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HomeLecture BooksNorm and Action
III: Act and Ability
1. The concept of a human act is of basic importance to the questions which are discussed in this book. It is not one of the aims of deontic logic to clarify this concept. The notion of an act is more like a tool which this logic has to use for other purposes of clarification. Considering however the complex and obscure nature of this notion we must try to throw light on some of its aspects before we can be reasonably sure that our use of it as a tool in deontic logic stands on a firm basis.
I find it surprising that the concept of a human act has as such been relatively little discussed in philosophic literature. The same is true of the related notions of activity and behaviour. Traditional philosophic discussion bearing on these concepts has concentrated on the problem of the so-called freedom of the will. In this discussion it is all too often taken for granted that it is clear what action is. In fact much of what has been said about the problem of freedom can be shown to be void of interest because based on some logically defective notion of acting.
In our discussion of acts we renounce every pretension of being systematic and shall try to confine ourselves to a necessary minimum of conceptual distinctions and observations. The freedom of the will we shall not discuss at all. But of the related topic of the ability to act (do) we shall have to say something.
2. The notion of a human act is related to the notion of an event i.e. a change in the world. What is the nature of this relationship?
It would not be right I think to call acts a kind or species of events. An act is not a change in the world. But many acts may quite appropriately be described as the bringing about or effecting ('at will') of a change. To act is in a sense to interfere with 'the course of nature'.
An event we have said (Ch. II Sect. 6) is a transition from one state of affairs to another or from a state to a process or from a process to a state; or it is a transformation of processes. The Logic of Change which we sketched in the preceding chapter is primarily a logic of events of the first type. Events of the second and third type are also called the beginning (commencing starting) and the end (ceasing stopping) of processes.
The events which are effected through action can be of any of the several types just mentioned. The acts of opening a window or of killing a person effect changes in states of affairs. Starting to run or stopping to talk may be acts which effect a change from a state to a process and from a process to a state respectively. But when a walking man starts to run his action effects a transformation of processes.
The Logic of Action which we are going to outline in the next chapter will primarily be a logic of acts which effect changes among states of affairs. Other types of action will not be explicitly dealt with in our formal theory.
The examples of acts which we have here mentioned are examples of what I shall call generic acts or act-categories. There is an in principle unlimited number of cases of window-opening or of starting to run.
The several cases of generic acts I shall call individual acts or act-individuals. It is noteworthy that the word 'act' is used ambiguously in ordinary language to mean sometimes a generic and sometimes an individual act. It is e.g. correct to call murder an act; this is an act-category. It is also correct to call the murder of Caesar an act; this is an act-individual.
To the generic act of opening a window there answers the generic change of a window becoming open. To the individual act which was the murder of Caesar there answers the individual event of Caesar's death.
The logical difference between acts and events is a difference between 'activity' and 'passivity'. An act requires an agent. An individual event is the taking place or happening of some generic event on a specified occasion. An individual act again is the doing of a generic act on a specified occasion by a specified agent.
3. When we say that an individual event happens on a certain occasion we may regard this occasion for the happening of the event as constituted by two successive occasions for the obtaining of certain states of affairs (see above Ch. II Sect. 6). Similarly when we say that an individual act is done on a certain occasion we may regard this occasion for the doing of the act as constituted by the two successive occasions for the corresponding individual event.
Not every occasion (or pair of successive occasions) is an occasion on which just any individual event may happen or act be done. Thus for example only on an occasion when a certain window is closed can this window open or become opened. Generally speaking only on an occasion on which the generic state of affairs described by p obtains can the generic change described by pT ~p or that described by pTp take place or become effected ('at will').
We shall say that an occasion constitutes an opportunity for the happening of a certain generic event or for the doing of an act of a certain category when the occasion has some generic feature which makes the happening of this event or the doing of this act (logically) possible on that occasion. For example: Only on an occasion when the window is closed is there an opportunity for opening it.
Any opportunity for the doing of an act of a certain category is also an opportunity for the happening of the corresponding generic event i.e. for the event effected through the act. The converse entailment however does not hold. Not every opportunity for the happening of a certain generic event is also an opportunity for the doing of a corresponding act. The occasion for the happening of the event has to satisfy additional conditions in order to constitute an opportunity for the doing of the corresponding act i.e. the act of bringing about this event. Which these additional conditions are will be discussed later (Sect. 7).
4. The notion of an agent is essential to the distinction between acts and events. We shall here make only a few brief comments on this notion.
We may distinguish between empirical (natural) and super-empirical (super-natural) agents. An agent is empirical I shall say if the agent's existence is a contingent or empirical fact. Super-empirical agents have necessary existence. The difference between the two categories of agent can also be expressed by saying that an empirical agent is a 'perishable' a super-empirical agent an 'eternal' being.
The ideas of necessary existence and of super-empirical agents cannot be discussed within the limits of this work.
Agents who perform human action are empirical. But not all agents of human acts are human individuals.
We can distinguish between personal and impersonal agents. An impersonal agent is for example any so-called legal or juristic person (such as a corporation) a law court a legislative assembly or the state.
The action of impersonal agents is certainly 'human action' in some sense of the word. The question may be raised whether acts which we impute to juristic persons and other impersonal agents of human acts are 'logical constructions' i.e. could be defined (conceptually explicated) in terms of acts of some personal agents. This question however we shall not discuss.
Of what I here call personal agents we can further distinguish two kinds viz. individual and collective agents.
When an act is performed by one man we shall say that it is performed by him individually.
Sometimes the performance of an act requires the joint acting of several men. The table may be too heavy to be removed from the room by one person alone but two or more persons may do it by their joint efforts. We then say that the act of removing the table is performed by two or more men collectively.
That an act is performed by several agents collectively may also be described by saying that the agent who performs this act is a collectivity of men or a collective agent.
A collective agent must not be confused with an impersonal agent such as say a corporation or the state or some other juristic person. But the acts of a juristic person may entail the collective acting of some men.
Whenever several men perform an action collectively ('by joint efforts') each man does something individually. The question may be raised whether acts attributed to collective agents could not be regarded as 'logical constructions' of acts of some individual agents. This is another problem which will not be discussed here.
5. To every act (of the kind which we are here considering) there corresponds a change or an event in the world. The terms 'change' and 'event' must then be understood in the broad generalized sense which covers both changes (events) and not-changes (not-events). This correspondence between act and change is an intrinsic or logical tie. The act is as it were 'defined' as the act of effecting such and such a change. For example: the act of opening a certain window is logically the act of changing or transforming a world in which this window is closed to a world in which it is open.
By the result of an act we can understand either the change corresponding to this act or alternatively the end-state (see Ch. II Sect. 6) of this change. Thus by the result of the act of opening a certain window we can understand either the fact that the window is opening (changes from closed to open) or the fact that it is open.
On either way of understanding the notion of a result of action the tie between the act and its result is intrinsic. The act cannot be truly described as being an act of the category in question unless it effects a change or ends in a state of affairs of the kind in question which we call its result. An act cannot be truly called an act of opening the window unless it ends (results) in the window's being open—at least for a short time. Trying to open the window need not of course result in this.
When the world changes in a certain respect it may happen that it also by virtue of so-called causal or natural necessity becomes transformed in a certain other respect. We then say that the second transformation is a consequence of the first. If the first transformation is effected through action is the result of an act then the second is a consequence of action is a consequence of this act.
For example: a consequence of the act of opening a window may be that the temperature in a certain room sinks (is subsequently lower than it was before).
Whether a certain transformation will cause a certain other transformation to take place or not will usually depend upon the presence or absence of a number of other features of the world beside the states associated with the two transformations themselves. This is true also of human action. Whether the temperature in a room will sink or not as a consequence of opening a window will depend among other things upon the antecedent difference in outdoor and indoor temperature. Sometimes the temperature will not sink but rise.
Unlike the relation between an act and its result the relation between an act and its consequences is extrinsic (causal).
Someone may wish to object to our terms 'result' and 'consequence' (of action) on the ground that what is here called a consequence is quite commonly in ordinary language spoken of as the result of an act and vice versa. Thus for example we say that as a result of the window's being opened he caught a cold. The catching of the cold however was a consequence to use our terminology of the act whose result was that the window became open.
I am of course not anxious to correct the ordinary use of 'result' and 'consequence'. What matters are not the terms but the conceptual distinction between such changes and states as have an intrinsic and such as have an extrinsic relation to a given act. This distinction is important to note and it is somewhat unfortunate that no clear terminological indication of it in ordinary parlance should exist.
Perhaps this 'defect' of ordinary language is connected with the fact that the distinction between the result and the consequences of an act although logically sharp is at the same time in an important sense relative. What I mean by this can be explained as follows:
Consider again the act whose result we said was that a certain window is open (at a certain time and place). Could one not truthfully answer the question of what the person who opened the window did by saying that he let cool air into the room (thus lowering the temperature)? Is not the cooling of the room the result rather than the consequence? A consequence may be that someone in the room began to shiver and went out or subsequently caught a cold.
The answer is that we can certainly speak of an act of cooling the room but that this is a different act from that of opening the window. The act of cooling the room requires logically that the temperature should go down and may require causally that the window should be opened. The act of opening the window again requires logically that the window is opened and may lead causally to the fact that the indoor temperature sinks.
Thus one and the same change or state of affairs can be both the result and a consequence of an action. What makes it the one or the other depends upon the agent's intention in acting and upon other circumstances which we shall not discuss in this work.
The act of opening a window and that of cooling a room are logically distinct because of the nature of their results. But there is a sense in which the two acts may be said to 'look' exactly alike. The sense in which they look alike is that the activity involved in performing the two acts may be identical viz. certain muscular contractions and movements of the agent's limbs.
6. We shall distinguish between act and activity. To close a window or to kill a person is to perform an act. To smoke or to run or to read is to be engaged in activity.
The distinction is obviously important but philosophers have so far done very little to clarify it. Here I shall make only a few scattered observations on the topic.
As acts are related to events so are activities related to processes (cf. Ch. II Sect. 5). Events happen processes go on. Acts effect the happening of events activities keep processes going.
Activity is not internally related to changes and to states of affairs in the same manner in which acts are related to their results. Activity however may be externally or causally related to changes and states which are consequences of performing this activity. Running need not leave any 'imprint' on the world but smoking may leave smoke. As a consequence of drinking a person may get drunk. Getting drunk is an event and drunkenness a state.
The question may be raised whether activity is logically prior to acts or vice versa.
In some sense activity seems to be prior. Action may be said to presuppose or require activity. The bodily movements which are a prerequisite of most human acts may be regarded as activity in which the agent has to engage in order to perform those acts. The changes and states which we call results of action may be viewed as consequences of such prerequisite activities.
Yet in another way action seems prior. Human activity has a beginning and an end. The beginning and the ending of activity have sometimes at least the character of acts. To run is an activity but to start running or to stop running are acts of a kind. These acts however differ characteristically from acts which effect changes in states of affairs. The first of them implies a change or transition from a state to a process the second again from a process to a state (cf. Ch. II Sect. 6).
Beside the distinction between act and activity we have to note a distinction between acting and doing. To do something is to perform an act. To be doing something is to be engaged in some activity. That which we have called the result of an act is that which any agent who (successfully) performs this act on a certain occasion has done on that occasion. When an act fails of its intended result the agent has tried to do something which in fact he failed to accomplish (do). Trying is thus a 'logically incomplete' mode of acting. It is not immediately clear whether trying should be counted as falling in the category of act or in that of activity (cf. below Section 10).
7. We have previously (Ch. II Sect. 7) introduced the notion of an elementary change. The four types of elementary change we said are the four types of change and not-change which are possible with regard to a given (atomic) state of affairs and a pair of successive occasions. As schematic descriptions of the four types of change we introduced pTp pT ~p ~pTp and ~pT ~p.
We now introduce the notion of an elementary act. By an elementary act we shall understand an act the result (Section 5) of which is an elementary change. The correspondence between elementary act and elementary change is one to one.
We shall use the symbol d for acting. The schematic descriptions of the four types of elementary act shall be d(pTp) d(pT ~p) d( ~pTp) and d( ~pT ~p). It should be observed that d(pTp) etc. are schematic representations of sentences which describe acts just as pTp etc. are schematic representations of sentences which describe changes and p etc. are schematic representations of sentences which describe (generic) states of affairs.
We shall now consider the nature of the four types of elementary act in turn. For purposes of illustration let p represent the sentence 'The door is open'.
Take first d( ~pTp). It describes the act of changing or transforming a ~p-world to a p-world. In terms of our illustration: it describes the act of opening the door. We could say that d( ~pTp) represents the sentence 'the door is being opened'. A way of reading the schema d( ~pTp) would be 'it is being done that p'. For purposes of convenience however we shall read it though this is somewhat inaccurate 'p is done' and call the act which the schema describes 'the doing of p)'. (A more accurate but clumsier name would be 'the doing so that p'.)
It is easy to see that the act described by d( ~pTp) can (logically) be done only provided two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the state described by ~p prevails on the first of the two successive occasions which jointly constitute an occasion for doing the act. Only when the door is closed can it become opened. One cannot open an open door. The second condition is that the change described by ~pTp does not happen as we say 'of itself' i.e. independently of the action of an agent from the first to the second of the two occasions. If a door is so constructed that a spring or other mechanism pulls it open as soon as it has become closed then there is no such act as the act of opening this door. (But there may be an act of closing it and of keeping it closed. See below.)
Consider next d(pT ~p). It describes the act of changing a p-world to a ~p-world. If we call the act described by the schema d( ~pTp) 'the doing of p' we could call the act described by the schema d(pT ~p) 'the destroying of p)'. If we apply the schema to our example it describes the act of closing the door.
The conditions for the doing of the act described by d(pT ~p) are as follows: The state described by p should prevail on the first of two successive occasions and not 'of itself' change to its opposite from this occasion to the next. For example: A door can become closed as a result of action only provided it is open and does not close 'of itself'. Here the words 'of itself' mean that the change is due to some 'natural' cause such as e.g. the operation of a spring and is independent of the action of an agent.
Which act does d(pTp) describe? pTp means that the world does not change in the feature described by p on two successive occasions. Can this be a result of action? It certainly can. The world might change in a certain feature unless there is some agent to prevent it from changing. This is the sort of action that d(pTp) describes. We might call it 'the preserving of p)'. This act can be done provided that the state described by p) initially obtains and would change into its contradictory state unless the change were prevented through action. For example: It could happen that a door which is open will close e.g. under the influence of a spring-mechanism unless somebody keeps it open.
d( ~pT ~p) finally describes the act of keeping the world unchanged in the feature described by ~p. We could call this act 'the suppression of p'. This act can be done provided that the state described by ~p obtains but would change into the state described by p unless prevented through action. For example: It could happen that a door which is closed will open unless someone keeps it closed.
If by the result of an act we understand not a change but the end-state of a change then the correspondence between act and result is not a one-to-one correspondence. The same state may be the result of more than one act. Thus the state described by p can be the result both of the elementary act described by d(pTp) and of the elementary act described by d( ~pTp). The fact that a certain window is open can be a result either of an act of opening it or of an act of keeping it open.
Each one of the four types of elementary act can be performed only provided a certain state of affairs obtains. The types of act described by d( ~pTp) and d(pT ~p) moreover can be done only provided the change which is their result does not take place 'of itself' i.e. independently of action. The types of act described by d(pTp) and d( ~pT ~p) again can be done only provided that the changes described by pT ~p and ~pTp respectively would take place unless prevented by action. But this is the same as to say that the changes (not-changes) described by pTp and ~pT ~p i.e. the changes which are the results of the respective acts do not take place 'of themselves' i.e. independently of action.
The question may be raised what we shall say of the case when some other agent beside the agent in question effects the change which must not happen 'of itself' if we are to say truly that the agent in question has done it. Shall we say then that neither agent does the act? Or shall we say that both do it? If a person shoots at another at the very moment when the latter dies of a stroke the first person cannot be rightly said to have killed the second. The second died but was not killed. The first did not commit murder although he may have attempted to do so. Suppose however that two persons at the same time shoot at a third and that each shot individually would have killed him. Obviously we must say that the third man was killed i.e. that his death was a result of action. But by whom was he killed? If the assumption is that each shot individually would have killed him it is not correct to say that the two murderers killed him 'jointly' or 'by joint efforts' and that therefore the agent technically speaking was a collective agent. The right thing to say is in my opinion that he was killed by each one of the two murderers i.e. that his death was the result of an act of the one murderer and of an act of the other murderer. Both did it not 'jointly' but 'individually'.
We must thus think of the changes the not-happening of which are conditions for the performance (performability) of an act that they are changes in nature i.e. such changes as happen independently of the interference of agents. This explains the meaning of the phrase 'of itself' which we have been using when speaking of those changes.
8. Beside acts we have also to study their 'correlatives' forbearances. What is it to forbear (to do) something?
Forbearing is not the same as not-doing simpliciter. That one forbears to produce through action the change described by ~pTp or the state of affairs described by p cannot be described by ~d( ~pTp). If for example a certain window is closed on a certain occasion one does not close it on that occasion—but neither does one forbear closing it then. Furthermore things which are beyond human capacity to do (e.g. to change the weather) one does not do—but neither does one forbear doing them.
It is also clear that forbearing cannot be defined as the doing of not-changes. d( ~pT ~p) does not mean that an agent forbears to produce the state of affairs described by p. It means that he ('actively') prevents this state from coming into existence—e.g. keeps open a door which otherwise would close.
It seems that forbearing cannot be defined in terms of action and change (and truth-functional notions) alone. But we can define it in terms of action change and ability. We propose the following definition:
An agent on a given occasion forbears the doing of a certain thing if and only if he can do this thing but does in fact not do it.
The notion of forbearing thus defined is the logically weakest member of a series of progressively stronger notions of forbearing. On our definition forbearing to do something which one can do does not presuppose awareness of the opportunity. In a stronger sense of 'forbear' an agent forbears only such action as he knows he can perform on the occasion in question. In a still stronger sense an agent forbears only such action as he knows he can perform but decides (chooses prefers) to leave undone on the occasion in question. If in addition he feels an inclination or temptation to do the action which he chooses not to do then he is in a still stronger sense forbearing it. Of this strongest sense of 'forbear' we also use such words as 'abstain' or 'forsake'.
We shall introduce a special symbol f for forbearing.
f( ~pTp) shall mean that one forbears to change through action a ~p-world to a p-world. We shall call this kind of action forbearing to do. The forbearance described by f( ~pTp) is possible only in a ~p-world which does not on the occasion in question 'of itself' change into a p-world. For example: To forbear to close a door is possible only provided this door is open and does not close 'of itself'.
f(pT ~p) means that one forbears to destroy (annihilate undo) the state described by p. This forbearance is possible only in a p-world which does not on the occasion in question 'of itself' change into a ~p-world.
f(pTp) means that one forbears to preserve the state of affairs described by p. This is possible only in a p-world which will on the occasion in question change into a ~p-world unless the change is prevented through action.
f( ~pT ~p) finally means that one forbears to suppress the state of affairs described by p. This is possible only in a ~p-world which will on the occasion in question change into a p-world unless the change is prevented through action.
The modes of conduct which we have just been discussing we shall call the four types of elementary forbearances. It should be clear in which sense we can talk of 'corresponding' elementary acts and forbearances. To the elementary act described by d(pTp) corresponds the elementary forbearance described by f(pTp) and so forth.
Forbearing just as much as acting has results and consequences.
Primarily the results of forbearing are that certain changes do not take place. Thus the forbearance described by f( ~pTp) results in that the change described by ~pTp does not occur. And similarly for the other elementary types of forbearance.
There is a prima facie objection to this way of arguing which has to be answered. The result of my forbearing to open a certain window say is that I do not open it. But what if somebody else opens it? Cannot in spite of my forbearance the change from 'window closed' to 'window open' take place as the result of some other agent's interference with the state of the world? The answer seems to me to be this:
At the very moment when another agent opens a window which I have up to this moment forborne to open the opportunity for (continued) forbearing gets lost. What I may forbear to do when the window is being opened by another person is to keep the window closed or to prevent the other person from opening it. But I can no longer forbear to open the window. Thus my forbearance to do this will necessarily be 'reflected' in the fact that the window remains closed.
Using our generalized notion of change which includes not-changes we can also say that the results of forbearing are that certain changes take place. There is a certain convenience in this mode of expression.
Thus instead of saying that the forbearance described by f( ~pTp) results in the fact that the change described by ~pTp does not take place we can say that it results in the fact that the change described by ~pT ~p takes place. For if the state of affairs described by ~p obtains on a certain occasion and if the world does not change in this feature then—by the laws of the Logic of Change—the world remains unchanged in this feature.
By similar argument we can say that the forbearances described by f(pT ~p) f(pTp) and f( ~pT ~p) respectively result in the changes described by pTp pT ~p and ~pTp respectively.
Instead of calling certain changes the results of forbearance we can also call certain states of affairs the results of forbearance. These states are the end-states of the resulting changes. Unlike the correspondence between forbearances and changes as their results the correspondence between forbearances and states is not one-to-one but one-to-two. Thus e.g. the state of affairs described by p can be the result either of a forbearance to prevent it from coming into being or of a forbearance to destroy it. It can also as will be remembered be the result either of an act of doing or of an act of preserving it. Finally this state can exist without being the result of either an act or a forbearance.
It should now be clear what has to be understood by the consequences of forbearances—and also clear that forbearance can have consequences. The consequences of a certain forbearance are the consequences of the state or change which is the result of this forbearance. Thus e.g. if the state described by p is the result of a forbearance to prevent it from coming into being then everything which is a consequence of the change described by ~pTp is a consequence of this forbearance. There is no difference 'in principle' between the consequences of acts and of forbearances. (This is a logical observation of some importance to a certain type of ethical theory.)
We can exhibit the correspondences between the elementary acts forbearances and changes together with the conditions of acting and forbearing and the results of acts and forbearances in a table. (See p. 49.)
In ordinary language it seems the words 'act' and 'action' are used pretty much as synonyms. The philosopher is free to give to the two words different meanings for the purpose of marking some conceptual distinction which he thinks important. Here I shall employ the term 'action' as a common name for acts and forbearances. Acts and forbearances we could say are two modes of action.1
9. From the discussion of acts (and forbearances) we now move to a discussion of abilities or the notion of 'can do'.
We have distinguished between generic and individual acts (Section 2) between the result and the consequences of an act (Section 5) and between act and activity (Section 6). These distinctions are relevant to the present discussion.
When do we say of an agent that he can do a certain thing—for example can open a window or can get up from his bed or can tell a lie? This is a very complicated question. What is said about it here will be confined to a necessary minimum for our theory of norms.
To be able to do some act we shall say is to know how to do it. Sometimes we can also say that it is to master a certain technique. The mere fact that by some haphazard movements of my hands and fingers I succeed in opening a door with a complicated lock-mechanism does not entitle me to say that I can open a door with this type of lock. But if normally i.e. on most occasions when I set myself to the task I succeed in opening the door without much trial and error then I may be said to be able to do this sort of thing. I then know how to do it. I also master a certain technique.
Condition of action Act or forbearance Result of action
pT ~p
p is but vanishes
p is preserved unless preserved d(pTp) pTpp remains
Same f(pTp)
one lets p vanish pT ~p
p vanishes
p is and remains
unless destroyed d(pT ~p)
p is destroyed pT ~p
Same f(pT ~p)
one lets p remain pTp
p remains
~pT
p is not and does not
happen unless
produced ~p
p is produced d( ~pTp) ~pTp
p happens
Same f( ~pTp)
one lets p remain
absent ~pT ~p
p remains absent
~pTp
p is not but happens
unless suppressed d( ~pT ~p)
p is suppressed ~pT ~p
Same f( ~pT ~p)
one lets p happen ~pTp
Ability to do a certain act must be distinguished from ability to perform a certain activity such as to walk to run or to speak. Of the ability to perform a certain activity we do not normally use the phrase 'know how'. A child who has learnt to walk or to speak is not ordinarily said to know how to walk or to speak. But ability to perform an activity can sometimes quite naturally be characterized as mastership of a technique; for example when a child has learnt to handle knife and fork in eating.
The 'can do' which we are here discussing is the 'can do' of acts and not the 'can do' of activities.
One can make a distinction between ability and skill and relate it to a distinction between knowing how and having the mastership of a technique. The man who is able to do a certain thing knows how to do it. Only if the activity which is involved in doing the thing is of a complicated kind does this ability amount to mastership of a technique. When it does this we call such ability a skill.
We can also make a distinction between ability and capacity. Capacity often has the character of 'second order' ability. It is within a man's capacity to do a certain thing we may say when he can acquire the ability or skill needed for doing this thing although he does not yet possess it.
On the view of ability which we are here adopting a criterion for judging truly that a man can do a certain act is that normally on most occasions for doing it he should succeed. But is this not like saying that he can do something only if on most occasions he can do this? Are we not moving in a circle here?
I do not think that we have a circle here but a noteworthy shift in the meaning of certain words. That I 'can do' something has a different meaning when it refers to an act-individual and when it refers to an act-category. That on some occasion a certain state of affairs say that a door is open comes (came) into being as a consequence of some activity on my part say some movements of my hands and fingers is a necessary and sufficient condition for saying that I can (could) do this thing or produce this state on that occasion. The sole criterion of the 'can do' is here the success of certain efforts. Of this 'can do' no 'know how' and no reasonable assurance of success before the attempt is required. These are requirements of that 'can do' which refers to act-categories and which alone amounts to ability. It is moreover only when these requirements are satisfied that consequences of activity assume the character of results of action.
I shall call the 'can do' which refers to individual acts the can do of success and that which refers to generic acts the can do of ability. The first 'can do' is always relative to an occasion for acting. The second is independent of occasions for acting. By this I mean that it makes no sense to say that we can do—in this sense of 'can do'—the thing on one occasion but not on another—unless that other occasion belongs to a stage in our life-history which is either before we have learnt to do this thing or after we have forgotten how to do it.
Before we have acquired the ability success and failure on the individual occasion for acting is the only sense in which we can or cannot do a certain thing. When the ability (or skill) has become acquired however we can also do things which we sometimes fail to accomplish in spite of efforts. We may fail because of some unforeseen obstacle or because another agent interferes and prevents us from completing the act. When this happens we describe what we did on the occasion by saying that we tried to do something but failed.
Yet as already observed we cannot be said to have the ability unless on most occasions when we set ourselves to do the act we succeed in doing it. In this way success can be said to be the measure and criterion of ability and yet the meaning of the 'can do' of ability be different from the meaning of the 'can do' of success.
10. It would be a mistake to think that whenever an agent has successfully accomplished an act he has also tried to accomplish it. A similar remark can be made of activity. Normally when I shut a door or walk or read I cannot be said to try successfully to shut the door or to move my legs or to read out the words. To construe every act as a result or consequence of trying to act would be a distortion.
Although doing does not entail trying to do it would seem that ability to do entails capacity for trying to do. If I can do I also can try.
It would also be a mistake to think that although one cannot do any given thing one can at least try to do it. One cannot for example jump to the moon. But can one not try to jump to the moon? It is not clear what sort of behaviour we should describe as trying to jump to the moon'. Not until we have at least some idea of how to do a thing can we try to do that thing. To 'have an idea' of how to do a thing again presupposes that we are not convinced that it is humanly impossible to do that thing. Since we are convinced that it is humanly impossible to jump to the moon in the ordinary sense of 'jump' we can rightly say that we are unable even to try to perform this feat. To say 'I try although I know that I shall fail' is to state a contradiction in terms.
There are also many things which I know are humanly possible and which I may learn or otherwise acquire the ability to do but which at present I cannot even try to do because of my ignorance.
The question may be raised: Is trying act or activity? In the course of trying to do something one may perform various acts. But basically trying seems to me to belong to the category of activity. Trying to do something may as we say 'result' in the act's being successfully performed. But performing the act is not tied to trying to perform it in the same way as the resulting change is tied to the doing of the act. One is inclined to call the successful performance a consequence rather than a result in our sense of the terms. It is contingent whether trying leads to result but it is necessary that acting result in change.
When an agent tries to do something which he can do but fails to accomplish the act has he then forborne to do the thing in question? We are free to answer Yes or No depending upon how we wish to mould the notion of forbearing. Here we shall understand 'forbear' in such a way that unsuccessful trying to do something which it is within the agent's ability to accomplish counts as forbearing. 'Forbearing to do' in other words will not be understood so as to entail 'forbearing to try'.
On this ruling doing and forbearing are two jointly exhaustive modes of action. If an agent can do a certain thing then on any given occasion when there is an opportunity for him to do this thing he will either do it or forbear doing it.
We could however also mould the notions in a way which would make unsuccessful trying a 'middle' between doing and forbearing. That which is here called 'forbearing' could then be called 'failing to do' or 'leaving undone'. Perhaps it would be more in accordance with ordinary usage to call the two jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive modes of action 'doing' and 'failing to do' rather than 'doing' and 'forbearing'. But usage seems to be vacillating. The important thing is not whether we should choose this or that terminology but that it should be clear how the terminology actually chosen is to be understood.
11. The notion of forbearing we have thus defined (see Section 8) that ability to do and ability to forbear doing the same thing are reciprocal abilities.
It may appear more plausible to say that what an agent can do he can also forbear doing than to say that what an agent can forbear doing he can also do. It is inviting to think that it is somehow 'easier' to forbear than to do and that there are many more things which we can forbear than things we can do.
The appearance of asymmetry between the abilities is partly I think due to confusions and to neglect to observe certain conceptual distinctions.
First the idea may be guilty of a confusion between not-acting and forbearing. On an occasion which is not an opportunity (see Section 3) for doing a certain act an agent necessarily does not do this act. Of course we could so define 'forbear' that an agent is said to forbear those acts also which he has not even an opportunity of doing. But this would be an odd use. We should then have to say such things as that an agent who is in a room where the window is open 'forbears' to open the window in that room.
Secondly the impression that there are more things one can forbear than things one can do may be due to a confusion between doing and trying to do. Consider a man on the bank of a river which is as a matter of fact too wide for him to cross swimming. He cannot cross it but if he can swim and is not certain whether he will reach the other shore he may try to cross it. If he can try he can also forbear trying. He forbears trying by not plunging into the water and setting out for the other shore. This is exactly the same 'negative behaviour' by which our man would manifest his forbearance to swim across the river could he perform this feat. But this does not mean that forbearing to swim across the river and forbearing to try to swim across the river are one and the same thing. They are different just because they are forbearances relative to different modes of action.
In a sense therefore forbearing is precisely as 'difficult' as doing. But in another sense forbearing can quite rightly be said to be normally easier than doing. That an agent can or is able to do a certain thing shall mean we have said (Section 9) that he knows how to do this has learnt it sometimes that he has acquired mastership of a technique. However in order to be able to forbear an agent need not normally learn anything in addition to learning to do the thing in question. We could express this insight in several ways. 'Can do' we might say is prior to 'can forbear' although the two 'cans' are reciprocal. There is no special 'know how' of forbearing.
Consider again the eight elementary acts and forbearances which answer to a given state of affairs.
An agent's abilities with regard to corresponding acts and forbearances we have found are reciprocal. That which an agent can effect as a result of his action he can also forbear to effect as a result of his action and conversely.
An agent's abilities with regard to acts and/or forbearances of different types but relative to the same state of affairs are not reciprocal. They are on the contrary logically independent of one another. The fact that an agent can through his action destroy a state of affairs which exists and does not vanish 'of itself' is no guarantee that he can produce this same state of affairs if it does not exist and does not come into being independently of his action. There are plenty of examples of this. To take a drastic but convincing one: Men can kill each other but they cannot raise the dead. Generally speaking: that a man can or cannot do the act described by d( ~pTp) is logically independent of the proposition that he can or cannot do the act described by d(pT ~p).
The same seems to be true 'in principle' of the pairs of acts described by d( ~pTp) and d(pTp) and by d(pT ~p) and d( ~pT ~p) respectively. That I can suppress something which happens unless it is suppressed does not entail that I can destroy it if it exists. Nor does the converse entailment hold. And that I can prevent from vanishing something which exists does not entail that I can produce it if it does not exist or vice versa.
12. There are two types of act which are of great importance to deontic logic and which relate to one agent's ability to interfere with the ability of another agent to perform a certain act. These are the types of act which we call hindering or preventing and compelling or forcing.
These two types of act are obviously interdefinable. Therefore we can here limit the discussion to one of them. To compel an agent to do something is the same as to prevent him from forbearing this thing. And to hinder an agent from doing something is the same as to force him to forbear it.
To hinder an agent from doing something is to act in such a manner that it becomes impossible for that agent to do that thing. To hinder or prevent is to 'make impossible'. The result of the act of hindering an agent from doing a certain thing on a certain occasion is to change the world in such a way that the agent cannot do that thing on that occasion. But this result be it observed can be effected only on condition that the agent can do this thing. One cannot prevent people from doing that which they in any case cannot do. An act of preventing thus results in the fact that an agent in some sense cannot do that which he in some sense can do.
This may look like a paradox though it certainly is not one. But it is an interesting illustration of the two senses of 'can do' which we distinguished and discussed in Section 9. The sense in which one must be able to do something in order to become prevented from doing this thing is that sense of 'can do' which refers to act-categories. The sense again in which one is not able to do that which one has become prevented from doing is the sense of 'can do' which refers to act-individuals. Preventing from doing does not annihilate ability to perform the generic act. Preventing on the contrary presupposes this ability and destroys the successful exercise of it only on an individual occasion.
This of course is not to say that abilities could not become annihilated or destroyed as a result or consequence of action. By injuring a person I may temporarily or even permanently make him unable to perform a certain generic act which before he could do. This however is not what we ordinarily call 'preventing'. We call it 'disabling'.
1. Sir David Ross, too, makes a distinction between act and action. The distinction for which he uses the two terms is quite different from the distinction for which they are used here. See The Right and the Good (1930), p. 7.
Norm and Action


text:
Q: mat-select not selecting default option select for select method. But it's not selecting the default option. while trying the same code with online editor it's working fine. Don't know why it's not working with mine.
HTML
<mat-form-field class="example-full-width">
    <mat-select placeholder="Please Select" name="status" [(ngModel)]="myData.selectionData">
        <mat-option value="selection1">selection 1</mat-option>
        <mat-option value="selection2">selection2</mat-option>
    </mat-select>
</mat-form-field>

TypeScript
myData: any = {
  selectionData: "selection1"
}

A: Please verify in your console if you have any errors for:

*

*MatSelectModule

*BrowserAnimationsModule

If you do, then you are missing importing them in your app or respective module which has the component using mat-select.
Here is a working Stackblitz with exactly the same code from the question.
https://stackblitz.com/edit/angular-xlumuu

A: As already told It's working in online editors but not working with my code. Now I changed ngModel to value It's working fine. Thank You for your kind response.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


Hughes-Syndrome or antiphospholipid syndrome (APS) is an autoimmune disease that affects predominantly young women in their reproductive ages. The disease causes thromboses, recurring miscarriage and intrauterine fetal death without any explicable reason. The blood of these patients contains specific autoantibodies against phospholipids like cardiolipin or phospholipid-binding proteins.
Celiac disease is a chronic autoimmune disease triggered by intolerance to the grain component gluten.
In celiac disease, local autoimmune reactions in the mucosa of the small intestine develop after intake of gliadin, a protein from wheat. Proteins such as gliadin can pass through the layer of epithelial cells of the intestinal lining. The damaged mucosa is not able to absorb essential nutrients, leading to deficiencies and developmental disorders if children are affected.
Recent research has also shown that autoimmune processes are implicated in cases of arteriosclerosis. After all, diseases basing on an autoreactive meachanisms are quite common.
Antiphospholipid Syndrome - a Challenge for Laboratory Diagnostics (PDF-Download). In: Up-to-Date 2009, Publisher Orgentec Diagnostika, Mainz, Germany.
Celiac Disease - From Childhood Disease to Common Ailment (PDF-Download). In: Up-to-Date 2008, Publisher Orgentec Diagnostika, Mainz, Germany.
Autoimmune and Inflammatory Mechanisms in Atherosclerosis.
The present review focuses on the concept that cellular and humoral immunity to the phylogenetically highly conserved antigen heat shock protein 60 (HSP60) is the initiating mechanism in the earliest stages of atherosclerosis. Subjecting arterial endothelial cells to classical atherosclerosis risk factors leads to the expression of HSP60 that then may serve as a target for pre-existent cross-reactive antimicrobial HSP60 immunity or bona fide autoimmune reactions induced by biochemically altered autologous HSP60. Endothelial cells can also bind microbial or autologous HSP60 via Toll-like receptors, providing another possibility for targetting adaptive or innate immunological effector mechanisms.


text:
Vivendi Universal, USA Networks in $10.3bn deal
By Patrick Frater2001-12-17T10:39:00+00:00
Vivendi Universal has confirmed this morning that it is taking full control of the entertainment assets of Barry Diller's USA Networks (USA) in a deal valued at approximately $10.3bn and unanimously approved by both boards.
Vivendi Universal will have a 93% control of an entity to be called Vivendi Universal Entertainment (VUE) that brings together Universal Studios Group and the entertainment assets of USA.
Diller, as expected, will run VUE as its chairman and CEO - in addition to remaining as chief of the surviving USA entity, which will be called USA Interactive. Diller will also have a 1.5% stake in VUE, which will have its own board convened separately from that of the Vivendi Universal parent company.
The top management of Universal Studios Group - including President and Chief Operating Officer Ron Meyer, Universal Pictures Chairman Stacey Snider and Chairman and CEO of Universal Studios Recreation Group Tom Williams - will all remain in place.
Former Channel 4 chief executive Michael Jackson, as chairman and CEO of USA Entertainment Group, will aid Mr. Diller in the integration and consolidation of Vivendi Universal Entertainment. Pierre Lescure will continue in his role as Co-Chief Operating Officer of Vivendi Universal. He will focus on U.S. / Europe integration of synergies across those two geographic areas.
The transaction will be financed by the exchange of USA and Vivendi Universal securities in addition to a cash injection of $1.6bn - the same amount that the company received from USA in the original transaction.
John Malone's Liberty Media - a 21% shareholder in USA Networks - ends up with a 3.6% stake in Vivendi Universal as part of a deal that also involves Liberty selling its 27% stake in the European cable TV company, Multithematiques to Vivendi Universal.
Commenting on today's announcement, Jean-Marie Messier, Chairman and CEO of Vivendi Universal said: 'Our strategy is clearly coming together. Combining within the same operational entity, VUE, USG and the entertainment assets of USA creates a new U.S. major, which will benefit from the full integration of TV and movies activities with production and distribution.
'Along with our strategic partnership with EchoStar, this transaction fully addresses Vivendi Universal's needs in terms of integration and distribution on the U.S. market.
'I also welcome Liberty Media Communication as a Vivendi Universal shareholder and a key partner as we expand our prospects in programming alliances in Europe.'
On top of revenues which are expected to exceed Euros 32bn in 2002, EBITDA from media activities is expected to increase by more than Euros600m as a result of the deal. Net income will be increased by approximately $200m and free cash flow by more than $350m.
Messier also said today that he will also create a worldwide entertainment committee that will gather every month all Vivendi Universal entertainment CEOs to ensure coherence of Vivendi Universal entertainment strategy and success of integration. The committee will coordinate the actions of all the CEOs of the entertainment assets, extract all possible synergies and seek out and organise strategic partnerships.
Messier will be seconded in this role by Pierre Lescure. The entertainment committee will cover film, TV, music, games and education, with a charter to extract all possible synergies among and between business units and to organize other strategic partnerships.
As a result of this transaction, the companies believe there will be improved content offerings on USA cable networks, which will drive ratings and per-subscriber fees. Also, this is the opportunity to fully 'monetise' Universal franchise content, such as Dr. Seuss' How The Grinch Stole Christmas and Erin Brockovich, through improved TV distribution.
While immediate revenue synergies are estimated to be approximately about $60m, these opportunities are expected to represent more than $100m of additional EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation) - approximately $40m from cost savings, in addition to the new revenue generation. Other cost saving opportunities may arise through information technology and real estate integration, said Vivendi Universal, which saw its shares immediately rise by 4% to Euros55.9 upon news of the deal.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
NGC 1481 é uma galáxia elíptica (E-S0) localizada na direcção da constelação de Eridanus. Possui uma declinação de -20° 25' 36" e uma ascensão recta de 3 horas, 54 minutos e 28,9 segundos.

A galáxia NGC 1481 foi descoberta em 13 de Novembro de 1835 por John Herschel.

Ver também
Astronomia extragaláctica
Lista de galáxias
Lista de objectos NGC
New General Catalogue

Ligações externas

NGC 1481
Constelação de Eridanus
Galáxias elípticas

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Sacred forests of India: a strong tradition of community-based natural resource management
Ormsby, Alison A. and Bhagwat, Shonil A. (2010). Sacred forests of India: a strong tradition of community-based natural resource management. Environmental Conservation, 37(3) pp. 320–326.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0376892910000561
Sacred forests represent an important long-held tradition of conserving specific land areas that have cultural, and often religious, significance. India, with its diversity of cultures and traditions, has over 100 000 sacred forests. Many of these groves are forest fragments in agricultural landscapes. In most cases, community members are at least aware of these fragments, if not actively involved in their protection and management. This review focuses on the Western Ghats in southern India and Meghalaya state in northeastern India, both international biodiversity hotspots. In addition to the cultural significance of sacred forests, a number of studies have suggested that they are important refuges for conservation of biological diversity, including medicinal plants, within highly anthropogenic landscapes. Whilst sacred groves have been successful conservation areas, current threats to these forests are numerous, ranging from pressures for use of timber and other forest products to clearing for agriculture or general changes in cultural traditions. A variety of arrangements exist for ownership and management of sacred forests, making it necessary to identify solutions on a case-by-case basis. Support for the continued practice of the tradition of sacred forest protection is needed in order to provide a culturally sensitive model for community-based natural resource management.
Download Version of Record (PDF / 217kB)
community-based conservation; customary conservation; ecosystem services; protected areas; sacred groves; traditional conservation practices
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Geography
OpenSpace Research Centre (OSRC)
© 2010 Foundation for Environmental Conservation
Shonil Bhagwat


I'd be hard put to list all the causes and groups I'm asked to join, both on Facebook and via that old method, email. Something's come through in the past few days that makes me want to "join," in the fullest sense of the word.
Engage with Grace: The One Slide Project is an astonishingly simple idea that literally touches everyone. Alexandra ("Alex") Drane, whose sister-in-law almost died in the hospital (had her family been less attentive - and at age 32 of glioblastoma* seven months post diagnosis - grab your tissues and see the backstory) has set in motion a talking/blogging/thinking campaign to get us to deeply consider how we want to die.
Alex's one slide has five conversation-starter questions about dying, really simple stuff like: given the choice, do you want to die at home or in the hospital; do you want medical intervention or not...etc (see below) - and then she did the networking thing. Now bloggers have agreed to post her message about the campaign as a Thanksgiving project. We're all posting the same message - with a lead-in of our choosing on Nov 26 - and leaving it up throughout the holiday weekend (yay! an enforced break from blogging - my family will be so happy).
There's also a great short video (as in a minute) with Alex explaining how she used the very best of networking principles to keep this really really simple.
I have lots of blogger friends reading here, more than I know about, and you've got lots of friends so...please direct them to the group on Facebook and/or ask them to contact me and I'll send the note that we're all posting.
Finally, why does this touch me when I let so much else pass by without really "joining?" My mother died in the hospital, which she did not want to do, her "Do Not Resuscitate" order was not enforced...and my best friend, Linda, who wanted to die at home, also died in the hospital...and, as many of my close friends here know, her husband died of *glioblastoma eighteen months later. So I connect in that beating, pulsating, deepest place with what Alex is doing.


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text:
Q: checking regular expression for . and / I want regular expression for checking whether a word has . or / like abcd. or abcd/a or abcd.def or abcd/def. Any help will be gr8!

A: /[\/\.]/

Usage
if "some test. string" =~ /[\/\.]/
   # ..
end

A: Both / and . are reserved characters in regex, so you would normally need to escape them. The exception to this is that . doesn't need to be escaped when it's in a character class, which is how you'd want to search in this case.
The escape chararacter in regex is \, so your / character becomes \/. Your . remains as it is.
Therfore, to check if a string contains either a / or a ., you would need a regex that looks something like this:
/[.\/]/

This will check any string and return true if it contains either of these characters anywhere within the string, regardless of what else is in the string.

A: /(\.|\/)/ matches the period or slash to a group.
/[\/\.]/ just matches for period, slash or both.


text:
Should Democrats Keep Running To The Left? Tuesday Will Tell.
Bloomberg via Getty Images
Sen. Bernie Sanders campaigns with Democratic House candidate Randy Bryce in Wisconsin. Bryce is one of many Democrats campaigning on populist economic policies in districts won by Trump in 2016.
There has been a lot of argument about whether Democrats need to win by running more to the left or more to the center. In my writings, I've contended that the best way for Democrats to gain ground is to run populist on economics.
Why? Because (1) that's where the country needs radical reform; (2) that's where the Clinton-Obama Democratic Party lost its soul; (3) if the election is all about identity, that plays to Trump's fear-mongering; and (4) economic populism creates a politics of working people of all races against economic royalists rather than working people of different backgrounds against each other.
By working people, I mean not just the "working class," often defined as the non-college-educated, but anyone who lives on paychecks and is not filthy rich. It's a class politics that Democrats can and should win. It's also a politics that can allow Democrats to win back some disgusted voters who voted for Trump because they didn't think either party spoke for their interests.
Trump has tried to make the election about us versus them, with them defined as Muslims, African-Americans, and immigrants. But the real us versus them is everyone else versus Wall Street.
The people who insist that Democrats should not run on pocketbook issues because the economy has improved miss the point. The economy has barely made back its losses since the collapse of 2008. And the economy is vastly more precarious for regular people than it was a generation ago. That is the deeper source of Trumpism.
It's also a mistake to assume that Democrats should just forget about the white working class, who are mostly racist anyway, and focus on the "emerging electorate" ― a new rainbow of African-Americans, Latinos, other immigrant groups, liberal professionals, the idealistic young, and LGBTQ people.
The white working class may be only 30 percent of the national electorate, but it's more than half the electorate in the states where Trump won the 2016 election — Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa and Indiana. In western Pennsylvania, the white working class is more than 60 percent.
And it's a mistake because the next Democratic presidential candidate needs to win big, not just to eke out a victory based on a coalition of minorities. A Democratic Party that turned its back on a major portion of the working class would not be worthy of the name.
An opposite argument, advanced by groups that represent corporate Democrats, such as Third Way, holds that Democrats should not run as economic progressives because voters tend to self-identify as moderates rather than liberals. But if you dig deeper behind the superficial labeling, the majority of voters are in favor of defending and expanding Social Security and Medicare, and having a higher minimum wage. If that's the definition of moderate, bring it on.
Congressional Quarterly via Getty Images
Iowa Democrat JD Scholten has declared his support for Medicare for all and a number of other progressive economic positions during his run against Rep. Steve King.
For Democrats, the only way to win a real mandate would be to win back some of the working-class people who voted for Trump. Not all of them — winning back 15 or 20 percent of it would be huge. And the way to their hearts has to be through their pocketbooks.
But don't take my word for it. Take a close look at Tuesday's results, and see which winning Democratic candidates ran as economic progressives.
The Progressive Change Institute examined all 142 Democratic candidates in contested races, based on rankings from the nonpartisan Cook Political Report as well as material from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. The group then looked at which Democrats could reasonably be considered economic progressives, based on their support for such issues as Medicare for all or a Medicare public option and expanded Social Security.
Using these indicators, they found that in the 69 most competitive House races rated by the Cook Report as leaning Democratic, toss-ups, or leaning Republican (but winnable for the Democrat), 52 Democrats, or more than three-quarters, were running as economic progressives.
Democrat Jess King is running in Pennsylvania's 11th congressional district on a platform that includes expanding Social Security and Medicare and raising the minimum wage.
On Tuesday, we'll see how these progressive Democrats did. Even where the Democrat does not win, we can see how they performed relative to the Democrat in the same seat in 2016 or 2014, by using a clear progressive pocketbook message.
There are really two kinds of House races Tuesday. In some Republican-leaning suburban districts, where upscale voters are disgusted with Trump's vulgarity, his condoning of violence, his baiting of immigrants, not to mention his concentration camps for toddlers on the Mexican border, the Democrats are likely to pick up some seats regardless of whether they're running as moderates or as progressives. But in working-class seats that went for Trump last time, they are more likely to win as economic populists.
Once the midterm is behind us, and we start thinking seriously about the presidential election in 2020, this debate about whether Democrats should run as centrists or progressives will only intensify. Tuesday's results should inform that argument.
Robert Kuttner is co-editor of The American Prospect and a professor at Brandeis University's Heller School. His new book is Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? Follow him on Twitter at @rkuttnerwrites.
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Donald Trump 2018 Elections Democratic Party Working Class Progressives


Reading is an essential skill to have in today's environment. Everything is word based. It is critical that children develop and master it so that they can grasp any opportunity that comes their way. If the five ways below are observed daily then children should be able to improve their reading and succeed at it.
Parents need to model reading to children. They must be seen reading daily by their children. Children look up to their parents. So when they see their parents value reading by doing it they will want to emulate them.
As with anything, practise makes perfect. It is the parent's responsibility to ensure that their children are practising reading everyday. If the children go one day without reading then it will slow their progress. Many parents put their children with me to tutor them reading and think that once or twice a week is enough. It is not. Whatever they learn they must practise at home. Daily.
Flashcards are great for revising new words. I don't mean to sit the children down and drill all the words into them for half an hour or more. The way to do it is to flash the cards during moments when children are pausing from whatever they are doing. For example, when they are pausing during play, flash the cards in front of them and ask them to read. Or, when there is a commercial break on television. Do it often, say, once every hour or two. All it takes is a couple of minutes every so often throughout the day. This helps children to recall the words. The more they see it the better the recall.
Write or type out words to label the things in the house. Refer to these words often otherwise it will blend into the decoration and furniture and children won't notice them anymore. Every time the children go pass a label ask what it says (much like you would the flashcards).
Reading and writing are closely linked. Have children read what they have written. This may seem obvious but children don't read what they have written. This is a part of editing their work and it helps them to see if what they have written makes sense and any spelling or grammatical error. They also need to be able to recall what the word looks like and what letters make up the word to be able to write it correctly - and read it.


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Welcome to CitiesStrong, an alliance of former and current municipal officials from St. Louis County. We are united in advocating regional collaboration, local decision-making and hometown pride in our distinctive communities. We welcome creative and willing collaboration to better serve our citizens. We are a source of credible and complete research and information about the respective roles of local governments that are closest to our citizens.
Mayor of Crestwood 1996-2002; Member Board of Aldermen, Crestwood 1978-96; Professor Emeritus of Management, Webster University; Professor Webster University 1976- 2015.
Graduated from St. Louis University Law School in 1973 and has has been a principal in the law firm of Kuelker & Gates P.C.for the last 42 years. He served eight years as alderman, followed by sixteen years as mayor, of the City of Shrewsbury in St Louis County. He has also served as president of the St Louis County Municipal League and of Mayors of Small Cities; and has also served on the board of directors of Citizens for Modern Transit.
Senior Account Executive with The Daniel & Henry Company specializing in working with governmental entities. Previously employed as a City Administrator in the St. Louis area with over twenty years of experience at the federal, state & local levels.
Lifelong resident of Webster Groves, and City Attorney for 16 years. Grinnell College ('63) and Yale Law ('66), and US Navy. Served on The Board of Freeholders to consider governmental economies. Married with two adult children both residing in Webster.
Worked nearly 40 years with organizations serving local governments in the St. Louis region, including as Executive Director of the Municipal League of Metro St. Louis from 1990 to 2015.
Monica M. Huddleston, former Mayor-City of Greendale 2003-2007 and 2011-2015. Retired Southwestern Bell Director-Central Office Operations-Eastern Missouri.
Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Public Policy Administration, Dean Emeritus of Arts and Sciences, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
Executive Director of the Municipal League Metro St. Louis. Served 8 years as Alderman and 14 years as Mayor for the City of Brentwood. Village Administrator for the Village of Twin Oaks and was Vice President of Business and Community Development for Eagle Bank & Trust.
Served on both the St. Louis County and Missouri Municipal Leagues' Executive Boards, as Chairman of the Mayors of Small Cities, as Legislative Chair for Missouri and Kansas for the International Conference of Shopping Centers (ICSC), on the St. Louis County Economic Collaborative Committee, and as the ICSC Missouri and Kansas State Alliance Public Sector Co-Chair. Member St. Louis – Jefferson County Solid Waste Commission Executive Board.


text:
FRONT ROW: Dwayne Keyes, Herman Sillas, William B. Shubb, Francis M. Goldsberry II; BACK ROW: Donald B. Ayer, Peter A. Nowinski, David F. Levi, Robert Twiss, Charles J. Stevens, Paul Seave, John Vincent, McGregor Scott. NOT PICTURED: John P. Hyland, George L. O'Connell, Richard H. Jenkins.
JOHN P. HYLAND. Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson as the first United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, he took office on the day the district was created on September 18, 1966. A graduate of the University of San Francisco Law School, after serving as a Deputy District Attorney in Tulare County, Hyland practiced law in small two lawyer firm in Visalia, California before moving to Sacramento with his wife Catherine and nine children to assume his duties as the district's chief federal law enforcement officer. He presided over a staff of three assistants in Sacramento. He later hired a full time Assistant U.S. Attorney to staff the Fresno office and a fourth assistant U.S. Attorney in the Sacramento office. During his tenure, a lands division was also established, with two Justice Department lawyers on the eighth floor of the courthouse at 650 Capitol Mall in Sacramento. Hyland's term came to an unexpectedly abrupt end following President Johnson's decision not to seek another term as President. Hyland remained in Sacramento, where he maintained a private practice until his death.
D. DWAYNE KEYES. Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969, the district's second United States Attorney was formerly the Assistant District Attorney of Fresno County. The United States Attorney's office grew in size to more than ten assistants during his tenure. The famous trial of Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme on charges of attempting to murder President Gerald Ford took place during his term, and Keyes personally took a prominent part in that trial. Other noteworthy events during his term included the trial of Steven Soliah for the 1975 robbery of Crocker National Bank and the murder of Myrna Opsahl, and the trial of certain Pit River Indians for allegedly assaulting United States Marshal Arthur Van Court and several of his deputies in the incident at Four Corners. He later became Presiding Judge of the Fresno County Superior Court.
HERMAN SILLAS. The district's third United States Attorney, Sillas had been Director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles under Governor Jerry Brown before his appointment by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. As United States Attorney, he placed an emphasis on educating the public about the role of the office. He resigned in the middle of his term to return to private practice with the firm of Ochoa and Sillas. The court then appointed former Assistant U.S. Attorney and partner in the Sacramento law firm of Diepenbrock, Wulff, Plant and Hannegan, William B. Shubb to take his place in October of 1980. Shubb served until he returned to private practice in December of 1981. Shubb's First Assistant Francis M. "Mac" Goldsberry was then appointed by the court to take his place until the next Presidential appointee took office.
DONALD B. AYER. The fourth presidentially appointed United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California took office early in 1982. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Ayer had been an associate attorney in the San Jose office of the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher after receiving his law degree from Harvard in 1975. The United States Attorney's office experienced its greatest period of growth during his two terms, nearly tripling in the number of attorneys employed. When Ayer left to enter private practice in Washington D.C., his Chief Assistant, former Department of Justice lawyer Peter A. Nowinski, was appointed to take his place. Ayer subsequently served a short term as Deputy Attorney General, with Nowinski as his Associate. He is currently a partner in the Washington D.C. office of Jones Day.
DAVID F. LEVI. As the district's fifth presidentially appointed United States Attorney, President Reagan selected one of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Ayer's criminal division. This was the first time, but would not be the last, that an assistant in the office would be appointed by the President to serve as the United States Attorney for the district. The son of former Solicitor General and Attorney General Edward Levi, David Levi graduated from Harvard University and received his law degree from Stanford University. His term as United States Attorney was cut short by his appointment by President George Bush to the United States District Court in October of 1990. Assistant United States Attorney Robert Twiss, who had served in the criminal division of the office, and was Levi's Chief Assistant, was appointed by the court to take his place.
GEORGE L. O'CONNELL. President George Bush chose another assistant in the criminal division of the office to be the sixth presidentially appointed United States Attorney. After graduating from Purdue University, O'Connell received his law degree from Harvard University in 1972. He had served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California and engaged in the private of law in Los Angeles before being hired by Ayer to head the Sacramento office's special prosecutions unit. He left the office in 1973 to become a partner in the Sacramento law firm of Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, later forming the law firm of Stevens and O'Connell with former U.S. Attorney Chuck Stevens.
CHARLES J. STEVENS. Prior to his appointment by President Bill Clinton in 1994 as the district's seventh United States Attorney, Chuck Stevens was the partner in charge of the Sacramento office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, where he handled business litigation matters and business crimes investigations. A graduate of Colgate University and the University of California School of Law, he also previously served as an Assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles, where he tried numerous federal criminal cases and supervised grand jury investigations in white collar criminal matters. He left the office in 1997 to form the Sacramento law firm of Stevens and O'Connell. Stevens' Chief Assistant, Paul Seave, was appointed by the Attorney General to serve as United States Attorney pending presidential appointment.
PAUL SEAVE. As the district's eighth presidentially appointed United States Attorney, a career federal prosecutor was selected by President Clinton. Before being asked by Stevens to come to Sacramento to be his Chief Assistant in 1993, Seave was an Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of California from 1983 to 1987 and again from 1989 to 1993. A graduate of Princeton University and the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, Seave had also served stints in private practice both in Pennsylvania and Southern California. As U.S. Attorney he co-chaired the Greater Sacramento Area Hate Crimes Task Force; chaired the executive committee of the Central Valley High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, and was co-founder of Project Help: Sacramento Mobilizing Against Substance Abuse. When he resigned in 2001 to work for California Attorney General Bill Lockyear, his chief assistant, long time Assistant U.S. Attorney John Vincent, was appointed by the Attorney General to take his place.
McGREGOR SCOTT. The district's ninth presidentially appointed United States Attorney is the former District Attorney of Shasta County. He is a graduate of Santa Clara University and earned his law degree from Hastings College of Law at the University of California. A veteran prosecutor, he served in the District Attorney's Office in Contra Costa County before moving to Redding. Appointed by President George W. Bush in 2003, Scott has taken a personal interest in the history of the office, creating a "Wall of History" with a plaque containing the names of all past United States Attorneys and photos of all those who were Presidentially appointed.
BENJAMIN WAGNER. The district�s tenth presidentially appointed United States Attorney joined the office as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1992, after practicing for five years with the firm of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel in New York City. A graduate of the NYU School of Law, he served in the office as Chief of the Special Prosecutions Unit, Hate Crimes Coordinator, and Anti-Terrorism Coordinator, before his appointment as United States Attorney by President Obama in 2009. He served until 2016, when he left to return to private practice with the firm of Gibson Dunn.
RETURN TO CourtHistory.org.
� 2004 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Historical Society.


by Good DirectionsItem #: GD-41401 This item has been discontinued.
This adaptation of an English dovecote makes an excellent focal point in the garden.
Add this beautiful lazy hill bird house to your patio. This will attract birds singing in your garden.The base of all of our bird houses and feeders are made of a solid cellular vinyl, a wood alternative that gives you the look and feel of wood, with little maintenance. The end result is an architecturally pleasing house that looks like wood, but lasts like vinyl. The redwood roofs are made to endure the elements year after year.Our copper tops age over time to a natural patina or you may choose a verde roof that will give you the patina look right out of the box!


We are now making appointments for our flu clinics which are starting from Monday 24th September 2018.
We also are running clinics on Saturday 29th September & Saturday 6th October 2018.
Please contact reception on 01691 652929 to make an appointment.


All materials (canvas, brushes, acrylic paint in an array of stunning colors, sponges, protective apron) will be provided during the workshops.
Simply bring yourself and your creativity.
You will be provided with a beautiful 40cm x 40cm canvas, hand covered in Thailand with meticulously preserved lotus leaves.
Upgrades to larger canvas sizes available in the studio.
No art experience is necessary—our helpful trained instructors will guide you through the two and a half hour session.
Our teachers are trained in classic studio art, art history, color theory, meditation, and Thai cultural history.
At the end of class, you can take your finished and dried painting with you.
We will send you home with a varnish of non-toxic natural preservative you can then apply to the painting to make it long-lasting and beautiful.
Our Lotus-Leaf Painting classes are held in Brooklyn, Park Slope at 470 6th Street Apt 2, near the 7th Avenue subway station on the F & G line.
Please note that classes are non-refundable, but we would be happy to reschedule you for another class session, if you call/e-mail 48 hours before your scheduled class start time. For more info please read our policies here.
Want to know more about classes for kids only, or info on birthday parties? E-mail us at hello@himapan.us!
Celebrate birthdays, engagements, bachelorette parties, and bridal showers, or plan an unforgettable and exclusive networking or team building event. BYOB welcome, so come celebrate with us!
Reach out for more details and see what we can create for you: e-mail us at hello@himapan.us.