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Pascal Venier
The diplomatic context: Britain and International Relations around 1904
10/06/2020 11/06/2020 par pascalvenier, posted in Article, English, Preprint, Prepublication
Pascal Venier, « The diplomatic context: Britain and International Relations around 1904 », in Brian W. Blouet (editor), The Geographical Pivot of History: Halford Mackinder and the Defence of the West (London: Frank Cass, 2004). (Frank Cass Geopolitical Theory series).
Research conducted in the history of both geography and geopolitics has stressed the importance of re-situating key texts within their original context (Livingstone, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996). Political Geographers such as Brian Blouet, Geroid Ó Tuathail or Gerry Kearns, have demonstrated the interest of an exploration of Mackinder's thought, set in its precise historical setting (Blouet, 1987; Ó Tuathail 1992; Kearns, 1985). More recently, Geoffrey Sloan has shown a way forward in analysing each of the 1904, 1919, and 1943 versions of Mackinder's heartland theory, « in the context of the unique periods of their formulation » (Sloan, 1999). This suggests the pertinence of further investigation into the actual diplomatic and strategic context of the historical moment when the Geographical Pivot of History was written, presented as a lecture and eventually published.
The history of international relations in the years before 1914, perhaps more than any other period, has been the subject of considerable scrutiny on account of the importance of the question of the origins of the Great War (Mombauer, 2002). Controversies about the issue of responsibility regarding the outbreak of the war have generated tremendous historical production. The impression of venturing onto well-trodden territory, when engaging in the study of any aspect of the period, can however be extremely deceptive. A major risk in this respect is to read too much into the major developments of the period, in the light of what is now known of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. The benefit of hindsight is perhaps more than a mixed blessing, and it is essential to remain aware of the power of focus and its potential distorting effects.
In order to propose a meaningful analysis of a period which is usually described as either one of « geopolitical transition » by political geographers, or as one of « diplomatic revolution » by international historians, it seems essential to be fully aware of both past and current historiographical debates about the history of international relations during this period, and to fully engage with its key issues. This will involve studying particularly the period around 1904 within its own logic, rather than as part of some prelude to the First World War, as well as taking into account the major historiographical revision which has recently taken place in the history of British foreign policy (Neilson, 1995; Wilson, 2003), and which has stressed how central imperial issues were in the formulation of British foreign policy, right until 1914. The proposed snapshot of the diplomatic context of « the Geographical Pivot of History » will involve, firstly, an analysis of the context of international relations and the British geopolitical code at the beginning of the twentieth century; secondly, the examination of the main orientations of Edwardian foreign policy between 1902 and 1904; and finally, will look in some depth at the situation during the winter of 1903-1904.
I. International relations and the British Geopolitical Code in the Early Twentieth Century
Following the Great War, the Old Diplomacy and the regime of alliance of the pre-1914 period have been stigmatised and widely held responsible for the outbreak of the war. A revealing illustration is to be found in a cliché; such as that of « fateful alliance« , widely applied to the Franco-Russian alliance (Kennan, 1984). Such an evocative formula, like so many others now so powerfully anchored, have distorted perceptions of the ways in which the international system operated during the first years of the century. It is therefore necessary, for instance, to stress how, in the 1890s, alliances were defensive in nature, and operated as « blocking coalitions » (Schroeder, 1986, 10). As such, they did contribute decisively to maintaining a balance of power in Europe. This was arguably still the case around 1904. Presenting Europe as being divided between two antagonistic blocks can also be misleading. Not only, at that time, the « Triple and Dual Alliances stood – to modify an apt phrase of Mr. Winston Churchill – side by side, not face to face" (Schmitt, 1924, 451); but thinking about the international system in terms of multipolarity, rather than bipolarity, may give better insight into the way it actually operated. After all, not only was Britain remaining aloof from the two main European alliance systems, but greater fluidity and a more dynamic environment than usually acknowledged, were key features in international relations during the first years of the century. Furthermore, the alliances themselves were showing signs of relative fragility, and « The Triple Alliance undoubtedly passed through a period of ineffectiveness. » (Schmitt, 1924, 452)
One of the most vivid images of the period before 1914 is undoubtedly that of the « struggle for mastery in Europe ». However it does appear rather elusive for the period under study. As Paul Schroeder has noted, « for most of the period covered, up to 1890 or 1900 at least, there was no such struggle for mastery in the sense of a conscious drive to achieve preeminent position and dominant power (Schroeder, 1986, 9). » It could further be argued that this remained a reality as late as 1904. A careful analysis of the main potential clash points between the great powers in the early years of the twentieth century reveals the tuning down of intra-European rivalries: "the two danger-zones of Europe, Alsace-Lorraine and the Near East, were relatively quiet. » (Schmitt, 1924, 451) From the mid-1890s, a climate of détente prevailed in Franco-German relations, whilst the 1897 agreement between Russia and the Habsburg Empire opened a period of relative quietude. A shift of tensions from within Europe to the wider world took place in the 1890s. Greater stability in Europe corresponded with the unleashing of imperial rivalry overseas, as European powers such as such as Britain, Russia and France, soon joined by Germany, and extra-European powers such as the United States and Japan, competed for world positions. The so-called New Imperialism and doctrines of power politics and world policy were the order of the day, whilst the Far East was often taking centre stage in international relations.
Analysing Britain's geopolitical codes proves to be a stimulating starting point. Political geographers define a geopolitical code as « a set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy » (Taylor, 1993; Dijink, 1996). This usually incorporates « a definition of a state's interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such threats, and a justification of that response. » Any definition of British interests, during the Edwardian period as during the Victorian period, must start with issues pertaining to trade. In an international economy based upon overseas trade, preserving the safety of sea routes was essential, all the more so as Britain was reliant on imports for its domestic consumption, and for ensuring access to foreign markets. Hence Britain's keenness regarding the « open door » policy in China, which was preserved. The security of the British Isles and of the Empire was also of great importance. This involved ensuring that Britain remained protected from the risk of invasion, a permanent source of concern, giving rise periodically to recurrent invasion scares. Another crucial issue was the integrity of imperial frontiers, a task of gigantic proportions, as Britain had « by far the greatest extent of territorial Frontier of any dominion in the globe« : over 12,000 miles of frontiers in Africa, more than 3,000 miles of frontier with the United States in Canada and above all India's frontiers, « nearly 6,000 miles long with Persia, Russia, Afghanistan, Tibet, China, Siam, and France. » (Curzon, 1907, 9) Finally, maintaining the balance of power in Europe could also appear as another vital British interest, and involved denying « continental hegemony to any state or coalition of states, because a hegemonic enemy, undistracted by the need to wage major conflict on land, would have been able to use all or most of western Europe as a base for developing a quantity and quality of seapower fatal to Britain's ability to command the narrow seas and hence to thwart invasion and protect its maritime commerce". (Gray, 1988, 15)
The identification of the main threat was not problematic, as Russia, engaged in global rivalry with Britain, was regarded as the traditional enemy. Russian expansionism was of increasing concern to the British government. In particular, the Russians were following an increasingly agressive policy in the Far East.The Boxer rebellion of 1900 and the ensuing European intervention had been an opportunity for Russia to occupy Manchuria in Northern China, which it later refused to evacuate. The British also felt that the security of India was threatened by both Russia's advance into Central Asia, and her increasing influence in Persia. Of particular note was the construction of the railway line from Orenburg to Samarkand, which was to be completed in 1905. « This line doubled the potential supplies that could be transported into Western Turkestan from Russia in the event of a military expedition from that territorial base. » (Siegel, 2001, 4) The growth of Russian naval assets in the Far East greatly concerned the Admiralty, which feared that « it would be unable to match a Franco-Russian naval combination in the Far East. » (Bartlett, 1993, 96) The rivalry with Russia posed the problem of Imperial defence, which Prime Minister Arthur Balfour described in a speech to the Commons on 8 August 1902 as « one of the most difficult and one of the most complicated problems that any Government or any body of experts, can have. » (Mackay, 1985, 115-6) This was however not the only threat that the Balfour administration could identify, for on account of the Franco-Russian Alliance, any  conflict with Russia could potentially lead to a global struggle against both her and her French ally. Worse still was the risk that Britain would come to face a hostile coalition of continental powers made up of Russia, France and Germany.
British planned responses to threats focused first and foremost on maintaining British worldwide naval supremacy and British command of the seas. Since 1889, the two-power standard had provided an excellent indicator of the adequacy of naval relative strength. The South African war of 1899-1902 had cruelly exposed the weaknesses of the British Army, and reform and modernisation were on the agenda. However, budgetary contraints, the weight of the military bureaucracy, together with the importance of the British political tradition not to maintain a strong standing army in peacetime, were major impediments to the development of the British army to the necessary standards of preparation in the event of a possible Russian challenge on the frontiers of India. Diplomacy was indeed a key element of Britain's possible response to the perceived main threats. The policy of splendid isolation followed by Salisbury was based on the diplomatic paradigm of the Free Hand (Gooch, 1974, 181). This involved avoiding, as far as possible, becoming party to alliances in peacetime, in order to guarantee Britain's existing freedom from entanglements (Howard, 1967). The policies followed by Salisbury's successors at the Foreign Office, Liberal Unionist Lord Lansdowne and Liberal Sir Edward Grey, are conventionally described as marking the end of isolation (Monger, 1963). Nevertheless, besides the 1901 alliance with Japan, renewed in 1905 and 1911, and limited in scope to the Far East, British diplomacy between 1901 and 1914, did stick to the Free Hand paradigm. Landsdowne's foreign policy aimed at defusing, as much as possible, any risk of conflict for Britain. It involved an active diplomacy, focusing on improving bilateral relations with each of the powers perceived as posing a threat. Niall Ferguson, following in that Sir Michael Howard's earlier view, has gone as far as interpreting Edwardian foreign policy as, in essence, one of appeasement: it also involved dealing with key issues on a case to case basis, and attempting to bring about, whenever possible, a form of collective security at a regional level (Howard, 1972, 29-30; Fergusson, 1999).
2. Edwardian foreign policy, 1901-1904
In order to get a fair picture of Britain's position in international affairs around 1904, it is useful to analyse the main dynamics of Edwardian foreign policy at work. A first important development in this respect was the significant improvement of relations with the United States, which had in 1898 asserted, in a very spectacular manner, its status as an imperial power in the Caribbean and the Pacific. This allowed for a transition from a relation of rivalry to one of friendship, and amounted to an informal Anglo-American rapprochement. The US was increasingly determined to strictly enforce a very broad interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, first enunciated in 1823, which involved preventing any European interference on the American continent (Kennedy, 1981, 118). London had for a long time been studiously ignoring such a doctrine, but this proved no longer possible, and following the Anglo-Germano-Italian blockade of Venezuela in 1903, the British came to recognise this (Herwig, 1976, 75). Britain also renounced formally in 1901, her right to claim a share in the construction of the Panama Isthmian Canal and two years later the Alaskan boundary dispute was settled favourably for American claims. This evolution allowed a British strategical withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere.
In the Far East, upholding British interests alone and ensuring the maintaining of the « open door » policy deemed crucial in China, had become increasingly difficult due to Russian expansionism. Having initially explored the possibility of a diplomatic understanding with both Germany and Japan, Lansdowne finally came to sign an agreement with the latter alone. He did so under pressure and in order to preempt a Russo-Japanese rapprochement, which seemed imminent and which would have isolated Britain disastrously in the region (Monger, 1963, 56). Ian Nish has demonstrated very clearly how « Britain entered into the alliance largely by reason of her eastern rather than her European interests (Nish, 1966, 231). » The Agreements between Great Britain and Japan of 30 January 1902, in substance a military alliance, by which which each power was bound to belligerence in a war between their ally and any two other powers, were strictly limited in scope to the Far East.
This Far Eastern commitment marked a striking departure from the usual British foreign policy praxis not to firmly commit in advance. Its positive effects for Britain were clear, preventing isolation in the region and contributing to alleviate the pressure on the Royal Navy's commitments. The alliance designed to bring about greater stability in the region, however, did not operate in such a way. It proved unable to prevent the rise of tension between Russia and Japan. It was soon feared that it could backfire, as the risk of the casus fœderis arising, and of Britain being drawn in a war, was becoming real. Not simply a local war but a global war, if a third power, most likely France, became involved against Japan in support of Russia.
If the period preceding the outbreak of the Great War has been marked by the rise of Anglo-German rivalry, it is essential to bear in mind that relations between the two powers were far from hostile in the period before 190
5; much to the contrary. Britain had indeed welcomed the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, as Germany's « half-hegemony » in Europe established a balance of power (Schroeder, 1986, 9). Furthermore, between 1898 and 1901, several attempts to bring about an alliance with German took place. However, they came to nothing. Fundamentally, Germany feared that such an alliance might result in a situation where it would have to face the Franco-Russians alone on the continent (McLean, 2001, 91); whilst Britain objected, as Monger put it, « as a parliamentary country, she could not to commit herself in advance (Monger, 1963, 63). »
The momentum for an alliance with Germany quickly passed, but maintaining good working relations with Berlin remained nevertheless a priority for London. Prime Minister Arthur Balfour remained convinced of the identity of interests between the two powers. (Kennedy, 1980, 255) The unpredictability of the Kaiser, who had acquired a justified reputation as a tactless trimmer, naturally inspired a degree of caution. As ruling out the possibility of collaboration with Germany would have significantly limited Britain's freedom of action, this was clearly not on. (Kennedy, 1980, 256; Much to the contrary, not only did the two powers undertake, together with Italy, a joint naval blockade of Venezuela in 1902, but furthermore the following year, they actively explored the possibility of jointly financing the extension of the Baghdad railway project; a smart way, in Lansdowne's view, to prevent further Russian penetration in the Middle East. (Morris, 1984, 55) The British government was however, in each instance, forced to back track because of the rush of popular Germanophobia such ventures caused (Kennedy, 1980, 256).
It has sometimes been suggested that the threat posed by the German fleet became, as early as 1902, a key factor in British policy making, but it is difficult to follow this interpretation. Germany's aim was, indeed, to become the second naval power in the world. (Sondhaus, 2001, 181) However, the superiority of the Royal Navy over the German navy, which was still in its infancy, remained overwhelming, not only in 1902-4, but for many years after 1905. (Lambert, 1999, 8 ) Significantly, when First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne expressed, in 1902, some concern about the on-going development of the German navy, Balfour did remain « somewhat sceptical ». (Kennedy, 1980, 255) It seems important to stress that Germany was only perceived as realistically posing a threat as part of an anti-British coalition. As a counter to this, in 1902 the Admiralty pressed for the two-power standard, plus an extra six battleships over and above the straight parity with France and Russia". (Bartlett, 1993, 99)
Britain's policy towards the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance was extremely crucial in this period.  Russia remained Britain's traditional enemy and the problem of the defence of India remained a very sensitive issue in London. In late 1901, Lansdowne had explored the possibility of an understanding with Russia, before settling under pressure for the alliance with Japan. The Balfour cabinet remained nevertheless extremely keen, and at times even desperate, to reach an understanding with Russia on outstanding Asian issues. (Kennedy, 1980, 255) In the summer of 1903, the expansionist party seemed to gain increasing influence over the Tsar. A Viceroyalty of the Far East was created on 13 August 1903, and Witte, the finance minister, resigned within a fortnight. As the tension between Russia and Japan was increasing in the Far East, London again sought an agreement with Russia, but to no avail (Neilson, 1995).
It is very tempting to see in Lansdowne's handling of relations with the Franco-Russian alliance, an urge to follow a policy of reinsurance, designed to avoid the dangers inherent to the Far Eastern commitment. A parallel could be made with the policy of Bismarck who, after signing a defensive alliance treaty with Austria-Hungary in 1879, brought about the League of the Three Emperors in 1881, and after it lapsed concluded the Reinsurance treaty of 1887 (Woodward, 1935, 68). Lansdowne came to think that an improvement of relations with France could lead to have positive effects on Anglo-Russian relations. He revealingly observed in September 1903 that « A good understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia, and I need not insist upon the improvement which would result in our international position » (Monger, 1963, 133). It is however generally accepted that from the start of his period as French Foreign Secretary, Théophile Delcassé's grand design was to bring about a coalition between France, Britain and Russia (Andrew, 1968, 228). A difficulty for the French was to conciliate a possible restoration of the Entente cordiale with her alliance with Russia.
Between 1902 and 1904, Franco-British relations evolved, as Edward Grey aptly put it in a speech to the Commons on 1 June 1904, from a « glacial epoch » to a « genial epoch« . (Grey, 1931, 21-2) French and British interests seemed to converge. Financial ties in particular contributed significantly to the two powers coming closer together, as the City remained dependant on French capital. (Saul, 1997, 666) From a strategic perspective, the Anglo-Japanese alliance had seriously undermined the security of French Indochina, but whilst the overall balance of naval power with France had undoubtedly evolved in Britain's favour, it remained that the French naval policy of concentration in the Mediterranean had crucially modified the equilibrium in the Mediterranean. The rapprochement of 1903 was marked by an exchange of visits by King Edward VII and President Loubet in May and July 1903, and steps were soon taken to open negotiations on the main outstanding colonial dispute between the two imperial powers. (Andrew, 1968)
To complete this analysis of Britain's international position at the time when « The Geographical Pivot of History » was conceived by Halford Mackinder, in the winter of 1903-1904, it seems useful to consider the two key elements of this context: the on-going rethinking of British defence policy and the implications of the developing Far Eastern crisis for British diplomacy.
Following the Boer war a major reevaluation of defence policy was undertaken. A painstaking assessment of the Army performance was conducted by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the South African war, or Elgin Commission, which highlighted the need to reorganise the War Office. (Kennedy, 1981, 63) Such a reorganisation was however extremely slow, on account of the complexity of the task, the weight of bureaucracy and the political sensitivity of the issues involved. The War Office Reconstruction Committee, chaired by Lord Esher, which was appointed in September 1903 by Balfour, was in January 1904 finalising the first of the three instalments of its report which led to a thorough reorganisation of the War Office. (Dunlop, 1938, 168-9) At the same time War Secretary Arnold-Forster was in early February 1904 revealing to his colleagues in the cabinet a scheme to reform the Army (Williams, 1991, 45). With the acute budgetary crisis faced by the British government and the prospect of a large deficit in the coming year, it was vital considerably reduce defence spending (Mackay, 1985, 160-1) The Committee of Imperial Defence, set up in October 1903 by Prime Minister Balfour, had undertaken a systematic analysis of imperial defence requirements. An investigation into the invasion issue was conducted, and in November 1903 the committee deemed the possibility of a large-scale invasion of the British Isles most unlikely. This assessment was of great importance, as it subsequently informed the study of imperial defence requirements and a triumph for the blue-water school. (Bond, 1972, 198; Gooch, 1974, 177) The clear consensus was that the Empire was most vulnerable in India, « our only possible place of contact with a great European Army« , as Arnold-Foster put it in his speech on the Army Estimates on 7 March 1904 (Dunlop, 1938, 172), and the main strategic problem remained the question of the defence of the North West frontier. (Bond, 1972, 198) Prime Minister Arthur Balfour summarized very effectively, in a letter to Edouard VII on 14 December 1903, what military policy should be: « The object to be aimed at may be roughly summarized as follows: we want an army which shall give us sufficient force for at least any immediate need of Indian defence; and, in conjonction with the auxiliary forces, for Home defence; which shall be capable of expansion in time of national emergency … and shall throw a smaller burden on the tax payer. This last is of peculiar importance, not merely because of the present condition of our finances, but because the demands of the navy are so great and so inevitable that the total cost of imperial defence threatens to become prohibitive. » (Williams, 1991, 44)
The development of the Russo-Japanese crisis in the Far East placed Britain in a rather embarrassing situation. What had been Balfour's worst fear in December 1901 at a time when the possibility of an agreement with Japan was debated among the cabinet, namely that « we may find ourselves fighting for our own existence in every part of the globe because France has joined forces with her ally over some obscure Russo-Japanese quarrel in Corea [sic] », was becoming a distinct possibility (Monger, 1963, 62). The main shortcoming of the Anglo-Japanese agreement was not only its binding nature, but also the fact that it amounted not simply to a defensive alliance but also to an offensive alliance. Accordingly, the Japanese Imperial Cabinet was left with great freedom of judgement to decide whether Russia was leading a policy of provocation. It does not seem simply incident that between 1904 and 1914, successive British administrations, Tory and Liberal alike, stayed clear from entering any new alliance in peace time, much to the French despair.
The development of the crisis led the British government to take diplomatic precautionary steps to avoid been drawn into the conflict, which involved active diplomatic collaboration with France. The convergence of views on this matter became quickly apparent as French foreign secretary Théophile Delcassé shared similar concerns. Both realised how easily their respective existing alliances with Russia and Japan could lead them to become involved in the coming conflict. A Franco-British attempt at mediation between the two parties came to none as the Japanese attacked Port Arthur on 8 February 1904. After the outbreak of war, the two powers promptly engaged in close diplomatic collaboration to attempt to localise the conflict, by remaining strictly neutral.
The conflict gave momentum to the Franco-British discussions and both parties became convinced of the pertinence of promptly to reaching a timely settlement of their imperial disputes, on 8 April, two months day for day after the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war. This would be the starting point for the Franco-British Entente cordiale (Keiger, 2001, 164-168).
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The Geographical Pivot of History and Early Twentieth Century Geopolitical Culture
Preprint of :
Pascal Venier, The Geographical Pivot of History and Early 20th Century Geopolitical Culture, Geographical Journal, vol. 170, no 4, December 2004, pp. 330-336.
On 25 January 1904, the director of the London School of Economics, Halford J. Mackinder gave a lecture on the Geographical Pivot of History at the Royal Geographical Society. In 1887, Mackinder had introduced the teaching of Geography at the University of Oxford, and in this 1904 lecture he was seeking « a formula […] express[ing] certain aspects […] of geographical causation in universal history ». He ventured boldly, but not without taking necessary oratory precautions in developing a "working hypothesis", which posited that a "pivot zone" or "heart-land", the vast zone of continental and arctic drainage of Central Asia, had long been the geographical pivot of history, still was and would remain the "pivot of the world's politics". Furthermore, he developed the argument that the history of Europe was subordinate to that of Asia. This piece of work, at the crossroads between historical and political geography, can be seen as a stimulating reflection on international affairs, seeking to demonstrate the policy relevance of geography in aiding statecraft.
Much of the recent literature on the history of both geography and geopolitics has stressed the importance of re-situating key texts within their original context (Livingstone, 1992; Ó'Tuathail, 1996). Political Geographers such as Brian Blouet, Gerry Kearns or Geroid Ó'Tuathail have explored Mackinder's thought, set in its precise context (Blouet, 1987; Ó'Tuathail 1992; Kearns, 1985). International Historian Paul Kennedy showed one way forward in his landmark essay on « Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power"(Kennedy, 1983); so has more recently, strategic studies specialist Geoffrey Sloan in analysing each of the 1904, 1919, and 1943 versions of Mackinder's heartland theory, « in the context of the unique periods of their formulation » (Sloan, 1999). This suggests the pertinence of exploring a fresh perspective on The Geographical Pivot of History – one which sets it in the context of the international relations and strategic debates of the time, and engaging more fully with the historiography of British foreign policy during the Edwardian period.
William H. Parker's influential interpretation of The Geographical Pivot of History in his classic study Mackinder, Geography as an Aid to Statecraft provides a useful starting point. In this study, he boldly stated that: "One reason why the paper had little impact in 1904, and would have been regarded by the Cabinet – had they heard it – as of little practical value, was that it was concerned with the future rather than the present. And the present had pressing problems of its own, the chief of which was how to contain Germany, not Russia. As for Germany allying herself with Russia, this was not very likely for France had already done so, and Britain was preparing to come to an understanding with her. The immediate danger was from German industrial competition and naval rearmament rather than from landpower in the remote fastnesses of Euroasia." (Parker, 1982, 159) However, there are major difficulties with such an interpretation, which appears untenable when The Geographical Pivot of History is analysed within its precise historical context.
A close examination of The Geographical Pivot of History, keeping primarily in mind issues pertaining to international relations, reveals that a key dimension of the article was Mackinder's attempt to pronounce upon Britain's international position by identifying a number of major potential threats. The first threat was a perceived trend towards a shift in the equilibrium between land power and sea power, which Mackinder feared was turning in favour of the former, eventually resulting in a challenge to the primacy of British world hegemony by the continental powers. The second threat, logically derived from the first, but more immediate, was posed by Russia, "the pivot state »: "Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppemen. In the world at large she occupies the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe." (Mackinder, 1904, 436) It is crucial to note a double mapping of the threats posed by the continental powers. Whilst acknowledging "the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe », Mackinder clearly saw Russia as the major threat, and Germany only as a minor threat. Finally, Mackinder also considered the risk of an alliance of the two main continental powers, Russia and Germany, a major peril for Britain: "The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia". (Mackinder, 1904, 436) It is important to stress that potential threats identified by Mackinder involved either Russia, or worse Russia and Germany together, but never concerned Germany alone. Resituated within the context of January 1904, the position taken by Mackinder, and his attempt to mobilise the power of geographical scientific knowledge to back his views, represented a strong statement. His emphasis on Russia was firmly in opposition with the position taken by a number of other leading imperialists, such as the director of the National and English Review, Leopold Maxse, a fellow member of the Co-efficients Dining Club, who underlined the German threat. (Hutcheson, 1989; Morris, 1984)
Contrary to W.H. Parker's argument, the analysis conducted by Mackinder seems remarkably in tune with the thinking of the British decision-makers at the time it was conducted. It is indeed unquestionable that Russia, engaged in worldwide rivalry with Britain, remained for decision-makers in London the principal external threat to her interests. Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, as a strong supporter of the Blue Water school of strategy, held that the British Isles would be best defended by the navy and that the primary purpose of the British army was to contribute to imperial defence. (Mackay, 1985) He therefore, in a time of acute budgetary crisis, further advocated concentration on issues of imperial defence and specifically the defence of India. That his outlook on foreign and defence policy was clearly characterised by "Indocentricity" has been well documented (Williams, 1991; Judd, 1968). During the Army debates of March 1904 in the House of Commons, he stressed the Russian threat to the British empire, stating that "no man can blind himself to the fact that the whole trend of circumstances in the East is to make us a Continental Power conterminous with another Continental Power, and that is the dominating circumstance which we have to take into account in framing our Army Estimates. » (Dunlop, 1938, 172) Undoubtedly, Mackinder was over evaluating the Russian threat, but such an attitude was deeply rooted in Victorian and Edwardian geopolitical culture, sometimes to the point of bordering on paranoia. (Towle, 1980)
If the period leading to the Great War was indeed marked by the rise of Anglo-German rivalry, it is essential to bear in mind that before the First Moroccan crisis in 1905, Britain's relations with Germany were far from hostile, despite recurrent rushes of popular Germanophobia which erupted at regular intervals. (Kennedy, 1980) After several unsuccessful attempts in 1898-1901, the momentum for an alliance with the German Empire had passed. However, maintaining good working relations with Berlin remained a priority for the British government, and its leader was still convinced of the community of interests between Britain and Germany. Significantly, in 1902, when Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty expressed some concern about the on-going development of the German navy, the British premier remained sceptical. (Kennedy, 1980, 255) Whilst she had become involved in a policy of fleet building, the potential naval threat posed by the German fleet was not yet a key factor in British policy making. The superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine, still in its infancy, was overwhelming, not only in 1902-4, but for many years after 1905. (Lambert, 1999, 8) As Mackinder noted in 1905: "the Empire possesses […] a fighting fleet equal to any two or three, other fleets." (Mackinder, 1905, 137) Mackinder's perception of the risks posed by a Russo-German coalition has all too easily been viewed as an anachronistic facet of his work (Parker, 1982, 159). However, this perception was a recurrent theme in British foreign policy debates before 1904, and especially so in the early months of the Boer war, when it became a major cause for concern for Britain (Corp, 1979; Diplomaticus, 1899). When it came to actual strategic planning, Germany was only perceived by the Admiralty as realistically posing a threat as part of an anti-British coalition. As a counter to this, in 1902 the Admiralty had pressed for the two- power standard, plus six battleships over and above the straight parity with France and Russia. (Bartlett, 1993, 99) The direct relevance of Mackinder's analysis about the risk of a Russo-German coalition, usually treated dismissively, is demonstrated by the fact that twice during the Russo- Japanese war Kaiser Wilhelm II did propose an alliance with Russia. (Sontag, 1928) A first attempt in October 1904 was unsuccessful. (Steinberg, 1970, 1977-81) but in July 1905, the Russian Tsar signed the Bjorkö Treaty, a defensive alliance, though the Russians denounced it just a few months later. (McLean, 50-51) The possibility of such a continental alliance had been the cause of considerable concern in Britain, as it would have had very serious implications in the context of the ongoing Russo-Japanese war. Under the terms of the Agreements between Great Britain and Japan of 30 January 1902, Britain would have been bound to belligerence in a war between her ally and any two other powers. (Nish, 1966) The Times even got somewhat carried away in September 1904 by wrongly announcing that a Russo-German understanding had been reached. (Steinberg, 1970, 1977)
It is not uncommon for scholars to read The Geographical Pivot of History as directly recommending a precise policy of alliance. For instance, Robert Strauz-Hupé felt that Mackinder « advocated an Anglo-Russian understanding which, after nearly a century of estrangement, was concluded in 1907. » (Strauz-Hupé, 1942, 43) However, it can be argued that the actual prescriptive dimension of the article was perhaps more limited, and primarily amounted to three key points. Firstly, Mackinder stressed the absolute necessity for Britain to contain Russia and stop the "pivot state" from gaining access to the coast of Persia. He did not give any specific indication of how Britain might go about this, but maintaining the status quo in the Gulf was already a key priority for British foreign policymakers. This had been made clear by Lord Landsdowne in his « Persian Gulf Declaration » of 5 May 1903, in which he forcefully stated that: "We should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. » (Monger, 1963, 123) This view was further reinforced by the official tour of the Gulf undertaken by the Vice-Roy of India, Lord Curzon at the end of 1903.
Secondly, the article suggested the necessity for Britain to prevent the two main continental powers, Germany and Russia, from coming together. This can be understood as suggesting that it was crucial for Britain not to encourage Germany to follow a "pivot policy" by displaying an unnecessarily hostility. Finally, Mackinder considered how Britain could deal with what was clearly a worst-case scenario, a possible Russo-German alliance: "if Germany were to ally herself with Russia. The threat of such an event should, therefore, throw France into alliance with the over-sea powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea would become so many bridge heads where the outside navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets." (Mackinder, 1904, 436) The author's prospective thinking on this scenario is very interesting and deserves comment. Such an alliance would have revolutionized strategic affairs at the beginning of the twentieth century. It would have been most likely that in such circumstances France would have denounced her alliance with Russia, as the outstanding question of the annexation of the French provinces by Germany in 1871 remained an insurmountable obstacle to a Franco-German alliance (Keiger, 2001). Incidentally, Franco-British relations had recently improved spectacularly, thanks to the rapprochement of 1903, which was to lead to the Entente cordiale of 8 April 1904, a settlement of imperial disputes between the two powers and the starting point of active diplomatic collaboration. (Andrew, 1968, 201-215) The expression of the "overseas powers", used by Mackinder seems to be understood as the powers of the outer crescent: Britain and her empire, her ally, Japan, but also the United States. Such a de facto solidarity between Britain and the USA, as assumed by Mackinder, is interesting in it-self and appears consistent with ideas of a common Anglo-Saxon world so influential at the turn of the Twentieth Century. According to Mackinder, the maritime power's response to a continental coalition involved a form of containment policy. The suggested strategy of bridgeheads implied the need for Britain and her allies to develop a capacity for projecting power in the regions of the coastlands that she clearly did not have in 1904. At that time the British Army seemed ill prepared for a possible war with Russia, and the defence needs of India needed to be addressed. This obviously implied the necessary manpower resources, but there Mackinder placed his hopes on the potential represented by the empire. (Mackinder, 1905) Besides, an alliance between the maritime powers would have provided a sizeable number of men. A fascinating dimension of the last scenario is undoubtedly that an alliance of the two main continental powers would have posed the question of the very survival of Britain. This seems to be extremely representative of the ideological climate of Social Darwinism.
Mackinder's article is generally interpreted as a pessimistic reading of the position of Britain in the world. Mark Polelle, for instance, thinks that, "Mackinder should be recognized as a pessimistic prophet for recognizing and lamenting the overshadowing of the European nation-state by continental power centre."(Polelle, 1999, 58) An alternative interpretation could stress that The Geographical Pivot of History was primarily an "exercise in 'shock' tactics" (Heffernan, 1998, 66), but also that beyond the prognosis, it was pointing towards changes needed for Britain to be able to meet the challenge of the new century. Mackinder and fellow social imperialists were actively promoting a solution based on the idea of constructive imperialism and imperial unity. Some lateral thinking may provide some useful reflections on whether formulas such as the fin de siècle spirit or the crisis of conservatism help us to grasp the mood of this group of Edwardians. For there seems to be something of an extraordinary voluntarism in the frame of mind of Mackinder and of his fellow social imperialists, together with a feeling of quiet superiority, racial or otherwise, of the Edwardian British elites. If not offering a panacea, they felt that the empire gave Britain a major card to play, providing it was possible to bring about imperial unity. Mackinder further advocated tariff reform, which would allow for the economic integration of Greater Britain and the promotion of national efficiency through a programme of social and educational reform.
Geroid Ó'Tuathail has very aptly noted that, « the pivot is the new myth around which the British Empire must reconsolidate itself ». (Ó'Tuathail, 1996, 235) Such a constructive dimension is indeed central to the famous map of the "seats of powers", which accompanied the article, and which was not simply illustrative but central to the argument itself. (Mackinder, 1904, 435) "Man-power as a measure of national and imperial strength", an article Mackinder published in January 1905 in the National and English Review, offers some valuable insight into this positive vision. (Mackinder, 1905, 140) Mackinder makes a case for regarding "Canada, Australasia, and South Africa as set like crescent on the Turkish flag, with India in the place of the star." This way of symbolically visualising the imagined imperial community of the British White colonies, forming a crescent centred on India, is indeed noteworthy. It is symptomatic of the way in which racialist views were central to imperial thinking in the age of Social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism. It is interesting to resituate the use of such a visual metaphor, undoubtedly part of an effort to foster a process of nation identity building, that of Greater Britain, with Mackinder's organicism, which is already very well documented. (Ó'Tuathail, 1992; Deudney, 2001) An organic concept of history can be found in the meta-narrative developed by Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History. As he put it, "ideas which go to form a nation … have usually been accepted under the pressure of a common tribulation, and under a common necessity of resistance to external force"; elsewhere he refers to the way in which external pressures had had a "stimulative" effect on the people of Europe (Mackinder, 1904, 422-3 and 428). In 1904, the task at hand was, in Mackinder's view, for the British Empire to move towards imperial unity, stressing the potential threat posed by the "pivot state" of direct relevance. Linda Colley has addressed the powerful role that French enmity played in the development of Britishness in the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. Colley, 1992) Seemingly, Mackinder sought to identify Russia as a suitable enemy who, in turn, would stimulate identification with a Greater British nation. After all, had not the South African war of 1899-1902 offered an interesting insight into how the Empire could react positively to a common foe?
Much of the thinking of scholars who have argued that Mackinder's ideas were largely irrelevant has been informed by the interpretations of international relations. This stresses the shift in focus in British foreign policy from imperial issues to European ones in the period between 1904 and 1914, while emphasizing the importance of Anglo-German relations and the way in which British policy makers almost exclusively focused on the German threat (Steiner, 1969, 1977; Williamson, 1969). However, an important historiographical trend has emerged which has challenged this interpretation. International historians such as Keith Wilson and Keith Neilson have convincingly argued that imperial issues, and especially the defence of India, remained central to British foreign policy- making during the period leading up to 1914. (Wilson, 1985, 2003; Neilson, 1995) They have stressed the limits of Euro-centricity, and the fact that Russia had a much greater impact on the formulation of British foreign policy than Germany. This suggests the pertinence of a reassessment of the relevance of Mackinder's thinking.
The relevance of Mackinder's thinking is perhaps best illustrated during the period 1906-1914 by the Anglo-Russian convention on Persia, signed in 1907. It is essential to stress the centrality of strategic issues in the thinking behind the negotiations on the question of Persia. As Sir Edward Grey declared in a speech to the Commons on the Anglo-Russian convention on 17 February 1908: « In making the Agreement in respect of these regions in Asia strategical considerations with us were paramount". He also explained that: "Anyone who has studied the question of the Agreement between Great Britain and Russia would see that the first point all through in the minds of those who considered it has not been the commercial but the strategical importance of it. It is the strategical position which makes the Agreement desirable and essential. » (Grey, 1931, 60) A comparison of the map of the Anglo-Russian convention with that of the pivot area gives a striking revelation of the similitude, as Persia was divided into three zones of influence. In addition to a Russian northern zone, the creation in the East of a British zone of influence and to the South of a neutral zone, kept the Russians, confined to the northern zone, away from the coast of the Gulf.
A number of historians maintain that this focus on Imperial policy did continue after the agreements of 1907. (Wilson, 2003; Neilson, 1995; Siegel, 2002) Keith Wilson has shown how as late as 21 July 1914, in a key memorandum on Anglo-Russian relations in Persia, it was stressed that "after seven years HM Government are faced with the urgent necessity of taking stock of their position in Persia, for the incapacity of the Persians and the steady advance of Russia have together created a situation which cannot be allowed to drift any longer without the most serious danger to those British interests whose maintenance constitutes one of the most cardinal principles of Imperial policy" and that "the first principle of our foreign policy must be genuinely good relations with Russia, and founded on the belief that if we do not make relatively small sacrifices, and alter our policy, in Russia now, we shall both endanger our friendship with Russia and find in a comparatively near future that we have sacrificed our whole position in the Persian Gulf, and are face in consequence with a situation where our very existence as an Empire will be at stake". (K. Wilson, 1995, 185-6) It should however be noted that Mackinder's strategic thinking was itself evolving during this period. As early as January 1905, he was already involved in revising and slightly expanding his conception of the potential threat posed by the continental powers to include the Ottoman Empire: "Egypt may rank in this view as essentially a part of the Indies, for Turkey, like Russia and Germany, is Continental, and by no means wanting in crude, fanatical man-power, which railways are in process of mobilising. You cannot send ironclads into Syria, but a Continental Power or Allied Powers in possession of the Suez canal would hold the most central naval base in the world." (Mackinder, 1905, 140)
Examination of the international context in 1904 reveals how Mackinder's analysis of potential threats was both remarkably in tune with British geopolitical codes – and geopolitical culture – around 1904, and with the ideas of the British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. The prospective effort of Mackinder does not appear as merely speculative, but as both extremely well grounded in the fundamentals of British foreign policy, and extremely relevant. A number of issues seem to deserve further attention, in particular that of the influence exerted by Mackinder before 1914, and that of the genesis of Mackinder's conception of the "pivot zone" or "heart-land".
An evaluation of the existing academic literature on Mackinder reveals a broad consensus on the extremely limited influence of The Geographical Pivot of History on the actual elaboration of British foreign policy prior to the First World War. (Parker, 1985, 28; Ó'Tuathail, 1998, 18) Whilst it is well established that Mackinder did have a degree of political access to a number of leading politicians such as Richard Haldane and Sir Edward Grey, and that he was involved in a number of political groups such as the Co-efficients or the Compatriots' Club, it is extremely difficult to identify the influence of his work. In the absence of clear evidence, Brian Blouet simply notes the possibility of such influence, and he writes that « Sir Edward Grey, and particularly Haldane found Mackinder's views interesting, and both became members of the Liberal government that signed the Anglo- Russian agreement of 1907." (Blouet, 1987, 117) The present article has shown a number of ways in which The Geographical Pivot of History appeared relevant to British foreign policy between 1904 and 1914. If this suggests the pertinence of further archive-based research into the possible influence of Mackinder's thinking on British foreign policy making, it is necessary to remain cautious, as direct relevance does not necessarily imply direct influence. This is all the more so in the light of Patrick O'Sullivan's remark that "It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which geopolitical ideas have directly influenced policy and action or whether they merely reflected the zeitgeist, with both theories or actions manifesting ambient attitudes". (O'Sullivan, 1982, 57)
Whilst the present re-examination of The Geographical Pivot of History shows that much of Mackinder's strategic thinking was well grounded in the realities of the international relations of the early twentieth century, the heart-land itself remains problematic. The heart-land "working hypothesis", unproven yet un-refuted, was soon to become a thesis in Mackinder's Democratic Ideals and Reality (Mackinder, 1919), losing a hyphen in the process, and later assumed the condition of a theory. As such, it really took on a life of its own, becoming, and to this day remaining, one of the most influential theories in Western strategic thought. (Gray, 1988, Dodds, 2000) As such, it perhaps deserves further research in order to be carefully debunked. This could involve exploring the genealogy of the idea of the "pivot zone"/"heartland": notably how Mackinder came to conceive the geographical pivot of the historical hypothesis and what was the influence of other contemporary studies on Central Asia? How did Mackinder, in an attempt to engage in prospective thinking, set about using past trends – the American model? – to reflect upon the possible development of the pivot area? What were the methodological issues that arose from its very definition? And in what ways and to what extent was he consciously involved in bringing geographical truth to established policy principles?
Blouet, B., 1987. Halford Mackinder: a Biography, Texas A & M Press, College Station, Texas.
Colley, L. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
Corp, E.T. "Sir Charles Hardinge and the Question of Intervention in the Boer War: An Episode in the Rise of Anti-German Feeling in the British Foreign Office", Journal of Modern History, 51 (2) (June 1979), On-Demand Supplement, D1071-84.
Deudney, D., "Greater Britain or greater synthesis? Seeley, Mackinder, and Wells on Britain in the global industrial era", Review of international studies, Apr 2001, Vol.27, No.2, pp.187- 208.
Diplomaticus [Lucien Wolf], "Bergen and the Coalition Nightmare", Fortnightly Review, 1 September 1899, pp. 536-546.
Dodds, K., 2000. Geopolitics in A Changing World, Prentice Hall, London.
Dunlop, J., 1938. The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914. From the eve of the South African War to
the eve of the Great War, Methuen: London.
Gaddis, J. L. 1982. Strategies of containment. New York: Oxford University Press. Gray, C., 1988. The Geopolitics of Superpower, UP Kentucky, Lexington.
Grey, E., 1931. Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 1904-1914, G. Allen and Unwin, London. Heffernan, M., 1998. The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics, Arnold, London.
Hutcheson, J.A., 1989. Leopold Maxse and the National Review, 1893-1914: Right-Wing Politics and Journalism in the Edwardian Era. Garland, London, 1989.
Judd, D., 1968. Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932, Macmillan, London.
Kearns, G., 1985. "Halford John Mackinder, 1861–1947". Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies 9, pp. 71–86.
Kennedy, P., 1981. The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865- 1980, Fontana, London.
Kennedy, P., 1983. « Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power », in Stategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945, Eight Studies, Allen and Unwin, London, pp. 41-85.
Mackinder, H.J., 1904. "The Geographical Pivot of History", Geographical Journal, Vol. XXIII, No 4 (April), 421-437.
Mackinder, H.J. (1905). Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength", National and English Review, 45, 136-143.
Monger, G., 1963. The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907, Nelson, London.
Morris, A., 1984, The scaremongers. the advocacy of war and rearmament 1896-1914, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Nish, I., 1966. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, Athlone Press, London.
Ó'Tuathail, G. 1992, « Putting Mackinder in his Place: Material Transformations and Myth », Political Geography, 1992, 11, pp.100-118.
Ó'Tuathail, G., 1996. Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space, Routledge, London. Ó'Tuathail, G., 1998. The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, London.
Ó'Tuathail, G., 2003. « Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics, in Tchantouridze L. (ed.), Bison Paper 4, Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies.
Polelle, M. 1999, Raising Cartographic Consciousness, The Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century, Lexington Books, Oxford.
Sloan, G., « Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now », in Gray, C.S. and Sloan, G.R., Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
Sontag, R.J., 1928. "German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906", The American Historical Review, vol. 33, no. 2, 278-301.
Steinberg, J., 1970. "Germany and the Russo-Japanese War", The American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 7, 1965-1986.
Strauz-Hupé, R., 1942.Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power, Putman, New York.
Taylor, P.J., 1993. Political Geography, World Economy, Nation-State and Locality, Harlow,Longman.
Towle, P., 1980. "The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India", Military Affairs, vol. 44, No 3, 111-117.
Williams, R., 1991. Defending the Empire, The Conservative Party and British Defence Policy, 1899-1915, Yale University Press, London.
Wilson, K., Decisions for War, 1914, Londres, UCL Press, 1995.
Wilson, K., [c. 1988]. "The Struggle for Persia: Sir G. Clerk's memorandum of 21 juillet 1914 on Anglo-Russian relations in Persia", in Proceedings of the 1988 B.R.I.S.M.E.S International Conference on Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford : British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, pp. 290-334.


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Viviane De Muynck
Viviane De Muynck (1946) studied drama at the Brussels Conservatoire. She was a student with Jan Decorte. From 1980 she was a member of the theatre collective Mannen van den Dam. In 1987 she was awarded the Theo d'Or for her interpretation of Martha in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? directed by Sam Bogaerts with the company De Witte Kraai. Later she joined the company Maatschappij Discordia.
In the beginning of the 1990's she met Jan Lauwers, artistic director of Needcompany, which was the beginning of an interesting itinerary. Since the opera Orfeo (1993) by Walter Hus and Jan Lauwers, she often played with Needcompany in Lauwers' productions, including The Snakesong Trilogy (Le Pouvoir, Le Désir and the integral version), Macbeth (1996), Caligula (1997), Morning Song (1999), DeaDDogsDon'tDance/DJamesDJoyceDeaD (2000), Goldfish Game (2002), No Comment (2003), De kamer van Isabella (Isabella's Room - 2004), Alles is ijdelheid (Everything is Vanity - 2006), Het Hertenhuis (The Deer House - 2008) en De kunst der vermakelijkheid (The Art of Entertainment - 2011).
She performed with Toneelgroep Amsterdam, the Nationaal Toneel of The Hague and the Zuidelijk Toneel. She was in two productions of Kaaitheater: in 1994 in Pijl van de Tijd (Time's Arrow, Martin Amis) directed by Guy Cassiers and in 1995 she played the part of Odysseus in Philoktetes Variations (Mueller, Gide, Jesureen) by Jan Ritsema, with Dirk Roofthooft and Ron Vawter. She guest starred in several productions of the Wooster Group (New York), including O'Neill's The Hairy Ape. She toured with Relazione Pubblica, a choreography by Caterina and Carlotta Sagna. In 2007 he played the lead in Ein Fest für Boris, a creation for the Salzburger Festspiele. She collaborated with the Schönberg Ensemble, Zeitklang, Spectra Ensemble and Neue Musik Berlin.
In 2004 she participated in Men in Tribulation by Erik Sleichim and the Bl!ndman Saxophone Quartet.
Viviane De Muynck's work as a director include a creation of Die Vagina Monologe for the Deutsches Schauspielhaus in Hamburg (2000) and an adaptation of William Faulkner's As I Lay Dying (2003).
In 2006 she received the Award of the Flemish Community in the category stage art.
Viviane De Muynck appears regularly on the big and small screen. She was in Vinaya, a film by Peter van Kraaij and Josse De Pauw, in De Avonden (The Evenings), directed by R. Van den Berg, in Vincent and Theo, directed by Robert Altman and in The Crossing, directed by Nora Hoppe. At the Utrecht Film Festival she was nominated for a Gouden Kalf on two occasions: for her part in De Avonden and for the television drama Duister Licht (Dark light) by Martin Koolhoven. In 2005 she appeared in Fien Troch's first feature film Een ander zijn geluk (Someone Else's Happiness) and in Geoffrey Enthoven's Vidange Perdue (2006), followed by a part in the feature film Vreemd Bloed (Strange Blood - 2010) by Maria Goos and Mark Timmers and a remarkable part in the awarded tv-series Oud België (Old Belgium, 2010). In 2013, she appeared in Met man en macht (With Might and Main).
In 2013-2014 she will tour with the Toneelhuis production Van den Vos (FC Bergman).
Productions with Viviane De Muynck
Van den Vos - (Season 2015-2016) Actor
Van den Vos - (Season 2014-2015) Play
Wolpe! - (Season 2008-2009) Play
Men in Tribulation - (Season 2003-2004) Ciguri / the prosecutor

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Q: QGIS unable to get correct fishnet cell centroids for United States I want to create a fishnet grid across the United States with cells sizes of 10km x 10km in QGIS. I then want to pull the coordinates of the centroid of each cell.  I have done a similar thing with Manhattan, NY previous question and answer.
But with the US I am struggling with the projection type and the transform functions.
Previous transform functions:
x(transform(centroid($geometry), 'EPSG:32618', 'EPSG:4326'))

y(transform(centroid($geometry), 'EPSG:32618', 'EPSG:4326'))

I have amended these to (and also ESRI:102008) the below, but am not getting coordinates in the US:
x(transform(centroid($geometry), 'EPSG:3857', 'EPSG:4326'))

y(transform(centroid($geometry), 'EPSG:3857', 'EPSG:4326'))

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
https://apnews.com/press-release/pr-newswire/media-online-media-d232b31298b7a39bd178d2d1fc57e8bb
Pringles® Returns To Big Game In 2021 With New Flavor Stacking Spot
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As fans count down the days until the Big Game, Pringles will share more details on the campaign and spot. For more information, follow @Pringles on Instagram, Twitter and check out Facebook.com/Pringles.
About Kellogg Company
At Kellogg Company (NYSE: K), we strive to enrich and delight the world through foods and brands that matter. Our beloved brands include Pringles®, Cheez-It®, Special K®, Kellogg's Frosted Flakes®, Pop-Tarts®, Kellogg's Corn Flakes®, Rice Krispies®, Eggo®, Mini-Wheats®, Kashi®, RXBAR®, MorningStar Farms® and more. Net sales in 2018 were approximately $13.5 billion, comprised principally of snacks and convenience foods like cereal and frozen foods. Kellogg brands are beloved in markets around the world. We are also a company with Heart & Soul, committed to creating Better Days for 3 billion people by the end of 2030 through our Kellogg's® Better Days global purpose platform. Visit www.KelloggCompany.com or www.OpenforBreakfast.com.
View original content to download multimedia: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pringles-returns-to-big-game-in-2021-with-new-flavor-stacking-spot-301193533.html
SOURCE Kellogg Company


text:
WesMaps - Fall 2018 Courses Offered Home Archive Search FGSS
FGSS117F-01 Social Norms and Social Power (FYS) Weiss,Margot
.M.W... 10:50AM-12:10PM; CAMS 1;
FGSS130F-01 Thinking Animals: An Introduction to Animal Studies (FYS) Weil,Kari
.M.W... 01:20PM-02:40PM; BOGH113;
FGSS175F-01 Staging America: Modern American Drama (FYS) Pfister,Joel
.M..... 07:10PM-10:00PM; DWNY208;
FGSS209-01 Feminist Theories Pitts-Taylor,Victoria
..T.R.. 10:20AM-11:40AM; ALLB304;
FGSS224-01 Mystics and Militants: Medieval Women Writers Nisse,Ruth
.M.W.F. 09:50AM-10:40AM; BOGH115;
FGSS234-01 Queer Russia Utkin,Roman
..T.R.. 01:20PM-02:40PM; FISK413;
FGSS240-01 The Gendering of Music in Cross-Cultural Perspective Zheng,Su
..T.R.. 02:50PM-04:10PM; MST301;
FGSS243-01 Television: The Domestic Medium Traube,Elizabeth G.
..T.R.. 10:20AM-11:40AM; FISK208;
FGSS244-01 Feminist and Queer Theories of Social Reproduction Boggs,Abigail Huston
..T.R.. 01:20PM-02:40PM; PAC421;
FGSS265-01 American Labor History from 1776 to Recent Times Schatz,Ronald W.
FGSS267-01 Revolution Girl-Style Now: Queer and Feminist Performance Strategies Brewer Ball,Katherine
.M.W... 02:50PM-04:10PM; TST101;
FGSS269-01 Gender and History: Women Working, the U.S., and Global Capitalism Since 1900 (FGSS Gateway) Loiselle,Aimee
FGSS301-01 Black Speculative Fictions and the Anthropocene Vermeulen,Heather
....R.. 01:20PM-04:10PM; CFH106;
FGSS315-01 Entertaining Social Change Pfister,Joel
..T.... 07:10PM-10:00PM; CFH106;
FGSS323-01 Survey of African American Theater McMahon,Rashida Z. Shaw
...W.F. 01:20PM-02:40PM; 116MTV102;
FGSS343-01 Imitations of Life: Experimental Bodies at the Interface of Science and Culture Glick,Megan H.
.M..... 01:20PM-04:10PM; ALLB004;
FGSS345-01 Women's Lib, Women's Lit Bachner,Sally
..T.R.. 08:50AM-10:10AM; DWNY100;
FGSS350-01 Historicizing Early Modern Sexualities Korda,Natasha
...W... 01:20PM-04:10PM; CFH106;
FGSS390-01 Politics and Society in Japanese Women's Writing Aalgaard,Scott W.
.M.W... 02:50PM-04:10PM; FISK404;
FGSS405-01 Senior Seminar Tucker,Jennifer
.....F. 10:00AM-12:50PM; ALLB304;
Spring 2019 Courses Offered Home Archive Search FGSS
FGSS164F-01 Hurting (FYS) Schwartz,Claire
..T.... 07:10PM-10:00PM; ALLB004;
FGSS200-01 Sex/Gender in Critical Perspective (FGSS Gateway) Pitts-Taylor,Victoria
FGSS216-01 Global America: Gender, Empire & Internationalism Since 1890 Zemach-Bersin,Talya
FGSS233-01 Global Queer Studies Weiss,Margot
FGSS236-01 Activism and Theories of Change Gabel-Brett,Leslie
...W... 07:10PM-10:00PM; ALLB304;
FGSS255-01 Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: Empowerment, Exploitation, and the Politics of Sex Kaye,Kerwin
FGSS264-01 Black Feminisms in the Americas: Politics, Representation, and Queer Ruminations of Elsewhere Sneed,Chriss
.M.W... 01:20PM-02:40PM; CAAS LOUNG;
FGSS277-01 Feminist Philosophy and Moral Theory (FGSS Gateway) Springer,Elise
.M.W... 01:20PM-02:40PM; RUSSMILLET;
FGSS305-01 Techniques of the Liar: Performance, Artifice, Fraud Damman,Catherine
FGSS309-01 Christianity and Sexuality Rubenstein,Mary-Jane Victoria
..T.R.. 10:20AM-11:40AM; BOGH112;
FGSS314-01 All the Feels: Affect Theory and Cultural Studies Silber,Lauren
.M..... 01:20PM-04:10PM; 116MTV102;
FGSS320-01 Staging Race in Early Modern England Korda,Natasha
FGSS321-01 BioFeminisms: Science, Matter, and Agency Pitts-Taylor,Victoria
FGSS326-01 Queer Times: Poetics, Activisms, Temporalities Cohen,Lisa
...W... 01:20PM-04:10PM; PAC421;
FGSS371-01 Sister Acts: Black Feminist/Womanist Theater of the African Diaspora McMahon,Rashida Z. Shaw
...W... 01:20PM-04:10PM; 116MTV102;


Is it possible to apply a default fade time(ex: 3 seconds) to new cues being stored to any executor?
At the moment, I'm having to store a new cue, then change the fade time separately.
push the "Time" button. Ther all the default times.
you can also use the Time button to apply a fade time into the cue you are going to store.


I wanted to try Bulgogi long time ago.
I watch many Korean Variety Shows and when they shown the Bulgogi dishes ...really make me drooling. I wanted to try this whatever it takes. At least once in life time.
I keep telling myself to live my life by eating less meat.
I did...anyway!!!! But hey...this does not mean it is a BIG NO NO NO...it just a reduce intake of all those meaty dishes.
Last weekend, Chingu decided to treat me at Bulgogi Brothers since somebody told me I need to have some meat at least to continue living. It is a cycle of life and I don't have to feel like a sinner just because they have to kill the cow to feed me the meat. WTH!
OK let us experience eating like Korean enjoy the Bulgogi!
This meat is thinly slice and eat it with gwangyang sauce. Not so strong taste to preserve the natural meat taste and all cook on hot plate right in front of us.
They add in guguma aka sweet potato, slices of leek, clove of garlic and mushrooms.
Served with 6 types of banchan aka korean side dishes which consist of seasoned brinjals, sweet guguma paste,lotus roots, morning glory,white radish and cabbage kimchi.
Wrap meat with salad and top with some banchan and then dip with sauce given.
There you go...SO KOREAN STYLE!!!!
We ordered Seafood Bibimbap to complete our dinner after watching the Guardian of Galaxy.
Oh! how I missed bibimbap at Paju which I ate last 2 years after my trip to DMZ. It was super delicious and taste to remember for life!!!!
The damage for all those dishes at Bulgogi Brothers????
RM86.90 include with one hot jar of corn tea.
The food just average taste.
I still prefer Dubu Dubu.
Upset me a lot....when we are about to make payment using credit card to collect 10 times point using Standard Chartered Credit card...that waiter said off line and they don't accept credit card and only CASH.
I am so upset....what if we are that kind who travel with less cash and just spend more use credit card???? I lost my 860 credit card points....isk isk isk. Like their food cost only less the RM20????
Two person eating can easily cost RM50 and above...so???? Credit card machine need to work all the time.Duh!!!!
If its not working display the signage 'credit card payment offline'!
aiks when do they want to open more outlets in penang!
Wah, credit card machine offline, that's the worst part!
exactly! ppl now totally cashless era!
Ya lor!!! the worst...one stay in the restaurant and the other run out to the nearest ATM. lol...if dine alone??? too bad...need to call somebody to rescue then.


text:
Thursday, 4 March 2021, 7:00 JST
Source: Chiseikan Dojo, Aikido in Kyoto
Chiseikan Dojo in Kyoto Grand Opening Event: "When in danger, how can you best protect yourself?"
Learn Practical Self Defense From One of Japan's Top Bodyguards
KYOTO, Japan, Mar 4, 2021 - (JCN Newswire) - Kyoto's Chiseikan Dojo (Nakagyo Ward, Kyoto City, Director: Yoshie Sugai) will hold a special "Grand Opening Seminar" on Saturday, April 3, 2021, to help teach children & adults the art of self-defense.
On April 3, 2021 as part of the grand opening of Nenshinryu Budo's Chiseikan Dojo in Nakagyo-ku, Kyoto, the CEO of one of Japan's top security firms (specializing in security and the protection or important individuals) will hold one special seminar for elementary school students and one more for junior high, high school students and adults entitled "The art of self-defense techniques that anyone can use." The maximum number of attendees for these two classes is limited to 12 participants each.
Almost every day there are news reports of sex-related crimes, random murders, street crime, and incidents targeting children and the elderly. Because of this, there is no telling when danger will strike. In this seminar, participants will be able to learn from one of Japan's top security professionals what they need to do to escape when they are suddenly grabbed or attacked, the best way to escape from an attacker if they are targeted, and how to use a bag or backpack and its contents to defend themselves.
This event will be held on April 3, 2021 and includes two separate classes. The first class will be held for students enrolled in elementary schools in Kyoto from 13:30-14:30. The second class will be held for students enrolled in junior high & high schools in Kyoto as well as adults living in Kyoto from 15:30-16:30. Reservations will be accepted on a first-come, first-served basis and will be closed as soon as the number of participants reaches the maximum. The participation fee is 2,500 yen for 1 person. Reservations are accepted only through the Chiseikan website. In order to strictly protect the privacy of the lecturer, assistants and related parties, all photographs and recordings without permission or approval of the Director of Chiseikan Dojo are prohibited.
April 3rd Program Details
13:00: Doors Open
13:30-14:30: Self Defense for Elementary School Children Seminar
Capacity: 12 people (students enrolled in a Kyoto City elementary school)*
15:30-16:30: Self Defense for older children and adults
General (Kyoto City residents of Junior high school age and older) capacity: 12 people*
*Applications will be closed as soon as the quota is reached.
This event will be taught by the CEO of a Kanto-based company involved in overall crisis management and security (Specializing in the protection of important individuals).
Outline of the Event
Event Name: Chiseikan Dojo Grand Opening Seminar
Venue: Chiseikan Dojo
Access: JUSTIN Ohnmae Building 3F, Mibu Higashi Takada-cho 43-6, Nakagyo Ward, Kyoto City
10 minute walk from the JR Sagano Line "Tambaguchi Station" on the east side of Kyoto City Hospital.
How to apply: From HP (https://en.aikidoinkyoto.com)
Fee: 2,500 yen
About Chiseikan
Chiseikan Dojo was founded with the spirit to help all students to "Learn together. Help each other. Grow together." Using Aikido as its foundation, the classes at Chiseikan integrate a variety of martial arts techniques including karate, judo, jujutsu, and iaido and also offer insights how to apply the lessons from the Japanese martial arts to living life more comfortably and smoothly. Additionally, Chiseikan Dojo holds Japanese business etiquette courses for international residents.
Company Name: Chiseikan
Location: JUSTIN Ohmae Building 3F, Mibu Higashi Takada-cho 43-6, Nakagyo Ward, Kyoto City
President & CEO: Yoshie Sugai
FOUNDED: January 11, 2021
URL: https://en.aikidoinkyoto.com
Customer Contact Information
From HP: https://en.aikidoinkyoto.com
TEL: 075-286-7036 (9:00-18:00)
For press information about this release, please contact:
Chiseikan, Director: Yoshie Sugai
E-mail: yoshie@aikidoinkyoto.com
Sectors: Sports
Chiseikan Dojo, Aikido in Kyoto Related News
Saturday, 24 September 2022, 7:00 JST
Seiryoku Zenyo, Jita Kyoei spirit is fundamental to Value Creation
2022年9月22日 16時02分 JST
「精力善用・自他共栄」は価値創造の基本です。 智誠館道場館長・合気道黒帯8段の須貝圭絵氏、国連総会科学サミットで講演へ
2022年3月26日 6時00分 JST
Chiseikan Dojo partners with KRP to hold 5-part BizDo Seminar Series ''The Way of Business Excellence''
Saturday, 26 March 2022, 7:00 JST
Chiseikan Dojo partners with KRP to hold 5-part BizDo Seminar Series "The Way of Business Excellence"


text:
The Master of the Třeboň Altarpiece () was a Bohemian painter active in Prague around 1380–1390. His name is derived from the Třeboň Altarpiece from the church of Saint Eligius at the Augustinian convent of Třeboň (known in German as "Wittingau"). The triptych depicts Christ on the Mount of Olives, The Tomb of Christ, and the Resurrection. It has been dated to around 1380, and is today held at the Convent of St. Agnes branch of the National Gallery in Prague.

Stylistically, the master seems to have been aware of French painting; in addition. He created the so-called "beautiful style", a Bohemian variant of the International Gothic style in which figures are placed in deep settings and modeled with chiaroscuro; such intensity had never before been seen in Bohemian art, but would be prominent in the work of future generations of artists. In addition, the master's influence can be seen in the work of other European artists of the period, most especially the Master of the Bamberg Altar.

A painting of Our Lady of Sorrows by the master, painted before 1380, once hung in the church of Církvice; a Madonna in Roudnice is now in Prague. The painter is also responsible for an Adoration of the Child in the castle of Hluboká Castle and a Crucifixion and a St. Mary of the Altar of Heaven in Prague; the latter is one of the first known Bohemian paintings to be displayed with a decorated frame as part of the composition. In addition, the Virgin with Saint Bartholomew and Saint Margaret, also in Hluboká, is believed to be by his hand.

Gallery

See also
Adoration of Our Lord from Hluboká
Třeboň Altarpiece

References

Sources

 Baragli, Sandra. European Art of the Fourteenth Century. LA: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2007.
 Chilvers, Ian. The Oxford Dictionary of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
 Hourihane, Colum. The Grove Encyclopedia of Medieval Art and Architecture, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
 Suckale, Robert. Gothic. Cologne: Taschen.

Further reading

Boehm, Barbara Drake. Prague: The Crown of Bohemia, 1347-1437. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2005.

14th-century births
14th-century Bohemian people
14th-century painters
Trebon Altarpiece, Master of the
Czech painters
International Gothic
Year of birth unknown
Year of death unknown

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Are you applying for your controlled substance license? We can help. We will work directly with your DEA agent and State Licensing Board.
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NEW YORK (AP) — Five-time Super Bowl champion Tom Brady is adding the title of author to his resume.
Tom Brady and Gisele Bunchen.
Simon & Schuster announced Thursday that it will publish the Patriots quarterback's debut book in September. "The TB12 Method: How to Achieve a Lifetime of Sustained Peak Performance" is described by the publisher as an "athletes' Bible" that will reveal Brady's methods for success. The book will explore Brady's path to his unusual training and exercise regimen.
In a statement, the former sixth-round draft pick calls himself "a great case study" on how the methods described in the book can transform an athlete.
Brady and New England won their fifth Super Bowl title in February by overcoming a 25-point deficit late in the game to defeat the Atlanta Falcons.


We might not realise it but in our modern world we're swimming in virtual sea of toxins. Toothpaste, cooking utensils, in our home and in our car; potentially harmful chemicals are almost impossible to escape. But, if you know where these molecular nasties are hiding there are things you can do to reduce your exposure and your chances of suffering in the future. In this Nightlife podcast Tony is entering the secretive world of toxins with authors of 'Toxin Toxout' Bruce Lourie and Rick Smith. TAKING OUT THE TOXINS PODCAST.


Optimas Vacu-Mobil E | Ingconsult Ltd.
The Optimas Vacu-Mobil E is equipped with a very quiet electric motor. This makes the Optimas Vacu-Mobil E an ideal machine for laying heavy slabs in, for example, pedestrian areas or residential zones. Concrete and natural stone elements up to a weight of 100 kg can be moved and accurately laid as if they were weightless.
- Pallet fork tines pick-up pockets for fast relocation on a building site or for small projects in open terrain.
- The 4 hydraulically controlled supporting legs allow the machine to be balanced easily and provide a secure positioning.


text:
Fans tab Drue Tranquill as biggest priority free agent to re-sign
Do the majority of fans agree to not rest the starters against the Broncos?
By Michael Peterson@ZoneTracks Jan 7, 2023, 10:00am PST
Share All sharing options for: Fans tab Drue Tranquill as biggest priority free agent to re-sign
Photo by Brandon Sloter/Icon Sportswire via Getty Images
For this week's SB Nation Reacts questions, I put up two additional questions on top of our usual confidence check-in. But first, let's see how everyone's feeling after the team's fourth consecutive win.
According to our results, 89 percent of participants believe the team is heading in the right direction. Apparently the remaining 11 percent are truly in the "Super Bowl or bust" camp.
As for the first of our two additional questions, I asked you all to which of these players is the biggest priority to re-sign this offseason: Drue Tranquill, Morgan Fox, Trey Pipkins, and Kyle Van Noy. Tranquill won by a landslide with 64 percent of the vote. Trey Pipkins came in second with just 16 percent.
Lastly, I wanted to know just how many of you agreed with Brandon Staley's decision to play the starters (should the Bengals lose to the Ravens) against the Broncos in the season finale in order to clinch the AFC's No. 5 seed. Per our results, a healthy 79 percent said they agreed with the decision.
Well of course we don't WANT to see the starters play because it means the Bengals dropped what should be a layup of a game, but either way, one more shot to see them in the regular season will always be welcomed with open arms.


A Virtual Private Network (VPN) allows you to privately browse the Internet by eliminating threats or supervisions of any kind. It's also a great way to reach Geo-blocked content. However, one of the biggest problems surrounding these types of providers is their inability to provide their users with a good connection speed.
It's common knowledge in this industry that VPNs slow down your Internet connection. However, although most times it turns out to be true, this, in fact, depends on many factors. If you are thinking about purchasing a VPN, or you already own one and are experiencing problems, there are a few things that you should know when it comes to speed.
How does a VPN slow down your connection?
When purchasing a VPN, you will get a set of features, including the number of servers and server locations. This means that the provider is offering you a list of IP address that will serve as a substitute for your own IP address, masking your real identity and location. Basically, this is the simple way of explaining how a VPN works. This and the encryptions.
However, the servers play a major role in determining your connection speed. Or more precisely, their distance and whether they are overcrowded or not.
If you are trying to connect to a server that is near you, obviously the speed will be much better as it doesn't have to travel to such a far destination. However, if you are trying to access, let's say a server in Japan, while your location is in Western Europe, chances are that the connection won't be the fastest one ever. Also, it's not always about the distance but the number of people using the server at the same time. The more people share a server, the bigger the chances are of buffering. Overcrowded servers are one of the main reasons for connection problems, not just speed. Additionally, if you have a provider with a large list of servers, then you'll have greater chances of finding one with decent speed.
The next and probably most obvious reason is the level of encryption your provider uses. A VPN encrypts all of the traffic traveling to and from your computer. It works as a safe tunnel between you and your Internet Service Provider, as well as the content you are trying to reach. This way you can bypass any restrictions and reach all content on the Internet anonymously. It's the number one reason behind purchasing such a service. Nowadays, lurkers are everywhere, and by using a VPN provider you will be protected from any kind of supervision. However, this comes at a price, besides the basic meaning of the word. Stronger levels of encryption slow down your Internet connection. And not just the encryptions, but the VPN protocols as well.
There are a few basic protocols, and most of the providers offer the following: PPTP, L2TP/IPSec, and OpenVPN. Each protocol has its own encryption level, and depending on your needs, they are used on different occasions. From these protocols above, the most advanced is the OpenVPN protocol, which means that by using it the chances of a slower connection are the highest. The other two are somewhat less encrypted and won't cause connection problems. In terms of encryptions, the most widely used and secure is the 256-bit encryption. According to the industry standards, it's a military type of encryption. Some providers offer an additional layer of security, such as the SSTP protocol, which is actually fast and with the best ratio of encryption, but only available for Windows. Other strong protocols and encryptions are used only if you value privacy much more than the overall experience of using a VPN provider.
You might be looking at the problem from the wrong angle. Many times, it's not the VPN with the faulty connection but your ISP. A high-speed connection may go up from 10Mbps to 1Gbps, and if this is the case, then your online experience won't be affected on a large scale. However, if your ISP cannot offer these speeds, then chances are you'll lose your patience when trying to download something, or even open a website.
When it comes to your IPS, someone else might be facing these problems or the interconnection between the ISP and the VPN could be bad. Sometimes due to this, you might lose even more than half of your speed after connecting to a VPN.
How can you improve speed?
After pointing out the main problems, the next step is to resolve them. The next four tips might help you with improving the speed while using a VPN provider. However, they are not a guarantee for an impeccable speed. At the end of the day, it all depends on the provider you choose.
Unless you need a more distant server, try to use the ones that are closer to your real location, and make sure the server you are using is not overcrowded. If you are trying to download content, stream or play games, it's the best possible solution. However, this is only for latency-dependent things, meaning that you can easily browse the web (an activity that isn't latency-dependent) regardless of your location.
Again, it depends on what the main reason behind using a VPN is. If you are a privacy freak, reducing the levels of encryption won't be the best solution. However, if you are using your VPN for something such as accessing region-locked content, it's perfectly safe to lower your guard. The fastest, thus weakest security protocol, is the PPTP, OpenVPN, and SSTP. The protocol that will slow down your speed the most is the IKEv2/IPSe one, so try to avoid using it.
Setting up a VPN on a home router is considered to be a great option, mainly because it allows you to connect to as many devices as you need. In comparison, the typical VPN service provider allows 3-5 connections included in the deal. However, unless you buy a special VPN router, chances are that connecting the network through this device will only result in connection problems. Routers are slow, therefore your Internet connection will be slow as well.
Bottom line, sometimes no matter how much you try to fix a problem, you won't get the wanted results. Therefore you are left with the last option – to change your VPN or ISP. If you located the problem in your ISP, it's easy to find a better provider, one which will offer you a better connection speed. If that's not the root of the problem, then you'll be better off with a new VPN provider. Sometimes we go after the price or the false promises which these companies give, only to end up with a faulty connection and bad features. Before deciding on a new provider, make sure you carefully go through everything they offer and choose only the best ones. Never go for a free provider, because chances are you won't get good service. Make sure you invest in your privacy, security, and speedy connection because it's the best way of getting an impeccable service.


text:
New website launched: Hearing Help
Hearing loss is often referred to as an 'invisible disability' due to there being no obvious early signs of symptoms. Did you know that it is estimated that one in six Australians is affected by hearing loss? This number is expected to rise to one in four people by 20501.
Last week, Australian Hearing launched a new free support service, to coincide with Hearing Awareness Week. The new website, called Hearing Help, is set to be a game changer, helping the millions of Australians who are impacted by hearing loss and find it difficult to seek impartial advice and support.
Whilst there are general medical helplines available in Australia, Hearing Help is the first that is purely dedicated to hearing, putting people directly in touch with a fully qualified hearing specialist, either over the phone or via live web chat, incurring no out-of-pocket expenses.
Gina Mavrias, Australian Hearing Chief Operating Officer, said the new service has been created to address the barriers that face many Australians with hearing loss, in today's rapidly evolving society.
"Hearing Help is about making hearing advice convenient and easily accessible - whether that's browsing the website for resources, asking for help through online chat, or picking up the phone to chat directly with a hearing specialist. This way, we're not asking people to physically travel to a hearing centre.
"We can help with all manner of hearing associated questions. We can help people wanting information on hearing related conditions, such as tinnitus. We can share knowledge on the most technological advances on hearing devices, or help someone wanting to know how to get a hearing check.
Good hearing is essential to communication, but when it starts to decline, frustration can creep in. That's one of the many reasons why we created Hearing Help; as a valuable support line for the entire family.
"We can help time-poor parents who appreciate instant access to information for their child. We can also help loved ones wanting to know how they can help their partner communicate again," says Ms Mavrias.
In addition to the free phone and web chat support, Hearing Help is backed by a new resource hub, which also includes a free hearing test. Australians can call a fully qualified hearing specialist on Freecall 1800 740 301 or visit hearinghelp.com.au.
1. Listen Hear! Access Economics, https://audiology.asn.au/public/1/files/Publications/ListenHearFinal.pdf


text:
Q: How to fix breakpoint expressions in Visual Studio 2017 With VS2012 you could use some collection methods in breakpoint expressions such as this:
test.Contains("3")

However, with 2017 this throws the following error:

The condition for a breakpoint failed to execute. The condition was
  'test.Contains("3")'. The error returned was 'error CS1061: 'string[]'
  does not contain a definition for 'Contains' and no accessible
  extension method 'Contains' accepting a first argument of type
  'string[]' could be found (are you missing a using directive or an
  assembly reference?)'. Click OK to stop at this breakpoint.

Has this just something to do with my VS2017 instance or did they break something in 2017? Does anyone know how to resolve it. Breakpoint expressions were great in 2012 but they're pretty much useless in 2017.

A: I just tried this in my Visual Studio Enterprise 2017 Version 15.9.5. My conditional breakpoint test.Contains("foo") works as expected.

A: Did you mean test to be of type List<string> or string[] (just as the error message suggests)?
If you meant to use System.Collections.Generic.List.Contains(string), just fix the type of test.

If you want test to be of type string[], read to end.
The error you are receiving is the same Compiler Error you would get if you would write the Conditional Expression from the Breakpoint in code:
using System;

internal static class Program
{
    private static void Main(string[] args)
    {
        string[] test = { "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9" };

        test.Contains("3"); //Compiler Error
    }
}

string[] does not contain a definition for Contains accepting a first argument of type string.
In order to access the extension method Enumerable.Contains in the Namespace System.Linq, you need to bring it into scope with this using directive in code:
using System.Linq;

Additionally, you need to use any type or method from that namespace in code, in order for the breakpoint condition to work as expected.
Alternatively, you may call the method directly:
System.Linq.Enumerable.Contains(test, "3")

However, you still need to add the corresponding using directive and actually use any type or method from that namespace in code.