text:
United States v. Broce
Class v. United States
Id., at 63, n. 2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 46 L. Ed. 2d 19. In more recent years, the Court has reaffirmed the…
State v. Kelty
When a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, the nature and effect of the plea…
1,980 Citing Cases
Full title:UNITED STATES v . BROCE ET AL
488 U.S. 563 (1989)
109 S. Ct. 757
holding that the review of a final judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea is generally limited to the question of whether the plea was both voluntary and counseled
Summary of this case from United States v. Huggins
See 25 Summaries
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Argued October 4, 1988 Decided January 23, 1989
Respondents pleaded guilty to two separate conspiracy indictments in a single proceeding in District Court. One indictment charged respondents with entering into an agreement to rig bids on a certain highway project in violation of the Sherman Act, and the other made similar charges with respect to a different project. After the District Court conducted a hearing, at which respondents were represented by counsel, and found the guilty pleas free and voluntary and made with an understanding of their consequences and of the nature of the charges, convictions were entered on the pleas and sentences were imposed. Respondents subsequently filed a motion to vacate the convictions and sentences under the second indictment, contending, in reliance on the District Court's holding in another case involving the same bid-rigging conspiracy, that only one conspiracy existed and that double jeopardy principles required their convictions and sentences to be set aside. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that notwithstanding their guilty pleas, respondents were entitled to introduce evidence outside the original record to support their one-conspiracy claim, since in pleading guilty they admitted only the acts described in the indictments, not their legal consequences, and that moreover, since the indictments did not expressly state that the two conspiracies were separate, no such concessions could be inferred from the pleas. On remand, the District Court granted the motion, finding that there was only a single conspiracy, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Respondents' double jeopardy challenge is foreclosed by their guilty pleas and convictions. Pp. 569-576.
(a) In holding that the admissions inherent in a guilty plea "go only to the acts constituting the conspiracy," the Court of Appeals misapprehended the nature and effect of the plea. By entering a guilty plea, the accused does not simply state that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he admits guilt of a substantive crime. Here, the indictments alleged two distinct agreements, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that because the indictments did not explicitly state that the conspiracies were separate, respondents did not concede their separate nature by pleading guilty to both. When respondents pleaded guilty to both indictments, they conceded guilt to two separate offenses. Pp. 569-571.
(b) By pleading guilty, respondents relinquished the opportunity to receive a factual hearing on their double jeopardy claim. That their attorney did not discuss double jeopardy issues with them prior to their pleas, and that they had not considered the possibility of raising a double jeopardy defense before pleading, did not entitle respondents to claim that they had not waived their right to raise a double jeopardy defense. Conscious waiver is not necessary with respect to each potential defense relinquished by a guilty plea. Pp. 571-574.
(c) Under the well-settled principle that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea by an accused who has been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked, respondents, who have not called into question the voluntary and intelligent character of their pleas, were not entitled to the collateral relief they sought. P. 574.
(d) The exception to the rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea established by Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, in cases where a conviction under a second indictment must be set aside because the defendant's right not to be haled into court was violated, has no application in this case. Here, in contrast to those cases which were resolved without any need to go beyond the indictments and the original record, respondents could not prove their double jeopardy claim without introducing new evidence into the record. Pp. 574-576.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 580. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 581.
Roy T. Englert, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rule, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Starling.
Glenn E. Casebeer II argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Curt T. Schneider.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider here the circumstances under which a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to a criminal charge may assert a double jeopardy claim in a collateral attack upon the sentence. Respondents, upon entering guilty pleas, were convicted of two separate counts of conspiracy, but contend now that only one conspiracy existed and that double jeopardy principles require the conviction and sentence on the second count to be set aside. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that respondents were entitled to introduce evidence outside the original record supporting their claim and directed further proceedings in the District Court. We hold that the double jeopardy challenge is foreclosed by the guilty pleas and the judgments of conviction.
Respondents, Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc., bid for work on highway projects in Kansas. Two of the contracts awarded to them became the subject of separate indictments charging concerted acts to rig bids and suppress competition in violation of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The relevant portions of the indictments are set forth in the Appendix to our opinion. The first indictment charged respondents with entering into an agreement, sometime in or about April 1978, to rig bids on a particular highway project. The second charged respondents with entering into a similar agreement, sometime in or about July 1979, to rig bids on a different project. Both indictments were discussed during plea negotiations, and respondents acknowledged in plea agreements that they were subject to separate sentences on each conspiracy charged. Plea Agreement between the United States of America and Defendant Ray C. Broce, App. to Pet. for Cert. 126a, 127a: Plea Agreement between the United States of America and Defendant Broce Construction Co., Inc., App. to Pet. for Cert. 133a, 134a.
Respondents pleaded guilty to the two indictments in a single proceeding. The District Court conducted a hearing fully in accord with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and found that the pleas were free and voluntary, made with an understanding of their consequences and of the nature of the charges. Respondents had counsel at all stages and there are no allegations that counsel was ineffective. Convictions were entered on the pleas. The District Court then sentenced Broce to two years' imprisonment on each count, the terms to run concurrently, and to a fine of $50,000 on each count. Broce was also sentenced for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, a conviction which is not relevant here. The corporation was fined $750,000 on each count, for a total of $1,500,000. Neither respondent having appealed, the judgments became final.
On the same day that respondents entered their pleas, an indictment was filed against Robert T. Beachner and Beachner Construction Co. charging a violation of both the Sherman Act and the mail fraud statute. The indictment alleged a bid-rigging conspiracy involving yet a third Kansas highway construction project. These defendants, however, chose a different path than that taken by the Broce respondents: they proceeded to trial and were acquitted. After the acquittal in the Beachner case (Beachner I), a second indictment was returned by the grand jury charging Beachner Construction Co. with three new Sherman Act violations and three new acts of mail fraud. The Sherman Act counts charged bid-rigging conspiracies on three Kansas highway projects not mentioned in Beachner I.
Once again, Beachner pursued a different strategy than that followed by Broce and Broce Construction Co. Prior to trial, Beachner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the bid-rigging arrangements identified were merely smaller parts of one overarching conspiracy existing among Kansas highway contractors to rig highway bids within the State. In light of its acquittal in Beachner I, the company argued that a second prosecution would place it in double jeopardy.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 555 F. Supp. 1273 (Kan. 1983) (Beachner II). It found that a "continuous, cooperative effort among Kansas highway contractors to rig bids, thereby eliminating price competition, has permeated the Kansas highway construction industry in excess of twenty-five years, including the period of April 25, 1978, to February 7, 1980, the time period encompassed by the Beachner I and Beachner II indictments." Id., at 1277. The District Court based the finding on its determination that there had been a common objective among participants to eliminate price competition, a common method of organizing bidding for projects, and a common jargon throughout the industry, and that mutual and interdependent obligations were created among highway contractors. Concluding that the District Court's findings were not clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 729 F.2d 1278 (CA10 1984).
One might surmise that the Broce defendants watched the Beachner proceedings with awe, if not envy. What is certain is that the Broce defendants sought to profit from Beachner's success. After the District Court issued its decision to dismiss in Beachner II, the Broce respondents filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) to vacate their own sentences on the Sherman Act charge contained in the second indictment. Relying on Beachner II, they argued that the bid-rigging schemes alleged in their indictments were but a single conspiracy. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that respondents' earlier guilty pleas were an admission of the Government's allegations of two conspiracies, an admission that foreclosed and concluded new arguments to the contrary. Nos. 81-20119-01 and 82-2001-01 (Kan., Nov. 18, 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a.
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 753 F.2d 811 (1985). That judgment was vacated and the case reheard en banc. Citing our decisions in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam), a divided en banc court concluded that respondents were entitled to draw upon factual evidence outside the original record, including the Beachner II findings, to support the claim of a single conspiracy. 781 F.2d 792 (1986). The en banc court rejected the Government's argument that respondents had waived the right to raise their double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause "does not constitute an individual right which is subject to waiver." Id., at 795. It further rejected the Government's contention that respondents' guilty pleas must be construed as admissions that there had been separate conspiracies. The Court of Appeals observed that the indictments did not "specifically allege separate conspiracies," and held that "the admissions of factual guilt subsumed in the pleas of guilty go only to the acts constituting the conspiracy and not to whether one or more conspiracies existed." Id., at 796.
On remand, the District Court, citing Beachner II, concluded that the indictments merely charged different aspects of the same conspiracy to restrain competition. It vacated the judgments and sentences entered against both respondents on the second indictment. Nos. 81-20119-01 and 82-20011-01 (Kan., June 30, 1986), App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. In its decision on appeal from that judgment, the Court of Appeals noted that our intervening decision in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), made clear that the protection against double jeopardy is subject to waiver. Nonetheless, it concluded that while Ricketts invalidated the broader rationale underlying its earlier en banc opinion that double jeopardy protections could not be waived, it left intact its narrower holding that the guilty pleas in this case did not themselves constitute such waivers. It then held that the District Court's finding of a single conspiracy was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed. Nos. 86-2166 and 86-2202 (CA10, Aug. 18, 1987), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. We granted certiorari, 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
A plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence. Accordingly, when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary. If the answer is in the affirmative then the conviction and the plea, as a general rule, foreclose the collateral attack. There are exceptions where on the face of the record the Court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence. We discuss those exceptions below and find them inapplicable. The general rule applies here to bar the double jeopardy claim.
The Government's petition for certiorari did not seek review of the determination that the bid-rigging described in the two Broce indictments was part of one overall conspiracy. Instead, the Government challenges the theory underlying the en banc judgment in the Court of Appeals that respondents were entitled, notwithstanding their earlier guilty pleas, to a factual determination on their one-conspiracy claim. That holding was predicated on the court's view that, in pleading guilty, respondents admitted only the acts described in the indictments, not their legal consequences. As the indictments did not include an express statement that the two conspiracies were separate, the Court of Appeals reasoned, no such concession may be inferred from the pleas.
In holding that the admissions inherent in a guilty plea "go only to the acts constituting the conspiracy," 781 F.2d, at 796, the Court of Appeals misapprehended the nature and effect of the plea. A guilty plea "is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). It is an "admission that he committed the crime charged against him." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32 (1970). By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime. That is why the defendant must be instructed in open court on "the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered," Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1), and why the plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts," McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
Just as a defendant who pleads guilty to a single count admits guilt to the specified offense, so too does a defendant who pleads guilty to two counts with facial allegations of distinct offenses concede that he has committed two separate crimes. The Broce indictments alleged two distinct agreements: the first, an agreement beginning in April 1978 to rig bids on one specified highway project, and the second, an agreement beginning 15 months later to rig bids on a different project. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that because the indictments did not explicitly state that the conspiracies were separate, respondents did not concede their separate nature by pleading guilty to both. In a conspiracy charge, the term "agreement" is all but synonymous with the conspiracy itself, and as such has great operative force. We held in Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942), that "[t]he gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by the statute is the agreement . . . to commit one or more unlawful acts," from which it follows that "the precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects." A single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy. By the same reasoning, multiple agreements to commit separate crimes constitute multiple conspiracies. When respondents pleaded guilty to two charges of conspiracy on the explicit premise of two agreements which started at different times and embraced separate objectives, they conceded guilt to two separate offenses.
That is certainly how all participants viewed the indictments at the time. As noted earlier, see supra, at 565, respondents acknowledged in their plea agreements that they were subject to receiving separate sentences for each offense to which they were pleading. Furthermore, the District Judge informed Broce at the Rule 11 hearing of the maximum punishment "on each charge," and Broce stated that he understood. App. 36. Prior to sentencing, the Government prepared an "Official Version of the Offense" for inclusion in the presentence report which stated that there were "two separate conspiracies" giving rise to the indictments. Id., at 51. At his sentencing hearing, Broce was given an opportunity to state "any dispute with what the government has included in the pre-sentence report about the official version of the offense," and did not dispute the statement that the conspiracies were separate ones. Id., at 63-64. We do not suggest that any of these events are necessary to our holding that respondents have forfeited the opportunity to dispute the separate nature of the conspiracies; on the contrary, the guilty pleas are alone a sufficient basis for that conclusion. We review these incidents simply to note that our reading of the indictments is the necessary one, and was shared by all participants to the plea proceedings at the time the pleas were entered.
Respondents had the opportunity, instead of entering their guilty pleas, to challenge the theory of the indictments and to attempt to show the existence of only one conspiracy in a trial-type proceeding. They chose not to, and hence relinquished that entitlement. In light of Beachner, respondents may believe that they made a strategic miscalculation. Our precedents demonstrate, however, that such grounds do not justify setting aside an otherwise valid guilty plea.
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the petitioner had been charged with kidnaping in violation of what was then 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964 ed.). He entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. Nine years after the plea, we had held in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), that the provision of § 1201(a) providing for a death penalty only upon the recommendation of the jury was unconstitutional. This was of no avail to Brady, however, because the possibility that his plea might have been influenced by an erroneous assessment of the sentencing consequences if he had proceeded to trial did not render his plea invalid. We observed:
"A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise." 397 U.S., at 757 (citation omitted).
Similarly, we held in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), that a counseled defendant may not make a collateral attack on a guilty plea on the allegation that he misjudged the admissibility of his confession. "Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts." Id., at 770. See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ("[J]ust as it is not sufficient for the criminal defendant seeking to set aside such a plea to show that his counsel in retrospect may not have correctly appraised the constitutional significance of certain historical facts, it is likewise not sufficient that he show that if counsel had pursued a certain factual inquiry such a pursuit would have uncovered a possible constitutional infirmity in the proceedings") (citation omitted).
Respondents have submitted the affidavit of Kenneth F. Crockett, who served as their attorney when their pleas were entered. App. 72-73. Crockett avers that he did not discuss double jeopardy issues with respondents prior to their pleas, and that respondents had not considered the possibility of raising a double jeopardy defense before pleading. Respondents contend that, under these circumstances, they cannot be held to have waived the right to raise a double jeopardy defense because there was no "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Our decisions have not suggested that conscious waiver is necessary with respect to each potential defense relinquished by a plea of guilty. Waiver in that sense is not required. For example, the respondent in Tollett pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, and later filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that his plea should be set aside because black citizens had been excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. The collateral challenge was foreclosed by the earlier guilty plea. Although at the time of the indictment the facts relating to the selection of the grand jury were not known to respondent and his attorney, we held that to be irrelevant:
"If the issue were to be cast solely in terms of `waiver,' the Court of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in concluding that there had been no such waiver here. But just as the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy were found to foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of claimed antecedent constitutional violations there, we conclude that respondent's guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury." 411 U.S., at 266.
See also Menna, 423 U.S., at 62, n. 2 ("[W]aiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases").
The Crockett affidavit, as a consequence, has no bearing on whether respondents' guilty plea served as a relinquishment of their opportunity to receive a factual hearing on a double jeopardy claim. Relinquishment derives not from any inquiry into a defendant's subjective understanding of the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty. The trial court complied with Rule 11 in ensuring that respondents were advised that, in pleading guilty, they were admitting guilt and waiving their right to a trial of any kind. A failure by counsel to provide advice may form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but absent such a claim it cannot serve as the predicate for setting aside a valid plea.
In sum, as we explained in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984), "[i]t is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked." That principle controls here. Respondents have not called into question the voluntary and intelligent character of their pleas, and therefore are not entitled to the collateral relief they seek.
An exception to the rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea was established by our decisions in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, supra, but it has no application to the case at bar.
The respondent in Blackledge had been charged in North Carolina with the state-law misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to state procedures, he was tried in the county District Court without a jury, but was permitted, once he was convicted, to appeal to the county Superior Court and obtain a trial de novo. After the defendant filed an appeal, the prosecutor obtained an indictment charging felony assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury. The defendant pleaded guilty. We held that the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness against those who seek to exercise their right to appeal raised sufficiently serious due process concerns to require a rule forbidding the State to bring more serious charges against defendants in that position. The plea of guilty did not foreclose a subsequent challenge because in Blackledge, unlike in Brady and Tollett, the defendant's right was "the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation of proceedings against him . . . thus operated to deny him due process of law." 417 U.S., at 30-31.
The petitioner in Menna had refused, after a grant of immunity, to obey a court order to testify before a grand jury. He was adjudicated in contempt of court and sentenced to a term in civil jail. After he was released, he was indicted for the same refusal to answer the questions. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced, but then appealed on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that Menna had waived his double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty. We reversed, citing Blackledge for the proposition that "[w]here the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty." 423 U.S., at 62. We added, however, an important qualification:
"We do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — Judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute." Id., at 63, n. 2 (emphasis added).
In neither Blackledge nor Menna did the defendants seek further proceedings at which to expand the record with new evidence. In those cases, the determination that the second indictment could not go forward should have been made by the presiding judge at the time the plea was entered on the basis of the existing record. Both Blackledge and Menna could be (and ultimately were) resolved without any need to venture beyond that record. In Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant's guilty plea were simply irrelevant, because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in the State's power to bring any indictment at all. In Menna, the indictment was facially duplicative of the earlier offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced so that the admissions made by Menna's guilty plea could not conceivably be construed to extend beyond a redundant confession to the earlier offense.
Respondents here, in contrast, pleaded guilty to indictments that on their face described separate conspiracies. They cannot prove their claim by relying on those indictments and the existing record. Indeed, as noted earlier, they cannot prove their claim without contradicting those indictments, and that opportunity is foreclosed by the admissions inherent in their guilty pleas. We therefore need not consider the degree to which the decision by an accused to enter into a plea bargain which incorporates concessions by the Government, such as the one agreed to here, heightens the already substantial interest the Government has in the finality of the plea. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Excerpts from Indictments
"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF KANSAS
"Criminal No. 81-20119-01
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BROCE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., RAY C. BROCE, AND GERALD R. GUMM, DEFENDANTS
"[Filed: Nov. 17, 1981]
"V
"OFFENSE CHARGED
"11. Beginning sometime in or about April, 1978, and continuing thereafter, the exact dates being to this grand jury unknown, in the District of Kansas, Ray C. Broce, Gerald R. Gumm and Broce Construction Co., Inc., defendants herein, and others known and unknown, entered into and engaged in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition for the construction of Project No. 23-60-RS-1080(9) let by the State of Kansas on April 25, 1978, which contract involved construction work on a Federal-Aid highway in the State of Kansas, in unreasonable restraint of the above-described interstate trade and commerce in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 1, commonly known as the Sherman Act.
"12. The aforesaid combination and conspiracy consisted of an agreement, understanding and concert of action among the defendants and co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were:
"(a) To allocate to Broce Construction Co., Inc., Project No. 23-60-RS-1080(9) let by the State of Kansas on April 25, 1978; and
"(b) To submit collusive, noncompetitive, and rigged bids to the State of Kansas in connection with the above-referenced Federal-Aid highway project.
"13. For the purpose of forming and effectuating the aforesaid combination and conspiracy, the defendants and co-conspirators have done those things which, as hereinbefore charged, they have combined and conspired to do, including:
"(a) Discussing the submission of prospective bids on the above-described project let by the State of Kansas, Project No. 23-60-RS-1080(9);
"(b) Designating the successful low bidder on the above-referenced Federal-Aid highway project;
"(c) Submitting intentionally high or complementary bids on the above-referenced Federal-Aid highway project on which Broce Construction Co., Inc. had been designated as the successful low bidder;
"(d) Submitting bid proposals on the above-referenced Federal-Aid highway project containing false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and entries; and
"(e) Discussing the submission of prospective bids on other projects let by the State of Kansas on April 25, 1978."
"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
"Criminal No. 82-20011
RAY C. BROCE AND BROCE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., DEFENDANTS.
"[Filed: Feb. 4, 1982]
"10. Beginning sometime in or about July, 1979, and continuing thereafter, the exact dates being to this grand jury unknown, in the District of Kansas, Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc., defendants herein, and others known and unknown, entered into and engaged in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition for the construction of Project No. KRL 29-2(26) let by the State of Kansas on July 17, 1979, which contract involved construction work on a public highway in the State of Kansas, in unreasonable restraint of the above-described interstate trade and commerce in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 1, commonly known as the Sherman Act.
"(a) To allocate to Broce Construction Co., Inc., Project No. KRL 29-2(26) let by the State of Kansas on July 17, 1979; and
"(b) To submit collusive, noncompetitive, and rigged bids to the State of Kansas in connection with the above-referenced public highway construction project.
"(a) Discussing the submission of prospective bids on the above-described project let by the State of Kansas, Project No. KRL 29-2(26);
"(b) Designating the successful low bidder on the above-referenced public highway construction project;
"(c) Submitting intentionally high or complementary bids on the above-referenced public highway construction project on which Broce Construction Co., Inc. had been designated as the successful low bidder;
"(d) Submitting bid proposals on the above-referenced public highway construction project containing false, fictitious and fraudulent statements and entries; and
"(e) Discussing the payment of consideration of value to another contractor to induce that contractor to submit a noncompetitive, rigged bid on the above-referenced public highway construction project."
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
While I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to identify the doubtful character of the basic premise on which respondents' double jeopardy claim rests. Respondents assume that their price-fixing activities in April 1978 and July 1979 were not separate crimes because they were carried out pursuant to an overarching conspiracy that had been in existence for more than 25 years.
"A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes." United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910). It "does not become several conspiracies because it continues over a period of time" or because it is an "agreement to commit several offenses." Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 52 (1942). Thus, the continuous, cooperative effort among Kansas highway contractors to rig bids, which permeated the Kansas highway construction industry for more than 25 years, see ante, at 567, was unquestionably a single, continuing conspiracy that violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. It does not necessarily follow, however, that separate bid-rigging arrangements carried out in furtherance of an illegal master plan may not be prosecuted separately.
All of the elements of a Sherman Act violation were alleged in the indictment charging respondents with price fixing on the Kansas highway project bid on April 25, 1978. App. 143a-151a. The same is true with respect to the indictment relating to the second project, bid more than a year later and to be performed in a different county. Id., at 136a-142a. Each indictment alleged a separate crime. I am not at all sure that the fact that both may have been committed pursuant to still another continuing violation of the Sherman Act should bar separate prosecutions for each of those violations.
There is something perverse in the assumption that respondents' constitutional rights may have been violated by separately prosecuting them for each of two complete and flagrant violations of the Sherman Act simply because they may also have been guilty of an ongoing and even more serious violation of the same statute for more than a quarter of a century. Whether the law requires that all of these violations be merged into one is a question that need not be decided in this case. Yet I believe there is value in making it clear that the Court has not decided that question today.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
A guilty plea, for all its practical importance in the day-to-day administration of justice, does not bestow on the Government any power to prosecute that it otherwise lacks. Here, after remand, the District Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the two indictments brought against respondents charged two parts of the same conspiracy, and therefore sought to punish respondents twice for the same behavior, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Government, see ante, at 569, does not contest the finding that in fact there was only one conspiracy. It argues, however, that the defendants' guilty pleas render this fact wholly irrelevant, and urges us to let stand convictions that otherwise are barred. Because I believe it inappropriate for a reviewing court to close its eyes to this constitutional violation, and because I find that the basis of respondents' double jeopardy challenge is obvious from a reading of the two indictments and entitles respondents to a hearing, I dissent from the majority's ruling that the guilty pleas are conclusive.
As noted in Brady and by the majority today, in most instances a guilty plea is conclusive and resolves all factual issues necessary to sustain a conviction. But in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), this Court unequivocally held that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant's right to contest the constitutionality of a conviction "[w]here the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court." Id., at 62; see also Blackledge, 417 U.S., at 30. Although our recent decision in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), allows a defendant to waive a double jeopardy claim as part of a clearly worded plea agreement, none of our prior cases limited a defendant's ability, under Menna and Blackledge, absent an express waiver, to challenge the Government's authority to bring a second charge.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970).
It is true, as the majority notes, that neither Blackledge nor Menna involved an independent evidentiary hearing to assess the defendants' double jeopardy claims. But nothing in Blackledge or Menna indicates that the general constitutional rule announced in those cases was dependent on the fortuity that the defendants' double jeopardy claims were apparent from the records below without resort to an evidentiary hearing. This is not surprising. There simply was no need for an evidentiary hearing in either Blackledge or Menna. Certainly, nothing in those cases suggests that a collateral proceeding would be inappropriate. Blackledge was a habeas proceeding in which the record was already fully developed, 417 U.S., at 23; and the remand in Menna from this Court to the New York Court of Appeals was not limited in any way, 423 U.S., at 63. To the extent that the majority reads the particular circumstances of those cases as compelling, or even implying, that the need for an evidentiary hearing alters the effect of a guilty plea, it infuses mere happenstance with constitutional meaning and draws distinctions where none belong.
The majority also justifies its outcome by looking to four words of dicta in a footnote in Menna, 423 U.S., at 62-63, n. 2. The relevant language in the Menna footnote is: "[A] plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute" (emphasis added). The majority takes this language to mean that respondents can prevail only if they prove their claim by relying on nothing more than the indictment and the record.
A much better reading of the Menna footnote, however, is to place the emphasis on the word "claim." Accordingly, if a claim that the Government was without power to prosecute is apparent on the face of the indictment, read in light of the existing record, a court should not consider the claim to have been waived, and must go on to consider its merits. This interpretation is true to the outcome in both Menna and Blackledge. It also gives appropriate force to the footnote's language and its apparent purpose of placing some limit on the ability of a defendant who has pleaded guilty to make a later collateral attack without some foundation in the prior proceedings. Most important, it gives real content to the defendants' constitutional rights.
This case provides a powerful example of why there is an especially great need to maintain the right collaterally to attack guilty pleas in the conspiracy context. Conspiracy, that "elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense," Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion of Court), long has been recognized as difficult to define and even more difficult to limit. When charging a conspiracy, a prosecutor is given the opportunity to "cast his nets" in order to cover a broad timeframe and numerous acts and individuals, in part because conspiracies by their nature are clandestine and difficult to uncover. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947). But this very permissible breadth of conspiracy indictments provides potential for abuse and confusion. Judge Parker said it meaningfully 50 years ago:
"Blanket charges of `continuing' conspiracy with named defendants and with `other persons to the grand jurors unknown' fulfil a useful purpose in the prosecution of crime, but they must not be used in such a way as to contravene constitutional guaranties. If the government sees fit to send an indictment in this general form charging a continuing conspiracy for a period of time, it must do so with the understanding that upon conviction or acquittal further prosecution of that conspiracy during the period charged is barred, and that this result cannot be avoided by charging the conspiracy to have been formed in another district where overt acts in furtherance of it were committed, or by charging different overt acts as having been committed in furtherance of it, or by charging additional objects or the violation of additional statutes as within its purview, if in fact the second indictment involves substantially the same conspiracy as the first. . . . The constitutional provision against double jeopardy is a matter of substance and may not be thus nullified by the mere forms of criminal pleading." Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 624 (CA4 1937).
This Court noted in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 65-66 (1978): "The precise manner in which an indictment is drawn cannot be ignored, because an important function of the indictment is to ensure that, `in case any other proceedings are taken against [the defendant] for a similar offense, . . . the record [will] sho[w] with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction,'" quoting Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 (1895). See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the two indictments at issue here were broad and vague and substantially overlapped. Although the majority has included in the Appendix to its opinion, ante, p. 576, the few paragraphs in the two indictments which differ, it fails to acknowledge that the indictments otherwise are almost identical.
The indictments alleged acts occurring in the same place, having the same object of eliminating competition on a highway project, and having the same effect of restraining competition. More important, the first indictment is vague and open-ended in a number of material respects. While alleging a definite beginning date, the first indictment specified no termination date. As a consequence, the acts alleged in the second indictment were contained within the timeframe of the first. Moreover, the first indictment alleged that respondents conspired with "others known and unknown"; so, too, did the second indictment. Both indictments, therefore, may have involved the same participants. This vagueness, coupled with the express identical elements, provides a strong inference that the two agreements alleged were part of the same conspiracy. For this reason alone, there are sufficient grounds for raising a double jeopardy challenge under a proper reading of our decisions in Menna and Blackledge.
In determining how many conspiracies are involved in a particular case, courts have looked to a number of discrete factors. Some of these include the relevant (1) time, (2) participants, (3) statutory offenses charged, (4) overt acts charged, and (5) places where the alleged acts took place. See United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1188-1189 (CA4 1988); United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 432 (CA5 1987); see also United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (CA2 1985) (considering eight factors).
That the two indictments were duplicitous is further betrayed by the nature of the charged offense. The indictments state that the conspirators designated a low bidder on each project, submitted artificially high or complementary bids, and discussed paying consideration to other contractors to induce those contractors to submit noncompetitive rigged bids as well. Ante, at 577-578, 579. Although it is theoretically possible that such a conspiracy might involve only one project, it is highly unlikely. Rather, it seems reasonably clear to me, as it should have been to the Government, that in order to make any sense such an agreement must involve a number of projects, so that a conspirator who agreed to submit a sham bid on one project would be rewarded by being chosen for the successful bid on another project. In fact, a Justice Department release issued several weeks after the second indictment was filed described a Tennessee highway bid-rigging scheme as follows: "`The prearranged low bidder would usually get the job as other contractors submitted intentionally high bids, knowing their turn as low bidder was coming.'" 42 BNA Antitrust Trade Regulation Rep. 523 (1982), quoting unpublished release. See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Actions Being Taken to Deal with Bid Rigging in the Federal Highway Program (May 23, 1983). The very nature of the conspiracy alleged all but compels the conclusion that the initial indictment charged an ongoing agreement covering numerous projects.
The majority's reading of the indictments appears to focus solely on the fact that each states a separate agreement, relating to a separate project. See ante, at 570-571. Had the majority reached the issue raised by JUSTICE STEVENS, in his separate concurring opinion, ante, p. 580, and decided that multiple conspiracies within an ongoing conspiracy could be prosecuted separately, then those allegations might be determinative. The majority, however, has not done this.
The Government argues that the respondents should have realized all this, and refused to plead to the second indictment. I agree. But it is no less true that the Government should have been aware that it could be charging duplicitous conspiracies, and, if so, not brought the second indictment. I fail to see why a reviewing court should punish the respondents' oversight, but reward the Government's.
"`The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that . . . its limitations [can be avoided] by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.'" Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S., at 72, quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). As we pointed out in Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 52 (1942), there may be a "single continuing agreement to commit several offenses." On the face of the two indictments, there was clear support for a claim that prosecuting the second indictment was barred by double jeopardy.
The question remains as to what procedures a reviewing court should follow when faced with such a double jeopardy claim.
As noted above, our prior cases and common sense require that the reviewing court consider the record in determining whether the claim of double jeopardy is sufficient to bar the second prosecution. It may be that in most cases the issue can be determined by reference to the record alone. Statements made at the plea hearing or other pretrial proceeding may be sufficient to clarify any ambiguity, or may constitute an express waiver of any double jeopardy challenge. But in the absence of a definitive record, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary in order to assure that the questioned indictment in fact alleges separate criminal conduct.
An evidentiary hearing on the double jeopardy issue would not be overly burdensome or replicate the trial that the guilty plea avoided. As noted in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977), in a claim of double jeopardy "the defendant makes no challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him." Although the nature of the evidentiary hearing obviously will depend on the facts of the particular case, for a challenge similar to the one here the hearing probably would involve only the Government's explanation of how the conduct charged in the second indictment differs from the facts established by the guilty plea to the first indictment, and the defendants' arguments to the contrary. The truth of many of the relevant facts will have been established by the guilty plea to the first indictment, and the legal sufficiency and independence of the second indictment should be determinable without substantial additional testimony. These challenges rarely should involve extensive proceedings.
Indeed, we know already that this case did not require a long, complicated hearing. By the Government's stipulation, the District Court considered the record in the Beachner case, see ante, at 566-567, as if that record had been a part of the plea proceedings.
The Government's complaint that conducting an evidentiary hearing will present it with problems of proof, as well as administrative headaches, may have a modicum of force. Every prosecutor, however, has the power to avoid this by more carefully considering the actual scope of the alleged conspiracy, and by carefully drawing the indictment. The prosecutor also may ensure that any double jeopardy concerns are addressed at the plea hearing by describing with some particularity the scope of the agreement that is the basis of the conspiracy. While such steps are not absolutely required, each makes good sense, and would help to assure that every issue that should be raised at the plea hearing will be raised. Directly addressing double jeopardy questions at the plea hearing will prevent situations like the one at issue here. Once on notice, a defendant might expressly waive any double jeopardy challenge, see Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987), or might reconsider his inclination to plead guilty and, instead, litigate the issue.
It would also be worthwhile for the Government to provide a defendant with a copy of each indictment well in advance of the scheduled plea hearing. Here the defendants first received a copy of the second indictment on February 8, 1981, the same day on which the guilty pleas were entered. This may have contributed to respondents' failure to raise the double jeopardy issue at that time.
This solution, it seems to me, properly balances the interests of the Government in finality of convictions pursuant to guilty pleas with those of criminal defendants who may have been unaware of their rights when pleading guilty. The Constitution's prohibition against placing a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same conduct is fundamental, and no less applicable because a complicated question of conspiracy law may be presented. Because I believe that there is no legitimate interest in either punishing defendants twice for the same conduct or in allowing the Government to gain untoward benefits from the use of vague and imprecise indictments, and that an evidentiary hearing would not be a significant burden in the few cases where it would be necessary, I dissent.
holding that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea is not subject to collateral attack on appeal
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Hernandez-Guardado
holding that a defendant who pleads guilty unconditionally thereby relinquishes his entitlement to challenge either the facts or the legal theories supporting the charge
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Meade
holding that a conviction resulting from a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty by the defendant advised by competent counsel is, generally, not subject to collateral attack; if not challenged on direct appeal, it is deemed procedurally defaulted
Summary of this case from Moore v. United States
holding that double jeopardy challenges are "foreclosed by...guilty pleas and judgments of conviction"
Summary of this case from Williams v. Hooks
holding that a valid guilty plea in a criminal proceeding generally forecloses claims arising from the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights occurring before the entry of the plea
Summary of this case from Walker v. United States
holding that by pleading guilty, "the accused is not simply stating that [the accused] did the discrete acts described in the indictment; [the accused] is admitting guilt of a substantive crime"
Summary of this case from Formica v. Clarke
holding that defendants waived their double jeopardy challenges by pleading guilty to indictments that, on their face, described separate offenses
Summary of this case from Cannon v. Jones
holding that double jeopardy challenge was waived by guilty plea, even if defendant and attorney were unaware of the basis for the challenge at the time of plea
Summary of this case from Tomlinson v. Escapule
holding that "when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary."
Summary of this case from Cannon v. Stephens
holding that defendants' "guilty plea served as a relinquishment of their opportunity to receive a factual hearing on a double jeopardy claim. Relinquishment derives not from any inquiry into a defendant's subjective understanding of the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty."
Summary of this case from Henriquez v. Devesa
holding that double jeopardy claim was waived by knowing and voluntary guilty plea
Summary of this case from United States v. Johnson
holding that a voluntary guilty plea forecloses a subsequent double jeopardy challenge
Summary of this case from Stevens v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
holding that a double jeopardy claim is waived by a guilty plea
Summary of this case from Clinton-Harriel v. Prudden
holding that by entering a plea of guilty, the accused is admitting both to the discrete acts described in the indictment and to guilt of a substantive crime
Summary of this case from Barksdale v. U.S.
holding that "when the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary"
Summary of this case from Jackson v. Dretke
Summary of this case from Howington v. Dretke
holding double jeopardy claim non-jurisdictional where proof of claim required factual evidence beyond face of indictments
Summary of this case from Slavek v. Hinkle
Summary of this case from Anderson v. Dretke
Summary of this case from COX v. DRETKE
Summary of this case from Patrick v. Dretke
Summary of this case from Mosley v. Cockrell
Summary of this case from Medlinger v. Cockrell
Summary of this case from RONE v. COCKRELL
Summary of this case from Jones v. Cockrell


text:
Previous / Dakar 2022, Stage 4: Al-Attiyah wins after late trouble for Sainz Next / Dakar 2022, Stage 5: Price beats Petrucci to victory
Dakar / Dakar News
De Villiers gets five-hour Dakar penalty for second motorcyclist incident
Giniel de Villiers has received a five-hour penalty in the Dakar Rally overall standings, leaving him out of the battle for victory after a second incident with a motorcyclist.
Jan 5, 2022, 7:37 PM
The South African Toyota Gazoo Racing driver has been involved in two consecutive incidents (Stage 1 and Stage 2) in the 2022 Dakar event with two bike riders.
The FIA sanctioned the 2009 Dakar winner on Monday with a five-minute penalty for hitting Chilean César Zumaran and not stopping to help him, but the second penalty was much more severe.
De Villiers ran into Moroccan rider Mohamedsaid Aoulad Ali coming down a dune, although he was able to avoid the competitor, he ran over his Morocco Racing Team KTM and left it unusable at around 11.00 local time on Monday during Stage 2.
"We have not heard any alarm signal from Sentinel (car-to-car communication system). We do not doubt that we have received a signal. The problem is that the button for the Sentinel is located on the floor of the co-driver's side," read de Villiers' statement.
"During the Selective Section, the co-driver's feet jump back and forth and can easily, accidentally press the button. When we came over the dune, we saw the motorcyclist and I avoided him so as not to hurt him.
"At the bottom of the dune, we turned around to make sure that the rider was not injured. We didn't feel hitting the bike when we landed. Then we continued the Selective Section.
"We are very embarrassed that something like this happens. We apologise very much for this incident. We are also willing to compensate the cost to rebuild the bike", explained the South African.
#207 Toyota Gazoo Racing Toyota: Giniel De Villiers, Dennis Murphy
Photo by: Red Bull Content Pool
De Villiers has reached an agreement with the Moroccan rider to pay him the costs of replacing the destroyed bike and the registration for the 2023 Dakar Rally.
Even so, the FIA stewards have determined that De Villiers acted in an "unsafe" manner and, according to article 12.2.1.h of the International Sporting Code, he has been given a five-hour penalty overall.
This leaves him completely out of the battle, after finishing Wednesday's fourth stage in fourth place overall – 49m18s behind Toyota teammate Nasser Al-Attiyah.
"The Sentinel is essential for the driver's safety and for the safety of all other competitors in Rally Dakar. Safety is one of the major concerns by the FIA," says the official document.
"Safety remains a key challenge and the FIA is committed to do everything possible to protect, among others, the drivers. It is the obligation of the crew to react to the signal of the Sentinel System to avoid danger to themselves and others."
"The Stewards consider the behaviour of the crew as an infringement of the regulation which must have consequences. Since Mr. de Villiers has voluntarily contacted the rider, apologised, and will pay for the damage caused, the stewards consider a time penalty to be necessary but also appropriate".
De Villiers is now 5h49m behind the leader and has little chance of winning his second Dakar in 2022.
Dakar 2022, Stage 4: Al-Attiyah wins after late trouble for Sainz
Dakar 2022, Stage 4: Barreda wins again as Petrucci stars
Dakar 2022, Stage 5: Price beats Petrucci to victory
Dakar mechanic dies on the last liaison of 2022
Dakar leader Al-Attiyah hit by belated FIA seat belt penalty
Dakar Prime
Why Sebastien Loeb has joined forces with an old enemy for Dakar

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Rad News Digest II
By Team EnviroReporter on December 10, 2012 in Blog, Fukushima Meltdowns, Radiation Station, Team EnviroReporter
« 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82View All»
NRC Regional Office to Discuss Regulations about Releases from Nuclear Power Plants; Webinar to be Held May 23.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2013/13-018.iii.pdf
A fault running under reactor 2 at the Tsuruga plant in Fukui Prefecture is active, effectively killing any chance the reactor will be reactivated.,,, appears to have moved within the past 130,000 years, is therefore considered technically active.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/16/national/fault-said-active/#.UZkWao4QEoK
Monju reactor faces long-term suspension over lax safety system
In the latest case, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, operator of Monju, was found to have skipped inspections of nearly 10,000 pieces of equipment since 2010, including crucial devices in the safety and emergency systems at the plant, based in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201305130090
2012 record-breaking year for wind power.
http://www.dw.de/2012-record-breaking-year-for-wind-power/a-16819096
NRC To Discuss 2012 Performance Assessment for Columbia Generating Station June 4, 2013.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2013/13-014.iv.pdf
Markey Introduces Bill to Stop Energy Department's Radioactive Recycling Program.
http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-introduces-bill-stop-energy-department%E2%80%99s-radioactive-recycling-program
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant Shut Down After Crack Discovered.
http://www.witn.com/news/headlines/Shearon-Harris-Nuclear-Plant-Shut-Down-After-Crack-Discovered-207726571.html?ref=571
336 Bq/Kg from vacuum cleaner dust in Sendai Miyagi.
http://fukushima-diary.com/2013/05/336-bqkg-from-vacuum-cleaner-dust-in-sendai-miyagi/
Richland nuclear plant oversight returns to routine level.
http://www.tricityherald.com/search_results?q=Columbia%20Generating%20Station
Atomic Energy of Canada says no danger during nuclear 'near-miss' at Chalk River.
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/technology/Atomic+Energy+Canada+says+danger+during+nuclear+near+miss/8391509/story.html#ixzz2TgPrd7uu
NRC: Lapdog or Watchdog?
Officials say U.S. nuclear plant operator "was going to do an experiment on the people of Southern California" — "That's their words; they said it was an experiment" (AUDIO).
http://fairewinds.org/content/nrc-lapdog-or-watchdog
Environmentalists decry plan to truck weapons-grade N-waste through N.Y.
Sometime this summer, high-level, weapons-grade radioactive waste is expected to pass through New York State – maybe through the Buffalo Niagara region – on flatbed trucks traveling from Ontario to a South Carolina facility.
http://www.buffalonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130515/CITYANDREGION/130519417/1010
Northwest Nuclear Plant Scores Higher Safety Rating.
http://www.nwpr.org/post/northwest-nuclear-plant-scores-higher-safety-rating
Mystery black substance detected in Japan with extreme radioactivity levels — Over 170,000 CPM (VIDEO).
http://www.youtube.com/user/kienaiyoru?feature=watch
Japanese notice,:"please view cherry blossoms from inside of the car because the radiation level is too high".
http://fukushima-diary.com/2013/05/express-notice-please-view-cherry-blossoms-from-inside-of-the-car-because-the-radiation-level-is-too-high/
Kendra Ulrich, Nuclear Campaigner for Friends of the Earth, explains the significance of the May 13 Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) ruling that mandates an adjudicated public hearing on Southern California Edison's (SCE's) scheme to restart the dangerous, damaged Unit 2 at San Onofre.
http://lhalevy.audioacrobat.com/download/5026ecc7-e08d-d30c-3fdc-aa50419346cd.mp3
Tags: EnviroReporter.com Fukushima meltdowns Rad News Digest radiation Rocketdyne Team EnviroReporter
Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
Margery Brown
Michael..what a great way to start a New Year! It is just way beyond terrific to have all of these important articles, with their links, all listed on one page. First of all, it is really impressive to see that there are so many recent articles that MUST be read, and second…it is wonderful not to have to go hunting for them. I just wish I had the time back that I have spent in the past, trying to locate these articles, in order to forward them to friends, in an attempt to inform and educate them as to the nuclear crisis that is going on, thanks to Fukushima. I just wish that the US Government would go and do likewise!
While I know that there are certainly articles on this potential global disaster to be found in some small newspapers, I have not, so far, found anyone, anywhere, who has been tackling the whole Fukushima disaster, head on, as you have been doing. And, in addition, you have also written many articles, plus, now, a five part series, on our local nuclear and toxic chemical contamination on the Santa Susana Field Laboratory.
I cannot believe how incredibly lucky that we all are to have you here in our midst, doing your knowledgeable environmental reporting, without which we would basically all be in the dark, when it comes to understanding and interpreting everything that has been happening in California, the USA, and the World. My hope is that in 2013, you, and also Denise, will continue to have the concern, energy and courage to keep investigating and writing about all of these issues, which affect the health and welfare of all of us.
Meanwhile, 2012 grateful THANKS!
radar.weather.gov/Conus/full.php Check out this site to see the [possibly] radioactive clouds across USA


Low vision is defined as having sight problems that cannot be improved or corrected by using lenses, medication or surgery. The reasons behind low vision differ and can be since birth or due to an accident or disease.
o Large Prints: Prints get enlarged to match the low vision case.
o Technological devices: like the screen reader that helps the blind read everything written on the computer screen. It even enables the blind to assess the internet.
Persons with low vision depend heavily on the residues of their sight, some of them also use the means used by the blind.


text:
Перевод: с английского на все языки
balloon-borne+satellite
1 balloon-borne satellite
< aerospace> ■ Ballonsatellit m
English-german technical dictionary > balloon-borne satellite
спутник, выводимый на орбиту с аэростата
English-russian astronautics dictionary > balloon-borne satellite
Satellite temperature measurements — have been obtained from the troposphere since 1978. By comparison, the usable balloon (radiosonde) record begins in 1958.Satellites do not measure temperature as such. They measure radiances in various wavelength bands, which must then be… … Wikipedia
Skyhook balloon — The skyhook balloon launched in 1957 to photograph the sun Skyhook balloons were balloons developed by Otto C. Winzen and General Mills, Inc., and used by the United States Navy Office of Naval Research in the late 1940s and in the 1950s for… … Wikipedia
X-ray astronomy — X rays start at 0.008 nm and extend across the electromagnetic spectrum to 8 nm, over which the Earth s atmosphere is opaque. X ray astronomy is an observational branch of astronomy which deals with the study of X ray observation and detection… … Wikipedia
weather forecasting — Prediction of the weather through application of the principles of physics and meteorology. Weather forecasting predicts atmospheric phenomena and changes on the Earth s surface caused by atmospheric conditions (snow and ice cover, storm tides,… … Universalium
Antiproton — Negaton redirects here. For the negatively charged particle in an atom that was once called a negaton, see Electron. Antiproton The quark structure of the antiproton. Classification Antibaryon Composition … Wikipedia
Cosmic ray — For the film, see Cosmic Ray (film). Cosmic radiation redirects here. For some background types of cosmic radiation, see cosmic background radiation and cosmic background. The energy spectrum for cosmic rays Cosmic rays are energetic charged… … Wikipedia
Cosmic Background Explorer — (COBE) General information NSSDC ID 1989 089A Organization NASA … Wikipedia
Cosmic-ray observatory — A cosmic ray observatory is a scientific installation built to detect high energy particles coming from space called cosmic rays. This typically includes photons (high energy light), electrons, protons, and some heavier nuclei, as well as… … Wikipedia
Max Planck Institute for Solar System Research — Abbreviation MPS Formation 1934 (founded as the Luftwaffe test grounds in Rechlin/Mecklenburg) / July 1, 2004 (renamed to the Max Planck Institute for Solar System Research) … Wikipedia
List of astronomy acronyms — This is a compilation of acronyms commonly used in astronomy. Most of the acronyms are drawn from professional astronomy and are used quite frequently in scientific publications. However, a few of these acronyms are frequently used by the general … Wikipedia
Jeffrey A. Hoffman — Infobox Astronaut name =Jeffrey Alan Hoffman type =Astronaut nationality =American date birth =November 2, 1944 place birth =Brooklyn, New York occupation =Scientist selection =1978 NASA Group time =50d 11h 54m mission =STS 51 D, STS 35, STS 46,… … Wikipedia


When it comes to sliding on snow, there is plenty in the Oisans Valley to satisfy your every desire!
In winter, enjoy the heights and the chill out in the mountain air. There's enough to offer in the Oisans Valley for everybody to find both their ideal space and activity. With 3 epic ski resorts on your doorstep, endless-off-piste and ski touring, and tranquil cross-country trails… you won't run out of terrain to ski and surf.
Les Deux Alpes is unique: it has skiing for beginners and experts on the lower slopes and at high altitudes. This makes it ideal for everyone.
There really is something for everyone! Wide, open slopes leading down to the resort, red runs leading in every direction from Alpette, and black runs galore from the top of Pic Blanc.
The Oisans Valley is an off-piste paradise. Choose from 3 resorts, including the mythic 'La Grave', or simple head out in to the wilderness on a ski tour.
Cross-country trails can take you far away from the hustle and bustle of the main ski pistes , giving you a different perspective on the mountains.


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NOJV04 Voicy Al DaCapo´ne "Daco"
Daco lives on the Island Langeland with "his people" Gunvor & Erling. They also have the shelties Eifel & Hamlet and the malinois Rex. Daco has turned into a very handsome boy. He has already done well in the showring and became Nordic Youth Winner 6th of November 2004.
Gunvor and Daco have also started several agility competitions. Daco is very fast and unlike the dogs Gunvor has worked with previous so there is a lot she has to learn.


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OPINION: How India's coal-fired power plants can reduce both emissions and costs
It is perfectly possible for companies to ensure profitability of their coal-fired power plants without compromising on environmental commitments.
Small nuclear reactors key to sustainable development by ensuring zero emissions: Rosatom
In an interview with ET's Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury Nikita Mazein, Vice President of Rusatom Overseas explains how small reactors can play a big role in phasing out coal-fired power plants
New emission norms: 70 per cent of India's coal-fired power plants won't meet 2022 deadline, report says
Besides being accountable for emissions of pollutants like SO2, the sector is also extremely water-intensive – it is responsible for 70% of total freshwater withdrawal by all industries in the country.
Pollution from fossil fuels costing India Rs 10.7 lakh crore every year
Titled 'Toxic Air: The Price of Fossil Fuels', the report states that China mainland, the United States and India bear the highest cost of air pollution due to fossil fuels
ICRA revises year-end outlook to negative for conventional power sector
Slowdown in power demand growth coupled with higher generation from hydro, nuclear and renewable sources led to a decline in capacity utilisation
Govt's pollution control devices for coal-fired power plants can also boost CO2 emissions: Report
This may impede India's ability to meet international commitments to reduce carbon-emissions intensity
Coal-fired plants may have to scale down utilization to 35 per cent by 2022: KPMG
Even a scenario with 130 GW of renewables instead of the planned 175 GW by 2022 could result in plant load factor (PLF) dropping to 35-40 per cent for many coal plants.
Renewable energy projects captured 80 per cent of all energy financing in India in 2018
In 2018, a total of 49 renewable energy projects with a combined capacity of 4.7 Gw obtained loans of Rs 24,442 crore
PPC says bids for coal-fired power plants to be submitted May 28
PPC, which is 51 percent state owned, received six expressions of interest for the plants and a licence to build a new one in northern Greece in March
China to launch non-subsidised pilot solar, wind power projects
Electricity generated from the pilot projects will be fully bought by grid companies
Switching to clean energy may save 11 million life years in India: Study
The 2.7 billion people who live in India and China -- more than a third of the world's population -- regularly breath some of the dirtiest air on the planet, said researchers from the Harvard University in the US
Standard Chartered creates sustainable finance team
The team follows Stanchart's move in common with other peers in recent months to stop financing coal-fired power plants
Coal-fired power plants killing 80,000 adults every year: Study
An earlier study conducted by the Conservation Action Trust, Greenpeace India and Urban Emissions had stated that pollution from coal-based power plants resulted in 85,000-1.15 lakh premature deaths between 2011-12.
Nearly all European coal-fired power plants will be loss-making by 2030 -research
European power companies could save billions of dollars by stepping up closure of coal-fired power plants as nearly all of them will be loss-making in Europe by 2030, think-tank Carbon Tracker Initiative says.
Italy proposes phasing out all coal fired power plants by 2025
The new energy strategy, still under discussion, aims to reach the goal of 27 percent of gross overall energy consumption from renewable sources by 2030, the document showed.
Jakson Group to invest Rs 700 crore to set up new solar power plant
The firm, which has a small 70 MW manufacturing plant in Greater Noida at present, is confident about competing with Chinese imports.
KPMG to ready Vision 2030 for Coal India
KPMG will have to present a draft document of the Vision 2030 within eight weeks. This would be followed by two workshops — one for coal producers and another for coal consumers.
Capacity utilisation at coal-fired power plants increases by over 60 per cent
Thermal capacity utilisation had fallen earlier in the year as good monsoon rainfall reduced agricultural demand and increased hydroelectric supply.
Bill Gates bats for innovation to prevent coal-fired power in India
Referring to the millions of Indians without access to electricity, Gates said unfortunately their straightforward path to get there is coal.


Brighten each day with Gallery Easel�accent, combining upbeat words of positivity, an appealing design, and mini easel display. Perfect for your desk or shelf, home or office, or wherever you want to express yourself.
Have a question about	the Mini Gallery Artwork? Ask us! Someone from FranklinPlanner or the community would be happy to help you!


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Pressure Sensitive Thin Membrane – Assembly
Home > Case Studies > Pressure Sensitive Thin Membrane – Assembly
The heart of a pressure regulator is a sensitive, thin diaphragm that must hold and react with pressure changes. However, the diagram must also have a component hard enough to interact with other mechanical mechanisms. Requiring both a solid interaction platform, but at the same time provide an elastic feature that is able to reflect the pressure, requires two diverse materials to be attached. So LSR (liquid silicone rubber) can be used for the thin membrane so the part can have elastic characteristics. However, a PA (polyamide) is used for a core to provide the needed interaction. Furthermore, the diaphragm must be placed into a greater assembly with no deformation so it can perform correctly.
The first problem that is encountered during the molding of the parts is the bonding between the LSR and the PA. With manual assembly, the LSR and PA components could be improperly lined up. With an unaligned diaphragm, the component will perform inconsistently or even fail. To compensate for manual error, transfer molding could be used where the PA core is formed and then later put into a mold to have silicone injected over it. This process requires a primer to prep the material for silicone over molding which requires constant maintenance on the tool and an additional process that requires material. Even with the component properly assembled, putting the component into the greater device may cause problems as the thin diaphragm may distort or be contorted.
SIMTEC Solution
Increasing the bond strength between the LSR and PA true two shot molding is a viable option. In true two shot over molding, the substrate (PA) is molded in one half of the mold and then is transferred to the other half of the mold to have the silicone injected over the top of it. A better bond is formed since the PA is still hot, allowing more of the composition to settle in place with the silicone. Furthermore, the part was just molded, so there are no surface contaminants that would get in the way of the bond. With a quick transfer, the part does not require any pre-treatment that would add to the cycle time, maintenance, or operating costs.
To address the integration into the main component, design plays a large factor. To ensure the diaphragm is never distorted or wrinkled when placed into an assembly, a stabilizing feature should be in place. The stabilizing feature could be simple like a thicker silicone ring that will provide a lip to interact with. However, this will still require manipulation to properly place in an assembly. Another choice that would be coupled with two shot over molding is using a PA stabilizer ring as the outer diameter of the component. If true two shot is used, the part will provide great bond strength, and with a solid outer ring, the part can essentially just be dropped into place.


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Francesco Finocchiaro
Francesco Finocchiaro (Ph.D.) is Senior Research Scientist at the University of Vienna.
He studied Oboe at Catania Conservatory, Music Education at Bologna Conservatory, and Musicology at the University of Bologna. Under Professor Maurizio Giani's mentorship, he conducted his doctoral study on Arnold Schönberg's theory of composition at the University of Bologna, from 2002 to 2006.
His research interests focus on the points of connection between composition, theory, and aesthetics in twentieth-century music and have unfolded within several research programs (PRIN, FWF, Lise Meitner, etc.) in the role of project leader as well as project co-contributor.
He has dedicated his studies to the Second Viennese School and has released the Italian edition of Arnold Schönberg's theoretical work The Musical Idea (A. Schönberg, Il pensiero musicale, Italian edition and translation by F. Finocchiaro, Rome: Astrolabio-Ubaldini, 2011) in cooperation with the Arnold Schönberg Center in Vienna. His essays on Schönberg's work and theory have been published in international musicological journals (e.g. Il Saggiatore musicale, 2012; Acta Musicologica, 2015).
Since 2012, he has been a co-founder and member of Athena Musica, a research group in music aesthetics at the University of Bologna, and he has recently founded the peer-reviewed book series Biblioteca di Athena Musica (Turin: Accademia University Press, 2017). He has recently edited the collected volume Musica e metafora: storia analisi ermeneutica,Turin: Accademia University Press, 2017 (with M. Giani).
He has also published extensively on film music, with a special focus on the relationship between silent cinema and musical Modernism (F. Finocchiaro, Musical Modernism and German Cinema from 1913 to 1933, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; Italian edition Modernismo musicale e cinema tedesco nel Primo Novecento, Lucca: LIM, 2017; see also Music and the Moving Image, 2016).
Since 2005, he lectured on Music Aesthetics, Music Semiotics, Music Education, and Music Theory at the Universities of Bologna, Milan, and Florence, as well as Film Music at Ferrara Conservatory. In 2012 and 2016 he also taught Silent Film Music in German Cinema at the University of Vienna.
Since 2013 he has worked as Senior Research Scientist at the University of Vienna's Department of Musicology. Currently he is leading the FWF Research Project Film Music as a Problem in German Print Journalism (1907–1930) at the University of Vienna.
Institut für Musikwissenschaft – Universität Wien
Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 9 A-1090 Wien
francesco.finocchiaro@univie.ac.at
https://finocchiarofrancesco.wordpress.com
https://filmmusicjournalism.com


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Policy and Communications Officer (FTC), Wales
We are looking to recruit a Policy & Communications Officer to work with our Executive Director for Wales
12 month FTC, full time/ open to flexible working arrangements
circa £30K per annum + Competitive Benefits
About the role/person
Samaritans are looking to recruit a Policy & Communications Officer to work with our Executive Director for Wales. The post will be for 12 months and will provide maternity cover for the permanent postholder. This is a great opportunity to contribute to the work of Samaritans in Wales and to be a part of our dedicated and enthusiastic team.
The successful candidate will be responsible for supporting the work of Samaritans and of the Executive Director for Wales to raise awareness of our work and to influence policy and practice. In addition, the successful candidate will be responsible for increasing understanding of the work and messages of Samaritans at a Welsh national and local level through, for example, policy briefings for external audiences.
This post requires the experience of working in a communications, policy or public affairs environment with the ability to communicate at all levels within and outside the organisation. The role also requires the ability to build and maintain positive relationships with key stakeholders and a sound understanding of the role of communications and policy in a large, volunteer-led, federated charity.
The post is full time however, Samaritans are open to flexible working and will consider applications for working 4 days per week.
At Samaritans, our vision is that fewer people die by suicide. We believe it is preventable and that by working together we can give people the support they need before they reach crisis point. We are one of the most trusted charities in the UK and ROI, and we answer a call for help every six seconds. We have around 175 staff and more than 20,000 volunteers based across 201 branches giving emotional support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We don't just hear you, we listen.
.As an employer we offer a good range of benefits, including 25 days' holiday, well-being days, free parking, Health Cash Plan, Pension and interest-free season ticket loans.
Please download and read the full job description and application form below. Completed application forms should be emailed to [email protected] no later than
09:00am on 5th August 2019. 1st Interviews to be held on 22nd August 2019.
Download document: Job Description
100.3 kb - PDF
Download document: Samaritans job application form
45.8 kb - DOCX


The property is located in a private domain, just 3 minute walk to the beach. A nice garden with pool invites to spend time outside with friends and family. The villa was recently renovated in a modern style with light colors and contemporary interior.


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What's on where
Loan Collection
Ramsey Music Society
Concerts are normally held at the West Building, Ramsey Grammar School, on Mondays, at 7.30pm but dates and locations are subject to change, so please look at the Ramsey Music Society website.
2019-2020 CONCERT SEASON
Concerts are normally held at the West Building, Ramsey Grammar School, on Mondays, at 7.30pm but dates and locations are subject to change.
16 September – Yu Kosuge, piano
Yu Kosuge's upcoming debuts include Warsaw Philharmonic Orchestra, BBC Scottish Symphony Orchestra, Orchestre Philharmonique de Monte Carlo and Orchestre de la Suisse Romande.
28 October – Nemanja Bogunovich, Guitar
Nemanja Bogunovic has given recitals and public appearances in the United States, Canada, Mexico, England, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and has also appeared as a soloist with several chamber and symphonic orchestras in the USA and Europe.
25 November – Jamal Aliyev, cello, plus piano accompanist
In 2017 Jamal made his debut at the BBC Proms and won the Arts Club – Sir Karl Jenkins Music Award. Highlights over the last year include appearances as soloist with the Philharmonia Orchestra at the Royal Festival Hall, and with the Symphony Orchestra Simón Bolívar of Venezuela.
9 December - 'It's Christmas!'
Festive-themed concert
Kristene Sutcliffe, soprano and Olga Eggert, piano
13 January - Martina Colli and Rossella Rubini.
An Italian Piano Duo
The Duo was founded in 2010 by Martina Colli and Rossella Rubini and they started their collaboration mixing together their different experiences, particularly broadened in jazz music and composition by Martina and chamber music and musicology by Rossella.
17 February – Huw Wiggin, saxophone and John Lenehan, piano
Commonwealth Musician of the Year, First Prize and Gold Medal winner of the 2014 Royal Over-Seas League Annual Music Competition, Huw Wiggin is one of the most popular saxophonists of his generation. John Lenehan has always been a popular collaborator, performing and recording with many of the UKs top performers.
23 March – Simon Callaghan, piano
Recognised as an exciting performer of the new generation, Steinway Artist Simon Callaghan's recent schedule has included Wigmore Hall, Royal Festival Hall, Bridgewater Hall, Birmingham Symphony Hall, Liverpool Philharmonic Hall and St David's Hall, Cardiff.
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Let's take a look at some of the guideline changes coming to ICD-10-CM and use these guidelines to code an acute MI scenario.
The guidelines will be important to coders, but there are additional documentation requirements that will be important to everyone in the agency! Currently in ICD-9-CM, we need to know the site of the MI (subendocardial, posterior wall, etc.), the episode of care (initial, subsequent), and whether any complications are present (rupture of tendon or muscle or septal defect). However, documentation in ICD-10 will need more specific information for each episode of care (initial and subsequent). In the initial episode of care, coders will need to know not only the type of MI but also the specific location of occurrence (left main coronary artery, left circumflex coronary artery, etc.), as well as more specific information regarding type of complication that occurred within the 28 day initial time period (thrombosis of atrium, post infarction angina, ventricular or atrial septal defect, etc.). Furthermore, documentation should be present to identify whether the patient has ever been exposed to tobacco smoke (environmental, personal history or current use, occupational exposure).
A 54-year-old female was treated for an acute non-ST anterior wall MI. This patient also has atrial fibrillation. After discharge home, the patient presented to the ED two weeks later and was diagnosed with an acute inferior wall MI. She is still being monitored following her initial heart attack two weeks earlier and continues to have atrial fibrillation. She was treated with a cardiac catheterization while in the hospital. Upon discharge, the patient is referred to home health. What diagnosis codes will be assigned?
Work through this scenario during the week and be on the lookout for the correct responses, along with rationale soon!
AHCC stands up to U.S. Congress to reinforce the importance of ICD-10 implementation!


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Art in War – Alex Parfenov – Ep 24
ON TODAY'S EPISODE
What do we need in our lives to persevere on our creative path? How do we keep going, and is it ever okay to stop? In the grand scheme of things, how crucial is our art anyway? We might not ask these questions under normal circumstances. But when big, unexpected changes occur in your life, these questions (as well as their answers) can surface.
Alex Parfenov is a brilliant videographer. For several years he's been working with me and my team creating videos that tell inspirational stories of artists from all over the world. He also happens to live in Ukraine. The recent and ongoing invasion of his country has completely changed his life. Like so many Ukrainians, Alex has recently relocated and was still somehow able to find an internet connection.
He shares with us the impact these recent events have had on him, his family, and his friends, as well as the clarity he's gained about the purpose, need, and ongoing viability of creativity in one's life. The calm vulnerability and steady resolve of Alex's voice moved me greatly, and it's a privilege to share this extraordinary conversation with you.
Listen if you are interested in…
Alex recounts his experience of the Russian invasion of Ukraine [2:30]
The courage and beauty of the Ukrainian people in the face of adversity [7:50]
Using creativity to navigate unimaginable tragedy [13:43]
Ukrainian resilience and more stories from the war [23:05]
How Alex is helping his children process the war [28:41]
The invasion's impact on Alex as an artist [31:57]
How the world is helping Ukraine and looking towards the country's future [36:23]
Suddenly the world came crashing down
On the evening of February 24th, 2022, Alex Parfenov's life drastically changed as Russian rockets bombarded the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. Alex, his wife, and their two young daughters were able to temporarily escape just outside of the city until the violence reached there as well. Constant sirens and continued aggression forced them to flee into Western Ukraine near Poland. The trauma from these events was so intense that it took him a week to even begin feeling some sense of normalcy in his body. In the first days after finally leaving Kyiv, Alex couldn't eat, he couldn't sleep, and his mind was constantly flooded with anxious thoughts about the safety of everyone he loves. Especially his children. Alex went from being an artist and videographer to enlisting in the Ukrainian army to fend off a Russian invasion in a matter of two weeks. It's impossible to fathom walking a moment in his shoes, let alone a mile.
United as one
One of the most awe-inspiring things about everything happening in Ukraine right now is the courage, strength, and beauty of its people. The longer this conflict goes on the more we hear stories that celebrate the human spirit and restore our faith in humanity. From fighters, fundraisers, and everyone in between, Alex notes that the whole nation is united like never before and every Ukrainian is a warrior whether they're on the battlefield or not. I even saw that composer Hans Zimmer stopped a recent concert to honor a Ukrainian pianist who, in an act of defiance, played Zimmer's theme to the movie Inception during the initial Russian air raid…incredible. Even in the midst of horrifying tragedy, Alex has never been prouder of his country and his people.
Finding light in the darkness
By nature, artists are incredibly sensitive people. It's often easier for us to live in a world of our own creation than be confronted by some of life's painful realities. But what happens when that pain becomes so visceral that escape is not an option? This is Alex Parfenov's wartorn reality. He doesn't have the luxury of taking a mental vacation when his survival and the survival of his family are at stake. But as Alex elaborated, he's noticed a shift within himself from being in survival mode this long. Creativity has always been a spring that he could use to bounce back when faced with hard times. As the initial shock from the last few week's events wears off, Alex feels all of the pent-up anger winding itself into a powerful spring about to explode with creativity. He's finally allowing himself to ask how his art can be a light in this present darkness and I'm on the edge of my seat waiting to experience the answer. Listen to this episode for more of Alex's story and his experience in Russian-occupied Ukraine. To learn how you can help the people of Ukraine, please visit the links below!
Resources & Ways to Help Ukraine
See what's happening in Ukraine
National Bank of Ukraine – Fundraising Account for Humanitarian Assistance to Ukrainians
Donate to World Central Kitchen and help provide fresh meals to Ukrainian families in need
Connect with Alex Parfenov
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/alex.parfenov/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/parfenov.alexander
Alex's Highlight Reel: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1L91ZkSyUnxjOO-GDMbSiICjHpgxmthjD/view?usp=sharing
Alex's other work: https://vimeo.com/sptvstudio
Connect with Nicholas Wilton
Nicholas@art2life.com
Join the Art2Life Artists' List and get the Sunday vlog here
Subscribe to Art2Life on
Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts
← The Truth in Art – James Higgins – Ep 23
Persistence – Russell Chatham – Ep 25 →


Des McAnuff, the Artistic Director of the Stratford Festival, will be reuniting with his original 1993 Tony award winning team to bring Tommy to the festival in Ontario this spring. The musical will be staged at the Avon Theatre May 4 to October 19, opening on May 30.
Tickets and information are available on the Stratford Festival website. Also featured on the site is a good article: A Tommy for the Twenty-First Century.


He or she will manage the company's social media pages.
He or she will perform other tasks as assigned by management.
I think you may be interested in this position - Jobs at Owens and Xley Consults. This is the link: https://www.myjobmag.com/job/106667/it-digital-channel-officer-owens-and-xley?utm_source=email_friend. Copy and paste link on browser if link is not working. Check it out!