text:
Chinese Law Prof Blog
Editor: Donald C. Clarke
Chinese law position at Monash University Faculty of Law
By Donald Clarke
The Faculty of Law at Monash University is interested in hiring someone with Chinese law expertise. Here's the announcement. It doesn't mention China specifically, but I am informed that that is one of their areas of interest.
January 3, 2016 in Internships/Employment Opportunities | Permalink | Comments (0)
Jobs available in China IPR
The China IPR blog announces three China IP positions: http://chinaipr.com/2015/11/27/three-chinaip-positions-open/
November 27, 2015 in Internships/Employment Opportunities | Permalink | Comments (0)
USPTO seeks China program specialists
The USPTO is looking for China program specialists; law degree not required.
Program Specialist (IP Exchange), GS-13, all sources
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/422056500
Program Specialist (IP Exchange), GS-13, status/federal candidates
United States Information Technology Office (Beijing) seeks managing director
Here's the job announcement: http://www.usito.org/usito-seeks-candidates-managing-director.
More on Taiwanese independence and sovereignty
I posted the other day about a column written by my colleague David Shambaugh in which he averred to a "delusion" that Taiwan was an independent, sovereign state. I argued that by the definition of "state" in the Montevideo Convention, this view of Taiwan was hardly delusional. David has declined my invitation to respond, so I don't know whether he thinks that Taiwan is not a state under the Montevideo Convention definition, or whether he is just using a different definition of "independent, sovereign state."
In another forum in which I posted my comments, some have suggested a plausible, different definition of sovereignty: that it necessary involves an element of recognition by many other states. If so, and if we define "recognition" narrowly, then it could certainly be said that because Taiwan is not recognized (in the narrow sense) as a state by many other states, it therefore does not meet this particular definition of "sovereign." But if we use that definition of "sovereign," then we have to drop the claim that anyone is delusional, because nobody thinks that Taiwan is in fact recognized in this narrow sense by many countries. Some people celebrate that fact and some people bemoan it, but nobody disputes that it is a fact. Thus, under some definitions of sovereignty, Taiwan is in fact sovereign, and so people aren't deluded to think it is; under other definitions, it's not, but nobody thinks it is, so people aren't deluded in that case either. I cannot think of a fact-based definition of sovereignty about which people could be said to be deluded, since people of all political views pretty much agree on what the current facts on the ground are regarding Taiwan's ability to govern itself and its place in the international community. Of course, they disagree on the ought, but not on the is.
November 15, 2015 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (2)
Is Taiwan an independent sovereign state?
In a recent op-ed in the South China Morning Post, my colleague David Shambaugh spoke of "the delusion and illusion that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state". I'm not sure what he means by this. Needless to say, people have different views on whether Taiwan should be an independent, sovereign state. But as for whether it actually is one now, that is a matter of (a) facts and (b) how those facts fit one's definition of "independent sovereign state".
I'm not sure there is too much disagreement on the facts; in the same op-ed, David refers to Taiwan's "de facto autonomy", and autonomy is of course just a synonym for independence. That is at least one important fact. The question then becomes, what does he mean by "independent sovereign state"? Everyone is of course entitled to their own definition, but for a definition that is reasonably well accepted in international law and wasn't simply cooked up with Taiwan in mind, we could turn to the Montevideo Convention of 1933. That says, in pertinent part:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.
Under this definition—and it doesn't seem like a particularly wild and crazy one—it's hard to see how Taiwan would not qualify. David is of course not obliged to accept that definition himself, but surely it's going a bit far to claim that anyone who does is delusional.
Paul Gillis on the PCAOB's China troubles
Last Tuesday I blogged about the breakdown in talks between China and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Here's a blog post on the same issue from Paul Gillis at the China Accounting Blog. Check out the comments as well.
November 8, 2015 in Commentary, News - Chinese Law | Permalink | Comments (1)
More problems for the PCAOB in its effort to audit the auditors
According to Bloomberg's Securities Law Daily, last month "a final agreement that would have allowed a U.S. regulator to examine the audits of Chinese companies listed on American stock exchanges fell through" (full story here). The story calls this a "setback" for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and a "blow" to its chairman, James Doty. And it is. But the story does not portray the breakdown in negotiations as in any way problematic for those on the other side of the negotiating table, the Chinese government. And perhaps the story is right on that, too - is anything undesirable going to happen to China or Chinese companies now that negotiations have failed? Are Chinese accounting firms no longer going to be qualified to audit financial statements of companies listed in the United States? If a failure of negotiations results in no adverse consequences for one party to the negotiations, why would it ever negotiate? Failure has to have consequences for both sides before these negotiations can go anywhere.
The problem, of course, is that China treats information about just about anything as having potential national security implications. And it claims that allowing the PCAOB to inspect domestic auditors would be an infringement on its sovereignty--perhaps its "auditing sovereignty"? Two answers. First, big deal. That's what international negotiations are about. You give up some of your sovereign freedom of action in order to get something you want. Second, the purpose of an audit of a financial statement is to protect investors--in this case, US investors. Chinese auditors are exporting audit services to the US. China exports chicken to the US and accepts that the US Department of Agriculture has a legitimate interest in inspecting its chicken processing plants; it doesn't cry that that infringes on its poultry sovereignty. If it's acceptable for the US to go to China to inspect the way imported chickens are made, how is that different from going to China to inspect the way imported audits are made?
November 3, 2015 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Criminalization of test cheating? Less than meets the eye.
The Shanghaiist blog recently reported on a recent amendment to the Criminal Law that will come into effect on Nov. 1st, saying, "Chinese students who cheat on exams could now face up to 7 years in prison." (Here's a similar story from the China Daily headlined "Cheating in civil service exams means seven-year jail".) Well, not exactly. Actually, not even close.
There is indeed a new rule about cheating on official state examinations, including the all-important gaokao (university entrance examination). It will appear as Article 284A (第二百八十四条之一) in the revised Criminal Law.
Here's the full text in Chinese:
在法律规定的国家考试中,组织作弊的,处三年以下有期徒刑或者拘役,并处或者单处罚金;情节严重的,处三年以上七年以下有期徒刑,并处罚金。This provision provides for up to seven years' imprisonment for those who organize cheating in serious circumstances. This is not a punishment for the cheaters themselves.
为他人实施前款犯罪提供作弊器材或者其他帮助的,依照前款的规定处罚。 This provides punishment under the previous paragraph for those who assist in the above offense by providing cheating equipment or other assistance. Again, no punishment for cheaters themselves.
为实施考试作弊行为,向他人非法出售或者提供第一款规定的考试的试题、答案的,依照第一款的规定处罚。This provides punishment under Para. 1 for those who sell or other supply exam questions and answers in order to help people cheat. No punishment for cheaters themselves.
代替他人或者让他人代替自己参加第一款规定的考试的,处拘役或者管制,并处或者单处罚金。Finally, we have some language that provides punishment for cheaters themselves. But it applies only to one kind of cheating: impersonating a test-taker to take the test, or having someone impersonate you to take the test. There is no punishment for any other kind of cheating. And the punishment for cheating by impersonation is light: detention (拘役), which is for between one and six months, or control (管制), which is similar to probation.
Bottom line: The headline should read, "Chinese students who cheat in one particular way on exams could face up to six months in detention."
October 28, 2015 in Commentary, News - Chinese Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Central Committee and State Council issue document on state-owned enterprise reform
Last month, the Chinese government (to be precise, the Central Committee of the Communist Party together with the State Council) issued a document on state-owned enterprise ("SOE") reform: the Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises (关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见) (the "Opinions"). Given the level at which they were formulated and issued, the Opinions seem intended to be a major statement about SOE reform. But what do they actually say? The following comments are based on a quick read and are not, for better or worse, informed by what anyone else has written, because I have not come across any other commentary so far. (I haven't looked.)
If you are looking for a statement that the government will reduce the role of SOEs in the economy, or engage in large-scale privatization, this is not that statement. Quite the contrary. Indeed, it still scrupulously avoids the term "private" when talking about investment or ownership, using instead such clumsy circumlocutions as "non-public". (This term has been used for so long it doesn't even sound silly any more, even though Cao Siyuan properly skewered it many years ago, pointing out that we don't refer to our right hand as our "non-left" hand.) I think it's safe to say that if in 2015, policymakers still can't bring themselves to say the word "private" in a major document about the economy, there are certain conclusions we can draw about policy goals.
The Opinions declare that public ownership shall remain the mainstay of the economy. For the Opinions, the point of reforming SOEs is to do state ownership better, not to reduce it or even eliminate it. This goal appears not only in the specific proposals of the Opinions, but also in the language that permeates the document: a mounting pile of clichés that I last saw in such profusion back in the 1980s, when the same goal prevailed.
The diagnosis of SOE problems seems as muddled as ever and no good solutions are offered. For example, the Opinions promote the separation of ownership (所有权) from control (expressed as "the right to manage" (经营权)) as a positive good. This has been a mantra of SOE reform for decades. Yet it fails to recognize that where the state is an owner, it must necessarily act through human agents. Those human agents—SOE managers—exercise control. If there is any aspect of SOE operations they don't control, that's because someone superior to them—another human agent of the state—controls it. Thus, ownership and control necessarily are now, have always been, and always will be, separated in SOEs. If SOEs are not performing properly, it is not because ownership and control are insufficiently separate. It is because management does not have the right set of incentives that align their interests with those of the state owner. The separation of ownership from control is an unavoidable problem to be managed, not a solution to be embraced.
This inattention to the problem of incentives is reflected in the language about enhancing internal supervision of SOEs, among other things by strengthening the oversight role of the enterprise's staff and workers congress (职工代表大会). Assuming the staff and workers congress is not dominated by management and in fact represents the interests of the staff and workers—a big assumption—then one would expect it to exercise any power it had in the interests of staff and workers, which will not be congruent with the interests of the state owner. There is no point in giving people power over management decisions without a clear understanding of the direction in which they are going to pull such decisions.
A great deal of language in the Opinions is devoted to the idea that SOEs should be more "independent". But independent of what or whom? The chief significance of separate legal status in a US corporation is that it delineates a pool of assets that are available to corporate creditors—the assets of the corporation—as against the assets that are not—the assets of the stockholders. Protection works the other way, too: creditors of the stockholders cannot seize corporate assets. They can seize only the rights of the stockholder, and those rights don't include a right to take a percentage of corporate assets at will.
Yet the Opinion seems to conceive of independence as meaning that SOEs have a kind of will and interest of their own. They should manage themselves, be responsible for their own profits and losses, and bear risks themselves. One sees what the Opinions are getting at, of course: SOEs (more accurately, people who work at SOEs) shouldn't expect endless subsidies from the state. But this way of putting it obscures two important points. First, it's entirely appropriate for SOE managers to be accountable to some outside body, and a body representing the state, which after all put up the money, is a reasonable candidate. Second, the state shareholder is taking risks when it owns SOEs. If the SOE is profitable, the shareholder wins. If the SOE loses money and eventually becomes bankrupt, the shareholder loses. The state shareholder is not legally required to pay the debts of the bankrupt SOE—that's what limited liability is all about—but that doesn't mean that the SOE as such bears risks. It's all the interests associated with the SOE—state investor, management, workers, and suppliers, among others—that actually bear the risks of things going bad.
One possible meaning of "independence" is the idea expressed in the Opinions that SOEs shouldn't have to answer to multiple masters, and that no government department may interfere in their operations without proper authority. The question is, what allows that to happen now, and how will it be prevented? If managers are appointed by and responsible to Agency X, why do they need to listen to Agency Y? If Agency Y is going beyond its mission to impose burdens on the SOE, why does the SOE have no remedy at present? The approach of the Opinions seems to be to ask those doing improper things to stop doing them, not to give the victims of the improper doings a means to resist.
While promoting the independence of the SOE (and presumably its management), the Opinions proclaim at the same time the critical and leading role of the Party organization in the SOE. The Party's role should be written into the SOE's corporate charter, and the Chairman of the Board should generally be the Party secretary. The Opinions call for upholding the unity of the principle of Party control over cadres and corporate procedures for electing directors and appointing management (i.e., election by shareholders and selection by the board respectively), but don't make clear how the apparent contradiction between the two principles is to be resolved.
The Opinions propose that SOEs should be divided into two categories: commercial and public-interest. (The actual work of categorization is to be carried out by whichever state body acts as the investor.) The goal for commercial SOEs? Strengthen the state-owned economy and maintain and increase the value of state assets. In other words, do SOE operations better. Private investment in these enterprises may be allowed in order to diversify the shareholder base. As long as the enterprises remain controlled by the state, this of course has the effect of increasing the amount of assets under state control.
For commercial SOEs in competitive sectors, the Opinions encourage diversification of the shareholder base by allowing in private investors and other state investors. Curiously, the Opinions state that in addition to retaining absolute or relative state control in such enterprises when private investment is allowed in, it will also be permissible for the state merely to have equity participation, which presumably means something less than even relative control. But if the state has neither control over, nor a majority economic interest in, an enterprise, in what sense can we continue to call the enterprise "state-owned"? In any case, the Opinions set forth standards for the assessment of managers in such commercial SOEs; the standards are about business results and asset values.
For commercial SOEs in key economic sectors and sectors related to national security, private shareholding is permitted, but the state must maintain a controlling interest. The standards for assessing managers are the same.
With respect to public-interest enterprises, the Opinion suggests, albeit not very clearly, that the state must maintain a controlling equity interest here as well. Managers will be assessed on business results and asset values, with some attention paid to "social assessment" (社会评价).
The Opinions also address the issue of state holding companies, also known as group companies (集团公司). These companies are not well understood; apparently some have yet to undergo formal corporatization under the Company Law and are still structured as traditional SOEs. The Opinions encourage further corporatization of holding companies, and suggests that in some circumstances they could be listed. State equity could in some circumstances be converted to preferred shares, and the Opinions also suggest the possibility of something that looks like a golden share—that is, a state share with super voting rights or a veto over changes in control. Since it is customary for interests labeled "preferred shares" not to have voting rights, it is not clear how the Opinions contemplate that state control or influence will be maintained in companies where the state's interest takes that form.
The Opinions devote a great deal of text to what they call the principle of management over capital as opposed to management over enterprises, and stress the importance of the former. Judging from the content of the discussion under this heading, it seems to mean that enterprises as such shall no longer be sacrosanct in the state's approach to managing SOEs; instead, it will be quite acceptable to close down one enterprise and move state-owned capital to a sector where it will be more productive. In other words, the goal is not to maximize the performance of state-owned enterprises as such; it is to maximize the performance of state-owned capital—within, of course, the limits of the policy that the state must remain invested in certain sectors and types of industry. This could be an important change in the way the state manages its assets.
On the whole, the Opinions do not seem to set forth a radically new policy toward SOEs. The language can seem quite old-fashioned at times; it seems to come from the 1980s. It contains no hint at all that the state intends to get out of the business of owning enterprises; instead, its goal is to have the state manage its enterprises better. But this is not a new goal; the state has been trying to do this since SOEs first came into existence. And basically no radically new policies are proposed to achieve this goal. The one new policy (at least, new to me) is that of the principle of managing capital instead of enterprises. This is sufficiently vague, however, to require that we wait and see how it is implemented before pronouncing it meaningful.
September 21, 2015 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (0)
Robert Precht on the ABA's non-statement about the crackdown on lawyers in China
Here's his op-ed.
[POSTSCRIPT Sept. 7, 2015: Here's Jerome Cohen's statement about the statement.]
September 7, 2015 in Commentary | Permalink | Comments (2)
Follow-up to post on contempt for law by lawmakers
I recently blogged about a notice of "residential surveillance at a designated place" (RSDP) that I stated was blatantly illegal because it wasn't for investigation of one of three statutorily designated crimes. I didn't discuss one exception to the restriction--RSDP may also be imposed where the suspect has no fixed residence (无固定住处的)--because I figured (and still believe) that the suspect in this case was not homeless, and since I was tired it didn't seem worth undertaking an extended discussion only to conclude that the exception didn't apply.
I still believe it doesn't apply, but my friend and colleague Joshua Rosenzweig has kindly permitted me to reproduce an email he sent me (part of which quotes from a forthcoming paper of his (earlier version here)) that shows that the issue isn't quite as undeniable and blatant an illegality--at least from the standpoint of the police--as I had originally supposed.
Both the MPS and SPP [have issued] regulations [that] define 'fixed residence' as a 'legal' (合法) residence (住处 or 居所) in the city or county where the case is being handled. There is, however, no clear standard for what constitutes 'legality' of a residence in the context of criminal procedure, leaving the matter open to a degree of interpretation. According to the definition of 'domicile' under civil law, legal residence might be defined as the place of household registration. Many Chinese reside in locations different from their places of household registration, however. Chinese civil law provisions also contain the concept of 'habitual residence,' which requires a period of continuous residence of one year or more. But there is also the problem of determining whether a rental unit can be considered a 'fixed' residence or how to handle individuals who reside in shared rentals or dormitories.61
This probably has something to do with why the case is being handled by police in Tianjin. Since the lawyers are all from Beijing, they don't have 'legal' residences and thus become eligible for this form of detention.
In other words, this is how the police could respond if accused of violating the Article 73, whereas if the language about "no fixed residence" weren't there, they would really have no defense at all, even a spurious one.
Josh of course is not defending any of this; he's just making the point that there is this linguistic escape hatch. It's a pretty spurious defense, though. If there were a neutral arbiter deciding these issues, I would argue back that given the intention of the new Article 73 (to reduce long-standing police abuse of RSDP by strictly limiting its application), it couldn't possibly be correct that it could still be used on anyone not living in the place specified in their domicile registration, since that's probably hundreds of millions of people, and neither could it be right that all you need to do to get around it is to send in police from somewhere other than the suspect's place of usual residence. And of course mere departmental regulations can't override a statute, anyway.
But this just underscores the real problem: there is no neutral arbiter, and the police are the judge in their own case. Before the revision to the Criminal Procedure Law, the police were already violating the law on residential surveillance by cooking up RSDP, which had no statutory basis. The law allowed residential surveillance, and there is no basis for thinking that the lawmakers really meant to include surveillance not at the suspect's residence. But there was no institution in China willing and able to call them on this and rein them in. Then in 2012 the legislature decided to try again by allowing it, but only in limited circumstances. As before, the police can issue their own interpretive regulations and engage in practices that clearly violate the spirit of the law and the intention of Article 73, but there is no neutral third party capable of making that call. All the legislation in the world is not going to change police practices; what's needed is institutional change. This is not a breathtakingly original insight; I mention is just to put this particular phenomenon in context.
August 7, 2015 in Commentary, News - Chinese Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Should the United States send Ling Wancheng back to China? Could it?
The New York Times recently carried a story confirming a long-standing rumor that Ling Wancheng, brother of the toppled top aide to China's former top leader, Hu Jintao, was living in the United States. Apparently China wants him back in China—not surprisingly, given his intelligence value. Presumably—apparently it's all unofficial so far—China is telling the US that he's wanted on corruption or other criminal charges. This has led to quite a bit of discussion on the question of whether the US could or should send Ling back. (This blog post is a slightly expanded and more legally technical version of my contribution to a discussion at the Asia Society's ChinaFile site.)
I think it might be useful to lay out some of the legal issues involved here. First of all, let's distinguish between extradition and deportation. Extradition would take place pursuant to a treaty between China and the US, and critically would not require a finding by US authorities that Ling had violated any US law (or even Chinese law). Nor would any other legal basis for sending Ling back (aside from the treaty) be required. All that is necessary would be for China to make a case—presumably meeting some standard of plausibility—that Ling had violated Chinese law and should be returned to face trial. But for the very cogent reasons discussed by Jerome Cohen in his contribution, there is no extradition treaty between China and the US.
Thus, if the US government wants to keep Ling, it has no obligation to send him back. This raises two issues: (1) Should it want to send Ling back? (2) Assuming it wants to send him back, can it?
On the first issue, one of the points raised in this discussion has been the idea that sending Ling back will promote cooperation by China in US law enforcement. I'm dubious about this. In a wide range of fields, China has over the years been consistently and highly uncooperative with both the US and other countries in their efforts to investigate unlawful activities in China. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board have experienced years of frustration in seeking Chinese cooperation in their efforts to investigate securities fraud and accounting malpractices involving Chinese firms and citizens. Just two months ago, an Associated Press report described the "legal firewall" shielding Chinese parties from foreign investigations, in this case Italian attempts—utterly stonewalled by China—to investigate the flow of $4.9 billion in laundered money to China. And despite its denunciations of hacking and denials of government involvement, the Chinese government has refused to help foreign authorities bring Chinese hackers to book. China doesn't need to do more than anyone else, but it does need to offer the degree of cooperation that's normal in the international community before it can reasonably ask others to cooperate with it. If the US government has good policy reasons for wanting to send Ling back, so be it, but a vain hope that it will induce greater cooperation by China in a range of law enforcement activities should not be among them.
The second issue is whether the US government can send Ling back, assuming it wants to.
The short answer is maybe. There are three general types of legal basis. (There may be others.) The first is contained in 8 USC § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i), which states that "[a]n alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deportable." There are some exceptions to this deportation power but they don't seem applicable to Ling's case.
The second legal basis would be in a violation by Ling of immigration law in connection with his entry into the United States. This is not of course to say that Ling did violate immigration law when he entered the United States—I have no knowledge of the circumstances under which he came here—but if, for example, he entered on a non-immigrant visa without the intention, at the time of entry, to depart when the time came, that would be a violation of immigration law and likely grounds for deportation, as would any other kind of false statements (at least if they were material) in the visa application process.
The third legal basis—which I use as a catch-all category—would be the commission of various acts (for example, terrorism and other crimes) that Congress has deemed grounds for deportation. Again, I have no reason to believe that Ling has committed any such acts.
The point, then, is that the US government operates under some constraints where deportation is involved. It cannot just decide to deport and then deport. There must be a statutory basis.
Let us suppose, then, that the US government relies on deportability on foreign policy grounds—the first basis above, which does not depend on any violation of US law by Ling. That is still not the end of the story. There is a further complication posed by the fact that Ling could raise various bars against deportation. He could, for example, claim that he is the subject of political persecution and seek asylum on those grounds. Such a claim would not, of course, necessarily succeed.
A second and more plausible claim—since it relies importantly on conditions in China and not much on Ling's personal characteristics—would be that he was in danger of being tortured if returned to China. The United States is a party to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The CAT is one of the reasons that the Canadian courts made it so difficult for Canada to send Lai Changxing back to China. Art. 3 says, "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." The US has declared that it interprets this to mean "more likely than not."
The status of the CAT under US law is complicated, but the long and the short of it is that Ling can raise a claim of possible torture to try to avoid getting sent back to China. (As with all claims, to say he can raise it is not to say he can raise it successfully.) In 1998, Congress passed legislation intended to incorporate the rules of the CAT, which the US had ratified, into US law, precisely because the US had specifically declared upon ratification that the CAT would not automatically become part of US law. Congress specifically directed the executive to enact regulations implementing the US's obligations under the CAT, and to use as definitions of various terms the definitions of those terms in the CAT. But Congress also added that any regulations so enacted would not be reviewable by courts. In other words, the executive branch would have the last word on what compliance with CAT meant. Other countries might disagree, but that wouldn't affect anyone's rights under US law. Thus, Ling could attempt to resist deportation by asserting whatever rights he has under the relevant Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations designed to implement the CAT.
Even assuming he can successfully make a case under those regulations, however, there is still a final question: does the Secretary of State's power to deport under 8 USC § 1227 trump an alien's right not to be deported under the relevant DHS regulations implementing the CAT? Who wins in case of a conflict? The same conflict could crop up if Ling seeks asylum on the grounds of political persecution. I do not know the answer under US law, but it might well be different from the answer under international law.
Finally, let me caution readers that I am not an expert in this area of law, and would welcome correction where I have got it wrong.
August 6, 2015 in Commentary, News - Chinese Law, People and Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)
The Ai Weiwei visa mess - how it might have happened, from a Foreign Office insider
With the kind permission of the author, I'd like to share Kerry Brown's take on how this whole mess might have happened:
I worked as the Head of Policy at UK Visas for six months in 2005. It was my last Foreign Office job, though the department was one shared between the Foreign Office and the UK Home Office. Since then I have been fully rehabilitated back into society! I have to say though, from knowledge from that period, that the Ai Weiwei visa case has all the hallmarks of a cock up. In some ways, it would be preferable had there been high level fiat about this, because at least it would have shown that someone, somewhere was making decisions.
The truth is that Entry Clearance Offices, at least in the British system have God like powers, and the only person who can overturn their decisions, in the end (as this case proves) is the Home Secretary. That means that often very junior and inexperienced visa staff, who are more often than not utterly clueless to the changing rules and regulations governing visa issuance, can make the most extraordinarily perverse judgments. The case I remember best from my brief, inglorious stint in this position (it was hard to do a job where the words in the job title were so completely at odds with the reality of what I was doing - there was, and I suspect still isn't, a visa `policy' - just mildly contained bedlam, so I spent my days reading Guy Debord and the situationists and gazing at the MI6 building gardens next door) was that of issuing work visas to people needed to come and be employed in UK abattoirs. Unsurprisingly, these positions were hard to fill with local staff, so at that time, for some reason, they were recruited from (I think) Ukraine. Staff before going out to post to be visa offices were told that unmarried, largely uneducated, young men from underdeveloped countries were the highest risk and the ones they needed to be most careful about issuing work visas too! (Needless to say, UK Visas resisted all attempts to include its work in relevant racial and gender equality legislation). However, it was precisely this demographic that tended to apply to come to the UK for six months to work in abattoirs.
All worked well, and the annual quota of abattoir workers were happily delivered, until a more pure minded, zealous visa official was sent to work in Kiev, and promptly turned down the whole batch of new applicants, causing chaos in the farming community in the UK reliant on this source of labour, who of course used their considerable clout to protest. It was to no avail though, The person who did the refusing was acting within the law, and there was no way that year any were let through. I think it was only resolved with them being offered some other tasty post to exercise their budding bureaucratic skills, and a more compliant official sent to replace them. .
So I can well imagine the scenario with Ai Weiwei. A visa officer with a sheen of knowledge of his case, mostly culled from the Daily Mail (still no doubt shipped by air freight to the post in Beijing), who sees this Chinese avante garde artist attempting to sully the pure morals of the Great British public, and deciding to make a silent majority stand by turning him down. His or her Entry Clearance Manager, probably a Foreign Office appointee with a bit more political sense, would no doubt have had the `discussion' when reviewing the refusal, and suggesting a compromise (the 20 days). We have, ladies and gentlemen, the final result - a classic, great British cock up. I can well imagine the weary sighs in the Chancery the morning this story broke, because as ever they would be left to clear up a mess which, in this case, I truly believe, was not of their making.
Oh that there had been sinister calculations about how to avoid Ai bashing into Xi Jinping during his September visit. Or at least some artfulness and signs of intelligent (albeit perverse) life. But no, I really don't think there was.
But I would be happy (and relieved) to be proved wrong.
More contempt for law from the lawmakers
Over the last month or so, the Chinese authorities have been engaged in a crackdown on rights lawyers of unprecedented ferocity. Here's Jerome Cohen in a Wall Street Journal article about it:
New York University law professor Jerome Cohen, one of the first American lawyers to work in China after the country opened up in the late 1970s, described the sweep as "insane." China's leaders "must be in desperate straits to engage in this extraordinary, coordinated attack on human-rights lawyers," he said.
Strong words! In any case, after all that stuff at the Fourth Plenum about the rule of law and exercising power within a cage, you might think that the authorities, with the power to make law completely in their hands, would manage to abide by it, right? Wrong. There are of course many stories about lawyers and others being rounded up without proper procedures, but today I came across a particularly glaring example that exists in black and white and cannot be denied or explained away.
Take a look at the document below: it's a notice of "residential surveillance at a designated place", i.e., so-called residential surveillance where the police hold you at some place that is neither a nail nor your residence -- and we're not talking about a fancy hotel here. The suspect is the lawyer Xie Yuandong, and the suspected crime is that of "stirring up trouble".
The problem with all of this is that under Article 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which reflects a 2012 amendment designed to reduce police abuses of this procedure, "residential surveillance at a designated place" may be imposed on a suspect only for three crimes: "Where there is suspicion of the crime of endangering national security, the crime of terrorist activities, or the crime of receiving bribes in serious circumstances, and implementing residential surveillance at the suspect's residence could hinder the investigation, then upon approval by the next higher people's prosecutor's office or public security authority, residential surveillance may be implemented at a designated place of residence[.]" (对于涉嫌危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪、特别重大贿赂犯罪,在住处执行可能有碍侦查的,经上一级人民检察院或者公安机关批准,也可以在指定的居所执行。)
Thus, placing Xie in residential surveillance at a designated place is an open-and-shut violation of the Criminal Procedure Law and is nothing more than kidnapping. Of course, the whole problem could easily have been avoided had the authorities had the wit to fill in the blank for the suspected crime with one of the eligible ones. But this is exactly the point: the law means so little to them that they can't be bothered to understand or follow it even when it would be easy to do so.
[AUG. 8th UPDATE: The situation is a bit more complicated. See this follow-up post.]
The Peter Humphrey/Yu Yingzeng case (again)
I last blogged about this case in August 2014, when Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng were convicted and sentenced in Shanghai on charges of unlawful acquisition of personal information of citizens. I had some preliminary comments on the case based on the trial transcript and some quick-and-dirty research. I've now had the chance to do much more extensive research and to look at the text of the judgment as well, and have written up the results. They pretty much confirm my initial take: that this was a case of selective prosecution, and the sentences were out of line with cases with comparable facts. Humphrey was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment; no previous defendant in any of Shanghai's 92 cases had ever gotten more than 24 months. (For those not following this story, Humphrey and Yu were recently released and have gone to the UK.)
The abstract is below; the full paper can be found here at the Social Science Research Network site.
The case of Peter Humphrey and Yu Yingzeng, convicted in China on August 2014 on charges of unlawful acquisition of citizens' personal information, raises important issues about Chinese law. A narrow but important issue is how Chinese law draws the line between lawful and unlawful acquisition of information, a practice routinely carried out by businesses and individuals. This article examines the trial transcript and judgment in the Humphrey/Yu case and finds that it sheds regrettably little light on what remains a murky question. A broader issue is whether the Chinese legal system can be counted on to operate in a fair and impartial manner. This article presents the results of a study of all reported cases in Shanghai (ninety-two cases) involving the same provision of the Criminal Law that was the basis of the Humphrey/Yu conviction. It finds that the Humphrey/Yu sentences are outliers relative to other cases with comparable facts. In particular, Humphrey's sentence of 30 months' imprisonment was by far the heaviest sentence ever meted out by Shanghai courts, even though the circumstances seem conspicuously less serious than those of many other cases where lesser sentences were imposed.
August 6, 2015 in Commentary, People and Institutions | Permalink | Comments (0)
More Catholic than the Pope: UK government states Ai Weiwei has criminal conviction in China (he doesn't)
In an astounding cock-up of monumental proportions (because it could so easily have been avoided by spending a few minutes searching around the web), the UK government has accused Ai Weiwei of lying on his application for a UK visa. In a letter issued to Ai, the "Entry Clearance Manager" for Beijing stated:
It is noted that in answer to the question on the visa application form on whether you have ever had any of the following in the UK or a different country:
A criminal conviction, at any time
A driving offence, at any time, e.g. for speeding or no insurance
I was arrested or charged, and I am currently on or awaiting trial
A caution, warning, reprimand or fixed penalty notice
A court judgment, e.g. for debt
A fine for breaking UK immigration law (called a 'civil penalty')
You have stated: 'No, I have never had any of these'. It is a matter of public record that you have previously received a criminal conviction in China, and you have not declared this.
The ECM goes on to say that Ai will be granted a visa, but for less time than he had applied for. He or she urges Ai to respond truthfully next time, and notes that there is a place on the form to explain any answers.
Let me be clear about my own view: It is not unreasonable for the UK government to ask these questions, and applicants should respond truthfully. It would, of course, be unreasonable for the UK government to treat politically-motivated criminal convictions as equal to a genuine criminal history, but that's not what's at issue here. If Ai had had a criminal conviction, he should have said so.
The problem is that Ai does not have a criminal record in China. It is most emphatically not a matter of public record that he has previously received a criminal conviction in China. Anyone who claims this should be asked to produce this public record. (After all, it's public, right?) It's rather astounding that when the Chinese government, for all its harassment of Ai, did not see fit to charge and convict him on criminal grounds, the UK government should step up to the plate and do it for them.
Some people say, "Oh, but didn't he have some tax troubles a while back?" And others respond, "Yes, but those were politically motivated." All beside the point. To the second group, I say that he should respond truthfully and then explain, even if only as a practical matter, given that not telling the truth about things that really are in the public record is just not going to work. To the first group, I say that the ECM did not state an objection to Ai's failures to mention (a) his 2011 detention, allegedly for investigation of tax issues, or (b) the assessment and fine levied as an administrative (not criminal) matter on his company (not him). The ECM's objection was to Ai's failure to state that he has a criminal conviction. But he doesn't have one.
The ECM might have been on firmer ground had he or she said something along the lines of, "Really? No 'caution, warning, or reprimand'? Ever?" I suspect Ai has received a lot of communications that would qualify. Of course they are politically motivated, but that's what the place on the form for an explanation is for. But that's not what the ECM said.
It's understandable that everyone's memory is a little fuzzy about what happened back in 2011. What's harder to understand is how someone could give legal effect to that fuzzy memory without bothering to take just a few minutes to google around to verify the facts. Even more disappointing is that the UK authorities seem to be digging in their heels and refusing to admit their mistake. A Foreign Office spokesman, confronted with questions on this issue, said, "This is a visa issue, where applications are decided by UKVI [UK Visas and Immigration] based on relevant legislation." Yeah. thanks. We know it's a visa issue. And we know that UKVI is supposed to decide on applications on the basis of relevant legislation. Does the relevant legislation really call for decisions to be made on the basis of made-up facts?
By the way, if you think you've heard this kind of bland, bureaucratic non-answer before, you have. Here's Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei on questions about Ai's 2011 detention: "China is a country under the rule of law, and relevant authorities will work according to law." And here's Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying on questions about Pu Zhiqiang's detention: "The judicial authorities of China handle the relevant case in accordance with the law."
Well done, Britain!
POSTSCRIPT: I'm not yet willing to dismiss the theory that this is just a low-level bureaucratic cock-up: somebody thinks he's fibbing because they misremember; they ask their superiors what to do, precisely because they don't want to deny him a visa, not because they do; the superiors, who assume that their subordinates have got their facts right, say, "Well, just give him a slap on the wrist and tell him not to do it again."
AUGUST 6th UPDATE: Kerry Brown, formerly of the Foreign Office, has kindly permitted me to publish his take on how this might have happened.
July 30, 2015 in Commentary, News - Chinese Law | Permalink | Comments (1)
China bans high-speed rail travel for people with outstanding judgments against them
Story below. I think this falls under the "be careful what you wish for" category. We always complain about the weakness of Chinese courts in enforcing their judgments, but this reminds us that if the state is well-organized enough, it can make your life miserable not only for good reasons (as here) but for bad reasons as well. Bullet trains today, credit cards tomorrow, and ATMs the day after. They won't need to arrest the lawyers in that case.
http://english.caixin.com/2015-07-22/100831677.html
Bullet Trains Off-Limits to People Failing to Make Court-Ordered Payments
Country's highest court adds high-speed trains to list of banned services for individuals failing to repay debts or make compensation payouts
By intern reporter Shan Yuxiao
Images of convicted debtors flashed across a giant digital billboard at the entryway of the Changsha Railway Station on the afternoon of January 20 / CFP
(Beijing) – People who do not make payments ordered by judges cannot ride on China's popular bullet trains, the highest court has said, adding to the list of services that are off-limits to individuals who fail to make child support payments or repay debts.
The Supreme People's Court said on July 21 the ban is intended to clamp down on people who have been ignoring rulings that they repay a debt or provide compensation for some wrongdoing. The order came into effect on July 22.
In 2010, the top court said that people who did not make payments ordered by judges could not buy airplane tickets, ride sleeper trains, or stay at rated hotels and resorts.
People in China must provide ID when they buy train tickets or check into hotels. To enforce the crackdown, the judicial system gives a list of people who have failed to repay debts or make compensation to airlines, train ticket sellers and hotels.
The country's judicial system is often seen as weak because its orders are often ignored. There is little cooperation between the courts and police regarding civil lawsuits, child support disputes and compensation for injuring someone, for example. This has meant that people who owe debts to others can go about their daily routines unaffected.
Liu Guixiang, who heads a division overseeing enforcement of rulings at the Supreme People's Court, said that adding bullet trains to banned services could prompt more people to make court-ordered payments because this form of transport has become very popular with travelers.
Nearly half of the country's train passengers in the first half of the year – about 2.9 million people – rode bullet trains, data from railroad operator show. China has been building a huge high-speed train network in recent years and is still adding to it. Bullet train travel is generally seen as affordable and comfortable, and the lines linking major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, are popular, especially on holidays.
The top court will also urge lower courts to hand out stiffer punishments for failing to repay debts, Liu said. Data from the highest court show that more than 58,000 people were detained from the beginning of 2010 to the end of June for failing to make good on a debt, but only 864 were charged with a crime.
July 23, 2015 in News - Chinese Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Job opportunity: Human Rights in China seeks Senior Program Officer, Hong Kong
Here's the announcement.
June 30, 2015 in Internships/Employment Opportunities | Permalink | Comments (0)
Post-doc position available at Leiden University: Researcher on Chinese law and governance
June 30, 2015 in Fellowships/Research Opportunities, Internships/Employment Opportunities | Permalink | Comments (0)
Previous Articles More Articles
This blog is an Amazon affiliate. Help support Chinese Law Prof Blog by making purchases through Amazon links on this site at no cost to you.
REDHA BENDRIDI on How to become a China lawyer
mazmur on Moving my blog site
pakar seo on Moving my blog site
jasa seo on Moving my blog site
Moving my blog site
How to become a China lawyer
Full Private Land Ownership Returns to China's Cities
Correction/retraction to post on China granting self authority to hack into foreign servers
China grants self carte blanche to hack into foreign servers in criminal investigations
Please Select \ Books \ Commentary \ Conferences \ Current Affairs \ Fellowships/Research Opportunities \ Internships/Employment Opportunities \ News - Chinese Law \ News - Miscellaneous \ Other \ People and Institutions \ Publications \ Research Resources The Archives
Please Select May 2017 April 2017 March 2017 February 2017 January 2017 December 2016 November 2016 October 2016 September 2016 July 2016 June 2016 May 2016
PageViews Since May 30, 2005
Donald C. Clarke


They say cats have nine lives, but a puppy in Turkey may have a few of its own.
Omer Yilmaz, a shopkeeper in Turkey fed a stray pup a piece of sausage, when the piece got stuck in its throat.
The man saw the puppy couldn't breathe, dropped to his knees and put his finger down the little dog's throat. He removed the piece of sausage from the pup's mouth and started to perform C.P.R. on the unconscious animal.
The shopkeeper said that he could feel its mother's gaze begging him to bring her baby back to health. After a few breaths and splashes of water, the puppy was brought back from the brink.
The shopkeeper said it was impossible not to act in that moment of life or death.


Raymond Donald Evernham, Sr., "Pop", 80, of Mooresville, passed away on Sunday, May 22, 2011, at his residence.
He was born in Rumson, N.J. on March 18, 1931, to the late Raymond John and Madeline Hawkins Evernham. He is also preceded in death by a brother, Alfred Evernham and a sister, Marjorie Davidson.
Evernham was a mechanic working with the railroad and with race teams. He served his country in the United States Navy on board the destroyer USS H. J. Ellison DD-864. He was a member of Grace Covenant Church, Cornelius, N.C.
He is survived by his wife, MaryLou Bailey Evernham; children, Raymond Evernham, Jr. and wife, Erin, Willie Evernham and wife, Barbara, and LuAnn Evernham; grandchildren, Danelle, Donald, Willy, Ray J., Scotty and Taylor and great grandson, Christopher; sister, Caroline Nicholl and brother, Robert Evernham.
Visitation will be held on Tuesday, May 24, 2011, at Cavin-Cook Funeral Home, from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. and from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. Funeral services will be on Wednesday, May 25, 2011, at 1 p.m. at Grace Covenant Church, with Pastor Farrell Lemings and Pastor Paul Turbedsky officiating.
Memorials may be made to Grace Covenant Church, 17301 Statesville Road, Cornelius, NC 28031 and/or the National Kidney Foundation of NC, 5950 Fairview Road, Suite 708, Charlotte, NC 28210.
NASCAR takes Easter Weekend off, visit your local short track!


Ready Capital currently sports a Zacks Rank #1 (Strong Buy), along with "B" grades for Value and Momentum in our Style Scores system. The company is a non-bank real estate and small business lender for multifamily and commercial real estate. The publicly traded mortgage REIT, which is externally managed by Waterfall Asset Management, LLC, is projected to see its quarterly FFO surge over 16% and its full-year FFO soar roughly 30%, based on our current Zacks Consensus Estimate.
Meanwhile, the company's quarterly revenues are projected to pop 11.3%. Plus, RC trades with a P/E of just 8.9, which marks a discount to its industry's average of 9.4. The company declared a dividend of $0.40 a share in December 2018 and boasts a dividend yield of 10%. Ready Capital stock opened at $15.83 a share Tuesday and has experienced positive momentum to start the year.
Exantas Capital is a REIT that provides commercial real estate loans and credit investments such as commercial mortgage-backed securities. XAN currently carries a Zacks Rank #2 (buy) and has "B" grades for both Value and Growth. The company's quarterly FFO is expected to skyrocket over 264% from the year-ago period, on the back of 33% revenue growth.
On top of that, its full-year FFO figure is projected to expand by 190%, with the following fiscal year's figure projected to come in 45.7% above our 2018 estimate. The New York-based company also boasts a dividend yield of 6.5%. XAN is also trading under $11 a share and has seen its stock price surge to start 2019.
Chatham Lodging is a self-advised hotel REIT that focuses on upscale extended-stay and select-service hotels. The company's portfolio includes notable brands such as Courtyard, Hampton, Hilton Garden Inn, and many more. These facilities are primarily near large metropolitan markets in the U.S., so Chatham is definitely in some prime lodging real estate.
CLD holds a #2 (Buy) rating. Its consensus estimates for FFO the next quarter, as well as the current and next full fiscal years, have all moved higher over the last 90 days. CLD also trades with a P/E of just 10.9, which is a steep discount to its industry's average of 15.1. The stock presents a dividend yield of 6.2%, and the company has consistently delivered this payout for years.


text:
Dieter Hermann (* 6. Mai 1941 in Herpf, bei Meiningen in Thüringen; † 18. März 2022 in Erfurt in Thüringen) war ein deutscher Leichtathletik-Trainer und ehemaliger Leichtathlet.  Er wurde vor allem bekannt durch die langjährige Trainer-Tätigkeit für Nils Schumann sowie als vierfacher DDR-Meister im Hindernislauf.

Als Athlet
Seine sportliche Laufbahn begann in frühen Jahren als Stürmer beim achtklassigen Herpfer SV, bei dem er bis zum heutigen Tage Ehrenmitglied ist. Mit 16 Jahren entdeckte Horst Fenchel in Meiningen sein Talent für das Laufen. Nur ein Jahr später lief er dann für den ASK in Erfurt, wo Erich Bock sein Trainer wurde.

In den Jahren 1964 bis 1967 studierte er neben seiner Läufer-Tätigkeit nach dem Vorbild seines Vaters Bauingenieurwesen.
1967, 1968, 1969 und 1971 wurde Dieter Hermann DDR-Meister im 3000-Meter-Hindernislauf. 1967 gewann er die Mittelstrecke bei den DDR-Crossmeisterschaften. In der Halle war er von 1967 bis 1970 Meister im 1500-Meter-Lauf. Seine Bestleistung über die 1500 m auf der Aschenbahn betrug 3:42 Minuten, im 3000-Meter-Hindernislauf lief er 1969 seine Bestzeit von 8:36,2 Minuten. Über die selten gelaufenen 1500 m Hindernis hält Hermann noch den deutschen Rekord, den er 1966 in Prag aufstellte. Von 1967 bis 1969 trat er in sechs Länderkämpfen für die DDR an. 1971, mit 30 Jahren, beendete er die Karriere, nachdem er sich beim Höhentraining im bulgarischen Belmeken schwer erkältet hatte.

Als Trainer
Dieter Herrmann war von 1971 bis 1990 Trainer im DVfL. Als Trainer arbeitete er wissenschaftlich, forcierte Schwimmen, Skilanglauf und Radfahren für seine laufenden Schützlinge.
Mit seinen Assistenten wie Marion Peters, Stephan Gneupel, Dieter Fromm oder Enrico Aßmus stellten sich vor allem nach der Wende große Erfolge ein. Hauke Fuhlbrügge wurde 1991 WM-Dritter über 1500 m, Martin Strege oder Ralf Aßmus erreichten später die WM-Finals über 3000 m Hindernis. Noch erfolgreicher war sein Schützling Nils Schumann, dieser wurde erst Europameister, dann 2000 in Sydney Olympiasieger im 800-Meter-Lauf. Zuletzt war er als Trainer für den SV Creaton Großengottern aktiv.

Nach einer Alzheimer-Erkrankung zog er sich 2018 aus der Öffentlichkeit zurück. Er starb am 18. März 2022.

Er hinterlässt neben seiner Ehefrau Sigrid Hermann die Söhne Thomas, Robert und Erik.

Literatur
 Klaus Amrhein: Biographisches Handbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen Leichtathletik 1898–2005. 2 Bände. Darmstadt 2005 publiziert über Deutsche Leichtathletik Promotion- und Projektgesellschaft S. 447

Weblinks
 Artikel zum 70. Geburtstag auf thueringer-allgemeine.de
 Artikel zum 80. Geburtstag auf thueringer-allgemeine.de
  Artikel über das Karriereende von Nils Schumann auf leichtathletik.de
 27.-30.07.1967 XX. Leichtathletik Meisterschaft Halle Dieter Hermann, Turb. Erfurt Foto unbekannt im DDR-Bildarchiv
 Ordensverzeichnis für den Banner der Arbeit Stufe II auf nd-archiv.de
 Nachruf zum Tod auf Leichtathletik.de
 Nachruf zum Tod des TLV
 Nachruf zum Tod auf thueringer-allgemeine.de
 Nachruf zum Tod in der OTZ

Fußnoten

1500-Meter-Läufer (Deutschland)
DDR-Meister (Leichtathletik)
Leichtathletiktrainer (DDR)
Leichtathletiktrainer (Deutschland)
DDR-Bürger
Deutscher
Geboren 1941
Gestorben 2022
Mann

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


If your business owns vehicles used by an owner, employee or company director, you need to determine if you have a personal-use payroll reporting requirement. Generally, nonbusiness use of a company vehicle is taxable compensation to the employee which is subject to payroll taxes. Therefore, you need to include this in your payroll processing before your deadline for making a timely tax deposit for 2011 passes.
Since this payroll reporting must be done before the end of the year, November and December usage can be reported next year.
For your convenience, we have the 2011 Worksheet and the IRS Annual Lease Value Table available for your use in calculating the benefit to be included in your payroll reporting.
In order to have the employee cover the employee's share of the payroll taxes, this compensation needs to be reported when you are processing a payroll with wages.
If you miss reporting the taxable benefit with a payroll run, you will need to gross up the taxable benefit to include the employee's share of the payroll taxes resulting in a net zero check.
For those of you using a payroll service, please contact your payroll representative regarding this taxable benefit and any others that need to be included in your year-end reporting. If you need a payroll-service referral, we would be happy to help you make that connection. Or if you prefer, we will be happy to assist you with this reporting requirement for those of you with do-it-yourself payrolls.


A chicken barbecue to benefit the Wyalusing Valley Lady Rams softball team on June 23 at the chicken pit by PenMart, Rt. 6, Wyalusing. Hope to have chicken halves off grill by 10 a.m. Come out and support your Lady Rams.
The American Red Cross is sponsoringa Blood Drive on June 24, St. Basil's, Dushore, 1 to 6 p.m.
Monthly Breakfast at the Herrickville Fire Hall, Sunday, June 30, 2013, 7:30 to 10:30 a.m. All you can eat: pancakes, French toast, ham, sausage, eggs, home fries, sausage gravy and biscuits, coffee, orange juice, real maple syrup and sugar-free syrup. Adults, $7; children to 12 years, $3; preschool, free. Benefit: Herrick Twp. Vol. Fire Co. - Dept. 4.
Calvary Chapel Endless Mts., Rt. 6 (Old Cornerstone Bookstore), Wyalusing. Friday Nite "Light," family-based discipleship, Friday, 7 to 9 p.m. Open to all who want to serve Jesus. Childcare for ages 0-12. Call Joe or Dawn Buttito, 570- 746-1689, dbuttito@epix.net.
Messengers, a contemporary Christian band from the Factoryville United Methodist Church, will be presenting the worship service at the Skinners Eddy United Methodist Church on June 23 at 11 a.m. Everyone is welcome to hear the "word" in spoken and musical testimonies.
The Stevensville Presbyterian Church Vacation Bible School is set for June 24 to 28, 9 to 11:30 a.m. The theme is "Everywhere Fun Fair. "The staff and youngsters will share Bible stories, crafts, science studies, games and snacks. Children, ages three through sixth grade are welcome. VBS leaders are seeking helpers. If you can help, call Vande Marks, 570-746-3188.
The Wyalusing Presbyterian Church on Church Street in Wyalusing will be celebrating their 220th birthday following the 10 a.m. worship service on June 30. Any church or community member willing to share photos, papers or memories should contact the church office, 570-746-3333 or Pam Quentin, 746-1064. This is a community event and everyone is invited.
The Moxie Community Church located at 315 Benjamin Road in Wyalusing will hold Vacation Bible School June 26 to 28 from 6 to 8:30 p.m. Children will attend the regular service that next Sunday morning to share what they learned. This year's program is SonWorld Adventure Park and children from preschool through sixth grade are invited. Call Mike at 570-746-3574 or Linda at 363-2360 for registration information.
Vacation Bible School, "Rev It Up for God," is being held at the Orwell Bible Church Sunday, June 23 to Thursday, June 27, 6 to 8 p.m. for grades K to six. Parents and all adults are welcome to join. The church is located on Orwell Hill Rd., between Potterville and Rt. 187 north of Rome. For any questions, call Pastor Vieldhouse, 570-744-1915.
The WVHS Class of 1951 will meet for lunch on Friday, June 21 at noon at Mark's Valley View, Laceyville.
Block party on Saturday, June 22 from noon to 4 p.m. at the First Presbyterian Church, Towanda, 5 Court St. Bring family and friends. Food, games, music, prizes, a petting zoo and much more and it is all free.
Free family movie to be shown at Mt. Pisgah on Friday, June 28. Come to the Hilltop Pavilion at dusk to watch "Those Calloways." For more information, contact the park office at 570-297-2734.
The Bradford County Library's Summer Reading program begins on Wednesday, June 26 at 6:30 p.m. with a special appearance by the Binghamton Zoo's Zoomobile. The program is free and open to the public. Call the library at 570- 297-2436 for more information.
Endless Mountains Amateur Radio Club will hold their annual field day at the Emergency Services Building, 3880 SR 6 East, Tunkhannock on June 22 from 1 to 8 p.m. and June 23, 7 a.m. until noon. Learn about radio communications and become a ham yourself. For further information, call Al, 570-836-5030 or Joe, 207- 0070.
Bookmobile Schedule June 24, Monroeton Library, 11 a.m. June 26, Hopkins Commons II, 9 a.m.; Hopkins Commons I, 10:30 a.m.; Keystone Manor, 1 p.m.; Kozy Kastle, 3 p.m.
A pasture walk and workshop will be hosted by producer David Egge in Albany Township on June 26 from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. Participation and lunch are free for those who register by June 21. To register or ask for directions, contact Laura Hewitt at 570-265-2717 or info@endlessmountainsrcd.org .
Home Textile Tool Museum Events: June 22, Rugs, Rugs and More Rugs; June 29, Flax Day; July 6, Young Hands and Young Hearts/Youth Day; July 13, Bobbin Lace; July 20, Tape Looms and Lucets; July 27, Indigo Dyeing. Workshops: June 15, Natural Dye Day; July 15, Housewife; July 22, Felt Hat or Scarf; July 26, Combined Cheese Making 1 and 2. For more information, contact Esther Welden at 570- 278-1886. The museum is located in Orwell on Route 1036.
Salt Springs State Park Happenings: Land Forest Owners Assoc. annual picnic, June 23, 1 p.m.; All-American Music, July 3, 7 p.m.; Children's Gardening Series, July 10, 1 p.m. For more information, email Debra Adleman dadleman@stny.rr.com.
The Bradford County Historical Society will host a free program entitled "The Rifled Musket in the Civil War" scheduled for Friday, June 21 at 6 p.m. Door open at 5:30 p.m. Participants are asked to register by calling 570-265-2240 or by email at info@bradfordhistory.com.
Gospel Jamboree at Spencer's Gazebo in Transue on Sunday, June 23 at 3 p.m. All are welcome.
Come Join the Depression Support Group at the Herrickville Fire Hall, first and third Thursday of the month at 2 p.m. For more information, contact Colleen Taylor, 570-746- 3021.
Lines Reunion - Descendants of W. Earl and Lena Lewis Lines of LeRaysville on Sunday, July 14 at Haigh's Pond outside of LeRaysville. Dinner at 1 p.m. Bring your own table service, a dish to pass and beverage. Swimming and fishing are available. Chinese Auction. Bring a small item for each family member attending. Any questions, call Marilyn Stalford Ross at 570-746-1701 and leave a message or Ronnie Wickwire for directions, 570-744-1286.
WVHS Class of 1983. This year's reunion will be held on June 22 at the park in Wyalusing from 1 to 4 p.m. Meat, drinks and tableware provided. Families welcome to come, just bring a dish to pass. Any questions, contact Deb Sands, 570- 250-8030 or Dan Allen via facebook.
The WVHS Class of 1998 will hold their 15th year class reunion on Saturday, Aug. 3 at 6 p.m. at the Towanda Rod and Gun Club. If you did not receive an invite, please contact Morgin Tewksbury Jones at 570-934- 2604 or mjjones@epix.net.
Stoddard Reunion - will be held on Sunday, July 7 at 1 p.m. at the Wilmot Fire Hall in Sugar Run. Bring a wrapped item for the Chinese Auction, covered dish to pass, table service and beverage. Meat will be provided and door prizes drawn. For further information, contact Leona Fitzgerald at 570-746-3076.
There will be a Trap Shoot at the Silvara Gun Club on Sunday, June 23 from noon to 3 p.m. to benefit the Beaver Meadows Ladies Aid. The cost is $25 and bring your own shells. Refreshments served by the Ladies Aid.
Winding River Players will host their annual Summer Workshop Acting Troupe during the last week of June. The first session will be held on June 21 from 1:30 to 3:30. Auditions will be held at that time. The workshop will be held June 24 to 28 from 10:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. Two performances of Through the Looking Glass, June 28, 3 and 7 and a performance at French Azilum on July 14 at 1 p.m. Age range from 8 to 15 years. For more information, 570-265-3623 or julieln@epix.net.


Julie is one of five Roskill Community Voice reps on the Puketapapa Local Board. She has a strong interest in how the council can use its resources to get better community, economic and environmental outcomes. With a background in education, Julie is an activist by nature with a passion for social justice. When not on the radio, a computer or in a meeting she is running a busy household which includes three children. Time out is reading science fiction.
Priyanca is a Labour list MP. She has extensive experience working with women survivors of violence and migrant workers facing exploitation. She is passionate about social justice and strongly believes that everyone deserves to live with dignity. In her down time, you can find Priyanca playing board games with friends or spending time with her husband and two rescue dogs.
Previously a community lawyer in Henderson, Shane is now the Chair of the Henderson –Massey Local Board, elected under the Labour Party banner in 2016. He is a proud Westie who in his community law role gave free advice and gained many insights into community needs. In his downtime, Shane enjoys cricket and goes surfing and hiking.
Marja arrived in Aotearoa from Holland in 1989. As a travel lover and self-confessed workaholic, she struck a balance working for 21 years as a flight attendant for Air NZ. An invitation to campaign for Labour in Rodney piqued her political interest and she's been hooked ever since. She lives with her husband and son Max near Wellsford, where they share a five acre block with their cows, chickens and ducks.
An MP since 2017, Anahila is passionate about family values. Her career includes over 17 years social work experience, a broadcast role for Radio Tonga of Aotearoa, and she has been as a catalyst for action and change for women, social services and community groups. On top of all that, she's also a boss in the sports department, having held managerial roles for Lofa Tonga National Women's Rugby and Otahuhu RFC, and currently as vice president of the NZ Tonga RFA.
A member of the Māngere–Ōtāhuhu Local Board, Christine works part-time in the Manukau East Electorate office. Her family's values of social justice and community service drew her to years of volunteer work and into politics. She believes Council support for the arts fosters wellbeing, innovative thinking, economic opportunity and is essential to thriving communities. On free evenings, she reads, watches K-Dramas or exercises her two rescue dogs.
A practising lawyer and Chair of the Waitākere Ranges Local Board, Greg has been an active supporter and Labour activist since joining the Labour Party in 1975 – though some of his best friends are Greens. He is a sometime contributor to political blog The Standard, and when he's taking a break from work and politics, he can be found enjoying a round of golf.
Anahila Kanongata'a-Suisuika MP explains the details of the End of Life Choice Bill, which has now passed its first reading in Parliament.
Dianne McCarthy of Friends of Wairaki Stream joins Julie Fairey to talk urban streams and weed control.


De dienst ";RouteXL "; is offered via the internet by way of software-as-a-Service by RouteXL B.V.. ("RouteXL"), established in Heiloo and office at the address Kennemerstraatweg 464, OF 1851.
The use of RouteXL below are conditions attached. By using RouteXL, do you agree with this. Deviations from these conditions are only binding if accepted in writing by RouteXL.
1.1 RouteXL is offered for the benefit of routing through the tools offered via the website RouteXL. You decide how you deploy the tools and for what specific purposes.
1.2 RouteXL can register mandatory for some of its services to be determined by. Once your registration is completed, you can log into your account and use the service. RouteXL holds only registered users history and user settings.
1.3 You will need access to your account to foreclose using the username and password for unauthorized. In particular, you should keep your password strictly confidential. RouteXL may assume that everything that happens from your account after login with your username and password, is under your direction and control. So you are liable for all acts, unless you have reported in RouteXL that someone else knows your password.
1.4 RouteXL you process personal data. RouteXL hereby acts as the processor in the sense of the Protection Act; you are the controller. You indemnify RouteXL all claims of the parties involved under this Act.
2.1 It is forbidden to use RouteXL for acts that are contrary to the Dutch or other applicable law- and regulations. This will include the store or distribute through the service information that is defamatory, is defamatory or racist.
2.2 In particular, it is prohibited to use RouteXL in a way that nuisance or annoyance to other users created. Among others is through the use of own scripts or programs up- or downloading large amounts of data, or the excessive often calling the service.
2.3 If RouteXL find that you violate the above conditions, whether a complaint will receive, RouteXL may itself intervene to terminate the infringement. The provisions of Article 7.4 of these conditions is then applied.
2.4 If, in the opinion of RouteXL nuisance, damage or other hazard to the functioning of the computer systems or network RouteXL or third parties and / or the services provided over the internet, in particular, because of the excessive doing the calculation of routes or otherwise excessively calling the service, leaks of personal or activities of viruses, Trojans and similar software, RouteXL is entitled to take any measures it considers reasonably necessary to avert this danger or to prevent.
2.5 RouteXL is always entitled to report offenses reported. Furthermore RouteXL entitled to your name, address, IP address and other identifying data to deliver to a third party who complains that you are infringing on his rights or these Terms and Conditions, provided that the correctness of the complaint is reasonably plausible enough, there is no other way to get this information and the third has a clear interest in release of the data.
2.6 RouteXL, the damage caused by violation of the conduct charged to you. You indemnify RouteXL all claims by third parties relating to damage caused by a violation of this AUP.
3.1 RouteXL endeavor to make available the services are, but does not guarantee uninterrupted availability.
3.2 RouteXL maintains the service active. If maintenance is expected to result in a limitation of the availability, RouteXL this will be carried out as the use of the service is relatively low. Maintenance is announced in advance as possible. Maintenance related emergencies can occur at any time and without prior announcement.
3.3 RouteXL may from time to time modify the functionality of RouteXL. Taking your feedback and suggestions welcome, but ultimately decided RouteXL themselves what adjustments they may or may not enter.
3.4 RouteXL will perform endeavor maintenance as possible, but this will also depend on its supplier(s) and third-party updates and error recovery software. RouteXL entitled some updates do not install if correct operation of the software in its opinion does not benefit or is not in your interest.
4.1 The service RouteXL, its software and all information and images on the website is the intellectual property of RouteXL B.V.. This may be copied or used in any way without separate written consent RouteXL, except where permitted by law.
4.2 Information that you save or processed through the service and remains your property (or that of your suppliers). RouteXL has a limited license to use this information for service, including future aspects.
4.3 If you send information to RouteXL, For example, feedback on an error or suggestion for improvement, gives you its unlimited and perpetual license to use this information for service. This does not include information that you highlight emphatically as confidential.
4.4 RouteXL will take cognizance of data you store and / or distributes through RouteXL, unless this is necessary for a good or service RouteXL is obliged under a statutory provision or court order. In that case RouteXL will endeavor the notification of data to minimize, so far as lies within its power.
5.1 The use of RouteXL is a fee attached to use certain features. You will be advised of the relevant functionalities on costs. The fee is per unit, route and / or address calculated.
5.2 Payment can be made via PayPal, by transferring the amount to the bank account itself RouteXL, via iDealbetaling, via creditcard, by direct debit, or according to the payment instructions at the website.
5.3 Because the service is delivered directly, and be on your explicit request, it is not possible to undo a payment by relying on the Distance Selling Act.
6.1 RouteXL strive to the utmost in order to offer an optimal route. However, route optimization is a complex mathematical problem, which no absolute formula for the current state of scientific knowledge available. RouteXL can particularly do so, but also because of its dependence on the quality of third-party data (in particular cards) no guarantee of absolute optimality of calculated routes. RouteXL makes every effort to get the most 95% of the calculated routes 95%.
6.2 RouteXL likewise strive to the utmost in order to map to the correct location addresses entered by the user, and translate to locations to the right addresses. RouteXL can not guarantee the accuracy of addresses and locations. The user is responsible for checking the correctness of addresses and locations on the map.
6.3 Instructions for navigation are suggestions. Conditions and traffic regulations always take precedence. The driver is obliged to heed and is personally responsible for following the suggestions.
6.4 The provisions of Articles 6.1 to 6.3 implies that RouteXL, except in cases of willful misconduct or gross negligence, can never be liable for damages resulting from not absolute optimality of routes and / or defects in the display of addresses and locations on the map.
6.5 Except in case of intent or gross negligence liability RouteXL is further limited to the amount you paid in the three months prior to the time of the harmful event.
6.6 RouteXL is explicitly not liable for indirect damage, consequential damages, lost profits, lost savings and loss due to business interruption.
6.7 Condition for the existence of any right to compensation is that you in writing to RouteXL damage within two months after discovery.
6.8 In case of force majeure RouteXL is never liable to compensate any damage caused to you. Force majeure situations include cases to malfunction or breakdown of the Internet, telecommunications infrastructure, blackouts, domestic disturbances, mobilization, war, gridlock, staking, exclusion, business interruptions, stagnation in supply, fire and flood.
7.1 This Agreement is effective as soon as you are first used the service and runs indefinitely.
7.2 The Agreement may be terminated at any time, with a notice period of one month, counted from the time of termination.
7.3 RouteXL may terminate the agreement if you have not logged in twelve months. The agreement ends automatically if a party capable of bankruptcy, suspension of payments, or general will seize power partly laid file, dies, goes into liquidation or is dissolved.
7.4 RouteXL the right service or temporarily suspend or discontinue if fails to fulfill any obligation towards RouteXL, unless such failure to suspend or discontinue the service in view of the subordinate does not justify.
7.5 After the end of the User's RouteXL entitled to delete all the benefit of stored data. RouteXL is not obliged to provide a copy of the data.
8.1 RouteXL should these conditions and adjust pricing at any time.
8.2 RouteXL, the amendments or supplements at least thirty days before the entry into force Announce the service there so you can hear.
8.3 If you do not wish to accept an amendment or addition, you can cancel the agreement until the date of entry into force. Use of the service after the effective date shall be deemed acceptance of the amended or supplemented Conditions.
9.2 Except as otherwise required by mandatory law, all disputes relating to RouteXL be submitted to the competent Dutch court of the district where RouteXL located.
The 9.4 version of communications or information stored shall be deemed to be correct RouteXL, unless evidence to the contrary in this regard.
9.6 RouteXL is entitled to transfer its rights and obligations under the contract to a third party who takes RouteXL whether the operation of its.
9.7 These Terms and Conditions are drawn up in Dutch and English. In case of differences (the interpretation of) the text prevails The Dutch text.


Most states require some form of declaration of intent to homeschool for the new school year.
It's a new school year, which means that it's time to file our Declaration of Intent to Homeschool form here. Do you know your state homeschool laws? If you don't, it would be a good idea to read up on them. You don't want to discover you didn't follow the law by a visit from your local truancy officer– or worse yet– Children's Services.
If you're not sure where to find out what your state laws are, the Coalition for Responsible Home Education has information on those. You do not have to be a member to access their website. (I'm not.) For local information, hit up the Google machine and type in "(your state name) homeschool laws" or "(your state) state homeschool organization". State-level homeschool organizations often have more detailed information on the ins and out of dealing with specific school districts or superintendents. This is especially important if there have been problems.
By following the laws of your state, you are lending credibility to what you do and more importantly, to what all of us are doing. The stories of "under the radar" homeschoolers seem to abound in certain areas and can often make homeschooling come across as something wrong or undermining to the government. Following the existing laws helps to protect all of us.
If you don't know how to file your Intent form, contact your state or local homeschool organization.
School districts each have different ways to doing things, and sometimes they don't exactly follow the laws. If you're homeschooling in Washington, I have more written about what you HAVE TO fill out on the DOI form. <– I will update this post if the current law changes.
The DOI form is a hoop to jump through– albeit an important one– so that your family can spend the rest of the school year enjoying learning together. Have you filed yours yet?