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Home Explore Small Wars Journal - Thinking Differently- Unlocking the Human Domain in Support of the 21st Century Intelligence Mission - 2013-08-20
Small Wars Journal - Thinking Differently- Unlocking the Human Domain in Support of the 21st Century Intelligence Mission - 2013-08-20
Published by five7alpha, 2014-11-20 04:21:25
Description: Small Wars Journal - Thinking Differently- Unlocking the Human Domain in Support of the 21st Century Intelligence Mission - 2013-08-20
Thinking Differently: Unlocking the Human Domain in Support of the 21st Century Intelligence MissionBy Robert R. Greene SandsJournal Article | Aug 20 2013 - 1:43pmThinking Differently: Unlocking the Human Domain in Support of the 21st Century IntelligenceMissionRobert R. Greene SandsAbstractThe author acknowledges that this is a very in-depth treatise of a subject that is trending more frequentlyright now. This journal – and others by the current selection of topics related to culture, the human domainand a highly volatile transnational environment – realizes the importance of promoting knowledge, skillsand abilities (even attitudes) to enable mission success within that domain.People are the currency of the human domain; their visible behaviors and symbols are one of the onlyways to really discern their thoughts and motivations. Add in the cultural complexity of differingworldviews, beliefs and values that play on those thoughts and motivations and the domain becomes evenless certain to decode. Factor in that U.S. military and civilian personnel directly, and indirectly, influencethe course of interactions and behavior in the domain and the human domain becomes incredibly layeredand dense, where meaning and purpose is difficult to extract and effort and skill necessary for successwithin the domain difficult to master. One of the primary keys to unlocking the human domain isknowledge about mitigating the array of unintended biases that spin out of human cognition; the mostprofound and compelling of those biases are cultural. This article is about just that; promoting thinkingdifferently about the human domain, and more generally, the uncertain and dynamic transitional securityenvironment that it is a part of. It goes beyond recognition of this need to provide an autopsy of how wethink, the different kinds of thinking strategies we employ to try to make sense of and forecast behaviorand events, and ultimately, how the development of thinking differently can mitigate the cognitive andcultural errors we subconsciously, even unconsciously fold into our analysis. The paper concludes withthoughts on developing a learning program that would introduce thinking differently. As it were, theauthor does not apologize for the article's length. It is not surprising that to think about thinking differentlyrequires a little extra ink.Introduction[i]Recently, there have been articles within this journal (Rebugio, 2013; Martin, 2013; Hoffman & Davies,2013) and elsewhere that have identified the human domain critical to the next phase of U.S. militarystrategy. One such conceptualization of the human domain refers to it as "the totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior" (McRaven in Ruolo, 2013). Early Post-COIN postmortems, speeches and presentations by a variety of United States Government (USG) andDepartment of Defense (DoD) leaders have indicated that critical takeaways from the last decade of U.S.involvement in two long wars have more to do with mastering the culture-general and culture-specificknowledge and interpersonal skills necessary to navigate in that human-centric space which for many ofus is veiled in ambiguity and uncertainty. It is an inescapable fact that wars are won, delayed or avoided inthis human space that is not defined by traditional and conventional domains that can be conquered, over-run or defended. This realization is gaining traction in the consciousness of many following the lastdecade of war and an accelerating pace of transnational security threats (Martin, 2013; Hoffman &Davies, 2013; Lamb et al., 2013).The last decade of American military and USG involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and the more recentdirect and indirect engagement in the Middle East, and other ongoing U.S. support to counterinsurgencieselsewhere have prompted a recalibration of overall DoD strategy and a diversification of missions awayfrom the reliance on COIN as the pre-eminent U.S. military strategy. It is clear that long-termexpeditionary counterinsurgency involving large numbers of U.S. forces will be considered as a lastresort; however, approaches and programs that supported COIN will remain as actual or potential supportto ongoing and future missions. Still, many now claim the demise of COIN as a strategy, even that COINshould never have been a strategy in the first place; elements of COIN have been forecasted to continue infuture DoD engagements (i.e. Hames 2012; Ucko, 2012; Collins, 2013; Manea, 2013; Gray, 2013).Speeches and comments by DoD leadership have portended a post-Afghanistan military future as one thatcontinues the war on terrorism while balancing a less kinetic more challenging role of building andsustaining partnerships with allied and partner nations. This future will include the development ofnational and human security of nations and populations where security may be in danger or failing,opening the door for insurgency and terrorism (Obama, 2009; Panetta, 2012; McRaven, 2012; Odierno,2012).Nation-states and other more local government or quasi-governmental organizations are subject toinsurgencies fueled by both internal and external actors such as terrorists, transnational and cyber-criminalelements, and extremists while also falling prey to environmental and man-made environmental crises.Flynn et al., (2012) suggests much of the efforts toward reducing global conflict should be aimed "left ofbang" where policy options and other types of assistance can ward off escalating tensions leading toconflict. Both former Secretary of Defense Panetta (Panetta, 2012) and USSOCOM commander ADMMcRaven (2012) offer complimentary perspectives where beyond traditional military involvement againstterrorism, the DoD (in particular SOCOM) will continue a range of missions such as SFA, training, andhumanitarian support (Magnuson, 2013), "Their missions are not secretive. They are not sexy. Nor dothey involve low-flying black helicopters in the dead of night." Afghanistan is winding down. This "willgive us an opportunity to do more in places we have neglected" McRaven said (p. 1).The last two decades have seen a remarkable shift in the transnational threat environment. "What weknow and project about the future operating environment tells us that the significance of the "humandomain" in future conflict is growing, not diminishing….to shape a peaceful and prosperous globalenvironment will rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within thehuman domain" (Odierno et al., 2013 - Strategic Landpower White Paper). However, little has beenwritten on how we need to think about the human domain (see Martin, 2013 for an initialconceptualization), especially about those domain residents who prompt us to figure out what and whythey are thinking, while we only have their behavior and other cultural artifacts to help us with piecingtogether what is occurring inside their minds. "Essentially… human population groups are complexadaptive entities and prone to behavior that the U.S. military has not quite gotten the grasp of…" (Martin, 2013) may be an understatement. New or modified technology cannot alone solve the gaps anddeficiencies that exist in our understanding of and ability to interact in this behaviorally-defined space."Many have oversimplified the concept to mean that in the past the U.S. military has done a terrible job ofthinking about how people will act and react to our actions, but this is disingenuous. The real reason Ithink this concept has gotten a lot of play is that even though we HAVE [emphasis author] thought aboutpeople, we still do not seem to be having the effects we want" (Martin, 2013).This article suggests as well that the human domain is a critical space to master and manage intent,purpose and interaction of the different actors involved. This newly defined (or re-defined) domain resiststraditional military and intelligence conceptualization and analysis for a number of reasons, most of thesereasons stem from deeply-seated cognitive, analytic and the most profound and least understood, culturalbiases. Some of these reasons are: the domain does not coincide or align neatly with spatial boundaries defined by geopolitical, physical or environmental variables; one cannot draw absolute boundaries around the human domain; the defining variables of the human domain critical to the management of it are behavioral and based on constructs such as worldviews and underlying cultural lattices of belief systems and values of the actors (including military and/or intelligence personnel); in other words, these underlying cultural systems greatly influence the behavior that is observable in the human domain; Domain features are similar to the properties of culture (shared, holistic, learned). The human domain transcends the traditional domains, Air, Sea, Space and Land (and now Cyber); behavior found in each can be traced back to the human domain; "Knowing" about the human domain is critical, the kinds of knowledge necessary to understand the parameters of this domain include sociocultural knowledge domains that feature culture-general and region and culture-specific information; The application of these types of knowledge sets to ascertain meaning of behavior and to interact within this domain with pertinent actors is tantamount to success and requires mastering thinking strategies and interpersonal skills and abilities not traditionally a part of military operations or learning programs.There seems to be two important strains that factor heavily in understanding and managing successfullywhen it comes to the human domain. First, this domain is being impacted/influenced by the increasinglycomplex international/transnational threat landscape that has a lasting impact as well on the conventionalstate-actor bipolar security environment. The present and future security landscape will consist, "of thethreat of hybrid warfare, involving multiple entities; the increasing ability of non-state actors to destabilizeentire regions and challenge national forces; the complexity of rules of engagement that constrain one sideand enable the other to operate with near impunity amongst the people…" (Odierno et al., 2013).Important to grasping the workings of the human domain depend on a host of sociocultural factors andinformation that can assist piecing together meaning of behavior in this domain, not traditionally a part ofinformation collected and analyzed on the conventional domains associated with conflict. As we havefound out, this sociocultural information is extremely relevant to asymmetrical, irregular andunconventional warfare to include stability operations, counterinsurgency, and counter-terrorism missions.This knowledge set is comprised of culture-general knowledge about how human culture works and itsuniversal tendencies and processes and more regional/culture-specific knowledge about how thosecultural-general concepts and tendencies are translated within that specific domain either geospatiallyanchored or translated to more contemporary actors and behaviors in a human domain that crossesboundaries and borders. Scott Atran discusses the latter arrangement, where global connectivity createshybrid associations and groups in a transnational more or less combination of virtual and scattered geospatial points of reference (2010, 2013). Recently, a collection of analytical skills and methods havebeen bundled up and offered under the rubric of sociocultural analysis (SCA) that would promote ways ofeliciting data and information that can speak more to the cultural complexity to the human domain (Flynnet al., 2012; Puls, 2010). SCA can help discern "complex social phenomenon" that can lead to a morerobust explanation of "…how populations understand their reality, why they choose either to support orresist their governments, how they organize themselves socially and politically, and why and how theirbeliefs transform over time" (Flynn et al., 2012:13).The second strain critical to operationalizing the human domain is developing and sustaining skills andabilities to "work" in the human domain, from interacting with a much more variable host of state and non-state actors to assist operational/mission goals involved, to include the population-centriccounterinsurgency, Security Force Assistance (SFA), building enduring partnerships but also being able to"collect" and interpret data gathered from those actors to bring to bear for use in intelligence missions.Interactional skills for this include cross-cultural communication, cross-cultural negotiations, and rapport-building, etc.These two strains play more importantly as the human domain is not restricted to a geospatial "space" buttranscends time and place and can exist in instantaneously-constructed social media messages that crosstraditional cultural features of religion, ethnicity, tribe, language and engage a millennial identity morefocused on contemporary issues human rights and human security or less defined but just as compelling ofa draw, sacred values (Atran, 2010, 2013). This, in effect, promotes, "the increasing pace and mutabilityof human interactions across boundaries, through virtual connectivity to form, act, dissolve, and reformthe pursuit of hostile purposes" (Odierno et al., 2013). Elsewhere, I have posited that developing cross-cultural competence is necessary for 21st century military and intelligence missions (Sands & Haines,2013; Sands, 2013; Sands, 2012, see also Sands and Greene-Sands in press, 2013). Cross-culturalcompetence prepares and provides capabilities to interact with the many different actors within the humandomain and promotes the necessary skills to place one in the position to discern the meaning of behaviorexhibited by these actors useful for forecasting and predicting future behavior. As I have explored andtaught for the last year in support of culture learning in the intelligence community, there is a need tointroduce a foundational capability, framed by skill-based cross-cultural competencies of perspective-taking and cultural sensemaking into the thinking strategies leading to successful mission operationsacross the spectrum of the human domain. I have labeled this capability, thinking differently, and it iscritical to those who need to understand and interact with the people who make up this newly envisionedlandscape, and just as important to consider the influence of the their own social and cultural orientationand culturally-influenced cognition on how they think (Sands & Haines, 2013). Thinking differently canapply equally to military organizations such as Special Operations Command and to the DefenseIntelligence Enterprise (DIE) or other intelligence agencies. Both SOF and intelligence must be intimatewith analyzing behavior that characterizes the human domain.Thinking differently, as we shall see in the rest of this paper, represents a fundamental shift in how weapproach, think, and make informed decisions based on this human domain. One of the primary purposesof this paper is to explore human cognition and how the cultural complexity of contemporary transnationalsecurity and the emphasis in the human domain will require behaviorally "rewiring" our cognition forsuccess in the human domain. In effect, traditional and even more recent attempt to fold alternativeanalytical methods into the intelligence process does not meet the analytical need of analysts, collectorsand other intelligence professionals to master the complexities of the human domain in the 21st century.There has been discussion about weaving non-traditional (alternative) analytical methods into theintelligence process (i.e, Fishbein & Treverton, 2004a; Fishbein & Treverton, 2004b; Babetski. 2012;Swanson, 2012; Berrett & Johnson, 2011; Sands & Haines, 2013). Promoting this discussion has been the acknowledgement by many that the traditional state-centric analysis is deficient in providing the right kindof information about a much more culturally complex transnational landscape that often defies the cold-war perspective still apparent in intelligence analysis. Finally, it is not enough to call to task deficienciesin how the military and others must prepare to face a complex and interconnected world. This paper willend with an initial exploration of how thinking differently can be folded into a learning program that canintroduce and accelerate the uptake and application of those requites and critical knowledge, skills,abilities and attitudes that promote thinking differently. Although this effort will concentrate on theintelligence process and the need to adopt thinking differently as a primary focus of analysis, it will alsoprove to be very applicable to other military populations like SOF who are also dependent on intimateunderstanding and interacting within the human domain.ContentTo begin this exploration of thinking differently, human cognition or thinking will be modeled based onNobel Prize winning author and economist Daniel Kahenman's (2003, 2011) systems approach utilizingtwo distinct but related cognitive systems and Gladwell's theory on thin slicing (2007). Evolution drovethe development of human cognition and key to this exploration is managing the unintended consequencesof that development in light of a changing intelligence mission landscape and focus. Knowledge of therole of components and their interrelationship within cognition will be provided. Providing the communityof learners (intelligence professionals) as well as learning professionals a primer on human cognition (andthe overt and hidden dangers of unintended consequences of the evolutionary development of cognition) iscritical to applying structured (often times synonymous with critical thinking) and non-structured thinkingstrategies to analysis to facilitate better forecasting and predictive capability. It is important to grasp howhumans think to better know how to how to identify and promote an array of thinking strategies andmethods better suited for the current and future intelligence need.The IC has moved toward folding in critical thinking skills as well as promoting alternative analyticalmethods "to enhance their abilities to anticipate potential threats in highly complex, fast-movingtransnational issues such as terrorism and weapons proliferation" (Fishbein & Treverton, 2004, p. 2).Critical thinking (CT) and alternative analysis are explored in the next section, thinking critically andalternatively. Although CT and alternative analysis provides a frame and an array of methods to facilitatemore nuanced interpretation of the intelligence problem while offering means to drive to competinghypotheses, the operations of method still are considered analysis – disaggregating of part, utilizinglogical or in many ways formalized operations to identify eventually a hypotheses or competing set ofhypotheses that can be promoted to aid in explanation, if not prediction.The section on thinking differently that follows considers the need to promote underlying skill-basedcompetencies that are also engaged in cross-cultural competence as a process or means to better "see" thecomplexity of transnational security environments because it will facilitate entrance into perspectives ofthe actors that seem not to be evident in thinking and analytical methods described up to this section.Sensemaking and mindfulness are introduced in the beginning of this section as a continually iterativeand within reason intuitive effort to offer a view of an environment. Sensemaking includes planning andquestioning that leads to a process of "foraging" for answers (and disaggregating elements) which is thensynthesized to form a "systematic" interpretation of an issue that can should lend itself to convincingexplanation (Moore, 2011, p. 8). Mindfulness, being in the present and questioning process to acquireknowledge, as well as the knowledge itself, contributes to the need to evaluate levels of expectations ofstakeholders (to include the analyst) and to continually challenge assumptions held by the stakeholders aswell those held by the analyst(s) (Fishbein & Treverton, 2004a and b; Moore, 2011). Thinking differently,however, calls into question first that the intelligence professional is unable to consider the current threat environment and in general transnational security environment because all analytical strategies andmethods drive toward convergence of product and outcome. Even alternative strategies and methodsrecently proposed exist as part of a structured process. Thinking differently proposes a space that resiststhe traditional bindings featured in analysis. Just as critical is that any form of analysis suffers from theinability of those involved in the intelligence process to accurately reflect and interpret the core sets ofbeliefs (and worldview) of those actors that make up the dynamic transnational security environment (aswell as even the more traditional state actors). Thinking differently also addresses the simultaneousexploitation of existing mental models of the analyst that prohibit a more mindful cultural self-awarenessthat will influence the reception and perception of beliefs of those actors that inspire and motivatebehavior. It is critical to understand how humans think and analysts "analyze" to know how and where toapply cross-cultural competence.This article will conclude with an exploration of a learning program that would promote knowledgetransfer, application and synthesis to facilitate more effective analysis and related intelligence activities.Indeed introducing concepts related to culture, region and language are essential – driven by the growingcomplexity of the contemporary and future international and transnational landscape, including thesupport of military activities designed to promote Left of Bang efforts. Perhaps more valuable to theintelligence professional is the need to conceptualize how thinking and more non-conventional analysis ispromoted and incorporated into practice and learning, enhanced by cross-cultural competence. This paperwill chart a learning program that considers elements of region, culture and cross-cultural competence andits articulation with the development of an array of thinking strategies. Bottom-line, this paper sees theneed to build capability to not only manage the workings of human cognition but to foundationally alterand direct, and at times to require stepping out of perspectives that run counter and contrary to ourpowerful and influential worldviews and belief systems while culturally making sense of that perspective.Background to Thinking DifferentlyRobert Sinclair, a CIA analyst, published a 1984 monograph, Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Scienceand the Intelligence Analysis, that urged CIA and its Directorate of Intelligence (DI) to pay attention to thejust then developing field of cognitive science and its application of "…powerful metaphors about theworkings of our minds that have developed over the past two decades" (Sinclair 2010's revised edition of1984) and apply those metaphors to the "work of the CIA's DI" (Sinclair 2010, p.1). Sinclair was treadingon ground that had been partially tilled by earlier work of Richards Heuer on the implication of humancognition and its impact on analysis. Heuer's Psychology of Intelligence Analysis is still used in manycourses on analysis. Sinclair's treatise identified the human mind and how it works as important toconsider in analysis. Heuer's work and book drew more attention to the "mental machinery" (Heuer 1999,p. 1) involved in analysis and the caution that being able to understand the analytic process "…is hinderedby the lack of conscious awareness of the workings of our own minds" (1999:1).Intimate to Heuer's thesis, and foundational to this paper, is that people are not consciously aware or haveexperience of what goes on "inside" their mind and when it finally does become conscious thought, theworking of this mental machinery produces unintended consequences such as cultural biases that canprove to be detrimental to the successful analysis. Daniel Kahneman peered inside this mental machineryand proposed a model of dual and sometimes contrary cognitive systems that explained this unconsciousprocess (2003, 2011), exposing the unintended consequences as a function of who we are and how wethink. Malcom Gladwell (2007) contributed a more popular book, Blink, with a similar thrust. Otherpopular works that probe the notion of cognition are John Nasibet (2008), Mind Set, Johnathan T. Evans,(2007), Hypothetical Thinking: Dual Processes in Reasoning and Judgment, Dan Garner (2012),Future Babble: Why Pundits Are Hedgehogs and Foxes Know Best and Jonathan Silver (2012), The Signaland the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail — but Some Don't . There is clearly an interest from a variety of perspectives on the power (or weakness) ofprediction/forecasting capability.Recently, there has been research and publications specific to cognition and intelligence specific tointelligence analysis by intelligence professionals that have introduced thinking strategies, such as criticalthinking and alternative analytical methods to mediate the unintended consequences of our cognition(Fishbein & Treverton, 2004a and b; Klein, 2011; Moore, 2007, 2011; Harris & Striker, 2012).Deconstructing human cognition to understand its processes and how to manage those processes tomitigate biases is critical to doing good intelligence. However, the implications of a contemporarytransnational security environment and the complexity of actors, cultures, dynamic and shifting alliancesthat is far different than a conventional Cold War security environment introduces complications thatdemand a kind of thinking that must consider the influence of not just the analyst's cognitive architecture,but the powerful effect of culture (worldviews, beliefs and values) on the analyst and those actors andgroups that are being considered. This paper suggests that thinking differently (an awareness and process)can only promote better analysis; thinking differently is managing the unintended consequences of humancognition – bias – and its operation when considering those who are culturally different. To get to thinkingdifferently, the intelligence process and community must move in a direction that is open to the non-traditional methods promoted by recent authors (several which seem to be fringe to the IC even today).The IC must recognize that due to current threat environment, the nature of prediction/forecasting andwhat constitutes products and outcomes should be reconsidered. Moore's recent 2011 treatise onsensemaking was subtitled A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution, this paper suggests that therevolution is not fully developed.Thinking: Human CognitionHuman cognition includes a group of mental processes that feature attention, memory, producing andunderstanding language, learning, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. How the human mindaccesses and makes sense of incoming information, how the mind makes inferences about thatinformation and how those inferences lead to forming and sustaining beliefs, thinking in other words, isthe bedrock of analysis. Primarily, the mind is a composed of a series of related mental models, orschemas, that have been constructed through direct and indirect experience based on social and culturalfactors such as socialization, collective and individual worldviews, profession, and cross-culturalexperience, among others. These schemas are appended and buttressed by a system of beliefs that act toguide cultural members' behavior and contextualize meaning as well as influence the construction ofschemas (Rentch et al., 2007; Heuer, 1998; Harris & Striker, 2012).In general, schemas represent related patterns of thought that are a result of an organizing cognitivesystem that incorporates new knowledge or information, "knowledge structures that guide thecomprehender's interpretations, inferences, expectations, and attention" (Graesser & Nakamura, 1982, p.60 in Rentch et al, 2007, p. 21). Schemas are what form the basis of interpreting incoming information,expanding and/or creating new schemas to handle the novel, surprising or foreign behavior is critical.Schemas are interrelated and more than one schema can be activated to address incoming information(same or similar behavior, events, and activities). Activation of schemas/and interrelated schemas isdependent on a variety of factors, accessibility, priming, external agency, emotional investment, andothers (more on priming below). There are schemas for a variety of knowledge sets and as a template forskills and abilities, examples include schemas that correspond to archetypes, social roles and socialknowledge, worldviews, and cultural understanding that enable "…individuals to make sense of theirexperiences" (Rumelhart in Rentsch et al., 2007, p. 21). A schema for cultural understanding (Rentsch etal., 2009) is critical to making sense of foreign cultural behavior which is significant to the contemporary security environment but as we shall see in the following sections, schemas can also be restrictive andlimiting in the interpretation of cultural behavior. Once formed, a schema may be expanded or co-opted bynew or novel experiences if the experiences vary dramatically and a cognitive restructuring will occur,spawning new schema (Rumelhart in Rentsch et al., 2007, p. 21). The next section introduces a model ofhuman thinking. At the crux of this foundational problem is not just the workings of a cognitive apparatuswrapped up in the thinking systems or the associated behaviors that produce bias, but the need to subvertan evolutionary tendency through an array of unconscious and conscious thinking strategies.Fast and Slow ThinkingThe evolutionary development of the human mind and thinking is based on an efficient application ofschemas that have promoted the survival of our species. Having to access and then quickly sort through atorrent of information that could lead to either survival or death promoted a human capacity to makesense/meaning of this information and be able to better predict outcomes – critically important inenvironments where threats to our ancestors, both overt and covert, are embedded in nature. "We arewired to detect patterns and respond to opportunities and threats without much hesitation" (Silver, 2013, p.12). This is still the case for contemporary humans in a very culturally complex landscape rich in threats.Kahneman (2003, 2011) and Evans (2008) among others cast thinking as a result of two systems. The firstsystem, the fast operating almost automatic system 1, generates impressions and feelings and uses these toconstruct accurate schemas and utilize predictive capability in familiar environments, "…with little or noeffort and no sense of voluntary control" (Kahneman, 2011, p. 20). System 2 is the more slower, reasonedand attention-focusing system and "…allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it,including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjectiveexperience of agency, choice and concentration" (2011:21) and acts to develop and sustain beliefs andenables deliberate choices based on what system 1 generates (Babeski, 2012:2).System 1 works in a space where input aligns with existing schemas and judgment of input is neededquickly. The outcome of system 1 thinking is to define and focus possible options to a singular path.System 2 works best when there is a complex and/or novel space and the possibilities of judgment arebased on innovative perspectives (Harris & Striker, 2012, p. 211). The systems receive inputsimultaneously, but the need to consider immediate action toggles System 1 initially. System 2 has a hostof variables that conspire to create a more reasoned and measured approach. "The first system…is a quick,automatic, implicit process that been proposed to explain judgment….The other system, reasoning, iseffortful, conscious, and deliberately controlled" (Harris & Spiker, 2012:211).Learning and IntuitionIn essence, what we are referring to when considering the operation of schemas, and their modification isthe construction of knowledge. Learning is the reinforcement of existing schemata (assimilation) and theknowledge that comprises schema, or the process of enhancing or augmenting (accommodation) existingschema, or replacing schema. Learning can occur either in the operation of system 1 or the need toengage the more deliberate approach of system 2 to consider the significance of the information, andknowledge as it relates to meaning and prediction of future behavior.Gladwell (2007) and others suggests that there is a human propensity for a quicker and usually efficientprocess that manages the potential information overload. This is especially germane to the contemporaryinformation-rich environment. Our brains have an incredible amount of information storage, but palesconsiderably when faced with the amount of information generated daily; it is critical that our minds beefficient in how we select what information we choose to store. To Silver (2013), our brains processinformation through approximation, "we perceive far more inputs that we can consciously consider, and we handle this problem by breaking them down into regularities and patterns" (2013:449). Labeled "thinslicing" by Gladwell, the mind processes large amounts of information through System 1 and relies onschemas to assimilate the incoming information. If a minimal amount of familiar (thin slices) cues exist inthe patterns of knowledge and behaviors, then we unconsciously make quick decisions, or intuition, basedon minimal amounts of information. As Kahneman suggests, the efficiency of system 1 draws littleprocessing effort as it sorts through familiar information, behavior and situations. Assimilation, and theengagement of intuition, acts to conserve effort, always an important biological consideration. As long asour intuition is based on repeated experiences and familiar cues, system 1 can produce fairly reliablepredictions of future occurrences in similar situations based on just small amounts of information.However, there are unintended consequences of the way human cognition operates. When novel or newinformation or environments activates the schemata, system 1 attempts to assimilate the sensory input intoexisting schemas. Based on a series of behaviors, such as ignoring or forgetting input, the recentness ofthat schemata activation, expectation of the individual on what is being experienced, and the confidence inthe schema, the interpretation, meaning and relevance of the information and its application as knowledgetoward understanding future behavior can be skewed. This is generally referred to as bias and is a result ofan error in system 1 processing. When system 2 kicks in to aid in processing, due to the complexity ofincoming information these biases often go undetected or uncorrected. The information provided tosystem 2 is replete with these systematic and reinforced biases. System 2 although good at deliberatethinking based on a more measured "slower" approach does not recognize well the embedded biases thatare continually passed on as system 1 is always operating. In addition, most schemas are 'set" strongly inour cognition. Accommodation may incur a more compelling set of standards to modify or even discardthe schema, and more importantly the patterns of knowledge that are engaged by that schema. In essence,system 1 errors, discarding what could be relevant information because it does not align with schemas - isa very real danger and leads to the formation and sustainment of biases, "systematic errors in specifiedsituations" (Kahneman in Babeski, 2012, p. 2). Often, if the input does not align at all or there are "holes"in the sequence of information, existing schemas will be applied to complete the processing. Kennedy andBugajska (2010) found that humans utilize a series of behavioral strategies that inhibit the faster system 1.Intentionally blocking stimuli either physically or substituting another behavior or performing another taskare examples of promoting inhibition of system 1. We will explore the latter through engaging differentthinking strategies later in this paper.The Dangers in Prediction and ForecastingCore missions of intelligence professionals involve an in depth understanding of a much more complexand interrelated landscape populated with a host of state and non-state actors and the need to derivemeaning from behavior, events, activities to better facilitate forecasting and prediction. Silver (2013)casts a similar net when he suggests that the amount of information available today to bear on problemsand the value or prediction creates, rather than defuses, complexity. It may be that re-defining what aprediction is to analysis is in order; it may be also that the utility of prediction to intelligence needs acts toimpede information and potential understanding based on a conventional end-state. In other words, is howprediction been arrived at and its use debilitating to the kinds of information/data that will allow a bettergrasp of security threats? Silver says it best when he writes that humans have a prediction problem. Theyare not very good at it and that in its most ideal state as an objective assertion of the future, the best wecan hope for is a subjective interpretation of an imperfect objectivity. Accepting subjectivity while stillstriving for objectivity is necessary to get us the best possible outcome that passes as a prediction is all wecan hope for – "…belief in the objective truth – and a commitment to pursuing it – is the first prerequisiteof making better predictions… [and the] next commitment is to realize that she perceives it imperfectly"(Silver, 2013, p. 14). Silver focuses in on issues that have been highlighted up to now and will be returned to throughout the remainder of this paper as critical considerations for prediction and thinking differentlyoverall. Invoking Bayes' theorem, Silver extends the notion of thinking differently about our ideas toactually "testing" them as outcomes in a future state, "We must think differently about our ideas and howto test them. We must be more comfortable with probability and uncertainty. We must think carefullyabout the assumptions and beliefs that we bring to a problem" (2013, p. 15). We cannot stop predicting, itis a consequence of our cognition, no matter the imperfect nature of its outcome. Prediction is also thedriver to connect our subjectivity (perceptions) to the "objective reality" of the world around us.In essence, intelligence analysis that churns to prediction will always be flawed and tainted byconsequences of how we think. There are limits to prediction based on its conventional use in theintelligence process and as complexity of the human domain increases, or in some ways, we start tounderstand the dynamics of the human domain, in the number and kinds of actors included, the oftentimes dramatically belief systems from the analysts that drive their behavior, and the potentiality ofnumerous options of human behavior, the depth and meaning derived from prediction becomes lessmeaningful. For instance, Kahneman sees two distinct kinds of predictions; the first is based primarily onempirically derived calculations and very detailed analyses of outcomes that range across finite andsimilar occurrences. These kinds of analyses produce a clear measureable relationship between variables,such as calculations of fuel usage for planes based on mission-type. This type of prediction involves analmost plug and play procedure as the knowledge and the mental calculations are easily retrievable.Involved in this type of analyses, Kahneman details two sets of varieties, one that includes problems thatdraw on the experience and expertise found in familiar and repeated situations (and embedded in knownschemas) which can promote a more accurate prediction. Here System 1 is in familiar territory and grindsout believable strips of future behavior while the biases inherent in system 1 thinking can operate toproduce forecasts based on just minimal or thin slices of information. In the gaps that might break upinformation flow, schemas act to "fill in" the spaces and actually promote a more effective and acceleratedanalysis, leading to a more true forecast. Intuition works as constructed. For example, Babeski (2012)offers applying a burn rate of fuel for an airplane given a set of environmental or mission variables toproduce a rather accurate prediction which can then be applied to a larger problem set.The second type of prediction in a way overloads system 1 with variables and situations that defy quickand or simple associations to solution. Silver would characterize the problems associated with this typeof prediction in the human domain as containing a lot of "noise" at first and the attempt at discerningpatterns out of that noise to begin the construct prediction produces insufficient information based both onthe types of cultural knowledge necessary and the meaning of behavior. It is the second type of intuitivethinking where the fallibility of system 1 is brought front and center and the confidence associated withthe first type of intuitive prediction and those inherent biases creates flawed predictions. Here intuitioncollides with perceived "expertise." The rub is that if there are any "familiar cues" identified in behavior,activities or situations that can be novel, surprising, or foreign, system 1 cranks out analysis based onexisting schemas, or if the behavior has no familiar cues, system 1 reaches out to existing schemas andapplies the familiar to explain the unfamiliar. System 1 offers up a best guess/estimate and proceeds toprediction because it has no other choice.[ii] System 2 becomes the stopgap measure to disrupt theflawed predictions given the second type of intuitive while maintaining the integrity of the intuition that isapplicable to promoting successful analysis. It is properties of measured, "effortful" (Harris & Striker,2012, p. 211) and slow thinking found in system 2 that begs articulation of "structured" analytictechniques (as we shall see in the next section). These strategies and methods need to be applied in a wayas Kahneman and Silver both suggests that mitigates "biased, intuitive forecasts and predictions withoutalso discouraging, delaying or even eliminating the intuitive insights that true expertise provides"(Babeski, 2012, p. 3). Intuition is a double-edged sword it seems. The intelligence profession as most of American society prizesintuition and what it says about the individual and/or the enhanced capability it brings to thinking, andpredicting. Intuition coupled with experience and other qualities many consider as an expertise and canoverride the ever-present system 1 errors (Klein, 1999, 2011).However, expert performance driven by intuition can often drive judgments in wrong directions when theassociations grounded in schemas are based on history and past validity (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). "Theassociational processes used in System 1 that make expert performance so quick and powerful are thesame processes that are responsible for systematic errors that experts sometimes make. Additionalweaknesses of System 1 are that it depends on the quality and amount of experience an individualpossesses, and it can't be used effectively in novel situations" (Harris & Striker, 2011).Kahneman provides "ground rules" for assessing the value in the intuition that is being used. Skillacquisition requires "a regular environment, an adequate opportunity to practice, and rapid andunequivocal feedback about the correctness of thought and action (2011, p. 416)." First, the strength ofconfidence cannot be used to measure validity. Second, two conditions must be present for intuition to beconsidered: an environment that is regular and predictable and the empiricism to gauge its predictability(Babeski, 2012). Deconstructing the myth of intuition as a power and instead considering it as a hyper-tuned system 1 where sensing an occurrence is actually the connection of extremely valid cues based onthe regularity and experience of that regularity that can be applied to the environment generating thosecues is important. Approaching intuition as a set of skills that requires training and repetition will helpalleviate its shortcomings.Notwithstanding the development of Klein's naturalistic skills, identifying conditions and relatedstrategies and techniques that can promote "trust" in the prediction is thinking through a range of analyticthinking strategies and associated methods. One must consider the intelligence process to be an exampleof what Kahneman labels as "low-validity" (Babeski, 2012, p. 4) in which intuition, even if consideredexpertise fails in promoting validity, much less certainty of prediction. In a sense, given the nature ofintelligence analysis and the drive toward prediction/forecasting, it is suggested here that the accuracy thatmay have been implied in more conventional analysis in the past may be more difficult to achieve andeven harder to measure when applied to the contemporary and for the foreseeable future a complex threatenvironment.In evolutionary terms, our cognition was engineered for quick and efficient processing of our environmentand carries with this processing "wiring"/predisposition for thin slicing that promotes intuition. Movingout of the stone age and into the information age, the quickness of searching and settling on patterns canoften lead us to "see" patterns when none exist, or "finding patterns in random noise" (Poggio in Silver,2013, p. 12). The cognitive system cannot be disconnected or "rewired" but the application of thinkingstrategies can be applied to promote "debugging" of propensity for system 1 errors especially whendealing with the need to predict/forecast behavior of a host of actors and non-state actors. Kahneman seesbiases as more a problem of the cognitive operating ease of System 1. From our perspective, slowing itdown would have created a short-lived species in a very sensory and threat-loaded environment on theAfrican savanna (ironic perhaps is the replication in some ways of this environment in the transnationalsecurity landscape today). However, the slower, more reasoned approach of System 2 often fails torecognize when this "ease" is led astray, thus System 1's bad reputation as the source of errors and biases,"predictable biases to cognitive illusions such as anchoring, non-regressive predictions, overconfidence,and numerous others (Kahneman, 2011, p. 417). System 1 runs constantly and under the radar of ourconsciousness. "It provides the impression that often turns into your beliefs, and is the source of theimpulses that often become your choices and actions…. It contains the model of the world that instantly evaluates events as normal or surprising. It is the source of your rapid and often imprecise intuitivejudgments" (2011, p. 58). In essence, it cannot be turned off nor can its immediate effects be mitigatedbefore it produces output. There are no alarms that ring indicating error, the voice of reason emanatingfrom System 2 is barely perceptible yet it can and does provide reflection on not just intuition but as weshall see in later sections, considering the powerful influence of cultural worldviews and beliefs, asconscious and unconscious barriers leading to eventually awareness or even prediction. Kahneman seesthis debugging process as possible but consisting of "considerable investment of effort," while Silversuggests that avoiding our naturalistic tendency toward prediction will lead to the inability to reconcilesubjective perception and objective reality. In other words, we are built to predict but our cognition hasbuilt in tendencies that threaten the utility of prediction in the human domain.In brief, cognition, as most theorists agree, seems to be constructed around two systems that runcontinuously and play off each other's fallibilities and strengths producing a synergistic response.However, falling between the cracks of articulation and the limits of each system is intuition and theeffects of thin-slicing. Developing expert intuition may alleviate the system 1 errors, biases, associatedwith its processing. Yet, even the limits of expert intuition suggests that system 2 thinking is all the morecritical when it comes to comprehending the complexity of the human domain featuring a multitude ofstate and non-state actors with shifting and varying alliances, dynamic intentions and end states that canbind even the most assumed contrary organizations. Debugging our cognition and reducing biases leadingto improved judgments and decisions is possible, but requires a bevy of knowledge and skills not usuallyassociated with analysis. It is reasonable to assume that a more complex and populated human domain thatmarks today's threat environment will complicate and limit accuracy of prediction, making expertintuition subject to performance issues. In this next section, we will explore approaches to more structuredthinking strategies. "The trick is in using structured techniques and approaches – or applied system 2thinking - in a way that eliminates biased intuitive forecasts and predictions without also discouraging,delaying or even eliminating the intuitive insights that true expertise provide" (Babeski, 2012, p. 3). It isnot surprising that based on the model of cognition presented, that System 2 processing is similar to whathas been defined as critical thinking.Thinking Critically and AlternativelyThe legacy of Sherman Kent still reverberates within the IC and considers prediction as an end state andthe scientific method acts to define capabilities through the collection and disaggregating of more andmore descriptive data (Moore 2011). The context of the conventional threat environment and thenaturalistic bent of science informed Kent's view of "…the historian as scientist" (Moore, 2011, p. 6). ForMoore, disaggregating larger volumes of data while storing for future use will not get to an understandingof how the real world stacks up – what is missing is context, reflection, interpretation, measured intuition,search for patterns and meanings and synthesis. "Traditional intelligence analysis generates forecasts orexplanation based on logical processing of available evidence…" (Fishbein & Treverton 2004a, p. 1). Inmany ways, prediction (as defined and suggested earlier) may not be possible or beneficial in the morenon-conventional threat environment. In addition, the traditional state-actor threat environment may notreflect the current state-to-state relationships, as the states themselves are subject to the current threatenvironment.The intelligence community through a number of revelations and hindsight and the legacy of 9/11 hasbeen taken to task by group of academics and intelligence professionals to revolutionize the intelligenceprocess and promote a new paradigm of analysis that would include redefining end states and potentialand refocusing effort and product. Structured analysis of any kind involves reducing problem sets or needsinto discrete elements, causes and effects for example and then using operations developed through logical processes, such as the scientific method, identify and test hypotheses that can yield a means of explanationand offer potential for prediction (Fishbein & Treverton, 2004a; Moore, 2011). There is a looseconfederation of concept of strategy and method that forms the boundaries of intent and an informalagreement among these "revolutionaries" that the intelligence process can and should be improved.Approaches from industry and academia have been borrowed, modified, and adapted to the uniqueenvironment perpetuated by the organization and its obligations. Most of this body of work draws onheuristics theory and the model of complementary cognitive systems of which the thinking strategies andmethods proposed serve the articulation and function of systems detailed earlier. In other words, system 1errors based on restrictive e schemas and the tenuous relationship between automatic determination andmeasured reasoning are considered by attention to process. Yet even as late as 2011 (Moore, 2011),acceptance of these "new" approaches – even though the IC has recognized the value of them and policy[iii] and training programs been developed – has not led to full implementation into practice and learningprograms. What can be agreed upon and has fueled this revolution is the inability to grasp completely thenature of contemporary complex transnational issues, the underlying belief systems and worldviews ofthose individuals and groups that are involved in those issues. Many if not most of these groups have onlyindirect or no direct affiliations to traditional nation-state actors, and this leads to a lack of understandingof what kinds of sociocultural data are necessary and useful to help frame the complexity. As we haveexplored in the section on human cognition, perhaps the most important consideration for this revolutionis the way evolution has built our mind.Critical ThinkingA quick summary of this collection of approaches represents can be useful. Critical thinking is perhapsthe most salient to the community and has reached some legitimacy within the community as an approach,in so much as it drives to "…inferences that specify then who, what, when, why and how of the activity ofinterest and lead to appropriate actions" (Harris & Striker, 2012, p. 209). In the last decade there areseveral publications that have introduced and tied critical thinking skills to intelligence analysis andseveral of these have identified the benchmark of 2001 as a time that called into question conventionalanalytical methods (e.g. Moore, 2007, 2011). Critical thinking is: "…that mode of thinking – about anysubject, content, or problem – in which the [solitary] thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking byskillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards uponthem" (Paul & Elder in Moore, 2007, p. 8). Critical thinking revolves around two behaviors, ametacognitive component (reflecting on the quality of reasoning) which entails thinking about thinkingand a cognitive component that reasons to conclusion – improving reasoning while driving to a reasonableand "correct" conclusion (Moore 2007, p. 8). Critical thinking provides a process which will allowintelligence professionals to be reflective of their reasoning processes and to think about how theirjudgments are constructed and their path to a conclusion was reached with the same amount of reasoningas the "judgments and conclusions themselves" (Heuer, 1998). In essence, critical thinking is an effortfuland deliberate process where one moves toward a conclusion while thinking reflexively on the process. Itcan involve a myriad of steps or stages and offers a "structured approach" to a problem or inquiry. Assuch, it moves beyond the scientific method, while incorporating inductive, deductive and abductiveprocesses. Critical thinking skills map to functions, in this case analytical functions: assess and integrateinformation, organize information into premises, develop hypotheses and test hypotheses (Harris &Striker, 2012, p. 222).Alternative AnalysisCritical thinking has received extensive treatment in education and philosophy and what it looks like asadvanced cognitive abilities. However, critical thinking also represents a structured approach to problem- solving for the intelligence community. Cross-cutting critical thinking is the realization that there areforms of structured analyses and methods which may not initially drive to forecasts through a traditionalanalysis, but will provide means to challenge assumptions or hypotheses and cast a wider net when itcomes to possible outcomes, "…to address discrete questions – what if Ruritania acquires 'the Bomb'"(Fishbein & Treverton, 2004b, p. 1). These methods have been labeled alternative analysis and as suchcan enhance critical thinking while remaining structured in process and focused on a limited set ofprobabilities. This set of methods is driven by the application of system 2 and provides means to mitigatesystem 1 errors while also identifying these errors if embedded in system 2 thinking.There is an IC Directive on Analytical Standards that includes promoting alternative analysis whereappropriate, analysis that is free of bias and distinguishes assumptions and judgments of the analystamong other considerations addressed in this section (IC Directive, 2007). A 2009 US Governmentpublication, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysisoffers a survey of alternative analysis methods – some simple, others more complex and time intensive –that include diagnostic (transparency of assumptions, arguments, data gaps), contrarian (challenges ofcurrent thinking) and imaginative thinking techniques (develop new insights, alternative differentperspectives and/or outcomes" (A Tradecraft Primer 2009, p. 5).Red-Teaming is a contrarian technique that works to illuminate or make conscious the perspective of anadversary, "…to enhance decision making, either by specifying the adversary's preferences and strategiesor by simply acting as a devil's advocate (Red Team Journal)." More germane to the IC, red-teaming hasbeen a staple of informal approaches in military science to aid planners in "emulating and adversary" in aprocess that is structured and iterative where team members are properly trained and carry with themappropriate subject matter expertise (Swanson 2012, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies(UFMCS) Red Team Handbook 2011). Red teaming, similar to other alternative analytical methods, isplagued with inconsistency of application, lack of formalized or standardizes processes, and lack ofappropriate training (Swanson, 2012; DSB, 2003). There are examples both in document and practicewhere red-teaming has been a measured success. Sandia Labs and the University of Foreign Military andCultural Studies have through red-teaming leveraged resources and sociocultural approaches to instill intheir students and workforce improved critical thinking skills and a more relevant mindset of foreignactors (Sandia Labs IDART 2012, UFMCS Red Team Handbook, 2011).The imaginative thinking group of methods includes brainstorming and divergent thinking as aids togenerating a range of hypotheses utilizing a group concept. Brainstorming is used only periodically and islimited to 60-90 minutes (A Tradecraft Primer, p. 28). It like other alternative methods is a structuredprocess, somewhat ironically considering the goal is to promote produce creativity among groupmembers. Characterized by the oft-quoted "thinking outside the box," in the divergent thinking stage, thegroup promotes an array of factors and ultimately hypotheses that an individual could think up whilecognitive biases can be broken down by group members. In the convergent thinking phase, the range offactors begins to cluster, leading to a consensus conclusion.It must be noted that in general critical thinking, and specifically application of alternative analysismethods, is not an end in itself and not always the right approach to take in analysis. The application ofonly some critical thinking skills or alternative analytical methods or failing to perform a critical thinkingcomponent can produce a fallible response and that education level and experience can affect the qualityof a solution (Harris & Striker, 2012; Tradecraft Primer, 2009). Alternative analysis best responds as wellwithin a structured pathway based on discrete questions.Thinking Differently – a 21st Century Requisite There is no doubt that the intelligence community faces an international and transnational securityenvironment that is far different than what prompted the development of an intelligence organization andmission with the advent of the Cold War. Traditional analysis works well within known and bounded state-to-state diplomacy/relations and parsing a restricted range of outcomes, alternative analysis and methodscan broaden the aperture of outcomes. As discussed in the Introduction, and touched on throughout thispaper, the current transnational threat environment and the role the human domain plays offer acomplexity that often times yields meaning that is incomprehensible to analysts and collectors. Thisenvironment features fluidity of state and non-state actors whose behaviors adapt to a fast-movingenvironment that speeds ahead of the ability to track and monitor. It also is characterized by a complicatedweb of worldviews and belief systems that incorporate known, traditional identities with cultural identitiesthat have grown and continue to sprout on a landscape that has been made fertile by the inequities andmarginalization brought on by globalization.Traditional analysis works well within known and bounded state-to-state diplomacy/relations and parsinga restricted range of outcomes based on actors. Alternative analysis and methods can broaden the apertureof outcomes. For many, critical thinking and alternative analysis offer strategies and methods that canprovide relevance to much of the contemporary intelligence/security environment that feature a spectrumof actors, situations, events and possible futures. However, many contemporary events and occurrencesare not very susceptible to any kind of analysis, especially if answers come out of breaking apart facts andinformation in general from a known collectivity: too many hypotheses, too little evidence to supportlogical judgments. The intelligence community has pivoted toward the realization that the past threatenvironment may only represent a partial reality posed by the inclusion of a transnational securityenvironment and the influence of transnational and non-traditional cultural groups on state actors. Ineffect, the way the game was played in the past is not the way the game has to be played now. Writes GaryTreverton on this change: We at NGA used to look for things and know what we were looking for. If we saw a Soviet T-72 tank, we knew we'd find a number of its brethren nearby. Now, though, we're not looking for things. Instead, we're looking for activities or transactions. And we don't know what we're looking for (in Moore 2011, p. ix).In this section, we will explore the need for intelligence professionals to not only think critically and applyan array of analytical methods, but to think differently. In essence, as Moore (2011) attempts to show,working within a structured analytic framework, even one that engages alternative methods alreadydiscussed, closes off the analyst to an array of possible behaviors or solutions because the analyst cannotfully engage and comprehend perspectives of the actors, or truly understand the limits/restrictions posedby her own set of beliefs. This may be because the right kind of sociocultural data has not been collectedor maybe even more damning, the analyst cannot consciously, or unconsciously, comprehend theunderlying belief system of the various actors and the cultural considerations that are a result of that beliefsystem due to system 1 errors. Thinking differently will consider the application of skill-basedcompetencies that promote cross-cultural success now being developed within the DoD and alsoconsidered necessary for successful fieldwork in the social sciences.Sensemaking and MindfulnessTwo important components of thinking differently relate not to the kinds of prescribed "structured"methods or tools of analysis discussed so far in this paper, but to states of awareness. Sensemaking has perhaps garnered the most attention in recent publications and research that promote the need for engagingalternative perspectives in intelligence analysis. Paik and Pirolli define sensemaking as "active seekingand processing of information to achieve understanding" (2012, p. 2168) while Klein refers to it as a"deliberate effort to understand events" (Klein in Rasmussen et al., 2009, p. 2). Sensemaking can also be aresponse to a departure from expectations. A composite view of sensemaking combines the intuitive-basedapplication toward solutions as described earlier (and in more detail Klein, 2002) and the construct ofsensemaking (as explored by Weick, 1995 and later utilized in a number of intelligence-relatedpublications) as the process of comprehending the complex nature of the contemporary multi-actorenvironment that is or is considered relevant to goals and needs. Sensemaking can be seen as engagingprocesses that seek and filter information while also producing schemas that best fit the available data(Paik & Pirolli, 2012). Sensemaking works best when features of the problem set include discrete,informal rather than formal and focused more on unbounded rather than bounded issues. Promotingsuccessful sensemaking is the quality of "mindfulness," an ongoing state of deliberate awareness that hasat its core; challenging expectations while reflecting on a host of potential alternatives. With regard to thecurrent and future transnational security landscape, sensemaking and its underlying sense of vigilantmindfulness prompts a broader "mental readiness" to consider actions, events and symbols (signs) ofthreat rather than disaggregating constituent parts to drive toward identifying rational and alternativeoutcomes (Fishbein & Treverton, 2004b).Moore (2011) provides perhaps the most in depth look at sensemaking in the intelligence community. Hisbook, Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution takes a rather comprehensive approach tosensemaking. Identifying a number of intelligence failures, Moore argues, as many authors so fardiscussed argue, that the standard model of intelligence, among other things: limits the aperture ofinformation flow; presupposes coherency of evidence that is considered evidence; cannot consider thelarge and dynamic (certainly beyond finite) amount of signals (and level of background noise) thatrepresents potential data; and due to the needs of the organization, imposes a linear structure on itsanalysis (even alternative analysis). In essence, Moore divides the world of intelligence problems intotame and wicked problems. Tame problems, or puzzles (a problem with a solution if the right informationcan be found) yield clear definition of adversary and "battlefield" and attack, the solution is obvious whenengaged and can be objectively validated from a limited set of alternatives. Tame problems and solutionslend to resolutions of other similar tame problems (think the operation of system 1). Moore argues that theintelligence community operates as if its intelligence problems are tame, and he readily admits many are.However, he also goes on to clarify that tame problems may in essence be components of larger moremessier or wicked or as "mysteries," problems "… with several outcomes depending upon how underlyingdriving forces and combine… [and] questions without certain answers…because they are future andcontingent" (2004b, p. 9).Sensemaking and mindfulness can be beneficial to framing and providing processes to put the analyst in aposition to think differently when it comes to the dynamic and fluid transnational security environment.As Moore has called the need to embrace sensemaking as a revolution, others have suggested that endstates of the intelligence process may not accommodate traditional goal of prediction, nor specifically thetraditional focus on products instead of outcomes (Moore, 2011; Dennehy et al., 2012). However, thispaper will suggest that as analysts and other intelligence professionals think about problems, they are stillfailing to consider the effect of system 1 errors on their analysis. More to the point, they are failing toconsider the power of culture in its many ramifications on the intelligence process and the end states. Tothis respect, the use of culture consists of a set of knowledge containing universal sets of domains andprocesses that undergird all human behavior. Culture features a worldview/lens that can both explainhuman behavior and constrain/restrict discerning meaning and is also is comprised of a set or core beliefs which motivate and compel human behavior. In effect, forms of analysis artificially constrain openness toa cultural perspective. Sensemaking and mindfulness can create the space to consider these aspects ofculture, but utilizing and engaging cross-cultural competence and being versed in region and cultureknowledge can provide a critical and foundational mindset to bear on actors, events and activities thatmake up the human domain and the transnational context.The Human ImperativeHumans interpret their surrounding physical, social and cultural environments through a lens, orworldview. In essence, a worldview is the set of assumptions about the basic or fundamental aspects ofreality that anchor and then influence our perception, thinking, knowing, and doing. More specifically, aworldview encompasses the sum total of knowledge, perspective, amalgamated philosophies of members,beliefs and values, commonly shared emotions and ethics, and more. Your worldview is more or lessimplicit. We rarely have the opportunity or need to articulate fully the content of it. Elements of aworldview are interrelated thereby it is difficult to tease out singular components. Often a worldview canbe exposed through behavior. Worldviews are prone to stability; they are entrenched in society throughformal and informal socialization, the power of traditions, ideology, and other mechanisms. The keycomponent of a worldviews is a system of interlocking beliefs that are a set of ideas that are held to betrue by the individual or shared by a cultural group. Beliefs impel/compel individual/groups to act acrossthe breadth of interaction, reinforcing group beliefs and values while acting to define the type ofinteraction and behavior involved in a situation.In part, humans relate to each other based on intra and intergroup relations. Worldviews and beliefs act todefine in and out groups, a critical need to insure individual and group survival, as similarity breedscomfort. Beliefs act to promote group survival through group solidarity and are instantiated throughcultural schemas. In essence we have aligned ourselves with groups who are similar, look similar and actsimilarly. We hold those different or unfamiliar in abeyance and confined in a space defined by caution.The upshot of this is that we as humans discern difference and use it to order our interactionalenvironment. In addition, we assign behavioral indicators to help us maintain that distinction and thesebehavioral indicators manifest themselves through what anthropologists and others liable as ethnocentrism– "…our culture's tendency to twist our judgment in favor of homegrown beliefs [and behavior] andagainst foreign alternatives (Etinson, 2013). Recent research also indicates that ethnocentrism may also behuman's way of establishing and upholding moral beliefs (Haidt in Etinson, 2013). Basically, humans seethe world through an ethnocentric lens. In terms of system 1 errors and biases, this predisposition towardethnocentrism is not just an interesting cultural fact or expression of human frailty. It is a known anddeeply ingrained behavior. It colors and affects the nature of our relationships with other groups in deeplyprofound ways, even if that interaction is not framed in immediacy or played out in face-to-faceinteractions. It is not difficult to see the effects of ethnocentrism at play in the intelligence process, but weseldom acknowledge or are consciously aware of the influence of ethnocentrism on our thinking patterns.In our daily existence, fathoming the meaning of other's behavior is important. Promoting successfulinteractions or in trying to understand the motivations and meaning of the behavior is in part a function ofanticipating the context that spurs those actions. Tomasello et al., (2005) suggests that an important facetof human cognition is "cultural cognition," that which prompted human's ability to evolve was the socialcollaboration that is a hallmark of humans. This collaboration required the cognitive ability to firstunderstand others' intentions, but to then to align intentions, shared intentionality, for future activities."Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading andcultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and a unique formof cognitive representation for doing so" (2005, p. 675). Cognitive science has advanced Theory of Mind (TOM), similar to Tomasello's cultural cognition, to suggest that humans have developed cognitive skillsto assign mental states to others and then to use those states to explain and further predict the actions ofothers. Moreover, TOM presupposes a cognitive capability or competence and assumes that the actors weare interested in are "intentional agents". This assumption then allows us to interpret their thoughtsthrough the expression of beliefs, desires and emotions. An alternative view of TOM is the theory ofmental simulations. This view of TOM argues that we can infer others future actions/intentions byengaging our own mind to model their emotive and cognitive states. Tomasello et al., and work involvingTOM, intentionality of others and even shared intentionality driven by alliance of need is a consequenceof our cognition and if so, argues for a capability that can be developed or enhanced.Intentionality may suggest a capability, but our thinking process (and system 1 errors) and ethnocentrismwill often place our attempts to "think" like them in alignment with our own mental schemas, subject tosystem 1 errors that are not always accurate and colored by our intuition. Rob Johnston (2005, p. 75)attributes a failure of the intelligence process to our ethnocentric tendencies and the inability to recognizethe powerful influence of our own logic as we attempt to attribute meaning of behavior and actions to like-minded thinking and similar beliefs and desires. "…the cognitive process of understanding or even recognizing that there are cultural and cognitive differences is not intuitive at all….This effort often appears doomed to failure, because, "trying to think like them" all too often results in applying the logic of one' own culture and experience to try to understand the actions of others, without knowing that one is using the logic of one's own culture."The recently published Landpower Strategy: A Clash of Wills suggests that U.S. military failures in thelast 50 years rest on the inability to understand the human domain – "the physical, cultural and socialenvironments." Echoing Johnston, the strategy posits that "the physical insularity of the US coupled withits egalitarian ethic underpins the simplistic idea that other people are like us, or at least want to be us"(2013, p. 2). Based on differentiating cultural behaviors, Archer (in Rasmussen et al., 2010) sees the initialperspective or view "…grounded in expectations stemming from the normal situational behavior learnedwithin one's own culture" (2010, p. 2). Williams (2010) writing about anthropologists and fieldwork(process of elucidating information from others) states, "what is required is an ability to suspend what oneassumed about a particular group or situation and open oneself up to the possibility that what is actuallygoing on is entirely different from what one thought was going on" (2010, p. 10).In summary, humans are designed to interpret their environment through a focusing lens or worldview,which is constructed around a system of interlocking beliefs that are the foundation for behavior, actions,and emotions. Cultural domains and systems are expressions of beliefs and operate to order humanbehavior. Worldviews and beliefs also define in and out groups and as such reflect an inherentethnocentrism that can profoundly affect how others and other cultures are viewed. The ability to attributeintention and event to others can be considered a capability and is based on cultural cognition and TOM.This capability is subject to intuition and applying the beliefs and logic of one's culture without realizingthe effect of ethnocentrism and the false assumption of shared logic. Bronislaw Malinowksi (2013) one ofthe giants of early anthropology and field work stressed that good anthropology involved "seeing lifethrough the eyes of the native" – certainly an admirable goal and one that can bear dividends, but also onefraught with cognitive pitfalls as this paper will explore shortly. For intelligence professionals, the criticalneed is to defuse the impacts of the human imperative as well as the cognitive/thinking system to better beable to provide the kind of intelligence necessary and possible to comprehend the range of security environments. McCollough (2013) uses Sun Tzu to help recast the need to "know thy enemy" in responseto the questions that have swirled around the Boston Marathon bombings. Writes McCollough, "Afterconducting more than 400 interrogations, as well as working with Iraqi informants, I've had theopportunity to see the enemy as he is, a human being with a range of motivations, loyalties and ideologies.I discovered the enemy isn't crazy or immoral, or twisted, though his reasoning may be alien to theWestern understanding of sanity and morality" (2013). Cross-cultural competence offers a set of skill-based competencies that can "interfere" with the unintended consequences of our cognition, biology andcultural arrogance.Cross-Cultural CompetenceThe last decade of U.S. military involvement has emphasized the sociocultural complexity that ourmissions and operations occur in. There seems to be twin needs, as suggested earlier, to build betterrelationships and partnerships with a host of foreign actors while also engaging skills to help discernmeaning of behavior to better anticipate future behavior. Cross-cultural competence is a set of skill-basedcompetencies that act to increase success in cross-cultural situations while also developing skills toenhance the understanding of foreign cultures. More to the point, engaging in cross-cultural competencethat includes acquiring and applying cultural and region knowledge through appropriate lenses isinstrumental in preparing for present and future intelligence mission paradigms.Cross-cultural competence is the ability to navigate in complex interpersonal and cross-cultural situations,interpret or express ideas/concepts across worldviews and cultural divides, and to make sense of foreignbehavior. Possessing and using knowledge and skill-based interpersonal competencies both influences andfacilitates successful cross-cultural relationships, and promotes the ability to discern meaningful behavior,as well as providing context to help interpret past events and gauge potentiality of future events/behaviors(Sands & Haines, 2013)Cross-cultural competence research and learning programs exist across the DoD.[iv] Cross-culturalcompetence is now being institutionalized in military education and training in the DoD. Research hasidentified core sets of competencies that are now being validated. DoD language and region policy hasidentified four of this core set that have been incorporated as requirements in all services and selectedcivilian populations.[v] This paper suggests that the application of this core set to thinking differently iscritical. Cross-cultural competence will aid in mitigating system 1 errors and support successful system 2thinking. It will also provide access to sociocultural knowledge that will help in alternative analysis and inpromoting sensemaking. Cross-cultural competence will also work to provide access to others'perspective to ascertain state of mind, intention, and meaning of behavior. In essence, cross-culturalcompetence will mitigate elements of the human imperative that act to constrain analysis, and perhapsmost importantly will make us aware of our most deepest-held beliefs that can lead us to the likelihood oferror in our thinking process. Additional cross-cultural competencies can facilitate successful interactionsacross cultural boundaries useful for intelligence professionals who deploy or take assignments in foreigncountries to engage in collection or work in partnership capacity.There have been several efforts to distill and delineate core competencies (i.e. Rentch et al., 2007; Abbe,2008; Abbe et al., 2007; Ross, 2008; Ross & Thorsen, 2008; Rasmussen et al., 2009; Mclosky et al.,2010A; McClosky et al., 2010b; Rasmussen & Sieck, 2012; Reid et al., 2012; Sands, 2012, 2013; Sands &Haines, 2013). Cross-cultural competence for the purposes of this paper and the intelligence community iscomposed of the following competencies (adapted from Reid et al., 2012; Sands & Haines, 2013; researchdone in support of the IC's Culture Regional Knowledge Expert Group (CRKEG)):Cultural self-awareness – having cognitive awareness of your worldview and belief and value system, and biases that follow, and awareness of influence on others, and engaging self-regulation, whenappropriate.Skill-based competencies: Understands self in a cultural context Understands the factors that shape one's worldview Understands self in a cross-cultural context Understands the existence of cognitive and cultural biases and the need to manage them with respect toCultural learning– utilizing learning/acquiring processes to gain important culture and regional generalknowledge, general cultural and regional knowledge. Learning may include text research, observation, andother knowledge gathering methods utilized by social scientists and also consider identification of sourcesSkill-based competencies: Acquires cultural knowledge Learns through observation Learns the rules about survival language and expressing nonverbal behaviors; sociolinguisticsPerspective-taking– ability to take alternative perspectives and be able to "see or even feel" others'behavior in the frame of that person's culture (belief and value system). Perspective-taking requiresinsight into others' thoughts, motivations, and concerns – "…ultimately insight into the mental model andfactors that shape and affects decision making processes within specific contexts" (Rasmussen et al.,2009, p. 4). Perspective-taking allows the opportunity to understand cultural behaviors of those from adifferent culture within the worldview and belief system of that culture. Engaging perspective-takingpromotes anticipation of behavior or reactions of others within their cultural context. McClosky et al.,(2010a) discovered that increasing awareness of biases will increase the accuracy of perspective-taking.Skill-based competencies: Recognizes existence of other worldviews Develops cultural explanations of self and others' behaviors Comprehends self-worldview Recognize cross-cultural mental models Refines cultural scripts based on cross-cultural mental models Develops skills to promote an individual to transfer knowledge to novel situations Develops cultural scripts based on cross-cultural mental models Suspends judgmentCultural sensemaking– the ability to make sense of foreign cultural behavior in a variety of contexts.Rasmussen et al (2010) define cultural sensemaking as processes that people engage to "….make sense ofand explain "culturally different behaviors" (2010, p. 2). Sensemaking and mindfulness are criticalenablers for cultural sensemaking. Moore's and others conceptualization of sensemaking from anintelligence perspective generally refers to its skills of making connections, gaining understanding ofnecessary and relevant parts and "promoting situational awareness in situations of uncertainty" (Stefik inMoore, 2011, p. xxxv). Cultural sensemaking engages in thinking that will require moving outside ofworldviews and beliefs systems (and resident cultural models) to discern meaning of behavior in culturalcontexts that may institute feelings of surprise, novelty, uniqueness leading to resistance and misunderstanding. Cultural sensemaking is the process by which understanding and meaning is derived. Inconcert with perspective-taking, cultural sensemaking will facilitate understanding of foreign cultures andtheir individuals' behavior that concern specifically and more generally behavior that falls outside thetraditional intelligence awareness.An example of developing cultural sensemaking capability is Rasmussen et al., (2010) model of decisionmaking that promotes development of cultural sensemaking through connecting "metacognitive skills toregion-specific knowledge" (2010, p. 1). Providing people with knowledge of what influences decision-making of those from different cultures within a specific context while also providing or strengthening thecompetencies will help them apply that specific frame to novel and more complex "real-life" situationsencountered (2010, p. 9). Here, discerning influence will depend on ascertaining and understanding thearray and role of beliefs that motivate those decision-making behaviors.Skill-based competencies Provide cultural explanations of self and others' behaviors Promote complex decision-making that incorporate the uncertainty of future events Provide cultural explanations of self and others' behaviorsKnowing a foreign language can enhance cross-cultural competence, from the ability totranslate/understand source documents as means to acquire meaning from content to promote a morecomplex understanding of cultural behavior and underlying belief systems. For those having to interact inforeign cultures, language and the competency to communicate effectively across cultural boundaries isnecessary. Cross-cultural competence also includes skills that promote successful cross-culturalcommunication.Cross (Inter) Cultural Interaction – the ability to effectively communicate through a variety ofcommunication channels and events with those from foreign cultures and promote successful cross-cultural relationships.Skill-based competencies Develops self-monitoring skills Develops cognitive complexity Develops nonverbal & verbal communication skills Develops survival language skills Understands the elements required for communication planning Develops trust building tacticsCompetencies and EnablersThere are core enablers (attitudes and affective abilities) that complement and can enhance cross-culturalcompetence. These enablers can be considered to be part of a collection of thoughts, feeling and behaviorsof an individual's personality and can be considered to be traits and states. Personality traits areconsidered mostly stable and "are relatively enduring general characteristics [enduring patterns ofbehavior]…consistent across situations" while states seem to momentary or "transient experiences thatcan change quickly from moment to moment (Grawitch, 2013). Traits will differ across individuals andcross-cultural psychology considers how traits may be aligned with cultures and are grouped in what mostbehavioral scientists would consider the "Big Five": neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience,agreeableness and conscientiousness. The bottom-line here is that enablers can prominently enhance and amplify (or if not present can impede) cross-cultural competence and have been identified through variousstudies (McClosky et al., 2010a and 2010b; Reid et al., 2012; DEOMI/DoD culture.org). From anintelligence perspective, Moore (2002) attends to competencies for intelligence analysis and builds acollection of knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) and levels of competence that apply to analysis"performance". Moore establishes minimum competencies for each analysis and maps the competenciesto the four types of analysis: descriptive, explanatory, interpretative, and estimative. The latter two typesof analysis in addition to KSAs Moore include "analyst characteristics" which may be considered enablers.This paper does not consider the development of enablers in promoting cross-cultural competence otherthan this brief section. There are ongoing projects in the DoD that consider the role of enablers, however,as this paper represents one of the first cuts toward developing 3C in intelligence professionals, looking atthe role and possible development of enablers should be one of the critical next steps. Office ofDepartment of National Intelligence (ODNI) is presently undergoing a rewrite of IC competencydirectories and one of those directories pertains to foreign language. A subset under this directory is onebased on regional expertise and culture and includes baseline competencies such as perspective-taking,cultural self-awareness and learning.The Emic and Etic of Perspective-TakingAs suggested in this paper, thinking differently requires minimizing the influence of existing mental andcultural schemas and the consequences of system errors. Perhaps the most important of cross-culturalcompetencies to minimizing system errors are perspective-taking and cultural sensemaking which work tomitigate the effects of cognition errors when working across cultures. Discerning the meaning of others'behavior requires discerning states of mind, intention, and emotion. Reframing/modifying or generatingnew schemas take on added complications when mind, intention and emotion of those from differentcultures are predicated on worldviews and belief systems that are contrary to the intelligence professionaland follow no existing (internal to the intelligence professional) cultural logic. For anthropologist and oneof the first ethnographers, Bronislaw Malinowski, perspective-taking was "seeing culture through the eyesof the native". Getting to that place and space is the topic of this section.Crossing over or working through existing schemas to try to unravel the cultural logic of foreign culturesand individuals requires mediating the dichotomy of insider versus outsider. In the case of thinkingdifferently, this dichotomy references the ability to get at mind, intent, and emotion of others while stillbeing capable of applying that perspective more generally in broader, comparative and methodologicalterms. Elsewhere this has been labeled as methodological cultural relativism (Sands, 2012), suspendingjudgment while understanding the behavior of others through their cultural framework. Sands (2012) usedthe fieldwork method of anthropologists, ethnography, as a model for cross-cultural competence and thissection will continue that application. Early formative anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski,E.E. Evans-Pritchard, and James Frazier approached their fieldwork as objectively reconstructing the"native's culture" and treated their fieldwork as taking place in a social laboratory. Their intent lay wellbeyond just "insider" description but to a larger purpose of a comparative science to help construct generaltheory of humankind.[vi]What constitutes data, the form of that data and how accurate or valid the data is contribute to theusefulness of perspective-taking. Anthropology has framed the insider/outsider dichotomy in terms oflinguistically-derived concepts emic and etic and this distinction can facilitate a more usefulconceptualization of what is involved in perspective-taking. Pike (1967) borrowed these concepts fromcomponents of language, specifically phonemic and phonetic, where phoneme refers to a unit of distinctsound and phonetic units represent the signs/symbols applied to sounds for study and comparison. Pike'sutilization of the phonemic/phonetic perspective produced the emic /etic distinction, "etic viewpoint studies behaviors as from outside of a particular system [culture] while emic viewpoint results fromstudying behavior as from inside the system" (1967, p. 37 in McCutcheon, 1999). The emic perspective isstriving to describe a specific culture in its own terms from the insider's self-understanding, and an eticview is adopted by comparative researchers who tend to describe differences across cultures tied to ageneral, external standard (Morris, 1999). One important caveat to this distinction which is of primaryimportance for conceptualizing the two terms (and behaviors implied) is the attribution of the end result ofan emic perspective as an insider's view – there remains the difference between "insider" and thefieldworker. The insider usually has no interest in taking the inside information to apply to an eticviewpoint, while the outsider's mission is just that. The emic perspective becomes "localized" in a largerprocess with an end goal much different than an insider's need to be solely proficient to live within thatculture. The outsider must not only be at a proficient level, but also to translate that proficiency into datauseable in an etic formulation. Proficiency will always be a barometer of truthfulness and validity ofperspective. Unless the intelligence professional is either a cultural native or has spent sufficient time inthat culture, or has a chance to collect field data, how the "insider's perspective" was obtained and thevalidity of it is crucial to its use.In short, an emic description is that which is meaningful to one from that culture and can only be suppliedfrom a cultural resident (pulled from a specific culture by those within that culture). "Emic accountsdescribe thoughts and actions primarily in terms of the actor's self-understanding – terms that are oftenculturally and historically-bound (Morris et al 1999:782)." An etic description is the description ofcultural behavior by an outside observer/social scientist of cultural behavior that can then be used tocompare across human cultures. An etic version in its most ideal form is a neutral rendering of theobserver, stripped of ethnocentrism, any western bias or political or social agendas. It also assumes thatlevels of interpretation have been reconciled within the observer.In anthropology, one of the primary disciplines that promotes "naturalistic" field study, there is anacademic-wide dialogue on whether there can ever be a truly emic perspective, one driven by the need toobjectively characterize a culture as a collective set of beliefs and values and shared cultural systems.[vii]First, a cultural reality to many anthropologists and other social scientists is composed of an array ofindividuals and groups within the larger frame of culture, and thus resistant to forms of scientificrepresentation. Secondly, the impact/influence of the anthropologist/fieldworker, through bias,interpretation, situation and agenda, and the problems of reflexivity conspire to produce only validdescriptions of individual's perspectives and only at a given moment. In essence, the fieldwork captures atbest a multi-authored narrative of reality and one resistant to a scientific approach and thus the analyticapproaches needed in the intelligence process. In fact, true validity of an emic perspective can only beascertained through final authority of the native. This does beg the question is the native conscious of allreasons for holding beliefs and acting on them and secondly, what to make of differences between culturalmembers or between members and the fieldworker. Can one posit there is a valid and accurate culturalreality that can serve as a foundation to make more general claims of awareness and understanding about aculture, let alone utilize this reality in prediction and forecast?Anthropologists Clifford Geertz (1973) and Marvin Harris (1979) may uniquely hold the key to answeringthat question. Thinking differently allows entrance to understanding beliefs and values that act as primemotivators for behaviors. An emic view as so far described tries to produce an authentic view of the worldthrough a cultural insider's perspective. This is gained through any number of fieldwork methods; mostutilize eliciting data or information from cultural members. However, individual members may produce avariation of meaning. To Geertz, perspective becomes a quest for meaning that can only be observed as apublic representation, "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I takeculture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz, 1973, p. 5).Up to this point, we have modeled cognition as a process/behavior to understand the world around us. Inessence, our mind functions as its systems respond to what we take in as information. For an intelligenceprofessional, managing the consequences of those systems involves competencies and skills.Interpretation of what is applied to our schemas becomes both one of those consequences and one of thoseskills, and crucial to what follows in terms of response/behavior. If culture can only be approached andperceived in terms of pubic meaning, then interpretation of that meaning, and more importantly, culturalreality, involves squaring individual representations/meaning with a collective interpretation. For this,Geertz posits the notion of thick description as cultural meaning that only comes out in context andthrough a collusion of cultural members. A multitude of researchers study the same topics and withsimilar "data" come up with readings that build up one on top of another (Geertz, 1973, p. 25). The moremembers elicited, the more valid the data becomes as a means of validating cultural reality to those beinginterviewed (triangulation discounting variation within the population). In essence, at best, according toGeertz's view, what comes back to the intelligence professional is a multi-layered narrative of more orless an emic perspective that considers different views of reality, including the author as complier of allthe perspectives gathered.Before we gather too much steam, let us return to the potential of an etic determination of that culturalreality. Marvin Harris (1979) considers the role of that insider's perspective useful only if its role isproviding a more "scientific" or generalized theory that can be speak to need and focus and illuminate anarray and motivator of behaviors. This then characterizes the dichotomy of emic and etic, of Geertz andHarris – what to do, or can be done, with the insider's perspective. To Harris, and even to the intelligenceprofessional, to consider only an emic perspective results in more or less verifying indigenoussubstantiations and what they might mean by beliefs or actions. This leaves the intelligence professionalshort of deriving deeper and more useful explanations for reasons of why the cultural insiders act or thinkthe way they do – driving toward general understanding of what motivates behavior, beyond just adescription of meaning of behavior is critical. The end state does not become that description of reality, ora choir of voices referencing multiple realities. The end goal is to understand what generates andmotivates cultural actors, and an emic "bias" of description versus more general comparative analysis mayhinder that effort.Thus, what drove the inquiry in the first place may drive how much of either/or emic and etic is necessary.Explicating meaning of cultural behavior is dependent on acquiring description and interpretation fromthose from the local culture as well as being able to do good social science to determine accuracy andvalidity. Thinking differently and perspective taking requires both an emic and etic approach. The need toconsider "voice", the power and danger of interpretation, and what actually is considered by "insider" or a"native" perspective is important if the assumption is that perspective-taking is a critical skill-basedcompetency to support thinking differently and a more relevant intelligence process. At the end of the day,there still can be a relevant and useful insider or emic perspective to consider.Alternative analysis and even more so thinking differently can better be served by approaching the studyof culture as a "positivistic" endeavor (Sands, 2008) and thus one that will also need to utilize the eticview. Studies of populations can yield general statements of cultural reality that can be beneficial inunderstanding cultural members and useful in promoting precision in analysis. Williams (2010) writingabout sociocultural fieldwork as part of the Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan sees the goal of elicitinginformation from strangers while doing fieldwork, based on thick description not as "the prediction offuture events but the enlargement of the universe of human discourse" (2010, p. 17). This approach wouldcombine an insider's cultural reality and a more objective comparative view of that reality. "For example, it has been argued that an emic approach serves best in exploratory research, whereas an etic approachserves best in testing hypotheses" (e.g., Greenfield, 1996 in Morris, 1999, p. 783). A blended emic/eticperspective mitigates/controls system 1 errors that derive from cognitive biases and engages cross-culturalcompetence to open the analyst's aperture to the potential foundational discrepancy of competing and orcontrary belief systems and values that undermine any sense of ultimate objectivity by the analyst."Simply put, for Harris, etic or analytic scholarship is not constrained by the way in which the people westudy say they act or think. Instead, it is constrained by the rules that comprise rational, comparative,scientific analysis" (McCutcheon, 1999). McCollough (2013) writes, as if reinforcing such a blendedperspective, "…we must see the enemy for what he is – a rational, calculating human who fights for avariety of reasons. Whatever his reasons, they are justified in his own mind."In brief, fieldwork offers advantages not available to a desk-bound intelligence professional or even alimited time of duration collector, yet can offer. Time in the field immersed as an insider with opportunityto participate and observe can promote more faithful renderings of cultural reality through eliciting datafrom cultural members and being able to participate in cultural events and activities to promote culturalproficiency (Sands, 1999, 2002). The emic/etic distinction applies most readily to collectors andfieldworkers. However, there is a plethora of open-sources material accessible to those not in the field,much of it first and third persona narrative that can be quite effective for discerning an emic or insider'sperspective. This distinction should also be a consideration of analysts and other professionals as theywork toward doing perspective-taking and applying cultural sensemaking to elicit meaning of foreigncultural behavior. Adopting positivism in this regard can in the end promote a greater clarity ofperspective to those in the human domain,Cultural PrimingLacking first-hand knowledge or "natural" experiences can restrict insider capability, but as Flynn et al.,(2013) and Puls (2011) suggest time and effort are both critical variables to utilize to help provideintelligence professionals with knowledge about cultures. Developing perspective-taking and culturalsensemaking skills can be beneficial to mediating emic versus etic orientations. One potential method topromote perspective-taking is cultural priming. Cultural priming theory posits that psychological stimulior conditions can change an individual's response to a later stimulus. Tools (cognitive primes orconditions) can be developed to prepare or "prime" an individual to think, act, or behave in a wayconsistent with expectations of an individual from another culture or cultural group (Dien et al., 2012).Successful priming can be engaged through an individual's own volition, or provided through an externalagency.Generally, the priming process involves honest evaluation of one's experience in the target culture.Research has indicated cognitive differences in thought patterns exist between cultural members. The trickis to get the one being primed to engage in the actual thought patterns of that target culture, either throughmeaningful and actual experience of the individual or through an exercise/cognitive stimuli which reflectsthe cultural models of the target culture. The next step is to identify/apply a trigger while clearing othercultural influence of the individual's culture that might intercede in the priming experience. Triggerscould be based on extended and/or immersive experiences in the target culture by the analysts – the moreemotionally (even sensory) evocative, the more compelling the trigger. The trigger can also be as simpleas a piece of text or narrative which influences perspective based on priming needs. While activating thetrigger, mitigating direct or indirect associations inherent in the analyst's culture is beneficial to how wellthe prime will work. This could be as easy as moving into neutral or culturally distinct environment,another room, a cafeteria, an eatery that features a menu from that country/culture, etc. It is also criticalthat the trigger and task that needs to be completed be in the format that strips or as much as can be facilitated minimizes the cultural or tradecraft "formatting" of the analyst (i.e. PowerPoint, structuredanalytical methods or collaboration, etc).It is here that mindfulness be considered, as Moore and as others have called out as important insensemaking. Being in the "moment" when undergoing a priming event is essential to cutting offcontaminating influences of an array of system 1 errors. Depending on length of task, the primingexperience may be revisited with multiple activations. The concluding step is to evaluate the results of thetask and the utility of the priming experience. This involves the application of the measured and reflectiveoperation of system 2. Thinking about the thinking and priming process is important to continued successof priming. Essentially these primes can aid in the process of reframing context to cultural sensemakingand also facilitate perspective-taking. Skillfully applying cultural priming cues, intelligence officers maybetter estimate the effects of actions and events of others from a different culture – getting the assessment"left of bang". There is an additional wrinkle associated with priming that must be considered; adoptingthe mindset and thinking like those from foreign cultures also means inheriting the biases that accompanythat perspective.University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL) is currently involved in acultural priming study and has application to successful cross-cultural relationship building, effectivecross-cultural collection skill development, and discerning and estimating future behavior of foreigncultures. This research first explores the range of potential cultural characterizations usually assigned to adual frame of individualist/collectivist. Preliminary research implicates the "individualist/collectivist"dichotomy that is usually applied to characterize western and non-western societies may be more nuancedthan what has been commonly accepted in the literature (Hamedani et al., 2012; Fiske, 2002, 2004).Suggesting that the "collectivist" category may engender different cultural perspectives, researchersproposed a multidimensional cultural frame that is based around the arrangement of social relationships.Second, determined through validation of these frames and supported by neuroimaging tests on fourdifferent cultural groups, a prime is proposed for development in the next phase to be used by analysts toadopt the appropriate collectivist mindset in the workplace to help better predict behaviors of those incultures that promote such a mindset, i.e., East and South Asian cultures.Priming can easily work the other way and produce unconscious effects, thoughts, ideas and emotionsthrough an association with past events that one is not aware (Kahneman, 2011). Even more, an idea byitself or just simple gestures can influence behavior, "…primed ideas have some ability to prime otherideas….Like ripples on a pond, activation spreads through a small part of the vast network of associatedideas" (2011, p. 53). Priming occurs in System 1 and the thinking part of System 2 has no access to theactivation of its effect. Thus, although priming can promote perspective-taking through consciousmanipulation, it also plays havoc on our System 2 deliberations, "studies of priming effects have yieldeddiscoveries that threaten our self-image as conscious and autonomous authors of our judgments and ourchoices" (2011, p. 55).The development of cross-cultural competence centers on four baseline competencies (in addition to theskills and strategies that facilitate more successful cross-cultural interactions), however, a multitude ofstudies and extensive research in and outside the DoD have identified a suite of supporting competenciesand enablers that will act to promote a more accelerated and sustainable development of cross-culturalcompetence. It is not surprising that there are personality traits and states that can either enhance cross-cultural competence development or hinder its progress and some like empathy, ambiguity, acceptance oflack of closure, self-regulation, motivation to learn and others have direct implication on one's cross-cultural competence. Moore (2002) identified core competencies essential for analysts and some of thesupporting competencies have also been identified to support cross-cultural competence. However, as research has indicated, learning programs have been developed and DoD has reiterated in policy, thecompetencies identified as critical for cross-cultural competence align with those delineated in this paper.Learning to Think DifferentlyThe shifting, fluid and "fundamentally transforming" transnational environment as we have made the casethroughout this paper prompts the need to develop knowledge, skills and strategies to think differently.The same contemporary and future environment also demands the development and sustainment of"astute, mentally agile, flexible and cosmopolitan intelligence professionals (Haines, 2013WP)."Identifying the skill-based competencies necessary for thinking differently as well as promoting thinkingstrategies such as critical thinking and alternative analysis (and methods) is one step, building a learningprogram that can build on academic and experiential background of incoming, and already residentintelligence professionals to promote thinking differently is equally if not more important. Science,technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) programs may be important to promoting a morecompetitive US society in the global marketplace, but it is also important to acknowledge that incomingintelligence professionals may also matriculate through the American, even Western educational systemsdeficient in components that can enhance thinking differently and germane to this last section, cross-cultural competence. These deficient knowledge and skills include qualitative and quantitative criticalthinking skills, second language acquisition, critical and applied regional studies understanding, andappreciation of region and culture-general concepts.How to rectify and develop learning programs for thinking differently demands a re-envisioning of thelearning process for intelligence professionals and need to deconflict while synergizing the training,education and workforce development landscape. "Essential to cognitive flexibility, agility, and diversity–all considered within the contemporary rubric of critical thinking critically and differently is recognizingthe need to change the form, format, content and delivery of training and education as is done today"(Haines, 2013WP). Frerichs and Di Rienzo (2011) argue similarly, "The goal of intelligence educationand training is to produce individuals who can creatively explore, describe, and or explain the intelligenceissues or problems (accurately)" (2011, p. 69).It is apparent that managing our thinking process while utilizing an array of thinking strategies involves alifelong learning program, advancing this attainment and sustainment as a function of existing training andeducation programs misses the mark on what is needed. Essential to cognitive flexibility, agility, anddiversity –all considered within the contemporary rubric of critical thinking and to us thinking differently– is recognizing the need to change the form, format, content and delivery of training and education as isdone today. Training at its essence must effectively facilitate acquiring skills while adapting to andapplying technologies to perform tasks. Successful training must then be blended with the educationalprecepts of acquiring information, processing that information and consequently producing thatinformation as understanding. However, to this paper, the missing link is the ability to not only managethe workings of human cognition but to foundationally alter and direct, and at times step out ofperspectives that run counter and contrary to our powerful and influential worldviews and belief systemswhile culturally making sense of that perspective. This involves working in and out of the moment andengaging self-awareness and openness to the type of reflexive learning that is foreign and contrary toexisting structured analysis. Current education and training programs in academia and in the intelligencecommunity (in their current perspective of what education and training does and how it is constructed) failto address this need. Developing new educational technologies is not the answer, but it could be a means.For starters, curriculum must expand and integrate traditional complexities that encourage creativity,accepts 'failure', while acknowledging flexibility and agility in a framework against the dynamicenvironment of the future. Curriculum should be problem solving, collaborative, and allowed to follow paths and directions that may only initially be tangential. Discussion should be featured prominently andstudent - participative and student- led and guided by a "trained" facilitator. The goal should not be toteach the students the "right" way but to provide to them the art of the possible. The cadre must know howto set up the event, nurture it, but stay comfortably away from leading the learning. Curriculum andclasses must be designed for 'mastery'; they must be individualized, customizable and adaptive. Classesare to be modularized and not be developed, or considered time-bound. Research indicates the mosteffective learning periods do not exceed 20 minutes. Classes and content learning can be structured aroundthose periods, and when individualized and computer delivered, individuals learn at their own pace. Thistype of curriculum must also be recognized as not an end-state, but the beginning. Education sciencerecognizes that true learning takes place in the arena of novelty, uncertainty and bounded by risk; whatformalized learning leads to is developing a capability.Foundations of Learning ProgramIt is the supposition of this section that promoting and developing alternative analytical methods and cross-cultural competence may not be covered effectively in existing learning programs. To be effective as acapability, thinking differently, like alternative analysis, cannot be promoted as an enhancement oraugmentation, but must be considered as an active component from the introduction of human cognitionthrough the more specific leaning on the different array of analytical strategies and methods. In effect, theanalyst is being tasked to be a structured thinker, as well as one who thinks critically, alternatively anddifferently. Developing separate and distinct courses in "culture" may marginalize the impact andimportance of the development of a mature and effective thinker.The overall goal of this learning program should be to introduce a model of learning that pursuesquantitative and qualitative reasoning skills, critical and alternative thinking capabilities matched againstrelevant content and the integration of technology. Features that are not presently factored into existingintelligence training are the development of cross-cultural competence and the development of greaterawareness of knowledge that considers culture and region as integral to the contemporary securitylandscape as general and iterative awareness but also to inform the analytic process and facilitateoutcomes to include prediction/forecasting.More specific learning goals would be: Introduce human cognition for analysts Expand and introduce cultural schemas that represent the contemporary transnational and international security landscape Introduce region and culture general knowledge Develop an integrated instruction on a range of analyses and thinking strategies that can facilitate more effective intelligence solutions and mitigate cultural, cognitive and tradecraft system 1 errors Incorporate Baseline 3C competencies into this instruction Promote the development of alternative analytic methods Promote red teaming, divergent thinking, brainstorming and other methods Promote sociocultural analysis as part of this program Develop learning on thinking differently Promote and develop perspective-taking and cultural sensemaking and incorporate methods such as cultural priming to promote more salient emic/etic perspectives Develop an innovative learning environment that promotes a seamless and productive integration of training, education and development programs that emphasizes lifelong learning and offers a learning space to grow professionally Offer a range of learning methods and platforms Promote a model that features instructor-directed, self-paced and collaborative learning opportunitiesCultural Components of a Thinking Differently Learning ProgramCultural components of learning program should consider these features: foundational culture and regionknowledge, procedural cross-cultural competence knowledge and application of that knowledge, and whatcan be termed region (culture)-specific knowledge, and the appropriate sequencing, application anddelivery of the learning program.Cultural (general) knowledge (declarative) is the basis by which the behavior of a defined group ofpeople is better and more accurately understood. Human behavior is predicated on and reflected in asystem of shared beliefs and values, and is expressed through domains of activities. Beliefs are ideas thatare held to be true by a society; values are shared beliefs that are meaningful judgments of personalattributes and reinforcement of qualities important to group members. These beliefs, values and behaviorsare learned and shared across generations. Culture is more or less an organizing concept or process thatgenerates and sustains human behavior. Cultural knowledge helps to understand the 'contextual' whybehind a group's behavior by discerning the formation and sustainment of those beliefs and values.Cultural knowledge provides the basic understanding of the common aspects and domains based on sharedmeaning of behavior that offers broadly-applicable general principles and helps serve as a framework toestablish a group's identity. Included in cultural knowledge is the understanding of how cultural systemsare integrated and how those systems operate across time and space. This perspective views culture asfoundational to all human behavior – as a means to organize and motivate behavior and as a means todefine or draw behavioral boundaries around groups of people.Regional knowledge (declarative) includes the measurable or observed elements of a geographicallydefined region or nation-state that enables, constrains, or impacts the range of human behavior. Theexpression of regional knowledge (i.e., governance and economic systems, belief systems, language,technology, systems of affiliation, cultural heritage, development, and security) considers a range ofcategories: a nation-state, collection of nation-states, non-state actors, or cultural and ethnic groups—theboundaries around a region can be determined by mission or focus. Regional knowledge contextualizescultural general concepts to place and space. Contemporary transnational threats stretch the limits oftraditional national and geoethnic borders. Region will also include virtual communities of interest thattranscend geographical borders. However, borders and boundaries will continue to play an important rolein promoting identity and offering safe havens.Cross-cultural competenceas has been outlined is suite of five skill-based competencies, four of whichcomprise the Baseline and one that engages cross (intercultural) communication strategies and skills.There also is the consideration of supporting "enablers" that can be important to how engaged and skillfulthe individual is in 3C. Introducing these competencies (and enablers) in a learning program wouldinclude the presentation of concepts and process of engaging the competencies (declarative and proceduralknowledge). Development and application of competencies would be accomplished through sets ofstudent-centered and facilitated exercises/scenarios that would be integrated into the overall instruction onthinking differently. For intelligence collectors, the baseline and especially cross (intercultural)communication would be critical to mission success.Sociocultural analysis (and methods) is an array of methods used to discern meaning of behavior throughdata that traditionally was undervalued and did not play a major role in traditional analysis (Sands &Haines, 2013). Critical to the contemporary security landscape, the culture and regional knowledge provides methods to extract/mine this kind of data and data sets that should be considered as traditionalstate-actors are joined on the landscape by individuals and cultural groups that are motivated by intrinsicbeliefs and values expressed through cultural domains and systems.Beyond analysts, there is an array of qualitative extraction methods that can be important to providingaccurate and true-to-the reality/perspective of those from a foreign culture that can provide useful data. Assuggested earlier, not just the baseline competencies can facilitate successful collection, but thedevelopment of cross (intercultural) communication strategies and skills is critical to facilitatingsuccessful and enduring relationships with human resources "on the ground" and elsewhere to promotedata exchange. As anthropologists and others involved in naturalistic field work confront issues ofinterpretation, filters, and biases (think Malinowski), intelligence collectors will also need cross-culturalcompetence, especially perspective-taking, cultural sensemaking and cross-cultural communicationcompetence.The Learning ExperienceThis paper concludes with a proposed learning experience based on the concepts and principles oflearning elaborated on earlier. What will drive this learning experience is arguing against the assertion thatthinking differently can be presented as thinking additionally. Since much of what will be considered asKSAs are "culture-related", the recent DoD experience in promoting culture in training and educationoffers a history of how not to incorporate these subjects into training and education programs that will besustainable. Immediacy of OIF and OEF mission prompted surface training on culture-specific "survival"facts and cultural etiquette along with survival languages and was delivered in brief command briefingspresented through PowerPoint or in small groups with little or no theory supporting the pedagogy.Services also developed short and succinct country field guides or Smart Books to aid culturalunderstanding and Mobile Training Teams (MTTS) crisscrossed the country delivering these culturepresentations. Cross-cultural competence has only recently been incorporated into training and educationin the DoD. This awareness (and no better level of comprehension, let alone application) of culture-related topics have only recently become institutionalized in more lasting and deeper learning programs,such as PME instruction and shorter duration courses. Appending culture to existing instruction andcourseware as add-ons or disconnected from curriculum that features relevant topics such as strategy,leadership, regional studies, etc does not promote a synergy that is necessary. There have been somepromising pedagogical experiments in combining language and culture in curriculum (Sands 2013a). Thesuggestion of this paper is thinking differently, like critical thinking and alternative analysis, should befolded into a learning experience that considers human cognition, thinking and analysis in one or multiplecoordinated and/or sequenced curricula. Once culture is divorced from the learning goals and objectives ofthe primary task of providing analysts (and collectors) a learning program on how to think like successfulintelligence professionals, the synergy and the import of those KSAs become marginalized in the learner'smind as well.The learning program should be a blended/hybrid experience with a focus on moving seamlessly fromacquisition of declarative and procedural knowledge to student-centered facilitated exercises andindependent learning activities that engage structured "convergent" thinking and analysis and reflectivenon-structured thinking. This latter kind of thinking engages as an outcome incorporating those conceptsintroduced in this paper: competences such as perspective-taking, cultural sensemaking and self-awareness, meaningfulness and searching for cultural patterns of behavior that can only be derived andconnected through non-directed pursuit of knowledge. There should be a mixture of facilitation andlearning styles: instructor-led, facilitated and guided, and self-paced. There is a double realizationsuggested here, one that thinking differently is itself not an addition to an already existing thinking strategy and two, as human cognition is a function of cognitive systems, all kinds of thinking are only asuseful and productive as that which considers how this system works and its unintended consequences. Inessence, the security landscape has dramatically changed and become more complex, convoluted,uncertain and random. The learning program should as well reflect in its design and goals/objectives thiscurrency. There should be multiple assessments considered. The learning experience this paper representsan entry-level and in-depth program given to incoming intelligence personnel.The course structure and learning goals for Discerning Thinking Strategies for the IntelligenceProfessional would include the following high level learning goals (see appendix for a more detailed lookat learning objectives).Introduction - The Contemporary Transnational Landscape Describe the need to think differentlyNavigating Culture Describe the relationship between worldviews, beliefs and values and the influence of each on behaviorThinking Explain the mechanics of human cognition Intuition, Bias Formation and the Nature of Prediction/Forecasting The human imperative and cross-cultural competence – competencies for debugging unintended consequencesThinking Critically Describe the conventional analytic process Describe critical thinking and alternative analysis methods/techniques to support the intelligence community and process in formulating forecasting capabilities Sociocultural analysisThinking Differently Overcoming the Human Imperative Creating non-structured thinking space Engaging 3C methods to promote perspective-taking=cultural primingThe suggestion is that elements of culture and region general should also be introduced during or parallelto learning experience on thinking to better facilitate active knowledge transfer of culture and regiongeneral as it enhances application to thinking differently.ConclusionThe central tenet of this paper is that there is a need for articulating skill-based cross-culturalcompetencies with current analysis to promote a more effective understanding of the contemporarytransnational security landscape, more specifically to approach and work within the human domain. Thisneed also includes the capability to discern meaning of actions and activities of those non-traditionalactors in this domain and lend some credence to the act of prediction and forecasting. To this end, thispaper explored a model of how human cognition operates and the development of models/schemas and the biases that are unintended consequences of the evolution of the mind. Schemas and intuitions work fine inknown and repeated environments with recognized and limited actors, as system 1 errors are controlled bythe exchange of the system 1 and 2. Traditional and structured linear analysis leading to disaggregatingconstituent elements and then driving to a convergent prediction can produce adequate responses andsupport prediction. Alternative analysis can add diversity of options to consider in the analytic process.However, due to the nature of contemporary transnational security environment and human that includes:fluid and randomness of non-state actors; lack of awareness of critical sociocultural factors, includingunderstanding of foundational belief and value systems of cultural groups and the systems' influence onmotivating behavior; deep-seated cultural bias that can restrict perspective-taking and produce ultimatelyerroneous predictions, and other reasons, alternative analysis may not add value to the intelligenceprocess. Sensemaking and mindfulness are two skill-based competences that can provide a bridge to moreaccurate or valid understanding of others' behavior, however, to really get at what others' are thinking,feeling and desiring one must engage thinking differently.Cross-cultural competence was introduced as a collection of further skill-based competencies that whenengaged can provide means to aid in mitigating cognitive and cultural biases, promote more effective useof a range of cultural/regional knowledge, promote more nuanced cultural sensemaking to better achievean active understanding of foreign cultural behavior and when coupled with mindfulness and techniqueslike cultural priming can enhance and sustain processes to think outside both structured/convergentanalytical pathways. Utilizing cross-cultural competence can activate a learning environment thatpromotes self-reflection and an openness to understand and then accurately model cultural reality thatoften is contrary or contradictory to that held by the analyst. A program was introduced that detailed goalsand high-level objectives to a learning program that explores thinking differently and applying cross-cultural competence.References Abbe, A., Gulick, L.M., & Herman, J.L. (2007). Cross-cultural competence in Army leaders: A conceptual and empirical foundation (ADA476072). Arlington, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Retrieved from https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA476072&collection=pubtr&cont entType=PDF&citationFormat=1f Abbe, A. (2008). Building cultural capability for full-spectrum operations (ADA478179). Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 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(2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: the Origins of cultural cognition. Behavior and Brain Sciences 28(5), 675-735. Ucko, D. H. (2012). Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan. PRISM 3(1): 3-20. United States Government. (2009). A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, https://www.cia.gov/library/...for.../Tradecraft%20Primer- apr09.pdf University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (2011). Red Team Handbook, v. 5 (April 15), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/.../ufmcs_red_team_handbook_apr2011.pd...End Notes[i] The author would like to acknowledge the thoughtful comments provided by Thomas Haines, MarkDye and Allison Greene-Sands on draft copies of this paper. Thanks also to Jessica DeVisser for herediting efforts.[ii] There are other examples in human cognition where this thinking process has promoted specific andunique behaviors. Studies by cognitive anthropologists Scott Atran (2002), In Gods We Trust: TheEvolutionary Landscape of Religion and Atran and Douglas Medin (2010), The Native Mind and theCultural Construction of Nature (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology), andPascaul Boyer (2002), Religion Explained have suggested that System 1 thinking was critical inidentifying threats in past environments and gods and other supernatural agencies are an outgrowth ofthreat identification transferred to new and unknown existential situations. Eugene D'Aquilla et al (1979),The spectrum of ritual: a biogenetic structural analysis and (1990), Brain, symbol & experience: toward aneurophenomenology of human consciousness suggested a "cognitive imperative" or need to address theunknown using 'scripts" or schemas of known behavior or experience. The familiar relationships andidentities in our ancestors' experience was transposed onto the pantheon of spiritual agents and imbuedwith human tendencies and personalities.[iii] See Intelligence Community Directive #203 (June 21, 2007)[iv] There is a very robust literature on research and development of learning programs in cross-culturalcompetence. See the following site for a survey of research and publications:http://www.defenseculture.org/Home/index.cfm , See also Sands and Greene-Sands (in press 2013),Culture, the Flipside of COIN: Cross-cultural Competence for a 21st century Military for a broad andindepth look at conceptualization, application, research and learning of cross-cultural competence in theU.S. military.[v] See Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5160.70 and Department of Defense Directive(DODD) 5160.41E[vi] As of late, the discipline is in the throes of debate on whether anthropology can or should be in thebusiness of creating and proving theories of human behavior. Trying to balance the need to derive theinside perspective while still being able to apply an objective rendering of that perspective for purposes ofcomparison across cultures beyond description became a theoretical stumbling block to accessing culturalreality of others for later anthropologists. This issue remains a contentious one for many in the academywho feel that anthropology cannot fulfill the latter intent. [vii] Most anthropology done prior to the advent of post-modernism was considered scientific and yieldedan etic perspective. Ironically, it was the publication of Malinowski's personal diary (1986) kept duringhis fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands during World War 1that finally put to the rest the myth thatanthropologists were beyond their own cognitive dissonance and their array of system 1 errors. However,Malinowski's polemic treatise on the Islanders is still considered one the classic works in early andcontemporary anthropology, a descriptive and yielding publication that bears no hint of the racism, sexismand arrogance that is on display in his diary. Malinowski it seems was able to cognitively negotiate hisbiases to produce the etic/emic perspective in his treatment. Malinowski's three plus years of "embedded"fieldwork can help in minimizing system 1 error, as time and experience allows modification of existingor generation of new schemas. About the Author Robert R. Greene Sands Robert R. Greene Sands, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Culture and Language at Norwich University. Sands, an anthropologist, teaches in the Strategic Security and Defense Analysis Program in Norwich University's College of Graduate and Continuing Studies. Sands also is a consultant supporting the development of Language and Culture programs for various agencies within the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. From 2008 to 2011, Sands was Culture Chair then Chair of the Cross-Cultural Competence Department and Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) and Air University at Maxwell AFB, AL. Sands is the author of several books, articles and chapters on culture and language in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community and co-editor (with Allison Greene-Sands) of the forthcoming volume, Culture, the Flipside of the COIN: Cross- Cultural Competence for a 21st Century Military (Lexington Books).Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thinking-differently-unlocking-the-human-domain-in-support-of-the-21st-century-intelligenceLinks:{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-r-greene-sands-0{2} https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA476072&collection=pubtr&cont{3} https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA478179&collection=pubtr&cont{4}http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/22/black_and_white_and_red_all_over_boston_bombing_terrorists_media{5} http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2013/01/12842318{6} http://www.cnas.org/files/.../AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pd{7} http://www.slu.edu/x13437.xml{8} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/joint-force-2020-and-the-human-domain-time-for-a-new-conceptual-framework{9} https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-2/cultural-topography-a-new-research-tool-for-intelligence-analysis.html {10} http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/nrl_fast_n_slow_cognitive.pdf{11}http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/May/Pages/SpecialOperationsMissionstoRequireNewDoctrine.aspx{12} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/acting-in-the-human-domain-but-educating-for-the-physical-domains{13} https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA534118&collection=pubtr&cont{14} https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA533959&collection=pubtr&cont{15} http://www.socom.mil/.../2012_SOCOM_POSTURE_STATEMENT.pdf{16} http://nation.time.com/2013/05/07/knowing-thy-enemy/{17} http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Fac/Adler/Reln101/McCutcheon%20-%20emic-etic.htm{18} http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/us/politics/18obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0{19} http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/{20} http://www.parc.com/publication/2908/cognitive-biases-in-a-geospatial-intelligence-analysis-task.html{21} http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1737{22} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bias-and-perception-how-it-affects-our-judgment-in-decision-making-and-analysis{23} http://redteamjournal.com/about/red-teaming-and-alternative-analysis/{24} https://www.dtic.mil/DOAC/document?document=ADA488616&collection=pubtr&cont{25} http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120219{26} http://idart.sandia.gov/{27} http://www.sfaa.net/newsletter/newsletter.html{28} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/language-and-culture-in-the-department-of-defense-synergizing-complimentary-instruction-and{29} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/promoting-cross-cultural-competence-in-intelligence-professionals{30} https://www.cia.gov/.../Thinking-and-Writing-Feb2010-web.pdf{31} http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/enhancing-red-team-performance-driving-measurable-value-and-quality-outcomes-with-process-i{32} https://www.cia.gov/library/...for.../Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf{33} http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/.../ufmcs_red_team_handbook_apr2011.pd{34} http://www.defenseculture.org/Home/index.cfm{35} http://smallwarsjournal.com/comment/reply/14457#comment-form Copyright © 2013, Small Wars Foundation. 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