text:
BlogNews
CITY GIRL: Women's achievements are conveniently ignored
By CITY GIRL March 9th, 2018 3 min read
Kenyan environmental, political activist and Nobel laureate the late Prof Wangari Maathai. FILE PHOTO
When, in 1971, Wangari Maathai received her PhD from the University College of Nairobi (now University of Nairobi), she became the first woman in East and Central Africa to receive a doctorate.
In her book, Unbowed: A memoir, Prof Maathai says at the time, nobody cared about her achievement.
Here is why Wangari Maathai tree was cut down – PHOTOS
Uhuru the most 'loved' public figure by Kenyan women, study shows
No plans to build five-star hotel in Karura forest, says official
It's official, Limuru road to be named after Maathai
"I was the first woman in East and Central Africa to receiver a doctoral degree – a significant achievement that went largely unnoticed. It didn't even make the media headlines, probably because I was not the president, or his daughter, and my husband wasn't famous. It is funny how such things can be conveniently ignored," she says.
Prof Maathai's significant achievement might have been ignored 47 years ago, but I can confidently say things have not yet changed, particularly in this country.
Actually, I also need to mention that even after Prof Maathai was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, it didn't occur to the administration that she deserved the promotion from an assistant minister to a "full Cabinet minister".
But then again, since when did we recognise women for their work?
Kenyan women – and women in general – and their achievements are still conveniently ignored by a society that still has a problem with fully embracing high-achieving women.
DOWNPLAY ACHIEVEMENTS
The reductionist approach with which we still treat women today is not just appalling but quite sad, given how hard women work to get to the top or achieve anything worthwhile.
Women generally work twice as hard to get half of what men have, yet our society has been conditioned to reduce the achievements of women to mere footnotes in history.
We have this philosophy to thank for women downplaying their achievements and keeping quiet about their accomplishments so that they are not seen to be "bragging", yet we encourage boys from a tender age to speak out about their achievements as we punish girls for the same.
As I was conducting research for a feature story, I stumbled on a TV story about Kenya's first female architect, Ms Aida Njeri Munano, now the Principal Secretary for Urban Planning and Housing. I am sure only a few of you know this great woman who opened the door for many other great female architects.
As she was listing her accolades on TV, she stopped midway and said: "I am sounding like I am blowing my own trumpet…" after which she went on to say something else.
Now, when you are in a room full of men, you will not lack one or two egotistical, self-aggrandising ones blowing their own trumpets; listing their accolades and exaggerating their capabilities. There will always be that braggart who talks about how company X cannot do without him and his fantastic ideas, and how valued he is in company Y.
GREAT AND SUCCESSFUL
Men will rarely allow you to forget their achievements and successful projects (which earned millions, by the way) and if a man happens to be the first-ever person to accomplish something, you will not hear the last of it.
Men will brag about even the simplest of things – such as merely shaking the hand of a great man; they will even mount photos on their office walls, post them on Facebook timelines and use them as their social media profile pictures.
Rarely will a woman brag about her achievements or remind you of her accolades. Women are more likely to hide their successes because society has conditioned them that way, lest they are seen as show-offs. If a woman stands before a crowd and lists her achievements, as she rightly should, chances are that she will be branded arrogant, while the same behaviour is rewarded for men who are branded as simply "confident".
Success for women becomes like an albatross which they must carry around their necks, because society shames those who went against the grain to become great and successful.
Let us be honest; we only truly celebrated Prof Maathai when the international community showed some interest in her, otherwise she was just another woman. Right?
Well, I am not asking us to recognise women. Such change of mind-set may never happen in my lifetime. All I am saying is that the constant overlooking of the achievements of women is costing us more than we can imagine. Women have so much to offer, if only they were given a chance to showcase their potential.
Mukaru Ng'ang'a family awarded Sh15m for late...
Reckless Umoinner driver crushed my skull and ruined my life


text:
Kasper Winther Jørgensen (Copenhague, 21 de março de 1985) é um remador dinamarquês, medalhista olímpico.

Carreira
Winther Jørgensen competiu nos Jogos Olímpicos de 2012 e 2016. Em Londres integrou a equipe da Dinamarca do quatro sem peso leve que obteve a medalha de bronze. Quatro anos depois conquistou a medalha de prata na mesma prova, no Rio de Janeiro.

Naturais de Copenhague
Remadores olímpicos da Dinamarca
Medalhistas olímpicos da Dinamarca
Remadores nos Jogos Olímpicos de Verão de 2012
Remadores nos Jogos Olímpicos de Verão de 2016
Medalhistas nos Jogos Olímpicos de Verão de 2012
Medalhistas nos Jogos Olímpicos de Verão de 2016
Medalhistas olímpicos do remo

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Haute Hong Kong Hotels
Posted by Leah Walker | Destinations, Featured |
There's no shortage of luxury anything in Hong Kong. It's a place where Bentleys and Rolls Royces sit in traffic next to Ferraris and Lamborghinis. Multiple outlets of Cartier, Prada, Gucci and every other major luxury brands dot the city. Hong Kong has plenty of fine dining options, boasting 62 Michelin-starred restaurants, second only to Paris. Thus, it should come as no surprise that over 20 five-star hotels also exist in the city. With so many luxury choices, how does one choose?
Located in the Central district overlooking Victoria Harbour, the Hong Kong-Mandarin Oriental celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2013, solidifying the storied hotel as a perennial five-star favorite.
Decorated in a contemporary style with a nod to its Oriental legacy, the Mandarin Oriental's 501 rooms and suites serve as a refuge in the bustling city. Linen sheets, Hermes bath products and a pillow menu are lovely, but room extras like the pass-through valet boxes are a novel and practical touch for guests who require the upmost privacy.
Not just a hotel, the Mandarin Oriental is a culinary destination for visitors and locals alike. Ten restaurants and bars are located in the hotel, including Michelin-starred restaurants, Pierre, Mandarin Grill + Bar and Man Wah. The Krug Room, created in conjunction with Krug Champagne, was designed with a train carriage in mind, giving diners an intimate experience. There is no menu. Instead, the 10-14 courses are created by chef Uwe Opocensky and paired with Krug Champagne, the largest collection outside of France.
The Captain's Bar is a must for its inviting atmosphere and the unique collection of engraved silver tankards—regulars eventually are gifted their own, which is then kept in the bar for future visits. The Chinnery, a classic British-style pub, didn't allow women to enter until 1990 and boasts over 120 types of whiskey.
Both male and female spa devotees will find bliss at the Spa of the Orient. With a design that harkens back to 1930s Shanghai, the spa features eight treatment rooms, an indoor pool, tea lounge and Hong Kong's first Kneipp pool, which stimulates the feet and lower legs with pebbles. Therapists specialize in ancient Chinese techniques and offer Traditional Chinese Medicine consultations.
The Mandarin Salon tends to ladies' coifs and also offers the world-famous Shanghainese Pedicure by Samuel So. Gentlemen are attended to in the Mandarin Barber. In traditional barber's chairs, clients indulge in straightedge shaves and haircuts, while massages, waxing and facials are performed in private treatment rooms for the upmost discretion.
Given the hotel's proximity to the city's most popular destinations, impeccable service and recent $140 million room-by-room makeover, the flagship Mandarin Oriental will continue serving discerning tastes in Hong Kong for years to come.
Though not the biggest or most well known hotel in Hong Kong, The Luxe Manor is certainly the most unique. A member of Small Luxury Hotels of the World, The Luxe Manor is kooky in the best kind of way. Winning several design awards, the hotel is Alice in Wonderland meets Salvador Dali. Located in the Tsim Sha Tsui district on the island of Kowloon, The Luxe Manor keeps with the vibe of the bustling shopping and dining area.
A bold palate of red and black, along with a mix of classical and whimsical décor, greet guests in the lobby. Eyes dart from the mosaics on the floor to the damask mirrored walls to the Merino glass chandeliers. The imaginative design feels like a scene from a Tim Burton film.
Delightful are the standard rooms, but it's the six uniquely themed suites that are exceptional. They're for the guests who like their luxury with a lot of personality. The Nordic suite is decorated in a palate of white and light blue, with mirrored and acrylic furniture that mimics the look of ice. Four door handles and only one that works is just one of the eccentric design elements of the Mirage suite. Apply named, nothing is quite what it seems. The Royale suite is perfect for the would-be rock star. Decorating with glittered carpets, red velvet sofas and zebra print rugs requires gumption, and The Luxe Manor certainly has that.
Located in the hotel, FINDS, is the only Scandinavian restaurant in Hong Kong. For a bit from each of the five countries, request chef Jaakko Sorsa's Nordic Express Menu. It's a 2.5-hour gastronomic journey complete with a custom-made map of the region, table setting from Finnish brand, Iittala and stories of chef Jaakko's Finland home. The pre-fixe meal includes six amuses and six courses inspired by Finland, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. After dinner, a drink at Dada is a must for Dali lovers. The surrealist atmosphere will leave patrons feeling as if they've been sipping on a bit of mind-altering absinth.
In a city filled with luxury options, Four Seasons is among the best. Found in the International Finance Centre, Four Seasons is perched on the doorstep of the best luxury shopping and fine dining in Hong Kong's Central district. And with numerous world-class companies surrounding the hotel, the lobby serves as the gathering place for the city's elite.
Keeping with Hong Kong's East meets West moniker, rooms and suites are designed in either a modern Western or contemporary Chinese style and feature wall-to-wall windows that frame views of Victoria Peak, Kowloon or Victoria Harbour. Each of the 399 rooms are well appointed and typically Four Seasons luxury.
Epicures will be delighted with the dining choices at Four Seasons. Caprice, a two-star Michelin restaurant, serves contemporary French cuisine with ingredients brought in daily from France. A vast collection of wine from France and other top wine producing regions provides diners with a wealth of options from world-renowned wineries. An impressive menu of artisanal French cheeses is kept in Hong Kong's first cheese cellar. As the first Chinese restaurant to ever be awarded Michelin's three-star rating, Lung King Heen specializes in authentic Cantonese cuisine, including dim sum and seafood. Chef Chan Yan-Tak is the benchmark for excellent Chinese food not only in Hong Kong, but the world.
City hotel pools are often lackluster, but the at Four Seasons Hong Kong that's far from the case. Sitting atop prime real estate overlooking Victoria Harbour, guests have not one, but four pools to choose from, including an incredible infinity pool that features underwater speakers. Stunning is the only way to describe the Spa at Four Seasons. For the ultimate in indulgence, book the Double Serenity treatment in one of their spa suites. While sipping on Champagne, guests begin with a bubble bath in a marble tub overlooking Victoria Harbor. A full-body scrub is followed by signature Fusion Massage, which incorporates both Swedish and Asian techniques.
Kowloon Shangri-La
The opulence of the Kowloon Shangri-La is apparent with one glimpse of the lobby. A hotel fit for Midas, gold accentuates everything from the marble floors to the crystal chandeliers that drip from the ceiling. Located on the island of Kowloon, the Shangri-La is ideally located for exploring the shopping and entertainment district of Tsim Sha Tsui East. Inviting and exuding energy, the hotel attracts both business and leisure travelers.
Perhaps the best view of Hong Kong's nightly Symphony of Lights show is seen from the comfort of Horizon Club Harbour View Rooms. Floor-to-ceiling bay windows showcase the panoramic views of Hong Kong Island's skyline, as well as Victoria Harbour. And for a closer look, rooms include binoculars. The accommodations are just as lovely as the view outside. Gold tones and rich wood accents highlight the sophisticated Asian-influenced décor.
The personal attention given to Horizon Club guests makes this service worthy of upgrading, as it goes beyond the usual Shangri-La superior service. Some of the perks include private check-in, Club Concierge and hot beverages delivered with wake-up calls. Breakfast, as well as evening cocktails and appetizers, are provided daily in the Horizon Club Lounge.
Hong Kong is known as Asia's world city, thus it comes as no surprise that diners are spoilt for choice at the Shangri-La. At the two-star Michelin restaurant, Shang Palace, chef Mok Kit Keung presents creative and visually appetizing Cantonese dishes in this newly renovated restaurant. Nadaman delivers a variety of sushi, sashimi and inventive Japanese dishes, while Angelini uses seasonal ingredients imported from Italy to create its authentic Italian menu.
Hong Kong is where East and West collide. Most every high-end hotel chain has a presence in the city, which is great news for travelers since competition begets continued excellence. As a result, Hong Kong is home to some of the best hotels in the world.
All photos are copyrighted and courtesy of the respective hotels.
To read the Luxe Beat Magazine version of this article click on the title Haute Hong Kong Hotels.
Unique Beverage Learning Center Opens in Las Vegas
PreviousRomantic Getaway in Burgundy France
NextCrispy Pacific Oysters with Black Truffle Caviar
Leah Walker
As Editor-at-Large for Luxe Beat, Leah Walker is a luxury travel and culinary writer who also has contributor and editor roles with The Daily Meal, Bonjour Paris, The Daily Basics, Forbes Travel Guide, as well as her award-winning site, LeahTravels.com. A devout Francophile, she's also a travel ambassador for Atout France. Having split time between Texas and the rest of the world, Leah is now living in Paris after being awarded the three-year Compétences et Talents visa, though her talents don't extend to speaking French. Yet.
Ten Top Mediterranean Cruises for Every Budget and Taste
Cunard Announces 10-Day Sale on Select Queen Mary 2, Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth Voyages
Coffee Tourism in El Salvador Jolts Interest of Worldly Travelers
The Trendy Duniway Hotel Portland
Ben Alcock (@DisarmDoors)	on February 17, 2014 at 4:11 am
So pleased to see the Luxe Manor (and a couple of other personal faves) on this list.
#Sigh

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


We've recently made a man in a banana suit, a 3 feet tall pinup-style hand made doll and a cake topper with the couple riding their favorite convertible!
Whatever people wish to make. I rely on the endless inspiration of my clients, they can come up with the best ideas of what a cake topper or a figurine should look like.
We've recently made a man in a banana suit, a 3 feet tall pinup-style hand made doll and a cake topper with the couple riding their favorite convertible!
Over the internet and by requesting photos of the bride and groom and having a consultation call with them to understand exactly what they want.
The care and thought that goes into it. There is no comparison versus mass made.
Especially in weddings, the cookie cutter style is not very popular any more!


text:
52 Ancestors in 52 Weeks: 2017
Zalewski
Thielke
DeBroux
Online Tree
Zalewski Project
Everything I Know Sites
Disclosure/Review Policy
Saturday Genealogy Fun
SNGF – Sweet 16
Randy Seaver at Genea-Musings came up with this fun post on Saturday. I thought I'd give it a try.
Here is your SNGF assignment for the evening (if you choose to accept it – this is not stump the genealogist or even Mission Impossible):
1) List your 16 great-great-grandparents in pedigree chart order. List their birth and death years and places.
2) Figure out the dominant ethnicity or nationality of each of them.
3) Calculate your ancestral ethnicity or nationality by adding them up for the 16 – 6.25% for each (obviously, this is approximate).
4) If you don't know all 16 of your great-great-grandparents, then do it for the last full generation you have.
5) Write your own blog post, or make a comment on Facebook or in this post.
Some of this was tough due to the fact that a lot of my ancestors were born in either Prussia or Pomerania, which touched into both Germany and Poland, but I estimated as close as I could. Here are mine:
16. Frank J ZALEWSKI Sr. was born on 4 Sep 1858 in Prussia. Frank died on 8 Aug 1941 at the age of 82 in Milwaukee, Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. Anna A LINDNER and Frank J ZALEWSKI Sr. were married in Jan 1885 in Poznan Province, South Prussia (Poland). [POLISH]
17. Anna A LINDNER was born on 27 Nov 1865 in Prussia. She died on 11 Apr 1939 at the age of 73 in Milwaukee, Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. [POLISH]
18. Joseph TROKA was born on 17 Nov 1871 in Poland/West Prussia. Joseph died due to being hit by a drunk driver on his way to church on 1 Jan 1962 at the age of 90 in Milwaukee, Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. Clara SZULTA and Joseph TROKA were married on 29 Jan 1894 in St. Hedwig, Milwaukee, Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. [POLISH]
19. Clara SZULTA was born on 6 Jan 1876 in Poland/West Prussia. Clara died on 19 Jul 1959 at the age of 83 in Oak Creek, Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. [POLISH]
20. Thomas J CORRIGAN was born on 3 Mar 1855 in Mara Township, Brechin, Ontario, Canada. He died of a stroke on 25 Jul 1915 at the age of 60 in Ashland, Ashland Co., Wisconsin. Emma Jane FIRMENICH and Thomas J CORRIGAN were married on 18 Apr 1892 in Sanborn, Ashland Co., Wisconsin. [IRISH]
21. Emma Jane FIRMENICH was born on 23 Jun 1873 in Wrightstown, Brown Co., Wisconsin. She died on 28 Apr 1941 at the age of 67 in Ashland, Ashland Co., Wisconsin. [GERMAN/FRENCH/UK]
22. Frank F BRAATZ Sr was born on 17 Apr 1867 in Germany. Frank died on 10 Jul 1948 at the age of 81 in Ashland, Ashland Co., Wisconsin. Margaret K STEARNS and Frank F BRAATZ Sr were married on 4 Jun 1891 in Bear Creek, Outagamie Co., Wisconsin. [GERMAN]
23. Margaret K STEARNS was born on 30 Aug 1866 in Württemberg, Germany. She died in 1943 at the age of 77 in Ashland, Ashland Co., Wisconsin. [GERMAN]
24. Johann THIELKE was born on 26 Oct 1843 in Schwerin, Mecklenburg, Germany. He died on 24 Apr 1927 at the age of 83 in Grafton, Ozaukee Co., Wisconsin. Wilomene C "Minnie" RATHKE and Johann THIELKE were married on 21 Jun 1891 in Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. [GERMAN]
25. Wilomene C "Minnie" RATHKE was born on 1 Sep 1857 in Pommerania, Prussia. Minnie died on 26 Jun 1929 at the age of 71 in Wisconsin. [POLISH/GERMAN]
26. Carl F H "Charles" LAST was born on 26 Sep 1851 in Doeringshagen, Pommerania. Charles died on 5 Jun 1926 at the age of 74 in Port Washington, Ozaukee Co., Wisconsin. Augusta Johanna Wilkelumire LUEDTKE and Carl F H "Charles" LAST were married on 25 Feb 1883 in Milwaukee Co., Wisconsin. [POLISH (Doeringshagen is in current Poland)]
27. Augusta Johanna Wilkelumire LUEDTKE was born on 3 Jul 1863 in Storkow, Pommerania. She died on 14 Jul 1963 at the age of 100 in Grafton, Ozaukee Co., Wisconsin. [POLISH (Storkow in is current Poland)]
28. Joseph DEBROUX was born in May 1865 in Grand Chute, Outagamie Co., Wisconsin. Joseph died in 1918 at the age of 53 in Wisconsin. Mary Philomene LAURENT and Joseph DEBROUX were married on 8 Sep 1891 in Langlade Co., Wisconsin. [BELGIAN]
29. Mary Philomene LAURENT was born in Dec 1865 in Little Chute, Outagamie Co., Wisconsin. She died on 18 Sep 1956 at the age of 90 in Wausau, Marathon Co., Wisconsin. [BELGIAN/FRENCH CANADIAN]
30. Pieter Franciscus VAN PARIJS was born on 21 Jan 1874 in IJzendijke, Zeeland, Netherlands. Pieter died on 22 Sep 1962 at the age of 88 in Kenosha, Kenosha Co., Wisconsin. He was also known as Peter Van Price. Minnie M MUHM and Pieter Franciscus VAN PARIJS were married on 17 Jan 1898 in Shawano Co., Wisconsin. [DUTCH]
31. Minnie M MUHM was born on 12 Jul 1879 in Norwood Township, Langlade Co., Wisconsin. Minnie died on 6 Jul 1959 at the age of 79 in Port Washington, Ozaukee Co., Wisconsin. [GERMAN]
So, doing the math, that makes my ethnicity: Polish – 40.625%, German 30.1875%, Belgian 9.375%, Dutch 6.25%, French 6.25%, Irish 6.25%, Unknown UK Area (Scotland/England/Ireland) 2.0625%
Well, that comes to 101%, but it was a pretty random estimate so I'm glad it was even close to 100%. As far as I know, I have no English ancestry. One ancestor is listed as being from Ireland, Scotland and England in multiple census records, so it may be possible.
Belgium Corrigan DeBroux Dutch Firmenich German Irish Last Luedtke Polish Stearns Szulta Thielke Troka Van Parijs Zalewski
Gwynn Socolich
I am interested in your Corrigan line (#20) from Wisconsin. I have a Walter Corrigan 27 December 1899 married Jessie Anna Donaldson in Weyauwega, Waupaca County, Wisconsin. Are they in your direct or collateral line?
Jessie died on 25 May 1925 Whitefish Bay, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. I have a letter from their son Thomas Corrigan with a description of their house and how my grandfather Thomas Riddell Sankey hung out with his cousin Helen Corrigan (Thomas' sister)
I'm not aware of any of my Corrigan entries living in Waupaca Co. or near Milwaukee. I haven't really done any research of the descendants of Thomas Corrigan, besides my line.
Here is Thomas' entry in my family tree website: http://www.zalewskifamily.net/family/getperson.php?personID=I1&tree=zalewski
Michael Irish
I was wondering if you found an Edward Irish Jr. at all through your searches. Born 12 Apr. 1937. He was my father. Born in Milwaukee. His mothers name was Anna Tischler. His father was Edward Irish Sr. I do not know much about them at all and would like to trace back the roots on his side. My father married Darlene Faucher. If you could help at all I would greatly appreciate it.
I started genealogy research about mid-1999. My grandfather had passed away in April of that year. Since then I've done a lot of research not only for myself, but for friends and other relatives. In 2006, I married the love of my life, Darcy, and welcomed the birth of our daughter in 2010 and our son in 2012. I can't wait to tell them stories about all of their ancestors.
+ more ... join me @ WikiTree
An Amazing Genealogy Week
Genealogy Community
The Genealogy Guys
Al's Polish-American Genealogy
The Genetic Genealogist
Creative Gene
Trace Your Dutch Roots
The Blundering DNA Genealogist
Czech Genealogy for Beginners
Genetic Genealogy
Eastman's Genealogy Newsletter
RootsWeb
UPGS Conference
WikiTree
Podcasts/Media
Extreme Genes
© 2017 Brian Zalewski


text:
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
First published Mon Feb 21, 2000; substantive revision Wed Mar 23, 2005
Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or justified belief.
A little reflection suggests that the vast majority of the propositions we know or justifiably believe have that status only because we know or justifiably believe other different propositions. So, for example, I know or justifiably believe that Caesar was an assassinated Roman leader, but only because I know or justifiably believe (among other things) that various historical texts describe the event. Arguably, my knowledge (justified belief) about Caesar's death also depends on my knowing (justifiably believing) that the texts in question are reliable guides to the past. Foundationalists want to contrast my inferential knowledge (justified belief) about Caesar with a kind of knowledge (justified belief) that doesn't involve the having of other knowledge (justified belief). There is no standard terminology for what we shall henceforth refer to as noninferential knowledge or justification.[1]
For convenience, in what follows we will concentrate on foundationalism about justification. Everything said about justified belief will apply mutatis mutandis to foundationalist views about knowledge. On the "classical" analysis of knowledge, the core of the concept of knowledge is justified true belief and the foundational structure of knowledge simply derives from the foundational structure or justification. It should be noted, however, that the presupposition that the structure of knowledge parallels the structure of justification is controversial. Indeed, in a highly influential book, Timothy Williamson (2000) argues that knowledge is unananalyzable and is a concept that should be employed in understanding a host of other interesting epistemic concepts, including the concept of evidence. In short, his view is that our evidence simply consists in everything we know. Justification may have foundations but only because we end a regress of justification with propositions that are known—the evidential foundational on which all justified belief rests is knowledge (186). A discussion of Williamson's view would take us too far afield, however, and in what follows I will continue to suppose that our understanding of knowledge is parasitic upon our understanding of justification, and not vice versa.
It is surely fair to suggest that for literally thousands of years the foundationalist's thesis was taken to be almost trivially true. When an argument was implicitly or explicitly offered for the view it was most often the now famous regress argument. It is important, however, to distinguish two quite different regress arguments for foundationalism—the epistemic regress argument and the conceptual regress argument.
1. The Regress Arguments for Foundationalism
2. The Analysis of Noninferential Justification
2.1 Noninferential Justification as Infallible Belief
2.2 Noninferential Justification as Infallible Justification
3. Objections to Classical Foundationalism
4. Externalist Versions of Foundationalism
Suppose I claim to be justified in believing that Fred will die shortly and offer as my evidence that Fred has an untreatable and serious form of cancer. Concerned, you ask me how I discovered that Fred has the cancer and I respond that it is just a hunch on my part. As soon as you discover that I have no reason at all to suppose that Fred has the cancer, you will immediately conclude that my whimsical belief about Fred's condition gives me no justification for believing that Fred will soon die. Generalizing, one might suggest the following principle:
To be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing E.
Now consider another example. Suppose I claim to be justified in believing that Fred will die shortly and offer as my justification that a certain line across his palm (his infamous "lifeline") is short. Rightly skeptical, you wonder this time what reason I have for believing that palm lines have anything whatsoever to do with length of life. As soon as you become satisfied that I have no justification for supposing that there is any kind of probabilistic connection between the character of this line and Fred's life you will again reject my claim to have a justified belief about Fred's impending demise. That suggests that we might expand our Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ) to include a second clause:
Principle of Inferential Justification:
To be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must not only be (1) justified in believing E, but also (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.
With PIJ one can present a relatively straightforward epistemic regress argument for foundationalism. If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be noninferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification.
If we accept the more controversial second clause of PIJ, the looming regresses proliferate. Not only must S above be justified in believing E1, S must also be justified in believing that E1 makes likely P, a proposition he would have to infer (if there are no foundations) from some other proposition F1, which he would have to infer from F2, which he would have to infer from F3, and so on ad infinitum. But S would also need to be justified in believing that F1 does in fact make likely that E1 makes likely P, a proposition he would need to infer from some other proposition G1, which he would need to infer from some other proposition G2, and so on. And he would need to infer that G1 does indeed make likely that F1 makes likely that E1 makes likely P, and so on. Without noninferentially justified beliefs, it would seem that we would need to complete an infinite number of infinitely long chains of reasoning in order to be justified in believing anything!
The above argument relies on the unacceptability of a vicious epistemic regress. But one might also argue, more fundamentally, that without a concept of noninferential justification, one faces a vicious conceptual regress. What precisely is our understanding of inferential justification? What makes PIJ true? It is at least tempting to answer that PIJ is an analytic truth. Part of what it means to claim that someone has inferential justification for believing some proposition P is that his justification consists in his ability to infer P from some other proposition E1 that is justifiably believed. But if anything like this is a plausible analysis of the concept of inferential justification, we face a potential vicious conceptual regress. The analysis of inferential justification presupposes an understanding of justified belief. We need to introduce a concept of noninferential justification in terms of which we can then recursively define inferential justification.
Consider an analogy. Suppose a philosopher introduces the notion of instrumental goodness (something's being good as a means). That philosopher offers the following crude analysis of what it is for something to be instrumentally good. X is instrumentally good when X leads to something Y which is good. Even if we were to accept this analysis of instrumental goodness, it is clear that we haven't yet located the conceptual source of goodness. Our analysis of instrumental goodness presupposes an understanding of what it is for something to be good. In short we can't understand what it is for something to be instrumentally good until we have some prior (and more fundamental) understanding of what it is for something to be intrinsically good. The conceptual regress argument for foundationalism puts forth the thesis that inferential justification stands to noninferential justification as instrumental goodness stands to intrinsic goodness.
If foundationalists are united in their conviction that there must be a kind of justification that does not depend on the having of other justified beliefs, they nevertheless disagree radically among themselves as to how to understand noninferential justification. In the latter part of this century, the rise of externalist epistemologies has generated even more fundamentally different versions of foundationalism. It will not be possible to survey all of the strikingly different analyses that have been offered of noninferential justification. In what follows we will examine a few of the more prominent versions of classical and contemporary externalist foundationalisms.
Descartes is often taken to be the paradigm of a classical foundationalist. Determined to build knowledge on appropriate and secure foundations he seemed to want to identify foundational knowledge with infallible belief. Implicitly or explicitly others seemed to follow his lead by restricting noninferentially justified beliefs to beliefs that cannot be mistaken. Thus, for example, when Price (1950) introduced the notion of sense data, knowledge of which would be included in his foundations of empirical knowledge, he contrasted sense data and their nonrelational properties with other sorts of things about which one could be mistaken, implying again that the way to find the correct foundations of knowledge is to eliminate from one's beliefs system all those beliefs that could be false. Following Lehrer (1974, p. 81)) we might formulate the following definition of infallible belief:
S's belief that P at t is infallible if S's believing P at t entails[2] that P is true.
As Lehrer and others have pointed, it is far from clear that this concept of infallible belief has much relevance to an attempt to understand the epistemic concept of noninferential justification. The first and most striking problem involves necessary truths. Every necessary truth is entailed by every proposition, and thus if I happen to believe a necessary truth, P, that I believe P will entail that P is true. Thus by the above definition my belief that P will be infallible whenever P is a necessary truth even if P is far too complicated for me to prove and I believe it solely on a whim.
Furthermore, a foundation of knowledge and justified belief restricted to infallible beliefs (as defined above) would arguably be far too flimsy to support any sort of substantial epistemic edifice. There are a few contingent propositions that are trivially entailed by the fact that they are believed. My belief that I exist entails that I exist, that I have at least one belief, that someone has beliefs, that experience (broadly construed) exists, etc. But once we get past these sorts of "self-referential" propositions, propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs. Ayer (1956, p. 19) argues that as long as the belief that P is one state of affairs and P's being the case is an entirely different state of affairs (not including as a constituent the former) there can be no logical absurdity in the supposition that the former could occur without the latter.
Although it doesn't add much to the logical force of the argument, one might employ our hunches about how the brain might work to rhetorically bolster the argument. Consider a standard candidate for an infallible empirical belief, my belief that I am in pain now. It is surely possible that the region of the brain causally responsible for producing the belief that I am in pain is entirely different from the region of the brain causally responsible for producing the pain. There may be a causal connection between the occurrence of the "pain" brain event and the occurrence of the "belief" brain event, or vice versa, but even if the causal connection holds it will be a contingent fact that it does. It hardly seems that the neurophysiologist could discover these (or any other) causal connections purely a priori. But if the brain state responsible for my belief that I am in pain is wholly different from the brain state responsible for the pain, and if the connections between them are merely nomological, then it is in principle possible to produce the one without the other. The belief will not entail the truth of what is believed.
It may be that classical foundationalists start off on the wrong foot if they seek foundations in logical relations between the mere fact that someone believes some proposition and the proposition's being true. Noninferential justification is, after all, a kind of justification and if the impossibility of error is essential to noninferential justification, it may be more plausible to locate the source of infallibility in a special kind of justification available in support of a belief. Let us say that S's belief is infallibly justified at t when S's justification for believing P at t relevantly entails the truth of P. We need to qualify the entailment as relevant to circumvent the problems discussed earlier. Whenever I have any justification at all for believing a proposition that turns out to be necessarily true, that justification will entail the necessary truth. But we do not want just any sort of justification to yield infallibly justified belief even if the object of that belief is a necessary truth.
What is the difference between relevant and irrelevant entailment? This is a question notoriously difficult to answer, but intuitively it should have something to do with the fact that would make true the proposition entailed and the fact that would make true the proposition that entails it. More specifically, we could say that P relevantly entails Q only if the fact that would make P true is at least a constituent of the fact that would make Q true. This suggestion can be considered at best only preliminary since we will obviously need a more detailed account of facts and their constituents. That I have grey hair entails that someone has grey hair, but is my having grey hair a constituent of the fact that is someone's having grey hair? There is certainly a sense in which it is something one can point to in answer to the question "What makes it true that someone has grey hair?" One cannot appropriately point to my having grey hair as something that makes it true that two plus two equals four.
Consider again my belief that I'm in pain (when I am). If such a belief is noninferentially justified, in what does the justification for that belief consist. Surely not in the mere fact that the proposition is believed. What is it that distinguishes this belief from my belief about Caesar's assassination. Some foundationalists want to locate the noninferential justification in the truth-maker for the proposition believed. What justifies me in believing that I'm in pain when I am is the mere fact that I'm in pain. But again, what is it about my being in pain as opposed to Caesar's being assassinated which makes it appropriate to claim that my being in pain justifies me in believing that I'm in pain while Caesar's having been assassinated doesn't justify me in believing that Caesar was assassinated.
It is tempting to think that the foundationalist is better off appealing to some special relation that I have to my pain which makes it unnecessary to look to other beliefs in order to justify my belief that I'm in pain. It is the fact that I have a kind of access to my pain that no-one else has that makes my belief noninferentially justified while others must rely on inference in order to discover that I am in this state. This takes us to another classical version of foundationalism, the acquaintance theory. Perhaps the best known proponent of an acquaintance theory is Bertrand Russell,[3] but it takes little imagination to read the view into most of the British empiricists. Roughly the view is that what justifies S in believing that he is in pain when he does is the fact that S is directly and immediately acquainted with his pain in a way in which he is not directly and immediately acquainted with any contingent facts about Caesar, the physical world, the future, and so on. On a correspondence conception of truth, one might add that to be fully justified in believing a proposition to be true one must be acquainted not only with the fact that makes the proposition true but the relation of correspondence that holds between the proposition and the fact.
In one of the most influential arguments against foundationalism, Wilfrid Sellars (1963, 131-32) argued that the idea of the given in traditional epistemology contains irreconcilable tensions. On the one hand, to ensure that something's being given does not involve any other beliefs, proponents of the view want the given to be untainted by the application of concepts. On the other hand, the whole doctrine of the given is designed to end the regress of justification, to give us secure foundations for the rest of what we justifiably infer from the given. But to make sense of making inferences from the given the given must have a truth value. The kind of thing that has a truth value involves the application of concepts or thought, a capacity not possessed (we may presume) by at least lower-order animals.
If there is a solution to the dilemma presented by Sellars (and others) it is to emphasize that acquaintance is not by itself an epistemic relation. Acquaintance is a relation that other animals might bear to properties and even facts, but it also probably does not give these animals any kind of justification for believing anything, precisely because these other animals probably do not have beliefs. Without thought or propositions entertained there is no truth, and without a bearer of truth value in the picture there is nothing to be justified or unjustified. The acquaintance theorist can argue that one has a noninferentially justified belief that P only when one has the thought that P and one is acquainted with both the fact that P, the thought that P, and the relation of correspondence holding between the thought that P and the fact that P. On such a view no single act of acquaintance yields knowledge or justified belief, but when one has the relevant thought (entertains the relevant proposition), the three acts together constitute noninferential justification. When everything that is constitutive of a thought or a proposition's being true is immediately before consciousness, there is nothing more that one could want or need to justify a belief. The state that constitutes noninferential justification is a state that contains as constituents both the bearer of truth-value and the truth-maker.[4]
When an acquaintance with the fact that P is part of what constitutes my noninferential justification for believing P, there is a trivial sense in which my noninferential justification is infallible. I can't be directly acquainted with the fact that P while I believe P falsely. There is, however, nothing to prevent an acquaintance theorist from allowing that one can be noninferentially justified in believing P by virtue of being directly acquainted with a fact very similar to, but ultimately different from the fact that P (the fact that makes P true). Such an acquaintance theory could allow for the possibility of noninferentially justified but false belief that P.[5]
Once the received view, classical foundationalism has come under considerable attack in the last few decades. We have already considered the very influential objection raised by Sellars to the idea of there being a "given" element in experience. It is crucial that the foundationalist discover a kind of truth that can be known without inference. But there can be no bearers of truth value without judgment and judgment involves the application of concepts. But to apply a concept is to make a judgment about class membership, and to make a judgment about class membership always involves relating the thing about which the judgment is made to other paradigm members of the class. These judgments of relevant similarity will minimally involve beliefs about the past, and thus be inferential in character (assuming that we can have no "direct" access to facts about the past). A reply to this objection would take us far afield indeed. Perhaps it will suffice to observe that the objection relies on a number of highly controversial claims about the nature of judgment, most of which the classical foundationalist should and would reject.
The direct acquaintance theorist does presuppose the intelligibility of a world that has "structure" independent of any structure imposed by the mind. Without nonlinguistic facts that are independent of the thoughts and judgments that represent them, one could not make sense of a relation of acquaintance between a person and a fact, a relation that grounds noninferential justification. More radical contemporary rejections of foundationalism may well involve dissastification with the foundationalist's implicit commitment to a strong realistic correspondence conception of truth. Since Kant there has always been a strong undercurrent of anti-realism running through philosophy. The metaphor is that of the mind imposing structure on reality. And there is an intuitively plausible sense in which one can genuinely wonder whether it makes sense to ask about the number of colors that are exemplified in the world independently of some framework provided by color concepts. But despite the periodic popularity of extreme anti-realism, it is surely absurd to suppose that it is even in principle possible for a mind to force a structure on a literally unstructured world. There are indefinitely many ways to sort the books in a library and some are just as useful as others, but there would be no way to begin sorting books were books undifferentiated. If a rejection of foundationalism relies on an extreme form of anti-realism so much the worse for the anti-foundationalist.
Just as some anti-foundationalists reject the conception of truth underlying classical foundationalist accounts of noninferential justification, so others profess to be bewildered by some of the fundamental concepts employed in defining noninferential justification. The acquaintance theorist tends to have relatively little to say by way of analyzing what direct acquaintance is. To be sure one can try to give someone a feel for what one is talking about by contrasting one's awareness of pain with the temporary distraction caused by an engrossing conversation. It is tempting to suppose that for a short time the pain was still present but the person with the pain was no longer aware of the fact that the pain exists. This awareness, the acquaintance theorist will argue, is obviously something over and above mere belief in the existence of the pain, as one can believe that one is in a mental state (say a subconscious mental state) without being aware of that state. Like most theories foundationalism will, however, ultimately rest its intelligibility on an appeal to a sui generis concept that defies further analysis. Just as one needs to end epistemic regresses with foundational justification, the foundationalist will argue, so one needs to end conceptual regresses with concepts one grasps without further definition.
Laurence BonJour (1985) raised another highly influential objection to all forms of classical foundationalism (an objection raised before he joined the ranks of foundationalists). The objection presupposed a strong form of what we might call access internalism. Put very superficially the access internalist argues that a feature of a belief or epistemic situation that makes a belief noninferentially justified must be a feature to which we have actual or potential access. Moreover, we must have access to the fact that the feature in question is probabilistically related to the truth of what we believe. So suppose some foundationalist offers an account of noninferential justification according to which a belief is noninferentially justified if it has some characteristic X. BonJour then argues that the mere fact that the belief has X could not, even in principle, justify the believer in holding the belief. The believer would also need access to (justified belief that!) the belief in question has X and that beliefs of this sort (X beliefs) are likely to be true. At least one of these propositions could only be known through inference, and thus the putative noninferential justification is destroyed.
BonJour presented the objection on the way to developing a coherence theory of empirical justification. But it ultimately became obvious that the objection to foundationalism, if good, was too strong. Given the structure of the argument it should become evident that the coherence theory (and any other theory) would be equally vulnerable to the argument. Just replace "X" with some complicated description of beliefs cohering with each other. That might suggest to the classical foundationalist that strong access internalism is a view to be avoided.
The Principle of Inferential Justification used to generate the regress argument for foundationalism is itself controversial. It is important to note that either clause of the principle can be used by itself to generate the allegedly vicious epistemic and conceptual regress for the philosopher who rejects foundations. It is the two clauses combined that are supposed to present the anti-foundationalist with an infinite number of vicious regresses. A number of philosophers (among them foundationalists) would argue that the second clause of PIJ confuses levels of epistemic questions. It is far too strong to require someone to have a justified belief in a probabilistic connection between available evidence and the conclusion reached on the basis of that evidence. Such a requirement is at best plausible for having second-level justification for believing that one has an inferentially justified belief. In responding to a challenge presented to one's having an inferentially justified belief in P on the basis of E one might find oneself searching for justification to support the claim that E makes probable P, but that is only because in the context of the challenge one is trying to make good (i.e., justify) the claim that one has a justified belief. A similar claim might be made with respect to clause 1) of the principle, although it is more difficult to generate the supporting intuition.
In any event, the careful foundationalist is certainly not confused about level-distinctions. The foundationalist who supports PIJ is claiming that a necessary condition for someone's having an inferentially justified belief in P based on E is that the person have both a justified belief in E and a justified belief in the proposition that E makes P probable. It is simply not enough that E is true or that E does in fact make probable P. Our original examples used to support PIJ would seem to reinforce that conclusion. Even if there happened to be some bizarre connection between palm lines and length of life, for example, the person who has no reason to believe that such a connection exists has no justification for conclusions reached about length of life based on this anatomical feature of people.
Huemer (2002) objects to using examples like the palm-line inference to argue for the second clause of the principle of inferential justification. While most share the intuition that we would need additional information in order to legitimately infer truths about the length of a person's life from knowledge of palm lines, all that really shows is that we wouldn't view the inference in question as legitimate in the first place. Even palm readers don't think that they can make predictions about a person's life based on information about palm lines and that information alone. But that doesn't show that when we have an argument whose premises really do support its conclusion we still need to be aware of the connection in order to justifiably believe the conclusion based on the premises. But while Huemer's point is plausible and the foundationalist trying to argue for the second clause of the principle of inferential justification should heed Huemer's warning to be careful in the use of examples, it is not clear that one can't find plausible examples of inferences from premises to conclusion where the premises do make probable, even entail, the conclusion but the resulting belief is unjustified because the person who reached the conclusion had no awareness of the relevant connection between premise and conclusion. All we need to do is consider a person who infers P from E where E logically entails P, but where the entailment is far too complex for the person to see or even understand. Surely the belief that P is unjustified if the person who reaches conclusion couldn't "see" how the available evidence entais the conclusion.
There are, of course, other responses to the charge of vicious regress facing anti-foundationalists. The coherence theorist rejects the foundationalist's presupposition that justification is linear. Each belief is justified by virtue of its coherence with the rest of what one believes but one avoids the appearance of vicious circularity by insisting that one needn't first have justification for believing the other propositions in one's belief system. The coherence theorist's response to the argument for foundationalism is, of course, only as plausible as the coherence theory of justification (See coherence theories of justification).
Peter Klein (1998) may be the lone supporter of a view he calls infinitism. The infinitist accepts the need to be able to supply non-circular justification for believing what we do, but argues that given the complexity of the human mind and its capacity to entertain and justifiably believe an infinite number of propositions, there is nothing vicious about the relevant regresses we face. There is no reason to suppose that we would be unable to justify every proposition we believe by appeal to some other different proposition which we justifiably believe. Infinitism is a view that should be seriously considered, particularly once one realizes that one not only can but does have an infinite number of justified beliefs (e.g., that 2 is greater than 1, that 3 is greater that 1, and so on.). It is not clear, however, that even if the infinitist can cope with the epistemic regress argument foundationalism, he has a response to the conceptual regress argument discussed earlier. Klein will argue, however, that one needn't define inferential justification recursively by relying on a base clause that invokes the concept of noninferential justification. Rather one can employ a base clause the invokes an ununanalyzed generic understanding of justification.
Although anti-foundationalists are not always eager to admit it, I suspect that the primary dissatisfaction with classical foundationalism lies with the difficulty the view has avoiding radical skepticism. On infallible belief, infallible justification, or direct acquaintance theories of foundational justification, there is precious little included in the foundations of knowledge. Most classical foundationalists reject the idea that one can have noninferentially justified beliefs about the past, but the present disappears into the past in the blink of an eye. How can one even hope to get back the vast body of knowledge one pre-philosophically supposes one has, if one's epistemic base is so impoverished. If the second clause of the Principle of Inferential Justification were accepted, the problem is even more serious. One might be able to convince oneself that one can know noninferentially the principles of deductive reasoning, but deduction will not take one usefully beyond the foundations of knowledge and justified belief. As Mill (1906, p. 126) argued, there is a very real sense in which one doesn't advance one's knowledge significantly employing a form of reasoning that takes one only to conclusions that were implicitly contained in the conjunction of one's premises. To advance beyond foundations we will inevitably need to employ non-deductive reasoning and according to PIJ that will ultimately require us to have noninferential (direct) knowledge of propositions describing probability connections between evidence and conclusions. It is not absurd on the face of it to suppose that one can have noninferential a priori knowledge of probabilistic connections, but it is perhaps an understatement to suppose that the view is not popular.[6]
The epistemic landscape has changed dramatically in the last quarter of a century with the rise of externalist epistemologies. It is notoriously difficult to define clearly the controversy between internalists and externalists in epistemology.[7] It is sometimes taken to be a controversy over whether or not one can identify epistemic properties with "internal" states of believers. Others seem to think that the controversy centers over the question of whether one requires certain sorts of access (or potential access) to the states or properties that constitute having justification. Certainly, paradigm externalists would reject the second clause of the principle of inferential justification. According to virtually all externalists, one can arrive at a justified belief in P by inferring it from E without being aware of any sort of evidential connection between E and P.
While the externalist defends radically different views than those of classical foundationalists, the structure of knowledge and justification that emerges from such theories is still often a foundationalist structure. We might first illustrate the point by examining the view defended by the most prominent of the externalists, Alvin Goldman's reliabilism.[8]
The fundamental idea behind reliabilism is strikingly simple. Justified beliefs are reliably produced beliefs. Justified beliefs are worth having because justified beliefs are probably true. Goldman initially distinguished, however, two importantly different sorts of justified beliefs—those that result from belief-independent processes and those that result from belief-dependent processes. The former are beliefs that are produced by "software" of the brain that takes as its "input" stimuli other than beliefs; the latter are beliefs produced by processes that take as their input at least some other beliefs. So, for example, it is possible that we have evolved in such a way that when prompted with certain sensory input we immediately and unreflectively reach conclusions about external objects. And we may live in a world in which beliefs about the external world produced in this way are usually true (or would usually be true if enough of them were generated).[9] Such beliefs will be justified by virtue of being the product of reliable belief-independent processes. They can in turn be taken as input for reliable belief-dependent processes in order to generate still more justified beliefs. A belief-dependent process is reliable if its output beliefs are usually (or would usually) be true if the relevant input beliefs are true, and the output beliefs of reliable belief-dependent processes are justified provided that the input beliefs are justified.[10]
The above is but the crudest sketch of Goldman's early reliabilism—he later modified it to deal with a number of objections. But the sketch is enough to bring out the foundationalist structure inherent in a reliabilist account. The reliabilist actually accepts the first clause of PIJ, but avoids both the epistemic and conceptual regresses by embracing a kind of justified belief that does not owe its justification to the having of other different justified beliefs. That the reliabilist is concerned with avoiding the conceptual regress is clear from the fact that the analysis offered is explicitly recursive. The base clause of the recursive analysis in effect captures the concept of a noninferentially justified belief.
I have illustrated the way in which an externalist account of justified belief can exemplify a foundationalist structure by examining one of the most prominent versions of externalism, reliabilism. But other versions of externalism are also implicitly or explicitly committed to a version of foundationalism, or, at the very least, give an account of justification that would enable one to distinguish noninferential from inferential justification, direct from indirect knowledge. Consider, for example, a crude version of the so-called causal theory of knowledge according to which one knows a proposition when one believes it and the belief is caused (in the "right" way) by the very fact that makes true what is believed. Obviously, on such an account one can distinguish causal chains leading to the belief in question that involve intermediate beliefs from those that do not, and using this distinction one can again define a distinction between direct and indirect knowledge.[11]
Externalist versions of foundationalism are probably attractive to many because they often allow at least the possibility of a much expanded foundational base of justified beliefs. The reliabilist's noninferentially justified beliefs, for example, might be produced by processes that are not even very reliable. Unlike the Cartesian, the reliabilist's distinction between noninferentially and inferentially justified belief has nothing to do with how probable it is that the belief in question is true. If nature has been co-operative enough to insure the evolution of cognitive agents who respond to their environmental stimuli with mostly true beliefs then there might be an enormous store of foundational knowledge upon which we can draw in arriving at inferentially justified conclusions. On most externalist accounts of noninferentially justified belief there are literally no a priori constraints on what might end up being noninferentially justified.
A full evaluation of externalist versions of foundationalism is far beyond the scope of this article. The very ease with which the externalist can potentially broaden the foundational base of noninferentially justified belief is, ironically, one of the primary concerns of those philosophers unhappy with externalist epistemology. Many internalists are convinced that externalists are simply re-defining epistemic terms in such a way that they lose the kind of meaning that the philosopher wants them to have in order to ask the kind of penetrating philosophical questions that are the peculiar product of a kind of philosophical curiosity. When a philosopher starts looking for justification in support of a belief, the internalist will argue, the philosopher is interested in achieving a state in which a kind of philosophical curiosity is satisfied. That philosopher wants epistemic justification to provide a kind of assurance of truth. If I'm wondering whether or not I have justification to believe that God exists, I'm hardly going to think that my question has been answered when I'm told by the reliabilist that I might have a reliably produced belief that God exists or when I'm told by the causal theorist that my belief that God exists might be caused by the very fact that God exists. As far as satisfying intellectual curiosity, exemplifying reliably-produced belief or belief caused by the right fact is no more useful than having true belief. If I were to stipulate a technical sense of foundational Knowledge* according to which I foundationally know that P when I believe truly that P and my belief isn't caused by any other belief, there may well be all sorts of truths I "know", but will having such knowledge do me any good as far as putting me in a state that satisfies my philosophical curiosity?
Armstrong, David. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.
Ayer, A. J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.
BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
-----. 2000. "Toward a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism." In Resuurecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, ed. Michael DePaul. Lanham, Ma.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Fumerton, Richard. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, Ma.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Goldman, Alvin. 1979. "What is Justified Belief?" Pp. 1-23 in Justification and Knowledg, ed. George Pappas. Dordrecht: Reidel.
-----. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
-----. 1988. "Strong and Weak Justification." Pp. 51-69 in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Huemer, Michael. 2002. "Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification." Journal of Philosophical Research, 27, 329-40.
Klein, Peter. 1998. "Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVIII: 919-26.
Lehrer, Keith. 1974. Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mill, John Stuart. 1906. A System of Logic. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Price, H. H. 1950. Perception. London: Methuen.
Russell, Bertrand. 1910-11. "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description." The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 11: 209-32.
-----. Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Ed. by Elizabeth Eames. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.
-----. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1963. Science Perception and Reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
justification, epistemic: coherentist theories of | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of
Richard Fumerton <richard-fumerton@uiowa.edu>


This post is a review on SuperMoney by Adam Smith. The book is first published in 1972 and re-introduced in 2006. The NLB does not seem to have the book.
The book is a description of financial markets in the period roughly around 1965-1975. Supermoney is interesting to me in a few aspects.
1) Supermoney has a chapter on Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett, even before Warren Buffett becomes famous. The author conducts his interview at around the time where Buffett no longer manages money (somewhere after 1969) but rather working as an owner of Bershire. And it seems that Buffet's famous Rule of 'Don't lose money' comes from Benjamin Graham. I shan't say much here, since it will spoil the joy of reading that chapter.
2) Another interesting event is the Penn Central bankruptcy. The event is a bit similar to the subprime fallout now. I shall briefly describe what happen from my understanding from the book.
At that point of time, Penn Central files for bankruptcy and its commercial paper (or bonds) naturally will become worthless. And at that time, not only Penn Central but also other corporations with similar credit-worthiness are having the commercial papers out in the market too.
The financial circle become worried that the Penn Central incident would spread to other commercial papers from similar corporations. People may become scared to own commercial papers due to Penn Central incident. Corporations may not be able to sell their commercial papers or they have to issue their commercial papers at a much lower price. And when price becomes lower, the yield becomes higher. Note that this may indirectly affect the stock market as money may flow from stock market to purchase higher yielding commercial papers.
To cut the story short, Penn Central incident's final impact is reduced due to actions by the Fed. The corporations who are unable to sell their commercial papers go to the banks. The banks then go to the Fed and borrow money to lend to the corporations. A potential large fallout was averted.
In conclusion, Super Money is interesting to read, especially if you are interested in US financial history.


text:
Q: How to redirect register output for failed hosts in ansible using assert or any ways - name: Check the VolumeGroup has 5gb space
  assert:
    that: ansible_lvm.vgs.VG00.free_g|int >= 5
    fail_msg: 'VG has no free space'
    success_msg: "{{ ansible_lvm.vgs.rhel.free_g }}"
  register: vg00
- name: Line in file
  shell: echo -e "{{ ansible_fqdn }},VG_FREE=0" >> /tmp/failed.txt
  delegate_to: localhost
  when: "'FATAL' in vg00"

I need only the failed hosts to be redirected using when condition but it is not working. Any different condition will help

A: It seems like you are trying to use facts that do not exist (I've checked in ansible 2.9.12).
So my way of getting this to work would be:
---
- name: answer stack overflow
  hosts: all
  become: yes

  tasks:
    - name: Get VolumeGroup "mirror" free space in GB
      shell: vgs --units G|grep mirror|awk '{print $NF}'|tr -d 'G'
      register: vg_free
    - name: report your findings
      shell: echo {{ ansible_hostname }} has {{ vg_free.stdout }} GB free on VG mirror >> /tmp/hosts_with_vg_less_than_5GB_free_report.txt
      delegate_to: localhost
      when: {{ vg_free.stdout | int }} < 5

Using shell module extensively is not recommended as Idempotence (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idempotence) is hard to achieve but for reporting purposes - why not :) .

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
My review of Sarah Tomlinson's memoir "Good Girl" is live at Colorado Review. http://coloradoreview.colostate.edu/reviews/good-girl/
Sarah Tomlinson's debut memoir, Good Girl, is about her complicated relationship with her narcissistic, often absent father. From the outside, Tomlinson had a picturesque childhood. Born in 1976, she was a bright, precocious child who grew up with her mom, stepfather, and little brother on a hundred-acre rural enclave in Freedom, Maine. Still, she longed for her birth father, an acid-dropping, mystically "enlightened" itinerant taxi-driver her mother had divorced because he was a compulsive gambler. As a young girl, Tomlinson looked forward to her father's sporadic visits. She often stood alone by the window for hours, waiting and waiting for her father to arrive. Most of the time he failed to show. She reflects on the speculative calculations she performed as she stared toward the empty road:
As I waited for him to arrive, I rested my fingertips on the wood of the windowsill, staving off my fear of disappointment by redoing the numbers in my mind. At two, when he had still not come, I held onto the logic of my math problem: if he left at eleven, he'd be there by two thirty. But no, just to be safe, maybe he hit traffic, or got his cab serviced, or grabbed a fish sandwich on Route 1.
Tomlinson's story tumbles forth with the rapid urgency of a young woman searching for meaning and perhaps a bit of insight amid the chaos of unexpected wounds created by her neglectful, self-centered father. As a teenager she was smart and ambitious, seeking more than her small high school and her bohemian home life could offer. At age fifteen she left for Bard College at Simon's Rock before going on to earn a graduate degree and establishing herself as a journalist, music critic, and ghost writer. Throughout her travels to Boston, Portland (Oregon), and Los Angeles, she struggled to negotiate work, love, and friendship. With intelligent and courageous writing, Sarah Tomlinson refuses to dilute the painful realities of her life—the trauma of a school shooting, the social lubricant of drugs and alcohol, the choice of unavailable men. Tomlinson examines her life through a dual lens: one tinted by her inner child's belief that her personal value is rooted in external validation and the other a clear lens of the grown writer who recognizes her personal value rooted inside herself.
For an author, father-daughter memoirs can be tricky business. Confronting fathers directly and publicly is not easy. To write about a father is to sit in judgment upon him. Not only do cultural norms dictate that such judgments are a no-no, but an author-daughter still hopeful of paternal reconciliation has personal, after-publication fallout to consider. She might ask herself what she's trying to work out on the page, how her story reveals insights about herself, what readers might gain from those insights, and whether her private-made-public revelations might affect her relationship with her still-living father. Not an easy list of considerations.
Although the absentee father-daughter conflict is a familiar theme in the larger landscape of memoirs, what is unique and perhaps most engaging in Good Girl is Tomlinson's honest depiction of how her father's unavailability shaded almost every aspect of her childhood, teenage, and young adult life. Tomlinson's prose is strongest when she dives into close observation of her father's everyday behavior. With subtle humor she captures his delusional revelry and childlike exuberance as he visits her two-story Boston apartment for the first time:
He was halfway across the warped kitchen floor when he stopped, transfixed by the view of the treetops and sky straight ahead. He put both hands out as if to steady himself on a surfboard, bent his knees slightly as if testing the give.
"Far out," he said.
At its heart, this book is a coming-of-age story about the emotional cavern created by her father's absence. Tomlinson strives to work around, if not repair, the internal damage her father did. On one level, she continually tries to deepen her connection with him—she really does want to have a relationship with her father, shortcomings and all. On another level, she comes to realize that in order to protect the newfound sense of wholeness she's strived so hard to achieve, she must keep her father at arm's length.
Good books sometimes remind us of things we already know on some level. We know that people are complicated; we know that daughters can love fathers despite their shortcomings; we know that a wounded heart can crawl back to its source of pain time and again; and we know that there may or may not be an adequate response to a child's call for parental attention. In the end, Tomlinson finds no tidy solutions. She does, however, leave readers with the glimmer of hope that some sort of peace is possible, even if it means we continue to love unconditionally the people who have disappointed us.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized on July 9, 2016 by Carole Firstman.
← The Origins of the Universe and What it All Means by Carole Firstman book beginnings on Friday: Origins of the Universe and What It All Means by Carole Firstman →


1409, John born in England, heir & s/o 950664. William Filoll & 950665. Joan Frome.
1416, John age 7 at the death of his father.
1420, John heir to his great-aunt, Mary Filoll, widow; inheriting manors of Woodmancote, Morley and other lands.
~1430, Margaret born in England, d/o 950666. John Carent.
1434, "Compotus of fermers of John Filoll; Location: Bloxworth, Knowlton etc. Dorset ." (S) UKNA.
6/1/1434, "court leet with view of frankpledge the first of John Filoll' son and heir of William Filoll' held at Langton Wallis." (S) UKNA.
1436-42, "Compotus of bailiffs of John Filoll; Location: Bloxworth etc. Dorset." (S) UKNA.
1443, Because of a suit between the Appulbys and John Filoll of Dorset, Elizabeth Holden agreed to enfeoff those designated by Filoll and to deliver the deeds of her third of Pomfret to him. (S) Stepney: Manors and Estates, A History of the County of Middlesex: V11.
1451-52, "Compotus of bailiffs of John Filoll; Location: Bloxworth etc. Dorset." (S) UKNA.
1461, "Quitclaim by Felicity, formerly wife of John Note, and John her son, to Robert Frampton and John Filoll of lands in Etchilhampton and Stert." (S) UKNA.
1467, John wrote his will, naming his father-in-law an executor.
Bef. 8/28/1467, John, Esq., of Woodlands, … Dorset, died.
Margaret married 2nd John Wroughton.
i. William Filoll (237666), born 1453 in England.
ii. Katherine Filoll, born ? in England.
1486, "Katherine Filoll, daughter of John Filoll, esquire. v. John Wroughton: Land in .... geswell and elsewhere in S[omerset] and Dorset." (S) UKNA.


Compare and find the ideal accommodation for as little as $24 per night by exploring the 178,604 properties listed in Canada. Using HomeToGo you can instantaneously compare the prices of each listed rental to find the best price and save up to 35%.
This graph displays average prices of the vacation rentals and holiday apartments located in Canada. The most expensive dates to travel to Canada are in June (6/15 - 6/22). The cheapest week to book a vacation rental is in November (11/9 - 11/16).
This graph shows the vacation rental availability rate for the next twelve months. It is in July that you will find the week with the least available rentals (7/20 - 7/27). Conversely, you will find the highest percentage of available offers in Canada in September (9/28 - 10/5).
In Canada, apartment rentals are the most prevalent accommodation type. In addition, apartment rentals there have a median price $218 per night as well as a median size of 89 ft². Moreover, the majority of apartment rentals in this destination can welcome 4 people, which makes it a perfect vacation destination for medium-sized groups and families. You can also search and find other types of accommodation in Canada. House rentals are, for example, another popular property type there with 55,992 properties to compare. Our data shows that the median price of house rentals is $324 per night for an area of 151 ft².
For travellers, vacation rentals in Canada allow for a variety of travel types and adventures! From cozy cabins in cottage country to fabulous city short term apartments, there is something for everyone. Canada is a vast and fascinating country, offering world-class culture, art, and food in its cities, and breath-taking vistas and nature. From Toronto to Qualicum Beach in British Columbia, this is a country of vast beauty and exciting culture to discover. To really experience Canada, a vacation rental allows you to make the most of your stay - and tailor your needs to enhance your vacation experience.
Canada is famous for many dishes and ingredients, namely maple syrup and Canadian bacon. Quebec is known for creating beloved poutine, a belly-busting dish of fries drowned in gravy and cheese curds. Visitors to Canada should at least try a bite of poutine, diet or not – you can find it just about anywhere in the country these days.
You'll find fresh Pacific salmon served on bagels as a quick lunch or as a main dish. If you're seeking something more exotic, try caribou (reindeer) stew, and if you're heading out for drinks, order a Caesar, perhaps Canada's most famous cocktail. It's made with vodka, Clamato juice, Worcestershire sauce, and a lime wedge for a tart kick.
For history, art, and culture lovers, Canada's large cities never disappoint. From a downtown Toronto vacation rental, art lovers can walk to the Royal Ontario Museum and the Art Gallery of Ontario. Montreal is also known for its cultural elements, such as the famous Mary, Queen of the World Cathedral and Montreal Museum of Fine Arts. The Museum of Anthropology and "Graffiti Alley" in Mount Pleasant, Vancouver, are also well worth seeing.
Canada proudly showcases its indigenous history and culture, and there are several places you can learn about these cultures and their influence in the country today. Check out the Museum of Aboriginal Civilization across from Parliament Hill in Ottawa, or the Inuit Gallery of Vancouver, which highlights aboriginal art through the ages.
There are plenty of kid-friendly activities to choose from when planning a family vacation in Canada. Active families will love exploring the great outdoors at the many natural areas such as Papineau-Labelle Wildlife Preserve near Ottawa, whose hiking trails are perfect for spotting wild turkey, otters, and other critters, or Banff National Park, where you can ride horseback through the Canadian Rockies. In Ontario, the beaches along the Great Lakes promise hours of summer swimming and sandcastle building.
Although Canada's outdoors may be unparalleled, its cities are also tons of fun for families. In Toronto, head to Legoland Discovery Centre or the Ontario Science Centre for a day of hands-on fun. If you're in Vancouver, make sure to see the aquarium, and in Ottawa, the Aviation and Space Museum.
What is Canada's Nightlife Like? Big Nights Out in Toronto and More!
Canada's large cities all have thriving party scenes, so when you find yourself ready for a night of dancing, you'll never be disappointed. In Toronto, the Entertainment District, Chinatown, and the Fashion District are all close to each other and feature superb bars, restaurants, and much more. For travellers visiting Vancouver, a West End vacation rental offers easy access to a dense concentration of night life.
If you're more into theatre and other high-culture pursuits, you'll be equally well catered to in Canada. Opéra de Montréal puts on stunning, world-class performances, as does Toronto's Ed Mirvish Theatre. The Alberta Ballet Company in Calgary is also renowned. Traditional theatre performances are easy to find in each of the big cities, and most smaller towns put on exciting small-scale performances, too.
In a country with such stunning natural surroundings, you'll surely be tempted to see the magnificent national parks it's famous for. Banff National Park, just a 90-minute drive from Calgary, is the country's oldest, and offers eye-popping views of the Valley of the Ten Peaks over Moraine Lake.
Another idea is to take day trips to different cities. Although most major cities are far apart, Montreal is just over two hours' drive from Ottawa, the nation's capital. You could experience French Canada and also see the Canadian Parliament building at Centre Block, among Ottawa's other landmarks. If you're in Winnipeg, you'll be close to outdoor activities in summer such as hiking and windsurfing at Grand Beach.


Before I get into this post, I'd really like to explain some of the thought behind it. It's a little lengthy, but I think it's important to understand. If you really don't care, you can skip below to the next section, but I would ask you try to read this first.
There was an interesting talk by [qu0rum] on the Crypto Village track of DefCon 24 called "Opps! I cracked my PANs!" This talk focused on the poor practices that merchant gateways can use to generate PCI-compliant transaction tokens for online payments. The idea is: if you have one of these tokens, and store this instead of certain parts of PII, it will help protect your customers in the event of a breach. That's all fantastic on paper, but the execution of this policy is extremely important. However, [qu0rum] discovered that many MGPs will generate these tokens using insecure hashing schemes (say, for example, unsalted SHA1).
All of that leads to the awful position where the defenders believe they are far more well-off than they really are. At the same time, malicious actors will know better.
How should we go about correcting the problem?
This is something I have struggled with quite a bit. As a simple solution, one would assume that you either alter the hashing algorithms to something stronger, or even use a different scheme entirely (.e.g. UUIDs.) However, this is easier said than done. With massive amounts of infrastructure already in-place, possible misunderstandings about the technology, and no obvious epidemics to recognize or reference, where is the motivation for businesses to spend large amounts of money changing infrastructure that appears to work fine? If it's not broke, don't fix it! Right?
Except, it is broken, and a lot of people just don't know it. So now where do you go? There are only a few options from here, and none of them seem particularly good.
One answer is to do some research, and talk to the world about the problem. Maybe people will get riled up enough to actually want to do something and get the issue corrected. This DefCon talk could have been that. The problem here is that people may not listen. Unfortunately, it's now well into 2017 and not many people seem to have taken notice of [qu0rum]'s talk. Most people in tech that I try to talk to about this topic don't seem to even know transaction tokens may be a possible problem.
An alternate solution might be releasing tools which demonstrate the dire consequences of failing technologies, and hopefully inspire the defenders to take some action. This is the category I place tools like Hashcat into (although I recognize that Hashcat specifically grew from very different roots.) But the problem with this approach is, how can you trust the ways in which these tools will be used? Or abused, as the case may be. I've spoken to quite a few people about this exact dilemma. I wish there were an easy answer, but there isn't. People have vastly different perspectives, with quite a range of passion regarding this point.
You could sit down for quite a while trying to come up with theoretical options, but in the end I came to acknowledge that no matter what we choose to write, or how we choose to disseminate this information among defenders, the malicious actors will be writing their tools anyway. All it will mean is the defenders won't have the tools (or possibly even the insight) to know how to protect against these actors properly. Personally, I see that as a grave problem.
Given my choices, I tend to think giving defender the proper tools they need to understand a problem out-weighs the relatively smaller chance of abuse. I mean, Kali Linux is an entire OS built on this principle! Give defenders the tools they need to be effective.
It's an imperfect world, filled with imperfect solutions. All you can do is try your best at the right thing, and hope it all doesn't go south.
So please, if you use this tool, don't abuse it.
For defenders looking to test their infrastructures as part of a security life-cycle, I have crafted a new utility called ccsiege. Unlike [qu0rum]'s solution of modifying Hashcat directly, I thought it would be more useful to have a standalone utility which can be used to generate candidates. You can then further process the generated data before eventually piping it as input into whatever range of tools you happen to want to use. Here, we're no longer limited to just using Hashcat if we don't want to.
NOTE: The following examples illustrate some general use-cases of ccsiege and are not meant to specifically target any particular institution or region.
For example, one could choose to generate all valid candidates of PANs issued by MasterCard in the UK.
Or all of the PANs issued by MasterCard in Australia used by BankWest or Commonwealth Securities.
$ ccsiege --walk --issuers mastercard --country au --vendors bankwest,"Commonwealth Securities"
Additionally, you can use --verify and feed it data on stdin. This will output only the data which qualifies as a valid PAN candidate.
Looping back around to merchant gateways, let's pretend that the security team of the Acme company wanted to do some security analysis on the tokens Gateway X is handing them. They suspect these tokens are unsalted SHA1. In this example, we can use ccsiege to feed Hashcat and find out results.
Or, we could even use ccsiege for simply generating random PANs to be used with testing of online merchant systems.
It's easy to see the flexibility of this system. ccsiege allows us greater control on crafting specifically targeted tests, and can easily become a valuable tool for those trying to protect online merchant systems. I am placing the code on GitHub with a BSD license. All I ask is that you take care when using this software, and please don't use it for malice.


Starting operations in the United Kingdom is relatively simple and straightforward compared to areas such as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. That's why plenty of companies set their sights on the UK being their base for European expansion and end up familiarizing themselves with UK remittance along the way. There are a couple of nuances such as the apprenticeship levy and auto-enrollment into UK retirement and pension plans for employees. Overall, the region is a great choice for companies seeking a stable economy (pre-Brexit at least – time will tell) with plenty of resources available for keeping their multinational expansion in tip-top shape.
Getting money into the region to pay your company's employees is simple; it's usually just a matter of having the right partnerships and resources established. First, you'll need to ensure that your organization is set up as a legal UK employer, which includes a few options ranging from a full business entity to a more agile method for operations.
For larger organizations with more than 25 employees in-country, and those that must purchase real estate or are in manufacturing, your company will need to establish a legal entity to pay your team members.
The process for establishing a legal entity includes registering with the proper authorities, setting up a local bank account, and finding in-country partners to help you manage the compliance on a day-to-day basis. It can be a long and confusing process, not to mention expensive, especially if your organization is a small to midsize firm without plenty of in-house resources. While this may be necessary to operate in-country, you will want to explore all of your options before establishing a permanent entity, even in a secure area like the UK.
If your company is testing the waters and not necessarily ready to make a full commitment to the UK through a foreign subsidiary, you can take advantage of foreign employer exception. This option, which is only available in the UK and Thailand, allows your company to hire and pay local staff without making local withholdings and contributions, hence without needing a legal entity. Your employee will instead, bear the burden of UK tax and social security filings as if they were self-employed. This option is similar to hiring a foreign independent contractor. Your company will just need to ensure that the employee is working autonomously as to avoid contractor misclassification issues, which can be costly and time-consuming.
Another option, and arguably the most flexible and compliant method for UK remittance is International PEO (Professional Employer Organization). This service leverages a third-party's resources in-country to help your company get into markets quickly, efficiently and compliantly without setting up an entity. It ultimately enables your company to forego maintenance costs, onboard your candidates quickly, and keep global operations, including payroll, streamlined.
In general, paying your employees in the UK is straightforward and involves standard withholdings and pay schedules. Your organization will need to record your employees' pay including salary and wages, calculate deductions such as national tax and withholdings, calculate your company's contribution to the National Insurance fund, produce payslips for each employee, and report your team members' pay and deductions to HMRC in a Full Payment Submission (FPS).
The primary considerations for UK remittance are the withholdings including taxes, social security contributions and where and how your team members are paid. You can attempt to manage payroll in-house or work with a global payroll provider to help you consolidate your international payroll and take care of compliance.
When it comes to trading across borders, the UK is a bit more difficult, ranking number 28, compared to other countries around the globe. The lower ranking is likely a direct result of the impending Brexit, which will impact many aspects of doing business in the region. Currently, the EU membership allows Great Britain to sell goods and services across the bloc under a free trade agreement. Brexit creates some uncertainty given that the EU is the UK's biggest trading partner, providing a market for 44% of all British exports and supplying 53% of its imports.
Restrictions on trade could make getting money in and out of the country more difficult because of increased regulations, taxes, and tariffs.
Right now, there are many unknowns involving the effects of Brexit as negotiations between the EU and the UK get heated in 2018. While leadership is trying to avoid any disruption in business operations given the results of the transition, it appears that longer-term trade and the regulatory environment will not be defined for some years. This means that for a long period of time, there will be unresolved uncertainties surrounding the financial state of the region.
One area that can be directly impacted is the transfer of EU-specific money to and from the UK. When it comes to foreign currency transition, invoicing, and VAT, it's difficult to understand all of the regulations surrounding money transfers in the UK. This is another reason why it's beneficial to rely on a payroll provider to help your business navigate the difficulties involved with UK remittance, especially during a confusing transition period.
If you're interested in exploring more to save on payroll costs, reduce global treasury management headaches, or just need help maintaining compliance on the global scale, give us a call or shoot us a message. Thank you for your attention!


This course is designed for anyone wishing to undertake formal training operating a Pallet / Stacker truck in a warehouse or logistics environment.
To provide delegates with a thorough understanding of the hazards associated with incorrect procedures when operating the equipment. To give consideration to manual handling techniques and to have a working knowledge of various manoeuvring techniques of the vehicle.
This course can be delivered at a clients' site with the necessary equipment.


text:
Home What we do > Where we work > Middle East Gender Equality Programme
Middle East Gender Equality Programme
Women from Oxfam's partner organisation, League of Tunisian Female Electors, protest outside the National Constitutional Assembly for Tunisia to demand that women make up 50% of electoral lists. Photo: Serena Tramonti
Sarah Barakat, Programme Officer, Women's Access to Justice in the Middle East and North Africa
In this region, Oxfam aims, through different approaches, to ensure gender equality. Our objective is to give women the tools that allow them to take control of their own lives.
It's a broad-ranging project. We are working to end violence against women in Lebanon, Jordan and the occupied Palestinian Territories, by engaging with men and boys in these countries. We're involved in achieving social protection for widows in Iraq. Based on our experience in Yemen we promote women's access to justice in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. And we help women to take part in politics.
Full details of Oxfam's Middle East Gender Equality programme (PDF, 2MB)
Oxfam's projects like our Middle East Gender Equality Programme rely on your generosity.
I feel proud to be a woman capable of relying on herself. It is not shameful to work. I will work until the last day of my life, but I wish I had a pension to rely upon when I am no longer able to work.
Shafeeka, who has not seen her husband since the Gulf War
Related reports and papers
A Clean and Decent Life Without WASH? The impacts and risks of reduced WASH funding for Syrian refugees in Bekaa, Lebanon
A Fresh Start For Iraq: The case for debt relief
A Letter from Concerned International Non-Governmental Organisations Regarding the Humanitarian Consequences Of War In Iraq
Follow the campaign...
Occupied Palestinian territories and Israel
Oxfam in the Philippines
Somalia/Somaliland
Issues we work on
Sign up for Oxfam email updates
Oxfam Lottery
Your company and Oxfam
Donate £5 a month
Pay in your fundraising
Oxfam shop finder
Give a goat
Donate to our shops
Oxfam GB is a member of the international confederation Oxfam.


Yooka-Laylee is the upcoming 3D platformer from Playtonic Games and the spiritual successor to the popular Rare game, Banjo-Kazooie.
The adventure game features a chameleon and bat, named Yooka and Laylee and their quest to defeat the evil Capital B and his malevolent plan to control the world's literature and transform it into profit for his own business.
A manic, intense and hysterical multiplayer meltdown, pitting up to four players against each other for who can bag the most quills in the set time. The frozen platform which you spend racing around to grab the quills, will fall through, so you'll have to act quickly and be expected to fight to the death!
Probably the most competitive of the mini-games, because everyone fancies themselves an expert in 'carting games', yes, you are probably great at Crash Team Racing and Mario Kart, but that doesn't mean anything in this carting game.
A rendition of capture the flag, but instead add flames, little green monsters, jars with SKULLS and competitive opponents and you have yourself a great mini-game!
Dodge obstacles and swerve out the way of blockades, whilst fighting for space against your opponents. You also have a neat gun that you can use to blow up the little green monsters that stand in your way.
My favourite of the mini-games, where large blocks slide in and out of place, as you dart through avoiding hidden obstacles, whilst trying to collect the most quills. There can only be one winner!
A race to the finish line, blocked my gigantic poker chips and rows of die. Dodge, leap, block and remember to collect all the quills.
We'll be covering more of the Yooka-Laylee multiplayer action soon, so be sure to check back for an update and insight into the local co-op mini-games!