$Signed a three-year, $15.5 million contract with the Bengals in June of 2016.
Bernard actually got the start on the first series ahead of Joe Mixon, but that was largely ceremonial, as Mixon was the primary ball carrier again Sunday. That's reflective of the new reality -- Mixon became a three-down back this season, so Bernard's role was marginalized except for the two weeks where Mixon was hurt. He finishes the year with 211 yards rushing and 218 yards receiving, tallying three touchdowns in the process.
How do Giovani Bernard's 2018 advanced stats compare to other running backs?
See where Giovani Bernard lined up on the field and how he performed at each spot.
How do Giovani Bernard's measurables compare to other running backs?
Bernard was on pace for his fourth consecutive season with more than 1,000 combined yards, along with a career high in receptions, when he tore his ACL in Week 11's game against the Bills. When healthy, the 5-9, 205-pound back is one of the league's most dangerous runners in the open field, possessing an elite combination of vision, elusiveness and quickness. But after suffering one ACL tear already in college, there's no guarantee Bernard will be able to return to peak form. He was a full go for the start of training camp less than nine months after suffering the injury, but the Bengals added Joe Mixon in the draft to further muddy Bernard's prospects for touches. Even if he does come back 100 percent from his knee injury, he could find himself relegated to a change-of-pace role.
Sometimes less is more, as we saw with Bernard during his third NFL season. Although his rushes dropped to a new personal low, he hiked his YPC up to a personal best, a jump of 0.7 over the previous year. Bernard also nudged his catch rate forward, adding up to a Top 20 RB finish in PPR leagues. Ah, but touchdowns also pay a lot of the fantasy bills, and that's where Bernard was disappointing — perhaps unlucky — last year. Although his red-zone usage was similar to where it was in 2014, Bernard dropped from seven touchdowns to just two. He was the only back in the league to score just twice on 26 or more red-zone rushing attempts (Bernard collected 32 in all). And it wasn't like all the totes were from long distances; he had 13 chances inside the 10. It's not that Bernard is ever likely to lead the league in touchdowns — heck, his running mate, Jeremy Hill, did that last year — but given his expected volume and breakaway ability, you'd expect a modest gain in TDs this time around. There's nothing particularly thrilling about Bernard entering his fourth campaign, but he's been a fantasy-useful player his entire career, and he might be entering the boring-but-thrifty veteran portion of the program.
Expected to be Cincinnati's lead back last season, Bernard instead battled shoulder, rib and hip injuries, missing three games and ceding the starting role to rookie Jeremy Hill, who never let it go. That's not an encouraging trend for an undersized player who'd already undergone ACL surgery in college. When healthy, Bernard still showed the incredible quickness, vision, balance and elusiveness that make him a threat to explode for a long gain on every touch. Although he bails out too often in pass protection, his 130 targets through two seasons demonstrate the Bengals' commitment to giving him a prime spot in their passing game to take advantage of his hands and ability to make defenders miss in space. The more physical, bruising Hill is a reliable asset on the ground, and Bernard likely will get fewer carries this season to limit the punishment he takes. That might actually be the best scenario for his career prospects, as he might stay more effective with a reduced workload.
One of the league's most exciting rookies last season, Bernard made an instant impact in the pass game and showed quick cutting ability as well as great burst despite seeing his carries limited by a timeshare with BenJarvus Green-Ellis. He'll again have to split off some carries to Green-Ellis and second-round pick Jeremy Hill this year, but appears poised to take over a more featured role in the Bengals' offense. A second-round selection in 2013, Bernard's final numbers were depressed by a lack of playing time alongside Green-Ellis – and yet he still racked up more than 1,200 total yards from scrimmage. He could have ended up with even more, but did struggle over the season's final three games, carrying 39 times for a total of just 77 yards. But the Law Firm seems in line to be phased out after his third consecutive season of sub-4.0 yards per carry, meaning that Bernard should see his carries jump well over 200 while retaining all his usefulness in the pass game. Despite being a smaller back at 5-9, 208, Bernard has so far looked terrifically durable, and even though Green-Ellis is a more prototypical short-yardage back, Bernard still saw six goal-line touches last season and should see that role expanded this year. He has all the goods to be a true three-down back, and he could finally see that role materialize this season.
The 37th overall pick – and first RB selected this year – Bernard has extremely quick feet and the vision and burst to break runs outside. Bernard's also a natural receiver out of the backfield and, as such, is likely to see plenty of third-down work. He'll likely begin the year as a change-of-pace runner and complement to BenJarvus Green-Ellis, but has the tools to be a productive three-down back should Green-Ellis miss time.
Bernard caught both of his targets but was unable to gain yardage during Sunday's 26-18 loss to Cleveland.


text:
By Kris Crews
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"Because of bullying at work"… 3 months of marriage, extreme selection of a new groom
Home » News » "Because of bullying at work"… 3 months of marriage, extreme selection of a new groom
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Pictures of material not directly related to the article. [사진 출처 = 연합뉴스]
Allegations were raised that the new groom, who worked in Nonghyup for three months after his wedding, made an extreme choice due to constant harassment in the workplace.
The newly deceased groom tried to choose a theater group three weeks before the wedding, but due to the Nonghyup's lukewarm response, he chose a theater group again and ultimately lost his life.
According to the family of Mr. And on the 25th, Mr. A (33), who joined an agricultural cooperative in the province in 2019, continues to hear abusive words from him after Mr. B took office in January last year.
Mr B said insulting words to Mr. And in front of the workers, such as "Why can't you do your job like that?" and "I don't know what's in your head."
When Mr. parked And in the workers' car park, the family said, "Who are you to park in such a convenient place?"
Mr A, unable to withstand the bullying, eventually tried an extreme choice about three weeks before the wedding in September last year. Fortunately, Mr A was found in time and his life was saved, after which the Nonghyup began an investigation into the bullying.
However, according to Mr A's family, the Nonghyup conducted an investigation without separating the work of the perpetrator and the victim. At that time, Mr. A in hospital due to depression caused by Mr.'s bullying. B. Even after that, Mr. B to behave offensively, such as not accepting Mr.
In the end, on the 12th, Mr A parked his car near the Nonghyup where he worked and tried another extreme choice and died in the end.
The will he left behind is said to contain content such as "I tried hard, but the office told me to take time off (it was hard)" and "This choice will be difficult for my family, but I' I think the difficult days will be long if I continue in this state." transfer down
Mr. A's younger brother said, "My older brother was an office worker who worked so hard that he even received an award from the governor of Jeonbuk Province."
He continued, "Every time my brother was bullied, he recorded the circumstances in detail on his laptop, and after learning this fact, Nonghyup's side threw the laptop away without permission." I hope that those responsible for neglecting the situation will be properly punished," he said.
Mr A's family plans to file a complaint against workplace harassment at the Ministry of Employment and Labor on the same day and also file a complaint with the police.
An official from the Nonghyup said, "The investigation was carried out in accordance with the manual and through legal procedures. He also put Mr B on paid leave and implemented the separation measures," he said.
Ronaldo sold a 600 million sky-high private jet to the star
Will Chuu's entertainment activities come to a halt… Blockberry files a complaint with the Korean Federation of Trade Associations
This was the world's best game show…'E3′ where all the platform holders are fighting


text:
.. Sequences/Intrinsic Metafunctions//is_sequence

is_sequence
===========

Synopsis
--------

.. parsed-literal::

    template<
          typename X
        >
    struct is_sequence
    {
        typedef |unspecified| type;
    };

Description
-----------

Returns a boolean |Integral Constant| ``c`` such that ``c::value == true`` if and
only if ``X`` is a model of |Forward Sequence|.

Header
------

.. parsed-literal::

    #include <boost/mpl/is_sequence.hpp>

Parameters
----------

+---------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Parameter     | Requirement       | Description                                   |
+===============+===================+===============================================+
| ``X``         | Any type          | The type to query.                            |
+---------------+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+

Expression semantics
--------------------

.. parsed-literal::

    typedef is_sequence<X>::type c;

:Return type:
    Boolean |Integral Constant|.

:Semantics:
    Equivalent to

    .. parsed-literal::

        typedef not_< is_same< begin<T>::type,void_ > >::type c;

Complexity
----------

Amortized constant time.

Example
-------

.. parsed-literal::

    struct UDT {};

    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT_NOT(( is_sequence< std::vector<int> > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT_NOT(( is_sequence< int > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT_NOT(( is_sequence< int& > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT_NOT(( is_sequence< UDT > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT_NOT(( is_sequence< UDT* > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT(( is_sequence< range_c<int,0,0> > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT(( is_sequence< list<> > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT(( is_sequence< list<int> > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT(( is_sequence< vector<> > ));
    BOOST_MPL_ASSERT(( is_sequence< vector<int> > ));

See also
--------

|Forward Sequence|, |begin|, |end|, |vector|, |list|, |range_c|

.. copyright:: Copyright ©  2001-2009 Aleksey Gurtovoy and David Abrahams
   Distributed under the Boost Software License, Version 1.0. (See accompanying
   file LICENSE_1_0.txt or copy at http://www.boost.org/LICENSE_1_0.txt)


Inhabiting A-Z Homestead at the National Gallery of Australia: Through the glass.
A person sleeping with a shawl over her face.
Brett and Derek fixing the faulty window.
By the Australian artist Ian Burn, 1967-68. Found via the NGA art Library.


text:
Barclays branches and ATMs in Alderley Edge
Alderley Edge
Barclays opening hours in Alderley Edge
List of all Barclays offices and ATMs in Alderley Edge
Locate your closest Barclays branch in Alderley Edge and you will be able to access all contact information, available ATMs, check their opening hours and client support phone.
Barclays at 22 London Road, Alderley Edge, Cheshire
22 London Road, Alderley Edge, Cheshire
0 Km - Alderley Edge
Barclays at 59 Grove Street, Wilmslow, Cheshire
59 Grove Street, Wilmslow, Cheshire
2.7 Km - Wilmslow
Barclays at 10 Market Place, Macclesfield, Cheshire
10 Market Place, Macclesfield, Cheshire
8.9 Km - Macclesfield
Barclays at 87 King Street, Knutsford, Cheshire
87 King Street, Knutsford, Cheshire
9.1 Km - Knutsford
Barclays at 48/50 George Street, Altrincham, Cheshire
48/50 George Street, Altrincham, Cheshire
11.9 Km - Altrincham
Barclays at Station Approach, 92 Park Road, Timperley, Altrincham, Cheshire
Station Approach, 92 Park Road, Timperley, Altrincham, Cheshire
Barclays at 198 Ashley Road, Hale, Altrincham, Cheshire
198 Ashley Road, Hale, Altrincham, Cheshire
Barclays at 753/755 Wilmslow Road, Didsbury, Manchester
753/755 Wilmslow Road, Didsbury, Manchester
12.6 Km - Didsbury
Barclays at 1 Bridge Street, Stockport, Cheshire
1 Bridge Street, Stockport, Cheshire
12.9 Km - Stockport
Barclays at 10 Compstall Road, Romiley, Stockport, Cheshire
10 Compstall Road, Romiley, Stockport, Cheshire
Barclays at 136 London Road, Hazel Grove, Stockport, Cheshire
136 London Road, Hazel Grove, Stockport, Cheshire
Barclays at 430 Reddish Road, Reddish, Stockport, Cheshire
430 Reddish Road, Reddish, Stockport, Cheshire
Barclays at 10 The Hollins, Stockport Road, Marple, Stockport, Cheshire
10 The Hollins, Stockport Road, Marple, Stockport, Cheshire
Barclays at 14 Woodford Road, Bramhall, Stockport, Cheshire
14 Woodford Road, Bramhall, Stockport, Cheshire
Barclays at 17 Northenden Road, Sale, Cheshire
17 Northenden Road, Sale, Cheshire
14.7 Km - Sale
Barclays at 31 High Street, Congleton, Cheshire
31 High Street, Congleton, Cheshire
15.7 Km - Congleton
Branches/ATMs of other banks in Alderley Edge
Royal Bank Of Scotland at Rbs, 1 London Road, Alderley Edge
Rbs, 1 London Road, Alderley Edge
Natwest at 52 London Road, Alderley Edge, Cheshire
Prestbury


Watch Interlude in Prague (2017). Prague, 1786. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart spends a few turbulent months escaping the frustrating, privileged elite of Vienna. However his unconventional presence soon unleashes a series of dramatic and tragic events.


July | 2015 | Diabetes Doesn't Own me!
What was supposed to be a fun hiking day, turned into a saturday filled with tears, hail and high blood sugar.
About a month ago I planned a 10 mile round trip hike to Inspiration point with a new friend. I went to sleep early the night before, packed snacks, water and extra diabetes supplies and laid out a healthy breakfast.
The hike started out perfect. It was warm and sunny. My blood sugar was good, I was feeling good. I got an amazing shot of a rainstorm over Los Angeles. It looked like the rain was going to miss us.
By the time we saw the lightening get closer to the mountain, it was beginning to drizzle. We figured that we'd make it to the halfway point and decide if we wanted to go the whole way up to Inspiration point. It didn't look so bad. If anything, we'd wait out the storm before continuing on.
The higher up we got, the closer the lightening was. By the time we made it to Echo Mountain it was raining hard, windy, and freezing. A park ranger suggested that we head back down. At this point my blood sugar was on its own steady climb up. At the base of the mountain my sugar was 206. By the time we got to the top it was over 300. I cancelled my 50% temp basal and gave a correction. We kept stopping along the trail as the rain got heavier and heavier. Then, for a brief couple minutes it started to hail. In July. In Pasadena. And every time I looked at my sensor my blood sugar was higher. By the time we finally got back to the car my sugar was over 400. I felt terrible, I was soaked to the bone and all I wanted to do was sleep.
As soon as it starts to rain, everyone in Los Angeles loses their minds. Nobody knows how to drive. People freak out because idiots drive other idiots off the road. It took forever, but i finally got home. I drove as slow as possible and felt like someone was twisting my stomach into knots from the inside the entire way. Somewhere along the way I had to stop the car and throw up.
My wonderful husband helped me inside and got me a nice cold diet ginger ale to sip on. I changed my pump, gave a correction and fell asleep.
A couple hours later we decided to get ready for the Red Sox/Angels game that night. We already had tickets and I was beginning to feel better. Unfortunately, because of the rain, it took us almost 2 hours to get there and we were about 45 minutes late to the game. By the time we finally got food, sat down and could relax, there were only 3 innings left.
We stayed until the very end and were having a wonderful time…. until we walked to the parking lot and discovered that someone had stolen my car. I guess things can always get worse….
I decided to see what all the hype was about and finally make cauliflower crust pizza. I've been meaning to try this recipe for weeks. So yesterday I got cauliflower, mozzarella, parmesan, and tomato sauce and invited my neighbors over for moral support. We already had a backup plan in case the meal turned out to be a total bust.
The recipe called for rosemary and oregano for the crust, but I used fresh basil from the one plant I haven't killed in my apartment yet. Looks like I need to restock my salt and pepper….The wine was very crucial in the cooking process!
My first step was to shred the mozz. I did it the same way the Layla (blogger who posted the recipe) did it and shredded it in my food processor. I don't think I'm ever going to use a cheese grater again. Next was the cauliflower. It was probably the most time consuming part of the recipe because I got such a large head of cauliflower and I have a smallish food processor. About halfway through I realized I had been hitting the chop button instead of the puree button.
As I cleaned up the sink and got the egg, salt, garlic powder and 1/4 cup of each cheese, my neighbor Liz squeezed all the liquid out of the pureed cauliflower. I mixed everything together and realized I had forgotten to preheat the oven to 500….oops.
I didn't have any parchment paper and since I don't eat regular pizza I didn't have a pizza stone either. But we made do with a cookie sheet and aluminum foil. I sprayed the foil with Pam and pressed the dough into an oval. About 40 minutes later we had a delicious, misshapen crust. Once it had browned in the oven, I sprinkled with mozz, parm, and fresh basil. We turned on the broiler and put it back in the oven for 4 minutes to get the cheese nice and melty.
Around this time Sean and Liz's husband, Federico, got back from the Italian restaurant around the corner with meatballs, garlic bread and an actual slice of real pizza (Sean's idea-unbelievable). The apartment smelled amazing and the pizza was ready to come out of the oven. We all served salad and got a slice of the 'faux' pizza. The real Italian food was on standby.
Liz took the first bite and said what we all were thinking, 'It's good, but it tastes like cauliflower, sauce and cheese.' After we stopped laughing, we ate the rest of the "pizza" and the Italian meatballs. I wouldn't say this recipe is a bust, but if you're expecting it to taste like the real thing… well it doesn't. Sean's biggest complaint was that it had no pepperoni.
I'll probably be making this again, my blood sugar hovered around 100 throughout the night and into the next morning. But next time, I'm adding toppings!
Now that I'm drinking Shakeology everyday again, my blood sugars have started leveling off again. This week it's been hard to squeeze in workouts, but I'm managing to set aside at least 30 minutes a day. The best is when I have the time to ride my bike to get groceries. It's even better when I can go for a long, challenging hike. I've noticed that out of everything I do to work out, hiking is the best for my blood sugar. As long as I keep an eye on what my sensor says during and after the hike and adjust my basal rate as necessary. I'm looking forward to hiking with a new friend on Saturday!
Last night, the last thing I wanted to do was cook. I had planned early on to make a dinner plan for the week, but couldn't find the time for that. So when I got home from work, I looked in the fridge and groaned. Fortunately, the hubby came home just before I had given up all together and ordered take-out. We took ground beef, veggies, tomato sauce and pasta and whipped up a delicious meal. I only had a few pieces of penne and loaded up on the broccoli. My blood sugars started rising only after I ate blueberries with whipped cream 🙂 That's one of my favorite things about Sean, he can create something delicious (albeit many times extremely unusual) with almost nothing in the fridge. Hopefully today I'll have more time to go grocery shopping!
As much as I love routine and structure, sometime it's nice to mix things up. I celebrated my second anniversary with my hubby last night. We went to an amazing restaurant on the water. Originally, I was concerned that my blood sugar would spike. I've never been great at estimating carbs in restaurant food. But I didn't spike as high as I thought I would. I went up to about 250 and hovered around there a bit before coming back down this morning. I did have bread (who could resist!!), and I bloused for my meal about 30 min before we started eating. I started to go low (92 and dropping) right as our appetizers arrived. I also tried to eat low glycemic index foods. I had salad, ahi tuna, calamari, and a petit filet with a side of snap peas. We didn't get dessert, although all of them sounded delicious. I also didn't eat everything off my plate, so I didn't leave the restaurant feeling like I overdid it.
I know my blood sugars aren't going to be perfect everyday. Hi's are a part of life, but it is frustrating when my number gets hi and stays hi no matter what I do. I ate the same foods, checked my blood and bloused like I've been doing but for the past couple nights, my sugar wont go below 250. I changed my site, and then changed it again but my numbers still see-saw. And then I realized that I haven't had Shakeology in about 3 days. My secret weapon to stability. I always go on and on to whoever will listen about how wonderful Shakeology is and how much it has helped me. How could I have completely forgotten about it?
I'm staying positive because I know that I'll always have good days and bad days. Good weeks, bad weeks. They're all learning experiences. For instance, I've re-discovered how crucial Shakeology is to a lower a1c. I'm not forgetting my shake tomorrow.
I'm the first to admit that I spend way too much time on Pinterest. It's the best way to find creative recipes, doable DIY projects and endless inspiration. I wanted to make something summery for dinner with all the fresh vegetables I had in the fridge. My plan was fresh, grilled chicken kabobs with rice. I had zucchini, mushrooms, tomatoes and chicken, oil, salt and pepper and seasoning. My only drawback is that when I've made kabobs in the past, the veggies never come out quite right. I never want to overcook the protein so the vegetables are either overcooked or undercooked. I found a pin for the best 'fool proof' recipe for kabobs. Instead of mixing everything on the skewers, put all of one food on each. So I had 2 filled with zucchini, 2 with mushrooms, 4 with chicken and 4 with tomatoes. Everything cooks at different times so everything was cooked to perfection. My only regret is not taking pictures while I was doing it. Next time I'll remember! The best part is that since I skipped the rice and loaded up on veggies, my blood sugar stayed steady at 150 (until I had fro yo and had to correct…). I still haven't made cauliflower crust pizza, and there are a lot of recipes to try on my list!
Before my delicious meal, I had an awesome workout with a great friend. I forgot how much I loved the track! I went with my neighbor to run and to do the stairs. We stayed about 45 minutes and didn't stop moving the entire time. I love working out with a friend because the time just slips away. As much as I love working out, I can get a bit lazy when I exercise by myself. Having a buddy there with me holds me accountable! She is working up to a 5k, I'm working up to a half marathon. No matter the level it doesn't make the goal as daunting when you're experiencing it with someone else.
I just had my monthly endo appointment and I can honestly say it was the best one I've had in years. In just the few weeks I've started using the minimed cgm again my blood sugars have been amazing! Doc Peters said that she thought she was looking at someone else's chart. The real reason I have been doing so well I think is because I'm checking my blood more often. That was the first thing Doc Peters had me doing when I first started seeing her a year and a half ago. I wasn't even checking once a day, but by checking 3 times a day and not changing anything else, it brought my sugars down (to an average of 280) immediately. The more I check my blood, the more I correct, and since the minimed cgm isn't as accurate as my old dexcom, I never bolus or correct off the sensor. It might seem that that would make my control worse, but now I'm almost forced to check my blood. That, combined with my diabetes kit sidekick, I have everything I need. Eating better foods keeps my blood sugars from spiking and that keeps me from getting frustrated and giving up too quickly. I LOVE seeing a steady line around 150. It rarely goes over 200. I have more energy so I look forward to exercising. Everything is coming together and helping me feel (a little bit more) in control of my diabetes.
I don't want to get too preachy. There are things that bring my BS up. I went to a Dodgers game last night and sat in the all you can eat pavilion seats. Even giving insulin 30 minutes before I started eating didn't keep my sugar from going over 300. But this time I was prepared, I bloused, I corrected, and the next morning woke up at 140.
So I'm busted. Doc Peters knows what I'm capable of. And she doesn't expect any less from here on out. I don't expect any less from myself either.


text:
Posted on December 18, 2014 by blog_admin
AABANY Applauds Nomination of Kathy Hirata Chin for New York Court of Appeals Vacancy
Contact: Yang Chen, Executive Director
NEW YORK – December 18, 2014 – The Asian American Bar Association of New York ("AABANY") is proud to announce that the Commission on Judicial Nominations has named Kathy Hirata Chin (Partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham, & Taft LLP) as one of seven well-qualified nominees for the judgeship vacancy on the New York State Court of Appeals created by the retirement of Judge Robert Smith. The Commission on Judicial Nomination, charged with evaluating and recommending to the Governor candidates to fill vacancies on the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, received 53 applications and interviewed 22 candidates for the Smith opening.
"AABANY applauds the Commission on Judicial Nomination for its recommendation of Kathy Hirata Chin to join the highest court of New York and strongly encourages Governor Cuomo to make history by appointing the first-ever Asian Pacific American (APA) judge to this esteemed institution," said AABANY President Clara Ohr. "Kathy's qualifications would make her a valuable addition to this court and her appointment would be an important step toward making the judiciary in New York a more accurate reflection of the population it serves." APAs remain significantly underrepresented in the New York Judiciary. With approximately 1300 judges in the New York State court system, only 22 of them are APAs in spite of the fact that APAs make up approximately 8% of the population of New York State.
"We congratulate Kathy on her selection as a nominee to the State's highest court," said Linda Lin, Co-Chair of AABANY's Judiciary Committee. "Her outstanding credentials, balanced temperament, and sterling achievements undoubtedly make her an excellent candidate for the bench and we strongly urge Governor Cuomo to appoint Kathy Chin to the New York Court of Appeals bench."
Kathy Hirata Chin is an accomplished litigator who has handled dozens of appellate cases, concentrating her practice in healthcare and real estate. After graduating magna cum laude from Princeton University and graduating Columbia University School of Law, where she was a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar and Editor-in-Chief of The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Ms. Chin joined Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, becoming one of the first minority and women Partners in 1990. Nominated by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Ms. Chin served on the New York City Planning Commission from 1995-2001. Nominated by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Ms. Chin has served on the New York City Commission to Combat Police Corruption since August 2003. She has also served on Governor Mario M. Cuomo's Judicial Screening Committee for the First Judicial Department from1992-1994; the Magistrate Judge Merit Selection Panel for the Eastern District of New York from 1992-1999; the Gender Bias Committee of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Fairness; the New York County Lawyers' Association's Task Force to Increase Diversity in the Legal Profession; and Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye's Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections from 2003-2006; and the New York County Lawyers' Association Board of Directors. She currently serves as a member of The Attorney Emeritus Advisory Council and The Commercial Division Advisory Council, and as member of the Board of Directors of the Medicare Rights Center. Ms. Chin has been a longstanding and active member of AABANY.
For more information, please contact Yang Chen, AABANY Executive Director, at (718) 228-7206, or direct any inquiries to main@aabany.org.
The Asian American Bar Association of New York is a professional membership organization of attorneys concerned with issues affecting the Asian Pacific American community. Incorporated in 1989, AABANY seeks not only to encourage the professional growth of its members but also to advocate for the Asian Pacific American community as a whole. AABANY is the New York regional affiliate of the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA).
Additional information about AABANY is available at www.aabany.org
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Follow us on Twitter at www.twitter.com/aabany
Find us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/aabany
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Tagskathy hirata chin, New York State Court of Appeals, nomination, press release
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text:
This Week in London – Well-being at Kew; Poussin wins credit for 'The Triumph of Silenus'; and, Euston explored…
by exploringlondon April 30, 2021 April 30, 2021
• Kew Gardens have unveiled a new programme of well-being events with the aim of encouraging people to enjoy the outdoors after the COVID-19 lockdown. The events, all of which will be COVID-19 safe and follow government guidelines, including everything from forest bathing sessions in the Arboretum inspired by the Japanese art of Shinrin-yokuto, a rare chance to cycle through the gardens on an evening bike ride, pilates in the Nash Conservatory and yoga sessions in the Temperate House. Check the Kew website for dates and times and admission charges.
The Triumph of Silenus hanging in Room 29 at The National Gallery. PICTURE: © The National Gallery
• The creator of The Triumph of Silenus (c1637), which was one of the first paintings to enter the collection of The National Gallery when it did so in 1824, has been confirmed as 17th century French painter Nicolas Poussin. The painting had long been plagued by questions of authenticity but following recent conservation work and in-depth technical analysis, it has been confirmed as a work of Poussin. The confirmation means the gallery holds 14 works by Poussin, making it one of the world's leading collections of paintings by him. Later this year, the picture will feature in a new exhibition, Poussin and the Dance.
• People will have the chance to see parts of Euston Station usually not accessible to the public on a new virtual tour announced by the London Transport Museum. The tour is part of the next season of 'Hidden London' virtual events with new dates also to be announced for tours of King William Street, Brompton Road, Holborn (Kingsway) and Aldwych. Meanwhile, the museum will recommence its 'Secrets of Central London' walking tour in the West End on 17th May. Charges apply. For more on the virtual tours and dates, head to www.ltmuseum.co.uk/hidden-london/virtual-tours.
Send all items for inclusion to exploringlondon@gmail.com.
Covent Garden Euston Galleries Gardens Museums News Trafalgar Square TransportHidden London Kew Gardens London Transport Museum Nicolas Poussin The National Gallery The Triumph of Silenus well-being programme
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Home | Recalling the infamous "Order me a f*&%ing pizza while you're at it" incident
Recalling the infamous "Order me a f*&%ing pizza while you're at it" incident
Author adminPosted on 24 August 2020 25 August 2020 Categories Criminal law Tags attempted murder, contempt, contempt of court, criminal proceedings, criminal trials, David Allan Baker, Justice Daubney, Justice Martin Daubney, pizza, Supreme Court of Queensland3 Comments on Recalling the infamous "Order me a f*&3ing pizza while you're at it" incident
David Allan Baker had been charged with attempted murder and had sacked his barrister and solicitors on an earlier occasion when his trial came on for hearing.
Baker's trial was set to commence before Justice Martin Daubney on 4 June 2012, but the day before he again sacked his legal representatives and the matter came on before the court on an application by his second set of legal representatives for leave to withdraw after he had dispensed with their services. Continue reading "Recalling the infamous "Order me a f*&%ing pizza while you're at it" incident"
Neil Andrew Pentland found not guilty of murder of Philip Carlyle
Author adminPosted on 11 August 2020 21 August 2020 Categories Criminal law Tags ATNET Pty Ltd, Criminal Code, criminal proceedings, criminal trials, judges, Justice Martin, murder, Neil Andrew Pentland, Neil Pentland, Philip Carlyle, Robina, Supreme Court of Queensland2 Comments on Neil Andrew Pentland found not guilty of murder of Philip Carlyle
After a lengthy judge-only trial, Pentland was acquitted.
In 1996, Neil Pentland and his wife Dianne set up a company called ATNET Pty Ltd. Pentland was a director and the secretary of the company. The shares were held by him and his wife. The initial operation of the company involved assisting clients to set up email accounts and with basic internet functions. Mr Carlyle was employed by the company as its marketing manager from late 1996. He was not a shareholder but there was an agreement which would have allowed him to buy 30% of the company's shares for $30,000 at a later time.
Philip Carlyle was murdered on 13 April 1997. He had been lured, or coerced, into a small, sound-proofed plant room in an office building at Robina. He was then shot in the head and neck with four .32 calibre steel jacket bullets. The weapon used to kill Mr Carlyle has never been found.
Continue reading "Neil Andrew Pentland found not guilty of murder of Philip Carlyle"
Appeal bail refused for Kleenmaid director despite Covid-19 risks
Author adminPosted on 16 April 2020 1 July 2020 Categories Criminal law, Liberty Tags Andrew Eric Young, appeal bail, bail, Chamberlain v. R. (1983), Coronavirus, covid 19, criminal appeals, Ex parte [1985], Ex parte [1985] QSCFC 113, Judge Brian Devereaux, Kleenmaid, Kleenmaid director, Lyons SJA, Maher, R v Kelly (Edward) [1999] 2 Cr App R(S) 176, Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Queensland2 Comments on Appeal bail refused for Kleenmaid director despite Covid-19 risks
Former Kleenmaid director Andrew Eric Young was convicted after a trial of two counts of fraud with circumstances of aggravation and 17 counts of insolvent trading. Prior to trial the Mental Health Court held he was fit for trial and the proceedings should continue according to law, and the trial judge refused to put that issue to the jury.
Continue reading "Appeal bail refused for Kleenmaid director despite Covid-19 risks"
The law of lawyers bills in Queensland
Author adminPosted on 24 February 2020 22 April 2020 Categories civil litigation, Legal profession, litigation, Professional fees Tags Atlantic 3-Financial (Aust) & Anor v Marler & Anor, Attorneys and Solicitors Act 1729, bill of costs, Clayton Utz, Clayton Utz Lawyers v P & W Enterprises Pty Ltd, clients, Cobbett and others v. Wood, contentious business, Cook v Gillard, costs assessments, Currie v Robinson, District Court, Eversheds v Osman, Florence Investments Pty Ltd v HG Slater & Co, Fryberg J, Gorczynski v Beilby, gross sum bill, Haigh v Ousey, Henchman v Hannes, In re Baylis, itemised bills, Jackson & Anor v. Creswick Middleton Solicitors, Joanne Murdock, Judge McGill SC, Judge Porter QC, Karen King, Keene v Ward, Kiefel J, legal costs, Legal Profession Act 2007, litigation, lump sum bill, Malleson Stewart Stawell and Nankivell v. Williams, McGill DCJ, McGrath v Roe, Murdock v Sterling Law, non-contentious business, Osborn v Osborn, Piper Alderman v Smoel, Pott v Clayon Utz, Pott v Clayton Utz, Queensland Court of Appeal, Queensland Mushrooms Pty Ltd & Ors v Hawthorn Cuppaidge and Badgery, R G Kilner & Black, Ralph Hume Garry v Gwillim, Re a Solicitor, Re a taxation of costs, Re Bailey's Bill of Costs, Re Rose and Jensen, Re Walsh Halligan Douglas' Bill of Costs, Solicitors Act 1843, Sterling Law, Supreme Court of Queensland, Tabtill No 2, Tabtill No 2 Pty Ltd & Ors v DLA Phillips Fox, the debtor Joanne Murdock, Thomson Hannan v McDonald & Doolan, Walsh Halligan Douglas, Zizza v Seymour3 Comments on The law of lawyers bills in Queensland
For a very long time in Commonwealth legal systems, the legal profession has been regulated for the benefit of clients of lawyers and the public at large. Among other things, there has been a recognised public interest in protecting those liable to pay legal fees from overcharging by lawyers. One of those protections is and has been the legal requirement for a bill to be provided so that the client can seek advice on the fees and charges.
As a result, one of the many modern obligations that lawyers in English legal systems have to comply with in the course of legal practice is to provide clients and any other persons liable for their fees with proper bills before such persons can be liable for or sued for such fees. Continue reading "The law of lawyers bills in Queensland"
John William Chardon guilty of manslaughter
Author adminPosted on 9 September 2019 8 January 2020 Categories Criminal law Tags John Chardon, John William Chardon, murder, Novy Chardon, Supreme Court, Supreme Court of QueenslandLeave a comment on John William Chardon guilty of manslaughter
A Brisbane jury has today found John William Chardon guilty of manslaughter over his wife's disappearance in 2013.
Novy Chardon went missing the same day her husband John Chardon received a legal letter from her solicitors about custody of their children. Her body has never been found. John Chardon has consistently denied any involvement.
Chardon told police that when he woke up on February 7 his wife was gone, with him suggesting she might have sold $70,000 worth of jewellery to fund her departure. However, investigators found Ms Chardon's passport and she hadn't used her bank accounts or social media accounts.
Continue reading "John William Chardon guilty of manslaughter"
Injured plaintiff not ordered to pay costs of successful defendant
Author adminPosted on 22 December 2018 7 January 2020 Categories litigation, Personal Injury Tags liability, Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, motor vehicle accidents, motorcycle accidents, Nominal Defendant, Supreme Court of QueenslandLeave a comment on Injured plaintiff not ordered to pay costs of successful defendant
On 25 November 2014, the Plaintiff Glenn Garside was riding his motorcycle along the Gregory Highway travelling north from Emerald to Capella when an object fell from a truck (the truck) and struck him, causing personal injuries to him.
Continue reading "Injured plaintiff not ordered to pay costs of successful defendant"
Baden-Clay and the perils of giving evidence in murder trials
Author adminPosted on 13 December 2018 8 October 2020 Categories Criminal law Tags Allison Baden-Clay, Court of Appeal, criminal appeals, criminal charges, criminal proceedings, Gerard Baden-Clay, High Court of Australia, murder, presumption of innocence, Queensland Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Queensland3 Comments on Baden-Clay and the perils of giving evidence in murder trials
Allison Baden-Clay was reported missing by her husband Gerard Baden-Clay on the morning of 20 April 2012.
Her body was found on 30 April 2012 under a bridge on a bank of Kholo Creek, some 13 kilometres from her home. Leaves found on the body were from trees of six species that grew at the Baden-Clay and his wife's home; four of these did not grow at the site at which the body was found. Baden-Clay and his wife's eldest child thought that her mother was wearing a "sloppy jacket" and pyjama pants at the time she was watching television. Her body was found clothed in three-quarter length pants, socks, sneakers and a singlet top which had a bra built into it. Blood matching her DNA profile was found in the rear section of her car, which had only been acquired in February 2012. Tests on Baden-Clay's mobile phone showed that it had been placed on a charger, adjacent to the side of the bed on which he slept, at 1.48am, at a time when he claimed he was asleep.
Gerard Baden-Clay had observable injuries to his right cheek when he reported his wife missing.
Prior to Allison Baden-Clay's disappearance, Gerard Baden-Clay had been having an affair with Ms Toni McHugh since August 2008. He and his wife were due to go to a conference on 20 April 2012 that Ms McHugh would also attend.
Baden-Clay was also in financial difficulty at the time of his wife's death.
Baden-Clay gave evidence at his own trial in 2014, in which he denied any involvement in his wife's disappearance, death or the disposal of her body. He said that he went to bed at about 10pm, leaving his wife, who was watching television, in the living room. He awoke just after 6am on 20 April 2012. His wife was not at home, but she often went for an early morning walk. That morning, he was responsible for getting the children ready for school and taking them there. He testified he was "under the pump a little bit", was "rushing that morning" and that he had cut himself shaving.
Three experts gave evidence that there were two categories of injuries to the Baden-Clay's right cheek. Their evidence was that it was most likely that fingernails caused one set of scratches and it was implausible that those scratches had been caused by a shaving razor. A second set of marks appeared to be different. They were fresher, and were consistent with having been caused by a razor "particularly if moved from side to side as it was drawn from front to back or back to front across the face."
Gerard Baden-Clay was convicted of his wife's murder by the jury. He appealed his conviction pursuant to s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable, and two grounds concerning the adequacy of the trial judge's summing up to the jury.
Relevant law
Section of 302 the Criminal Code (Qld) provides that:
"if the offender intends to cause the death of the person killed or that of some other person or if the offender intends to do to the person killed or to some other person some grievous bodily harm… is guilty of "murder"."
Section 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld), which concerns appeals in ordinary cases, provides that:
"The Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it is of opinion that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable, or can not be supported having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of the wrong decision of any question of law, or that on any ground whatsoever there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal."
In Barca v The Queen [1975] HCA 42, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ said:
"When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are 'such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused': Peacock v The King. To enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be 'the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw': Plomp v The Queen; see also Thomas v The Queen."
In Weissensteiner v The Queen [1993] HCA 65, it was said that:
"in a criminal trial, hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused."
In R v White [1998] 2 SCR 72, in the Supreme Court of Canada, Major J said that:
"As a general rule, it will be for the jury to decide, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, whether the post-offence conduct of the accused is related to the crime before them rather than to some other culpable act. It is also within the province of the jury to consider how much weight, if any, such evidence should be accorded in the final determination of guilt or innocence. For the trial judge to interfere in that process will in most cases constitute a usurpation of the jury's exclusive fact-finding role."
Court of Appeal decision
The QLD Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It held that "there was no evidence of motive in the sense of a reason to kill", and therefore it was not open for the jury to find that Baden-Clay had intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to his wife.
The Court of Appeal held that the evidence at trial was not able to exclude a reasonable hypothesis that:
"there was a physical confrontation between [Baden-Clay] and his wife in which he delivered a blow which killed her (for example, by the effects of a fall hitting her head against a hard surface) without intending to cause serious harm; and, in a state of panic and knowing that he had unlawfully killed her, he took her body to Kholo Creek in the hope that it would be washed away, while lying about the causes of the marks on his face which suggested conflict."
Remarking on Baden-Clay's facial injuries, the Court of Appeal opined that:
"There is nothing about the facial scratches to indicate the circumstances in which they were inflicted; whether they occurred in the course of a heated and perhaps physical argument or in resisting a murderous attack."
The Court of Appeal also said that:
"The jury could properly have rejected every word [Baden-Clay] said as a lie. But that would, with the exception of his explanation of the scratches on his face, have done nothing to advance the Crown case. Conclusions that he had lied in that regard and that he had taken steps to dispose of his wife's body were properly to be taken into account, as evidence of a consciousness of guilt, in the context of all the evidence in the case. But the lies, or the lies taken in combination with the disposal of the body, would not enable the jury to draw an inference of intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm if there were, after consideration of all the evidence, equally open a possibility that all of that conduct was engaged in through a consciousness of a lesser offence; in this case, manslaughter."
The two grounds concerning the adequacy of the trial judge's summing up to the jury were rejected.
The result in the Court of Appeal was that the conviction of murder was set aside, and a conviction for manslaughter was instead imposed.
High Court decision
The Crown appealed to the High Court.
In the High Court, the Crown argued that because no hypothesis of unintentional death caused by Baden-Clay was raised by the defence at trial and there was no evidence to support such a hypothesis, it was not a hypothesis which could form the basis of a reasonable doubt in the jury's minds. The Crown also argued that the evidence of Baden-Clay's ongoing relationship with McHugh, his wife's "venting and grilling" concerning that relationship and the imminent meeting of McHugh and his wife at the conference on the day after her disappearance could fairly lead to the jury inferring an intent to kill. Baden-Clay's post-offence lies and deceptions were also said to support such a conclusion.
Baden-Clay submitted that as the case for murder depended entirely upon circumstantial evidence and the onus of proof of murderous intent was always upon the Crown, the jury could not return a verdict of guilty. He argued that a hypothesis consistent with innocence of murder was open on the evidence. Baden-Clay's post-offence lies and deceptions were submitted to be neutral on the question of whether he had intended to cause his wife's death.
The High Court noted that Baden-Clay's own evidence at trial was that he was not present and had no involvement in his wife's death, and held that that evidence had the following effect:
"The evidence given in the present case by the respondent narrowed the range of hypotheses reasonably available upon the evidence as to the circumstances of the death of the respondent's wife. Not only did the respondent not give evidence which might have raised the hypothesis on which the Court of Appeal acted, the evidence he gave was capable of excluding that hypothesis.
The Court of Appeal's conclusion to the contrary was not based on evidence. It was mere speculation or conjecture rather than acknowledgment of a hypothesis available on the evidence. In this case, there was no evidence led at trial that suggested that the respondent killed his wife in a physical confrontation without intending to kill her. There were "no positive proved facts from which the inference" drawn by the Court of Appeal could be made. There was no evidence at trial of any injury to the wife's body that might have killed her… Not only were there no fractures to the head, which might have suggested the wife had fallen and hit her head on a hard surface (as in the example given by the Court of Appeal), there were no other fractures on the body."
The significance of Baden-Clay's own evidence at trial was further explained by the High Court as follows:
"To say that the respondent's evidence was disbelieved does not mean that his evidence could reasonably be disregarded altogether as having no bearing on the availability of hypotheses consistent with the respondent's innocence of murder. His evidence was important, even if it was disbelieved, because it was open to the jury to consider that the hypothesis identified by the Court of Appeal was not a reasonable inference from the evidence when the only witness who could have given evidence to support the hypothesis gave evidence which necessarily excluded it as a possibility.
The Court of Appeal should not have treated the case as one in which it was open to it to identify a hypothesis as to the circumstances of the death of the deceased on the basis that the respondent's evidence could be disregarded as if it had not been given at all."
The High Court also observed that a further problem with the Court of Appeal's approach was that at trial the case was conducted on the basis that Baden-Clay was either guilty or murder or had no part to play in his wife's death, and neither the Crown nor the defence had ever suggested that Baden-Clay may be guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. Indeed, his Counsel admitted this approach had been adopted by the defence as a "considered tactical position".
Furthermore, the High Court held that it was open for the jury on the evidence to find beyond reasonable doubt that Baden-Clay had intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm when he killed his wife. The jury were entitled to conclude "that it tested credulity too far to suggest that his evident desire to be rid of his wife was fortuitously fulfilled by her unintended death".
Citing the above comment of Major J in R v White with approval, the High Court held that:
"[Baden-Clay's] false denials to police about his ongoing affair, his suggestion to Ms McHugh that she should "lie low", and his enquiry of her as to whether she had revealed the affair to the police were all capable of being regarded by the jury as evidencing a strong anxiety to conceal from police the existence and true nature of his affair with Ms McHugh. This anxiety could reasonably be seen as indicative that, in his mind, the affair and the killing were inter-related, and that the killing was not an unintended, tragic death of his wife, but an intentional killing…
It was open to the jury, in this case, to regard the lengths to which the respondent went to conceal his wife's body and to conceal his part in her demise as beyond what was likely, as a matter of human experience, to have been engendered by a consciousness of having unintentionally killed his wife."
Finally, the jury was also entitled to consider and rely on "the absence of any signs that a weapon was used to cause the death", combined with "the difficulty involved in killing a human being without the use of a weapon unless the act of killing is driven by a real determination to cause death or grievous bodily harm" in support of the necessary element of intent.
The result was Baden-Clay's murder conviction was reinstated.
The High Court found that the Court of Appeal erred because it held that there was sufficient evidence of intent, and that due to a lack of evidence to support the hypothesis that Baden-Clay has accidentally killed his wife such a hypothesis was mere conjecture. As a result, the Court of Appeal's decision was set aside and the murder conviction was re-instated.
Significantly, Baden-Clay's own evidence at trial was held by the Court to support a finding that he did intend to kill his wife, even though that very evidence was obviously rejected by the jury. According to the High Court, the jury were entitled to conclude that Baden-Clay's false testimony that he had no part whatsoever in his wife's death would not have been given if he had not intended to kill her. In other words, Baden-Clay would have been expected to admit his role rather than give evidence denying it he had accidentally killed his wife.
The result is, as Baden-Clay's lawyer Peter Shields has pointed out, many people accused of murder now are strongly advised to not give evidence at their own trials, because "if an accused doesn't give evidence then they're not subject to that forensic criticism." In other words, the false testimony provided by a person accused of murder can according to the High Court be legitimately used by jurors to help conclude that they did intend to kill, and therefore that they are guilty of murder rather than manslaughter.
Conversely, if an accused person does decide to give evidence at their own murder trial, they should ensure that their evidence is truthful and (if possible) does not provide a jury with a belief that their evidence consists of self-serving lies. According to the High Court, Baden-Clay's decision to give evidence at his own trial denying any involvement whatsoever in his wife's death could be used by the jury to conclude that such an attempt to conceal his involvement inferred murder, and that such false evidence would not have been provided if her death was an accident on his part. The effect of this decision is that those accused of murder are in effect encouraged to 'come clean' and admit their involvement (if any) if they wish to be acquitted of murder.
Finally, the High Court's decision confirms that evidence of intent can be proven beyond reasonable doubt even if it is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. In this case, Baden-Clay's stated intention to be rid of his wife, the lack of evidence suggesting accidental death and Baden-Clay's post-offence conduct provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Gerard Baden-Clay had intentionally killed his wife.
Employers & Mine Operator liable for worker's injuries after work
Author adminPosted on 16 March 2018 18 May 2018 Categories Negligence, Personal Injury Tags litigation, negligence, Supreme Court of Queensland, work injuriesLeave a comment on Employers & Mine Operator liable for worker's injuries after work
It is common for workers in the mining industry to work long hours during long shifts, and to perform many such shifts in a short period of time. Exhaustion is therefore a real safety risk.
In this case, the Plaintiff Harold Kerle had been employed as a dump truck operator at the Norwich Park Mine near Dysart in Central Queensland and was severely injured after work in a one vehicle accident on his way home.
This case shows that the duty of care owed by employers and others is not always confined to the work hours or the place of work.
Harold Kerle had completed four consecutive 12 hours shifts at the Norwich Park Mine. He made the fateful decision to commence his journey home at about 6.30am on the morning of 30 October 2008, moments after he had finished his final shift. He lived in Monto, a five hour 430 kilometre drive away.
Shortly before 10am, Kerle crashed his car into a concrete wall after veering onto the right hand side of the road and colliding at high speed on an Armco rail on a bridge crossing at Alma Creek on the Burnett Highway. Kerle sustained significant injuries, including a brain injury and fractures of his ankle, nose and skull. Kerle had no memory of the accident or the events leading up to it.
Alleging the accident was caused by fatigue, Kerle sued his employer Axial HR Pty Ltd ("Axial"), his host employer, HMP Constructions Pty Ltd ("HMP") and the operator of the Norwich Park Mine, BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd ("BMA"). Continue reading "Employers & Mine Operator liable for worker's injuries after work"
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What to Expect from Trump's Meeting with the Queen
It's not an official state visit, but there will be plenty of pomp and circumstance.
By Hilary Weaver
Left, by Yuri Gripas/Bloomberg/Getty Images; Right, by Max Mumby/Indigo/Getty Images.
On July 13, President Trump and First Lady Melania Trump will be visiting Windsor Castle. This might be some kind of Friday the 13th trick of fate, but it's happening nonetheless; Queen Elizabeth will greet the Trumps at the "dais in the quadrangle of the Castle," per a press release from Buckingham Palace.
Though it's not an official state visit, described instead as a "working visit," the whole thing is going to play out as ceremoniously as any other royal occasion. A guard of honor will give a Royal Salute before the U.S. national anthem plays, and then Trump and the Queen will "inspect the guard of honor" before the military walks past. Trump, Melania, and Her Majesty will then adjourn for tea in the castle, which going on The Princess Diaries for reference, is something the Queen might say.
In her 66 years on the throne, the Queen has received three other presidents at Windsor Castle, Kensington Palace says, and has met 11 out of 12 presidents during her reign. President Johnson was the only president not to make the trek to royal stomping grounds.
As far as controversial presidents go, Q.E. II has got some experience. She and Ronald Reagan rode horses together in 1982. This tactic makes sense: riding seems to be something that soothes the Queen, even at 92. She was seen riding on the day Prince Louis was born in April.
The royal family is famous for being tight-lipped about politics, which is what made Thomas Markle's apparent on-air revelation of Prince Harry's opinion on Brexit so shocking. Earlier this year, Trump suddenly canceled a planned visit to London, at the Queen's invitation, bizarrely blaming the Obama administration's decision to sell the original American Embassy in London for "peanuts."
Now it's time for the visit to happen at last, 18-plus months into the Trump presidency. Surely the Queen has used all this time to prepare her hand for the awkward presidential grip to come.
The Famous and Controversial Guests of Queen Elizabeth, Princess Diana, and Kate Middleton's Weddings
By Bert Hardy/Picture Post/Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
Clementine and Winston Churchill
Winston Churchill and his wife Clementine, in fur, at the wedding of the newly titled Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, and then-Princess Elizabeth. Please refer to season one of Netflix's The Crown for the underlying dramas that this picture does not convey.
Q.E. II
Queen Elizabeth Had a Full Week of Events in Scotland
Just one week after she felt under the weather.
prince louis
The Queen Is Missing Today's Major Royal Family Event
Prince Louis's christening takes place on Monday afternoon at St. James's Palace in London.


text:
964 F. 2d 706 - Amoco Petroleum Additives Company Ag Jackson
964 F2d 706 Amoco Petroleum Additives Company Ag Jackson
140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2425, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,201,
7 IER Cases 854
In the Matter of AMOCO PETROLEUM ADDITIVES COMPANY and Buck
Isbell, Petitioners.
In the Matter of Robin A.G. JACKSON, an Underwriter at
Lloyd's, London, et al., Petitioners.
Nos. 92-1649, 92-1676.
Submitted April 2, 1992.
Robert A. Knuti, Jane H. Veldman, R.R. McMahan, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Ill., Thomas C. Walsh, Rebecca Jackson, Sabrina M. Wrenn, Bryan Cave, St. Louis, Mo., and Neil L. Brilliant, Amoco Corp., Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.
Douglas J. Klingberg, Ruder, Ware & Michler, Wausau, Wis., Lawrence T. Hofmann, Timothy W. Regan, Dale I. Larson, Robert M. Wattson, Zelle & Larson, Minneapolis, Minn., and John T. Papa, Pratt & Callis, Granite City, Ill., for respondents.
Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Two petitions for mandamus present questions concerning review of orders remanding cases to state court.
* Employees working in a laboratory in Wood River, Illinois, complained to management that Kathryn Gullick and Dennis Cheatham, a supervisor, were visiting the women's locker room together during working hours. Amoco Petroleum Additives Company, the employer, installed a video camera in the ceiling of the entrance hallway, which enabled the firm to record who entered and left the locker room, and when, but not what they were doing inside. The videotape recorded one instance of a joint Gullick-Cheatham visit. Local No. 7-776 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, filed suit in state court seeking an order restraining the operation of the camera; "Jane Doe" sought damages for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants (Amoco and one of its managers) removed the case to federal court, contending that despite the state-law veneer the suit required the court to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, creating federal jurisdiction and a right to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
Plaintiffs asked the district judge to remand the case, contending that it is based on state law and so may not be removed. (Amoco does not contend that the parties are of diverse citizenship.) On January 17, 1992, the district court entered this handwritten order: "Before the Court is plaintiff's motion to remand. Having considered the premises contained in the plaintiff's motion, briefs, and heard oral argument, plaintiffs motion is Denied." The court gave no explanation. After taking some discovery, Amoco filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and also altered the lineup of parties. The union dropped out, and eight female employees (including Gullick) replaced "Jane Doe." The new plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. More briefs and another oral argument ensued, and on March 6 the court entered this handwritten order:
Case called on u's Motion for Summary Judgment and W's Second Motion for Remand. Ct considers the Motion for Remand initially. Arguments heard and the Court being fully advised the Motion to Remand is granted. The Court does not consider u's Motion for Summary Judgment as it does not have jurisdiction.
Again the judge furnished no explanation. Amoco lodged its petition for mandamus, which has been briefed.A
An order remanding a case to state court is not appealable--not only because the case continues, see Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 270, 21 L.Ed. 493 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507, 23 L.Ed. 103 (1875); Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53, 96 S.Ct. 584, 593-94, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), but also because of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
Amoco did not remove under § 1443, so a straightforward reading of § 1447(d) leads to the conclusion that we lack power to act, for mandamus is the "or otherwise" of which § 1447(d) speaks.
"Straightforward" is about the last word judges attach to § 1447(d) these days, however. Thermtron holds that § 1447(d) does not mean what it says, that it forbids mandamus only when the judge relies on § 1447(c), which provides the exclusive reasons for remand. Remand on an unauthorized ground produces an automatic writ of mandamus, while even an obviously erroneous invocation of § 1447(c) is untouchable. Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). Then Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), held that Thermtron does not mean what it says--that district courts sometimes may remand cases on grounds unmentioned in § 1447(c). When they do so, review by mandamus remains a possibility. Carnegie-Mellon approved a remand of state claims after the plaintiff dropped all federal claims. That leaves us with three categories: (1) remands on grounds listed in § 1447(c) and beyond the power of appellate review; (2) remands on grounds not listed in § 1447(c) but nonetheless sometimes proper, and reviewable to decide whether this is one of those times; (3) remands not authorized by § 1447(c) or anything else, and subject to automatic mandamus. Figuring out which remands fall into which categories is a difficult task, as a series of our cases illustrates. See Hernandez v. Brakegate, Ltd., 942 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.1991); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School District 11, 909 F.2d 267, 269-71 (7th Cir.1990); Rothner v. Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir.1989). Complex proceedings just to determine whether a remand is reviewable by the court of appeals defeat the speed and simplicity that one would have thought to be the principal justification for § 1447(d).
Section 1447(c) calls on a court to remand a case "on the basis of any defect in removal procedure" or whenever "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction". Why did Judge Beatty remand this case? He did not say. Even his second order, which mentions jurisdiction, may mean only that after the remand the court lacks jurisdiction and so cannot adjudicate the motion for summary judgment. But the only reason we can imagine, and the only one the parties discuss, is lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The dispositive question is: "When?" Was there subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal, vanishing because of the change in the identity of the plaintiffs? If so, we have a replay of Carnegie-Mellon and may review the remand order. Well, not quite a replay, for that case involved the remand of pendent state claims after the resolution of the federal claim. Here there are no pendent claims; the parties dispute whether the claims rest on state or federal law. But we understand Carnegie-Mellon to permit review when the district judge believes that removal was proper and that later developments authorize remand. If the judge believed that subject-matter jurisdiction was missing at the outset, however, § 1447(d) puts the remand beyond our ken.
Unfortunately, the district judge did not reveal whether he believes that jurisdiction has been missing all along, or whether instead the case was properly removed but jurisdiction is no longer present. Appellate judges are no better than average mind readers, which creates difficulties in reviewing unexplained acts. Still, it is hard to understand the court's order of January 17, refusing to remand the case, if it believed the removal improper. The only way to make the two orders consistent is to assume that the judge believed that so long as the union was a plaintiff, there was federal-question jurisdiction, which vanished when the union dropped out. If that was indeed the court's approach, then we may review the order by mandamus, properly asserted here in aid of our (eventual) appellate jurisdiction if indeed the case comes within federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Whether this case comes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts depends on a doctrine misleadingly known as "complete preemption." When federal law occupies a field, state rules are preempted. But preemption is just a defense, and federal defenses to claims based on state law are adjudicated in state court. There is no general right of federal-defense removal. When national law is so pervasive that it is impossible even to state a claim based under state law, though, a court treats the attempt to do the impossible as equivalent to a spelling error, which does not affect the body of law invoked by the complaint. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987); Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2852, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.1992).
Federal law so dominates relations between employers and unions that the Supreme Court treats any attempt to interpret, enforce, or question a collective bargaining agreement as necessarily based on national law--in this case, § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. "[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles--necessarily uniform throughout the Nation--must be employed to resolve the dispute." Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881-82, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Substantive federal principles permit removal under the federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at 406 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1881 n. 5; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). The nature of the claim, not the identity of the plaintiff, determines federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs maintain that their claims for invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress do not depend on the meaning of the agreement between the union and Amoco. Defendants reply that surveillance in the workplace is one of the standard conditions of employment, either regulated by agreement or reserved to management's discretion by a management-rights clause. Plaintiffs concede that a collective bargaining agreement could authorize surveillance but observe that there is not one word in the compact about cameras, locker rooms, or surveillance in general. Amoco does not find this surprising, because on its view the subject is covered by the management-rights language. As Amoco sees things, everything that is neither regulated nor forbidden by the collective bargaining agreement is committed to its discretion by this residual clause. Thus "resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement", which transmutes state to federal law.
Amoco has the better of this argument. A state court could not award damages without first construing the collective bargaining agreement and rejecting Amoco's interpretation of the management-rights clause. Lingle held that to adjudicate a claim that the employer retaliated against a worker who had asserted rights under state workers' compensation legislation is not to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. Workers' compensation laws exist outside collective bargaining; no agreement may vary them. Privacy in the workplace, by contrast, is an ordinary subject of bargaining. The extent of privacy is a "condition" of employment. Even agreements that do not mention surveillance expressly may deal with the subject by implication. If Amoco were to discipline Gullick or Cheatham, the union could file a grievance and take the complaint to arbitration. An arbitrator, we doubt not, could overturn any discipline if he believed the surveillance unjustified. Damages remedies under state law would disrupt this process of accommodation and interpretation.
Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.1987), holds that a claim of invasion of privacy in the workplace necessarily rests on federal labor law. Although decided before Lingle, this opinion uses the same approach, expressly concluding that adjudication of the claim would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 811 F.2d at 256. Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.1990), takes the same view of a claim that the employer violated a worker's privacy by demanding that the worker consent to a search of his car. As Stikes noted, state-law invasion-of-privacy claims depend on proof that the defendant invaded an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 914 F.2d at 1269. What expectations of privacy in the workplace are objectively reasonable depends on powers and duties specified in the collective bargaining agreement.
A series of drug testing cases reinforces this conclusion. Several courts have held that federal rather than state law governs employees' privacy-based objections to drug tests--and this whether or not the collective bargaining agreement expressly mentions drug tests. E.g., Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.1988); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.1988); Utility Workers v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1085-87 (9th Cir.1988). Cf. Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 953 F.2d 807, 826-29 (3d Cir.1991) (in banc) (unions may compromise employees' privacy claims, including objections to drug tests). Although based on the Railway Labor Act, Conrail v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989), offers support for the conclusion. Conrail holds that objections to drug testing are "minor disputes" in the RLA's parlance--that is, disputes about the interpretation or application of an existing agreement. Although the labor agreement between Conrail and its unions did not mention drug tests, the Court held the dispute "minor" because "collective-bargaining agreements may include implied, as well as express, terms." Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. at 2485. Implied terms include the norms of the shop. Because the railroad asserted a customary right to alter physical testing rules, the Court held that the dispute required interpretation of the agreement. Just so here: Amoco claims both a customary right to monitor employees' movements in the workplace and a contractual preservation (through the management-rights clause) of that entitlement. No more is necessary to make this a federal case.
Once the invasion-of-privacy claim is brought under § 301, the case is removable. A single federal claim suffices to support removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). As it happens, though, the claim for infliction of emotional distress can be brought under § 301 in the same fashion. Douglas v. American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir.1989). Cf. Sluder v. United Mine Workers, 892 F.2d 549, 552-53 (7th Cir.1989).
Whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment is a question for the district court in the first instance. The petition for a writ of mandamus is granted. The district court shall vacate the order remanding the suit to state court and shall decide the case on the merits.
Employers Insurance of Wausau entered into reinsurance treaties with many underwriting syndicates at Lloyd's of London and other domestic and foreign reinsurers. These treaties provide that the parties will arbitrate their disagreements. Since 1988 the reinsurers have declined to reimburse Wausau for payments on asbestos claims. Wausau invoked the arbitration clauses of the treaties, and when the reinsurers did not reply fast enough Wausau petitioned a state court to direct arbitration before two arbitrators Wausau had selected (these two would appoint a third). The complaint, filed on August 19, 1991, named as defendants many syndicates at Lloyd's plus corporations from Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. On September 9 all of the syndicates, joined by all but three of the corporations, filed a petition asserting that the parties are of diverse citizenship and removing the case under § 1441(b) [sic: should be § 1441(a) ]. We call the defendants who sought to remove the case "the Reinsurers." Wausau filed a motion to remand, contending, first, that by the insurance treaties the Reinsurers had waived any right to remove and, second, that the unexplained omission of three defendants spoiled the removal and called for remand under § 1447(c) on account of a "defect in removal procedure".
As a rule, removal requires a petition joined by all defendants. Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Industrial Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272 (7th Cir.1982). Nominal parties need not join the petition, ibid., and the Reinsurers initially insisted that the three defendants that had not joined the petition are nominal. This contention has dropped out of the case, for nothing suggests that the three (El Banco, St. Helens Insurance Co., and La Preservatrice Fondore Assurances) are anything other than full participants in the reinsurance treaties. They are not "nominal" defendants, mere bystanders or formal parties. They have refused to respond to Wausau's demand for arbitration, to answer the complaint, or to join the petition for removal, but an obdurate litigant is not on that account a nominal one.
On November 29, 1991, the Reinsurers asked leave to amend their petition for removal to allege 9 U.S.C. § 205 as the proper basis. This statute, part of legislation ratifying the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. 6997, provides:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention, the defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending. The procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law shall apply, except that the ground for removal provided in this section need not appear on the face of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal. For the purposes of Chapter 1 of this title [the Federal Arbitration Act] any action or proceeding removed under this section shall be deemed to have been brought in the district court to which it is removed.
Because defendants may remove "at any time before the trial", the Reinsurers contended that they may amend a defective petition for removal at any time. The district judge disagreed, holding that a "defect in removal procedure" requires remand unless the petition is promptly amended to cure the defect--and this amendment, Chief Judge Crabb concluded, was belated. Her opinion laid out the arguments pro and con and limited the remand to the defect in the petition; she withheld judgment on Wausau's claim of waiver by contract.
After the court denied a petition for clarification on January 13, 1992, the case returned to state court. Before the state judge could act, however, the Reinsurers filed another petition for removal. This document, lodged on January 30, invokes § 205 rather than § 1441 and asserts that the omission of the three intractable firms is irrelevant. On March 23 the court remanded for a second time. 787 F.Supp. 165 (W.D.Wis.1992). Once again supplying a clear and thoughtful explanation, the judge held that § 205 does not authorize removal by fewer than all defendants. The reference to "the defendant or the defendants" implies that all must join a petition to remove, as does the adoption of the "procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law". Because three of the defendants have disdained the opportunity to remove, a "defect in removal procedure" requires remand. Moreover, the judge added, the case must be remanded because defendants have only one opportunity to remove. That a petition under § 205 may be filed any time before trial does not imply that defendants may keep filing petitions until they finally get it right. More than one petition unduly disrupts the progress of the case, the court held.
Section 205 incorporates the "procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law". This means title 28, chapter 89, of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-52. In particular it means § 1447(c), authorizing remand for defects in the removal procedure, and § 1447(d), blocking appellate review of remands under § 1447(c). This much the Reinsurers concede. Nonetheless they ask us to issue a writ of mandamus, contending that the district court misinterpreted § 205.
Although Congress enacted § 205 in 1970, there has been almost no litigation about its meaning. McDermott International, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir.1991), the only significant decision interpreting § 205, holds that parties may waive their right to remove under that section but only by express language. A general forum-selection clause, of the sort in the reinsurance treaties there (and here), does not bar removal. Chief Judge Crabb did not use the language of the treaties as the foundation for remand, but McDermott is still of some interest--for it holds that review of remand orders is by appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 rather than by mandamus. 944 F.2d at 1201-04. As the Reinsurers seek mandamus and have not filed a notice of appeal, McDermott is a potential obstacle.
McDermott believed that a remand on the authority of a contractual forum-selection clause is reviewable as a "collateral order" under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The fifth circuit relied on Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), which accepted an appeal from an order staying proceedings in the litigation, when that order had the practical effect of dismissal. A remand is even more effective in ending the federal court's role, McDermott observed. True enough, but the point of Moses H. Cone was that the litigation was (effectively) over, while a remand, like a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, continues the litigation in another forum.
Twice the Supreme Court has held that remands are not appealable as final decisions. See Comstock and Wiswall. Cohen does not inter these cases; no subsequent decision questions them; Thermtron cites both with approval and observes that mandamus is a proper way to obtain any review not precluded by § 1447(d). 423 U.S. at 352-53, 96 S.Ct. at 593-94. Carnegie-Mellon also involved a writ of mandamus rather than an appeal, and it was the principle of Carnegie-Mellon that avoided § 1447(d) in McDermott. Two cases the fifth circuit did not mention hold that orders identifying the appropriate forum for the case are not appealable under Cohen. See Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 109 S.Ct. 1976, 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988).
Lauro is particularly close to McDermott, for the Court held that an order interpreting a forum-selection clause and selecting the place for litigation is not appealable before trial. The fifth circuit treated the policy allowing liberal removal under § 205 as an argument in favor of appellate review; the Supreme Court in Lauro deemed the equally strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of forum-selection clauses as an argument on the merits rather than a justification of appellate review. 490 U.S. at 501, 109 S.Ct. at 1980. Our own opinion in Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1418-19, concludes that mandamus is the appropriate way to obtain review of remand orders. McDermott does not persuade us that Rothner is wrong or that Wiswall and Comstock are no longer binding.
It is mandamus or nothing--a distinction that makes a difference in light of the discretionary character of mandamus. Expeditious action on the motions papers allows the case to continue, while briefing and argument of an appeal consume many months. This suit, seeking nothing but an order to arbitrate, has been paralyzed since August 1991, and more delay lies in store if we set the case for argument next fall as an ordinary appeal. Arbitration is supposed to be quick. Litigation about arbitration frustrates that objective. Litigation about where to litigate about arbitration mocks that objective.
Having cleared away the underbrush, we can be brief. First, § 1447(d) applies and precludes appellate review. Second, we would not issue a writ of mandamus even if we possessed the power to do so. The two points are related. The district court expressly found that the removal was procedurally defective because the petition was not joined by all parties. A defect in removal procedure authorizes remand, and § 1447(d) then bars review. Rothner holds that a defect in removal procedure means failure to comply with one of the requirements in § 1446. Our opinion in Airco, on which Chief Judge Crabb relied, holds that the participation of all defendants is a condition of an effective notice of removal under § 1446(a). All of the Reinsurers' arguments that the district court erred in holding that § 205 does not change this rule are beside the point. A search for error is precisely what § 1447(d) forbids. "[I]f the district court gives a reason authorized by statute, courts of appeals may not inquire whether the court erred." Hernandez, 942 F.2d at 1226.
Whatever doubt remains we resolve by exercising any discretion against issuing a prerogative writ. The district judge issued two careful opinions explaining why the attempted removals are defective. If these orders are incorrect, the error is not so apparent that the petitioners' right to relief is clear. Mandamus is not the appropriate means to resolve doubtful issues of procedure or statutory construction. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-09, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1821-22, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989); Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-03, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123-24, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). An applicant for mandamus must establish a "clear abuse of discretion," Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953), or conduct amounting to "usurpation of power," De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 65 S.Ct. 1130, 1133, 89 L.Ed. 1566 (1945). Thoughtful resolution of novel questions under an untested statute is some distance from these pejorative phrases.
Instead of seeking immediate review of the first order remanding the case, the Reinsurers tried again in the district court and then came here. They seem fixed on prolonging rather than resolving this contest. It is time to get down to the merits. Wisconsin will decide the meaning of the treaties; interpretation of contracts is a staple of business in state courts. The Reinsurers do not contend that Wisconsin disfavors arbitration or that any other doctrine or practice used there would inhibit prompt and accurate resolution of the parties' dispute. Eight months of litigation about where to litigate is plenty. The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.


text:
Poetry & Classics
Poetry by individual poets
Songs of Innocence and of Experience
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Songs of Innocence and of Experience and the Book of Thel


Battery Operated Speed Racer Race Track with Figure 8 Shape, Battery Box, Plunger hand controllers. Two Racers with Magnetic Base and Headlight, Lap counter track, Power intake Track, Curve Track and Straight Track.
It is a Christmas gift for my nephew's. I'm sure they'll love it.


Stock Exchange: Bear Market Relief Rally?
Our previous Stock Exchange asked the question: Are You Watching Out For Bear Trap Rallies? We noted the market was up four trading days in a row, but that markets rarely make V-shaped recoveries. We also reminded traders that even though they sometimes seem at odds with each other, prudence and aggressiveness are two necessary ingredients of trading success. This week, our theme is similar.
This Week: A Relief Rally Within A Bear Market?
Although the market has been rallying so far in 2019, we continue to meet upward resistance at key levels. For example, this chart from legendary trader Charles Kirk suggests we need to see more upside before confirming conditions are anything other than bearish.
From a dual momentum standpoint, it can be wise to confirm market direction on multiple levels before diving into a trading position. And relating that back to Kirk's viewpoint above, we don't yet have the full confirmation that this market isn't still in bear mode–even though we are up significantly year-to-date.
We use varying types of risk controls within our own trading models, one of which is simply to exit our short and mid-term trading positions when market conditions are not healthy. And in fact, our momentum based models have exited their trades recently, waiting for more conducive conditions. This is not a call on the direction of the market, but rather a risk control measure. We get aggressive with our positions when conditions are right, but exhibit prudence when they're not.
Note: This week's Stock Exchange is edited by Blue Harbinger, a source for independent investment ideas.
Holmes: Being the aggressive yet prudent dip-buyer that I am, I bought shares of Deckers Outdoor (DECK) this week. And as you know, I typically hold for about 6 weeks.
Blue Harbinger: That is quite a dip, Holmes. Would you mind explaining to us why the shares sold off? What is the fundamental story behind the price move?
Holmes: As a technical-based trading model, I focus on hard data, not stories or narratives like you, which are often entirely subjective, false and misleading. That's one of the benefits of being a model–objectivity.
BH: Well to those of us who are curious, Deckers is in the business of designing, marketing and distributing footwear, apparel and accessories developed for both everyday casual lifestyle use and high performance activities. Here are a few of their brands.
Holmes: Great. Here is a look at some hard data. The company has been beating earnings and revenue estimates, and they've also been raising guidance. Decker is expected to announce earnings again on January 31st, which is within my typical 6-week holding period.
BH: Ok, at least that hard data is based on fundamentals, maybe we have more in common than I thought, Holmes. And here is the Fast Graph, which contains more data for you to consider.
Holmes: Great. Thanks. But some of that data is looking out years into the future. I'll likely be out of this trade in about six weeks.
BH: Alrighty then. Thanks for sharing your "dip-buying" trade, Holmes. And how about you Road Runner and Athena–any trades to share with us this week?
Road Runner: No trades. We need a little more proven market momentum before we start placing trades. Perhaps some dual momentum, or a technical resistance breakthrough to better indicate the market's direction. It's called being prudent, or risk management if you like.
BH: I can respect that. This market has been nuts lately. How about you, Felix–do you have anything to share?
Felix: Yes. This week I ran the Nasdaq 100 stocks through my technical trading model, and I have ranked the top 20 for you in the following list. As a reminder I am a momentum trader, but I hold for a longer time period than the other models–typically around 66 weeks.
BH: Thanks for that ranking, Felix. You've got a few powerful growth names on that list that I follow. For example, Netflix (NFLX) has been on absolute fire this year. It was due for a rebound after the vicious sell off in the fourth quarter.
Plus, there have been reports that Netflix will be raising their super low subscription fees very modestly, which will flow right through to the bottom line, considering it likely won't deter new subscribers from signing up. The market loved the news and the shares popped higher. Do you have any favorite shows on Netflix, Felix?
Felix: I am a computer-based trading model; I don't watch Netflix.
BH: Too bad. Maybe some of our readers will share their favorite Netflix shows in the comments. Anyway, how about you, Oscar. Anything to share with us this week?
Oscar: As our resident sector/ETF rotation model, I also have a ranking to share. This week I ran our Comprehensive and Diverse ETF universe through my model, and the top 20 are ranked in the following list.
BH: I see a lot of energy ETFs on your list again. For example, the US natural gas ETF (UNG), the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP) and the United States Oil ETF (USO). Oil had a horrible 4th quarter (we can debate the causes of that), but it has been rebounding hard, and arguably has good momentum on its side now (although we may be in a bear market relief rally). Thanks for sharing those rankings.
Despite the strong year-to-date performance for stocks, that does not mean we're out of the woods just yet. The market performed terribly in the fourth quarter, and this year's gains could simply be a Relief Rally within a Bear Market. We still haven't received adequate confirmation of the market's overarching direction in order to declare the "all clear" on momentum trades. Signs of technical confirmation include breaking though upper resistance levels or even some "dual momentum." Every trader has their own goals and tolerance for volatility, and every trader should have appropriate risk controls in place to achieve their individual goals.