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Statement for the Record of Human Rights First on the Authorization For Use Of Military Force After Iraq And Afghanistan
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Human Rights First welcomes the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's attention to the status and future of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). The debate at hand raises profound legal and policy issues that are critical to our democracy and our security. Is the United States engaged in armed conflict as defined by international law? If so, does the 2001 AUMF meet domestic and international legal criteria for authorizing the types of use of force that the United States is now employing?
These questions may seem inessential at best to policy makers and operators intent on securing authorization to go after a suspect or push an interrogation in real time. And they may seem academic or a luxury when placed against the lives of comrades lost on the battlefield in Afghanistan, or the fate of 200 girls ripped from school into sexual servitude.
In fact, the strong wall between war and peace underpins the democratic stability that Boko Haram wants to keep out of Nigeria and Osama Bin Laden sought to undermine here at home. A state of perpetual warfare skews our policymaking framework towards decisions designed to eliminate – rather than manage – threats, an unrealistic goal that leads to unbalanced and unhealthy policy results. The longer the United States remains in a state of armed conflict to take advantage of the flexibility war allows, the more likely it is that extraordinary powers become the norm and, in the worst case, that policies creep in that are the hallmarks of dictatorships and enemies of human rights: detentions without charge or trial, extrajudicial killings, military tribunals, and mass surveillance.
In recent years, military and diplomatic leaders have documented the high increasing costs of prolonged and global armed conflict: partners and allies reluctant to cooperate on counterterrorism operations, authoritarian leaders cynically pointing to U.S. excesses to justify their own repressive policies, loss of support and trust in American efforts among publics in countries such as Yemen. At home as well, public controversy and distrust has risen around every aspect of our wartime activities. And counterterrorism professionals continue to point to a suite of core competencies – non-military policies that are essential to our security – that are under-emphasized and under-resourced.
To date, Congress, military leaders, and outside experts have debated reforms and transparency piecemeal. Below, Human Rights First reviews the legal and policy ramifications of maintaining the current AUMF, adopting a new one, or moving to reliance on non-war national security authorities, and makes the following recommendations:
Congress and the administration should publicly debate and clarify the shifting nature of the threat posed by Al Qaeda, and the core competencies and additional legal authorities, if any, needed to keep Americans secure.
The administration should remedy the lack of transparency about current U.S. policy under the AUMF, by disclosing to Congress and the American people:
With which groups the administration considers the United States to be at war;
Which groups the administration considers to be "associated forces;"
The countries in which military force is currently being used, the criteria it uses to classify targets and collateral damage; and
Any and all legal memoranda and policy guidance that govern lethal targeting operations.
The administration should describe in concrete and specific terms the conditions necessary to bring an end to the armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated forces.
The administration should clarify and reform its legal and policy framework for the use of lethal force outside of active zones of hostilities to put it on more solid footing by bringing it further in line with the requirements of international human rights law.
Congress should hold a series of hearings, with the cooperation of the administration, to examine the most effective way to narrow and ultimately repeal the 2001 AUMF. Congress should not pass any new AUMF that would expand the mandate contained within the 2001 AUMF.
The administration and Congress should seek and implement a bi-partisan solution to remove one of the most problematic legacies of the AUMF – the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay – by transferring all cleared detainees to their home or third countries, prosecuting detainees suspected of criminal conduct in Article III courts, and transferring the remaining detainees to the United States with a view toward their ultimate release or prosecution elsewhere.
Is war the best way for the government to organize, and citizens to understand, a campaign that reflects few of the attributes of how we understood war for hundreds of years?
The law has much to say about this; America's best lawyers and soldiers believed a clear separation between wartime and peacetime behavior was essential, and worked to codify it in our laws and international law.
This hearing has as its starting point a legal debate: is the United States engaged in armed conflict as defined by international law? If so, does the 2001 AUMF meet domestic and international legal criteria for authorizing the types of use of force that the United States is now employing?
In fact, the strong wall between war and peace underpins the democratic stability that Boko Haram seeks to keep out of Nigeria and Osama Bin Laden sought to undermine here at home. A state of perpetual warfare skews our policymaking framework towards decisions designed to eliminate – rather than manage – threats, an unrealistic goal that leads to unbalanced and unhealthy policy results. The longer the United States remains in a state of armed conflict to take advantage of the flexibility war allows, the more likely it is that extraordinary powers become the norm and, in the worst case, that policies creep in that are the hallmarks of dictatorships and enemies of human rights: detentions without charge or trial, extrajudicial killings, military tribunals, and mass surveillance.
Congress, military leaders, and outside experts have debated such reforms piecemeal, out of concern for fundamental rights and freedoms and a sense that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are warped by an over-emphasis on tools available in wartime.
Course correction must come with limiting the scope of the government's claimed armed conflict to situations that actually resemble war – the exchange of hostilities of sufficient intensity between the United States and another state or an organized armed group. They can begin when the administration sets out clearly where and against whom it believes the United States to be in an armed conflict, and works with Congress to decide whether such authority is the wisest choice to achieve its objectives. The United States clearly remains in an armed conflict in Afghanistan. However, counterterrorism operations far from any battlefield against groups that have limited to no connection to core Al Qaeda or the Taliban and the 9/11 attacks do not fall within an armed conflict framework, unless the facts on the ground meet the legal test for what constitutes an armed conflict under international law: ongoing hostilities of sufficient intensity with an organized armed group. Sporadic acts of violence or terrorist attacks by groups or individuals do not meet this test.
Despite the best efforts of intelligence and security agencies, the United States will likely continue to face threats from terrorism, which may result in successful terrorist attacks such as the attacks against our embassy in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. The response, however, cannot and should not be to declare war or authorize the use of military force against any terrorist group that presents a concern to the United States. To do so would not only be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the rule of law, but would also likely be ineffective in the long-term struggle against extremist groups that seek to goad the United States into overreaction.
WHAT IS THE AUMF?
Three days after the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the most open-ended Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in American history. This law's key sixty-word sentence granted then-President George W. Bush power to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" that he determined either executed the attacks or aided those who did.[1]
The AUMF does not specify whom its mandate is directed against, or what military objectives would satisfy the mandate. Perhaps consequently, in the nearly 13 years since its passage, the AUMF has been invoked not only to conduct the war in Afghanistan but also to justify targeted killings under the drone program reaching from Somalia to Yemen and the prolonged detention without charge of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Bagram Air Field. It has contributed to a wartime climate enabling expanded government powers such as the PATRIOT Act and the NSA's expansive domestic surveillance programs.
WHY REVISIT IT
The 2001 AUMF was passed by Congress within days of the 9/11 attacks, before the Bush Administration had identified with certainty the full universe of those perpetrators.
As the Obama Administration prepares to end combat operations in Afghanistan, numerous legal authorities have called into question the continued viability of the AUMF. The Supreme Court stated of the AUMF in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that "If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding [of who may be detained until the cessation of hostilities] may unravel."[2] This concern has been echoed by Brigadier General Mark Martins,[3] chief prosecutor for the military commission trials at Guantanamo Bay, and former Pentagon General Counsel Jeh Johnson,[4] now Secretary of Homeland Security.
The 2001 AUMF is, on paper, confined to organizations responsible for committing or helping with the 9/11 attacks, or others who harbored them – generally understood to be core Al Qaeda, the group directly led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and other groups directly engaged in hostilities with the United States. The administration has officially interpreted those organizations to include Al Qaeda and "associated forces," including groups such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), even though groups such as AQAP have little to no connection to the 9/11 attacks.
Terrorist organizations in the headlines today, and groups that now pose specific, credible threats to the United States, often have a loose or unclear connection to "core Al Qaeda" and the 9/11 attackers. Security professionals from across the political spectrum have commented that the 2001 AUMF bears little relevance to the shape of the struggle against terrorist groups that the United States remains engaged in.
At least as important, the greatly varying tactics and levels of competence and ambition of our adversaries do not lend themselves to the set of rules and policies set aside in law as "armed conflict," or the all-or-nothing approach evoked for Americans by the word "war."
"Armed Conflict" is no longer the most effective paradigm for U.S. counterterrorism policy
An over-reliance on our military does a disservice to the extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and human capital resources that the United States can marshal in support of policy goals. Moreover, pursuing an unachievable goal of complete security, contributing to an inability to contextualize threats appropriately and deploy a full range of counterterrorism strategies short of war-making contributes to a dangerous stagnation in the foreign policy making apparatus of the U.S. government.
Shifting away from the authorities created by the overstretching of the 2001 AUMF is the first step in reforming U.S. counterterrorism policy. By continuing institutional development of core competencies and acknowledging the shifting nature of the Al Qaeda threat, the U.S. government can move from the post-September 11th framework to a more nuanced and flexible approach to protecting our security. Given how our adversaries have evolved, where the existing approach has succeeded and where it has failed, such a shift will be more effective. Winding down controversial wartime activities will free resources and attention to remake our security assistance, promote security sector reform, the rule of law and democracy, and innovate in economic approaches. Those are changes that will ensure the United States can marshal its full military, economic, and human capital resources for ongoing efforts to thwart the tactics and perpetrators of terrorism.
The large-scale wars in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted under the AUMF have carried a heavy price tag for the U.S. military, particularly on equipment, personnel, and veterans. The Department of Defense can anticipate an extremely large price tag for the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, and even more costly will be the replenishing of obsolete or defective equipment. Linda J. Bilmes writes that "equipment, material, vehicles and other fixed assets have depreciated at an estimated 6 times the peacetime rate, due to heavy utilization, poor repair and upkeep in the field, and the harsh conditions in the region."[5] In 2008 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Richard Cody drew attention to the wars' effects on readiness, arguing that because of heavy deployments, soldiers and marines lacked training for major combat operations using their entire range of weapons. In this testimony, Cody stated that the Army did not have fully ready combat brigades on standby should another threat or conflict occur.[6] At a time of tight budgets, and national debate over how to meet our obligations to the members of our armed forces and maintain readiness for tomorrow's security threats, an existing AUMF which would permit a return to large-scale combat, and encourage the flow of resources into military counterterrorism as opposed to other policy options, is not in the nation's interest.
As a world leader that promotes prosperity, opportunity, and liberty, the United States should be actively seeking a state of affairs in which armed conflict is minimized and cabined, rather than a permanent state of war with occasional lulls in the fighting.
Asserting that we are entrenched in constant struggle and armed conflict projects to the world a lack of confidence in our ideals and institutions, and it sends the wrong message about the power of our opponents. As George Kennan wrote 68 years ago about another atypical international conflict, the Cold War, the central challenge facing the United States was to "create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time."[7]
Instead, the continuation of the policies enacted within a war paradigm after 9/11—ramped-up levels of targeted killings, lack of transparency about targets and outcomes, continued questions around rendition, detention, surveillance, detention at Guantanamo and prosecutions by military commission – is damaging our global leadership and credibility on basic human rights and the rule of law.
Simply put, the war-based policies the United States has adopted are not popular with our allies or with civilians in the countries where we are engaged in a contest of ideals with extremists, and where the outcome may depend on people's belief that the United States is on their side.[8]
The unpopularity of these policies is cynically exploited by those who wish us ill, and those who benefit from the United States' diminished influence. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Syria's Bashar al-Assad, and Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have all pointed to Guantanamo to deflect attention from human rights abuses in their own countries. When the United States advocates with other governments for respect for human rights, its words are instantly undermined when a newscast sets images of Guantanamo against the American assertions of human rights as universal values.
War-based policies have specific negative consequences for our security. Extremist groups use them to attract recruits; the New York Times has reported that "drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants."[9]
These policies also undercut our ability to cooperate with crucial partners and allies. After a U.S. drone strike in Waziristan killed two German citizens in 2011, Germany restricted the type of information it shares with the United States, a sharp reversal from being an eager partner in America's fight against terrorism.[10]
Our insistence on using military commissions rather than federal courts to prosecute some terrorism suspects has also had negative consequences for the counterterrorism cooperation we depend upon. Attorney General Eric Holder said, "A number of countries have indicated that they will not cooperate with the United States in certain counterterrorism efforts — for instance, in providing evidence or extraditing suspects – if we intend to use that cooperation in pursuit of a military commission prosecution."[11]
AUMF-based military detention policies also continue to have negative ramifications. For example, the administration has stated that Guantanamo, which is based on AUMF authority, "plagues our bilateral and multilateral relationships, creates friction with governments whose nationals we detain, provides cover for regimes whose detention practices we oppose, and provides our enemies with a symbol used to foster anti-U.S. sentiments around the world."[12]
The choices made by Washington within an armed conflict framework are setting precedents that may harm our interests when used by other nations. John Brennan has said of drone use that the United States is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians." [13]
WHY NOT LIVE WITH THE EXISTING AUMF?
Many observers have suggested that, either because the existing AUMF has allowed for counterterrorism policies under which no massive attacks on the United States have been repeated, or because a polarized Congress in an election year is ill-suited to deliberate a new framework, the wisest course for the United States is to leave matters as they are. We disagree.
First, while concern over the AUMF's validity after withdrawal from the Afghanistan theater is real, the president retains sufficient authority to counter future threats from terrorism without the AUMF, as we lay out below.
With respect to detention, the president and Congress should not allow the issue of Guantanamo to carry forward what has now become the longest war in American history. There is a reasonable path forward to dealing with Guantanamo, and legal experts agree that detainees must be prosecuted or transferred at the end of active hostilities.
Second, the legal framework created by the AUMF is ill-fitting for the current threats we face and does not satisfy human rights advocates, the military, or counterterrorism professionals. Both liberals and conservatives have expressed concerns about the growing disconnect between the authorities and our actions. The further we get from 9/11, there is every reason to expect that the fit will grow more awkward, pushback from our partners sharper, and possibilities for abuse greater.
Finally, standing war authorities are not needed for effective counterterrorism policy, and in some instances prove distorting and counter-productive to keeping Americans safe.
THE UNITED STATES CAN EFFECTIVELY COUNTER TERRORISM WITHOUT IT
Counterterrorism and military leaders agree that a successful U.S. policy will rely far less on the use of force, especially large-scale military engagements and occupations, than was the case in the years immediately following 9/11. From former Afghanistan commanders saying "we can't bomb our way to victory" to recent media coverage of the difficulty the CIA is having transitioning away from wartime activities,[14] evidence is mounting that Congress and the administration have much work to do to strengthen a comprehensive approach which leverages economic, diplomatic and human resources as well as intelligence and military assets. Continued emphasis on war authorities and the activities that flow from them has resulted in under-development and under-resourcing of some elements of a 'whole-of-government' approach. The best counterterrorism policy for the post-post-9/11 era will put more resources into these core competencies, resources gained by getting away from the financial and human costs of the war paradigm.
Conditional Security Assistance: The best way to keep America safe is to help partners ensure that terrorist threats are defeated in the countries where they start. This entails strong, effective support for military, intelligence, law enforcement and the rule of law. But too often over the last decade, resources for civilian security assistance have been stretched too thin, while counterterrorism training in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia was carried out by contractors while the best U.S. counterterrorism troops were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sustainable Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law: Funding to support independent strong courts, police and local governments in countries facing the threat of terrorism has declined more sharply than military spending, while important parts of military assistance, such as vetting counterterrorism units for human rights abuse under the Leahy Law, remain grossly under-funded. The Leahy Law can also be used more robustly to resource and incentivize military justice in partner countries.
Counter Threat Finance as a Tool to Marginalize Extremists: Perhaps Washington's greatest counterterrorism innovation in the post 9/11 years, this approach is most effective when enforced multilaterally under U.S. leadership – which requires international support for U.S. approaches.
Maximize the Role of the Criminal Justice System: More than 500 individuals have been convicted of international terrorism charges in federal court since 9/11.[15]
Improve Effectiveness, Focus of Intelligence Community: Observers continue to report that the intelligence community's transition off a wartime footing is struggling and needs more emphasis from within and oversight from without.
CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In both his National Defense University (NDU) speech and the 2014 State of the Union Address, President Obama committed to moving the United States away from a permanent war footing, arguing that "We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us."[16] His administration has since taken concrete steps towards transparency, oversight, and reform in specific areas including the targeted killing program and domestic surveillance efforts, and reinvigorated efforts to reduce the detainee population at Guantanamo and close the detention facility permanently. Ending reliance on the AUMF and the policies that go with it is crucial to shifting United States counterterrorism policy off of a permanent war footing.
To that end, Human Rights First urges Congress and the administration to work together to develop shared understandings about the shifting nature of the threat posed by terrorism; the current uses of wartime authorities and what they have accomplished; and the framework of an effective, whole-of-government counterterrorism policy that keeps Americans safe while reassuring our citizens and the world that we remain committed to human rights, liberty, and personal freedoms for ourselves and others.
Recognize and clarify the shifting nature of threat
Al Qaeda is no longer the same organization in terms of capability, structure, capacity, or ambition that launched the September 11 attacks against the United States. Policymakers no longer frame the counterterrorism challenge as hunting down a specific group of individuals responsible for specific attacks or protracted troop deployments in the Middle East.
The Al Qaeda core leadership that threatened the United States in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks was the highly centralized critical node of a financial, ideological, and human capital terrorist network. This node has since been vastly reduced in terms of capability and influence. As then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said in 2012, "over the last few years, Al Qaeda's leadership ranks have been decimated. This includes the loss of four of Al Qaeda's five top leaders in the last two and a half years alone — Osama bin Laden, Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi."[17]
What has emerged in its wake is a complex web of groups, sharing at minimum an attraction to terrorist violence and a desire to trade on the Al Qaeda "brand." Some, such as al-Nusra, have explicitly sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda's core leadership and take direction from Bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri;[18] others appear to receive some training or financial support but limit their aims to internal or regional struggles, unlike Al Qaeda (Boko Haram appears to fit in this category);[19] and some have little or no operational connection or, as is the case of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq), have been thrown out of the Al Qaeda family."[20]
The AUMF categories of 9/11 perpetrators, supporters, or associated groups thus lack relevance to the current challenge. Specific groups, be they legitimate 'franchises' of Al Qaeda core or merely imitators, must be assessed individually on the basis of their capabilities and ambitions, which vary significantly.
It is misleading to characterize the rise of these other groups – connected in varying degrees or not at all to core Al Qaeda – as more or even equally dangerous to the United States. President Obama remarked that "in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves Al-Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States."[21]
Many pose an intense threat to their home governments and regional stability – in some cases American allies. Many, such as Boko Haram, ISIS, and al Nusra have carried out large-scale attacks on civilians. Their rise must not be a matter of indifference to Americans.
But that does not mean that a war footing – in legal terms, an armed conflict authorized by an AUMF – is the right policy response to most or all of them. It is simple logic that as Al Qaeda has changed, so must the U.S. response. By failing to recognize that many groups seeking to use the Al Qaeda label or connection for their own prestige do not constitute an imminent threat to the United States, we provide an overblown excuse to use far-reaching wartime policies that breed resentment in the international community and put our most fundamental rights and principles in jeopardy.
Enable intelligent debate by clarifying for Americans where our nation is using AUMF authorities and with what results
Discussion of where armed conflict authorities are or are not needed is greatly hampered by the fact that the American people and many members of Congress do not know basic facts about what operations are currently conducted under the AUMF, what other authorities are used to underpin uses of force, and what the results are. To gauge the costs and benefits of war authorities versus other authorities, enact new laws or repeal existing provisions, and conduct proper oversight, Congress must have this information. As noted above, transparency with the American people and the civilians around the world we aim to protect is essential to the long-term credibility of American counterterrorism policy and American leadership. Some members of Congress have made requests, offered amendments, filibustered bills to acquire pieces of this information. Such a piecemeal approach will not achieve the goal of making America safer and counterterrorism activities more sustainable: Coherence and a commitment to an articulated standard of transparency will make the drone strategy more defensible and effective.
To that end, Human Rights First recommends that Congress connect its action on the AUMF, and its funding for the use of lethal force outside active zones of hostilities, to the release of the following information:
A list of organizations or groups the United States considers itself to be at war with;
A list of organizations or groups the United States considers to be "associated forces;"
The specific laws and legal interpretations each U.S. government agency involved relies upon in its use of lethal force, within and outside of armed conflicts, including: a) An unclassified version of the Presidential Policy Guidance referenced by President Obama in his May 23, 2013 speech at the National Defense University[22] and b) all relevant Department of Justice legal memos;
Where, when and under what circumstances the United States believes it is using lethal targeting within an armed conflict, and where, when and under what circumstances it believes it is acting outside an armed conflict.
The countries where the United States has conducted targeted killings since September 11, 2001, and identities of all individuals killed, both in the past and going forward; how each U.S. agency involved determines who has been killed after a strike; how each agency classifies those killed as "civilian," "militant" or "combatant;" and summaries of all post-strike investigations, including who was killed, who was killed erroneously or constitutes "collateral damage" and whether and when apologies and/or compensation were provided for mistaken or collateral killings;
The criteria each U.S. agency involved (read: Department of Defense and CIA) uses to decide whom it may target with lethal force – that is, who constitutes a targetable member of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an "associated force;" what signatures are used to justify "signature strikes;" and what exactly constitutes an "imminent threat" that justifies lethal force;
An explanation of how each relevant U.S. agency decides that capture of a target is not feasible and therefore warrants the use of lethal force, and explanations going forward why capture was not feasible in each instance.
Elucidate a framework for effective post-armed conflict authorities
U.S. and international law provide a comprehensive framework within which the United States can apprehend, detain, interrogate, prosecute, and—if necessary—use lethal force against, terrorism suspects without relying on AUMF-based law of armed conflict authorities. That framework also pertains to intelligence-gathering, an issue which is not discussed here, although Washington will face the same pressures to align its espionage and surveillance activities more closely with its partners' understanding of international and domestic law, in order to retain support for its counterterrorism agenda abroad as well as at home.
Transfer, Arrest, and Pre-Trial Detention
In many cases, terrorism suspects will be arrested and prosecuted by foreign law enforcement and security officials, acting with the assistance of the United States government and broader international community. Accordingly, building partner nation capacity to deal with threats must be the focus of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy moving forward.
However, in some cases where the terrorism suspect is of particular interest to the United States, U.S. officials must act to effectuate the arrest, despite the fact that the suspect is located abroad and subject to foreign criminal jurisdiction.
In these cases, U.S. officials have authority to arrest terrorism suspects located abroad far before any terrorist attack has been committed or even planned. Several federal offenses apply extraterritorially, providing a basis for arresting individuals who have even limited connections to terrorist groups through providing training, money, logistical support, or other forms of assistance, irrespective of whether any terrorist attack has occurred.[23]
Terrorism suspects are often transferred to U.S. custody pursuant to extradition agreements or other formal procedures agreed upon by the United States and the country in which the suspect is located. In circumstances that require it, the military may effectuate capture, or assist U.S. law enforcement assets in apprehending and detaining terrorism suspects abroad.
While a terrorism suspect is in custody, nothing prevents government officials from interrogating that individual, and using any information secured for intelligence purposes. Some have warned that the Miranda requirement forces the government to tell the suspect that he may remain silent and is entitled to a lawyer, thereby compromising an ability to effectively interrogate the suspect. This is incorrect for a number of reasons.
First, in cases where there may be an ongoing terrorist threat, the public safety exception to Miranda would apply and government officials could interrogate the terrorism suspect and use the resulting information for any purpose, including prosecution, so long as the subject's statements are voluntary. Second, even where government agents elect to read a suspect the Miranda warnings, in the majority of cases the suspect waives his rights or otherwise cooperates to provide information to the agents.[24] Finally, Miranda violations occur, if at all, not at the point of interrogation, but only when and if the government attempts to introduce the "un-Mirandized" statements at the trial of the suspect. Therefore, government officials always retain the option of not reading a suspect the Miranda warnings and proceeding with an interrogation. The consequence of doing so is that government could use the information gained in such an interrogation for intelligence purposes, but not in a prosecution of the individual in question. The individual could still be prosecuted on the basis of other evidence, and even on the basis of subsequent interrogation by a "clean team" following Miranda warnings.[25] Intelligence gained through lawful interrogations and law enforcement interviews includes: Al Qaeda communication protocols, Al Qaeda recruiting techniques, information on Al Qaeda's finances, terrorist tradecraft used to avoid detection, information on Al Qaeda weapons programs and training, locations of Al Qaeda safe houses and training camps, information on Al Qaeda security protocols, identities of operatives involved in past and future planned attacks, and information about plots to attack U.S. targets.[26]
The United States retains substantial flexibility to prosecute terrorism suspects irrespective of the circumstances surrounding their initial capture and interrogation. More than 500 individuals have been prosecuted and convicted in federal courts for international terrorism-related offenses. In dozens of these cases, the defendants were initially apprehended abroad. A number of these cases involved substantial periods of pre-trial detention and interrogation, and in many cases cooperation has extended throughout the prosecution phase and into the post-conviction phase. One such case is that of Lackawanna Six defendant Yahya Goba, who pled guilty to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to 120 months in prison, but as part of his plea agreement, continued to provide information to aid the government investigation, even testifying as a government witness in several other cases.[27]
As noted above, military commissions have been a failure in every respect; they lack global credibility and have prolonged the wait for justice for victims. Recently, 23 senior retired military leaders called the military commissions "a poor substitute for justice."[28] To the degree that an end to wartime authorities require a move away from military commissions, this will not result in the loss of an effective tool for justice but rather will prompt reliance on the more credible and effective tools of our Federal court system.
Post-Conviction Detention
Likewise, 13 years' experience has not indicated a necessary role for wartime authority for post-conviction detention. Hundreds of individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses after 9/11 remain incarcerated in high-security U.S. prisons. According to Attorney General Holder, "Not one has ever escaped custody. No judicial district has suffered a retaliatory attack of any kind."[29] After serving their sentences, non-citizen U.S. terrorism suspects are subject to immediate post-conviction deportation and mandatory detention pending the conclusion of removal proceedings.
Lethal Targeting
The President has said that the number of instances in which lethal targeting is the chosen tool of counterterrorism should decline. Experts and military leaders have echoed this, for both moral and practical reasons.[30] In narrow circumstances in which a terrorism suspect poses an imminent threat to the lives of Americans that cannot be dealt with through detention or other means, the president retains the authority under domestic and international law to use force against such threats. Christine Wormuth, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, told Congress, "The President's authority as Commander in Chief provides sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging terrorism threats posed by organizations not covered by the 2001 AUMF."[31] As a matter of domestic law, Article II of the Constitution provides clear authority for such operations, and Congress can and should play a role in further regulating and ensuring transparency, oversight, and accountability over such uses of force.
As a matter of international law, uses of force in self-defense against groups that committed an armed attack against the United States are permitted under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.[32] Further, international human rights law permits using force when it is required to save lives and there is no other means to deal with a threat.[33]
The administration has made significant progress towards compliance with applicable international law in articulating through Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) criteria governing the use of lethal force outside of active zones of hostilities. However, important questions remain. The release, with appropriate redactions, of the underlying Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda, or other information pertaining to such lethal strikes is essential for Congress to make wise decisions about how the administration is defining key terms such as "imminence" and "feasibility of capture," whether those definitions are consistent with Article II and international law – and whether the administration is fully complying with the criteria that it has laid out.[34]
Reject Proposals to expand the AUMF's mandate.
The post-armed conflict framework outlined above is legally sustainable and provides operators with substantial discretion to investigate, detain, interrogate, prosecute, and—where necessary – use lethal force against terrorism suspects, irrespective of whether such individuals are connected to Al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks. By contrast, under the current AUMF, the government is only permitted to use law of war detention to detain individuals who are determined to be part of or substantially supporting Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force in hostilities against the United States. Where the individual does not have a strong connection to core Al Qaeda, hostilities in the Afghanistan war, or the 9/11 attacks, this is a difficult legal case to make.
The weakness of the AUMF once applied beyond individuals with clear links to core Al Qaeda or 9/11 has called into question law of war detention and military commission trials at Guantanamo, as well as lethal targeting operations outside of the Afghan war theater against individuals and groups that have no connection to the 9/11 attacks.
Noting these limitations, some have argued that Congress should pass a new AUMF to provide even broader wartime authorities to use the military to detain, prosecute, and target terrorism suspects. For example, one proposal would confer onto the Executive Branch authority to add groups to a list that would be covered by a new AUMF, even if such groups have not attacked the United States, and are not connected to core Al Qaeda, 9/11, or the conflict in Afghanistan.[35]
Congress should reject the idea of a new or expanded AUMF for three reasons:
We have little or no evidence that pre-emptive U.S. military action against groups that do not pose us an imminent threat is either desired by the American people or is an operationally-effective way of diminishing the long-term threat such groups do pose. Analysts have referred to groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, ISIS in Iraq, al-Nusra in Syria as "emerging threats." There is no question that these groups are violent, anti-Western, and enormous threats to human rights and stability where they operate. But where such groups have not shown explicit capability or intention to target the security of the United States, the military activities permitted under an AUMF are the wrong response.
An expanded AUMF directed at emerging terrorist threats would pose serious legal problems without conferring clear operational benefits. An AUMF encompassing groups that have not attacked the United States, or do not pose an imminent threat of attack, would not be consistent with international law. So-called "preemptive" uses of force against groups and individuals are not permitted under self-defense criteria.
Similarly, authorizing AUMF-based wartime authorities in situations involving terrorist groups beyond active zones of hostilities would not be consistent with the laws of war, which can only be applied in "armed conflict"—situations involving hostilities of sufficient intensity with organized armed groups. Although some groups, such as Boko Haram or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, pose a serious threat in areas in which they operate, the United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with these groups under the laws of war and thus an AUMF directed at these groups would not be appropriate.[36]
An AUMF directed at emerging threats also poses serious constitutional problems. Some have noted that an AUMF conferring authority to the Executive Branch to use force generally against emerging terrorist threats – without clear and specific limits – would run afoul of separation of powers principles, which require Congress to clearly define the scope of the authority conferred.[37] Similarly, providing to the Executive Branch authority to bring new groups within an AUMF could constitute a violation of the non-delegation doctrine because Congress would be unconstitutionally delegating authority that is committed by the Constitution to the Legislative Branch.
Finally, the value of an AUMF must be weighed against the risk of its use as a future blank check. The drafters of the 2001 AUMF have stressed that it is being used in ways they did not intend.[38] Nothing would prevent this or a future administration from using even a carefully crafted new AUMF to justify another large-scale invasion or costly war without further congressional debate or authorization.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH A NEW AUMF MAY BE APPROPRIATE
As noted, it is highly problematic as a matter of law and policy to expand the existing AUMF or pass a new one to target emerging terrorist threats that have not attacked the United States and do not pose an imminent threat of attack. Further, the United States has the authority under domestic and international law to use force to deal with imminent threats absent an AUMF. For these reasons, the administration has not requested additional AUMF authority and the president has indicated that he will not sign legislation that expands the AUMF's mandate.[39]
However, there are circumstances in which an AUMF would be an appropriate and lawful response to a threat. The clearest example would be if the United States was attacked on a large-scale and Congress and the president intended to engage in a prolonged and sustained military campaign, which rose to the level of armed conflict, against one or more responsible armed groups. History also provides examples of presidents choosing to act under imminent threat, and then come to Congress for authorization for an extended engagement. Congress has proven itself able to move quickly and supportively in such instances, and there is no reason to believe that has changed.
In addition, in some situations, the United States may choose to engage on a prolonged basis in an ongoing armed conflict even if the United States has not yet been attacked. For example, if the United States were to decide to engage in military attacks on a sustained basis in the ongoing armed conflict in Syria, it would be appropriate for the Executive Branch to secure an AUMF from Congress before doing so. Similarly, most experts agree that there is an ongoing armed conflict in Yemen, and though Human Rights First does not take a position on whether that conflict is wise, the Congress may choose to authorize the United States to engage alongside the Yemeni government in that armed conflict.
The work of protecting the United States from terrorist violence is far from done. Yet it is increasingly clear that, both for effective counterterrorism and for preserving U.S. stature as a leader on human rights and the rule of law, the 2001 AUMF and the wartime attitudes and policies it has facilitated are outdated. The domestic and international laws that built a strong wall between wartime and peacetime have a vital policy purpose; absent them, powers that were once extraordinary become the norm, and policies that are the hallmarks of dictatorships become associated with America. Congress and the administration have the opportunity to move beyond piecemeal attempts at reform to set a clear legal and policy framework that combats terrorism effectively and makes clear to our friends and enemies that we will not be goaded into eroding our national strength through a permanent state of war. Human Rights First supports this goal and looks forward to engaging in the hard work of elaborating specific legal and policy understandings on these vital questions.
[1] Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (2001).
[2] Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
[3] Karen DeYoung, Afghan War's Approaching End Throws Legal Status of Guantanamo Detainees into Doubt, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/afghan-wars-approaching-end-throws-legal-status-of-guantanamo-detainees-into-doubt/2013/10/18/758be516-2d0a-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html.
[4] Hon. Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., The Conflict Against
Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?, Speech Before the Oxford Union (Nov. 30,
2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/.
[5] Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2013), p. 3.
[6] Ann Scott Tyson, "Heavy Troop Deployments Are Called Major Risk," The Washington Post (Washington, D.C., United States), April 2, 2008, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-02/news/36851181_1_stryker-brigade-readiness-iraq-troop.
[7] George F. Kennan ("X"), The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Aff., July 1947, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23331/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.
[8] Pew has documented a marked decrease in global approval of the administration's international policy including drone strikes. See, e.g., Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted: Drone Strikes Widely Opposed, Pew Res. Global Attitudes Project (June 13, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slips-international-policies-faulted/.
[9] Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html.
[10] Holger Stark, Drone Killing Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange with US Intelligence, Spiegel Online Int'l (May 17, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,762873,00.html.
[11] Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Address at Northwestern University Law School (March 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
[12] White House Plan for Closing the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility (July 24, 2013), available at https://ia601005.us.archive.org/28/items/777815-white-house-plan-to-close-guantanamo/777815-white-house-plan-to-close-guantanamo.pdf.
[13] John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100.
[14] Kimberly Dozier, Exclusive: CIA Falls Back in Afghanistan, The Daily Beast (May 4, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/04/exclusive-cia-falls-back-in-afghanistan.html.
[15] Adam Serwer, Courts Can Win Terror Convictions After All, MSNBC (March 26, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/courts-can-win-terror-convictions-after-all.
[16] President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Nat'l Def. Univ. (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter NDU Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
[17] Kate Brannen, Leon Panetta: Al Qaeda's Leadership 'Decimated', Politico (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84131.html.
[18] Al-Nusra Commits to al-Qaida, Deny Iraq Branch 'Merger', Naharnet (April 10, 2013), http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/78961-al-nusra-commits-to-al-qaida-deny-iraq-branch-merger/.
[19] Michael Stothard, William Wallis & Javier Blas, West African Nations Pledge United Front against Boko Haram, Fin. Times, (May 19, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e1ffe30c-de92-11e3-9640-00144feabdc0.html#axzz325tbbJvU.
[20] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, head of ISIS, scoffed that "I have to choose between the rule of God and the rule of Al Zawahiri, and I choose the rule of God. See, e.g. Aryn Baker, Why Al-Qaeda Kicked out its Deadly Syria Franchise, Time (Feb. 3, 2014), http://time.com/#3469/why-al-qaeda-kicked-out-its-deadly-syria-franchise/.
[21] NDU Speech, supra note 16.
[23] See generally Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., 94-166, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf.
[24] Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: 2009 Update and Recent Developments 30, Human Rights First (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf.
[25] See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Hearing on Terror Suspect Explores Miranda Warning, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2011, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/nyregion/us-terror-hearing-explores-use-of-miranda-warning.html.
[26] See generally David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 1 (2011), available at http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf.
[27] Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in Federal Courts 118-19, Human Rights First (2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf.
[28] Letter from retired U.S. generals and admirals to Senators Richard Durbin and Ted Cruz, Chairman and Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee, Re: Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights Hearing on Closing Guantanamo: The National Security, Fiscal, and Human Rights Implications (July 24, 2013), available at https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Generic-RML-letter.pdfGTMO.pdf.
[29] Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Address at the Univ. of Cal. Berkeley School of Law Commencement (May 11, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130511.html.
[30] See generally Joshua Foust, Oversight for Effectiveness: A Counterterrorism Perspective on the Targeted Killings "White Paper", Nat'l Sec. Network (2013), available at http://nsnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/FOUST-Drone-Paper-022713-FINAL2.pdf.
[31] Advance Questions for Christine E. Wormuth, Nominee for the Position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, S. Armed Serv. Comm. (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wormuth_02-25-14.pdf.
[32] U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
[33] Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
[34] In active zones of hostilities where the United States may be using force to aid a foreign government in an armed conflict against a local group with terrorism-related ties, broader law-of-war based lethal targeting authorities would continue to apply.
[35] Robert Chesney, Jack Goldsmith, Matthew C. Waxman, & Benjamin Wittes, A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation Terrorist Threats, Hoover Inst. (2013), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/141271.
[36] Although an AUMF does not constitute a Declaration of War under domestic law and cannot create a state of armed conflict under international law, historically AUMFs have nonetheless constituted, in effect, war authorizations and signaled an intent to engage in armed conflict.
[37] Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, After the AUMF: A Response to Chesney, Goldsmith, Waxman, and Wittes, Lawfare (March 17, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/after-the-aumf/
[38] See Andrew Rosenthal, Op-Ed.,The Forever War, N.Y. Times Taking Note (May 17, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/the-forever-war/; Jack Goldsmith, Congress Must Figure Out What Our Government Is Doing In the Name of the AUMF, Lawfare (May 17, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/congress-must-figure-out-what-our-government-is-doing-in-the-name-of-the-aumf/.
-Counterterrorism
20 Years After 9/11: Rights-Based Policies for a New Era
2002 Iraq AUMF Repeal Provision in National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members: We, the undersigned, are a diverse group of organizations with a range of missions and perspectives from across the ideological…
Countering ISIL's Messaging
By Jordan Dannenberg Delegitimizing ISIL's ideology and messaging is a key pillar of the president's five-part strategy for "degrading and defeating" it. Last week, PBS's…
A Perilous Path: How Exceeding Term Limits Can Foster Violent Extremism
After the deadly attacks on hotels in Mali in November and Burkina Faso in January, neighboring Senegal is justifiably worried about the threat of violent extremism spilling over into…
A Resolution in 9/11 Trial Still Elusive Despite Best Efforts for Justice
By Julia McKay Last month, I traveled as an NGO observer to the US Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to watch the 37th pretrial hearing…
A Welcome Step Toward Clarity and Transparency by the New State Department Legal Advisor, but Speeches Aren't Enough
By Rita Siemion Last Friday, the new State Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan, gave a speech on "International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign" at the…
Abu Zubaydah Gets His PRB
This morning, a Gitmo detainee not seen in public since the CIA captured him in 2002 received his Periodic Review Board hearing. Abu Zubaydah, a 45-year-old Palestinian, has…
Administration Attempts to Win Congressional Support for ISIL AUMF
At yesterday's hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three top administration officials—Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and Chairman of…
Administration AUMF Fails to Include Sunset of 2001 Authorization
Washington, D.C. – Human Rights First today expressed disappointment that the Obama Administration's proposal for an authorization for the use of force (AUMF) against the Islamic…
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Washington, D.C. – As Members of Congress consider the administration's proposal to launch military strikes against Syria, Human Rights First today urged lawmakers to ensure…
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Washington, D.C.—Human Rights First today, urged President Trump to use congressionally-mandated reporting requirements as an opportunity to provide much-needed transparency on the United States' use of force…


Shunji Iwai's neo-classical romance, Love Letter, about the woman who wrote letters to her deceased lover and got responses back, is over 20 years old now since its release. However, its mark as a pop culture reference across Asia is undeniable. In its time, the film made actress Miho Nakayama a household name, and it launched Shunji Iwai's filmmaking career (and hence has given us: Ayumi Ito and Yu Aoi).
Just look at the members of -relatively new- Kpop group G-FRIEND, who played a round of movie quotes to decide who would be the host of that specific One Fine Day episode's segment (10 months after their debut). The group is formed by 6 young women, all who were born post-95. In fact, eldest member (and leader of the group), Sowon, was born almost 8 months after the release of Love Letter. But it is member Yuju ('97) who first references the movie with the knowledge of all the group.


text:
Cablegate: Staffdel Luse Visit to the Philippines
Wednesday, 29 August 2007, 11:12 pm
Ref: 07MANILA2931
DE RUEHML #2931/01 2412312
O 292312Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 6678
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0728
UNCLAS MANILA 002931
FOR STATE/EAP PINGENERI, SMARCIEL
FOR STATE/H PDIGGS
FOR ANE/EAA CDOWNEY, FDONOVAN
STATE PAS TO CEQ/LUGAR
TAGS: OREP AMGT ASEC AFIN ID RP CH MD
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL LUSE VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES
REF: STATE 104535
1. (U) Summary: Mr. Keith Luse, Senior Professional Staff, visited
the Philippines from August 14-18 as part of a three-nation Asian
visit that also included Indonesia and Mongolia. The purpose of Mr.
Luse's visit was to conduct a field-based study on bilateral U.S.
foreign assistance, and also gather information about the human
rights situation in the Philippines, particularly the issue of
extra-judicial killings. On foreign assistance, Mr. Luse met with
the full range of Embassy sections and staff involved with foreign
assistance, government counterparts, NGOs, private sector, and other
donors. On the issue of unlawful killings, Mr. Luse had a wide
range of meetings including with the Embassy, Philippine government,
police, military, and NGOs. Embassy Manila believes the visit was
very productive, with excellent opportunities for substantive
discussion on human rights issues and exposure to the strong
inter-agency approach to U.S. foreign assistance at Post. End
2. (U) Regarding U.S. bilateral assistance, Mr. Luse met on the USG
side with the Charge, the Acting DCM, and Country Team members. He
had in-depth discussions with USAID; the U.S. military (both the
Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, which manages U.S. support to
Philippine Defense Reform, and the Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines, the political section and regional security
office (which manage U.S. law enforcement and counterterrorism
assistance), Foreign Agricultural Service, and the USAID team
managing the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) Philippines
Threshold Program. On the Philippine government side, Mr. Luse met
with Senator Gordon (also Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross, a long-time U.S. partner in disaster assistance) and select
MCC counterparts, the Assistant Ombudsman, Department of Finance
Undersecretary, and the Finance Secretary. Among donors, Mr. Luse
had discussions with The World Bank Acting Country Director, the
Asian Development Bank Philippines Country Director and the
Alternate U.S. Executive Director. Among NGOs, Mr. Luse met with
The Asia Foundation and the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, both USAID implementing partners. A roundtable dinner
hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce gave Mr. Luse the
opportunity to hear from the private sector, with the companies such
as Ford, Chevron, and Bristol Myers represented.
3. (U) Highlights of the discussions included Embassy Manila's
communication of the strong inter-agency approach to U.S. assistance
in the Philippines (especially in Mindanao and on rule of law
issues) and program coherence with the foreign assistance strategic
framework and the transformation diplomacy goal. Embassy Manila's
integrated and transformational approach pre-dated -- but was
deepened by -- foreign assistance reform (the "F process"). The
private sector voiced concerns about corruption, smuggling, and
other challenges of doing business, but nonetheless said that
foreign investors could see good returns in the Philippines. Other
donors cited examples of productive coordination with the U.S., such
as on procurement reform and tax administration, and praised the
Philippine Development Forum (in which the U.S. is an active
participant) as a productive vehicle for more substantive
Philippines government-donor coordination and a "genuine agent for
change." A repeatedly expressed view by many with whom Mr. Luse
spoke was that, despite the Philippines' significant challenges,
especially in the areas of corruption and rule of law, the U.S. and
other donors are able to effectively support "islands of good
governance" (as characterized by the World Bank) and reform
champions in both government and civil society. Many, therefore,
expressed cautious optimism about prospects for progress in the
Philippines.
4. (U) On the issue of extra judicial killings, Mr. Luse had a wide
range of meetings with a diverse group including the Embassy,
Philippines government, police, Philippines military, and NGOs. His
discussions with Embassy staff (political section, regional security
office and others) and with The Asia Foundation and the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems addressed human
rights as well as foreign assistance issues. These NGOs said human
rights abuses were a serious concern and cited a weak judicial
system as a root cause. In the Philippines government, Mr. Luse met
with Senior State Prosecutor and Head of the Presidential Task Force
Against Media Harassment of the Philippine Department of Justice,
Undersecretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Deputy National
Security Adviser, and Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Mr. Luse also attended a briefing by the Philippine
National Police's "Task Force Usig," which is charged with
investigating human rights abuses. Mr. Luse clearly conveyed
rising U.S. Congressional concerns, along with those of NGOs and
church groups in the United States, and the increasing "perception,"
whether correct or not, that the Philippines was on a "downward"
trend in terms of the rule of law and human rights.
5. (SBU) In several meetings with senior Philippine officials, Luse
conveyed serious Congressional concern about extrajudicial killings
and explained that his trip was essentially a fact-finding visit to
learn first-hand about the issue. He added that he hoped to obtain
the Philippine government's perspective on the nature of the problem
and possible solutions. The Department of Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary asserted that the Philippine government took
extrajudicial killings seriously and had recently taken a number of
steps to address the issue, such as designating 99 special courts to
hear such cases and providing additional funding to the Commission
on Human Rights. However, the Undersecretary explained that the
killings did not occur in a vacuum, but resulted partly from the
Philippine government's concurrent fight against three insurgencies
(communist, Muslim, and terrorist). In addition, he claimed that
many of the killings were actually perpetrated by the Communist
National People's Army, which was currently purging its ranks of
disloyal members as it had done in previous years.
6. (SBU) The Philippine National Deputy Security Adviser's comments
closely followed Department of Foreign Affairs comments, heavily
emphasizing the role of the National People's Army in the killings.
However, he noted that to the extent the Philippine military was
involved, it was "rogue elements" within it, as the Melo Commission
had concluded. The Task Force Using Deputy Director provided Luse a
detailed briefing of its ongoing investigations into extrajudicial
killings. The Deputy Director underscored that Task Force Usig's
systematic evaluation of all the cases conveyed that many of the
killings claimed by human rights organizations were not politically
motivated, but the result of personal squabbles, armed conflict,
escape attempts, and many other non-political reasons. Luse was
grateful for the perspective he gained from the briefing and
requested that the Task Force continue regularly to brief Embassy
officials. The Philippine Department of Justice Prosecutor, who was
recently appointed to head the Presidential Task Force Against Media
Harassment, did not address extrajudicial killings in general but
instead focused on the case of a journalist who has been missing
since April. He alleged that members of the military could be
involved, but the investigation was as yet inconclusive.
7. (U) Mr. Luse was briefed about what the U.S. and other donors'
programs in the area of rule of law to address extrajudicial
killings, as well as corruption, narcotics, trafficking in persons,
terrorism, and other crimes. The State Department is working to
strengthen law enforcement capacity by assisting and training police
and prosecutors. USAID is supporting programs to improve the
efficiency of the Philippines' backlogged courts and increase access
to justice. The MCC Threshold Program focuses on supporting
government agencies (the Office of the Ombudsman and Bureau of
Internal Revenue) that investigate and prosecute corrupt officials,
tax evaders, and smugglers. The Joint U.S. Military Assistance
Group's support to Philippine Defense Reform is helping build a more
professional and accountable Philippine military. All are critical
and integrated components of a broader U.S. foreign assistance
effort that is seeking to transform the Philippines into a more
democratic, prosperous and stronger sustaining partner of the United
States. Mr. Luse's visit afforded excellent opportunities for
substantive discussions of these challenges and opportunities in the
Philippines and for U.S. bilateral assistance.
8. (U) Keith Luse cleared this cable. Kenney

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Q: Is this code correct to post strings from Xcode and post them to a mysql database using php I am trying to use Xcode textfields to post onto my mysql server. The issue is that i don't get errors in Xcode or php but the post never gets inserted into my mysql table. I know the url is right as well as the username and password and dbname etc. Here is my code when the submit button is pressed in Xcode:
NSString * post = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"message=test&name=%@", name.text];
NSData * postData = [post dataUsingEncoding:NSASCIIStringEncoding allowLossyConversion:YES];

NSMutableURLRequest * request = [[NSMutableURLRequest alloc] init] ;
[request setURL:[NSURL URLWithString:[NSString stringWithFormat:@"http://localhost:8888/Upload.php"]]]
[request setHTTPMethod:@"POST"];
[request setHTTPBody:postData];
NSURLConnection * conn = [[NSURLConnection alloc] initWithRequest:request delegate:self];
[conn start];

if (conn) NSLog(@"Connection Successful");

my php looks like this:
<?php
/*
Johnny
JUL, 2011
*/
    $DB_HostName = "localhost";
    $DB_Name = "test";
    $DB_User = "root";
    $DB_Pass = "root";
    $DB_Table = "test";

    $con = mysql_connect($DB_HostName,$DB_User,$DB_Pass) or die(mysql_error());
    mysql_select_db($DB_Name) or die(mysql_error());

    $name = $_POST["name"];
    $message = $_POST["message"];

    $query = "INSERT INTO Locations('name','message') VALUES('$name','$message')";

    mysql_query($query) or die(mysql_error("error"));

    mysql_close();
?>

Is there a way to test if my php file connects to my database?

A: This is some old code we use. (We have since updated to SQL Injection Prevention Techniques which I HIGHLY recommend you do!) Their are some differences I'm not 100% sure if that would fix your problem, but this code works.
Your problem may be your connection, I have never connected to a local DB server. Ive always had a DNS setup. We host through a website hosing company for our testing web service. So I have never done the http:// localhost:8888/ before and that may be where your problem lies.
I would try this first:
Try to connect to the web server (not the database) with your app and make sure you can actually connect. If you can connect then I would try my code below (double check that it properly updated your information in it). If that still doesn't work I would manually enter some data into your database and try and load it using SQL SELECT statement. If you don't have code for this message me and I can show you how to load data from a SQL Server parsing through JSON. (Sounds worse than it is.)
Once you get it up and running I would look into SQL Injection and updating your PHP to prevent it. SQL Injection prevention is not my area of expertise, but I would at least use PHP mysqli with prepared statements to protect your databases. Just google around a bit about SQL Injection Prevention.
Objective-C
NSString *post = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"message=test&name=%@", name.text];
NSString *removeSpaces = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%@", [post stringByAddingPercentEscapesUsingEncoding: NSUTF8StringEncoding]];
const char *urlUTF8 = [removeSpaces UTF8String];
NSString *postBody = [NSString stringWithUTF8String:urlUTF8];

NSData *postData = [postBody dataUsingEncoding:NSASCIIStringEncoding allowLossyConversion:YES];

NSString *postDataLength = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%d", [postData length]];

NSMutableURLRequest *request = [[NSMutableURLRequest alloc] init];
[request setURL:[NSURL URLWithString:[NSString stringWithFormat:@"http://localhost:8888/Upload.php"]]];

[request setHTTPMethod:@"POST"];
[request setValue:postLength forHTTPHeaderField:@"Content-Length"];
[request setValue:@"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" forHTTPHeaderField:@"Content-Type"];
[request setHTTPBody:postData];

PHP

$DB_HostName = "localhost";
$DB_Name = "dbname";  //Depending on your server setup you may need to use  'sqlname_dbname'
$DB_User = "username";  //Depending on your server setup you may need to use  'sqlname_username'
$DB_Pass = "password";  //Depending on your server setup you may need to use  'sqlname_password'

$con = mysql_connect($DB_HostName,$DB_User,$DB_Pass) or die(mysql_error());
if (!$con)
  {
    die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
  }
mysql_select_db($DB_Name,$con) or die(mysql_error());

if (isset ($_POST["name"])) {
    $name = $_POST["name"];
} else {
    $name = "N/A";
}
    //
    if (isset ($_POST["message"])) {
    $message = $_POST["message"];
} else {
    $message = "N/A";
}

$sql = "INSERT INTO Locations ('name','message') VALUES ('$name','$message') ";
$res = mysql_query($sql,$con) or die(mysql_error());

--Mike

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


So here you are! You have worked on and completed your own laser-tight analytic business plan and you think you're all set up to drive forward into a sun-shining future…. And then there always seems to be yet another hurdle to overcome. This is the heart and soul of the young, start-up business; especially if you are trying to push the boundaries and deliver innovation in your industry.
Your business plan will (we REALLY hope) detail how you will act on your business opportunity. However, in the start-up company environment "the only constant is change" and that throws up seemingly endless new hurdles and challenges to overcome. It is how you deal with these hurdles on a profesisonal and personal level that will set you apart from your competitors and see your business succeed or fail. How can you do this?
Don't let your passion for what you want to do blind you from reality. It is easy to side-step (or at worst ignore) the issues that may fundamentally affect your core business proposition especially if you don't have experience dealing with them. Get them out on the table early on – be honest with yourself and others – it will save enormous grief in the long term. If any issues are serious enough to affect your core business you should review your financial assumptions to see how they affect your forecast going forward.
No-one has the answers to all the questions that they will be faced with in starting a business. The art is to recognise your limitations and ask the right questions of the right people. Where you have weaknesses build a network of support (professional, informal, non-executive) and use it to overcome problems as they arise. You don't have to know everything, you just have to know where to find the information that will enable you to make the best decision. Budgeting in your business plan for the cost of periodic advice is wise at least on a contingency level.
When you come across a hurdle deal with it thoroughly and without exception. It is a threat to your success and that of your business. If you don't it will likely come back and cause you problems in the long term. A number of relatively small un-addressed problems can drain the business and pull it down. Executing a business plan relies on the ability to deliver success amidst change. The way you deal with issues as they arise conveys a message to your employees, investors, and partners. If you deal with issues openly, professionally and ruthlessly you will gain their respect even if your business plan is not achieved in full.
This is your guide to keep you on track. It is the straight rod to remind you of your CORE business. Ignore the shiny lights and trinckets, when distracted, revisit The Plan!
However also remember that it is NOT inflexible, far from it. Revise the plan as necessary when (notice this is WHEN not IF!) your original assumptions are challenged.
In the business decision making process, face up to the hard issues, ask for advice and be a cut throat professional throughout it all.


text:
Mohammad Ridwan Hafiedz or Ridho (born September 3, 1973, Ambon, Indonesia) is an Indonesian guitarist, backing vocalist and songwriter. He is best known as Slank's rhythm guitarist and back vocalist along with another lead guitarist, Abdee Negara. With Slank, Ridho has created nine studio albums and three live albums, also one compilation album which was released in May 2006.

Early life
Ridho was born and raised in a Muslim family from Ambon, Indonesia. His musical background is considered active back when he was in middle school as he started to play guitar since year 7.

Career

Pre-Slank career
As mentioned above, Ridho started to play guitar when he was in year 7, with Jimi Hendrix and The Beatles as his idols. His experience in the music industry began when he formed a band called LFM in 1991, just six years before he joined Slank. After he finished his formal education, he went to Hollywood, United States, to study music at Musicians Institute to gain his musical tertiary education.

Slank
In 1996, three from five of the members of Slank left the band. The problem arose from the drug addictions of Bimbim (drummer) and Kaka (lead vocalist). However, Slank chose to rise and recruited new members to revitalize Slank, that was when three new members were introduced; Abdee, Ivan, and of course, Ridho. Currently Ridho spends his time conducting guitar clinics, teaching students, and running his guitar company.

Music

Style
Ridho's musical style has given a big contribution to Slank's style, rock and blues. Since his idols are Jimi Hendrix and The Beatles, no wonder that he has such of blues influences.

Equipment
 Marlique Ridho Hafiedz Model
 Valhala Amp
Ridho has his own guitar model, the Marlique Ridho, which is made and designed in Indonesia.

Discography
 Tujuh (1997)
 Mata Hati Reformasi (1998)
 Konser Piss 30 Kota (1998)
 999 + 09 Biru (1999)
 999 + 09 Abu Abu (1999)
 De Bestnya Slank (2000)
 Ngangkang (2000)
 Virus (2001)
 Virus Roadshow (2002)
 Satu Satu (2003)
 Bajakan (2003)
 P.L.U.R (2004)
 Slankissme (2005)
 Since 1983 - Malaysia Edition (2006)

Personal life
He was married Ony Serojawati at August 25, 2001. His children are Marco Maliq Hafiedz, Omar Hakeem Hafiedz, and Stella Aisha Hafiedz.

See also
 Slank

Footnotes

External links
Official Slank website
Official Marlique Guitars website

1973 births
Indonesian guitarists
Living people
People from Ambon, Maluku
21st-century guitarists

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
TVNZ News & Sport Search Engine Optimisation
Awards: RSVP Craft Best Use of Search Engine Marketing Winner
Entrant: SureFire Search
Nominee: TVNZ
Entrant Credits: Nick Guebhard, Mark Sceats
Nominee Credits: Tom Cotter, Tim Aitken, Sarah Pritchett
In order to improve organic search rankings, particularly for news, sports and the online video, TVNZ took the opportunity to ensure that SEO was an integral aspect of a website design and build, rather than a retro-fitted afterthought. The upgraded version of its website, tvnz.co.nz, was launched on 17 December 2008.
The SEO campaign SureFire devised and executed for TVNZ ensured significant increases in traffic. A key element of this growth was driven by organic search traffic, which is now TVNZ's single biggest source of website visitors.


Looking for furniture contractors in Pune?
Redoing your home and need new furniture, cabinets, wardrobes, or a remodel involving wood? If you are looking to hire the right furniture contractor in Pune, there are a few ways to be able to get the best work out of the contractor you hire.
Carpentry can often involve intricate and very skilled work, so you want to always ensure that you do your homework thoroughly and find someone who not only has talent but a few other important attributes to make your project a true success. However, to be able to get the best work possible from your furniture contractor, keep these tricks in mind.
While it is best to always have 2-3 options before you finalise on the furniture contractor you eventually hire, it is a good idea to ask your furniture decorator in Pune to recommend their preferred team. Not only will this help create flawless communication between the decorator and the carpenters, your designer can give you further reassurance for quality of work, respect for timelines and finishing finesse of the work.
There are two kinds of contracts that furniture contractors prefer. One is a fixed rate contract, wherein the contractor charges a lump-sum amount for completion of project in various stages and handles material plus labour. The other kind of contract is based on labour rate wherein the contractor charges only for the work done and you can buy the material yourself with the help of your furniture contractor in Pune. Pick a contract that works best for you and your project based on your comfort level. Make sure that there are no hidden costs, as these can skew with your budget. Ask for a detailed quote and agree to pay as decided, until and unless the project requires some changes on-the-spot because of technical reasons, as this can change the expenses as well.
If you have chosen to hire a furniture contractor in Pune who also sources the material, make sure you check the material. Every home owner needs to be vigilant about the quality of materials, as they greatly affect the finished quality of your new woodwork. Also, ask for actual bills so you can gauge for yourself what kind of material was bought, how much of it was used, and if there were some unnecessary wastage in the project. You can question your furniture contractor when the numbers don't match and withhold payments until you get clarity.


Will it be glory for Ore?
October 21, 2016, 10:30 a.m.
Following his tens from the judges, Ore Oduba is challenging Danny Mac for viewers' affections as we enter the show's fifth weekend, the latest YouGov Strictly tracker reveals.
The BBC Sport presenter is now the contestant viewers are rooting for, with almost a third (32%) of those with an opinion saying he is the dancer they most want to win. This is a seismic turnaround as the previous week this figure stood at just 7%. With one routine, Ore has leapfrogged Danny Mac, Louise Redknapp, Judge Rinder, Claudia Fragapane and Greg Rutherford in viewers' appreciation.
His jive has also landed him in second spot when viewers are asked about who they think is most likely to win. Almost one in three (32%) of those with an opinion think he has the best chance of prevailing, meaning he is in touching distance of leader Danny Mac (35%). Again, this is an impressive turnaround for the presenter as last week just 3% believed he would lift the glitterball trophy.
The research suggests that a number of contestants could be in line to go home this weekend. Anastacia is bottom of the table when viewers are asked to consider who they would most like to win. For the same question, Claudia Fragapane has seen her support decrease by more than half – down from 9% to 4% among viewers with an opinion.
It could also be a troubling weekend for Greg Rutherford, Lesley Joseph and Ed Balls. All three have 1% support (or less) when viewers with an opinion are asked to choose the competition's likely winner. Naga Munchetty left the competition after securing 1% support in the question in YouGov's poll last week.


text:
Just Dance 3 set list
by mvern78 | Aug 23, 2011 | Default, News, PlayStation 3, Wii, Xbox 360 | 0 comments
Ubisoft is burning up the dance floor with the Just Dance franchise lining up some great new songs and a number of classics dance tunes. Don't take our word for it – go look at the set list yourself it includes 80's classics from A-ha and Bananarama, some 90's dance beats from the Chemical Brothers and Daft Punk and instant classics like Cee Lo Green's (the clean version) "Forget you".
Just Dance 3 will include updated game play and a number of new game features. For example: songs that feature 4-part choreographies, Dance mashup mode, create their own unique choreographies with the JUST CREATE, Just Dance choreographies. But wait that's not all – all tracks will provide on-screen lyrics to karaoke with the hits while dancing. Don't you worry Dance fans Just Dance 3 still has everyone's favourite dance modes like Classic Mode, Duet Mode, Medley, Simon Says, an updated Just Sweat mode with more workout plans, and more!
Tracks available in Just Dance 3 include:
1. 2 Unlimited – "No Limit"
2. a-ha – "Take On Me"
3. Anja – "Dance All Nite"
4. Bananarama – "Venus"
5. Black Eyed Peas – "Pump It"
6. Bollywood Rainbow – "Kurio ko uddah le jana"
7. Cee Lo Green – "Forget You"
8. Countdown Mix Masters – "Beautiful Liar"
9. Daft Punk – "Da Funk"
10. Danny Elfman – "This is Halloween"
11. Donna Summer – "I Feel Love"
12. Dr. Creole – "Baby Zouk"
13. Duck Sauce – "Barbra Streisand"
14. Girls Aloud – "Jump (For My Love)"
15. Groove Century – "Boogie Wonderland"
16. Gwen Stefani – "What You Waiting For"
17. Inspector Marceau – "The Master Blaster"
18. Janelle Monae – "Tightrope (Solo Version)"
19. Jessie J featuring B.o.B – "Price Tag"
20. Brahms by Just Dance Classical Orchestra – "Hungarian Dance No. 5"
21. Katy Perry featuring Snoop Dogg – "California Gurls"
22. Kiss – "I Was Made For Lovin' You"
23. Konshens – "Jamaican Dance"
24. African Ladies – "Pata Pata"
25. Latino Sunset – "Mamasita"
26. Laura Bell Bundy – "Giddy On Up (Giddy On Out)"
27. Lena Meyer-Landrut – "Satellite"
28. LMFAO featuring Lauren Bennett and GoonRock – "Party Rock Anthem"
29. Madness – "Night Boat To Cairo"
30. MIKA – "Lollipop"
31. Nelly Furtado featuring Timbaland – "Promiscuous"
32. Pointer Sisters – "I'm So Excited"
33. Queen – "Crazy Little Thing Called Love"
34. Reggaeton Explosion – "Boom"
35. Rita Mitsouko – "Marcia Baila"
36. Robbie Williams and Nicole Kidman – "Somethin' Stupid"
37. Scissor Sisters – "I Don't Feel Like Dancin'"
38. Sweat Invaders – "Gonna Make You Sweat (Everybody Dance Now)"
39. Taio Cruz – "Dynamite"
40. The Buggles – "Video Killed The Radio Star"
41. The Chemical Brothers – "Hey Boy Hey Girl"
42. The Girly Team – "Baby One More Time"
43. The London Theatre Orchestra & Cast – "Think"
44. The Sugarhill Gang – "Apache (Jump On It)"
45. Tommy Sparks – "She's Got Me Dancing"
46. Wilson Pickett – "Land of 1000 Dances"
Just Dance 3 will be released worldwide on October 11.


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Broward Public School Teachers Getting RaisesThe Broward School Board held a special session on Friday and approved a proposed pay raises for teachers.
FSU Wants Judge To Toss Potential Class-Action Lawsuit Seeking Refunds For Students
By CBSMiami.com Team September 1, 2021 at 12:56 pm
Filed Under:Coronavirus, Florida State University, Local TV, Miami News
TALLAHASSEE (CBSMiami/NSF) – Florida State University is asking a federal judge to toss out a potential class-action lawsuit seeking refunds for students who were forced to learn remotely in spring 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The lawsuit, filed on behalf of FSU law student Harrison Broer, is one of numerous similar cases filed against colleges and universities in Florida and other states. What FSU attorneys described as a "flood of litigation" spurred Florida lawmakers to pass legislation this spring to try to shield schools from such lawsuits.
READ MORE: Broward Public School Teachers Getting Raises
The Broer case, initially filed in May in Leon County circuit court and moved this month to federal court, contends that students should receive partial refunds of tuition and fees because the FSU campus shut down in March 2020 and classes were shifted online.
In part, the lawsuit alleges that FSU breached contracts with students, who had paid money expecting on-campus classes and services.
But in a motion to dismiss the lawsuit Friday, the university's attorneys disputed that an "enforceable written contract" existed between Broer and the school. Without such a contract, the motion said, the university is shielded from a breach-of-contract claim because of sovereign immunity, which helps protect government entities from lawsuits.
"There is no contract between plaintiff and FSU — let alone an express contract — thereby dictating dismissal of plaintiff's breach of contract claim based upon sovereign immunity," the motion said.
But in an amended version of the lawsuit filed July 30, Broer's attorneys said FSU students entered into "express" contracts with the university through a series of steps, including submitting applications, accepting offers of admission, registering for classes and paying tuition and fees.
"The scope of the agreement between plaintiff and defendants was formed throughout the application process, admission, enrollment, registration and payment — including through all the documents and materials shared and agreed to during those processes. … By enrolling in courses and paying his fees for tuition and other services for the spring 2020 semester, plaintiff provided consideration for and accepted the regulations and policies established by defendants and governing fees for tuition and other services," the lawsuit said.
But FSU attorneys, in last week's motion to dismiss, said a "hodgepodge of documents patched together, none of which singularly, or in the whole, amount to an express contract, do not promise plaintiff the refund he seeks."
The lawsuit also raises other arguments, including that the university has violated what is known as the "takings clause" of the U.S. Constitution. FSU attorneys pointed to the federal constitutional question in shifting the case early this month from state court to federal court in Tallahassee.
U.S. District Judge Allen Winsor has scheduled a June 2022 trial in the dispute, though that could be short-circuited if he agrees with the university's motion to dismiss the case. The lawsuit does not specify an amount of refunds sought for FSU students.
The legislation passed this spring by state lawmakers and signed by Gov. Ron DeSantis provided liability protections for public and private universities and colleges for actions taken because of COVID-19.
The legislation took effect July 1, and Broer's attorneys wrote that any attempt to use it in the lawsuit would be an unconstitutional impairment of an existing contract. The university's attorneys did not focus heavily on the new law in the motion to dismiss, though they wrote that "retrospective-looking language of the statute indicates that the law was meant to apply retroactively to the COVID-19 emergency period."
In the lawsuit, Broer's attorneys wrote that there is "no question" classroom learning is more valuable to students than online learning and that FSU students were deprived of "the opportunity, services and experiences for which they paid" after the campus shut down.
"Rather than offer partial refunds, credits or discounts to students like plaintiff and members of the proposed class and balance the financial difficulties associated with COVID-19, defendants have instead elected to place the financial burden entirely upon its students by charging them full fees for tuition and other services when the services FSU provided were not the full educational and on-campus opportunities, experiences and services that plaintiffs and members of the proposed class agreed to and reasonably expected," the lawsuit said.
MORE NEWS: 'This Is A Disaster': Rain Caused Partial Ceiling Collapse At Fort Lauderdale Apartment
But in the motion to dismiss, the university's attorneys wrote that payment of "student fees is not a 'pay as you go,' 'fee for service' model as plaintiff would have this court believe. Moreover, while FSU is sympathetic to all of its students for the many interruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, no provision of the Florida statutes guarantee students a seamless in-person instructional experience, nor has plaintiff attached or cited any document explicitly guaranteeing such an experience."
CBSMiami.com Team
More from CBSMiami.com Team
Code Red Lockdown South Plantation High


Ameren Illinois Division Director Jason Klein (left) hands the keys to a 2009 Ford F-550 bucket truck to Bethalto Mayor Alan Winslow. Tim Brown (right) Building and Zoning Administrator, reached out to Ameren Illinois to request the donation of a truck.
BETHALTO | Ameren Illinois presented Mayor Alan Winslow with the keys to a 37-foot aerial bucket truck the utility is donating to the village. The Ford F-550 Super Duty model was recently retired from the Ameren Illinois fleet after nine years in service.
Ameren Illinois has nearly 3,300 vehicles including trucks, trailers and equipment. Vehicles that are being rotated out of the fleet and require minimal repairs or refurbishing can be made available for donation to a municipality or community organization. Last year, Ameren Illinois donated six vehicles to entities in Central and Southern Illinois.
"Village leaders reached out to us and indicated that they had a need," said Jason Klein, director of division operations. "We're glad to keep this reliable heavy-duty vehicle in service for the people of Bethalto."
Bethalto will use the truck for tree-trimming, light pole maintenance and general maintenance around the community. The truck is especially useful for projects that require workers to safely reach heights.


The decades that followed the war and rebuilding were to be decades of expansion: Röhlig became a trusted airfreight forwarder, proved itself as a transport logistics expert for international turnkey projects and pursued new and distant trading destinations all over the world.
Oscar Herwig was the fourth generation of the family to join the company. He and his partner Hans Schackow were fundamental in establishing a worldwide presence in the 1960s and 1970s. During this time, Röhlig profited from two crucial factors: the economic growth in Western Germany and the advancement of the jet airplane.
Once again, the company seized opportunities and continued to open new doors. Parallel to expanding the sea freight forwarding business, Röhlig extended trading with international air freight as their second major division - this resulted in further world- wide expansion.
As the business prospered, Röhlig's leadership changed hands. In 1985, Thomas W. Herwig successfully moved into the role of managing partner, with the clear goal from the outset to preserve Röhlig's independence as a family-owned business.
The 1980s and 1990s were characterized by progressive, dynamic growth. Röhlig founded additional branches worldwide and entered a strategic alliance with Gebrüder Weiss, Austria's market leader for general cargo. The geographical expansion was also reflected through profitability for the first time in its history: Röhlig returned gross profits of more than DM 100 million.
Today, the company is a global enterprise with a greater diversity of employee skills than ever before - managed from Bremen, but at home in almost every corner of the world.


Enforcing your rights in a courtroom can be expensive: in addition to money for the lawyer, you must take into account the administrative costs (which can go from a few dozen up to over one thousand euro) and any technical consultancy fees.If the citizen is not able to bear these expenses, the State intervenes withlegal aid.
In order to apply for legal aid, you must have an income of no more than 10,766.33 euros (the last Irpef declaration is authentic).If you live with your spouse and / or other family members, apart from specific cases, the income considered is that of the entire family unit.For civil trials, the application must be submitted to the secretariat of the council of the Bar Association, which is located inside the Courthouse.As for the competent office, it is the one where the judge who oversees the process is located.
Forms pre-printed to make the application are available in the lawyers' secretariats.The application must be signed and delivered by attaching a photocopy of the identity document.Within ten days from the filing of the application, the Council of the Bar Association must communicate the acceptance or the refusal of the request to the applicant.If the request is rejected, the possibility remains of asking the question directly to the judge who will take care of the trial.Once admitted to legal aid, it is possible to appoint a lawyer, choosing it from among the members of the relative list of lawyers.


text:
Scholar wins European Fellowship
Derrick Roberts wins one of Europe's most competitive and prestigious awards to do postdoctoral research.
A Gates Cambridge Scholar has been awarded a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions research fellowship to pursue research on healing from chronic wounds.
Derrick Roberts has won one of Europe's most competitive and prestigious awards to undertake a postdoctoral position at the Karolinska Institutet in Sweden from 2017.
He will be working with Professor Molly Stevens, one of the foremost biomedical engineers in the UK in the area of regenerative medicine. His project will centre on developing new dynamically-responsive hydrogels for accelerated healing in chronic wounds.
The Fellowship programme is named after the double Nobel Prize winning Polish-French scientist known for her work on radioactivity, and supports researchers at all stages of their careers, irrespective of nationality. It is aimed at fostering interdisciplinary research and international collaborations.
The MSCA research fellowship is the European Union funding programme with the broadest reach across the research community. There are opportunities at every career stage, from masters degree students to professors. The programme funds all disciplines and has a strong track record of industry participation.
Derrick [2012] is completing a PhD in Chemistry focused on self-assembled molecular containers and their uses in nanotechnology. During his time at Cambridge, he has published several papers in peer review journals and won second place in the 2015 Association of British Turkish Academics Doctoral Researcher Awards.
As part of his PhD research programme, Derrick has been taking part in a £500K EPSRC-funded project to investigate synthetic protein-like molecules for better understanding cystic fibrosis, and potentially develop a treatment regime for this devastating disease.