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Nationalist Legacies and European Trajectories: Post-Communist Liberalization and Turkish Minority Politics in Bulgaria
Dia Anagnostou. Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies. Volume 5, Issue 1. January 2005.
The politics of ethnic minorities in post‐1989 Central East and Southeast Europe (CESE) has been characterized by an apparent paradox between, on the one hand, well‐integrated minority parties at the national level, on the other hand, strong demands for decentralization and local self‐government. This article examines the impact of post‐communist reforms, since the late 1990s taking place within the frame of European integration, on ethnic politics and state‐minority relations in CESE focusing on the case of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. It argues that liberalization cum European integration in CESE states fundamentally transform inherited national divisions, and integrate minorities in existing political and state institutions. At the same time, such integration is constrained by the legacy of state socialism that consolidated ethnic differences by embedding them in economic‐territorial structures. In doing so, it set the frame for the growth of a fundamentally distinct minority politics on a regional basis that diverges as much from the traditional nation‐state model as from the liberal approach to post‐communist democracy, market reform and European integration.
The politicization of minorities in post‐communist Central East and Southeast Europe (CESE) has been characterized by an apparent paradox between, on the one hand, well‐integrated minority parties at the national level and, on the other hand, strong demands for decentralization and local self‐government. The rise of ethnic politicization in the post‐89 period was initially seen to reflect inherited ethnic cleavages that came to surface and mobilized after the 'lid' of communism was lifted and democratization ensued. From this 'legacies of the past' perspective, ethnic identities are largely being treated as givens. Divisions between states and minorities are arguably so entrenched in the political culture and history of CESE that they are likely to constrain the construction of liberal democracy and the processes of European integration in the region. Nationalist legacies are seen to be particularly intractable in Southeast Europe where the violent conflagrations in Yugoslavia and ongoing border disputes reinvigorated fear and suspicion of minorities. The region is considered the historical locus of an exclusive kind of ethnic nationalism contrasted to an inclusive civic nationalism purportedly prevailing in Central Europe.
From a divergent perspective, however, scholars seeking to understand and explain the politics of minorities in post‐communist CESE have challenged the view of inherited ethnic cleavages. Far from being an expression of historical ethnic divisions, such a politics is arguably centrally shaped by political and economic parameters defining the processes of democratization and post‐communist liberalization. Factors such as choices of political elites, party positions on key issues of reform, and established institutional frameworks of representation and participation arguably account for the degree of conflict and accommodation between minorities with majorities and the central state (Csergo 2002). Through the broad lens of this perspective, scholars have dwelled upon liberal democratic reforms promoting political inclusion of and rights guarantees to all individuals and groups, including minorities, as capable of transforming rather than being constrained by inherited ethnic divisions. Increasingly defined within the frame of European integration in the 1990s, liberal reforms and institutions arguably reinforce a moderate and accommodating approach to minority issues, potentially mitigating nationalism and the salience of ethnic community.
In reference to the above two perspectives, this article seeks to provide an interpretation of Turkish minority politics in post‐communist Bulgaria, being particularly interested in the effects of post‐communist reforms and the influence of European factors. Initiated by party reformers and controlled by the Communist‐renamed‐Socialist party (BSP), Bulgaria's transition saw the restitution of minority rights, which was closely linked to the country's externally driven democratization and European oriented reform process. Through 1996, Bulgaria remained a largely 'unreconstructed ex‐communist polity' under the ongoing reign of the successor BSP that sheltered nationalist concerns and sought to restrict ethnic Turkish rights that found political expression in the creation of the minority organization Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF). This period also saw the growth of a liberal coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), which advocated respect for human rights and the protection of minorities, together with radical reforms towards the market, in reference to the overarching objective of membership in the EU. With its advent to power in 1997, reforms in this direction expanded and accelerated reforms, marking, according to some scholars, the actual turning point with the former regime.
The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria
Making up about 8-10 per cent of the country's population, ethnic Turks inhabit the northeast and southeast regions of the country, as well as areas across the Black Sea. Their highest concentration as a percentage of the total local population is in the southeast province of Kircali and the northeast province of Razgrad, where this research was carried out. They are an agricultural community with the lowest levels of urbanization in the country and the highest levels of population concentrated in rural areas (Demografski I Sotsialno‐Ekonomitcheski Harakteristiki – Rusenska Oblast 1994). Razgrad is a fertile lowland region specializing in grain production. Kircali on the other hand, comprises a mountainous and semi‐mountainous zone where tobacco is the main crop. It is situated in a region geographically proximate to Turkey in the east, and borders with the Greek region of Thrace to the south, where a small but territorially concentrated Turkish Muslim population lives.
The presence of the Turkish minority is a relic of the country's Ottoman past, an outgrowth of autochthonous Muslim communities, which, despite large immigration movements, remained in significant numbers in Bulgarian territory after its independence in 1878. In the course of the twentieth century, ethnic Turks transformed from a religious community of the Ottoman millet system to a minority with a distinct Turkish national consciousness, a process that reached completion during state socialism. In the inter‐war period, a rising secular intelligentsia influenced by Attaturk and the Young Turks revolution had challenged the traditional Muslim leadership and sought to redirect the deeply religious allegiances of Bulgaria's Muslims to the Turkish national community. Driven by Marxist tenets, the communist regime subsequently declared war against what it considered to be vestiges of religious backwardness, which were seen to obstruct the overarching goal to rapidly industrialize and secularize Bulgarian society.
From the 1960s onwards, the regime sought to counter a growing legitimacy crisis that confronted it by resorting to nationalism as the dominant credo of the highly centralized party‐state, despite earlier dismissals of it as bourgeois artifact. It found expression in assimilation policies targeting the country's internal minorities that culminated in 1984-85 with a massive campaign that compelled over 700,000 ethnic Turks to give up their Muslim‐Arabic names and take Christian‐Slavic ones. Hailed as national 'revival process' (vazroditelnjia protses) and carried out with the help of the police and the armed forces, the campaign was professed as necessary to defend Bulgaria from alarming trends of Turkish demographic expansion and separatism (Crampton 1987: 205‐8). During the rest of the decade, intensifying regime repression banning all forms of religious and ethnic expression reinforced growing anti‐regime resistance and radicalization of the minority. In May 1989, following a series of bombing attacks that were attributed to Turks, Zhivkov addressed the nation and announced that the border would be open for those who 'do not feel Bulgarian' to leave. Viewing it as a prelude to systematic expulsion from the country, an estimated 360,000 Bulgarian Turks crossed the border to Turkey during the summer of 1989.
Domestic unrest caused by mass exodus to Turkey and widespread international condemnation of the assimilation campaign, including pressure from the Soviet leadership of Gorbachev for a change of guard, all tipped the scales to party reformers who in November 1989 forced Zhivkov to resign. Under the leadership of erstwhile Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov, they immediately abolished the Constitution's 'leading role' of the CP, introduced political pluralism, and scheduled elections for June 1990. Denouncing the foregoing violations against ethnic Turks, they announced the restoration of Muslim names and cultural‐religious rights. This reversal of government policy prompted the return of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks from Turkey but also provoked massive anti‐Turkish protests in the ethnically mixed regions. Organized by local Bulgarians who had been the chief participants in the name‐changing campaign, they grew into massive rallies that were larger than those of the anti‐communist opposition and in January 1990 descended in the capital of Sofia. Rising tensions between the Turkish minority and Bulgarian nationalists, who in the northeast even threatened to disobey central decisions proclaiming the 'Independent Republic of Razgrad', brought the country on the verge of destabilization, if not open ethnic conflict.
Over the next decade, however, minority radicalization and ethnic tensions in Bulgaria impressively declined. Turkish minority politics has come to be almost entirely monopolized by the MRF, an ethnic party, outgrowth of clandestine anti‐regime mobilization founded by dissident ethnic Turkish leaders released from prison in 1989. The movement has moved away from its radical origins and firmly denounced Turkish nationalism and separatism, which characterized minority organizations such as the Turkish Democratic Party. During the 1990s, it consolidated itself as the third largest party in Bulgarian politics. Besides defending the protection of ethnic identity, its political demands have also addressed the socioeconomic problems confronting ethnic Turks, setting as its overarching goal their integration in Bulgarian society. In comparison to its counterparts elsewhere in the Balkans, the MRF has followed the most appeasing and conciliatory political strategy on behalf of minority interests strictly within the parameters of established political institutions.
The restitution of Muslim names and cultural rights of Bulgaria's Turks in December 1989 was inseparably linked to the attempts of party reformers to demonstrate their democratic credentials, as well as to deal with the sharp ethnic tensions that threatened to destabilize the country. It took place simultaneously with their application to gain guest status for Bulgaria at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that had sharply condemned the assimilation campaign during the preceding months and years. The pursuit of such a status created for countries willing to comply with human rights obligations, reflected a 'striking shift from open defiance' of the organization only a few months earlier. In a sudden reversal of foregoing policies, it was intended to counter Turkey's international campaign condemning the treatment of the Turkish minority, which was seen to damage Bulgaria's national interests.
In the first crucial half of 1990, domestic electoral considerations enabled the newly established MRF to participate as a political party representing ethnic Turks in the first June 1990 elections. In the next couple of years, however, the legality of the MRF was repeatedly brought under question due to a provision incorporated in the country's new constitution adopted in 1991, that banned parties on ethnic‐religious basis. Bulgarian nationalists largely from within the ranks of the Communist‐renamed‐Socialist party (BSP) invoked this provision to request the outlawing of the MRF. At the same time, Bulgarian liberals primarily under the umbrella of the UDF opposed restrictions to the rights of the Turkish minority, attributing them to a purported attempt of the BSP to reinstall nationalism and communism, and subvert the democratization process. After 1996-97, the UDF government of Kostov explicitly anchored the liberalization of minority rights in Bulgaria's process of association with the EU that became the backdrop to domestic reforms and policies within the frame of an advanced Accession Partnership (AP) signed in 1999.
This article seeks to understand the causes of Turkish minority politicization, as well as the factors contributing to the integration of minority politics embodied in the MRF in post‐1989 Bulgaria. It also seeks to interpret the nature and scope of such integration: does it indicate decline in the salience of cultural‐community identity and a shift of ethnic politicization in a civic direction? The article argues that electoral interests of domestic elites in conjunction with European human rights influences defining Bulgaria's democratization and liberalization processes promoted political incorporation of the Turkish minority and mitigated inherited ethnic divisions. At the same time, in embedding ethnic differences in economic‐territorial structures, the legacy of state socialism set the frame for the growth of a fundamentally distinct minority politics on a regional basis. Such a politics diverges as much from traditional socialist as from liberal approaches to post‐communist democracy, market reform and European integration.
The first part of the article examines the legacy of state socialism on ethnic Turkish identity and the regions inhabited by the minority. The communist regime's resort to nationalism was thoroughly enmeshed in the highly centralized structures of the party‐state, leading in the late 1980s to sharp polarization between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. The second part of the article examines the liberalization of minority rights and its impact on inherited national divisions, paying particular attention on the ways in which Bulgarian political elites and parties dealt with ethnic issues during the democratic transition and the reform processes through 1996. The third section explores the evolution of ethnic Turkish politicization in the post‐1996 period until the present, particularly in relation to the politics of economic restructuring and European integration, which are the main axes along which Turkish minority politics unfolds. The last section discusses the implications for nationalism, minority rights and European integration.
The analysis presented here is based on local field research carried out in 1994-96 in the minority‐inhabited provinces of Kircali and Razgrad in, as well as in the capital of Sofia. It consisted of 25 interviews conducted with Bulgarian authorities and ethnic Turkish leaders at the local and national level. It also included collection of municipal reports and information about the regional economic changes and socioeconomic conditions in the provinces under study. This material was also indirectly informed by knowledge gained through 40 interviews with individual men and women from the minority during the same period (Anagnostou a: appendix). Since then, this research has been supplemented by secondary literature, as well as systematic follow‐up and review of political party positions and documents pertaining to the Turkish minority and Bulgaria's association with the EU. Collected in a brief two‐year period, the primary material represents only a fraction of a reality in flux, in a South European polity and society that is being thoroughly reconfigured, and thus requires follow‐up study. The 1994-96 period, however, was a politically dense period, when the battle between the ancien régime still being defended by the reigning Socialist party BSP and the ascending liberal UDF reached its apex.
Muslim Minorities, Communism, and the Modernization Project
Following its advent to power in 1944, the Herculean task of social and economic modernization of Bulgaria's agrarian and impoverished society undertaken by the communist regime unintentionally strengthened ethnicity as a primary referent of collective identity among Turkish‐speaking Muslims. While closing down religious schools, the regime established a nation‐wide system of compulsory education on secular principles, with instruction partly in Turkish, in which it massively enrolled Muslims. Turkish language and culture were further promoted through the creation and promotion of Turkish‐speaking theaters, press and university departments in the 1950s. No doubt impelled by the need to reach local Turkish‐speaking Muslims, such measures were also inspired by the Soviet policy of 'national in form, socialist in content', underlined by the intent to enlist minority support for and participation in the cause of constructing a socialist society. The regime implicitly anticipated that modernization would dissolve ethnic differences into the contours of a unified socialist society. In the longer run, cultural measures promoted the formation of a secularized and fluently bilingual generation of Turkish Muslims, including a Turkish intelligentsia, who were recruited in large numbers in party and local government structures.
While cultural policies nurtured Turkish language and culture among local Muslims, the centrally planned system reinforced their concentration in rural areas and peripheral regions. Structured along the lines of 'democratic centralism', regional development policy was based on a five‐year economic plans drafted by ministerial bureaucrats under Communist Party (CP) supervision, which decided about infrastructure, input supplies and production targets. Besides undergoing compulsory collectivization of agriculture, rural areas inhabited by Muslims became a target of special development measures that had strong correspondence to minority areas. Aiming to maintain a stable agricultural population at a time of rapid industrialization, these involved the construction of small factories (tsechove) in sectors such as apparel, food processing, textiles, etc., which were subsidiaries of large enterprises in the regional centre. This so‐called 'social industry policy' privileged the lagging regions of the southeast near the border with Greece and Turkey, such as Kircali, where it was specifically aimed at sustaining the production of eastern varieties of tobacco, a major export commodity and source of hard currency for the regime. Farm cooperatives contracted it to large Turkish Muslim families in rural areas who had traditionally specialized in it and who were given incentives such as higher wages to remain in this highly labour‐intensive but lucrative production.
The special development policies described above bequeathed a distinctive production structure in the minority‐populated provinces of Kircali and Razgrad that intricately tied ethnic differences to regional economic disparities. They resulted in the concentration of the large, core enterprises in the central homonymous municipalities of Kircali and Razgrad, and the creation of a network of branch plants in the surrounding smaller municipalities (obshtini). Bulgarians have predominated in the central municipalities and towns where industry and manufacturing, as well as the bulk of infrastructure and administrative resources are concentrated (Informatsia za sustojianieto na obshtina Kircali prez 1993). Turkish Muslims, on the other hand, have lived in the peripheral and less developed municipalities, as well as in villages and small towns, and they are overwhelmingly employed in the agricultural sector. As branch plant economies, these minority municipalities have depended for employment, production and resources on the large enterprises at the regional centre. In the 1990s, the correspondence between the rural character of an area and minority presence remained startling (Anagnostou a: chapter 3; Appendix II).
Far from keeping national differences in a state of political hibernation, the communist regime's cultural and economic policies in Bulgaria consolidated the formation of a Turkish minority with a distinct consciousness, as well as regional economic and territorial characteristics. It did so not by constitutional design as in the socialist federations but through special development measures that sustained their rural and peripheral character in a rapidly industrializing society. While socioeconomic development improved the infrastructure, education and living standards in minority areas, the centrally imposed and often forced manner, in which it was implemented, as well as the assault on religion caused strong local reactions and grievances among Muslims. Seeking to diffuse them, the regime encouraged their large‐scale emigration to Turkey in successive waves from the early 1950s through the 1970s, which expanded a sense of ethnic community through the diffusion of family bonds with the kin state.
From the 1960s onwards, the regime increasingly took on a nationalist outlook that fused ideas of national unity into the centralized structures of the planned economy and the party‐state. Regarding minorities as constituent elements of the Bulgarian nation, whose consciousness as such had yet to come to full maturity, the regime launched in 1971 its first assimilation campaign against Bulgarian‐speaking Muslims (Pomaks). By the late 1970s, with a revised constitution that no longer recognized the existence of minorities, it declared that Bulgaria is a single nation that evolves towards full homogenization. The regime's resort to nationalism was rooted in growing structural problems confronting state socialism. Concomitant pressures to democratize and reform the system of central planning were evidenced across the region and erupted with the 1968 upheavals in Czechoslovakia. Party leaders appealed to the need to defend national unity from internal and external foes in order to reassert and vindicate the concentration of political‐economic power in the party‐state, to forestall reforms, and to preempt dissidents asserting national sovereignty vis‐à‐vis the Soviet Union. Defensive programmes of 'bureaucratic nationalism' of the sort appeared across the Soviet bloc blending communism with nationalism, both sharing a totalizing impulse that placed emphasis on the unity of society as a whole.
The ideological rigor and political salience of national ideas grew together with reform pressures to deal with the structural problems and deteriorating performance of the planned economy. Consolidating a homogeneous national state overlaid the vision of a unified socialist society in the hope of reviving dwindling regime legitimacy. The name‐changing campaign against the Turkish minority in the 1980s coincided with plummeting economic output and unmistakable signs of eroding regime support and commitment to the party (Crampton 1987: 187-97). A series of reforms through the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1982 and 1987 had failed to decentralize the economy, to open to market forces and to reverse economic decline. Official manifestos of the campaign disclosed an underlying concern to resuscitate the regime, calling for thorough party intervention in the society, family and the workplace, to raise Bulgarian national consciousness and public commitment. Name changing was accompanied by the so‐called 'explanatory campaign' to convince Turks that they were members of the Bulgarian nation who had been forcefully converted to Islam under the Ottomans.
While state socialism consolidated the formation of an ethnic Turkish and territorially concentrated minority, the assimilation campaign radicalized and politicized it. Far from persuading Turks of their Bulgarian origin, the campaign actually raised ethnic consciousness and instilled among them the belief that they are a victimized minority that must collectively defend itself. Many individuals from the younger cohorts of the minority, who had come to embrace modern socialist ideas, described it as catalytic in reinvigorating a powerful sense of community among them. As one of them noted ironically, 'it's good that Zhivkov did the name‐changing. We had almost forgotten that we are Turks. Name changing brought us back together as an ethnos' (interview, Khurdzali, 19 November 1995). As repression intensified and systemic crisis spread, minority anti‐regime resistance mobilized around clandestine political organizations, such as the 'Turkish National Liberation Movement in Bulgaria' founded in 1985 by Medi Doganov (Ahmet Dogan). The intelligentsia formed during the 1950s and 1960s played a leading role in it, a privileged stratum of urban‐based, university‐educated Turks, among whom 'the most ardent exponents of a distinct ethnic consciousness' were to be found.
The assimilation campaign against ethnic Turks diffused national ideas and practices in the structures of democratic centralism in the ethnically mixed regions and polarized relations with local Bulgarians. It did so through large‐scale mobilization of local party leaders and cadre, who organized the campaign, and large numbers of Bulgarian Christians who participated in enforcing the cultural ban. The local CP nomenklatura in collaboration with administrative personnel and enterprise managers played a key role by distributing privileges and benefits (i.e. jobs) to Bulgarians mobilized in the 'national revival' and sanctioning those ethnic Turks who resisted. Bulgarians saw the minority's mass exodus to Turkey in the summer of 1989, which profoundly disrupted the economy of several regions and further caused production to plummet, as unpatriotic and destructive and as proof of their disloyalty to Bulgaria. Thousands of them volunteered to meet the resulting labour shortages in industry and agriculture, and bought the property of hastily departing ethnic Turks in very low prices. When Mladenov announced the restoration of Muslim names in December 1989, they took to the streets en masse to protest against it.
Democratization and the Legacy of Ethnic Nationalism
The transition to democracy in 1989-90 presented an opportunity for the disgruntled Turkish minority to organize through the newly founded Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) and contest a place in the emerging system of political pluralism. While local cadre of the BSP mobilized Bulgarian nationalists, the party's reformist leaders at the national level controlling the transition did not succumb to vociferous demands to restrict Turkish minority rights. Possibly alarmed by the potential of broader destabilization, but also seeking democratic legitimation both at home and abroad, deeming it to be their best chance to preserve power, they instead downplayed and sought to diffuse ethnic tensions.
Exemplifying their self‐restrained and pragmatic attitude was the decision of reform communists to seek the support of the newly formed opposition of the UDF in dealing with the ethnic issue and to invite it to roundtable talks in January-March 1990. In the course of the latter, however, and while they implicitly agreed to avoid public discussion of the ethnic issue, leaders of the two participating parties did not remain immune to nationalist pressures. Arguably a tacit concession to the latter, the Agreement on Political Parties signed at the roundtable included a provision to ban political parties formed on ethnic, racial or religious basis. It was no doubt directed against the MRF that had submitted a petition to get registered as a political party.
Nonetheless, electoral considerations in light of the first crucial June 1990 elections weighed heavy on the dominant BSP, leading it to bypass the concerns of its Bulgarian nationalist supporters and to silently push for waiving the aforementioned ban in the case of the MRF. In April 1990, instructions most likely originating from BSP leaders tacitly directed the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to register candidates nominated by the MRF despite an earlier decision of the Sofia City court banning the latter on ethnic grounds. This seemingly paradoxical intervention of reform communists on behalf of the independent Turkish minority party was intended to dilute the possibility of a united opposition front, which the UDF sought to establish, and for which ethnic Turks would have otherwise most likely voted. A further possible reason was to avert the likelihood of minority abstention from voting had the MRF been excluded, which would have again benefited the opposition and also jeopardized the seal of international approval that the Mladenov government of reformers was seeking. The June elections brought the BSP back to power and the MRF emerged as the third largest party in Bulgarian parliament with 7.5 per cent of the vote.
The incorporation of the MRF ensuring participation and self‐representation of ethnic Turks in the country's nascent democratic polity became a target to ongoing nationalist pressures to restrict it. These found a firm basis in the 1991 constitution drafted and adopted by a Socialist‐dominated National Assembly that expressed an overarching concern with national homogeneity and reincorporated the provision banning ethnic parties (Article 11, para. 4). In 1990-91, BSP deputies joined by 100 deputies from the liberal UDF, invoked it and petitioned to the Constitutional Court to declare the MRF illegal. This period witnessed sharp divisions between Socialists and the UDF opposition, which led to the replacement of the BSP government with the caretaker government of Popov, but also an unprecedented degree of inter‐party consensus on one issue: the pursuit of membership in European organizations. In January 1991, the Popov government, jointly supported by ex‐communists and liberals, submitted the application for membership in the CoE, in which Bulgaria had been granted guest status six months earlier.
Shaped by a complex interplay of domestic elite support and external influences from the CoE, the milestone decision of the Constitutional Court affirmed in April 1992 the legality of the MRF narrowly by one vote, largely with the support of Bulgarian liberals. Invoking human rights principles, the CoE delegates evaluating Bulgaria's membership application had explicitly expressed their disapproval of the ban on ethnic parties, reflecting what they saw as restrictive provisions for minorities. In considering the actual influence of the CoE, one cannot but notice the time sequence between the unfolding of the court's decision and the advance of Bulgaria's evaluation process by the CoE: being repeatedly postponed, the former upheld the legality of the MRF immediately following the submission of the final reports by the latter. Two months later, in May 1992, Bulgaria was admitted in the CoE because in the opinion of the latter, Bulgarian authorities would be flexible in the application of the constitutional ban on ethnic parties.
Far from amounting to an external imposition by international mentors, which elites or the Court's justices 'were trying to please', domestic liberal support for the MRF intrinsically stemmed from the logic of anti‐communist opposition. The countenance to minority rights provided by the CoE was influential precisely because it struck a chord with the political predilections of the 'dark' blue segment dominating the liberal UDF that in 1991-92 held government power in coalition with the MRF under the premiership of Filip Dimitrov. Reflecting the dominance of radical liberals among its ranks, it professed as its priority the dismantling of the totalitarian past and the 'complete decommunization of the country'. Not being politicized in a narrow partisan sense, yet guided by normative principles broadly congruent with this logic, the court's justices supporting the legality of the MRF, all but one appointed by UDF, saw it as an indispensable guarantee of pluralist democracy against the threat of totalitarianism. Dissenting judges, on the other hand, most appointed by the BSP, defended the imperative of national unity as supreme over an unqualified conception of pluralist politics. Such unity, they counter‐claimed, would be imperiled by an ethnic party like the MRF.
Despite the affirmation of the MRF's constitutionality, nationalist pressures to restrict Turkish minority rights remained highly influential and volatile, breathing new life into the largely unreformed regional economic and administrative structures, in which state centralization and nationalism since the communist period had been fused. The MRF acquired a dominant position in local government in those municipalities where ethnic Turks are demographically predominant. In the 1991 local elections in Bulgaria, MRF representatives won a majority of seats in 28 municipal councils, in addition to having mayors elected in 653 communes. In the period through 1996, outstanding structural and organizational advantages enabled the BSP to retain its hold over the political system. While acceding to market reform, the reigning Socialists sought to preserve the centralized state and its role in the economy, recognizing in the 1991 constitution local self‐government but opposing the existence of 'autonomous territorial formations'.
Reforms suspended privatization and decentralized production and employment decisions to the directors of large regional enterprises, which, however, remained in state hands, under the supervision of ministerial bureaucrats and dependent on central government subsidies. In the MRF‐dominated municipality of Kircali in 1995, for example, only six out of the 65 enterprises in 1995 were municipal firms, while the rest of the enterprises were managed by centrally appointed directors who made decisions about production and employment (interview, Kircali, 2 August 1995). In 1990, they decided to close down the branch workshops in the minority‐inhabited rural areas, leading to massive unemployment among ethnic Turks, but to retain and subsidize production in unprofitable plants in central locations, where the majority of employees were ethnic Bulgarians.
While the BSP had officially revoked nationalism, in the minority‐inhabited municipalities under study, its ability to preserve the centralized economic structures, where its power was entrenched, depended upon the support of a dominant nationalist constituency. Such a constituency had as its kernel the ex‐communist nomenklatura, the enterprise directors, party cadre and administrative personnel, who retained their decision‐making power over distribution of production, resources and jobs, as well as their party connections after 1989. Having been mobilized to carry out the assimilation campaign of the 1980s, they were thoroughly imbued in the nationalist ethos that it nurtured and the privileges it distributed, which they saw as being threatened by the MRF‐dominated local government. This nomenklatura was able to 'amass' local votes and 'offer' them to the central Socialist party in exchange for ongoing inflow of state resources and jobs, largely reserved for Bulgarians, a mutually beneficial arrangement that allowed both to protect inherited privileges and power.
This central‐local nexus of clientilistic party connections reinforced the fusion of state centralism and nationalism around a political logic that projected the preservation of centralized administrative and economic structures as imperative for the defense of Bulgarian national unity and territorial integrity. For the BSP, this paid off, leading it to rise as a strong force in minority‐inhabited regions, where it successfully contested the local Bulgarian vote vis‐a‐vis the UDF that registered small gains. Bulgarians remained loyal to the BSP that forged local alliances with extreme nationalist parties, such as the Fatherland Party of Labor (Otetchestvena Partjia na Truda) in Kircali, which accused the MRF of Turkish separatism (Anagnostou: ch.4).
In the minority regions under study, the reassertion of state centralism cum nationalism embodied in Socialist rule restricted the MRF ability to represent and respond to the problems of ethnic Turks through local government. Conflicts over control and distribution of resources and jobs, as well as over minority religious and language rights reinforced central‐local and inter‐communal tensions along ethnic lines (Anagnostou: ch.6). These were particularly pronounced in the municipalities of the Kircali province, where MRF mayors attributed severe fiscal pressures to purposeful delay of central transfers by the Socialist government with the intent of politically discrediting the MRF (Momchilgrad, 20 January 1996; Kircali, 10 November 1995; Galubov: 2). In a series of interviews conducted by this author in 1994-96, local minority leaders and elected representatives opposed state and economic centralization as a powerful constraint to minority political representation, regional development and democracy. In the MRF‐governed municipalities, Bulgarians in turn denounced what they saw as favourable distribution of locally‐controlled resources to Turks as an expression of narrow ethnic concerns to the detriment of regional development and national interests, which justifiably invited central government intervention (Kircali, Field notes, 13 November 1995).
Central-local juxtaposition between the Socialist government and the MRF reinforced inter‐communal mistrust and escalated in the 1995 local elections in Kircali. In the contest for mayor, when the MRF candidate Rasim Musa won over the Socialist candidate by a narrow margin, the centrally appointed regional governor refused to ratify the elected Turkish mayor. Following a suit filed by the BSP accusing the MRF for election fraud, the Municipal Court annulled the election results, and new elections were scheduled for May 1996. Such central political interference with the democratic process prompted minority protests and MRF accusations of the Socialist government as an agent of 'communist restoration'. Jointly with the UDF opposition, it warned about 'dangerous tendencies towards the revival of nationalism … and attempts for direct ethnic juxtaposition' (Prava I Svobodi, 10 March 1995; Murat 1995: 3). Minority leaders drew analogies with the 1980s, seeing a 'second national revival campaign' underway and claiming that 'the picture of [administrative] cadre in the town of Kircali astonishingly reminds of 1989'.
Notwithstanding the entrenched legacy of nationalism particularly vital in the ethnically mixed regions, a conjunction of domestic electoral interests and crucial elite choices, subsequently reinforced by influences from the CoE, contributed to safeguarding Turkish minority rights that found their political expression in the MRF. Made possible by an early elite consensus to join European organizations, human rights influences in domestic minority policy were particularly formative when they domestically coincided with political control by the center‐right UDF liberals. Viewing it as a vestige of communism and a façade for the BSP to preserve the centralized state and economic structures of the former regime, UDF liberals developed an aversion to Bulgarian nationalism. Opposing it as the epitome of totalitarianism led them to support full restitution of Turkish minority rights extending from cultural identity to political self‐representation, a stance resonating with the CoE human rights principles. A liberal intelligentsia and ruling circles connected to the UDF, including Bulgaria's former presidents Zheluy Zhelev and Petar Stojanov, denounced the assimilation campaign against ethnic Turks and offered an official apology to the latter.
From early on, the subordination of UDF concerns about the 'nation' to the imperative of thoroughly dismantling communist structures was also reflected in economic reforms towards the market. As an antidote to state centralism cum nationalism, the UDF sought decentralization and market restructuring through privatization reforms aimed at eliminating the role of the central state in the economy. Its approach as such was exemplified in the reform launched during its brief tenure to power in 1991-92 that initiated the dissolution of state‐owned farm collectives and the restitution of land to its original owners. By radically eliminating state management and the centralized regional economic structures, in which communism and nationalism had been gestated, the agricultural reform sought to dismantle the communist legacy there where it seemed to be strongest – in the countryside. In 1997, the UDF sweeping electoral victory was undoubtedly based, at least in part, on a broad realization that ongoing state financing of unprofitable regional enterprises could not be sustainable in the longer run. By 1996, it had led Bulgaria's economy into bankruptcy, triggering massive protests and forcing the Socialist premier Zhan Videnov to resign.
While initially instrumentally endorsed by reform communists in 1989-90, the European orientation of Bulgarian politics expanded and in 1995 the Socialist government of Zhan Videnov lodged the country's application for membership in the EU. Both politically in the sphere of human rights and economically in market restructuring, the imperatives of European integration had a particularly strong appeal among Bulgarian liberals that saw in them the strongest guarantee against the perceived threat of 're‐communization'. It is this logic that primarily shaped domestic support for Turkish rights in the first half of the 1990s, legitimating the MRF and entrenching it as one of the main political actors in post‐1989 Bulgarian politics. After 1997, in the frame of Bulgaria's association process with the EU sealed with an Accession Partnership in 1999, the Kostov government accelerated market restructuring and enterprise privatization and took further steps to institutionalize minority rights. Most important was the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1998 without any reservation clauses. In the face of strong opposition from the Socialists, PM Kostov successfully urged the parliamentary assembly to ratify the Convention in order not to harm the reputation of Bulgaria's young democracy and to prove its European credentials.
Political Economy Restructuring and the Regional Basis of Ethnic Policies
The incorporation of an independent minority party, the MRF, in parliamentary institutions and in national and local government structures was instrumental in containing and mitigating ethnic tensions in post‐communist Bulgaria. It allowed to channeling minority issues and grievances into established institutions and mainstream politics, and imbued pragmatism among its leadership. The MRF utilized its pivotal position as the third largest party to enter into strategic alliances not only with the liberals but also with the Socialists. In 1992, it tacitly sided with the BSP to cast a vote of no confidence that brought down the UDF Dimitrov government, and subsequently proposed Liuben Berov to lead a caretaker government principally supported by the BSP. MRF deputies have also taken recourse to the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE to redress complaints, i.e. on Turkish language rights, instead of the possible alternative of seeking patronage of the 'kin‐state'. When the Municipal Court initially annulled the 1995 local election results in Kircali, the MRF immediately reported to the PACE that sent delegates to visit the region. Notably, within five months, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of lower courts and resolved the issue in the interest of the MRF, ordering the regional governor to reinstall the elected mayor from the Turkish minority.
Acquiring a measure of influence in domestic and European politics contributed to neutralizing the appeal of extreme nationalist organizations such as the Turkish Democratic Party of Adem Kenan, which could have gained ground had the MRF been excluded. Besides denouncing separatism, the MRF leadership has gone out of its way to demonstrate its commitment to the integrity and legitimacy of Bulgarian state institutions, casting off its early semi‐loyal overtones and earning the acceptance of all major political parties. Bulgarian majority elites across the political spectrum, including former President Petar Stojanov and ex‐premier Ivan Kostov have unreservedly acknowledged its moderation as such. Together with Turkish minority leaders, they proudly refer to the 'Bulgarian model for the resolution of ethnic conflict' as a major accomplishment of democratization.
Notwithstanding the moderation and integration of Turkish minority politics, the salience of ethnic community politicization far from diminished in the second half of the 1990s. In 1996-97, a segment of young Turkish leaders from the northeast municipalities of Samuil and Kubrat, led by MRF MP Giuner Tahir, challenged Dogan's emphasis on ethnic community solidarity on the grounds that it undermined individual rights. This segment spoke on behalf of local minority entrepreneurs who came in conflict with Dogan because they pursued local economic investments involving inter‐communal and cross party cooperation, and advocated the incorporation of minority representation in the broader UDF coalition (interview, Razgrad, 12 February 1996). It formed a splinter party significantly named 'National MRF', a political appendage of the UDF, which, however, has had negligible appeal among the minority (Anagnostou: ch.4). Instead, Dogan's ethnic‐based approach enjoys its overwhelming support, gaining in the last 2001 national elections 7.5 per cent of the vote, the largest percentage since 1990. While trying to manoeuvre away from the ethnic label, variably defining the MRF as liberal, centrist and socialist, for all intents and purposes, the movement has been and remains a party of the Turkish community, and has staunchly defended its independence from other parties.
While the entrenchment of a party like the MRF in post‐communist Bulgaria established an avenue for moderating and 'normalizing' ethnic politics, in the context of accelerated market restructuring and association process with the EU, it seems to form a venue for generating a new kind of minority politics. Such a politics not only conflicts with the socialist BSP but also diverges from that represented by the liberal UDF. In the second half of the 1990s, the process of restructuring inherited centralized state and economic structures formed the locus of a sharp conflict between the MRF and the UDF, which according to Dogan, was even more intractable than the conflict with the Socialists (Dogan). Its origins lied in the 1991-92 agricultural reform that led Dogan to withdraw MRF support from the Dimitrov government in protest of it. While the overall effects of the reform regionally varied, the dissolution of the farm collectives had thoroughly disrupted production, and given the legacy of state socialism, it led to much higher unemployment among ethnic Turks in comparison to Bulgarians.
While initially appearing to be about the nature and pace of market reform, in the course of the 1990s the MRF dispute with the UDF grew into a fundamental conflict about the regional dimension of economic reform, with important potential implications for the territorial structures of the central state. The UDF approach epitomized in the agricultural reform was premised on a uniform nation‐wide strategy seeking fast privatization of enterprises and state withdrawal from the economy. Development would be driven by private entrepreneurial activity and local government units, which would independently generate resources for investment. Such an approach, however, disregarded the inherited structural disadvantages of the overwhelmingly agricultural minority‐inhabited municipalities with less developed infrastructure than the average for the country. In its alternative approach to reform, the MRF has advocated a regionally‐specific strategy, in which the central state would assume an instrumental role in steering and assisting economic development of peripheral municipalities. The UDF dismissed MRF demands for state assistance as an onerous residue of communist mentality unwilling to adjust to market conditions and the discipline of reform. In criticisms that broadly resonated with UDF leaders and supporters, ex‐Premier Kostov held the MRF responsible for suspending the reform process.
In defending its nation‐wide reform strategy against the regional approach of the MRF as essential in expediting the prospect of EU membership, the UDF rift with the MRF sharpened and acquired national overtones. In the 1999 local elections in Kircali, the confrontation between the two was paradoxically reminiscent of the 1995 electoral contest with the Socialists with the vote polarized along ethnic lines. For the first time, the MRF Turkish candidate lost to a UDF‐nominated candidate who rallied the support of local Bulgarians just like the Socialist predecessors in 1995. Similarly to Socialists, the liberal government of Kostov accused the MRF of being narrowly concerned with local ethnic interests to the detriment of Bulgaria's interests as a whole. Characterizing MRF politics as ethnically fanatic, backward and anti‐reformist resonated with the view of ethnic identity as an obstacle to socioeconomic development and national modernization earlier projected by communism. In asking, 'why do Bulgarian liberals translate basic categories of nationalism in the language of liberalism?' Dogan hinted at an unpalatable convergence perceived between these two (Dogan: 6).
Scholars exploring the effects of post‐communist liberalization in ethnic politics have overlooked the regional socioeconomic structures inherited from state socialism, as well as the long‐term implications of minority local experience under the former regime. In entrenching ethnic differences in distinct and resource‐unequal territorial and production patterns, such a legacy constrains in minority regions the viability and appropriateness of nation‐wide strategies of market restructuring, and differentiates the interests and perceptions of ethnic Turks from those of Bulgarians. In analyzing rural discontent in the 1990s, anthropologist Gerald Creed drew a compelling analogy between the top‐down fashion in which the UDF implemented decollectivization and the central imposition of communist collectivization in the 1950s, in both cases 'with little attention to local conditions'. One could reinforce this analogy in the case of minorities, where socialist strategies of economic development were not only forcefully engineered from above but also intrinsically and explicitly linked to programs of national‐cultural assimilation. In fusing intricate cultural ties with common socioeconomic interests among Turkish Muslims, while simultaneously repressing their distinct identity, the former regime strengthened community consciousness and imbued thorough mistrust of the central state.
In the post‐communist period, such a legacy resonates with strong demands for local self‐government, fundamentally differentiating MRF politics from that of the otherwise politically akin Bulgarian liberal majority. While attributing a role to the central state in assisting local development, the MRF also advocates thorough decentralization, within the frame of the Bulgarian state but increasingly in a way that demarcates regional economic units along ethnic community lines. The 2001 MRF program emphasizes enhanced local government power to decide about and construct development strategies appropriate to local conditions, which are seen as viable through anticipated influx of EU funds in the underdeveloped ethnic regions (Bulgaria-Evropa 2001). Since 2001, the MRF has been a junior partner in the coalition government of the National Movement of Simeon II (NMSV), holding the Ministry of Agriculture, a sector crucial for the minority but also for EU policy. From this position of national power, the MRF leadership has put forth its own development and investment strategy for the ethnically mixed regions that it controls, which it put on top of the party's agenda, by drawing from EU pre‐accession funds such as PHARE, ISPA and the agriculture‐specific SAPARD.
The consolidation of a distinct minority politics that forges a close link between regional territory and the ethnic community is reinforced not only by the transfer of economic resources, but also by the human rights and cultural diversity discourse defining processes of EU enlargement to CESE. In contrast to the UDF view of the EU as a vehicle of socioeconomic modernization, the MRF alternatively depicts it as the only true guarantor of ethnic identity, which in the European context is no longer considered a disadvantage but a 'strategic advantage' (Dogan 2000; 2001). While the MRF has highlighted the integration of minorities in Bulgarian society, it has over the past few years pronounced as equally, if not more, important the preservation of ethnic‐religious identity (Dogan). While denouncing aggressive nationalism, Dogan also stated that in the context of European integration, 'we [the Turkish minority] need a moderate nationalism … to gain legitimacy for our national identity on the basis of liberal values of the European community' (Dogan). Evident of his ambitions of establishing the movement as a European player, the hitherto undisputed leader admonishes that without the participation of the MRF, Bulgaria 'will not have the requisite internal stability and external weight to open the doors to Europe' (Dogan 2000).
In highlighting the preservation of ethnic community identity as a condition of minority social integration, MRF politics conflicts both with the traditional nation‐state model advanced by the BSP and with the liberal model of development and European integration projected by the UDF. In its 2001 election programme, the MRF advocates thorough institutionalization of minority rights through anti‐discrimination law, language rights, and the guaranteed participation of minorities at all levels of government and administration (Bulgaria‐Evropa 2001). While its positions are predominantly shaped by the personality and authoritative top‐down leadership of Dogan, the MRF is also a party with extensive organization at the local level and thus penetrable from and susceptible to bottom up pressures. Thus the opinions expressed in Dogan's speeches and party documents, on which this section relies, are a barometer and attempted synthesis of the diffused and often conflicting tendencies among the minority at large. While firmly accepting its territorial integrity, the MRF increasingly talks about Bulgaria in reference to the multi‐ethnic state replacing the traditional unitary national state and appeals to ethnic Turks to support community organizational and political strategies to help them sustain their political leverage and power (Dogan).
Liberalization, European Integration, and Minorities in Southeast Europe: Triumph or Mirage?
The preceding analysis of the Bulgarian case suggests that historical ethnic‐national cleavages do not necessarily shape, predominantly or in any given manner, political relations and state institutions; there is nothing inherently disintegrative about such cleavages in an emerging democracy. Instead, factors such as elite interests in the course of transition and electoral competition, liberal reforms and political attitudes towards the communist past, as well as human rights influences from European institutions determine the degree of conflict and accommodation in relations between minorities with majorities and the state. In post‐89 Bulgaria, a combination of such factors contributed to liberalization of minority rights and to remarkable political integration of the country's sizeable Turkish minority through an ethnic party, the MRF, in stark contrast to the sharp ethnic tensions characterizing the last years of the Zhivkov regime. While diffused nationalist ideas and practices in centralized state structures bequeathed from state socialism significantly influenced post‐1989 Bulgarian politics, they far from grew to be hegemonic.
The analysis of this article partly accords with studies highlighting post‐communist reforms pursued by European‐oriented elites and liberal majorities that challenge the precepts of the traditional nation‐state and promote consensual government relations with ethnic minorities (Csergo 2002). The broader underlying premise is that elite interests and choices concerning key issues of reform and democratic government are not necessarily constrained by historical national divisions but can transform the latter, shaping the politics of inter‐ethnic conflict and cooperation in CESE. In Bulgaria the aspiration, from early on, of transition elites to steer for a European course exposed the democratic process to external countenance to guarantee minority rights and to pursue accommodating policies towards ethnic Turks. Such external advocacy coincided with domestic electoral interests to incorporate the MRF as an independent party in the political system, and resonated with liberal opposition to nationalism as a vestige of the communist past. Inclusive policies towards ethnic Turks transformed mainstream national institutions and existing state structures into 'habitable' spaces for the minority and mitigated tensions with the Bulgarian majority.
The Bulgarian case challenges the oft‐encountered view of the Balkans as being trapped in a historical legacy of exclusive ethnic nationalism, in contrast to a liberal and 'benign' civic nationalism purportedly characterizing Central Europe. What is unique about the Balkans is the large size of territorially concentrated ethnic minorities that have historically survived in the region in comparison to Central Europe, which is bound to make minority issues more politically controversial. Vachudova and Snyder's thesis about the inescapable role of ethnic nationalism in obstructing liberalization and European integration in Southeast Europe misrepresents actual developments in the region. In unitary states like Bulgaria or Romania, the politicization of ethnic minorities did not bring about state dissolution as in the socialist federations, where the distribution of resources and power corresponded to clearly demarcated administrative and territorial entities on national basis. Yugoslavia was the exception rather than the rule in the Balkans with the federation structure a significant factor in differentiating the nature and political consequences of nationalism from that in unitary states, as comparative and case studies have so lucidly demonstrated.
While liberalization and the European‐oriented reform processes significantly moderated inherited national tensions and integrated minorities, they have not marginalized or diluted ethnic cleavages consolidated under the former regime, nor have they mitigated the politics of ethnic identity. Besides suppressing cultural and political rights, state socialism also pervasively embedded ethnic differences in socioeconomic disparities and production structures in minority inhabited regions. Part and parcel of the centrally directed model of political economic development that culminated in assimilation policies to consolidate the nation‐state, such a legacy densely fused cultural community bonds and socioeconomic structures comprising Turkish ethnicity. In doing so, it paved the way for a regional‐specific approach to economic and political reform, as well as for decentralization and local self‐government demands, that fundamentally distinguish minority politics from socialist or liberal models of state organization and market reform in the post‐1989 period. Notwithstanding such demands, ethnic politics in post‐1989 CESE is fundamentally different from earlier challenges minorities posed to state integrity in the era of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century nationalism. It is no longer about redrawing state borders but about reconfiguring the political‐territorial structures of the centralized state historically implanted in the region, from within, not merely through economic decentralization but more importantly through assertion of minority local self‐government.
Turkish minority politics of the MRF draws upon ethnic community support to construct and define a regional‐based approach to development as an alternative to state‐centered reform and development strategies, irrespective of whether they are mandated by liberal or socialist, economic or national imperatives. It develops in opposition as much to the traditional model of nation‐state as to a diffused logic of modernization that pervades and dominates the liberals' approach to democracy, market economic reform and European integration. While ethnic Turks and Bulgarian liberals both endorse these, they view very differently the relationship between regions, the ethnic community and the central state, attributing a fundamentally divergent content to minority rights and the nature of the EU. The dominant individualistic liberal paradigm espoused by the Bulgarian majority comes in conflict with an alternative conception of liberalism advocated by the MRF on behalf of ethnic Turks. The deepening processes of European integration in CESE are likely to render more visible the contradiction between two competing notions of liberalism, reflecting fundamentally different visions of political community and ultimately of the EU as it expands eastwards.
In the context of European‐oriented reform process, the majority's liberalism promotes centrally directed strategies of economic development but also decline of the central state's social‐economic role, it supports European integration as a vehicle of political‐economic modernization, and appeals to the individual. On the other hand, the minority's conception of liberalism advocates decentralized strategies of economic development but also sustaining the central state's social and economic role, it supports European integration as a multi‐cultural entity and appeals to the local and ethnic community. Such a politics is not instrumentally driven by minority rights norms promoted by European institutions and academics, as Stephen Deets argues, but it is a product of complex interactions unleashed in the process of transporting West European development models in the ethnically diverse societies of Southeast Europe. Deets, nonetheless, rightly argues against a narrowly collectivist approach to dealing with minority issues. The analysis of this paper also points to the need for a more comprehensive approach to the latter that encompasses cultural measures to preserve identity but also regional political and economic strategies to effectively redress socioeconomic disparities.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized on 21/11/2020 by Admin.
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Apr 12, 2010· The bonecrusher is a reward from the Dungeoneering skill. It requires 21 Dungeoneering and 21 Prayer. It costs 34,000 tokens at the rewards trader and is .
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Specialising in the construction of new roads and the rehabilitation of asphalt and gravel roads. Adopting the French EME Design – we worked with Clients such as, WBHO and Stefanutti Stocks on the new Bus Route System for the EThekwini Municipality.


text:
Hoiberg doesn't think Derrick Rose needs nights off
By Kurt HelinSep 28, 2015, 5:45 PM EDT
Derrick Rose has played 100 regular season games total in the last four NBA campaigns. That's out of a possible 312 games. He's had surgeries to both knees (an ACL and a meniscus), hamstring injuries, toe injuries, back injuries, and the list goes on and on. The number of minutes former coach Tom Thibodeau asked Rose to play (not to mention the rest of the team's core) was one of the reasons he was forced out.
Which is why this comment from new coach Fred Hoiberg at Bulls media day raised some eyebrows (and sounded more like spin than reality). Courtesy PBT's own Sean Highkin, who was at Bulls media day:
Hoiberg doesn't think Rose will have to take nights off. "He's got his explosiveness right now."
— Sean Highkin (@highkin) September 28, 2015
Rose is going to get nights off this season. Hoiberg would not have this job if he didn't plan to reduce minutes and load on the core players, with the goals of having them stay healthy and be fresher for the playoffs. It's not just Rose, Joakim Noah and Pau Gasol are going to get some breaks, and younger guys like Jimmy Butler are not going to get run into the ground.
I think this was more about Hoiberg saying "Rose looks like Rose again." Which he had only in flashes last season, we'll need to see more of it before I fully buy in. However, Rose is feeling confident, as noted by Vincent Goodwill of CSNChicago.com.
Rose on expectations of 2011 Rose: "I know I'm great. I know I can hoop. A lot of people don't know that."
— Vincent Goodwill (@vgoodwill) September 28, 2015
On another note out of training camp, in the half court in particular look for the Bulls to try to play off the high IQ game of Pau Gasol.
Hoiberg plans on playing through Gasol a lot, either on the block/high post or pick and roll
That's a good plan, although at 35 Hoiberg needs to make sure Gasol gets some rest, too.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Phil 'CM Punk' Brooks made a calculated decision to avoid using his considerable skills on the mic prior to his UFC debut. He opted instead to let his fighting skills do the talking, but in this regard, Brooks is a mime.
However, his handpicked opponent Mickey Gall ended up being a lively addition to the roster thus far. UFC president Dana White was 'Lookin for a Fight' and Gall won, and called out Punk. White accepted. Then Gall won, and called out Sage Northcutt. White and Northcutt accepted.
Gall spoke recently with TMZ Sports and detailed how he plans for the fight to go.
Where Punk had opted not to build hype for the UFC fight on the mic, Gall borrowed a page from pro wrestling and suggested the loser be forced to shave his head.
In 2007 at WrestleMania 23, Donald Trump and owner Vince McMahon engaged in such a contest. Trump won, and was assisted by now Bellator MMA heavyweight Bobby Lashley.
Mickey Gall fights Sage Northcutt at UFC on Fox 22 on December 17, in Sacramento, California.


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For a mag hag like me, anything that has editorial content and some nice pics is a goer. I hoard the COS, Matches and Harvey Nichols Edit magazines as if they're collectors editions of Vogue and can't wait for b Store's new b Magazine to launch during LFW. Since the latest My-Wardrobe Style Guide arrived two weeks ago it hasn't left my desk. Not only is it packed with a breakdown of the new-season buys but there are pages of style advice from fashion editors and mini Q&As with emerging designers. Oh and a brilliant 'how I'd wear it' feature by the always-inspiring Katie from What Katie Wore.
Interestingly, My-Wardrobe's Saran Curran revealed to me that she often has to justify the cost of producing the Style Guide to her investors as they don't always see its benefit. Yet for an online store to produce a printed publication makes perfect business sense to me as it serves as a tangiable reminder of the brand as well as offering genuine shopping advice – and no small amount of encouragement.
Wise words from Larry Rosen, CEO and chairman of Canada's Harry Rosen Inc.
When I was working in India on the launch of a new magazine, Salvatore Ferragamo was one of the international brands that kept pinging up on my radar – their spring-summer shoes were breathtaking and Ferragamo is quite big in India. On my return I proceeded to forget about them, until today. While on my round of appointments calling in for a forthcoming shoot, I came across these purple patent hotties and once home I (naturally) tried them on. Heaven! They have a slightly curved cone heel and a demi platform, yet don't come under the 'statement shoe' umbrella because somehow they retain all their elegance and wearability, maybe because the uppers and ankle straps make them quite delicate. Ferragamo's Vara bow pumps are already in the thick of a revival, with the baby sister version Varina (the flat one) now a cult hit with New York Gossip Girl wannabes and Japanese O-nee-kei girls alike.
My interest piqued, I decided to have a pootle and see what Ebay has to offer. Sadly, the beauties I'd lusted after on a weekly basis while in India were nowhere to be seen (but you can see a few here), however there were lots of affordable Varas including these AAAA ones (Ferragamos are known for being ultra-comfortable, due to their varied width fittings and going up to a more generous-than-average UK size 9), plus some sweet lace-ups from the quaintly-named Grecia's Graciously Used Shoes.
And in the '30s and '40s when the war made it difficult to obtain leather for shoes, he stitched together corks from wine bottles to make cork wedges. An eco early-adopter – who knew! This year is the 80th anniversary of Ferragamo and it's all change at the house. Cristina Ortiz has taken up the baton as head designer following Graeme Black's departure so I'm keeping a close eye on proceedings. In the meantime, I'm also keeping a close eye on these lovelies. All in the name of research you understand.


A woman who had climbed up a tree in Canoga Park and refused to come down for nearly 12 hours was finally coaxed down by firefighters Tuesday morning, officials said.
The woman climbed the 30-foot tree at the Lanark Recreation Center, 21816 Lanark Street, about 7:30 p.m. Monday night.
Officials exchanged words with the woman Tuesday morning in an attempt to get her down. At one point they brought her food, which she refused. She eventually accepted coffee, food and a blanket.
A large airbag was set up under the tree in case the woman fell or jumped.
Los Angeles Fire Department Capt. Erik Scott said the woman, who he described as being in her 30s and homeless, likely frequents the park and goes up the tree. He said officials found paraphernalia up the tree.
Two firefighters with ladders managed to build a rapport with the woman and finally convinced her to come down shortly before 7 a.m. Tuesday.
"She wasn't real concerned about me helping her down. She wanted to come down on her own and that's what we did," LAFD Capt. Gary Rodriguez said.
When asked by KTLA why she went up the tree, the woman said "because I like it."
Scott said the woman was uncooperative, but had not seemed to be "mentally altered." However, when she finally came down, she became "more unstable" as people approached her.
The woman was not injured but was expected to be mentally evaluated.
"Now we just want her to get the definitive care that she needs," Scott told KTLA.
Los Angeles Police Department officials also responded to the scene.


text:
RomanceLove
Wait For The Person Who Loves You Just Like This
By Kirstie Devine Updated May 2, 2019
Wait for the person when you're ready. When you're no longer finding it hard to get out of bed in the morning because you're not waking up in someone else's bed you used to share with them every day.
Wait for the person who makes you see why every other guy you went out with before them was wrong for you. The ones who stood you up on a Saturday night only wanted you for your body and a conversation that never went past a text.
Wait for the person who never questions your worth. Because they see you for all that you are and likes every single part of you, even the bad ones.
Wait for the person who makes your eyes glisten when you see them waiting for you outside your door.
Wait for the person who makes your heart skip a beat the first time you meet them at a bar on a Thursday night.
Wait for the person who makes you feel comfortable. Where talking for five hours at a bar about your past and drunken regrets feels normal.
Wait for the person who supports you when you feel like the world is crumbling around you.
Wait for the person who brings you to a bookstore in the city on a date because you told them you loved to read and get lost in books and they listened.
Wait for the person who's easy to open up to. Where bringing up painful topics doesn't scare you as much as it used to.
Wait for the person who has kind eyes and soft hands. The kind that makes you feel safe in their touch and not flinch.
Wait for the person who sings with you in the car to Taylor Swift down the highway at 1 am because you told them she's your favorite singer and they didn't turn her off.
Wait for the person you'd be proud to introduce to your mom.
Wait for the person who makes you feel beautiful. Even when you go out to a public place wearing a sweatshirt, no makeup, and a braid because your hair was still wet from taking a shower.
Wait for the person who makes you smile just thinking about them.
Wait for the person who reawakens your soul in ways you never saw coming.
Wait for the person who helps pick up the pieces of your heart and puts them back together.
Wait for the person you never saw coming.
Wait for the person your ex told you you deserved.
I think I found him.
Real Love Isn't About Finding Someone Who Meets All The Criteria On Your List
The Truth Is It Will Never Work Out With The Wrong Ones
I write about my past and what's caused me pain Follow Kirstie on Instagram or read more articles from Kirstie on Thought Catalog.
Love Real Love Relationships
How To Get Rejected By Your Crush
You Don't Deserve Someone Who Comes Back, You Deserve Someone Who Never Leaves
Move On From The One Who Got Away And Wait For The One Who God Will Allow
250 People Reveal The Lesson They Learned After A Failed Relationship


Ductwork plays an essential role in your home's forced-air heating and cooling system, delivering conditioned air to rooms, and then routing spent air back to the HVAC equipment to be heated or cooled again. But what happens when ducts deteriorate over time? The fact is that old ductwork can severely hamper the work of your HVAC system and even lead to contaminated indoor air.
That being the case, it's important for homeowners to recognize signs that their ductwork is old, and may need to be repaired or replaced.
The first one is obvious; you know when the ducts were installed because you know when the house was built, and the same ductwork that delivered conditioned air on your home's first day is still doing that job 25 years later (or however long).
You've looked at exposed duct sections and have noticed rust or corrosion. Or maybe old duct tape is falling away from connections, and the duct sections themselves are loose or hanging.
Your energy costs have been rising in recent years, and you haven't been able to figure out why. Energy rates have been stable, and your household usage hasn't changed. Leaky, loose ducts could be at fault.
The force of air emerging from vents is inconsistent from room to room. This could be because duct runs to some rooms are leaking or blocked.
Faulty ductwork will reduce energy efficiency in your home, as heated or cooled air leaks into unconditioned areas such as wall cavities, the garage, attic or crawl space. Your equipment has to work harder to make up for lost air. Backdrafting also can occur with leaky ducts; dirty or contaminated air — or even carbon monoxide from nearby exhaust vents — can get sucked into ducts via leaks, and then get distributed in your house.
The best way to ascertain whether your old ductwork should be repaired or replaced is to schedule a comprehensive inspection by a trained technician. Please contact us at Roth Heating & Cooling to set up a duct inspection in your Portland area home.


Think of a box with black and white balls in it. We draw one ball from the box. The probability of drawing a white ball equals the number of white balls divided by the overall number of all balls in the box.
If we don't know the number of balls in the box, we can (theoretically) still calculate the probability of drawing a white ball by repeatedly drawing a bill and counting how many white balls we get. Then we can estimate the probability by dividing the number of white balls by the number of times we drew a ball. As more repetitions we make, the more exact our estimation will be.
You can model any stochastic question with balls in box and variations of it, eg. drawing balls multiple times with or without putting the drawn ball back in the box.
Lets apply this model to poker. Of course, here we draw cards from a stack. Once a card is drawn, it is taken and will never be drawn again. In the words of the original model this means: drawing without putting balls back into the box.
There are 52 possibilities to draw one first card. Then there remain 51 possibilities to draw a second cards. So there are 52*51 possible starting hands for a player in Texas Hold'em.
The most often cited calculation in Poker are Pot Odds. Pot Odds are a rule of thumb how you should act after the flop, when you hold a draw and another player has already raised before you. Mathematically this situation can be seen as a bet. The stake is the amount of chips you have to call and the possible earning is the overall pot (including all bets). Your Pot Odds are the fraction of these two.
An 'Out ' is a card that completes your draw. The possibility of completing your draw (and hopefully winning the showdown) with the turn or river can be estimated as 4 * number of outs.
If the right side is larger then you can call and hope to complete your draw.
When you see a Poker tournament on TV there are numbers next to each players hands. These numbers represent the probability of this hand to win against all other players, for each possible combination of remaining cards. Of course you can only calculate these probabilities, if you know the other players cards. In contrast to that, I was looking for probabilities that tell me how to act in a given situation within a game, knowing only my cards and the cards on the board.
Given are my two hole cards and the cards on the board (if any). Now I could calculate all possible combinations of cards for all opponents. But there are far too many possibilities to get through all of them in a lifes time. So I try to narrow the field by simulating how the other players might act.


Process value analysis involves a review of each step in a process to see if the activity provides value to the customer. If the activity does not provide value, the analysis team looks for ways to eliminate it from the process. By going through a comprehensive process value analysis, a business can strip costs out of the organization while also shortening the duration of the process. When the length of a process is reduced, customers experience a shorter turnaround time for their orders, which increases customer satisfaction levels.
Processes can undergo repeated analyses of this type, where the latest technologies and equipment can be applied to the newest iteration of a process. The concept is also applicable to acquired businesses, where the acquirer can budget for likely cost reductions from a sweeping set of process value analyses.
This analysis might initially appear to be an outstanding way to improve several aspects of an organization, but there is a risk that key control points will be cut out of a process in the pursuit of cost reductions. Consequently, the accounting staff or a controls analyst should be included in the analysis, to advise on how to retain robust controls.


text:
Corning Partners with Community Organizations Establish Regional Food Hub
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Corning Partners with Community Organizations to Establish Regional Food Hub
Corning Partners with Community Organizations to Establish Regional Food Hub During COVID-19 Pandemic | Corning
"As we move through this challenge in the coming weeks, we will continue to face and overcome this obstacle just as we have so many times before – together. We are one community, united and strong."
— Wendell P. Weeks, chairman and chief executive officer
Corning is collaborating with the Food Bank of the Southern Tier and the Corning-Painted Post School District to help address the increased demand for food assistance in Steuben County as a result of COVID-19.
Corning Enterprises, a subsidiary of Corning Incorporated, and the school district worked to find a location for a food hub which will serve as the Food Bank's satellite distribution center in Steuben County and provide emergency food boxes to non-profit agencies for their clients.
The Food Bank recently suspended its volunteer program at its central location in Elmira because of challenges in maintaining social distancing. The impact of the pandemic has also caused demand for Food Bank services to spike across the region.
"We are so grateful for our partnership with Corning Incorporated and the Corning-Painted Post School District who made this food hub possible," said Natasha Thompson, president and CEO of The Food Bank of the Southern Tier. "Our pantries and meal programs across the region we serve have seen a 51% increase in the number of people coming to them for help. Over the last two weeks in March, we distributed 300% more food than we did during the same time last year. The only way we can continue to meet this increased demand is with the support of the community."
"We are so grateful for our partnership with Corning Incorporated and the Corning-Painted Post School District who made this food hub possible." — Natasha Thompson, president and CEO of The Food Bank of the Southern Tier
The Food Bank will also receive assistance from Corning and C-PP School District employees who have stepped up to volunteer at the Steuben County Food Hub. Corning, through the work of its employees and support provided by the Corning Incorporated Foundation, have long partnered with the Food Bank to fight food insecurity.
"I'm grateful to the teams and volunteers that have worked tirelessly to get this innovative approach operational and provide support to our community when it needs it the most," said Wendell P. Weeks, Corning chairman and chief executive officer. "As we move through this challenge in the coming weeks, we will continue to face and overcome this obstacle just as we have so many times before – together. We are one community, united and strong."
Similar food hubs have been established in the six-county area served by the Food Bank to help mitigate potential exposure to COVID-19 for volunteers, staff, and clients.
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Q: how to not skip array containing null using jq? I want to process this data
{
  "results": [
    {
      "headword": "binding",
      "senses": [
        {
          "definition": [
            "a promise, agreement etc that must be obeyed"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "headword": "non-binding",
      "senses": [
        {
          "definition": [
            "a non-binding agreement or decision does not have to be obeyed"
          ],
          "examples": [
            {
              "text": "The industry has signed a non-binding agreement to reduce pollution."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}

into this
{
  "headword": "binding",
  "definition": "a promise, agreement etc that must be obeyed",
  "examples": null
}
{
  "headword": "non-binding",
  "definition": "a non-binding agreement or decision does not have to be obeyed",
  "examples": "The industry has signed a non-binding agreement to reduce pollution."
}

this command
cat data.json | jq '.results[] | {headword: .headword, definition: .senses[].definition[], examples: .senses[].examples[].text}'

errors out with 'Cannot iterate over null'
to overcome that, this command using '.[]?' filter
cat data.json | jq '.results[] | {headword: .headword, definition: .senses[].definition[], examples: .senses[].examples[]?.text}'

but this outputs only
{
  "headword": "non-binding",
  "definition": "a non-binding agreement or decision does not have to be obeyed",
  "examples": "The industry has signed a non-binding agreement to reduce pollution."
}

so, How do you iterate over null and not skip array?

A: Using an if/else statement may help.
jq '.results[] | {
    headword,
    definition: .senses[0].definition[0],
    examples: (if .senses[0].examples then .senses[0].examples[0].text else null end)
}' data.json

A: As @oguzismail has implicitly pointed out,
assuming that the senses array has only one element
is risky, especially as the choice of name suggests
it was anticipated that each headword might have more than one sense.
A similar observation could be made about .examples, but
the Q does not make it clear what should be done if .examples has more than one element.
In the following I shall therefore opt for a safe approach,
since it can easily be adjusted to meet more specific requirements.
.results[]
| { headword }
  + (.senses[]
     | { definition: .definition[0],
         examples: (if has("examples")
                    then [.examples[].text]
                    else null end) } )

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


The most notorious aspect about this place are the buildings that surround it, because they have the unquestionable historical and artistic values of having fixed an architectural style that extended throughout the city and characterized the Cuban architecture of the 18th century.
The oldest and one of the most beautiful in Havana. It is the perfect starting point to explore Old Havana, surrounded by cafes, bars and restaurants. It forms the first space of the city, where around it the most representative buildings of the Cuban Baroque and the Spanish colony are grouped.
A place where there are buildings of remarkable value, the Convent and the Church of San Francisco de Asís. In this square, there are different shows and activities that demonstrate the value of cultural actions in public spaces and give a recreational option for residents and visitors, while contributing to revitalize the heritage and bring it closer to the new generations.
It integrates a set of elegant mansions of the aristocracy of the colonial era and is the maximum expression of the baroque period of colonial architecture. It has been the scene of various events of historical, political and social nature.
The largest of the military installations built by Spain in America. It has a Weapons Museum and it is the venue for cultural and recreational activities, of which the traditional 9 o´clock gun cannon fire ceremony stands out, that night after night, can be appreciated by visitors.
Fortress of great historical value and outstanding cultural tourist attraction, it is located on a cliff at the entrance to the port of Havana. Its construction began in 1589 and concluded in 1630, being a vital part in the defense of Havana against the siege of corsairs and pirates.


I've really been enjoying getting my house in order, the new season is a perfect excuse to switch up, declutter, rejig and organise your life. A new start for a new season. So far I've deep cleaned the house, switched my wardrobe out, decorated for a new season, and now I'm taking my switches to my skincare routine.
A change of season is a harsh time for the skin. Weather, diet and lifestyle all tend to shift, three things that can all upset your skin's balance and cause upset. When autumn rolls around my skin tends to get dry from the cold, dehydrated because I'm drinking less water, duller from lack of sun, and it can get a breakout or two as my diet skews more towards hearty, filling, comfort foods. So, this time of year, I make a few skincare switches to help my skin cope with the change a little better.
A do it all, wonder balm.
I'm a big fan of multi-tasking beauty products, products that make my routines easier and that can do it all. I've been trying out the Cowshed Wonder Balm recently and honestly it's been a game changer. I love this for skin that's feeling the pinch of the weather change, I've been keeping this in my handbag for on the go moisture hits. It really softens and nourishes the skin, it contains hydrating avocado butter that my skin just drinks up. It's a hard balm that softens into an almost oil-like texture when you warm it between the fingers. It's great for dry spots, sore lips, I love this for keeping my hands and cuticles soft and I've even used it on the ends of my hair!
Around this time of year, your skin starts to take a bit more of a beating from the weather. With that in mind, I want my skin to feel calm, nourished and healthy, so I always opt for the gentlest of cleansers. Something softening, not stripping and gently nourishing to the skin. For me, that normally means a new bottle of the Glossier Milky Jelly Cleanser (follow this link for 10% off!), which just can't be beaten when it comes to gently. It's soft and soothing, doesn't leave the skin feeling stripped, and lasts a long time too. When used after The Body Shop's Camomile Cleansing Balm, it's the perfect combo for calm, happy skin.
I've started using a pump of the Milky Jelly Cleanser on a Scrubbie, and it's amazing. They offer my skin a good, gentle exfoliation to get rid of dead skin cells in the least abrasive way possible. My skin much prefers this to going in with gritty scrubs, or harsh acid exfoliators, and it does the same job. They come in a pack of 7, one for each day of the week, with a little bag to store them in, then you simply wash them in the machine ready for the next week! You can order them here.
I've always been good with moisturisers, but I've never really looked to serums for hydration. A mistake really, because my skin LOVES Hyaluronic acid, and drinks it up. I like using The Ordinary's Hyaluronic Acid Serum in the mornings before moisturiser, it softens my skin and whatever I use after sinks in better too. Hyaluronic acid boosts collagen production and helps the skin retain moisture, exactly what we want to help prevent that autumn dehydration.
Honestly I've preached about the wonder of Niacinamide before, and I'm not about to stop now! I love this stuff, it clears my skin up in a matter of days, heals approaching spots before they even really appear, and just generally helps my skin feel better. On days when my skin is feeling less than hot, I've been adding this into my morning skincare routine as well as using it before bed, and honestly my skin just drinks this up.
Come the end of September I'll be cracking out the heavy duty moisturisers morning and night. I love a slightly more intense moisturiser in the mornings for autumn (sorry Glossier Priming Moisturiser, you won't cut it anymore), and usually revert back to the Caudalie Vinosource Moisturising Sorbet, although this year I've picked up the Saturday Skin Featherweight Moisturiser to help really create a barrier between the day and my skin. Like the Caudalie option, this sinks in fast despite it's good moisturising punch.
For the evenings, I'm back on the Sunday Riley C.E.O Cream, which is not only SO luxurious on the skin, it's packed with anti oxidants to help repair + protect the skin. It's pricey, but my autumn winter best friend.
Swapping out eye cream is another autumn must. During the summer I stick with light and bright, but as the weather gets colder I find myself reaching more and more for the Kiehl's Creamy Avocado Eye Cream. This stuff really is heavy, but my under eyes just drink it up, and I find any concealer I apply after using this sits on my skin much better.
My skin tends to look a little duller without the attention of the sun, so around this time of year I always end up cracking out the Ren Glycolactic Radiance Renewal Mask again. This one is just a bathroom staple for me, I use it once a week for ten minutes and it just gives my skin it's glow back.
I like to pay a little more attention to my lips this time of year, they're usually the first place to show signs of dehydration and weather-wear. Enter stage left the Laneige Lip Sleeping Mask, which I slather on in the evenings, enjoying it's yummy berry scent, and wake up with plump, hydrated lips.
I think my skin is ready for autumn now! What skincare switches do you make this time of year?


TENAZA GRIP CORTATUBOS DE CADENA 250 MM. Ø DE 15 A 75 MM.
LLAVE SUECA BOCA LAGARTO 1,5\"
LLAVE SUECA BOCA LAGARTO 1\"
CORTATUBOS PROF.3 - 35 MM P/COBRE, ALUMINIO Y MET CON 2 CUCHILLAS DE 19 X 5 MM.
CORTATUBOS PROF. 6 - 76 MM P/COBRE, ALUMINIO Y MET CON 2 CUCHILLAS DE 19 X 6,20 MM.
CORTATUBOS PROF. 3 - 35 MM P/INOXIDABLE CON 2 CUCHILLAS DE 19 X 5 MM.
CORTATUBOS PROF. 3 - 30 MM P/COBRE, ALUMINIO Y MET CON 2 CUCHILLAS DE 19 X 5 MM.
CADENA RECAMBIO PARA CORTATUBOS DE CADENA 250 MM. LONGITUD: 380 MM.


OTDR: What does it do?
Optical Time Domain Reflectometers (OTDRs) and fault locators are used to certify new fiber installations and locate faults in deployed fiber optic networks.
Scan and characterize fiber optic networks (from one end of the fiber).
Display characterized fiber either as a trace showing optical loss and reflectance vs. distance or as a LinkMap providing an icon-based representation of the fiber sections, splices, connectors and any detected faults (breaks or macro-bends).
Provide link summary information (end-to-end length, loss, optical return loss).
Provide details for each detected connector, splice or fault including event location, event type, loss and reflectance at event and loss to event.
OTDRs and fault locators are available for both multi-mode and single-mode networks including passive optical networks (PONs) supporting a range of performance requirements and budgets.