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816 F. 2d 1144 - Ohse v. Hughes
816 F2d 1144 Ohse v. Hughes
James R. OHSE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Michael HUGHES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Argued May 16, 1986.
Decided April 1, 1987.
As Amended April 15, 1987.
Rehearing Denied May 14, 1987.
Joseph D. Pavia, Kirtley-Pavia-Narsh, Urbana, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Gabriel M. Rodriguez, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., Steven M. Helm, Durkes O'Rourke, Stewart, Martin & Helm, Ltd., Danville, Ill., Marty R. Schnorf, State's Attys. Office, Toledo, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before CUDAHY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.*
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant James Ohse appeals the dismissal of his action brought in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Ohse claims he was wrongfully terminated from his position as an Illinois Adult Probation Officer and that the termination violated various rights which he was entitled to under the United States and Illinois Constitutions and Illinois state law. Seven individuals and entities are named as defendants in this action. Included are the Illinois Counties of Coles and Cumberland, Chief Probation Officer Michael Hughes, State's Attorney Nancy Owen, and Illinois Circuit Judges William Sunderman, Joseph Spitz and Paul Komada. The district court had jurisdiction over several counts in this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. Pendent jurisdiction was exercised over the state claims. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all the federal claims. Thereafter, pursuant to United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) and Benson v. Cody, 761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir.1985) the pendent state law claims were dismissed as well.
The relevant facts are as follows. On December 12, 1977 James Ohse was appointed as an Adult Probation Officer in an office headed by Michael L. Hughes, Chief Adult and Juvenile Probation Officer for Coles and Cumberland Counties, Illinois. In either late 1980 or early 1981 friction developed between Ohse and Hughes. There is some testimony that the friction was prompted in part by the promotion of a fellow employee, Vickie Starwalt, to the position of Deputy Chief Probation Officer. In any event, by the spring of 1981 Ohse and Hughes spoke to each other only when necessary.
In April of 1982 Hughes approached Ohse about complaints he had received regarding Ohse. By May, 1982, the situation degenerated to the point where Hughes and Ohse had a confrontation at a staff meeting which was marked by name calling. On May 24, Ohse countered by conversing with two fellow employees about illegal and improper conduct at the Coles-Cumberland Probation Office. Ohse informed them that there had been alcohol consumed during business hours in the office by Hughes and others. Ohse also revealed that Hughes had directed employees to report meal expenses as mileage expenses for reimbursement purposes. The next day Hughes held a staff meeting and admitted the incidents of drinking on the job and the falsifying of mileage reports. Hughes stated, "... we'll all start fresh, we'll all start anew from this point." (See Hughes Deposition at p. 35). Soon thereafter Hughes revised the office policy manual and wrote a letter to Chief Circuit Judge Ralph Pearman indicating he intended to abide strictly by the rules therein. The Circuit Court has supervisory authority over the probation office, including the power to hire and fire personnel, pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Secs. 204-1 et seq. (see infra ).
In June, 1982, Hughes had the opportunity to evaluate Ohse's work performance. Ohse was rated as "adequate" to "exceptional." On August 11, Ohse complained about the evaluation in a memorandum to Hughes. Ohse especially wanted to know why he had been rated only "adequate" in certain areas.1
On November 23, Ohse filed a 17 page grievance with Hughes pursuant to the established office grievance procedure. The grievance detailed their tumultuous personal history and questioned the veracity of Hughes' claim that he had received complaints about Ohse from employees at the State's Attorney's Office. Hughes responded to Ohse's grievance by meeting with three of the defendants in this case: Circuit Judges Spitz, Sunderman and Komada. Hughes asked the judges what he should do. They replied Hughes' evaluations were acceptable and nothing further need be done. Thereafter, on December 2, 1982, Hughes told Ohse his grievance lacked merit. On December 11, a dissatisfied Ohse took his grievance to Judge Pearman. Thereafter, on December 22, Ohse sent a memorandum addressed "To Whom It May Concern" to Pearman, the three defendant judges, selected County Board members and the Coles County State's Attorney's Office. The letter alleged the following improper conduct from the Hughes-headed probation office: 1) misuse of mileage vouchers to cover meal expenses; 2) abuse of sick and vacation time; 3) misappropriation of money budgeted for office expenses; 4) abuse of authority concerning Hughes' obtaining of a hospital's records for personal use; 5) miscellaneous other violations such as the allowing of employees to sleep on the job and secretaries to do personal typing during business hours. Ohse's letter called for an investigation and the filing of criminal charges.
On December 27, defendant Nancy Owen, State's Attorney for Coles County, informed Ohse by letter that criminal charges would not be filed against Hughes. On the next day, December 28, Judge Pearman informed Hughes that he believed Hughes' defenses to the Ohse allegations were sufficient and that nothing further would be done. On January 3, 1983 Hughes suspended Ohse. He also requested Ohse's termination, alleging various acts of insubordination.2 On January 6, Judge Pearman appointed defendant Judges Sunderman, Spitz and Komada to investigate Hughes' request to terminate Ohse. A hearing was held on February 1. On February 2, a written decision was issued terminating Ohse.
On March 16, 1983, Ohse filed the instant action in the district court. The district court broke down his various claims into four areas. First, Ohse alleged his termination violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He claimed he was deprived of property and liberty interests due to the manner in which he was terminated. Second, Ohse claimed his discharge violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression under the United States Constitution. Third, Ohse claimed he was denied his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Ohse asserted various claims under the Illinois Constitution and Illinois law. We shall discuss each claim as presented above.
I--Due Process Claims
A. Property Interest Claim
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) is the seminal case setting forth the current analysis to employ when ascertaining if a person has a property interest in a public sector employment position. In Roth, the Court recognized the now longstanding principle that a person may have a sufficient interest or expectation in a government benefit (see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)) or a position of public employment (see Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956)) to be deemed to have a property interest in that position safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When such a situation arises, summary termination or separation of the person from that interest is unconstitutional. Instead, a hearing or inquiry into the merits behind the proposed termination is necessary to meet Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. This hearing ensures the person is separated from the entitlement only for good cause. When good cause is demonstrated by a separate and fair hearing, a person is deemed to have received all the process that he or she is due. In ascertaining whether a property interest attaches to a particular situation the Roth court stated:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.... Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
92 S.Ct. at 2709.
Indeed, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) the Court declared:
A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law. (Footnotes omitted).
Turning to Illinois law, did Ohse have a legitimate claim of entitlement to his position as an Adult Probation Officer which would create a property interest as described above? We answer in the negative. In Levin v. Civil Service Commission of Cook County, 52 Ill.2d 516, 288 N.E.2d 97 (1972), the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly stated:
As to the status of a public employee, this court has held that a person has no property right in public employment. (People ex rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 77, 49 N.E. 229; People ex rel. Akin v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 585, 606, 51 N.E. 785; Elder v. Mall, 350 Ill. 538, 542, 183 N.E. 578). This court has likewise held that a public employee has no property right in public employment which falls within the protection of the due-process clause of either the State or Federal constitution. Pickus v. Board of Education, 9 Ill.2d 599, 606, 138 N.E.2d 532; Jordan v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 15 Ill.2d 369, 155 N.E.2d 297.
288 N.E.2d at 100.
We also note the language of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Sec. 204-1 which stated in pertinent part during the relevant time pertaining to this lawsuit:
The circuit court of each of the several counties in this State may appoint a probation officer to act as such for and throughout the county to which he shall be appointed. The circuit court of any county may appoint such number of additional probation officers for such county as the court may deem to be necessary or advisable. Any circuit court may also, in its discretion appoint a chief probation officer, deputy chief probation officers, and supervisors, in addition to the number of probation officers appointed.... The probation officers shall serve as such from the date of their appointment, shall be subject to the orders of the courts appointing them, and removable in the discretion thereof by an order duly entered of record. (Emphasis added).3
Ohse claims Ill.Rev.Stat. Chapter 38, Sec. 204-5 mandates that he only be fired "if good cause existed for his termination." (Ohse brief, p. 10). Section 204-5 reads in pertinent part:Any Chief Probation Officer shall have authority to suspend any Probation Officer under his supervision for a period of not exceeding thirty (30) days, but may not discharge, and it shall be the duty of such Chief Probation Officer promptly to file charges against any Probation Officer so suspended by him, with the Court or Judges appointing such Probation Officer, and said Court or Judges shall thereupon investigate said charges and may hear evidence, and shall act thereon as the interest of justice and the good of the probation service may require. (Emphasis added).
We find Ohse's argument unpersuasive. The language of Levin explicitly rejects any notion that public employees in Illinois are presumed to have a property interest in their positions. Further, the language in section 204-1 supra clearly states probation officers serve at the discretion of the state circuit court. As Ohse himself points out in his brief, the rules of statutory construction dictate that words in a statute be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (Ohse Brief, p. 9). By invoking this rule of construction this court is lead to the inescapable conclusion that section 204-1 and Levin clearly indicate that Ohse had no property interest in his position at the probation office. Ohse's reading of section 204-5 as mandating his termination be for good cause only is (arguably) a reasonable interpretation, but not necessarily the only interpretation to be had from the language of the section.4 Since the plain and explicit language of section 204-1 allows removal of Ohse at court discretion, we are unwilling to usurp the plain meaning of that language with Ohse's interpretation of section 204-5.
The Illinois Personnel Code at Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 127, Sec. 63b104a & c is supportive of this ruling. While recognizing Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 127, Sec. 63b108b.16 requires certain state employees be fired only for cause and only after notice and prior hearing, we note Sec. 63b104a & c lists certain groups of employees as exempt from such treatment. "Employees of the courts" are included among the exempt groups.5 Undoubtedly Ohse is an employee of the court, as the district court concluded. This point also nullifies Ohse's argument under Article VI, Section 18(b) of the Illinois Constitution for Ohse must consider himself to be a judicial officer of the Circuit Court in his position as Adult Probation Officer.6
We have considered Ohse's miscellaneous other arguments as to why he had a property interest in his position and find them unpersuasive. Even assuming arguendo that Ohse had a property interest in the instant case, we close our discussion in this section by wondering aloud where a due process violation could be considered to have occurred? Indeed, conspicuously absent from the arguments of both sides in this case is the fact that Ohse did receive a February 1, 1983 hearing before three (now defendant) judges of the state circuit court prior to his discharge. At this hearing Ohse was represented by aggressive counsel who filed several motions. Ohse was also allowed to testify and present documentation and cross-examine witnesses. All this occurred at a hearing held several months after Ohse had initiated a grievance against Hughes pursuant to a delineated procedure and had distributed a letter to the circuit judges, selected county board members and the state's attorney's office outlining the issues we discuss here today. Hence the judges presiding at the February 1 hearing cannot be said to have been ill-informed or unprepared to make a ruling on the matter. The impression Ohse leaves is that anything less than a jury trial is insufficient--assuming arguendo he has a property interest in his position in the first place. Certainly Ohse has no constitutional entitlement to a jury trial in this situation.
B. Liberty Interest Claim
Ohse asserts there is an issue as to whether his termination deprived him of a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree. In order to establish a deprivation of a liberty interest, a plaintiff must advance evidence that the State seriously damaged his standing and associations in the community through allegations of, for example, dishonesty or immorality. Roth, 92 S.Ct. at 2707. The resulting effect should be of sufficient severity that the plaintiff has trouble finding other employment opportunities. Id.7 Ultimately, an individual must be deemed to be deprived of "... the right ... to contract ... (or) engage in any of the common occupations of life...." Id.
No doubt Ohse suffered some degree of negative stigmatization from his discharge but that is inevitable in any discharge and does not necessarily amount to a constitutional deprivation. As we stated in Lipp v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir.1972):
... not every remark which may arguably affect one's reputation violates due process if made by a government official without a hearing, for the fourteenth amendment protects only against charges that 'might seriously damage [one's] standing and associations in his community'.
(Citing Roth, 92 S.Ct. at 2707) (Cited with approval in Hadley v. County of DuPage, 715 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir.1983)).
In Munson we concluded:
A liberty interest is not implicated where the charges merely result in reduced economic returns and diminished prestige, but not permanent exclusion from or protracted interruption of employment.
Id. at 693 (citing Stretten v. Wadsworth, 537 F.2d 361, 366 (7th Cir.1976)).
We do not believe Ohse has alleged any persuasive facts which would lead us to conclude a liberty interest deprivation occurred here. Ohse admits he found employment after his termination (Ohse Dep., Doc. 66, pp. 24-25). Further, no significant evidence is advanced by Ohse that his discharge seriously damaged his associations or reputation in the community. Indeed, the evidence suggests otherwise. Subsequent to his discharge at the probation office Ohse, while employed, apparently pursued a masters degree in business administration at a reputable state university. The district court correctly dismissed Ohse's liberty interest claims.
II--First Amendment Claim
Ohse's First Amendment claim presents more perplexing questions. The criteria to employ here are well established by three cases: Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) and Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827 (7th Cir.1985) (Coffey, J.). Pickering teaches us that to determine whether Ohse's speech was constitutionally protected we must employ a two step analysis. First, we must decide whether Ohse's speech "is a matter of public concern" in which "debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate." Pickering, 88 S.Ct. at 1736. The district court ruled the speech was of public concern and we see no reason to reach a different conclusion. After all, Ohse detailed serious abuses in a publicly funded probation office which were later admitted by the chief of the office to be true. Ohse revealed the drinking of alcohol by probation employees during business hours, the falsifying of mileage charges to cover meal expenses, the inappropriate taking of sick and vacation days, situations where Hughes misappropriated public funds for unauthorized uses, and members of the office sleeping on the job. It is clear to us, as it was to the district court, that the above matters are of public concern which would trigger "debate ... vital to an informed decision-making electorate." Id. Having determined the speech of public concern, the next step, according to Pickering, is to employ a balancing test best described by Judge Coffey in Knapp:
If the speech is deemed a matter of public concern, the court must then engage in the Pickering balancing test, weighing the interest of the public employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern with the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting effective and efficient public service.
757 F.2d at 839.
Several factors should be considered in this analysis, such as:
(1) whether the speech impeded the employee's ability to perform her responsibilities; (2) the importance of close working relationships with superiors and coworkers; (3) the time, place, and manner in which the speech was delivered; and (4) the context in which the underlying dispute arose.
Id.
Ultimately, however, the Pickering court recognized that:
Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by ... public employees may be thought by their supervisors, against whom the statements are directed to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.
88 S.Ct. at 1734-35.
At this point, for purposes of comparison and perspective we turn to the fact patterns and analysis surrounding the Connick and Knapp cases. In Connick the allegedly aggrieved employee was named Sheila Myers. Myers held a position as an Assistant District Attorney. Upset over her proposed transfer to another office she spoke to one of her superiors about the matter. Unsatisfied with the results, she prepared an office questionnaire and then distributed it in-house to 15 Assistant District Attorneys. The questionnaire asked the staff its opinion on the office transfer policy, office morale, the desirability of creating a grievance committee, the degree of confidence in the supervisory staff, and whether it was felt there was pressure to work on the political campaigns of office supported candidates. District Attorney Harry Connick, Myers' boss, considered the questionnaire an act of insubordination and discharged Myers. Myers concluded the questionnaire triggered her termination and therefore abridged her First Amendment right to speak freely. Connick claimed the termination was because Myers refused to accept the transfer. The Supreme Court rejected Myers' argument, reversing the rulings of the lower tribunals. It reasoned:
Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships. Myers' discharge therefore did not offend the First Amendment.
103 S.Ct. at 1693-94.
The Connick Court continued:
In this case, with but one exception, the questions posed by Myers to her co-workers do not fall under the rubric of matters of "public concern." We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers' co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers' dispute over her transfer to another section of the criminal court. Unlike the dissent, post, at 1698, we do not believe these questions are of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney's Office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoings or breach of public trust on the part of Connick and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient performance of its duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celebre. (Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, we disagree with the district court that Connick compels us to reach the conclusion that Ohse's speech was unprotected. We are of the opinion that Ohse's "To Whom It May Concern" letter, distributed to various figures in positions of public trust, was more focused upon issues of public concern than Myers' in-house office questionnaire. The Connick Court found only one of Myers' questions of public concern. This cannot be compared to the several questions of public concern raised by Ohse. Further, Ohse's actions were not as disruptive to the management of his office as Myers' questions/actions were to hers. The Hughes abuses delineated by Ohse were probably generally recognized by a significant percentage of the office personnel (if not all personnel). Additionally, Myers' questionnaire was distributed in-house and doubted the integrity and competence of the supervisory staff in general. Ohse's grievances were taken out of the office and attacked only Hughes' performance as office leader. The "To Whom It May Concern" letter may have disrupted the office, undermined Hughes' authority, and hindered close working relationships in a manner which may best be described as inevitable; however, we believe that the matters the letter addressed were of high public concern and that Ohse was entitled to raise these important issues as he did.
Interestingly, it was only six days after Judge Pearman informed Hughes that his defenses to the Ohse allegations were adequate that Hughes suspended Ohse, triggering the process that would lead to Ohse's termination.8 Before this event, Hughes had rated Ohse's professional competence as "adequate" to "exceptional." In sum, in this case we conclude Ohse's interest as a citizen in commenting on these matters of public concern outweighs the State's interest in promoting an efficient and effective working environment. The Pickering balancing test weighs toward Ohse's interests and therefore we rule his speech was constitutionally protected, reversing the district court here.9
The facts of the Knapp case closely parallel those in the case at bar, although they are not as similar as the facts of Atcherson. In Knapp this court affirmed the district court ruling that plaintiff Knapp's speech on certain issues was constitutionally protected. This enabled Terry Knapp, a school teacher, to take his case to the jury, which ultimately granted him an award for damages. Yet it can hardly be comfortably concluded that Knapp's speech was less disruptive to the school system that employed him than Ohse's speech was to his probation office. The Knapp court summarized:
The record indicates that Knapp contacted School Board members concerning his classroom assignment; the content of administrative assistant Hatton's evaluations; the inequitable mileage allowance for Woodruff coaches; the liability insurance provided by Peoria School District No. 150 for coaches and volunteer parents who transport student-athletes to school-related activities; and the general ineffectiveness of the grievance procedure within District 150.
The record also indicates Knapp consistently avoided following established grievance procedures and chains of command while contacting the School Board. Indeed, Knapp delivered an 11 page statement to the Board (not unlike the Ohse "To Whom It May Concern" letter) describing his school's policies and actions. Even Knapp's union representative called at least one of Knapp's five grievances without merit. School principal Russell McDavid labeled this conduct disruptive and insubordinate, not unlike as Hughes has done in the instant case.
Not all of Knapp's issues of concern were deemed of public concern by the court. However, when the Pickering balancing test was employed by the Knapp court, Knapp's interests were deemed to have priority. Not insignificantly, the Knapp court stated:
The initial, and often determinative, question is whether the speech interferes with the employee's work or with the efficient and successful operation of the office. Knapp's speech clearly did not interfere with his teaching responsibilities, as Knapp continued to teach in the science department at Woodruff High School for more than a year after he spoke with the School Board members.
We are unconvinced there is sufficient evidence to conclude at this point that Ohse's speech interfered with his responsibilities at the probation office. Several reasons compel such a conclusion. First, before the "To Whom It May Concern" letter, even Hughes rated Ohse's performance "adequate" to "exceptional." Secondly, no significant concrete examples of professional incompetence are ever advanced by Hughes. Thirdly, there is no evidence that Ohse was unable to get along with an unusually large number of fellow employees at the office. The only disruptive result of Ohse's speech and conduct from the evidence advanced is the degenerative effect it had on the already volatile Hughes-Ohse relationship. That is not sufficient to separate the case from Knapp, where the plaintiff was allowed to proceed to trial.
In sum, Ohse's speech addressed matters of public concern by unearthing breaches of the public trust. The issues of public concern raised by Ohse were of equal import compared to those found in Knapp and greater in number than those found in Connick. Hence we conclude that Ohse's speech was constitutionally protected as a matter of law.
Yet Ohse is still not out of the woods. We must vacate and remand this case back to the district court. As we stated in Knapp:
The initial issue is one of law, whether the plaintiff's speech is constitutionally protected.... If this burden is satisfied, the next question is one of fact, whether the constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's actions. If this second burden is satisfied, the third question is also one of fact, whether the defendant defeated the plaintiff's claim by demonstrating that he would have reached the same decision in the absence of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected speech. (Footnotes omitted).
Therefore, in order to decide these questions of fact, we believe a remand is appropriate.
III--Equal Protection Claim
Ohse claims he was denied equal protection of the laws because other state employees are assured evidentiary hearings before their termination. We reject this contention.
Ohse's attack on the Illinois law that draws a distinction between any process probation officers and other state employees may receive before termination is without merit. Under the traditional equal protection analysis the distinction must have a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. We believe the distinction meets this test. The State could rationally conclude that probation officers are in a position of trust and confidence with the court that justifies discretionary removal. Of course, this recognition of a probation officer's sensitive relationship with the judiciary should not be read to necessarily preclude an individual's First Amendment right to speak freely on issues of public concern, an issue which Pickering teaches us should be examined on a case by case basis. We see no constitutional violation in the distinction given to probation office positions.
In this section we address two final matters. The first is Ohse's argument that the defendant judges do not enjoy absolute immunity in this case. Ohse claims the judges served in an executive as opposed to judicial capacity and therefore are entitled to only good faith immunity and capable of being sued in this case. The district court did not address this issue and therefore on a remand, Ohse believes his counts against the judges should be considered. We disagree and rule the three defendant judges are to be dismissed from this lawsuit as a matter of law.
In Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.1986), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1282, 94 L.Ed.2d 140 (1987), we reflected upon the fact that for several hundred years a judge's judicial "acts" or rulings from the bench on matters within his jurisdiction are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See 792 F.2d at 650-51, dissent at 660-61. Similarly, in McMillan v. Svetanoff, 793 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.1986) we elaborated that:
It is well established that judges are immune from liability for their judicial acts, even when they act maliciously or corruptly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). The purpose of judicial immunity is to protect the public's interest in an independent judiciary. The doctrine of judicial immunity was initially developed in the context of adversarial proceedings where judges decide controversies between parties. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). It has since been extended to any "judicial" act performed by a judge and even to other officials acting in a manner closely aligned with the judicial process. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Mother Goose Nursery Schools, Inc. v. Sendak, 770 F.2d 668 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 884, 88 L.Ed.2d 919 (1986).
The rationale for a doctrine that excludes judges from liability for even intentional and malicious conduct while on the bench is that judges should be free to make controversial decisions and act upon their convictions without fear of personal liability. Stump, 435 U.S. at 364, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. It is the concern for principled and fearless decisionmaking that forms the basis for judicial immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). But immunity is only granted when essential to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-335, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 1116, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).
Courts are hesitant and cautious in applying the judicial immunity doctrine to areas outside the traditional adversarial process, such as to quasi-judicial acts. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In order for quasi-judicial officials to be granted absolute judicial immunity, their acts must reflect the essence of judicial decision-making and involve discretion of a judicial nature. See id., 106 S.Ct. at 1097; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.1966). Accordingly, only in the most extraordinary cases are executives shielded from damages liability. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 496, 501, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (citing favorably Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d at 669, 674 n. 2 [7th Cir.1984] (Cudahy, J., concurring)). We must be equally hesitant in applying the doctrine to judges acting outside the traditional dispute resolution function.
793 F.2d at 150-51.
Surely, the defendant judges in the instant case were involved in a "judicial act" in which they should feel free to render decisions without fear of personal liability. Ohse's hearing had all the elements of a judicial proceeding--counsel was present, witnesses were cross-examined and documentary evidence was received. Importantly, the judges had no personal or professional interaction with Ohse other than when Ohse initiated the interaction through his own letters addressed to them and, of course, through the hearing. Any interaction by the judges with Hughes concerning Ohse was also done in a judicial manner and can only be considered as judicial in nature. Ohse's argument that the judges were serving in an executive, as opposed to judicial capacity, simply misses the point. As the Supreme Court stated in Butz v. Economo, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).
Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities. This point is underlined by the fact that prosecutors--themselves members of the Executive Branch--are also absolutely immune.
Of course, supportive authority for our ruling here today also comes from Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). In Pierson a municipal police officer had presided over a criminal case under Mississippi law which resulted in 15 defendants being given sentences of four months in jail and fines of $200. On appeal the County Court reversed the convictions and the cases were dropped. Subsequent to this, the defendants turned petitioners by filing a Sec. 1983 action against the municipal police justice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The petition asked for damages based on false arrest and imprisonment. The Supreme Court stated:
We find no difficulty in agreeing with the Court of Appeals that Judge Spencer is immune from liability for damages for his role in these convictions. The record is barren of any proof or specific allegation that Judge Spencer played any role in these arrests and convictions other than to adjudge petitioners guilty when their cases came before his court. Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349, note, at 350.) It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by Sec. 1983, which makes liable "every person" who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), that immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.
87 S.Ct. at 1217-18 (Footnotes and citations omitted).
In sum, for reasons articulated above, we find the role played by the three defendant judges in this action unmistakably judicial in nature and within their jurisdiction. Therefore, we rule the three defendant judges are to be dismissed from the lawsuit.10
Finally, we note Ohse has pleaded state law claims which were never addressed by the district court after it dismissed all the federal claims. On remand, these claims should be addressed accordingly.
IT IT SO ORDERED.
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all aspects of the lucid and persuasive majority opinion except for the section finding the judges, Messrs. Spitz, Sunderman and Canada, absolutely immune as a matter of law. It may be that these judges should enjoy absolute immunity, but the district court has never ruled on the matter, and I believe the issue should be remanded to the district court for fact-finding. The root of the problem is that these judges did not act within their "judicial" jurisdiction (as I understand the term). This was not litigation brought before them in normal course for their decision as judges. Rather the question was administrative or executive in nature: whether to discharge an individual with respect to whom the Circuit Court wielded ultimate supervisory authority. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38 Secs. 204-1, et seq. (1981).
It is certainly arguable that Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), would support absolute immunity for these administrative acts performed by judges proceeding in a fashion generally associated with a formal adjudication. On the other hand, the judges' acts challenged in the present case relate to the resolution of internal personnel matters rather than to the enforcement against outside parties of agency regulations or statutes as in Butz. Cf. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 503, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (denying absolute immunity for prison disciplinary committee members functioning as adjudicators in disciplinary proceedings); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (denying absolute immunity for school board members enforcing disciplinary regulations in the school); Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 653-54 (7th Cir.1986) (describing cases regarding immunity for judicial personnel decisions), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1282, 94 L.Ed.2d 140 (1987).
Despite repeated declarations by the courts that it is function rather than status which controls, see, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14, there seems to me to be a bias in the cases toward granting absolute immunity to judges--even when they are acting in matters of personnel administration, cf. Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d at 658-64 (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1282, 94 L.Ed.2d 140 (1987). On the other hand, there is in the cases a thread of reluctance to recognize absolute immunity where a discharge is at stake, see id., 792 F.2d at 653-54. Finally, there is the important factor of formal adjudicatory procedures as a protection against error, which argues for absolute immunity. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-14, 98 S.Ct. at 2914-15, cf. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S.Ct. at 501.
In the instant case, I believe this is a very close question and fact-finding about the relation of the judges to the plaintiff and about the precise nature of the judges' proceedings might clarify the issue. I would therefore remand on this point and to this extent I respectfully dissent from an opinion which in all other respects I find exemplary.
The Honorable William J. Campbell, Senior District Judge of the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation
We note Ohse claims Hughes told him, prior to the evaluation, that he had received complaints about Ohse from employees of the State's Attorney's Office. Ohse asserts he questioned those employees and they all denied ever complaining to Hughes
This procedure is pursuant to the statutory scheme found at Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Sec. 204-5 (see infra )
Section 204-1 has been repealed, effective January 1, 1986. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Section 204-5 (infra ) has been amended and rewritten effective January 1, 1986, however there is no indication this section should be applied retroactively to fit Ohse's situation. [See Union Pacific Railway Company v. Laramie Stockyards Company, 231 U.S. 190, 199, 34 S.Ct. 101, 102, 58 L.Ed. 179 (1913), "the first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past ... a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights ... unless such be 'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislation.' " (quoting United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. 399 (3 Cranch 399), 2 L.Ed. 479 (1806)) (quoted in Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160, 84 S.Ct. 615, 621, 11 L.Ed.2d 576 (1964)) ]
Indeed one could argue a situation could arise where a person could be fired without cause because "the interest of justice and the good of probation service" requires such a move, although we do not mean to suggest we find this argument any more persuasive
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 127, Sec. 63b104a reads in pertinent part:
Definition of jurisdictions. There are hereby created three separate areas of personnel jurisdiction of the Department of Central Management Services, as follows:
(1) Jurisdiction A, with respect to the classification and compensation of positions in the State service.
(2) Jurisdiction B, with respect to the positions in the State service to which persons must hold appointments on a basis of merit and fitness.
(3) Jurisdiction C, with respect to conditions of employment in State service.
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 127, Sec. 63b104c reads in pertinent part:
General exemption. The following positions in State service shall be exempt from jurisdictions A, B, and C, unless such jurisdictions shall be extended as provided in this Act:
(3) Judges and officers and employees of the courts, and notaries public.
Article VI, Section 18(b) of the Illinois Constitution states:
"The General Assembly shall provide by law for the election, or the appointment by Circuit Judges, or clerks and other non-judicial officers of the Circuit Courts and for their terms of office and removal for cause."
In Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 693 (7th Cir.1985) we summarized Roth 's teachings as follows:
In interpreting the Supreme Court's holding in Roth, this court has held that a liberty interest is implicated when either (1) the individual's good name, reputation, honor or integrity are at stake by such charges as immorality, dishonesty, alcoholism, disloyalty, Communism or subversive acts; or (2) the state imposes a stigma or other disability on the individual which forecloses other opportunities.
Arguably it was less than six days since one of those six days was New Year's Day and therefore not a working day
To this extent we reject the district court's ruling that Connick overrules Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.1979). Atcherson concerns a situation factually similar to the case at bar. Esther Atcherson was a probation officer who had strained relations with her boss. Eventually she wrote a letter to Judge Siebenmann stating that if it was her integrity that was at issue, she'd like to reveal some facts about her boss's conduct. She then alleged the office regularly engaged in improper expense reimbursement procedures such as the falsification of mileage expenses to cover other expenses. Soon thereafter, Atcherson was forced to resign. The Eighth Circuit ruled the termination was wrongful and in violation of her First Amendment right to free speech. We agree and note we distinguish Atcherson from Connick using the same reasoning to distinguish Ohse's case from Connick above
Ohse's cite to Atcherson v. Siebenmann, supra as supportive authority is without merit. The Atcherson court did not rule, as Ohse suggests, that judges in a position as we find them in the case at bar do not enjoy absolute immunity. Rather, the Atcherson court ducked the question stating:
Assuming without deciding that Judge Siebenmann acted as an administrator and not in his judicial capacity, we hold that he established a qualified immunity defense to damages liability.8
Footnote number 8 reads:
Because of our disposition of the qualified immunity issue, we do not reach Judge Siebenmann's argument that his conduct in terminating Atcherson's employment was cloaked in absolute judicial immunity.
Therefore Atcherson does not bolster Ohse's argument here and, more generally, Ohse fails to persuade us there is any significant case law on point supportive of his position.


When armed police are dispatched in Britain, they have to decide if the person they are called for is a danger, and if so, do they shoot.
While this sound fine in principle, in practice, you have to obey all instructions that these armed officers give both promptly, and correctly in every detail, otherwise, you are likely to end up dead.
Unfortunately for about a quarter of those on the receiving end of this treatment, this is something you can't easily do if you are mad, or deaf at the time.
Despite signing up in the late 1980's to a treaty that commits them to use non-lethal force for policing whenever possible, it is only in 2001 that they are actually introducing any less-lethal weaponary at all, and these weapons are the ones most likely to produce a lethal outcome.
The justification for this delay is that when you try and use such weapons which are not designed to be lethal, some people die from it, and others get injured. Because of the risk of injury or death, they refuse to use these weapons, leaving the only option to be to shoot to kill, or not.
America on the other hand have been using non-lethal weapons for a number of years, resulting in thousands of people still being alive who if confronted in Britain would be dead.


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Heath Care
Stock Market Nation
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Medicinal Marijuana: The Cannabis Fund Trend
How Will General Motors NYSE:GM Perform After its Closure in Venezuela
Issues That Haunts Tesla, Inc. NASDAQ:TSLA
Why Exxon Mobil Corporation (NYSE:XOM) Requested to Lift Sanction
Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALXN) Inches Its Way Back
Virtu Financial NASDAQ:VIRT & KCG NYSE:KCG To Merge
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Socially Responsible Investment: How to Invest in Stocks You Can Feel…
3 Reasons Why You Should Target Biotech For Investment
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America's Changing Belief About Marijuana and Marijuana Stocks
How to Buy Your First Stock
Incyte Corp. (NASDAQ: INCY) and the Effect of FDA's Disapproval
Home Business How Will General Motors NYSE:GM Perform After its Closure in Venezuela
Dan Hughes
On April 20th of this year, the General Motors announced it was pulling out its business in Venezuela. The reason was the Venezuelan government had seized one of its plants. This happened simultaneously with anti-government protests held by civilians who oppose Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's government. They are calling for the ousting of President Maduro and the return of democracy in their country.
Possible Grounds Behind the Confiscation of General Motors Assets
The government did not give any explanation why it froze General Motors assets. The government believes that having an economy that is entirely managed by the government will boost the country and rise from its bankruptcy.
A court in Zulia directed the confiscation of all the assets and properties of GM. This decision came at the same time protesters are rallying against the government. The court issued the order based on a lawsuit filed by a former GM dealer in 2000. Many wondered why it's only now that the tribunal reprimanded such action. The reason for ruling this order at the height of protests against the government was not clear to its citizens.
General Motors NYSE:GM has been operating in Venezuela since 1948. GM officials say the action and the forced acquisition of the plant and its assets is illogical. They have completely disregarded the rights of GM Company to due process.
With the decision of GM to stop its business operations in Venezuela its 2,700 plant employees become instantly un-employeed . This is not the first time that the Venezuelan government seized and held assets of a foreign company. How the companies stock will perform after this event remains to be seen.
GM or General Motors Company, is an American automotive manufacturer. The company operates in 35 countries around the world. NYSE:GM is its stock symbol on the New York Stock Exchange market.
SOURCE(Fernando Llano/AP)
NYSE:GM stocks
President Nicolas Maduro
Venezuelan government
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Exploring Differences, Deepening Faith
At Hartford International, you'll learn in an interfaith community that allows you to deepen your faith, as well as to appreciate and understand the religion of others.
A 180-Year Legacy of Training Faith Leaders
Hartford International prepares the next generation of religious leaders – peacebuilders who care for and serve people not just of their own faith, but of other faiths in their communities.
Global Facing. Impact Focused.
As an International University for Religion and Peace, we foster faith exploration, respect, and peacebuilding – ideas brought to life through work with our global and community partners.
A Legacy of Asking the Big Questions
Our world-renowned faculty and students use research to examine faith – from origin and interpretation to how we can use our understanding of one another to drive peace across the globe.
Together in Hope of Peace
Our students use their skills, sensitivity, and drive to see positive change in communities near and far – examining international conflicts with empathy, understanding, and unparalleled respect for others.
Hartford Seminary is now Hartford International University for Religion and Peace.
As a pioneering, interreligious, international theological university, Hartford International has helped thousands of people find peace within, and many thousands more find peace with each other. At Hartford International, we use interfaith dialogue and discovery to deepen our beliefs, respect our differences, and find ourselves and love for each other.
HIU Highlights
M.A. in Interreligious Studies
Immerse in interfaith dialogue and deepen your knowledge of your own faith.
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Leading a deeper understanding of faith, humanity, and how we thrive together.
M.A. in Chaplaincy
Preparing the next generation of religious leaders.
Pioneering an interreligious environment like no other – we help thousands of people deepen their faith & lead countless more out of conflict.
Degree Programs Leadership Certificates
Hartford International now offers religious diversity training and consultation for businesses and working professionals.
From our faculty to our students, Hartford International is home to and fosters world-renowned scholars who are engaged in religion research – exploring answers to questions of faith in the world today.
Our students work with religious scholars across the globe – from consortiums with the world's top academic institutions to local and international communities.
$1 Million Lilly Endowment Grant to Create a National Training Program for Black Church Leaders
Climate Change and Migration: Why Do People Leave the Homes They Love?
Facing the FACTs: What an Interreligious Survey of 15,000 Faith Communities Says About Congregational Health
President Lohr Sets Spring Office Hours
Pulse of the Region Podcast to Feature President Lohr
Our approach to theological study is about building connections and experiencing our differences – nourishing love for the entire human family, no matter where you come from or what faith you hold closest in your heart.
The Four Elements of Moral Imagination
Peacebuilders have the complex task of examining conflict, collective trauma, and working with communities to overcome cycles of violence. Our Master of Arts in International Peacebuilding program deeply engages students in a skills-focused application of...
How psychology plays an integral role in Chaplaincy
Chaplains working in a number of settings need to understand the important role that psychology plays in their profession, in order to best serve the people they are working with.
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A Name Change Not Taken Lightly
In one form or another, Hartford Seminary has been around for 187 years. While the campus has been in five different locations, and though we actually began as the Theological Institute of Connecticut, for most...
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Ducking Day at the SCOTUS
Yesterday's SCOTUS decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop case did not decide the main issue that made it worth following: whether a baker has a constitutional right of free speech to refuse to make a wedding-style cake for a same-sex couple in the teeth of a state public accommodations law. Instead, as I discussed here, the Court resolved the case based on a rather far-fetched reading of the record in the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, attributing anti-religious bias to one or two commissioners based on statements that, all things considered, are best read not to express such bias.
I have my doubts about whether all seven justices in the Masterpiece majority (or even five of them) actually thought this was the best way to resolve the case. It strikes me as more likely that this was a compromise ruling on relatively narrow case-specific grounds, reflecting an inability of the Court to produce a definitive ruling just yet.
Or maybe not. The Supreme Court has been holding the cert petition in Arlene's Flowers v. Washington since November. It presents essentially the same issue but with a florist instead of a baker. Had the Court resolved Masterpiece in favor of the cakeshop on the free speech claim, the standard procedure now would be to grant the Arlene's Flowers cert petition, vacate the Washington State Supreme Court ruling, and remand for reconsideration in light of Masterpiece. Such a procedure--grant, vacate, and remand--is known in the trade as a GVR. But because the Court did not address the key issue in Masterpiece, a GVR now makes no sense. There is, so far as I'm aware, no issue of possible subjective anti-religious bias in Arlene's Flowers. Thus, if the Court resolved Masterpiece the way it did because a majority of the Court really thought that the subjective bias issue was the best way to deal with the case on the merits, it should now grant cert in Arlene's Flowers to address the bigger question it left unresolved in Masterpiece. However, if the Court now simply denies cert in Arlene's Flowers or, worse, nonsensically GVRs, then we will have strong evidence that the justices are punting because they don't want to decide the conflict between speech and civil rights.
I don't want to sound too critical of the Court's performance in Masterpiece. There are times when strategic ducking makes sense practically if not strictly legally. In recent memory, the best example is probably the Court's handling of the 2004 Establishment Clause challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance for its inclusion of the phrase "under God." Rather than rule in favor of the plaintiff and open a new front in the culture war, a majority dismissed the case on questionable standing grounds. Sometimes a bogus procedural ruling is better than either a bad substantive ruling (such as approving the Pledge) or a correct one (such as invalidating the Pledge) that sparks destructive backlash.
Whether Masterpiece Cakeshop can best be described as justifiable procedural ducking remains to be seen, but there are reasons to be hopeful. For the most part, state and lower federal courts have been ruling against claims for religious and speech exceptions to anti-discrimination laws brought by the likes of photographers, bakers, and florists. And because I think that generally that's the right result, I'd much prefer that the SCOTUS stay out of these cases than resolve them in what I regard as the wrong way. So from my perspective, there's no great urgency here. Put differently, I would regard a cert grant in Arlene's Flowers as potentially worse than a denial.
If ducking hot-button cultural issues sometimes makes sense, there can be little justification for the SCOTUS avoiding "cold-button" wonky issues that hold no interest for the general public but are important to state and lower federal courts. Yet that is what the Court appeared to do yesterday in Hughes v. United States.
A little background may be helpful. In 2011, in Freeman v. United States, the Supreme Court decided a somewhat technical issue involving the interaction of the US Sentencing Guidelines and a federal statute. However, there was no majority opinion. Instead, the justices divided 4-1-4 among three different options, with Justice Sotomayor casting the solo vote. Some confusion resulted in the lower federal courts. Under a decision procedure specified in the 1977 case of Marks v. United States, when the Court divides in this way, lower courts should give precedential effect to "that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Most lower federal court judges thought that Justice Sotomayor's opinion staked out the narrowest ground in Freeman and thus treated it as controlling. But a few courts did not, arguing that her ground for decision was not a logical subset of Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion. Kennedy and Sotomayor provided different rationales for the same bottom line in Freeman, these lower court judges observed, but neither rationale was broader or narrower than the other.
That characterization echoed a longstanding criticism of the Marks procedure. A good introduction to that criticism (along with a proposed solution) can be found in a cleverly titled recent article--Questioning Marks--by Prof. Ryan Williams in the Stanford Law Review. Prof. Richard Re offers still more pointed criticisms of Marks in a forthcoming article in the Harvard Law Review. Meanwhile, Prof. Max Stearns has defended Marks in various academic work summarized in an amicus brief he filed in Hughes. According to Prof. Stearns, when the Court divides, it usually does so along one dimension, and in those circumstances, there is no difficulty with applying the Marks rule.
As the careful scholarly attention given to the critique and defense of Marks indicates, whether to retain Marks, if so, what exactly it means, and if not, what should replace it, are important questions. The first two of three cert questions in Hughes concerned the application of Marks. And the briefing and oral argument in Hughes focused intently on the Marks-based procedural question: what should lower court judges do when faced with non-majority opinions of the SCOTUS?
So how did the Court answer the question in Hughes? It didn't. Rather than say what precedential effect should be given to which opinions from Freeman, the Court simply issued a majority opinion resolving the issue that divided the justices in Freeman. Justice Kennedy explained the non-decision of the Marks question this way:
a majority of the Court in the instant case now can resolve the sentencing issue on its merits. So it will be unnecessary to consider [cert] questions one and two despite the extensive briefing and careful argument the parties presented to the Court concerning the proper application of Marks. The opinion that follows resolves the sentencing issue in this case; and, as well, it should give the necessary guidance to federal district courts and to the courts of appeals with respect to plea agreements of the kind presented here and in Freeman.
To which one wants to say: What??!!! Sure, you've rendered a decision regarding Marks unnecessary in the Freeman context, but what about all of the other circumstances in which lower courts need to figure out how to apply non-majority opinions? The Hughes opinion offers no justification whatsoever for punting on Marks.
Perhaps there is an excuse, if not exactly a justification. As Professor Re notes in a short post this morning on Prawfsblawg, maybe the justices could not reach a majority agreement about the Marks question. He observes that "it would have been awkward if the Court had issued a fragmented decision on the meaning of fragmented decisions." Indeed, that would not have been merely awkward but self-defeating. A fragmented decision could not resolve how to construe fragmented decisions except by self-referential bootstrapping.
But maybe the justices could have reached majority agreement on the Marks question and simply chose not to because, to quote CJ Roberts when he was a circuit judge, resolving the merits issue in Hughes was "a sufficient ground for deciding this case, and the cardinal principle of judicial restraint - if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more - counsels [the Court] to go no further." If such a notion of judicial restraint motivated the Court's reticence on Marks in Hughes, then, I humbly suggest, the Court erred.
Avoiding unnecessary judicial decisions is a fine principle, one connected in some measure to separation of powers: If resolving an issue is truly unnecessary to the resolution of a case, then a court that resolves the issue drifts away from its role of resolving concrete cases and controversies and closer to the realm of legislation.
But let's not kid ourselves that the principle of avoiding unnecessary decisions has infinite weight. It sometimes competes with other important principles, including the weighty principle that like cases should be treated alike. Because of the limited number of cases the Supreme Court hears, in order to carry into effect the treat-like-cases-alike principle, the Court must issue opinions that give lower courts sufficient guidance so that they are applying the same rules of law. Accordingly, what CJ Roberts calls "the cardinal principle of judicial restraint" must sometimes give way to the principle that the SCOTUS should give guidance to lower court judges. Hughes should have been a case in which giving guidance prevailed over avoiding unnecessary decisions.
Indeed, one can go even further in criticizing the Court's unexplained ducking of the Marks question in Hughes. Usually when the Court fails to resolve some issue, if the issue is important a new case will come back to the Court presenting it soon enough. As noted above, that could happen very quickly with respect to Masterpiece Cakeshop. But the Marks question will remain duckable indefinitely, so long as a majority of the Court can resolve the underlying merits question.
To be sure, there are a couple of contexts in which it matters what the law was at some prior time, not what it is today: Whether a matter was clearly established is relevant to whether officers have qualified immunity for violating civil rights and for whether a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief. Thus, it is possible to imagine a case in which the only issue is what some prior divided Court ruling meant. E.g., did a 4-1-4 ruling clearly establish that some course of conduct was unlawful? However, the qualified immunity and habeas contexts have their own complications that make the answer to the question in those contexts potentially different from the general question of how, in a non-qualified-immunity/non-habeas context, a lower court should construe a divided SCOTUS ruling.
As a consequence, it does really look like the Court, following the practice of Hughes, could avoid resolving the Marks question indefinitely. If the justices wait for a case in which it is truly necessary to decide the Marks question to decide the case, they will wait forever.
Checks & Balances Judiciary Civil Rights Religious Freedom Justice & Safety Criminal Justice
Versus Trump: Blurring Public and Private Conduct
On this week's Versus Trump, Jason and Charlie discuss two new legal filings by the Trump DOJ that blur the line between the President as government official and the President as private citizen. In the first case, the government argues that the President's twitter feed is not an official public forum, so he can block people with whom he disagrees. In the second, the government argues that the President's denials that he sexually assaulted E. Jean Carroll were made in his official capacity as President. Listen now!
How the Right to Vote Became Fundamental
The Nineteenth Amendment helped cement the idea that the right to vote is a fundamental right inherent in citizenship
David Gans
The Real Problem with Seila
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that tenure protection for the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutional. The decision's reasoning may be more important—and worrisome—than the holding itself.
U.C. Hastings College of the Law


Yes, the SM-G925F, is the internation version of the Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge. If you look at the link you shared to Amazon the phone is listed as fully compatible with AT&T and partially compatible with T-Mobile.
I looked up the Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge on FrequencyCheck.com. You can use this site to see how compatible a phone like the G925F is with the different networks by country. This phone is very compatible with AT&T's network in the USA. While it is compatible with T-Mobile's 4G LTE network as well as their 2G and 2.5G network it is only partially compatible with their 3G and 3.5G network. This would be a concern if you found yourself in an area with little or no 4G coverage on T-Mobile. The phone would like fall back to slow 2G or 2.5G service.
You didn't mention why you wanted the G925F, the international version. If you want to use the phone outside the US, I'd encourage you to use FrequencyCheck.com to see how compatible it is in the other countries you want to use it.
If you just want an unlocked phone, I'd ecourage you to look at the AT&T, T-Mobile, or Verizon models that have better support for US network. The G925F as no support for Verizon or Sprint as it doesn't have CDMA.
I also checked out the hardware specs on GSMAArea.com. Sometimes the CPU, chipset, and GPU differ between the US and international models but for the G925F they are identical. For people concerned with hardware specs and capabilities this is sometimes an issue.
One other thing you may want to consider is Android security and system updates. For the G925F these updates would need to come directly from Samsung. If you buy the G925A, G925T, or G925V the updates will come from AT&T, T-Mobile, or Verizon. I'm not sure if the carriers deliver more frequent updates than Samsung, but I have heard from at least one person who claimed updates from Samsung are sporadic.
Finally a note about buying this phone on Amazon. Please note this phone is being offered by independent sellers. These phones are neither sold or fulfilled by Amazon. Make sure you understand if the phone you are buying is new, used, or refurbished and that you understand the return policy.
A few years back I bought a "new" Samsung Galaxy S3 Verizon phone on Amazon. I paid a premium for a new phone, rather than a used one from eBay. When the phone arrived it was in a Galaxy S3 box for a different model phone. When I contacted the seller, he told me they get new phones, without boxes, buy samsung boxes, and package the phones. That wasn't my definition of new, so I returned the phone. That phone was fulfilled by Amazon so the return went smoothly but I learned to be careful after that.


Everyone has food cravings every now and again. But for people who struggle to control their daily calorie intake, food can be downright addictive.
A new study presented at the annual conference of the European College of Neuropsychopharmacology discovered that brain activity in obese people is different than that of their normal-weight counterparts, which may explain the susceptibility to food. In fact, in obese individuals, brain activity in response to food is similar to that of substance abusers.
For their study, researchers provided a buffet-style meal to 81 people in total, 39 of whom were obese and the others were within the normal weight range. Later, each participant underwent an MRI while viewing photos of the food from the buffet to stimulate a food craving. Researchers then used the scans to map a neurological response.
In obese individuals, the MRI showed a greater connectivity between the dorsal caudate and the somatosensory cortex, parts of the brain associated with reward-based habits and the coding of the energetic value of foods. Normal-weight participants did not show the same neural response.
These findings suggest that people who struggle with their weight may have a tendency toward food cravings hard-wired into their brains. Knowing the differences in brain activity between obese and normal-weight individuals could help researchers come up with new therapies, such as pharmaceuticals or brain stimulation techniques, according to the study's authors.
Certain types of foods are more addictive than others. Foods high in sugar and/or fat have typically been implicated in food addiction research. Earlier this year, a PLOS One study by University of Michigan researchers confirmed that chocolate, pizza and other highly processed foods were much more addictive than foods like vegetables or brown rice, an unsurprising finding. Whether highly palatable foods can trigger changes in the brain, however, remains to be seen.
Read the full article "For Obese, Food Craving Is 'Hard-Wired'" at Discovery News.


text:
Het Estadio El Sadar (van 2005 tot en met 2013 genaamd Estadio Reyno de Navarra) is een voetbalstadion in Pamplona, Spanje. Het heeft 23.576 zitplaatsen en is het stadion waarin de voetbalclub CA Osasuna haar thuiswedstrijden speelt. Het stadion werd in 1967 gebouwd en in zowel 1989 als 2003 gerenoveerd.

Behalve voor voetbal is het stadion ook in gebruik voor concerten. Zo trad bijvoorbeeld Bon Jovi hier op 5 juni 1996 op.

El Sad
Sport in Pamplona
Bouwwerk in Navarra
Pamplona

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Let me guess, you have been playing USA Today crossword and got stuck on the clue Teri of "Tootsie". Well, you have come to the right place to find the answer to this clue.
Now you have the answer to your clue. Its time to move on to the next clue. You can browse through the list with all the answers to the USA Today crossword of December 12th, 2018. Or you can use the search form below to find the answer (no matter if its USA Today Crossword or any other crossword).
If you want to get the bird, don't put her off!


text:
Fonteo (llamada oficialmente Santa María de Fonteo) es una parroquia y una aldea española del municipio de Baleira, en la provincia de Lugo, Galicia.

Organización territorial

La parroquia está formada por ocho entidades de población, constando cuatro de ellas en el nomenclátor del Instituto Nacional de Estadística español:
 A Ferraría
 A Veiguiña
 Castiñeiras
 Fonteo
 O Barreiro
 O Pibidal
 Río de Castro
Valdeirexe

Demografía

Parroquia

Aldea

Referencias

Bibliografía

Enlaces externos

Parroquias de Baleira
Localidades de Baleira
Localidades de la provincia de Lugo


If you have requested a permanent booking, we will come back to you and advise if we have a spot available for your child. If we have a spot, we will email you an Offer. Simply accept the offer, pay your Bond then complete and submit your child's Enrolment form online to confirm your child's spot.


Falling Leaves, a hand-colored etching by Carol Collette, captures New England at it's most spectacular time of year! Carol is especially known for her shadows and rural scenes.
The framed example (of Winter Moon) has double archival matting and a rustic black wood frame; Falling Leaves looks fantastic in this frame (the grooves in the frame accentuate the etching lines). The frame also comes in a wider version - please contact us if you'd like a price or to see images of that. It's approx. 26" x 34" framed.


text:
> Homes
Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux 'selling Bel-Air home' after marriage split
The couple showcased the property in the new issue of Architectural Digest
February 16, 2018 - 09:29 GMT Chloe Best Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux are reportedly selling the home they shared in Bel-Air after announcing their split. The couple married at the property, and showcased it in the new issue of Architectural Digest magazine
Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux are reportedly selling their dream home in Bel-Air following their split. The couple, who announced on Thursday that they had "lovingly" parted ways after two years of marriage, recently showcased the beautiful residence in the new issue of Architectural Digest.
Speaking to the magazine, Jennifer said she and Justin had designed the property together, and tied the knot in the garden of the lavish home in August 2015. Photos shared on the magazine's Instagram page show Jennifer's impeccable living room. "Sexy is important, but comfort is essential," the actress said, pointing out her vintage Jean Royère Polar Bear sofa, Jacques Adnet armchairs, and Mies van der Rohe daybed arranged around the room. Jennifer enlisted the help of interior designer Stephen Shadley, who noted that the screen star "is drawn to wood, stone, and bronze – materials that have real substance and depth". He added: "No matter how beautiful or glamorous something is, it has to be warm and inviting."
Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux are reportedly selling their Bel-Air home
Giving an insight into her home life, Jennifer, 49, revealed that she spent Sundays with her husband, cooking and lounging by the pool. "We put out a mean taco bar, and the chilli's pretty good in the colder months," she said. The Horrible Bosses actress also admitted that she is more picky about her upcoming projects. "I look around at my husband and my dogs and our home, and there's nowhere else I want to be," she said.
MORE: Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux split after two years of marriage
Jennifer and Justin announced their separation in a statement on Thursday, saying that they remained friends following the split. The statement, which was released by Jennifer's longtime publicist, stated: "In an effort to reduce any further speculation, we have decided to announce our separation. This decision was mutual and lovingly made at the end of last year. We are two best friends who have decided to part ways as a couple, but look forward to continuing our cherished friendship."
The couple showcased their home in the new issue of Architectural Digest
"Normally we would do this privately, but given that the gossip industry cannot resist an opportunity to speculate and invent, we wanted to convey the truth directly," the statement continued. "Whatever else is printed about us that is not directly from us, is someone else's fictional narrative. Above all, we are determined to maintain a deep respect and love that we have for one another."
RELATED: See inside Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux's home
More about jennifer aniston
Friends stars Courteney Cox, Lisa Kudrow and Jennifer Aniston meet up again and give big reunion clue
Blonde vs Brunette: 7 celebrities who've experimented with their hair colour over the years
Jennifer Aniston says Friends reunion could happen
Take a look inside Jennifer Aniston's Beverly Hills home
Calling all Friends fans, a real life Central Perk could be opening!
Serena Williams drops £1.5m off asking price for Bel-Air home: see inside
Jennifer Aniston and Justin Theroux split after two years or marriage
Kim Kardashian and Kanye West sell Bel Air home for a huge profit
Justin Theroux says split from Jennifer Aniston was heartbreaking


text:
Nigerian Forces, their Good and Bad Sides
A force man collecting bribe on the road Photo credit: Google
Have you taken cognisance of the incessant bribe our armed forces collect from their fellow citizens as they discharge their duties daily? Have you also noticed how they leave the ignorant people at their mercy? In fact, none of the forces are left out, from the least to the highest, everyone is corrupt. No exceptions. Apart from them, I think the whole system needs deliverance from the spirit of bribery and corruption if there is any such thing like that.
Some weeks back, I went to a court around here and got the shock of my life. I had actually wanted to make a correction for my name. Prior to that, my colleagues had warned me of the surprise package that awaited me at the court.
When I arrived, I met some vibrant young men at the gate who looked like they were the good Samaritans being spoken of in the Bible. They all wanted to help me with the correction of name. I accepted to be helped by one of them and he took me to a business center inside the court. Initially, I was perplexed but later had a relaxed mind considering that it was actually the Nigerian Court of Law and of course everything should be put in place and in order too.
After putting down the necessary information needed for the process, hear the conversation.
"You know that this is a court and you don't really know your way around here, that's why I choose to help you so that nobody will chop you mugu. The thing is this, I don't want us to waste time doing this just give me Two thousand Naira so that in next five minutes, you will go back to your office".
I was set aback by the greedy conversation of the so proclaimed good Samaritan and helper. I put up a smile and said "Bros, calm down, which one be two thousand Naira, we dey fight abi you wan chop salary for my head? Oga abeg talk better thing biko.
He then goes like this again, "ok, oya bring one thousand eight hundred Naira, make I no dey waste your time, there's no electricity here, I will have to go buy fuel to print it out and we are short of papers too".
"Really? So we're now bargaining on this. Don't it have a fixed price? Do I look like the government? How could you tell me I will have to buy fuel and paper in a court? I snapped at him.
"The last price is one thousand five hundred Naira, just bring it let me do it. But a because you dey talk like this, normal, we don't do it like that", he said again.
It was up to my neck, I couldn't bear it any longer. "Oga please I don't have that such amount with me, let me make some withdrawal and get back to you", I angrily said as I stood up.
Oya naaa, let me give you my number, when you come again, you call me, nobody can do it with that little amount I told you. It's just that I don't want us to keep wasting time because of it".
He was still talking when I heard myself say, "thank you".
That was for the first day, the second day it was the same old story. But the summary of the whole episode is that this correction of name had a fixed price of fifty naira from the government, where these greedy souls get the amount of money they collect from people is what I still don't understand. But, that's by the way.
Back to our armed forces, they have really become a menance in society. I was once more surprised by the actions of one of the members of the forces. Honestly, I hold in high esteem this set of people, but had to withdraw my respect immediately I witnessed an incident.
It was raining and the vehicle I boarded alongside my friends was in very bad condition. Such vehicles should not in any way be found close to Nigerian roads. Almost all the windows couldn't close. The roof was leaking, likewise the floor. Dirty water poured into the vehicle from underneath as the driver drove. Our body was soaked. Disappointedly, we complained to the driver, he burst out in laughter. That wasn't enough, at a check point, the force men who uses blue vehicles flagged him down. Immediately, he began to ask for two hundred. I asked my friends, is it possible to settle this set of men just like the Police and they chorusly answered 'yes'. To my greatest amazement, this force man collected the money, looking side ways like a thief. I bowed my head in shame. What a world? The man who collected this money was a young man. I had actually expected discipline and perhaps see him saving dignity for at least, his Uniform because this vehicle in question had no seat belt, the side mirrors were all broken and no rare view mirror. It had an open roof and broken windows. So how the hell will that force man buy the lives of the passengers if peradventure anything happens to us? He was supposed to be a saviour of lives and not the opposite.
That was just the beginning of the series as it continued. I have a friend, Kene. His birthday was last week. His cousin had picked him up from his work place to treat him in one of the eatries around. On their way, his cousin drove into a mechanic shop to inspect the work being done for him. Few minutes later, Kene's cousin left to withdraw some money to pay the mechanic while Kene remained in the car.
Sooner than later, a police van drove into the same mechanic shop. Kene was the first to acknowledge their presence as they alighted. They hurriedly went to the back of the mechanic shop and picked some boys who unknowingly to Kene was drowning themselves in the pool of marijuana.
The Police men came out and also ordered the arrest of Kene. Kene quickly placed a call on his brother who was still on the endless queue at the ATM stand waiting patiently to make a withdrawal. His cousin ran hastily to the scene. But before his arrival,Kene had already been beaten black and blue, beyond recognition. At his arrival, he began talking with the Police men who vehemently stood their ground that Kene will only be released with the sum of one million Naira. What a birthday?
He pleaded like every other person would do, that they make a reduction in their demand but his pleas fell comfortably on deaf ears.
The story became sour when Kene's cousin pleaded that he gave them one thousand naira each for Kene's release. Kene's case worsened because the police men claimed that Kene's cousin had insulted them by even mentioning one thousand naira.
Few minutes later, Kene found himself in the police station. Kene was later released by the bail of his cousin who paid through his nose.
I don't find it wrong this Police men performing their responsibility but it shouldn't be to the detriment of the masses. I believe that they should be a fixed price for such crimes, if that was a crime at all anyway. But if it is, one million Naira is way too much for such a crime.
I also think, the government should look into the bill being passed on the Force men. Things are hard, they shouldn't make it harder for the masses.
On the other hand, be vigilant, know where you stay and what happens around there. Don't fall a prey of these greedy men. The law does not accept ignorance as an excuse. Kene didn't smoke marijuana, he never knew such thing was done around there because he was inside his cousin's car fiddling with his phone.
Armed forces, please don't make your financial incapability a threat to our lives. You're paid your salary every month just like every other worker. If a citizen defaults, penalize him according to the law and not according to your greed.
Do have a great week!


text:
Шевче́нкове Друге — село в Україні, у Близнюківській селищній громаді Лозівського району Харківської області.

Населення становить 24 особи. До 2020 року орган місцевого самоврядування — Квітнева сільська рада.

Географія
Село Шевченкове Друге знаходиться за 3,5 км від села Квітневе, така ж відстань до міста Лозова. Біля села протікає пересихаючий струмок на якому зроблено загата.

Історія
 1924 - дата заснування.

 12 червня 2020 року, відповідно до Розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України № 725-р «Про визначення адміністративних центрів та затвердження територій територіальних громад Харківської області», увійшло до складу Близнюківської селищної громади.
 17 липня 2020 року, в результаті адміністративно-територіальної реформи та ліквідації Близнюківського району, увійшло до складу Лозівського району Харківської області.

Економіка
 В селі є молочно-товарна ферма.

Примітки

Посилання
 Погода в селі Шевченкове Друге

Села Харківської області
Населені пункти, названі на честь Тараса Шевченка
Населені пункти Лозівського району


Over an informal morning coffee break with the team, we exchanged anecdotes on how people sometimes goof up simply by sending an email to a wrong recipient. This is what triggered the thoughts in this article.
An accountant intended to send a payroll sheet for approval to his manager – only to realize later that it was sent to a company-wide Distribution List (DL).
Another employee sent out some client data to another client where the email ids of both client representatives had similar names.
Yet another manager accidentally included a client id while intending to write to internal team members only.
You may have come across some (or quite a few!) such instances. While there is seemingly no end to human mistakes, organizations continue to invest on 'training' employees on this front and share write-ups on Email Best Practices. There is, of course, merit in continuing to do this. However, is there anything more an organization can do to minimize such incidents? Something that the email system can be enhanced to do and not merely depend on the human judgment alone?
Some organizations are experimenting with moving away from traditional email, at least partially and adopting intranet forums for internal communication. Yet, email as a means of communication remains widely prevalent in the industry.
Here's a series of thoughts on what the email system could be enhanced to do – and others like yourself may add on. It wouldn't be surprising if some of these are already being used in some organizations.
Add the department name or similar indication as part of the email id when the name auto-completes, to minimize the risk of sending the email to an unintended recipient. It's not foolproof, but could be somewhat better than no hint at all.
Add a provision to block the recipients from using Reply All when sending an email (could be feasible for emails sent within the organization). Adding 'Please DO NOT reply all' isn't 100% effective. An alternate approach could be to BCC people and state in the email 'Intended recipients are BCC-ed'.
Use simple workflows where feasible to send sensitive info like payroll, revenue report, etc. to managers rather than emails.
I am sure there could be many more ideas. These measures might just save some reputation damage to firms/individuals.


To get an idea of the new opportunities, a series of maps showing the travel time in 2012 and 2021 have been produced for both road and rail. The maps are produced for 7 cities in the Öresund region. The blue color indicates the geographical range of a typical one-day meeting without flying or staying overnight.
For road transport the future travel times are already known in detail. For rail transport there are still some decision to be taken, so the maps are based on Green String Corridor studies that demonstrate the feasibility of travel times Copenhagen-Hamburg just over 2 hours, meaning air travel speed can be a reality with landbound transport.
Producing maps of the future travel times with public transport is always a challenge. The maps usie the old municipality borders in Denmark and a decomposition of the counties (Kreise) in Germany in order to get the same geographical resolution in Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Data for the maps are produced in cooperation with Femern A/S in Copenhagen.


text:
var Fluxxor = require('fluxxor');

var actions = require('../actions/Actions.js');

var TodoStore = Fluxxor.createStore({

  //Init data
  initialize: function () {

    //Stores the state
    this.todos = [];

    //We bind each action to handler in the Store
    this.bindActions(
      actions.ADD_TODO, this.onAddTodo,
      actions.TOGGLE_TODO, this.onToggleTodo,
      actions.CLEAR_TODOS, this.onClearTodos
    )

  },

  //Process data input and emit events
  onAddTodo: function (payload) {

    //payload is basically the user input that comes together with the action

    this.todos.push({text: payload.text, complete: false});
    this.emit("change"); //should we emit something more than change?
  },

  onToggleTodo: function (payload) {
    payload.todo.complete = !payload.todo.complete;
    this.emit('change');
  },

  onClearTodos: function (payload) {
    this.todos = this.todos.filter(function (todo) {
      return !todo.complete;
    });
    this.emit("change");
  },

  //gets the store state!
  getState: function () {
    return {
      todos: this.todos
    }
  }

});

module.exports = TodoStore;

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Sometimes, words cannot describe a feeling. But sometimes, a simple figure can: 6:57 minutes. Witness the record-shattering lap of the new 918 Spyder on the Nordschleife in this video.
The Porsche 918 Spyder has conquered the 12.8-mile (20.6-kilometer) lap around the Nürburgring Nordschleife in less than seven minutes. Achieving a time of six minutes and 57 seconds, the super sports car equipped with a hybrid drive shaved 14 seconds off the previous Nürburgring record for a street-legal automobile, and 17 seconds from its run last September.
By taking the Nürburgring record, the 918 sports car is demonstrating the enormous potential that lies in Porsche's pioneering plug-in hybrid concept, and is underpinning the leading role the company enjoys when it comes to developing sporty hybrid vehicles.