text:
UNITED STATES v. WILLIS
UNITED STATES v. WILLIS (2005)
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Lamond WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOZINSKI, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. Anne R. Traum, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas, NV, for the defendant-appellant. Andrew W. Duncan (argued) and Thomas S. Dougherty, Assistant United States Attorneys, Las Vegas, NV, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appellant Mark Lamond Willis appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2), felon in possession of a firearm and forfeiture of the firearm. Willis moved to suppress the firearm found in his possession as the fruit of an illegal seizure. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Finding his arguments unpersuasive, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence and affirm Willis's conviction.
On December 19, 2002, around 2:00 a.m., Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") Officer Carl Boehmer "observed a [white two-door] vehicle turning rapidly onto Las Vegas Boulevard․" Officer Boehmer testified that the vehicle's rapid turn attracted his attention because "[i]t was just a more excessive turn than a citizen should[make]." He followed the vehicle as it made two more quick turns before stopping in front of an apartment building in a high-crime area. Officer Boehmer then watched a male (later identified as Willis) get out of the car, sprint across the street and up the stairs to the second floor of an apartment building, and pound on the door until he was admitted into one of the apartments. When Officer Boehmer drove past the vehicle, he noticed that Willis had left the windows down, which he thought was unusual because there are "many stolen vehicles in that area ․ [and] gang activity․" He then ran a check on Willis's Colorado license plate, and notified his dispatch unit to request a backup unit.
The LVMPD Communications Center informed Officer Boehmer that the car was listed as a "suspicious vehicle" and that there was a National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") missing person's report or "hit" associated with the license plate.1 After receiving this information, Officer Boehmer positioned himself in an alley where he could watch the car and the apartment. Shortly thereafter, Officer D. Miller arrived, and as Officer Boehmer was describing the situation, Willis exited the apartment, reentered his vehicle, made an illegal U-turn, and drove a short distance before pulling over in front of a second apartment complex a block or two away. Officers Boehmer and Miller each made U-turns, turned on their overhead lights, and boxed in Willis's car.
As the officers parked their vehicles, Willis stepped out of his car and looked nervously from side-to-side at the patrol cars. Officer Boehmer testified that he believed that Willis was contemplating running away, and he ordered Willis to step in front of the vehicle and show his hands. Officer Boehmer testified that he "immediately began ordering commands to him to step to the front of my vehicle, and also to take his hands out of his pockets because at the time he had his hands in his jacket pockets․ [F]rom my experience again, someone that ․ immediately opens up their vehicle and jumps out and begins looking side to side pretty frantically is, in my experience they've always taken off running. So before ․ he had a chance to, I just started giving commands."
Willis complied, and as Officer Boehmer approached him, Officer Boehmer asked, "Do you have anything on you I should know about?" Willis replied, "Yes, I do." When Officer Boehmer asked "what is it?", Willis answered: "a gun." Officer Miller requested permission from Willis to look inside his pockets, which Willis gave, and the officer retrieved a fully loaded .25 caliber handgun from Willis's jacket.
Officer Boehmer questioned Willis about the firearm while Officer Miller "proceeded to take care of the missing person['s report]." Willis explained to the officers that the person identified in the report was his girlfriend and that she was in his apartment.2 Officer Miller conducted an interview with Willis's girlfriend upstairs in the apartment complex. Officer Boehmer testified that "she was okay, and she stated that she had talked with her family and it [the NCIC missing person's report] needed to be cleared out of the system."
Willis admitted to the officers that he had been convicted of crimes in Hawaii and Colorado. Officer Boehmer confirmed this through a criminal history check, and he arrested Willis for being an "ex-felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, [and] ex-felon failure to register."
Willis moved to suppress the evidence of the handgun. He argued that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining and searching him, and that the evidence of the handgun was the illegal fruit of that detention and search. The magistrate judge concluded in his report and recommendation that the officers had no "reasonable articulable suspicion ․ of criminal activity" to justify an investigatory Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, the magistrate judge found that "[u]nder these circumstances ․ Officer Boehmer's community caretaking function required him to take reasonable steps in an effort to determine the current status of the alleged missing person. His failure to do so would have amounted to a dereliction of duty."
The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation over Willis's objections. Willis entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his objection to the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the search. The district court sentenced Willis to a term of thirty-three months imprisonment. Willis appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.3
Willis argues that neither the community caretaking function nor the related emergency aid doctrine justified his seizure. He also argues that the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop, and that the government waived its arguments advocating reasonable suspicion when it failed to object to the findings of the magistrate judge's report.4
We decline to determine whether the community caretaking function, or the emergency aid doctrine, justified the officers' detention of Willis. Instead, we hold that the detention came within the scope of a valid traffic stop, because Officer Boehmer had at least reasonable suspicion-if not probable cause-to stop Willis for violating the traffic laws. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ("As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred."); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so called 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest"; holding that a traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir.2000) ("the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops"; holding that "the Court in Whren [did not] intend[ ] to change this settled rule"). Since Willis's detention was supported by reasonable suspicion, the officers could reasonably question Willis to ensure their own safety. Once Willis admitted possessing the weapon, the officers' search to relieve Willis of his weapon was also reasonable.
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Such investigatory stops are justified by "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity may be afoot. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. 690. "[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions ․ but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (citations omitted).
Although we look to reasonableness in determining the propriety of a stop under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States does not require us to determine the reasonableness of a temporary detention if there is reasonable suspicion to conclude that a traffic violation occurred. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769. In Whren, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where officers had probable cause to believe that the petitioner violated the traffic code, even if the ultimate charge was not related to the traffic stop. Id. at 808-09, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Police observed a truck in a "high drug area" stopped at stop sign for an excessive amount of time, which then turned without signaling and sped off at an excessive speed. Id. at 808, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Once the police caught up to the vehicle, the officers observed Michael Whren, one of the passengers, holding two large bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine. Whren argued that the stop had not been justified by probable cause to believe that the occupants were engaged in illegal drug activity, and that the officers' asserted ground for approaching the vehicle, which was to give them a warning about traffic violations, was pretextual. Id. at 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
The Supreme Court held that the officers had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the traffic code had been violated. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. The Court specifically declined to hold that the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be "whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given." Id. Rather, the Court explained that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," and that "we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers." Id. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Whren stands for the proposition that if the officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the officers may conduct a traffic stop even if the stop serves some other purpose. See also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588, 593-94, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) ("[The] subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.").
There is ample evidence that the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to stop Willis for his traffic violations. First, Officer Boehmer testified that he watched Willis make an illegal U-turn on Hoover. Second, Officer Boehmer testified that he watched Willis make a rapid turn, stating, "It was a traffic violation being that it was a turn-making a turn more excessive than it should have been [and] ․ it would have been a municipal traffic code [violation]." Third, according to testimony by Officer Boehmer, Willis's car also appeared to accelerate excessively. Cf. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (police stopped car after it "turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off at an 'unreasonable' speed.")
Officer Boehmer specifically noted that after he observed the rapid turn, "I was going to follow him to see if he had made any other-other traffic violations ․" (emphasis added). It is clear from Officer Boehmer's testimony that he observed several traffic violations, including driving too fast, rapid turns, and an illegal U-turn.5
The fact that Willis had parked his car at the point that the officers detained him does not affect our analysis. Officer Boehmer did not stop Willis immediately after he first noted Willis's traffic violations, but followed the car to "see if [Willis] made any other traffic violations." Moreover, any delay between Willis's traffic violations and the officers' actions was insignificant. The officers detained Willis as soon as they observed him pull over.
Under Whren, we cannot second-guess the reasons for the officer's stop. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").6 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently affirmed this proposition in Devenpeck: "Our cases make clear that an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause." 125 S.Ct. at 593-94. Therefore, as long as "the officers had probable cause to believe that [Willis] had violated the traffic code[,] ․ the stop [was] reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Whren, 517 U.S. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769. The officer testified that he was planning on conducting a vehicle stop "because of the information of the NCIC missing person ․ [and ] because of the way the vehicle was evading me and conducting an illegal U-turn also, in the middle of Hoover." Since Officer Boehmer could have relied on the traffic violation as a justification for stopping Willis, the stop was valid under Whren.7
The dissent argues that Willis's detention was not a traffic stop because "Officer Boehmer never mentioned any traffic violation or issued any traffic citation." Dissent at 725. But Officer Boehmer explained that by the manner in which Willis exited his car, Boehmer thought Willis was about to run. It was in the ensuing quick exchanges between Boehmer and Willis that Boehmer discovered that Willis was armed and arrested him. We think it was reasonable for the officers to view any traffic violations as inconsequential in light of Willis's arrest. Whren and Lopez-Soto require that the officers have reasonable suspicion to stop a driver for traffic infractions, not that the officers issue citations.8
Once the police stopped Willis, they could, within reason, search the area and question Willis about weapons for their own safety. "Police officers are entitled to employ reasonable methods to protect themselves and others in potentially dangerous situations." Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (9th Cir.1983)). Our cases have justified the use of force in making a stop if it occurs under circumstances justifying fear for an officer's personal safety. See Jacobs, 715 F.2d at 1345-46; United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.1979). In this case, Officer Boehmer merely asked Willis if he had anything that Officer Boehmer should know about. He did not take more extreme measures, but simply asked Willis a question to ensure the officers' personal safety. Officer Boehmer did not act unreasonably in ensuring his personal safety and the safety of his fellow officer. Indeed, even before Officer Boehmer was notified about the NCIC hit, he requested backup for his own safety. As he testified, "I notified dispatch on the radio that I was requesting a backup unit․ For officer safety. Due to the suspicious situation, the known gang, prostitution and drug activity in the area ․ for officer safety, I wanted another officer there, and the time of night."
Given everything that the officers knew, including the NCIC hit, Willis's erratic driving, the high-crime area, and Willis's nervous and agitated state, Officer Boehmer's question to Willis eliciting information about Willis's gun was reasonable. Once Willis informed the officers that he was carrying a firearm, the officers were entitled to seize the firearm in order to avoid any possibility that Willis would use it against them. The evidence of possession of a firearm was not the fruit of an illegal search, and the evidence need not have been suppressed.
The district court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence is affirmed. Willis's conviction is affirmed.
In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge found that because defendant Mark Willis had already voluntarily stopped his car, Officers Carl Boehmer and D. Miller did not perform a traffic stop under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Because the magistrate judge found that there had been no traffic stop, he specifically declined "to assess the credibility of the officer's testimony about Willis's driving." The magistrate judge further found that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, the magistrate judge found that the stop was justified by the community caretaking function under Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In denying Willis's motion to suppress, the district court adopted without change the Report and Recommendation.
The majority declines to affirm the district court's decision based on either Terry or Cady. Instead, it affirms on a ground explicitly rejected by the magistrate judge and the district court-that Officers Boehmer and Miller performed a permissible traffic stop under Whren. For two independent reasons, I respectfully dissent.
First, Officer Boehmer was required to present "specific, articulable facts" to support his contention that there was reasonable suspicion that Willis had violated the traffic laws, and thereby to justify a traffic stop under Whren. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir.1996). Despite ample opportunity, he did not do so. Second, Whren applies only to "run-of-the-mine" traffic stops. 517 U.S. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769. The stop at issue in this case was anything but "run-of-the-mine," and therefore does not qualify as a traffic stop under Whren.
I. Facts
Only two people testified at the suppression hearing before the magistrate judge, Officer Boehmer of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, and defendant Willis. The magistrate judge wrote that he "need not assess the credibility of the officer's testimony about Willis's driving" because he found that no traffic stop occurred, given that "Willis voluntarily pulled his car over in front of his own residence before Officers Boehmer and Miller swooped in and surrounded him." (Emphasis in original.) For purposes of my dissent, I assume that Officer Boehmer testified truthfully about what he saw and thought he saw.
As will be apparent, there are two problems with Officer Boehmer's testimony. First, as to his justification for the traffic stop, the problem is not with what Officer Boehmer stated. Rather, the problem is what he did not state. That is, Officer Boehmer's testimony does not contain sufficient "specific, articulable facts" to justify a traffic stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, Michael R., 90 F.3d at 346. Second, as to the nature of the stop, Officer Boehmer's testimony makes clear that his detention of Willis was anything but a "run-of-the-mine" traffic stop. Because it was not such a traffic stop, it cannot be justified under Whren.
A. Willis's Driving
Early in the morning of December 19, 2002, Willis, an African-American male, was driving a car with Colorado license plates within the city limits of Las Vegas, Nevada. Officer Boehmer testified that he began to follow Willis in a marked patrol car after seeing him make a "rapid turn" from Hoover Avenue right onto Las Vegas Boulevard. Officer Boehmer testified at the hearing that three aspects of Willis's driving warranted a stop for traffic violations-his "rapid turn" onto Las Vegas Boulevard, his accelerating and speeding after that turn, and his later U-turn on Hoover Avenue. I consider them in sequence.
1. "Rapid Turn"
Officer Boehmer testified that the "rapid turn" onto Las Vegas Boulevard from Hoover Avenue was "more excessive than it should have been," and that he believed this turn violated the traffic laws. Officer Boehmer elaborated in an exchange with the magistrate judge:
Q: What do you mean that the turn is more excessive than it should have been?
A: Well, the speed is more excessive than I'd say operating speed would be.
Q: All right. What is the traffic code violation?
A: I don't know, Your Honor.
Q: No citation was issued in this case?
A: No.
Q: Do you have any idea what-I mean, is there-this was in the city of Las Vegas and would have been under the-either the state's-
A: It would have been-it would have been a municipal traffic code. Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Okay. And you don't know what the traffic code would be?
A: No, Your Honor. I don't really write too many tickets.
Q: Okay.
A: I just mostly do criminal investigations.
2. Accelerating and Exceeding the Speed Limit
Officer Boehmer testified that after turning right onto Las Vegas Boulevard, Willis turned right onto Charleston Boulevard, turned right onto Third Street, and finally turned right back onto Hoover Avenue. The distance on Las Vegas Boulevard between Hoover Avenue and Charleston (i.e., between Willis's first and second turns) is one block. The distance on Charleston between Las Vegas Boulevard and Third Street (i.e., between his second and third turns) is two blocks. The distance on Third Street between Charleston and Hoover (i.e., between his third and fourth turns) is a block and a half. After his fourth right turn back onto Hoover, Willis parked his car on the south side of the street at or near the northwest corner of Third and Hoover. Willis traveled essentially in a circle, covering a total distance of somewhere between four-and-a-half and five blocks.
On direct, Officer Boehmer testified that he was driving northbound on Fourth Street at the intersection of Fourth and Hoover when he first saw Willis. Officer Boehmer was one block away from Willis, who at that moment was making his "rapid" right turn from Hoover onto Las Vegas Boulevard. Officer Boehmer testified that he turned right onto Hoover toward Las Vegas Boulevard to follow Willis. Then, as Officer Boehmer turned right onto Las Vegas Boulevard from Hoover, he saw Willis-still one block ahead of him-turning right onto Charleston. Officer Boehmer testified, "I accelerated to attempt to catch up with the vehicle because it was apparent to me, with the distance he had gained, he had been accelerating. I then made a westbound turn onto Charleston, and at the time the vehicle was just beginning to make a turn onto northbound Third Street." Boehmer testified that in his opinion Willis was trying to evade him. He said, "Just from my experience-my three years experience, in the past people trying to evade me, make rapid continuous turns like that."
On further questioning by the magistrate judge, Officer Boehmer reiterated his view that Willis's right turn onto Las Vegas Boulevard had been a traffic violation. He also stated for the first time that, although he could not tell "exactly how fast" Willis was traveling, he was exceeding the speed limit:
Q: [A]s you reached Hoover, to your right you looked and saw this white vehicle making a right turn from Hoover onto Las Vegas Boulevard south-bound?
A: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
Q: A rapid turn?
A: Yes, a rapid turn.
Q: Was it a traffic violation in your judgment?
A: It is. Basically the way he made his turn.
Q: Is that what you thought at the time?
A: Oh, definitely at the time, that's why I continued to follow him. And then once I made the turn and I observed how far he had gotten from me, the distance that he had gained, he wasn't going the speed limit. I had, you know, no way to tell exactly how fast, but he wasn't going the speed limit because I had to accelerate excessively to try to catch up with him.
The magistrate judge sought to clarify the distances (and, by inference, the speeds) involved, asking if Officer Boehmer could see Willis after he turned onto Charleston from Las Vegas Boulevard, and then again after he turned onto Third from Charleston:
Q: So you saw him make a right turn on Third [from Charleston]?
A: Yes I did.
Q: And then when you reached Third and made a right turn, do you recall where he was when you were able to see down Third Street?
A: Yes. I believe he was already past Coolidge because I was saying-I remember saying to myself, man, this guy is driving so fa[s]t, you know it was almost to the point I was going to call out the vehicle pursuit, but I had no other description besides the white vehicle.
The distance between Charleston and Third is a block and a half. Coolidge comes into Third at an angle, joining Third half a block up from Charleston. The magistrate judge continued:
Q: And then when you turned north on Third Street, he was already halfway between Coolidge and Hoover?
A: Yes.
Q: He must have been slowing down as he approached Hoover, correct?
A: He did.
Q: And he then made a right turn on Hoover?
Q: Just around the corner practically-
Q: -and parked-
Q: On the south side of the street?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
When Willis parked his car, he was less than two blocks from where he had been when Officer Boehmer had first spotted him. He was now back on Hoover, pointed in the same direction he had been driving when he made his "rapid turn" from Hoover onto Las Vegas Boulevard.
Officer Boehmer never testified as to the speed limit on the streets on which Willis traveled, or as to the exact speed Willis was traveling. He also made no attempt to explain how Willis had been able to exceed the speed limit when he never traveled more than two blocks in a straight line. Nor did Officer Boehmer attempt to reconcile his belief that Willis was trying to evade him with the fact that Willis had essentially driven in a four-and-a-half to five-block circle, coming back onto Hoover and then stopping voluntarily.
3. U-Turn on Hoover
After parking his car on Hoover, Willis got out, "sprinted" (Officer Boehmer's word) across the street to a nearby apartment, and banged on the door. He was admitted to the apartment and stayed for a short time. He then came out of the apartment, got into his car, and made a U-turn on Hoover. He crossed Third Street and stopped the car at the curb on Hoover in front of what we now know was his own apartment.
Officer Boehmer testified that Willis's U-turn on Hoover was illegal, but he cited no provision of any applicable traffic law. Nevada's traffic laws provide that "[a] U-turn may be made on any road where the turn can be made with safety, except as prohibited by this section and by the provisions of N.R.S. 484.309 [driving on a divided highway] and 484.339 [turning on a curve or crest/grade]." Nev.Rev.Stat. 484.337(1) (2002). U-turns may not be performed at stoplights that have signs prohibiting these turns. Id. at 484.337(2). Nor may they be performed in a business district unless at an intersection. Id. at 484.337(3). Las Vegas's municipal traffic code provides, "The driver of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction upon any street in a business district and shall not upon any other street so turn a vehicle unless such movement can be made in safety and without interfering with other traffic." Las Vegas Mun.Code 11.12.050 (2005).
Nowhere in his testimony did Officer Boehmer state that Hoover Avenue at Third Street is in a business district. We know from Officer Boehmer's testimony that there were residential apartments along Hoover at the point where Willis made his U-turn. Further, Officer Boehmer's testimony indicates that there was no traffic on Hoover when Willis performed the U-turn. Finally, there is nothing in Officer Boehmer's testimony to indicate that there was a stoplight or a sign prohibiting a U-turn, or that Willis's U-turn was unsafe.
4. Other Evidence
Officer Boehmer testified at the suppression hearing that he had no recollection of having mentioned any traffic violations to Willis during the course of the arrest, and that no traffic citation was ever issued to Willis. Officer Boehmer further testified that he did not mention Willis's rapid accelerating and speeding in either of his two written reports prepared after the arrest. Officer Boehmer did mention Willis's U-turn in his reports, but only as part of the narrative leading up to Willis's voluntary stop in front of his own apartment. Officer Boehmer did not indicate anywhere in his two written reports that Willis's U-turn was illegal. Indeed, there is nothing in either of Officer Boehmer's two reports to indicate that Willis had violated the traffic laws in any manner, or that Officer Boehmer had stopped Willis for a traffic violation.
B. Circumstances of the "Traffic Stop"
Officer Boehmer's testimony makes clear that he suspected that Willis was engaged in, or had engaged in, criminal activity. He testified that his suspicions were first aroused by Willis's manner of driving between the time of his initial turn from, and subsequent return to, Hoover Avenue. His suspicions were further aroused when Willis parked on Hoover, left his windows rolled down, ran across the street, and banged on the door of an apartment. At that point, Officer Boehmer asked that a check be run on the Colorado license plates of Willis's car. He also asked for back-up: "Due to the suspicious situation, the known gang, prostitution and drug activity in the area, I just, for officer safety, I wanted another officer there, and the time of night." While he waited for his back-up to arrive, Officer Boehmer made a U-turn on Hoover and drove a little over half a block away to the west. He parked in an alley that intersected Hoover between Third Street and Casino Center Boulevard. He testified that he had an unobstructed view from the alley to the apartment complex to which Willis had run.
Officer Boehmer testified that the license plate check revealed that Willis's car was listed as a "suspicious vehicle in an earlier event almost a week earlier." It also revealed "that the vehicle has a missing persons [National Crime and Information Center ("NCIC") ] hit on it." About a week earlier, the woman who owned the car Willis was driving had been driving with Willis in Las Vegas. They were stopped by Las Vegas police because the car had a missing person listing on the NCIC system. During the stop, Las Vegas police officers learned that the woman was in Las Vegas on her own volition and wanted no assistance. According to Officer Boehmer, the suspicious vehicle report had been entered into the local Las Vegas police department system at about the time of this stop.
Las Vegas police contacted the woman's family and the Escondido, California Police Department (the source of the missing person listing) to tell them what they had learned. The Escondido Police Department requested that the Las Vegas Police Department let them know where the woman was so that she could be removed from the missing persons list. The record does not indicate when or if the Las Vegas Police Department responded to this request. However, none of this was known to Officer Boehmer as he watched from the alley. The only thing he knew was that the car was listed as a "suspicious vehicle" on the local Las Vegas system, and there was an NCIC missing persons "hit" on the car.
Officer Miller arrived in a separate police car in response to the back-up request. While Officer Boehmer was describing the situation to Officer Miller, Willis came back out of the apartment. Willis got into his car, made a U-turn on Hoover, and drove less than a block. Still on Hoover, Willis pulled over to the curb of his own accord and parked in front of his own apartment. Officers Boehmer and Miller immediately moved to box in Willis's car. Officer Boehmer made a U-turn, turned on his overhead lights, and drove up behind Willis's car. Officer Miller made a U-turn from the other direction, turned on his overhead lights, and drove up to the front of Willis's car.
Officer Boehmer testified that Willis opened his car door as he was in the middle of his U-turn. Then, "as he stepped out [of his car] I was putting my vehicle into park and I observed a black male start looking from side to side rapidly." Boehmer testified, "I immediately began ordering commands to him to step to the front of my vehicle, and also to take his hands out of his pockets because at the time he had his hands in his jacket pockets․ [F]rom my experience again, someone that, you know, immediately opens up their vehicle and jumps out and begins looking from side to side frantically is, in my experience they've always taken off running. So before, you know, he had a chance to, I just started giving commands."
Officer Boehmer testified that Willis complied with his commands. After Willis had walked to the front of the police car, Officer Boehmer asked him, "[D]o you have anything on you I should know about?" According to Officer Boehmer, Willis "said he had a gun." Officer Boehmer says he "then asked him to place his hands behind his back and spread his feet apart[.]" Officer Boehmer testified that Officer Miller "gained [Willis's] consent" to look in his pockets, where he found a loaded firearm. Officer Boehmer testified that he then gave Willis a Miranda warning and asked him more questions. He testified that he asked a records clerk to run a criminal history check, and that the check revealed that Willis was a convicted felon. Officer Boehmer placed Willis under arrest "[f]or ex-felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, ex-felon failure to register at that time." After arresting Willis, Officer Boehmer transported him to the Clark County Detention Center.
In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the police may make an ordinary "traffic stop" whenever they have sufficient reason to believe that a traffic law has been violated. It does not matter under Whren that the police might have some ulterior motive for making the stop, so long as they have sufficient reason based on suspicion that the traffic laws have been violated. The Court in Whren spoke of "probable cause," 517 U.S. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, but we, along with other circuits, have construed Whren to require only that the police have "reasonable suspicion" to believe that a traffic law has been broken. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir.2000).
Whren gives the police considerable leeway in making traffic stops, but it does not provide them carte blanche. There are two independent requirements for a valid traffic stop under Whren.
First, "specific, articulable facts" to justify reasonable suspicion must be provided by the police officer. As stated by the Supreme Court in Terry, "the police officer must be able to point to specific, articulable facts which, together with rational interferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir.1996) (police officer making a traffic stop must have "specific, articulable facts which, taken together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity") (quoting United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 246 (9th Cir.1995)); Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104 (same). A police officer may rely on his training and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he observes, but those inferences must also "be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation." Michael R., 90 F.3d at 346.
Second, the stop must be an ordinary traffic stop. The Supreme Court was careful in Whren to specify that its rationale, and its holding, was limited to what it called the "run-of-the-mine case." Whren, 517 U.S. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769. That is, if a detention of a vehicle by police is other than a "run-of-the-mine" traffic stop, Whren does not apply.
If either of these two requirements is not satisfied, a detention is not a valid traffic stop under Whren. I consider them in sequence.
A. "Specific, Articulable Facts"
A defendant has the ultimate burden of proof on a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.2005). But when a traffic stop based on Whren is at issue, the police officer has the initial burden of production. That is, Officer Boehmer had the burden of providing "specific, articulable facts" to justify a "reasonable suspicion" to believe that Willis had violated the traffic laws. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Michael R., 90 F.3d at 346; Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104. In the absence of such "specific, articulable facts" provided by the police officer, the defendant has no obligation to refute the police officer's testimony, for he has failed to satisfy his initial burden of production. Unless the police officer provides "specific, articulable facts," a traffic stop under Whren is invalid.
Officer Boehmer failed to carry his initial burden of production of providing "specific, articulable facts" to justify a reasonable suspicion that Willis violated the traffic laws. Even when invited to do so, Officer Boehmer failed to point to a single provision of Nevada or Las Vegas traffic laws that Willis might have violated. Officer Boehmer admitted forthrightly in his testimony, "I don't really write too many tickets." Rather, "I just mostly do criminal investigations."
Officer Boehmer first asserted that Willis's "rapid turn" onto Las Vegas Boulevard was a traffic violation, but he was unable, even when asked, to specify any law that had been violated. Officer Boehmer next asserted that Willis had broken the speed limit, but Officer Boehmer did not specify the applicable speed limit, and was unable to say, even when asked, exactly how fast Willis was going. It is apparent from Officer Boehmer's narrative that Willis's speed would have been limited by the route he took, for Willis never had more than two blocks of straight driving before turning onto another street. Finally, Officer Boehmer asserted that Willis had made an illegal U-turn on Hoover Avenue. But it is apparent from Officer Boehmer's testimony that the U-turn was accomplished on a stretch of Hoover that was bordered by residential apartments. Officer Boehmer failed to specify any traffic law forbidding a U-turn in a residential area. He also failed to specify that Willis's U-turn was performed in an unsafe manner, or in any other manner that would have violated the traffic laws.
B. "Traffic Stop"
The totality of circumstances surrounding Officer Boehmer and Miller's arrest of Willis make it clear that they did not perform a "run-of-the-mine" traffic stop within the meaning of Whren. I recognize that there are circumstances in which a valid traffic stop under Whren can take place after a car has already been stopped. For example, if a police vehicle openly pursues a fleeing car and the driver belatedly decides to pull over and stop to wait for the police vehicle to catch up, no one would dispute that the car had been subjected to a traffic stop within the meaning of Whren. But this is hardly such a case.
Officer Boehmer made clear in his testimony that he suspected Willis of criminal activity. After Willis made his first stop on Hoover, Officer Boehmer called for backup and drove to a secluded alley where he could watch and wait for his back-up. After Officer Miller arrived, Officer Boehmer told him what was happening. Willis then returned to his car, made a U-turn on Hoover, and drove less than a block to park in front of his own apartment.
After Willis had already parked his car on his own accord, Officers Boehmer and Miller "swooped in," boxing in the already stopped car from the front and rear. Officers Boehmer and Miller then behaved exactly as one would expect welltrained officers to behave when stopping someone suspected of criminal activity. To dissuade Willis from running away, Officer Boehmer "immediately began ordering commands to him to step to the front of my vehicle, and also to take his hands out of his jacket pockets[.]" To ensure the officers' safety, Officer Boehmer asked Willis if he had "anything on [him] I should know about." When Willis replied that he had a gun, Officer Boehmer arrested him and took him to the detention center.
After stopping Willis, Officer Boehmer never mentioned any traffic violation or issued any traffic citation. Nor did Officer Boehmer ever mention any traffic violation in his two written reports prepared after Willis's arrest. The first time a purported traffic violation was mentioned was when Officer Boehmer was questioned by government counsel at the suppression hearing.
C. Summary
The majority's rationale under Whren thus fails on both counts, either one of which is fatal. Officer Boehmer did not provide "specific, articulable facts" that justified reasonable suspicion that Willis had violated any traffic law. Further, Officers Boehmer and Miller's detention and arrest of Willis was not a "run-of-the-mine" traffic stop within the meaning of Whren.
III. Failure to Remand
Even if I agreed with the majority's legal analysis, I could not agree with its disposition. Rather than remand for factfinding, the majority simply affirms the denial of Willis's suppression motion.
Because the district court concluded-as I do-that Officers Boehmer and Miller did not perform a traffic stop within the meaning of Whren, it did not determine whether Officer Boehmer's testimony about Willis's driving was credible. The magistrate judge noted that Willis had contended that Officer Boehmer's testimony was "simply not credible." But the magistrate judge wrote that he did not "need [to] assess the credibility of the officer's testimony about Willis's driving" because there had been no traffic stop under Whren.
Unlike the district court, the majority concludes that there was a traffic stop under Whren. It also concludes that the traffic stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion that Willis had committed a traffic violation. In order to reach the second conclusion, it treats Officer Boehmer's testimony about Willis's driving as credible. It does so despite Willis's explicit challenge to its credibility, and despite the magistrate judge's explicit refusal to "assess [its] credibility." Under the circumstances, I would remand to the district court for factfinding.
The majority distorts the law to hold that Officers Boehmer and Miller performed a permissible traffic stop under Whren. The majority recognizes the weakness of the other two rationales offered by the government-a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry and the community caretaking function under Cady v. Dombrowski. But the majority's alternative rationale is even worse. If, on these assumed facts, Officer Boehmer provided "specific, articulable facts" to support a reasonable suspicion that Willis had broken the traffic laws, "reasonable suspicion" has lost much of its meaning. And if, on these facts, Officers Boehmer and Miller performed a "run-of-the-mine" "traffic stop," those terms, too, have lost their meaning.
1. The NCIC is "a national criminal records data system administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 534. NCIC contains criminal history information, including outstanding arrest warrants, and is available to police departments nationwide. State law enforcement agencies are connected to NCIC through their computer systems." Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Dep't, 249 F.3d 921, 923-24 (9th Cir.2001).
2. LVMPD officers had stopped Willis and his girlfriend a week earlier, on December 12, in response to the NCIC report. During that encounter, police questioned Willis about the missing person's report and determined that Willis's girlfriend was not in any danger. LVMPD requested that the Escondido Police Department ("EPD"), which issued the report, call and confirm that the missing person's report was still current. EPD confirmed the report, and asked LVMPD to send a "locate," which is information stating that the missing person has been located in the area. LVMPD contacted Willis's girlfriend's family and EPD to give them information about her, but the record does not indicate when or if LVMPD sent the requested "locate" to EPD.
3. We review the district court's denial of Willis's motion to suppress evidence de novo; the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.2003).
4. Willis argues that the government waived its reasonable suspicion argument by failing to present it to the district court when the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation denying Willis's motion to suppress. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/Torf Environmental Management), 357 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir.2004). Here, the government prevailed before the magistrate judge. A party prevailing before a magistrate judge need not object to the magistrate's report and recommendation in order to preserve its right to argue an alternative theory in support of the recommendation on appeal. See Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1983) ("The language of [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ] does not indicate that failure to object to a magistrate's recommendation will be an absolute bar to appeal from the district court's decision."), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). But cf. McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that waiver is appropriate where a party's failure to object to the magistrate judge's conclusions of law was coupled with its failure to raise the objection until its reply brief); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1222-24 (D.Ariz.2003) (noting a possible intra-circuit conflict on whether a failure to object to a magistrate's conclusions of law waives the right to appeal them). Although Britt and McCall are to some degree in tension, Britt's core holding-that a prevailing party need not object to a magistrate judge's conclusions of law in order to preserve those grounds for appeal-remains good law, at least where the objections are raised on appeal in either the prevailing party's opening or answer brief. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
5. The dissent purports to take Officer Boehmer at his word, see Dissent at 16564, but then proceeds to doubt his observation that Willis committed traffic infractions. See id. at 16569-70, 16575-77. The dissent's doubts are based on the fact that the officer did not provide information such as the posted speed limit, the exact speed Willis was traveling or whether the incident occurred in a business district. But the officer has satisfied the government's burden of production by coming forward with "specific and articulable facts," Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, to support his suspicion of illegal activity. The defendant has the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence, see United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.2005), and if Willis wanted to cast doubt on Officer Boehmer's statement that his erratic behavior constituted a traffic infraction, he was required to introduce contrary evidence or get the officer to retract his testimony on cross-examination. Defendant did neither, so Officer Boehmer's testimony that he observed Willis committing traffic infractions stands unrefuted.
6. The dissent relies on the fact that the magistrate judge "found that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify a [Terry ] stop." Dissent at 718. The magistrate judge found, in pertinent part, as follows:Here, the court finds that the totality of the circumstances described by Officer Boehmer did not give rise to a "reasonable articulable suspicion" that Willis was engaged in or about to engage in some identifiable form of criminal activity. Although Boehmer may have seen Willis exceeding the speed limit, the reason Boehmer wanted to stop him was not to issue a traffic citation; it was to inquire into the circumstances giving rise to the NCIC missing person hit.To the extent the magistrate judge made the same mistake as the dissent, by finding reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop lacking based on the officer's subjective motivations, we reverse. The parsing of police motives-as opposed to "articulable facts," Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868-is precisely what Whren tells us we may not do. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (refusing to "endors[e] the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred").Nor need we remand to establish the basis for a Terry stop. See Dissent at 16577-78. The magistrate judge made a factual finding after an evidentiary hearing that Willis "made a U-turn on Hoover." Officer Boehmer testified that this turn was illegal, and his testimony is unrefuted. The magistrate judge's statement that "[t]he court need not assess the credibility of the officer's testimony about Willis's driving" presumably refers only to Officer Boehmer's testimony that Willis was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, since the excessive speed allegation-unlike the fact that Willis "made a U-turn on Hoover"-was not part of the magistrate judge's factual findings. Because the illegal U-turn was sufficient to justify the traffic stop, no remand is required.
7. Willis also argues that the evidence seized in the stop should be excluded because the police had stopped Willis the week before based on the same NCIC report. We find no basis for excluding the evidence. There is nothing in the record that shows Officers Boehmer and Miller were aware that the NCIC missing person's report was outdated, nor is there evidence that the LVMPD deliberately failed to send a "locate" to the Escondido Police Department. In any event, because the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to stop Willis for a traffic violation, the validity of any other reasons they may have had to stop him becomes irrelevant.
8. Indeed, in Whren, the plainclothes vice officer who stopped Whren after observing apparent traffic violations testified that "he did not intend to issue a ticket to the driver for stopping too long at the stop sign, but he wished to stop the Pathfinder to inquire why it was obstructing traffic and why it sped off without signalling in a school area." United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C.Cir.1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
BYBEE, Circuit Judge.


As I read the first chapter of the book, "What is Your Suffering?" I immediately felt at home. The chapter lays out the intent of the book, which is not to change the 12 steps, but to explain them in non-theistic language. As I read this chapter, I became excited that I might finally read the 12 steps without feeling my skin crawl.
If you're like me, the idea of an interventionist god, who is going to fix you, who is going to save you, simply does not resonate. And if you're like me, you were probably told that you don't need to believe in God to practice the 12 steps. You may have been told that there is a difference between Spirituality and Religion. And when you insisted that there was too much God talk in the steps, you were probably pointed to the chapter "We Agnostics" in the Big Book.
And if you're anything like me, when you read "We Agnostics" you probably read it for what it is — A half assed attempt to cover up the religion that dominates the steps as written in the Big Book. Indeed the entire chapter seems to focus not on acknowledging that you don't need an interventionist god to get sober, but rather to convince you that you do. The story of Bill Wilson's conversion figures prominently in this chapter. So too do stories designed to prove that science and reason are not always right — such as the recounting of the widespread belief that man would never fly until the Wright Brothers developed the airplane.
Yes, we were like you too. We were men of science and reason. We didn't believe in God. But we couldn't reason our way out of drinking and in our moment of utter defeat, we succumbed to the idea that we needed to believe in God to get sober. And you will too, just you wait.
Every time I hear that in a meeting I cringe because I know that there are many paths up the mountain.
My relationship with organized religion is complicated. I've written about my challenges with the phrase "a God of my understanding" in the past. I've struggled with the notion of spirituality without the heavy handedness of evangelical christianity (and make no mistake, the Oxford Group from which the 12 steps came was an evangelical group).
My last post explored the idea of Faith rather than Belief. After reading it, one of my friends on Twitter pointed me to the book The Alternate 12 Steps: A Secular Guide to Recovery. I wondered if I would find it valuable. So many of the things that I've been pointed to on this question have failed so miserably that I had my doubts. But I knew that Paul was a kindred spirt and that there just might be something worth reading in this book.
I found the book to be true to it's intent. While the steps have been re-written to remove the theism that dominates the 1935 version of the steps, the intent does not change. The book provides clear guidance for those of us who wish to approach the steps without approaching god. The book makes clear the distinction between the religious and spiritual.
One final note, is that this book really puts the onus of recovery on the individual. "What matters is to have faith in our spiritual selves – in other words, to have faith in the energy that gives us life."5 This really resonates with me — after all is said and done, no one can do anything for anyone else. No one can make us better. We are not dependent on an interventionist god to make us better. We have to accept our responsibility to ourselves in order to get better.
So, if you're like me, and you struggle with the god talk in the recovery community, I highly recommend you read this book. It made a big difference for me.
This entry was posted in soberlife. Tagged 12steps, agnostics, alcoholics anonymous, alcoholism, book review, faith, MondayBlogs, recovery, spirituality.
Can't wait to read it! And I am giving a copy to someone in recovery, who has the same struggles! I love the meaning of spirit! That makes SO much sense!
Thanks Wendy. I hope you find the book helpful.
I cringe at meetings when folks start "testifying" and getting too Christian. It makes me want to talk about "enlightenment through LSD," Buddhism, or the beauty in the Islamic faith.
While I didn't struggle with the higher power concept, I also found "We Agnostics" to be rather condescending (same with "To the Wives.) My personal view of how I rely on Spirit sounds very similar to "The Alternative 12 Steps…" approach. The 12 steps is my path to spirituality. Thanks for sharing about this book!
We Agnostics makes me so angry! For so long i couldnt even look past the condescending arrogance to see the kernal of truth: doing simple practices that religious people do (meditation, prayer/affirmations) is helpful to my recovery. I am now quick to see where religious people are right, even if I don't believe in god.
Another great read on nontheistic AA recovery is Marya Hornbacher's book Waiting: A Nonbeliever's Higher Power.
Thanks, I'll add that to my reading list!
I don't need it, Damien, but you can't imagine how pleased I am that you found something that can work.
Your anger with the spiritual side of the program and your angst over the Higher Power/God part has always perplexed me. The way I read the chapter We Agnostics was exactly as described in your new book.
Now, about that capitalization of the Big G…. Ya know, I know why you folks do it, but I doubt we would get along very well if I ran around poking you in the eye every now and again.
I've said my peace, do as you wish. Either way, I'm truly happy for you.
Thanks brother. I'm happy too.
and the walls torn down.
it was the 1st word in all the steps I've ever heard or read. . . .
Thanks Paul. Eternally grateful for the recommendation of this book.
Damien, I think you know that you and I don't completely "agree" on on this but it is worth noting how unimportant that fact is. I learn a lot from your discernment and it forces me to question (healthily) my beliefs and approach. I'm appreciative of that and of the fact that it helps me grow, too.
Oh thank you so, so much and thank you Paul! I have really struggled with the text because despite the continued assurances that anything can be my higher power, the source material is pretty clear (and sorta condescending). I am off to check this out immediately!
Glad this post helped. You might be interested in my latest post, It's a Mystery which discuses purpose as a higher power.


School starts on Wednesday, August 22, 2018 for PK3 only, K, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th grades, from 8:30am-1:00pm. PreK-4 only starts on Thursday, August 23, in addition to K, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th grades, from 8:30am-3:30pm. On Friday, August 24, ALL GRADES have school from 8:30am-3:30pm.
Please see the school calendar, available here, for more details regarding the staggered schedule.
School hours on Wednesday, August 22 are from 8:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. for all students. Students in PreK-4 and up will attend a full day of school from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on Thursday, August 23.
Regular school hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays.
On all Wednesdays, school hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Note that on Wednesdays, from 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m., the after school program is included only for students signed-up for the program on a Full-Time basis or Part-Time including Wednesday. Students not signed up for Full-Time or Part-Time including Wednesday who attend Wednesday after school programming from 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. will be charged a separate drop-in rate.
Are before and after school programming provided during the first week of school?
There will be NO before school programming provided on the first day of school. Before school programming will be offered beginning on Monday, August 27 for ALL students.
When is the earliest I may drop my student off at school? When is the latest I may pick them up?
Families may drop their student off between 8:10 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. Students who are dropped off earlier than 8:10 a.m. will join the before school program and be billed the daily drop-in fee.
Families must pick their children up by 3:45 p.m. Students who are not picked up by 3:45 p.m. will join the after school program and be billed the daily drop-in fee.
Breakfast is served beginning at 8:10 a.m. in the Kitchen for grades 1- 5 and in classroom for Pre-K and Kinder.
My child will participate in the before school program. Will they get to eat breakfast when they arrive?
We will begin serving breakfast at 7:30 a.m. for all students in the before school program. Students in before school programming will be supervised by staff.
You have to sign up for breakfast to ensure that the school prepares one for your child. This allows us to accurately prepare the correct number of breakfast meals for the school. If you initially sign up for breakfast but find the routine isn't working for your child and you choose to eat at home, please email meals@mundoverdepcs.org to cancel. Breakfast is FREE of charge to all children regardless of family income.
Do students receive snack during the day?
All students are provided a midday snack. Students who participate in after school also receive a snack after school free of charge.
How much do midday snacks cost?
Full pay families are charged $20/month for snacks and families who qualify for a Free or Reduced Meal are offered snacks at no charge. Mundo Verde will ensure that students are provided with healthy and varied snack options that are cooked from scratch by our food service team. The snack fee ensures that Mundo Verde is able to provide healthy and nutritious snacks to each child.
My child doesn't eat certain snacks due to allergies, etc.; do I still have to pay a midday snack fee?
The Food and Wellness Coordinator along with the kitchen staff take into account the allergies of students to ensure that all students are able to eat the midday snack. If a student has allergies or a medical condition that precludes them from eating the majority of the snack options, families may chat with the Food Initative & Wellness Manager to come up with a list of approved items. Please contact Kelsey Weisgerber at kweisgerber@mundoverdepcs.org.
For more information, see the school meals section here.
What is the cost of lunch?
School meals will be $4.75 a meal or roughly $100 a month. Lunch will be free of charge for families who qualify for a Free or Reduced Price Meal.
How do I know if I qualify for a Free or Reduced Meal? How do I apply?
Free and Reduced Meal (FARM) applications are available on our website and at the school during office hours. Click here for more details in English and Spanish, to evaluate your income eligibility, and to complete an application in English and Spanish here. We ask all families who are interested to submit an application as early as possible. Families may apply at any time during the school year to qualify for a Free or Reduced Meal. Until families qualify and receive confirmation from the Food and Wellness Coordinator that their application is approved, families will be charged the full meal price.
Will my child be able to eat the school lunch on a drop-in basis?
Unfortunately we are not able to provide a drop-in meal service. Families will need to provide one week's notice before enrolling/canceling meal service. We are working towards our mission of being a sustainable kitchen by trying to eliminate as much food waste as possible. Having exact meal counts allows us to prepare the proper amount of food and limit food going into the compost.
How do I sign up for the meal program?
Sign up is available for 2018-2019. Click here.
How do I pay for meal service?
All families are required to keep a positive account balance. We suggested families fund about $100/month per child which covers lunch and the midday snack fee ($20/month). You may deposit checks at the front desk. You may also pay with credit card online or at the main office (with our Business Manager). Families will receive a monthly Invoice detailing deposits and charges.
How will school meals accommodate allergies? Will there be milk alternatives, gluten free, vegetarian, vegan options, etc.?
We are able to offer vegan, gluten-free, dairy free and vegetarian and other dietary options. If a child has an allergy that requires a special meal, they must provide a physician's order and instructions before we can provide a meal for them.
For greater detail about the before-school program, please refer to the Program FAQ.
What are the before school program hours?
The before school program will be available from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.
Will you offer drop-in before school programming? If I would like to use drop-in service do I need to provide the school with advance notice?
We understand that unanticipated, last minute changes can occur in a family's day-to-day schedule throughout the academic year. We are sensitive to these changes and aim to help families as much as possible. Families are asked to request drop-in services by emailing dropinservices@mundoverdepcs.org by 6:30pm the day prior. If a family requires child care but misses these deadlines, they must call the school immediately at 202-750-7060, in order to insure the school can integrate the student into a classroom and guarantee him/her a breakfast.
How much will the before school program cost?
The costs of the before and after school program are detailed in the SY18-19 Summary of Fees in English or Spanish. Before School Program costs $144/month for full pay. Cost for families who qualify for Free pay is $28.8/month, Reduced $57.6/month, and Discounted $86.4/month. After School Program costs $450/month for full pay. Cost for families who qualify for Free pay is $90/month, Reduced is $180/month, and Discounted is $270/month. Full-time fees have increased by 2.5% for the SY18-19 for the first time since SY15-16 to cover the increased costs related to program growth and inflation. For eligibility discounts complete the FARM form in Spanish and English (even if you do not qualify for FARM).
If I enroll in full-time before school programming mid-month is the cost prorated?
When you enroll in the program, you will be required to provide a start date. Your invoice will reflect the cost of the before school program based on the date you provide. Use of the program prior to that start date will be charged at a drop-in fee. Absences are not reimbursed.
How do I sign-up and pay for before school programming?
The sign-up form is available here. All families are required to keep a positive account balance. Electronic invoices with a link for immediate payment are sent to families every first business day of each month. Families can request a paper copy of their invoice and can make in-person payments at the front desk. Families can pay in the form of cash, personal checks or credit/debit.
What are the hours of the after school program?
The after school program is offered from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. Evening extension services are available from 6:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. On Wednesdays, when school ends at 1:00 p.m., after school programming begins at 1:00 p.m. In order for families to access the after school program, they must register for the services they will need. Students who are not registered and not picked up by 3:45 p.m. M, T, Th, F will be integrated into the after school program and be charged the drop-in fees related to the duration of their stay. Students not registered and not picked up by 1 p.m. on Wednesdays will be charged the drop-in fees related to the duration of their stay.
Will you offer drop-in after school programming? If I would like to use drop-in service do I need to provide the school with advance notice?
We understand that unanticipated, last minute changes can occur in a family's day-to-day schedule throughout the academic year. We are sensitive to these changes and aim to help families as much as possible. Families are asked to request drop-in services by emailing dropinservices@mundoverdepcs.org by 2PM the day of service. For before school services, the request must be made by 6:30pm the day prior. If a family requires child care but misses these deadlines, they must call the school immediately at 202-750-7060, in order to insure the school can integrate the student into a classroom and guarantee him/her a snack.
How much will after school cost?
If I enroll in full time after school mid-month is the cost prorated?
When you enroll in the after school program, you will be required to provide a start date. Your invoice will reflect the cost of the after school program based on the date you provide. Use of the program prior to that start date will be charged at a drop-in fee. Absences are not reimbursed.
How do I sign up and pay for after school programming?
The sign-up form is available here. All families are required to keep a positive account balance. Electronic invoices with a link for immediate payment are sent to families every first business day of each month. Families can request a paper copy of their invoice and can make in-person payments at the front desk from 7:30 a.m.-6:30 p.m., with the exception of arrival (8:10-8:35am) and dismissal times (3:15-3:45pm).
What form of payment can I use to pay for after school programming?
Families can pay in the form of cash, personal checks or credit/debit. When paying with cash, families are asked to be mindful that change may not be available at the front desk or in the school building. For example, if you desire to make a $50 payment toward your account, you are encouraged to bring exact change.
For greater detail about the summer school program, please refer to the Summer Program FAQ [in English] y [en español].
What are the dates and hours of the summer school program?
Mundo Verde offers summer programming to families with current MV students. The summer school program is a three-week program. The dates of the 2019 Summer Program are June 24 - July 12 (closed on July 4). Families may opt to sign up for individual weeks. The program runs from 9:00 a.m. - 3:45 p.m., with a drop-off window between 8:30 a.m. - 8:55 a.m. Optional extended day (after-school) services are available.
What are the summer program fees?
Mundo Verde's summer program fees are affected by the District's public funding dedicated to summer programming. To support the cost of staffing, enrichment offerings, partnerships, field trips, transportation, the per session fees—equal to roughly $63/day and $317/week.
If I currently qualify for FARM or discounted before/after school rates for the 2018-19 school year do I need to submit another application for the summer program?
No, families that currently qualify for FARM or the discounted before/after school rate do not need to complete another FARM or discounted rate application for the summer program.
Is the summer program similar to a traditional summer school or more like a summer camp?
Think of the summer program as a hybrid of summer school and summer camp. Ample opportunity for fun and adventure will be built into the day as will literacy, math and science, Mundo Verde's summer program's primary goal is to accelerate learning and mitigate immersion loss.
Is the summer program open to all Mundo Verde students?
To ensure quality programming and instruction Mundo Verde will cap registration with the intent of serving as many of our families as possible without compromising our desire to limit class sizes. Slots will be provided on a first-come first-served basis and preference given to students required or recommended to come by their teachers. Last year we were able to accommodate the demand with the spaces available.
Does the summer program offer before school services?
NO, before school program services are NOT offered during the summer school program. There is a drop off window between 8:30 a.m. - 8:55 a.m.
Does the summer program offer after school services?
YES, after school services are offered during the summer program from 4:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. Families must sign up for these services.
Optional extension services are offered from 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Families must sign up for these services.
What activities are offered during the extended day schedule of the summer program?
Extended day programming is a continuation of the full-day program and organized activities—some off-site—will run until 5:00 p.m. Should they opt to participate in extended day, the earliest families may pick up their student(s) is 5:00 p.m.
Yes. We have a uniform that is a simple t-shirt, which students are required to wear every day. The main purpose of the uniform is so that staff may easily and quickly identify students when they are outside the school building. Students will be allowed to wear their choice of bottoms and shoes. Please note that students are required to wear shoes that are appropriate for outdoor play. Flip-flops, sandals, and shoes that fall off easily are a safety hazard and not allowed.
How do I purchase the uniform and what will it cost?
T-shirts are available for purchase at the front desk between 9am and 3:00pm, or by appointment with the Front Desk Staff. The short sleeve t-shirts cost $8/t-shirt for youth size and $10/t-shirt for adult size. The long sleeve t-shirts for youth size cost $12. Sizes include 4T and 5T for toddler, and XS, S, M, L, XL for youth and adult. Hooded sweatshirts are $20. We have discounted pricing for families who qualify for Free or Reduced Meals.
Is there a winter uniform?
For cold weather months, we offer long-sleeve shirts and hooded sweatshirts for purchase. These items are optional for families. Long-sleeve shirts are $12 each for all students. Hooded sweatshirts are $20 each for all student. These items are available for purchase through the Front Desk.
What happens if my child does not wear uniform attire to school?
In the case that students are not wearing their Mundo Verde t-shirt or sweatshirt, teachers will send students to the front desk to obtain a loaned uniform shirt. Families will receive an invoice for each uniform shirt provided by the school. If you have concerns about your ability to purchase Mundo Verde uniform t-shirts, please reach out to the Student and Family Support Coordinator.
Are there any required school supplies?
Purchasing school supplies, providing an extra set of clothes, and/or purchasing uniforms is a hardship for my family. Can Mundo Verde offer me any resources?
Please contact Andrew Walker, Student and Family Support Coordinator, at awalker@mundoverdepcs.org and he will be able to support families with acquiring the appropriate supplies. We may also be able to help with other resources your family might need that are related to school.
What are the expectations regarding drop-off and pick-up?
We want our students to be on time and safe to school, so please read the complete routine for Arrival and Dismissal here. If a student is late we ask that they be signed in at the front desk. During after school, families should sign-out students at the front desk.
If a student arrives late to school, the parent is expected to sign the child in at the front desk.
Is there anywhere to park since I will need to drive my student to school each day?
Yes. There is metered and residential parking available on surrounding streets. We also encourage families to walk, take public transportation, and carpool.
Does Mundo Verde have a shuttle bus?
There is a shuttle bus that picks up from Lamont Park in Mount Pleasant in the morning (7:45am departure from Lamont Park) and drops off after 3:30 pm dismissal. Read more here.
To sign up for the shuttle bus service, complete the sign up form here. If you have any questions, please click here to read more FAQ.
Please click here to see pricing.
For more information, see the shuttle bus section here.
How do I find the school calendar?
The school calendar is posted on our website here.
Will there be any office hours sessions or get togethers before school starts?
Yes. We host an Office Hours Session for our families on Friday 8/17 from 12:00-1:00pm and 3:00-4:00pm at Main Building/La Casa. Staff will be available to answer questions regarding services provided by Mundo Verde.
My child does not speak any English or Spanish, should we be preparing them for a new language?
There is no expectation that students will have a certain level proficiency in either language. However, the best support that you can provide your child is demonstrating yourself enthusiasm for the foreign language. You may do this by diving together into activities where you are both enjoying the language (for example, through a song or movie) and grappling together to make sense of it (for example, trying to figure out what a sign or title might say). Your modeling of a positive attitude towards language immersion is all your child will really need from you to be successful.
Is it possible to visit the school and/or the teachers before school starts?
Through a partnership with the Flamboyan Foundation, Mundo Verde conduct home visits before school starts and throughout the school year. Home visits are an opportunity for teachers and families to build stronger relationships with each other.
If your child has special needs you would like us to be aware of before the school year starts, please contact Norma Villanueva, our Director of Student Support Services at nvillanueva@mundoverdepcs.org .
Schools have sometimes trimmed recess to make more time for instruction, or withheld the daily break as punishment for misbehavior. Yet research shows this time can be used to reinforce a positive school culture. Playworks is a national nonprofit that promotes organized, intentional recess. A study of the model shows that children learn and practice conflict resolution, compromise, and self-regulation, as well as leadership and physical activity. Essential components of this model include treating recess with the same intentionality as academic lesson plans, having dedicated staff to organize and model games, establish common rules, use simple tools to resolve disagreements such as rock-paper-scissors, and foster positive language.


text:
Q: Find the roots for y
$$-1=(0.55)\cdot[1+(y+1)^2]^{\frac{3}{2}}$$

I got stuck with this expression. I have l some difficulty in leanding with some algebraic manipulation. What should I do to solve this equation??
I tried to answer but without results. I thought in taking square roots of booth sides, but this will lead me to the complex numbers.

A: Deep breath and be careful.
$-1= (0.55) \cdot[1 + (y+1)^2]^{\frac 32}$
$-1 = \frac {55}{100}\cdot[1 + (y+1)^2]^{\frac 32}$
$-\frac {100}{55} = -\frac {20}{11} = [1 + (y+1)^2]^{\frac 32}$
$(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23} = 1 + (y+1)^2$
$(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23} -1 = (y+1)^2$
$[(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23} -1]^{\frac 12} =y +1$
$[(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23} -1]^{\frac 12} -1 = y$
Now there are three values for $(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23}$ (they are $\sqrt[3]{\frac {20}{11}}^2,\sqrt[3]{\frac {20}{11}}^2e^{\frac 23\pi i},\sqrt[3]{\frac {20}{11}}^2e^{\frac 43\pi}$).
ANd so there are six values for $[(-\frac {20}{11})^{\frac 23} -1]^{\frac 12} -1$

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Rode NT1-A Kits added to hire stock.
We have added Rode NT1-A 1″ Large condenser microphones to our hire stock, normally found in studio applications they represent the best value for money/audio quality on the market today.
As with all Rode mics the voicing is both crisp and warm, with detail normally found on much more expensive products, the build quality is second to none which is why Rode provide offer a 10 year warranty.
As things at www.harrogatealternativeradio.co.uk progress we wanted to be able to offer a quick portable solution to enable recording shows, so combined with the Zoom H5 handheld recorder these mics are absolutely the best way to capture the presenter's every word, while taking a stereo line input from the program material simultaneously without the need for a mixing desk and complex bulky recording equipment.
We offer the complete kit with stands cables and accessories from £24.00 per day/£72.00 per week inc Vat.
If you wish to purchase the Mic kit yourselves they come in at £160.00 inc Vat, delivered with the cradle and pop shield included.
Please check out our other microphone stock for both live and recording purposes, bulk discounts are available for school and charity productions.


text:
Minimum Wage, Maximum Conflict
March 5, 2021 March 6, 2021 5 min read
For the last decade or so, the question of whether or not to jack up the nationally mandated minimum wage has lurked at the intersection of our democratic government and capitalist economy like a patch of black ice.
It's a tricky question, to be sure, which is why Congress has consistently detoured around it. The last time the minimum wage was raised was in 2009, to $7.25. The newly ascendant Democrats tried to more than double that — to $15 an hour — with a provision in the latest stimulus bill, but it didn't fly.
Part of the reason may have been bad timing. The coronavirus pandemic has already mowed down thousands of small businesses, both temporarily and permanently, and many others remain on life support. No doubt, many legislators were understandably leery of the blowback they would get from surviving business owners if wage increases were added to their challenges.
The economic realities of hiring have also been altered, at least for the time being. During a strong economy, offering $7.25 an hour might turn away a lot of prospective employees. Now, though, a reduced number of employers can choose from a larger and more desperate pool of applicants, many of whom have been laid off.
All of these factors made it easy for a majority in the Senate to procrastinate yet again. The prevailing negative argument seemed to be that requiring businesses to pay their employees more might force them to lay off some of those workers to make up the difference, thus negating the benefits that $15 an hour would bring.
Of course, the philosophical divide between Democrats and Republicans on this issue runs even deeper. In a democracy with capitalist underpinnings, should the government tell private companies how to run their businesses?
The debate might be framed this way: Is our government an "it" or an "us"?
Those who come down on the "us" side would argue that in a democracy, it is assumed that the government will use the public money with which it has been entrusted to fulfill — as much as possible — the basic needs of the citizens who provided that money.
The counter-position is that government is only a basic mechanism designed to handle what individuals cannot, which means carrying out large infrastructure projects and protecting us against crime at home and military threats from abroad. Virtually everything else should be up to us, to be orchestrated in large part by the capitalistic marketplace.
The minimum wage seems to fall somewhere in between. It's on the books but rarely enforced. Some states already require more — the minimum wage is $15 in Washington, D.C. — others tend to look the other way when employers pay even less, such as to undocumented immigrants forced to settle for anything they can find.
Democrats see the myriad individuals struggling to eke out a living as their core constituency. Republicans, for the most part, represent the business sector.
On several occasions in our recent history, however, dramatic changes followed overwhelming evidence that the freedom to run a business as the owner sees fit was impinging on the rights of a large swath of society. The Jim Crow laws not only kept many African-Americans in poverty but vastly limited their options on everything from where to work to where to eat to what seat to take on a bus. The American With Disabilities Act was passed because asking businesses to spend a little money to make their buildings accessible seemed a fair tradeoff for improving the daily lives of millions.
It'sIt's hard to argue that every American worker shouldn't earn enough to keep him or her above the poverty line. The concept that high unemployment is good for business because it increases the labor pool is too dark and Ayn Randian to be adopted as policy.
Remember, also, that it is the government that is required to shell out billions in unemployment payments.
During the current minimum wage debate, many Republican legislators employed the strikingly irrelevant "I was paid minimum wage back when I was in high school, and it worked fine for me" argument. This ignores the difference between a 17-year-old saving up for college or date night and a desperate single mother or father with three mouths to feed. Or how inflation has chewed away at that high school wage in the intervening years. When what you have left after paying basic bills is virtually nothing, a few dollars can make a significant difference.
Logically, raising the minimum wage would increase consumer spending, generate more tax dollars and probably reduce crime. At the same time, some businesses would undoubtedly suffer, perhaps fatally. Many of them pay entry-level workers the minimum wage not because they are scrooges, but because it's all their balance sheets tell them they can afford.
The bridge here would have to be the government. In his most recent pitch to Congress, Sen. Bernie Sanders did suggest that the wage increase might be phased in over a few years. He also proposed a program of tax breaks.
One weakness of Big Government is that it tends to adopt a "one size fits all" policy.
The first stimulus payout, for example, was barely enough to momentarily chase the wolf from the door for many Americans, while others no doubt spent it on smartphones or other luxuries that only benefitted Amazon.
In the minimum wage case, there are plenty of large corporations that could double entry-level salaries with little or no ill effects (they might have to give slightly smaller bonuses to executives). Many of these already receive significant tax breaks from federal, state, and local governments, which gives those governments some leverage. No wage hike, no more tax break.
Meanwhile, businesses on the razor's edge of survival could apply for relief. If it's accepted, the federal government would either make up the difference for each worker or provide the business with a more significant tax write-off.
Using taxes as the fulcrum would eliminate the need for government to enforce the new normal with an intrusive army of "minimum wage police."
Of course, a government-funded health care system would take a big load off the many large and medium-sized companies that currently pick up the tab for employee health plans, saving far more money than an increased minimum wage would cost.
Don't expect Congress to go there any time soon, either.
*This article has been updated since first publication to represent a late development on the minimum wage debate.*
Darrell Laurant
Founder at Snowflakes in a Blizzard | + posts
Darrell Laurant is a veteran journalist who previously worked at the News & Advance (Lynchburg). He published over 7,000 pieces in three decades. Darrell has covered papal visits, the Olympics, American sports, and political issues in Virginia. He has also written a variety of books, including "Inspiration Street: Two City Blocks that Helped Change America."
Policing The Police
No More Games - Black Athletes and Protest
A Tale of Three Falwells
← Virginia State Legislature Votes to Abolish The Death Penalty
The Marvelous Ms. Mason: From Slavery to Richest Woman in the West →
Haven't We Seen Enough? The Trump vs Biden Debates
The Denial of Neera Tanden: What the OMB Nominee's Failure Could Mean for the Future
Labor Market Shortages Plague American Businesses
July 2, 2021 August 15, 2021 6 min read
Editor's Picks Latest News Opinion
Local Newspapers Do Not Have To Die
Community Conversations Year On
Is Social Media Bad for Us? Hint: it's not
October 5, 2020 October 6, 2020 6 min read
An industry on pause: the pandemic's effect on the music business
February 7, 2021 February 7, 2021 5 min read

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Examples of its pre Hispanic past can be appreciated in places of important findings such as La Garañona, El Risco de los Angeles, Cueva de los Viejos, Barranco de Acentejo, Risco del Castillo, La Baranda, Las Breñas, where there are dwelling caves, and sepulchres (some with mummies) showing different tools used by the guanches.
A walk through the historic area is an attractive spectacle due to the examples of domestic buildings built in island style.
Specially notable is the Classic Music Season, that programs concerts at the Municipal Auditorium with groups related to the Tenerife Symphonic Orchestra and the Teobaldo Power Camera Orchestra. It is complemented all year long by treaties subscribed by the Insular Chapter, autonomous government and different island organizations for theatre, dance, music, and folklore.
The representation of the Lord's Epiphany or Act of the Three Wise Men, an annual event that takes place on a scenario of more than 2 000 m 2 and with a cast of approximately 400 actors, it is without a doubt, the most important manifestation where all the town participates, since it unites the efforts of each and every one of the municipality's groups and a multitude of town dwellers.
Among the local celebrations, the most notable are those of San Pedro Apostle (the Sunday closest to June 29th) and that of San Nicolás. For the latter, it is a tradition to bless bread and to deal it out, then the pieces are thrown to the rooftops of the houses, as an augury for abundant rains.
January 5th Representation of the Living Bethlehem (Cavalcade of the Wise Men).
Its court with its wine press was an ancient Canary farmstead from the XVII century, property today of the Tenerife Chapter House. It is dedicated to the island's wine promotion.


The Champion of Champions program has been discontinued as of September 2018. TQHA is pursuing other options (locations & events) for novice riders in 2019.
Thank you to everyone for your support and participation in this fun and great show.
Stay tuned for what is next!
*There is no qualification necessary for Champion of Champions, but exhibitors must be a current TQHA member to enter any C of C class.


text:
a collection of sixteen historical flash fictions
Love is the central force in Birdie, a collection of sixteen historical and out-of-time flash fictions that sing with the voices of women loving and losing and learning.
The characters here find strength, despite the sorrows of death and deceit: a ghost-child returns to Massachusetts to comfort her grieving mother; the daughter of a Spanish orange tycoon regrets her mother's terrible choices; an English maid longs for, but can't be with, her mistress's son.
Birdie contains O'Connor's signature ekphrastic work, drawing on artists as diverse as Matisse, da Vinci, and American painter Edwin Romanzo Elmer. The natural world looms large too: sheep and foxes roam these pages, as much as seawater washes through them.
A sincere thank you to the Arts Council of Ireland for a COVID-19 Crisis Response Award for Literature that enabled the writing and compilation of this collection of historical flash fiction and micro fictions
You can buy the ebook version of birdie for Kindle here or here for other readers.
'This collection of historical flash fictions is available now as an ebook, but there is also a beautiful print edition from Arlen House if one is so inclined. 'Flash' – a form O'Connor is a huge supporter of, advocate for and practioner of – feels like such an apt term for these briefly-illuminated moments of the past, obliquely or explicitly referencing real figures, deftly pulling us into a particular time and then depositing us back into our own world once more. This is a short book to be read like poetry, resting between pieces to let them sink in. It's also, for the writers out there, a reminder of how much can be done in a couple of hundred words. How a page-long story can still pack a punch.'
Claire Hennessy, author and editor at Banshee


text:
Q: What am I doing wrong with the Drupal 7 Exif module? I am trying to get a gallery set up that will display EXIF and other metadata from images that are uploaded. To do this I am using Drupal 7's exif module, which is supposed to draw the data into fields automatically.
I set up a content type, exif_image. I added an image field, and a field named field_exif_resolutionunit to the type. I then uploaded an image of that content type. The image does have a resolution unit exif field, but it doesn't show up in the node for the uploaded image.
I did this all on a fresh install of Drupal 7. What did I do wrong?

A: Make sure the widget type is set to metadata from image for the field field_exif_resolutionunit that you created.
In the field properties, make sure the exif field data is set to name of the field is the exif field name.  If this doesn't work, try changing this to the exif data property that you want and see if that makes a difference.
In your exif module settings at admin/config/media/exif/settings, make sure you have the Nodetype set for the content type you created.  And make sure the Refresh on node update is checked off.


A dry deck is what we call a dry top attached directly to a spray skirt. Dry decks reduce bulk around your midsection, are quick to put on, and provide a completely dry seal between the skirt and the dry top. They're great for freestyle paddling, touring, and easy river running but should be used with great caution when creeking.
Start by selecting a skirt and dry top of your choice off the IR site. Specify in the order notes at checkout that you'd like to have these made into a dry deck. We will contact you after we receive the sale, and collect an assembly fee from you, and double check sizing. The assembly fee is $75 for IR garments and $105 for items of another brand.
Please triple check with us on sizing.
We need a measurement from you before we start. It's the height from the top of the cockpit rim to the top of your shoulder.
Dry Decks are NOT considered safe for creek boating or paddling any place you might end up with something like a log across your skirt. The skirt and jacket are joined with a very robust glued seam, meaning you are not going to be able to come out of your boat through the skirt tunnel if the skirt is pinned to the deck.


text:
Disability Services Consulting
Accessing the NDIS- A Psychosocial Disability Resource
The mental health community is buzzing with understandable concern about the impact that the NDIS will have on people who use their services. Much of this derives from the cessation or reduction of state and federal funding for community-based mental health programs, including Mental Health Respite: Carer Support, Partners in Recovery, Personal Helpers and Mentors, and Support for Day to Day Living in the Community.
Not everyone with a psychosocial disability will be eligible for individualised funding in the NDIS. However, for many people, this will be the best option. In these cases, mental health community providers will have a role to play supporting people through the application process.
The Flinders University in collaboration with the Department of Social Services and NDIA has produced "Accessing the NDIS"- a visually beautiful guide that aims to assist mental health providers to support participants on the journey to the NDIS. It explores the premise of the NDIS, eligibility criteria, appeals, resources, and information treating professionals can provide to support the application process. The guide strongly emphasises the importance of documenting the person's functional capacity and focusing on how the condition impacts day-to-day life. It also contains essential sections on supporting cohorts more likely to experience barriers, such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and culturally and linguistically diverse communities, and continuity of support options for people who are found ineligible.
The guide addresses some of the more challenging domains of the intersection, including how the NDIS fits into a recovery model of mental health and eligibility issues for people with episodic conditions. However, one notable and unfortunate absence is information on supporting participants who find discussing their mental health history for the application and planning processes highly traumatic. The Productivity Commission noted this issue last year, and recommended a psychosocial disability pathway that seeks to avoid re-traumatisation. Despite this absence, the guide does contain essential information for mental health providers. In times of transition, documents that provide cohort-specific guidance are not to be missed. They are the map for the bumpy and uncertain road ahead.
Eligibility with Psychosocial Disability
Only a tiny proportion of people who experience mental illness will be eligible for the NDIS. Kylie takes a detailed look into what criteria people with psychosocial disability have to meet to access the Scheme.
Another Mental Health Promise
Yesterday, the Federal government told us that they had listened to community concerns and had a plan to support people with psychosocial disability in the NDIS. But as Sara explores, it is a plan that feels a little too familiar.
The mental health community is buzzing with understandable concern about the impact that the NDIS will have on people who use their services. This guide produced by Flinders University aims to guide providers into supporting people onto the NDIS.
Mental Health & NDIS: The Emerging Gap?
The announcement that 'mental health' was going to be included in NDIS was met with a mixture of excitement and worry. However, as Kylie explores, gaps between the health system and NDIS are beginning to emerge.
Reimagine.today: A New Site Helping People With Mental Health Conditions Navigate the NDIS
With funding from the NDIA, the Mental Health Coordinating Council has produced reimagine.today - a user-friendly website to help people with mental health conditions and their carers understand the NDIS.
Mental Health Supports in the NDIS: What's Changing?
Kylie Morgan cuts through the confusion around NDIS mental health supports, breaking down what we currently know about which programs will transition and how.
Unravelling Psychosocial Disability
Psychosocial disability is the term used to describe the disabilities that are associated with mental health conditions in the NDIS. This position statement by the National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum (NMHCCF) is a great resource to begin understanding the definition and experience of psychosocial disability
Partners in Recovery (PIR) & NDIS
This fantastic paper from Hunter PIR describes the complementary aspects of PIR/NDIS service provision, outlines some of the challenges and outcomes experienced by 'joint consumers', and proposes recommendations for future collaboration between the NDIS and PIR.
Tagged: Latest
Newer PostA Key NDIS Architect Leaves Politics
Older PostMental Health & NDIS: The Emerging Gap?
NDIS should fund health supports, says Tribunal
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has just released a mind-blowing judgement that could fundamentally alter the types of supports funded by the NDIS. Sara explores the implications of this groundbreaking verdict.
What Auditing Modules Will You Need To Meet?
Under the new Quality and Safeguarding Commission, the registration groups that you select will impact the scope of your audit. So Jess has created a handy resource to help you understand how the registration groups align with the NDIS Modules you will be assessed against.