In first ten years, Texas Mamma Jamma Ride has returned almost $1.7 million to its beneficiary organizations; Breast Cancer Resource Center, Komen Austin, Ascension Seton, Team Survivor, Wonders & Worries, Community Action Central Texas, and Sustainable Food Center.
Mamma Jamma is a 501 c 3 nonprofit organization and a year-round endeavor of breast cancer awareness, fundraising, and cycling.
Be sure to like and follow Mamma Jamma on social media (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn) and check this website for additional information and updates about the ride. Please contact our Executive Director, Marion Martin, at marion@mammajammaride.org with any questions.
Located on the banks of the San Marcos River, Martindale is 8 miles east of San Marcos. This charming Texas town opens up its historic Main Street to host a street party for ride participants and spectators. The countryside offers scenic views, friendly neighbors, and lovely country roads for our cyclists.
Pick a distance that fits your comfort level: 15, 25, 40 and 65 miles. The routes are great for new cyclists and seasoned riders. You don't need an expensive bike to get out there and pedal for the cause, you just need one that's comfortable for you.
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He's the owner of a 1958 Chevrolet, updated and impeccable to the detail. He's a fan of Made in USA products, from an iPhone to Guess jeans. Through El Paquete [The (Weekly) Packet] he follows American television series and Major League Baseball. With religious punctuality, every day he plays 200 pesos in the illegal lottery known as el bolita [little ball]. He drinks more alcohol than is recommended. He has two lovers and he likes to visit with his buddies in a rented house at the beach, where they don't lack for fried pork and young women.


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Home » Jubilant Food stock price down 4.51 per cent as Sensex climbs
Jubilant Food stock price down 4.51 per cent as Sensex climbs
Shares of Jubilant Foodworks Ltd. fell 4.51 per cent to Rs 3789.95 at 02:09PM hours (IST) on Monday. Earlier in the day, the stock saw a gap up start to the session.
As per data available on BSE, total traded quantity on the counter stood at 28,742 shares with a turnover of Rs 11.06 crore till 02:09PM (IST). The stock traded at a price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple of 132.72, while the price-to-book value ratio stood at 17.29.
Return on equity (ROE) was at 16.23 per cent, according to exchange data. The stock hit an intraday high of Rs 4000.1 and a low of Rs 3766.05 during the session and quoted a 52-week high price of Rs 4166.4 and a 52-week low of Rs 1915.0.
The stock's beta value, which measures its volatility in relation to the broader market, stood at 1.0.
The 200-DMA (day moving average) of the stock stood at Rs 2948.9 on August 23, while the 50-DMA was at Rs 3408.88. If a stock trades above 50-DMA and 200-DMA, it usually means the immediate trend is upward. On the other hand, if the stock trades below 50-DMA and 200-DMA, it is considered a bearish trend. If it trades between 50-DMA and 200-DMA, then it suggests the stock can go either way.
The Relative Strength Index (RSI) of the stood at 57.51. The RSI oscillates between zero and 100. Traditionally, a stock is considered overbought when the RSI value stands above 70 and oversold when it is below 30.
Promoter holding
As of 30-Jun-2021, promoters held 41.94 per cent stake in the company, while FIIs held 41.72 per cent and domestic institutional investors had 10.62 per cent.
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Sterling and Wilson Solar Q2 results: Firm reports Rs 284 crore loss
Elon Musk sells $6.9 bn in Tesla shares after Twitter poll
Ipca Labs Q2 results: Net profit declines 6% to Rs 250 crore
Reliance makes final call for payment on rights issue

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Popoyo Nicaragua Surf Report. The swell is dropping off a bit further, but plenty of fun peaks with good conditions remain. New swell coming Wednesday 🙂 Check the pics and enjoy your Valentine's Day everybody.


Men's White Gold Finish Blue Sapphire and Genuine Diamond Statement Ring. 925 (Sterling Silver) Ring Size: 10 Carat Weight: 0.50 Stone Shape(s)/Setting(s)/Clarity: Round Brilliant / Pave / SI2-I1 Other Details: This Ring Comes in a beautiful presentation box. Here is a bold designer ring crafted in a solid Sterling silver wrapped in White Gold (12.3 grams) with a large lab-created sapphire in it's center.
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Sonic Reality is proud to announce Neil Peart Stereo Drums for Reason! Neil Peart, legendary drummer of the band Rush, has collaborated with Sonic Reality and producer/engineer Nick Raskulinecz (Rush, Foo Fighters, Alice In Chains) to bring the authentic sound of Neil's "Snakes and Arrows" Custom DW® Drum Kit into the digital domain. With advanced features such as deep level dynamics and humanized random alternating hits, this deluxe sampled kit is an ultra-realistic recreation of Neil's actual acoustic set as used live on tour and in the studio.Now for the first time, musicians and producers can play rock drum samples with the iconic signature sound of drum legend Neil Peart and have a world-class, hard-hitting drum kit suitable for many styles of music from Progressive Rock to Heavy Metal! Producer Nick Raskulinecz engineered the sample sessions with over 20 channels of Neve® mic preamps, deluxe vintage tube mics and multiple room positions for one of the most elaborate sampled drum kits ever. Neil Peart has been one of the world's most acclaimed drummers for over 35 years. His virtuosic work with the band Rush has inspired drummers and expanded the school of rock drumming beyond all technical limitations. Peart is known for his intricate beats, fast hands and complex time signatures. Neil Peart joined Rush in 1974, who has written and recorded rock classics such as "Tom Sawyer," "The Spirit of Radio," "Freewill," "Limelight" and "YYZ." The band continues to play around the globe to enthusiastic audiences of all generations.
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Home	Biden Administration	GOP Representative Mike Waltz Claims Putin Can 'Smell Weakness' In Joe Biden
Biden AdministrationPoliticsTrending
GOP Representative Mike Waltz Claims Putin Can 'Smell Weakness' In Joe Biden
Florida Republican Rep. Mike Waltz went off this week about how Russian President Vladimir Putin must be very excited to meet with Joe Biden.
During an interview on Fox News, Waltz said Putin is "emboldened by weakness" that he can smell from the White House.
"He is everywhere now. Went back to the Middle East under President Obama in Syria. They have a presence in Libya. They still have a presence in Georgia. They now have a presence on the house using some mercenaries on the inside of Ukraine. Congressman, how do they afford all this military action?" host Brian Kilmeade asked.
"Yeah. And their population is shrinking, is on track to be smaller than Bangladesh in a few decades. Putin is bluffing with a pair of fours at best. But, you know, he knows how to pray this game. He is emboldened by weakness. Is he deterred by strength," Waltz said.
"And right now he smells weakness in the White House. We are seeing a massive and sophisticated Russian nuclear modernization. We are seeing them rearm in the artic where they want to control international shipping as the polar ice cap shrinks," he added.
"We are seeing them complete the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that isolates Poland and Ukraine. They are incredibly upset about that. We are seeing them use criminal proxies to launch cyberattacks across the United States at our critical infrastructure. Biden wants to go in and kind of play the nice guy and hope to tamp all of this down. And what Putin is going to do is take advantage of it. Take as much as he can get and continue his neo-colonialist March to return to the old Soviet Union," he added.
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Even Never-Trumper John Bolton — who previously served as a national security adviser to Donald Trump before being fired — is worried about Biden's meeting with Putin.
While speaking on MSNBC, Bolton said Putin "won't be impressed" with what Biden has done the "past 5 months."
"That may be what he's going to take, but Putin comes into this meeting. He knows exactly what he wants. There's no ambiguity in his mind," Bolton said.
"He's been on this track a long time. So, the idea that he's going to be impressed by Joe Biden saying, hey, I'm not Donald Trump isn't going to cut it. What he's going to look for is the performance. And admittedly it's only five months in, but the performance has been weak so far," Bolton added.
It's clear to many that Biden has been a total embarrassment to the United States.
And when Biden and Putin meet face to face on Wednesday, many would agree that Biden is not capable of being firm, tough, and making America tough on the world stage.
Do you think Joe Biden is weak? Let us know in the comment section below…
Biden Admin Calls For Americans To Report 'Family or Friends' Who May Be 'Radicalized' Politically
Retail Sales Begin To Plummet Under Just Months of the Biden Administration


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Plastics /
Engineering Plastics /
Polybutylene Terephthalate
India PET & PBT Resins Market, By PET Resins Application (Bottles, Films, Food Packaging, and Others), By PBT Resins Application (Automotive, Consumer Appliance, Electronical & Electrical and Others), By Region, Competition, Forecast & Opportunities, 2018-2028F
Region: India
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India Pet & Pbt Resins Market is Expected to Witness Impressive Growth Because of the Government's Various Initiatives, Such as Make in India, to Promote Domestic Production During the Forecast Period.
This report comes with 10% free customization, enabling you to add data that meets your specific business needs.
India PET & PBT Resins Market is expected to witness impressive growth because of the government's various initiatives, such as Make in India, to promote domestic production during the forecast period. Electronics production across India was estimated to be valued at over USD 65 Billion in financial year 2021.
The demand for PET and PBT resins has grown significantly over the past five years because of rising utilization in various end-user industries, including packaging and bottling, automotive, electrical, and electronics. The replacement of conventional packaging materials like glass, aluminum, paper, and metal, as well as the expansion of the FMCG industry, is driving up demand for PET resin, while factors like thermal stability, high heat resistance, and superior electrical properties are driving up demand for PBT resin. Purified terephthalic acid (PTA) and monoethylene glycol (MEG) are used to make the plastic polymer Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET), whereas 1, 4-butanediol, and PTA are used to make Polybutylene Terephthalate (PBT).
Increasing Demand for PET-Based Bottles
PET, also known as polyethylene terephthalate, is now a vital component of India's packaging industry. A significant increase in demand for PET resins in food and beverage packaging grades has been triggered over recent years. The increased purchase of disposable objects, especially those created from PET-based resins, has been impelled by the critical concerns for Personal Hygiene. The Indian pharmaceutical and healthcare industries, which recently experienced rapid growth, can be accounted for as another influential factor driving the market growth. The Indian pharmaceutical market, which is ranked third in terms of volume and thirteenth in terms of value, is vital to the expansion of the PET bottles market, resulting in the rise of the India PET Resins Market during the forecast period.
Rising Demand for Electrical & Electronics Applications in Automotive Industry
Engineering plastics like Polybutylene Terephthalate were subject to import restrictions due to government-led initiatives like `Make in India.` The plan calls for inviting foreign firms to do business in India and encouraging them to start new industrial facilities there. The market is anticipated to develop as more Polybutylene Terephthalate is used to make interior and exterior body parts for electric vehicles. As people become more aware of environmental damage, they choose electric cars over fuel-based (diesel, petrol, and CNG) vehicles more significant numbers. The market for polybutylene terephthalate is anticipated to grow steadily because of automotive advances such as electrification, automated driving, and efforts to reduce emissions. Additionally, the production of various electronic sensors for electric vehicles is significantly influenced by hydrolytically resistant PBT.
Recent Trends & Developments
The market for polybutylene terephthalate (PBT) and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resins has undergone a few developments like LNP Elcrin WF006XXPiQ and LNP Elcrin WF0061XPiQ, two new polybutylene terephthalate (PBT) compounds, were introduced by SABIC in January 2021.
The India PET & PBT Resins Market is segmented based on PET Resins Application, PBT Resins Application, Company, and regional distribution. Based on PET Resins Application, the market can be segmented into Bottles, Films, Food Packaging, and Others. Based on PBT Resins Application, the market can be divided into Automotive, Consumer Appliance, Electronical & Electrical and Others. Regionally, the market can be split into North, South, East, and West.
Market Players
Reliance Industries Limited, JBF Industries Limited, BASF India Limited, SRF Limited, IVL Dhunseri Petrochem Industries Private Limited, Sen Pet (India) Limited, DuPont India Private Limited, Ester Industries Ltd., Mitsubishi Chemical India (MCI), SABIC are some of the key market players.
Report Scope:
In this report, India PET & PBT Resins Market has been segmented into following categories, in addition to the industry trends which have also been detailed below:
India PET & PBT Resins Market, By PET Resins Application:
India PET & PBT Resins Market, By PBT Resins Application:
Consumer Appliance
Electronical & Electrical
India PET & PBT Resins Market, By Region:
Company Profiles: Detailed analysis of the major companies present in India PET & PBT Resins Market.
Available Customizations:
With the given market data, the publisher offers customizations according to a company's specific needs.
This product will be delivered within 1-3 business days.
1. Product Overview
1.2. Scope of the Market
1.2.1. Markets Covered
1.2.2. Years Considered for Study
1.2.3. Key Market Segmentations
2.2. Baseline Methodology
2.3. Key Industry Partners
2.4. Major Association and Secondary Sources
2.5. Forecasting Methodology
2.6. Data Triangulation & Validation
2.7. Assumptions and Limitations
3.1. Overview of the Market
3.2. Overview of Key Market Segmentations
3.3. Overview of Key Market Players
3.4. Overview of Key Regions/Countries
3.5. Overview of Market Drivers, Challenges, Trends
4. Voice of Customer
5. India PET & PBT Resins Market Outlook
5.1. Market Size & Forecast
5.1.1. By Value & Volume
5.2. Market Share & Forecast
5.2.1. By PET Resins Application (Bottles, Films, Food Packaging, and Others)
5.2.2. By PBT Resins Application (Automotive, Consumer Appliance, Electronical & Electrical and Others)
5.2.3. By Region (North, South, East & West)
5.2.4. By Company (2022)
5.3. Market Map
5.3.1. By PET Resins Application
5.3.2. By PBT Resins Application
5.3.3. By Region
5.4. Pricing Analysis
6. North India PET & PBT Resins Market Outlook
7. South India PET & PBT Resins Market Outlook
8. East India PET & PBT Resins Market Outlook
9. West India PET & PBT Resins Market Outlook
10. Market Dynamics
10.1. Drivers
10.2. Challenges
11. Market Trends & Developments
11.1. Recent Developments
11.2. Product Launches
11.3. Mergers & Acquisitions
12. India PET & PBT Resins Market: SWOT Analysis
13. Porter's Five Forces Analysis
13.1. Competition in the Industry
13.2. Potential of New Entrants
13.3. Power of Suppliers
13.4. Power of Customers
13.5. Threat of Substitute Products
14.1. Business Overview
14.2. Product Offerings
14.4. Financials (In Case of Listed Companies)
14.5. Key Personnel
14.6. SWOT Analysis
14.6.1. Reliance Industries Limited
14.6.2. JBF Industries Limited
14.6.3. BASF India Limited
14.6.4. SRF Limited
14.6.5. IVL Dhunseri Petrochem Industries Private Limited
14.6.6. Sen Pet (India) Limited
14.6.7. E.I. DuPont India Private Limited
14.6.8. Ester Industries Ltd.
14.6.9. Mitsubishi Chemical India (MCI)
14.6.10. SABIC Innovative Plastics India Pvt. Ltd.
15. Strategic Recommendations
Reliance Industries Limited
JBF Industries Limited
BASF India Limited
SRF Limited
IVL Dhunseri Petrochem Industries Private Limited
Sen Pet (India) Limited
E.I. DuPont India Private Limited
Ester Industries Ltd.
Mitsubishi Chemical India (MCI)
SABIC Innovative Plastics India Pvt. Ltd.
Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) and Polybutylene Terephthalate (PBT) Resins Global Market Report 2022: Ukraine-Russia War Impact
Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin & Polybutylene Terephthalate (PBT) Resin : Global Strategic Business Report
Engineering Resins, Polymer Alloys and Blends: Global Markets
India Polybutylene Terephthalate (PBT) Market Analysis: Plant Capacity, Production, Operating Efficiency, Technology, Demand & Supply, End Use, Sales Channel, Region, Competition, Trade, Customer & Price Intelligence Market Analysis, 2015-2030
Global Polyethylene Terephthalate Resin Market, By Product Type, By End-Use Industry, By Region, Trend Analysis, Competitive Market Share & Forecast, 2018-2028
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I have been with UAG since established, and in automotive industry over 15 years. I am a certified automobile engineer . Married with two childrens. I enjoy electronics and new technologies ,Movies & Travelling.


It's never too early to begin preparation for the upcoming deer season. Learn what deer stand strategy you can develop now to give yourself the best chance of success next deer season!
With turkey season winding down across the country, many turn their attention to fishing. But, what about you deer hunters? Stick with us for the N1 Outdoors N1 Minute.
For you hunters out there, the wait until the start of deer season can seem like an eternity. But don't just sit around waiting. It's never too early to start thinking about access routes to your stand. Start clearing now, and it will only take a few minutes in the weeks prior to the season and will limit the amount of scent you leave in those locations.
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Tag Archives: PRC
Indo-Asia-Pacific
A Tale of Three Speeches: How Xi Jinping's 40th Anniversary Speech Marks A Departure
June 11, 2019 Guest Author	1 Comment
This article originally featured on China Leadership Monitor and is republished with permission. It originally published under the title, "A Tale of Three Speeches: How Xi's Speech Marking the 40th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Differs from those of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao." Read it in its original form here.
By Minxin Pei
Xi Jinping's speech marking the 40th anniversary of reform and opening on December 18, 2018 recapitulates the substantial ideological and policy changes he has initiated since coming to power in late 2012. A comparison of this speech with speeches by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao on the 20th and 30th anniversary of reform and opening respectively reveals significant differences in terms of ideological rhetoric and substantive policy issues. Whereas the speeches by Jiang and Hu adhere to the basic ideological and policy guidelines established by Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping's speech underscores his personal authority and political vision. Most significantly, Xi's speech emphasizes the supremacy of Communist Party centralized and unified strongman rule and China's bold and expansive role in international affairs. The uncompromising tone of his speech suggests that it is unlikely that Xi will make substantial changes to his domestic and foreign policies despite the strong headwinds both domestically and internationally.
Parsing speeches by top Chinese leaders for clues about their ideological leanings and policy preferences recalls the now much-derided Kremlinology. The torrent of information pouring out of China in the post-Mao reform era casts doubts about the utility of textual analysis. Yet, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under General Secretary Xi Jinping increases the intensity of its control over the flow of information, scrutiny of the language in pronouncements by the top leaders is likely to provide useful insights into their ideological mindsets and policy priorities
The speech delivered by General Secretary Xi Jinping on December 18, 2018, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress, is a case in point.1 During the six years since becoming party leader, Xi has instituted radical policy changes affecting the distribution of power, security for ruling elites, ideology, state-society relations, and foreign policy. An implicit rule of Chinese politics is that such changes must be elevated to a new political narrative and accorded fresh ideological legitimacy in a carefully crafted political speech delivered on a key occasion, such as a national CCP congress or an anniversary of a major historic event. The political symbolism and substance of Xi's speech marking the 40th anniversary of reform and opening cannot be overstated. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Xi's two immediate predecessors, also delivered highly publicized speeches celebrating, respectively, the 20th and 30th anniversary of the historic Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Congress.
On the surface, these anniversary speeches may not appear to be fertile ground for mining evidence of the differences between the ideas and policies of successive top leaders during the post-Deng era. However, despite their dry language, they nevertheless yield useful clues about the personal, ideological, and policy differences among different generations of top leaders because such high-profile anniversary speeches are drafted by an assigned writing team and typically undergo several revisions to ensure that the speeches both fully and accurately reflect the thinking of the top leadership. The final draft is reviewed, edited, and approved by the top leader himself.
In the following pages, we will dissect the rhetorical and substantive differences between Xi's speech on December 18th and the speeches by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao on similar occasions in 1998 and 2008.2 We first examine the subtle differences in their references to key terms and in their phraseology to both describe past policies and leaders and to spell out the party's bottom-line positions on reform. We then focus on the noteworthy differences in the policy statements contained in these speeches. Specifically, such statements are included in the section devoted to "lessons learned" from the previous decades. In reality, these lessons, typically numbering about ten points, not only summarize the leader's own interpretation of the achievements of the previous decades but also describe the guiding principles for future domestic and foreign policies. We conclude with an analysis of the implications of the observed differences between Xi's speech and those of his two predecessors.
Rhetorical Differences
High-profile speeches by top leaders follow implicit rhetorical rules. In particular, they are supposed to make obligatory references to the official ideology and the past leaders and their achievements. The CCP's fundamental political principles and policies, such as those expressed in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping (the so-called four "cardinal principles"), must also be reiterated.3 On the whole, the rhetoric in the three speeches under examination may not seem significantly different in these respects. Nevertheless, we can still detect subtle and non-trivial rhetorical differences that indicate how Xi Jinping regards his own status in the pantheon of CCP leaders.
Despite the obligatory nature of such references, the frequency of invoking the orthodox Communist ideology as well as previous Chinese leaders and their ideological doctrines can serve as a useful proxy for the degree of ideological legitimacy the present leader attaches to the orthodox ideology and to his predecessors. A speaker who believes that his policies are more faithful to the orthodox ideology and to the doctrines of his predecessors will more frequently refer to the said ideology, doctrine, and leader. When there are fewer such references, the speaker is generally less ideologically beholden to former doctrines and leaders. It is also reasonable to assume that the leader who makes the least number of references to his predecessors is implicitly hoping to highlight his own status and contributions.
Based on this assumption, an examination of the number of references to Marxism-Leninism, Mao, and Deng Xiaoping in the three speeches under examination would reveal substantial differences in how Jiang, Hu, and Xi perceived their ideological faithfulness. Of the three speeches, each leader made about the same number of references to Mao (four for Jiang, and five each for Hu and Xi). This may suggest that all three leaders were aware of the potential political peril of excessive references and homage to Mao's ideas and legacy. Nevertheless, a close reading of the assessment of Mao in the three speeches reveals subtle and important differences between Xi and his two predecessors.
In the speeches by Jiang and Hu, the assessments of Mao's contributions are almost identical—both brief and even perfunctory. There is no hint of rethinking the Maoist legacy. By comparison, Xi's speech represents perhaps the most important—and positive -—revision of Mao's legacy. Xi not only devotes more space (one long paragraph) to describe Mao's achievements but also adds key terms to put a positive spin on the disastrous Maoist period. The most notable section reads, "In the process of exploration, despite serious detours, the party gained unique and original theoretical results and monumental achievements, providing precious experience, theoretical preparations, and material foundations for creating Chinese-style socialism in the near historic era." (在探索过程中,虽然经历了严重曲折,但党在社会主义革命和建设中取得的独创性理论成果和巨大成就,为在新的历史时期开创中国特色社会主义提供了宝贵经验、理论准备、物质基础).4 Critically, Xi's speech portrays the Maoist period positively as a "process of exploration" — a far cry from the phrase "the decade of calamities" (十年浩劫) that the party usually uses to describe the Cultural Revolution. Additionally, by linking the "theoretical" and "material" achievements of the Maoist period to the "new historic era," Xi's speech endorses the view that the Maoist period and the post-Maoist period are inseparable and cannot be used to "negate one another," a point that Xi first advanced in January 2013.5
In terms of references to Marxism-Leninism, Hu's speech contains the most references to Marxism-Leninism (24), whereas Jiang and Xi invoke Marxism-Leninism ten times and eight times, respectively. As for Deng, Jiang makes 18 references to him whereas Hu and Xi refer to him eight and six times respectively. These notable differences in invocating the sources of ideological legitimacy and inspiration may be interpreted as Jiang's desire to be seen as Deng's faithful heir whereas Hu may have been seeking to present himself as a more faithful adherent to orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In the case of Xi, he appears to be far more confident in presenting himself as a leader less dependent on the traditional sources of ideological legitimacy.
Xi's efforts to set himself apart from his two immediate predecessors are also apparent in other parts of his speech. For example, norms of modesty and political constraints probably prevented Jiang and Hu from lauding the achievements of their first terms, as there exist no such references. But Xi's speech contains a long section listing the accomplishments of his first term. A rhetorical deference to the previous leaders is notably different as well. Both Jiang and Hu specifically salute the achievements of their immediate predecessors.6 In contrast, Xi does not salute the achievements under Hu's leadership. In referring to previous leaders, both Jiang and Hu use two key phrases, "collective leadership" (集体领导) and "as its core" (核心) to describe their predecessors. Xi replaces "as its core" with "as its main representative" (为主要代表) when referring to Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The key phrase "collective leadership" has completely disappeared from Xi's speech.
These rhetorical changes were evidently designed to signal Xi's power and status. Because the official Chinese media never drops the phrase "as its core" when describing Xi's position in the party, any removal of this phrase from descriptions of his predecessors may suggest that Xi occupies a truly unique position. The elimination of the phrase "collective leadership" from his speech also underscores today's political reality of strongman rule at the apex of party leadership today.
Substantive Differences
Xi's speech also differs from those by Jiang and Hu on key ideological and policy issues.
1. Interpreting the past and setting the direction for the future
In the second half of the anniversary speech, each leader lists the most important policies pursued by the party and credit these policies with bringing about the achievements of the prior decades. A quick examination shows how Xi differs from his predecessors in this regard. Jiang and Hu credit the same principle—Marxism-Leninism—as the most important factor contributing to the party's accomplishments. In contrast, Xi singles out the supremacy of the party and "centralized unified leadership of the party" (党的集中统一领导) as the most important factors, relegating Marxism-Leninism to third place.7 Whereas Jiang and Hu focus on the application of Marxism-Leninism to China's reality, in a full paragraph Xi amplifies the supremacy of the party. In this paragraph, which sets the direction "for the road ahead" (前进道路上), Xi emphasizes "we must strengthen the "four consciousness" and "four self-confidence" and "resolutely safeguard the authority and centralized leadership" firm adherence to the party center's authority and centralized unified leadership"—code words demanding loyalty to his leadership (two of the four types of "consciousness" are "consciousness of the rules and consciousness of compliance.8 Since "firm adherence to the authority of the party center and to centralized unified leadership" clearly implies loyalty to Xi, the elevation of centralized personal leadership to the top political principles is a significant departure from the collective leadership under Jiang and Hu. Notably, Xi appears to justify centralized personal leadership by invoking the dangers lurking in the future. In the same paragraph, he warns that there "will certainly be various risks and challenges, even an encounter with perilous storms" (惊涛骇浪)—a phrase that has led many analysts to wonder about his meaning.9
We can also gain a better understanding of Xi's emphasis on the supremacy of the party by comparing how his speech treats the sensitive topic of political reform limits. In the speeches by Jiang and Hu marking the anniversary of reform and opening, the two Chinese leaders pay only lip service to reform of the political system (政治体制改革), a task initially introduced by Deng in the early 1980s. Jiang devotes a full paragraph to political reform and declares that the party will "actively, gradually, and appropriately promote" such a reform. One key lesson or successful policy listed in Hu's speech is the "combination of promotion of economic foundations and reform of the super-structure and the continuous promotion of reform of the political system."
Remarkably, in Xi's speech, the key phrase, "political system reform," appears only once—in the section summarizing the achievements of the past four decades. In the most important section listing the key policies contributing to the party's success and the guiding principles for the future, not only does the phrase "political system reform" completely disappear but there is also no equivalent section dealing with any future reform of key political institutions.
Equally remarkable is Xi's emphatic statement on the boundaries of reform. To be sure, both Jiang and Hu set such boundaries in their speeches. Comparatively, however, Jiang uses the least harsh language to spell out what kinds of reforms the party will tolerate. He insists that the party will not "shaken, weaken, or discard" (动摇,削弱和丢掉) these reforms at any time; we must adhere to "socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics," and not copy "the mode of the West's political system should not be copied" (照搬西方的政治制度模式). In Hu's speech, the language setting the boundaries of reform seems harsher as he describes a reform path that will result in a fundamental change in the party's status and as an" evil path toward replacing flags" (改旗易帜的邪路), even though he balances this language with a declaration that the party will not return to a path of self-imposed isolation and ossification (封闭僵化的老路).10
In the first section of Xi's speech summarizing the party's past successes, he repeats Hu's language about not returning to a path of isolation and ossification or embarking on an evil path leading to a loss of power. More notably, in spelling out the future direction in the same section, he presents the clearest marker about what can and what cannot be reformed . In answering his own question of "what changed, how to change" must be based on "how to reform the socialist system with Chinese characteristics." Xi declares: "We will resolutely reform what should and can be reformed, but we will resolutely not reform what should not be and cannot be reformed" (该改的、能改的我们坚决改,不该改的、不能改的坚决不改).11
2. Definition of Chinese socialism today
Since the CCP's 13th Congress in 1987, arguably the most liberal congress in CCP history, the party has defined Chinese socialism as the "initial stage of socialism." Jiang Zemin's 1998 speech emphasizes that "China today is and will for a long time continue to be at the initial stage of socialism" (当今中国还处在并将长期处在社会主义初级阶段). Hu Jintao's speech ten years later reiterates this line and elaborates on its meaning—as long as China remains at the initial stage of socialism, it will prioritize economic development, maintain reform and opening, and focus on domestic priorities.12 Significantly, in Xi Jinping's speech the "initial stage of socialism" is formally replaced by "socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" (新时代中国特色社会主义).13 This semantic change, easy to miss, has profound ideological and policy implications. Ideologically, it authorizes Xi's political vision and ideas, now collectively known as "the thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" (新时代中国特色社会主义思想), with the status of the party's new guiding principles. Substantively, this new formulation also justifies Xi' vision of China as a great world power and his ambitious foreign-policy agenda. Although his anniversary speech does not elaborate on this vision, it is fully developed in his political report to the CCP's 19th Congress in late 2017. The overall task of this "new era," as Xi declares in his political report, is to "realize socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and . . . build a . . . great modern socialist country."14 The most important policy implication in the difference between the "initial stage" and the "new era" is that China will have a new objective—seeking to be a global superpower.
3. Foreign policy and relations with the outside world
Probably the most notable policy difference between Xi's speech and those of his predecessors is his foreign-policy vision. In both tone and substance, Jiang's speech reiterates the well-known foreign-policy guidelines established by Deng. A subtle but significant deviation from Deng's foreign policy can already be detected in Hu's speech, which contains code language indicating a more defiant stance toward the United States, but by and large Hu remains defensive and cautious in nature. In comparison, Xi's speech unambiguously demonstrates a far more ambitious and proactive foreign policy, representing a fundamental departure from the foreign policy enunciated by Jiang some twenty years earlier.
For example, Jiang emphasizes that "The primary task of our external work is for peace and to serve socialist modernization" (我们对外工作的首要任务,就是争取和平,为社会主义现代化建设服务). Jiang then practically repeats Deng's foreign policy dicta— when "handling international affairs, it is essential to adhere to the principle of observing things soberly, dealing with problems calmly, doing what ought to be done, and never meeting them head-on so that we can seize opportunities to develop ourselves, accomplish the work at home" (坚持按照冷静观察、沉着应付、有所作为、决不当头的方针处理国际事务,以利抓住时机发展自己,把国内的事情办好). Hu attempts to strike a balance between adhering to the Dengist principle of subordinating foreign policy to domestic development and extending Chinese external influence as Chinese power and interests had greatly expanded since 1998.15 Hu calls to "make all-round plans for the overall domestic and international situations" (统筹好国内国际两个大局) and he adds a coded language suggesting a more assertive foreign policy aimed at challenging American unipolarity. Hu's foreign-policy objectives include to "actively promote world multipolarization, promote democratization in international relations, respect variety in the world, and oppose hegemonism and power politics" (积极促进世界多极化、推进国际关系民主化,尊重世界多样性,反对霸权主义和强权政治). Compared with Jiang's speech, which contains only the code phrase "opposition to hegemonism," Hu's speech presents a substantive departure from the Dengist foreign policy. Nevertheless, the tone and content of Hu's foreign-policy principles and objectives are defensive and do not indicate an expansive vision for future Chinese foreign policy.
The second half of Xi Jinping's speech includes a section dealing with foreign policy. This section indicates how much has changed in the Chinese foreign-policy vision and objectives during the two decades since Jiang's speech. It is difficult to detect traces of Deng's foreign-policy principles. In setting China's foreign-policy course, Xi reiterates some of Hu's coded language, but he is much more emphatic. He declares that: "We must respect the right to choose the path of development of peoples, the maintenance of international fairness and justice, promote the democratization of international relations, against his own will on others, oppose interference in other countries' internal affairs, against bullying" (我们要尊重各国人民自主选择发展道路的权利,维护国际公平正义,倡导国际关系民主化,反对把自己的意志强加于人,反对干涉别国内政,反对以强凌弱). The most striking part in this section is Xi's unequivocal endorsement of a bold vision of China's international role in general and of a long-term objective to reshape international relations. As a "responsible great power," China will "play the role of a responsible big country, support of the majority of developing countries, and actively participate in the global governance system reform and construction" (支持广大发展中国家发展,积极参与全球治理体系改革和建设). He further stresses the long-term strategic importance of his signature program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to Xi, China … "will use the BRI as a major foundation of its new foreign policy to create, with others, a new platform of international cooperation" (我们要以共建 "一带一路" 为重点,同各方一道打造国际合作新平台).16
So What?
What do these observed and, in most cases, significant differences tell us about Xi's ideological and policy preferences and agenda?
For starters, this comparative exercise illustrates the nature and pace of changes in political vision and policy during the last two decades. If there are subtle but real differences in Hu's speech as compared to Jiang's, the differences are largely evolutionary in nature. But the same cannot be said of Xi's speech, which represents a radical departure from the speeches by his predecessors in terms of both tone and substance. For those familiar with the speaking styles of the three leaders, it is not difficult to notice that whereas the speeches by Jiang and Hu appear to be mainly the work of writing teams, Xi's speech bears his own rhetorical identifiers and personal touches, in particular the use of direct quotes and classical idioms as well as the choice of poetic and lofty language.
What this may imply is that, taken as a whole, Xi's speech should leave no doubt that the radical transformation of the Chinese political system from collective leadership to strongman rule and the resultant policy changes are here to stay. We can further note that Jiang and Hu presented their respective speeches under far more favorable domestic and international circumstances, whereas Xi delivered his speech amid mounting domestic challenges and a fundamentally different external environment—the raging trade war and a possible cold war with the United States. The firmness of Xi's tone and the reiteration of his signature policies indicate a low probability of a fundamental policy shift in Beijing despite growing doubts about the sustainability of the current path.
Minxin Pei, editor of China Leadership Monitor, is Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government and director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College. He is also non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Pei has published in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, Project Syndicate, Fortune.com, Nikkei Asian Review, and many scholarly journals and edited volumes. He is the author of China's Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay (Harvard, 2016); China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard, 2006), and From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Harvard, 1994). Pei formerly was senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1999–2009) and assistant professor of politics at Princeton University (1992–1998). He currently holds the Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-China Relations.
[1]习近平:在庆祝改革开放40周年大会上的讲话, December 18, 2018, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-12/18/c_1123872025.htm
[2] Jiang and Hu's speeches can be accessed at the following links: Jiang Zemin, November 7, 2008, at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/138172/138173/8302188.html; Hu Jintao, December 18, 2008, at
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2008/12-18/1492872.shtml
[3] The four cardinal principles established by Deng are "uphold the socialist path, uphold the people's democratic dictatorship, uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and uphold Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism."
[4] The official translation is "In the exploration process, although experienced serious twists and turns, but the original party theoretical results achieved in socialist revolution and construction and great achievements, and creating socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new historical period has provided valuable experience, theoretical preparation, substance basis." Because official translation is often awkward and even inaccurate or incomplete, I use my own translation in the main text where I believe the official translation is wrong or inaccurate, but I will note the official translation in the endnote. This will apply to all the translations in this essay.
[5] 中国共产党新闻网, 习近平"两个不能否定"是实现"中国梦"的科学论断, May 10, 201e, at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0510/c241220-21441140.html
[6] Jiang also said: "We deeply miss Comrade Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of our country's reform, opening, and modernization" (我们深切怀念我国改革开放和现代化建设的总设计师邓小平同志). But this sentence is missing from the official translation.
Hu said: "We must extend a lofty salute to the party's third-generation central leadership collective with Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core" (我们要向以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代中央领导集体致以崇高的敬意).
[7] The official translation of (党的集中统一领导) is "the Party's centralized leadership."
[8] The original Chinese phrases describing the four types of "consciousness" are政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识 (consciousness of social responsibility, consciousness of rules, consciousness of dedication, and consciousness of integrity; the four types of self-confidence (中国特色社会主义道路自信、理论自信、制度自信、文化自信) can be translated as self-confidence in the socialist path with Chinese characteristics, self-confidence in the theoretical systemic regime, and self-confidence in the culture.
[9] The official translation of this section is "the future will certainly face the challenges of this kind of risk, even unimaginable encounter stormy sea"
[10] The official translation is :rigid and doctrinaire" for 改旗易帜的邪路 and "the old path of developing a closed country" for 封闭僵化的老路.
[11] The official translation appears to make no sense since it reads "We can change the resolute reform, reform should not be reform determined not to change."
[12] Hu's language is: "我们党作出我国仍处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段的科学论断,形成了党在社会主义初级阶段的基本路线,这就是:领导和团结全国各族人民,以经济建设为中心,坚持四项基本原则,坚持改革开放,自力更生,艰苦创业,为把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家而奋斗."
[13] It should be noted that in his political report to the 19th CCP Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping appeared to be advancing his concept of a "new era" without completely jettisoning the established party line on "the initial stage." After describing what the "new era" means, Xi mentions the "initial stage" by noting that "the basic dimension of the Chinese context—that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not changed" (我国仍处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段的基本国情没有变). However, in his speech on December 18, 2018, Xi does not repeat the latter language. 习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告, October 27, 2017, at
http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm
[14] "总任务是实现社会主义现代化和中华民族伟大复兴,在全面建成小康社会的基础上,分两步走在本世纪中叶建成富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国," ibid.
[15] Chinese GDP, which was less than 12 percent of U.S. GDP in dollar terms in 1998, was approaching 40 percent of U.S. GDP in 2008. More importantly, the global financial crisis of 2008 appeared to offer Beijing a golden opportunity to play a more activist role in international affairs.
[16] Intriguingly, the official translation omits this section about BRI "We will use the BRI as a major foundation of its new foreign policy to create, with others, a new platform of international cooperation" (我们要以共建 "一带一路" 为重点,同各方一道打造国际合作新平台).
Featured Image: China Vice-President Xi Jinping stands during a trade agreement ceremony between the two countries at Dublin Castle in Dublin, Ireland February 19, 2012. (Reuters/David Moir)
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Capability Analysis, Indo-Asia-Pacific
A Question of Time: Improving Taiwan's Maritime Deterrence Posture
November 15, 2018 Joe Petrucelli	Leave a comment
The following essay is adapted from a report published by George Mason University's Center for Security Policy Studies: A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan's Conventional Deterrence Posture
By Joe Petrucelli
Just last month two U.S. Navy warships conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait, reminding the world that the status of Taiwan remains contested and unresolved. Although China prefers to use peaceful means to achieve unification, it has not taken the possibility of force off the table. Accordingly, Taiwan remains one of the few states to endure the plausible risk of military invasion.
After visiting Taiwan to study this problem, a team of researchers, including the author, recently released a report advocating for a dramatic shift in Taiwan's conventional deterrence posture. Among our recommendations, we call for Taiwan's navy to change its current acquisition priorities and embrace an unconventional-asymmetric doctrine of sea denial.
We suggest this shift in maritime strategy because of what we termed Taiwan's deterrence trilemma. At a strategic level, Taiwan must simultaneously accomplish three goals that exist in tension with each other:
It must counter China's grey zone challenges, which means Taiwan must project symbolic strength across its airspace and territorial waters;
It must raise the costs of invasion, which means it needs forces that can prolong any conflict and inflict unacceptable losses on the invaders; and
It must do both of these things in a resource-constrained environment defined by a general unwillingness to significantly increase defense spending
At least in the near term, a military invasion remains unlikely since the PLA faces a number of obstacles that complicate its ability to mount a successful invasion. Nonetheless, time is on China's side and Taiwan's naval doctrine and force posture remain misaligned. Although Taiwan has revised its strategy to emphasize multi-domain, asymmetric deterrence, it remains focused on purchasing high-end, high-capability systems such as the F-35B fighter, Aegis-like destroyers and diesel submarines, the "darlings of their service chiefs."
We argue that Taiwan should enhance its deterrence posture by adopting a more coherent and holistic approach. Specifically, we recommend that it adopt an elastic denial-in-defense strategy, which will consist of three core elements:
Accept risk in the grey zone. Grey zone aggression does not constitute an existential threat allowing Taiwan to rebalance its force to maintain "just enough" capability to push back against grey zone challenges, such sufficient naval strength to prevent and intercept unwanted excursions into Taiwanese waters;
Prioritize denial operations. Specifically, divest as many costly, high-tech platforms as possible so as to invest in large numbers of relatively low-cost, counter-invasion capabilities. This would raise the cost associated with bringing a hostile force close to Taiwan's shores; and
Invest in popular resistance. The prospect of waging a prolonged insurgency will likely deter China's leadership far more than the threat of fighting a relatively small, conventional force.
We are not the first to propose shifting to an asymmetric maritime force to deny China use of the seas as an invasion corridor. Numerous reports and analyses have suggested specific maritime platforms Taiwan should acquire to execute a sea denial strategy, such as fast missile boats, semi-submersibles, mini-submarines, mines, and coastal defense cruise missiles. We entirely agree with these recommendations and note that to date, despite talk of an asymmetric strategy, Taiwan has made only marginal changes. For example, while it has modestly increased its inventory of missile boats and anti-ship cruise missiles, Taiwan's navy remains anchored around a relatively small and therefore vulnerable inventory of high-end platforms.
The political reality is that Taiwan's navy faces major resource constraints and so must make difficult choices. Accordingly, Taiwan should defer its high-profile procurement priorities, especially the Aegis-like destroyer and the Indigenous Diesel Submarine (IDS). These are technically challenging programs, especially given Taiwan's lack of experience building similar platforms. Additionally, they are expensive enough that Taiwan will not be able to field them in large numbers and ultimately remain vulnerable to Chinese long-range strike and anti-access weapons systems. Taiwan's current naval fleet, although aged, is sufficient to "show the flag" and resist grey-zone aggression for the near future. Instead of these planned procurements, Taiwan should significantly increase the numbers of low-cost, lethal platforms, even at the expense of other planned procurements.
These lower cost platforms, by the larger numbers procured, complicate adversary targeting and improve their force-level survivability against PLA strike capabilities. Taiwan should start by fielding a larger fleet than currently envisioned of its stealthy Tuo Jiang missile corvette and build on the lessons learned from these small corvettes to field a future small frigate. Both can fulfill peacetime missions but be built in large enough numbers to possibly survive in a wartime environment. By delaying the more ambitious destroyer and IDS programs and starting with smaller, less expensive projects, Taiwan can best prioritize limited resources.
This incremental approach also helps develop relevant technical capability, so that potential future submarine and large surface combatant programs are less technically risky when it becomes fiscally and strategically appropriate to build them. The immediate savings from delaying the destroyer and IDS programs can be diverted into the sea denial platforms that Taiwan needs now, ranging from the small frigate discussed above to even smaller missile boats, mini-subs and mobile anti-ship cruise missiles.
Moreover, Taiwan should eliminate its entire amphibious force. Bluntly speaking, Taiwan's amphibious assault ships are strategically unnecessary as they are not immediately useful for confronting limited challenges to Taiwan's territorial sovereignty or other "grey zone" aggression. They also have no ability to counter a cross-strait invasion. Rather than procure expensive amphibious assault ships and maintain aging landing craft, which generate sizable sustainment costs, Taiwan should retire this entire force. It can then shift these savings into further investments in counter-invasion capabilities.
Because Taiwan's Marine Corps would be losing its sealift, it should be rebranded as Taiwan's premier counter-amphibious force so as to fill a gap between the navy's sea denial role and the army's ground denial mission. Specifically, it would specialize in defending possible landing zones with mines and spread out hard points in addition to engaging landing craft with dispersed, near-shore weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles.
These proposals to transform Taiwan's naval strategy and procurement plans would produce a force capable of waging a sea denial campaign against a conventionally superior opponent, tailored to the specific threat of a cross-Strait invasion. The changes in naval force structure would be mirrored throughout Taiwan's armed forces, to include a reduction in army ground strength, the termination of plans to procure F-35B fighters, and accelerated procurement of similar asymmetric capabilities. To invest in popular resistance, we recommend transforming Taiwan's two-million-man Reserve Force into a Territorial Defense Force prepared to conduct a lengthy insurgency campaign. By abandoning plans for a decisive battle and shifting to a posture that increases invasion costs and prevents a quick victory, Taiwan can better deter China.
Read about these recommendations and more in the full report: A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan's Conventional Deterrence Posture.
Joe Petrucelli is a Ph.D. student at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government and a currently mobilized U.S. Navy reserve officer. The analysis and opinions expressed here are his alone and they do not represent those of the Department of Defense.
Featured Image: Tuo Jiang-class missile boat in service with the Taiwanese Navy. (Defense Ministry of Taiwan)
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Is the Belt and Road Initiative Too Big to Fail? Pt. 2
September 4, 2018 Guest Author	Leave a comment
What could and should the United States do if the Belt and Road Initiative collapses?
By Grant Newsham and Tuan Pham
Part one of this two-part series discussed the growing concerns of a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bubble that may burst, and that China's hurried and reckless BRI investments through the years are beginning to drag down its already slowing domestic economy.
So to advance the strategic dialogue, let's assume that the BRI bubble has, or is close to bursting, and is exacerbated by a weakened Chinese economy and a destabilizing trade war. In part two, each author individually offers his perspective on what America could and should do (and conversely not do) as the result thereof.
Opportunities – What to Do
Pham: Make the most of the strategic opportunity and build more economic leverage on the issues of China's unfair trade policies and practices, discriminatory trade barriers, unequal trade balances, forced technology transfers, and intellectual property rights theft. Leverage the recent U.S.-European Union agreement to ally against China which has nearly broken the world trading system. Then, convert the accumulated economic leverage into additional political leverage in the geographic spheres of North Korea, South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea, and Taiwan and contested domains of space and cyberspace – similar to how Beijing uses the BRI. When appropriate and expedient, rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership to complement the other U.S. instruments of national power; bind America to the other regional economies; blunt the other Chinese economic initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and ultimately offer an enduring alternative to the BRI. From there, use the added influence to further encourage and challenge China to become a more responsible stakeholder that contributes positively to the international system and uphold the international rule of law and respect for global norms (human rights, freedom of navigation, etc.); and in the long-run, possibly consider a grand bargain to adopt mutual agreements and avoid another Cold War (no large-scale conflict directly between the two sides, but each may be supported by major regional "proxy" wars) and the Thucydides Trap (a rising power challenges a dominant power leading to a great power competition for preeminence).
Of note, the concept of the Thucydides Trap has detractors who understandably and fairly warn against the Chamberlain Trap (avoiding conflict through concessions) and cite the years of ill-advised U.S. acquiescence and accommodation (strategic patience and wishful thinking) in the SCS. Nevertheless, no matter which side one takes on this philosophical debate, the reality remains that China and America are interlocked in a strategic competition for regional and global pre-eminence. So, how best to contain and manage this competition and keep it from escalating into a "no-win" conflict?
Newsham: Recognize that China's objectives with the BRI are ultimately political. BRI is one front in an existential, multi-front campaign to displace and overtake the United States – and America's pernicious notions of individual liberty, rule of law, and equality among nations – that have served the world well for the last 70 years.
As such, the U.S. Government (USG) ought to do several things with the BRI in mind. First, develop and implement a political warfare effort that exposes the BRI as ultimately a combination of colonialism and loan-sharking. As often as not, BRI investments and projects are over-priced, poorly thought out, and shabbily constructed; and benefit China and Chinese companies more than the recipient countries.
Toward this end, the USG might also profitably direct its vast intelligence resources toward exposing the corruption and payoffs that are part and parcel of Chinese business and government efforts connected with the BRI. The USG bringing charges against Patrick Ho, a former top Hong Kong official, for bribing African officials on behalf of a Chinese company shows what is doable. Locals who resent Chinese heavy- and under-handedness will welcome exposure of such improprieties.
Second, keep trade pressure on China in response to longstanding unfair trade practices. This pressure – and attendant reductions in the foreign exchange needed to keep the Chinese economy chugging along – reduces funds available for BRI activities – to include investments, bribes, and bailouts. It's ironic that U.S. and Western businesses have effectively funded the BRI efforts – not to mention China's military development.
But it's not enough to criticize China and the BRI – even if well founded. Indeed, one must admire China and Chinese companies' willingness to get involved in countries where American companies refuse to go. The USG needs to work closely with the private sector and change the "risk profile" for American companies so they might show some initiative and go where Yankee Traders of old used to go. And since this is ultimately a political struggle, why not link the public-private partnership effort with that of allied countries such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and others?
In summary, recognize the BRI for what it is, expose its vulnerabilities and rapacious aspects, keep trade pressure on China and thus reduce the foreign exchange available for its BRI activities. And as importantly, the United States and like-minded countries need to offer a better alternative.
Challenges – What Not to Do
Pham: In light of the deepening economic stagnation, the present risk of domestic political instability may drive Beijing's future foreign policy. Economic prosperity (purse) and nationalism (people) – buttressed by the People's Liberation Army (gun) and propaganda (pen) – have long been the principal sources of legitimacy, credibility, and stability for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the prosperity and nationalism wanes, President Xi Jinping (undisputed core leader of CCP) may increasingly rely on propaganda and security – tempered to a certain extent by fiscal constraints – to maintain the party's (and his own) power and influence over the masses. In other words, make people look outward at the forest and not inward at the trees.
But here lies the strategic quandary for U.S. policymakers. The tricky part is to avoid strategic overreach and to find the right balance of making the most of the strategic opportunity without triggering the CCP to a tipping point that elicits a strong nationalist response (including military confrontation).
Newsham: Don't bail out Xi and China if they've been overextended on the BRI. They won't appreciate the gesture. The more problems Beijing has with financially draining overseas ventures – and the inevitable local opposition they provoke over time – the less China can concentrate its efforts on military development and bringing its regional neighbors to heel while being able to take on its declared main enemy – the United States. It also dispels the image of inexorable Chinese domination.
Don't try to calibrate just the right mix of pushback and engagement (to include on the BRI) that will make Beijing become a "responsible stakeholder." Why should it? China has done well enough over the last 40 years without adjusting its behavior. Robert McNamara also tried "calibrated" pressure with North Vietnam. It didn't work very well. Instead, stand up for America's own interests and keep the pressure on.
Don't consider the chance for a few American firms to make some money on BRI projects to outweigh the existential threat the CCP-led China poses to the free, liberal world order. And don't forget that today's China holds over one million people in internment camps and is trying to do the Uighurs what King Edward the First tried with the Scots. It is also a repressive security state along the lines George Orwell wrote about and where modern technology is creating new and unprecedented tools of oppression. At the end of the day, regardless of the highways, ports, and bridges it might build (for a considerable price and of questionable quality) in far-flung places, it should always be remembered that the BRI is an outgrowth of a staunchly authoritarian and repressive regime.
China risks big with the BRI, and accordingly, could lose big if indeed the declining trend lines are proven correct. If so, how does it impact Beijing's strategic ambitions for national rejuvenation and ultimately global preeminence? But more importantly, how could and should Washington make the most of the strategic opportunity?
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Officer and a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.
Tuan Pham is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The personal views expressed therein are their own.
Featured Image: Officials attend the groundbreaking ceremony of the rail project linking Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima, on Dec. 21 in Nakhon Ratchasima, Thailand. (Photo by Yukako Ono).
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Book Review, Capability Analysis
Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security
August 21, 2018 Guest Author	1 Comment
Rupprecht, Andreas. Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security. Houston: Harpia Publishing, 2016. 80pp. $23.45
By Lieutenant Commander David Barr, USN
Since his rise to power six years ago, thousands of analysts and policymakers across the globe have attempted to understand the intentions of, and the mechanisms employed toward, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping's seemingly expansionist vision for China. That vision, dubbed "The Chinese Dream" by Xi in 2012, solidified his plan for "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Although arguably vaguely defined, "The Chinese Dream" has been viewed by some as Xi's call for rising Chinese influence on the international stage – economically, politically, diplomatically, scientifically, and militarily, i.e., China's "grand strategy."
In support of this vision, Xi has embarked on a multitude of political and military reforms and now, backed by one of the world's most technologically-advanced militaries, Xi is ready to thrust his revitalized China further onto the world stage. During his opening speech to nearly 2,300 party delegates and dignitaries at the October 2017 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi publicly described the extraordinary complexity of China's domestic and foreign policy challenges and opportunities: "Currently, conditions domestically and abroad are undergoing deep and complicated changes. Our country is in an important period of strategic opportunity in its development. The outlook is extremely bright; the challenges are also extremely grim."1
In his new book, Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security, Andreas Rupprecht, author of Modern Chinese Warplanes: Combat Aircraft and Units of the Chinese Air Force and Naval Aviation, attempts to break out of his comfort zone and succinctly capture the complexities of Chinese foreign policy and the geopolitical environment of the Asia-Pacific Region. The content of Flashpoint China is predominantly focused on Chinese regional security issues; however, in his introductory paragraph, Rupprecht states the goal of Flashpoint China is to "draw upon" Modern Chinese Warplanes and "offer an overview of potential military conflicts along the borders of the People's Republic of China (PRC)."2 This is a laudable goal, for even attempting to synopsize the complexity of Chinese military history and foreign relations in a mere eighty pages would challenge the most knowledgeable defense and foreign relations expert. Yet for the most part, Rupprecht succeeds. There are some content areas however that could benefit from further research and development.
Following the introduction, Rupprecht utilizes Chapters Two through Five to succinctly introduce the various foreign policy concerns for China in each of its five Theater Commands. Each chapter opens with a succinct description of the nuanced histories behind each foreign policy concern, provides an overview of PLAAF and PLANAF capabilities available to each Theater Command, and closes with well-structured charts of each Theater Command's PLAAF and PLANAF order of battle. It is through this structured approach that Rupprecht meets his goal of drawing upon Modern Chinese Warplanes and answering the following question: If conflict were to occur at any of the flashpoints, what People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) units and platforms are likely to be involved?
Over the last two to three decades China's entire military force has undergone a rapid and unprecedented military modernization campaign designed to transform it into a regionally-dominant and globally-significant force. To further tie his two books together however, Rupprecht would be remiss to not include an update of what has transpired within and across the PLA between the books' publication dates (2012 and 2016, respectively) in the introductory section of Flashpoint China, specifically how PLA reforms and the subsequent establishment of the five Theater Commands have affected the PLAAF and PLANAF. Additionally, Rupprecht briefly describes concepts such as China's "active defense strategy" and "anti-access /aerial denial (A2/AD)" (what the Chinese refer to as "counter-intervention") capabilities. Counter-intervention represents how China plans to "deny the U.S. [or other foreign] military the ability to operate in China's littoral waters in case of a crisis."3 Collectively, these organizational, doctrinal, and operational changes should weigh heavily in a book of this nature yet Rupprecht does not fully incorporate their significance in his work. To do this, the author would need to answer the following question: How would PLAAF and PLANAF platforms and capabilities likely be employed to prevent U.S. or other regional forces from intervening in a conflict at any of the flashpoints?
Some of these geographical areas and issues carry a higher military priority for China. According to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in its 2017 Annual Report to Congress, "Taiwan remains the PLA's main "strategic direction," one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as endowed with strategic importance [and represents a "core interest" of China]. Other focus areas include the East China Sea [ECS], the South China Sea [SCS], and China's borders with India and North Korea."4 And as the strategic importance of a geographical area increases for China so does its allocation of PLA assets.
For example, the richness and variety of the geopolitical concerns involving the countries presented in Chapter Two of Flashpoint China (Japan, Russia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and South Korea), provide significant examples of historical, current, and potential military conflict for China; however, in Chapter Two Rupprecht doesn't reflect on the order of strategic priority and therefore the military significance of the Northern and Central Theater Commands. Instead, Chapter Two opens with a very brief paragraph regarding Mongolia, thereby dampening the impact of the chapter's "flashpoint" narrative.
Additionally, the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the ECS dominates the military significance of China's foreign policy vis-à-vis Japan; however, Rupprecht merely allocates a single sentence to the situation: "The dispute over the Senkaku Islands – known as the Diaoyu Islands in China – is meanwhile a matter of heated rhetoric and near-open hostility."5 Since the historical dispute took a dramatic leap forward in April 2012 following the Japanese purchase of three of the eight islets from their private owner, the PLA's Eastern Theater Command has assumed primary responsibility for this flashpoint area. Unfortunately, Chapter Two mistakenly assigns PLA responsibility for China's ongoing dilemma with Japan in the ECS to the Northern and Central Theater Commands: "The PLA subordinates responsibility for Japan and the Korean peninsula to the Northern Theater Command and to the Central Theater Command."6 When the purchase was made public, the PLA immediately began regularly deploying maritime and airborne patrols from Eastern Theater Command bases into the ECS to assert jurisdiction and sovereignty over the islands. Additionally, as Rupprecht alludes to on page 25, in November 2013, China declared the establishment of its first air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the ECS which included the area over the disputed islands. Subsequently, both the PLAAF and PLANAF established routine airborne patrol patterns and the use of ECS airspace and the straits of the Ryukyu Islands to conduct long-range, integrated strike training with PLA Navy (PLAN) assets in the western Philippine Sea.
A map of the Southern Theater Command's Area of Responsibility (from Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security, Click to Expand)
Additionally in Chapter Two, Rupprecht aptly describes the history of Sino-Russian relations: "For years, relations between China and Russia have been described as a 'tightrope walk', and have frequently oscillated between close friendship and war."7 However, the author fails to capture the significance of the military connection between Russia and China, especially as it relates to Rupprecht's stated theme for this book, for China's military modernization arguably started with mass acquisitions of Russian military technologies in the early 1990s. Over the ensuing decades, China embarked on a widespread effort to acquire Russian military technologies, reverse-engineer that technology, and then indigenously mass-produce similar technologies adapted to Chinese specifications. That period however may be rapidly coming to a close as many China analysts assess that China has now transitioned from a Russian technology-dependent force to a truly indigenous production force. In fact, China's most recent procurement of Russia's technologically-advanced Su-35 FLANKER S fighter aircraft and S-400 strategic-level surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, touched on by Rupprecht on page 18, may be the last significant items on China's military hardware shopping list.
Another example is found in Chapter Three which Rupprecht opens by stating, "The issue of Taiwan is a very special one for the PRC, and certainly the top priority in regard to the PLA's modernization drive. This is clearly indicated by the official order of protocol, which lists the responsible Eastern Theater Command first."8 Although the Eastern Theater may have primary responsibility for the Taiwan issue, the extraordinary political, strategic, and economic significance of the Taiwan dispute represents a "core interest" of China. This fact cannot be overstated. The entire essence of Chinese military modernization efforts over the recent decades have been in direct support of the possible requirement to take back Taiwan by force should alternative means of reunification prove fruitless. As Chinese Communist Party legitimacy would ride on the success or failure of a PLA campaign to "liberate" Taiwan, an effort of this magnitude would involve PLAAF and PLANAF assets from multiple Theater Commands, something Rupprecht's narrative and order-of-battle charts do not capture.
The geography, the respective sovereignty claims, and the strategic and operational scope of each Theater Command's responsibilities matter greatly with respect to China and its ambitions. Each chapter ends with a wonderful map that provides a highly informative, geographical illustration of each respective theater. The geographical impact of each chapter's flashpoints may be better served however by moving each chapter's map to the beginning of the chapters rather than the end.
Rupprecht's best work is reflected in Chapter Four. China's sovereignty claims and the controversial Chinese land reclamation and infrastructure construction activity in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (SCS) presented in Chapter Four are definitely the most contentious issues facing the Southern Theater Command. And here Rupprecht does not disappoint. The author allocates numerous pages to both describe and illustrate the significance of the SCS dispute to China, its regional neighbors, and the U.S. Just as in Modern Chinese Warplanes, Rupprecht has included spectacular, colored photographs of various Chinese aircraft into Flashpoint China. Various PLAAF and PLANAF fighters, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, along with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are presented in wonderful detail throughout the book. Chapter Four however is especially unique for its inclusion of vivid photographs of China's land reclamation and infrastructure construction activity in the Spratly Islands.
A UAV is showcased in a Chinese military parade (Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security)
How Chinese, U.S., and regional neighbors approach this issue politically, diplomatically, and militarily carries significant strategic, operational, and tactical implications. History has proven how a single tactical event in the region can carry immediate and substantial strategic implications. For example, the infamous EP-3 incident of 2001 provides just one example of how tactical miscommunication and miscalculation can have significant strategic implications.9 These type of airborne interactions continue on a regular basis as U.S. reconnaissance aircraft operate in international airspace over the SCS. Chinese fighter aircraft routinely intercept the U.S. aircraft, sometimes operating outside the assessed bounds of safe airmanship. Japanese fighters also come into regular contact with Chinese aircraft, regularly scrambling to check Chinese airspace incursions over the ECS and through the Ryukyu Straits. These tactical events often receive attention from the government and military leaders of the respective countries and occasionally result in public demarches.
In a book of this nature, each SCS claimant country deserves its own dedicated section as China's rise has forced each country's government to reassess their national security and military means with some countries making substantial increases in their military expenditures. For example, Vietnam is "in the process of addressing its limitations with respect to combating modern threat scenarios with its existing obsolete equipment, and has embarked on military modernization plans over the last few years."10 Additionally, the 02 May – 15 August 2014 Hai Yeng Shi You 981 oil rig standoff (also referred to as the "CNOOC-981 incident") provides a real-world event which not only illustrated the contentiousness of the SCS claims between China and Vietnam, but also revealed an operational reaction from the PLA, with specific operational responses from both the PLAAF and PLANAF.11
Finally, the most impactful flashpoint for China in the Western Theater, presented in Chapter Five, regards India. Typically the issue between the two countries revolves around unresolved border disputes; however, much to India's chagrin, China also continues to advance its military-to-military relationship with India's rival, Pakistan. This is especially relevant for Rupprecht's efforts within Flashpoint China as Pakistan's Air Force and China's PLAAF conducted the sixth consecutive iteration of the annual "Shaheen" series of joint exercises in 2017. Since its inception in 2011, the Shaheen exercise series has consistently grown in complexity and scope, incorporating a wider variety of PLAAF aircraft and platforms such as multi-role fighters, fighter-bombers, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, and surface-to-air missile crews and radar operators.
In Flashpoint China Andreas Rupprecht ambitiously attempts to couple the highly complex geopolitical environment surrounding modern day China with the PLAAF and PLANAF's ever-evolving order of battle and force projection capabilities – an assignment with which even the most renowned scholars would struggle, especially within the allotment of so few pages. Via the well-structured narrative and fabulous photographs, Flashpoint China goes a long way in tackling the question of what PLAAF and PLANAF assets could China bring to the fight should a military conflict occur at any of the presented flashpoints. Readers however would have certainly enjoyed reading the author's assessment of how might the PLA use its air power in support of Chinese military intervention into these contentious hotbeds. But this may have to wait for another day. Still, if brevity of space and time were the only options available to the author, then Flashpoint China can certainly prove useful as is. However, with even some minor content and structural improvements, the book could prove irreplaceable.
LCDR David Barr is a career intelligence officer and currently serves as instructor with the National Intelligence University's College of Strategic Intelligence. All statements of facts, analysis, or opinion are the author's and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense or any of its components, or the U.S. government.
1. Buckley, Chris. "Xi Jinping Opens China's Party Congress, His Hold Tighter Than Ever"; The New York Times; 17 October 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/world/asia/xi-jinping-communist-party-china.html
2. Rupprecht, Andreas. Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security. Houston: Harpia Publishing, 2016. p. 9.
4. OSD. Annual Report to Congress: "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017," OSD, (Annual Report, OSD 2017)
5. Rupprecht, Andreas. Flashpoint China, Chinese Air Power and Regional Security. Houston: Harpia Publishing, 2016. p. 21.
9. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "U.S. Plane in China After It Collides with Chinese Jet"; The New York Times; 02 April 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-chinese-jet.html
10. Wood, Laura. "Future of the Vietnam Defense Industry to 2022 – Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts – Research and Markets". Business Wire; 04 October 2017. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171004006043/en/Future-Vietnam-Defense-Industry-2022—Market
11. Thayer, Carl. "4 Reasons China Removed Oil Rig HYSY-981 Sooner Than Planned". The Diplomat; 22 July 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/4-reasons-china-removed-oil-rig-hysy-981-sooner-than-planned/
Featured Image: Two JH-7 fighter bombers attached to an aviation brigade of the air force under the PLA Western Theater Command taxi abreast on the runway before takeoff for a sortie near the Tianshan Mountains in late March, 2018. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Xiaofei)
featuredPLAPLAAFPLANAFPRCTaiwanXi Jinping


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Malayalam Features
Remembering: MT Vasudevan Nair's Tale Of Idyllic Old Age
By Aswathy Gopalakrishnan
While MT Vasudevan Nair's novel, Randamoozham, a classic work, will soon be retold on silver screen with Mohanlal playing the protagonist, there exists a movie of his – not as celebrated or grand, perhaps – but just lovely and insanely perfect.
"We have a word for that in Japanese. It's called 'ma'. Emptiness," explained Japanese auteur Hayao Miyazaki in a 2002 interview with critic Roger Ebert, answering a question about the 'gratuitous motion in his films'. The narrative in Miyazaki's films pauses several times to watch fish swimming in a stream or wind blowing through the woods – shots that are of no consequence to the actual plot, but are meaningful in their own right. Moments of 'ma' are strikingly visible in his films like My Neighbor Totoro. It is with such images – which often go unnoticed in real life – that Miyazaki builds a deep sense of calm.
Jnanapith award-winning writer, director and script-writer MT Vasudevan Nair's Oru Cheru Punchiri (A Slender Smile, 2000) is a collage of such gentle moments that encompass the uncomplicated beauty of life. If silence is imperative in Miyazaki's films, in Oru Cheru Punchiri, there is always a pleasant presence of sound in the form of music, conversations, the moo of a cow, or the din from a nearby playground in the frame. The film's unhurried pace is something that usually filmmakers do not aspire for.
A luminous tale of companionship, the film is centred around an old couple, 74-year-old Krishna Kurup (Oduvil Unnikrishnan) and sixty-something Ammalu Amma (Nirmala Sreenivasan),who are leading a post-retirement life in their native village. It's very idyllic. They spend their days taking strolls through their kitchen garden that they nurture with so much love, watching old romantic movie songs on television, reading and re-reading letters from their children who live in far-away cities, and just talking to each other about things that might not make much sense to the fast-moving busy world. Their old friends, classmates and colleagues are either dead or living in loneliness, but Kurup and Ammalu Amma have each other in sickness, happiness, and most importantly, in surviving the monotony of everyday life.
It's not a sugar-coated tale, though. Alongside all the tempting images of the pastoral life, there are frequent mentions of death. But Oru Cheru Punchiri doesn't look at death as an unsolicited and gloomy event, but a slender smile when life reaches its peaceful end.
An adaptation of Mithunam, a short-story by Telugu writer Sriramana, Oru Cheru Punchiri is one of the lesser known works of MT, whose film oeuvre has acclaimed movies like Oru Vadakkan Veera Gadha, Perumthachan and Sadayam.
Oru Cheru Punchiri is much smaller and simpler in comparison. It won MT the State Film Award for the best director in 2000, bagged a National Award that year for the Best Film on Environment Conservation/Preservation, and went on to win hearts at various international film festivals it was screened at.
The relationship of the couple has a curious touch of childlike innocence. He is a staunch foodie. A disciplinarian who talks in a loud voice. She is poised, but not any meek. You see her spiritedly reminding him that she used to be a bright matriculation student when he teases her of being a fool. There is a scene in which Kurup, Ammalu Amma and Kannan, a little boy they have befriended, are walking through the farm, examining and passing comments about the coconut trees and vegetable plants. "Hope no one casts an evil eye on them. We should get a scarecrow," says Ammalu Amma, to which Kurup replies cheekily, "That's easy. Why don't you wear that black saree of yours and walk around the farm?" Kannan bursts out laughing, and a furious Ammalu snaps, "Oh, you think you are a handsome man, don't you? Men like Dileep Kumar get more good-looking with age, and look at you, like a withered seed!"
The easiness with which they make fun of each other, complete each other's sentences, and read each other's mind is endearing. During another instance, you see her watching him slide into a deep sleep after taking a country medicine that she had prepared for him. The camera lingers on her face, now lit up with a hint of smile on her lips. It makes you wonder if it's so effortless to be in love.
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There is another reason to why Oru Cheru Punchiri is an unparalleled work. It normalises old age, treats the elderly as people, and not as dispassionate props. Kurup and Ammalu Amma can be foolish and vulnerable, as they can be wise and stern in an orthodox way.
There is a moving scene in which an old colleague, Govindettan, who is visiting them, bids goodbye. "When you come next, stay back for a few days," Ammalu tells him, and he nods, his eyes welling up with tears. Who knows if there will ever be a next time! "Life is in these brief moments that I spend with friends and the people I love, doing things like in the old days," he says.
The prelapsarian Eden where Krishna Kurup (Oduvil Unnikrishnan) and Ammalu Amma (Nirmala Srinivasan) live, looks like a place that exists. Their life, wrapped in happiness and peace, is the one most of us are striving to achieve.
Aswathy Gopalakrishnan is a Film Critic at Silverscreen India, and can be reached on Twitter at aswathyg31 or by email at aswathy@silverscreen.in


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Talent-Job Fit Case Studies Using the TriMetrix System
A Resource Provided by The Talent Management Institute
National Retailer Reduces Turnover and Increases Profitability Using Job-Talent Fit Process
A new division of a successful national retailer wanted to set the new chain apart from the parent company. The company needed to fill management teams for the division's new chain of stores and establish a company culture that expressed their distinct consumer market appeal.
Job reports were created for general manager, assistant manager, and district manager positions.
Talent reports were used to assess candidates for open positions and managers who had already been hired.
Customized development programs were designed based on the job-talent gap report which made it possible for managers to address their own individual growth needs.
The company had already hired both a general manager and an assistant manager before the job benchmarks were created.
When the general manager was assessed, the report revealed that she was strongly motivated by the desire to give back to society and help others. Her job description was then adjusted accordingly to include the responsibility for creating store events that would generate revenue while contributing to the surrounding community and enhancing employee job experience.
The assistant manager's assessment indicated his strong motivation to achieve aesthetic harmony. His job description was adjusted to include responsibility for new store launches, particularly aesthetic aspects such as signage and product placement.
All new candidates for the general manager position were assessed and compared to the general manager job benchmark. Assistant manager candidates were compared to both general manager and assistant general manger benchmarks. The results revealed that some candidates could be fast-tracked because their profile more closely matched that of a general manager. In fact, some of the assistant managers they hired were promoted to general manager within two months.
The result after 10 months of this process was 0 turnovers in a market where turnover rates had historically been at 50%. Going forward, this process was used to staff 30+ new stores the following year.
Improving Job Fit Results in $2.2 Million Turnaround
A company had experienced three consecutive years of poor performance with $2 million in losses in one year alone. The company's lender had given them 18 months to reverse the trend.
The turnaround process began by benchmarking key positions to determine the talent requirements for superior performance.
All employees were assessed to determine job fit and no longer rely on subjective criteria. Only those employees or candidates who were in alignment with the benchmark were considered a good hire for the company.
The VP of sales was replaced and two new sales people were hired using the talent matching process. The rest of the sales team matched the skills, behaviors and motivators that the job required for superior performance.
The job-talent fit process indicated that the reconfigured team fit the profile required for superior performance.
Customized development plans were designed for each employee including a process to address the gaps the assessments identified.
The development process included weekly professional development seminars in some groups and focused single event workshops for other teams to quickly address specific skills.
Going forward onboarding of new hires included a focus on development to sustain the turnaround results.
The development process expanded the employees' capacity beyond their current performance for an immediate improvement. Before the lender's deadline, the company had experienced a $2.2 million turnaround and posted a profit of $200,000 the following year.
High Levels of Sales Force Turnover Eliminated By Job-Talent Matching
A company was experiencing 74% turnover rate of their sales force. This was a major problem because of an estimated cost of salary to find and train a replacement can be up to twice an employee's the damage to morale among remaining employees. Imagine negative impact on the company's bottom line.
The following actions were taken:
The sales job was benchmarked to determine the talent requirements for superior performance.
All current and new salespeople were assessed and compared to the talent requirements of the job.
Based on the job–talent gap report, a personalized development and management plan was created for every salesperson
The company's sales team turnover was reduce to 0% for the following 24 months.
Software Sales Team Skyrockets to First Place With Job-Talent Fit
A new sales manager for software company inherited a sales team that ranked No. 22 out of 22, or dead last.
The sales position was benchmarked and individual talent assessments of current salespeople were compared to the benchmark.
A massive 75% of the sales force did not match the sales position benchmark.
By replacing the 75% with superior salespeople who fit the job benchmark, the team skyrocketed to No. 1 out of the 22 sales teams.
Call Center Turnover Reduction Results in 940% ROI
A group of U.S. customer call centers with 140 employees at each location had turnover rates among customer service representatives in the 80% to 120% range—the national average is 50%. The company calculated their cost of turnover to replace a customer service representative at $17,000 each. Based on 80% turnover, 140 representatives the annual turnover cost was $1,904,000.
Hiring practices were completely revamped the using assessment in screening, interview and hiring process.
A year later the call centers had cut turnover rates in half, saving the company over a half million dollars a year, producing a 940% return on investment.
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