This lesson can be used as a pre-lesson for the Analyzing Visual Elements lesson plan.
Students will be able to make connections between visual elements and the text.
Students will be able to draw inferences from a text.
Students will be able to make inferences about visual elements with introductory phrases using a graphic organizer and paragraph frame.
Show the picture from the Drawing Conclusions worksheet. Then, inform students that just by looking at this picture, they can find clues about the 5 W's ("who," "what," "when," "where," "why"). Call on students to share their ideas about this scene.
Tell students that in order to really know what's going on in this picture, they would need to read the part of the story that goes along with the picture.
Tell them that today they're going to be using clues that they find from both the text and pictures in a story to make inferences about that story.
Display the worksheet I Can Make Inferences: Concept Web in a highly visible place in your classroom and read the different parts of the web.
Tell your students that during this lesson, they'll be reading parts of the book Freedom Summer and using a graphic organizer and sentence frames to write inferences.
Tell students that you'll be reviewing some key terms that they'll need to know before starting this lesson.
Ask students to participate in a choral response as you read each of the following key terms: inference, clue, connection, visual element, narrator. Review student-friendly definitions and an example sentence for each term and provide visuals when possible.
Distribute a class set of the Glossary worksheet, and ask students to record the student-friendly definition for each key term listed above. Remind students that they can refer to these definitions as needed throughout the lesson.
Ask each partnership to write their names on the back of the index card and define their key term in their own words. Write the following sentence frame on the board for student reference: "The word _____ means _____."
Display the worksheet Part 1: Using Visual Clues to Make Inferences and hand out one copy to each student. Read through the teaching tool at the top of the worksheet, as well as the information on the graphic organizer. Model which key terms (from the vocabulary activity) to underline as you read aloud.
Refer to Deborah Wiles' picture book, Freedom Summer, to show students the visuals and text that were selected for the graphic organizer, providing enough context for students to make inferences. (Note: If you can allow more than the allotted time for this lesson, read the picture book aloud).
Ask students to complete inference number 3 on the graphic organizer with their shoulder partner. Call on students to share their responses.
Ask students to complete inference numbers 4 and 5 independently. Have students share their responses with their shoulder partner and allow time for partnerships to ask any clarifying questions.
Explain that now that everyone has practiced making inferences, they'll practice writing inferences with specific introductory phrases. Ask students if they've ever used phrases such as "for instance" or "according to the author" when writing about their reading. Explain to students that these are introductory phrases.
Display the worksheet Part 2: Using Visual Clues to Make Inferences on the document camera and read through the Introductory Phrase Word Box. Complete the first question as a class. Then, ask students to work with their shoulder partner to complete questions 2–4. Review answers and address any questions.
Tell your students that they'll select from these introductory phrases as they write about their inferences.
Remind your students that writers use introductory phrases and transition words such as, "I can infer that ____," to help make their words flow together more smoothly.
Read the first part of the paragraph and have students draw a star next to the phrases "for example," "based on the visual clues," and "I can infer that." Inform students that these phrases give this paragraph a clear structure.
Point out the spaces for the introductory phrases and inferences within the paragraph frame and ask students to complete their paragraph, while referring to their inferences on the graphic organizer in Part 1 of the worksheet.
Define key vocabulary terms essential to the story during the read-aloud.
Allow beginning ELs to work with sympathetic and helpful intermediate or advanced ELs during independent work.
Ask students to share their sentences and paragraphs first to the group.
Pair beginning and advanced students with the same L1 and allow them to speak in their L1 while discussing the text.
Display the image from the Drawing Conclusions worksheet and tell your students that they will be writing an inference about this picture using the sentence frame format from Part 2: Using Visual Clues to Make Inferences.
Hand out an index card to each student, and have them write their inference and remind students to include an introductory phrase.
Read the following inference slowly: "Based on the illustration, I infer that this situation happened in the springtime." Ask your students to clap once if they think this inference has an introductory phrase. Point out the introductory phrase in the sentence.
Review the concept that authors use visual elements as one way to inform their readers about the meaning of their story, without directly stating certain information. Visual clues tied to information within the text allow readers to draw strong inferences.
Graphic novels, animated stories, and storytelling videos pop with enhanced meaning, tone and beauty.


NAI Capital's team of Chris Jackson and Todd Lorber have accomplished more than $1 billion in transaction volume since 1997. One significant recent accomplishment was representing the seller Finkelstein Family Trust on the sale of an 18,652 square foot warehouse in Sun Valley in November of last year. The transaction totaled $3.15 million or $169 per square foot. In April of this year, Jackson and Lorber, along with Vice President Tristian Greenleaf and NAI Capital's Investment Services Group completed a $4.65 million investment sale of a retail property occupied by Learn4Life charter school in Lancaster.


Thank you for your purchase from Byron Bay Beach Life. This warranty applies to the original purchaser only.
Our Warranty is for 12 months on components and covers manufacturers faults and defects only.
This warranty does not cover damage caused by wind or adverse weather conditions, fair wear and tear, accidents, misuse, hail, or alterations or repairs. It does not apply against any deterioration of any kind due to wind or weather related damage, misuse, burns, negligence, vandalism, perforations or stains due to environmental pollution, and fair wear and tear & discoloration typical in normal conditions.
The benefits given by this warranty are in addition to all other rights and remedies in respect of the product, which the purchaser has under the Trade Practices Act and similar State and Territory Laws. Nothing in this warranty will exclude, restrict or modify any conditions, warranty rights or liability implied in this purchase or protected by law where to do so would render this warranty void.


Porter, Charles H. A statement of the case of The people against Elisha B. Fero. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1870. 8vo (23.3 cm, 9.25"). 48 pp., illus.
Porter (1834-1903), an M.D. living and practicing in Albany, gave post-mortem forensic medical evidence at the trial of Elisha Fero for the murder by gunshot of his wife. He lays out of the evidence and testimony presented by both sides, including his own for the defense, and the verdict of the jury.
"From the Journal of Psychological Medicine, April, 1870" (title-page). "The case of The people vs. Elisha B. Fero was tried at the Delaware (N.Y.) Oyer and terminer, commencing September 23, and ending October 1, 1869 . . . Fero was indicted for the murder of his wife, Louisa Fero, on the morning of November 24, 1868" (p. 3) and was found not guilty.
=> Illustrated with forensic images of skulls.
Not in McDade, Annals of Murder. Original printed wrappers, chipped, and with old light waterstaining at rear. (39248) Please RESHELVE This.


text:
State Board of Education takes big step to save Manual
By Al Stilley
The State Board of Education (SBOE) approved a task force's recommendation for Manual High School to become a full charter school. The decision capped five community meetings with stakeholders who sought to save Manual and Howe high schools and Emma Donnan Middle School which have been under a state mandate and operated by Charter Schools USA since 2012.
Board members voted 7-3 and were swayed favorably by (1.) community input/survey with two-thirds majority favoring a charter school; student achievement, especially at Manual that came from a 'failing" school to a "C" school; the sustainability of CSUSA; and IPS on record as not wanting Manual or Howe high schools even if they become "passing" schools; The future of Emma Donnan Middle School is solid because it now becomes an innovative school for 7th- and 8th-grade students, like its current operation for K-6.
Letters of intent were previously sent to the Indiana Charter School Board in anticipation of SBOE's historic action March 6. Those who spoke up in favor of Manual seeking a charter pointed out that state-mandated CSUSA takeover of Manual has resulted in higher student achievement and a positive impact in the community. Pastor Judy Frackenthal of nearby Garfield Park Baptist Church provided the strongest public statement about today's Manual High School.
"I was adamantly opposed to charter schools and I wasn't happy when Emma Donnan and Manual were turned over," she said. "But then the schools reached out to us. Our church was invited to participate in faith-based meetings. We helped make a difference because the charter schools invited us into their building. Seeing these schools turnaround … the kids are excited about learning, they respect themselves and they care about each other."
However, there were spokespersons, including Indianapolis Public Schools interim Supt. Aleesia Johnson, who urged the state board to delay their decision for 30 days. Johnson pointed out that the composition of the IPS board has changed since its 2017 report that called for not accepting Manual or Howe back. She said the board is prepared to reassess its position.
Some SBOE members leaned that way but ultimately supported the task force's recommendation because of IPS' past failings. Johnson also brought forward a legal representative of IPS who reviewed several items pertaining to Manual becoming a charter school, including debt service through 2028 and any potential lease on the buildings.
Task force member Aryn Shounce said in front of the SBOE that the "process was flawed" and that "we deserve to make a real choice and allow IPS time to make a presentation to the community alongside CSUSA." Board member David Freitas stated, "This is a long-term success story; everything is going in the right direction, and we need to support that direction."
The board defeated motions by board member Gordon Hendry to postpone a decision and to take a vote on each school separately. He also wanted to change the nickname and mascot of Manual which died due to a lack of a second.
Sports: 500
Sports: Basketball
Sports: Track

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Yoko Ono Steps Down From Beatles Business Interests, Sean Ono Lennon to Take Over
Erica Banas // Rock Music Reporter November 11th, 2020
Yoko Ono has reportedly ceased heading up various business dealings with The Beatles and John Lennon and has transferred those responsibilities to her son, Sean Ono Lennon.
U.K's The Mirror reports Sean was appointed as the director of "eight companies linked to Yoko and the Beatles, including Apple Corp. He also joined the board at Lensolo, which deals with music rights of some of John's solo work."
Yoko, 87, has made very few, if any, public appearances in recent years and is dealing with an unspecified illness. The Mirror reports Yoko said during a public appearance in 2017, "I've learned so much from having this illness." However, she never clarified to what illness she was refering.
GALLERY: John Lennon and Yoko Ono Through the Years
Yoko and John
Japanese multimedia artist, singer, songwriter, and peace activist Yoko Ono with her husband, English singer, songwriter, and peace activist who co-founded the Beatles John Lennon (1940 - 1980) in Paris for their honeymoon, France, 23rd March 1969. (Photo by Reg Lancaster/Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
John's Joke Art
Beatles singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife, artist Yoko Ono, at the opening of John's 'Joke Art' exhibition, UK, 1st July 21968. (Photo by Ballard/Daily Express/Getty Images)
John And Yoko
Singer and songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980), formerly of English rock band the Beatles, and his wife Yoko Ono share a bag labelled 'Bagism' before their appearance on the 'Today' programme with Eamonn Andrews, UK, April 1969. (Photo by Bob Aylott/Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Singer and songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) of English rock band the Beatles and his wife Yoko Ono holding acorns during a press conference at Heathrow Airport in London, 1st April 1969. They have just arrived from Austria, and are going to send the acorns to world leaders as a symbol of peace. (Photo by Dennis Oulds/Central Press/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
The Magic Christian Premiere
Musicians John Lennon and Yoko Ono carrying a 'Britain Murdered Hanratty' sign at the premiere of the film 'The Magic Christian' at the Odeon Kensington, London, 11th December 1969. (Photo by Pierre Manevy/Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Singer and songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife Yoko Ono arrive at London Airport from New York, 14th July 1971. (Photo by R. Brigden/Daily Express/Getty Images)
Japanese-born artist Yoko Ono and her husband, singer and songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) at Selfridges department store in London to autograph copies of Ono's new book 'Grapefruit', 15th July 1971. (Photo by Central Press/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with Yoko Ono, December 1968. (Photo by Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
John, Yoko And Balloons
Beatle John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his girlfriend Yoko Ono outside the Robert Fraser Gallery, where Lennon's work is on show at the gallery in an exhibition entitled 'You Are Here', London, July 1968. Lennon is about to release 365 helium-filled balloons to mark the occasion. (Photo by Keystone Features/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
John, Julian and Yoko
John Lennon (1940 - 1980), his son Julian and Yoko Ono pose for photographers at Internel Studios in Stonebridge Park, Wembley, during a rehearsal for the Rolling Stones' 'Rock and Roll Circus' TV special, London, 10th December 1968. (Photo by Daily Express/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Bed-In For Peace
Beatle John Lennon (1940  1980) and his wife of a week Yoko Ono in their bed in the Presidential Suite of the Hilton Hotel, Amsterdam, 25th March 1969. The couple are staging a 'bed-in for peace' and intend to stay in bed for seven days 'as a protest against war and violence in the world'. (Photo by Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Beatles Bride And Groom
John Lennon and Yoko Ono, both dressed in white, board a private aircraft in Gibraltar after their wedding, 20th March 1969. Their pilot Trevor Copleston stands by the plane. (Photo by Simpson/Express/Getty Images)
Lennon's Certificate
John Lennon and Yoko Ono, both dressed in white, with their marriage certificate after their wedding in Gibraltar, 20th March 1969. (Photo by Simpson/Express/Getty Images)
John And Yoko Circus Costume
Beatles singer and songwriter John Lennon with his wife Yoko Ono on the set of the TV special 'Rolling Stones Rock n Roll Circus' at Internel Studios in Stonebridge Park, Wembley, London, December 1968. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Mr And Mrs Lennon
Lennon And Ono
1969: John Lennon (1940 -1980), singer, songwriter and guitarist of British pop group The Beatles, with his wife Yoko Ono listening to the playback of one of their tapes. (Photo by Keystone Features/Getty Images)
17th May 1971: Ex-Beatle John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife Yoko Ono stroll in the sunshine at Cannes. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
Rock 'N' Roll Circus
L-R: Rolling Stones guitarist Brian Jones, artist Yoko Ono and her husband, Beatles guitarist John Lennon, with his son Julian on his lap, guitarist Eric Clapton, and behind them singer Roger Daltrey of The Who, gather at Internel Studios in Stonebridge Park, Wembley, where they watched some of the circus acts who will appear in a television spectacular planned by the Rolling Stones, 'The Rolling Stones' Rock 'n' Roll Circus,' England, December 10, 1968. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Bed Peace
25th March 1969: Beatles singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon and his wife of a week Yoko Ono receive the press at their bedside in the Presidential Suite of the Hilton Hotel, Amsterdam. The couple stayed in bed for seven days 'as a protest against war and violence in the world'. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images)
1st July 1968: Beatles singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife, artist Yoko Ono, at the opening of John's 'Joke Art' exhibition. (Photo by Ballard/Express/Getty Images)
Bed Protest
25th March 1969: John Lennon (1940 - 1980), singer, songwriter and guitarist with the Beatles, in bed in the Presidential Suite of the Hilton Hotel in Amsterdam with his wife, artist Yoko Ono. The couple stayed in bed for seven days as 'a protest against war and violence in the World'. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images)
Carrying Yoko
1970: British pop singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon (1940 - 1980) carries his wife, artist Yoko Ono, across the snow in North Jutland, Denmark, where they are visiting Yoko's daughter by her previous marriage, Kyoko, who lives with Yoko's former husband Anthony Cox and his wife Belinda. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
Shorn Lennons
24th January 1970: Beatle John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife, artist Yoko Ono, seen with their newly shorn hair, at the Centre Of Peace in Vust, North Jutland, where John, Yoko and friends are living in meditation. (Photo by Anthony Cox/Keystone/Getty Images)
Lennons In White
2nd April 1969: Singer and songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife artist Yoko Ono, both dressed in white at London Airport. (Photo by Evening Standard/Getty Images)
January 1970: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with his wife Yoko Ono the first time he was photographed with short hair since his hippy days. (Photo by Anthony Cox/Keystone/Getty Images)
1969: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife Yoko Ono arrive at London Airport. They were married secretly in Gibraltar on 25th April. (Photo by Evening Standard/Getty Images)
circa 1970: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with his wife Yoko Ono. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
Lennon & Ono
31st March 1971: Rock singer songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife, artist Yoko Ono at a gallery party. (Photo by Evening Standard/Getty Images)
Lennon On The Phone
25th November 1969: Singer-songwriter John Lennon (1940 - 1980) on the telephone during the press conference held after he returned his MBE to the Queen in protest against the war in Biafra, the British support of the American action in Vietnam, and, he quipped, his latest single dropping in the charts! Beside him is his Japanese born wife, artist Yoko Ono. (Photo by Joe Bangay/Express/Getty Images)
Gallery Party
31st March 1971: British rock star John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with his wife Yoko Ono at the E.M. Gallery party. (Photo by Evening Standard/Getty Images)
1969: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with his wife, Yoko Ono and James Hanratty Senior at a protest meeting against the controversial execution of Hanratty's son for the A6 murder of Michael John Gregsten. Posters on the walls read 'Britain Murdered Hanratty'. (Photo by Express/Express/Getty Images)
Shorn Lennon
4th February 1970: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and Yoko Ono in London after having their hair cut. The hair was given to the Black Power leader Michael X in exchange for a pair of Muhammad Ali's shorts. Both the hair and the shorts will be auctioned for charity. (Photo by Central Press/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
1969: John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and Yoko Ono pictured during filming of the promotional film for 'The Ballad of John and Yoko'. (Photo by Fox Photos/Getty Images)
John, Yoko And Kyoko
1st May 1969: John Lennon (1940 - 1980), former member of The Beatles, with his wife, Yoko Ono, and her daughter Kyoko (from her first marriage to Anthony Cox) at London Airport, where they are leaving for the Bahamas. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
Laughing Lennon
14th May 1971: Beatles singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon (1940 - 1980) with his wife, artist Yoko Ono, at London Airport. (Photo by George Stroud/Express/Getty Images)
Beatle In Bed
Rock 'n' roll singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon (1940 - 1980) of The Beatles with his wife of a week, artist Yoko Ono, in bed in the presidential suite of the Hilton Hotel in Amsterdam during their honeymoon, 25th March 1969. They plan to stay in bed for seven days as a protest against war and violence. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images)
In Bed With Eamonn
Television presenter Eamonn Andrews in bed in a London TV studio, while John Lennon and Yoko Ono sit in front of him. Lennon and his wife have been staging a protest for world peace which will feature on a television show presented by Andrews. (Photo by Bob Aylott/Getty Images)
Lennons In Paris
John Lennon of The Beatles with his partner, artist Yoko Ono, on a visit to Paris following their recent wedding. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images)
Bagism
John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and his wife, Japanese born artist Yoko Ono, sit in a bag before appearing on the 'Today' programme with Eamonn Andrews (1922 - 1987), seen in bed in the background. (Photo by Bob Aylott/Getty Images)
John Lennon (1940 - 1980) and Yoko Ono pose on the steps of the Apple building in London, holding one of the posters that they distributed to the world's major cities as part of a peace campaign protesting against the Vietnam War. 'War Is Over, If You Want It'. (Photo by Frank Barrett/Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
John, Yoko & Kyoko
Beatles singer, songwriter and guitarist John Lennon with his wife Yoko Ono at London's Heathrow airport before flying to the Bahamas to stage a seven day 'Bed In For Peace' protest. With them is Kyoko, Yoko's daughter by her previous marriage, who Lennon is carrying. (Photo by Central Press/Getty Images)
Erica Banas is a rock/classic rock news blogger who's well versed in etiquette and extraordinarily nice.
Sean Ono Lennon,Yoko Ono


Shop Black Friday Deals at Walmart.com!
Basically, there are huge sales in EVERY department at Walmart for Black Friday 2014 — way too many to list!
HSN Clearance sections marked down up to 65% off!
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So I attempted my first joiners mallet. Made it out of walnut for the handle and hickory for the mallet. Made the handle a little short so it would be not be handle heavy but mallet end heavy. Think it turned out alright.
I have not seen a mallet head with the grain running in that direction before. I am curious how it works over the course of time.
Nice looking mallet. Like TechTeacher04 said never seen one made with the grain like that. Keep track and repost in say a year and show how it has held up. Be interesting to see.
Yeah didn't think about grain direction will update as I use it. Of course might be a little skewed on results as I did use hickory for the mallet head.


text:
Q: Error installing libcamera I am trying to install Libcamera on my Ubuntu 21.04 setup. I followed a tutorial and ran
$ pip3 install --user meson
$ pip3 install --user --upgrade meson
$ git clone https://git.libcamera.org/libcamera/libcamera.git
$ cd libcamera
$ CC=clang CXX=clang++ meson build -Dpipelines=uvcvideo,ipu3 -Dprefix=/usr
$ ninja -C build
$ sudo ninja -C build install

but I got an error message
ninja: Entering directory `build'
[1/2] Installing files.
Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mesonbuild/mesonmain.py", line 140, in run
   return options.run_func(options)
 File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mesonbuild/minstall.py", line 554, in run
   installer.do_install(datafilename)
 File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mesonbuild/minstall.py", line 359, in do_install
   d = self.check_installdata(pickle.load(ifile))
AttributeError: Can't get attribute 'OctalInt' on <module 'mesonbuild.coredata' from '/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mesonbuild/coredata.py'>
FAILED: meson-install
/usr/bin/meson install --no-rebuild
ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed.

How do I fix the error?

A: At first please note that libcamera is packaged for latest Ubuntu versions.
To start using it you have to install needed development package by
sudo apt-get install libcamera-dev

If you really need to compile it from source - then enable Source Code repositories (deb-src) using Software & Updates (software-properties-gtk) and then get its build-dependencies by
sudo apt-get build-dep libcamera-dev

and then proceed with compilation.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


This entry was posted in Orthography, Reading. Bookmark the permalink.
The best part of studying words in this way is that play-by-play lesson planning is not necessary. I reinforce the key principles of SWI and let the students discover how reliable our spelling system actually is for themselves!
My job is to point out things that I find interesting – that I want them to think about. I help them find reliable resources. Sometimes we read together and sometimes they are independent in their searching. During the summer I do not formally assess to see if, say, they know the suffixing conventions. It is time to nurture that excited feeling one gets when the reward for learning is personal joy!
My district offers both remedial and enrichment courses for four weeks each summer. The last couple of summers I have offered orthography, Real Script, read aloud, and Ukrainian Egg decorating. Students choose the classes they want to take.
What an incredible journey studying words takes us on!
Did you offer this summer study privately or did your district offer it?


If age does, in fact, beget wisdom, then O'Krent Floors is the Yoda of floor coverings. O'Krent has been in the business since 1915.
Founded in Ohio, the store moved to San Antonio in 1936, when Samuel O'Krent opened a shop on St. Mary's Street. Today, the 103-year-old company resides in a showroom in North Central San Antonio, but even though the location has changed, O'Krent remains a family-run operation. Five generations of O'Krents have worked there, including Sam O'Krent, Samuel's great-grandson and the current president and CEO.
To help homeowners navigate those thousands of options of wood, carpet, tile, etc., the CEO has some advice.


text:
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/tilbur/9311.html
Formal and Informal Sector Employment in Urban Areas of Bolivia
Pradhan, M.
Van Soest, A.
Menno Prasad Pradhan
Arthur Herman Otto Van Soest
No abstract is available for this item.
Pradhan, M. & Van Soest, A., 1993. "Formal and Informal Sector Employment in Urban Areas of Bolivia," Papers 9311, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9311
Pradhan, Menno & van Soest, Arthur, 1995. "Formal and informal sector employment in urban areas of Bolivia," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 275-297, September.
Pradhan, M.P. & van Soest, A.H.O., 1993. "Formal and informal sector employment in urban areas of Bolivia," Discussion Paper 1993-11, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Pradhan, M.P. & van Soest, A.H.O., 1995. "Formal and informal sector unemployment in urban areas of Bolivia," Other publications TiSEM 4b6b27c8-e099-40fd-bee4-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
Richard Blundell & Ian Walker, 1986. "A Life-Cycle Consistent Empirical Model of Family Labour Supply Using Cross-Section Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 539-558.
Hartog, Joop & Oosterbeek, Hessel, 1993. "Public and private sector wages in the Netherlands," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-114, January.
Newey, Whitney K., 1984. "A method of moments interpretation of sequential estimators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 201-206.
Smith, Richard J & Blundell, Richard W, 1986. "An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 679-685, May.
Richard Smith & Richard Blundell, 1983. "An Exogeneity Test for the Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model With an Application to Labour Supply," Working Paper 546, Economics Department, Queen's University.
Vuong, Quang H, 1989. "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 307-333, March.
Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
Hausman, Jerry A, 1978. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1251-1271, November.
J. A. Hausman, 1976. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Working papers 185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Heckman, James J & Honore, Bo E, 1990. "The Empirical Content of the Roy Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1121-1149, September.
Fields, Gary S., 1975. "Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and underemployment, and job-search activity in LDCs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 165-187, June.
Gindling, T H, 1991. "Labor Market Segmentation and the Determination of Wages in the Public, Private-Formal, and Informal Sectors in San Jose, Costa Rica," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(3), pages 584-605, April.
Heckman, James J, 1990. "Varieties of Selection Bias," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 313-318, May.
Lung-Fei Lee, 1982. "Some Approaches to the Correction of Selectivity Bias," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 355-372.
Heckman, James J, 1974. "Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(4), pages 679-694, July.
Magnac, Th, 1991. "Segmented or Competitive Labor Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 165-187, January.
van der Gaag, Jacques & Vijverberg, Wim, 1988. "A Switching Regression Model for Wage Determinants in the Public and Private Sectors of a Developing Country," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(2), pages 244-252, May.
Idson, Todd L & Feaster, Daniel J, 1990. "A Selectivity Model of Employer-Size Wage Differentials," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages 99-122, January.
A. D. Roy, 1951. "Some Thoughts On The Distribution Of Earnings," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 135-146.
wages ; labour market;
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cekubnl.html .


This looks so good. I love eggs. I can eat my body weight in deviled eggs. I need to try this.
They look yummy! :P I need to try this recipe one day.
Hugs from us and the kitties, hehe!
i eat eggs every morning and always am looking for new ways to make them.
Gracious that looks heavenly. Eggs (and cheese) never get old in my book. When I get home, I'll have to try this!
This looks absolutely delicious. I probably would make this and take a couple bites since I'm allergic to eggs, lol. I do know eggs are so yummy so it's hard to stay away from it.
Thanks for the recipe. I'll probably make this for dinner one these days.
LOVE eggs with cheese. this looks seriously yum.


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[Home] [Blog] [Where the weapons are - Nuclear weapon storage facilities in Russia]
Where the weapons are - Nuclear weapon storage facilities in Russia
This map above shows the structure of nuclear weapon storage sites in Russia. Or, more correctly, it shows units of the 12th Main Directorate that maintain nuclear weapon storage facilities. What was once a very large infrastructure now appears to include 12 national-level facilities (large red dots) and an estimated 35 base-level facilities. (This map can be difficult to read. Here is a larger one.)
More details about the facilities are in the UNIDIR research report "Lock them Up: Zero-deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe", which was completed earlier this year. The report also lists locations of NATO bases in Europe that host U.S. weapons. The idea of the research project that produced the report was to look into a possibility of an arrangement that would transfer all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage facilities (those big red dots). Russia, in fact, has long maintained that it has done just that, although it never specified that it's the national-level facilities that it considers "central." We have found that the "zero-deployed" arrangement is entirely feasible. Its key element is that we would only verify the absence of nuclear weapons at specified sites and never have to have access to weapons. This would make verification much easier than counting the number of non-strategic weapons in storage, as most proposals advocate. Please read the report for a more detailed discussion.
Back to the Russian storage sites. Until 2009, the base-level facilities were assigned to individual services, but now all of them are in the 12th Main Directorate. However, they still bear marks of their former affiliation. Badges of individual units were very helpful in the process. Also, with a few exceptions, it is relatively easy to identify the units that a storage facility is supposed to service.
There are a couple of outliers, though - the site in Shaykovka, located near a long-range aviation airbase, appears to be subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. There are two "engineering units" - Khabarovsk-41, located near the Khabarovsk-47/Korfovsky national-level site, and Chita-46, co-located with the Gornyy base-level storage. The mission of Gornyy is not entirely clear - it is technically assigned to the air force, but there is no air base there. It used to be a Strategic Rocket Forces site, but that was quite some time ago.
Storage facilities are fairly easy to identify in most cases, although not always - for some units we can only be certain of the location of the headquarters. I got some flack for putting all this information together, but that was a conscious decision to do so. Yes, security of these sites is important. But those who are entrusted with protecting these sites should never ever assume that their facilities are invisible. Because they are out there in the open.
I must also admit that the list of storage sites in the report is incomplete. We just missed the Borovsk-1 facility that stores nuclear weapons for interceptors of the Moscow missile defense. This does not change any conclusions in our report, but for the sake of completeness, here is the site:
I've been told that we may have missed one or two more. I think it is unlikely, but it is possible. Leave a comment or send me a note if you know what is missing.
UPDATE: I should note that the idea of removing non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage is, of course, not new. It's been discussed ever since Russia declared that all its weapons are withdrawn to central storage sites. The idea was discussed by a number of authors. For example, Rose Gottemoeller wrote about it in her "Eliminating Short-Range Nuclear Weapons Designed to Be Forward Deployed," in Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Complete Report of 2007 Hoover Institution Conference, ed. George P. Shultz et al. (Hoover Press, 2013). Alexey Arbatov had a very detailed discussion of the proposal in this chapter "A Russian Perspective on the Challenge of U.S., NATO, and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action, ed. Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams (NTI, 2011).
[Arms control] [Nuclear complex] [August 24, 2017] [#]


By customers who purchased the Extra-wide 36mm Combination Floor Tool.
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The passion for "making things*" was certainly instilled in me by my parents. Together we made sculptures from salt dough, masks from balloons or painted frames on the mirror, it was a part of our everyday life.
I bet you have cut out similar family or two in your day. All you have to do is fold the paper, take scissors and cut out a group of children playing. They can then be colored, painted, covered with stickers and played with you your heart's content, and when you get bored, you can hang them over the bed.


We adore this open airy design. Garnet is the perfect gift for January birthdays. A beautiful Sterling Silver circle is open and filled with a pretty decorative look. Dangling from the bottom is this gorgeous faceted oval shaped Garnet encased in Sterling Silver. Sterling Silver half ball style clip on earrings. Measures 1 ¼" long and about ½ inch wide. Please note- there are no returns on Sterling Silver items. Make sure you are pleased with measurements before ordering.


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The allure of the Breton lies in its versatility. From day time casual to evening chic, this really is the must-have piece for spring!
...and for evening, transform your stripey tee with some white culottes, jewels and a clutch? Ta dah!


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"Who am I to judge?"
by Puleng Matsaneng in Articles on Sun, Aug 18th, 2013 | 0 Comments
A few weeks ago, flying back from World Youth Day, Pope Francis was asked by a journalist about his attitude towards the gay priests. "Who am I to judge?" was his reply. On an equally difficult question (divorced and remarried Catholics) he said: "Mercy is a larger theme than the question you raise… This is a time of mercy… If the Lord never tires of forgiving, we do not have any other path than this one."
The Christian community has a reputation for precisely the opposite: for judging, for setting high moral standards and then publicly condemning those who fall beneath them. But does our faith give us permission to judge? How should we react to the failings of others, especially sexual failings?
The question of sex in public life never seems to go away. Recently we have seen a sex scandal involving COSATU leader, Zwelinzima Vavi. He has admitted that he slept with his secretary and on M-Net's Carte Blanche has apologised for the pain he caused his wife and family. The union federation he leads finds itself divided: some in support of him and some against him. But he has a wider political role beyond the unions because of his public opposition to e-tolling. Some are claiming that the moral backlash against him is an orchestrated political campaign.
It was only 7 years ago that another politician in our country – then not yet President – admitted to having had sex with a much younger woman whom he knew to be HIV+. He was cleared of charges of rape. But his claim that he used a shower to cleanse himself of the virus still shocks us for the dangerous message it sent especially to our young people.
Sex scandals are not new. 3,000 years ago, the Lord's chosen one, King David, wanted Bathsheba for himself and so he had her husband Uriah the Hittite killed in battle (2 Samuel 11: 5-27). But when the Prophet Nathan visited, David repented and admitted he had sinned against God. King David is part of a long line of politicians throughout history who have been entrusted with seats of power and then find themselves involved in immoral acts. They show themselves to be human beings with human struggles.
I do not think there is any easy answer to this. In Psalm 139: 24 we are told to "see if my way is crooked" and certainly there is a need to help society recognise wrong-doing. But when Jesus is faced with a crowd of people publicly condemning (and stoning) a woman who has been caught in adultery he famously challenges the person who is without sin to cast the first stone (Jn 8:1-11). Jesus' words to the woman find an echo in what Pope Francis said: "Has no one condemned you? Then neither do I condemn you. Go and sin no more."
It is telling that the each member of the crowd fell away 'starting with the oldest'. As we rush to judge others are we willing to start by judging ourselves?
Ms Puleng Matsaneng
B.A. (Johannesburg)
Puleng works in Spirituality and researches Ignatian Spirituality in an African context. Her area of speciality is in exploring how African themes and practices of spirituality dialogue with the Western traditions, and how that is understood in relation to Ignatian Spirituality. She has looked at how Ignatian Spirituality can be integrated into the African worldview. Most especially, how the use of song and storytelling can be part of the prayer process. She is currently managing retreats in daily life and training prayer guides. Puleng is also involved in ongoing Spiritual Direction, giving 8-day and 30-day retreats. Her latest venture is a pilot programme of healing workshops that use the principles of Ignatian Spirituality.
p.matsaneng@jesuitinstitute.org.za
See more from Puleng Matsaneng
LISTEN: Reflection for the 2nd Sunday Ordinary Time 2022 – Year C


The latest US economic data confirms the US remains locked in a prolonged period of slow growth with major consequences for geopolitics and destabilising consequences for US domestic politics.
Almost no international issue is more crucial for economic and geopolitical strategy than economic trends within the US. It is therefore crucial to have an accurate analysis of these. Regarding such a serious issue and such powerful forces there is no merit in 'pessimism', underestimating US growth, and no merit in 'optimism', overestimating US growth – there is only a virtue in realism.
This article therefore analyses the latest US GDP data. The conclusion is clear. The data confirms the US fundamentally remains in a period of medium/long term slow growth which will last for at least a minimum of several years.
Strikingly, taking a period of 15 years after the beginning of the international financial crisis, average US growth will be slower than after the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929. Analyses which appear in parts of the media claiming the US is entering a significant new period of rapid growth are fundamentally in error – for reasons analysed in detail blow.
Trump selected as Republican Party Presidential candidate against the wishes of that Party's establishment, and elected President against the opposition of the overwhelming major of the US mass media.
Since Trump's election sharp clashes have continued within the US political establishment with leaks against the President by the US security services, the President's sacking of the FBI head, investigations by the US Congress and US police of close aides to the President, and open campaigns to force the President to change policies or to remove him from office by major US media such as the New York Times and CNN.
Within the Democratic Party a serious challenge mounted to the Party establishment's candidate Clinton by the first figure declaring themselves to be a socialist to receive major US public support for almost a century – Sanders.
As US medium/long term slow economic growth will continue sharp turns and tensions in US politics will not disappear but are likely to continue.
The consequences for US relations with China flowing from this situation, and geopolitical tensions between the US and its traditional allies such as Germany shown for example at the recent G7 summit, are analysed at the end of this article. The conclusion is that China's constructive approach to the Trump administration is clearly correct but that the risk of sharp turns in the situation must be taken into account due to the tensions within the US created by its historically low growth.
This prolonged period of slow growth in the US, and in the advanced economies in general, combines with China's own transition to 'moderate prosperity', and then to a 'high income' economy by World Bank international standards, to create under Xi Jinping a qualitatively new period in China's development.
Starting with the global background to the latest US economic data, a defining feature of the present overall international situation is extremely slow growth in the advanced Western economies.
In nine years since the 2008 international financial crisis average growth in the advanced Western economies is already almost as slow as during the 'Great Depression' of the 1930s and by the end of 2017 it will be significantly slower. By 2016, total GDP growth in the advanced economies in the years since 2007 was only 10.1% and by the end of 2017, on IMF projections, the growth in the advanced economies after 2007 will be lower than in the same period after 1929 – total growth of 12.3% in the 10 years after 2007 compared to 15.1% in the 10 years after 1929.
Even more strikingly IMF data projects that future growth in the advanced Western economies, following the international financial crisis, will be far slower than in the same period after 1929. IMF projections are that by 2021, fourteen years after 2007, total growth in the advanced economies will be less than half that in the 14 years after 1929 – average annual growth of only 1.3% compared to 2.9%, and total growth of 20.6% compared to 49.8%.
This data is shown in Figure 1. An aim of this article is instead to carry out the necessary factual checks that the latest US data does not represent a break with long-term trends.
In the 1st quarter of 2017 US GDP was 2.0% higher than in the first quarter of 2016. To evaluate this 2.0% growth, given that a market economy inherently displays business cycles, it is necessary to separate purely cyclical trends from medium/long term ones. Failure to do so leads to false analysis/statistical trickery – comparing a peak of the business cycle with the trough will exaggerate growth, while comparing the trough of the business cycle with the peak will understate growth. Such cyclical effects may be removed by using a sufficiently long term moving average that cyclical fluctuations become averaged out and the long term structural growth rate is shown. Figure 2 therefore shows annual average US GDP growth using a 20-year moving average – a comparison to shorter term periods is given below.
Figure 2 clearly shows that the fundamental trend of the US economy is long-term slowdown. Annual average US growth fell from 4.4% in 1969, to 4.1% in 1978, to 3.2% in 2002, to 2.2% by 1st quarter 2017. That is, the most fundamental long term growth trend in the US economy is that it has been slowing for half a century. The latest US GDP growth of 2.0% clearly does not represent a break with this long term US economic slowdown but is in line with it.
US per capita GDP growth follows the same falling trend. Figure 3 shows a 20-year moving average for US per capita GDP growth. Annual average US per capita GDP growth fell from 2.8% in 1969, to 2.7% in 1977, to 2.4% in 2002, to 1.2% by the first quarter of 2017. The latest US data shows no break with this trend of long term slowdown – it is in line with it and continues these long term trends.
This data shows clearly claims the US economy is currently 'dynamic' driven by a 'wave of innovation' are therefore factually false – a pure propaganda myth repeated by US media such as Bloomberg with no connection with factual trends. US per capita growth has in fact fallen to a low level.
This fall of US per capita GDP growth to a low level clearly has major political implications within the US and underlies recent domestic political events. Very low US per capital growth, accompanied by increasing economic inequality, has resulted in US median wages remaining below their 1999 level – this prolonged stagnation of US incomes explaining recent intense political disturbances in the US around the sweeping aside of the Republican Party establishment by Trump, the strong support given to a candidate for president declaring himself to be a socialist Sanders, current sharp clashes among the US political establishment etc.
Turning from long term trends to analysis of the current US business cycle it may be noted that a 5-year moving average of annual US GDP growth is 2.0%, a 7-year moving average 2.1% and the 20-year moving average 2.2%. Leaving aside a 10-year moving average, which is greatly statistically affected by the severe recession of 2009 and therefore yields a result out of line with other measures of average annual growth of only 1.4%, US average annual GDP growth may therefore be taken as around 2% or slightly above. That is, fundamental structural factors in the US economy create a medium/long term growth rate of 2.0% or slightly above. Business cycle fluctuations then take purely short term growth above or below this average. To analyse accurately the present situation of the US business cycle therefore recent growth must be compared with this long-term trend.
Figure 4 therefore shows the 20-year moving average for US GDP growth together with the year on year US growth rate. This shows that in 2016 US GDP growth was severely depressed – GDP growth in the whole year 2016 was only 1.6% and year on year growth fell to 1.3% in the second quarter. By the 1st quarter of 2017 US year on year GDP growth had only risen to 2.0% – in line with a 5-year moving average but still below the 20-year moving average.
As US economic growth in 2016 was substantially below average a process of 'reversion to the mean', that is a tendency to correct exceptionally slow or exceptionally rapid growth in one period by upward or downward adjustments to growth in succeeding periods, would be expected to lead to a short-term increase in US growth compared to low points in 2016. This would be purely for statistical reasons and not represent any increase in underlying or medium/long US term growth. This normal statistical process is confirmed by the acceleration in US GDP growth since the low point of 1.3% in the 2nd quarter 2016 – growth accelerating to 1.7% in 3rd quarter 2016 and 2.0% in 4th quarter 2016 and 1st quarter 2017.
President Trump's administration may of course claim 'credit' for the likely short term acceleration in US growth in 2017 but any such short-term shift is merely a normal statistical process and would not represent any acceleration in underlying US growth. Only if growth continued sufficiently strongly and for a sufficiently long period to raise the medium/long term rate average could it be considered that any substantial increase in US economic growth was occurring. The latest US growth data, 2.0% year on year, however does not represent any acceleration in US growth compared to longer term averages and is therefore in line with the pattern of US slow growth and does not represent a break with it.
Turning to the causes of this slow US growth, and therefore evaluation of the possibility of overcoming it, statistical analysis shows numerous factors explain purely short term fluctuations in US growth. Factors ranging from fiscal or monetary policy, to international trade fluctuations, even to the weather may therefore affect short term US growth. However, over anything except the short term Table 1 shows clearly that two factors are decisive in US growth – total US net saving/capital creation (the sum of household, company and government saving) and US net fixed investment. Over a 5-year time frame the correlation of the percentage of net savings in US GDP and the percentage of net fixed investment in US GDP with US growth is over 0.5, more powerful than any other factors, while over an 8-year time frame the correlation of net fixed investment with GDP growth is an extremely strong 0.72.
Consequently, while over the short term numerous factors are correlated with US short term growth, making short term trends difficult to predict, over a medium-long term frame the correlation of US economic growth with US net savings and net fixed investment is decisive.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to analyse whether US net fixed saving and US net fixed investment causes economic growth, or economic growth causes high net fixed savings and net fixed investment, or a third process causes both – it is merely sufficient to note that these high correlations means that over the medium/long term US GDP growth cannot be substantially increased without an increase in either US net savings or US net fixed capital investment. As changes in US net savings and net fixed capital investment have significantly different implications for US domestic and foreign policy and politics they will be considered in turn.
During the deep crisis at the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929-33 US net capital accumulation was negative – the US economy was consuming more capital through depreciation than it was creating. This necessarily produced deep economic crisis. After this the rate of US savings/capital creation rose, with a powerful acceleration during World War II, to reach a long-term peak as a percentage of the US economy in 1965. This coincided with the great boom in the US economy during World War II and decades immediately following it.
After 1965 US net savings/capital creation steadily fell as a percentage of the US economy until it once again became negative during the 'Great Recession' in 2008-2009. Given the strong correlation of US net saving/capital creation with US growth this declining trend of US capital creation naturally explains the long-term growth US slowdown that was shown above.
Turning to the latest data for the 1st quarter of 2017, to analyse if there has been any break with the long-term trend, Figure 6 clearly shows that at the latest date available there has been no long-term recovery in US net capital creation. Naturally there has been some recovery since the extreme depth of the financial crisis, when US net capital creation again became negative, but the present level of US net saving is still below the pre-crisis period. Furthermore since 4th quarter 2015 there has been a small but definite fall in the share of net saving in the economy – a decline from 3.3% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 4th quarter 2015 to 2.3% of GNI in 1st quarter 2017. As an extremely strong correlation exists between US net capital creation and medium/long term US GDP growth a medium/long term US economic acceleration could only take place when there was a major increase in US net capital creation – which has not occurred.
As investment must necessarily be financed by an exactly equal amount of savings it may therefore be noted that no increase in the percentage of US domestic resources available for investment has taken place.
Turning from economic trends to their implications for US politics, as US net savings are US domestic capital creation, and the total US economy is necessarily equal to consumption plus savings, any attempt to increase the level of net capital creation in the US economy has major implications for US politics as it reduces the proportion of the economy allocated to consumption by the US population.
Purely in principle, the level of US net capital creation/net savings could be raised without attacks on the living standards of the US population. In particular US military expenditure, from a technical economic point of view, is a form of consumption. Reducing US military expenditure could therefore raise US savings without lowering the proportion of the economy devoted to the population's living standards. However, the Trump administration has rejected this policy – projecting a major increase in US military expenditure.
Reducing the proportion of the US economy devoted to wages, with the aim of increasing company profits and therefore potential company savings, would be unpopular as it would involve a reduction of the proportion of the US economy devoted to the main source of the population's income.
Reduction of the US budget deficit (that is decreasing the level of government dis-saving) through reductions in state expenditure on health, education, social protection etc. would involve reduction in the population's living standards.
For these political reasons, given the commitment to increased military spending, attempts by the Trump administration to increase US net savings are likely to be politically unpopular and therefore difficult. Indeed, if US taxes are cut without corresponding state expenditure reductions the resulting increase in the US budget deficit would actually reduce the US net savings level.
Turning to US net fixed investment, it should be recalled that total investment is equal to total savings. However US investment does not necessarily have to be financed by domestic US savings. US investment can also be financed by foreign capital/savings and foreign borrowing. This, however, as analysed below, has major implications for US foreign policy.
US net fixed investment was negative during the onset of the Great Depression – that is more capital was being consumed through depreciation than was being newly invested.
US net fixed investment then rose very sharply during World War II and the decades long boom following it, before declining from the mid-1960s onwards. This decline was correlated with the long slowdown of the US economy shown above in Figure 2.
The chief difference to be noted between the trends in US net fixed saving and those of US net fixed investment is that during the international financial crisis after 2007 US net fixed investment fell to a very low level but did not become negative as US net savings did. The reason for this is that during the international financial crisis the US continued to finance its fixed investment through foreign borrowing – as analysed below.
Turning to the latest data, for 1st quarter 2017, Figure 8 shows that there has been no fundamental recovery in the US net fixed investment level. There is again naturally a recovery from the extremely low level during the 2007-2009 international financial crisis but US net fixed investment remains substantially below pre-financial crisis levels.
Given the close correlation of US medium/long term economic growth with US net fixed investment no basis therefore exists at present for any medium/long term US economic growth acceleration.
The considerable domestic US political obstacles to increase US domestic savings were analysed above. However, an increase in US investment could in principle also be financed by foreign borrowing. What, therefore, are the practical possibilities of an increase in US investment financed from foreign savings/capital?
Under Reagan a new policy was adopted of large scale US foreign borrowing. This may be seen in the very sharp deterioration in the US balance of payments during the Reagan period – the US balance of payments on current account worsened from a surplus of 0.3% of GDP in the 4th quarter of 1980, the last quarter before Reagan came to office, to a deficit of 3.4% of GDP by the 3rd quarter of 1986. This 3.7% of GDP worsening of the US balance of payments is equivalent to over $700 billion at today's prices.
Under George H. W. Bush (Bush Senior) the US temporarily abandoned large scale foreign borrowing. With foreign sources of financing US investment reduced US net fixed capital formation fell sharply, from 7.5% of GDP in the last quarter of 1988 to 4.8% of GDP in 1st quarter 1992. The US fell into recession in the last quarter of 1990/1st quarter 1991 – the unpopularity of this leading to Bush's electoral defeat.
Under Clinton and George W Bush US foreign borrowing increased massively, rising to 6.3% of GDP by the last quarter of 2005 – such huge borrowing was unsustainable, was a significant contributory factor to the international financial crisis, and necessarily had to be reduced.
The onset of the international financial crisis forced a huge reduction in US foreign borrowing – reducing net inflows of capital into the US from 5.3% of GDP in 1st quarter 2007 to 2.5% of GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2009. The level of US foreign borrowing has since remained essentially unchanged – net inflows of capital into the US were 2.4% of GDP in the latest available data in the last quarter of 2016.
If the US once again turned to financing its investment through a major increase in international borrowing there are very clear geopolitical and political consequences.
Prior to Reagan US net export of capital/outward transfers from the US were a stabilising factor in the world economy – increasing the supply of capital for other countries and therefore aiding their economic development.
After Reagan the reliance of the US on large scale foreign borrowing to finance its investment was a destabilising factor in the world economy – decreasing the supply of capital in other countries and thereby making more difficult their economic growth.
As the US from Reagan onwards was dependent on large scale foreign borrowing to finance its investment, and given the strong correlation of US growth with net fixed investment, US growth became strongly dependent on sources of foreign capital.
Therefore, analysis of the ability of the Trump administration/US to tap large scale sources of foreign finance requires examining which countries could potentially supply this and the issues in US foreign policy this creates.
Can Trump achieve large scale foreign borrowing?
It was analysed above that considerable political obstacles exist to raising the US domestic savings level. However, the US obtaining capital/savings from other countries also raises significant issues in foreign policy – as becomes clear when it is analysed which countries could supply such capital/savings to the US as they possess large balance of payments surpluses. The fundamental data on this is shown in Figure 10 – in this chart the percentages at the end of the graph lines are for the country/region's balance of payments surplus/deficit as a percentage of the US's 2016 balance of payments deficit.
The source of the huge US foreign borrowing from Reagan to Clinton was clear – Japan. Japan's balance of payment's surplus was equivalent to 54% of the US balance of payments deficit under Reagan, 127% under George H.W. Bush, and 60% under Clinton. As Japan cannot defy the US on any major issue Japan could, therefore, easily be forced into policies which supplied capital to the US even if this damaged Japan's economy – as indeed it did from the 1980s onwards in the creation of the 'bubble economy'.
China – whose balance of payment deficit was equivalent to 24% of the US balance of payments deficit.
The severe fall in the international oil price from mid-2014 onwards, however, sharply changed the situation for US borrowing by eliminating the balance of payments surpluses of the Middle East oil exporters – as shown in Figure 10. Recent aid from Saudi Arabia, following Trump's trip to the Middle East, is useful but too small to fundamentally affect the situation of the US economy. The only countries with sufficiently large surpluses to finance very large scale borrowing by the US are China, with a balance of payment surplus equivalent to 58% of the US deficit, and Germany – with a balance of payments surplus equivalent to 64% of the US deficit.
It is for this reason that the key foreign policy countries for the US, from an economic viewpoint, are now China and Germany – Russia is important for the US geopolitically and militarily but not economically. To revive US economic growth by foreign borrowing either or both China and Germany must be peruaded or forced into substantially increasing supplies of capital to the US. This, of course, in turn necessitates key foreign policy decisions by the US.
In the run up to Trump's election, and early in this presidency, he clearly attempted to intimidate/pressure Germany into greater economic subordination to the US. Politically this was carried out by reversing the historic US policy of support for the EU and instead seeking to weaken/break it up by supporting anti-EU currents such as Brexit and LePen in France. This led to a clear clash with Germany – for which the EU represents a decisive economic reserve and chief market. Merkel made clear Germany was not prepared to subordinate its interests to Trump's requirement either by an inordinate increase in German military expenditure or accepting US protectionism. Germany also secured a crucial strategic political victory against Trump with the overwhelming election of Macron against LePen in the French Presidential election. These clashes between US and German policy were clearly reflected at the recent G7 summit and in Merkel's declaration following it, in which she was clearly referring to the US, that: 'The times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over, as I have experienced in the past few days.' German diplomacy followed this up actively with in rapid succession the visit of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Germany, the visit of China's premier Li Keqiang to Germany, and the invitation of Putin to visit France by Macron – such an invitation was clearly discussed by Macron in advanced with Merkel. It is important not to exaggerate, a serious split between Germany and the US on military matters is not possible. But refusal of Germany to be intimidated into significantly subordinating itself to US economic demands blocks one of the only two major sources of large scale foreign capital which could be transferred to the US.
Regarding China, the other major potential foreign source of capital, Trump's team again initially appeared to attempt intimidation – the notorious phone call with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen in violation of the bedrock 'One China' policy followed by the US since establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the bringing of hard line anti-China ideologues such as Navarro and Barron into the administration etc. However, China made clear it would not accept any intimidation regarding 'core interests' such as the One China Policy, the South China Sea etc. China is certainly correct to propose positive 'win-win' policies for both the US and China, but it is not subordinate to the US as Japan was – and therefore will now allow its economy to be fundamentally damaged to subsidise the US, as Japan did, and China will not be intimidated regarding fundamental issues.
The US therefore certainly has some economies (Japan, Middle East oil exporters, Taiwan province) that are entirely subordinate to its policies and which can transfer capital to it – but, unlike in the Reagan period, these are now too economically weak to meet the needs of very large scale US foreign borrowing. The only two economies which could potentially transfer capital/savings to the US on a sufficiently large scale, Germany and China, are too strong to be economically intimated to the US. Germany and China certainly seek 'win-win' outcomes with the US but they cannot be intimidated into undertaking policies which would finance the US at the cost of serious damage to their own economies.
Therefore, unless either Germany or China can be persuaded/forced into large scale capital transfers to the US the basis for accelerating US economic growth through very large scale foreign borrowing does not exist at present.
Finally, while the above analysis is made in terms of economic fundamentals, in case it may be argued that the above analyses suffer from a 'pessimism bias', an underestimation of the growth potential of the US, it worth doing a cross check against the implications of IMF projections. These show that in terms of medium/long term growth the IMF projects that the US economy will not accelerate but even slow further.
In the next six years 2016-2022 the IMF projects that annual average US GDP growth will be 2.0% – below the 20-year moving average for the US economy, although in line with the 5-year moving average. As a result, taking into account the sharp recession in 2009, US long term growth, the 20 year moving average, will actually fall further to 1.9%. This is shown in Figure 11.
Once again it is useful to make a comparison of the period since the international financial crisis to that of the Great Depression after 1929. In the 15 years after 1929 US economy more than doubled in size, growing by 112%, an annual average 5.1%. In comparison IMF projections are that in the 15 years after 2007 the US will grow by 26%, with an annual average 1.6% growth. In short in the 15 years after 1929 US total economic growth was over times four times that projected in the 15 years after 2007, which results for a post-1929 average US growth rate over a 15 year period that was over three times that projected after 2007.
Analysis of the latest US GDP data therefore leads to a clear conclusion – the US remains locked in a period of slow growth which will last for at least a number of years. Claims to the contrary in sections of the media that there will be a substantial increase US growth, in anything other than a purely short term sense already analysed, results either from 'wishful thinking' or basic economic errors. As China's policy, particularly on such a fundamental issue, must be based on the principle of realism and 'seek truth from facts', not on wishful or confused thinking, it is therefore worth analysing the errors of some claims in part of the media that there will be a substantial increase in US medium/long term economic growth.
The simplest form of 'wishful thinking' is that it would be highly 'helpful' from the point of view of China's trade and development if the US economy grew rapidly. This is undoubtedly true – but because something would be desirable does not mean it will happen!
Since Trump's election China has rightly proposed numerous forms of economic cooperation with the US – setting these out comprehensively in the Ministry of Commerce's 'Research Report on China-US Economic and Trade Relations'. This is extremely important in foreign policy terms, showing clearly the goodwill of China to the US, the search for win-win outcomes, and that any problems in US-China relations do not arise from China. Such proposals, because they are win-win can aid sectors of both the US and Chinese economies. But the sums of finance involved are not sufficient by themselves to overcome the deep-seated problems creating slow US growth which have been analysed. To give the scales of finance involved it may be recalled that the extra foreign borrowing undertaken under Reagan would be equivalent to over $700 billion at today's prices.
A confusion (whether deliberate or objective) is sometimes expressed in parts of the Chinese media between purely short term growth fluctuations and basic trends. For example, it was noted above that US growth has increased from an extremely depressed 1.3% in the 2nd quarter of 2016, and for statistical reasons it is likely that in 2017 US growth will increase from the low 1.6% annual level of 2016. Any such short-term acceleration in growth does not alter the fundamental trend of the US economy – only if such more rapid growth were continued for a significant period would it represent a basic acceleration in the rate of US growth.
It is sometimes claimed that the US will experience rapid economic growth due to a 'wave of innovation'. However, as has already been shown factually, the US has not been experiencing 'rapid growth' but very low growth. Furthermore, while there is ample evidence that innovation embodied in increasing fixed investment leads to faster growth, there is no evidence from the US that innovation which is not accompanied by increased fixed investment leads to rapid growth.
It is sometimes claimed tax reductions proposed by Trump will lead to rapid growth. This is based both on errors in economic theory and wrong factual information regarding what occurred under Reagan – whose administration did cut taxes. First, tax cuts if unaccompanied by equivalent state spending reductions, increase the budget deficit and therefore reduce the overall domestic US savings level – which, because of the close correlation of net savings and growth will reduce GDP growth. Second, Reagan used massive foreign borrowing to sustain US growth as was shown in Figure 9. Certainly, if Trump could achieve huge foreign borrowing by the US growth would be expected to increase during the period of such borrowing. But as already analysed only two countries have the resources necessary for this, Germany and China, and for different reasons neither is likely to supply the huge borrowing required.
Claims appearing in sections of the media that there will be a basic acceleration of the US economy from its present state of low growth are therefore false – as such analyses have been previously tested and rejected by events during the very prolonged slowdown of the US economy analysed at the beginning of this article and was shown in Figure 2.
The practical conclusions of this situation for China's policy are clear and provide a clear backdrop showing the coherence of the initiatives taken by China under Xi Jinping.
The fact that China has to base its economic perspective on the continuation of slow US growth for a prolonged period means that while initiatives are rightly being taken for 'win-win' outcomes between the two countries a very rapid increase of China's exports to the US cannot be relied on. Furthermore, as the US is not merely the world's largest economy, but it particularly influences trends in the other advanced Western economies. overall growth in the advanced economies will remain relative slow by historical standards.
As this extremely slow growth is confined to advanced economies, and not to developing economies, it means that economic role of developing economies, and in particular the OBOR region, will be even more decisive for China. IMF projections are that total GDP growth in the developing economies from 2007-2021 will be 98% compared to only 21% in the advanced economies Measured at current exchange rates in 2016-2021 the OBOR region will account for 46% of world economic growth.
The unfolding development of geopolitical and political events is significantly affected by the fact that while long term economic growth after 2007 in the Western economies is becoming even slower than after 1929 nevertheless the form is significantly different. The slow average growth during the 'Great Depression' after 1929 was produced by an extremely violent recession follow by sharp recovery in the majority of advanced economies. This extreme initial recession unleased rapid political crisis. In September 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, beginning its military attack on China; in September 1931 Britain abandoned the gold standard, resulting in collapse of the then existing international financial system; in November 1932 Roosevelt was elected US President, leading to the 'New Deal', in January 1933 Hitler became German Chancellor. In contrast, after 2007 the initial recession was far less severe but the long term slow growth in the crisis was prolonged. Instead of being extremely rapid the political crisis after 2007 was therefore slow building and cumulative – leading eventually to key turning points such as Brexit and Trump's election.
Within the US as very slow growth will last for a prolonged period there will be a not rapid return to US political stability. The sharp turns represented by the election of Trump, the rise in support for Sanders, the continued severe fighting within the US political establishment over Trump and foreign policy will continue. While continuing with its correct policy of seeking 'win-win' solutions with the Trump administration China must, however, be prepared for sharp turns in the situation. This is why issues such as military reform, as emphasised by Xi Jinping, are correctly running side by side with economic initiatives such as OBOR and seeking win-win economic relations with the Trump administration.
Domestically, China is making the transition first to 'moderate prosperity' and then within a decade to a 'high income' economy by World Bank classification.
Internationally China faces a situation of slow growth in the US and advanced economies.
This combination of domestic and international trends constitutes a new period in China's development and has not faced any previous Chinese leader. This may therefore be understood as a background to the distinct policies launched under the Presidency of Xi Jinping.
The original version of this article originally appeared in Chinese at Sina Finance Opinion Leaders.
 For economic specialists' differences between the way GDP data is presented in the US and in China are explained here.
Some media reported US GDP growth in 1st quarter 2017 as 1.2%. This reflects the way the US Bureau of Economic Analysis presents the data – 'real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 1.2% in the first quarter of 2017.' But it is not sufficiently widely understood that US GDP data is presented in a different way to China's data.
US data in the above form is presented as the percentage growth between one quarter and the next on an annualised basis. That is, the new US data in that form is presented as the growth of 1st quarter 2017 compared to 4th quarter 2016 presented on an annualised basis. Actual US GDP growth between 4th quarter 2016 and 1st quarter 2017 was 0.3% on a seasonally adjusted basis – 1.2% on an annualised basis.
What may appear a technical issue has considerable significance due to a serious and known problem in the US data. The US method has the disadvantage that for accurate data the seasonal adjustment between quarters must be correct – different quarters of the year have features which strongly speed or slow growth in that period. But as is widely known among Western analysts the seasonal adjustment in US data for the 1st quarter of the year is inaccurate as it understates growth – the US statistical authorities are aware of this but have not so far succeeded in resolving the problem. To avoid this, it is better to use the system of comparing the 1st quarter of 2017 with the 1st quarter of 2016 – as this automatically avoids the need for seasonal adjustment. On that basis US year on year GDP growth was 2.0% not 1.2%. In order to avoid understating US growth this 2.0% is used in this article.
A second issue is that a market economy inherently displays business cycles. It is therefore necessary to separate purely cyclical trends from medium/long term ones. Such cyclical effects may be removed by using a sufficiently long term moving average that cyclical fluctuations become averaged out and the long term structural growth rate is shown – as is done in this article.
 From a theoretical point of view US savings and investment includes inventories as well as fixed investment. However taking a quarterly average since 1947 97% of US gross investment has been fixed investment and only 3% inventory formation, therefore by focusing here only on fixed investment and not dealing with inventories no significant distortion of trends occurs.
 To allow capital to flow out of Japan to the US, particularly after the 1987 Wall Street stock price crash Japan's interest rates were held at a low level, therefore creating huge financial bubbles within Japan's economy which duly exploded in the 1990s.


Festivals in Ada, MN. State Fairs.
A State Fair organized by Norman County Agricultural Society.
This Minnesota State Fair will have Commercial/Retail exhibitors and tba food booths. There will be 1 stage with local talent and the hours will be Wed 10am-12 Midnight, Thu 10am-12 Midnight, Fri 10am-12 Midnight, Sat 10am-12 Midnight. Admission tickets are $5 - $50. This event will also include: races of all kinds, ranch rodeo, mud run, horse shows, midget wrestling, human foosball.