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Mix 93.8 - FM 93.8 - Johannesburg
Famous For Our Music!
5/5 based on 3 reviews.
Mix 93.8 is a broadcast radio station from Johannesburg, South Africa, providing Adult Contemporary, Classic Rock music, Entertainment, Information,...
139 tune ins FM 93.8
Johannesburg - South Africa - English
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Carlswald Decor Center Corner of Harry Gaulan & 5th Street
abi@mixfm.co.za
Songs playing in Mix 93.8
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Listening to Steve Ashley singing "Cry To Me". The original singer of "Cry to me" was Steve Lonsdale who was one the top S A Singer back in the 60's when he was with the Staccatos
Nov. 9, 2018, 8:47 p.m. GMT
Glenn Osher
just what s.a needs right now... lots of encouragement...loal xxx love glenn www.smashwords.com/books/view/659168
Feb. 9, 2017, 10:58 a.m. GMT
Daispringbok52
Play some decent MUSIC IE: 30/40's BIg Band, 50'
March 5, 2016, 5:48 p.m. GMT
Amy4clasicalmusic
Hello, I have a very inspiring story to share with you about my daughter who has cerebral palsy. Please send me your email address so I can send it to you. In brief, Amy (19) is a young lady with cerebral palsy who has a wonderful vocal talent. She has been invited to Florida, USA in July next year see more... for a Talent Showcase event and needs to raise funds for this. Is there any way in which you would be able to assist her or advise us? The ARTS International Showcase (www.artstalent.com). Please listen to her beautiful voice on You Tube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_bylFMJixM. With grateful thanks and warm regards, Sharon Mannheimer (Mom) 079 390 6413 / 011 463 5139.
Oct. 6, 2015, 11:45 a.m. GMT
Madiba, you talking about him, the communist, the terrorist, the murderer.... Really spreading the propaganda now on air stevie... really...?
Aug. 1, 2015, 3:21 a.m. GMT
Jacobs Peter
THE OTHER STATIONS DEFINITELY SO BOOOORING,AND DEFINITELY NOT SO COOL DJ,S
April 25, 2015, 6:40 a.m. GMT
BEST BEST RADIO THERE IS SUPERCEDES ALL OTHERS THAT EXIST
ViveUtVivas
Loving this radio station. Just wish signal in my car wouldn't wander off so often! Seems to often be a victim of attempted hijacking by other radio stations.
Oct. 30, 2014, 1:19 p.m. GMT
Dominic Ginns
Listening to Tony Blewitt in Afghanistan, could you please play any Led Zeppelin for me, enjoying your music, thanks.
June 9, 2014, 5:18 a.m. GMT
HI PLS PLAY GAGE!I DIG THEIR NEW TRACK YOUR EMOTION!
Jan. 2, 2014, 10:01 a.m. GMT
Riaan Pretorius Working here in Bahrain and listening to you guys at Mix FM, really makes me long home ( Lonehill) Lots of love to my fiance Vicky Demeyere.....mwha ! You guys rock....! Riaan Pretorius
Jan. 27, 2018, 3:18 p.m. GMT
So love that you let us hear songs that many may have forgotten. i can't get enough of MIX 93.8. goodbye all the other boring radio stations with annoucers that think they are ssooooo cool. Everyone in the office wanted to know what station I was listening to, they have changed as well. GOOD LUCK AND THANKS!!!!!!!! Marlene
June 17, 2014, 1:53 p.m. GMT
Hi I just want to say that I as a Christian who believe in Jesus Christ all the way enjoy the South-African & international Gospel music on our radio stations. May God bless you.
April 17, 2013, 10:11 p.m. GMT
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Super Bowl fever is about to sweep the US, and what a good opportunity to have a party!
This coming weekend, Sunday 5 February 2017, will bring the biggest night of sport to our screens, plus a special halftime show from Lady Gaga.
If you're looking for a good time, some American food and authentic drinks – we've got you covered.
Here's some of the best spots to watch in London, but grab tickets now… as they're selling out fast!
This Covent Garden spot is known for its rowdy American atmosphere and this year they're welcoming the NFL London Cheerleaders to add some atmosphere.
They'll be four super screens and nine extra-large plasmas to create an "unparalleled viewing experience" plus a special Roadhouse Super Bowl Menu available all night which includes the famous Roadhouse Burger a bumper size sharing platter and a wide selection of American craft lagers brought in especially for the day.
Don't fancy sitting around? How about 3 events at different 3 venues, all with different USA themes.
A celebration of all things American, the 1 Big Night Out Pub Crawl will take you through London's bars, drinking cheap booze from Solo Cups and chanting USA USA USA all night long! There's the Shoreditch Superbowl and Shots event, which does exactly what it says on the tin. As well as a Frat Party Pub Crawl.
Expect beer and lots of chicken wings!
If you're going to do the Super Bowl. Go all out.
Club Aquarium is one of the biggest UK USA parties, with 10 screens and two projectors showing the match in all its glory.
There will be performances from London's leading cheerleading group, The Komani Cheerleaders, who will re-create the authentic US Superbowl 51 experience along with a swimming pool, Jacuzzi, Xbox and games room, beer pong, American themed food, competitions and more….with food and beer from £3.80.
Chicago Rib Shack know how to do proper American food and on Sunday they'll be upping the ante with a Super Bowl special.
They'll be half-time show prizes, games & giveaways throughout the evening. Your ticket includes a complimentary beer, bar snacks and guaranteed seat.
Belushis will be offering HD screens, beer fridges, sharing platters, beer pong and awesome Belushis cheerleaders to get the party started.
They'll be bottled spirits and beers, all American sharing platters ready for your arrival, 16'' dawg & fries at half time plus a goodie Bag packed full of fun.


With the grace and blessings of Param Pujya Pramukh Swami Maharaj, the Akhil Bharatiya Mahila Shibir 2015 entitled 'Akshardham se Akshardham: Parabrahma ka Sankalp, Jiva ka Param Lakshya' was held at BAPS Shri Swaminarayan Mandir New Delhi on 11 and 12 July 2015. Over 370 delegates representing 13 states from around the country attended the event.
The seminar began with dhun, prarthana and stuti followed by the traditional deep pragatya. After the welcome, karyakars shared their experiences, wisdom and knowledge through inspirational discourses and multimedia presentations in four different sessions, centered around Dharma, Gnan, Vairagya and Bhakti. Karyakars from different centers spoke about the satsang activities in their region.
The program was interspersed with a series of skits, elevating talks, inspirational videos, workshops and interactive discussions. Through this the delegates learned how Gnan can help one overcome life's challenges, how sincere Bhakti creates a constant connection with God, how understanding Dharma allows us to make the right choices in life and how Vairagya can help decrease wants and increase bliss. Video ashirwad of Pramukh Swami Maharaj added to the great motivation, inspiration and guidance that the delegates received.


STEM The philanthropist knows firsthand what it's like to be a woman in the field. Now she wants to change the industry.
WHERE ARE ALL THE WOMEN: The world of STEM is male dominated, but it doesn't have to be, and Melinda Gates wants to see it change.
If you're a young woman interested in all things science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), it can be hard to navigate your way through these male-dominated fields. Do not despair, young researchers, there is hope. And it starts with you.
It's easy to get swept away by the majority and to try to fit in, but the best thing any woman can do in any industry is just be herself.
As a woman, you might — and should — bring a different perspective to the equation, and that's okay. Melinda Gates considers the day that Microsoft offered her a job to be one of the happiest of her life. However, working as a woman in a male-dominated field can be difficult, and Gates struggled at first to find her place while preserving her own happiness.
What did she do? She tried being herself and found that everything changed, and for the better. Not only was she happier, but she also felt more fulfilled in her career, she became a better manager and colleagues asked to be on her team.
Gates also gives this advice to those aspiring to join the world of research and technology.
Having someone who's been in your shoes, who understands your struggles and who can support you and guide you along the way is an invaluable part of getting more women in the field. "And then, one day, be that person for someone else," she says.
When Gates talks to students today, she says it's frustrating to hear women "describe some of the same barriers that [she] faced in the 80s." However, there's a silver living: People are finally talking about the gender gap and inclusivity — issues that were ignored when she was starting her career.


Southwestern Energy Company (SWN) dropped -5.95% or -0.28 to $4.43. It is nearly 13.21 million shares traded, which is 79.68% compare to the average total volume 16.58 million. The market cap of SWN is $2.40 billion. The year to date change is 20.67%. The 52 week price range is from $3.23 to $6.23. Price of SWN have changed 9.03% during last week. It have changed 12.41% over last month, 30.11% over last 3 months, -6.73% over last 6 months and 10.05% over one year.
Some investors will use 50-day and 200-day Moving Averages as support and resistance levels. Those moving average will be very helpful most of time. The 50-day Moving Averages for SWN is 4.33. It is -2.26% below current price. The 200-day Moving Averages for SWN is 4.90. It is 10.61% above current price. The 52-week High is 6.23. It is 40.63% from the current price. The 52-week Low is 3.23. It is -27.09% from current price.
Some people may be interesting about short interest ratio of a stock. The short interest ratio of SWN is 5.84 on 2019-02-28. Short % to float is 17.39%. There are some statistics of SWN. It is has market cap $2.40 billion. The share outstanding is 541.32 million. The average volume is 16.58 million. The percent of top 15 Institution holding is 167.80%. Return on equity is how much of net income returned as a percentage of the total amount of shareholder equity found on the balance sheet. Return on equity (ROE) of SWN is 24.65%. Return on assets (ROA) is an indicator that shows how profitable a company is using its total assets to generate earnings. Return on Assets (ROA) of SWN is 8.03%.


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is a Japanese footballer who plays for Machida Zelvia on loan from Matsumoto Yamaga.

Club statistics
Updated to 23 February 2016.

References

External links

Profile at FC Machida Zelvia

1991 births
Living people
Keio University alumni
Association football people from Tokyo
Japanese footballers
J2 League players
J3 League players
Matsumoto Yamaga FC players
FC Machida Zelvia players
Association football midfielders

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Q: Help getting a representation of a curve K for a Line integral So I have to calculate line integral of a vector field:
$\overrightarrow{F}(x,y,z)=(x+y,y+z,x+y)$
And I want to calculate the Line integral:
$$\int_K \overrightarrow{F}(x,y,z)d\overrightarrow{r}$$
And K is defined as intercutting of these two surfaces:
$$x^2+y^2=1, z=x^2+y^2-2y$$
I did do a sketch, and is seems like it some sort of elipse or circle.
But how can I get its equation?
I thougth maybe something like this this:
$x^2=1-y^2 \rightarrow z=1- y^2+y^2-2y=-2y $
But it just gave me normal line, or is this all there is to it?
Are there any tricks to it.
Any help with the solution would be appreciated.

A: You wish to integrate over the set
\begin{align}
K &= \{(x,y,z) \in \Bbb{R}^3: x^2 + y^2 =1 \quad \text{and} \quad z = x^2 + y^2 - 2y  \} \\
&= \{(x,y,z) \in \Bbb{R}^3: x^2 + y^2 =1 \quad \text{and} \quad z = 1 - 2y  \} \tag{$*$}
\end{align}
Notice that if you now define the function $\alpha: [0,2 \pi] \to \Bbb{R}^3$ by the rule
\begin{equation}
\alpha(t) =
\begin{pmatrix}
\cos(t) \\
\sin(t) \\
1 - 2 \sin(t)
\end{pmatrix},
\end{equation}
then $K = \text{image}(\alpha)$. In words, $\alpha$ is a parametrization for $K$. I hope you see how I obtained such a parametrization from ($*$). Hence,
\begin{align}
\int_K \vec{F}(x,y,z) \cdot d \vec{r} &= \int_0^{2\pi} \left(\vec{F}(\alpha(t)) \cdot \dfrac{d \alpha}{dt} \right) \, dt
\end{align}
(the $\cdot$ being a dot product of vectors in $\Bbb{R}^3$)
I'll let you substitute the formulas and perform the computation. I got $-3 \pi$ as the answer... there may/may not have been a computation error, but this is the general process of how to approach these questions.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


We will develop a curriculum with a K-12 scope and sequence designed to build students' engineering habits of mind while identifying and tackling real-world challenges.
We will incorporate service learning into the engineering curriculum so that students have the opportunity to drive social change with engineering projects.
We will provide faculty with professional development opportunities to integrate engineering practices into current curriculum and design new curricular initiatives.
We will build and outfit —with the appropriate tools and technology—a dedicated makerspace for our students and faculty.
We will provide time for students to access the makerspace outside of the traditional classroom schedule for independent work that allows them to take control of their own learning.
We will explore ways to utilize the makerspace in extended programs, such as Friends After Three and Summer Friends.


text:
Iran Says It Is Increasing Uranium Enrichment Fourfold
A TV grab shows three versions of domestically-built centrifuges at Natanz, an Iranian uranium enrichment plant, June 6, 2018
Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced on Monday, May 20 it has increased low level uranium enrichment fourfold, but is abiding by the nuclear agreement, keeping enrichment at level low.
Spokesman of IAEO Behruz Kamalvandi said that starting today enrichment of 3.67 percent uranium has quadrupled. This step does not mean the number or type of Iran's centrifuges change; so Iran continues the current status in accordance with the agreement.
Iran announced May 8 that it will partially suspend implementing the 2015 nuclear agreement, demanding that the United Kingdom, France and Germany, the three European signatories of the deal, assist in trade despite the current U.S. sanctions.
The increase in the amount of uranium being enriched might end up as a violation of the agreement if it accumulates beyond the permitted 300 kilogram limit. In any case, Kamalvandi acknowledged that in a few weeks Iran will exceed the set limit.
He emphasized that soon Iran will reach the 300 kilo limit and other "parties" should take note of this fact.
It seems Iran is playing a game of brinksmanship with the U.S. and Europe, by ramping up pressure gradually.
Article 26 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA says that Iran will suspend parts or the whole agreement if sanctions are reimposed. The U.S. withdrew from the agreement in May 2018 and reimposed heavy economic sanctions during the year.
The last U.S. move was to ban Iran from shipping out excess uranium and heavy water. This puts Iran in a bind. If Iran maintains an intense enrichment pace it will reach the set limits and has to either violate the agreement or stop enrichment.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has also threatened to boost enrichment to 20 percent. Kamalvandi said that Iran's technical needs and orders of senior leadership "will determine our next steps".
Iran currently holds 200 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, according to JCPOA. This was accumulated prior to the agreement. Experts believe that it would not be hard for Iran to further purify that stockpile to have enough material for one bomb.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Republicans Trade Insults at Latest Debate
Republican presidential candidates, businessman Donald Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, argue a point during a Republican presidential primary debate at Fox Theatre, Thursday, March 3, 2016.
Republicans Get Down and Dirty
Candidates traded insults, yelling, screaming, interrupting and mean talk at the latest Republican Party debate.
The debate, on Thursday evening in Detroit, was filled with yelling and personal insults.
Party front-runner Donald Trump debated with Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, and Ohio Governor John Kasich.
The candidates questioned the other candidates' manhood. Trump called Rubio, "little Marco." Rubio earlier in the week said Trump had small hands.
New York businessman Trump called Cruz "lying Ted." Rubio looked at Trump and told him he mocks everybody. Trump returned an insult by calling Rubio, a "lightweight" and "a real con artist."
Cruz and Rubio took the verbal fight to Trump. Cruz accused Trump of being "someone who has used government power for private gain." Rubio said Trump is "trying to con people into giving him their vote."
Republican presidential candidates, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., and businessman Donald Trump argue during a Republican presidential primary debate at Fox Theatre, Thursday, March 3, 2016, in Detroit. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya)
Cruz belittled Trump, saying: "I think that the American people understand that yelling and cursing at people doesn't make you a tough guy."
Kasich was low-key and stayed out of the verbal fight. He is trailing by a large margin in the polls.
"I have never tried to go and get into these kinds of scrums that we are seeing here," Kasich said. "People say, wherever I go, 'You seem to be the adult on stage.' "
I'm Kathleen Struck.
William Gallo reported on this story for VOANews.com. Jim Dresbach adapted the report for Learning English. Kathleen Struck was the editor.
What are your feelings about the American presidential campaign? We want to hear from you. Write to us in the Comments Section or visit our Facebook page.
Republican Party – n. one of the two major U.S. political parties
front-runner – n. the person or thing that is most likely to win a race or competition
yelling – v. to say something very loudly especially because you are angry, surprised or trying to get someone's attention
interrupting - v. stopping the progress of an activity
mock – v. to laugh at or make fun of someone or something especially by copying an action or a way of behaving or speaking
lightweight – n. someone or something that has little importance or power
con artist – n. a person who tricks other people in order to get their money
Republicans Attack Trump as 'Unfit' Candidate
Is There More Lying In This Election?


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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database; Fund staff estimates.
The paper considers whether this drop is evident—even after controlling for other factors— by adding Russian real GDP growth to a standard growth regression for the other CIS and Baltic countries. The model will be estimated using annual data for 1993–2003 pooled across the 13 CIS and Baltic countries (excluding Turkmenistan, for which data quality is poor and data are scarce, and of course Russia itself) using a one-way error component regression model.4 The study tests whether there has been a change in the relationship between growth in Russia and growth in the other CIS and Baltic countries related to the Russian crisis. As suggested by the simple correlations, the econometric evidence supports the hypothesis of a weakening of the link that broadly coincided with the crisis. The paper also considers some possible reasons and transmission channels for this change, including a decline in trade and financial flows.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief literature review. Section III discusses the data. Section IV presents unit root tests. Section V lays out the econometric model. Section VI discusses model selection and sensitivity analysis. Section VII presents estimates of the model. Possible transmission channels are considered in Section VIII. Section IX concludes.
Researchers studying the international correlation of output changes have mainly analyzed the transmission of business cycles between the industrial countries, although some papers have studied the business cycles of developing countries.5 Given the short period since independence, these studies have limited relevance for the present study. Arora and Vamvakidis (2004) examine the effect of changes in U.S. economic growth on long-run economic growth in the rest of the world by including the U.S. growth rate as an explanatory variable in a regression of other countries' growth rates on standard determinants of growth. Similarly, Arora and Vamvakidis (2005b) estimate a model of economic growth for sub-Saharan African countries, augmented by growth in South Africa, to analyze the effect of South African growth on other countries in the region. More generally, Arora and Vamvakidis (2005a) examine the extent to which a country's economic growth is influenced by its trading partner economies, based on a panel of over 100 countries.
Empirical studies of the former Soviet Union have focused on the determinants of economic growth within each country rather than regional growth linkages and mostly refer to the period prior to the Russian crisis. A number of studies have estimated growth regressions for the transition economies, including notably Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1998), Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998), Berg and others (1999), and Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000).6 The studies have identified a variety of macroeconomic, structural, and institutional factors as determinants of economic growth in transition economies. Berg and others (1999) use perhaps the most extensive array of econometric techniques to address possible simultaneity bias, dynamics and unit roots, structural change, and panel data issues. In contrast to these previous studies, the present paper estimates the growth linkages between Russia and the other CIS and Baltic countries econometrically and considers how these may have changed following the Russian crisis.
The variables identified in past studies as determinants of economic growth in the transition economies may be classified into three broad categories: initial conditions (including institutions); macroeconomic variables (including both policy indicators and outcomes); and structural reform indices. A list of possible explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. Following Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998) and Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000), growth in transition economies appears to be correlated with a set of initial conditions. The present study utilizes Havrylyshyn and van Rooden's (2000) two "clusters" of initial conditions—capturing respectively macroeconomic distortions and unfamiliarity with market processes (IC1) and the level of socialist development and its associated distortions (IC2)—and initial income.7 Variables capturing macroeconomic performance include consumer price index (CPI) inflation (following for instance Berg and others, 1999; and Havrylyshyn and van Rooden, 2000) and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (this measure was used—instead of the fiscal balance measure used by Berg and others, 1999;Fischer, Sahay, and Végh, 1998; and others—due to problems of noncomparability and breaks in series). A structural reform index has been compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Other candidates for explanatory variables, not falling directly into one of these three categories, include: growth in other trading partners (real GDP growth in the EU; and in the world);8 measures of the real exchange rate (the CPI-based real exchange rate vis-à-vis Russia; and the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate); and measures of trade dependence (the share of exports to Russia; openness defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP).
It is also worth noting that other studies have examined related aspects of economic growth performances in the CIS countries. Loukoianova and Unigovskaya (2004), for instance, analyze recent growth developments in the low-income CIS countries using standard demand-side growth decompositions and growth accounting. Berengaut and others (2002) consider various possible explanations for the pickup in Ukraine's economic growth following several years of decline, such as increased utilization of the capital stock inherited from the Soviet period. Elborgh-Woytek (2003) documents the shift in trade by the CIS countries away from intra-CIS trade and toward the rest of the world, including notably the EU, and compares actual with potential trade.
Annual data for real GDP growth, CPI inflation, and government expenditures as a percentage of GDP were obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook database, which reflects the data used by country desk officers. These data are displayed in Figures 1-3. Figure 1 shows that the graphs of real GDP for most of the CIS countries exhibit a "smile" pattern, while the Baltics experienced an increasing output trajectory. Trends in real GDP data are extensively discussed in Campos and Coricelli (2002).9 Consumer price inflation data are displayed in Figure 2. They show in many cases rapid disinflation in the early 1990s and low inflation thereafter. Movements in government expenditure as a share of GDP— shown in Figure 3—are varied. Data describing initial conditions were taken from Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000). The reform index was obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) reform indices, which summarize a variety of indicators of reform progress.
Table 3 provides test statistics for the null hypothesis that the level of real GDP exhibits a unit root. Based on a presumption that real GDP series are trended, both a constant and a time trend are included in the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions.13 The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in 7 of 13 cases at the 5 percent level based on the DF test but in only 2 of 13 cases based on the ADF test. Using the specification that minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the tests reject the null hypothesis in 5 of 13 cases. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) t-bar test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that all cross-sectional units have a unit root based on either the DF or ADF test statistics. Given that the levels of real GDP for most countries appear to have a unit root, regressions will be estimated below using real GDP growth rates.
1 Dickey-Fuller regression were augmented by adding a single lag.
2 Based on minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
3 The critical value for the t-bar test at the 5 percent level is -2.74 (N=10, T=10).
Two well-known model evaluation and selection methods could alternatively have been used: (i) the general-to-specific approach associated with David Hendry and others;19 and (ii) the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach developed by Sala-i-Martin, Doppenhofer, and Miller (2004). However, these approaches do not seem well suited to the estimation problem in this paper, for the reasons discussed in Box 1.
The general-to-specific approach starts with a general model, such as equation (2), that includes current and lagged values of the dependent and independent variables, and considers multiple paths along which combinations of explanatory variables may be excluded based on standard statistical tests. It is a priori agnostic as to which combination of explanatory variables should be included in the regression, a quandary that led Berg and others (1999) to apply the general-to-specific methodology "loosely" by always simplifying first among time constants, then initial conditions, and finally policy variables. This appears well suited to the aim in Berg and others (1999) of disentangling the role and timing of macroeconomic and structural reform policies from initial conditions as explanations of economic growth performances in transition economies. In the present study, however, once the specification has been narrowed to exclude dynamics that appear excessively demanding given the short time series, the need to narrow the specification further is limited.
The BACE approach, developed to sort through a large number of possible explanatory variables suggested by alternative theories of economic growth by forming weighted averages of coefficient estimates based on all possible combinations of regressors, is agnostic as to the correct specification except for model size. The main issue of model specification in the present paper is rather that there are insufficient time-series observations to permit the estimation of dynamics.
Table 4 presents a comparison of results for a variety of different specifications that were estimated following the exclusion of lagged independent variables from the general model in equation (2). Results for the general model (albeit excluding lagged independent variables) are presented in column (1). This specification includes lagged own-country growth, country dummies, the CPI, government expenditure in percent of GDP, the EBRD structural reform index, EU growth, the real exchange rate, Russian growth, the trade openness ratio,20 and interactions between a post-Russian-crisis dummy variable and all of the other explanatory variables. This specification assumes that the structural break point was 1998; the dummy is equal to 0 prior to 1998 and 1 in 1998 and onwards. Additional results are presented below based on the alternative assumption that the break point occurred in 1999; structural change tests based on endogenizing the break point are also discussed. The coefficient on Russian growth is quite substantial (0.96) and significant.21 The coefficient on the Russian crisis dummy interacted with Russian growth is –0.91 and also highly significant. These results imply that, on average, a one percentage point increase in Russian growth was associated with a 0.96 percentage point increase in another country's growth rate, holding other factors constant, before the Russian crisis. After the crisis, this effect dropped to 0.05 percentage points and was not significantly different from zero. As described below, this finding is robust to changes in the set of included explanatory variables, use of initial conditions instead of country dummies, and many other specification choices.
1 T-statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates.
2 Regression (4) includes the CIS countries only (i.e., the Baltics are excluded).
3 Regression (5) includes the Baltic countries only (i.e., the CIS countries are excluded).
1 Regression (4) includes the CIS countries only (i.e., the Baltics are excluded).
2 Regression (5) includes the Baltic countries only (i.e., the CIS countries are excluded).
While countries' growth linkage to Russia fell on average following the Russian crisis, the own-country effect rose in 9 of 12 cases following the crisis. This is reflected in the many positive (and significant) coefficients on the interactions between the Russian crisis dummy and the country dummies. These results suggest that pickups in economic growth in the last few years are explained by own-country effects and do not appear to reflect higher growth in Russia.
Based on the results in column (1), the coefficient on CPI inflation is not significant and is near zero, as is the coefficient on the interaction between CPI inflation and the Russian crisis dummy. While the coefficient on government expenditure (as a percent of GDP) is also insignificant and essentially near zero, its interaction with the Russian crisis dummy is –0.5 and statistically significant. Growth in the EU has a negative coefficient (–2.9) and is significant prior to 1998, while in the 1998–2003 period it becomes insignificant and close to zero. The negative coefficient on EU growth during 1993–97 appears to be a statistical reflection of declining output in the CIS countries coincident with growth in the EU, whereas the finding that the coefficient on EU growth was insignificant during 1998-2003 suggests that the regression is capturing more than a shift in trade patterns. The coefficient on EU growth would need to become positive and significant if the results were just a reflection of the EU taking up the role that Russia used to play. Lagged Russian growth is not significant.
Estimation of an alternative specification, including initial condition measure IC2 (IC1 was not significant) but not country effects, is shown in column (2) of Table 4. The results are broadly similar to those obtained above. The estimated coefficient on Russian growth is 0.67 and highly significant prior to 1998, while thereafter it fell to 0.19 and was insignificant. Interestingly, estimated coefficients corresponding to the CPI and government expenditure in percent of GDP are statistically significant in this specification, although the coefficient on the CPI is still near zero. These findings are consistent with the observation above that the country fixed effects partly capture the effects of missing macroeconomic variables on each country's economic growth.
In contrast to the negative (expected) sign found by Havrylyshyn and others (1998), the estimated coefficient for initial conditions is positive and highly significant. In other words, unfavorable initial conditions appear to have had a persistent, depressing effect on growth in the model estimated by Havrylyshyn and others (1998), while in the present study they seem to have had a positive effect, probably by creating more incentives to "catch up." This difference is probably due to the different sample of countries and time periods (the sample used by Havrylyshyn and others, 1998, included transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and covered only the period up to 1997). Rerunning the regressions estimated by Havrylyshyn and others (1998) using the sample of countries and years included in the present study, the impact of initial conditions appears to be positive.
A regression equation including regional dummy variables (Baltics; the Caucasus and Moldova; and Central Asia—Belarus and Ukraine constitute the reference group) instead of country effects was also estimated. The equation includes the same variables as in column (1) except that all terms involving country dummies are omitted and the following variables involving regional dummies are added: (i) the regional dummies themselves; and (ii) regional dummies interacted with the Russian crisis dummy. Results reported in column (3) of Table 4 are broadly similar to the results in column (1).
The results are insensitive to the choice of whether the Baltics are included in the sample, which suggests importantly that the paper's findings are quite robust with respect to changes in the country sample. Column (4) of Table 4 presents estimates based on the previous specification but excluding the Baltics. The coefficient on growth in Russia is 1.37 and is highly significant while the coefficient on the Russian crisis dummy interacted with Russian growth is –1.32 and highly significant; their difference is 0.06 and is insignificant. For completeness, column (5) includes estimates using data only for the Baltics.
Two other variants are obtained by including a CPI-based bilateral real exchange rate vis-à-vis Russia either instead of, or in addition to, the multilateral real effective exchange rate index, in the previous specification. Results obtained by including these variables should be interpreted with care owing to several shortcomings in the calculation of these indices. For instance, real exchange rate measures are based on official exchange rates, whereas various countries (e.g., Belarus and Uzbekistan) have operated systems of multiple exchange rates. Moreover, while the CPI may be a highly inaccurate index of price competitiveness, possibly more appropriate indicators such as the producer price index (PPI) are not available for all countries and all years in the sample. With these caveats, results from these regressions—reported in columns (6) and (7) of Table 4—are very similar to those reported above for the key variables of interest. In column (7), for instance, the coefficient on Russian growth is 0.78 and highly significant prior to 1998, while it falls to 0.06 and becomes insignificant thereafter.
The table includes estimates for a variety of other specifications, results of which are all broadly similar for the key variables of interest—namely, Russian growth and its interaction with the crisis dummy. Column (8) provides estimates for a specification that excludes both country fixed effects and initial conditions. Possible nonlinearity in the response of growth to inflation is explored in column (9) by including INF, the natural logarithm of percent changes in CPI inflation, in place of CPI. The coefficient on (log) CPI inflation is still insignificant, while the coefficients on Russian growth are similar to those reported earlier, indicating that the results are robust to changes in the functional form. Column (10) includes estimates based on substituting world growth for EU growth. While the coefficient on world growth is insignificant, once again the coefficients on Russian growth are similar to the earlier results.
It is likely that the Russian crisis was associated with changes in the output linkages between Russia and the other CIS and Baltic countries, although the timing of changes in these relationships is somewhat uncertain. These changes probably occurred in either 1998 or 1999. To assess whether the choice of 1998 as the structural break point is appropriate and whether a different choice would affect the results, estimates are presented in Table 5 for the same specifications as in Table 4 but assuming that the break occurred in 1999 rather than 1998. The fit of these regressions is (except for the Baltics-only regression) uniformly worse using a break point of 1999 compared to regressions using a break point of 1998, as reflected in the lower values of the log-likelihood function, the higher values of the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the smaller number of significant t-statistics. While the coefficients are generally less precisely estimated using a break point of 1999, results are very similar in many respects to those presented in Table 4 above. In particular, the coefficient on Russian growth is broadly similar in magnitude to the estimates based on a 1998 break point and highly significant in all but one specification. However, the coefficient on the Russian crisis dummy interacted with Russian growth ranges widely and is no longer significant in any of the specifications. Moreover, the effect of Russian growth on growth in the other CIS and Baltic countries is not significantly different from zero following the break point in any of the specifications and the magnitude of the post-crisis effect varies widely.
1/ T-statistics are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates.
2/ Regression (4) includes the CIS countries only (i.e., the Baltics are excluded).
3/ Regression (5) includes the Baltic countries only (i.e., the CIS countries are excluded).
Taken together, these results provide support for the choice of 1998 as the structural break point. This finding may appear somewhat surprising in view of the fact that the authorities allowed the Russian ruble to float on August 17, 1998, leaving only a limited amount of time in the remainder of 1998 for the Russian crisis to influence the output linkages between Russia and the other CIS and Baltic countries. Upon further consideration, however, it seems reasonable that the break point could have been in 1998. Expectations appear to have converged by early 1998 that macroeconomic imbalances were emerging in Russia. Moreover, links between Russia and the other CIS and Baltic countries may have been disrupted even before the currency crisis by the same macroeconomic imbalances and financial sector vulnerabilities that eventually precipitated the crisis (see Owen and Robinson, 2003, Chapter 2).
To assess further the sensitivity of the results to changes in the break point, and notwithstanding the prior information, Andrews's (1993) Sup W, Sup LM, and Sup LR tests—which allow for uncertainty regarding the break point—were applied to assess whether there was a structural break using a range of possible break points. These tests also have power against alternatives that involve gradual changes in regression coefficients. Results of these tests did not allow to reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy, either for the entire coefficient vector or for the coefficient on Russian growth. Reflecting partly the limited number of observations, the data set provides insufficient information either to reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy or to accept it based upon the tests proposed by Andrews. The reason for this indeterminacy is also related to the fact that these tests are based on sums of squared regression residuals; imprecision in the estimation of coefficients on the many control variables in the model appears to have contaminated the findings concerning the constancy of the coefficient on Russian real GDP growth. In contrast, the standard tests of constancy of the coefficient on Russian real GDP growth presented above are not contaminated in this way, suggesting that the standard tests are more reliable in this context.
As noted above, inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the error components model leads to a bias in least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimators. Arellano and Bond (1991) and others provide consistent instrumental variables estimators for this model. In Table 6, results based on LSDV estimation, presented in column (1), are compared with results based on Arellano-Bond estimation in column (11) and for an alternative specification in column (12).22 Coefficients on Russian growth are broadly comparable to those obtained using LSDV estimation, although the coefficient is significant only in one of two specifications. Arellano-Bond estimates of the coefficient on the interaction between the crisis dummy and Russian growth are also comparable to the LSDV estimates and are significant in both specifications.23 Results of the Sargan test do not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions underlying the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation method are satisfied, suggesting that the instruments are valid. Finally, the null hypotheses of second-order serially uncorrelated errors are not rejected, fulfilling a necessary condition for consistency of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure. Column (13) presents Arellano-Bond estimates that also correct for possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables CPI and EXP, using one-period lagged values of these variables as instruments. These estimates are very similar to estimates based on the assumption that the explanatory variables are exogenous. While the Arellano-Bond estimator is consistent under the stated assumptions, it may nevertheless exhibit large bias in finite samples and will have higher standard errors than ordinary least-squares. Therefore, even the endogeneity-corrected coefficient estimates presented in Table 6 need to be treated with caution and should not necessarily be presumed superior to the LSDV estimates presented in Table 4.
1 Arellano and Bond, 1991.
2 Coefficient estimates in this column assume that CPI and EXP are endogenous. First-order lagged values of these variables are used as instruments.
3 These figures refer to p-values instead of t-statistics.
For the random effects model, estimates of the variance of the random country effect μi were negative. As discussed in Baltagi (2001), this problem occurs only when the true variance is small and close to zero. In these circumstances, the generalized least squares estimator for the random effects model reduces to ordinary least squares.
Disruptions in trade and financial flows are two candidates for explaining the drop in the effect of Russian economic growth on growth in the other CIS and Baltic countries. The Russian crisis reduced Russia's demand for imports. Capital flows into the region declined as well, both as a result of reduced Russian investment and reflecting the sharp cutbacks in international capital flows into emerging markets generally in response to the crisis.24 Worker remittances from Russia to the other CIS countries may also have been affected by the crisis. An alternative explanation for the declining effect of changes in Russian real GDP growth on growth in the other CIS countries could be transition-related effects (see for instance Havrylyshyn, 2001, pp. 54–56). In 1993–98, real GDP in the CIS countries may have fallen together due to transition effects. Once these effects had begun to play themselves out, output may have rebounded at different rates.
Concerning trade flows, Figure 4 (and Appendix Table 2) shows that merchandise exports from the CIS and Baltic countries to Russia, as a percent of their total merchandise exports, were generally on a declining trend during 1993–2003. The drop in exports to Russia as a share of total exports during 1997–99 was pronounced for the Baltics, whereas for the CIS countries it was more gradual and started prior to the crisis. As noted above, the share of exports to Russia in total exports was statistically insignificant in alternative specifications of the growth regressions reported in Section VII above.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade database; Fund staff estimates.
Aggregate growth decompositions provide little support for the hypothesis that net external demand played a crucial role in economic growth of the CIS and Baltic countries (Appendix Table 3).25 External demand usually was not a large factor in accounting for real GDP growth and the effects of the Russian crisis on real GDP growth via external demand are not very evident. Exports to Russia generally contributed only a small amount to real GDP growth in these countries and there is little evidence that this contribution declined following the Russian crisis.26 Notwithstanding these aggregate figures, it would be premature to discard the hypothesis that a decline in Russian export demand helps explain lower growth in the other CIS countries and the decline in growth correlations. Although exports to Russia did not account for a large portion of their growth directly, indirect effects that are difficult to capture may be even more important than the direct effects. Specifically, export production generates purchases of domestically produced inputs whose value added contributes to GDP.
While net capital inflows did slow markedly during the crisis (Figure 5), data on capital inflows from Russia are unavailable.27 It is reasonable to suppose that at least some of the additional capital (and other foreign exchange) flows into Russia in the post-crisis period were invested in other CIS countries which, if true, might tend to strengthen rather than weaken the growth linkages.
Sources: IMF Balance of Payments database, national authorities, and Fund staff estimates.
This paper has investigated whether the growth linkages between Russia and the other CIS and Baltic countries have become weaker over time, particularly following the 1998 Russian crisis. After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the countries faced severe output shocks and implemented far-reaching macroeconomic and structural reforms, which have proceeded at different speeds. The resulting economic, social, and political transformation has led to a substantial reorientation of production and trade away from other former republics and toward other trading partners.
To investigate whether these growth linkages have weakened, the paper specified an econometric model which includes standard determinants of growth identified in the literature on transition economies (initial conditions, macroeconomic variables, and measures of progress with structural reform) as well as the economic growth rate of what had been the leader and dominant player in the region—Russia. The model also allows for the effects of Russian growth to vary over time, in particular between the periods before and after the Russian crisis. A variety of sensitivity tests were performed on the resulting econometric estimates.
Based on this methodology, the paper found that indeed Russian economic growth was a significant determinant of economic growth in the other CIS and Baltic countries in the period prior to the Russian crisis, with each percentage point of additional growth in Russia leading to around 0.8–0.9 percentage points of additional growth in the other countries on average and holding other factors constant. Beginning in 1998, a 1 percentage point increase in Russian real GDP appears to have induced an increase in the real GDP of the other CIS and Baltic countries of less than 0.2 percentage points on average. Moreover, this link was statistically insignificant in the period starting in 1998, the most likely break point given the data. These findings are quite robust with respect to the choice of explanatory variables and estimation methods. While there may have been substantial variations in the extent to which countries saw their growth links with Russia fall after the Russian crisis, the results indicate that on average this drop was statistically significant. These findings should however be interpreted with care in light of substantial weaknesses in the data and the limited number of time-series observations.
Exploring the role of trade and financial flows as growth channels at an aggregate level did not yield a clear-cut explanation for why the link between Russian economic growth and growth in other CIS and Baltic countries fell substantially in the post-crisis period. Exports to Russia fell quite a lot over time, albeit gradually and starting prior to the crisis. Net external demand generally, and exports to Russia in particular, did not, in most cases, account for a large proportion of real GDP growth even before the crisis. However, indirect effects of trade on growth are difficult to measure and may even exceed the direct effects. Capital flows were clearly affected by the crisis in many countries but there is little information on how Russian investment into neighboring countries may have been affected. Further investigation into the links between trade and financial flows in the region are needed, possibly at a disaggregated level, in order to explain the apparently significant break in economic growth links that this paper found in the post-crisis period. An alternative explanation discussed in the paper is that output fell during 1993–98 due to transition effects, resulting in a high correlation, but that countries rebounded at different rates.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade and World Economic Outlook databases; Fund staff estimates.
AgénorPierre–RichardC. JohnMcDermott and Eswar S.Prasad1999 "Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Developing Countries: Some Stylized Facts" IMF Working Paper 99/35 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
AndrewsDonald W.K.1993 "Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Unknown Change Point" EconometricaVol. 61No. 4 (July) pp. 821–56.
ArellanoManuel and StephenBond1991 "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations" Review of Economic StudiesVol. 58 (April) pp. 277–97.
AroraVivek and AthanasiosVamvakidis2004 "The Impact of U.S. Economic Growth on the Rest of the World: How Much Does It Matter?" Journal of Economic IntegrationVol. 19 (March) pp. 1–18.
AroraVivek and AthanasiosVamvakidis2005a "How Much Do Trading Partners Matter for Economic Growth?" IMF Staff PapersVol. 52No. 1 pp. 24–40.
AroraVivek and AthanasiosVamvakidis2005b "The Implications of South African Economic Growth for the Rest of Africa" IMF Working Paper 05/58 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
BackusDavid K. and Patrick J.Kehoe1992 "International Evidence on the Historical Properties of Business Cycles" American Economic ReviewVol. 82No. 4 (September) pp. 864–88.
BackusDavid K.Patrick J.Kehoe and Finn E.Kydland1992 "International Real Business Cycles" Journal of Political EconomyVol. 100No. 4 (August) pp. 745–75.
BaltagiBadi H.2001Econometric Analysis of Panel DataSecond Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.).
BerengautJulianErik DeVrijerKatrinElborgh-WoytekMarkLewis and BogdanLissovolik2002 "An Interim Assessment of Ukrainian Output Developments, 2000-01" IMF Working Paper 02/97 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
BergAndrewEduardoBorenszteinRatnaSahay and JerominZettlemeyer1999 "The Evolution of Output in Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences" IMF Working Paper 99/73 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
CamposNauro F. and FabrizioCoricelli2002 "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should" Journal of Economic LiteratureVol. 40No. 3 (September) pp. 793–836.
DoyleBrian M. and JonFaust2002 "An Investigation of Co-Movements Among the Growth Rates of the G–7 Countries" Federal Reserve BulletinOctober pp. 427–37.
Elborgh-WoytekKatrin2003 "Of Openness and Distance: Trade Developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1993–2002" IMF Working Paper 03/207 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
EricssonNeil R.JuliaCampos and Hong-AnhTran1990 "PC-GIVE and David Hendry's Econometric Methodology" Revista de EconometriaVol. 10No. 1 (April) pp. 7–117.
FischerStanleyRatnaSahay and Carlos A.Végh1998 "From Transition to Market: Evidence and Growth Prospects" IMF Working Paper 98/52 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
HausmanJerry A. and William E.Taylor1981 "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects" EconometricaVol. 49No. 6 (November) pp. 1377–98.
HavrylyshynOleh2001 "Recovery and Growth in Transition: A Decade of Evidence" IMF Staff PapersVol. 48 (Special Issue) pp. 53–87.
HavrylyshynOlehIvailoIzvorski and Ronvan Rooden1998 "Recovery and Growth in Transition Economies 1990–97: A Stylized Regression Analysis" IMF Working Paper 98/141 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
HavrylyshynOleh and Ron vanRooden2000 "Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies" IMF Working Paper 00/70 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
HelblingThomas and TamimBayoumi2003 "Are They All in the Same Boat? The 2000-2001 Growth Slowdown and the G–7 Business Cycle Linkages" IMF Working Paper 03/46 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
ImKyung SoM. HashemPesaran and YongcheolShin2003 "Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels" Journal of EconometricsVol. 115No. 1 (July) pp. 53–74.
International Monetary Fund1999Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/140 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
JohnsonSimonDanielKaufmann and AndreiShleifer1997 "The Unofficial Economy in Transition" Brookings Papers on Economic ActivityVol. 2 pp. 159–239.
LoukoianovaElena and AnnaUnigovskaya2004 "Analysis of Recent Growth in Low-Income CIS Countries" IMF Working Paper 04/151 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
MaddalaG.S. and In-MooKim1998Unit Roots Cointegration and Structural Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
MichalopoulosConstantine1999 "The Integration of Transition Economies into the World Trading System" Policy Research Working Paper No. 2182 (Washington: The World Bank).
MichalopoulosConstantine and David G.Tarreds.1994Trade in the New Independent States Studies of Economies in Transformation No. 13 (Washington: The World Bank).
OwenDavid and David O.Robinson2003Russia Rebounds (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Sala-i-MartinXavierGernotDoppelhofer and Ronald I.Miller2004 "Determinants of Long-term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach" American Economic ReviewVol. 94No. 4 (September) pp. 813–35.
The authors would like to thank Balázs Horvath, Gabriela Inchauste, Shigeru Iwata, Yuko Kinoshita, Vitali Kramarenko, Nienke Oomes, and Mika Saito for helpful comments and suggestions.
Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994, Chapter 1) describe the sharp contractions in trade and output during the period immediately following the breakup of the former Soviet Union, including due to the collapse of the trade agreements of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991 and other serious impediments to interstate trade including payments problems, massive terms of trade shifts, export restraints, state trading and imperfect competition, and an erratic framework of regional trade preferences and discrimination. These impediments to trade were gradually dismantled. Michalopoulos (1999) reviews the subsequent trade and trade policy developments.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an economic alliance of 12 of the former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The Baltic countries consist of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
See Baltagi (2001), Chapter 2.
See, for instance, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Backus and Kehoe (1992), Agénor, McDermott, and Prasad (1999), Doyle and Faust (2002), and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003).
These studies are surveyed by Havrylyshyn (2001), who also summarizes the large literature that explores possible reasons for the output collapse in the former Soviet Union during the early 1990s and describes how numerous studies containing growth regressions have attempted to control for these explanatory factors.
As explained by Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998, p. 14), IC1 includes: repressed inflation, the black market premium, trade dependency, market memory, existence as an independent state prior to 1989, and location. IC2 includes: 1989 per capita income, the level of urbanization and over-industrialization, prior economic growth, and the richness of natural resources.
This may introduce some multicollinearity into the regression because EU and world growth may also affect Russian growth.
Their survey describes the growth performances of the transition countries, reviews the theoretical macroeconomic literature on transition, and assesses whether the empirical literature supports the theory.
Many countries do however incorporate—albeit partially—an estimate of the underground economy into their official GDP data. See Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) for estimates of the unofficial economy in transition countries.
Measures of fiscal deficits appeared to suffer from greater problems of non-comparability across countries and over time than the government expenditure measures due to breaks in series.
See IMF (1999) for a description of weaknesses in the data for Turkmenistan.
The ADF regressions include one lag. It is also possible that the trend is nonlinear, reflecting transition effects.
See for instance Baltagi (2001), Chapter 8. As discussed there, Arellano and Bond (1991) and others develop estimators that avoid this inconsistency by using instrumental variables.
Under the assumption of fixed country effects, the restrictions that the sums of the μi s and dtμi s are equal to zero need to be imposed on the estimation of equation (2) to avoid the dummy variable trap. Initial conditions must also be excluded from xit under the assumption of fixed effects (but can be included under the assumption of random effects) since the initial conditions vary across countries but not over time and hence are perfectly collinear with the country effects.
Maddala and Kim (1998, p. 398) argue that prior information on the regime switch point should be used if it is available—asking the question of whether there was a structural change around that period—rather than simply endogenizing the breakpoint.
Results for this general model, including lags for all explanatory variables, are available from the authors upon request.
Results should be interpreted with caution since lagged explanatory variables may be important.
For a review, see for instance Ericsson, Campos, and Tran (1990).
Alternative specifications were also estimated that included exports to Russia as a proportion of the country's total exports but this variable was not statistically significant.
This result is broadly consistent with the finding in Arora and Vamvakidis (2005a) that a 1 percentage point increase in economic growth of trading partners is correlated with as much as a 0.8 percentage point increase in domestic growth.
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimates presented in Table 6 correspond to a one-step procedure, using one-period lags of the independent variables as instruments. Results using a two-step procedure and robust standard errors are similar to those presented in Table 6.
The Arellano-Bond procedure uses first differences of strictly exogenous regressors as instruments and hence time-invariant strictly exogenous regressors such as the country fixed effects drop out.
Reductions in capital flows would lead to simultaneous reductions in Russian and other CIS countries' growth but do not necessarily provide a reason why a decline in Russian growth would cause a decline in other CIS countries' growth.
Strictly speaking, only net exports should be compared with GDP. Caution is needed in comparing exports and GDP because the former includes the imported intermediate inputs used to produce exports whereas the latter includes only value added. In addition, the data underlying these decompositions are subject to substantial shortcomings such as weaknesses in the expenditure decomposition of GDP.
The contribution of exports to Russia from one of the CIS and Baltic countries is estimated as follows: 100×Δ[(XRt/Xt)xt]/yt−1 where XRt and Xt are the values of exports to Russia and total exports of merchandise, respectively, xt is real total exports of goods and services, and yt−1 is real GDP.


text:
CommentEditorial
comment, editorial,
It used to be said that painting the Sydney Harbour Bridge was a full-time job. Crews would begin the mammoth task at one end of the famous landmark and, day by day, painstakingly work their way to the other. And by the time they finished the job, years later, crews would simply go back to the beginning and start all over again. It was same for the Tyne Bridge, Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Forth Road Bridge, near Edinburgh. Wollongong City Council's roads and gardens crews must know how they felt. A wet winter has been welcomed by most residents in a community that still has vivid memories of the bushfires which ripped through the south coast and Kangaroo Valley in 2019. But with spring now here and the weather starting to warm, those same wet months have sparked an explosion in vegetation growth in public reserves and on roadsides right across the Illawarra. You don't have to go far to find metre-high grass that's creating an eyesore and potential haven for snakes and other critters. Not to mention our grass verges and playing fields that are saturated and full of puddles. Labor Councillor Janice Kershaw knows too well how treacherous it can be walking on wet nature strips with no footpaths. On Saturday, she suffered a bad fall in Stanwell Park while campaigning for the upcoming council elections on December 4. Unfortunately, she slipped on wet grass, broke her ankle, and needed emergency surgery on Sunday. Residents of Northern Illawarra have warned that more footpaths are needed in the area, particularly where children are walking home from school. Janice admitted that her fall had highlighted the need for allocating spending on footpaths. With the council election coming up, there's a chance for the local community to have their voices heard, loud and clear. And, when it comes to rain, it's worth remembering that we have a lot more to complain about when it doesn't fall than when it does. - Gayle Tomlinson The Illawarra Mercury newsroom is funded by our readers. You can subscribe to support our journalism here. Sign up for breaking news emails below ...
/images/transform/v1/crop/frm/e5Qc2M5qQnfX3PTaVNk9Vy/7b880c30-2576-46cc-9465-54b39465c3bb.JPG/r2_92_1712_1058_w1200_h678_fmax.jpg
When rain halts the campaign
Gayle Tomlinson
Cr Janice Kershaw and her husband Craig.
It used to be said that painting the Sydney Harbour Bridge was a full-time job.
Crews would begin the mammoth task at one end of the famous landmark and, day by day, painstakingly work their way to the other.
And by the time they finished the job, years later, crews would simply go back to the beginning and start all over again. It was same for the Tyne Bridge, Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Forth Road Bridge, near Edinburgh.
Wollongong City Council's roads and gardens crews must know how they felt.
A wet winter has been welcomed by most residents in a community that still has vivid memories of the bushfires which ripped through the south coast and Kangaroo Valley in 2019.
But with spring now here and the weather starting to warm, those same wet months have sparked an explosion in vegetation growth in public reserves and on roadsides right across the Illawarra.
You don't have to go far to find metre-high grass that's creating an eyesore and potential haven for snakes and other critters. Not to mention our grass verges and playing fields that are saturated and full of puddles.
Labor Councillor Janice Kershaw knows too well how treacherous it can be walking on wet nature strips with no footpaths.
On Saturday, she suffered a bad fall in Stanwell Park while campaigning for the upcoming council elections on December 4.
Unfortunately, she slipped on wet grass, broke her ankle, and needed emergency surgery on Sunday.
Residents of Northern Illawarra have warned that more footpaths are needed in the area, particularly where children are walking home from school. Janice admitted that her fall had highlighted the need for allocating spending on footpaths.
With the council election coming up, there's a chance for the local community to have their voices heard, loud and clear.
And, when it comes to rain, it's worth remembering that we have a lot more to complain about when it doesn't fall than when it does.
- Gayle Tomlinson
The Illawarra Mercury newsroom is funded by our readers. You can subscribe to support our journalism here.
Sign up for breaking news emails below ...


text:
Q: How to restrict access to nuget package? I'm uploading a new package to NuGet but I would like to restrict the access to it for only a group of people using a user and password combination or something like that. I can not see a way to do this on the NuGet docs and haven't found something similar here on stackoverflow. Please help

A: You'll need to use a nuget hosting service, such as https://www.myget.org/


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Due to the flexible nature of the Carbonwave heaters it is extremely unlikely that they would be damaged in transit or throughout the lifetime of their use. The Carbonwave heaters have a much lower surface temperature to a ceramic tube. This makes it possible to touch the heater during use without being burnt, which results in a safer sauna experience for the whole family.
The Carbonwave heaters have been externally tested and shown to produce a maximum infrared output in the 6-14mm range. The peak infrared output of the human body is around 10mm , which directly corresponds to the infrared output created using the Carbonwave heaters.
The heating surface area of the Carbonwave heaters are typically 35-50 times higher when compared to saunas using ceramic tube heaters. This increased surface area provides an even heat distribution and can provide an improved coverage of infrared within the sauna. The larger surface area helps envelope the user and reduce any colder spots in the sauna.
The Carbonwave heaters have been RoHS tested to show that hazardous substances (such as mercury, lead, cadmium) have not been used in the equipment. Furthermore, electrical wiring is protected by a steel conduit to ensure that any electromagnetic fields are reduced to an extremely safe level.
Note: As both heating technologies will emit heat from the front and rear of the heater element the comparison compares just the internal facing surface area of the heaters.


MPN Does Not Apply. UPC Does not apply. Pre-Owned Condition, Mismatched and worn.
A PAIR OF PRADA SHOE DUST COVERS FOR PROTECTION. DRAW STRING CLOSING. WHITE BRUSHED COTTON.
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HOTTER DRAWSTRING SHOE BAG, GREY WITH BRANDING, 15 x 15", PROTECTION/CARE/COVER!
THE BAG FEATURES A GREY CORD STRING WHICH CAN BE TIGHTENED TO CLOSE THE BAG. THIS ITEM IS A LOVELY, LIGHTWEIGHT SHOE BAG, WITH A DRAWSTRING CLOSURE. IT'S IDEAL FOR STORING SHOES AWAY WHEN NOT IN USE, FOR KEEPING THEM CLEAN/IN GOOD CONDITION, OR JUST FOR GENERAL USE.
For safe storage and transportation of your running shoes, spikes or trainers this More Mile Shoe Bag is a great choice. Clothing Footwear. We take pride in supporting grassroots sport whenever we can and are proud to support a number of up and coming athletes.
LANVIN DESIGNER DUST BAG x 2. BLACK Brushed cotton. White inside.
1 Schuhbeutel von Nike Football mit Kordeldurchzug oben und Kordeln seitlich zur Nutzung als Rucksack schwarz mit Aufdruck in orange innen oben große Tasche mit Reißverschluss für Schlüssel, Geldbeutel etc. ca. 39 x 32 cm POLYESTERGEWEBE guter gebrauchter Zustand dies ist ein Privatverkauf !Keine Garantie, keine Rücknahme. bei Kauf von mehreren Artikeln, die in einer Sendung versandt werden können, natürlich Versandkosten nur für diese Sendung! Ich berechne immer die günstigste Versandart !
Auch für Schuhe bis Schuhgröße 49/50 anzuwenden. 38 x 23 cm.
3 off HOTTER, COMFORT CONCEPT, SHOE DUST BAGS.
Halfar Schuhtasche, grau. mit Tragegriff. Seit 01.01.02 haftet ein Verkäufer 2 Jahre lang für Sachmängel. Gewicht ca. 180 Gramm.
TOD's, England. braun mit orangefarbenem Emblem.
For safe storage and transportation of your running shoes, spikes or trainers this More Mile Shoe Bag is a great choice. We take pride in supporting grassroots sport whenever we can and are proud to support a number of up and coming athletes.
AUTHENTIC CHANEL / CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN PARIS DRAWSTRING SHOE DUST BAG LOT!!!
UP FOR SALE IS A LOT OF AUTHENTIC CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED / CHANEL DRAWSTRING SHOE DUST BAG LOT! YOU GET 4 LARGE BAGS 11.5"W X 14.5"L!
Set of 2 NEW CHANEL Dust Bags for Shoes,Boots or Clutch Purse 11.5 x 13.3/4"
CHANEL black string tie dust bags, with white CHANEL logo printed on one side of each bag. CHANEL DUST BAGS FOR SHOES OR CLUTCH PURSE. SET OF 2 NEW.
New Authentic Christian Louboutin Red Fabric Shoe Dust Bag Cover 9" x 14"
Set of 2 NEW CHANEL Dust Bags for Shoes or Clutch Purse 7.3/4 x 12.5"
Weiche Flanell. Unten finden Sie eine automatische Übersetzung ins Deutsche. _gsrx_vers_841 (GS 7.0.16 (841)). Great Pre-Owned Zustand.
Set of 2 NEW CHANEL Dust Bags for Shoes or Clutch Purse 8.1/4 x 14.5"
CHANEL black string tie dust bags, with white CHANEL logo printed on one side of each bag. CHANEL DUST BAGS FOR FLATS SHOES OR CLUTCH PURSE. SET OF 2 NEW.
Unten finden Sie eine automatische Übersetzung ins Deutsche. UPC Does not apply.
CHANEL Dust Bag for Flats Shoes or Clutch Purse 8.1/4 x 14.5"
CHANEL Dust Bag for Flats Shoes or Clutch Purse 7.3/4 x 12.5"
NEW CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN WHITE DUST BAG FOR SHOES CLUTHCES 11.5 x 15.5"
NEW Christian Louboutin Red Dust Bag for shoes or clutch purse 11.3/4 x 15.5"
CHANEL Dust Bag for Shoes,Boots or Clutch Purse 11.5 x 13.3/4"
NEW CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED DUST BAG LINING SILK FOR SHOES CLUTCHES 9.5 x 14"
New Authentic Philipp Plein Large Dust Bag Storage Bag Storage Travel 24" x 16"
Set of 2 Christian Louboutin Red Dust Bag for shoes or clutch purse 9 x 14"
SET OF 2 NEW CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN DUST BAGS FOR SHOES OR CLUTCH PURSE. Christian Louboutin Paris black logo printed on one side of each bag.
Bottega Veneta 8X15". Christian Louboutin 8.5x14". DVF Diane von Furstenberg 10x15.5".
Christian Louboutin Red Shoe Dust Bags 100% Authentic 15in X 11in It's 2 Shoe Dust Bags, one for the left and one for the right. Any questions or concerns feel free to ask.
ECCO Premium Golf Shoe Bag Black and Red. Pre-owned and in excellent condition! Main pocket with divider plus pocket on other side for socks or accessories. See all photos! Shipped with USPS Priority Mail. My feedback is perfect so buy with confidence!
We are a professional manufacturer for hunting and fishing and cycling products based in Guangzhou, China. Premium zipper shoe storage bag with top carry handle, strong, lightweight, durable and portable.
Each has a pull string to one side and the gold lettering in the front. Material is a soft cotton.
Set of 2 CHANEL Dust Bags SMALL black string tie for Flats Shoes or Clutch Purse NEW Authentic!
2 LAUREN Ralph Lauren Shoe Bags Drawstring bags Travel Shoe Bag Green 13" X 10"
Protect clothing from shoes in your suitcase, with these travel bags by LAUREN Ralph Lauren. You will never want to travel without the protection of these shoe bags. These travel bags are perfect for keeping your shoes from getting dusty in your closet.
Set of 2 CHANEL Dust Bags SMALL black string tie for Shoes or Purse NEW Authentic!
White Christian Louboutin Dust Bag BooShoe Storage Bag Storage Travel 23" X 22". Shipped with USPS Priority Mail. Free shipping applies to US lower 48 states only. All others request quote.


text:
The master of a raw and shambolic fusion of rockabilly, blues, and fractured noise, Tav Falco, along with the Cramps, anticipated the fractured but hard-hitting blues wailing of the Gories and the Jon Spencer Blues Explosion by close to a decade. Born in Philadelphia and raised in Arkansas, Falco moved to Memphis, Tennessee in 1973 and introduced himself to the city's creative community as a filmmaker and performance artist while supporting himself with a variety of odd jobs. While making documentary films on blues artists in Tennessee and Mississippi (including a piece on R.L. Burnside shot at his legendary juke joint in 1974), Falco was inspired to pick up the guitar, though his first on-stage performance with the instrument involved him destroying a six-string with a chain saw. - Mark Deming
Tav Falco – Cabaret of Daggers
Tav Falco – A Tav Falco Christmas
Tav Falco's Panther Burns – Me & My Chauffeur Blues b/w Whistle Blower Blues
Tav Falco's Panther Burns – Sway b/w Where The Rio De Rosa Flows


text:
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Law School Advisor - 14th October 2019
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Sydney Law School Popular Programs Undergraduate Degree Program, Bachelor of Laws (LLB): Bachelor of Laws program is taught in combination with arts, commerce, economics, engineering or science. The Sydney LLB provides first class legal education for a career in a dynamic global environment. Alongside a partner degree in arts, commerce,...
Introduction Melbourne Law School (MLS or Melbourne Law) is one of the professional graduate schools of the University of Melbourne. Located in Carlton, Victoria, MLS is Australia's oldest law school, and offers J.D., LL.M, Ph.D, and LL.D degrees. The University of Melbourne Law School has been ranked seventh in the...
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Andrea married Aaron so he could get his mining company house, but now she wants an annulment.
Catherine immediately falls in love with tall, hunky miner, Harold. She wants to marry him, but there is one "meowly" little problem.
Brought to Jubilee Springs after the death of her mother, Bessie, a confirmed spinster meets Zeb, a decisive, impatient rancher who is NOT pushing forty.
I'm not a fun person—I tend to be serious.
go to a social party.
to create new block designs.
digital cameras and photo-editing programs.
I love to create digital memes, banners and blog post headers.
I belong to my county genealogical society.


I have been teaching for the last 16 years in the New York City School system. I am certified in Special Education. I teach and reinforce student skills in academic areas including mathematics, science, social studies, reading, writing, and communication. I also evaluate different forms of assessment considerations into lesson plans. I break down the work for each individual student for his or her own style of learning. I have also worked as an in-school suspension teacher.


text:
Cheap Thrills, June 19-25
By Gerry Galipault , Herald-Tribune
/ Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Tonic plays Shephard's Beach Resort in Clearwater Beach on Saturday. (Courtesy photo)
Hearthstone Thursdays at Growler's Pub — 9 p.m. Thursday (June 19). Test your skill in the "Heroes of Warcraft" online card game; there will be a bracket competition. Bring an iPad or laptop in order to play. 2831 N. Tamiami Trail, Sarasota.
Onshore Offshore Boat Show — Friday-Sunday (June 20-22). Bradenton Area Convention Center, One Haben Blvd., Palmetto. New boats, boating accessories, fishing gear, and new this year, the Captain Joe Fishing School seminars. $5. Kids ages 12 and under free. Free parking. Show hours: 10 a.m.-6 p.m. Fri.-Sat.; 10 a.m.-5 p.m. Sun. onshoreoffshoreboatshow.com.
22nd annual Downtown Venice Craft Festival — 10 a.m.-4 p.m. Saturday-Sunday (June 21-22). Along Miami Avenue in downtown Venice. Free. (561) 746-6615; artfestival.com.
Myakka Band — 5-8 p.m. Saturday (June 21). The versatile quartet, which plays a mix of bluegrass, classic rock, blues and R&B, plays Snook Haven during the dinner hour. The group is led by Brad and Lisa Fitzgerald. Free. 5000 E. Venice Ave., Venice. 485-7221; snookhaven.com; myakkamusic.com.
Tonic — 11 p.m. Saturday (June 21). The Grammy-nominated pop-rockers (remember "If You Could Only See"?) will play Shephard's Beach Resort, 619 S. Gulfview Blvd. in Clearwater Beach; tickets are $10. (727) 442-5107; facebook.com/ShephardsBeach.
"Amazing Grace" — 10 a.m. Sunday (June 22). Bee Ridge Presbyterian Church's Paul Alexander will lead a collection of arrangements of America's favorite hymn at 4826 McIntosh Road, Sarasota. "Amazing Grace" will be celebrated in unique and inspiring ways on the piano, organ and with choral accompaniment. Come early for refreshments, 9-9:45 a.m., in Keys Hall. 504-3818; beeridgechurch.com.
Last modified: July 3, 2014
Spotlight on the Arts: Aug. 25
Theater Review: Play festival winner struggles to find its focus


text:
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/TearJerker/TheLastNarutoTheMovie
This is based on opinion. Please don't list it on a work's trope example list.
Tear Jerker / The Last: Naruto the Movie
Create New - Create New - Analysis FanficRecs FanWorks Haiku Headscratchers ImageLinks PlayingWith Quotes Recap ReferencedBy Synopsis Timeline
In a movie about love, you must have some of these.
The pain in this moment cannot be explained in words.
The beginning of the movie has shades of this, because despite being the hero of Konoha and the whole world, Naruto still returns to a lonely home.
Naruto's realization at the end of his and Hinata's merged memory-recalling dream sequence. As he stares forlornly at Hinata's paper with his name on it, you can tell that he's berating himself for being blind all this time. Remember that Naruto spent most of his childhood trying to be acknowledged by the entire village, but he now realizes in doing that, he didn't know that someone has acknowledged him from the very beginning, long before Iruka did, and has admired and loved him for the way he is since the day they met—Hinata. All those years alone because he was so dense that he never noticed Hinata's love for him, and you can see the despair on his face because he knows now that he could have spent his childhood with her, instead of being alone and hated by everyone else.
Worse still, anyone who's followed the series knows that, similar to Naruto, Hinata spent most of her own childhood alone, within her own clan.
Hinata's depression over Hanabi's kidnapping. Even as Naruto tries to lift her spirits by reminding her that she came to the moon to save her sister, Hinata still thinks she's not doing enough, calling herself a "terrible big sister" and regretting leaving Hanabi alone.
The first half of the second act is ironically bittersweet, because while Naruto is being incredibly obvious in showing his feelings for Hinata, Hinata had already decided to stop pursuing him after she thought Kushina's green scarf was from another woman. This, combined with Hinata prioritizing Hanabi over everything else, sets up the moment in the above picture in the second half.
Naruto confesses his love to Hinata just moments before Toneri arrives. She coldly, unexpectedly, "rejects" him and goes with Toneri out of duty to deal with him herself, leaving Naruto too stunned to say anything for a few moments. Then, he screams her name in anguish, so loudly that it was heard clearly all the way back to the camp where the others were. He chases after her and Toneri and demands that he give her back, unable to hide the pain from his voice. It only gets worse as Toneri taunts him that he and Hinata are going to get married, with Naruto begging Hinata to tell him that everything that just transpired is all a lie. Because she has already made up her mind to save Hanabi at any cost, Hinata averts her eyes and stays silent. The look on Naruto's face says everything—you can visibly see his heart breaking.
Seeing his opponent has lost his will to fight, Toneri drains Naruto's chakra and uses it to hit him with the blast it creates. Then he uses a green orb to knock Hinata out. The last thing Naruto and Hinata see before they both lose consciousness is the person they love the most drifting away from them. Especially Naruto's lifeless eyes and defeated facial expression as he falls towards Earth. The scene ends with the red scarf burning up, symbolizing Naruto and Hinata's broken bond.
Naruto's demand that Toneri "give(s) Hinata back" is a Call-Back to him demanding that Orochimaru "give Sasuke back" in the Sai and Sasuke arc. Only this time, there's no anger in his voice—just desperation.
It's even sadder if you look at this scene in context. Naruto has spent most of his childhood alone with no friends, no family and almost everyone hating him for no reason. However at this point, he's realized that ever since the day they met, Hinata has always acknowledged, admired, loved, and cared about him. And then you remember that after Hinata brought Naruto out of despair following Neji's Heroic Sacrifice, he thanked her for staying by his side. The thought of this person abandoning you, only two days after you finally realize just how important this person has always been to you, will really put someone down.
Hinata: (coldly) Naruto-kun... Goodbye...
Naruto's reaction and subsequent depression can really hit close to home to anyone who has ever confessed their feelings to the person of their affections, whether it's your own One True Love or whether you're asking them to be your date at a school dance or to be your significant other...only to get coldly rejected.
On the other side of this, Hinata has just found out that Naruto is in love with her. Toneri then shows up and unfortunately for Naruto, Hinata has already committed to a plan to rescue Hanabi, offering herself away as Toneri's bride so that she can be inside the enemy's base. Because of this, she chooses to reject Naruto's Love Confession, something she has been waiting almost her entire life for, but then has to watch as Toneri blasts Naruto away, potentially even killing him. Needless to say, those four days away from Naruto were probably eating away at her. Which is why when she is later reunited with Naruto, she apologizes to him for hurting his feelings, though Naruto understands why she did it and forgives her.
The novelization makes this scene more painful. After Naruto begs Hinata to tell him that Toneri is lying about them getting married and Hinata looks away, seemingly not denying his panicked inquiries, the completely stunned Naruto thinks that he must have caused Hinata so much pain due to his Oblivious to Love status, as he confused her love for him with being similar to his love for ramen or shogi. He feels that by Hinata "rejecting" him and "accepting" Toneri's proposal on her own free will, he is receiving his punishment for the long years of being dense towards her feelings. It needs to be repeated: Naruto thinks that losing Hinata to another man is what he rightfully deserves for being blind to her love.
Naruto falls unconscious for three days after Hinata "rejected" him and left with Toneri. It hurts him so much that, when he wakes up, Sai teases him that he now understands how a guy reacts to rejection and tells Naruto that he spent those three days mumbling Hinata's name and "other embarrassing things". Since Naruto mistakes Hinata's actions for a real rejection, he doesn't want to hear about her anymore and he spends the rest of the day and night curled up in a Troubled Fetal Position...until Sakura reminds him that Hinata only ever loved Naruto, similar to how she herself only ever loved Sasuke, and that will never change. Getting his Heroic Second Wind, Naruto states in his Heroic Vow that he will save Hinata and properly return her love for him.
In the novelization, after Sakura's pep-talk, Naruto starts crying as he thinks about how he had truly fallen in love with Hinata, confessed his love to her, and then was unexpectedly "rejected". He acknowledges that not only did Hinata's "rejection" cause him to hit rock-bottom, but he was having a hard time climbing back up and finding his strength again. It needs to be repeated: our Determinator cannot find his strength, because the thought of Hinata not loving him is breaking him, to the point where he actually hit rock-bottom. It isn't until he remembers everything his teammates said that he finally gets his Heroic Second Wind and makes his Heroic Vow.
Pay attention to Naruto's Heroic Vow. Depending on the translation, he says "This whole time, you always loved me for the way I am" or "You've loved someone like me forever and ever." During the War Arc, Kiba implied that Naruto was insecure around Hinata because of the way he tried to act tough and cool in her presence, and Naruto did not deny nor poke fun at his statement. His Heroic Vow confirms it. Even after realizing Hinata's love for him and his own love for her, Naruto still can't believe someone like Hinata would genuinely love him for him. This just reaffirms that, no matter how beloved he is now as the hero of Konoha and the savior of the world, Naruto's incredibly lonely and painful past plagued him with insecurities to the extent that he can't believe someone could ever love him, let alone unconditionally like Hinata has since forever.
The scene where Toneri brands Hinata a traitor and turns her into one of his puppets is just heartbreaking. She is pleading with him to stop, telling him that he doesn't have to destroy the Earth, but he spitefully destroys her red scarf because he knows she was really making it for Naruto and then he hypnotizes her just to make sure that she wouldn't betray him again.
Toneri's backstory in the novelization is quite sad as well. His clan was divided as to how to respond when Madara summoned the gedo statue out of the moon. One side believed the action was cause to punish all humanity, the other opposed them. This led to war and in the end only Toneri, at the time only a child, survived. He has since lived in utter isolation and come to blame humanity for it all.
At the end when Naruto and Hinata are running hand-in-hand through the portal back from the moon to the Earth, they're shown running as they are, then as they were in Part II of the manga, then looking like they were back in Part I, and finally like they were when they first met as children. In all forms, Naruto is wearing the red scarf Hinata made for him. This sequence WILL make you cry.
During the ending credits with Naruto and Hinata's wedding montage, the entire cast (except Sasuke) appears, with Hanabi holding Neji's funeral photograph.
The whole ending credits sequence of the movie is a Tear Jerker in its own right, when you realize that this is essentially the end of Naruto! This is his final story. A character that we have loved and rooted for completes his journey after 15 years, and is now happy and content with the woman he loves and who's always loved him in return. It really does feel like watching your child grow up, get married and leave the house.
The fact that the ending credits song is Hoshi No Utsuwa a brilliant and poignant song about life, death and cosmic rebirth makes the scene even more touching.
It becomes a literal Tear Jerker in the meta sense, when you find out that director Tsukeo Kobayashi passed away several months after the movie was released. See "Around the Movie" below for more details.
Around the Movie
Studio Pierrot knew that the movie's director, Tsuneo Kobayashi, had severe health problems and that he probably wouldn't last until the end of the year, which is why his name is the one featured prominently at the end of the Creative Closing Credits, instead of Masashi Kishimoto's. This movie is quite literally Kobayashi's Swan Song, and even those who didn't like the story of the movie cannot deny its splendid direction and visual flair. Kobayashi passed away on May 2015.
Hinata's Image Song, Fuyu no Owari ni , is about Hinata's feelings for Naruto during Part II when they were still not realized. The song's lyrics are quite heartbreaking. The song directly states that she has tried to be selfless, move on, and tell herself that she would be all right if only Naruto was happy, but in reality she was lying to herself all this time. She can no longer deny the fact that she still loves him and wants to be with him. So she will try once more, even though she thinks that her feelings won't reach his heart. It's sad and bitter, but it makes Naruto's Love Confession to her, and his own Image Song, No Matter What Day It Is —which, according to its lyrics , is a direct response to her song—all the more Heartwarming.
Special mention goes to Nana Mizuki's performance, which makes the song even more heart-wrenching. Hinata's voice starts out fairly cheery, but gets progressively sad and bitter as the song goes on. During the last few verses, when she declares that she will try once more to convey her feelings to Naruto, and that she won't give up, even though she thinks that her love won't reach him, you can clearly hear Hinata's voice start to crack as if she's about to start crying from despair. It's subtle, but it makes the song that much more emotional.
The English Version of the song doesn't pull any punches either.
Konoha Hiden: The Perfect Day for a Wedding, the officially sanctioned novel that deals with Naruto and Hinata's wedding, is generally a very light and funny read...which makes these moments especially hard to handle:
Lee is dreaming of Neji when he is exhausted.
Tenten also remembers Neji as she tries to move on with her life and carve her own unique path as a shinobi.
Teuchi laments about the shinobi customers who never come back.
Iruka's Manly Tears of Joy to the following line doubles as Tear Jerker and Heartwarming:
Naruto: "I'd like you to come to this wedding as my father."
Naruto the Movie: Road to Ninja
TearJerker/Anime & Manga
Boruto: Naruto the Movie