Missouri statutes require abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital (§ 188.025); require a pathology report for each abortion performed (§ 188.047); require the presence of a second physician during abortions performed after viability (§ 188.030.3); and require minors to secure parental consent or consent from the Juvenile Court for an abortion (§ 188.028). In an action challenging the constitutionality of these provisions, the District Court invalidated all provisions except § 188.047. The Court of Appeals reversed as to § 188.028 and § 188.047 but affirmed as to § 188.030.3 and § 188.025.
Held: Section 188.025 is unconstitutional, but §§ 188.047, 188.030.3, and 188.028 are constitutional.
664 F.2d 687, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the second trimester hospitalization requirement of § 188.025 "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion." Akron v. Akron Center of Reproductive Health, Inc., ante at 462 U. S. 439. 462 U. S. 481-482.
1. The second physician requirement of § 188.030.3 is constitutional as reasonably furthering the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses. Pp. 462 U. S. 482-486.
3. Section 188.028 is constitutional. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. And as interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean that the Juvenile Court cannot deny a minor's application for consent to an abortion "for good cause" unless the court first finds that the minor was not mature enough to make her own decision, § 188.028 provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with established legal standards. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante at 462 U. S. 439-440. Pp. 462 U. S. 490-493.
1. The second physician requirement of § 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State has a compelling interest, extant throughout pregnancy, in protecting and preserving fetal life. 462 U. S. 505.
2. The pathology report requirement of § 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion, and its validity is not contingent on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is imposed. P. 462 U. S. 505.
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on a minor's decision to undergo an abortion, the parental consent provision of § 188.028.2 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. P. 462 U. S. 505.
POWELL, J announced the judgment of the Court in Part VI and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which BURGER, C.J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 494. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 505.
JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court in Part VI and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II and an opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins.
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante p. 462 U. S. 416, and Simopoulos v. Virginia, post, p. 462 U. S. 506, present questions as to the validity of state statutes or local ordinances regulating the performance of abortions.
reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to § 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also held that the District Court erred in sustaining § 188.047, the pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with respect to the second physician requirement was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating to the second trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F.2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court adhered to its holding that the second trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F.2d 687, 691 (1981). We granted certiorari. 456 U.S. 988 (1982).
The Court today, in City of Akron, ante at 462 U. S. 426-431, has stated fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at issue.
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion." Ante at 462 U. S. 439. For the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is unconstitutional.
"[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.
"take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman."
See n 3, supra. It also provides that the second physician "shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant.
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and health of the woman. Many third trimester abortions in Missouri will be emergency operations, [Footnote 8] as the State permits these late abortions only when they are necessary to preserve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreasonable for the State to assume that, during the operation, the first physician's attention and skills will be directed to preserving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations where Missouri permits third trimester abortions, may be of assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health and life of the child.
circumstances where Missouri permits a third trimester abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a viable fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, [Footnote 9] but the State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We believe the second physician requirement reasonably furthers the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional.
"[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital."
abortions performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a pathologist.
complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, Schoenbaum, Monson, Stubblefield, & Ryan, Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J.A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 428 U. S. 81 (1976).
"absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue removed from abortion, or for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involves the removal of tissue from the human body."
decide to have an abortion] may be permissible where justified by important state health objectives."
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment,"
428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 81. [Footnote 14] We view the requirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.
provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with these established legal standards. [Footnote 18]"
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause:"
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; or"
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or"
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is denied."
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes Juvenile Courts [Footnote 20] to choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section.
"would initially require the court to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her own decision, and that an abortion was not in her best interests."
655 F.2d at 858. Plaintiffs contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not agree.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated Missouri's second trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld the State's parental and judicial consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).
* Together with No. 81-1623, Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, et al. v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Missouri Rev.Stat. § 188.025 (Supp.1982) provides: "Every abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a hospital."
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be made a part of the patient's permanent record."
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician performing or inducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, consistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman."
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of eighteen years unless:"
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent of the minor and one parent or guardian; or"
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or"
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or"
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, in compliance with subsection 3 of this section."
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the following procedures:"
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abortion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor majority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the next friend;"
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. . . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor;"
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is denied;"
"If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of and, if possible, sign the written consent required by Section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the life of the minor."
The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of fees. See 655 F.2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V), should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plaintiffs prevailed.
"'Hospital'' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-four hours in any week medical . . . care for three or more nonrelated individuals. . . ."
Cf. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and "with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo.Admin.Code § 50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of Social Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, and administration of hospitals. § 50-20.010 to 50-20.030. These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 462 U. S. 432, and n. 16.
The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's partial dissenting opinion agrees, post at 462 U. S. 499-500, that there is no possible justification for a second physician requirement whenever D&E is used, because no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F.Supp. at 694; 655 F.2d at 865. Accordingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second, D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed, almost all of the authorities disagree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's critical assumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure after viability is subject to the requirements of § 188.030.2. See id. at 865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible." Id. at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by those courts or by the partial dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the District Court referred in a footnote. 483 F.Supp. at 694, n. 25. This testimony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice movement." 3 Record 415-416. He supported the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See id. at 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead fetus." Id. at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," ibid., and finally that, "as a general principle," "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id. at 435. Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E abortion. Id. at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 2 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 3 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 5 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id. at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks); id. at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78-81 (deposition of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently Dr. Crist performed abortions only in Kansas, 3 Record 334, 368, 428, a State having no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is not clear whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were "contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E ever will be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare situations where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would justify invalidating § 188.030.3.
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote, the District Court cited -- with no elaboration -- Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not necessary, he considered the point mostly theoretical, because he "simply [did] not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion." 5 Record 836. When reminded of Dr. Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a medical standpoint. . . ." Ibid. Given that Dr. Crist's discordant testimony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second physician requirement even though there may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate every conceivable contingency.
There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for example, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section 188.030.3 is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 450 U. S. 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs).
See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, p. 4 (Dec.1979) (as high as 7% live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am.J.Obstet.Gynecol. 83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (1 survival out of 38 live births); 5 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27 weeks); id. at 729 (25-92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id. at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks).
A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatidiform moles or other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. See, e.g., ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed.1982) (1982 ACOG Standards); National Abortion Federation (NAF) Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief for American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae, O.T. 1982, Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, p. 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for nonhospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards").
ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed.1974). The current ACOG Standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination." 1982 ACOG Standards at 52. JUSTICE BLACMUN's partial dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these Standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was controversial within the College. See 5 Record 799-800. ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized -- on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions -- that, in a majority of them, a microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980).
The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 443 U. S. 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 428 U. S. 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to obtain proper pathology reports. See The Abortion Profiteers, Chicago Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals.
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pathology examination, JUSTICE BLACKMUN's partial dissent suggests that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post at 462 U. S. 498. But these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important for their protection.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's partial dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm because it does not require microscopic examination, post at 462 U. S. 496-497, but that misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. See n 12, supra; 5 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy") (emphasis added).
"[t]he added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits."
428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.055.2, § 188.060 (Supp.1982).
The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one, and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post at 462 U. S. 503-504. But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court, while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II (plurality opinion); 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 656-657 (WHITE,J., dissenting).
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section."
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need for the State Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions.
Cf. H. L. v. Matheson, supra, at 450 U. S. 406-407, and n. 14, 450 U. S. 411 (upholding a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notification detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that § 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F.2d at 873; 483 F.Supp. at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, § 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification.
The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. Cf. H. L. v. Matheson, supra, at 450 U. S. 407 (using word to describe a minor). Although the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo.App.1981) (quoting 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child § 86, p. 811 (1950)); In re Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo.App.1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo.App.1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.1959).
See n 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 18. 428 U.S. at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before our decision in Bellotti II.
We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to an "independent decisionmaker." H. L. v. Matheson, supra, at 450 U. S. 420 (POWELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent nonjudicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 643, n. 22.
Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of § 188.028.2(4), as evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 428 U. S. 146-147 (1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction to the State Supreme Court. See 655 F.2d at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, p. 525, n. 29 (1978 and Supp.1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I, supra, at 428 U. S. 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts to abstain.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante p. 462 U. S. 416, invalidates the city of Akron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provisions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy through abortion. I agree that Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the Akron analysis, and I join Parts 462 U. S. S. 481|>II of JUSTICE POWELL's opinion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the Court's prior decisions.
or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.047 (Supp.1982). This requirement applies to first trimester abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. Our past decisions establish that the performance of abortions during the first trimester must be left "free of interference by the State.'" Akron, ante at 462 U. S. 430, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 163 (1973). As we have noted in Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching upon first trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissible. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting first trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right," and must be "justified by important state health objectives." Akron, ante at 462 U. S. 430; see ante at 462 U. S. 489-490.
of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
". . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be sent for further pathologic examination. . . ."
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination."
National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis deleted).
readily detectable by a physician. 655 F.2d 848, 871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. [Footnote 2/2] While a pathologist may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo.Admin.Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of the attending physician and which will often make the pathologist's services unnecessary.
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist requirement] further[s] important health-related State concerns." Akron, ante at 462 U. S. 430. [Footnote 2/3] There has been no showing that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. Missouri does not require pathologists' reports for any other surgical procedures performed in clinics, or for minor surgery performed in hospitals. 13 Mo.Admin.Code § 50-20.030(3)(A)(7) (1977). Moreover, I cannot agree with JUSTICE POWELL that Missouri's pathologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante at 462 U. S. 489, on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a first trimester abortion by as much as $40. See 483 F.Supp. 679, 700, n. 48 (WD Mo.1980). Although this increase may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every woman seeking an abortion.
For the woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put the price of an abortion beyond reach. [Footnote 2/4] Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 383 U. S. 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 360 U. S. 255, 360 U. S. 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to appellate review for indigents).
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 428 U. S. 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor recordkeeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps approach[ed] impermissible limits." Today, in Akron, we have struck down restrictions on first trimester abortions that "may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." Ante at 462 U. S. 447-448; see ante at 462 U. S. 449-451. Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits have been exceeded.
shall take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion."
Mo.Rev. Stat § 188.030.3 (Supp.1982). The Court recognized in Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal health and protecting the potentiality of human life may justify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abortions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must be "tailored to the recognized state interests." Id. at 410 U. S. 165; see H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 450 U. S. 413 (1981) ("statute plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake").
The second physician requirement is upheld in these cases on the basis that it "reasonably furthers the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante at 462 U. S. 486. While I agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only when the abortion method used is one that may result in a live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction does not apply when this method "would present a greater risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.030.2 (Supp.1982).
F.Supp. at 694. [Footnote 2/5] When a D&E abortion is performed, the second physician can do nothing to further the State's compelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence is superfluous. The second physician requirement thus is overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the fetus." 655 F.2d at 865-866.
health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 439 U. S. 400 (1979).
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman,"
could be construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions without a second physician. Ante at 462 U. S. 485, n. 8. This construction is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause upon which JUSTICE POWELL relies refers to the duties of both physicians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with.
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court order. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.028 (Supp.1982).
"the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."
agreed that a Massachusetts statute permitting a judicial veto of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion was unconstitutional. See id. at 443 U. S. 649-650 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id. at 443 U. S. 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Although four Justices stated in Bellotti II that an appropriately structured judicial consent requirement would be constitutional, id. at 443 U. S. 647-648 (opinion of POWELL, J.), this statement was not necessary to the result of the case, and did not command a majority. Four other Justices concluded that any judicial consent statute would suffer from the same flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and his patient. 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 655-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties. . . . As a practical matter, I would suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the best interest of the minor. That standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor -- particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision -- is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision."
Ibid. (footnote omitted). Because Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.028 (Supp.1982) permits a parental or judicial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would hold it unconstitutional.
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examination. . . . An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination."
The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" for every abortion. 483 F.Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo.1980).
JUSTICE POWELL appears to draw support from the facts that "questionable practices" occur at some abortion clinics, while at others "the standards of medical practice . . . may not be the highest." Ante at 462 U. S. 489, n. 12. There is no evidence, however, that such questionable practices occur in Missouri.
A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first trimester abortion by 20% or more. See 655 F.2d 848, 869, n. 35 (1981) (cost of first trimester abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, & P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) (cost of first trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of first trimester clinic abortion is $190); National Abortion Federation Membership Directory 18-19 (1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first trimester abortion).
The District Court relied on the testimony of Doctors Robert Crist and Richard Schmidt. Doctor Crist testified that, in some instances, abortion methods other than D&E would be "absolutely contraindicated" by the woman's health condition, 3 Record 438-439, giving the example of a recent patient with hemolytic anemia that would have been aggravated by the use of prostaglandins or other labor-inducing abortion methods, id. at 428. Doctor Schmidt testified that "[t]here very well may be" situations in which D&E would be used because other methods were contraindicated. 5 Record 836. Although Doctor Schmidt previously had testified that a post-viability D&E abortion was "almost inconceivable," this was in response to a question by the State's attorney regarding whether D&E would be used "[a]bsent the possibility that there is extreme contraindication for the use of prostaglandins or saline, or of hysterotomy." Id. at 787. Any inconsistencies in Doctor Schmidt's testimony apparently were resolved by the District Court in the plaintiffs' favor.
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's factual finding that health reasons sometimes would require the use of D&E for post-viability abortions. 655 F.2d at 865. Absent the most exceptional circumstances, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507, 445 U. S. 512, n. 6 (1980).
In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the method or technique employed." Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.030.2 (Supp.1982). This ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one.
"[i]f the statute specifically excepted D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more frequently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the newborn."
"If a physician is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no rational connection with a patient's needs, and unduly infringes on the physician's right to practice."
"Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since, of course, 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.'"
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 405 U. S. 520 (1972), quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 402 U. S. 369 (1971).
A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second physician requirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 188.065, § 188.075 (1978 and Supp.1982).
Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second physician requirement impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second physician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a normal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the woman's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (5th ed., 1982) ("The individual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty").
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and teamwork are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room, a patient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detriment of both woman and child.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
For reasons stated in my dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante p. 462 U. S. 416, I believe that the second trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming, arguendo, that the requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless "reasonably relat[e] to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 163 (1973). I therefore dissent from the Court's judgment that the requirement is unconstitutional.
I agree that the second physician requirement contained in § 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State possesses a compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, but I believe that this state interest is extant throughout pregnancy. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.
I agree that the pathology report requirement imposed by § 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contingent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I agree that the parental consent provision contained in § 188.028 is constitutional. However, I believe that the provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I concur in the judgment of the Court on this issue.
I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983).
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.


Learn how the top performing medical & wellness operators leverage our member management software for optimum service and healthy outcomes.
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This is Compete® at a glance.
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Our intuitive Front Desk module is a user-friendly application that allows you to check in a member, add notes, sell memberships, complete POS transactions and much more!
Designed for the active club environment, it boasts a touch-optimized interface that allow for easy navigation. On the back end, our front desk was developed to give your staff the visibility they need into various member alerts and profiles. Our Front Desk supports a wide range of connected hardware peripherals and allows for role-based security to control data access by your staff.
Our comprehensive Back Office module is the heart and soul of the system. Here, you can configure club roles, create/modify agreements, edit member profiles, run your billing, create billing presets and access any custom or ad hoc reports…. and that's just the beginning.
The level of customization in our back office truly lets you keep a close eye on your business and provides you the data you need to make informed business-decisions. As with all facets of our solutions, the back office is entirely integrated with your database – this means that any change made in the front office or back office alike is reflected immediately in your records.
Imagine not being tied to a computer when signing up a new member – why not complete new membership agreements while giving them a tour of your club or when on an off-site promotional event? Enter Compete® "On the Go".
Compete® "On the Go" (COG) is the mobile arm to our club management software. There is no longer a need to be tied to a computer when signing up a member or even enrolling them in a class.
Join Online (JOL) & Empower M.E.
We offer an entire suite of member engagement solutions. At the head of the class are our Join Online (JOL) and Empower M.E. solutions.
JOL allows a prospect to sign up and pay for an agreement without ever having to step foot in your club. In today's digital environment, this is the perfect solution for the modern-day client, a way for them to connect, enroll and hit the ground running in their fitness journey.
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A fully-integrated member management software solution.
Here's some more on what we do.
Beyond our over 300+ canned reports, Compete® boasts an AdHoc Query Report Builder – allowing you to build custom reports at no extra cost. All reports are exportable to Microsoft Excel.
We partner with the best-of-breed software companies in the industry via our open API. With a network of over 40 integrations, our software provides a hub for all of your connected software solutions.
Do away with a messy, inefficient paper trail. Compete® supports paperless agreements and e-waivers – housing all the information you need in a single point of access.
Year after year we've consistently met our goal of 99.9% system uptime. This means that our software is always 'on' so you don't have to worry about any missed revenue caused by software outages.
There's always room for improvement. Our product team, delivers 3-4 strategic software releases every year and a dedicated R&D team whose only focus is to deliver on client-specific (Voice of the Customer) requests.
We offer around the clock support for your club when it comes to our software. Whether you need some with a member record or find a bug in the product, you can be confident we'll always be there for you.
Say hello to Compete® "On the Go" (COG), the mobile arm to our club management software; the alternative to the traditional, static front desk.
COG allows your staff to free themselves from the front counter and sell to members and prospects while leading tours of your facility or on off-site promotional events. COG is the perfect tool to help you cut back on long wait times at the counter by helping you streamline the sales process. It provides you with all the tools you need out of your gym management software without the need to be stationary.
Empower M.E. provides your members' instant access to account history, online statements and electronic agreements history. Empower M.E. syncs with your Compete database ensuring your member's personal and payment information is always up to date, saving you the time and money of verifying expired member data.
Online payments with pre-specified credit cards making it simple and easy to keep their payment information up to date.
Join Online (JOL) allows a prospect to sign up and pay for an agreement without ever having to step foot in your club. In today's digital environment, this is the perfect solution for the modern-day client, a way for them to connect, enroll and hit the ground running in their fitness journey.
Employee Self-Service (ESS) enables you, your employees and personal trainers to more efficiently manage their schedules and connect with members.
Your custom branded club app on every member's phone.
The Club Branded Mobile App service by Jonas Fitness offers a fully functioning app that provides a convenient yet powerful platform for your business to engage with your members, whether they are inside your facility, at home or climbing a mountain.
Your mobile app will integrate seamlessly with your Compete software. This allows you to leverage your existing data to drive meaningful and dynamic content into the app, promoting secondary spend, attendance and, above all, convenience for your members.
It is also a useful tool to drive membership sales, as you can encourage prospects to download your app and claim free passes to your facility, a strategy that has helped some clubs double their conversion rates.
Truly integrated software, billing and payment processing at your fingertips. This is Compete® by Jonas Fitness.
Experience the power of our patented, fully-integrated billing engine.
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Columbus – Andrea Collen scored the game-winning goal in overtime to propel the No. 23 UNC Pembroke Lady Braves to a surprising Peach Belt Conference victory over No. 14 Columbus State Friday night at the Walden Soccer Complex.
CSU falls to 1-1-1 on the year while UNCP improves to 3-0-1 on the season.
Collen's goal came in the 98th minute of action as she created a turnover in the CSU defensive third. She then hit a blast from the left side of the field that kept tailing towards the right side of the net dipping below the crossbar and into the back of the net.
The win was just the second all-time for the Lady Braves over CSU and snapped Columbus State's eight game winning streak over the PBC foe.
Columbus State had numerous chances in regulation to knock one in but was unable to capitalize. The first came in the 17th minute when Josefin de Broen served a corner kick into the box that was knocked around several times before landing at the foot of Stephanie Lowery whose shot went into the side netting. CSU's best opportunity in the first half came from Shea Wilby when she tried to send a shot into the right side of the goal but was just wide.
Kiana Nicholson almost scored right out of the shoot of the second half that had the ball being bounced around in the box in the 47th minute and Nicholson shot was heading towards the back of the net but a Lady Brave kept it from crossing the goal line.
As the statsheet indicates, the Lady Cougars dominated most of the possession as they outshot UNCP 21-10 in the contest and had a 7-1 advantage in corner kicks. Mary Mancin (1-1-1) made four saves for CSU allowing just the one goal while Brittney Bennett (3-0-1) kept the clean sheet picking up nine saves.
Columbus State returns to action on Sunday when they take on Barry in a non-conference matchup at the Walden Soccer Complex. Barry defeated West Georgia earlier in the afternoon in Columbus by a score of 2-1. The two sides played one of the most entertaining games of the year a season ago as CSU defeated the Buccaneers 4-3 in overtime.


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Inter Milan are now seventh in the Serie A and will not qualify for European competition, meaning they may need to sell some of their players to balance their books. Ivan Perisic is a transfer target for Manchester United , Inter director Piero Ausilio has confirmed. Ligue 1 giants, Paris Saint-Germain are also believed to be interested in the Croatia global, who only wants a move to Old Trafford after he reportedly held talks with Mourinho in March.
The British intelligence unit has reportedly stopped sharing intelligence with its USA counterpart after American media exposed profiles of the suspects of Monday's explosion at Manchester Arena. Greater Manchester Police were said to be "furious" and said they would stop sharing information with the US. It's the second time this month that Trump's administration has faced questions about the sanctity of intelligence shared by foreign governments.
That was one of the biggest, of course. "I stayed in life and I have all my fingers". But Kvitova, who is returning to action a month earlier than expected, said in Paris Friday that she believed she would return. I was always staring at the guys and looking if there are strangers there. "But with the time, it's better". When Boserup threatened to pull back from 3-0 to 3-2 in the opening set, Kvitova roared and pumped her fist when she saved a break point.
After the Cavs dropped Game 3 in Cleveland , then bounced back with a win in Game 4 despite some shaky moments, and to get the series-clinching Game 5 victory, the Cavaliers turned to their Big Three of James, Kevin Love and Kyrie Irving .
Game 4 will be Tuesday night in Cleveland before the series moves back to Boston for Game 5 Thursday. And speaking of rare, even leaving aside the odds and the arc both teams were tracing, there are a few other things that should not have happened in Game 3, but did.
The multiple-title winning team hasn't scored a podium since its switched to Honda power in 2015 and is now without points so far in 2017, but has maintained a high profile in recent weeks as a result of the team's decision to make a one-off Indy 500 bid with Alonso at the wheel.
He said players always need new challenges and will benefit from a change in leadership, and the club will certainly keep winning despite his departure. "This is a historic event ", he said. And, famously anti-Real Madrid , he has confirmed he is likely to miss Los Blancos in action in the Champions League final against Juventus .
After leading the Cleveland Cavaliers to their third straight Eastern Conference championship and trip to the NBA Finals, the last thing LeBron James wanted to talk about is the Golden State Warriors . He got the debate ranging on if he is the best point guard in the Eastern Conference and anyway you look at it, Irving is an elite National Basketball Association player on a great Cavaliers team .
It will grab a lot of eye balls. "We don't do well overseas, it's like a knife hanging over your head", he said. We have done it in the last couple of years. "IPL has only done good for Indian cricket". "After the kind of season we had, it teaches you a lot about the mindset that you need to have". It doesn't matter in what condition I am playing.
Despite the heartbreak of losing the final at Wembley the Chelsea players will eventually be able to look back upon the season as a success according to Shearer. I love to build, I love to get people going and I love what I do. "We had outstanding performances", Wenger said. "It's not a good feeling", the Belgian global told Chelsea's official website .
Hamilton will start 12th after penalties for other drivers but faces major damage to his title hopes with rival Sebastian Vettel's Ferrari on the front row. Instead, the three-time F1 champion could only get the 14th best time . This is one of the most mentally-demanding circuits and am glad I felt support from the fans and appreciated it."This weekend has been a bit tricky for us", said Bottas , who clocked 1:12.223.
Yesterday's setback, albeit on a surface the German has no great affection for, threatens to leave her season in tatters in which she could lose her No. Both year-end No. 1s appeared on the cover of Tennis Magazine's season-preview issue, and the jinx has already reared its ugly head. For the 40th-ranked Makarova, the Kerber victory is a first in her career as she lost the four previous times she played a reigning world No.


One of the first things you should do is perform an overall financial checkup. The end of the year is always a good time to assess your current financial situation and plan for the future. You should think about cash-flow, health care, retirement, investment, and estate planning. Check wills, powers of attorney, and health care proxies for changes that may have occurred during the year. Use the open enrollment period to reconsider employer-sponsored programs that could reduce next year's taxable income. HSAs and flexible spending accounts for dependent care or medical expenses allow you to use pre-tax dollars. Remember, it's never too early or too late to start planning for the future.
1. Accelerate deductions and defer income: Deferring tax is a cornerstone of tax planning. Generally, this means accelerating deductions into the current year and deferring income into the next year. There are plenty of income items and expenses you may be able to control. Consider deferring bonuses, consulting income, or self-employment income. On the deduction side, you may be able to accelerate state and local income taxes, interest payments, and real estate taxes. Donating appreciated stock is an especially valuable tool. You are allowed to take the deduction, but you do not need to pick up the appreciation as taxable income.
2. Make up a tax shortfall with increased withholding: Don't forget that taxes are due throughout the year. Check your withholding and estimated tax payments now while you have time to fix a problem. If you're in danger of being assessed an underpayment penalty, try to make up the shortfall through increased withholding on your salary or bonuses. A bigger estimated tax payment can still leave you exposed to penalties for previous quarters, while withholding is considered to have been paid ratably throughout the year.
3. Don't squander your gift tax exclusion: You can give up to $14,000 to as many people as you wish in 2014, free of gift or estate tax. You get a new annual gift tax exclusion every year, so don't let it go to waste. If you combine gifts with a spouse, you can give up to $28,000 per beneficiary, per year. For example, a couple with three grown children who are married could give each couple $56,000 each and remove a total of $168,000 gift tax-free in a single year. Even more could be given tax-free if grandchildren are included.


How do I configure CDRouter for DHCPv6 prefix delegation?
CDRouter's IPv6 add-on supports DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation (RFC 3633) on the WAN to dynamically assign an IPv6 prefix for the DUT to use on its LAN interfce(s).
DHCPv6 prefix delegation is enabled by setting dhcpv6WanEnablePD testvar to yes. IPv6 must also be enabled on the WAN interface (ie. ipv6WanMode must be set to DHCP, static, PPPoE, or autoconf).
The prefix and prefix length provided by CDRouter's DHCPv6 server on the WAN are specified by the testvars dhcpv6WanAssignPrefix and dhcpv6WanAssignPrefixLen.
The testvar dhcpv6WanAssignNextPrefix specifies a free prefix on the WAN used for renumbering tests. The testvar dhcpv6PDLatency defines the amount of time, in seconds, it takes the DUT to update its LAN side IPv6 settings when a new IPv6 prefix is learned on the WAN.
By default, the delegated prefix defined above may not include the DUT's global WAN address. CDRouter will generate an error if the ipv6WanIspAssignIp testvar overlaps with the delegated prefix.
The DHCPv6 Prefix Exclude option (RFC 6603) specifically allows an exception to this rule and must be enabled in order for CDRouter to allow this configuration.
For more information and configuration examples, please see the IPv6 Addressing with Prefix Delegation article in our Knowledge Base.


text:
Bruno Fischer (29 June 1908 – 16 March 1992) was a German-born American author of weird and crime fiction.

Biography
The son of a grocer, Fischer was born in Berlin, Germany, on 29 June 1908.  Bruno emigrated to the United States with his family in 1913, attending high school in Long Island.  He later attended the Rand School of Social Science and married Ruth Miller, a secretary, in 1934. Fischer became a sports reporter and then police reporter for the Long Island Daily Press (1929–31), following this with stints writing and editing at the Labor Voice (1931–32), Socialist Call (1934–36), and Modern Monthly.  In the 1936 election he ran as a candidate for New York's 14th district, and in 1938 he ran for the New York State Senate (12th district, Manhattan), both times under the Socialist banner.

With journalism providing an unreliable income, at a friend's recommendation Fischer tried his hand at writing for the pulps. Among the hundreds of pulp titles available at that time, Fischer was taken by the horror/terror titles, the so-called "shudder pulps:" Dime Mystery, Terror Tales, Sinister Stories, and others.  He sold his first story immediately, a horror tale ("The Cat Woman", Dime Mystery, November 1936).  While he often wrote under his own name, this first story and others came out under the pseudonym "Russell Gray", a name he had used during his newspaper days when writing two pieces for the same edition.  Other pulp stories appeared under the pen name Harrison Storm, but he no longer used this pseudonym after 1943. Initially Fischer became known as a purveyor of stories within the "weird menace" and "defective detective" subgenres, the latter being detectives with distinctive physical flaws. However, as Fischer recalled, these markets ended quite suddenly:In 1940 I was living in Florida with my family when the whole terror-horror market collapsed....  I got a letter saying the magazines had folded, and all my unpublished stories were returned. They just stopped, just like that. It was a shock. Just one day the market was gone.With his original markets gone, he moved to more general detective and crime fiction, with stories appearing in Dime Detective, Black Mask, and others. Ultimately he published several hundred stories, claiming to have written some two million words of fiction from 1937 to 1941 alone.

Fischer published his first novel, So Much Blood, in 1939. As the pulps died off in the late 40s and early 50s, novels became his primary output, though several of his short stories still appeared in the digest magazines (like Manhunt and Mike Shayne Mystery Magazine) that were the pulps' successor. Several of his books were published by Dell and Lion Books, including the popular Ben Helm series of P. I. novels. Paperback-original publishing house Gold Medal Books took on Fischer on the recommendation of John D. MacDonald. Gold Medal released several of his novels in the 1950s; House of Flesh (Gold Medal #123, 1950) sold some 1.8 million copies. An early member of the Mystery Writers of America, he was the editor of one of their annual short story collections, 1953's Crooks' Tour, and he is known to have written at least one erotic novel in 1970 (Domination, Olympia/Ophelia Press) under the pen name "Jason K. Storm".

In the 1960s Fischer worked as executive editor for Collier Books and education editor at the Arco Publishing Company. His last novel was 1973's The Evil Days, written after the demands of his job and a lengthy writer's block had greatly reduced his output. Following this he spent his later years between a summer home in a socialist cooperative community in New York's Putnam County (the Three Arrows Cooperative Society) and the Mexican town of San Miguel de Allende, where he sometimes gave lectures to the expatriate retirees about his adventures as a mystery writer. Nearly blind towards the end of his life, he died of a stroke while on a Mexican vacation with his wife on 16 March 1992.

Noted critic Anthony Boucher once wrote that Fischer displayed "a warm understanding of human relationships". Fischer himself described his "usual manner" of writing as containing "movement and suspense with very little violence" and as being about "ordinary people in extraordinary situations". His novels sold some 10 million copies and his works were translated into 12 languages, but by the time of his death he had largely faded into obscurity like many crime writers of his era. Modern releases of his books have been made by Stark House Press, while two volumes of his short story work as Russell Gray have been released by Ramble House.

Bibliography

General novels

 So Much Blood (1939; aka Stairway to Death)
 The Hornet's Nest (1944)
 Quoth the Raven (1944; aka Croaked the Raven; The Fingered Man)
 Kill to Fit (1946)
 The Pigskin Bag (1946)
 The Spider Lily (1946)
 The Bleeding Scissors (1948; aka The Scarlet Scissors)
 The Lustful Ape (1950; with Lion Books as Russell Gray; re-released that same year by Gold Medal as Bruno Fischer)
 House of Flesh (1950)
 Fools Walk In (1951)
 The Lady Kills (1951)
 The Fast Buck (1952)
 Run for Your Life (1953)
 So Wicked My Love (1954; a shorter version appeared in Manhunt, November 1953, as "Coney Island Incident")
 Knee-Deep in Death (1956)
 Murder in the Raw (1957)
 Second-Hand Nude (1959)
 The Girl Between (1960)
 The Evil Days (1973)

The Ben Helm series
 The Dead Men Grin (1945)
 More Deaths Than One (1947)
 The Restless Hands (1949; a shorter version first appeared in Mystery Book Magazine, Summer 1949)
 The Angels Fell (1950; aka The Flesh Was Cold)
 The Silent Dust (1950)
 The Paper Circle (1951; aka Stripped for Murder)
 "Dead Men Grin, The" (Two Complete Detective Books, Sep 1946)
 "The Quiet Woman" (Dell Mystery Novels Magazine, Jan/Mar 1955; re-released in the Oct. 1962 issue of Mike Shayne's Mystery Magazine as "Death Attends Rehearsal")

References

1908 births
1992 deaths
German emigrants to the United States
American crime fiction writers

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