text:
Band B 15%
This country is placed in Band B
Norway's GI ranking in Band B places it in the low category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Norway scored higher for Political and Personnel, which score in Band A (very low risk of corruption). The highest risk area is Operations, which fell in Band D (high risk of corruption).
Enhancing Integrity of Procurement
With a robust system of parliamentary oversight over the defence sector supported by capable audit institutions, Norway makes a large amount of information of defence budget and policies available for public scrutiny. Norway is also home to the Centre of Integrity in the Defence Sector, which provides expertise on anti-corruption to the Norwegian and partner armed forces through the NATO Building Integrity programme. The Norwegian defence sector could build on this anti-corruption expertise by ensuring that offset contract regulation seeks to minimise corruption risks. We recommend that procurement procedures restrict the incidence of single-source -- and therefore non-competitive tender procedures -- as well as nudge companies bidding for defence contracts towards adopting comprehensive compliance and anti-corruption programmes.
Approach to Anti-corruption
Since the Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership expired in 2012, the Norwegian MOD has guided its departments to adopt anti-corruption training and standards into their routine management practices. This appears to be a promising approach and will make anti-corruption activities a part of everyday operations. We encourage the MOD to keep promoting, monitoring, and reporting on these developments in order to ensure that they are successful. It would also be beneficial to institutionalise regular corruption risk assessments to ensure solutions put in place address the most important issues.
Building Integrity in Military Operations
Norway's experience in Afghanistan has brought recognition that corruption is an important variable affecting the stability and good governance in international operations. However, this recognition has yet to yield a detailed anti-corruption doctrine for operations. While there appears to be some anti-corruption training for commanders and some guidance on contracting is in place, it is not clear if either are tailored to operational challenges, such as contracting in complex environments. Specialist corruption monitors are also not deployed in operations. Norway could build on its experience in Afghanistan and specialist expertise within CIDS to ensure that anti-corruption guidance becomes part of pre-deployment guidance and training. Not only would this benefit Norwegian armed forces, it would help enhance NATO's institutionalisation of recent anti-corruption experience. Given its leadership role within the Building Integrity programme, Norway is well placed to assist the Alliance on this issue.
Reducing Procurement Risks in Offset Contracts and Subcontractors
While there is no evidence of corruption within offset arrangements, it appears that offset contracts regulations do not impose due diligence and/or audit requirements that would help prevent corruption risks or foster good practice. However, the Norwegian government has made known its intention to address the issue of offsets in a new White Paper, forthcoming in late 2015. We welcome this development and the opportunity of introducing more robust regulations.
Norway requires that companies bidding for defence contracts show that they have not been convicted of corrupt practices. The government could build on this to ensure that companies bidding for defence work have anti-corruption programmes in place and that this requirement trickles down the supply chain to subcontractors.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Article 25 of the Norwegian Constitution establishes the King as Commander-in-Chief of &quoute;the land and naval forces of the Realm&quoute;, but as a constitutional monarch, his role is mainly representative and ceremonial and the main powers rest with Parliament. The Constitution forbids an increase or reduction of these forces or their transfer to the service of foreign powers without the consent of Parliament. It also stipulates that foreign forces cannot be brought into the country, with the exception of auxiliary forces assisting against a hostile attack, without Parliament's approval. The Parliament approves the State Budget - including the defence budget - as per §75 of the Constitution, and also has the right to approve or veto laws on security (current bills being deliberated by Parliament can be found online (3)). Parliament approves defence procurement contracts over 500 million NOK (approx USD 61 million), known as Category 1 projects (5), and can turn down or amend defence policy (4). There is no evidence that the legislature is unduly influenced by the executive.
The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure establish the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. Although it is mainly the Government that presents bills to the Parliament, any member of the Parliament has the right to initiate a law. A bill is submitted to Parliament and then considered by the Committee, which then submits its recommendations, with any proposed changes, to the Parliament. This is then discussed in Parliament and voted on. The bill has two readings in Parliament before it becomes law, unless the two readings have different outcomes, in which case a third reading is required. Once the law has been passed, it is officially sanctioned by the King as a formality (he has no real political power).
1. &quoute;The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, The Constitution, as laid down on 17 May 1814 by the Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll (with subsequent amendments, the most recent being of 19 June 1992), Article 25&quoute;, http://www.constitution.org/cons/norway/dok-bn.html
2. Norwegian Parliament, &quoute;Stortingets forretningsorden, Ajourført pr. 1 oktober 2014, § 14 and § 17&quoute;, https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden/#kap3#
3. Norwegian Parliament, &quoute;Publications&quoute;. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Saker/?pid=2014-2015&tab=Topic&mtid=59&ptid=L#primaryfilter.
4. Norwegian Parliament, &quoute;Lovarbeit&quoute;. Last updated 26 February 2015. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Arbeidet/Lovarbeidet
5. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, &quoute;Hvordan selge til Forsvaret&quoute;. Last updated 1 September 2004. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/hvordan-selge-til-forsvaret/id493269/
6. Aftonbladet. &quoute;Sanksjoner mot Russland i drøftes i Stortinget på mandag.&quoute; Last updated 8 August 2014. http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Sanksjoner-mot-Russland-i-droftes-i-Stortinget-pa-mandag-7661539.html
7. Det Norske Kongus. &quoute;The Monarch Today.&quoute; http://www.kongehuset.no/seksjon.html?tid=27679
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Political control of the military is shared between the Government and Parliament and the Government retains primary executive authority of the Armed Forces, with Parliament being consulted on important matters. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is responsible for scrutinising military defence and civil preparedness, among other briefs. The committee is tasked with discussing matters concerning foreign policy, trade policy, security policy and emergency preparedness, including terrorism preparedness. Such discussions should take place before important decisions are made. In special cases the Committee may make recommendations to Parliament. The committee is active: it publishes its documents online and has an active meeting schedule, including with other NATO parliamentarians (2).
In addition to this, the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is composed of members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, the President of the Parliament and leaders of political parties. It advises the Government on decisions relating to foreign, trade and security policy prior to them being made; this can happen in closed session. Parliamentary committees have the right to deliberate on bills, propose changes and submit recommendations to the Parliament.
The Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee has 19 members (as of May 2015). Experts can take part in committee consultations and it is up to the committee to decide which experts appear in front of it.
The parliamentary Finance Committee also plays a part in overseeing the defence sector: according to both interviewees and the Finance Committee's website (4), the performance of the Defence Ministry is scrutinised by the Office of the Auditor General and then reviewed by the Finance Committee.
1. &quoute;Stortingets forretningsorden, Ajourført pr. 1 oktober 2014, § 14&quoute;. Last modified 30 September 2014. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden/#kap3
2. Stortinget. &quoute;Utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen.&quoute; Accessed February 16 2015 https://www.stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-komiteer/Komiteene/Utenriks--og-forsvarskomiteen/
3. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Norwegian Defence 2013.&quoute; Last modified May 2013. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/fakta-om-forsvaret-2013_engelsk_oppdatert-mai-2013.pdf
4. Stortinget. &quoute;Den utvidede utenriks- og forsvarskomité.&quoute; Accessed February 16 2015. https://stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-komiteer/Komiteene/Andre-faste-komiteer/Den-utvidede-utenriks--og-forsvarskomite/
5. Interview with parliamentary employees 1 & 2, 3 March 2015, by phone.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway's defence policy is available and easily accessible on the website and in the publications of the Ministry of Defence (3, 4, 5, 7). The website is regularly updated (for example, 15 news items 01.01.15 - 24.08.2015). It is also a topic of debate in parliament and among the public: sessions of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence are open to the public and can be broadcast on Parliament's web tv. Interested parties can apply to participate in public consultations. The progress of hearings, decisions and minutes are published on the Parliament website. The committee's publications are regularly updated, as is the status of bills currently going through the committee. There is also evidence of debate on defence issues in the media (6).
The sessions of the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence are closed to the public, unless otherwise expressly determined.
Score 3 has been selected as the extent of public consultation and the influence of the public on the polic is not entirely clear.
1. Norwegian Parliament, &quoute;Stortingets forretningsorden, Ajourført pr. 1 oktober 2014, § 17&quoute;. Last updated on 30 September 2014. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden/#kap3
2. Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget). &quoute;Utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen.&quoute; Accessed February 16 2015 https://www.stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-komiteer/Komiteene/Utenriks--og-forsvarskomiteen/
3. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Regjeringen. &quoute;Forsvar.&quoute; Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/forsvar/id215/
4. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 'Norwegian Defence 2013: Facts and Figures', https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/dokumenter/fakta-om-forsvaret-2013_engelsk_oppdatert-mai-2013.pdf, accessed 22 July 2015
5. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ordningen for militært tilsatte (S-delen)&quoute;, https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=62555, accessed 24 August 2015
6. Aftenposten. &quoute;Kronikk: Debatten om bevæpning trenger flere nyanser, mer fakta og færre absolutter&quoute;. http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/Kronikk-Debatten-om-bevapning-trenger-flere-nyanser_-mer-fakta-og-farre-absolutter-8131977.html, last updated 24 August 2015, accessed 24 August 2015.
7. Ministry of Defence, 'Norwegian Defence 2013'. http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/167437/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/e479f260-9c46-4888-b50c-e74862cb9a89/en/Norwegian+Defence-2013.pdf, accessed November 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: In a speech at Transparency International Norway's annual meeting in 2007, then Undersecretary for Defence Espen Barth Eide reflected upon the Siemens scandal and the work of the NGO Transparency International, commenting, &quoute;it has since also been demonstrated that the Armed Forces recently experienced what I would call irregular behaviour... involving large established companies here at home. Whether we are talking about corruption or other illegal acts, let a possible investigation and trial decide. Fortunately, there have been positive developments in society in general, both attitudinal and in criminal law. This applies not only here at home in Norway, but also internationally. A development that the activities of Transparency International should have their share of the credit.&quoute; (1)
The Norwegian government is open and cooperative towards NGOs in general; the 2013-2015 Open Government Partnership Plan affirms the principle of openness and consultation and has itself been adopted following consultations and workshops with NGOs. (3) However, as corruption is not widely seen as a problem of significant seriousness in Norway, there is very little material available on this issue. The main development since 2007 is the establishment of the MOD-affiliated Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS) in 2012. One of CIDS' partners is Transparency International UK, an NGO.(4) CIDS was recently involved in the NATO Building Integrity self-assessment process in Norway (2).
1. Espen Barth Eide. &quoute;Korrupsjon og det militærindustrielle kompleks&quoute;. Speech May 16 2007. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/korrupsjon-og-det-militarindustrielle-ko/id467575/
2. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. &quoute;The Centre.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://cids.no/?page_id=6
3. 'Norway's second Action Plan on Open Government Partnership (OGP)', October 2013 – September 2015. Finalised October 2013. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFYQFjAIahUKEwjf5eet4_PGAhXGjtsKHVOhApU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.opengovpartnership.org%2Ffiles%2Fogp-norway-action-plan-2-finalpdf%2Fdownload&ei=kzCyVZ_QK8ad7gbTwoqoCQ&usg=AFQjCNGiQimnOSm7n0jAln-4uqbxLFN1iA&bvm=bv.98476267,d.ZGU, accessed October 2015.
4. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, 'NATO Building Integrity (BI) Discipline Conference 2015', June 2015. http://cids.no/?page_id=4686, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway ratified UNCAC in 2006 and the OECD Convention in 1998. Norway's reports to the OECD on implementation of the Convention are published online (2), with the latest report published on June 2011 and an update published July 2013. The 2013 report shows evidence of compliance, concluding that out of eight recommendations put forward by the 2011 report, five had been fully implemented, two implemented partially, and one not implemented. (6)
UNODC's report on Norway's compliance to UNCAC is publicly available. While it identifies areas of improvement, particularly in international cooperation, it indicates that Norway has been largely compliant with the Convention. (4)
Norway joined the European Defence Agency voluntary Code of Conduct on defence procurement as a non-EU member under an Administrative Arrangement in 2008. It has also participated in the Council of Europe corruption prevention mechanisms, for example through working with GRECO. (3, 5)
1. UNODC. &quoute;United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status.&quoute; Last modified December 12 2014. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
2. OECD. &quoute;Norway - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention&quoute;. Accessed 17 February 2015. http://www.oecd.org/norway/norway-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm
3. European Defence Agency. &quoute;EDA Agrees to Norway's Participation in Regime on Defence Procurement.&quoute; May 28 2008. http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/EDA_-_Norway_Joins_CoC_Regime_on_Defence_Procurement.pdf
4. UNODC. &quoute;Executive summary: Norway&quoute;. 27 November 2013. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/26-27November2013/V1388147e.pdf, accessed 24 August 2015
5. Council of Europe. &quoute;Council of Europe praises Norway for its commitment to preventing corruption among members of parliament, judges and prosecutors&quoute;. 25 June 2014. https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/news/News(20140625)Eval4Norway_en.asp, accessed 24 August 2015.
6. OECD Working Group on Bribery, &quoute;Norway: Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations&quoute;, July 2013. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/NorwayP3WrittenFollowUp_EN.pdf, accessed october 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Issues of defence are regularly reported and debated in the national media. Government officials are made available for comment (2) and the MOD regularly releases news on its website. A further example is the NGO Norges Forsvarsforening hosts seminars and public debates bringing together representatives of civil organisations, academia and the Government. (1)
RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: Agree. Score 4 selected.
1. Norges Forsvarsforening. http://www.forsvarsforeningen.no/
2. Further examples of debate in the media include:
3. NRK. &quoute;Regjeringen vil ruste opp Forsvaret i nord&quoute;. Last updated 24 April 2015. http://www.nrk.no/troms/regjeringen-vil-ruste-opp-forsvaret-i-nord-1.12327697
4. Aftenposten. &quoute;Hva vil vi ha av forsvar og hva er vi villige til å betale for å ha det?&quoute; Last updated 5 May 2015. http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentarer/Hva-vil-vi-ha-av-forsvar-og-hva-er-vi-villige-til-a-betale-for-a-ha-det-8000664.html
5. Vol.no. &quoute;Utfordringene i Forsvaret&quoute;, Last updated 23 April 2015. http://www.vol.no/meninger/leserinnlegg/article10882709.ece
6. Netavisen. &quoute;Frp-debatt om forbud mot fremmedkrigere&quoute;. Last updated 30 April 2015. http://www.nettavisen.no/politikk/frp-debatt-om-forbud-mot-fremmedkrigere/3422781552.html
Comment: The evidence presented by the lead researcher would justify a score of &quoute;4&quoute; No limitations on the public debate has been presented.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian Ministry of Defence updated its policy document on ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector in 2011; the scope of the document explicitly excludes intergovernmental relations. The document describes acceptable, unacceptable and grey area behaviours and makes reference to Procurement Regulations for the Armed Forces and Guidelines for the Civil Service, Section 20 of the Civil Servants Act, the Disciplinary Act and §276a-c of the Norwegian Penal Code, which provides for punishment of either fines or a prison term for various forms of corruption.
The government also produced the Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership for 2009-2012 in the defence sector, which summarises action already implemented, as well as future plans. The last time the Action Plan appears to have been updated is for the period of 2009-2012. However, the Action Plan was evaluated by an independent auditor in April 2012 (3); the report recommended that a new plan was not necessary and that instead, anti-corruption measures should be implemented into the day-to-day management of the MOD subordinate entities and monitored by the Ministry. These measures included an e-learning course of ethics and leadership, and such a course is now available through the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. (6) The MOD has provided guidance to subordinate entities in an implementation letter. (4, 5)
1. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector.&quoute;
May 2011. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/ethical-guidelines-for-business-and-industry-in-the-defence-sector_2011_s-1001-e_web.pdf, last accessed May 2015.
2. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2009-2012.&quoute; December 2010. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HEL_Handlingsplan2009-2012_EN_web.pdf, last accessed 25 July 2015.
3. Ernst and Young, 'Evaluation of action plan &quoute;Attitudes , Ethics and Leadership&quoute; (AEL) in the defence sector', April 2014. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/temadokumenter/evaluering-av-handlingsplan-for-hel_ey_01042014.pdf?id=2272989, accessed October 2015.
4. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 'A defence for our time. Implementation letter to the defence sector for the period 2013-2016', 28 June 2012. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/ivbltp.pdf, accessed October 2015.
5. TI-DSP correspondence with government representatives, October 2015.
6. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, 'eLearning programme on attitudes, ethics and leadership'. Online course. http://cids.no/?page_id=4246, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Ministry of Defence established the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector in 2012, with the mandate to promote good governance and professional integrity in the defence sector, with a clear focus on anti-corruption. The centre is co-located with the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, and is institutionally affiliated with the MoD. CIDS participates in the NATO Building Integrity programme, puts together seminars on integrity and publishes best practice handbooks. It also provides e-learning courses for the Norwegian defence sector.
The government also produced the Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership in the defence sector 2010-2012 for the Ministry of Defence, which summarises action already implemented, as well as future plans. Since 2012, anti-corruption actions have been implemented within and by particular government departments, with guidance from the MOD. An effective internal audit department also plays a role in preventing corruption. (see Q14)
The Parliamentary Ombudsman on Defence can also investigate complaints registered by soldiers and defence employees, which could conceivably address some corruption-related issues.
Two state-wide institutions can also contribute to countering corruption in the defence sector. The Office of the Auditor General in Norway is responsible for the accounting audit of the Ministry of Defence under a department called Section R3.4. The Office submits an annual audit report to Parliament covering a range of ministries, the Ministry of Defence included. As of December 2013, the Auditor General had 513 employees, and the OAG's current budget stands at 460 000 000 NOK.
The Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM), tasked with investigating crimes including bribery and other corruption-related practices, has also investigated defence companies. (6, 7) ØKOKRIM's 2014 Annual Report indicates that the Authority has had successes in investigation and prosecution of crimes, and that it proactively diagnoses risks. (8)
1. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens rapport om den årlige revisjon og kontroll for budsjettåret 2012&quoute;. Last modified November 5 2013. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Rapporter/Sider/Dokument1for2012.aspx
2. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. Accessed 18 February 2015. http://cids.no/
3. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Forsvarsdepartementet etablerar Senter for integritet i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last modified August 10 2012. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/forsvarsdepartementet-etablerar-senter-f/id704063/
4. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2010-2012.&quoute; December 2010. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HEL_Handlingsplan2009-2012_EN_web.pdf
5. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Om Riksrevisjonen&quoute;. Last updated 14 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/OmRiksrevisjonen/Sider/OmRiksrevisjonen.aspx
6. Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM), homepage. http://www.okokrim.no/in-english, accessed October 2015.
7. Kongsberg, 'ØKOKRIM has taken out charges against KONGSBERG with allegations of corruption', 25 February 2014. http://www.kongsberg.com/en/kog/news/2014/february/okorim/, accessed October 2015.
8. Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM), Annual Report 2014. March 2015. http://www.okokrim.no/www/okokrim/resource.nsf/files/2545112408-okokrim_annualreport_2014/$FILE/okokrim_annualreport_2014.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Comment: Ombudsman for defence personnel might also be relevant: http://www.ombudsmann.no/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: No in-country polls or surveys exploring the issue of corruption and bribery in the defence sector were found, but on a broader scale, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2014 gives Norway a score of 86 out of 100, indicating that the Norwegian public sector is believed to be very clean. TI's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer found that only 16% of Norwegians thought the military was corrupt or very corrupt. The score was better than that for the legislature, political parties, the private sector, or the religious bodies, and third-best overall. However, 34% of respondent overall indicated the corruption was either a problem or a serious problem in the country (with a further 27% stating it was a slight problem). 33% thought the government's actions to tackle the problem were ineffective, with a further 8% stating they were very ineffective and 39% responding that they did not make any difference.
Moreover, the Siemens bribery scandal (5) challenged perceptions that corruption in the Norwegian public sector, including the defence sector, is non-existent - a theme referred to in an address by former Minister of Defence Espen Barth Eide to Transparency International in 2007 (2). The government responded by issuing ethical guidelines for business contact, as well as embarking on the Action Plan for Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership. Norway's largest defence contractor, Kongsberg Gruppen, was charged in 2014 by the economic crime division of the police, Økokrim, with corruption relating to a series of defence communications contracts in Romania between 1998 and 2008 (6). There is no indication as to how these scandals affected public perceptions of the defence sector. Score 3 has been selected to reflect this uncertainty combined with relatively high levels of trust in the armed forces overall, and shortcomings in the level of trust in the government's ability to tackle the problem.
1. Dagens Naerlingsliv. &quoute;Hvorfor er det ingen som stiller spørsmål om det kan ha vært korrupsjon knyttet til norske myndigheter?&quoute;. Last modified June 6 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.dn.no/nyheter/politikkSamfunn/2014/06/09/Korrupsjon/-hvorfor-er-det-ingen-som-stiller-sprsml-om-det-kan-ha-vrt-korrupsjon-knyttet-til-norske-myndigheter
2. Espen Barth Eide (2007) Korrupsjon og det militaerindustrielle
kompleks, Opening speech for Transparency Internationals' yearly congress in Norway 15th May 2007. Last accessed 5 May 2015.
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide
/2007/korrupsjon-og-det-militarindustrielle-ko.html?id=467575
3. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2010-2012.&quoute; December 2010. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HEL_Handlingsplan2009-2012_EN_web.pdf
4. Global Corruption Barometer 2013. &quoute;Norway&quoute;. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=norway
5. Siri Schubert and Christian Miller, 'At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item', New York Times, 20 December 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 23 July 2015.
6. Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, 'Kongsberg Gruppen Charged With Corruption', Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303426304579405313097968036, accessed 23 July 2015
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway trialled the NATO Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process in 2009. However, although the recommendation is to repeat the process on an annual or biannual basis, this has not been carried out as far as can be ascertained. Internal and external audit institutions do provide a risk assessment mechanism in some areas through their regular audits, and evidence suggests that the government does implement many of the recommendations. (see Q14 and Q15)
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Noted. However, at this point score 2 was maintained due to lack of public information and lack of an updated, publicly available anti-corruption plan. We note that Norway has now integrated anti-corruption measures into departmental management, however, it is not clear that risk assessments are regularly carried out.
1. Transparency International. &quoute;Corruption in Defence.&quoute; Accessed 18 February 2015. http://defenceintegrity.eu/en/publication/ti-international-defence-and-security-programme.
2. NATO. &quoute;Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process.&quoute; Published February 2014. Accessed 18 February 2015. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/1402_BI-Self-Assess-Quest_en.pdf
3. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. &quoute;NATO BI&quoute;. Accessed February 18 2015. http://cids.no/?page_id=3492
4. Email correspondence with defence representative 1, 26 February 2015.
Comment: An Integrity Action Plan draft has been produced based on the GDI 2013. This plan has been partly implemented, but not made public since it was used as basis for creating the Integrity Action Plan Handbook and subsequent course package.
This partly implemented plan will be used as the template for the biannual plan that will be produced based on the GDI 2015 and subsequent ones. Therefore, we are in the process of establishing an institutionalisation of integrity/AC assessment system in the Norwegian defence sector.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian MoD is responsible for all stages of acquisition planning (3) and is defined as the project owner of planning and overall coordination. The policy for defence acquisition planning is set out in the 2006-2007 government report to Parliament, &quoute;Defence and Industry - Strategic Partners&quoute;. Acquisition planning for the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Norwegian National Security Authority, the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Ministry of Defence itself is carried out under the direction of the Ministry, using the PRINSIX project model which sets out the phases of the projects, decision points and staff roles and responsibilities.
Parliament must approve any project over the value of 500 million NOK. Long-term acquisition planning for the Armed Forces is made public on the Prinsix website. (1,3)
The Office of the Auditor General's audits include different aspects of planning. The OAG conducted a specific audit of planning and management of joint management systems in defence in 2003.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score 3 selected to reflect shortage in publicly available information and the long time apparently having elapsed since the last audit of the system.
1. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Future acquisitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces 2014-2022.&quoute; March 2014. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/temadokumenter/acquisitions-2014-2022_mars-2014.pdf
2. Norwegian Government. &quoute;St.meld. nr. 38 (2006-2007) Forsvaret og industrien – strategiske partnere.&quoute; Accessed February 18 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-38-2006-2007-/id475469/?docId=STM200620070038000DDDEPIS&q=&navchap=1&ch=1
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;Velkommen til PRINSIX-sidene.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/Sider/default.aspx
4. Forsvaret. &quoute;Roller og ansvar.&quoute; Last updated 8 June 2013. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/investeringskonsept/Sider/roller-og-ansvar.aspx
5. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse om effektivitet i planlegging og styring av felles forvaltningssystemer i Forsvaret&quoute;. Last updated 18 April 2011. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/Dokumentbase_Dok_3_7_2002_2003.aspx.
Comment: Based on the GDI 2013, the MoD has produced a draft Integrity Action Plan for the defence sector that is partly implemented. Based on this plan:
- BI is now included in the joint operational doctrine and training.
- There is now a constant focus on how the Norwegian Acquisition Regulations for the defence sector are being implemented
- BI strategic communication is now being discussed in the MoD.
Furthermore, an updated integrity action plan will be released as a result of findings in the GDI 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Defence Annual Report is made publicly available on the internet, with the most recent available report being the 2014 budget. It includes a detailed breakdown of defence spending, referencing key items of expenditure, including figures for military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. Within these categories, detailed line-item descriptions can be found.
1. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Forsvarets årsrapport&quoute;. Last modified January 12 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta/undersokelser-og-rapporter/aarsrapport
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence is responsible for scrutinising the defence budget. It is provided with detailed information on proposed defence expenditures. It makes recommendations to the Parliament on the budget before it is voted on. The Norwegian Constitution guarantees the Parliament the right to amend the budget. While, no more publicly available information regarding the degree of detail presented to the Committee or its ability to influence outcomes could be located by the assessor, it is reasonable to conclude that the Committee receives sufficient information to perform effective scrutiny.
1. Stortinget. &quoute;Utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen&quoute;. Last accessed 20 February 2015. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Representanter-og-komiteer/Komiteene/Utenriks--og-forsvarskomiteen/
2. Interview with 2 parliamentary employees, 3 March 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The defence budget is published in detail on the government website (1), and the Freedom of Information Act allows citizens to request further information about the budget (2). There is also a searchable budget website. (4)
The Open Government Partnership has assessed Norway's commitment to freedom of information very positively, although it also indicated that the FOI Law would be reviewed by independent experts starting in 2013 (3). By summer of 2015, the Law had not been amended. There is, however, no indication that the Law is not adequate. Refusals to make information available (including where defence issues are involved) can be appealed to the Parliamentary Ombudsman. (5)
1. Regjeringen. &quoute;Prop. 1 S (2014–2015). FOR BUDSJETTÅRET 2015 — Utgiftskapitler: 1700–1795 Inntektskapitler: 4700–4799.&quoute; Last modified October 13 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/Prop-1-S-20142015/id2005450/?docId=PRP201420150001_FDDDDEPIS&q=&navchap=1&ch=1
2. Act of 19 May 2006 No. 16 relating to the right of access to documents held by public authorities and public undertakings (short title: Freedom of Information Act), http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20060519-016-eng.pdf, accessed 23 July 2015
3. Open Government Partnership. &quoute;Openness and Information Integrity in Norway&quoute;. Last updated 15 October 2013. http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/dr-anne-thurston/2013/10/15/openness-and-information-integrity-norway, accessed 25 August 2015.
4. Regjeringen.no, 'National Budget 2015'. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Revidert-budsjett-2015/, accessed October 2015.
5. Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman, Annual Report for 2013. https://www.sivilombudsmannen.no/getfile.php/Filer/%C3%85rsmelding/Engelsk%20%C3%A5rsmelding.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The defence budget makes public the MoD's full income derived from user fees from other ministries, rental fees for conferencing facilities and sales of real estate. This does not, however, include details other than amount and type, and does not include information on what the income is later spent on.
The Ministry of defence obtains resources from asset disposal and these are made public through auction notices; however, the actual proceeds of asset disposal and their destination is not made clear (see also Q22). The MOD also owns 100% of Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway (established in 2011), whose financial statements are publicly available. The annual revenue from state-owned companies, including AIM, is made public in the 'State ownership' report. Government revenue from AIM has so far been '0', as reflected in the reports.
Audit over government income is provided by internal auditors and by the Office of the Auditor General.
RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: As the income is not attributed to spending, score 2 is maintained as it reflects scoring criteria.
2. Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway. &quoute;Who we are.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://www.aimnorway.com/Who-we-are
3. Regjeringen. &quoute;Statens Eierberetning 2013.&quoute; https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/nhd/statenseierberetning2013/pdf/eierberetning2013_web.pdf, accessed 25 August 2015.
4. Regjeringen. &quoute;Statens Eierberetning 2014.&quoute; https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/459cfd3bfaad4f6abe4437d91c0f890a/statens-eierberetning-2014.pdf, accessed November 2015.
Comment: Lack of data on income from sales is due to the fact that all income from equipment sales and property disposal is returned to the defence budget at large.
Comment: User fees and similar income categories are often too small to justify the MoD providing accounts of what this money has been spent on.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Internal audits are conducted by the Office of Internal Audit of the Ministry of Defence. It is seen as a management tool of the MoD, with the aim of managing and controlling subordinate levels. Its principal task is to assess whether internal control is appropriate, adequate, effective and if it works as intended. (1)
Although the process for internal audit is not published by the MoD, it is outlined in presentations given by the Director of Internal Audit, including a Purpose-Commitment-Capability-Action-Monitoring & Learning model and the deployment of the Continuous Risk Monitoring and Maturity Assessment (KROM). (2,3)
Internal Audit does not provide reports to parliament, although Parliament can examine reports of the Office of the Auditor General on it, most recently in 2011. (4)
It is difficult to assess to what extent the government takes the findings of internal audit into account. Given that responses to recommendations made by the external Office of the Auditor General are mixed and some recommendations are not implemented (see Q15), it can be extrapolated that this is similar with regard to internal audit - particularly as the OAG incorporates some of internal audit findings into its own reports.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: This may be the case, but there is a lack of public transparency on this - the researcher has not been able to find much information. However, the score has been amended to 3 due to the internal audit department being scrutinised by the external auditor and Parliament's ability to scrutinise those reports in turn.
RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: The example given in the link is not relevant to this question as it concerns external audit (not internal audit) and a process that could not undergo parliamentary scrutiny because it had to lead directly to a criminal investigation which was still ongoing at the time of research.
1. Regjeringen. &quoute;Internrevisjon&quoute;. Last accessed 6 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/organisering-og-ledelse/avdelinger/controllerenhet/id85707/
2. Frank Alvern. &quoute;Revisors rolle i å vurdere kvaliteten på virksomhetsstyringen&quoute;. Published October 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.nkrf.no/filarkiv/File/Kurs_og_konferansepdf-er/Nasj-fagkonf-2014/T-1520-Alvern.pdf
3. Frank Alvern. &quoute;Erfaringer med bruk av internrevisjon i Forsvarsdepartementet&quoute;. Published 19 March 2013. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.iia.no/filestore/Nettverk/Nettverk_statlig/Presentasjoner/Nettverksmte_19_mars_2012/Nettverksmte_statlig_sektor_19mars2012_hos_DF_Alvern.pdf
4. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av intern kontroll i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; 2011. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Rapporter/Documents/2010-2011/Dokument%203/Dokumentbase_3_9_2010_2011.pdf, accessed 25 August 2015.
Comment: Reports are taken seriously and there is documentary evidence. We apply relevant international programmes and recognised certifications.
Otherwise, assessor's evaluation is fairly accurate, but has not been reflected in the score.
Comment: There are cases where internal audits are used very transparently by the Norwegian defence, and cases are forwarded to the relevant authorities. However, parliamentary scrutiny is missing. For example see https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/ny-informasjon-sendt-okokrim/id2424399/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: External audit is undertaken by the Office of the Auditor General, officially independent of the government. OAG reports are made available to the public on its website. (2) The Standing Committee for Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs is responsible for reviewing reports from the Office of the Auditor General in Parliament.
The OAG stipulates that its personnel must be academically proficient and that for some positions, there are higher requirements for professional competence / education, depending on the government agency being audited and on any specific tasks of the section. For some positions it may be appropriate to require special language skills or security clearance from the National Security Authority. (3)
In its audits, the OAG does evaluate whether previous findings have been taken into account. A review of OAG reports about the MoD reveals that government responsiveness to OAG findings is seen by the OAG to be mixed. (2) In October 2014, the Office identified serious problems that had been previously raised and which it felt had not been acted upon. In particular, this included inadequate financial management and internal control over the Air Force's purchases of training and education for simulator training abroad, violations of public procurement regulations regarding illegal direct purchases from suppliers over a period of 15 years, and security issues with the SAP system for accounting, payroll and material management, specifically missing routines and an excess of admin users. (1)
RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: The issue is not that the OAG finds irregularities, but that it feels compelled to comment that its recommendations have not been acted upon. Score 3 maintained as scoring criteria better correspond to the situation.
1. Dagbladet. &quoute;Riksrevisjonen konklusjon: Mangel, mangel, mangel, mangel, mangel, mangel.&quoute; Last modified October 16 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/10/16/nyheter/riksrevisjonen/innenriks/per-kristian_foss/forsvaret/35770305/
2. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av intern kontroll i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last modified June 7 2011. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/forsvarssektoren.aspx
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Hvem søker Riksrevisjonen?&quoute;. Last modified 7 March 2014. Last accesed 6 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Jobb/Hvem/Sider/hvem.aspx
4. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Om Riksrevisjonen&quoute;. Last modified 11 May 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/OmRiksrevisjonen/Sider/OmRiksrevisjonen.aspx
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment: External auditing is independent, with fully transparent fundings, and there is evidence that the government acts upon the findings of audit reports. The fact that audit reports find irregularities is deplorable, but should not influence this indicator.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: While there appear to be no statutory restriction on the defence sector's involvement in natural resource exploitation, no evidence of the MOD's or the armed forces' involvement in exploitation of natural resources has been found. The Ministry of Defence does not hold financial interests in natural resource exploitation, and there are no other public sources - such as from the media, academia or CSOs - which suggest rumours to the contrary. The government confirmed that there is no legislation or regulations which forbid especially the Armed Forces from exploiting natural resources, nor any regulation which gives it the right to such exploitation. Should the Armed Forces wish to pursue natural resource exploitation, it would need to apply to relevant civilian authority, local or national, and follow the same procedure as other public or private entities. Score 3 has been selected to reflect lack of statutory restrictions and no actual involvement in exploitation of natural resources.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: In March 2014, the national daily newspaper, Aftenposten, reported that a company contracted by the Ministry of Defence to repaint its central office used five subcontractors either suspected or convicted of serious economic crimes, two of which are linked to the Albanian &quoute;Zvonko&quoute; criminal network, believed to have laundered 40 million NOK (1). However, it could be considered a stretch to consider this as penetration of organised crime into the defence sector.
The National Criminal Investigation Service, Kripos, monitors organised crime in Norway and releases a report on trends in organised crime. The most recent report does not identify penetration of organised crime into the defence sector. (2, 3)
The Kripos has the power to investigate crime in the government defence sector, as evidenced by the recent arrest of a former employee of the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation in 2015 (4).
1. Aftenposten. &quoute;Siktet for grov kriminalitet - pusser opp for regjeringen.&quoute; Last modified March 27 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Siktet-for-grov-kriminalitet---pusser-opp-for-regjeringen-7515309.html
2. Kripos. &quoute;Den organiserte kriminaliteten i Norge – trender og UTFORDRINGER 2013–2014.&quoute; Last accessed February 27 2015. https://www.politi.no/vedlegg/lokale_vedlegg/kripos/Vedlegg_2014.pdf
3. Interview with Source 2: Law enforcement official 1, 27 February 2015, by phone.
4. Dagbladet. &quoute;Økokrim ransaker Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon.&quoute; 20 January 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/01/20/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/innenriks/37279559/, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting economic crime. Local police units also have the capability to investigate economic crime for smaller cases. Larger or more serious cases are typically taken on by Økokrim. (6) Økokrim brought charges against seven officers of the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2007, on suspicion of having intentionally received improper benefits from the Siemens Group, including expenses for hotel stays during a trip to Alicante in Spain in March 2004. The investigation found insufficient grounds for prosecution of four individuals and their cases were dropped in 2008. The other three individuals were tried and acquitted of corruption in July 2009. As Article 276 a-c Of the Penal Code, delaing with corruption offences, was introduced into the Norwegian penal code in 2003, the case represented one of the early tests of the updated legislation.
Økokrim has also been involved in a recent investigation in 2015 into the illegal sale of former Norwegian naval vessels to Nigerian paramilitary groups. British police announced in January 2015 that they arrested two UK nationals on suspicion of bribing a foreign public official. According to press reports, this foreign official is a retired individual who was working for the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation when he received 150 000 NOK in bribes.
No evidence has been found of past organised criminal activities linked with defence and security employees.
Organised crime would be policed by the Kripos, the National Criminal Investigation Service (7). The police service, including Kripos and Økokrim, is independent from the MoD.
1. Økokrim. &quoute;Korrupsjonssaker mot tre offiserer henlegges&quoute;. Last modified January 31 2008. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.okokrim.no/id/DB7039320B669CD3C1257589003C2365
2. Økokrim. &quoute;Frifunnet for korrupsjon&quoute;. Last modified July 4 2009. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.okokrim.no/id/96F211A384BA6241C12575E8004698A7
3. Dagbladet. &quoute;Økokrim ransaker Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon. Tre arrestert i Nigeriabåt-saken&quoute;. Last modified January 20 2015. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/01/20/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/innenriks/37279559/
4. City of London Police. &quoute;City of London Police arrest two in ex-naval vessels bribery investigation.&quoute; Last modified January 20 2015. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/news-and-appeals/Pages/-City-of-London-Police-arrest-two-in-ex-naval-vessels-bribery-investigation.aspx
5. Politiet. &quoute;Organisert kriminalitet.&quoute; Last updated 16 February 2015. Last accessed 6 May 2015. https://www.politi.no/kripos/organisert_kriminalitet/
7. Kripos. &quoute;Om Kripos.&quoute; Last updated 11 December 2014. https://www.politi.no/kripos/om_kripos/Tema_71.xhtml, accessed 26 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian Intelligence Service is administered by the Ministry of Defence, which is overseen by the Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Norwegian National Police Service by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, overseen by the Justice Committee. The Norwegian National Security Authority is cross-sectoral and therefore reports to both the MoD and the Ministry of Justice. Budgets are therefore included in the State budget and accounts and procurement are audited by the Office of the Auditor General. These are reviewed by the Finance Committee. The composition of these committees is determined by the Nomination Committee, which is itself elected by Parliament.
Additional oversight of the intelligence services, comprising Norwegian National Police Security Service, the Norwegian National Security Authority and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, is carried out by the parliamentary Committee for the Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services, as established by The Act relating to the Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services (Act No. 7 of 3 February 1995). The Committee is focussed upon protecting civil rights in the wake of scandals leading to the Lund Report of 1996 regarding the illegal surveillance of Norwegian citizens. It is independent of both the government and the parliament itself, and has 7 members as of May 2015. Its members are appointed by Parliament and the Committee reports to parliament; its reports are publicly available.
1. Amb. Leif Mevik and Hakon Huus-Hansen, &quoute;Parliamentary Oversight of the Norwegian Secret and Intelligence Services&quoute; in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini (Cornwall: Ashgate Books, 2007)
2. The Act relating to the Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services, Act No. 7 of 3 February 1995, http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19950203-007-eng.pdf
3. Norwegian Armed Forces. &quoute;Spørsmål og svar&quoute;. Last accessed February 21 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta/organisasjon/Etterretningstjenesten/sporsmaal-og-svar
4. Regjeringen. &quoute;Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) FOR BUDSJETTÅRET 2015 — Utgiftskapitler: 1700–1795 Inntektskapitler: 4700–4799&quoute;. Last accessed February 21 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/Prop-1-S-20142015/id2005450/?docId=PRP201420150001_FDDDDEPIS&q=&navchap=1&ch=1
5. Norwegian Parliament Oversight Committee on Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services.&quoute;Members&quoute;. Last accessed 6 May 2015. http://eos-utvalget.no/english_1/services/about_the_eos_committee_1/members/
6. Stortinget. &quoute;Parliament's Rules of Procedure&quoute;. Updated 1 October 2014. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden/#kap3, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is no evidence to suggest that senior positions within the intelligence services are not based on objective selection criteria and a full investigation. For example, the position of Director of Norwegian National Security Authority is filled after public announcement and a process following the same principles as all other top management positions in the public sector. Job description and selection criteria are available. The media and public at large are free to request disclosure of list of applicants and are as a general rule granted access. (3)
Public discussions surrounding these appointments do occur, but there is no suggestion that corruption has been an issue in the process. Criticisms of the current intelligence chief by the press, for example, a disagreement with the newspaper Dagbladet in 2014, are based on difference of opinion and not on questions of competence or propriety (1, 2). This assessment has uncovered no concerns on these grounds.
1. HT. &quoute;Grandhagen på plass.&quoute; Last modified September 7 2012. Last accessed 6 May 2015. http://www.ht.no/incoming/article322844.ece
2. ABC Nyheter. &quoute;Ordkrig mellom Dagbladet og E-sjef: – Offerrollen kler ham ikke.&quoute; Last modified February 25 2014. Last accessed 6 May 2015. http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/2014/02/25/ordkrig-mellom-dagbladet-og-e-sjef-offerrollen-kler-ham-ikke
3. TI-DSP correspondence with government representatives, November 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in February 2014; it subsequently came into force in December of that year. At present, it may too early to give full information on implementation of the three anti-corruption articles. Upcoming arms exports are processed by the Foreign Ministry and parliament may only debate general policy, based on an annually released White Paper detailing arms exports that took place the previous year. Criticisms are currently being made by civil society that Norway continues to export to authoritarian regimes and cannot guarantee that those arms will not be resold to a country outside of the Arms Trade Treaty. The policy of parliament considering arms exports retrospectively has also been criticised.
A further consideration is the Økokrim 2015 investigation into the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation on the basis of sales of ten former Norwegian naval vessels to private paramilitary clients in Nigeria which appear to not have raised a red flag during the Foreign Office process. The Pricewaterhouse Coopers audit that brought this to light also raised serious questions with regard to the errors and contravention of rules and regulations at the Defence Logistics Organisation. The alleged bribery of a former Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation employee by a UK company is also connected to the investigation.
There is no evidence of current oversight over upcoming arms exports.
1. Regjeringen. &quoute;Norway becomes eleventh State Party to the UN Arms Trade Treaty.&quoute; Last modified February 12 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/att_treaty/id751032/
2. Regjeringen. &quoute;Eksport av forsvarsmateriell fra Norge i 2013.&quoute; Last modified November 28 2014. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/stmeld_eksportkontroll/id2342600/
3. Framtida. &quoute;7000 underskrifter mot våpeneksport&quoute;. Last modified February 19 2015. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://framtida.no/articles/7000-underskrifter-mot-vapeneksport#.VOnmgFPF8rM
4. Framtida. &quoute;Vil stogge norsk våpeneksport&quoute;. Last modified June 27 2014.Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.framtida.no/articles/vil-stogge-norsk-vapeneksport-8731#.VOnqkFPF8rN
5. Dagbladet. &quoute;Et totalhavari&quoute;. Last modified January 24 2015. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/01/24/kultur/meninger/hovedkommentar/kommentar/nigeriabater/37343836/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Non-real estate asset disposal is conducted by the Armed Forces, which sells or destroys assets, including through the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation. Items for auction are listed publicly through Norwegian Mediation and Auctions. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA), which works under the direction of the Ministry of Defence, is tasked with disposing of real estate assets. Sales and upcoming sales are published on their website. In terms of oversight, the entirety of the MoD is audited regularly, while audits of more specific components such as asset disposal are conducted on a more ad hoc basis, with the 2005 report being more focused on the entirety of the asset disposal process (2).
A score of 2 has been selected here due to the lack of detailed information on asset disposal processes available to the public, as well as information on the proceeds of the disposals and details other than auction information. There is a lack of information on MoD follow-up of a report by the Auditor General in 2005 and further NDEA efforts to improve internal controls since 2011, at least with regard to asset disposal.
A further factor is the Økokrim 2015 investigation into the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation on the basis of sales of ten former Norwegian naval vessels to private paramilitary clients in Nigeria in contravention of export policy on military goods. The Pricewaterhouse Coopers audit that brought this to light in 2014 also raised serious questions with regard to errors and contravention of rules and regulations at the Defence Logistics Organisation. (4,5)
1. Forsvaret Prinsix. &quoute;Avhending&quoute;. Last modified August 11 2011. Last accessed 5 May 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/prosjektfaser/driftsfase/Sider/avhending.aspx
2. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Avhending av eiendommer, bygg og anlegg i Forsvaret - Dokument nr. 3:9 (2004-2005)&quoute;. Last modified May 27 2005. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/presserom/Pressemeldinger/Sider/Pressemelding_Dok_3_9_2004_2005.aspx
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av intern kontroll i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last modified July 7 2011. Last accessed 5 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/Rapporter/Documents/2010-2011/Dokument%203/Dokumentbase_3_9_2010_2011.pdf
6. Forsvarsbygg. &quoute;The Norwegian Defence Estates Agency&quoute;. http://www.forsvarsbygg.no/forsvarsbygg-in-brief/, accessed 25 August 2015.
7. Forsvaret. &quoute;Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon&quoute;. https://forsvaret.no/fakta/organisasjon/Forsvarets-logistikkorganisasjon, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Office of the Auditor General audits asset disposals as part of its independent audit of the Ministry of Defence. However, this is only alluded to summarily in the public report (without providing detailed data that audits are based on). (1) There is a lack of information on MoD follow-up of a report by the Auditor General in 2005 (2) and further NDEA efforts to improve internal control since 2011, at least with regard to asset disposal.
A contracted Pricewaterhouse Coopers audit uncovered irregularities that led to the Økokrim 2015 investigation into the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation on the basis of sales of ten former Norwegian naval vessels to private paramilitary clients in Nigeria in contravention of export policy on military goods. (3, 4) This audit is not publicly available, however, suggesting that while there is internal scrutiny, the results of these investigations are not always released.
1. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Forsvarsdepartementets forvaltning og gjennomføring av budsjettet for 2011&quoute;. Last modified October 25 2012. Last accessed 8 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/Dokument1for2011FD.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The State Budget for 2015 allots the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the Norwegian Police Security Service and the National Security Authority a total of approximately 2 billion NOK out of a defence expenditure of 44 billion NOK together with a justice expenditure of 33 billion NOK (secret spending comes out of both budgets, secret budget expenditure of 2.5%). Of this, the largest item was the Intelligence Service budget of 1.2 billion NOK. 2 billion NOK of intelligence expenditure constitutes 4.5% of the defence budget.
1. Royal Norwegian Defence Ministry. &quoute;Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak).&quoute; Last accessed February 23 2015. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/upload/Statsbudsjett_2015/dokumenter/pdf/jd.pdf
2. Royal Norwegian Justice Ministry. &quoute;Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak).&quoute; Last accessed February 23 2015. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/upload/Statsbudsjett_2015/dokumenter/pdf/jd.pdf
3. Royal Norwegian Treasury. &quoute;Prop. 1 S (2014–2015) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak.&quoute; Last accessed February 23 2015. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/upload/Statsbudsjett_2015/dokumenter/pdf/gulbok.pdf
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is no publicly available information on the issue; in the absence of information, overarching legal provision regarding financial oversight have been applied and confirmation has been sought from government representatives. The 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index provides information obtained from an interview, which remains accurate as far as could be verified. Score 3 reflects lack of publicly available information on the issue.
Para 43 of the parliamentary rules of procedure states that the national budget is presented to Parliament within six days after Parliament's opening. Various parts of the budget are distributed to the committees to be considered. Secret items do not have their own separate parliamentary procedures, so according to existing laws which apply to the defence sector, these are also considered by the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee and the Justice Committee. The overall budget is reviewed by the Finance Committee, and voted on as a whole by the Parliament. The parliamentary Committee for the Monitoring of Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services focuses on the protection of civil rights and does not play a part in scrutinising secret budgets.
Government representatives have confirmed that the Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is briefed on foreign intelligence issues, and members of the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs are invited to participate in these briefings. Annual, in-depth briefings on NIS activities and budgets are given to the President of the Storting and the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. (3) In interviews carried out for the previous Defence Anti-Corruption Index, parliamentary employees stated that three members of the Foreign and Defence Committee are given full insight into the budget including classified items. These are the chairman, the first vice chairman, and the second vice chairman. The rest of the committee may be informed about classified items. (1) This supports information obtained through research for this edition and appears to confirm its validity, and supports the conclusion that the key members of parliament exercising oversight over defence politics are provided with relevant information.
Score 3 has been selected to reflect lack of publicly available information on the issue.
1. Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2013, Norway country assessment. http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Norway.pdf, accessed October 2015.
2. §43, Parliamentary Rules of Procedure. Updated 1 October 2014. https://stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-instrukser/Stortingets-forretningsorden/, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian Intelligence Service is administrated under the Ministry of Defence, and its budget is therefore included in the State budget. Its accounts and procurement are audited by the Office of the Auditor General. According to parliamentary employees interviewed (1), audit reports are reviewed by the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, but they are not made publicly available.
Government representatives have confirmed that the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) is audited by selected personnel from the Office of the Auditor General of Norway, who are given security clearances. The Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is briefed on foreign intelligence issues, and members of the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs are invited to participate in these briefings. Annual, in-depth briefings on NIS activities and budgets are given to the President of the Storting and the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Additionally, the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS-utvalget) provides an additional layer of oversight focusing on human rights issues. This Committee receives full access to NIS materials, conducts on-site inspections, and reports to the Presidium of the Storting. (4) Interviews with parliamentary employees carried out for the previous Defence Anti-Corruption Index stated that &quoute;Three members of the Foreign and Defence Committee are given full insight into the budget including classified items. These are the chairman, the first vice chairman, and the second vice chairman. The rest of the committee may be informed on classified items. Annual accounts are public according to the law with the exception of classified items. The defence sector budgets are debated but there are no indications that classified items (secret budgets, programs, reports) are debated outside a smaller group.&quoute; (3) This supports information obtained through research for this edition and appears to confirm its validity.
2. Stortinget. &quoute;The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. https://www.stortinget.no/en/In-English/Standing-Commitees/The-Standing-Committee-on-Scrutiny-and-Constitutional-Affairs/
5. Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee, homepage. http://eos-utvalget.no/english_1/, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is no allowance for or mention of off-budget military expenditure in Norwegian constitutional or budgetary law. According to parliamentary employees interviewed, all expenditure is contained within the State Budget. However, strictly speaking, expenditures which are not part of the budget are permitted, but only in cases where the funds are separately allocated by Parliament - a process similar to that of agreeing the budget. (3) This was the case with, for example, acquisition of the F-35 aircraft by the Norwegian Air Force, when funds were separately authorised by Parliament. (4) Therefore, given the scrutiny accompanying the process, score 4 is maintained as these expenditures do not seem to constitute a gateway to greater corruption risk and should not be treated as off-budget.
2. Regjeringen. &quoute;Statsbudsjett 2015.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2015/Dokumenter-NY/Budsjettdokumenter/Statsbudsjettet-2010/Prop-1-S/
3. Open Budget Survey 2015: Norway, Q109-113. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-Questionnaire-Norway.pdf, accessed October 2015.
4. Gerhard O'Dwyer, 'Norwegian Budget Hike Gets Mixed Reviews', defenceNews, 18 October 2014. http://archive.defencenews.com/article/20141018/DEFREG01/310180028/Norwegian-Budget-Hike-Gets-Mixed-Reviews, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: As concluded in Q27, additional expenditure is allocated by Parliament and does not constitute off-budget spending. Interviews and audits of the Office of the Auditor General confirm that all spending is recorded.
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Forsvarsdepartementets forvaltning og gjennomføring av budsjettet for 2011.&quoute; Last modified October 25 2012. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/Dokument1for2011FD.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Freedom of Information Act allows for classification of information on the grounds of national security and denies access to confidential information.(1) The classification regime is set out by the Security Law.(2) As per the Security Law of 1998, the Norwegian National Security Authority applies classification, authorises other entities to handle classified information and provides regulations on classification. The NSM is under the supervision of the MoD, reporting to the Ministry of Justice on civilian matters and to the MoD on security matters.
The law stipulates that classification must ensure that information is marked with the appropriate security level. Security grading should not happen to a greater extent than is strictly necessary, and information should not be given a higher security level than is necessary. Security Grading should not be in effect for longer than is strictly necessary, with a maximum of 30 years, after which the information is declassified.
There is no evidence of individuals or agencies influencing decisions, outside of the command chain and prescribed processes; nor is there evidence implying that scrutiny over these mechanisms is compromised. Refusals to make information available (including where defence issues are involved) can be appealed to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (4), and the Open Government Partnership has concluded that Norway's commitment to availability of information was high. (5)
1. Law on right of access to documents in the Public Administration (Freedom of Information Act) 2006, Chapter 3, §21
2. Law on preventive security service (security law) 1998, Chapter 4, §11
3. NSM. &quoute;Organisasjon.&quoute; Accessed 8 May 2015. https://www.nsm.stat.no/om-nsm/organisasjon/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Ministry of Defence owns 100% of Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway, a state-owned enterprise, and publishes information, including financial details, on its operations. Its profit in 2012 was 14.7m NOK, and its operating income was 528m NOK, making it worth less than 1% of the Norwegian defence budget. Its corporate social responsibility documents include an obligation to an annual audit and are in line with other state-owned enterprises.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway SF is audited by the independent Office of the Auditor General, which audits to the standard of the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Organisations. However, the details of this audit are not published - other than the information that the audit has been conducted.
1. Regjeringen. &quoute;Aerospace Industrial Maintenance Norway SF.&quoute; Last modified January 6 2014. Last accessed 7 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/naringsliv/statlig-eierskap/statens-eierberetning2013/selskapsomtale/aerospace-industrial-maintenance-norway-/id727278/
2. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Vedlegg 6: Virksomheter som omfattes av Riksrevisjonens kontroll for regnskapsåret 2013.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/ReviderteVirksomheter/Documents/KontrollerteSelskaper.pdf
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Standarder for revisjon - Riksrevisjonen&quoute;. Last modified 25 February 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/revisjonsmetodikk/StandarderForRevisjon/Sider/StandarderForRevisjon.aspx
4. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Om Riksrevisjonen.&quoute; Last modified 14 May 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/OmRiksrevisjonen/Sider/OmRiksrevisjonen.aspx
Comment: CSR principles are revised annually and quality revisions undertaken, also by the owner (MoD).
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Økokrim, the economic crimes division of the police, arrested a former employee of the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation in 2015 on suspicion of receiving 150 000 NOK in two currency transfers in connection with the sale of six demilitarised Norwegian naval vessels in 2012 while still in employment. This led to the discovery of irregularities in the disposal of a coastal fort and the illegal acquisition of a quad bike, a motorboat and luxury mattresses by the same employee. The Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet criticised the government not reporting the later revelations to Økokrim quickly enough.
The relevant Code of Conduct states that employees of the Norwegian Armed Forces may not take extra jobs, second jobs, board jobs, or other paid work that are incompatible with the employer's legitimate interests or liable to weaken trust in public administration. The Code of Conduct states the employer will judge what sanctions will be taken if an employee contravenes these rules.
1. Dagbladet. &quoute;Økokrim har sikret beslag og bevis. Løslater korrupsjonssiktet offiser.&quoute; Last modified January 22 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/01/22/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/innenriks/37322837/
2. Dagens Naeringsliv. &quoute;Nigeriansk eks-pirat bruker tidligere norsk marinefartøy.&quoute; June 14 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015.http://www.dn.no/nyheter/utenriks/2014/06/14/nigeriansk-ekspirat-bruker-tidligere-norsk-marinefarty
3. Dagbladet. &quoute;SISTE: Krigsskipshøring før påske.&quoute; February 3 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015.http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/02/03/nyheter/nigeria/nigeria-batene/innenriks/regjeringen/37512357/
4. Dagbladet. &quoute;Hadde forsvarsluksus på eget landsted&quoute;. 2 August 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/08/02/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/forsvarspolitikk/40014819/, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The keynote speech of the Norwegian Minister of Defence at the NATO Building Integrity conference in June 2015 stresses the country's commitment to integrity and anti-corruption measures in defence, as well as to tackling corruption as a threat to international security. (6) The establishment of (in 2012) and commitment to the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS) is a further example of the commitment. CIDS' mission is to &quoute;promote good governance and professional integrity in the defence sector&quoute;; it works in cooperation with Transparency International UK and has a special interest in the NATO Building Integrity self-assessment and peer review process. Norway remains one of the lead nations in the BI programme and contributes to its trust fund.
However, no statements on integrity and anti-corruption from Norway's high-ranking military officers could be located.
1. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. &quoute;The Centre.&quoute; Last accessed 23 February 2015. http://cids.no/?page_id=6
2. Morits Skaugen, Dagen Naeringsliv. &quoute;Ta korrupsjon på alvor.&quoute; Last modified June 11 2014. http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2014/06/06/Korrupsjon/ta-korrupsjon-p-alvor
3. Morits Skaugen, Dagen Naeringsliv. &quoute;And prokuratorknep&quoute;. Last modified June 12 2014. http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2014/06/12/Ine-Eriksen-Sreide/et-prokuratorknep
6. Ine Eriksen Søreide, Minister of Defence, Speech at the &quoute;NATO Building Integrity Conference on Institution Building&quoute;, Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, June 2015. http://cids.no/?page_id=5128/, accessed October 2015.
7. NATO, Building Integrity programme homepage. http://buildingintegrity.hq.nato.int/BI.aspx?accor=8, accessed October 2015.
Comment: There is understandably public criticism of the handling of specific cases, but the MoD's overall commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures is clear and cohesive, publicly stated and supported by activities and strategies
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Civil Servants Act prohibits civil servants (including defence officials) from receiving gifts that they are forbidden to receive by regulations and prescribes disciplinary measures, suspension or dismissal of officials. In addition, it allows for prosecution after dismissal.
Procurement Regulations for the Armed Forces and Guidelines for the Civil Service, Section 20 of the Civil Servants Act, the Disciplinary Act and §276a-c of the Norwegian Penal Code, also provides for punishment through either fines or a prison term for various forms of corruption. The Penal Code §388 prescribes a punishment of up to 10 years imprisonment for gross corruption, which can be distinguished from other crimes of corruption, amongst other things, by being carried out by a public official. The State Personnel Handbook 2015 provides guidelines for dealing with corruption by civil servants.
Defence employees have been arrested and charged with these offences, for example in the Siemens scandal and the Nigerian vessel sales scandal. There is public criticism that the Ministry of Defence has not responded with appropriate speed or seriousness to events that have given rise to the current police investigation into the sale of demilitarised naval vessels to Nigerian paramilitaries. It has also failed to respond to concerns regarding the Rheinmetall Man procurement scandal, involving a company whose predecessor had previously been convicted of corruption in Germany.
1. Civil Servants Act, Chapter 2, §14-16, §20-21. (http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19830304-003-eng.pdf)
2. News in English. &quoute;Admiral regrets sales to Nigeria.&quoute; Modified 30 April 2015. Accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.newsinenglish.no/2015/04/30/admiral-regrets-sales-to-nigeria/
3. Aftenbladet. &quoute;Full støtte til Jan Reksten.&quoute; Modified 13 January 2010. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.aftenbladet.no/nyheter/lokalt/Full-stotte-til-Jan-Reksten-1887549.html
6. Defence Acquisition Regulations (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2013-10-04-1185)
7. Norwegian Penal Code, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1902-05-22-10, accessed September 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The right to become a whistleblower is codified in the Working Environment Act 2005, which applies to all employees, including those in the defence sector but with the exception of military aviation. The Act also obligates employers to develop routines for internal whistleblowing and prohibits them from retaliating against the whistleblower. (1) Subsequent legislation exempting civil servants from other passages of the WEA does not exempt them from whistleblowing legislation.(2)
MOD whistleblowing channels include a telephone hotline, an e-mail address, mail or reporting in person. Contact information is publicly available on all relevant Internet and Intranet sites, and the MOD provides a website describing the whistleblowers' right to protection and the process. There is also an online portal enabling members of the public to submit alerts. Should an employee not want to contact the concerned agency directly, notification can also be made to the Labour Inspection, Equality Ombudsman, Auditor General, or the police. (7, 8)
Score 2 has been selected in this instance because of evidence of an occasion on which the MoD did not protect whistleblowers since the last TI defence assessment was performed. In 2013, there was criticism that the then Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, had not responded in a timely fashion to whistleblowers' claims that threats and intimidation were being used against the marine unit Marinejegerkommandoen in a debate on merging of forces, and that the Ministry had made names of the whistleblowers public, which could be interpreted as a violation of the WEA and/or the Public Data Act. (3-5)
1. Act relating to working environment, working hours and employment protection, etc. (Working Environment Act) 2005, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/2477/Act%20relating%20to%20working%20environment,%20working%20hours%20and%20employment%20protection,%20etc..pdf
2. Regulations concerning exemption from the Working Environment Act for certain types of work and employee groups 2005
3. VG News. &quoute;Vurderer varsler-søksmål mot Forsvarsdepartementet.&quoute; Last modified July 1 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/forsvaret/vurderer-varsler-soeksmaal-mot-forsvarsdepartementet/a/10104945/
4. Minerva. &quoute;Hvorfor varslersaken i Forsvarsdepartementet er alvorlig.&quoute; Last modified July 17 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.minervanett.no/hvorfor-varslersaken-i-forsvarsdepartementet-er-alvorlig/
5. TV2. &quoute;Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen avslørte identiteten til varslere.&quoute; Last modified June 12 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.tv2.no/a/4067023
6. Regjeringen. &quoute;Varslingskanal - etikk.&quoute; Last modified December 12 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/forsvar/militart-personell/innsikt/varslingskanal---etikk/id2353944/
8. Government of Norway, 'Whistleblowing in the defence sector.' https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/forsvar/militart-personell/innsikt/varslingskanal---etikk/id2353944/, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Most positions in the military require a security clearance. The Procurements Regulations for Defence state that special attention ought to be paid to sellers who for the past two years have been employed within the armed forces.
Furthermore, it states that there might be reasons to prevent personnel from working on certain procurement deals when the seller and the government employee might have personal affiliations and where impartiality cannot be guaranteed.
However, there is no evidence of a comprehensive process that would identify sensitive positions, analyse corruption risks associated with them, and apply specific solutions.
1. Armed Forces. &quoute;Informasjon til jobbsøkere.&quoute; Last accessed 25 February 2015. http://forsvaret.no/karriere/ledige-stillinger/informasjon-til-jobbsokere
2. Procurement Regulations for Defence (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2013-10-04-1185)
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Detailed information on personnel statistics are given by the Armed Forces in the Personnel Report, most recently released in 2014. (1) This includes numbers of civilian and military personnel. Statistics are also given on an annual basis on the Armed Forces website. (2-3)
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Mannskaprapporten 2013.&quoute; Last accessed February 25 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Mannskapsrapport_2013.pdf
2. Forsvaret. &quoute;Forsvarets årsrapport.&quoute; Last accessed February 25 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta/undersokelser-og-rapporter/aarsrapport
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;Personell&quoute;. Last updated 7 April 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://forsvaret.no/fakta/undersokelser-og-rapporter/aarsrapport/personell
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel in the Armed Forces are published by the Norwegian Military Officers' Association. The information is comprehensive, detailing full pay scales and available allowances.
1. Norges Offisersforbund. &quoute;Forsvarets lønnstabell pr- 1. mai 2014.&quoute; http://www.nof.no/c-115-L%C3%B8nn.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is no evidence to suggest that payments are not made in a timely fashion; basic pay rates are published and non-discretionary. In December 2013, the Office of the Auditor General raised concerns that in a significant proportion taken from a random sample, overtime was being paid in excess, in error or without the appropriate documentation. (1) There is no further information published on the payments system, however. Bonuses are paid, although only those for the Home Guard are published. (2)
Score 3 has been selected to reflect shortcomings regarding the transparency and payment of overtime and bonuses.
1. ABC Nyheter. &quoute;Riksrevisjonen kritiserer forsvarets ekstrainntekter.&quoute; Last modified December 9 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/2013/12/09/riksrevisjonen-kritiserer-forsvarets-ekstrainntekter
2. Heimevernet. &quoute;Tjenestetillegg og lønn i HV-tjeneste.&quoute; Last updated 24 March 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://hv.forsvaret.no/info/soldat/Sider/tjenestetillegg-og-lonn.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Brief job descriptions for senior employees are available on the website, but the full job descriptions or assessment processes attached to the roles are not available; neither are there any available details on the appointments system.
There were allegations of appointment not being based purely on merit when former General Chief of Defence Harald Sunde recommended Karl Egil Hanevik for the post of Commander for the Special Forces, a post that he was subsequently appointed to in 2011. Sunde had been the best man at Hanevik's wedding in 1994. (2) Critics alleged that Sunde contravened The Public Administration Act §6 by not excusing himself as unfit to make the recommendation based on &quoute;special circumstances likely to undermine impartiality&quoute;. However, Sunde responded that he did not consider himself to be unfit to make the recommendation and that his relationship with Hanevik was primarily a professional one. No evidence of impropriety was found.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Transparency on the level of announcements is acknowledged.
1. VG News. &quoute;Påstås å ha presset spesialsoldater - hadde forsvarssjefen som forlover.&quoute; Last modified June 6 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/forsvaret/paastaas-aa-ha-presset-spesialsoldater-hadde-forsvarssjefen-som-forlover/a/10117007/
2. Dagbladet. &quoute;Forsvarssjef Harald Sunde: - Jeg er ikke inhabil.&quoute; Last modified June 6 2013. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/06/06/nyheter/spesialstyrker/forsvaret/forsvarssjefen/forsvarsminister/27566735/
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;MILITÆRE STILLINGER.&quoute; Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://forsvaret.no/karriere/ledige-stillinger/milit%C3%A6re-stillinger
Comment: Over the last two years, the position of Chief of Defence, Chief of Intelligence Service and Chief of the National Operational Command have been announced publicly. The shortlists of applicants have also been disclosed publicly, or are about to be published (Operations Commander just recently announced).
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Requirements for promotion of lower ranks of personnel are given in the Military Personnel Handbook. There are also processes based on objective criteria for middle and higher ranks, although information on this for higher ranks is less available. Middle-rank appointments are decided by both the employer and labour unions, while higher-rank appointments are decided by the employer, with labour unions giving their opinion.
The promotion scheme is regulated by the Officer System of the Armed Forces. Until now, this has varied across parts of the Armed Forces, as Norway remains the only NATO force to have a unit command system. As of May 2015, the MoD is consulting on a unified officer system that would provide better clarity and transparency, as well as predictability and long-term career development in the promotions process (2).
Currently, there are no public sources implying that the promotions system is affected by any conflicts of interest or vulnerable to influences from outside the decision-making chain.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Forsvarets personellhåndbok - Del B Forvaltning av befal.&quoute; March 28 2012. http://bfo.no/images/uploads/dokumenter/Forsvarets_personellh%C3%A5ndbok_-_Del_B_Forvaltning_av_befal.pdf
2. Forsvaret. &quoute;Foreslår ny personellordning.&quoute; Last updated 16 January 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/ny-personellordning
3. Regjeringen. &quoute;Ny ordning for militært personell.&quoute; Last modified 12 January 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/aktuelt/ny-ordning-for-militart-personell/id2358865/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway has compulsory conscription. The Military Service Law §49 proscribes imprisonment from three months to two years for seeking to evade conscription in the military (this would include attempting to provide bribes in return for a waiver) or to obtain undue advantage thereto.
The Penal Code §388 proscribes a punishment of up to 10 years imprisonment for gross corruption, which can be distinguished from other crimes of corruption by, among other things, being carried out by a public official. The State Personnel Handbook 2015 provides guidelines for dealing with corruption by civil servants.
There is no current publicly available evidence suggesting that bribery does occur in conscription situations.
1. Military Service Act §49, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1953-07-17-29?q=verneplikt, accessed 25 August 2015.
2. Penal Code §388, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-05-20-28?q=straffelov, accessed 25 August 2015
3. State Personnel Handbook 2015 10.19, https://lovdata.no/dokument/SPH/sph-2015, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Norway has compulsory conscription. The Military Service Law §49 proscribes imprisonment from three months to two years for seeking to evade conscription in the military or to obtain undue advantage thereto, which could include attempting to obtain a preferred posting. The Penal Code §388 proscribes a sanction of up to 10 years imprisonment for gross corruption, which can be distinguished from other crimes of corruption by, among other things, being carried out by a public official. The State Personnel Handbook 2015 provides guidelines for dealing with corruption by civil servants.
There is no evidence suggesting that conscripts have attempted to bribe their way into preferred postings.
2. Penal Code §388, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1902-05-22-10, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is no evidence of ghost soldiers within the Norwegian armed forces. Numbers of military personnel are made public and the defence sector is audited by an independent Office of the Auditor General. Lack of evidence indicating shortcomings in timely payments and separate chains of command and payment (please see Q40 and Q46) also indicate very low likelihood that this phenomenon exists.
2. Forsvaret. &quoute;Mannskapsrapporten 2013.&quoute; Last accessed February 25 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Mannskapsrapport_2013.pdf
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Armed Forces payment is managed by the Department of Payroll Administration, which is separate from operational departments. In the Ministry, payroll is managed by the Department of Development and Administration. Chains of command are kept strictly separate from chains of payment within the organisational structure.
1. Rejeringen. &quoute;Avdeling for utvikling og administrasjon.&quoute; Last accessed March 2 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/organisering-og-ledelse/avdelinger/avdeling_for_utvikling_og_administrasjon/id1383/
2. Forsvaret. &quoute;ORGANISASJON.&quoute; Last accessed March 2 2015. http://forsvaret.no/fakta/organisasjon
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The &quoute;Ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector&quoute; cover bribery, gifts and hospitality and conflicts of interest in contact between defence and industry, including military and civilian personnel, in detail. A separate document, &quoute;Core Values of Norway's Defence Sector&quoute; broadly outlines ethical values. Together, these documents serve as equivalent to a Code of Conduct and are both available to the public. The Armed Forces and the the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency have published their own statements about ethical conduct (3,4).
The application of the Code can be overseen in an administrative manner - the Code details career-related consequences of breaches - or by way of criminal sanctions if a breach is also an offence. This provides an oversight mechanism.
1. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Core Values of Norway's Defence Sector.&quoute; Last accessed February 26 2015. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Core_values_of%20Norways_defence_sector.pdf
2. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector.&quoute; May 2011. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/ethical-guidelines-for-business-and-industry-in-the-defence-sector_2011_s-1001-e_web.pdf
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;Legitimitet&quoute;. Last updated 30 June 2015. https://forsvaret.no/fakta/historie-oppdrag-verdier/forsvarets-verdiar/legitimitet, accessed 25 August 2015.
4. Forsvarsbygg. &quoute;Vårt arbeid med etikk.&quoute; http://www.forsvarsbygg.no/Om-oss/Etikk-i-Forsvarsbygg/, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The &quoute;Ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector&quoute; were introduced in 2011 after the Siemens bribery scandal. As it is a guidelines document, an event of corruption would be a breach of the laws described in the document, and would most likely be prosecuted under the Penal Code. (1)
However, the document also explains potential career consequences and disciplinary actions under the Civil Servants Act, as well as the factors that go into deciding how a case will be dealt with. (1) Results of prosecutions are made available to the press upon request. (2)
A recent example involves the employee of the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation, who was charged with corruption in April 2015 in connection with the corruption in the sales of vessels to Nigerian paramilitaries. (3)
Score 3 has been selected as publication of the results of prosecution are not made public proactively.
1. Norwegian Royal Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ethical guidelines for contact with business and industry in the defence sector.&quoute; Last accessed February 27 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/ethical-guidelines-for-business-and-industry-in-the-defence-sector_2011_s-1001-e_web.pdf
3. Dagbladet. &quoute;Nå er han korrupsjonssiktet, men da han solgte båter til Nigeria ble han hyllet av toppene i departementet.&quoute; Last updated 27 April 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/04/27/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/eksportkontroll/38835043/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The 2009-12 Action Plan (2) identified 'knowledge and competence building' as one of its four main pillars. Since the 'target group' for the plan is described as the 20,000 employees and leaders in the Norwegian defence sector, it can be inferred that some form of training is applicable to all (pp6-7). The Plan further states that all leaders and employees should possess the knowledge enabling them to make correct decisions, and suggests that ethical training could be incorporated into existing fora such as courses and seminars (p11).
This has been confirmed within the vignette for an e-learning course and by the Norwegian government: all employees, particularly new ones, receive anti-corruption and leadership training, including an online course and a mandatory classroom session exploring leadership and ethical issues. (1, 4) The e-learning course on attitudes, ethics and leadership is compulsory for all personnel, covering five modules: business contacts, whistleblowing, leadership restructuring, bullying and collegial attitudes and cultural differences and diversity. (1) CIDS also continues to provide other courses on integrity building (3).
Defence sector employees are invited to a one-day seminar on topics related to attitudes, ethics and leadership; however, there is no requirement regarding the training being repeated at regular intervals or annually. (4) Score 3 has been selected to reflect training being given to all employees and combined with an opportunity to refresh it, but stopping short of a requirement for follow-up training occurring at least annually.
3. Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector. &quoute;Kurs.&quoute; http://sifs.no/?page_id=3688, accessed 25 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: It is policy for the names of persons tried and the outcomes of their trials to be made accessible to journalists upon request. It is at the discretion of journalists as to whether they choose to publish the names, however.
There are recent examples of such details being made public. In April 2015, a Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation employee was charged with corruption. In August 2015, the newspaper Dagbladet criticised the government for a delay in reporting further alleged corrupt activities by the employee to the police. The government countered that it wanted to wait until it was sure of the allegations. Additionally, in 2007, charges of corruption were brought against eight defence services personnel in the Siemens case, of which four cases were dropped and four were acquitted.
1. NRK. &quoute;Frifunne for korrupsjon.&quoute; Last modified July 3 2009. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.nrk.no/norge/frifunne-for-korrupsjon-1.6681989
2. E24. &quoute;Siemenssaken forvitrer.&quoute; Last modified December 17 2008. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/siemenssaken-forvitrer/2827668
3. Dagens Perspektiv. &quoute;Siemenssaken i oppløsning.&quoute; Last modified December 17 2008. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.dagensperspektiv.no/nyheter/etikk_og_samfunnsansvar/siemenssaken-i-opplosning-
4. Dagbladet. &quoute;Hadde forsvarsluksus på eget landsted.&quoute; Last modified 2 August 2015. http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/08/02/nyheter/nigeria-batene/forsvaret/sikkerhetspolitikk/forsvarspolitikk/40014819/, accessed 26 August 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Penal Code lists imprisonment as the punishment for corruption and gross corruption (§ 387 - 388). While it does not explicitly mention facilitation payments, its provisions have been construed as forbidding them, as long as the facilitation payment can be construed to aim at creating improper advantage. If this is the case, criminal sanctions apply. (4)
This interpretation was reinforced in a 2008 pamphlet issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirming that facilitation payments were considered a form of corruption and thus prohibited. (5)
The State Personnel Handbook 2015 10.19 gives guidelines for handling cases of corruption in the public sector. The Ethical Guidelines for Business and Industry in the Defence Sector make it clear that accepting gifts and hospitality, with the exception of gifts of negligible value or moderate dinners, is not acceptable conduct.
No evidence of the sanctions being either applied or not applied in justified cases was found.
1. Penal Code 2005, §387-388, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-05-20-28?q=straffelov
2. State Personnel Handbook 2015, 10.19, https://lovdata.no/dokument/SPH/sph-2015?q=Statens+personalh%C3%A5ndbok
3. The Ethical Guidelines for Business and Industry in the Defence Sector 2011, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/ethical-guidelines-for-business-and-industry-in-the-defence-sector_2011_s-1001-e_web.pdf
4. Transparency International Norway, 'Protect your business! Anti-corruption handbook for the Norwegian business sector', 2009. http://www.transparency.no/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/protect-your-business_handbook.pdf, accessed October 2015.
5. Anti-Corruption Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Norway', June 2011. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/jd/oecd_anti_bribery_report.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The new Joint Military Doctrine updated in 2014 includes guidance for commanders highlighting that, especially for missions in places characterised by weak state structures and a fragile civil society, it is important that military forces are demonstratively orderly in their interaction both with representatives of the state, private operators and other persons in authority other than the state (for example, clan and ethnic leaders).
The doctrine states that collaboration with stakeholders in the area of operation requires a clear ethical framework, as well as cultural and social understanding. It advises that the force should take care not to undermine its own operations by being used in local power struggles or be dragged into corruption. There is no detail given in the doctrine beyond this.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine 2014.&quoute; Last accessed February 26 2015. http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/224031/5/FFOD%202014.pdf
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: There is evidence of some training on issues of corruption on operations. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence enacted the Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2009-2012, which included leadership, ethical and dilemma training. The Action Plan points to operations as one of its three 'areas of impact' (p7) and stresses integrating of ethical issues into operations training, as well as sharing lessons identified between units (p6). The Plan also states that senior personnel have participated in training and discussion forums, but does not specify whether this includes all commanders or whether commanders are tested on their understanding of the issues.
The Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector has also delivered a seminar on the Building Integrity programme. CIDS also delivers a mandatory course on ethics and leadership for all new defence sector employees. (5) However, the five modules comprising this course do not include a module on the significance of corruption as a strategic issue on military operations.
Score 2 being selected does not reflect existence of cases of corruption being mishandled by commanders, as there is no evidence of such cases. However, it is not possible to ascertain that all commanders receive relevant training (i.e. tailored to operational conditions) and that they apply this knowledge in the field: while corruption has been recognised as a strategic issue in, for example, Norwegian-Afghan relations, as well as a reason why aid was cut (3), the Norwegian plan for Faryab province in Afghanistan does not mention corruption explicitly. (4) It is also not known whether training is detailed and comprehensive.
1. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2009-2012. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HEL_Handlingsplan2009-2012_EN_web.pdf
2. CIDS, &quoute;Building Integrity Course Catalogue&quoute;. January 2015. http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/NATO-Course-Catalogue-2015.pdf, accessed 26 August 2015.
3. Reuters, 'Norway cuts Afghan aid over violence against women, corruption', 4 October 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/04/us-norway-afghanistan-idUSBRE9930L920131004, accessed October 2015.
4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice and the Police, 'A strategy for comprehensive Norwegian civilian and military efforts in Faryab province, Afghanistan', May 2009. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Sikkerhetspol/faryab_strategy0906.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Comment: Through the military ethics module for predeployment training, military leaders and staff personnel are trained and made aware of unethical behaviour in operations.
CIDS training, in particular for the Joint Staff College, is focused on corruption issues in deployment. The same goes for CIDS contributions to NODEFIC courses.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership does place emphasis on ethics in training for international operations, but Norway does not deploy specialist personnel for corruption monitoring in defence operations.
The Norwegian government does have a good general understanding of the high risks of corruption in Afghanistan, where the Army is currently deployed. This awareness is primarily focussed on the risks external to the mission and how Norwegian financial aid could fall prey to corruption.
1. VG News. &quoute;Korrupsjon svekker norsk bistand i Afghanistan.&quoute; Last modified May 29 2009. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/afghanistan/korrupsjon-svekker-norsk-bistand-i-afghanistan/a/10053776/
Comment: Norway does not deploy specialist personnel for corruption monitoring in defence operations.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian MoD's Action Plan describes interaction with private actors as one of the fields that training and decision-making need to encompass (1). Training for international operations includes issues such as rules of engagement, humanitarian law, and codes of conduct (1, p9). Government representatives have confirmed that overall procurement regulations apply to contracting on operations as well, and that staff are trained in operational contracting as part of regular education programmes. (2)
Score 2 has been selected to reflect uncertainty re. now detailed and tailored to the operational context the guidelines are, as well as little public information on specific training programmes.
1. Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 'Action Plan on Attitudes, Ethics and Leadership 2009-2012.' http://cids.no/wp-content/uploads/pdf/HEL_Handlingsplan2009-2012_EN_web.pdf. Accessed 23 July 2015.
Comment: Since training complies with international standards and regulations, it also addresses corruption risks and unethical behaviour.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Private military contractors are employed principally to deliver training to the Norwegian Armed Forces and they are overall not frequently used.
In the event of corruption involving a PMC, the Norwegian penal code Art. 276a-c would apply: any PMC found guilty of corruption would no longer be able to deliver services to the Ministry of Defence. So far, no cases have emerged to test this.
Norway is signatory to the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), both of which lay out good practices and guidelines when it comes to employing PMCs. The Document stipulates that PMCs should be subject to the criminal laws of the country contracting them and the country on whose territory they are registered and operate. It stipulates that when hiring a PMC, the state employer should ensure that the PMC has not been involved in organised crime, bribery, and corruption, and that its staff are properly trained, which includes anti-corruption training. The Document further encourages employing states to ensure that PMCs have policies against corruption. (3)However, the provisions of the Document are not legally binding, although the International Code of Conduct Association assesses PMCs' suitability to join the Code and audits their performance. (4) It is, however, unclear to what extent this is effective, particularly as standards are still being formulated. (5) According to correspondence with government representatives (3), standards applying to contractors would be equivalent to those applied to the armed forces.
1. Christian Kjelstrup. &quoute;NATO and Private Military Contractors: Different approaches, and challenges to internal cohesion and solidarity.&quoute; Master's Thesis, University of Oslo 2011. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13142/Kjelstrupx2011x_Master.pdf?sequence=1
2. Norwegian Penal Code Article 276 a,b,c, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-05-20-28?q=straffelov
3. Regulations on Public Procurement §11.10, §20.12 (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2006-04-07-402)
4. Regulations on Defence and Security Procurement, §11.12 (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2013-10-04-1185)
5. 'Letter dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General' (The Montreux Document), 6 October 2008. https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/Montreux-document-4_en.pdf, accessed October 2015.
6. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 'Regulating Private Military and Security Companies. The Montreux Document and The International Code of Conduct', 2015. https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20150506-regulating-private-military-security-companies_EN.pdf, accessed October 2015.
7. International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) Board Meeting (Call) - Minutes. 27 July 2015. http://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/Minutes%2027%20July%202015%20Board%20Meeting.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Legislation covering defence and security procurement is well-established, but was revised, taking effect in 2014, in accordance with the European Economic Area Agreement on Public Procurement, particularly with regard to Article 123 on the exemption of procurements from the agreement due to essential security interests. Defence and security procurement is broadly divided into three categories: procurement that may be exempted under Article 123 is regulated by the Defence Acquisition Regulations, defence and security procurement that cannot be exempted is regulated by the Regulations on Defence and Security Procurement, and all other procurement processes are regulated by the Public Procurement Act and Regulations.
The Public Procurement Regulations and the Regulations on Defence and Security Procurement both contain anti-corruption provisions: they stipulate that offers from companies convicted of corruption shall be rejected. Under the Defence Acquisition Regulations, it is stated that defence sector employees who commit corruption are subject to Article 276 a-c of the Penal Code (§2.13) and that defence sector employees have, as in the Working Environment Act §2.4, the right to report corrupt activities (§2.18). It also commits the defence sector to take measures to prevent corruption (§3.2).
1. Public Procurement Act (https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1999-07-16-69)
2. Public Procurement Regulations (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2006-04-07-402)
3. Defence Acquisition Regulations (https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411)
4. Regulations on Defence and Security Procurement (https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2013-10-04-1185)
5. FSI. &quoute;Nytt regelverk for forsvarsanskaffelser trer i kraft 1. januar 2014.&quoute; Last accessed February 27 2015. http://www.fsi.no/nyheter/aktuelle-saker/nytt-regel/
6. KPMG. &quoute;Avsluttet høring vedrørende forslag til ny forskrift om forsvars- og sikkerhetsanskaffelser.&quoute; Last modified January 22 2013. http://www.kpmglaw.no/artikkel/avsluttet-horing-vedrorende-forslag-til-ny-forskrift-om-forsvars-og-sikkerhetsanskaffelser
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The procurement cycle methodology and project management is disclosed on the Armed Forces &quoute;Prinsix&quoute; website, which summarises how the military conducts its investments. (1, 2)
While detail on some aspects of the process (for example asset disposals) might not be available, the entirety of the process and how it is conducted is publicly available.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Prinsix.&quoute; Last accessed March 3 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/Sider/default.aspx
2. Interview with Source 3: Industry representative, 3 March 2015, by phone
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: According to an industry representative, there is internal auditing of defence procurements and external auditing by the Office of the Auditor General. Internal auditing is used as a management tool in the MoD and its results are not published, whereas the summaries of the OAG's independent external audits are made public. The Standing Committee for Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs is responsible for reviewing reports from the Office of the Auditor General in the Parliament. All audits span changes in governments and politics.
In October 2014, the OAG identified serious problems that had been previously raised and which it felt had not been acted upon. In particular, this included inadequate financial management and internal control over the Air Force's purchases of training and education for simulator training abroad, violations of public procurement regulations regarding illegal direct purchases from suppliers over a period of 15 years, and security issues with the SAP system for accounting, payroll and material management, specifically missing routines and an excess of admin users.
In its audits, the OAG does evaluate whether previous findings have been taken into account. A review of OAG reports about the MoD reveals that government responsiveness to OAG findings is seen by the OAG to be mixed. (2)
2. Interview with Source 3: Industry representative, 3 March 2015, by phone.
3. Regjeringen. &quoute;Internrevisjon.&quoute; Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/organisering-og-ledelse/avdelinger/controllerenhet/id85707/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The government publishes &quoute;Future Acquisitions in the Norwegian Armed Forces&quoute;, detailing potential defence purchases in the next 5 to 10 years. This was last published in March 2014 with a publication planned for 2015.
Tenders below 500 000 NOK are published openly on the Doffin database for public procurement and above 500 000 NOK on the EU Tenders Electronic Daily website. However, the extent of audit verification of the data (and whether all items that should be disclosed, are) is unclear.
1. Anskaffelser. &quoute;How to find tender opportunities.&quoute; Last modified November 28 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.anskaffelser.no/verktoy/how-find-tender-opportunities
2. DOFFIN Database for Public Procurement. Last accessed March 2 3015. https://www.doffin.no/en/Notice
3. EU Tenders Electronic Daily. Last accessed March 3 2015. http://ted.europa.eu/TED/main/HomePage.do
4. Forsvaret. &quoute;Future acquisitions for the Norwegian Armed Forces 2011-2019&quoute;. March 2014. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/temadokumenter/acquisitions-2014-2022_mars-2014.pdf, accessed 26 August 2015.
Comment: Only the MoD has authority to determine whether potential defence purchases are made public or not.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Companies bidding for defence work are required to state if they, their employees, or others associated with the business have been convicted of corruption. Para 3-2 of the Procurement Regulations for the Defence Sector also requires that for contracts above a certain value, companies need to put in place corruption prevention measures such as internal control, ethical guidelines, and/or internal reporting channels.
Provision 1.9.2.5 of the Procurement Regulations for the Defence Sector also prohibits the defence sector from contracting companies that are guilty of criminal offences or serious misconduct against professional and ethical standards. Other requirements for bidders are listed in Chapter 36 of the regulations, which detail the need for financial solvency, etc.
1. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ethical Statement for Suppliers to the Royal Norwegian MInistry of Defence with Underlying Agencies.&quoute; https://lovdata.no/static/INS/sf-20131025-1411-05-01.pdf?timestamp=0. Last accessed February 26 2015.
2. Anskaffelsesregelverk for forsvarssektoren (ARF), 1.9.2.5, last updated 25 October 2013. https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411, last accessed 26 August 2015.
Comment: The revised Norwegian Acquisiton Regulations for the defence sector are still being implemented; they have provisions for better control of subcontractors. However, they do not place a requirement on companies to show that they have a formal compliance programme in place.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian Armed Forces prepare concept papers for long-term planning and investment available online, and clearly link this to investment management and procurement within an established methodology. The methodology linking each part of the procurement process is available on the Prinsix website, and the entire process is subject to government audits, although there have been criticisms on that front.
The government also published a report on building a strategic relationship with industry partners in the defence sector. The last criticism that the OAG published on planning was in 2011, when it criticised inefficient management and planning, and strategy changes resulting in unexpected costs; this was not related to corruption, however. Beyond this example, there is no evidence to suggest that procurement which is external or superfluous to this needs-based national strategy occurs.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Konsept for fremskaffelse av materielle kapasiteter i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last accessed March 3 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/investeringskonsept/documents/investeringskonsept.pdf
2. Regjeringen (Norwegian Government). &quoute;St.meld. nr. 38 (2006-2007) Forsvaret og industrien – strategiske partnere — Strategi for de næringspolitiske aspekter ved Forsvarets anskaffelser.&quoute; Last accessed March 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-38-2006-2007-/id475469/?docId=STM200620070038000DDDEPIS&ch=1&q=
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse om effektivitet i planlegging og styring av felles forvaltningssystemer i Forsvaret.&quoute; Last modified 18 April 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/Dokumentbase_Dok_3_7_2002_2003.aspx
4. Prinsix. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/Sider/default.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Armed Forces Prinsix website clearly defines the methodology for the procurement cycle and for identifying the requirements. This also includes resource planning, which is used to established the appropriate type and quantity of a procurement to be able to conduct an activity. As discussed in Q62, there is no evidence to suggest that procurement happens outside of this national strategy methodology. Future purchases are published in advance in a prospectus.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Ressursplanlegging.&quoute; Last modified August 5 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/prosjektteori/prosjektledelse/tidsstyring/Sider/Ressursplanlegging.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Defence Acquisition Regulations (ARF) state that procurement should be carried out as far as possible on the basis of open competition: paragraph 1-4 in the ARF state any procurement will follow the General Procurement Directive or the Defence and Security Procurement Directive (FOSA) which means full and open competition. It also gives conditions under which procurement processes can be exempted from open competition, e.g. when only one supplier can meet the procurement needs, if a rapid procurement is required due to unforeseen needs, or if essential national security reasons justify deviations from the procedure (this is in accordance with EEA procedures). The Public Procurement Regulations have equivalent rules on open competition and single sourcing. Exceptions need to be justified by the contracting authority. (2,3)
It is not known what proportion of procurements are single-sourced. However, in 2011 the Office of the Auditor General has found that of a sample of 98 procurements audited, 60 had been single-sourced, and of these only nine had the required documentation to be justified as single-source. While this report was detailed, it is important to note that such close scrutiny does not occur regularly: while general reports are published regularly, this report is an example of occasional and irregular OAG reports which make public details surrounding particular aspects of governance. (1)
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score changed to 1 following your suggestion and to reflect the principle of open competition in legislation and available evidence suggesting that around 2/3 of procurement tends to be single-sourced (it was not possible to conclusively verify this number).
RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: Agree. Score changed to 1 and information incorporated.
1. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av intern kontroll i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last modified July 7 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/forsvarssektoren.aspx
2. Defence Acquisition Regulations, §33-1, §34-2, https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411/*#KAPITTEL_2
3. Public Procurement Regulations, §3-1, §14-4, https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2006-04-07-402?q=anskaffelser
Comment: The Norwegian procurement regime is in line with European standards and practice. As a nation with a relatively small defence industry, we are largely dependent upon imports, which constitute some 70% of defence procurement annually.
Comment: A report by the Office of the Auditor General found that of a sample of 98 procurements audited, 60 had been single-sourced, and of these only nine had the required documentation to be justified as single-source. While this report was detailed, it is important to note that such close scrutiny does not occur regularly- while general reports are published regularly, this report is an example of occasional and irregular OAG reports which make public details surrounding particular aspects of governance.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Procurement regulations stipulate that procurement should be competitive, except for pre-defined exemptions.Tender boards are used in competitive procurement.
Procurement decisions can be audited by the Office of the Auditor General if deemed necessary (eg. as part of a sample). The results of the audits are published and seen as independent.
The primary mechanism for checking the decisions of tender boards appears to be the activity of the Complaints Board for Public Procurement following a complaint by a party to the procurement process, although the Board only gives advisory opinions that are not enforceable by law. Tender boards, as all parts of procurement, are bound by the Defence Acquisition Regulations and the Public Procurement Regulations, as well as Ethical Guidelines for Contact with Business and Industry in the Defence Sector, all of which are openly published.
Score 3 was selected as regularity of audits could not be established.
1. Visma. &quoute;How to tender and win contracts with Norwegian public authorities.&quoute; Last modified December 12 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://blog.visma.com/tender-win-contracts-norwegian-public-authorities
2. Norwegian Complaints Board for Public Procurement. &quoute;The Norwegian Complaints Board for Public Procurement.&quoute; Last modified February 9 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.kofa.no/no/English/
3. Riksrevisjonen. &quoute;Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av intern kontroll i forsvarssektoren.&quoute; Last modified June 7 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter/Sider/forsvarssektoren.aspx
4. Ethical Guidelines for Contact with Business and Industry in the Defence Sector, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/ethical-guidelines-for-business-and-industry-in-the-defence-sector_2011_s-1001-e_web.pdf
5. Defence Acquisition Regulations (ARF), https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411/*#*
6. Public Procurement Regulations, https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2006-04-07-402?q=anskaffelser
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Competition Law prohibits collusion and agreements between parties to hinder competition, punishable by fines or imprisonment of up to three years. This is extended to up to six years for particularly serious cases. (2, 4) The Penal Code provides for companies, as well as individuals, to be criminally liable (3, 4). It also proscribes punishments for corruption for individuals (Article 276 a-c of the Penal Code (§2.13).
Provision 1.9.2.5 of the Procurement Regulations for the Defence Sector prohibits the defence sector from contracting companies that have been found guilty of criminal offences or serious misconduct against professional and ethical standards (which includes collusion). Other requirements for bidders are listed in Chapter 36 of the regulations, which detail the need for financial solvency, etc.
The Norwegian Competition Authority has issued a checklist to help public procurement managers prevent and recognise collusion in bidding processes. (1) There is no evidence of cases of collusion, or suspected collusion within the defence sector; there is, however, evidence of sanctions being applied in another sector. (6)
1. Konkurranse Tilsynet. &quoute;Unngå anbudssamarbeid ved offentlige anskaffelser.&quoute; Last modified February 10 2009. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/Aktuelt/Nyheter/-Unnga-anbudssamarbeid-ved-offentlige-anskaffelser/
2. Law on competition between undertakings and control of concentrations between undertakings (competition law), §30, konkurranse
3. Penal Code, Chapter 3a, $48 a-b, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-05-20-28?q=straffelov
4. Økokrim. &quoute;Konkurranse.&quoute; Last modified January 13 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.okokrim.no/konkurranse
6. Competition Authority, 'Large fines for Veidekke and NCC', 5 March 2013. http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/news/archive/Large-fines-for-Veidekke-and-NCC/, accessed October 2015.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Training, comprising both e-learning and in-person seminars, is mandatory for project managers. Although it is not mandatory to take the exams that follow training, the title of &quoute;Project Manager in the Military&quoute; can only be earned by successfully passing the course exams. This covers the cycle of the Prinsix project management system including operational management of the project after the contract has been signed, and ensuring that defence contractors meet obligations on reporting and delivery. This is managed principally by the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation, who are the project managers at the acquisition stage.
There is no evidence to suggest that the department is under-resourced; nor is there any suggestion of undue influence on this issue from higher grades within the organisation. No recent reports of specific shortcomings have been identified.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Om programmet.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/utdanning/kursinformasjon/Sider/kursinformasjon.aspx
2. Forsvaret. &quoute;Eierstyring i prosjekter i Forsvaret.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/utdanning/kursinformasjon/Sider/Prosjekteierstyring-og-investeringsstyring-.aspx
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;Roller og ansvar.&quoute; Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/investeringskonsept/Sider/roller-og-ansvar.aspx
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: After a bidder has been notified of the award of a contract, there is a mandatory waiting period until the contract can be signed, in order to give other bidders the opportunity to appeal the decision. If a contractor decides to appeal, the award process is automatically temporarily suspended until a court decides that there are insufficient grounds to further suspend the procurement. This change was transposed into Norwegian law from EU Directive 2007/66/EC.
Complaints can be made to the Complaints Board for Public Procurement, which investigates the complaint, makes a conclusion and publishes the conclusion on its website. This conclusion is an advisory opinion and not legally binding. As of May 2015, the Complaints Board has one complaint open against the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation with regard to an illegal single source procurement of military vehicles. In 2015, the Complaints Board resolved 4 cases against the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency, two of which were thrown out and two of which were found not to have constituted a breach of procurement rules. In 2014, it resolved two cases against the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation, one of which it was cleared of, and in the other case was found to have provided conflicting information in the tender. It resolved a further case against the Norwegian Defence Estate Agents, who it found to have provided documents not suitable for a tender. Civil cases may also be tried before courts of law.
Non-discrimination is a principle of Norwegian public procurement. There is no explicit reference to non-discrimination against suppliers who have made complaints, but the Defence Acquisition Regulations require procurement decisions to be based on non-discriminatory criteria as much as possible. No evidence of discrimination against companies based on past complaints has been found.
1. Hjort. &quoute;Vunnet anbud - konkurrenten klager - hva med beredskapen?.&quoute; Last modified October 30 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.hjort.no/fagartikkel285?b=true
2. Hjort. &quoute;Nye håndhevelsesregler for brudd på anskaffelsesregelverket.&quoute; Last modified April 7 2012. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.hjort.no/nye-handhevelsesregler-for-brudd-pa-anskaffelsesregelverket
3. Klagenemnda for offentlige anskaffelser. &quoute;Hvem kan klage?&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://www.kofa.no/en/Levere-klage/For-du-klager/Hvem-kan-klage/
4. Defence Acquisition Regulations, §33-1, https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411/*#KAPITTEL_2
5. Regjeringen. &quoute;Veileder til reglene om offentlige anskaffelser.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fad/vedlegg/konkurransepolitikk/anskaffelser/veileder_reglene_offentlige_anskaffelser_komp.pdf
6. EU Directive 2007/66/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:335:0031:0046:en:PDF
7. KOFA. &quoute;2014/86 Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon.&quoute; Last modified 25 August 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.kofa.no/no/Innkomne-saker/201486/
8. KOFA. &quoute;Avgjorte saker.&quoute; Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.kofa.no/no/Avgjorte-saker/
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Norwegian Penal Code applies a sentence of a fine or imprisonment for corruption and gross corruption. A company found guilty of corruption can no longer bid for government work, according to procurement regulations: provision 1.9.2.5 of the Procurement Regulations for the Defence Sector prohibits the defence sector from contracting companies that have been found guilty of criminal offences or serious misconduct against professional and ethical standards. Other requirements for bidders are listed in Chapter 36 of the regulations, which detail the need for financial solvency, etc.
The Ministry of Defence has been criticised for opening a procurement with Rheinmetall Man, which could be perceived to be a successor of a company that had been recently found guilty of corruption outside of Norway. While it appears that there were doubts as to the continuity between the enterprise bidding for contracts and that convicted of corruption, the case suggests that the regulations might need to be made more robust. (2, 3)
1. Dagens Naeringsliv. &quoute;Forlanger svar fra Forsvaret.&quoute; Last modified 9 July 2014. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.dn.no/nyheter/2014/06/09/Industri/forlanger-svar-fra-forsvaret
2. Penal Code, §276 a-c, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-05-20-28?q=straffelov
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: Offsets are administered under Industry Partnerships or Repurchase by the Ministry of Defence. They are regulated by Chapter 42 of the Defence Acquisition Regulations and the Regulations on Industrial Cooperation Related to Defence Acquisition from Abroad.
Although these do impose an obligation to report on an annual basis, they do not impose any requirements regarding due diligence or auditing, which suggests that their effectiveness is limited.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The offset documents do not impose any due diligence or auditing requirements - which is not to say that due diligence or auditing does not take place on a case-by-case basis. However, this could not be verified. However, score 1 was selected to reflect the influence of general contract law on offset contracts.
1. Defence Acquisition Regulations, Chapter 42, https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411?q=anskaffelser+forsvaret
2. Regjeringen. &quoute;Regulations on Industrial Co-operation Related to Defence Acquisition from Abroad.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/reglement/gjenkjoepsbestemmelser_14mars2008_engelsk.pdf
3. Regjeringen. &quoute;Industrielt samarbeid.&quoute; Last modified July 2 2012. Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/tema/forsvar/forsvarsindustri/industrielt-samarbeid/id528526/
4. Forsvaret. &quoute;Industrisamarbeidsavtaler.&quoute; Last modified February 26 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://forsvaret.no/Industri/Industrielle-samarbeidsavtaler
5. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 'Ongoing Industrial Cooperation in Defence', February 2015, https://forsvaret.no/ForsvaretDocuments/L%C3%B8pende%20industrisamarbeidsavtaler_050215.pdf, accessed 23 July 2015.
Comment: It is inaccurate to assert that there is no due diligence or auditing on offset contracts. Offset contracts are in principle subject to the same scrutiny as other contracts.
Moreover, there is a new White Paper on the partnership between the armed forces and the defence industry being presented in the autumn, that will also address the offset regime. It will likely call for some changes including involvement of internal audit and risk assessments and revision of plans.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Regulations on Industrial Co-operation Related to Defence Acquisition from Abroad stipulate that Industrial Cooperation Agreements are exempted from public disclosure. However, the value of the agreement, remaining obligations and supplier's name can be published. This is published in a regularly-updated list on the internet by the Armed Forces.
This is in conformity with the regulations on offsets, which state that as a rule, they are exempted form public disclosure in accordance with the Public Information Act but the value of the agreement, the remaining obligations, and supplier's name are normally regarded as information subject to public disclosure.
1. Forsvaret. &quoute;Forsvarets løpende Industrisamarbeidsavtaler.&quoute; Last modified February 5 2015. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://forsvaret.no/ForsvaretDocuments/L%C3%B8pende%20industrisamarbeidsavtaler_050215.pdf
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The regulations detailing the procedure for offset procurement do not include any explicit rules on competitive processes. Norway subscribes to the European Defence Agency Code of Conduct on Offsets, which, while not binding, aims to reduce the use of offsets and states that &quoute;When used as a criterion for tenderer selection or award of contract, offsets will be considered of a less significant weight (or used as a subsidiary criteria in case of offers with the same weight)&quoute;.
In the Guidelines for Establishing and Implementing Offset in connection with Procurement of Defence Material from Foreign Suppliers, whether or not a competitive industry already exists in Norway is considered in whether or not to implement the offset. If direct industrial cooperation takes place, the regulations state that the Norwegian company must be competitive in order for the offset to be approved.
1. European Defence Agency. &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offsets.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf
2. European Defence Agency. &quoute;25 EU Member States and Norway to Take Part in the Code of Conduct on Offsets.&quoute; Last modified May 4 2009. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/EDA_-_25_EU_Member_States_and_Norway_to_Take_Part_in_the_Code_of_Conduct_on_Offsets.pdf
3. Forsvaret. &quoute;Guidelines for Establishing and Implementing Offset in connection with Procurement of Defence Material from Foreign Suppliers.&quoute; Last accessed March 4 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/.../procurement_form_5007_korrigert.doc
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The use of agents and intermediaries by companies in the procurement cycle is common: local agents set up meetings with defence procurement staff, provide information and support the bidding process (Interview with Source 3). However, the Defence Acquisition Regulations, para 36-3, state that the defence sector should not contract with agents. There is no evidence of further controls and given the use of agents is common in defence procurement, this does not appear to be enforced.
1. Defence Acquisition Regulations, 2013. https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411/*#KAPITTEL_5
2. Interview with Source 3: Industry representative, 3 March 2015, by phone, and 7 September 2015, by phone
3. Procurement Regulations for the Armed Forces, part I, para. 1.9.2.3, https://lovdata.no/dokument/LTI/forskrift/2004-09-01-1270/KAPITTEL_2#KAPITTEL_2
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Defence Acquisition Regulations are subject to the Freedom of Information Act, so individuals may request and receive information on details of procurement actions with the exception of information that is confidential for business reasons. According to an interview source, information is never released prior to the contract being signed, as per normal procedure in procurement contract negotiations.
1. Defence Acquisition Regulations, §2-3, 2-8, 5-13, https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2013-10-25-1411/*#*
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: The Defence Acquisition Regulations do not state that the contractor should adopt anti-corruption programmes. The Ethical Statement for Suppliers to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence does not require this either. The Ethical Statement, however, does stipulate that the contractor should confirm that persons associated with it have not been convicted of corruption.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Para 3.1 does not appear to specifically address corruption risk. Para 3.2 requires contractors to implement measures against corruption risk but does not make mention of subsidiaries and subcontractors. However, as these regulations are binding for companies participating in the tender and as contractors are encouraged to confirm that associated persons have not been convicted of corruption, score has been raised to 1.
1. Defence Acquisition Regulations (https://lovdata.no/dokument/LTI/forskrift/2008-03-13-317/*#*)
2. Lovdata. &quoute;ETHICAL STATEMENT FOR SUPPLIERS TO THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE WITH UNDERLYING AGENCIES.&quoute; Last accessed 10 May 2015. https://lovdata.no/static/INS/sf-20131025-1411-05-01.pdf
Comment: The revised Norwegian Acquisition Regulations for defence sector include an entire chapter on ethical trade and social responsibility. Para 3.1 calls for fundamental requirements for ethical trade and social responsibility, whilst para 3.2 aims at preventing corruption, and conditions that the supplier has implemented measures or installed systems which will prevent corruption and unlawful influence.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer3857: An acquisition must be based on an identified military need based on capability and structured planning. However, the Wikleaks leak of US diplomatic cables in 2010 revealed that Norway was subject to an aggressive lobbying campaign from the United States to purchase the F-35 fighter jet. National media accused the Defence Minister at the time of favouring the American bid and communicating positive messages to the US privately during the tendering process. The Norwegian government maintains that the tender was awarded purely on a cost performance criteria basis.
1. Prinsix. &quoute;Kapabilitets- og strukturplanlegging.&quoute; Last modified August 18 2011. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://prinsix.forsvaret.no/investeringsstyring/kapasitet-og-strukturplan/Sider/kapasitet-og-strukturplan.aspx
2. The Foreigner. &quoute;Norway's F-35 purchases: Fact or fiddle?&quoute; Last modified December 6 2010. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://theforeigner.no/pages/news/norways-f-35-purchases-fact-or-fiddle/
3. The Local Sweden. &quoute;Sweden 'tricked' in failed Norway Gripen bid.&quoute; Last modified December 3 2010. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.thelocal.se/20101203/30584
4. Aftonbladet. &quoute;Här blir vi blåsta.&quoute; Last modified December 3 2010. Last accessed 10 May 2015. http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article12688841.ab