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Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown
Arguing that in a Claim of Employment Discrimination Under Mass. G.L. c. 151B, an Employer Should Not Be Held Vicariously Liable for Punitive Damages Based on a Supervisor's Egregious Misconduct Towards a Subordinate Employee, if the Employer Has Made Good Faith Efforts to Comply with c. 151B, Namely by Taking Preventive and Corrective Steps to Eliminate Discrimination in the Workplace.
In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the novel issue whether an employer should be held strictly liable under the Massachusetts Employment Anti-Discrimination Act (Mass. G. L. c. 151B) for punitive damages based on the egregious misconduct of a supervisor toward a subordinate employee. The issue was significant because the SJC held many years ago, in College-Town v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156 (1987), that employers are strictly liable in actual damages for actionable supervisory misconduct under c. 151B. And so the Court was presented with the question whether the same College-Town standard of strict liability should apply to employers with respect to punitive damages, given the markedly different purposes that distinguish punitive from actual damages.
The plaintiff, Emma Gyulakian, was an employee of Lexus of Watertown from 2003 through 2012. In 2014, she prevailed in a jury trial on her claim that her immediate supervisor had sexually harassed her for an extended period of time and had thereby created an unlawful hostile work environment in violation of c. 151B. The jury awarded her $40,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. On Lexus' post-trial motions, the trial court vacated the award of punitive damages. The lower court apparently concluded that, as a matter of law, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable in punitive damages for egregious supervisory misconduct.
In the SJC appeal, NELF filed an amicus brief supporting the decision below, arguing that the College-Town standard of strict liability should not apply, and that an employer should not be liable for punitive damages unless it has engaged in blameworthy conduct itself. Recognizing such a standard is appropriate, NELF argued, because punitive damages serve to punish and deter an employer's wrongful conduct, not to provide the injured employee with a remedy for the actual harm inflicted by the rogue supervisor. Accordingly, NELF argued that an employer should not be held liable for punitive damages if it can show that it has taken affirmative steps to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, such as by implementing an antidiscrimination policy, through education and training, and by providing internal grievance procedures and acting appropriately on grievances. Indeed, NELF argued, recognizing such a standard would create an incentive for employers to take measures to carry out c. 151B's important social goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace.
In its decision of August 24, 2016, the SJC adopted NELF's position that an employer should not be held liable in punitive damages for a supervisor's egregious misconduct unless the employer itself has engaged in blameworthy misconduct. The Court announced that the standard to be applied is whether the employer was on notice of the supervisor's misconduct and egregiously or outrageously failed to respond. "We consider first whether the employer was on notice of the harassment and failed to take steps to investigate and remedy the situation; and, second, whether that failure was outrageous or egregious." The Court then applied this two-step test to the record and concluded that Lexus was liable in punitive damages for the supervisor's harassment of Gyulakian. Therefore, the Court reinstated the award of punitive damages. Nonetheless, the principle articulated in NELF's amicus brief is now the law in Massachusetts. Employers cannot be held liable for punitive damages unless they have engaged in outrageous or egregious misconduct of their own.
Initiative Legal Group v. Maxon
Click here to read the brief.
Opposing a State Court's Refusal to Enforce an Arbitration Agreement Contained in a Contract that the Plaintiff has Voided Based on a Technicality of State Law.
This case, a putative class action which is before the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, asks whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") permits a state (here California) to refuse to enforce an arbitration provision that is contained within an agreement that the plaintiff has voided based on a technicality of state law, long after the contract was performed, in an obvious attempt to evade his contractual obligation to arbitrate his claims arising from the agreement.
The plaintiff here, David Maxon, signed a contingency-fee agreement with the Petitioner, Initiative Legal Group ("ILG") to pursue his wage-hour claim against his former employer, the Wells Fargo Bank. The contingency-fee agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause covering all disputes between the attorney and the client. After ILG had completed its legal services under the agreement, Maxon filed this court action alleging that ILG had committed legal malpractice in representing him. ILG moved to compel arbitration. It turned out, however, that ILG had inadvertently failed to sign the contingency-fee agreement, and Maxon, invoking a California statute that permits a client to void a contingency-fee agreement unless both parties have signed it, gave notice to ILG that he was exercising his right under state law to void the fee agreement because ILG had not signed it. Maxon then argued that, because he exercised his statutory right to void the fee agreement, the entire agreement, including the arbitration provision, no longer existed. The California trial court and Appeals Court agreed with Maxon, and the California Supreme Court denied further appellate review.
As NELF argues in its amicus brief in support of the Petitioner, the California courts were wrong because under well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent, the mere voiding of the fee agreement does not also void the arbitration clause. As the Supreme Court has held, the FAA preempts such state interference with the enforcement of an arbitration provision. Under the FAA, an arbitration provision is severable from its "container" agreement. "[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (Scalia, J., for Court) (emphasis added). This principle of severability is mandated by the plain language of the FAA. "[Section] 2 [of the FAA] states that a 'written provision' 'to settle by arbitration a controversy' is 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' without mention of the validity of the contract in which it is contained." Rent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) (Scalia, J., for Court) (emphasis in original).
In short, NELF argues that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari, once again, to compel state courts, like those in California, to adhere to the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions, and to hold that the arbitration provision is enforceable even if the overall agreement is voided under state contract law, for whatever reason--such as illegality, fraud in the inducement, or unconscionability. Unless a party challenges the enforceability of the arbitration provision itself, the arbitration provision survives and must be enforced. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444-46 (challenge to overall loan agreement as usurious, and therefore void ab initio, did not affect enforcement of arbitration provision contained therein). See also Rent–A–Center, 561 U.S. at 70 (challenge to "all-disputes"/scope clause of arbitration agreement as unconscionable did not affect enforcement of separate arbitration clause delegating unconscionability challenges to arbitrator); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (challenge to overall agreement as induced by fraud did not affect enforcement of arbitration provision therein).
As of the time of this report, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether or not to grant certiorari in this case.
Chase v. U.S. Postal Service
Arguing that a plaintiff who alleges that his employer retaliated against him for taking leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act must prove that his leave was the but-for cause of the alleged retaliation
This case raises an issue of first impression in the First Circuit in an important area of employment law. In 2013, invoking traditional principles of tort law, the Supreme Court declared that the default rule is that "federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination" must be proven by but-for causation, i.e., it must be shown that the wrong would not have occurred but for the plaintiff's protected status or conduct. See University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).* Since then, outside of Title VII, lower courts have shown reluctance to take the Supreme Court at its word, continuing to allow liability to be established when an improper motivating factor has been shown to have played a role in the employer's decision, even though the factor was not the but-for cause of it.
In this case, a federal district court judge, faced with the task of deciding the causation standard for a retaliation claim arising under the Family and Medical Leave Act, declined to follow the teaching of Nassar; in the mistaken belief that the act is ambiguous on this point, he deferred to a U.S. Dept. of Labor regulation that adopts motivating-factor causation. That standard of causation is clearly wrong. Because Nassar makes but-for causation the default in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, even statutory silence on the subject of causation will not render a statute ambiguous; it merely signals that but-for causation is to be applied. Moreover, so-called Chevron deference to an agency is proper only when the language of a statute is ambiguous, and here the statute is not ambiguous.
Although the defendant employer is the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), an independent agency of the federal government, the law in question applies equally to private businesses, and therefore the outcome of the case should be of concern to NELF and its supporters in the business and legal communities.
In its amicus brief filed in support of the employer in this case, NELF has presented detailed arguments to supplement and strengthen the Post Office's argument that Nassar governs this case. Simply put, NELF makes two points. First, as NELF explains, Nassar establishes that but-for causation is an unspoken background principle of federal legislation and so does not have to be signaled by any special words. To the contrary, it is any other standard that must be clearly stated in a statute. Second, NELF demonstrates that the district court erred in declining to apply Nassar and in finding that the causation required for an FMLA retaliation claim is ambiguous in the statute. NELF argues that but-for causation is the standard to be applied in this case despite the fact that the statute is silent on the issue because, as Nassar stated, but-for causation is a presumption of federal legislation. In making its arguments, NELF rebuts, point for point, the trial judge's reasons for believing the statute ambiguous and for declining to apply the teachings of Nassar.
*NELF filed an amicus brief in Nassar.
Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc.
Arguing that When a Stockholder/employment Agreement Provides that a Corporation's Board of Directors Has the Exclusive Authority to Decide Whether a Senior Executive Should be Terminated for Cause, the Only Issue for a Reviewing Court Should Be Whether or Not the Board Made its Employment Decision in Good Faith.
Click here to read the brief.
This case, which is before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on an application for direct appellate review, asks how a court should review a decision of a corporation's board of directors to terminate a senior executive for cause under the terms of a stockholder/employment agreement. A high-ranking executive is generally an employee at will who can be terminated without cause, as in this case. Nonetheless, under the typical stockholder/employment agreement, such as the one here, an executive who is terminated for cause can lose his stock ownership in the corporation, along with any severance package. And, as with many other such agreements, the contract at issue provides a definition of "cause" and also provides, significantly, that "a determination of 'Cause' may only be made by the Board of Directors . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Under this clear contractual language preserving the board's fact-finding prerogative, should a court defer to the board's decision so long as the board has acted in good faith? Or should a court instead have the discretion to disregard the board's decision and determine the issue for itself in a trial de novo? The Superior Court in this case took the latter view and reversed the decision of the board of directors of Babcock Power, a high technology company headquartered in Danvers, Massachusetts, to terminate for cause the employment of Dr. Eric Balles, a high-ranking, senior executive employee. As a result, the lower court awarded Balles approximately $2 million in damages and attorneys' fees.
This case raises an important issue of internal corporate governance that warrants, and NELF supported Babcock Power's application for Direct Appellate Review and intends to file an amicus brief on the merits as well. In its amicus brief, NELF will argue, inter alia, that, in the circumstances of this case, the board's decision should be upheld unless the employee can show that the decision was made in bad faith or was otherwise tainted by fraud, and that the Superior Court's review should have been limited to those issues alone.
Molina v. State Garden, Inc.
Defending the Immunity from Suit, under the Workers Compensation Act, of an Insured Alternate Employer
This case raised an important issue of first impression under Massachusetts workers compensation law. The plaintiff worked for a temporary staffing agency (his general employer) and was sent out on a job assignment to the defendant (his special, or alternate, employer). He was injured on the first day of the assignment, while performing a task under the direct control of the defendant on the latter's premises. Later, after collecting workers compensation benefits, he sued the defendant on the theory that the company had not been his employer under workers compensation law and so did not enjoy an employer's statutory immunity from suit. The trial judge granted the defendant summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. He argued that the defendant could not be regarded as his employer because the benefits he received were paid on the temp agency's workers compensation policy.
As NELF noted in its brief, filed with co-amicus Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the defendant was named as an additional insured on an "Alternate Employer Endorsement" attached to the temp agency's policy. As NELF successfully argued several years ago in another legal context, the effect of being named as an additional insured on a policy is to create a direct relationship between the insurer and the additional insured for the latter's own liabilities, without regard to which party paid the premium for the additional coverage or who was identified as the named insured on the policy. Of crucial importance in this connection is the fact that the workers compensation act specifically permits a special employer, like the defendant, to agree with the general employer that it, not the general employer, will be liable for workers compensation, provided that the special employer is insured. The "Alternate Employer Endorsement" reflects precisely such an agreement and provides precisely such insured status to the defendant. In fact, as NELF pointed out, this particular endorsement form has been approved by the Massachusetts Division of Insurance for use in such situations, a fact of which both parties in the case were unaware.
NELF further showed that such endorsements are used nationally for this purpose, typically in the exact same standardized form found here (the form is promulgated by the National Council of Compensation Insurers). NELF called the Appeals Court's attention to the use of the form in other states (New York, North Carolina, Texas, Delaware, Minnesota), where the form is officially approved and sometimes even prescribed for this use. Molina's contentions that the use of the endorsement amounted to "an illusory promise" and a nefarious "artifice" were therefore without merit. In short, NELF concluded that State Garden was clearly the relevant insured employer for purposes of the work-related injury Molina suffered and that the company was therefore entitled to employer immunity from suit.
In its decision issued on September 3, 2015, the Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed with NELF that, under the endorsement, the plaintiff's special employer was immune from suit under the Workers Compensation Act.
On September 23, 2015, Molina applied for further appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court. This application remains pending.
Meshna v. Scrivanos
Arguing that the Massachusetts Wage Act allows a business to maintain a no-tipping policy
At issue in this case, which was before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"), was whether the tips provision of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 152A, allows a business establishment to maintain a no-tipping policy, under which patrons are requested not to tip employees, and employees are, in turn, required not to accept any such tips. The plaintiffs were employees of various Dunkin' Donuts franchises owned and operated by the defendants Constantine Scrivanos and the Scrivano Group (collectively "Scrivanos"). The plaintiffs claimed, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees, that Scrivanos violated their rights under the Wage Act by preventing them from accepting tips offered to them by customers. The Superior Court (Fabricant, J.) ruled that a no-tipping policy is permitted under the statute, so long as the policy is "clearly and conspicuously announced" to provide notice to patrons. The SJC took the case on direct appellate review and requested amicus briefing on this issue.
NELF argued, in support of the defendants, that the Wage Act does not prohibit, or address in any other way, a no-tipping policy. While NELF is not opposed to the practice of tipping, nevertheless NELF does not believe that the statute requires a business to permit tipping on its premises. Nowhere does the statute provide that a business must permit its patrons to tip its employees. Instead, the Act addresses only the consequences that result when a business does permit tipping—i.e., such a business cannot confiscate tips from its employees. And, since the statute does not require a business to permit tipping, its silence on the issue should be interpreted as leaving undisturbed "the traditional broad authority of owners and proprietors of business establishments to adopt reasonable rules regulating the conduct of patrons or tenants." Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp.2d 1022, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). After all, "[a] statute is not to be interpreted as effecting a material change in or a repeal of the common law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed." Reading Co-Op. Bank v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 464 Mass. 543, 549 (2013) (citation and internal punctuation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Act, lacking any clearly expressed intent to the contrary, should be interpreted as preserving the bedrock common law principle that "[t]he status of an invitee is not absolute but is limited by the scope of the landowner's invitation." 62 Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 100."). In short, the statute allows each business to exercise its own judgment and decide for itself whether tipping is a good idea for its particular establishment.
In its decision of April 10, 2015, the Court agreed with NELF and held that the tipping statute does not require an employer of wait staff to permit tipping. Instead, the statute only addresses the circumstances when the employer does permit tipping. "No language in [the tipping statute] prohibits an employer from imposing a no-tipping policy. The Tips Act addresses circumstances in which tipping is permitted and wait staff employees have been given tips, directly or indirectly; it prescribes what the employer is required to do with such tips." Meshna v. Scrivanos, 471 Mass. 169 (2015).
Southern Communications Services, Inc., d/b/a SouthernLINC Wireless v. Thomas
Seeking Supreme Court Review of an Arbitral Award of Class Arbitration that Was Admittedly Not Based on the Parties' Agreement but Was Instead Based Improperly on State Public Policy Favoring the Aggregation of Small-Value Claims
This case, which was before the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, raises the issue whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits an arbitrator to order class arbitration against a business without the business's consent. Here, in plain violation of recent Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FAA, the arbitrator has failed to identify any contractual basis in the parties' agreement to justify his order of class arbitration. In turn, the Eleventh Circuit has violated the FAA by affirming this arbitral award of class arbitration that lacks any contractual basis, under the mistaken belief that that the FAA requires this result. To the contrary, "[c]lass arbitration is a matter of consent [and not coercion]: An arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have authorized them." Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (citingStolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (FAA requires "a contractual basis" to justify award of class arbitration) (emphasis added)). NELF has participated in many recent Supreme Court cases on this issue, vigorously advocating the basic principle of party consent to class arbitration under the FAA. Preservation of this core principle of freedom of contract is crucial to protecting a business from being unwillingly exposed to the substantial burdens of class arbitration.
NELF was approached to participate in this case by counsel for the petitioner, Southern Communications Services, Inc., d/b/a SouthernLINC Wireless, based on the amicus brief that NELF had filed in Sutter, cited above. Unlike in this case, in Sutter the arbitrator awarded class arbitration based on a (strained) interpretation of the language of the arbitration clause at issue. Despite NELF's and the Court's apparent view that the arbitrator had misinterpreted the contract inSutter, the Court nevertheless upheld the arbitral award under the FAA's deferential standard of review. The Court in Sutter explained that the arbitrator had fulfilled his duty under Stolt-Nielsen to find a contractual basis supporting class arbitration. (A contractual basis does not require an express reference to class arbitration but does require some affirmative textual basis in the agreement). "So the sole question for us [when reviewing an arbitral award under the FAA] is whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not whether he got its meaning right or wrong." Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2068 (emphasis added).
NELF argued that, in sharp contrast to Sutter, certiorari should be granted here to vacate an arbitral award of class arbitration that, by the arbitrator's own admission, lacks any contractual basis whatsoever. Instead, the arbitrator based his award entirely on state judicial decisions favoring class actions for plaintiffs with small-value claims. In so ordering class arbitration as a matter of public policy, and not as a matter of the parties' consent, the arbitrator exceeded his powers under the FAA in substantially the same way as the overruled arbitral panel in Stolt-Nielsen. Moreover, the public policy grounds that the arbitrator has invoked are preempted by the FAA under Concepcion.
Just as this case aligns squarely with Stolt-Nielsen, it is entirely distinguishable from Sutter. Unlike the arbitrator in this case, the arbitrator in Sutter "arguably interpreted" the parties' contract to identify an affirmative textual basis that, in his view, authorized class arbitration. By contrast, the arbitrator in this case expressly interpreted the agreement to lack any such contractual basis but ordered class arbitration anyway, based on extracontractual factors that have nothing to do with the parties' consent to class arbitration.
NELF also argued that certiorari was warranted to dispel any lingering confusion over the requirements for a valid award of class arbitration under the FAA, as explained in this Court's recent FAA decisions. The arbitrator misinterpreted Stolt-Nielsen as authorizing an arbitrator to order class arbitration based on contractual silence on the issue, and based on factors outside of the parties' agreement, such as state decisional law. And the Eleventh Circuit, in turn, misinterpreted Sutter as requiring uncritical judicial deference to a facially invalid arbitral award of class arbitration, such as the one in this case, which is based entirely on public policy grounds and not at all on the parties' consent.
NELF argued further that certiorari should be granted to clarify that Stolt-Nielsen restricts the arbitrator to the four corners of the parties' agreement to find a textual basis supporting class arbitration, and that Sutter does not require judicial deference where, as here, the arbitrator has ordered class arbitration without identifying any such contractual basis.
Despite the compelling arguments of both the petitioner and NELF, the Court denied the petition for certiorari on January 21, 2014.
Bingham McCutchen v. Harwell
Seeking Supreme Court Review of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 2009 Decision in Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctrs., Inc.
This case, which arose in California, was before the Supreme Court on a Petition for Certiorari by Bingham McCutchen, a Massachusetts law firm with California offices, seeking review of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 2009 decision in Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctrs., Inc. NELF filed an amicus brief in support of Bingham's request for Supreme Court review of the SJC's decision, with which NELF has long disagreed.
In Warfield, the SJC barred the arbitration of state-law employment discrimination claims unless the employer identified those claims "in clear and unmistakable terms" in the agreement. In Warfield, the arbitration clause broadly covered all claims "arising out of or in connection with this [employment] Agreement . . . ." Long-established Supreme Court precedent establishes that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), such a broadly worded arbitration agreement should subsume all statutory claims. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's FAA precedent on the issue, the SJC ruled that statutory discrimination claims were not included. Since the employer in Warfield did not seek Supreme Court review of the SJC's decision, the Warfield decision has required employers in Massachusetts to add the SJC-mandated, special-notice language to arbitration provisions. However, the Warfield requirement is preempted under the FAA because a broadly worded arbitration clause in an employment agreement already subsumes all such employment-related disputes.
Accordingly, NELF argued that certiorari should be granted to abrogate the Warfield rule under the FAA. The Warfield rule bars the arbitration of state-law discrimination claims unless employers identify those claims "in clear and unmistakable terms" in their arbitration agreements. The Warfield rule is preempted because it defeats the FAA's core purpose of ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms. Where, as here, the terms of an arbitration agreement cover all claims arising from the parties' employment relationship, this Court has long held that, under the FAA, such an agreement includes all statutory claims falling within its scope. In fact, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the Court considered and rejected a heightened notice requirement substantially similar to the Warfield rule.
And yet Warfield has done precisely what Mitsubishi forbids, by erecting an unlawful presumption against the arbitration of State-law employment discrimination claims, which employers must then overcome with express language to the contrary in the arbitration agreement. The Warfield decision apparently sidesteps the Court's long-standing and dispositive precedent, by relying on the erroneous premise that state contract law alone determines the scope of an arbitration agreement, i.e., the arbitrability of a claim. To the contrary, the arbitrability of a statutory claim under a broad arbitration clause is a matter of federal law under the FAA. Therefore, the Warfield rule must fall. The FAA mandates that no additional language is necessary, and none may be required, by Massachusetts or any other State, to compel the arbitration of statutory claims that fall under a broad arbitration clause, such as the petitioner Bingham's, in this case.
NELF argued that the Warfield rule violates the FAA, and the Court's clear precedent, in two ways. The Massachusetts court has refused to enforce a broad arbitration agreement according to its terms, and the court has conditioned the exercise of that federal right of arbitrability upon compliance with an unlawful and extraneous drafting requirement.
NELF also argued that the Warfield rule cannot survive a preemption challenge under the FAA merely because the Massachusetts court has characterized it as a general rule of contract law, applicable to any contractual waiver of rights under State law. The FAA preempts the Warfield rule, notwithstanding the Massachusetts court's characterization, because the Warfield rule relies on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as its basis, namely the waiver of judicial and administrative avenues of relief.
NELF argued further that certiorari was further warranted to rectify the Warfield court's mistrust of arbitration as an adequate forum for the vindication of statutory rights. Warfield has failed to heed the Court's well-established principle that an arbitration agreement merely selects the forum for adjudicating a statutory claim. The agreement does not sacrifice any substantive rights associated with that claim. Since the employee who enters an arbitration agreement is not relinquishing any substantive statutory rights, no special notice is required to secure her consent to the arbitration of those statutory claims.
NELF argued that certiorari was also warranted because Warfield has misapplied the "clear and unmistakable" rule that this Court announced under federal labor law, with respect to the arbitrability of federal statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements. The Court has declined to extend the "clear and unmistakable" notice rule to individual employment agreements falling under the FAA. Moreover, Warfield has justified its misplaced reliance on this "clear and unmistakable" rule by quoting incompletely from 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), a case decided under the National Labor Relations Act, and not the FAA. The full quotation from this case does not support the Warfield rule because it has absolutely nothing to do with the arbitrability of a state statutory claim under a broad arbitration clause--the sole issue in this case. Instead, the truncated quotation from 14 Penn Plaza addressed the unrelated point that a federalstatutory claim (i.e., the ADEA) was arbitrable under either an individual employment agreement or a collective bargaining agreement, because that federal statute's text contains no contrary command against arbitration.
Finally, NELF argued that certiorari should be granted to dispel any possible confusion that certain language contained in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), would support heightened notice requirements in the arbitrability of State-law claims. This dictum from Concepcion is inapposite because it does not address in any way the content requirements to ensure the arbitrability of statutory claims under a broad arbitration clause. Instead this dictum is restricted to the unrelated, and highly specific, issue of the form of a class action waiver appearing in an adhesive consumer form contract.
Despite both Bingham's and NELF's compelling arguments, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case on January 13, 2014.
Machado v. System4
Supporting the Enforcement of Class Arbitration Waivers in Employment Cases
This case, which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) paired for hearing with the Court's reconsideration of its 2009 decision in Feeney v. Dell (in which NELF filed an amicus brief in support of Dell, see above), raises the same essential issue—the enforceability of a class arbitration waiver—but in the context of employment.
The dispute arises out of the plaintiff's franchise agreement with System4 and NECCS, Inc. (collectively "System4") to provide commercial janitorial services. The agreement included a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause that restricted arbitration only to individual claims (a class-arbitration waiver). In 2010 the plaintiff filed a putative class action in the Massachusetts Superior Court primarily alleging that System4 misclassified him and similarly situated individuals as independent contractors in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L. c. 149, § 148B. System4 moved to stay the litigation so that arbitration could proceed, but the Superior Court denied the motion on the ground that the class-action waiver in the arbitration provision was contrary to public policy under Feeney v. Dell. The Superior Court subsequently denied reconsideration of this decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding on the enforceability of class arbitration waivers inAT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. The SJC took the matter and solicited amicus briefs in this case, as in Feeney, on whether the public policy exception announced in Feeney survives Concepcion.
NELF filed an amicus brief in this case, again as in Feeney, arguing that the SJC's invalidation of class arbitration waivers in the 2009 decision has been invalidated by Concepcion, which held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), class arbitration waivers contained in valid arbitration agreements are uniformly enforceable.
In this connection, NELF's brief addressed the view recently expressed by the NLRB in its D.R. Horton decision that the National Labor Relations Act trumps the FAA. To the contrary, NELF argued that the command of Concepcion is not limited to state law claims, but applies equally to class waivers in the arbitration of federal statutory claims, absent a "contrary congressional command" on the face of another federal statute that bars or limits the application of the FAA to disputes arising under that statute. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). The NLRA's general language protecting employees' rights to engage in "concerted activity . . . for mutual aid and protection" falls far short, and is entirely unrelated to, the CompuCreditstandard, which would have to expressly create a nonwaivable right to class actions to limit the FAA's mandate under Concepcion.
In a decision issued before the Supreme Court Amex case, discussed above, the SJC enforced the class waiver. The SJC held that, although it interpreted Concepcion as permitting a case-specific challenge to class waivers, the plaintiffs in this case had failed to carry their burden of proof under such a challenge. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Amex, the SJC requested briefing to reconsider its decision, and the SJC then affirmed its decision enforcing the waiver, but on the ground that the FAA compels such a result.
Flagg v. AliMed, Inc.
Opposing Judicial or Agency Expansion of the Class of Persons Protected by Massachusetts G. L. c. 151B
This case dealt with the same unsettled question of Massachusetts anti-discrimination law as did Scott v. Encore Images, Inc., a Massachusetts Appeals Court case that NELF briefed in 2010. See 80 Mass. App. Ct. 661 (2011). Because the Appeals Court declined to rule on the question, no Massachusetts appellate court had yet ruled on whether an individual who is not handicapped has standing to sue for handicap employment discrimination under Mass. G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16) solely on the basis of that person's association with someone else who is handicapped.
Here, Flagg alleges that he was fired not because of his repeated absences from work, as his employer contends, but because his wife's disability would cost his employer's health plan a great deal of money (the wife herself is not an employee). The trial court dismissed his claim on the grounds that Flagg was not handicapped and therefore lacked standing to bring a handicap discrimination claim on his own behalf. Flagg appealed to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court took the case sua sponte and issued a request for amicus briefing.
Flagg's argument rests largely on the fact that the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), which is the agency charged with implementing c. 151B, recognizes such associational standing and advocated for it vigorously in a letter the agency filed in Scott.
NELF filed an amicus brief supporting AliMed and arguing that the plain language of the statute renders it impossible for Flagg to have a claim under c. 151B. As NELF demonstrated, the clear, unambiguous language of § 4(16) and related sections of c. 151B give only a handicapped person a claim for handicap employment discrimination when the discrimination has occurred "because of his handicap." It is unlike the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, which expressly provides for claims based on association.
NELF also argued that no deference is owed to the MCAD's view of this issue because deference is not warranted where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, as here, much less when the agency's reading of the statute is directly contrary to the statutory language, as is also the case here. NELF undertook a rebuttal of the reasoning the MCAD used its administrative decisions recognizing this type of claim. Since Flagg has incorporated into his argument the letter the MCAD filed with the Appeals Court in Scott, NELF also rebutted the arguments the MCAD makes there.
In both instances, the main theme of NELF's rebuttal was that the agency's view of the law in this case has been determined exclusively by broad policy considerations and that the agency has not paid even token heed to the actual text of the law.
In its July 2013 decision, the Court held that Flagg stated a claim. Sidestepping the plain language of the statutes, the Court looked to a few select decisions decided under the "analogous" federal Rehabilitation Act. In those cases a handicapped person who was the primary object of the act's protection was undisputedly discriminated against because of his handicap, and the cases dealt solely with consequential harms flowing to third parties from that clearly unlawful act. The Court did not explain in what way this is an analogy to a situation in which no handicapped employee protected by c. 151B was discriminated against "because of his handicap." The Court's decision also creates a question about what grounds justify other rulings of the MCAD, unrelated to handicap discrimination, in which the agency has found associational standing, again, directly contrary to the plain language of c. 151B.
Cook v. Patient EDU, LLC
Arguing That the Provision in the Massachusetts Wage Payment Act, Which Imposes Personal Liability on Certain Officers and Agents of a Corporation, Does Not Apply to Managers of a Limited Liability Company
This case dealt with the question of when, under the Wage Payment Act, those who run a business are personally liable for the business's wage-payment obligations. The plaintiff argued that the Wage Payment Act, which requires the timely payment of wages, permits him to hold two managers of the limited liability company for which he once worked personally liable for the company's alleged violations of the statute. The statute itself says expressly only that certain officers "of a corporation" may be held personally liable. The Superior Court construed the statute by its plain language and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff, arguing that the corporate officer provision is merely illustrative, not limiting, and that the scope of personal liability is actually determined by the expansive opening phrase of the statute ("Every person having employees in his service shall, etc."), asked the SJC to reverse the dismissal. The predominate note struck by the plaintiff is that the statute should be read expansively because it is remedial, but he also argues that the true list of liable parties is given in a separate statute, to which the Wage Payment Act expressly refers for its civil fines and penalties.
The importance of the issue is shown by the fact that the SJC took the appeal sua sponte from the Appeals Court and then issued a call for amicus briefing. In its amicus brief supporting the defendants, NELF marshaled a wealth of evidence from statutory history, case law, and contemporary usage from the time of the act's enactment to prove that the opening phrase of the statute means, and has always meant, only actual, literal employers. NELF also defended the trial court's plain-language interpretation of the corporate officer provision, showing that it is only one of a number of such provisions in the Massachusetts statutes creating personal liability only for corporate officials for violation of employment and labor laws and that nothing about its wording, history, or placement suggests it is to be understood as merely illustrative or as the beginning of an open-ended list of liable persons. Finally, NELF explained that the statute to which the Wage Payment Act refers for its penalties does not enlarge the list of parties liable for wage payment violations, as the plaintiff believes. Examining statutory language and statutory history, NELF showed that Wage Payment Act is one of several laws that look to that statute solely for penalties, not for persons liable. Moreover, the penalty statute is part of an entirely distinct comprehensive enactment dealing with public works and related public contracts; if it has any bearing on liability, it is limited to violations of employment laws that occur in the course of public works.
In its July 2013 decision, the Court, apparently agreeing that the corporate officer provision considered in itself has limited scope, chose, for policy reasons, to read into the provision the broader scope of the following, unrelated provision dealing with the liability of public employers. On that basis, it found that a claim could be stated against the LLC's managers. As a result of the decision, a new uncertainty looms over the scope of all the other corporate officer provisions found elsewhere in the employment statutes.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter
Arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act Requires Vacatur of an Arbitral Award of Class Arbitration based on a Boilerplate Agreement to Arbitrate "any Dispute under this Agreement" that is Silent on the Issue of Class Arbitration
This case raised the important issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits an arbitrator or court to order class arbitration where, as here, the parties have merely agreed to submit "any dispute under this Agreement" to binding arbitration, and nothing more. NELF filed an amicus brief on the merits in the case, in support of petitioner Oxford Health Plans, arguing that such a minimally worded arbitration clause can never provide the necessary "contractual basis" required under Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Internat'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) to authorize class arbitration. Therefore, Stolt-Nielsen requires vacatur of an arbitral award of class arbitration, as in this case, when it is based on a boilerplate agreement to arbitrate "any dispute under this agreement." In this case, the Third Circuit invoked the FAA's deferential standard of review to affirm an arbitrator's "interpretation" of the parties' generic "any dispute" arbitration clause as somehow providing a "contractual basis" authorizing class arbitration.
NELF argued in its amicus brief that the lower court's ruling should be reversed as contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Stolt-Nielsen that an arbitrator cannot order class arbitration unless there is a "contractual basis" that the parties have agreed to class arbitration. While Stolt-Nielsendid not require an express contractual reference to class arbitration, the Court did conclude that a mere agreement to arbitrate disputes could never support an implied agreement to class arbitration. Therefore, the parties' boilerplate "any dispute" at issue cannot provide a "contractual basis" authorizing class arbitration. Moreover, the Third Circuit's deference to an arbitral award to the contrary is misplaced, because the Court held in Concepcion that the FAA cannot be interpreted to destroy itself by compelling class-wide arbitration without the parties' mutual consent.
NELF also argued that, if the Third Circuit's decision is allowed to stand, not only the petitioner in this case, but countless other businesses that are subject to the same "any dispute" arbitration clause could face the significant burdens and financial risks associated with class arbitration. As the Supreme Court itself recently observed, "[w]e find it hard to believe that [any] defendant[] would bet the company [on class arbitration] with no effective means of review [under the FAA] . . . ." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
In a unanimous and disappointing decision, the Court held that the FAA requires courts to defer to an arbitrator's erroneous "interpretation" of an agreement with respect to authorizing class actions. In a surprising about-face, the Court limited Stolt-Nielsen to its unusual facts, wherein the parties had apparently stipulated that there was no contractual basis supporting class arbitration. It must be emphasized that, at the time of Stolt-Nielsen, there was a widespread misunderstanding of an earlier Supreme Court case as recognizing an implied right to class arbitration (which would have to be overcome by a class waiver). Hence, the likely reason for the plaintiffs' attorney in Stolt-Nielsen, who was seeking class arbitration for his clients, to actually stipulate that his clients had never agreed to class arbitration. The result in Stolt-Nielsen, in which the Court vacated an arbitral award of class arbitration, is now a dead letter, and that case's "contractual basis" requirement is now meaningless when an arbitrator decides the issue.


Debates about presidential pardon powers come up on a regular basis, but in some ways they are among the most misunderstood aspects of executive powers granted by the Constitution.
The current discussion in Washington is about unconfirmed reports that the Donald Trump administration inquired about the law regarding presidential pardon powers in relation to allegations of Russian election tampering.
In recent years, similar questions arose about pardons issued by Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, and a prospective pardon for former government contractor Edward Snowden.
Here is a brief explanation of the President's clemency powers, some past cases, and a theoretical look at a Nixon-era question: Can a President pardon himself or herself?
The President has pardon or clemency power under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, under the Pardon Clause. The clause says the President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The Office of the Pardon Attorney, which is part of the Justice Department, has handled such matters for the President since 1893, and it has a detailed description of the pardon and clemency process on its website.
Although the terms clemency and pardon seemed to be interchangeable, in general terms executive federal clemency is granted after someone had allegedly committed a crime. In most cases, that person is convicted of a crime, and then granted a form of clemency. A pardon allows a convicted person to reclaim lost civil rights after a conviction.
In the case of former President Richard Nixon, he was granted a pardon by President Gerald Ford for any crimes he might have committed during the Watergate scandal, even though Nixon wasn't charged with or convicted of federal crimes. (This is known as a pre-emptive pardon.) Nixon was able to receive a pardon under the precedent of an 1866 Supreme Court ruling called Ex parte Garland, which allowed for a pardon granted by President Andrew Johnson to remain in force for a former Confederate politician.
Pardons get the most attention when used by outgoing Presidents. President Barack Obama commuted a jail sentence for Wikileaks figure Chelsea Manning and issued a pardon to former general James Cartwright - triggering debates that usually accompany high-profile pardon moves.
In January 2001, President Bill Clinton pardoned his own brother, Roger (who had served a one-year jail sentence on a drug conviction), businessman Marc Rich, Whitewater participant Susan McDougal and former Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros. And in January 1989, President Ronald Reagan pardoned New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner for charges related to illegal campaign contributions made to Richard Nixon's presidential campaign.
Other people to receive presidential pardons or commuted sentences from Presidents include Jefferson Davis and Gordon Liddy (by Jimmy Carter), Jimmy Hoffa (by Richard Nixon), Roy Olmstead (by Franklin Roosevelt), Eugene Debs (by Warren Harding), Dr. Samuel Mudd (by Andrew Johnson), and Brigham Young (by James Buchanan).
And what about the question of President issuing a self-pardon? This is actually a debate going back to the Nixon and Clinton presidencies (but not the Andrew Johnson era).
Kalt believed on precedent that the President doesn't have self-pardoning powers." The intent of the Framers, the words and themes of the Constitution they created, and the wisdom of the judges that have interpreted it all point to the same conclusion: Presidents cannot pardon themselves," he concluded.
But Judge Richard Posner, another widely cited legal authority, said in a 1999 book about the Clinton impeachment that the question was left open by the Founders. "It has generally been inferred from the breadth of the constitutional language that the president can indeed pardon himself," Posner argued.
Kalt said Richard Nixon reportedly asked for an internal legal opinion about the option of a self-pardon towards the end of his presidency. The President's lawyers said he had the power to issue a self-pardon, but Nixon declined to do so.
But just before Nixon's resignation, the Justice Department Office of Legal Council issued its own memo on the subject, on August 5, 1974. "Under the fundamental rule that no one may be a judge in his own case, the President cannot pardon himself," said Mary C. Lawton, Acting Assistant Attorney General.
That didn't mean that a President couldn't find a way to receive a pardon and continue in office. "A different approach to the pardoning problem could be taken under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. If the President declared that he was temporarily unable to perform the duties of his office, the Vice President would become Acting President and as such he could pardon the President. Thereafter the President could either resign or resume the duties of his office," Lawton said.


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Hyde Park London Highlights – London's most legendary park takes centre stage during the 2012 Olympics
When one thinks of London, Buckingham Palace, Big Ben and the Houses of Parliament immediately spring to mind, with Hyde Park also being a leading symbolic London landmark. Hyde Park is one of the eight Royal Parks in London and the capital's largest park which covers an immense 350 acres. Being divided by the Serpentine, a 28-acre recreation lake, Hyde Park London is as famed for the many water sports activities, swimming and sunbathing as it is for its Speaker's Corner and being the location for mass demonstrations.
Opened in 1637 by King Charles I, Hyde Park is staunchly ingrained into the historical and aesthetic makeup of London. Given the park is one of the most distinguished and embedded features of London it is appropriate that Hyde Park London is a prominent location during the 2012 Olympic Games.
Throughout the Games this huge area, which for centuries has been providing tranquil respite from the hustle and bustle of city life, will be home to a series of Olympic related events.
Olympic Torch Hyde Park Concert
Given the fact that Hyde Park has always attracted the biggest names in show business to entertain an utterly receptive audience, it was only natural that this impressive London Royal Park was the venue for the Olympic torch relay finale concert.
On Thursday 26th July, more than 80,000 Olympic revellers headed over to Hyde Park to watch Dizzy Rascal and others play under a sun-drenched evening sky as the Olympic torch finally arrived at Hyde Park London.
BT London Live Hyde Park
'Unparalleled viewing' of the Games can be found at Hyde Park as several big screens have been erected at the park, including the largest outdoor screen in the UK. Hyde Park London has always thrived on being an atmospheric place for huge crowds to gather and none more so than to witness the dramas unfold of what is possibly the biggest event in the British capital's history.
Between 28th July and 11th August 2012, BT London Live Hyde Park is providing free access for visitors to experience the Olympic fever in one of London's most historical and recognisable locations.
Triathlon and Marathon Swimming at Hyde Park
If you thought all the Olympic drama taking place at Hyde Park was confined to a large screen then you can rest assured that there will be some 'live' Olympic action also occurring at London's most celebrated park.
On Saturday 4th August and Tuesday 7th August the women's and men's triathlon events will be taking place at Hyde Park as the legendary British park welcomes the world's best triathletes. You can find the route map for the Triathlon event above.
Additionally on the 9th and 10th of August, Hyde Park will also be hosting the Marathon Swimming women's and men's events where 25 athletes (including Beijing GB silver medallist Keri-Anne Payne) will swim 6 laps of the Serpentine totalling a distance of 10k!
Mapping out the London Olympic Marathon course
How will the Olympics change the face of London?
London 2012 non-sporting trail – a cultural backdrop against a summer of sport!
The A-Z History of London
To celebrate the launch of Philip Parker's new book, The A to Z History of London, here are 10 facts about London that you might not know. Interested in learning more about the history of London? Buy the… Read More

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


We undertake microseismic monitoring utilizing a great number of 3- or 6-channel recording instruments and short-period (1, 2, and 4.5 Hz) sensors that are available at the Survey.
Microseismic vibrations are observed continually in a relatively long time period to study the structural properties of an investigated object or area. In this way, vibrations in the object or faults and structural zones of the area can be located.


Planned on doing stuff with him yesterday. Didn't quite happen.
Working through an old Carnie arc with him — pretty much a waste of time, but at least it'll be done. Also, respecced him, keeping all the powers he had, but rearranging them a bit so that he has Stamina, Acrobatics, and his first Ice Hold by level 30, so I can screw around in Siren's Call more effectively.
Did a bunch of missions on him, solo. First time I've had him logged on in a looooong time. He's still fun to play, and MA looks fun with the flared boots on his "flash gordon approaching" outfit. That is is all.
Holy hell — I actually played him, roleplayed him, got the Boomtown Saints into the Coalition, and ran some missions with him (with help, cuz the Crey Protectors own him).
Fun to play. Not the uber-AT, by any means (slow animations on the attacks are annoying), but fun to play.
I friggin' love this guy. BIG BOOM attacks, and now with Fault from the stone attack set to keep everyone flopping around… it's just good smashing tank fun. Ran the respec trial, which was good, but while I really want to get teleport (or any move power), I just don't want to give anything UP to get it.
Ran a couple missions. Good build. Not nearly as much 'boom' as Dolmen, to compare my other brute, but he's pretty tough. Might need to dial down off the red/purple con missions.
Haven't played him. This makes me sad.
Silly Gilly. If she weren't my second oldest toon I'd remake her as an energy melee tank — I'm hamstringing the build by not taking footstomp.
Also… I just don't play her that much.
Unlike Bear, who gets weekly lovin'. Love the build, and pretty much expecting to like it even more when I7 speeds up the animations on the attacks.
Haven't been able to play him in a week or so. Love the toon, though. Much boom.
Like Bear, Gavin benefits from having a commited amount of playtime, due to being in a group. I like dark melee, and I like regen, so it's all good.
There are others, but that's what I'm talking about right now.
Noelle Frost (50) Finally finished off a level 20s Clockwork story arc, that was a pain only for the defeat alls that wouldn't attack me, because I was 30 levels higher than them. Compared Noelle's souvenirs to the list of story arcs on Hythia's Guide site, and I've only missed three at lower levels, and am on my last tow high level ones now. Got (I think) the last Malta one cued up, waiting for someone to help me. Killing Titans all by my lonesome is S-L-O-W!
Ginger.Snap (20? maybe 21?) Hard to believe silly horny little Ginger is my second highest toon, but that's thanks to haning out with a fun bunch of folks. Just got her some new duds that I'm looking forward to having her fight in. Although — sorry guys — no more looking up her skirt. I put her in hot pants.
Shadowslip (20) Languishing in the Tailor Shop in the Rogue Isles since January. But I do love stabbing things with her sword, so I hope she'll be getting up to some villianous action soon.
Sathariel (15?) Really eager for 16, since I took a non-travel power at level 14, and now I really want her to be able to fly. That said, I think a Mastermind's not the best archetype for me.
Sophie MacIntyre (13) Pushed to level 13 to stay ahead of the rest of the folks she teams with. Once we finally got a few organized sessions happening, it's been a load of fun to play her. Also, I like kicking things. Looking forward to superspeed in one more level.
And yes, that's all of them!


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Home News Brief El Salvador Probes 'Irregularities' in Failed Gang Truce
El Salvador Probes 'Irregularities' in Failed Gang Truce
Written by Escrito por
Marguerite Cawley
Barrio 18
El Salvador gang truce
Salvadoran Attorney General Luis Martinez
Investigators are close to finishing their probe into whether the negotiators of the country's failed gang truce broke any laws, according to El Salvador's attorney general. However, taking down the people behind the truce will not solve the new government's security dilemma.
Attorney General Luis Martinez told El Mundo that his office was nearly finished "evaluating" the actions of various people who had participated in what he called a "false gang pact." In a separate meeting with members of Congress, Martinez said his office would "reveal the truth" behind the pact and hinted that certain key actors — including truce negotiator Raul Mijango, a former guerrilla leader — could soon be summoned to testify in court, reported El Diario de Hoy.
The probe has reportedly revealed that as part of the truce, criminal gangs handed over hundreds of guns that didn't actually belong to them. Gang members testified that they bought some of these guns second-hand for $100 to use in the handover, reported La Prensa Grafica. Other weapons were reportedly stolen. The witnesses also allegedly said the gangs bought weapons from the armed forces while the truce was still active.
As the Attorney General's Office continues its probe, concerns over rising gang violence has prompted the government to create a special unit to investigate police deaths — many of which are supposedly due to clashes with gangs — and to allow police to carry guns on their days off. In another move, conservative party the ARENA proposed a bill that would give the armed forces control over security in areas with a strong gang presence.
InSight Crime Analysis
With homicides back to pre-truce levels; rising gang-police violence; and the new government of President Salvador Sanchez Ceren refusing to publicly support any negotiations with gangs, El Salvador's gang truce has basically been dead for months now. Now all that remains is the fallout, and as Martinez's comments suggest, it is looking increasingly likely that several prominent figures involved in the process will be caught up in this.
SEE ALSO: El Salvador's Gang Truce: Positives and Negatives
As InSight Crime has noted, the Sanchez Ceren government is being forced to walk a fine line. The spiraling violence means they cannot simply ignore the problem, but for political reasons, nor can they propose anything that makes it look as though the government is willing to get too close to the gangs again. Thus far, they have created a special security council — which includes Attorney General Luis Martinez as a member — that is supposed to propose solutions to the violence. Martinez has said he will "not allow" a new truce, but the most obvious alternative — a return to the unsuccessful hardline "mano dura" (iron first) policies that preceded the truce — looks just as unappealing.
What are your thoughts? Click here to send InSight Crime your comments.
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El Salvador Probes 'Irregularities' in Failed Gang Truce
3 Dirty Secrets Revealed by the El Salvador Gang 'Negotiations'
Homicide Drop in El Salvador: Presidential Triumph or Gang Trend?
Assessing El Salvador's Gangs in a Post-Truce Context
Should El Salvador Renew the Gang Truce?
'We're At War' With Gangs: El Salvador Police Official
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Airboat Rides Everglades: Not Your Average Pizza
When you think of the Everglades the last thing that comes to mind is probably still not pizza. A pizza joint in Fort Myers, Evan's Neighborhood Pizza, offers, "A special slithering pie topped with virtually every creature that lives in the swamp." At Evan's Neighborhood Pizza they serve an Everglades special which includes a combination of hog, alligator, tomato, frogs legs, swamp cabbage and last but not least, python.
"I'm very adventurous when it comes to food, that's for sure," owner Evan Daniell, 52, told the Daily News on Thursday. "You have different flavors throughout each bite."
"The python, for example, has a chewy consistency and is marinated to remove the "gamey" taste of the meat. The frog's legs, which include the bones, have a cleaner taste than chicken," Daniell said.
This bizarre idea to have a python pizza all started two years ago when the employees were talking about the invasion of pythons in the Florida Everglades. Since this "happy accident", Daniell believes he has sold about 150 python pizzas in the past two years. This place is especially popular with tourists and visitors who are anxious and curious in indulging into this particular pie. Their 14-inch Everglades pie is $45 but mostly because the python meat does not come cheap. About one pound of python meat is $66.
"The overpopulation became a nuisance, so that's what kind of did it for me and there was this article where a python killed a gator then started swallowing it and it ripped open its belly," said Daniell. "They were both found dead. It was an amazing photograph."
Daniell makes his own version of alligator sausage by blending chunks of alligator with different meats such as pork and likes to use the frog legs with the bone in so you can see the bones and it adds more flavor.
This may not be the typical dish you crave but for the exotic eating folks, this is just the place. Don't forget to also try the "roadkill" pizza with toppings of raccoon, armadillo and possum meat! Daniell continues to think of new and creative toppings for his pizza. He enjoys picking these crazy creations that end up being a customer favorite. "To really throw you off, we want to serve it with a side of squash," said Daniell with a laugh. "You know, like squash… You got to have a little fun with it."
Get the pizza after your Airboat Rides Everglades!
Airboat rides in Everglades Airboat rides Miami Best everglades airboat tours Everglades airboat tours Fort Lauderdale Florida's Everglades Miami Airboat Tours Things to do in Fort Lauderdale


Cobb salad was invented in 1937 at the Brown Derby restaurant in Los Angeles. Whenever I think of the Brown Derby, I think of the amazing Lucille Ball creeping on movie stars from her booth at the restaurant in I Love Lucy. Hilarious.
Anyhoo, Cobb salad is the perfect lunch or dinner- high in fat, fiber, and flavor and low in starch. This is how you want to eat to keep your blood sugars stable and your energy fizzing.
You can substitute ham for the chicken, red onions instead of green, or any kind of cheese if you don't care for bleu cheese – don't be afraid to be creative. Top it with my Basil Ranch dressing, or use any low-sugar dressing that you like.
This recipe serves 4 people easily, with dressing left over for future salads or vegetable dip.
Does that not just look mouthwatering?! It's very easy to make too!
Prepare the dressing first, and let it sit in the fridge for an hour or two, or overnight. The flavor gets better when you give it time.
You can whisk the dressing in a bowl, but I make it with my food processor or blender. This way, you can just give everything a rough chop and toss it in.
So, place the mayo, peeled garlic clove, chopped basil leaves, chopped green onions, dill, lemon juice, salt, pepper, and Worcestershire in the bowl of your blender or food processor. Process until smooth, about 30 seconds. If you're doing this by hand, finely chop the basil, onions, dill, and garlic, then mash the garlic with the side of your knife. Then whisk everything together.
Now add the sour cream and buttermilk. Process briefly, just until there are no lumps. If you're making this by hand, just whisk in the sour cream and milk.
Taste and add salt or pepper till it tastes right to you. Put the dressing in a jar or bowl and refrigerate.
When you are ready to assemble the salad, wash, dry, and chop your lettuce and greens. Place them in a big bowl or individual salad bowls.
Top the salad with the sliced boiled eggs, chopped cooked chicken, crumbled bacon, chopped green onions, bleu cheese, and avocado slices. Make it pretty – arrange it in stripes or in a starburst pattern.
Serve it up with your Ranch dressing!
The Basil Ranch dressing is not only great on the salad, but so good for dipping carrots, celery, or boiled shrimp. It will keep 2 weeks in the fridge in a sealed jar.
And don't forget to share any additions that made it even better!
Wonderful! Thank you. Let me know how it turns out!


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Home › Gyno › Endometriosis › Endometriosis Costs
The Hidden Costs Of Endometriosis
Putting a price tag on a disease isn't an easy task. Adding up the costs of doctor visits, medication, and surgery, for instance, gives one only a hint at the type of huge sums that the government and health care consumers must shell out on an annual basis for illnesses like heart disease or diabetes. Once you attempt to factor in societal impact and missed opportunities due to disease, you have a mighty difficult mathematical equation to solve.
Complex Equation
Sometimes the equation is made difficult by the complexity of the workup and treatment for a specific ailment. A case in point is endometriosis. In endometriosis uterine tissue grows outside of the uterus on pelvic organs. The disease now affects around one in every ten U.S. women. As a gynecological disease, endometriosis has become so common that the University of California's San Francisco Medical Center has cited the ailment as a major cause for infertility in females of childbearing age. The Center's statistics state that endometriosis is responsible for 25%-50% of all cases of infertility.
Funding Pie
You'd think that with this kind of high profile, physicians would, by now, know a great deal about the condition and have developed standard long-term management methods. But this is not so. The reason for the lack of understanding of the disease and its treatment is due to the fact that endometriosis research receives a very small piece of the government funding pie.
Many would like to see an overhaul of the way the government treats and spends money on health care issues. Meantime, private organizations devoted to specific medical issues, such as the World Endometriosis Research Foundation (WERF), have begun to push the envelope, too.
Mental Distress
Last August, for instance, WERF gathered a group of researchers from all over the world to determine the real costs of endometriosis. The project is called EndoCost and involved the analysis of studies relating to the past and future projected costs of diagnosing and treating endometriosis. The study also took into account some indirect costs, such as absence from the workplace and mental distress. The study took 5 months to complete and EndoCost is expected to publish a report by the middle of 2010.
The EndoCost consortium believes that the results of their project will prove that endometriosis is more costly than even Crohn's disease or migraines, two quite different but better-known chronic and disabling conditions. When one tallies up health care plus loss of productivity, a previous estimate finds that the annual cost of endometriosis runs $2,801 for each patient. If we assume that the illness affects 10% of the U.S. population, the total burden comes to $22 billion! But the WERF consortium believes this figure is a gross underestimate of the true cost of the disease.
Disease Profile
Clueless "Experts"
Endometriosis And Semen
Endometriosis Advances
Diet as Risk Factor
Lupron Issues
Cancer Risk
Elusive Endometriosis
CHM Treatment
Endometriosis And GNRH
Adenomyosis FAQs
Endometriosis Costs
IVF Failure In Asians
Endometriosis History
Vaginal "blisters", Lumps, And Bumps.
Jolting Pain
Losing Libido :/
Irregular Periods?
White Spots


text:
#if !CLR2
#else
using Microsoft.Scripting.Ast;
#endif
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Management.Automation.Language;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Runtime.CompilerServices;

namespace System.Management.Automation.Interpreter
{
    internal sealed class InterpretedFrame
    {
        [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage("Microsoft.Security", "CA2104:DoNotDeclareReadOnlyMutableReferenceTypes")]
        public static readonly ThreadLocal<InterpretedFrame> CurrentFrame = new ThreadLocal<InterpretedFrame>();

        internal readonly Interpreter Interpreter;
        internal InterpretedFrame _parent;

        [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage("Microsoft.Security", "CA2105:ArrayFieldsShouldNotBeReadOnly")]
        private int[] _continuations;
        private int _continuationIndex;
        private int _pendingContinuation;
        private object _pendingValue;

        [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage("Microsoft.Security", "CA2105:ArrayFieldsShouldNotBeReadOnly")]
        public readonly object[] Data;

        [System.Diagnostics.CodeAnalysis.SuppressMessage("Microsoft.Security", "CA2105:ArrayFieldsShouldNotBeReadOnly")]
        public readonly StrongBox<object>[] Closure;

        public int StackIndex;
        public int InstructionIndex;

        // When a ThreadAbortException is raised from interpreted code this is the first frame that caught it.
        // No handlers within this handler re-abort the current thread when left.
        public ExceptionHandler CurrentAbortHandler;

        internal InterpretedFrame(Interpreter interpreter, StrongBox<object>[] closure)
        {
            Interpreter = interpreter;
            StackIndex = interpreter.LocalCount;
            Data = new object[StackIndex + interpreter.Instructions.MaxStackDepth];

            int c = interpreter.Instructions.MaxContinuationDepth;
            if (c > 0)
            {
                _continuations = new int[c];
            }

            Closure = closure;

            _pendingContinuation = -1;
            _pendingValue = Interpreter.NoValue;
        }

        public DebugInfo GetDebugInfo(int instructionIndex)
        {
            return DebugInfo.GetMatchingDebugInfo(Interpreter._debugInfos, instructionIndex);
        }

        public string Name
        {
            get { return Interpreter._name; }
        }

        #region Data Stack Operations

        public void Push(object value)
        {
            Data[StackIndex++] = value;
        }

        public void Push(bool value)
        {
            Data[StackIndex++] = value ? ScriptingRuntimeHelpers.True : ScriptingRuntimeHelpers.False;
        }

        public void Push(int value)
        {
            Data[StackIndex++] = ScriptingRuntimeHelpers.Int32ToObject(value);
        }

        public object Pop()
        {
            return Data[--StackIndex];
        }

        internal void SetStackDepth(int depth)
        {
            StackIndex = Interpreter.LocalCount + depth;
        }

        public object Peek()
        {
            return Data[StackIndex - 1];
        }

        public void Dup()
        {
            int i = StackIndex;
            Data[i] = Data[i - 1];
            StackIndex = i + 1;
        }

        public ExecutionContext ExecutionContext
        {
            get { return (ExecutionContext)Data[1]; }
        }

        public FunctionContext FunctionContext
        {
            get { return (FunctionContext)Data[0]; }
        }

        #endregion

        #region Stack Trace

        public InterpretedFrame Parent
        {
            get { return _parent; }
        }

        public static bool IsInterpretedFrame(MethodBase method)
        {
            // ContractUtils.RequiresNotNull(method, "method");
            return method.DeclaringType == typeof(Interpreter) && method.Name == "Run";
        }

        /// <summary>
        /// A single interpreted frame might be represented by multiple subsequent Interpreter.Run CLR frames.
        /// This method filters out the duplicate CLR frames.
        /// </summary>
        public static IEnumerable<StackFrame> GroupStackFrames(IEnumerable<StackFrame> stackTrace)
        {
            bool inInterpretedFrame = false;
            foreach (StackFrame frame in stackTrace)
            {
                if (InterpretedFrame.IsInterpretedFrame(frame.GetMethod()))
                {
                    if (inInterpretedFrame)
                    {
                        continue;
                    }

                    inInterpretedFrame = true;
                }
                else
                {
                    inInterpretedFrame = false;
                }

                yield return frame;
            }
        }

        public IEnumerable<InterpretedFrameInfo> GetStackTraceDebugInfo()
        {
            var frame = this;
            do
            {
                yield return new InterpretedFrameInfo(frame.Name, frame.GetDebugInfo(frame.InstructionIndex));
                frame = frame.Parent;
            } while (frame != null);
        }

        internal void SaveTraceToException(Exception exception)
        {
            if (exception.Data[typeof(InterpretedFrameInfo)] == null)
            {
                exception.Data[typeof(InterpretedFrameInfo)] = new List<InterpretedFrameInfo>(GetStackTraceDebugInfo()).ToArray();
            }
        }

        public static InterpretedFrameInfo[] GetExceptionStackTrace(Exception exception)
        {
            return exception.Data[typeof(InterpretedFrameInfo)] as InterpretedFrameInfo[];
        }

#if DEBUG
        internal string[] Trace
        {
            get
            {
                var trace = new List<string>();
                var frame = this;
                do
                {
                    trace.Add(frame.Name);
                    frame = frame.Parent;
                } while (frame != null);
                return trace.ToArray();
            }
        }
#endif

        internal ThreadLocal<InterpretedFrame>.StorageInfo Enter()
        {
            var currentFrame = InterpretedFrame.CurrentFrame.GetStorageInfo();
            _parent = currentFrame.Value;
            currentFrame.Value = this;
            return currentFrame;
        }

        internal void Leave(ThreadLocal<InterpretedFrame>.StorageInfo currentFrame)
        {
            currentFrame.Value = _parent;
        }

        #endregion

        #region Continuations

        internal bool IsJumpHappened()
        {
            return _pendingContinuation >= 0;
        }

        public void RemoveContinuation()
        {
            _continuationIndex--;
        }

        public void PushContinuation(int continuation)
        {
            _continuations[_continuationIndex++] = continuation;
        }

        public int YieldToCurrentContinuation()
        {
            var target = Interpreter._labels[_continuations[_continuationIndex - 1]];
            SetStackDepth(target.StackDepth);
            return target.Index - InstructionIndex;
        }

        /// <summary>
        /// Get called from the LeaveFinallyInstruction.
        /// </summary>
        public int YieldToPendingContinuation()
        {
            Debug.Assert(_pendingContinuation >= 0);
            RuntimeLabel pendingTarget = Interpreter._labels[_pendingContinuation];

            // the current continuation might have higher priority (continuationIndex is the depth of the current continuation):
            if (pendingTarget.ContinuationStackDepth < _continuationIndex)
            {
                RuntimeLabel currentTarget = Interpreter._labels[_continuations[_continuationIndex - 1]];
                SetStackDepth(currentTarget.StackDepth);
                return currentTarget.Index - InstructionIndex;
            }

            SetStackDepth(pendingTarget.StackDepth);
            if (_pendingValue != Interpreter.NoValue)
            {
                Data[StackIndex - 1] = _pendingValue;
            }

            // Set the _pendingContinuation and _pendingValue to the default values if we finally gets to the Goto target
            _pendingContinuation = -1;
            _pendingValue = Interpreter.NoValue;
            return pendingTarget.Index - InstructionIndex;
        }

        internal void PushPendingContinuation()
        {
            Push(_pendingContinuation);
            Push(_pendingValue);

            _pendingContinuation = -1;
            _pendingValue = Interpreter.NoValue;
        }

        internal void PopPendingContinuation()
        {
            _pendingValue = Pop();
            _pendingContinuation = (int)Pop();
        }

        private static MethodInfo s_goto;
        private static MethodInfo s_voidGoto;

        internal static MethodInfo GotoMethod
        {
            get { return s_goto ?? (s_goto = typeof(InterpretedFrame).GetMethod("Goto")); }
        }

        internal static MethodInfo VoidGotoMethod
        {
            get { return s_voidGoto ?? (s_voidGoto = typeof(InterpretedFrame).GetMethod("VoidGoto")); }
        }

        public int VoidGoto(int labelIndex)
        {
            return Goto(labelIndex, Interpreter.NoValue, gotoExceptionHandler: false);
        }

        public int Goto(int labelIndex, object value, bool gotoExceptionHandler)
        {
            // TODO: we know this at compile time (except for compiled loop):
            RuntimeLabel target = Interpreter._labels[labelIndex];
            Debug.Assert(!gotoExceptionHandler || _continuationIndex == target.ContinuationStackDepth,
                "When it's time to jump to the exception handler, all previous finally blocks should already be processed");

            if (_continuationIndex == target.ContinuationStackDepth)
            {
                SetStackDepth(target.StackDepth);
                if (value != Interpreter.NoValue)
                {
                    Data[StackIndex - 1] = value;
                }

                return target.Index - InstructionIndex;
            }

            // if we are in the middle of executing jump we forget the previous target and replace it by a new one:
            _pendingContinuation = labelIndex;
            _pendingValue = value;
            return YieldToCurrentContinuation();
        }

        #endregion
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Clayborne Tips & Stories
These words have one thing in common: They have meanings!
Vision Validation Victory
Clayborne Reborne!
Fact: 9 years ago was 2009.
Myth: Cats can fly.
These are the types of confusing facts and myths you have to deal with everyday. Let's face it, the waters of the world are rough and you don't always bring your paddle. Don't worry, we have engines for our boats and that makes them really, really fast.
We can explain everything you need to know about our programs and life in a few short videos.
Wikileaks released confidential footage of Clayborne's sales manager disclosing company secrets. The implications will....blow....your....mind!
Clayborne's founder affirms Elon Musk's concerns that artificial intelligence could have serious negative consequences. Beware GMAT and GRE test takers!
CLAYBORNE'S PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES
Finally, someone explains the true differences between the ACT and the SAT. This groundbreaking explanation walks you through an eye-opening revelation about key test differences.
What is Academic Coaching? Most people say it falls between tutoring and life coaching. Listen as Clayborne's CEO explains to you that most people are wrong.
MORE THAN JUST TUTORING
Are you perfect? We don't think so. More importantly, we don't want you to be. That's because we have a tried and true method for fixing life's biggest mistakes. Richard Needham once again delivers earth-shattering insight into Clayborne's revolutionary methods for success.
With years of entrepreneurship coaching under his belt, Clayborne's CEO discusses how negotiated one of the biggest deals in Clayborne history. Check your expectations at the door because this insight will shake the foundation of your understanding of basic economics.
PREPARATION IS CRITICAL
As the director of test prep at Clayborne, Scott Webster knows that preparation is the key for success. This motivational video shows how being well prepared can make the most complicated questions seem effortless. Scott's captivating on screen presence, ability to adapt to any question, and his recollection of facts will be remembered with the likes of Simon Sinek, Amy Cuddy, and Tony Robbins. Be prepared to feel inspired!
Taking a standardized test takes is about preparation and nothing says preparation like our test prep director Scott Webster.
We are everywhere and we are nowhere.
Try to wrap your head around the ramifications of that statement.
(or send us a message.)
Clayborne Education, 515 Locust Ave, Charlottesville, VA, 22902434.295.4501contactus@clayborne.com
Ivy Location: 2125 Ivy Rd, Charlottesville, VA 22903
RICHMOND LOCATION: 3850 Gaskins Rd #240, Richmond, Va 23233


text:
Socrates and 'O Jogo Bonito'
Tom Hennigan writes: Full disclosure first. The Reuters Brazil football correspondent Andrew Downie is a friend and colleague and I read early drafts of several chapters from his recently published biography Doctor Sócrates: Footballer, philosopher, legend. Thankfully the final text suffered no harm as a result.
Therefore as a partial blogger I'll leave to one side the book's many achievements and instead just discuss how rare a bird it is. Despite being the world's fifth most populous nation, Brazil remains on the periphery of our global vision, a reality reflected by the relative dearth of biographies ‑ a genre which seems to pile up ever higher in our bookshops ‑ about Brazilians aimed at the general reader and published in English.
It is not that such books do not exist. But they are few in number and often too academic to capture a wide readership. This is a pity, because the biography of a compelling subject can serve as a more attractive and intimate introduction to a country for the casual reader than a weighty volume that seeks to make sense of it all in one go, something which seems to particularly afflict Brazil, a fact which itself hints that it is still viewed as terra incognita by many publishers. (The best example of this "way in" for me remains Peter Robb's peerless A Death in Brazil.)
As Downie's new Sócrates book shows, biography can come at a country from an angle, rather than through full frontal assault. It is first and foremost a football book about an extraordinarily elegant exponent of the beautiful game who captained a team that failed to win the World Cup in 1982 and in doing so became something far rarer than a mere world champion achieving instead mythic status as a member of the greatest team never to win the tournament. (Anyone who doubts this status should check out the YouTube reel of the fifteen glorious goals they scored in five games.)
But Sócrates is well-chosen as a subject because he belongs to one of those few categories in which Brazil stimulates some global interest ‑ football ‑ but is arguably more important for what he did off the field than on it. As a result the football reader might be drawn to the book by memories of the effortless cool of Sócrates and his team-mates thirty-five years ago in Spain but in reading about his life will get a fine introduction to the ferment that gripped Brazil in the 1980s without ever feeling they are stuck in a thesis on the institutional death rattle of a mid-20th century Latin American dictatorship.
From a certain, censorious, point of view, the life of Sócrates Brasileiro Sampaio de Souza Vieira de Oliveira was something of a failure. Dead in 2011 at just fifty-seven as a result of alcoholism, his career on the field, for all its elegance, is more famous for what he did not win ‑ the '82 and '86 World Cups ‑ than what he did, which amounted to little more than three São Paulo state championships with Corinthians. He was never a Brazilian national champion, nor did he grace the Copa Libertadores, the South American equivalent of the European Cup. His solitary year in Europe, with Serie A side Fiorentina, was an unmitigated failure, as was his subsequent career as an ageing pro, coach and later commentator. He piled up ex-wives, former lovers, estranged friends.
But much of this sorry (unless reckless boozing is your thing) tale took place in the shadow of his greatness, which was secured within five years as a result of what he said and did off the field in the early 1980s.
Not that he wasn't great on it, a beautifully languid conductor with an exquisite range of passing (though probably not the greatest Brazilian of his generation: this was arguably Zico, Sócrates's friend and team-mate in the '82 and '86 World Cups, who with Flamengo won several Brazilian national titles, the Copa Libertadores and orchestrated the 3-0 destruction of European champions Liverpool in the 1981 Intercontinental Cup). But Sócrates used his fame as a craque, his position as the captain of the national side and leader of the most popular team in South America's biggest city to do something unheralded. He spoke up for democracy at a time when a grim authoritarian military regime was running Brazil.
At the time this was a minority pursuit in a country that was part conservative, part cowed ‑ and unheard of from a football player. In part Sócrates did so because unlike most players he was from the middle class, well-educated and a qualified medical doctor by the time he rocked up at Corinthians. A confirmed bohemian with a love of late-night debates around bar tables covered in empty beer bottles ‑ as he once told an interviewer "I smoke, I drink and I think" ‑ he chafed against the restrictions of Brazil's football world, to this day one of the darker corners of the country's conservative soul.
To combat it he helped instigate the Corinthians Democracy movement of the early 1980s in which real workplace democracy was installed in a major football club, where all decisions were put to a ballot in which everyone, from club director to boot-man, had just one vote. It was a precarious, short-lived experiment whose tangible achievements pale alongside the impact such a radical departure within a high-profile institution made at a time when the country was struggling to emerge from the long night of dictatorship. As Corinthians fanatic and Brazil's first working class president Lula would later put it for ordinary people with little interest in politics "seeing players putting democratic ideas into practice showed how important that fight was".
Sócrates had himself been politicised by others, most importantly the dean of Brazilian sports journalists Juca Kfouri a former left-wing militant. But he quickly realised that as a high-profile footballer he could have a far greater reach than a journalist, union leader or academic when spreading the word about democracy.
For many poorer Brazilians, whether from apathy or well-founded fear, politics was something to be avoided. But they were obsessed with football and Sócrates would start interviews talking about upcoming fixtures but quickly veer off into the need for social justice, rights for residents of favelas, better primary medical care and an expanded network of trade schools. A sporting superstar, he could help this message reach portions of the population that were denied it by a reactionary mass media industry that was largely beholden to the generals.
Several of his team-mates were wary of his proselyting, knowing it would antagonise the regime. A perfect illustration of just how different the times then were in Brazil came in November 1982 when the Corinthians players lined up for a local derby with the words "Dia 15 Vote" ‑ Vote on the 15th ‑ on their shirts. It was a message for people to participate in state elections. Though the poll had been called by the military regime and the players only asked for people to take part in it ‑ a call that came without any recommendation about how to vote ‑ in the Brazil of 1982 even this simple civic gesture was seen as subversive by the powers that be and the players were warned not to repeat it.
It was in these ways, lighting matches in the darkness, that Sócrates played his part in Brazil's troubled democratic transition. His story is a football story but to read about his role is also to drop in on a society in transition and witness the birth of an era that now seems to be drowning to death in a sea of corruption scandals three decades on.
It is perhaps understandable that football, so identified with Brazil, has provided a rare opportunity to open a window onto this vibrant, hopeful, chaotic time and place through Downie's book. If only there were more such biographies in English, and not necessarily all about footballers, waiting for readers stimulated by his Sócrates read to find out more about the people who make up this endlessly complex, contradictory place called Brazil.
Ivan Illich: An Exchange
John Ashbery: The Syntax of Time
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