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4th Annual RePurpose It Contest! Entries must contain an items that has been repurposed to make something new.
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Since October 2012, Bahrain's government has jailed eleven netizens for allegedly writing anonymous Tweets that refer to Bahrain's King Hamad using terms such as "dictator" (الطاغية) or "fallen one" (الساقط). The Government contends that such Tweets run afoul of Bahrain's penal code, which prohibits "offending the Amir." The present report, which is based on an eight-month investigation we conducted, shows that the Government apparently identified these individuals by sending the anonymous accounts malicious IP spy links from a network of Twitter and Facebook accounts impersonating well-known opposition figures or other seemingly friendly individuals.
When a netizen clicks on an IP spy link, they reveal the IP (Internet Protocol) address of the internet connection they clicked from. The Government can then compel the internet service provider of the IP address to disclose the real name and street address of that internet connection's subscriber. Armed with a street address, the Government can conduct house raids, searches, and arrests. At trial, the Government links the subscriber's IP address to the account, citing "secret evidence." While the netizen is in jail, the Government apparently accesses their online accounts, and may target followers, friends, or contacts via private messages.
As we illustrate, using IP spy links to identify the author of a Tweet is unreliable: individuals other than the author can click on the IP spy link, and the link can be clicked from an internet connection not registered in the author's name. In at least one case, an individual with no affiliation to the anonymous account in question was accused, convicted, and sentenced to prison; he was the subscriber of an internet connection that someone else used to click on an IP spy link sent to the account. The consequences of clicking do not always include jail time: some have lost their jobs, or suffered intimidation, house raids, or beatings because they were identified as the authors of anonymous Tweets that their employers or the Government found offensive. In all, our investigation identifies more than 120 both pro- and anti-Government accounts that were targeted with IP spy links traceable to the Government. In many of these cases, the Government has apparently not yet acted on information received from these links. By and large, the ostensible design of the Government's IP spy campaign is to silence anonymous online dissent.
20. Target: Sahab Bint Abdullah Al-Saud?
Many people who are politically active in Bahrain conceal their true identity online to avoid reprisals or prosecution for criticizing the Government. Unsurprisingly, the Government wants to unmask these anonymous netizens. Since September 2011 or earlier, Bahrain's Government has been targeting anonymous social media accounts, apparently in an effort to identify their operators. The Government targets accounts using malicious links and social engineering. It appears that the Ministry of Interior's Cyber Crime Unit is orchestrating the attack. Victims receive malicious links from dozens of online accounts designed to appear legitimate: for example, an account named @Ali_Salman_, which impersonates the Secretary General of Bahrain's largest licensed opposition party Al-Wefaq, and an account named @QamrAlKhalifa, a fake member of the Al-Khalifa ruling family. In some cases, the accounts are designed to impersonate the friends of a target: for example they created an account @aIboflasa to impersonate @alboflasa, a former army officer who became Bahrain's first political prisoner after speaking at the Pearl Roundabout. The Government also sends malicious links through Facebook, e-mail, and likely via other services including YouTube, InstaMessage, and mobile messaging services including BlackBerry Messenger and WhatsApp. This attack puts the Cyber Crime Unit in the position of advising against "trusting strangers on social media networks," while at the same time apparently exploiting this trust to compromise users.
Some of the malicious links sent by the Government are phishing links, as well as links to what appears to be spyware. However, the vast majority of the links are designed to reveal the IP address of the internet connection used to open the link. When an individual connects to the internet on his computer or phone, they are temporarily assigned an IP address by the phone company or internet provider whose service they are using (e.g., Batelco, Zain, Menatelecom, etc). Bahraini law requires that every time an IP address is assigned, the internet service provider must record the name of the subscriber of the internet connection, as well as the date and time. This information must be preserved for at least one year, and the security forces must be able to directly access this information at any time.
The Government apparently discovers an IP address by using various freely available IP Spy services. The services provide an easy three-step process for "locat[ing] your target:" first, you generate a link, then, you send it to your "victim," who clicks on it, and finally, you receive an IP address via e-mail.
These are the freely available IP Spy services that the Government apparently uses to unmask activists.
Typically, each anonymous account is targeted with a unique IP spy link. When someone clicks on one of these links, the Government receives the IP address of the internet connection used to open the link, and can request the name and address of the internet subscriber. However, this process does not reliably identify the author of an anonymous message. The author is correctly identified only if (1) the individual who clicked is the author of the anonymous message, and (2) the author clicked on the link while using an internet connection registered in their name (e.g., their personal 3G or home DSL service). However, these assumptions are not necessarily valid. Often, the attackers send links using mentions on Twitter; a user is alerted when they are mentioned in a Tweet, but that Tweet is also publicly visible. The attackers likely use this strategy because they do not have access to accounts that are friends of their desired targets; Twitter only allows an account to send private messages to its followers. Because Twitter mentions are public, people other than the intended target can see the IP spy links, and may click on them. Thus, the Government may receive the IP addresses of these people, who are not associated with the anonymous Tweet or the targeted account. We identify more than 120 cases where a Government account targeted a Twitter account with an IP spy link using a public mention. In these cases, an individual not associated with the targeted account may have clicked on the link. Even if an operator of the account clicks on the link, he may not be the author of the anonymous message; many targeted accounts have multiple operators.
Despite the unreliability of this IP Spy method in identifying the authors of anonymous messages, the Government appears to be relying on it to persecute and prosecute. Some anonymous users who have clicked on these links have been subjected to house raids, beatings, arrests, account hacking, and dismissal from their jobs. Some have been convicted in court and sentenced to jail for Tweeting. In many cases, the consequences that these individuals have suffered are apparently a direct result of them having clicked on IP spy links. Some who have been arrested in these cases report that during interrogation, they saw or were shown papers from their internet service provider. Several technically savvy individuals described the papers as showing an IP address and a date and time. Others claim interrogators explained that the papers proved they were guilty of operating their anonymous accounts, and demanded their confession on that basis.
In at least one case, an operator of an anonymous Twitter account clicked on an IP spy link using someone else's internet connection; the subscriber of the connection was jailed for operating the account despite having no connection to it.
Ali Faisal Al-Shufa is a 17 year old student currently serving one year in prison for allegedly insulting the King using the @alkawarahnews account. The Public Prosecution claims it linked his IP address to the account on 9 December 2012. Around this time, the Facebook account linked to the Twitter account was targeted with an IP spy link via private message.
Ammar Makki Mohammed Al-Aali is a teacher currently serving one year in prison for allegedly insulting the King through the @14Feb_Tube account. During cross-examination at trial, Fawaz Al-Sumaim of the Cyber Crime Unit stated that Unit had obtained Ammar's IP address through "a private way I cannot reveal." It appeared as though the Government might be operating account after his arrest.
M was one of the operators of an anonymous village news account on Twitter. M received and clicked on an IP spy link in the Facebook account linked to the Twitter account, while connected through wi-fi belonging to one of the houses in the village. That house was raided three months later by police. Police failed to find a phone or laptop with the account open, and arrested the eldest son in the house, even though he was not associated with the account.
Salman Darwish was arrested from his home in East Riffa on 16 October 2012, and served one month in prison for allegedly insulting the King using an anonymous Twitter account. His family reported that police extracted a confession from him after a 27-hour interrogation during which they prevented him from drinking, eating, or using the bathroom. The Government apparently took an interest in his account two months prior to his arrest, and may have targeted him via direct message.
Mahdi al-Basri is a lawyer whose internet connection was used to send Tweets that the Government viewed as insulting to the King from the @karranah14 account. One of the account operators recalled receiving and clicking on a suspicious link in the past while using an internet connection registered to Mahdi. Mahdi was convicted of sending the Tweets, and is currently serving one year in prison.
Sami Abdulaziz Hassan is the leader of a trade union at Japanese engineering firm Yokogawa Middle East. He was sacked from his job in early 2013 after he was identified as the author of anonymous Tweets exposing alleged labor law violations by his employer. His Twitter account was targeted with IP spy links sent publicly via mentions. His company had filed a complaint about the Twitter account with Bahrain's police.
Twitter accounts advocating for labor issues, including @Garamco_dismisse, and @BAS_OPPRESSED.
Parody accounts for high-ranking Government officials, including @SheikhKhalifaPM, @RashedKhalifa, @TariqAlHassan, and @Samorarajab.
An account instrumental in challenging dubious official government stories about individuals killed by security forces, @BAHRAINDOCTOR. She was threatened with arrest, after a friend clicked on an IP spy link sent to her.
A prominent translator of news from Bahrain into French, with connections in the French media, @BrokenAngel077. An IP spy account said that he had obtained her information, and threatened to "break" her "part by part" unless she agreed to stop Tweeting.
An account that Tweeted information about Government surveillance programs, and the names of policemen allegedly responsible for abusing detainees in custody, @The_Cheaters1. He noticed initial attempts to target him, but may have eventually been identified.
An anti-Government account, @mn9oreen_bh. An IP spy account allegedly sent him a link; after @mn9oreen_bh opened it from his phone, the account requested that he open it from his laptop, because it was not possible to spy on his phone.
Pro-Government residents whose homes may be seized to develop a Government housing project, including @DR3_AL7OORA, @hoora318, and @FYOUSIF00.
A member of the Saudi ruling family and the wife of a son of Bahrain's King, @SahabAbdullah8, may have been targeted. An IP spy account appeared to stop a cyber blackmail attempt against Sahab, and then requested her help via direct message.
Sunni activists and Groups, including the 30 December Movement, and a member of the Al-Fateh Youth Coalition.
A notorious vigilante account allegedly operated by a member of Bahrain's ruling family, @mnarfezhom. The Cyber Crime Unit confirmed it had opened an investigation into the account after a complaint was filed accusing @mnarfezhom of defaming high-ranking politicians.
We also issue urgent guidelines to operators of anonymous accounts on how to minimize the chance of their identity being revealed via this type of attack.
In the past year, at least 11 people have been imprisoned and charged with insulting the King on Twitter, according to media reports. They have been sentenced to periods ranging from 1-12 months for violating Article 214 of the Penal Code, which proscribes offending the King. We have compiled the following partial list of those convicted in such cases.
It appears the accusations are referring to Tweets made via anonymous accounts.
At trial, the Public Prosecution's case rests on "secret evidence" used by the Cyber Crime Unit to link the defendant's IP address to the anonymous account. The defense argued that this does not constitute proof that the defendant authored the tweets in question. This argument was rejected.
When the defense requested information on how the IP address was obtained by the Ministry of Interior, the requests were declined.
The defense argued that a warrant is required to obtain the personally identifying information associated with an IP address.
In several cases, the defense noted that the anonymous account allegedly operated by the defendant remained active even while they were in prison. The defense argued that the continued activity implied that others could have published the offensive Tweets. This argument was rejected.
Lawyers requested copies of communications between the Ministry of Interior and internet service providers, as well as copies of search warrants, but often did not receive these items.
We received further information that two of the defendants were allegedly mistreated to extract confessions. For example, Ammar Makki says he was taken to a room with dogs and threatened with torture if he did not sign a paper affirming that he ran the account.
We provide an overview of some of these cases in more detail.
Accused of Tweeting Various Tweets referring to Bahrain's King as a "dictator/tyrant" (الطاغية) and "fallen one/illegitimate" (الساقط).
Targeted with IP spy links? The Facebook account linked to @alkawarahnews was targeted with at least one IP spy link.
Clicked on IP Spy link? No information.
IP address linked to account at time of click? Documents filed by the Public Prosecutor show that an IP address was linked to the account on 9 December 2012.
Suffered consequences? Ali is serving one year in prison.
Ali Faisal Al-Shufa is a 17 year old student currently serving one year in prison for allegedly insulting the King using the @alkawarahnews account. We obtained the files for Ali's court case, and publish selected excerpts below.
I would like to inform you that I opened the Twitter account (@alkawarahnews) to spread news of events in the village (Kawarah) and the situation in Bahrain, I began to spread Tweets on the clashes that occurred there…I was tricked by the revolution and believed the rumors of bringing mercenaries from the outside to suppress protesters, kill them and torture them, however I found out that these are untrue.
Q: What are the details of your confession?
A: I opened the Twitter account (@alkawarahnews) in March 2011 and in the beginning was spreading news about events that occurred in Kawarah such as weddings and religious festivities and after that I began to spread news of protests that occurred in Bahrain. I also took Tweets from other accounts and Tweeted them myself including terms like (trickster Hamad, dictator Hamad). I did not write these terms myself but copied them from other accounts and pasted them through my own account on Twitter.
Q: When did this occur?
A: I do not remember exactly but I think it was around July 2012.
Q: How were you arrested and summoned?
A: The police came to my house on [12 March 2013] around 2AM and they took me to be investigated, recorded what I said and bringing me to you today.
Q: How long have you been connected to the Internet?
A: I have been using the Internet for a long time, using my personal laptop for personal things and also using my phone to run my personal Twitter account.
Q: What is the display image shown in the account?
A: It is the body of the Pearl Roundabout with wings and a red background with Arabic writing on it saying "Al Kawarah Media Network," and I made this image.
Q: How many people follow your account?
A: Around 9 thousand, I don't know.
Q: What is your relationship to them?
A: I don't know any of them.
Q: How many tweets did your account publish?
A: I don't remember exactly, around 10 thousand.
Q: What are the terms used in those tweets?
A: Like I said the Tweets were about news from Al Kawarah village but then I published tweets about the demonstrations that were taking place in Bahrain, specifically in Al Kawarah, and some of those Tweets insulted his majesty the King such as (dictator Hamad, the fallen Hamad).
Q: And whom did you mean by those terms?
A: His Majesty the King Hamad Bin Isa.
Q: How do you publish these tweets?
A: I use my mobile phone where I copy them from other accounts and publish them through my own.
Q: What is the reason of using # in those tweets?
A: I use this symbol so the news can be published in accounts such as #bahrain, #14feb.
Q: How many tweets used those terms?
A: I don't remember exactly, around 5 or 6 tweets.
We contacted @alkawarahnews, who reported receiving two suspicious links around December 2012. One link was from "Red Sky" (https://facebook.com/red.sky.446), and one was from "Save Bah" (https://facebook.com/save.bah.1).
Accused of Tweeting No information.
Targeted with IP spy links? The Facebook account linked to the Twitter account is friends with a known IP spy account.
IP address linked to account at time of click? No information.
Suffered consequences? Ammar is serving 1 year in prison. The @14Feb_Tube account may have been operated by the Government after Ammar's arrest.
Ammar Makki Mohammed Al-Aali is a teacher currently serving one year in prison for allegedly insulting the King using the @14Feb_Tube account. Bahrain Watch obtained a portion of the defense's cross-examination of Lieutenant Fawaz Al-Sumaim of the Cyber Crime Unit. We translate the relevant portion below.
Defense: What information do you have about the case?
Fawaz: Through our daily work monitoring social media and Twitter, we discovered an account that was making verbal defamations against His Majesty the King. Based on this, we carried out the necessary investigation to ascertain the identity of the owner of the account. Our investigation uncovered that the owner is Ammar Al-Aali. We then opened a case file with this information and sent it to the Public Prosecution to get an arrest warrant and a warrant to search his house to obtain the equipment that was used to carry out this crime. After obtaining permission, a police force unit was sent to arrest the defendant and his equipment from his house, who were then accompanied to the department, and a case file was opened to record his statements and confession that he registered the account in question, and that he insulted the King, and that he registered other accounts not mentioned in the file, which were used for the same purposes, to insult the King, in the way described in the file.
Defense: What kind of investigation did you carry out?
Fawaz: It is a secret investigation.
Defense: What was the content of the investigation?
Fawaz: The investigation is a way to get to the user of the account used to insult the King, by finding out the IP address, which determines the identity of the person using the internet line to open the account.
Defense: How do you get the IP address?
Fawaz: Through a private methods of our department that cannot be disclosed.
Defense: Did the defendant write the tweet insulting the King?
Defense: Did you continue monitoring the account after the defendant was arrested to see that it was continuing to post tweets that were insulting to his Majesty, the King? Fawaz: That issue isn't my specialisation.
The Facebook page linked to @14Feb_Tube was friends with a Government account, Amal Al-Shareef (https://facebook.com/Amalalshareeef).
On 13 May 2013 -- more than two months after his arrest -- the account Ammar was accused of operating retweeted this video. The tweet no longer appears on his account.
While monitoring @14Feb_Tube, Bahrain Watch noticed that the account appeared to suddenly become active again in early July 2013. Bahrain Watch reported the account to Twitter as a possible victim of account hacking. Bahrain Watch noticed that the account had been suspended on 16 July 2013.
Date of Sentencing Case was dropped after arrest.
Linked to Account A village news account.
Targeted with IP spy links? The Facebook account linked to the Twitter account was targeted with an IP spy link in December 2012.
Clicked on IP Spy link? M recalls clicking on the IP spy. Logs show that the link was clicked once from Facebook on the same day it was sent.
IP address linked to account at time of click? A person interrogated recalls seeing a paper showing an IP address and a date and time. They do not recall the date and time shown on the paper.
Suffered consequences? Their house was raided and electronic devices were confiscated.
M was one of the operators of a Twitter account that spreads information, pictures, and videos about protests in a specific village (a "village news account"), and its associated Facebook account. In December 2012, the account received an IP spy link from "Red Sky" (http://facebook.com/red.sky.446) in a Facebook private message. M clicked on the link while connected to the internet through a wi-fi connection of one of the houses in the village.
On 12 March 2013, that house was raided around 2 AM by police. According to the family living there, police searched their home, confiscated all computers, and asked family members to unlock their phones. Police looked for open Facebook or Twitter accounts on the phones, seemingly in an effort to find a device with the targeted village news account. The family described how police used a device wrapped in an orange bag to detect the whereabouts of phones hidden in different locations around the house. Police failed to find any device with the village news account open, however, and arrested the eldest son in the house even though he was not associated with the account.
During interrogation, police urged him to confess that he was the operator of the account. Police said they had concrete evidence that he had insulted the King, and told him that they knew that the IP address of his house's connection operated the account. They showed him printouts of Tweets from the account, as well as a paper from Batelco. The paper from Batelco allegedly displayed the IP address of their house's connection along with a date and time, details of the connection's subscriber, and web history logs showing that the internet connection was used to access twitter.com. The police released him after interrogation and did not pursue charges against him.
Targeted with IP spy links? Known IP spy accounts sent messages to @JehadAbdulla.
Suffered consequences? Salman served one month in prison. His father claims he was mistreated during interrogation.
Salman Darwish was arrested from his home in East Riffa on 16 October 2012 and accused of insulting the King on Twitter using the @JehadAbdulla account. He was sentenced to one month in jail on 5 November 2012. Salman and his family deny the allegations that he insulted the King and claim that he has no connection to @JehadAbdulla.
Salman's father demands his release.
Salman was interrogated for a continuous 27 hour period where he was denied food, drink and use of a bathroom.
After police threatened that they would summon his mother and sisters for interrogation, Salman confessed to the charges.
While Salman was in detention he was denied adequate healthcare for a rare illness he has which makes him suffer chronic kidney stones.
Before his arrest, a doctor warned Salman he had 15 stones which required close medical attention.
Due to mistreatment in custody, Salman caught an infection and his health deteriorated, necessitating his transfer to the prison clinic.
Salman commented on his ordeal from his personal Twitter account.
The King orders 185 million dinars to Gulf Air.. From where did you get that money you weakest and stingiest King in the world? while people beg for health treatment in newspapers. #Bahrain.
The King remaining in his position has become a danger to Sunnis, there has to be solutions for this. This King has turned the state against Sunnis at a time when we are facing the Shia threat.
#The_people_of_Bahrain_condemn_the_building_of_biggest_church .. Yes King we oppose you directly and openly and do not fear anyone in the sake of God. You are disobeying God and you must stop.
A fake Ali Salman account associated with the IP spy campaign tells @JehadAbdulla that Sunni and Shia are brothers. Salman Darwish joined his Shia brothers in prison several months later.
@JehadAbdulla says hello to an IP spy account.
Targeted with IP spy links? The Facebook account linked to @karranah14 was targeted with an IP spy link.
Clicked on IP Spy link? An account operator told us that Mahdi was not associated with the account. This operator recalled clicking on a "suspicious link" at some point in the past using Mahdi's internet connection.
Suffered consequences? Madhi is serving one year in prison.
N is one of several people who operate the @karranah14 Twitter account and a linked Facebook account. These accounts disseminate the latest news about the uprising in the Bahraini village of Karrana. N recalls clicking on a suspicious link by mistake in the past, while using an internet connection registered to Mahdi Al-Basri. However, N does not have the old link, as he says that the group periodically deletes all old messages from their Facebook and e-mail accounts. The Facebook account was targeted with an IP spy link recently, on 25 July 2013.
Amal Al-Shareef targets the account. We reported the link to is.gd for an abuse of their terms of service, and they disabled it.
Mahdi Al-Basri, a lawyer, was accused of operating @karranah14 and jailed. However, Mahdi is not associated with @karranah14, as confirmed by N. Mahdi's personal account @MahdiAlbasri1, while generally sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, does not seem to contain any Tweets that the Government might view as insulting to the King.
According to Mahdi's family, police raided their house at around 3AM on 12th March 2013. Police searched the house, confiscated computers, and inspected phones. No device was found with @karranah14 or the linked Facebook account. Police allegedly damaged some belongings in Mahdi's room during the course of the search. Mahdi asked to see the search/arrest warrant but the police did not provide one, and allegedly laughed at his request. During his interrogation and trial, Mahdi consistently denied the charges against him.
Date of Arrest No information.
Date of Sentencing Not sentenced.
Accused of Tweeting Tweets against his employer.
Targeted with IP spy links? The @YLUBH account was publicly targeted several times with IP spy links. Two IP spy accounts apparently sent e-mails to @YLUBH.
Suffered consequences? Sami was sacked from his job for Tweeting.
Sami Abdulaziz Hassan was the leader of the "Yokogawa Labor Union of Bahrain," a trade union at the Middle East division of Japanese engineering firm Yokogawa. He was sacked from his job in early 2013 after he was identified as the author of anonymous Tweets exposing alleged labor law violations by his employer. His Twitter account was targeted with IP spy links sent publicly via Twitter mentions. His company had filed a complaint about the Twitter account with Bahrain's police. Yokogawa Middle East claimed that Sami was sacked for failing to inform the company about the police investigation.
@YLUBH claims Yokogawa is not abiding by various local labor laws, including those that mandate annual leave and sick leave.
Several IP spy accounts targeted @YLUBH in November and December 2012.
@YLUBH also may have been targeted via e-mail. While monitoring IP spy accounts, we noticed that two accounts messaged @YLUBH, asking to talk in private. In both cases, @YLUBH publicly responded with its e-mail address.
@YLUBH gives its e-mail address to an IP spy account.
A fake journalist may have contacted @YLUBH with a malicious link.
Another IP spy account, @sabreeena30, contacted @YLUBH on November 18, posing as an ex-employee.
@sabreeena30 claims to be an ex-employee.
The General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, Bahrain's made trade union coalition, criticized the sacking of Sami Abdulaziz, and demanded his reinstatement.
Gulf Daily News article on Sami Abdulaziz's dismissal.
This photo published by @SAIDYOUSIF shows Sami Abdulaziz at the GFBTU's 2013 May Day rally in support of sacked workers in Bahrain.
This section looks in more depth at the types of accounts that the Government uses to send IP spy links. The Government's goal in designing an IP spy account is to trick users into trusting the account.
These accounts attempt to impersonate a well-known individual.
These accounts represent fake people, usually attractive women or fake members of prominent families.
Moonbahr is an Instagram profile for a fake, attractive woman. The profile solicits targets to chat on InstaMessage, a service for sending messages using Instagram.
Facebook account Amal Al-Shareef uses the same picture.
These Twitter accounts for fake members of the Al-Buainain and Al-Khalifa families targeted Sunni and pro-Government groups.
The most common type of IP spy account exploits Twitter's sans-serif font, which renders a capital "I" and lowercase "l" in exactly the same way. These accounts have the same display picture, name, and description as trusted accounts, except they use a capital "I" instead of a lowercase "l" in the account's username. These accounts will typically send IP spy links using public mentions, as they have very few followers. The Tweets are deleted soon after the links are clicked on, and the accounts are frequently renamed. The following image from Topsy shows a small sample of such targeting. Topsy occasionally archives deleted Tweets, and renders all usernames in lowercase.
Being fooled by these impersonators may have disastrous consequences.
In some cases, IP spy accounts are very clever in their targeting. For example, they may impersonate one of the participants in a Twitter conversation, and send a malicious link.
This conversation has three participants: @saudi44, @AlBinSanad, and @AIBinSanad. Can you spot the imposter?
@slows77, a pro-Government Twitter user critical of the Muharraq Council might have thought that notorious pro-Government vigilante @7areghum was sharing a link with him if he didn't look closely at the spelling of the username.
In other cases, two vowels are permuted, or an additional copy of a vowel is added.
The letters "ai" are permuted to "ia" in "Alshaikh."
An extra "o" is added to "maloood."
The biggest potential risk to netizens comes when the Government gains credentials to access a trusted account.
On 12 March 2013, two brothers were arrested for allegedly operating the @Abu_Haider and @AboHamzah_BH accounts. After their arrest, both accounts showed activity: they regularly posted stories from major news outlets. We received information that this continued activity was the work of legitimate account operators. On 4 July 2013, while the brothers were still in prison, we observed that both accounts began to exhibit different behavior. The behavior seemed to be part of a Government effort to target or infiltrate the Tamarrod Bahrain movement, which calls for protests on 14 August 2013.
@AboHamzah_BH followed two accounts on 4 July 2013.
On 4 July 2013, @AboHamzah_BH followed two new accounts. The first was @Buhassan23, an account that had been repeatedly targeted by IP spy accounts in the previous few days. @Buhassan23 is an apparent key supporter of the Tamarrod Bahrain movement. The second was a known IP spy account account, @AlToobIi, which had only three other followers. The account was designed to impersonate @AlToobli. The new follows by @AboHamzah_BH were not follow-backs, and @AboHamzah_BH did not exhibit other follow-back behavior. According to our observations, @AlToobIi never mentioned @Abo_HamzahBH. It is worth noting that when an account blocks a follower, the follower automatically unfollows the account; unblocking this individual does not cause them to automatically re-follow you. Based on all of these factors, it seems likely that @AboHamzah_BH following @AlToobIi is an indication that the Government had access to this account.
@AlToobIi had three other followers, two of which are IP spy accounts.
While @AboHamzah_BH was apparently being operated by the Government, legitimate operation continued as well. This raises an alarming possibility: the Government may surreptitiously operate accounts, while the legitimate operators believe they are still in control.
@Abu_Haider followed three accounts on 4 July 2013.
On 4 July 2013, @Abu_Haider followed three new accounts. Two were common Government targets at the time: @tamarrodbh and @TamarrodBahrain, anonymous accounts that originated the Tamarrod Bahrain movement. The third account was @alaashehabi, the account of Bahrain Watch member Ala'a Shehabi, who had contemporaneously tweeted a warning that the Cyber Crime Unit was sending malicious links to identify and arrest anonymous users. In addition to following these three accounts, @Abu_Haider changed its profile picture to the Tamarrod Bahrain logo, and retweeted a number of tweets in support of Tamarrod, as well as Ala'a's warning. This unusual activity by @Abu_Haider did not go unnoticed among his followers.
A concerned Twitter user was apparently suspicious about @Abu_Haider's change in activity, and warned his followers.
Another account whose operator is allegedly in prison, @14Feb_Tube, began tweeting messages from "unfalert" a few days after 4 July 2013. The "unfalert" service sends tweets from an account when a user unfollows that account.
We reported @Abu_Haider, @AboHamzah_BH, and @14Feb_Tube to Twitter as possible victims of account hacking. We checked these accounts on 16 July 2013, and noticed that they were suspended.
On 24 November 2012, Reda al-Fardan, a member of Bahrain Watch based in France, was targeted by @RedSky446 with an IP spy link sent via direct message.
The IP spy link that Reda received from @RedSky446. The full name of the account is cut off in the image due to screen size constraints.
The attacker used two different IP Spy services: iplogger.org and ip-spy.com. The ip-spy.com link contains a parameter "to," which contains a Base64-encoded string. Decoding this string reveals an e-mail address: [email protected] We went to ip-spy.com and registered with our own e-mail address to test. The site gave us a link that had a "to" parameter containing a Base64 representation of the e-mail address that we provided. We clicked on our link and received an e-mail containing our IP address. This indicates that the "to" parameter represents the e-mail address that the IP spy data is sent to.
Checking the statistics for the bit.ly link (https://bitly.com/XNSdXS+) shows us that the link was created by a bit.ly user known as "al9mood" (https://bitly.com/u/al9mood), who is associated with hundreds of other links.
At this time, we did not realize that the IP spy attack was associated with the Government. We finally reported @RedSky446 to Twitter on 6 May 2013. On 15 May 2013, we noted that the account was suspended. An examination of @RedSky446's Twitter timeline reveals that his behavior changed on 17 October 2012. It is possible that his account was hacked, or he was arrested on this date. His last tweets mentioned the arrest of Twitter users on 16 October 2012, and contained advice on how to safely operate anonymous accounts using the TOR browser and VPNs. It also appears that @RedSky446's Facebook account was taken over around the same time (http://facebook.com/red.sky.446).
We were unable to find anyone who knew @RedSky446 in real life. Several individuals who did not know him suspected that he lived in London.
This section looks at the types of IP spy links we have observed. Broadly, there are four types of these links. All types capture the IP address of the user who clicks on them. The first type of link is designed to alert users to the fact that they have been targeted. We saw one instance of this type of link used, which displayed the following page.
The second type of link is designed to fool users into think that no malicious behavior has occurred by showing them an error page.
The third type of link is designed to convince users that no malicious activity has occurred by redirecting them to a legitimate website. These links behave like bit.ly or goo.gl URLs. The only way to detect them is by expanding the entire URL chain. A service like longurl.org can help identify this.
The fourth type of link is designed to convince users that no malicious activity has occurred by redirecting them to an innocuous-looking website. Instead of capturing the user's IP in a hop of the redirect chain, the page they are redirected to embeds an IP spy image. One service called "Richtweets" allows a tweeter to embed remote images into Tweets posted on the service. The attackers leveraged this capability to embed an image that captures the IP address of everyone who views a specific Tweet on Richtweets.
The IP spy campaign also made use of Webs, a service for designing and hosting free websites. For example, we saw links to the following page, which contains text copied from Wikipedia, as well as an embedded IP spy image.
IP spy page hosted by free web hosting company Webs.
Besides IP spy links, accounts linked to the Government sent out a number of other types of links. In one case, we found a link http://tinyurl.com/feb142012, which pointed to what appeared to be a Twitter phishing page. The phishing page contained a message "Confirm Your Account to Continue," and a place for a user to enter a username and password. The page also showed a map of Bahrain with a marker at the Pearl Roundabout, the center of mass protests in 2011. We do not know who was sent this link, or how they were targeted, but the use of the term "feb14" -- the date of the start of protests in 2011 -- and the map of the Pearl Roundabout -- indicates politically-motivated targeting.
Twitter Phishing Page that contains a map showing the Pearl Roundabout.
We also noted that Government-linked accounts sent several links to files hosted on MediaFire. We suspect that these files contained spyware. However, we have been unable to locate any of these files to verify this hypothesis. The uploader appears to have taken down the first file, and marked the latter two as private. Please search your computers for these file names, and contact Bahrain Watch if you have them.
We estimate that around 20-40 users from Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Romania, and the US clicked on this link.
10/25/2012 37vvl6ionj7gefr أمير سعودي يلهو مع بنات الشات.doc An unknown victim in Egypt clicked on this link, which was apparently sent to his Facebook account.
IP spy accounts sent documents to activists shared by "Ahmed Supra." We suspect that these documents contain spyware.
The appearance of the same private IP address suggets that this is perhaps the same actor as above, and suggests that 80.95.212.74 is another router used by the security forces in Bahrain. We did not see any other instances where an IP address clicked on more than one link.
Sabreena Ahmed (sabreeena30) shared a blog post from the Cyber Crime Unit on her Facebook page.
Usman Fazal posted at exactly the same time Sabreena Ahmed shared.
Usman Fazal says he works in the military as a Computer Forensic Examiner.
Usman Fazal's LinkedIn profiles say he works at the MoI or Cyber Crime Unit.
Sabreena Ahmed likes a page called MY OWN STUDY.
The page is associated with Bahrain, as well as the e-mail address "[email protected]" The posts and pictures on the page mostly consist of information about computer forensics.
MY OWN STUDY is located in Bahrain, and uses a contact e-mail apparently belonging to Usman Fazal.
In addition to @YLUBH, we noted that several other labor accounts were targeted, including an account for politically sacked GARMCO employees, @Garmco_dismisse, and an account Tweeting about issues at Bahrain Airport Services, @BAS_OPPRESSED.
Using a similar modus operandi to the attack on @YLUBH, IP spy account @CrazyFrogBH poses as an employee sacked for political reasons from Bahraini company GARMCO.
@BAS_OPPRESSED was targeted at least six times, including these four.
We noticed that several parody accounts for high-ranking Government officials were targeted by IP spy accounts.
@SheikhKhalifaPM, a parody of Bahrain's Prime Minister, was solicited to receive images and documents by IP spy account @sabreeena30.
@RashedKhalifa, a parody of Bahrain's Interior Minister, was sent links, and possibly spyware.
@TariqAlHassan, a parody of Bahrain's Chief of Police may have been sent spyware.
@Samorarajab, a parody of Bahrain Minister of State for Information Affairs, Sameera Rajab, was sent an IP spy link.
We also noted that parody accounts for religious leader Isa Qassim, and former MP Mohammed Khalid were targeted.
@BAHRAINDOCTOR's account has been targeted several times. On 14 June 2012, she issued a warning about @Zbroadcaster, one of the IP spy accounts. @BAHRAINDOCTOR recalls that the account was attempting to ask her questions in an apparent attempt to figure out her identity.
@BAHRAINDOCTOR advises her followers to not reveal any information about themselves to @Zbroadcaster.
After the threats, @BAHRAINDOCTOR reported that she lived in a state of anxiety.
@The_Cheaters1 apparently Tweeted information about various Government spy programs, as well as the names of police officers allegedly responsible for abusing detainees in custody. We noticed that his account was targeted with IP spy links.
@The_Cheaters1 noticed initial attempts to target him, and warned his followers.
@RedSky446 invites @The_Cheaters1 to talk in private.
@The_Cheaters1's trust of @RedSky446 might have done him in.
Meanwhile, two other Twitter accounts seem to have cooperated in targeting @The_Cheaters1, using links to the Richtweets service, which allows Tweets of more than 140 characters, and also allows remote images to be embedded into tweets.
The inactivity of @The_Cheaters1 since January 2013 suggests that he was eventually tricked into opening malicious links, and was identified. This suggests that even technically savvy users may be vulnerable to targeting.
While we were searching for individuals who had been targeted by IP spy accounts, we noticed that an anti-Government account named @mn9oreen_bh had Tweeted images of direct messages he allegedly exchanged with an IP spy account @kashfalmastor. The IP spy account apparently sent @mn9oreen_bh a link, which he opened from his phone. The IP spy account then asked @mn9oreen_bh to please open the link from a laptop, as it was not possible to spy on @mn9oreen_bh's phone.
@mn9oreen_bh posted these images of direct messages apparently exchanged with an attacker.
@sabreeena30 also solicited @mn9oreen_bh to receive files via e-mail.
@mn9oreen_bh's account is inactive. We have been unable to reach him to find out more details about the link he clicked.
To make way for a new Government housing project, hundreds of residents of Block 318 of Hoora were to have their houses taken and demolished. Many of these residents supported the concept of new housing, but opposed the seizure of their homes to build it. The accounts @DR3_AL7OORA, @hoora318, and @FYOUSIF00 apparently belonged to residents of Block 318 whose homes were to be taken. The accounts were otherwise pro-Government, but Tweeted criticisms of the Government's handling of the project.
A banner created by Hoora residents expresses support for housing projects, but opposition to the taking of their homes.
@DR3_AL7OORA and @hoora318 were targeted with IP spy links that showed them maps of Hoora.
An IP spy account tried to solicit direct messages from @FYOUSIF00.
Target: Sahab Bint Abdullah Al-Saud?
An account named @anaok6 (ID# 1533646338) tweeted a video entitled "Sahab bint Abdullah Drunk on Camera" directly at the Twitter account of Sahab Bint Abdulla Al-Saud, @SahabAbdullah8. Sahab is a member of the Saudi Royal family, and is married to Khalid bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, son of the King of Bahrain. The account @anaok6 was not following any accounts, and had only one follower -- an IP spy account. By the time we noticed the tweets, the video had been deleted, and it was unclear which YouTube account the video was associated with.
Two IP spy accounts, @CrazyFrogBH and @Bint_BuSalman, then targeted @anaok6 with two IP Spy links. One of the links was to the following page.
While conveying an innocuous message, an embedded image records the IP address of the user viewing this page.
The account @CrazyFrogBH then tweeted "TE Data Egypt" at @anaok6 -- presumably the implication being that @anaok6 was using that internet service provider. One of the Government accounts, @CrazyFrogBH, then told @SahabAbdullah8 "I need to talk to u if u allow me please … I need your help as I helped you twice now," asking Sahab to look at @CrazyFrogBH's previous tweets. Usually when the attackers ask for a direct message in this way, they send the recipient a malicious link.
Of course, we cannot be certain that Sahab was the target. Indeed, this could be a case of cyber blackmail against Sahab. However, it does appear suspicious that @CrazyFrogBH attempted to engage Sahab via direct message. As far as we could tell, Sahab never followed @CrazyFrogBH.
We noticed that several Sunni activists and groups were targeted in the IP spy attack, including a member of the Al-Fateh Youth Coalition.
A sampling of Sunni groups targeted. Bahrain's Bahrain's Chief of Police (@Talhassan) was also apparently targeted.
The "30 December Movement" @7araka30dec, an account that called for a "Sunni day of rage" on 30 December 2012 to demand reforms, was also targeted several times.
@7araka30dec was targeted with IP spy links sent by at least two different accounts.
The @mnarfezhom account is allegedly operated by a member of the ruling Al-Khalifa family, and functions as a cyber vigilante, mobilizing his followers against those seen as opposing the Government. He was targeted several times by IP spy accounts. On 7 January 2013, the Cyber Crime Unit confirmed that an investigation against @mnarfezhom was underway, after members of the Sunni community claimed he was slandering top politicians by associating them with the December 30 movement.
One of many instances where an IP spy account targeted @mnarfezhom.
The IP spy links may have been successful in revealing @mnarfezhom's identity.
We briefly mention a few other interesting targets we noticed.
Around the April 2013 Grand Prix, Anonymous launched #OPBahrain, an operation to raise awareness of the human rights situation in Bahrain by widely disseminating pictures, videos, and articles, and hacking into Bahrain Government and Formula 1 websites. IP spy accounts targeted the Twitter users who organized this operation. The Gulf Daily News reported that "experts" from the Cyber Crime Unit were monitoring #OPBahrain, and were ready to respond.
An IP spy account offers content for #OPBahrain. The link redirects through an IP spy service.
The same IP spy account also targeted the popular @YourAnonNews account.
IP spy account @RedSky446 voiced his support for the operation.
We contacted the account @OpBahrain_, who claimed to have chatted privately with @Ba7raaania. Bahrain Watch asked @OpBahrain_ to share links that he received from @Ba7raaania, but he declined to do so.
We also noticed that former Member of Parliament Mohammed Khalid was targeted by IP spy accounts on several occasions.
An IP spy account targets @boammar.
Bahrain Watch has received reports that activists operating anonymous Twitter accounts in the United Arab Emirates were sent links to the website a7rarelemarat.com via direct message from Twitter accounts of their friends who had been hacked. Activists who clicked on these links were later arrested.
Bahrain Watch has also received reports that anonymous Twitter users in Kuwait have been arrested. It is not clear how they were identified.
This section provides some commentary on relevant Bahraini and international law pertaining to freedom of expression.
A prison sentence shall be the penalty for any person who offends the Amir of the country, the national flag or emblem.
A punishment of imprisonment for a period of no more than two years or a fine of no more than BD 200 shall be inflicted upon any person who offends in public a foreign country or an international organization based in the State of Bahrain or its president or representative. The same penalty shall apply to a person who offends such organization's flag or official emblem. Legal action in respect of such crime shall not be brought except upon the written request of the Justice Minister.
The Cabinet has approved amendments to Article 214, which provide for a maximum prison sentence of 5 years and a fine up to 10,000 Bahraini Dinars, for offending the King. There are no clear guidelines in the law that explain what constitutes an offence, and the law is vague enough to be used against anyone who voices criticism towards the regime.
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is established through Legislative Decree No. 48 of 2002 promulgating the Telecommunications Law. Although classified as an independent body, Section 2(C) of the Decree states, "the Authority shall enjoy all advantages enjoyed by ministries, governmental entities, and official public sector organisations in the Kingdom." This would classify the TRA as a public body cable of producing secondary legislation.
Under the Lawful Access Regulation (LAR), licensees providing technical resources including "communications links, telecommunications equipment and systems" are required to provide "lawful access" of such services to security organs including call content and other related information sent through the telecommunications network "for purposes of fulfilling the requirements of national security." Information that should be readily available for access by security bodies includes Internet web pages, the content of an SMS, or the content of a phone call.
In addition to the specific content of communications, Article 3 of the Regulation also stipulates that licensees must provide subscriber identification numbers through calls, the IP address of the subscriber and "any other means of uniquely identifying the subscriber." The same article also requires licensees to identify the specific locations of communications subscribers.
Unless licensees undertake to implement lawful access, they will be prohibited from operating any telecommunications services under Article 4.
1. All numbers, including identifiers associated with a voice Call for all parties of a voice Call, including local, international or other CLI numbers, other identifications that could be used for CLI, information of the wireless phone used including IMEI and IMSI numbers, and forwarded numbers.
2. Date and time of the start and end of the voice Call.
4. The type of voice Call, if any, such as video, voice or other type of Call.
5. The Call parties' location when starting and ending the Call in the form of address in case of fixed services or longitude and latitude numbers in case of mobile Telecommunications services.
6. Telecommunications base stations used.
1. Date and time of the Call.
4. Mobile phone traffic data exchanged with Licensees in other countries.
3. Sender and receiver number.
5. Date and time of the Call.
6. Message delivery report, if any.
7. The call parties' physical locations when sending or receiving the call.
1. E-mail access data, including authentication username, date and time of login and log out and IP address logged in from.
2. Data of the e-mail sent, including authentication username, e-mail addresses used in all the fields (From/To/CC/BCC) and date and time of sending the e-mail.
3. Data of the e-mail received, including authentication username, e-mail addresses used in all the fields (From/To/CC) and date and time of receiving the e-mail.
2. Date and time of login and logout.
5. Call termination point and, for ADSL subscribers, Media Access Control (MAC) Address.
f) Access Related Information for Internet browsing: Proxies record data, including time, date, IP addresses used by all parties, website addresses visited, services used and the type of protocol used.
Bahrain's press and libel laws offer a significant disadvantage to the freedom of expression, applying both to electronic and paper print. An example of the limitation is provided under Article 68 of the 2002 Press Regulations which imposes year jail terms of up to five years for publishing anything that involves "criticizing the king or holding him responsible for any of the government's actions" or "instigation the overthrowing of regime or its change." This is in conflict with the rights assigned by the same law under Article 30 which states that "any opinion or true information revealed by a journalist shall not pose a threat to his safety." Such a law severely limits the conduct of net citizens and online journalists whom have assumed anonymity as protection. Prominent anonymous accounts continue to be targeted online, perhaps to identify users for future arrests.
The 2002 Decree offers an example of primary legislation of the powers vested upon the State to seize, censor, or monitor the private information of citizens. Below is an example of the powers assigned to the Public Prosecution through the decree. Although many of these laws require a Court assigned warrant, the dates of the action taken by the State representative in question and those of the warrants assigned cannot be determined to coincide as on many occasions the documents are not made available until trial.
The Public Prosecution may seize in post offices all letters, mail, newspapers, publications and parcels and in telegraph offices all telegrams. It shall be empowered to censor telecommunications conversations and correspondence or order the recording of conversations that occurred in a special place where this is useful in revealing the truth in a felony or misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment.
For taking any of the above actions, a prior permission shall be obtained from the Lower Court judge. The judge shall issue such permission upon reviewing the documents. In all cases, the seizure, censorship or recording shall take place upon a substantiated order for a period not exceeding 30 days which is renewable for another similar period(s).
A Public Prosecution member shall be exclusively empowered to have access to the seized letters, mail and other documents, provided that their review shall take place in the presence of the accused, person in possession thereof or addressee and shall note down his comments thereon. Depending upon the results of the review, he shall be empowered to include such documents in the case file or to return them to the person in possession thereof or to the addressee.
A Public Prosecution member shall be empowered to order the person in possession of a thing which he decides to seize or inspect it to produce such thing. The provision of Article (123) of this Law shall be applicable to anyone who violates this order unless he is in an event where the law authorizes him to refrain from giving his testimony.
The seized letters and mail shall be delivered to the accused or addressee or shall be given a copy thereof as soon as possible unless this is detrimental to the investigation. Every person who has a claim against the seized things shall be entitled to request the Public Prosecution member to deliver them to him. In case of refusal, he may file an appeal with the Lower Court and plead for hearing his statements by the said Court.
It is important to consider Bahrain's laws concerning terrorism as the term "terrorist" has found itself manifesting within State narratives of events. Terrorism laws allow significant derogations from international freedoms and formalities of proceedings that are designed to ensure fair trials. During the 2011 uprising, opposition activists have found themselves judged and branded "terrorists" through State media before a trial date has even been set. More often than not, those targeted publicly through State media have not even been officially charged yet. State media has also been used as a vehicle to determine future arrests, by libelling activists and protesters. Additionally, similar actions are also taking place on social media networks through State accounts issuing manhunts for activists.
Information submitted by the security sources for obtaining an extension of the detention period provided for the first Paragraph of Article 27 of this Law shall remain confidential with the Public Prosecution. Such information shall not be disclosed nor shall the names of their providers be divulged without prejudice to the provisions of Article 61 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
The Attorney General or whoever acts for him shall be empowered to order the seizure of mail of all kinds, publications, parcels and telegrams, the surveillance of communications by all methods and recording everything that takes place in public or private premises where this is useful for uncovering the truth in crimes to which the provisions of this Law applies.
In all cases, the seizure, surveillance or recording order shall be substantiated and for a period not exceeding sixty days. Such period shall not be extended except by an order of the High Court.
Article 30 The Public Prosecution shall order proceeding with access or obtaining any data or information related to the accounts, deposits, trusts or safe deposit boxes with banks or other financial institutions or the transactions related thereto if this is deemed necessary for revealing the truth in any of the crimes provided for in this Law. For taking such action, a prior permission shall be obtained from the High Court judge.
Rec No. 15: Direct relevant state bodies to activate the necessary legal action against those who use social networks in an illegal way, and toughening penalties against those who use those networks to disseminate false information to foreign sides which plot against the country's security and stability.
Rec No. 16: Basic liberties, particularly freedom of opinion, should be affected so as to strike a balance between law enforcement and human rights protection.
Bahrain has signed 8 out of the 9 major international human rights conventions. As part of its obligations under these conventions, Bahrain must ratify international obligations within domestic law. Bahrain is yet to draft a State report (due one year from ratification) in order to be assessed by the relevant treaty bodies. To put this into context, by signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2006, Bahrain has bound itself to send a State report to the Human Rights Council in 2007 and then one every four years. Bahrain is yet to submit its first report making it two reports behind schedule. It is a grave breach of international standards to target individuals based on their political or religious views.
As a result of the upsurge in controversy amongst international surveillance programmes, and in the absence of specific international legal doctrines governing these programmes, there has been a rise in legal guidance linking existing international legal rules – mainly the right to privacy and freedom of expression - to online monitoring. Some of this guidance is available below.
Bahrain Watch has released a simple guide on safely operating anonymous accounts. The guide is available in English and Arabic on our website.
This report would not have been possible without the contributions of John Doe. Thanks to Eva Galperin from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Maryam Al-Khawaja from the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Yousif Ahmed from Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, F.B., M. J. and many who we do not wish to put in danger by naming. Thanks to Nick Weaver, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and John Scott-Railton.
Bahrain Watch contacted the services: iplogger.org, whatstheirip.com, shivampatel.net, and whatstheirip.com. In some cases, we contacted the services anonymously. We received responses from two services: iplogger.org, and whatstheirip.com. Bahrain Watch did not contact ip-spy.com, because the site was unavailable, and we did not contact fuglekos.com, because their service did not appear to be abused on an ongoing basis.
Despite claiming on their webpage that their mission is "to ... [keep] the internet safe," whatstheirip.com disclaimed responsibility for the misuse of their service, and told us that there were "many other ways" for the Bahraini Government to obtain IP addresses associated with anonymous online accounts.
Bahrain Watch contacted Twitter and suggested the following modifications to their service to help defend against the IP spy attack.
Implement safeguards for accounts that change usernames with high frequency. In the cases we've observed, usernames are often changed very quickly. In the most extreme case, an account took 21 different usernames over a 3 month period.
Accounts showing this behavior this could be flagged, or an upper limit could be introduced on the number of username changes.
A cooling-off period on the ability to publicly mention or DM users after a rename.
Display mentions and DMs from new or recently renamed accounts in a different visual style or color along with a warning.
Run a similarity search through account usernames when accounts are created or profiles updated. For any similar names, check to see if the picture, description, and name are the same with any accounts of similar username. If so, then prohibit this name change. If Twitter only has a hash index on username, this might make similarity search difficult. However, it might be possible to do a limited number of hash lookups on similar account names (e.g., swapping any one lowercase "l" and uppercase "I", or any one a/e e/a, or so on).
Blacklist domains used for IP Spy attacks. Twitter could: (1) ban the links (2) ban accounts that post them (3) warn users who receive them (4) or warn users who receive these links in certain countries. It seems like these options would be consistent with the "Twitter Rules" on Spam and Abuse, which prohibit use of the service to "compromise a user's privacy."
* An inspection of @RedSky446's timeline indicated that he probably began participating in the attack starting from 17 Oct 2012.
** We believe that Red Sky began participating in the attack starting from 17 Oct 2012.


text:
Deloss McGraw
Painter and poet Deloss McGraw has been a pioneer in the art and poetry collaborative movement since the 1980s. McGraw migrated to California from Oklahoma in order to attend Long Beach State University and the Otis Art Institute. In addition, he studied at Michigan's Cranbrook Academy of Art, from which he graduated in 1973 with an MFA. In 1976, McGraw discovered the work of Pulitzer Prize-winning poet W.D. Snodgrass, now poet in residence at the University of Delaware. The artist sent Snodgrass a series of mixed media paintings that incorporated the poet's text into their compositions. Snodgrass, in turn, responded with new poems inspired by these images, and thus occurred a melding of media and ideas between the aritsts. Since then, McGraw has developed a pictorial style in which recognizable forms are morphed by his imagination into objects of poetic fancy. His figuration has been greatly inspired by so-called 'outsider art,' most notably by the work of American folk artists that McGraw has collected since his childhood. It is from these that the artist's paintings have derived their rough-hewn quality. Deloss McGraw's work has been exhibited extensively throughout the United States and Europe. His pieces have received critical acclaim in over 80 solo exhibitions, and are collected by such eminent institutions as: Oxford, Syracuse, Temple and Cornell Universities, as well as by the Whitney Museum of American Art Library Collection, The Library of Congress, the San Diego Museum of Art, and the Scottsdale Museum of Contemporary Art.The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York recently acquired two of his paintings.His illustrated version of Alice in Wonderland won the Illustrator's Society Book of the Year Award for 2002.
Painter and poet Deloss McGraw has been a pioneer in the art and poetry collaborative movement since the 1980s. McGraw migrated to California from Oklahoma in order to attend Long Beach State University and the Otis Art Institute. In addition, he
Alice's Evidence

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Doživjeti stotu is the fifth studio album released by Yugoslav rock group Bijelo dugme. The album is noted for the band's change of direction towards new wave, in contrast to folkish hard rock on their previous releases. Doživjeti stotu was being prepared and eventually released in the wake of the Yugoslav lifetime president Josip Broz Tito's death. His passing on May 4, 1980 triggered an extended mourning period that saw most of the entertainment activities throughout the country temporarily quiet down. Pre-recording rehearsals were held in Goran Bregovic''s chalet on Jahorina Mountain, before actual sessions began at Radio Belgrade's Studio 4 on October 6, 1980. Exactly two months later, on December 6, in anticipation of the album release, the 7-inch single 'Dobro vam jutro Petrovic' Petre' / 'Na zadnjem sjedištu moga auta' appeared in stores containing a song off the coming album as well as a B-side from the previous one.


Amen. May peace be with you.
Thank you, needed that today!
As I prepare to sell my house and relocate, your Scripture reminds me to be not afraid. Glad you are settling in your new home. Some things you can't know ahead of time, so I am glad you share what's going on in your move. Best wishes and much joy is hoped for you.


Commercial and retail property management systems are very important in the investment performance of an asset. The 'handover process' similarly so.
So many times you will see a landlord 'self manage' their property just to save money and management fees. Why would an investor or landlord risk the performance of an investment building in this way? Are they that clever that they really understand the bigger strategies behind tenant mix, lease documentation, rental recoveries, and expenditure control? Perhaps they think that the management process is simply just a matter of collecting rent. How wrong could they be!
Most property investors are very 'ordinary' and inexperienced when it comes to understanding and directing asset performance. Saving money on property management fees is a false economy and will threaten the investment performance. A good property manager can add considerable strategy and value to an asset over time; they have the tools, the systems, and they have the knowledge to do that.
The property management process at the levels of a moderate to large property are very special in so many ways. So many things have to be investigated, covered and controlled. Here are some ideas to help professional property managers with the 'handover process' at the time of taking up a new investment property. The asset performance and investigation systems are explained in the report. When you know the real estate facts, you can understand how to improve the asset over time.
Report on Commercial Property Manager Handover systems.


text:
Biography of Arthur L. Gardiner
Providence, Washington
Since 1900 the textile industry of Rhode Island has been the medium through which the business abilities of Arthur L. Gardiner, of Shannock, have found expression. Mr. Gardiner's work in business management has been highly commended, his activities prior to his coming to Shannock having been notable and appreciated by those with whom he was in association. Alive to the interests of the community in which he lives, he has been foremost in assisting in the promotion of such public enterprises as merited the attention of the better element and at present is a member of the Republican State Central Committee for the town of Richmond.
He was born in North Kingstown, Rhode Island, April 27, 1879, a son of Alonzo J., a native of Exeter, Rhode Island, and Mary E. (Wilcox) Gardiner, also of Exeter. His father was engaged in the textile industry from his youth until within twenty years of his death, these last having been spent as superintendent of Elmgrove Cemetery, at Allentown, Rhode Island. Following an education in the public schools of North Kingstown and at East Greenwich Academy, Arthur L. entered the retail clothing store in Providence and for sixteen years filled the position of office manager there. He then came to Shannock, in 1916, and assumed the post of office manager and assistant treasurer of the Columbia Narrow Fabric Company, a position he still holds. He attends the Baptist Church and is a devotee in his recreational moments of baseball, football and golf. He was one of the organizers of the Meadowbrook Golf Club.
Arthur L. Gardiner married, in 1907, Bessie W. Luce, of Providence, and they are the parents of one daughter, Charlotte Waterman Gardiner.


text:
Child-Friendly Communities
Social and Health Impact Assessment (SHIA)
Ferdinand S. Johns
Lamine Mahdjoubi
Tom Martineau
Ettore Maria Mazzola
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IMCL Awards
Over the years, IMCL has recognized cities that have achieved excellence in city livability, and outstanding individuals for major contributions to promoting city livability at a national or international scale. In 2007, IMCL introduced the Design Awards Competition to recognize cities and firms that achieved excellence in specific planning and design categories.
Freiburg, Germany received the IMCL City of Vision Award in 1993 for their commitment to principles of livability and sustainability in all planning and urban design issues. The creation of an extensive pedestrian zone in the old city, enhanced with paving, streams, a daily farmers market, and appropriate human-scale, mixed-use architecture ensures the city's vitality. Dedication to promoting walking, biking, and public transit links to surrounding neighborhoods and cities has dramatically reduced car use. Planning coordination among cities and towns in the Germany-France-Switzerland Upper Rhine region established sustainable regional planning principles that curbed sprawl and big box retail, thus ensuring the cities' economic vitality and protecting agricultural productivity.
Other cities that have received the IMCL Livable Cities Award include: Ravensburg, Germany; Strasbourg, France; Tuebingen, Germany; Portland, OR, USA
Dietmar Hahlweg, Mayor of Erlangen, Germany from 1972 to 1996, received the IMCL Award in 1991. When first running for election, his slogan was "Green in Erlangen", a promise that he fulfilled by making Erlangen a model ecological city. From replacing asphalt streets with paving set in sand to permit rain percolation, to a groundbreaking recycling system, district heating, and city-wide traffic calming, Erlangen led the way. Mayor Hahlweg's greatest passion was to promote the bicycle as a means of transportation, creating a bicycle network of 175 kilometers through the city.
HRH The Prince of Wales received the first IMCL "Lewis Mumford Award" in 1991 for championing city livability and appropriate human-scale architecture. He called for architecture that enhanced local character, and for planning practices that prioritized quality of everyday life over movement of vehicles and separation of functions. While incurring the wrath of architects who see architecture as a form of self-expression, and planners who believe in "modern" zoning principles, the Prince raised the public debate to a national and international level.
Other individuals who have received IMCL Awards include: Congressman Earl Blumenauer (Lewis Mumford Award); Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr., Charleston, SC, USA; Mayor Bob Cools, Antwerp, Belgium; Mayor Daniel Kemmis, Missoula, MT, USA; Richard Louv (first Jane Jacobs Award); Richard J. Jackson, MD, MPH (first Henry L. Lennard Award); Wolf von Eckardt; William H. Whyte; Rod Hackney, FRIBA
In 2013, two IMCL Joseph P. Riley, Jr. Awards were awarded to Mayor James Brainard of Carmel, IN, and to Mayor Ralph Becker of Salt Lake City.
In 2014, the IMCL Lewis Mumford Award was awarded to Mayor George Ferguson and Bristol City Council.
In 2015, the IMCL Lewis Mumford Award was presented to Jan Gehl for his inspirational leadership in improving the quality of urban life in cities.
In 2018 the International Urban Design Award was presented to Architect Maxim Atayants, of St. Petersburg, Russia.
In 2009 the IMCL Urban Plazas Design Award was presented to Portland Parks & Recreation and Peter Walker Partners for the development of Jamison Square, Portland in recognition of the sophisticated integration of flexible spaces for civic activities, gathering and socializing, with imaginative water and park elements for play and recreation.
Jamison Square supports individual uses, meetings, social gatherings, entertainment and festivals (e.g. Bastille Day). The focal element is the Spring, a low waterfall that gushes out of the stone layers to create a shallow tidal pool. In the summer, the pool attracts hundreds of children, while families relax on the lawn. During the year, the café and restaurant terraces on the north side support community life. An ice cream parlor, toy store, and other shops, services and restaurants nearby generate activity on the street, and the streetcar on either side enhances accessibility.
We just wrapped up the 56th Conference in Portland, a huge thanks to those of you who attended and made this conference so special. We're working on making the slides and photos available to the attendees, and we hope you're connecting with those you met on social media.
"I know of no other conference which provides the international expertise."
Sylvia Sutherland, former Mayor, Peterborough, Ontario
"A wonderful Conference. I truly believe this is the best Conference on cities."
Mayor Joseph P. Riley, Jr., City of Charleston
"The most important continuous conference dialogue on making the world's cities and towns more livable for all of their inhabitants."
Dr. Sven von Ungern-Sternberg, Governor, State of South Baden, Germany
"The conference holds a magnifying glass to the world's best cities, revealing why, and how they work."
Benjamin Thompson, FAIA AIA Gold Medalist
"Love for our cities unites all of us in this unique, impressive conference, with participants from different countries, with different professional backgrounds, but with one purpose: making our cities more livable."
Antonio Casellati Former Mayor, City of Venice, Italy
"Ive learned more from this conference than any other conference that I've ever gone to. I've been a city councillor now for twenty years, and I'm so glad I went to that first one twenty years ago."
Kim Richter, City Councillor, Langley, BC
"Well-structured, extremely well-organized and super-high quality of both the presenters and materials presented."
Dr. Mirela Newman, Coordinator, Urban Studies Graduate Program, S Conn St. University
What people say about the IMCL....
"The best conference on cities." - Joseph P. Riley, Jr., former Mayor, Charleston, SC
"The most important continuous conference dialogue on making the world's cities and towns more livable for all of their inhabitants."
- Dr. Sven von Ungern-Sternberg, former Mayor, Freiburg, Germany
"I know of no other conference which provides the international expertise."
- Sylvia Sutherland, former Mayor, City of Peterborough, Ontario
"The Conference holds a magnifying glass to the world's best cities, revealing why and how they work."
- Benjamin Thompson, FAIA, AIA Gold Medalist
"Love for our cities unites all of us in this unique, impressive conference, with participants from different countries, with different professional backgrounds, but with one purpose: making our cities more livable."
- Antonio Casellati, former Mayor, City of Venice, Italy
"These conferences were and I'm sure are still game changers. My first conference was in around 2003 or 2004 in Sarasota. It was pivotal for me as a new CAO of an Ontario municipality having emerged from the public works and engineering area. It helped to shape our town, Newmarket."
- Bob Shelton, CAO, Newmarket, Ontario
"I've learned more from this conference than any other conference that I've ever gone to. I've been a city councillor now for twenty years, and I'm so glad I went to that first one twenty years ago."
- Kim Richter, City Councillor, Langley, BC
"A truly invigorating event. I was inspired by being able to connect with so many wonderful people from around the world who are all passionate about the creation of great places."
- James Dougherty, Director of Design, Dover, Kohl & Partners
"The diversity of the audience, the excellent presentations - and importantly, the passion of the movement - have influenced my thinking and next steps."
- Candance Kokinakis, Ph.D., Sr. Director of Safe Routes to School, Michigan Fitness
"One of the best professional events I have ever attended. Well-structured, extremely well-organized and super-high quality of both the presenters and materials presented."
- Dr. Mirela Newman, Coordinator, Urban Studies Graduate Program, Southern Connecticut St. University
"The lively exchange of ideas and the opportunity to communicate with colleagues as well as civic decision makers made the sessions extremely successful… Both new and, I am sure, lasting friendships have been formed."
- Professor Derek Drummond, McDonald Professor of Architecture, Vice Principal, McGill University
"Architects, community organizations, city administrators, planners, urban designers, landscape architects, social scientists and developers committed to making cities livable, all attended. Participants came from places as close as San Francisco and the U.S. Eastern seaboard, to as far away as Samarkand, Russia; Prague, Czech Republic; Germany; The Hague; New Guinea; Switzerland; Australia; Venice, Italy; Austria; United Kingdom; Canada; Belgium; and Hong Kong. These international forums provide the yeast and inspiration to apply ideas to one's own hometown."
- M. Elizabeth Martin, Director, San Francisco Beautiful
"Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of the Members of this body the work of the International Making Cities Livable conference… a forum for hundreds of speakers and participants from 37 states and 11 countries to present ideas."
- The Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, U.S. House of Representatives
©2020 International Making Cities Livable LLC. All Rights Reserved.


text:
Q: MVC4 Linq Query Optimisation I have the below code which works  but I do not feel this is the best way to achieve the result.  I am looking at optimising my code.  Any suggestions of a better option will be appreciated. sub  is a subcategory  which is nullable.
[AllowAnonymous]
    public ActionResult _relatedgrps(string cat, string sub)
    {
         if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sub)){
            var pgs = db.Pages
            .Where(u=>u.MetaNoSearch==false)
            .Where(u => u.PaOk == true && u.Category.Name == cat &&   u.SubCategory.CatName == sub)
            .OrderByDescending(u => u.PaCreatedOn);
        return PartialView(pgs.ToList());

         }else{
           var pgs = db.Pages
            .Where(u=>u.MetaNoSearch==false)
            .Where(u => u.PaOk == true && u.Category.Name == cat )
          .OrderByDescending(u => u.PaCreatedOn);
        return PartialView(pgs.ToList());

    }}

A: Linq IEnumerables can be additive and the query will only be executed when enumerated for the first time (like calling .ToList()).  So you should be able to do something like this:
var pgs = db.Pages
    .Where(u => u.MetaNoSearch == false &&
           u.PaOk == true &&
           u.Category.Name == cat);

if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sub))
{
    pgs = pgs.Where(u => u.SubCategory.CatName == sub);
}

return PartialView(pgs.OrderByDescending(u => u.PaCreatedOn).ToList());

A: @user3021830 - be careful with String.IsNullOrWhitespace, you cannot use that in a database query.  You could do String.IsNullOrWhitespace(sub), but not String.IsNullOrWhitespace(u.*).
I'd avoid any conditionals in the query because that will likely result in a case statement in the SQL.
To produce the best SQL I'd do something like this:
var pgs = db.Pages.Where(u => u.MetaNoSearch == false)
                    .Where(u => u.PaOk == true)
                    .Where(u => u.Category.Name == cat);

if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sub))
{
    pgs = pgs.Where(u => u.SubCategory.CatName == sub);
}

var result = pgs.OrderByDescending(u => u.PaCreatedOn).ToList();

A: Create an object to query it. To improve it, you also could remove it boolean comparations because they are conditions.
var query = db.Pages.Where(u => !u.MetaNoSearch && u.PaOk && u.Category.Name == cat);

if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(sub))
    query = query.Where(u => u.SubCategory.CatName == sub);

query = query.OrderByDescending(u => u.PaCreatedOn);

return PartialView(query.ToList());

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit Women's Volleyball Team
2 Libero
Date of Birth 1991
*Player stats, includes all 2021-2022 season data.
Receptions 120
Reception Percentage 61
Simge Aköz started playing volleyball when she was 7 years old. Aköz played for İstanbul Artvin Sports Club, UPS, Yeşilyurt between 2010 and 2014, Çanakkale Belediyespor (2014-2015) and Halkbank (2015-2016).
Aköz joined the Club in the 2016-2017 season and started her Eczacıbaşı VitrA career by winning the 2016 FIVB Women's Club World Championship. She has won a bronze medal in the 2017 CEV Champions League and the 2018 CEV Cup. As a crucial member of the Turkish National Team, Simge has received a bronze medal in the 2017 European Championship, a silver medal in the 2018 FIVB Nations League. She had a big share in Turkey's successful EuroVolley 2019 campaign where she won a silver medal and was selected to the Dream Team of the tournament as the Best Libero.
In the 2018-2019 season, Aköz won the Spor Toto Champions Cup, a bronze medal in the 2018 FIVB Women's Club World Championship and the Turkish Cup.
Playing her fourth season as a Tiger, Simge has become the co-captain of the team in 2019 and opened the 2019-2020 season by winning the Turkish Super Cup. Crowning her continuous rise in 2019, Simge has not only won the silver medal at the 2019 FIVB Club World Championship but also made it to Dream Team of the tournament by receiving the Best Libero award.
A core player of the Turkish National Team, Simge did a great job in the 2020 CEV Tokyo Olympic Qualification where she helped her team in winning a ticket to the Tokyo Olympics and was also selected the Best Libero. Through that performance she has also made her third Dream Team appearance in 2019-2020 season after the 2019 European Volleyball Championship and the 2019 FIVB Club World Championship.
Team captain of Eczacıbaşı VitrA since 2019-2020 season, Simge Aköz is in charge of this role alongside with Tijana Boskovic since the 2020-2021 season.
Simge Aköz started 2020-21 season with the 2020 Turkish Champions Cup victory, thus winning her third straight Champions Cup title.
In summer 2021, Simge Aköz has won the fifth place as the libero of the Turkish National Team at the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. In EuroVolley2021, Simge Aköz has won a bronze medal for the second time.
STATS (LAST 5 GAMES)
TOTAL RECEPTION
RECEPTION PERCENTAGE
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Bolu Belediye Spor Kulübü | 11 December 2021
GAME TOTAL RECEPTION RECEPTION PERCENTAGE
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Bolu Belediye Spor Kulübü | 11 December 2021 0 0
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Calcit Volley Kamnik | 16 December 2021
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Calcit Volley Kamnik | 16 December 2021 0 0
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - PTT | 05 January 2022
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - PTT | 05 January 2022 0 0
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Nilüfer BLD. | 09 January 2022
Eczacıbaşı Dynavit - Nilüfer BLD. | 09 January 2022 0 0
VakıfBank - Eczacıbaşı Dynavit | 17 January 2022
VakıfBank - Eczacıbaşı Dynavit | 17 January 2022 0 0


This stunning Sterling Silver heart pendant is a perfect for a special occasion, and will add sparkle to any outfit. The heart is an eye catching piece. It features a sparkling cubic zirconia stone in a heart cut which twinkles beautifully.
The heart pendant has a soft polished finish and is sold without chain; see our Silver Chain Collection to choose the perfect partner.
A joyful and thoughtful gift for a loved one, friend or even yourself.
This necklace would be gorgeous for weddings, birthdays, anniversaries or Christmas.
Available in two sizes: 6x6mm and 8x8mm, and in pink cubic zirconia also. Matching earrings are also available, and even rings in the Clear stone.
Your jewellery will arrive beautifully packaged. Our postage costs reflect the weighed packaged item, good quality packaging and insurance against loss or damage.


Meet the Morton leadership team. Together they guide Morton's long-term strategy for success in the marketplace and workplace. Get to know the team.
Daron Hines is Vice President of Morton's Consumer & Industrial businesses. In this role, he leads sales and marketing efforts including innovation, pricing, e-commerce and other key strategies and initiatives to drive profitable growth across our markets and channels in North and South America. Daron joined Morton Salt in May of 2018.
Jennifer McCormick is Morton Salt's Vice President of Operations and is responsible for all of the company's mining, production and processing facilities. She also oversees various functions related to operations, including quality, environment and operations technical support. She assumed this position in 2017.
Elizabeth (Betsey) Nohe joined Morton Salt in 2011 as Vice President of Supply Chain. In this newly-created role, she is responsible for leading the company's supply chain function across all company operations.
Dan Thompson is Vice President of Sales & Marketing for the company's Bulk Deicing business, which provides bulk salt to municipalities, state departments of transportation, government agencies and roadway maintenance contractors for highway and roadway deicing during the winter season. He joined Morton Salt in 2013.
Nicole Turner is Morton Salt's Vice President of Human Resources and is responsible for the programs, policies and key strategies to enhance employee experience and cultural transformation across our sites in North and South America. She leads the company's strategy to hire, train and develop employee talent by becoming an employer of choice, creating and implementing progressive employee policies and programs and overseeing Morton's continuing cultural transformation. Nicole joined Morton Salt in January of 2019.
In May 2015, Chad Walker joined Morton Salt as Vice President, General Counsel & Chief Compliance Officer. In this role, he serves as chief legal counsel responsible for leading Morton Salt's Legal function across all businesses and operations in the U.S., Canada and the Bahamas. He oversees all of Morton's legal matters, including corporate governance and compliance, risk, intellectual property and litigation.


Our shoes are manufactured by Sanders & Sanders Ltd. (or Sander Bros. as it was first named) . They were established in 1873 by Brothers William and Thomas Sanders of Rushden, Northamptonshire. William Benjamin Sanders was apprenticed to the shoe and boot trade as a lad, and then went on to working in London as clicker before returning to Rushden in 1871 at the end of the Franco Prussian War, with the vision of setting up his own shoemaking business with his brother.


text:
Home Sources Business & Entrepreneurs
Bertelsmann welcomes Rolling Stones Mick Jagger and Keith Richards to BMG
in Business & Entrepreneurs, Categories, Countries, Media & Social Networks, Others, Sources
Following its withdrawal from the traditional music business in 2008, Bertelsmann had established the new BMG with a thoroughly service- and artist-centered business approach. Partnering with the financial investor KKR, it became the world's fourth-largest music rights management company in less than five years. In April 2013, Bertelsmann acquired KKR's shares in BMG and has since managed the company, which has a presence in all major music markets, as a wholly owned subsidiary.
"The fact that Mick Jagger and Keith Richards have chosen BMG to represent them so soon after the full acquisition is a very positive development for us as the parent company," said Rabe.
The Bertelsmann CEO explained that "rights management is one of the businesses with which Bertelsmann intends to grow in the years ahead. It is one of our growth platforms, as are, for example, Education, Financial Services and TV production."
Thomas Hesse, Bertelsmann's President Corporate Development and New Businesses and Executive Board member responsible for the music business, emphasized the value of this latest signing: "The Rolling Stones have been on stage for more than 50 years and are one of the most successful bands of all times. Artists of the stature of Mick Jagger and Keith Richards do not choose a new publisher lightly." He said the signing "demonstrates that the new BMG already ranks among the top global music companies."
Tags: BertelsmannBMGbusiness approachKeith Richardsmedia companyMick Jaggermusic businessRolling Stones


Last month I featured a photographer using the moniker "Shanghai Streets." This month, we're continuing the Shanghai Photo theme by bringing the work of "Shanghai Sky" to your attention. Now, Shanghai Sky claims to be an "American Cocker Spaniel living in Shanghai," but, well, whatever, nevermind….
They're photos. Let's let the photos do most of the talking.
Or just start at the top of Shanghai Sky's photo archive.


Company Overview - Foshan Saneagle Bicycle Manufactory Co., Ltd.
14YRSFoshan Saneagle Bicycle Manufactory Co., Ltd.
Foshan Saneagle Bicycle Manufactory Co., Ltd., established in 2000, locates in Nanhai, Foshan, Guangdong, China, is a professional manufacturer engaged in the research, development, production, sale and service of bicycles and electric bicycles. Our new facility has been put into use since 2012 and our company occupies an area of over ten thousand square meters. Supported by over 100 employees, our annual export sales reach 7 million dollars. Our products are exported to Europe, North and South America, the Middle East, Oceania, Africa and Asia. In addition, we have obtained I S O 9 0 0 1 international quality management system certification, CE as well and EN certification for our electric bicycles. We have subsidiary brands, such as Saneagle, Zenith, and Santa. We also welcome O E M and O D M orders. Our R & D team has garnered a series of patents in China. To keep us updated with the latest market trends and to showcase our products, we participate in various trade shows annually such as Canton Fair, China International Bicycle & Motor Fair and Eurobike Friedrichshafen. If you have any new ideas or concepts for our products, please contact us. We are glad to work together with you and finally bring you the satisfied products.


text:
Тончев, Димитрий (1859—1937) — болгарский политический деятель.
 Тончев, Тончо Димитров (род. 1972) — болгарский боксёр.

Примечания

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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