, in Chandler v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit found that a correctional officer's threat to the inmate had put him in "imminent fear of his life because she was in a position to carry it out." Id. at 1361. The court concluded that "[d]epending upon the gravity of the fear, the credibility of the threat, and on [the inmate's] psychological condition, the threat itself could have caused more than de minimis harm and therefore could have been sufficient to state a claim of excessive use of force." Id. at 1361, See also Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that allegation that officer put a gun to the inmate's head and threatened to kill him stated an excessive force claim). But see Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 815, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (sheriff's idle threat to hang prisoner did not state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (allegations that defendants threatened inmate with physical harm, where plaintiff also alleged the defendants had beaten him, did not state an Eighth Amendment claim).
The conditions of confinement cases provide a useful analogue to interrogation techniques that alter the conditions of a detainee's cell and surrounding environment. The conditions of confinement analysis often arises in claims concerning the use of administrative segregation and conditions attendant that segregation. In those cases, a condition of confinement is not "cruel and unusual" unless it (1) is "sufficiently serious" to implicate constitutional protection, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), and (2) reflects "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's health or safety, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The failure to demonstrate either one of these components is fatal to the claim. The first element is objective, and inquires whether the challenged condition is cruel and unusual. The second, so-called "subjective" element requires an examination of the actor's intent and inquires whether the challenged condition is imposed as a punishment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) ("The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.").
The Supreme Court has noted that "[n]o static 'test' can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (1981) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (stating that the Eighth Amendment embodies "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency"). Despite this broad language, in recent years the Supreme Court clearly has sought to limit the reach of the Eighth Amendment in the prison context and certain guidelines emerge from these cases.
As to the objective element, the Court has established that "only those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). It is not enough for a prisoner to show that he has been subjected to conditions that are merely "restrictive and even harsh," as such conditions are simply "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. See also id. at 349 ("'the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons"). Rather, a prisoner must show that he has suffered a "serious deprivation of basic human needs," id. at 347, such as "essential food, medical care, or sanitation," id. at 348. See also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (requiring "'the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise"). "The Amendment also imposes [the duty on officials to] provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer, 511 U.S, at 832 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court has also articulated an alternative test inquiring whether an inmate was exposed to "a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 837. See also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In order to satisfy the [objective] requirement, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In these recent cases, the Court has made clear that the conditions of confinement are not to be assessed under a totality-of-the- circumstances approach. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that "each condition must be considered as part of the overall conditions challenged." Id. at 304 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, the Court concluded that "[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation 'in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise -- for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets." Id. As the Court further explained, "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Id. at 305.
To show deliberate indifference under the subjective element of the conditions of confinement test, a prisoner must show that '"the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This standard requires greater culpability than mere negligence. See id. at 835; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305 ("mere negligence would satisfy neither [the Whitley standard of malicious and sadistic infliction] nor the more lenient deliberate indifference standard") (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is, however, "satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that there need not be direct evidence of such intent. Instead, the "existence of this subjective state of mind [may be inferred] from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious." Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002).
One of its most recent opinions on conditions of confinement -- Hope v. Felzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002) -- illustrates the Court's focus on the necessity of the actions undertaken in response to a disturbance in determining the officer's subjective state of mind. [66] In Hope, following an "exchange of vulgar remarks" between the inmate Hope and an officer, the two got into a "wrestling match." Id. at 2512. Additional officers intervened and restrained Hope. See id. These officers then took Hope back to the prison. Once there, they required him to take off his shirt and then attached him to the hitching post, where he remained in the sun for the next seven hours. See id. at 2512-13. During this time, Hope received no bathroom breaks. He was given water only once or twice and at least one guard taunted him about being thirsty. See id. at 2513. The Supreme Court concluded that the facts Hope alleged stated an "obvious" Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 2514. The obviousness of this violation stemmed from the utter lack of necessity of the guard's actions. The Court emphasized that "[a]ny safety concerns" arising from the scuffle between Hope and the officer "had long since abated by the time [Hope] was handcuffed to the hitching post" and that there was a "clear lack of an emergency situation." Id. As a result, the Court found that "[t]his punitive treatment amount[ed] to [the] gratuitous infliction of 'wanton and unnecessary' pain that our precedent clearly prohibits." Id. at 2515. Thus, "the necessity of the governmental action bears upon both the conditions of confinement analysis as well as the excessive force analysis.
Here, interrogation methods that do not deprive enemy combatants of basic human needs would not meet the objective element of the conditions of confinement test. For example, a deprivation of a basic human need would include denial of adequate shelter, such as subjecting a detainee to the cold without adequate protection. See Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). A brief stay in solitary confinement alone is insufficient to state a deprivation. See e.g., Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A brief stay in disciplinary segregation, [here 15 days,] is, figuratively, a kind of slap on the wrist that does not lead to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.). Such things as insulting or verbally ridiculing detainees would not constitute the deprivation of a basic human need. See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) ("To hold that gawking, pointing, and joking [about nude prisoners] violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment would trivialize the objective component of the Eighth Amendment test and render it absurd."). Additionally, the clothing of a detainee could also be taken away for a period of time without necessarily depriving him of a basic human need that satisfies this objective test. See, e.g., Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 1995). While the objective element would not permit the deprivation of food altogether, alterations in a detainee's diet could be made that would not rise to the level of a denial of life's necessities. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing." LaMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993).
Even if an interrogation method amounted to a deprivation of life's necessities under the objective test, the subjective component would still need to be satisfied, i.e., the interrogators would have to act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's health or safety. We believe that if an interrogator acts with the honest belief that the interrogation methods used on a particular detainee do not present a serious risk to the detainee's health or safety, he will not have acted with deliberate indifference. An honest belief might be demonstrated by due diligence as to the effects of a particular interrogation technique combined with an assessment of the prisoner's psychological health.
Finally, the interrogation methods cannot be unnecessary or wanton. As we explained regarding the excessive force analysis, the government interest here is of the highest magnitude. In the typical conditions of confinement case, the protection of other inmates or officers, the protection of the inmate alleged to have suffered the cruel and unusual punishment, or even the maintenance of order in the prison, provide valid government interests that may justify various deprivations. See. e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 1971) ("protect[ing inmates] from self-inflicted injury, [] protect[ing] the general prison population and personnel from violate acts on his part, [and] prevent[ing] [] escape" are all legitimate penological interests that would permit the imposition of solitary confinement); McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1978) (prevention of inmate suicide is a legitimate interest). As with excessive force, no court has encountered the precise circumstances here under conditions of confinement jurisprudence. Nonetheless, we believe it is beyond question that there can be no more compelling government interest than that which is presented here and depending upon the precise factual circumstances of an interrogation, e.g., where there was credible information that the enemy combatant had information that could avert a threat, deprivations that may be caused would not be wanton or unnecessary.
Return to Investigations of Government
Jump to: Select a forum ------------------ Library Notice Sacrificial Victims of the Information Age A Growing Corpus of Analytical Materials Carry On with Carreon Our Wild World THE COMING WAR WITH RUSSIA Another View on 9/11 Ancien Regime Art & Intellect Articles & Essays Biography/Autobiography/Memoirs Book Reviews Cartoons Charity Fraud -- It's All About Bears and Cancer Color Revolutions Corporate Crime Correcting Nazi Revisionism Declassified Documents Fiction FOIA Requests Good News Health Illustrated Screenplays Intellectual Property International Human Rights Interviews Investigations of Government Little Movies Mass Murderers Media Violence Media Violence Studies Miscellaneous Misogyny Ralph Nader News Articles Non-Fiction Peace Initiatives Perverts in the Sun Philosophy Planet on Fire Poetry Police Corruption: The Crime Starts When the Cops Show Up Political Science Propaganda Psychology Publishers vs. Libraries, With EBooks as the Battleground and Ownership as the Prize Reconciliation of Opposites Religion and Cults Reports Sadism Scholar's Jukebox Science Science Fiction Short Stories Slavery 2.0: Racist Cops and the Prison Industrial Complex Symbols The First Sex (All Embryos are Girls) The Tautological Nature of the Mind Third Parties Unemployment Statistics United States Government Crime Wackenhut / Inslaw Promis Software / Arkansas-Contra YouTube Picks Wikileaks Rapeutation Archive Blood On Their Hands! Andrew Cain Jon Carmichael Prof. Andres Carrasco John W. Dozier Ryan Halliton Montana Lance Tyler Long Megan Meier Rebecca Ann Sedwick Ty Smalley Brandon Swartwood Aleksey Garber Vayner Scott Wells Jessica Laney Decent People Anthony Brunelli, Gallery Owner Elizabeth Cohen, Columnist The Press & Sun Bulletin Tom Forrest Arlo Gilbert Michael Kimmelman, Chief Art Critic, NYT Jewish Voice for Peace C. Clark Kissinger Steve Pokin Stuart Simpson, Art Collector Jackie Wescott, Marla Collector Rapeutationists AboveTheLaw.com Amy Alkon Anonymous Coward Amir Bar-Lev Jordan Bass Chris Beam Buzz Bissinger, Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist Ann Bransom Jack L. Brown Stu Bykofsky, Philadelphia Daily News John Carney Michael Caron Michaela Cooper Jessica Cutler Lori Drew DrTdaxp Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FreeRepublic.com Scott Greenfield Dan Haley Kashmir Hill Matthew Inman IvyGate Travis R. Kavulla Alex Klein Francois Labarre Jerome Laflamme Latah County Sheriff's Office Paul Levy Kai Ma Mike Masnick Robert Stacy McCain P.Z. Myers Hal Parker Jane Pauley Marc Randazza Christopher Recouvreur Jean-Michel Rheault Ronald J. Riley Katelyn Roman Charlie Rose Robyn Schneider Guadelupe Shaw Bob Smith Nick Summers Emma Teitel J.K. Trotter Eric Turkewitz Nicholas Weaver Kenneth Paul White (Popehat) Wikipedia Ellen Winner, Child Psychologist Rapeutation Victims Mumia Abu-Jamal Hannah Arendt Ellen Batzel Judi Bari and Darryl Cherney Ralph Branca Aaron Burr, Vice-President Charles Carreon, Tara Carreon, and Family Charlie Chaplin Dixie Chicks Edward Drinker Cope John W. Dozier Pablo Ferro Jane Fonda Thomas Freyer George Galloway Sarah Grunfeld Anita Hill Thedala Magee Pete Matsko Edvard Munch Ralph Nader Marla Olmstead, Laura Olmstead, and Mark Olmstead Elio Petri Ghyslain Raza Vicki Roberts Howard Ray Schechter Jean Seberg John Seigenthaler Charlie Sheen Roger Shuler Dawn Simorangkir Robert Steinbuch Barbra Streisand James F. Tracy Aleksey Garber Vayner Loreta Velazquez Gary Webb Fredric Wertham, M.D. Soundtracks Still Videos and Transcripts Collateral Victims The Free Speech Mafia American Enterprise Institute Andrew C. McCarthy Tim Cushing Scott Greenfield Kashmir Hill Andrew C. McCarthy Glenn Reynolds Eugene Volokh Kenneth Paul White (Popehat.com)