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Justia › US Law › Case Law › Georgia Case Law › Supreme Court of Georgia Decisions › 2017 › Schumacher v. City of Roswell
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Schumacher v. City of Roswell
Justia Opinion Summary
The Roswell City Council enacted a new Unified Development Code to govern land use issues; the Code included a zoning map. Several Roswell property owners filed a lawsuit to challenge the process by which the City Council enacted the Code. When the superior court ruled against the property owners, they directly appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed their direct appeal, concluding that their lawsuit was a "zoning case" under Georgia Supreme Court decisions in Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County, (383 SE2d 123) (1989), and O S Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 482 SE2d 295 (1997) ("Rubin"), and thus required an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA 5-6-35(a)(1). But the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a stand-alone lawsuit challenging an ordinance as facially invalid, unconnected to any individualized determination about a particular property, was not a "zoning case" under Trend and Rubin and did not require an application under OCGA 5-6-35. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Atlanta June 30, 2017 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. The following order was passed: It appearing that the attached opinion decides a second-term appeal, which must be concluded by the end of the April Term, it is ordered that a motion for reconsideration, if any, must be received in the Supreme Court E-Filing/Docket (SCED) System by 12:00 p.m. on Monday, July 10, 2017. SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk's Office, Atlanta I hereby certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. In the Supreme Court of Georgia Decided: June 30, 2017 S16G1703. SCHUMACHER et al. v. CITY OF ROSWELL. PETERSON, Justice. The Roswell City Council enacted a new Unified Development Code (the "Code") to govern land use issues; the Code included a zoning map. Several Roswell property owners filed a lawsuit in superior court challenging the process by which the City Council enacted the Code. When the superior court ruled against the property owners, they filed a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed their direct appeal, concluding that their lawsuit was a "zoning case" under our decisions in Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 425-426 (1) (383 SE2d 123) (1989), and O S Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723 (482 SE2d 295) (1997) ("Rubin"), and thus required an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). But a stand-alone lawsuit challenging an ordinance as facially invalid — unconnected to any individualized determination about a particular property — is not a "zoning case" under Trend and Rubin and does not require an application under OCGA § 5-6-35. Accordingly, we reverse. As alleged in their amended complaint, Eric Schumacher and Mike Nyden ("Plaintiffs") are citizens and taxpayers of the City of Roswell ("City") and own residential property there.1 In February 2014, after conducting two public meetings, the Council of the City of Roswell ("City Council") approved a new zoning ordinance — the Code — and a new zoning map. The Code substantially replaced the City's existing zoning ordinance. As detailed in meeting minutes attached as an exhibit to the answer to the amended complaint, Plaintiff Schumacher had attended and participated in the first public meeting, voicing his concerns about the proposed Code. In particular, he expressed his concerns about density and the public's ability to understand the proposal. At the second public meeting, a letter from Schumacher's counsel was read into the record. The letter argued that the City had not complied with state statutory procedures for adoption of a new zoning code. Among other things, the letter argued that the City had violated the law 1 A third plaintiff named in the complaint has not filed an appearance in the appeal. 2 by inaccurately telling the public that the proposal would not change existing property rights. In neither meeting did Schumacher or his counsel address any issue with the zoning of any particular parcel of property. Following adoption of the Code, Plaintiffs filed suit against the City in the Superior Court of Fulton County.2 The complaint, as amended, challenged the manner in which the City Council had approved the Code as contrary to law for a variety of reasons. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Code adversely affected their property. They sought a declaratory judgment that the Code was illegally enacted and, therefore, void and unenforceable, and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, as well as attorney fees and costs. The City denied Plaintiffs' allegations, and attached and incorporated by reference to its answer copies of the Code, the new zoning map, and the minutes of the two City Council meetings where the Code and map were discussed and approved. The City also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs opposed the City's motion and moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit enforcement of the Code 2 The original complaint named the Mayor of Roswell and City Council members as additional defendants, but they were not named as defendants in the Plaintiffs' amended complaint. 3 during the pendency of the litigation. Following a hearing, the superior court granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all of Plaintiffs' claims and denied as moot Plaintiffs' motion for an interlocutory injunction. Plaintiffs filed a direct appeal of the adverse ruling, challenging only the dismissal of some of their claims against the ordinance. The City moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiffs were required to comply with the application procedures for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed and dismissed the direct appeal. Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 337 Ga. App. 268 (787 SE2d 254) (2016). We granted certiorari. 1. The enactment of the Code was not a "decision" of an "administrative agenc[y]" under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). We have advised litigants that they must "review the discretionary application statute to see if it covers the underlying subject matter of the appeal. If it does, then the party must file an application for appeal as provided under OCGA § 5-6-35." Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). As relevant here, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires an application for "Appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state and local 4 administrative agencies." The statutory question presented in this case is whether a city council's adoption of a new zoning code is the "decision" of a "local administrative agenc[y]." Our caselaw makes clear that an act of an administrative agency is a "decision" within the meaning of this statute only when it is a determination of an "adjudicative nature." See State of Georgia v. Intl. Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 401 (4) (a) (788 SE2d 455) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). We have noted that our opinions draw a distinction between determinations of an adjudicative nature which fall within the meaning of the term "decision" as used in OCGA § 5-6-35 and "those that are legislative or quintessentially executive in nature." Id. at 403 (4) (a). While requiring applications for discretionary review in cases where an administrative agency made a determination of an adjudicative nature, "[w]e consistently have refused . . . to require applications in cases concerning executive determinations and those involving rulemaking or other determinations of a legislative nature." Id. at 403-404 (4) (a). The conclusion that enactment of a new development code is an exercise of legislative power — and thus not an adjudicative "decision" under the statute 5 — is compelled by our case law: Administrative determinations of a legislative nature are prospective in application, general in application, and often marked by a general factual inquiry that is not specific to the unique character, activities or circumstances of any particular person. Determinations of an adjudicative nature, on the other hand, are immediate in application, specific in application, and commonly involve an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Id. at 401 (4) (a) (citations and punctuation omitted). Nothing about the adoption of a new development code fits within this definition of "decision." The lawsuit filed in superior court challenged only one action: the Roswell City Council's adoption of the Code. The suit seeks no individualized zoning-related relief. Nothing in the adoption of the Code focused on "the unique character, activities or circumstances of any particular person," or involved an "assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties." There was no individualized determination by any level of city government. The adoption of the Code was prospective in nature, as the adopting City ordinance provided that the Code was to take effect after June 1, 2014, and was to apply for the entire City. Thus, the adoption of the Code was not a "decision" as we have interpreted that statutory term. 6 Moreover, the City Council was not acting as an "administrative agenc[y]." The enactment of ordinances is at the core of the City Council's legislative functions. Indeed, the City argued below that the defendant City Council members should be dismissed from the suit by virtue of their legislative immunity because they had "engaged in a legislative function" in adopting the Code. OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires both a "decision" and an "administrative agenc[y]"; this case has neither, and thus the statute does not require an application for discretionary appeal. 2. Trend and Rubin do not apply here. Trend and Rubin do not require a different result. Trend and Rubin both announced that applications are required to appeal in "zoning cases." Rubin, 267 Ga. at 723 ("Adhering to our decision in Trend . . . we reiterate that all appeals in zoning cases require an application"); Trend, 259 Ga. at 425 (1) ("The Court takes this opportunity to advise bench and bar that appeals in zoning cases will henceforth require an application."). But a careful reading of those cases shows that they can be reconciled with OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) because a "zoning case" is a case involving a "decision" by an "administrative agenc[y]" dealing with the zoning or allowed use of a particular parcel of land. No such decision is at issue 7 here. In Trend, an appeal was taken from the denial of a landowner's petition to rezone certain property. That's the sort of individualized determination that we would generally consider a "decision" under the statute. See Keystone Knights, 299 Ga. at 401 (4) (a). The agency making the decision — the county commission — did not qualify as an "administrative agenc[y]" at the time Trend was decided. See Geron v. Calibre Cos., 250 Ga. 213, 216 (1) (296 SE2d 602) (1982) (holding "a county commission is not an administrative agency" for purposes of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1)). Seven years after Trend, however, we explicitly overruled Geron on this point, holding that, when performing a function that is "the equivalent of the function of an administrative agency," boards of commissioners are administrative agencies under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). See Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Commrs., 266 Ga. 646, 647 (1) (469 SE2d 666) (1996). Because Trend involved a "decision" of what we now understand to have been an "administrative agenc[y]" — and this case did not — Trend does not compel the filing of a discretionary application here. In Rubin, the agency in question was the City of Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment, likely an "administrative agenc[y]." The appeal was taken in the 8 superior court from the denial of a landowner's application for a sign ordinance variance, and then appealed to this Court. 267 Ga. at 724. As in Trend, that sort of determination is generally considered a "decision." Id. In Rubin, the landowner added to the variance request a claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Notwithstanding that the issue on appeal was the constitutional claim, however, Rubin still involved an appeal from an administrative agency's denial of an individual variance request. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs make a stand-alone challenge to a legislative act by a legislative body; there is no claim regarding the zoning of any particular parcel of land, no decision regarding any parcel of land, and no appeal from any such decision. This case is not a "zoning case" under Trend or Rubin.3 Trend announced that "appeals in zoning cases" would "henceforth" have to be brought by application under the statute. Trend, 259 Ga. at 425 (1). But the context of Trend and Rubin makes clear that when those decisions refer to "zoning cases," they mean cases involving individualized determinations by an "administrative agenc[y]" as to the zoning or permitted use of particular parcels 3 Notwithstanding the dissent's extended discussion of stare decisis, today we decide only that Trend and Rubin do not apply here. Whether they should be reconsidered in an appropriate case is another question for another day. 9 of land.4 The City asserts in its brief before us that the adoption of the Code and new map for the entire City "incidentally[] rezoned Appellants' property." Even assuming this is correct, however,5 Plaintiffs assert no claim and appeal from no individualized decision to change the zoning of any particular property or to grant or deny a request for a variance as to any particular property. Rather, they make various allegations about the process by which the Code was adopted — including that the City falsely told the public that the Code would not affect residential property owners and would not increase housing density — then baldly allege that the Code "adversely affects" their property. Although Plaintiffs thus allege — as they must to have standing — that they were harmed by the City's actions, those allegations do not convert their lawsuit into a "zoning case" as we used that term in Trend and Rubin. 4 If the City Council's adoption of a new zoning code were the "decision" of a "local administrative agenc[y]," the fact that Plaintiffs did not appeal from that decision and instead filed a stand-alone lawsuit challenging the decision would not entitle them to a direct appeal; the statute may not be so easily evaded. See Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville, 291 Ga. 124, 125 (2) (728 SE2d 197) (2012) . 5 It is not clear exactly what the City means by saying Plaintiffs' property was "rezoned," i.e., to what extent the Code changed what uses of Plaintiffs' property were permissible. The City does not point to anything in the voluminous attachments to its answer that addresses that question, and the amended complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs' property was "rezoned." 10 We acknowledge there is one case like this one in which we have found an application to be required. In Outdoor West, Inc. of Ga. v. Coweta County, 270 Ga. 527 (512 SE2d 604) (1999), we dismissed by order a direct appeal for failure to file an application. The order said, in full: As this is an appeal from a decision in a zoning case, appeal to this Court is by the application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35. O S Advertising Co. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724 (1) (482 SE2d 295) (1997); Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 (383 SE2d 123) (1989). In fact, Outdoor West, Inc., has, prior to this direct appeal, filed such an application (Outdoor West, Inc. of Georgia v. Coweta County, Georgia, S98D1665). The application was denied by this Court on August 14, 1998. Accordingly, this direct appeal is dismissed. Id. at 527. Two justices dissented, explained that what the majority believed was a "zoning case" was actually a stand-alone constitutional challenge to a sign ordinance, and concluded the direct appeal was appropriate. See id. at 527-528 (Carley, J., dissenting, joined by Hunstein, J.) (noting absence of any evidence that there had been any "final administrative decision or that Outdoor West ha[d] prosecuted any appeal therefrom by any method"). Outdoor West is a clear outlier; we have refused to require an application in other zoning-related cases that were not appealing decisions of administrative agencies. Compare Mid-Ga. Envtl. Mgmt. Grp., LLLP v. Meriwether County, 11 277 Ga. 670, 671-672 (1) (594 SE2d 344) (2004) (citing Trend rule and concluding, because no zoning decision had been made, that appellant had a right to a direct appeal — and that Court properly dismissed discretionary application — to seek review of denial of mandamus action to compel county to issue a verification letter and a declaratory judgment that county's zoning ordinance was not validly enacted), with id. at 676 (Hines, J., dissenting) ("[A]ll zoning decisions, whether determining the initial zoning classification or otherwise, are administrative. This Court has declared this principle to be a 'bright-line' rule. [citing Rubin] Today, the majority erases this rule."); see also King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428 (1) (531 SE2d 530) (2000) (unanimously denying appellee's motion to dismiss appeal pursuant to Rubin, because the order being appealed from (the grant of an injunction to enjoin appellant from violating city's zoning ordinance) did not involve the review of the decision of a local administrative agency); Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. & Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (498 SE2d 251) (1998) (citing Rubin and unanimously concluding that direct appeal was proper; case did not involve superior court review of an administrative decision where appellants brought action for injunctive relief to enforce rezoning conditions imposed against 12 neighboring landowner and "did not join their action for injunctive relief with any appeal from an adverse administrative decision"). Moreover, but for the issuance of a dissent, Outdoor West would be an unpublished order without precedential value. See Spurlock v. Dep't of Human Res., 286 Ga. 512, 514 (2) (690 SE2d 378) (2010) (unpublished orders serve as neither binding nor physical precedent). We do not find Outdoor West controlling, and expressly disapprove it to the extent inconsistent with our holding today. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed. Melton, P. J., Hunstein, Nahmias, Blackwell, and Grant, JJ. concur. Hines, C. J., Benham, J. and Judge Verda Colvin dissent. Boggs, J., disqualified. 13 S16G1703. SCHUMACHER et al. v. CITY OF ROSWELL GRANT, Justice, concurring. I join the Court's opinion in full, including its conclusion that the only issue decided today is that a freestanding challenge to the facial validity of a zoning ordinance, unaccompanied by any complaint regarding an individualized determination impacting a particular parcel of land, does not challenge a "decision" of an "administrative agency" under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). This decision is consistent with the text of the statute, and accordingly with our responsibility as judges to apply even complicated statutes as they are written by the General Assembly. That said, I understand and appreciate the concerns of the dissenting opinion regarding the lack of clarity in appellate procedures. More often than not, one would expect a close adherence to the textual demands of a statute to lead to greater clarity in the law; an attorney should be able to turn to the statute in the codebook and determine whether a direct appeal or an application is appropriate in a given case. That ideal is not necessarily met here. But the dissent's approach does not add clarity either, seeking to extend a rationale that we have already deemed to have "fallacies." See O S Adver. Co. of Georgia v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 725 (2) (482 SE2d 295) (1997). As illustrated by the numerous divided decisions of this Court over the years, this statute has never been a source of great clarity; even the members of this Court have been unable to agree on which cases fall within the parameters of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). See, e.g., Fulton Cnty. v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 857 (1) (572 SE2d 530) (2002) (after first holding that direct appeal was proper for appellants who had filed application for discretionary review, reverting to treat appellate filings as if they had been filed pursuant to an application for discretionary review, and granting the application); Powell v. City of Snellville, 275 Ga. 207, 208-210 (1)-(2) (563 SE2d 860) (2002) (initially dismissing appellant's discretionary applications because appellant had the right to direct review, but concluding after reviewing full record that the direct appeals should be dismissed and that applications were in fact required); Dunlap v. City of Atlanta, 272 Ga. 523, 524, 525 (531 SE2d 702) (2000) (Majority: "It is axiomatic that an appeal from a superior court's review of an administrative decision must be made through an application for appeal.") (Dissent: "[I]t is undisputed that the Board made no decision in this 2 case. Dunlap has bypassed administrative review entirely and, thus, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) did not require him to comply with administrative procedures."). Even in the context of zoning, which has purportedly been the subject of a "bright line rule," this Court has not been able to agree on which cases require an application. See Majority Opinion, at 11-13 (citing Mid-Georgia Envtl. Mgmt. Grp. v. Meriwether Cnty., 277 Ga. 670, 671-672 (1), 675-676 (5)-(6) (594 SE2d 344) (2004); King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428 (1) (531 SE2d 530) (2000); Outdoor W., Inc. of Georgia v. Coweta Cnty., 270 Ga. 527, 527-528 (512 SE2d 604) (1999); Harrell v. Little Pup Dev. & Constr., 269 Ga. 143, 144 (498 SE2d 251) (1998)). For example, in Sprayberry v. Dougherty County, 273 Ga. 503, 505-507 (543 SE2d 29) (2001), this Court concluded over dissent that because appellants had not filed an appeal to the superior court seeking review of an administrative decision on zoning, the order in question was directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a). The following year, the Court overruled Sprayberry in part, explaining that "to the extent Sprayberry holds that a litigant is not seeking 'review' of an administrative decision by filing a mandamus action in superior court to attack or defend that decision, Sprayberry is overruled." Ferguson v. Composite State Bd. of Medical 3 Examiners, 275 Ga. 255, 257 (564 SE2d 715) (2002). The Ferguson decision also included a special concurrence arguing that Sprayberry should not be overruled at all, and a dissent arguing that Sprayberry should be overruled in its entirety. See id. at 258 (Carley, J., concurring specially); id. at 260 (Hines, J., dissenting). This is not the stuff of bright lines. We recently attempted to bring some needed clarity to this interpretive enterprise by explaining in Keystone Knights that decisions can be "adjudicative," "legislative," or "executive," and that an application is required to seek review of "adjudicative" decisions by administrative agencies. State v. Int'l Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 400-406 (4) (a) (788 SE2d 455) (2016). That decision was a valuable step in asserting order over our jurisprudence in this area, but it still left much to be divined by practicing attorneys.1 Of course, in fairness to Keystone Knights, the complexity of the analysis required under any approach that takes statutory language seriously counsels in favor of a legislative solution. What, for example, is a 1 I have my own doubts about whether Keystone Knights may have read "adjudicative" too broadly and "executive" too narrowly, as not every individualized decision is truly adjudicative, no matter how specific or immediate. But that particular issue is not relevant to the outcome here, and it may also be that Keystone Knights leaves sufficient room for the category of "executive" decisions as more cases come before us. 4 "decision"? Or an "administrative agency"? And what is the answer when a case raises claims regarding legislative, executive, and adjudicative decisions by a government entity acting in different capacities with respect to each of the "decisions"? The statute invites rather than answers these questions, and we can only do so much to simplify while also remaining faithful to its text.2 Accordingly, the General Assembly may wish to clarify the scope of the matters that are subject to the discretionary appeal process. Until then, the best path forward — as remarkable as this is — may well be to follow the advice of two leading Georgia appellate treatises and file a discretionary application in every instance where there is any doubt. See McFadden, Brewer & Sheppard, Ga. Appellate Practice with Forms, § 8:12, p. 245 (2016-2017 ed.) ("The uncertainty created by these decisions, while seemingly academic, becomes less so in the context of the principle that the discretionary application requirements apply even within an area specifically referenced in the direct appeal provisions, and the Supreme Court's reminders that the discretionary application process is intended to reduce its caseload. In that situation, the 'tie' may not go the direct2 Nor do these questions address the additional layers of complexity that come about in cases that also require some application of OCGA § 5-6-34. See, e.g., Ferguson, 275 Ga. at 256-257; Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). 5 appeal runner, and either a discretionary application or an application together with a direct appeal would be the wiser course."); Michael B. Terry, Georgia Appeals: Practice and Procedure with Forms 122 (2015) ("when in doubt consider exercising an 'abundance of caution,' such as by filing both a notice of appeal and a discretionary application"). In fact, the more efficient path would be to file only an application, because this Court has made clear that when an application is filed, but a direct appeal is permitted, we will grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). See Cardinal Robotics, Inc. v. Moody, 287 Ga. 18, 20 n.3 (694 SE2d 346) (2010). In contrast, where an application for discretionary appeal is required, but is not filed, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the case will be dismissed. See Dunlap, 272 Ga. at 524. Where a litigant is in the quite understandable position of not being certain whether an application for appeal is required, the safer path is the one through the requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). I am authorized to state that Justice Nahmias joins in this concurrence. 6 S16G1703. SCHUMACHER et al. v. CITY OF ROSWELL HINES, Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because the opinion of the majority needlessly upturns the well-established, well-founded, and absolutely clear Georgia precedent regarding the appellate procedure in zoning cases to regress to a state of the law which was, and will now again be, abstruse and uncertain. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the starting point in the determination of the appropriate procedure for pursuing an appeal in the Court of Appeals, and indeed in this Court, is the examination of OCGA § 5-6-34, which outlines lower court judgments and orders that parties may appeal directly, and OCGA § 5-6-35, which prescribes the cases in which parties must file an application for discretionary appeal. Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). If a direct appeal of a judgment is not authorized under OCGA § 5-6-34 because the appealing party was required to pursue the discretionary application process set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35, the appellate court does not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal, and therefore, must dismiss it. Id. This comports with the primary legislative purpose of the passage of OCGA § 5-6-35, which is to aid the appellate courts in managing massive caseloads by giving them the discretion not to entertain an appeal in circumstances in which a direct appeal is not the optimal use of the appellate forum. Id. And, as was stressed in Rebich, generally the underlying subject matter of the appeal controls as to whether the procedure for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 56-35 must be followed. Id. (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the issue is straightforward - whether the Plaintiffs were required by OCGA§ 5-6-35 (a) (1) to file an application for discretionary appeal, and therefore, were not entitled to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34. In relevant part, OCGA§ 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires an application to appeal from "decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . local administrative agencies." In Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425 (383 SE2d 123) (1989), this Court determined that appeals in all zoning cases, whether to this Court or the Court of Appeals would require a discretionary application,1 id. at 426 (1), reasoning that such appeals were "from the decision of a court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA 1 Although the zoning appeal in Trend itself was not dismissed, the Court used it as the vehicle to announce the rule of appellate procedure to be followed in all future zoning cases as of the date Trend appeared in the advance sheets. 2 § 5-6-35 (a) (1)."2 Id. Trend involved an as-applied constitutional challenge regarding the landowners property, not a facial due process challenge like the one presented in this case. However, subsequently, in O.S. Advert. Co. of Georgia v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723 (482 SE2d 295) (1997), the Court was squarely faced with the issue of whether one who raises a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance should have a right of direct appeal. In such challenges the administrative agency cannot and does not adjudicate the claim. Nevertheless, although this Court expressly acknowledged that there were some "fallacies in the rationale in Trend," we declined to create an exception to Trend in the case of such a challenge to a zoning ordinance. Id. at 725 (2). We explained that the: proposed distinction would create confusion concerning the proper procedure to follow in appeals in zoning cases without providing property owners or zoning authorities any additional review of their substantive claims. Moreover, it would permit litigants to control the appellate procedure, contrary to legislative intent, by raising a facial challenge to every zoning ordinance. More problematic, it would impose on both the parties and this court the difficult task of 2 The opinion also noted that in Ross v. Mullis Tree Service, 183 Ga. App. 627, 628 (360 SE2d 288) (1987), the Court of Appeals held that "'OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) is applicable to appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of local zoning tribunals....'" Id. 3 determining whether the superior court acted in its role as a "trial court" or as a "reviewing court" in each zoning case. As a result, parties would file both an application and a direct appeal to avoid the risk of reaching a conclusion different from this court and thus losing their right to any appellate review. Because the decision in Trend provides a clear, efficient, and fair rule, we follow it here and dismiss this direct appeal. Id. at 725 (2) (482 SE2d 295) (1997). See also, Fulton County v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed, 275 Ga. 856, 857 (1) (572 SE2d 530) (2002), disapproved on other grounds by City of Cumming v. Flowers, ___ Ga. ___ (797 SE2d 846) (Decided March 6, 2017). Contrary to the very premise of the majority, Rubin with its application of Trend is direct and controlling precedent in this appeal as a matter of fact and of law. First, although the underlying case in Rubin involved an administrative determination regarding a variance, the sole issue on appeal was a facial challenge to the subject zoning ordinance. What is more, even if the Rubin appeal is viewed as one involving both an administrative decision and a facial attack, this Court's dismissal of the direct appeal and endorsement of the procedure for discretionary appeal implicitly confirms that Rubin controls the present case; this is so because if the facial challenge would have conferred a 4 right of direct appeal then the administrative decision would also have been a matter of direct appeal in accordance with the mandate of OCGA § 5-6-34 (d).3 See Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 257 (3) (794 SE2d 60) (2016). Indeed, the majority's procedural premise that the route to appeal is governed by everything raised in the litigation below rather than the issue on appeal, i.e, that the presence of a variance or other administrative zoning ruling guides the appellate procedure in regard to an attendant facial challenge, not only runs afoul of OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) but is directly contrary to our precedent; such precedent dictates that we look only to the issues on appeal to determine whether the 3 OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) provides: Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law contained in this Code section, or elsewhere. For purposes of review by the appellate court, one or more judgments, rulings, or orders by the trial court held to be erroneous on appeal shall not be deemed to have rendered all subsequent proceedings nugatory; but the appellate court shall in all cases review all judgments, rulings, or orders raised on appeal which may affect the proceedings below and which were rendered subsequent to the first judgment, ruling, or order held erroneous. Nothing in this subsection shall require the appellate court to pass upon questions which are rendered moot. 5 appeal is one of right or discretion, and issues, otherwise a matter of review by discretion may be reviewed on direct appeal when appealed as part of a judgment that is directly appealable. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 263 Ga. 498, 500 (1) (435 SE2d 914) (1993), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. Green Land Co., 272 Ga. 107 (527 SE2d 204) (2000). But, perhaps even more significantly, the holding in Rubin was broad and unequivocal: "Adhering to our decision in Trend Development Corporation v. Douglas County, we reiterate that all appeals in zoning cases require an application and dismiss this direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 724. (Emphasis supplied). This Court further stated that the holding in Trend "established a bright-line rule for both litigants and the appellate courts. If the underlying subject-matter is zoning, an application for discretionary appeal must be filed." Id. at 724 (1) (Emphasis supplied). The proper characterization of this litigation is unquestionably that it is a zoning case; therefore, it is controlled by Trend and Rubin. The adoption of the ordinance in question in some measure rezoned Plaintiffs' parcels of real property, allegedly to their detriment. Thus, this is no less a zoning matter affecting particular properties than an adverse decision on a request for a variance. Indeed, it arguably is a harsher particularized zoning determination 6 in that it completely changes the zoning of the properties in question whereas the denial of a variance leaves the applicable zoning in place. If these specific Plaintiffs and their properties had not allegedly sustained harm from the new zoning code then they would not have standing to challenge it in the first place. Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc. v. City of Doraville, 297 Ga. 513, 531 (5) (773 SE2d 728) (2015). The fact that they did so by a collateral attack on the zoning ordinance does not change the applicability of Trend and Rubin; we have made plain that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) procedurally governs not only cases in which there is a direct appeal to the superior court from the local government's zoning decision, but also where there is a collateral attack on the zoning decision by directly filing an action in superior court for relief. See Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville, 291 Ga. 124, 125 (2) (728 SE2d 197) (2012). While Trend has certainly produced a significant and consistent body of law in regard to appellate procedure in zoning cases, as noted in Rubin, the briefly-stated rationale of Trend, i.e., that all zoning cases would require discretionary appeal because they were within the ambit of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), is problematic. This is especially apparent in the case of a facial due process challenge to a zoning ordinance, where the local administrative agency does not 7 adjudicate the due process question. The express terms of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), contemplate that there be a "decision" of a state or local "administrative agency," i.e., a lower tribunal, that is "reviewed" by the superior court. This approach in zoning cases does stand in contrast to our approach in non-zoning cases. In non-zoning cases, we have said that a "decision" of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) is one that is adjudicatory in nature, which need not be characterized by formal adjudicative procedures. See State v. Int'l Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 299 Ga. 392, 399-407 (4) (a) and n. 22 (788 SE2d 455) (2016) (compiling cases indicating that "[t]he decisions in which this Court has actually applied OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) to require applications for discretionary review in cases involving administrative agencies almost uniformly appear to have concerned agency determinations of an adjudicative nature"). We noted that: When addressing agency determinations that are not quintessentially executive, the courts routinely have drawn a distinction between determinations that are legislative in nature, on the one hand, and those that are adjudicative in nature, on the other. Although the line between legislation and adjudication is not always easy to draw, there seems to be some agreement about the defining characteristics of these two sorts of 8 administrative determinations. Administrative determinations of a legislative nature are prospective in application, and often marked by a general factual inquiry that is not specific to the unique character, activities or circumstances of any particular person. Determinations of an adjudicative nature, on the other hand, are immediate in application, specific in application, and commonly involve an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Id. at 401 (4) (a) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the determination of whether there has been a "decision" of an administrative agency for purposes of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) was analyzed in a manner not reflected in Trend/Rubin.4 And thus, Trend and its progeny Rubin should be considered in light of the policy of stare decisis. Certainly, the doctrine of stare decisis is an essential part of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence, inasmuch as in most cases, it is of "more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions." Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 356-357 (5) (519 SE2d 210) (1999). However, 4 We noted in Keystone Knights that many administrative decisions are executive in nature, and thus, would not fall under the provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). 9 [s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.... In considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the importance of having the question decided against the importance of having it decided right. In doing so, we consider factors such as the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most importantly, the soundness of its reasoning. Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 812 (3) (b) (771 SE2d 362) (2015) (internal citations omitted). See also Flowers, ___ Ga. at ___. Moreover, the respect for precedent is strongest in the case of statutory construction, where the legislative body is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 696 (115 SCt 1754, 131 LE2d 779) (1995). The soundness of reasoning is of import in the analysis, but it is not necessarily determinative. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1565 (n.21) (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming that "'when [a]Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming 10 and overruling a prior case'" (emphasis added)); Hubbard v. United States, supra at 716 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that courts must give reasons for ignoring stare decisis, "reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all)" (parenthetical in original)). Here, as we have acknowledged, Trend's bare bones statement of rationale premised upon OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) has been called into question by a then majority of this Court. Rubin, supra at 725 (2). And, there is no further reasoning expressed in the opinion, sound or otherwise. However, again it is significant that the Trend rule helps implement the very purpose of the General Assembly in passing the discretionary appeal statute, i.e., promoting judicial management and economy. It alleviates confusion in the appellate process, and thereby benefits all concerned. Furthermore, it militates against specious claims by litigants in order to circumvent or control the appellate process.5 Simply, regardless of the flawed statement of rationale in Trend, there is a sound policy 5 If a facial due process challenge to the applicable zoning ordinance was allowed to confer a right of direct appeal, this might prove incentive to add such a claim to otherwise routine zoning litigation, or to bypass the administrative process entirely and rely solely on such a facial challenge burdening both the trial and appellate courts with a matter more expeditiously resolved by the local zoning commission or board. 11 for the decision in that it provides a clear, efficient, and eminently workable rule in zoning cases. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, ___ U. S. ___ (135 SCt 2401, 192 LE 2d 463) (2015) (stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision interprets a statute, even when the decision relies on the policies and purposes animating the law). Admittedly, it is difficult to find the presence of reliance interests. Generally, reliance interests in the context of stare decisis refer to contract interests, property rights, and other substantive rights. Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291, 298 (2) (766 SE2d 803) (2014). That is plainly not the situation in the present case, as Trend and Rubin are decisions of appellate procedure. However, the remaining factors in the stare decisis analysis prove to be determinative here. The ages of the decisions are significant in relationship to the resulting body of caselaw. Trend has now been the law of Georgia for nearly three decades, and consequently, has been cited as direct authority in numerous appellate decisions by this Court and the Court of Appeals, and has been highlighted in many secondary sources discussing Georgia jurisprudence. It has effectively functioned as the procedural gatekeeper in zoning cases, often 12 determining the fate of untold parcels of real property. Its progeny Rubin has been the law for 20 years, and has served the same purposes. And as I have noted, the General Assembly, as the body enacting OCGA § 5-6- 35 (a) (1), has for these decades been free to take legislative action in order to alter this Court's interpretation of its legislation. Hubbard v. United States, supra at 696. But, tellingly it has not done so. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 SCt at 2410. Trend and Rubin have not been cast in doubt by any act of the General Assembly, and unquestionably they have become the well-settled law of this State. But, most importantly in this situation is the factor of workability. There can be little dispute that the bright line rule of Trend adhered to in Rubin has provided needed clarity and direction to the bench and bar in the all-too-often quagmire of appellate procedure. It leaves no doubt for trial courts, practitioners, and indeed, litigants as to the proper procedure for an appellate challenge of a zoning issue, and therefore, avoids the pitfall of dismissal of a fatally-flawed appeal. The workability of Trend cannot credibly be questioned. And, neither can the significance of the factor of utility be in doubt because if a matter of appellate procedure proves unworkable, due to vagueness, confusion, 13 complexity, or otherwise, then the stated rationale for the procedure, even if reasonable in theory, is of little import. See Nahmias, J., concurring in Allaben v. State, 294 Ga. 315 (751 SE2d 802) (2013), overruled by State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376 (774 SE2d 106) (2015) (in the context of stare decisis, workability can be the major concern). See also, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (86 SCt 258, 15 LE2d 194) (1965) ("the mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great"). Contrary to any claim that the workability of a precedent is not a reason for retaining it, the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held otherwise. In Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 SCt at 2411, the Supreme Court stated that nothing about the precedent under consideration had proved unworkable; that the decision was "simplicity itself to apply"; that its "ease of use" appeared "in still sharper relief when compared to [the] proposed alternative"; and that the more "elaborate inquiry" would produce higher litigation costs and unpredictable results. Id. The Court determined that it should not trade in a decision which was eminently workable for one with perhaps better legal reasoning but which was not as workable. Id. It concluded that "[o]nce again, then, the case for sticking with long-settled precedent grows 14 stronger. Even the most usual reasons for abandoning stare decisis cut the other way here." Id. This Court too has recently made plain that "the doctrine of stare decisis strongly counsels adherence to our longstanding, consistent, and workable precedents." Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (Emphasis supplied). See also Nahmias, J., concurring in PNC Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Smith, 298 Ga. 818, 824 (785 SE2d 505) (2016) (the holding at issue "is a four-decade-old statutory precedent that created a workable rule . . . and thus it should be followed as a matter of stare decisis"); Nahmias, J., concurring in Brown v. Crawford, 289 Ga. 722, 725-726 (715 SE2d 132) (2011) ( the precedent had "been law for over a decade," had been "applied in a number of cases," and "the clear procedural rule . . . is workable, . . . as it simply requires the [filing of] a discretionary application to appeal"; "Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process."). To regress to pre-Trend puts the litigants, the attorneys, and the courts in the untenable position of determining the proper characterization of every action 15 by zoning commissions or zoning boards, who typically perform a mixture of administrative, quasi-judicial, and legislative functions. The discretionary appellate procedure unequivocally ruled as applicable in all zoning cases by Trend and its progeny has long proved to be a clear and workable system for handling appeals in zoning cases, and this Court should not now stray from it.6 As we aptly noted in Rubin, the discretionary appeal procedure, does not deny a party in a zoning case the right to appellate review. It merely permits this court to consider the appellant's enumerations of error in a streamlined process that [potentially] omits oral arguments and a written opinion. Id. Here, the Plaintiffs' amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenged the City Council's zoning decision to approve the UDC and the new zoning map on due process and other grounds, and the Plaintiffs sought to have the UDC and map declared null and void and to prevent their enforcement. None of the Plaintiffs' requests for relief were independent of the City Council's decision to approve the UDC and the map, and none of the requests for relief could be granted or denied by the superior court without affirming, reversing, 6 The policy of Trend/Rubin has been applied only in the arena of zoning. 16 or in some manner rendering a judgment in regard to the City Council's zoning decisions. Under these circumstances, in which an appeal is taken from a judgment of a superior court reviewing a zoning decision, there should be no direct appeal. Plaintiffs' appeal to the Court of Appeals was properly a matter of discretion under OCGA § 5-6-35, rather than one of right under OCGA § 5-634. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the plaintiff petitioners' direct appeal, and its judgment should be affirmed by this Court. As Circuit Judge Charles Clark observed in his special concurrence in part and dissent in part in Gulf States Mfrs., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 598 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1979), the opinion of the majority "supplants clarity with needless confusion. The end and purpose of this change are not apparent. If the objective is to advance the state of the law, I respectfully submit that it fails." Id. at 911. I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Judge Colvin join in this dissent. 17
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text:
France zeroes in on lightweight weapon for Rafale
By Craig Hoyle2011-06-09T15:00:00+01:00
France is close to selecting a new, reduced collateral effect weapon for its Dassault Rafale fighters, with the need for a lightweight air-to-surface store having been underlined by its recent combat experience over Libya.
Discussions involving the air force and France's DGA defence procurement agency have advanced over the recent weeks, with several options understood to be under consideration.
Recent attention has focused on the MBDA dual-mode seeker-equipped Brimstone missile, which has been used by UK Royal Air Force Panavia Tornado GR4 strike aircraft during NATO's Unified Protector campaign to safeguard Libyan civilians from attack by forces loyal to Col Muammar Gaddafi.
© DGA
"Brimstone is a solution, but it's not the only option," said Stéphane Reb, the DGA's Rafale programme manager. Other candidates could include guided rockets or a weapon in the class of Lockheed Martin's small contained-area precision energetic load bomb, or Scalpel, said industry sources. Meetings about a possible acquisition were held in late May, and a selection decision could come soon.
Acquiring a precision-guided, lightweight weapon for the Rafale has interested the French military for some time, with a TDA 68mm rocket pod having been exhibited alongside a Rafale at 2009's Paris air show.
A new system would provide a strike capability between the aircraft's internal 30mm cannon, and 250kg (550lb) bombs equipped with Sagem's AASM "Hammer" precision guidance and range extension kit.
"If you want to integrate something very quick and with a very limited firing envelope then it can be done, but if you want to do a complete system integration with a large firing envelope then we would need more time," said Reb.
The French air force is sustaining a detachment of seven Rafale B/Cs at Solenzara air base on Corsica in support of its operation Harmattan commitment to the NATO campaign in Libya. It will also send other Rafales to Afghanistan for a repeat tour of duty, to start on 1 August.
US Navy flies F/A-18F Super Hornet with Infrared Search & Track Block II pod
The US Navy (USN) for the first time in late 2019 flew an F/A-18F Super Hornet carrying an Infrared Search & Track (IRST) Block II pod under the centerline of its undercarriage.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Teufelsgold ist ein Roman von Andreas Eschbach aus dem Jahr 2016.

Handlung
Die Handlungen finden auf 2 Zeitebenen statt, dem ausgehenden 13. und beginnenden 14. Jahrhundert, also dem Beginn des Spätmittelalters bis zur Hungersnot von 1315–1317 sowie der Jahrtausendwende der Jetztzeit. Der mittelalterliche Handlungsstrang ergibt sich jeweils aus Buchauszügen, die dem Protagonisten in die Hände fallen bzw. später zugänglich gemacht werden.

Handlung im Mittelalter
In dieser Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts spielenden Geschichte wird ein reisender Alchemist namens John Scoro, ein Angelsachse, von den Bütteln eines Grafen verhaftet. In der Karre des Verhafteten findet man in einer Bleikiste einen Stein, der todbringende Strahlen emittiert und der sagenumwobene Stein der Weisen sein soll. Trotz massiver Gegenwehr des Alchemisten und Warnungen vor Unheil zwingt der Graf ihn, Gold aus Quecksilber herzustellen, um einen neuen Kreuzzug zu finanzieren.

Aus diesem Gold lässt der Graf für seine schwangere Frau ein Kruzifix und für sich selbst eine goldene Rüstung schmieden. An der Radioaktivität des verstrahlten Goldes sterben der Graf und alle um ihn Versammelten. Einem Mitstreiter des Alchemisten und seinem Gehilfen gelingt mit dem Stein die Flucht aus der dem Untergang geweihten Burg. Der Alchemist wird vermeintlich sterbend zurückgelassen.

Als später am Ort der Katastrophe eintreffende Ritter des Deutschritterordens die Vorgänge zu ergründen versuchen, erhalten sie vom heiligen Vater den immerwährenden Auftrag, des Steins habhaft zu werden, was schließlich auch gelingt, um ihn und seine unseligen Kräfte auszuschalten. Er wird in der Marienburg verwahrt, ist dort aber unauffindbar. Der Orden wendet danach alle Bemühungen auf, die Tatsache der Existenz des Steins geheim zu halten.

Nur wenige Eingeweihte im Orden wissen von seiner Geschichte und durch die Plünderung der Ordensbestände während des Dritten Reiches gelangen einige der Aufzeichnungen in die Hände anderer Personen.

Handlung in der Jetztzeit
Der Protagonist des Buches, ein junger Anlageberater namens Hendrik Busske, muss Ende der 1990er Jahre in Vertretung Geldanlegerseminare abhalten, ein Job, der ihm zunächst nicht zusagt. Insgesamt ist er mit seinem Leben, vor allem seiner Karriere, unzufrieden, vor allem wenn er, wie nun bei einer Seminarvorbereitung, die Welt der Reichen als Zaungast bestaunt. Um seine Aufregung zu dämpfen, stiehlt er in einem Antiquariat ein altes Buch, das von den Erlebnissen eines Alchemisten Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts erzählt und ihn fasziniert. Obwohl Hendrik an seine Anlageempfehlungen selbst nicht glaubt, wird das Seminar unverhofft zum Erfolg, zumal er ein natürliches Talent zum Erzählen hat und sein Seminar mit Weisheiten aus der Alchemie würzt, für die er sich schon immer interessiert hat. Eine junge Frau, die nach dem Seminar an der Hotelbar mit Hendrik anbandelt und ihn verführt, stiehlt ihm das Buch, das er zuvor allerdings kopieren ließ. Seine berufliche Entwicklung macht Fortschritte, seine junge Angetraute wird schwanger, und ein unverhoffter Geldsegen infolge Erbschaft und ein scheinbar zufälliges Angebot eines generösen Fremden, der ebenfalls Interesse an Alchemie hat, lassen ihn zum scheinbaren Schlossbesitzer werden, für ihn nur ein Arrangement, das der Werbung für seine Anlegerseminare dient, die er inzwischen als Selbständiger durchführt. Vorangegangen war ein Zufallstreffer bei der Prognose des Platzens der Dotcom-Blase im Jahr 2000.

Obwohl seine Karriere Fortschritte macht, er eine ihn liebende Frau und eine aufgeweckte Tochter hat, verspürt er eine Leere, so als habe er seine eigentliche Bestimmung und sein Glück noch nicht gefunden. Seine Seminare benutzt er, um fremdzugehen, doch bald befriedigt ihn das auch nicht mehr. Durch Zufall erhält er Kenntnis eines weiteren Buchfragments der Geschichte um den Alchemisten.

Als die seinerzeit verschollene Goldrüstung bei Autobahnarbeiten wiederentdeckt wird, nimmt Hendrik Kontakt zu seinem Bruder auf, der als Atomphysiker beim CERN in Genf arbeitet und der für das Ganze eine wissenschaftliche Erklärung hat. Hiernach sei wohl Gold aus Quecksilber unter Verwendung einer starken Strahlungsquelle, wahrscheinlich aus einem Meteoriten stammend, hergestellt worden. Gemeinsam wollen sie die Rüstung auf Radioaktivität untersuchen, jedoch wird zuvor der Fund gestohlen. Die beiden geraten unter Verdacht, und durch eine unglückliche Verkettung verliert Hendrik seine gut bezahlten Seminaraufträge, da er als Scharlatan enttarnt wird.

Der Schlossherr nutzt die Situation, um Hendrik in das Geheimnis der Alchemie einzuweihen und gibt vor, dessen eigentliches Ziel sei ewiges Leben in einer besseren Parallelwelt, dem Paradies gleich. Er präsentiert im Keller des Schlosses den eigentlichen Schlossherrn, den inzwischen 800 Jahre alten Alchemisten. Um ihn zu verjüngen und die Geheimnisse zu erfahren, soll Hendrik die Goldrüstung besorgen. Er kann die Frau, die ihm seinerzeit das Buch stahl, auf Staten Island ausfindig machen, sie ist die Erbin eines Großkonzerns. Sie eröffnet ihm, die Rüstung eingeschmolzen zu haben, um an die darin enthaltenen Bruchstücke des Steins der Weisen heranzukommen, da auch sie die Geschichte vom ewigen Leben kennt. Sie ist die Nachfahrin des Mitstreiters des damaligen Alchemisten.

Nachdem Hendrik ein noch fehlendes Dokument beim Deutschritterorden geraubt und den dort Verantwortlichen verletzt hat, versuchen die Beteiligten, die vom Alchemisten verheißene andere Existenzebene zu erreichen. Hendrik gelingt im letzten Moment der Ausstieg, nachdem er die Wahrheit über seinen Bruder und seine Tochter erfahren hat. Der Alchemist, Hendriks Bruder und die New Yorkerin vollenden das Experiment, doch es bleibt unklar, ob sie in einer Explosion sterben oder die andere Paralleldimension erreichen. Hendrik versucht, an sein altes Leben anzuknüpfen, muss sich aber zunächst der Justiz für seine verdiente Bestrafung stellen.

Weblinks
 Teufelsgold bei Bastei Lübbe

Literatur
 Andreas Eschbach: Teufelsgold. Lübbe-Verlag, Köln 2016, ISBN 978-3-7857-2568-9
 Taschenbuchausgabe 2018, ISBN 978-3-404-17727-1
 e-book, 2016, ISBN 978-3-7325-2951-3
 Hörbuchfassung (gelesen von Matthias Koeberlin), Lübbe, Köln 2016, ISBN 978-3-7857-5351-4

Literarisches Werk
Literatur (20. Jahrhundert)
Literatur (Deutsch)
Thriller (Literatur)
Werk von Andreas Eschbach

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Champs in Church Street: The Hartlepool wine bar which was just champion in the 1980s
Game of Thrones star gives clue to how show will end as final series prepares to air
One of the leading actors from Game Of Thrones has given a clue as to how the popular series will end.
By Ross Robertson
Wednesday, 10 April, 2019, 14:37
Actor Liam Cunningham, who plays Davos Seaworth in Game of Thrones, at the launch of the Game of Thrones touring exhibition at the Titanic Exhibition Centre in Belfast. Picture by: Liam McBurney/PA Wire
After 10 years of delighting fans, the fantasy epic will come to a close in its final season, which starts this month.
Actor Liam Cunningham, who plays smuggler turned Lord Davos Seaworth, described the ending of the show as "bittersweet".
Cunningham, from Dublin, appeared in Belfast on Wednesday to launch the Game Of Thrones Touring Exhibition, and defended the often shocking content of the show - as well as hinting that the ending will be as challenging as the previous seven seasons.
He described his character as the "moral compass of the piece".
Davos was present during a scene when three men were burned alive by the priestess Melisandre as a sacrifice to the "Lord of Light".
Cunningham pointed out it was a show written by grown-ups, for grown-ups.
"There were a lot of things that happened at the seasons went on that a lot of people found very challenging, shall we say," he said.
"This is a grown-up show, written by grown-ups, for grown-ups, and one of the reasons for its success was it wasn't condescending for its audience, it's genuinely challenging, and you do find yourself sometimes questioning your attachment to characters for what they get up to.
"But there is no-one bad in it for the sake of being bad - well, maybe the Boltons (known for flaying their enemies), and King Joffrey - but you understand their reasons for doing what they do.
"All that stuff... in our show it is justified, but not in real life."
He was tight-lipped about the fate of Davos.
"Mr George RR Martin, the man who wrote the story, described the end as bittersweet," he said.
"Having seen everything, I'd have to agree with that.
"The other thing I think it is fair to say is if we wrapped up this story with a nice pink ribbon, people would be very very annoyed with us because that would be patronising.
"It's a bit like life, there is unanswered bits and answered bits and pain and misery and suffering but all the big stories, there is a certain resolution to them.
"But I am not going to say any more than that."
Cunningham added that he had never dreamed of getting such an opportunity so close to home.
"Westeros is an hour and a half drive from my front door. All my actor friends are incredibly jealous because it's the biggest show on the planet.
"And in fact, when we filmed at the Linen Mills in Banbridge, that's only 40 minutes away - I could commute to Westeros," he said, adding that the show had introduced him to hidden gems in Northern Ireland.
"Ballintoy, the harbour there, first time we filmed there, it's an absolutely beautiful place. I'd never seen the Dark Hedges, there were loads of places that were news to me. It was great for me to see this corner of the island."
The Game Of Thrones Touring Exhibition will run at Titanic Exhibition Centre from April 11 until September 1.
The final season of the show is set to start on April 14 on Sky Atlantic.


HUDA BEAUTY SAPPHIRE OBSESSIONS PALETTE | First Impressions!
These Huda Beauty Obsessions Palettes are so convenient and affordable!! Check out my HONEST review!!
you are great alltime but please make new videos 4k or 60fps quality because it's very clear…and your clothes are great please more haul videos..


How the homes we live in turned into the monsters that ate our economy and how the United States became a nation obsessed with real estate. Our Lot tells how an entire nation got swept up in real estate mania, and it casts the business story—the collapse of the mortgage markets and its global impact on the economy—as the product of a decades-long project of social engineering by the U .S. government to make homeownership possible for those who had never been able to attain it before. Based on original reporting, Our Lot looks at the boom as experienced by ordinary Americans, and examines how our own economic anxieties and realities, combined with greed and delusion on Wall S treet and in Washington, inflated the real estate bubble. In accessible language, the book helps homeowners and would-be homeowners understand what really happened, how it has affected our homes and communities, and how we can move on to a future we'll want to live in.
ils:.b13116460|Book|Books|First edition.|English|Bloomsbury,||278 pages ; 24.


Slick West Coast uptempo soul music for dancers ONLY. 12-inch vinyl LP.
Wonderful compilation of lost 7" sides from the Dore label, joyous, fast tempo'd soul from the crucible of soul. Our favourites so far: The Fidels' boy/girl duet over stomping back beat, Milton James's "My Lonely Feelings," so effortlessly groovy and the brilliantly titled "I Only Cry Once A Day Now." Perfect weekend stomping..


text:
Google cracks down on personal loan apps in India following abuse and outcry
NEW DELHI, INDIA JUNE 12: A view of Nehru Place - wholesale IT and electronics market after the lockdown restrictions were relaxed, on June 10, 2020 in New Delhi, India. (Photo by Sanjeev Verma/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)
Google said on Thursday it has pulled some personal loan apps from Play Store in India and was implementing stronger measures to prevent abuse following reports that said several firms were targeting vulnerable borrowers in the country and then going to extreme lengths to recover their money.
The Android-maker said users and government agencies in India recently flagged several personal loan apps and the company reviewed hundreds of them. The review found an identified number of apps violated Play Store's safety policies and they were immediately removed from the Store.
Google, whose Android operating system powers 98% of smartphones in India, said it has asked the developers of the remaining identified apps to demonstrate that their apps are in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations. (In an email reviewed by TechCrunch, Google had asked a developer to provide documentation within five days.)
Indian startups explore alliance and alternative app store to fight Google's 'monopoly'
"Apps that fail to do so will be removed without further notice. In addition, we will continue to assist the law enforcement agencies in their investigation of this issue," the company said.
Users have identified several lending apps including 10MinuteLoan and Ex-Money in India in recent months that granted small ticket loans (typically in the range of $50 to $200) to people for short tenures without much verification to determine their eligibility, and then charged steep processing fees.
To avoid such abuse, Google said Play Store will only allow personal apps that require customers to make their repayment in 60 days or longer.
When borrowers struggled to repay their debt in the short period, collection agents on behalf of some lending apps among other ill tactics threatened to embarrass them in front of their friends, colleagues and family. In November, local newspaper Indian Express reported that a 23-year-old man committed suicide after being bullied by a money lending app. It's not the only reported suicide case linked to such harassment in recent months.
Online loan horror :
Representative of a loan app called " Udhaar Loan " Asking a girl from Tamilnadu to video call her naked , if she fails to pay loan on time .
She attempted suicide today.
Please share max until it reaches @PMOIndia . pic.twitter.com/nD9evsGrhl
— Prashanth Rangaswamy (@itisprashanth) November 8, 2020
Local media also reported that police in the city of Hyderabad recently froze bank accounts holding $58 million for alleged scams conducted through 30 lending apps, none of which had approval from the nation's central bank. A preliminary investigation found that these apps had processed nearly $2.9 billion through 14 million transactions.
Srikanth L of CashlessConsumer, a consumer collective on digital payments, told TechCrunch that Google took too much time to turn its attention to this issue. Srikanth, who has been tracking online lending apps in India for several quarters, said more than 100 apps in the last 10 days and about 450 in recent months had disappeared from Google Play Store, citing his own analysis.
He also criticized Google for not doing enough to stop apps from gleaning a wide range of data from a customer's Android phone. "They still don't mandate these apps to disclose their website and physical address," he added.
"To protect user privacy, developers must only request permissions that are necessary to implement current features or services. They should not use permissions that give access to user or device data for undisclosed, unimplemented, or disallowed features or purposes," wrote Suzanne Frey, vice president, Product, Android Security and Privacy, in a blog post.
"Developers must also only use data for purposes that the user has consented to, and if they later want to use the data for other purposes, they must obtain user permission for the additional uses," she added.
Thursday's move comes months after Google stepped up its efforts to crack down on fantasy sports apps in India.
Google pulls India's Paytm app from Play Store for repeat policy violations
'Evil' chef horrifies TikTok users with 'terrifying' mashed potatoes recipe
A self-proclaimed "evil" TikTok chef is causing a stir on the platform with their unconventional mashed potatoes recipe. On Jan. 19, user @elis_kitchen uploaded a video demonstrating how they make their "signature cheesy mashed potatoes." In case you have some strange desire to try Eli's recipe, here's how they make their mashed potatoes: First, they combine some water, salt and white vinegar and let it boil.
YouTube is embracing the hashtag. The company has been quietly working on a new feature that allows users to better discover content using hashtags -- either by clicking on a hashtag on YouTube or by typing in a hashtag link directly. Before, these actions would return a mix of content related to the hashtag, but not only those videos where the hashtag had been directly used.
Portugal's Paulo Sousa named new Poland coach
Poland will be coached by former Portuguese international and Bordeaux coach Paulo Sousa at the delayed Euro 2020 finals this year, the head of the country's football federation (PZPN) said on Thursday.
King size: keeper sets world record for long-range goal
Goalkeeper Tom King's midweek goal for fourth-tier Newport County has been confirmed as the longest in football history.
As the global agricultural industry stretches to meet expected population growth and food demand, and food security becomes more of a pressing issue with global warming, a startup out of South Africa is using artificial intelligence to help farmers manage their farms, trees, and fruits. Aerobotics is a South African startup that provides intelligent tools to the world's agriculture industry.
Police Warn Residents to Stay Home Amid Severe Weather in Ontario
Police in eastern Ontario warned residents to stay at home on Thursday, January 21, as heavy snow brought hazardous travel conditions.Environment Canada issued several winter weather warnings and alerts for Ontario on Thursday, including snow squall watches and winter weather advisories for Central Ontario and a snowfall warning for the north.This footage was shared to the Facebook page of Ontario Provincial Police, who said it was captured on Highway 11 in the North Bay area on Thursday morning."I was driving 50km/h [30 mph] with a transport in front of me in the dark this morning. A moose ran out and the truck was able to get stopped in these conditions because of his speed!" an Ontario official wrote on Facebook, encouraging drivers to go slow. Credit: Ontario Provincial Police – North East Region via Storyful
ViacomCBS International Studios Ramps Up Development Slate, Drives into Nonfiction (EXCLUSIVE)
ViacomCBS International Studios (VIS) has unveiled a new slate of projects tapping talents as diverse as "Guilt" writer-creator Neil Forsyth, "The Great" writer Vanessa Alexander, "Wild District" originator Cristian Conti and "High School Musical" writer Peter Barsocchini. Underscoring VIS' ambitions to play in the big league of international local content producer-distributors, both in production volume […]
Independent Spirit Awards Moves Up Two Days, Pivots to Primetime Event
The Film Independent Spirit Awards has announced it is moving its ceremony up by two days and will now take place on Thursday, April 22. Traditionally, the event is held during the day on the Saturday before the Oscars, and it is typically hosted from Santa Monica beach. However, this year the ceremony will break […]


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Trisepalum acaule är en tvåhjärtbladig växtart som först beskrevs av Euphemia Cowan Barnett, och fick sitt nu gällande namn av Brian Laurence Burtt. Trisepalum acaule ingår i släktet Trisepalum och familjen Gesneriaceae. Inga underarter finns listade i Catalogue of Life.

Källor

Plisterordningen
acaule


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Q: Prove that $\left$ is a subgroup of $C(a)$ For any element a in any group $G$, prove that $\left<a\right>$ is a subgroup of $C(a)$ (the centralizer of $a$)
I think I know how to approach this problem, but I'm not quite sure how to put it in a formal proof. By definition, the centralizer is the set of elements that commute with $a$. So, $\left<a\right>$ has to be a subgroup of $C(a)$ since $\left<a\right>$ contains all the elements that commute with $a$. Right?

A: Here are the key facts:

*

*$a \in H \implies \left<a\right> \subseteq H$, if $H$ is a subgroup of $G$

*$a \in C(a)$

*$C(a)$ is a subgroup of $G$

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Q: How to group three Eventlistener mouseover on 1 if statement in JS I want to set the background of a wrapping collapsible section to a certain image through JS, when the user hovers over one of the 3 divs inside the container.
I wrote this code , I don't know if it is correct (apparently it is not):
function BGchangeOnHover() {
if ((row2_4.addEventListener("mouseover") == true) ||
(row2.addEventListener("mouseover")) == true) || (row4.addEventListener("mouseover")) ==
true) {
myCollapsible3.style.backgroundImage = "url('/images/untitled2.png')";
}
}

please, what am I doing wrong ?


A ground beef and pork patty blend topped with pepper jack cheese, ham and pineapple, plus a sweet and spicy Hawaiian sauce made with Hellmann's® Real Mayonnaise.
Combine all ingredients except Hellmann's® Real Mayonnaise and simmer until reduced by 1/3.
Combine 1.75 cup of the reduction with Hellmann's® Real Mayonnaise. Reserve refrigerated.
Combine ground beef and pork and form into 4 oz. patties.
Cook patties through and top with cheese.
Spread the Hawaiin sauce on each bun.


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package org.opensextant.processing.progress;

public interface ProgressListener {

    public void updateProgress(double progress);
    public void markComplte();

}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Create a bright-eyed lash look with BECCA's Ultimate Full Lash Perfecting Mascara.
Vol: 8 mL / 0.27 Fl. Oz.
It perfectly defines lashes with its ultra-dark, bold colour while the high-performance formula lengthens and volumizes, making your eyes appear larger and beautifully enhanced.
The innovative dual-bristle brush head and the formula work together to lengthen and volume lashes, thickening them from root to tip. The short "lash lift" bristles shape frames eyelashes from the root, creating soft, full volume. The long "volumizing" bristles comb through lashes to create dramatic volume and length. This multitasking mascara adheres to lashes, without running, smudging, flaking, or clumping.


text:
About Alps & Meters
Alpine Rewards
Forged Performance
UPHOLDING THE TRADITION
OF CLASSIC ALPINE SPORT
Gear Patrol Magazine: Issue 3
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In this issue, we take you on a 190-mile dog sled adventure across the desolate Arctic Circle, share a thoughtful commentary from an American tourist venturing into the confounding and vibrant culture of Cuba, and survive a private session on the world's most notorious track, the Nürburgring, behind the wheel of what might just be Porsche's greatest car. Elsewhere, we dispatched teams to Los Angeles and New York's Hudson Valley for a fresh perspective from the designers, makers and creators advancing their crafts.
We also have three fascinating special reports for you. Associate Editor Chris Wright takes us down south to Georgia's Ossabaw Island for a look inside the quiet battle raging over America's miracle pig (yes, that's right, a miracle pig); Deputy Managing Editor Matthew Ankeny follows a cadre of elite female cyclists who embody the ideal of "for the love of sport"; and lastly, in the wake of the FTC's legislative hammer-drop on those egregiously using the term "Made in America," we survey the new crop of American-made timepieces. The results may surprise you.
And if it's gear you're after, we have you kitted out for the cold months ahead with a guide to winter boots, German beer, the ultimate café racer kit, a drive in the badass Mercedes-Benz 4x4 (squared), five perfect examples of why your next watch should be thin and rose gold, and an alluring look at this season's best new shirts captured by photographer Neave Bozorgi. You'll also find an inside look at where Leica makes its stories lenses and the Nomos watch factory.
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Does your dojo have a curriculum?
Does your dojo have a set curriculum? Or are lessons left up to whatever the instructor wants to cover?
a curriculum (/kəˈrɪkjʉləm/; plural: curricula /kəˈrɪkjʉlə/ or curriculums) is broadly defined as the totality of student experiences that occur in the educational process.
At Elements of Self Defense, we have an extensive written curriculum. Each student receives a copy of the curriculum for their own notes upon joining the dojo. This curriculum is broken down by level, by month, and by week. This way, you will always know what material will be taught on any given day. This also means you know exactly what material is required at each level. There is no guessing at what the instructors want to see you have learned before earning a new belt. It also allows you to "self instruct" on days that you cannot make it to the dojo.
Having a written curriculum in your dojo, rather than just something in your instructor's head, eliminates student instructor conflict. It means that there is little chance of missing material because the instructor didn't think to teach it or didn't "feel like doing that tonight." Our curriculum has detailed, step-by-step, breakdowns of the material. This shows the correct method, without instructor embellishment. Allowing our students to recognize the difference between what is required and what is instructor ego.
Previous Previous post: Why do we wear the black uniforms?


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Cristina focusses on data analysis skills with the NHS
Cristina Alcon went to Hellesdon Hospital for her PIPS placement. Cristina has always been interested in knowing more about the wider roles in the NHS and so set up the internship using her own contacts. "I wanted to learn more about data management systems. Being able to manage big datasets is a very powerful and transferable skill to have", says Cristina.
Cristina undertook her placement at the beginning of her third year. On reflection, Cristina felt that the internship experience would have been more beneficial and developmental if she had undertaken it earlier in her PhD. Cristina worked on a data analysis project looking at a Mental Health Service data set from the Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust. During the internship Cristina learnt SQL language which is a standard language for storing, manipulating and retrieving data in databases. Cristina undertook lots of data analysis and although this is something she is comfortable with from her experiences in her PhD she found the main difference was the amount of data she was using; "Excel is not the right programme to use when you deal with 500,000 rows in a spreadsheet", she reflects. Cristina also prepared several reports and one formal presentation so this helped improve her communication and presentation skills, as she quickly learnt that presentations and reports are required to be different in the NHS where she found a key target was to make them as precise and concise as possible.
Cristina found that there was a steep learning curve and it was challenging to learn all the acronyms people use in the clinical field, in addition to learning how to run queries using SQL. However the project was fulfilling as the work will have a direct impact on the business managers of the NHS. The internship also reinforced her confidence in her ability to adapt to new working environments/teams. Another benefit of the placement was an increase in Cristina's professional network which she hopes will be very helpful when she finishes her PhD and needs to look for a job. The internship has also provided her with a better insight of working in the NHS, and she has learnt useful tools to apply for a job in the future.
Cristina says of her PIPS "It is a great experience to do something outside your PhD project. Enjoy the opportunity as much as you can, and work hard to make it useful".


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Filming Location, Vessels & Props
Charlestown Harbour is synonymous with some of the most famous TV and film productions. It's unspoilt working harbour and surrounding areas have made it perfect for the likes of Poldark, Dr Who, The Three Musketeers and Taboo. The inner harbour functions as one of the largest marine film tanks in the UK with an area of water around 5,400 square meters. There are is also the Outer Harbour and surrounding beaches. Underground, there is a network of 19th Century tunnels, historically used as transport tunnels for clay, connecting to the harbour. There are also the lakes and woods, consisting of two large leat ponds built to supply the harbour with water. Surrounded by 25 acres old English deciduous woodland, the lakes and woods are completely private.
St Austell Bay itself offers a picturesque location for onboard and aerial filming. The backdrop of the rugged Cornish coastline is relatively unpopulated and can double for many coastal locations worldwide.
The team at Charlestown are expert in facilitating productions of all sizes and can assist with prop building, tall ship hire and green screen and the filming in the marine tank. The Harbour also has a wide array of props available for hire, ranging from fishing nets, lobster pots and market stalls through to dinghies and longboats. Most recently, the Charlestown Harbour Team provided the full rig and marine coordination for the ship Demeter for BBC One's Dracula, produced by the team behind Sherlock.
If you wish to make an enquiry about using Charlestown as a filming location, or would like a copy of our filming prospectus, please contact info@charlestownharbour.com


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IC 641 — галактика типу NF (в процесі підтвердження) у сузір'ї Малий Лев.

Цей об'єкт міститься в оригінальній редакції індексного каталогу.

Посилання

 IC 641  в оригінальному новому загальному каталозі
 IC 641 в оригінальному новому загальному каталозі
 Перевірена інформація про IC 641
 IC 641 в базі SIMBAD
 IC 641 в базі Vizier
 IC 641 в базі NASA Extragalactic  Database
 Бази даних про об'єкти NGC/IC

IC 641
IC 641
IC 641


The National Museum of the U.S. Navy has a Cold War Gallery. Please also visit Bldg. 70 when at the Washington Navy Yard.
No Upcoming Events. Please check later!
1906 - Reburial Commemoration Ceremony for Capt. John Paul Jones is held at the Naval Academy.
Open 9am-4pm Monday through Friday; Saturdays 10am-4pm.


I am proposing to add a feature to use the mixmaster network to send mails without need for registration. User clicks a send anonymous mail button, can enter recipient, sender, subject and text and press send.
Please refer to mixmaster as a tool to send mails and discard the anonymity aspects.   Needless to say, I suggest using mixmaster over Tor.
Although the network is quite old and small, the remaining node operators are active on the remops list and not looking like they are about to shut down the network. There are even some new developments on github (mixfaster).
I've been experimenting with the mixmaster remailer network. It works reliable. Sending a mail takes approximately 5 to 30 minutes, when using a one hop mixmaster node.
Anonymity would be provided by Tor and mixmaster would gladly deliver mail. I think this is quite interesting, since it doesn't require mail providers or registration.
Mixmaster supports also posting messages to Usenet Newsgroups.
Users who wish this, could alternatively receive their messages in alt.anonymous.messages (or another group of their choice), which is also less dependent on a single e-mail address. It's like a big shared inbox, where no troll can delete other peoples messages or change their account password.
This has the advantage, that no single mail provider can log when someone pseudonym checked an account. This is because users can fetch the whole newsgroup instead of single messages so no servers know which message was belongs to whom. Doing it right, no observer can find out who communicates with whom and when.
 In theory, remailers or to be more concrete, high latency networks are more secure than low latency networks like Tor. The anonymity provided by the remailer would add up to the anonymity provided by Tor. Given the facts, the there is almost no activity activity (press, blog posts, forum, mailing list discussion, development ceased) it's easy to assume that remailers have very few remaining servers and users and add not much anonymity in practice.
For the record, this would be amazing to have, but this constitutes work equivalent to writing a complete new extension. Also, the inherent problems with mixmaster still remain.
I am marking this as wontfix for now. Perhaps when TorBirdy reaches stable and there is enough interest for this, we will revisit it again.